RĀJADHARMA

(Dewan Bahadur K. Krishnaswami Row Lectures,
University of Madras)

BY

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THE ADYAR LIBRARY, ADYAR

1941
TO

DHARMĀTMA

PANDIT MADAN MOHAN MALAVIYAJI

IN VENERATION AND AFFECTION
PREFATORY NOTE

In the scheme of work outlined for the Library is the publication of a number of unpublished Dharmasāstra works, whose importance and rarity justify their inclusion in the Adyar Library Series. An important Digest of Hindu Law of the so-called “South India School,” the Vyavahāranirṇaya, which is older than the famous Parāśara-Mādhaviya, and probably older than the Smrṭicandrikā of Devaṇaṭa Bhaṭṭa, is ready for release as one of our Series. Another work which is on the anvil is the Kestava-Vaijayantī the famous bhasya on the ancient Viṣṇusmrṭi. Both these are being edited by Rao Bahadur, Professor K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar, Vidyāvācaspati, Dharmaṭṛthasāstraratnākara, whose pioneer works on Ancient Indian Polity and Economic Thought are well-known to students of Hindu social institutions. He has now completed for another well-known series a reconstruction of the long-lost law-book of Bṛhaspati, after many years of strenuous investigation. We are promised in the same series under his editorship, the first five volumes of Lakṣmīdhara’s Kṛtya-Kalpataru, the oldest extant digest of Dharmasāstrā and they are to be followed by the remaining nine volumes of this great dharma-nibandha. These undertakings are the result of studies
pursued by Professor Rangaswami Aiyangar in the scanty leisure of a busy official life.

By a fortunate circumstance, he selected as the theme of his lectures in the Dewan Bahadur K. Krishnaswami Row Foundation of the University of Madras some important aspects of Dharmasāstra. To these lectures, which were delivered in 1937, he gave the title of Rajadharma. The title might suggest one more study of ancient Indian polity, a subject which has had a great vogue in Indian and Foreign universities since the publication of the Arthasastra of Kautilya in 1909. In reality it is a prolegomena to Dharmasastra in which, among other matters, the inter-relations and canonical validity of both Arthasastra and Dharmasastra are explained and elucidated. In the early British Indian judicial administration the study of Dharmasastra had an attraction to lawyers and orientalists, which has steadily waned with the growth of Indian case-law and its supersession of smṛti law. Its popularity has now gone to Arthasastra. The two are now usually regarded as rivals and not as complementing each other. Academic criticism professes to see in them differences of aim, outlook, method and origin. It is significant, as pointed out in one of his ‘Notes’ by Professor Rangaswami Aiyangar, that even living repositories of traditional Sanskrit scholarship silently acquiesce in the view that Arthasastra is a body of secular knowledge, and on that hypothesis deduce a conclusion of its inferior authority as compared with Dharmasastra.
Such a view is one of many instances of the obscuration, even to paññīts of our day, of correct positions in regard to those two sāstras. Scholars whose approach to these has been in a spirit of contempt for traditional methods of study, and who, in violation of the spirit of the historic method, which they profess to follow, omit to take note of the mental and spiritual background of Hindu social thought, carry the process of obscuration further. We encounter accordingly in modern studies of ancient Hindu society a mass of doctrine for which scientific validity is claimed and conceded on grounds which a more balanced study might challenge.

A familiar instance of the trend is to be seen in the usual acceptance of Rajadharma as state-craft in the narrow sense in which it seems conceived by writers like Kāmandaka. The traditional conception of the term equated it with the whole corpus of Dharma. In the epic, when in answer to an interlocutor, a sage begins to expound Rajadharma, he deals not with constitutional and political matters alone but with the whole of Dharma. Seen in this perspective many conclusions which are now readily accepted in regard to our social thought will need revision. Professor Rangaswami Aiyangar has deliberately chosen the challenging title to draw attention to the patent harm done by omitting to recognise this traditional view. He illustrated the point by citing many instances when he delivered the lectures now published. These have now been amplified and expanded so as to
furnish to the reader adequate material for judging of the validity of the positions taken by the lecturer, and are embodied in a series of very condensed essays or articles, amounting to more than a hundred-and-eighty, which are modestly designated as 'Notes.' Even a cursory perusal of their titles in the list of contents will disclose their importance as well as their range, variety and interest. The 'Notes' form as important a part of the book as the text. Attention may be drawn also to the classified index, which may be useful to students. It is the work of a member of our staff, Mr. A. N. Krishna Aiyangar, M.A., L.T., Joint Editor of our Bulletin.

The scheme of publication which the Adyar Library has laid down provides for the publication of lectures like those now introduced. Our obligation to Professor Rangaswami Aiyangar, who has so freely been collaborating with us, is all the greater since he has given the Adyar Library all rights both in the lectures on Rājadharma now published and in other works which he is editing for the Library. To meet the convenience of readers of Sanskrit unfamiliar with Nāgarī script, he has given at considerable labour the many Sanskrit texts he has cited in the 'Notes' in Roman. It is hoped that this will enable a larger body of readers to examine the citations than would be possible if Nāgarī had been employed for their presentation.

The Adyar Library
1st July, 1941

G. SRINIVASA MURTI,
Honorary Director
PREFACE

In the renaissance of Indian studies, which is a feature of our day, a branch which has not come to its own is Dharmasāstra. Even among its special students divergent views as to its character, scope, content, source, authority and affiliations are not uncommon. This is due neither to lack of material nor to lack of intensive study. Though only a small fraction of the vast literature of Dharmasāstra has been printed and a still smaller fraction is available in translations, virtually all the great commentaries and digests that have survived eight centuries of alien and frequently hostile rule, are now available in one or other of our great manuscript collections.

Dharmasāstra was a living subject down to the threshold of the nineteenth century. It was assiduously cultivated at the great centres of Hindu learning and digests were written as late as the accession of Queen Victoria. For a generation or two afterwards, proximate utility drew lawyers and judges to the intensive study of one section of it, viz. vyavahāra. A mild interest has since then been evinced by students of ritual in the other two sections, viz., ācara and prāyasācita.
Legalist enthusiasm for *Dharmasāstra* rapidly waned with the growth of case-law and the ever-widening rift between the traditional Hindu law and the judge-made law of the British Indian courts. If and when the proposal under consideration to codify Hindu Law (on the basis obviously of judicial decisions and reformist advocacy) becomes *fait accompli*, the little interest which survives among professional men will vanish completely.

The contingency need not, however, cause misgiving. *Vyavahāra* doctrines have suffered greatly from specious reasoning and distortion in the interest of litigants and from their pursuit in the twilight of half-knowledge. If *Dharmasāstra* continues to hold an attraction, it will be chiefly to students of history, who will turn to it for the light it will throw on the institutions and ideals, the life and thought of an age remote from their own. It will also count as a disciplinary study in the Universities. Its liability to distortion will not disappear altogether. To read the present into the past is a foible to which historians are liable. The political use of history consists in the past forming an arsenal from which weapons for present strife may be drawn. History is not immune from interested falsification or from erroneous conclusions due to religious or political bias. These risks will have to be faced by *Dharmasāstra* also. But, as in the case of history, the margin of error can be reduced by the diffusion of high ideals of truth and accuracy and, as in the physical sciences which use laboratory methods
of investigation, by the provision of safeguards or 'controls.'

An aim of the lectures now printed was to evoke and stimulate interest in a branch of study which was regarded for ages as of paramount importance for the upkeep of the social order. Other aims were to illustrate its use to the student of Indian history and sociology, to define its position among kindred studies, and to vindicate the value of the traditional method of approach to it, the neglect of which has been the fertile source of numerous dubious conclusions now in circulation. An attempt was also made to demonstrate by examples the importance of securing, as a condition precedent to its study, a correct perception of the philosophic background of Hindu life and thought. Sir Henry Maine, whose masterly studies of Roman and Celtic law, vindicated the value of the historic method, made many plausible and invalid generalisations when he dealt with Hindu jurisprudence. His errors sprang not from any defect of the historic method but from his conspicuous drift from that method in the case of Hindu Law, when he read into its authors motives and purposes as well as beliefs of his day, and showed inability to avoid bias due to a sense of racial and religious superiority. It is natural but regrettable that the authority justly attaching to his name is still securing the currency of many erratic views for which justification will be difficult to find. It is still more a matter for regret that with far less excuse than Maine, who wrote from a cursory perusal of English translations of
a few *smythas* and digests and without access in the
originals to the major digests, commentaries and *smythas*,
modern writers, who enjoy these advantages, repeat or
add to Maine's erroneous statements. Few modern
books on Hindu ethics, for instance, are free, whether
composed in a spirit of apology or appreciation or of
hostile criticism, from statements which wider know-
ledge of *Dharmasāstra* and its study, not apart from
but side by side with cognate subjects, might have
prevented. In the Hindu view of life, aims, ideals and
activities were not divided up and considered as in-
dependent of one another. There was no distinction
between things secular and things religious: the dis-
tinction would have been unintelligible to the ancient
Hindu. Society was viewed as indivisible, except for
distribution of duties and obligations. On the equi-
poise of duties duly discharged, whether of indivi-
duals, classes or functionaries, was held to depend the
harmony not only of a particular state or community
but of the entire universe. Life was a *continuum*, not
interrupted by death, and so were deed and thought.
With such beliefs, to look into only one specialised
subject like *Arthasāstra* or *Dharmasāstra*, for a final
interpretation of the meaning of any rule of life or
institution, was to ask to be misled. This is why error
pursues the heels of one who would study a section
of *Dharmasāstra* (*e.g.*, *vyavahāra*) to the exclusion of
the others, or study *Dharmasāstra* and *Arthasāstra*
apart and as if they were not cognate and inter-
dependant. Specialisation has its limitations. We
might acquire knowledge of the histology and anatomy of Hindu society, and miss all knowledge of its physiology and psychology.

In earlier studies, some of which go back to 1914, it was my endeavour to indicate some of the devices which the traditional method of education and transmission of knowledge from generation to generation in the "bookless ages," provided for a correct comprehension of the Hindu ideals of life. The present lectures illustrate the uses of the traditional approach to the study of Dharmasāstra and Arthasāstra, and the unwisdom of ignoring or rejecting, in the special conditions in which Indian learning was conserved, valuable oral tradition and its late record in books.

The designation of lectures on some aspects of Dharmasāstra as Rājadharma requires in the conditions of our day an explanation which would have been superfluous to the old Hindu. Today we, under the obsessions of political studies, regard Rājadharma as king-craft or polity. This meaning was not unknown in the past but the wider sense of the term was in general use. The distinction involves what may be regarded as a "constitutional" issue. Among personal and functional obligations those which lay upon the head of society (e.g. Rājā) hinged round his duty to maintain each person in his duty or Dharma. The king's Dharma, Rājadharma, was thus the sum of the knowledge of all particular duties, i.e. the whole Dharma, Dharmasāstra. The new knowledge springing from the Arthasāstra has been used to support views
which reverse the relations of the ancient Hindu king and his society. The wider sense of the term would have automatically corrected the tendency were it understood. The idea was so familiar to the old-time Hindu that it entered into the fabric of ordinary literature. For instance, addressing Rāma, Lakṣmana is made by Bhavabhūti to say:

"Dharmaṇprākṛṣyamāṇo vā goptā Dharmaṣya vā bhavaṁ"

(Mahāvīra-carita, V, s'1. 30)
The king is the subject as well as the protector of Dharma.

The form of a lecture precludes the inclusion of citations of authority. The lectures now printed contain on every page statements which run counter to received opinion. During oral delivery such explanations as seemed from the nature of the audience to be called for were given on the spot. When the lectures are printed and addressed to a wider circle, it has become necessary to supply the material on which readers might judge for themselves of the validity of the reasoning or conclusions advanced in the lectures, instead of accepting them without examination. The need is met by the addition of the "Notes" at the end of the lectures (pp. 66-216). I have endeavoured to keep down their number and to condense them as far as possible consistently with clearness. In several 'Notes' the argument has been developed and carried a stage further than in the text. For understanding the points of view of the lectures the 'Notes' are very necessary. It is hoped
that they will prove of interest and of some use to students of Dharmasāstra.

The lectures were composed for oral delivery early in 1938. The University of Madras had no funds for their publication. I am indebted to the authorities of the Adyar Library and particularly to its erudite Director, Vaidyaratna, Captain G. Srinivasamurti for not only taking over the publication first through the Bulletin of the Library and then independently, but for the freedom given me in regard to the number and length of the 'Notes.' I am also indebted to the Joint Editor of the Brahmavidyā, Mr. A. N. Krishna Aiyangar, M.A., L. T., for seeing the book through the press and for providing an index of unusual fulness and clarity. My obligation is great to Mr. C. Subbarayudu, the Manager of the Vasanta Press, for his patience in overlooking the submission of numerous proofs, necessitated by the use, for the convenience of readers in Europe and America, of diacritically marked Roman type for passages in Sanskrit, and for the care with which the work has been done.

The printing of the book was begun in May 1939. As both Mr. Krishna Aiyangar and I became soon after engrossed in the task of organising an Oriental Institute at Tirupati and continued in the work till September 1940, a long interval between the commencement and the completion of the printing has become unavoidable.

_Vasumativilas,_
Rangachari Road,  
Mylapore, 5th July, 1941  
K. V. Rangaswami
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RĀJADHARMA

(DEWAN BAHADUR K. KRISHNASWAMI ROW
LECTURES)¹

I

A FEW months ago I received an invitation from the Syndicate of the University of Madras inviting me to give the initial lectures on a foundation bearing the name of the late Dewan Bahadur K. Krishnaswami Row. The lectures were to be based on personal investigations, and to bear on ancient Indian culture. My hands were then quite full with work. The distance between Kāśī and Madras, and the difficulty of getting away from the University, in which it is now my privilege to serve, in a period full of work, tended to add to my reluctance. But it was overcome on three considerations. The desire of one's alma mater is, in the Hindu sense, alan-
ghaniya—not to be set aside; the gentleman, whose name was borne by the lectureship was one for whom I had come to entertain affection and veneration; and the foundation seemed to be the first in the University, definitely marked for the advancement of a knowledge of ancient Indian culture, a subject which had yet to come to its own in Indian Universities. At present there is only one university in India—that at Benares—in which it is possible for a student to take a degree after a full course in this important branch. When teaching and

¹ Delivered on the 4th and 5th March, 1938.
research were accepted some years ago as *primary* obligations by the transformed provincial universities of India, a provision was made for the study of Indian history and archaeology in a few of them. In Madras, where even the retention of the study of the history of the mother-country as *one* of several subjects forming an *optional* group, in the degree course, was secured only after long struggles, the first chair to be instituted was that of Indian History and Archaeology, now limited by a convention to South India. Valuable additions have been made by instructors and research pupils to many branches of Indian history, political and cultural. But they have been due to the wide extension given by teachers to the scope of their duties. For instance, some recent additions to the literature of Indian polity and social structure have been made in the University of Bombay in the School of Sociology. With the exception of my colleague in Benares¹ who presides with distinction over our department of Ancient Indian History and Culture, only one other university professor in India—the Carmichael Professor in Calcutta University—derives his designation from this branch. But, in Calcutta there is no provision for the group in the ordinary and honours courses leading to the B.A. degree, though it can be offered by a candidate for the M.A. degree. In the University of Bombay a candidate can indeed offer it in the M.A. examination, but the provision is infructuous as neither the University nor the constituent Colleges offer any help to students in securing the antecedent knowledge, or provide post-graduate teaching in it. In the Benares Hindu University alone has the vision of its founders and supporters made, from its beginning, provision in all the degree courses for the teaching of ancient Indian history including the history of Indian

¹ Dr. A. S. Altekar M.A., LL.B., D.Litt.
literature, art, religion, and social and political institutions. The involuntary self-denial of so many Universities of India in this respect has not contributed to a correct perception of many present-day problems, which like most questions of the day, have their roots in the past. It is the feeling that it would not be right to refuse co-operation in any effort to revive the study of this important branch of study that has been the most powerful force impelling me to accept the invitation, in response to which it is my privilege to address today an audience in my old University. I trust that it will not be regarded as presumptuous, or as an abuse of hospitality, if I venture to express the hope that in the many admirable developments which are now taking place in a University, which can claim to be the mother of four other universities, provision will be made, hereafter atleast, for the adequate and continuous study of Indian culture in every stage of the courses of study leading to the M.A. degree.

It is now some years since Mr. Krishnaswami Row passed away.¹ His work was done in fields which do not come much into public view. His career was remarkable. Born in 1845, he turned to the study of English after a course of vernacular education, and passed the Matriculation examination in 1864 from the Presidency College. He had not the advantage of College education. But, when he had attained eminence, he was nominated a member of the University Senate and held the position for many years. He began his long official career as a clerk in the district court of an out-station. Without academic training in law, he rose to the position of a subordinate judge in Madras and of the chief judge in Travancore, and won a name as a very sound lawyer.

¹February, 1923.
and judge. After holding the highest judicial office in Travancore for over fifteen years, he was placed at the head of its administration by the Maharaja, a shrewd judge of men, devoted to the interests of his subjects. He held the office of Dewan with distinction for over the full term of five years. After his retirement in 1904, and till almost the last day of his life he took part in the chief public movements of the province. He was thorough in whatever he did. The reputation for efficiency, acuteness, balance and integrity, which he made even when he stood on the lower rungs of the official ladder, he kept throughout a long life. He was firmly rooted in a belief in the verities of his ancestral religion and dharma, and was inflexible in his adherence to them. To know him was to respect him. The commemoration of his name in a University, in which as a student he stood outside the portals, is a fitting recognition of a life devoted to culture and service. It is an honour to be brought into association with anything which bears his name.

"Indian culture," even when limited by the adjective "ancient," is a term of Atlantean extension. The wealth of themes in so wide a range is an embarrassment to one who has to make an initial choice, and perhaps to start a tradition. The selection of "Rajadharma," in the wide sense in which it is accepted in Indian tradition, is due, among other considerations to the desire to round off a series of studies, which were begun by me thirty years ago, and which have been pursued in moments of leisure snatched from daily avocation. In 1914 when I was honoured with an invitation like the present, to give the inaugural lecture on the foundation named after Dr. S. Subrahmanya Aiyar, the most venerated Indian of the day in our province, I gave the first fruits
of studies of ancient Indian polity. The attempt partook the character of a pioneer enterprise, as the *locus classicus* for all study of Indian polity, namely the *Arthasastra* of Kauṭilya had been published only five years previously inspite of its existence having been suspected very much earlier by Weber and Aufrecht. I next turned to ancient Indian economic theory and practice and gave the results of my study of them in ordinary lectures delivered before the University, and later on under the Maṅindra Foundation in the Benares Hindu University. When my official harness was shed in 1934, an invitation from the University of Calcutta to be a Special Reader enabled me to follow up the implications of our wide literature of *Arthasastra* and *Dharmasastra* on the social and schematic side. It is my purpose today to submit some reflections on the character, scope, progress and content of the Indian literature of *Dharma* as a prolegomenon to the study of an important branch of literature, which has influenced for centuries the life of the people of India, and whose force is still not spent. Many of the opinions to which expression is now given have been formed in the course of an examination of cardinal works in this branch which I am editing. It might be useful if it is made clear at the very beginning, that the aim of the lectures is not to attempt another resume of Indian political theory. The subject is worked out and there is little that one can hope to add to the data already collected. A stray interpretation, that may be new, will not justify a mere summary of accessible information. The source literature of ancient Indian polity is not large, judged by what has survived. Kauṭilya’s book towers over the rest like a Himalayan peak. The works of Kāmandaka, Somadeva, Hemacandra, Bhoja and Somesvara, along with the dubious
works bearing famous ‘epic’ names like those of the opposed sages, Bṛhaspati and S’ukra, and Vaisampāyana, virtually exhaust the number. Every inch of this small field has been subjected to the investigator’s spade. He who aspires here-after to add to our knowledge must discover another Kauṭi-
liya. The prospect is not hopeful.

The subject has, however, attained remarkable popularity. The feeling which the \textit{Arthasāstra} created at first was a mixture of admiration and consternation. A tendency arose to view the old pun in the name ‘Kauṭilya,’ as fitly describing the author of unethical and tortuous policies. More thorough study of the \textit{Arthasāstra} in relation to its environment changed the earlier view. Kauṭilya’s memory was then not only vindicated; he had a narrow escape from political canonisation. He has been gravely cited in legislative bodies, state papers and discussions of public policy, and his authority has been invoked—not always in defence of “emergency finance” or the necessity of espionage. The \textit{Arthasāstra} has been translated into several languages and is not regarded as needing to be bowdlerised before it can be prescribed for academic study. The exhumation of the old unsavoury reputation is now barred. It is \textit{res judicata}. The innocuous “Kauṭalya” is now welcomed as the correct form of his name, and it has replaced the suggestive “Kauṭilya”. The \textit{Arthasāstra} has the merit of being self-contained, and of exhibiting the working of a master-mind, like Aristotle’s. To the statesman and administrator, it holds a different attraction. Its opinions have entered into the fibre of Indian political thought and life. The statesman, like the physician, believes in inherited tolerance to certain remedies, and selects only those which the system will not reject. Institutions and ideas are more readily
accepted and assimilated when they fit in with inherited aptitude and tradition than otherwise. The doctrine of the unity and continuity of history gains from the belief that the past survives in the present, like the immortal protoplasm. It offers a fresh inducement to the study of institutional and cultural origins. Reformers, who have to contend against mass inertia or opposition, are strengthened by the discovery of an ancient ancestry for their ideas. Though the sources of ancient Indian polity have been worked threadbare, they will continue to attract men of affairs so long as there is belief in their utility.

This might please those who take a pride in national literature, but the satisfaction will not be un-alloyed. For a proper comprehension of our ancient life and thought not only Arthasastra but the bigger literature of Dharma-sūtra is needed. The former has been examined pretty thoroughly. The latter still awaits close study. The tendency has grown to view Dharma-sūtra as subsidiary to Arthasastra, and indiscriminate use has been made of citations from the former to support or to confirm the doctrines of the latter, and this has been frequently done without reference to context. The attitude reverses the traditional view of the relative position of the two. Barring the sections styled Rājanīti or Rājadharma in the Epics and Purāṇas, as well as in the Smṛtis, which are regarded of value on account of their political content, and the sections which deal with the principles and rules governing the law of persons and property (vyavahāra), Dharma-sūtra are rejected or ignored as ‘priestly twaddle.’ But, politics and civil law form by no means the whole or even the major part of Dharma-sūtra; nor were they regarded by old writers of acumen, possessing a
sense of proportion and reality, as the most important. Otherwise, there is no meaning in writers, who display a subtlety and robustness of mind comparable to that of the best lawyers of our age or any other (e.g. Vijñanesvara, Lakṣmīdhara, Jīmūtavāhana, or Mādhava or Raghunandana) spending themselves on the elaboration of the parts of Dharmasūtra, which are now rejected as useless.

This selective or differential treatment is largely the result of a historical accident. The early British administrators suddenly found their desks in the counting houses turned into the chairs of judges and magistrates. They had to govern people who were governed by personal laws, set forth in treatises written in languages which Europeans did not understand. The penal law, of the country, except in small islands of Hindu government, not submerged in the Muhammadan inundation, was Muhammadan and was based on the Koran and traditions. Warren Hastings, who had no compunction in enforcing a law which made forgery a capital offence, was outraged when he heard the sentence of a Kazi of Chittagong, which was in strict accord with Muhammadan Law, on certain persons guilty of robbery and violence. The substitution of a penal law from Europe for the laws of the two great communities was the first step in British administration, and the process was hastened by the Supreme Court. Another step was taken when the civil law relating to person and property (vyavahāra) was taken up for translation. Halhed translated from a Persian version the Sanskrit digest of vyavahāra made to the order of the Governor-General. A more satisfactory work was demanded by Hindu opinion, and it was supplied by Jagannatha’s nibandha on vyavahāra, still

1 Founded in 1774.
unprinted, of which a part was translated in 1797, and is known as ‘Colebrooke’s Digest.’

Other translations of legal works, like the vyavahāra section of the Mitākṣara and the Mayūkha, the Dāyabhāga of Jīmūtavāhana, the Dāyakramasaṅgraha of Śrī Kṛṣṇa, and two well known treatises on the law of adoption followed. ‘manuals of ‘Hindu Law,’ for the guidance of judges and lawyers ignorant of Sanskrit, were also compiled by Strange, Wilson and Macnaughten. Since their time, the addition to this branch of modern legal literature has been considerable, and has been largely due to the growth of case-law. In spite of increasing dependence on judicial decisions in the interpretation of Hindu law and usage, the desire for the study of treatises on vyavahāra, either in Sanskrit or in translations, did not sensibly diminish, mainly because the Bench began to be strengthened by the appointment of judges to whom the texts and local and caste usage held an appeal. Recently there was a mild flutter when an Indian member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council made citations in Sanskrit in a judgment which he pronounced.

Apart from the question of proximate utility, the selection of the vyavahāra content of Dharmasāstra for study is also due to the assumption that it alone dealt with the “secular” as contrasted with the “religious” aspects of Hindu life and activity. Such a division of the life of the Hindu is not however correct. Hindu thought does not recognise the distinction. Secular and religious considerations are inextricably interwoven in Hindu motives and actions. This feature is reflected in Dharmasāstra. Legal capacity is held to rest on

1 The Right Honorable Sir Shadilal P. C.
spiritual. Legal competence can be affected by ceremonial impurity, by the commission or the omission of particular religious duties, and by their performance at proper and improper moments. This is why the treatment of āsauca (impurity arising from birth or death) and kālanirṇaya (determination of the proper time for doing prescribed things) occupies so large a space in Hindu legal literature. Some of the old rules may be argued as still operative. So critical a writer as Jimūtavāhana found it necessary to write, besides his two books on inheritance (Dāyabhāga) and procedure (Vyavahāra-matrīkā) a much larger treatise on the “determination of suitable time” (Kālaviveka,) and Mādhavacārya also wrote a Kālanirṇaya. In old Indian criminal law, as in other archaic penal law, spiritual and secular punishments were intermixed. An offence was treated as both a sin and a crime. Much misunderstanding of the supposed one-sided and unfair discrimination in the award of punishments on a caste-basis is due to a failure to visualise that every offence had two sentences, both of which were usually operative. In a sceptical age like ours the sentence of a spiritual authority and the imposition of even an exacting penance or rite of expiation will be regarded as light in comparison with imprisonment, banishment or death, while mere refusal to admit a person even to the right of expiation, as a penalty for the gravest offences, will be viewed as virtually letting an offender off. But it is not right to interpret the beliefs and usages of one age by those of another. When life was viewed as continuous, and as extending over both ante-natal and post-mortem time, and when the idea that an unexpiated offence entailed very grave consequences in a future existence was implicitly accepted, the deterrent effect of a denial of the right of expiation must have been very powerful. Civil status and competence was
held to be affected adversely by unfulfilled penance or purification, or by some defect in an enjoined ceremony or sacrament. This is why the treatment of sacraments (samskāra), purification (suddhi) and expiatory rites (prāyascitta) occupies such an important place in Dharmasāstra. The so-called ‘Brahman immunities’ should be judged in relation to this attitude. Kauṭilya, who does not hesitate, when considering the punishment of treason against the state, to over-ride the smṛti rule that a Brahman cannot be put to death, denies even maintenance to the apostate, with an exception in favour of the mother alone, because apostacy placed one beyond the pale of redemption by purificatory rites.

The assumption of a secular, as distinguished from a religious division in Indian legal and political literature is responsible for the magnification, in modern times, of Arthasāstra, supposed to represent the realistic and secular, as contrasted with Dharmasāstra reflecting the idealistic and religious element. The assumption of the origin of Arthasāstra from a secular source is opposed to Indian tradition, which attributes a semi-divine, or at least an inspired source to it. It was counted in smṛtis among the sources of law, to which judicial recognition was due. Judges and assessors (sabhyāḥ) were to be expert in both Arthasāstra was included either under Atharva-veda, or Itihāsa, described as the fifth Veda, or was counted by itself as a sixth Veda. The implication of this picturesque statement is that it had the authority, which any body of doctrine claiming to be a Veda will have, and yet, not being of the strict Vedic corpus, it was available, like the Epics and Purāṇas and the sciences and arts (silpa, kalā) placed under the fifth and sixth categories, to women and to men of the unregenerate castes (Sūdrāntyajāḥ) for
study. This feature made it very acceptable in periods in which, contrary to tradition and rule, thrones were occupied by non-Kṣatriyas and by women, and a considerable section of the population left the Brähman fold to accept Buddhism and Jainism, which were outside the pale for denying the authority of the Veda.

The 'secular' character of Arthasāstra is another assumption which can be justified neither by its content nor context. Arthasāstra shared the same beliefs as Dharmasāstra. Its toleration of heresy was not new. Even before the days of Kauṭilya the Buddhist Sangha had become powerful. Under Asoka and his successors the heterodox position was further strengthened. Both Asoka and his successor Dasaratha patronised even the Ājivakas, who were atheists. Manu refers to associations of heretics, whose usages must be upheld for their own members. The heretic might be a nuisance but an administrator could not ignore his existence in society, especially when he had a powerful following. This is why in Rājaniti, beginning with Kauṭilya, it is laid down that a king, in granting audience, should give preference to heretics, magicians, learned Brahmans and destitute women. Heterodoxy was often believed to possess a mystic power which was the source of its confidence. The rule is thus merely one of prudence. The recommendation of Kauṭilya that the philosophies to be included in royal studies should include Ānvīṣikī, the Sāmkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata, is coupled with the injunction that they should be learnt only from teachers of proved orthodoxy. Yājñavalkya, like Manu, recognises the customs of heretics (pāṣandāh), and the reference must be to the Buddhists. This is proof of the spirit of comprehension in Dharmasāstra, of which another is the theory that it included Arthasāstra. Manu's impatience
with those who followed *Artha* and *Kāma*, is not a condemnation of the subjects which dealt with them, but was aimed against those addicted to the excessive pursuit of wealth and pleasure. It is not open to infer from the existence, from Mauryan times, of separate courts for the trial of criminal and civil causes that the differentiation reflected a distinction between secular and religious law, for the matters were adjudicated on in both types of tribunal. Criminal jurisprudence was also assigned a divine origin, and Daṇḍa (the Spirit of Punishment) was held to have been divinely created. Differences between rules of *Dharmasāstra* and *Arthasāstra* are neither more numerous nor wider than those within each, according to different writers. From the postulates that all knowledge is ultimately based on eternal verity (*Veda*) and that apparent differences or conflict, merely indicate options, (*vikalpa*) it follows that the differences between the two *sāstras* must be viewed as capable of explanation and reconciliation. Revealed knowledge must be self-consistent. There cannot therefore be any real conflict between *Arthasāstra* and *Dharmasāstra*. The hypothesis of divine origin invested both with the qualities of universality, consistency and permanence. It is inconsistent with belief in God’s omniscience to presume that circumstances and contingencies, which arise from age to age, or differ place to place, are not foreseen and provided for in literature which springs from Divinity. One’s inability to find a unifying principle between apparent opposites does not mean that such a principle does not exist and is not discoverable. Generalisations of this type paved the way for wide interpretation, and for the evolution of a science compounded of equity, logic, psychology, grammar and rhetoric, to which the name *Mīmāṃsā* came to be given. The rules of *Mīmāṃsā*, which later on underwent systematisation, are not un (like) like those
evolved in western law in regard to the interpretation of statute law, but they follow as corollaries from the premises of Hindu religion. First designed for Vedic exegesis, their application to Dharmasāstra and Arthasāstra compelled their further elaboration and consolidation as a coherent body of doctrine. The two subjects to which interpretation applied benefited from it, particularly Dharmasāstra; for it survived, superseded and absorbed Arthasāstra. The latter, which had enjoyed a vogue in and before the days of Kauṭilya and had been cultivated in many schools, ceased to command the old weight after the foundation of the powerful empire of the Mauryas and their successors. Its derivation from Sruti made it as unacceptable to the Buddhist as the Smṛti. In the Brahmanical reaction under the S’ungas, Bhārasivas and Vākāṭakas in North, and under the S’ātavāhanas and Pallavas in South India, an impatience of compromise was born. In the revision of Dharmasāstra and of epic literature made in the epoch, the Arthasāstra core of smṛtis was strengthened so well that Arthasāstra ceased to have an independent existence. Arthasāstra works adapted themselves to the changed milieu. Kāmandaka’s Nītisāra, which claims to be based on Kauṭilya’s work, adopts, like the smṛti, the sloka as the medium of expression. It rivals Manusmṛti in magnifying the power and position of the king. It omits the entire field of administration and law, leaving them to works like Manu’s. It elaborates the technique of foreign relations, involving the mutual relations of rulers (Rāja-maṇḍala) and interests, forming groups ranging in number from sixteen to three-hundred-and-sixty. It stresses only those features of its original as were acceptable to the Brahman reaction. The difference between Kauṭilya and Kāmandaka is that between one who saw a great empire rise on the foundations of a number of small states, and
of one who witnessed the daily struggles and the shifting alliances of a number of precarious principalities. Later works, like those of Somadeva and Hemacandra, reflect the steady political decline, of which we have evidence in history.

The Nītivākyamṛta of Somadeva is more a literary experiment than an original essay on politics. He reproduced in pithy sentences the words of Kauṭilya, but not the spirit. That was not to be expected. Temperamentally, the Mauryan king-maker and the pacific Jain ascetic were poles apart. The subject-matter of Somadeva’s little book is more closely related to Kāmandaka’s work than to Kāmandaka’s famous original. Hemacandra’s Lagu-arhan-nīti is more an imitation of the popular summary of smṛti rules (e.g. the Smṛṭisangraha) than a contribution to Arthasastra. Civil law is its chief topic. It reproduces the matter in digests, but without a reference to the ultimate and paramount authority of the Veda. Somadeva’s book is taken up with moral maxims. It could have little use to an administrator. Hemacandra’s book might have been used in a Jain kingdom, like that of Kumārapāla, but it is, at its best, a poor substitute for the works of Hemacandra’s contemporaries Vijñānesvara and Lakṣmidhara. The aim of the Jain monk and polyhistor was to establish his claim to all-round learning and not to add sensibly to the literature of polity or law. The literature of Rājadharmā, contained in the later digests more properly belongs to Dharmasastra.

There is another reason for the imperfect comprehension of the scope of Dharmasastra and its content. It consists in the misunderstanding of the small quantum of “worldly” matter in smṛtis, particularly in those of the earlier and later
times, and its absence in many of them. On the other hand, there are smṛtis of the middle period (fifth to eighth century A.D.), which omit everything but the "civil law". Nārada-smṛti is an example. The lost works of S'ankha-likhita, Hārīta (prose), Kātyāyana and Bṛhaspati seem to have had a large "civil law" content. The works of Manu and Yājñavalkya are comprehensive, and of the two, the latter, though very closely related in doctrine and attitude to Arthasastra (perhaps even to Kauṭilya's work) is relatively sketchy on politics. Parāśarasmṛti, which commends itself as the one pre-eminently indicated for the present age, is pre-occupied with ācāra and prāyāscitta and ignores law and politics completely. Is it to be inferred that the subjects were regarded as of no value to the present age? The core of purely legal matter, in the modern sense, in the Dharmasūtras of Gautama, Āpastamba, Bodhāyana, Vasiṣṭha and Viṣṇu is thin, and forms in each work but a small proportion of the total. Lost verse smṛtis like those of Yama, Vyāsa and others, seem to have dealt with both sides, but it is impossible in their present fragmentary condition to guess the relative proportions of the two sections in their original state. The usual explanation is that the different proportions reflect the secular or unsecular bias of the writers. The sūtras and later smṛtis are supposed to have been preoccupied with religion and ceremonial, a few only dealing with "law", under the influence of Arthasastra. The later smṛtis belong roughly to the same age as Kāmanḍaka. If, under the influence of Arthasastra, they devoted themselves to legal questions to the exclusion of religious and half-religious-topics, it is remarkable that Kāmanḍaka, who was deliberately modelling his book on Kauṭilya's Arthasastra, should completely ignore civil law and administration, which form a glory of his original, though even in it, the
sections dealing with law proper form but a small part of the whole. Kāmandaka's omissions should therefore be explained, like that of Somadeva, on the ground that he assumed the prevalent civil codes like those of Nārada. The theory of bias must accordingly fail. An efficient cause may also be found in the literary form of smṛti literature of the earlier epoch, and the methods in vogue for the transmission of doctrine. The older smṛtis are not only in prose but in aphoristic prose (sūtra), devised for memorising and for economy. A sūtra was not intended to be read. The aphorisms would usually be unintelligible to the uninitiated. The purpose of aphorisms was to act as sign-posts, and keep the real exposition to the track. It was so in Buddhist as in Brahmanic literature. The sloka, which came in to vogue later on was in some respects as useful. Its rhythm enabled it to stick to the memory, and it was more intelligible than a sūtra. But it lacked brevity, on which much store was set. In the earliest epochs of Vedic study, the Kalpasūtra would be taught in the school of the branch (śākha) of a particular Veda, and the traditional explanation would be handed down in the school. It would not be reduced to writing but be available for recitation in class. The paramount value of the teachings of the Buddha and the belief that the Suttas (sūtras) of the Tripiṭaka reproduced his actual words, made the early Buddhists arrange for recitations of Suttas in the annual gatherings of the Sangha. No similar compelling motive was present in the case of Dharmasūstras, which did not always form part of the Kalpasūtra of any particular Vedic school. Their commentaries were handed down from teacher to pupil, and ran the risk of becoming lost, when those who possessed the traditional explanation perished. When smṛti material was reorganised as a collection (samhita), in a comprehensive work, it incorporated much explanatory
material till then preserved by oral transmission. The Manu-
smyti apparently incorporated much matter of the kind, as also
the Brhaspatismyti, judging from the character of its fragments.
Invasions and wars must have interrupted the work of trans-
mission. To such calamities must be attributed the loss of much
smyti material and the earliest commentaries embodying oral
tradition. Among the lost commentaries that of Yajñasvāmin
on Vasiṣṭha, Asahāya’s bhāsyas on Manu and Gautama, and the
commentaries on Viṣṇu, Kātyāyana and Brhaspati must be
counted. Again, the oldest commentaries on the Dharmasūtras
are removed by centuries from their texts. We regard Karka,
Maskarin and Haradatta as very old commentators, but between
each of them and his original, twelve to fifteen centuries must
have run. The distance in time between Manusmyti and
Medhātithi, or Yajñavalkya and Visvarūpa is much less. It
is only from the bhāsyas, or elaborate commentaries, which
came nearest the oral transmission of the interpretation of the
sūtra literature, that one can form an idea of the space originally
occupied by the different heads of a subject of the sūtras, and
of the relative importance attached to them. For instance,
the first four aphorisms of the Brahmasūtra are deemed
relatively the most important in about a hundred and fifty,
forming the whole, but they take up over a fourth of the whole
space in the great commentaries of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja.
In the absence of continuous traditional interpretation, there
was always the risk of misapprehension of the views of the
original sūtra, even when shorter explanations embodying the
traditional view, known as vārttikāḥ were supplied, as they
were in many cases. But, even these were often criticised as
not correctly conveying the meaning and drift of the sūtra,
and the declared purpose of a bhāṣya was to explain, correct and
supplement the vārttika. The Mahābhāṣya does so in regard
to the grammatical aphorisms of Pāṇini and the vyṛtti of Kātyāyana. Kumārila does so in explaining the aphorisms of Jaimini and commenting on the bhāṣya of S'abara. Without vārttika and bhāṣya, a sūtra book is often not only not intelligible, but it is apt to mislead. Take the case of Kauṭilya’s work. At the end of it, there is a sloka which declares that having had experience of the contradictions between originals and commentaries, Viṣṇugupta (i.e. Kauṭilya) composed both the sūtra and the bhāṣya. The text of the Arthasaśāstra of Kauṭilya is mostly in prose, though there are many verses interspersed. They have all been usually taken as sutra. Mahāmahopādhyaya T. Gaṇapati S’āstri, to whom we owe both a good text and a valuable commentary, accepted the last sloka as authentic, and regarded the brief statements of the content in the introductory chapter (adhikaraṇa-samuddeśa), which are reproduced at the beginning of chapters, as the original aphorisms (sūtra) and the substance of each chapter as the commentary of Kauṭilya. The view merits acceptance. The aphorisms are just like chapter headings nothing more. Sūtras like Vyavahārasthāpana and Dāyabhāga are just headings. Suppose only these aphorisms or headings survived from the work of Kauṭilya. Could anything be gathered from them of his views, which are now so well-known? As verse smṛtis are often the lineal successors of sūtra works, the peculiarity may be postulated of them also. The long discussions of the great bhāṣyakāras, who commented at length on Manusmṛti and Yājñavalkya-smṛti will then be viewed as carrying on the tradition of the transmission of authentic interpretation of such aphoristic literature. The ‘tacking’ of Mādhavācārya, in his well-known commentary on Parāśarasmṛti, of a whole book

1 Curiously, the works of Kumārila are entitled vārttikas and tīka, while S'abara's work is styled bhāṣya.
of civil law (vyavahāra) and maxims of government to a quarter-verse of the smṛti (Rājā dharmena pālayet) will then be recognised as not exceeding the legitimate duty of a commentator, and his elaboration of the civil law, which the original appears to ignore as not a mere tour de force.

Bhāsyas and nibandhas (digests) continued to be written up to the threshold of our own times. Nevertheless, there has been an increasing neglect of Dharmaśāstra. It has not only shared the misfortune of all technical literature in Sanskrit through the drying up of the springs of patronage, but it has also suffered from another cause. The contact between European and Indian cultures in the 19th century produced, in Hindus, in the beginning an admiration for the former and induced an apologetic attitude for the supposed crudities of the latter. There came, later on, a new love for and pride in their ancient literature. But the revival helped only the study of the Veda and its auxiliaries, classical Sanskrit literature, and Indian philosophical systems. Dharmasūstra had little share in the revived interest. Its very mass repelled all but the few who devoted their time to the Kalpaśūtras, in their triple division of srauta, grhyā and dharma. Manusmṛiti was an exception. It is illustrative of the indiscriminate trend of the movement that when translations of even the smaller smṛtis of Nārada, Viṣṇu and Bṛhaspati were included in Max Müller’s “Sacred Books of the East,” a version of the samhita of Yājñavalkya, which had been so great an attraction, was not finally included in the series. Recent interest is due to lawyers and judges, who know Sanskrit. Indifference to Dharmaśāstra is still pretty general, and may be traced to the feeling that ‘things that matter’ like law and politics, are wanting in such “priestly” books. Most students have neither the patience nor the
conviction, which made Colebrooke obtain a grounding in \textit{Mīmāṁsā}, which is so vital to an understanding of \textit{Dharma-sāstra}, before he translated the \textit{Digest} of Jagannātha.

The result is regrettable in view of the excellent progress made in the study of our history, and of the application of the comparative or historical method to law and politics. Sir Henry Maine's influence was an important factor of the change. It helped to supersede the analytical study of Indian law and politics by the historical. Institutions are now viewed as growths which suggest lines of evolution. The reciprocal influence of idea and environment is assumed and investigated. Institutions, movements and ideas are judged without bias. But, have these safeguards been applied in the study of \textit{Dharma-sāstra}? Is it not a common tendency to assume ignorance, prejudice and self-interest as the ruling motives of hierarchy, and to regard them as present in \textit{Dharma-sāstra}, because it apparently emanates from the priestly class? Even a cursory view of \textit{Dharma-sāstra} must dispel such ideas. The critical faculty is not the monopoly of the modern age, any more than reasoned scepticism. Śabara indulges, in quite a 'modern' manner, in flings at priests and their selfishness when he comments on the purpose of some Vedic rites. Kauṭilya does not spare his own teacher. S'aṅkarabhaṭṭa does not spare his father, the renowned Kamalākara. Good faith and competence alone earn respect for authority from our 'legal' writers.

Doctrines which sound strange to us are not necessarily unsound. Nor can we presume that in an earlier age they were not considered reasonable and well-grounded. Take the instance of the doctrine that the king and the Brahman uphold the
world-order. The acutest writers of India accepted it, though they were aware of the weaknesses of individual rulers and Brahmans. Deliberate or veiled sophistry was certain of exposure in times in which logic was well-developed. Distortions of meaning were difficult when the rules of interpretation were clearly laid down and understood by those who used them. An author who misquoted a text, or altered its wording, would be promptly exposed. The care with which the texts were preserved, especially in technical literature, is seen in the way in which bhāsyas and digests notice and discuss even petty differences in reading. An authority opposed to one's own view is never ignored or suppressed. It is met squarely. The principle was enforced by the peculiar form adopted in exposition. The opposed statements were stated, then answered and the conclusion reached last. There were other conditions favouring literary integrity. Learning was localised in places like Kāśi, Paithān and Nāsik. The wandering scholar, who carried his library in his head, roamed about as a pilgrim and made his learning pay for the tour, helped to keep ideas and books in circulation. A new book soon acquired an instantaneous influence and recognition proportioned to its merit, even in far-off places, in an age which had not the advantages of printing. The conditions made for uniform texts as well as the spread of new methods, new ideas and new doctrines in areas far removed from those in which they were first promulgated. Critical estimates of the honesty, accuracy, and reliability of writers were carefully canvassed, and spread throughout the country. New writers had need to be careful. Rivalry between scholars was keen and criticism sharp and unsparing. The conditions were such as to ensure integrity in texts, accuracy and fidelity in interpretation, logic in inference, and absence of bias in application.
The spread of priestly impositions in such an atmosphere can be safely ruled out.

But it is largely on such presumptions and on defective understanding that many views of our day about *Dharmasāstra* are based. J. J. Meyer, to take a distinguished example, discriminates between Indian works on magic and law, and places *Dharmasāstra* under the former. The view is akin to that which ascribes the birth of civil law (*vyavahāra*) to the influence of political environment, and its incorporation into *Dharmasāstra* to an alliance between king and priest. The small content of 'law' in *smṛtis*, the existence of two classes of Mauryan courts, and the assumption that Indian thought differentiates between "religious" and "secular" elements are responsible for these wrong generalisations. They fail to recognise either the importance of *unwritten law*, preserved in the recollection of assessors and judges, who *had* to be trained in *Dharmasāstra*, or to the relative value to be attached to customary and king-made rules. Jolly's dictum that the characteristic of *Dharmasāstra* is high-flown religious idealism expresses a kindred view. To describe *Arthasāstra* as 'public law' and *Dharmasāstra* as 'private law,' as a recent writer (B. K. Sarkar) does, is to miss the intimate relation between the Hindu state and family, and the duty of the former to correct irregularities of conduct by members of the latter.

The Indian king was believed to be responsible as much for the correct conduct (*ācāra*) of his subjects, and their performing the prescribed rites of expiation (*prāyasciṭṭha*) as for punishing them, when they violated the right of property or committed a crime. The *ācara* and *prāyasciṭṭha* sections of the *smṛti* cannot accordingly be put outside the "secular" law. The allied
distinction between *Arthasastra* and *Dharmasastra* on the plea that the former deals with *real-politik* and the latter with *ideals*, over-looks the fact that when judges and parties shared the same ideals, as expressed in *smṛtis*, ideals were translated into action, and that there was an "idealist" element in *Arthasastra* as much as in *Dharmasastra*. Breloer’s view that *Arthasastra* is "planned economy" is correct taken by itself, but the ‘plan’ is part of a wider scheme of *social* organisation, laid down in *Dharmasastra*. Dr. K. P. Jayaswal’s distinction between *Arthasastra*, *Rājanīti*, and *Dharmasastra* as that between "municipal and secular law", "constitutional law," and "penance law" is not only based on superficial observation but on the disputable view of the origin and function of the two classes of Mauryan courts, and a failure to observe, that *Rājanīti* in the widest sense will include (as Sarkar realises), *all Dharmasastra*. The occasional identification of *Dharmasastra* and *vox populi* is due to the translation of ‘Mahājana,’ in a famous verse from the *Mahābhārata*, into ‘the populace,’ whereas it only means a magnanimous man learned in *Dharma*.

Illustrations can be multiplied of the prevailing misconception of *Dharmasastra* and its supposed rivals. Its primary cause is a failure to start, as in many *nibandhas*, with a chapter dealing with definitions of terms, (*paribhāṣā*) in which the term *Dharma* is explained. The word *Dharma* is indeed difficult to define, and Āpastamba, in a famous passage, states that it is best to gather its import from practice. Indian logic (*Nyāya*) defined it as an innate quality of the soul, action enjoined (i.e. by the Veda). The idea is further developed in *Mīmāṃsā*. *Dharma* is that which is signified by a direction and results in a benefit. The *Nyāya*
school held that an invisible effect, called *apūrva* attached itself to the soul by the performance of an enjoined act (*Dharma*), and lasted till the benefit actually accrued to the soul. *Dharma* was thus regarded as fixed in action. A school held that its effect was instantaneous, though its manifestation had to wait till death. The idea is akin to the belief that good and bad actions are inseparable from the soul and guide its pilgrimage through existences (*Karma, samsāra*). *Dharma* is viewed as the norm, which sustains the universe, and in this sense is somewhat like the Vedic *Ritam*, and the Greek Law of Nature. For practical purposes, *Dharma* can be taken as the innate principle of anything in virtue of which it is what it is. Analysed and applied, the conception becomes ethically duty, physically essential property, spirituality in religion and righteousness or law in popular usage. Manu equates *Dharma* with merit flowing from doing the right thing (*punya*), and in that sense it is described as the only thing which follows the soul. The belief in a moral God leads to the identification of *Dharma* with the Deity. Viewed in its working, *Dharma* is law of cause and effect, and is described as destroying when violated and protecting when obeyed. Innate quality and potentiality are related; so *Dharma* is taken to be the mean between the ideal and the possible. The many wide extensions which are given to the term by itself and in combination with qualifying words, is illustrated in the recently published *Dharmakosa*. The Buddhist adopted the concept, omitting the postulate of its being due to Vedic injunction. It becomes the root-principle of cosmic order, by finding which one can obtain liberation (*nirvāṇa*). It includes and underlies every law, physical, ethical, and human, and it is eternal. It forms therefore, along with the Buddha and the Saṅgha the *Triratna* (Three Jewels) of Buddhism.
Strictly construed, every science will thus be Dharma-sāstra, but the term was restricted to enjoined human action. So conceived, it was divided into pravṛtti and niyṛtti Dharma, according as its end was action or freedom from it, into ordinary and extra-ordinary, (sādhaṇa, asādhaṇa), into īśta and pūrta (viewed from the standpoint of enjoined Vedic ritual), and as relating to varṇa (caste), station (āsrama), caste and station (varṇāsrama), quality (guṇa) and context (nimitta). The divisions were subdivided, as general, special, equal and emergent e.g. Āsramadharma.

If differences springing from detail are put aside, Dharma is the whole duty of man. It includes not only the relations of man to man, but of man to the Universe. Whatever is enjoined by authority or the inward promptings of conscience is Dharma and comes within the scope of Dharmasāstra. In this sense its scope is encyclopaedic, and it comprehends all knowledge. This idea is implicit in the enumeration of the location of Dharma (Dharmasthāna) which brings all knowledge within it. The Purāṇas alone rival Dharmasāstra in so a wide scope. Vijñānesvara brings Arthasāstra, on this among other grounds, under Dharmasāstra. Apart from the relevance of legal medicine in any system of law, Ayurveda (Medicine) is one of the Dharmasthānas. So are Astrology, (Jyautiṣa) and Natural Science (Lakṣana). Two famous collections, both of Dharmasāstra, made in the 16th century illustrate this view. Mitramisra's Vīramitrodāyā has these branches among its 22 books. So has Todar Mal’s less famous Dharmasaukhya. Sometimes, the relevant information from a branch may alone be brought in; as medical knowledge in the treatment of grievous hurt, questions of paternity determination, the relative position of twin children, the liabilities of
professional soldiers, etc. But certain sections were deemed essential in a Dharmasāstra.

The best example of a complete Dharma digest (Dharma-nibandha) is the Kṛtyakalpataru of Bhaṭṭa Lakṣmīdhara. It is the oldest now available, and one of the most comprehensive and authoritative. It adopts a special arrangement not found in other digests. Taking the life of man to begin (as Hindu jurisprudence held it to begin) with conception in the womb, and to end in salvation after death (Mokṣa), Lakṣmīdhara expounds the traditional view of the public and private duties of man in a sequence following the progress of life and station. The first book begins with the period of dedicated study (Brahmacarya). The second is devoted to the house-holder, i.e., the ordinary citizen (Gṛhastha), and the third to the daily and periodical duties, and the proper time for their performance (Niyatakāla). The offering of oblations to ancestors is an essential duty, signifying the continued existence of the family. The ceremonies connected with this duty (S'rāddha) occupy the fourth book. In the Iron Age (Kaliyuga) an easy way of acquiring merit is by making gifts (Dāna) which form the subject of the fifth book. The dedication of objects of worship (Pratisthā), and the rites of worship (Pūjā) take up the next two sections. Merit (punya) accrues and demerit disappears. Pilgrimages to holy places or streams (Tīrtha) are performed. But pilgrimage cannot get rid of the need for ceremonial expiation, which is prescribed for all transgressions. The rites of expiation (Prāyascittā) perhaps took up another entire book which is now lost. Ceremonial impurity is believed to arise from birth, death, action, and contact. Purification from such impurity (S'uddhi) is therefore next dealt with. Thus far all the sections are common to persons
irrespective of their civil status. But, kings have not only to enforce, as part of their regal duty, the performance by every one of his special duty, but they have other duties springing from the headship of society. These are brought together in a separate section, named Rājadharmanakāṇḍa. The commonest work of the king, in a society, in which public opinion largely enforces the performance of religious and sacramental duties, even apart from State-compulsion, is that of seeing that every man’s person, property and status are not violated by any other person. Disputes concerning these come under Vyavahāra, with its eighteen conventional titles. The two sections ordinarily viewed as politics and law, form the twelfth and eleventh books. Among the duties of the king was that of performing public ceremonies, believed to be able to combat evil influences threatening society or its head. Misfortune is heralded by alarming portents (adbhuta). The treatment of these is taken up in the thirteenth section on propitiation (S'anti). To every one comes death, and the way to release (Mokṣa) if life has been properly lived. Its treatment concludes a vast treatise in fourteen sections, typical of the content of Dharmasāstra.

Lakṣmīdhara’s great book was written to a king’s order. It has been described to show the correct view of the scope of a smṛti or nibandha. Many digests were written subsequently, but with the exception of Viramitrodaya, none formally treats of all the sections in the Kṛtyakalpataru, though more or less the same matter is distributed in them. Sometimes, entire sections are omitted in certain digests, e.g. Rājadharma, in the narrower sense, in Smṛticandrikā, and Vyavahāra and Rājadharma in Smṛtimuktāphala, to refer to two digests with which we are familiar in South India. Their authors had
no political and forensic experience and so they refrained from dealing with what they did not know. The same reason will explain why Candesvara omits the sections dealing with consecration, purification, expiation, propitiation and salvation in his Ratnākara. He was a Thākur and not a full Brahman. Lakṣmīdhara was not merely a learned Brahman, but he had held successively every major administrative office, under a powerful king, before he commenced his digest. He did not feel debarred either by want of administrative experience or of Srotiśya status from dealing with every division or topic of Dharma.

The correct perception of the scope and content of Dharmasūtra, and of the means of ascertaining Dharma, requires, as an antecedent condition, a grasp of the major assumptions or postulates of Indian belief and their logical implications. The more important of them may be indicated. First in importance were two allied hypotheses: "Dharma has its root and finds its sanction in revelation (Veda)," and "the sole subject of revealed literature (Veda) is Dharma." The Veda is boundless, eternal, uncreated, omniscient, and consistent with itself and ultimate reality. In its branches, and in the knowledge derived from it, it is one-pointed. All of them aim at a common goal, teach the same doctrine, and their authority is equal. The purpose of life is four-fold, viz. the pursuit of welfare, of pleasure and salvation, (artha, kāma, mokṣa) along with the performance of Dharma; and the four-fold purpose corresponds to and is rendered possible of attainment by the four-fold division of the population (cāturvarṇa) and the four-fold division of life (caturāśrama). From these premises a number of inferences of importance for the determination of valid conclusions were drawn by close reasoning. They
demanded and obtained universal acceptance. A few of
them may be mentioned illustratively. The hypotheses
in regard to the Veda led to the conclusion that any
rule in a smṛti for which a Vedic source can be found
becomes invested with the infallibility of the Veda, and
its binding authority cannot be questioned. The first duty
of a commentator is to search the Veda for the authority
for any rule. S'abara, Kumārila and later writers of
Mīmāṃsā revel in such research. Visvarūpa excels in
finding Vedic authority for the text of Yājñavalkya, and
Medhātithi for that of Manu. Since the Veda is limitless, it
might be presumed that a portion of it has still to be found.
But as human ingenuity and skill cannot be equal, in our
degenerate times, to the discovery of the Vedic source of every
smṛti rule, those rules for which such an origin cannot be
found, are not to be rejected, if they are still found in a
smṛti, as that raises the presumption that the author of it had
the Vedic source before him which eludes the commentator.
Its operation will therefore be held in suspense. The Veda is
the bed-rock of Hindu religion. As Dharma is its only relevant
content, the science which lays down Dharma (Dharmasāstra)
has the binding character of revelation. The hypothesis
that Dharma creates a benefit, which attaches itself to the
soul (ātman) leading to a happy result ultimately, made the
exact study of Dharmasāstra a paramount duty.

An infallible Veda cannot contain any internal incon-
sistency. Nor can it be really in conflict with what is manifest
to experience. Since all knowledge has an ultimate Vedic
basis, every branch of knowledge must be in accord with every
other. Veda and smṛti must agree; so should smṛti and
smṛti, smṛti and Purāṇa, and so on. The practice of good
men, *i.e.*, men brought up in a proper tradition, should be presumed to be in accord with Vedic injunction, and be accepted as a guide to conduct. Hereditary practice must raise a similar presumption, and so also common usage or custom. When there is an apparent discord between a rule derived from one source and that from another, every endeavour should be made to reconcile them. *Smṛti* like the Veda is limitless in extent. Hence, even an unnamed or unidentified *smṛti* text, (*smṛtyantara*) must not be rejected, unless it is manifestly a forgery. So with a Purāṇa, or even an Upapurāṇa. There should be a close search for internal consistency. Caution is necessary in accepting guidance in so vast a field, and there should be no hesitation in rejecting unauthentic rules. An illustration may be given. The rule that a boy, who had undergone *samskāras* ending with investiture (*upa-nayana*) in the father's house, cannot be taken in adoption is laid down in the *Kālika Purāṇa*. After showing that the text, even if genuine, should be construed differently, Nilakantha and Anantadeva ultimately reject it, as it was not found in several MSS. of the Purāṇa, and so was unauthentic. The license to search for sanction over so wide a field did not lead to carelessness. It induced on the other hand exceptional vigilance in scrutinising every text cited as authority. The rules of interpretation were made more critical, refined and subtle, and so was also their application to the interpretation of rules of *Dharma* as guiding conduct.

The interpretation of *Dharma* and the adjudication of disputes on its basis was obviously not work for amateurs. To have the king preside over a court and hear cases might be embarrassing. He was therefore replaced by the trained judge, and the equally trained assessors who were to find the
verdict. It was open even to an expert visitor to intervene in a trial and state his view as amicus curiae. When there was either conflict between rules or authority, or between rule and usage, or when no rule could be found or the custom cited had to be examined for evidence of authenticity, the questions were to be decided by an ad hoc commission of experts, called parisad, for the constitution of which elaborate rules were laid down. These were three safeguards to ensure proper adjudication. A fourth lay in the power conferred on an expert to state the law on a disputed point, (like a jurisconsult) as a vyavasthā, and the medieval collections of vyavasthās were not unlike responsa prudentam in Rome. The opinion of a commentator or digest was to be honoured as vyavasthā. Special treatises on moot points (dvaita-nirñaya) commanded the respect they deserved.

But for all decisions and their soundness the ultimate responsibility was laid on the king or the state. It was in this way that Dharmasāstra in its comprehensive sense became the law of the country, and as it was the king who enforced its rules, it became Rājadharma.
The first impression created by even a superficial view of
the extant literature of Dharmasāstra is its vastness. But what
has survived is only a very small part of what must have been
composed. Indian social and literary history testifies to tireless
industry in the production of this form of literature amidst
the storm and stress of the centuries. Calamities like bar-
barian invasion, internecine war, the impact of alien religions
and cultures and political vicissitudes were powerless to stay
the creative activity. In such circumstances a dispropor-
tionately large number of the intellectual and religious leaders
of the community must have been eliminated, even if they
were not deliberately singled out for extirpation by a ruler
of an hostile religion or culture. Protracted wars have
usually resulted in a cultural set-back, and the recovery
takes time. That it worked so in India also cannot be
doubted. But the wonderful activity in the cultivation
of Dharmasāstra continued, almost without cessation, even
in the middle of wars and foreign invasions, and was some-
times even helped by them. What is the cause of the paradox?
What is the compelling influence which gave the subject
an enduring vitality and power of recuperation? An answer
to the questions throws light not only on the vitality of a
subject, which was closely associated with religion and re-
gulated modes of life, but it reveals special features of the
governments of the time and their relations to the lives of the people.

*Dharmasāstra*, like religion, dealt with the whole life, not with only a part of it. No one was outside its jurisdiction: the individual, the family, the corporations, and the king were all under it. It upheld the ideal of an indissoluble union between state and society, and king and subject. The welfare of the king was held to be rooted in the well-being of the people. Political union was sanctified by religious sanction. The King and Daṇḍa, the Spirit of Punishment (the power of sanction) were both of divine creation. Anarchy was abhorred. A condition of statelessness was conceivable only in the Golden Age. The doctrines of *karma* and *samsūra* linked life in this world with other existences and with the world order. A reciprocal influence, generated by *Dharma*, was believed to connect right or wrong living with cosmic influences of a supernatural character. Good government ensured the happiness of the people and it did so by bringing into operation beneficent influences which made happiness certain. Under ideal rule, like that of Rāma, unhappiness and sorrow were unknown. A good king reproduced the conditions of the Golden Age, and a bad one intensified the sufferings of the Iron Age. On the king lies a responsibility, which cannot be shifted or shirked. He is the maker of the age (*Rāja kālasya kāraṇam*). The theory of this awful responsibility of the state was enforced by telling illustrations. An Arjuna was given the name of the Hero of the Golden Age (*Kārta-vīrya*) because he was so vigilant that he corrected in his subjects even the impulse to wrong-doing. Rama was described as having produced in an age of less perfection the ideal conditions of the Golden Age (*Tretā-yuga-pravartita-*)
kārta-yuga-vṛttānta). The union of king and subject was like that of soul and body. An evil ruler must be expelled. Taxes are the king's wages; he must earn them by good government. His freedom to do what he likes ends with his coronation (abhiṣeka). Thence forward his life is dedicated to the maintenance of Dharma.

Faith in the reciprocal influence of human righteousness and the order of the universe, which is a teaching of religion, was thus harnessed to social comity, mutual co-operation and obedience to the state. To disobey the king was not merely imprudent; it was a dereliction of Dharma. Conversely oppression was not only risky and foolish, but it was A-dharma, and will lead to prompt retribution both in this world and in others. The fire engendered in the hearts of men by tyrannical rule will burn the king and his dynasty. If God (Viṣṇu) is in the king, He is no less in the subject.

These high conceptions of duty lead to the proposition that good government requires a correct knowledge of Dharma on the part of the ruler. He should know not only his own duties but fully visualise those of every one else in the kingdom. Unhappiness is a sign of error in governing; and as it springs often from social misfits, the discovery and correction of such misfits is a primary duty of the state. As all duties are implicit in Dharma, its vast literature and sources must be explored for the discovery of remedies for injustice and evil, and for the solution of problems continuously thrown up by changing times and circumstances. The belief in the divine character of Dharma and its universality of applicability to all times and circumstances, makes the discovery of remedies to social evils, the aim of research in Dharma. Dharma adjusts
obligation to capacity. How far would the principle justify reduction of the weight of caste duties in times of stress, or in the general decline of the Iron Age? Were rules to be the same after the ravages of war, conquest, alien settlement, the penetration into society of the barbarian (mleccha), the multiplicity of economic occupation, enforced departures from functional grouping, and divorce of privilege and the merit to justify it?

In the answers to such questions will be found the re-orientation of Dharma. The adjustment of law to the needs of society has usually been made in three ways: by legal fiction, by equity and by legislation. In the evolution of Dharma by interpretation and by research, we can see the influence of the first two but not of the third. But, unlike the fictions, which were deliberately used by the civil lawyers of Europe, for reconciling the letter of the law and the needs of society, the hypotheses which served the same purpose in India were those which were believed in as part of religious dogma. The possibility of a sceptical jurist in ancient or medieval India cannot be ruled out, but the probabilities are that every change made by interpretation was made in the honest belief that it was necessary to vindicate Dharma.

Even advanced thinkers are usually the creatures of their age. A study of the variations of opinion among Indian writers on Dharmasāstra will not disclose much chronological progress in ideas, and so-called "liberal views" may be found in writers of earlier and "conservative" leaning in those of later times. The existence of schools clustering round a great teacher or writer like Kauṭilya might lead to progress within the school. Of this we have parallel evidence in Indian
systems of philosophy. But till a late stage, cleavages of opinion, which would have led to the formation of schools of thought, did not arise in Dharmasāstra, though we can trace divergence of opinion far back. Later differences have been classified as 'schools' and been treated as racial and provincial, though to those who held the views aimed at tenets, the universal acceptance.

The Mauryan empire saw Buddhism rise to the rank of an Imperial religion, but Buddhism was heresy, according to Dharmasāstra. The period of barbarian invasions which followed the break-down of the empire of Magadha raised new problems of adjustment. Among them, the most important were readmission to varṇas of those who had gone out of them voluntarily or otherwise, the restitution of rights to abducted and outraged women, condonation (after purificatory or expiatory rites) of breaches of duty and failure to observe the sacramental rules, a new attitude towards non-क्षत्रिय kings, the recognition of renunciation (sanyāsa) by others than Brahmans, acceptance of foreigners who embraced Brahmanism the reduction of ceremonies which were beyond the strength of the people in altered conditions, permission of divorce and remarriage of women, and realignment privilege and duty to position and responsibility.

The hypothesis that Dharma was good for all time and all circumstances acted as the Law of Nature did in the evolution of Roman law. The processes by which the adjustment of Dharma was insensibly effected were, however, natural and logically followed from the primary hypothesis. The general lines are clear. Smṛitis were classified into those which had a 'visible' and an 'invisible' purpose (द्यस्तार्थ and
adṛṣṭārtha). To the former Vedic infallibility did not apply as their aim was wealth and pleasure as contrasted with the performance of enjoined duty and salvation of the latter. The latter prevailed over the former. Secondly, the authority of a smṛti depended on its merit sui generis. In a remarkable passage, Medhātithi dismisses the enumeration of valid smṛtis as futile because there is no end to it, and even a smṛti composed in the present generation might, if its doctrine was sound, become an authority. Thirdly, the rule of logical interpretation (nyāya) which Kauṭilya advocated and Manu condemned, received wide support. Fourthly, the application of valid usage was helped by the injunction to make official records of custom. Customary law was systematised, classified and made applicable to the groups concerned. The doctrine that weakness demands reduced rigor in penance, took the form of Yuga-dharma, accepted in the sense, not that it alone is operative universally in the Yuga or age concerned, but that it gives an option for a lenient construction of duty. The recommendation of gifts (dāna) and faith (bhakti) in preference to sacrifice (Yajña) and penance (prāyasccitta), the acceptance of the principle of substitution (pratīṇidhi) to meet cases in which the original cannot be produced (e.g. kricchra replaced by a money gift to one who does it for the donor), and the principle that certain ancient rites, which were not recommended, may be omitted in Kali-yuga (Kalivarjyās), moved in this direction. In the last category, it was the tendency to include customs which had gone out of use, like the levirate (niyoga) or rites which became impracticable (like the Aśvamedha sacrifice). Rules of pollution (in the case of town life as pointed out by Nanda Pandita) were relaxed in marriages, festivals, pilgrimage, war and personal danger. The practice of referring questions
to Pariṣads gained ground, and caste-pariṣads to settle caste rules came into vogue, in imitation of the original.

These changes, along with the appearance on the stage of rulers who accepted the responsibility to enforce Dharma, but had not been brought up in the old tradition, necessitated a recasting of smṛti literature. When a political purpose was behind the recasting, as has been suggested by the late Dr. Jayaswal, in regard to Manusmṛti, the rules tended to go back to the old ideals, e.g. the condemnation of Sūdra mendicancy and celibacy, and magnification of the Brahman. The new dynasties, which were either contemporaries of the Sūngas or came after them, were of dubious caste. Greeks and Scythians, who had no strong religion of their own, and no caste system embraced Brahmanism, and showed excessive zeal like all converts. The horse-sacrifice, which is one of the Kalivarjyas, is performed by rulers of doubtful caste, as well as by Brahman Kings like Puṣyamitra and the Bhārāśivas. The S'atakarnīs and the early Pallava rulers performed it. So did the Kadambas and the Gaṅgas, as well as the Vākāṭakas. Even the Kuśān Vasiṣṭa claims to have done one. Samudragupta, who raised a principality to an empire, and gloried in his relation to an out-caste class, performed two horse sacrifices. Heliodorus, a Greek envoy, calls himself a devotee of Viṣṇu (bhāgavata and erects a column in a Viṣṇu temple. The Huns, who were more cruel than other invaders, become worshippers of Viṣṇu. The depressing conditions of the age are reflected in an increasing addiction to magic. The altered circumstances are seen in the new smṛtis and Purāṇas. The literary Renaissance of the Gupta epoch shows the fillip given to new forms of old ideals under the inspiration of the Gupta dynasty. An empire has to be governed.
Civil law is more complex and requires specialists to enunciate it. The demand is met by the versified smṛtis of Yājñavalkya, Bṛhaspati, Nārada and Kātyāyana.

Cleavages of opinion between the smṛtis and their interpreters necessitate the production of adequate scholia. The new commentator cannot however rest content with brief explanations. He must attempt an exposition (Bhāṣya). Asahāya (600 A.D.), Visvarūpa (800 A.D.), Medhātithi (850 A.D.) illustrate this movement. The powerful support given to the spread of Mīmāṃsā doctrine by Kumārila and to philosophical speculation by Śaṅkara swept away the lingering remnants of Buddhism. Mīmāṃsā also furnished a potent instrument of smṛti interpretation. New dynasties came to power from the eighth century onwards, and history repeated itself. A great impetus was again given to the writing of commentaries and digests. The first experiments in ‘legal’ comprehension took the form of condensed verse summaries of the conclusions of the major smṛtis, which could be memorised and commented on in schools. Examples of it are Medhātithi’s lost Smyttiviveka and the anonymous Smṛtisārasangraha, Caturvimsatimata and Śaṭṭyamsanmata, but even these did not meet the new demand for full enunciation of Dharma. New motives for re-examination of the content of Dharma literature came after the Musalman invasions and settlement. There had been wholesale enslavement and forcible conversion to Islam of Hindu men and women. The attempt to rehabilitate them is reflected in Devalasmyti, which declares with vehemence that all smṛtis opposed to it were void. The new Rājput dynasties, which came into prominence after the eleventh century, like the Gāharwārs of Kanauj, the Paramārs of Mālva, and the Yādavas of Devagiri were fervidly Hindu. Nothing but wholesale
recapitulation of Dharmasāstra will satisfy them. Large digests (Nibandhāḥ) become the fashion in every Court. We have lost King Bhoja’s celebrated digest, Gopala’s Kāmadhenu and several other works of the kind, born of this movement. The Mitākṣara is virtually a digest though greatly limited by its text. The ruler of a modest kingdom in Konkan, the Śilāhara Āparārka, wins lasting fame by an extensive commentary on Yājñavalkyasyasti. But the most exhaustive of the digests is easily the Kṛtyakalpaṭaru produced by Lakṣmīdhara, by command of king Govindacandra. In Bengal Bāllālāsena and his teacher Aniruddha produced great digests. The stupendous digest of Hemādri, which covered only part of the ground, was the contribution of the new kingdom of Devagiri.

The later digests like those of Visvesvarabhaṭṭa, Madana- simha and Dalapati are useful, along with the digests of Candesvara and Vācaspati Mīśra, in showing how even under Muhammadan rule, the devotion to Hindu Dharma was sustained. The impulse to compose treatises on Dharmasāstra showed no sign of weakening, whether the head of the Muslaman empire was a broad-minded ruler like Akbar or a staunch iconoclast like Aurangzib. We owe the great digest of Mitra Mīśra to the revivalist zeal of a Būndela prince, who ambushed Abul Fazl, and became the friend of Jahangir. The still better known Mayūkhas were composed to the order of a petty Hindu chieftain. The production of such works in an epoch in which no Hindu ruler in Hindustan enjoyed independence, or under the patronage of Muslaman rulers, was due to either or both of two motives, viz. the desire to acquire merit by causing to be written, a great work which will be as a guide to more fortunate rulers in the future, and secondly, to have for their own guidance in the small
areas under their own rule, suitable codes of the full Hindu Dharma. The revivalist influence coupled with the ambition of new dynasties in commissioning great treatises is best illustrated by the first kings of Vijayanagara under whom Mādhava wrote his famous works, including the commentary on Parāśara.

Side by side with the production of digests and commentaries went on the writing of treatises on controverted points (Dvaita-Nirnaya). They are most common in the literature of Mithila in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

It was impossible to compose a new nibandha for the purpose of settling a number of minor questions in dispute. The composition of a nibandha involved an amount of labour which could be done only by a large body of scholars acting under the supervision of a master. Nor could the doubtful points of Dharma be settled by convoking Pariṣads, as men with the needed qualifications could not be secured. A permanent commission of legal reference was also out of the question. The Paṇḍita of the royal Court, the successor of the ancient Purodhā, had begun to replace him even in the Gupta period. S'ukranīti (12th century) makes it the duty of the Paṇḍita to consider laws which appear to run counter to tradition and worldly experience and advise the king on suitable action. The work of Pariṣads was sometimes done by the assemblies of paṇḍits specially convened in places like Kāśi, Paithān and Nāsik, where there was always a number of learned men.

The increase in the number of digests and commentaries did not altogether get rid of the embarrassment caused by conflict of views and doctrine. A conscientious ruler could
not easily commission a new digest. It was an expensive business, requiring the services of a large number of scholars working under the direction of the digest-maker. The Mimāmsā rule allowing an option (vikalpa), wherever two or more unreconciled positions had each separate authority, tended to increase confusion. If the matter was to be settled a way was open. If the king, as well as his people, ceased to believe in traditional Dharma, the ruler could proceed to frame by royal edict a new body of simple, compact and uptodate laws. But if the king or the bulk of his subjects were orthodox, and relied on Dharmasāstra, the course was open only if they felt that it was possible to supersede Dharmasāstra by royal edict (rājasāsana), giving it the precedence, which it appeared to have in Kauṭilya’s Arthasastra. But the passage was interpreted, as the similar one of Yājñavalkya, as implying only the power of a king to declare the law which was not in opposition to Dharma, in cases in which there was doubt, and not as vesting in a ruler concurrent or superior law-making authority. Consistency required that the authority for the alleged power should be considered in its context and read with the injunctions, found in both Arthasastra and Dharmasāstra, enjoining the king to adhere to Dharma. Both brought the king within the jurisdiction of law, and allowed decisions to be given against him in his own courts. Medhātithi roundly declared that a king cannot make a law over-riding Dharma. The personification of the power of punishment as a divinity was a picturesque way of expressing the view that the king is subject to law. The evidence of history does not disclose any exercise of the alleged regal power of independent legislation. Asoka, who declared Dharma in his edicts, merely enunciated doctrines which were equally acceptable to Brahman as well as to Buddhist,
He dealt with what would have been called *Sādhārana*, i.e. ordinary, *Dharma*. What little evidence there is appears to run counter to the claim. The point may be illustrated. In old Indian law, theft was a capital offence. The receiver of stolen property, even if he took it in good faith, or in the ordinary way of trade, might become liable to punishment. It is stated by Daṇḍin that the Mauryas made a rule that in cases where such property was found in the possession of merchants, the presumption should be of their innocence, and that they should not be punished as receivers of stolen property. The interpretation is equitable. In Indian law, the value of stolen property which was not recovered by the king had to be made good by him. A rule of the kind, alleged to have been made by the Mauryas, could only add to the king's own liability. Another instance is of a small alteration which Asoka claims to have made in criminal procedure. In Ancient India, the passing of a capital sentence was followed by immediate action. There was no time between sentence and execution. Asoka claims to have granted to such an offender a respite of three days, after sentence of death had been passed, to enable him to make his arrangements for spiritual benefit. It is noteworthy that Asoka did not claim a power of reprieve. In the *Rājadharmakāṇḍa* we have recommendations to kings to release prisoners on the occasion of their coronation. But, there is a universal exception to the royal power of pardon, and that is in regard to the sentence of death, which cannot be set aside by a king. Asoka who forbade the slaughter of animals, restricted the prohibition to the royal kitchen, and there is no evidence of his having interdicted the Vedic sacrifices. His prohibition of castration and castration was merely an enforcement of the *Dharma* rule against *brāṇahatti*. It is open to presume that if he felt he could change the law in the case of capital offences, the merciful
emperor might have exercised the power. His absence should be construed in support of the position of Dharmasūstra that legislation by edict can declare law, but not make law contrary to Dharma. The unnamed Maurya of Daṇḍin might have been the great emperor himself. It is significant that a Buddhist ruler should have been chary of making a change of traditional Dharma, and his frequent references to Dhamma, usually taken as allusions to the Buddhist Dhamma, may as legitimately be viewed as to Brahmanical Dharma. His Dharmavijaya is conquest according to the humane rules prescribed by Dharmasūstra. His Dharma-amātya was no other than the Dharmādhikārī. Aśoka’s partiality for the term might have been due to policy; even a Buddhist ruler must conform to the Dharma of his subjects. It may be noted that the Satraps of the Dakhān and the Pallavas, both reputed foreigners, styled themselves Dharmarājjas. The Kadambas of Banavāsi, who could not have ruled in strict accord with Dharmasūstra, took the title. The Gaṅgas of Tālkad did so too. Over the seas, the Kauṇḍinya emperors of Campā (e.g. Bhadravarman, c. 400 A. D.) took the title. The Colas gloried in keeping, like Kālidāsa’s hero-king, to the rules of Manu. The drift of the evidence is one-pointed.

What was expected from the king indicates what the state was competent to do. It may be gathered from the evils which a condition of anarchy (arājatā) was supposed to generate, and which the king was to ward off. Among the things which disappear in anarchy, prominent mention is made of the worship of gods, Dharma, sacrifices and freedom. The discharge of the primary state-duty of protection (paripā-lanam) ensures freedom; but the other functions imply the use of directive, regulative and coercive power of the state
in the interests of *Dharma*. The list should be read with the accounts of barbarian (*mleccha*) rule given by the Purāṇas, as his characteristic was that he contravened *Dharma*. The *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* counts among the enormities perpetrated by the *mleccha* (the Indo-Bactrian and Indo-Scythian) the slaughter of Brahmans, women and children, killing of kine, greed and unjust taxation, violence, internecine war (*hatva eva paras-param*) and omission of the rite of coronation. The mixture of offences against humanity, sound economy, sound polity and ritual should be noted. They are, in popular belief, the signs of Kali, the personification of Evil. Every king who, in medieval times, either ordered the codification of *Dharma* or did it himself, is described as freeing his kingdom from Kali by the service. The royal champion of *Dharma* stood not for mere morality but for religion. It is in this sense that the king is classed with the Brahman as the prop of world-order. The curious suggestion that this statement refers to an old rivalry between civil power and the sacerdotal, which was ended by the alliance of king and priest in their mutual interest, is based on misconceptions, among which that of the division of functions between the courts of justice in which the judges and assessors were Brahmans, who declared the law and found the verdict on the evidence, and the executive authority which implemented the judgment, stands foremost. The education of a prince, on the lines indicated in *Arthasāstra* and *Smṛti*, for his future office would be possible only if the prince succeeds by hereditary right to an old and established throne, in a small kingdom. A self-made ruler of a non-kṣatriya caste, who builds up a large kingdom, will neither have had the antecedent education for his office, nor the inclination and facilities to get it after the establishment of his authority and power. He would be
more dependent on his Brahman guides in regard to Dharma than a prince educated in the old royal curriculum. His acceptance of traditional duty will be even more complete, because it will be done with less understanding and with more desire for popular applause.

The atmosphere will be unsuitable for either the claim or the exercise of law-making by edict. Dependence for changes necessitated by altered conditions of life and time, will be exclusively on interpretation, involving the silent application of hypotheses and equity. That changes of far-reaching character did take place in the law (dharma) relating to almost every department of personal and public relationship is undeniable and will be illustrated later. A change, even one of a radical character, will not appear as revolutionary and as against Dharma, because of the belief in its eternal justice and its all-embracing character. Opposed positions will be viewed as instances of option (vikalpa), when properly vouched for, and will illustrate the latitude allowed by Dharma, when properly understood.

It is easy to give illustrations of the changes which took place, and which were manifestly due to the pressure of public opinion and the inner promptings of what may be termed the 'social conscience.' The first in importance is the altered attitude towards the relative position of the 'sources'. The increasing dependence on usage (caritra), on the doctrine of equal validity of all texts, (ekavākyatva), on anonymous texts (e.g., citations like 'iti smṛtiḥ', 'smṛtyantare', 'evamucyte'), on 'justice and good conscience' (samkalpa, ātman-astuṣṭih), insight and intuition (yukti) and 'the' practice of the elect (sīṣṭā-cāra), is evident, and it helped the process. Brhaspati
accepts even the usage of castes springing from condemned unions (*pratiloma*). There was also a tendency to emphasise the consultation of the expert, so as to bring in professional rules under valid custom. The digests illustrate the change in attitude. Mitra Misra accepts as authority the practice of the ‘good Sūdra’ (*sacchūdra*), apparently as a concession to the educated and pious member of the fourth *Varna*, bringing the extension under ‘the practice of the good’ (*ācaracasīva sādhūnam*), in the place of ‘the practice of the strict Brahman’ (*siṣṭācāra*). The animus against the learned Sūdra was really due to abhorrence of Jains and Buddhists for their abjuring the Veda and for their wholesale invitation to the Sūdras to desert their occupations and become monks. With the fall of Buddhism there was a marked reduction of acerbity even towards the Buddhist.

To begin with, we may note the widening of the rules regarding allowable occupation and areas of habitation for the follower of *Dharma*. It will amuse a modern student if a list of “excluded areas” is made. Sankha-Likhita excluded Sindh and Magadha. The *Mahabhārata* excluded the Punjab. Paśupata included Orissa by special mention. South India was excluded virtually by all authorities, and the Aryan area meant only the western half of the present United Provinces. The acceptance of two principles, *viz.* (1) that the country is ‘sacred’ over which the black antelope roams (*krṣnamya ga*), barley (*yava*) is cultivated, and the *kusa* grass grows, and (2) that any area in which there is a holy place (*tīrtha*), or through which a sacred river passes, is unobjectionable, along with the definition of *Ārya* as he who accepts the caste-classification, and the Aryan land as that in which *Varnāsamadharma* prevails, and the application of the rule of necessity (*āpad-dharma*)
to condone travelling to prohibited areas, brought the whole of India, and even far-off countries like Cambodia, Bali and Java within the ambit of permitted areas. Indian maritime activity and colonisation would have been impossible, without open breach of Dharma, but for the elastic provisions.

Next comes the principle of Yuga-dharma, ‘the Dharma of Time-cycles,’ which was interpreted so as to secure a relaxation in the interests of weaker sex or status. Under this principle, women and Sūdras can get the same merit (punya) as men and Brahmans by adopting easier rites. Certain forms of easy literature are opened to them.

Their non-investiture (upanayana) was to be viewed as an exemption and a privilege. The wife received the same power (adhikāra) as the husband, without his samskāras, by mere fact of marriage. The principle that a taint was acquired by mere contiguity or association was attenuated till it meant only a lapse through the closest association or actual commission of an offence. The very young and the very old were exempted from many obligatory duties or expiatory rites. The circumstances in which impurity from contact (asāṃśya) will not arise are made more numerous. Religious cults like those of bhaktimārga and tantra and the spread of monistic (Advaita) philosophy tended to extend both the area and the circle of recognised usage to persons and places accepting their ideas or produced indifference to strict conformity to prescribed conduct. Their influence helped to make things easier for women and the unregenerate castes, and to substitute faith and intuitive knowledge for rites of expiation, and “good works” and ‘self-realisation’ for ceremonial. But the substitution was
not effected without struggles with the adherents of smṛti (e.g., case of Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva saints).

In the history of the Indian law of person and property, there is abundant evidence of diversity of view leading to progress. An impulse to change the law was justified on the ground of conscience (ātmanastuṣṭi) and the desire to vindicate Dharma. Reform in law or usage is not barred, if the move to change is justified on these grounds. In the field of civil law the main changes which follow are in the direction of the emancipation of the individual and his gains of learning (cf. the way in which the freeing of the 'earnings of the camp,' castrense peculium, from patria potestas paved the way for individualisation of property in Roman law), the reduction in the number of forms of marriage to suit the new conscience (i.e., giving up forms like āśura, rākṣasa and, gāndharva-unions, which are but abduction, rape and seduction), the elaboration of the principle of adoption, and improvement in the civil status and rights of women.

The care of the dependant or destitute woman was then as great a social problem as the unemployed today. At first she was a charge on her family; next the obligation to maintain her was extended also to the clan or sept (kula) and ultimately to the state. Kautilya's recommendation of the provision of workhouses for women will be remembered, as well as his making male relations responsible for the maintenance of their helpless female dependants. The spirit of consideration for the weak, which is a feature of Dharma, is conspicuous in its operation on woman's rights. From mere right of maintenance to her right to inherit is a big advance, but it was already implicit in the Dharma attitude. If Āpastamba could assert
that by marriage a wife gains the right to a moiety of her husband’s spiritual merit (punya) and to none of his sins, the spirit is akin to that of Bryhaspati, who pleads vehemently for the right of the childless widow to inherit her husband’s estate in preference to agnates: “The wife is recognised by the Veda, the Smṛti, the world and men of integrity and virtue as half the husband’s person, and his partner in spiritual benefit. The death of the husband destroys only one-half of his person; the other half survives in the widow. So long as she lives, how can any other person take the dead man’s estate?” The right of the unmarried daughter to the expenses of her marriage was secured. In times of commotion, the weak require protection more than the strong. To a grown-up and fatherless woman, a husband is the natural protector. Marriage becomes an obligation to women, and is treated as a sacrament. It is invested with further attractions. The reaction against Buddhism and Jainism led to an emphasis on marriage, apart from questions of economic statemanship advocating population to make up the wastage of man-power in war, as these religions admitted women as nuns. But it is not necessary to cite Buddhist influence (as done by Dr. Jayaswal) to explain the recognition of the spiritual equality of the sexes in Hindu Dharma. It was there already. The indissolubility of the marriage tie, in later law, cancelling the older permission for separation and divorce, is perhaps due to the fear of the encroachment of Buddhism on the family, by attracting wives to nunneries. The emphatic condemnation of prolonged celibacy and the advocacy of the house-holder’s status, may be due to the reaction against a glorification of renunciation (sanyāśa) for women as well as for men. The medieval Hindu revivals, sanctifying pious works, are responsible for the attempts in digests (e.g., Śmyṭicandrikā and Vyavahāramayūkha) to extend
the widow's powers of alienation of property in which she has only a life-interest. When divorce had been universally denied to high-caste women, it was permitted, (as Kauṭilya did it) to Non-brahmanas; it was saved for the fourth caste, by Kamalākara. The marriage of widows is similarly limited, and then denied. Even virgin widows, to whom leniency had been formerly shown, cannot now remarry, for Devaṇṇa Bhaṭṭa and Madhavācārya explain away Parāśara's permission as barred by the inhibitions of the Kali age (kalivarjya). The time when a 'defender of the faith' like Candragupta II married, like Henry VIII, his brother's widow, without outraging orthodox sentiment, was forgotten. The gradual reduction of the levirate (niyoga), from permission to raise many off-spring to the raising of only one son to carry on the line, and then to positive prohibition, apparently on grounds of abuse by temptation springing from sex-impulse or the desire to retain property (definitely condemned by Vasiṣṭha), till its disappearance after the sixth century A.D., are to be noted on the debit side. But there is positive gain in two directions. Hypergamous unions (asavarnāvivāha) are prohibited as Kalivarjya, and the inhibition was a discouragement of polygamy, already falling through public opinion into desuetude, except in royal families. The growth of orthodox opposition to self-immolation of the widow (sahamarāṇa) was a second gain. Not only did an old jurist like Viṣṇu commend Sati, but there is Greek evidence, for its practice. The citation of Vedic authority for it, as for another famous exception to the rule against suicide (ātmahatyā), is explained away by Medhātithi as analogous to that of black magic, which though found in a Veda, is still unacceptable to the good, and by Devaṇṇa Bhaṭṭa as an inferior Dharma. Bāṇa naturally denounced it. Tantric influence, which ennobled woman's body, went also against it.
It was interdicted to expectant mothers and to Brahman women. The later attempts to annul the prohibition (as by Mādhavācārya and the Bhaṭṭas) is a reaction due to the same aristocratic feeling which made it survive in Rājputana, and which led to holocausts like those of Gāṅgeyadeva (d. 1041), who was burnt with his hundred wives, or similar horrors in later Rajput and Sikh history. As an institution Sati was doomed long before it was legally prohibited in the 19th century.

In two respects there was hardening of the old rules: viz. the readmission to caste privileges of apostates who desired reconversion, and the rehabilitation of the abducted or ravished woman. As regards the latter, there had been a general safeguard against the offences in the Hindu epochs in the law prohibiting the enslavement and ravishing of even slave women by their owners, and of wet-nurses by their employers (Kātyāyana). The abduction of women of respectable families was a graver crime, and the offence was punished with death, (Vasiṣṭha). The offender was included under a special class of criminals (ātāyinah) who could be slain by any one when caught in delicto. Unchastity in a wife did not entail the forfeiture of a right to maintenance, and there were easy penances for the offence. The case of one who had been abducted and forced into conjugal relationship or into an alien religion was ostensibly stronger. Vasiṣṭha, Atri and Parāśāra allow women to be reinstated in such cases after undergoing purificatory rites. Opinion was divided on the question of the readmissibility of a woman who had conceived during abduction, but Devala declared that she should be taken back after she gave birth to the child, which was to be separated from the mother to avoid caste-mixture (varṇa samkara). Vijñānesvara, who is later than
Devala, and lived at the beginning of the period of Musalman occupation, will not admit her to full rights, but will give her only a *locus penitentiae* in her husband's house. Her treatment becomes ungenerous during the period Musulman rule, when it should have been otherwise. The rigor was extended to ordinary unchastity in woman, which was naturally worse, being voluntary. (*Caturvimsatimata*; Aparārka). This attitude shocked Al Beruni. A man who had been taken a prisoner of war and converted to a mleccha religion, and had even associated with mleccha women, might be taken back after purificatory rites, according to Devala. Cases of even persons who had willingly gone over to the mleccha side were to be considered with sympathy. This was in harmony with the old Vedic rule for the admission of the vrātya to Aryan privileges after a ceremony called vrātya-stoma had been performed. Who are *Vrātyas*? The conventional explanation was that persons born in the three higher castes who had neglected to undergo upanayana, or to perform Sāvitrī were *Vrātyas*. A recent writer has made out that the original *Vrātyas* were a powerful civilised community in Eastern India. The common tendency was to equate *Vrātyas*, Mleccha and *Yavana*. Vasiṣṭha, Manu and Yājñavalkya had forbidden association with them, intermarriage with them and their admission to Vedic instruction and to religious rites. But they could be purified by *Vrātyastoma* or by the performance of the *Aṣvamedha* (Vasiṣṭha). The performance of the horse-sacrifice by so many kings of dubious caste in the "dark ages" of our history might probably have been due to this helpful rule. The abduction of women and men, or their being carried into slavery as prisoners of war, must have been an ordinary incident in the Muhammadan epoch. Why should the attitude be stiffened against the rehabilitation of unfortunate
men and women, when their number was so large? Two reasons may be suggested: firstly, whole-sale readmission was viewed differently from isolated cases of readmission, because of the fear of society being swamped by such large-scale reconversion; secondly, the fear of retaliation, directed both against the reconverted persons and against those who made the reconversion. When the power of reprisal was in the hands of a distant enemy it was negligible. But when it lay in men ruling the country, and their religion made apostasy a capital offence, it was to be dreaded. It is noteworthy that Sīvāji readmitted to the Hindu fold his general (Sarṇobat) Netāji Pālkar, who for ten years was a Muslim in Afghanistan and had even married a Musalman lady, after being carried away and forcibly converted to Islam. One of the Nimbālkars had become a Muhammadan. Sīvāji had him taken back and even gave him a daughter in marriage. But when it came to his own case, Sīvāji, would take no risks, and conciliated public opinion. He cheerfully underwent expiatory ceremonies as a vrātya, then had his rite of initiation, long intermitted in his family, and was crowned as a Kṣatriya king only after these ceremonies had been gone through.

Enough has been said to show the wide-spread feeling in heads of society that social well-being depended on the maintenance, in its purity, of traditional rules, and that the extension of such rules to meet new situations had first to be sanctioned by interpretation made in strict conformity with the prescribed rules and methods of investigation. To a ruler the part of the science of Dharma, which was of the most concern was the general part, and not that section, labelled Rājadharmā, which laid down the special duties of his station. Ācara, purification, gifts, and propitiation were directly
relevant to his conception of the duties of his office as King. This is why so many treatises on branches, which are so different from what is popularly regarded as politics, were written either by kings, like Ballālasena, or at the instance of kings, like Hemādri’s Caturvargacintāmanī or Jayasimha-kalpadruma. We may think that an Indian Rāja would have been attracted by what we feel attracted to, viz. Rājanīti, because it relates to polity. But, we should look at it from his standpoint. In an orthodox palace atmosphere, a prince will imbibe knowledge of the special duties of his future office (kingship) almost with his breath. He will not look for much inspiration or new knowledge of even court etiquette from books written by priests or pañḍits. He would feel differently towards civil law, and the different departments of activity with which the remaining sections of Dharmasāstra dealt. This attitude will explain two puzzling features of our Dharma and Nīti literature: viz. (1) the large non-nīti and non-uyavahāra content of Nibandhas written to order; and (2) the fewness, insipidity and unattractiveness of the special treatises on Rājadharma or Rājanīti, particularly when viewed in comparison with their most opulent rival. Among works on Arthasāstra, the only one written by a first-rate statesman was the Kauṭiliya-Arthasāstra; the others were written by pañḍits, or composed by pañḍits and fathered on kings (e.g. Yuktikalpataru of King Bhoja, and Mānasollāsa of King Somesvara of Kalyāṇa). The baffling Sūkranīti is an exception, but its composite character, uncertain age and origin, and mixture of archaism in diction and doctrine with startling modern views, raise special problems of their own. Kāmundaka, Sōmadeva and Hemacandra were poets as well as pañḍits. They wrote literary exercises, and aimed at pleasing, and not at contributions to political science. In the same way, the
handbooks on *Rājadharma*, in the restricted sense, with two exceptions, were composed by paṇḍits: *e.g.* *Rājadharma-prākāśa* of Mitramisra, *Rājanītimayūkha* of Nilakaṇṭha, and *Rājadharma Kaustubha* of Anantadeva.

The two exceptions to the unattractiveness of the narrower *Rājadharma* literature are: (1) the *Rājadharma-kānda* of the *Kṛtyakalpata* and (2) the *Rājanītiratnākara* of Candesvara. The latter has been printed by Dr. K. P. Jayaswal and Dr. A. Bannerji Shastri and has recently passed into a second edition. The former is being edited by me, and will soon be published. Lakṣmīdhara’s work is of importance from several standpoints. He was not only a great and austere Brahman, but he belonged to a family in which high office had descended from father to son. The highest office of his day was that of *Mahāsāndhivigrahika*, a combination of the cabinet duties of the modern ministers of war, foreign affairs, and home affairs. Lakṣmīdhara’s father Hṛdayadhara held the office also in the Gāharwār court. Lakṣmīdhara mentions the admiration which his mastery of law and fact evoked, when he ‘summed up’ as chief judge (*prādvivāka*), and his *finesse* as a minister. Apparently, he passed through the lower appointments before attaining the high office which he held when he wrote the *Kṛtyakalpata* and for which he had to wait till his father vacated it. He was thus a grandee, an inference which is confirmed by his allusion to his many gifts to Brahmans and temples. He represented the flower of the Brahman official hierarchy in his age, unlike his two great contemporaries. Vijñānesvara was not an administrator, and Aparārka was not a Brahman and had also not seen affairs with an intimacy which only a minister can obtain. Candesvara, who came nearly two centuries after Lakṣmīdhara, is
in many respects an "under-study" to Lakṣmīdhara, from whom he borrows extensively. He too was a nobleman (Thakur), a judge and a minister, as well as a scholar, and writer. But he was not a srotriya like his model, and he served in a small kingdom, unlike Lakṣmīdhara who served one of the powerful rulers of the time, Govindacandra of Kanauj (A.D. 1104-1154), who, in the length of his reign, the extent of his territory, prowess as a soldier, and distinction as an administrator, vied with his elder contemporaries in the Dakhan and South India, Vikramāditya VI and Kulottunga I. We might justly expect from these two writers a combination of learning and experience in dealing with Rājadharma, in its narrower sense, which cannot be looked for in treatises of Mitramisra, Nīlakanṭha and Anantadeva. Mitramisra does not also need extended consideration, since he has borrowed whole-sale from Lakṣmīdhara in the most unblushing way.

To take the latter first. Nīlakanṭha's Nitimayūkha does not cite Lakṣmīdhara, and is unlike the Kalpataru, from which he does not borrow in this section of his Bhagavanta Bhāskara. It is a jejune compilation unworthy of its author's reputation, and seems to have been put together simply to round off the digest. It borrows its treatment of policy wholesale from Kāmandaka, the sections on omens and prognostications from Varāhamihira, and the section on war from both, besides using Purānic literature to some extent. There is no sense of reality behind his statements. His patron was a mere nobleman, and Nīlakanṭha himself had no political training. The only topics on which he shows some animation are (1) the discussion whether a non-kṣatriya can be crowned in the old way, a point which he tacitly answers in the affirmative by furnishing a long account of the coronation ceremony, with extracts from
the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, and, (2) the consideration of the rule that a Brahman might be killed in self-defence. Nīlakanṭha takes the view that motive is insufficient, and that the Brahman must actually attempt murder, before he can be killed. He advocates the use of kūṭa-yuddha, or improper war in certain circumstances, a concession to the lowered moral standard of the day.

Anantadeva’s book virtually exhausts itself in three large divisions: architecture, following the injunction that the king should have forts; a treatment of civil and criminal law in their eighteen titles, showing little depth or originality; and a long account of the coronation ceremonies, with a description of the ritual and the mantras to be used on the occasion. The book was probably a manual for a small court like that of his patron Bāja Bahadur Candra of Almora (d. 1678). His special individuality appears only in the following. He recognises a polygamous king, with a chief queen for ceremonial purposes, and the possibility of competition to the succession, from the existence of many sons by different mothers. He recommends primogeniture. The cabinet he envisages is a small one and consists of the Minister, the Chief Priest, the Chief Cook and the Astrologer. He attaches importance to the ceremony of coronation and rules that the title of King should be taken only after coronation. It is noteworthy that S‘ivāji, from whose dominions Anantadeva’s family came, followed this precept, and the official form of dating his reign begins after his coronation in 1674; though he had taken the title of Rājā and declared his independence ten years earlier (1664).

Mitramisra’s book is redeemed by two features: its comprehensiveness, due largely to his absorption of virtually
the greater part of the work of Lakṣmīdhara; and his great learning, which enables him to add corroboration to what is given in his original. His patron Bīrsingh was given considerable freedom by Jahangir, and used his influence with the emperor to strengthen Hinduism. He was more than a petty ruler. It is possible that Mitramisra’s book might have been designed for the guidance of the small kingdom, but the probability is that both the scholar and patron looked for a wider audience. The elaborate description of the coronation of Śivāji, which we find in the Citnis Bakhar is almost word for word in accord with the rules laid down by Mitramisra, following Lakṣmīdhara, for the coronation of a king. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa (Visʿvesvara Bhaṭṭa) who officiated as chief priest at the coronation, and received a lakh as his fee (daḵściṇā) must have followed Mitramisra closely. It is also possible that Sawāi Jaisingh of Amber, the soldier-astronomer, who performed an asvamedha and underwent a coronation in accordance with Hindu rites, followed this work. Mitramisra is a man of affairs, but still a man of his age. He discusses the question whether a ruler should be a kṣatriya only or a consecrated kṣatriya, and affirms the second alternative. His doctrines are strictly in accord with Dharmasāstra. He advocates primogeniture and will not allow partition of a kingdom. His vigilance for the royal fisc is shown by an interpretation of the old rule that the king should make good property lost by theft, to the effect that the liability to the state will not arise where the loss is due to the carelessness of the owner. He shows some originality in the discussion of the theory of Maṅdala, disagreeing with Kāmandaka in some respects, but it is all mere theory, as in the days of Akbar and Jahangir, there was no scope for foreign policy for a subject Rājā. The Brahmaṇa is permitted to fight
in certain emergencies. The duties of the conqueror vis-a-vis the conquered are in accord with tradition and high ethics, and derive some animation from the circumstance that a Hindu prince under the Mughal empire was in the position of a conquered ruler, and that the plea for generous treatment was part of the claim of the surviving Hindu Rājās, whom the Mughal administrators treated as Zamindars.

Candesvara’s Rājanītiratnākara was the work of an octogenarian. It has many points of originality. He hardly uses the work of Lakṣmīdhara, from whom he borrows wholesale in his other works; for, in spite of an acknowledgment of his obligation to the older writer, Candesvara does not follow him either as regards his arrangement of topics, or his doctrine. He omits the treatment of various ceremonies prescribed by Lakṣmīdhara and other later writers for the propitiation of unseen powers. His work is more like the political testament of an old statesman, recording his opinion for the benefit of posterity. His own king was a Brahman and he himself was a Thakur. So, he rules that kings might be of any caste. He ignores the coronation ceremony, and attaches no special constitutional value to it. He recognises de facto sovereignty, and admits the legitimacy of the conqueror. To impress on the king his very limited scope for capricious action, he argues that the state is a society of all persons concerned, including the halt, the maimed, the helpless, and orphans, and that their interests will be sacrificed in a division of a kingdom. He thus just misses anticipating Burke’s famous definition. He is by no means for royal absolutism, or for breach of Dharma by the king. No man of his age could be. He cites the famous text (anonymous) about the divine character of the people, as a set-off to the theory of the divinity of the king.
Though brief, Candesvara's book displays originality, courage, and unconventionality. It was an after-thought, as he had completed his sketch of Dharmaśāstra in seven books, without the need to write specially of king-craft. He would probably not have written even this tract but for the importunity of his sovereign, Bhavesa.

It only remains to describe the Rājadharama-kalpataru, which may be taken as the locus classicus of this type of literature, regarded whether by itself or in its relation to other parts of Dharma in the wider sense. Lakṣmīdhara's work is in 14 books. His omission of vyavahāra in the treatment of Rājadharma is part of an outlook which treated all parts of Dharma as Rājadharma. Its omission in Kāmandaka or Mānasollasa will be a defect, unless the works are viewed as popular supplements to Dharma, devoid of any authority. One feature in Lakṣmīdhara is note-worthy. He will not cite any authority that is not recognised as a source of Dharma. He follows in the arrangement of his quotations the order of enumeration of the sources: sruti, smṛti, itihāsa, ṁpurāṇa and caritra. He assumes a good deal, of what he has said in other sections of his digest. To compile a work on polity by Lakṣmīdhara one would have to lay under contribution several sections of his digest; it cannot be written from his 'Rājadharma' alone. Lakṣmīdhara held the responsible position of chief minister to a king, whose power was daily growing, and yet who had to be educated in Hindu Dharma. It is therefore natural that, as in Kauṭilya's work, he should feel the need to deal with the problems of philosophy and religion, along with administrative organization, recruitment to the king's service, court ceremonial (important in a new dynasty, without tradition),
as well as economic development of a large area, just recovering from war, along with traditional treatment of the rules of taxation and economy, and the beneficial relations of the ruler and the ruled. His special “advance” on the Kautūliya is his elaboration of the magical and ceremonial rites recommended for the safety of king and kingdom. His reticence about foreign relations of the king is noteworthy, but the omission of the Maṇḍala theory is apparently the caution of the political minister, who will not give himself away. The Gāharwār king must have been proud of his kṣatriya lineage, which was questioned. It is proof of Lakṣmīdhara’s independence that the rites which he prescribes for the coronation of even a Rajput king are Purānic and not Vedic. In this respect he is more consistent than his successors, who indiscriminately mixed up the two, for kings whose claim to be kṣatriyas was even more questionable than Govindacandra’s. His magnifying the Brahman is consistent with himself and the tradition of the age. In one respect, he strikes an original note. While he will not countenance the use of deception or barbarism in war, he regards it as a game which should be short and sharp; and he accordingly recommends that the civil population of the enemy should enjoy no immunity from attack or destruction of property, as the aim of war is to put the maximum amount of pressure on the enemy and bring him to his knees quickly. He accordingly advises the laying waste of the enemy’s territory, and the destruction of the enemy’s buildings, water reservoirs, and bridges. But, once an enemy is overcome, the enemy subjects should receive the same considerate treatment as the subjects of the conqueror. Private looting is forbidden in war, and all booty belongs to the king. In civil government, the main principles of Lakṣmīdhara are economy, avoidance of waste, conservation of
resources and respect for the expert. Its modern-ness is what one would expect from a responsible and gifted statesman with great experience in governing a large kingdom. That the man of affairs was also a great Brahman was in conformity with a tradition, which refused to divide the functions of life, or accept any suggestion which would view mundane existence as the only one.

A result of the revived interest in legal texts and *Arthasāstra* in recent years has been a partial redemption of the reputation of Indians for realism and progressive instincts. But there still lurks a belief that religion and *Dharmasāstra* strangled the free growth of legal and political institutions, made for inelasticity, and rendered society unable and unfit to readjust itself to changing conditions and needs. The claim of the old Indian norm (*Dharma*) to be viewed as eternal, infallible and indisputable has been represented as a confession of the want of both the desire and the capacity to move forward. Evidence of such adjustments must force itself on the notice of students of our social history and institutions. It will show that, in spite of the fossilising effect of the norm, the liberal use of fictions enabled some readjustment to be effected. The entire area of a vast literature, which was the creation of religious fervour and an overpowering sense of duty in centuries of kings and thinkers, cannot be summarily condemned as the dismal outpourings of minds in fetters to priest-craft and superstition. Explanations, so facile and so appropriate in a superficial consideration of fragments of a great literature, cannot explain the continued vitality of the culture, and the religious beliefs on which it was based, through centuries of vicissitudes, like foreign invasions, conquest, and wholesale persecution, the like of which
has extinguished civilisation in other lands. That a frequently ravaged society was able to maintain its essential unity and cherished ideals and modes of life, through such calamities and through such a long stretch of time, adapting itself, within the limits of its fundamental beliefs, to the calls of altered needs, and that it ensured to its members a considerable degree of happiness and freedom, with the temper to make use of them, are claims which may be urged on behalf of the great body of tradition and literature called Dharmasāstra. That a study of its scope, aims and implications, along with that of the ways in which it renewed itself from age to age, may prove of use not only to those who accept it without question, but even to those who ardently wish for social change in the interests of wider well-being, among a vast population in which a great many persons have still the faith in it which will help them more readily to accept change if it is in consonance with tried ideals and methods, is the justification for the review which has been attempted in these lectures of what, from its vital bearing on the prosperity of the land, I have, consistently with tradition, to call Rājadharmā.
NOTES

[The figures at the head of the Notes refer to the pages and lines of the text of the lectures, while the figures on the top of Notes refer to the serial numbers of the Notes, which are given for convenience of cross-reference.]

1

1, last line. STUDY OF ANCIENT INDIAN CULTURE

The first Chair on the subject was founded by the late Mahārāja Maṅindracandra Nandi of Cossimbazar. Recently, H. H. the Mahārāja of Baroda has given the University a perpetual grant for the foundation of a Professorship in Ancient Indian Culture and some Fellowships. At Benares candidates can study the subject in all its ramifications from the pass B.A. course to the M.A. and D. Litt. degrees.

2, l. 9

The convention which was set up when the Chair at Madras University was first filled has been maintained with the widening activities of the Department of Indian History. Research more than teaching forms the chief occupation of the staff.

3, ll. 15-16

At Bombay the School of Sociology has produced some useful doctoral theses on Indian Polity and Sociology, marked by scholarship and insight.

2

4, line 23. RĀJADHARMA

The term Rājadharma is now popularly used in the sense of Polity or Rājaniti. It has been so especially since the study of
Ancient Polity was stimulated, if not actually commenced, by the publication in 1909 of Kauṭilya's *Arthasastra* and its translation into English. Lawyers have all along been pre-occupied, since the foundation of British Courts of justice in India, with that part of *Vyavahāra* which deals with inheritance and partition of heritage (*Dāyabhāga*). There has been a belief, which is not justified by Indian tradition, that, as the Hindu king was invested with the duty of adjudicating suits of law, the *Vyavahāra* content of *Dharma-sūstra*, and the special rules for the kings and courts alone constitute *Rājadharma*. The chief purpose of these lectures is to correct the impressions, to show that they are not in consonance with the traditional view of Hindu life or institutions, and to draw attention to the wider implications of the term.

3

5. THE LECTURER'S WORKS

*Ancient Indian Polity* was published in 1914, and a second edition appeared in 1934. *Ancient Indian Economic Thought* appeared at Benares in 1935. The Calcutta Readership lectures were named *Indian Cameralism*, from striking points of resemblance with European Cameralism and the *Arthasastra*. Though delivered in 1934, it has yet to be published.

4

6. USE OF THE KAUṬILĪYA IN MODERN POLITICS

Half in fun and half seriously, European administrators have cited the precepts of Kauṭilya in legislative debates in support of new taxes and the Criminal Intelligence Department.

5

7, II. 29-30. DHARMASAstra AS PRIESTLY TWADDLE

The Gṛhya-sūtras, which form part of the *Dharmasāstra*, have been characterised by a hostile critic as 'not only twaddle, but priestly
twaddle.' Many of the misconceptions of the nature and content of Dharmasāstra may be traced to the criticisms of Sir Henry Maine, made on the basis of the translation of Manusmṛti by Sir William Jones, and in ignorance of Sanskrit, and almost a contempt for it.

Some illustrative passages may be cited:

"The religious oligarchies of Asia, either for their own guidance, or for the relief of their memory, or for the instruction of their disciples, seem in all cases to have ultimately embodied their legal learning in a code; but the opportunity for increasing and consolidating their influence was probably too tempting to be resisted. Their complete monopoly of legal knowledge appears to have enabled them to put off on the world, not so much of the rules actually observed as of the rules which the priestly order considered proper to be observed. The Hindu Code, called the Laws of Manu, which is certainly a Brahman compilation, undoubtedly enshrines many genuine observances of the Hindu race, but the opinion of the best contemporary orientalists is, that it does not, as a whole represent a set of rules actually administered in Hindustan. It is, in great part, an ideal picture of that which, in the view of the Brahmins, ought to be the law. It is consistent with human nature and with the special motives of their authors that Codes like that of Manu should pretend to the highest antiquity and claim to have emanated in their present form from the Deity. Manu, according to Hindu mythology, is an emanation from the Supreme God; but the compilation which bears his name, though its exact date is not easily discovered, is, in point of the relative progress of Hindu jurisprudence, a recent production." (Ancient Law, ed. Pollock, 1927, pp. 15-16. The work was published in 1861).

"Hindoo law, which I have placed by the side of Roman law, calls assuredly for no euology. It is full of monstrous iniquities, and has been perverted in all directions by priestly influence. But then a great deal of it is of prodigious antiquity, and, what is more important, we can see this ancient law in operation before our eyes. British legislation has corrected some of its excesses, but its
principles are untouched, and are still left to produce some of their results.” (Early History of Institutions, 1874, p. 309).

8, ll. 1-7. SMALL CONTENT OF LAW AND POLITY IN DHARMAS'ÄSTRA

In Manusmṛti only three books, viz. the seventh, eighth and the ninth treat of politics and law proper, and take up about 980 verses against 1580 for the rest. In Vājañnavalkyasmṛti, the last (i.e. 13th adhikarana) of the first book, and the whole of the second deal with polity and law, and take up 367 verses out of the total 1009. In the reconstructed Brhaspati-smṛti, I have gathered 1288 verses (including some half-slokas) on law and polity, as against 1037 on the rest of the normal content of Dharmas'āstra. As Brhaspati's work concentrates on Vyavahāra, the large content of non-vyavahāra element in it is noteworthy. Parāsarasmṛti, as is well known, has no Vyavahāra or Rājadharma content, while the extant Nāradasmṛti is equally exceptional in having virtually only a vyavahāra element, which is noticeably very small in the Dharmasūtra literature, being relatively most abundant, while still relatively smaller than the non-vyavahāra element in Viṣṇusmṛti the only smṛti in sūtra form which has relatively a large vyavahāra content.

If we turn to the nibandhakāras, we find that only two out of the fourteen books of the Kalpataru of Lakṣmīdhara are devoted to Rājanīti and Vyavahāra. Jimūtavāhana's Dāyabhāga was exclusively devoted to a part of vyavahāra, as his Vyavahāra-mātykā was also, but he recognised the value of the non-vyavahāra element by writing a much larger work on Kālanirnaya, (i.e. the Kālaviveka, Bibliotheca Indica, 1905). His lost Dharmaratna, of which both the Kālaviveka and the Dāyabhāga are declared in their colophons to be parts, will if recovered furnish another illustration of the principle enunciated. (Kane, History of Dharmas'āstra, p. 319). Of the twenty-eight tattvas of Ragunandana only two (viz. on
dāya and vyavāhara) bear on law proper. Every large and complete digest will furnish similar instances.

8, II. 28-30. HALHED'S CODE

The original of N. B. Halhed's Gentoo Code, published in 1776, was a Persian translation of the Vivādaṁavaśetu (Bridge over the Ocean of Litigation) which was composed by a committee of smārtas named in the following sloka, which appears at the end of the printed edition of the work:

Bālesvara-Kṛṣṇarāma-Sāma-Gopāla-Kṛṣṇajivanakhyaiḥ ।
Vīresvara-Kṛṣṇacandra-Srī-Gaurikāntābhidhānaiḥ
ṣadbhīḥ ॥
Kālasaṅkara-Syāmasundra-Kṛṣṇakesava-samgaiḥ ।
Sitārāmasangaisca kṛto granthaiḥ sāhuratu sābhāyam ॥

There is no mention of the Mahārāja Ranjit Singh of Lahore, to whose inspiration the publisher attributed this work. The Oriental Manuscripts Library at Madras has a copy of this work with the title Vivādaṁava-bhaṅjana. It should not be confused with Jagannatha's famous digest, which H. T. Colebrooke translated in 1798. The title of the latter, which is still unpublished, is Vivāda-bhaṅgāṁava.

9, I. 2. COLEBROOKE'S DIGEST

This famous work, which has been extensively used by the British courts was published first in 1797 by H. T. Colebrooke. It is a translation of the sections on contract and succession of a digest specially composed by Jagannātha Tarkapaścānana of Triveni on the Ganges in 1796. Jagannātha is the last great nibandhakāra. He is said to have died at the great age of 111 in 1806. If it be so, he must have been a centenarian when the digest was composed, a

9, First Paragraph. Early English Translations of Dharmasāstra and Works on Hindu Law

Sir William Jones translated *Manusmrti* following Kullūka’s commentary, and an edition was published in 1796, after his death. He was responsible for the suggestion to undertake a comprehensive digest, and the *Vivādasārārṇava* of Trivedi Sarvorus’arman was composed accordingly in 1789. Meantime, the *Vivādārṇavasetaḥ* had been compiled in 1773, and was the original of Halhed’s *Code of Gentoo Laws*, 1776, published in 1781. Jagannatha’s *nibandha* was partially translated as ‘Digest of Hindu Law’ by T. E. Colebrooke, in 1797. Colebrooke published in 1810 his translations of Jīmūtavāhana’s *Dāyabhāga* and the *Dāyabhāga* section of the *Mitākṣaraḥ*. Borrowdale’s translation of the *Vyavahāramayūkha* appeared in 1827. The *Dāyakramasamgraha* was translated by P. M. Wynch in 1818. It was by Śri Kṛṣṇa Tarkālaṅkāra, and an edition of it was published in 1828. The *Dattaka-mīmāṁsā* of Nandapaṇḍita and the *Dattaka-candrikā* of Kubera was published by J. C. C. Sutherland in 1821. Sir Thomas Strange published his *Hindu Law* in 1825. In 1829 appeared Sir Willaim Hay Macnaghten’s ‘Principles and Precedents of Hindu Law’ in the same year as his father Sir Francis Macnaghten’s *Considerations on Hindu Law*. Goldstücker wrote his *Present Administration of Hindu Law*, in 1871. Meantime, A. C. Burnell had published a translation of the *Dāyabhāga* section of Mādhava’s *bhāṣya* on *Parāsarasmṛti* in 1868, which he followed up by a translation of the same section of Varadarāja’s *Vyavahāranirṇaya*, which I am about to publish for the first time. Vācaspata Miśra’s *Vivādacintāmaṇi* was translated in 1865 by P. C. Tagore, and the sections on inheritance in the *Smytticandrikā* were translated by T. Krishnaswami Aiyar in 1867. In 1868 Prosonno Coomar Tagore left by
will the funds for the foundation of the famous Tagore Law Professorship in the University of Calcutta, and H. Cowell gave in 1870 the first course of lectures under this foundation, and chose Hindu Law as his subject.

10

10, ll. 8-10. JIMUTAVĀHANA’S INTEREST IN NON-VYAVAHĀRA

The colophon to the Dāyabhāga, the most famous work of Jimūtavāhana, ends thus “Dharmaratne Dāyabhāgaḥ samāpttaḥ.” The same reference to Dharmaratna occurs in the colophon to his Kālaviveka (Bibliotheca Indica, 1905). The last words in the Kālaviveka “Samāptamcedam Bhūratne Dharmaratnam” will indicate that this section was the last in the Dharmaratna. The complimentary verse at the end of the section refers to the bigger work and its occurrence at the end of Kālaviveka will also suggest that the Dharmaratna terminated with the section of Kāra:

Bahuvirāda-vivāda-timiragratam grahaṇam raveḥ svasāṅkasya 1
Tad-dharmaratnādipālōkāt sakalam vilokayata 11

His Vyavahāramātṛka, which was published by Sir Asutosh Mookerjee in 1912, does not show this reference to Dharmaratna in the colophon, which ends thus:

Iti Pāribhadra Mahāmahopādhyāya Śrī Jimūtavāhana-kṛta Vyavahāramātṛkā samāptā. It is possible that the other sections of the Dharmaratna were never written, though planned.

11

10, ll. 10-11. MĀDHAVAŚĀRYA’S KĀLAVIVEKA OR KĀLANIRṆAYA

The reason given by Mādhavācārya for selecting Parāsara-smṛti for comment is that Parāśara’ is work was the most
resplendent among smṛti (Smṛti-suṣamā-parāśaraḥ) and it was not commented on by any previous writer:

Parāśarasmṛtih pūrvair na vyākhyātā nibandhrbbhiḥ ||
Mayāto Mādhavāryeṇa tad-vyākhyāyām prayatyate. ||

As this smṛti does not treat of kāla, just as it did not treat of vyavahāra and rājadharma, Mādhava seems to have felt the need to write a separate treatise on kāla, as he could not fasten one on a verse in the original, as he did his disquisition on law and government. His action shows how he felt that the treatment of these topics, which were omitted by Parāśara, were needed to round off the nibandha.

10, ll. 14-16. MIXTURE OF SPIRITUAL AND SECULAR PUNISHMENTS IN THE HINDU CRIMINAL CODE

The connection between sin and crime is shown by the view that they are identical, every crime being an offence against God and therefore a sin, and every sin, in primitive society at least, being an offence against the order established along with the state, and therefore punishable by the state. Sir Henry Maine pointed out in 1861 (Ancient Law, ed. Pollock, p. 381) that primitive jurisprudence knows both sins and torts. "Of the Teutonic codes, it is almost unnecessary to make this assertion, because those codes in the form in which we have received them, were compiled or recast by Christian legislators. But it is also true that non-Christian bodies of archaic law entail penal consequences on certain classes of acts, and on certain classes of omissions, as being violations of divine prescriptions and commands." The sinful nature of crimes was known to Europe, and is shown by the post-mortuary punishments for some classes of crime, like violent robbery, and suicide, by refusal of Christian burial. The Church’s refusal of absolution for certain offences is noteworthy.
NOTES

The relations between spiritual and worldly punishments is explained at some length by J. Jolly, *Hindu Law and Custom*, pp. 250-270. It is worth studying. *Viṣṇusmrīti*, 33-42, gives an elaborate catalogue of sins (*pātaka*), which the king should punish (*ib. pp. 250-252.*) For an offence there is expiation in two ways, by undergoing punishment at the hands of the king, as *punishment purifies* (*Manusmrīti*, VIII, 318) and by performing the prescribed penances, except in cases for which no penance can be prescribed, owing to their moral gravity. Expulsion from society (*tyāga*) corresponds to excommunication, *i.e.* cast-throwing. "In all the *smṛtis* an elaborate admixture of spiritual and worldly punishments is in evidence." (*ib. p. 263*) Penance as well as punishment was prescribed for almost all crimes. (*ib. pp. 267-268.*) It should be noted that the power of the king as the wielder of the 'rod of punishment' and of the community in arranging for readmission after penance, meant a capacity, by refusal of penance or punishment, to make the culpability continue in future lives, *i.e.* after death. A careful calculation of the effects of a punishment of this combined nature in the case of apparently preferentially treated persons, like Brāhmaṇas, might show that what appears, in a sceptical age as immunity or special consideration, is in reality a relatively heavy load for the class of apparently exempted offenders.

11. II. 5-11. BRĀHMAṆA IMMUNITIES

"Kauṭīlya believes in the immunities of Brahmins in several matters, frees them generally from corporal punishment, only providing that they be branded, or imprisoned in cases of *serious* crime, exempts their property from escheat and from forced contributions, and even provides for their receiving substantial largesses from the King, in cases where an innocent man has been punished. In these, he is like Manu, though he does not go to the lengths to which Manu would proceed in giving such privileges and immunities. But, Kauṭīlya would apparently not except even,
Brahmans from the law against suicide, while, in cases of their committing treason he would have them drowned, and he would also allow the Brahman to be killed on the battlefield or in self-defence" (Ancient Indian Polity, pp. 33-34. In II, i of the Arthasāstra fines are prescribed to those, who, though able to do so, do not support (a-bībhrataḥ saktimato) a number of named dependants like children, wife, parents, brothers under age, and sisters who are unmarried or have been widowed, but it is expressly stated that this injunction will not apply to claims for maintenance from these if they are out-castes or apostates (anyatra patitēbhyaḥ), but an exception to the saving clause is in favor of the mother (anyatra mātuḥ).

In the Sukraniti (IV, i, II. 194-22) occurs a long catalogue of persons whom the king is enjoined to punish, and among them are the atheist (nāstikaḥ) and the blasphemer (Deva-dūṣakaḥ). Mahāmahopadhyāya R. Shama Ṣastri has misunderstood the rule, and states that the failure of the mother and the apostate to maintain their dependants is not punishable!

11, II. 13-21. Alleged Secular Nature of Arthasāstra

See pp. 38-40, Ancient Indian Polity, where many instances are cited to show the sacerdotalism of the Arthasāstra of Kauṭilya, the most illustrious of its class. From the standpoint of Dharmasāstra.

According to the Caranaṇavyūha of S’aunaka, Arthasāstra is an Upa-Veda of Atharva-veda. The Atharva Veda is recognised as one of the four Vedas, which form the fourteen sources (sthānāni) of Dharma in Yājñavalkya, I, 3. As Aparārka points out, if the number fourteen was not specified, and the Vedas were mentioned as Trayī, the Atharva-Veda would have lost its place as a source (p. 6: Caturdasa-grahaṇādyāte Atharva-veda-samgrahona syāt.) The enumeration of another four, to make up eighteen "sources," by Viṣṇupurāṇa is dismissed by Aparārka with the observation that it catalogues the sources of vidyā not dharma.
In the four *Arthasastra* is named last. The *Arthasastra* is also included in *Itihāsa-Purāṇa*, thus bringing it into the canon of Dharma. The authors of Dharma-pradīpa have erred in suggesting that *Arthasastra* is of no canonical authority, and that therefore the dictum ‘Rājā kālasya kāraṇam’ being an *Arthasastra* dictum (l) should not be accepted, (p.15). The sentence occurs in a famous passage in the *Māhabhārata*, to which Dharma-pradīpa will not deny validity.

Manu denied the right to expound or study the *Dharmasastra* to non-Brāhmaṇas (II, 16-17):

*Niśekādi smavānānto mantraiḥ yasyodito vidhiḥ l
Tasya vāstre adhikārosmin jñeyo nānyasya karhicit l
Viduṣa brāhmaṇena idam adhyātavyam ārṣyatnataḥ l
Siṣyebhyasca pravaktavyam samyak nānyena kenaicit l*

The Chāndogya Upaniṣad (III, iv, 1-3,) equates *Itihāsa-Purāṇa* with the Atharva-veda, but they are open (according to Śankara, *Vedānta-sūtras*, XXXIV, S.B.E., p. 229,) to all four castes.

15

12, l. 7 ff. TOLERATION OF HERESY AND HETERODOXY

Three inscriptions of Asoka in the Barābar hill show that in the thirteenth and twentieth years of his reign he bestowed the rock-cut caves to the heretical Brāhmaṇa sect of the Ājīvakas. (Smith, *Asoka*, p. 144, ed. 1901). The Vahiya inscription of his grandson Dasāratha states that immediately after his accession he bestowed “on the venerable Ājīvakas” the cave “to be a dwelling place for them as long as the sun and the moon endure.” (ib. p. 145).

The Ājīvakas are known only from their rivals the Jains and the Buddhists. Gośala Mankaliputta, the contemporary of Mahāvīra and at one time his follower, is said to have led the Ājīvakas at the time. They seem to have held that the soul had color (Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, I, 1940, p. 292n) and also the atomic hypothesis (ibid., II, 194n).
Manusmṛti (IV, 61) refers to pāṣaṇḍi-gaṇa (association of heretics). Yājñavalkya, II, 192 provides for the maintenance of the regulations of their guilds:

Sreni-naigama-pāṣaṇḍi-gaṇānāmaṇayam vidhiḥ
Bhedam caisāṃ nyuḥ rakṣet, pūrva-vṛttim ca pālayan. ||

Nārada and Kātyāyana repeat the rule (vide my Ancient Indian Economic Thought, 1934, p. 184 where their words are cited). Medhātithi (on Manu, IV, 30), Vijñānesvara (II, 192) and Kullūka on Manu, (IV, 30) define the pāṣaṇḍa as one who rejects the Veda, and so the Buddhists and Jains were also brought into the category. It is possible that the reference in Manu is to monasteries of Buddhists and Jains. The audience to petitioners precedes the inquiry by the king into their affairs. Kauṭiliya (p. 39) advises the king to deal personally with the affairs of gods, heretics, learned Brāhmaṇas, cattle, sacred places, minors, the aged, the afflicted, the helpless and women, in the order of enumeration.

Tasmād devatāsrama-pāṣaṇḍa-srotriya-ḥasu-पुंयास्त्थानānām bal-vṛddha-vyādhita-vyasīnanāthānām striṇām ca krameṇa kāryāṇi pasyet.

For the king’s studies see Ancient Indian Polity, p. 39, note 63.

16

13, II. 4-9. DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS LAW

The Arthasāstra distinguishes the courts as Dharmasthīya and Kantakasodhana, and the third and fourth books of the Kauṭiliya are devoted to them. In regard to the treatment of subjects, there is little difference between Kauṭiliya and the smṛtis, and it may be therefore assumed that he followed only the Dharmasāstra. The differences between him and Yājñavalkya are for instance inconsiderable. The Dharmasthīya courts dealt not only with the civil matters included in the usual “eighteen titles of law,” but also sāhasam (violent crime) and assault (dauḍa-pāruṣya). Theft
had a great extension given to it by construction, so as to include abduction, on the principle that it is the theft of a human being, (Manu, VIII, 317) cheating in trade, (Yājñavalkya, II, 257) substitution of an article in deposit (ib. 246-247), and combinations of traders to raise prices (held again to be deceitful, ib. 249-250). The Kanṭakasvodhana courts dealt with such civil matters as the affairs of artisans, labourers and merchants, and offences against police regulations such as those relating to prostitutes. Capital punishment cases came under them, as did all police and magisterial enquiries and investigations. It is clear that roughly the difference was that between the courts of a judge and a magistrate in British India today. The differentiation was not made on the ground of secularity or religion. (vide, Jayaswal, Manu and Yājñavalkya, pp. 116-7) and V. R. Ramachandra Dikshitar, Mauryan Polity, pp. 160-164.

Not only therefore is there no clear distinction between religious and secular law, which in the circumstances we can not expect, but the lines of demarcation between crime and civil wrong is not clear. In most crimes, the offender has not only to undergo punishment by fine etc. but he incurs the liability to pay to the injured party due compensation. The underlying idea is that they are not public offences but private injuries. Offences against the spirit of religion take the place of grave crimes against the state. This is the ground of the serious view taken of adultery and offences against women. The original punishment for adultery had been death, but Kaṭṭilya reduced it to imprisonment and fine (op. cit., p. 228). The rule in Sukranitti making adultery and offences against women crimes in which the king prosecutes (IV, v, 83 ff.) is the result of viewing them as grave moral offences, likely to lead to varṇa-samkara. It would appear superficially that, (as suggested by Mr. C. S'ankararāma S'āstri, Fictions in the Hindu Law Texts, 1926, p. 35,) contrary to Sir Henry Maine’s generalisation, criminal law in India was the creature of civil law. The correct view is to regard both as the creatures of Dharma.
13, II. 9-11. Divinity of Punishment or Daṇḍa

This is indicated in Manusmṛti, VII, 14 and Yājñavalkya, I, 353.

Taysiathe sarva-bhūtānāṁ goptāram dharmamātmaṁ |
Brahmatejomaṁ Daṇḍamasṛjat pūrvam Isvaraḥ ||
and Dharmo hi Daṇḍa-rūpena Brahmanā nirmitaḥ purā ||

13, II. 13—14. Vedic Basis of Hindu Law

The assumption that not only all law and usage but all knowledge is enshrined in the Veda, leads to the conclusions that (1) there should be internal consistency in law, (2) the differences which appear are resolvable by enquiry, and (3) for every rule of law a vedic basis can be discovered. As the Veda is eternal, omniscient and infallible, and the Vedas have no limit (anantā vai vedāḥ), it should be possible to say of them what was claimed for the Mahābhārata (I, lxii, 26) viz., ‘what is not here is nowhere else’ (yun nāhāsti na kutraccit).

The Mimāmsa school held ‘the Vedas entirely and exclusively concern themselves with Dharma,’ Dharma being defined by Jaimini in his second aphorism as ‘that which is signified by a direction and leads to a benefit’ (Codanālakṣaṇārtho dharmāḥ). When one is unable to find Vedic authority for a rule, he would assume that the sruti had passed out of view (utsanna, lost) or is hidden (pracchanna), and the sruti text will come to view if diligently searched for. A bhāṣyakāra’s skill and learning are shown by his discovery of the texts which refer to the matters dealt with. Medhātithi and Vis'varūpa display the capacity, and particularly the latter, of whose work a modern writer has remarked that it “seems to have been written with the set purpose of establishing the Vedic origin of the Smṛtis.” (Fictions in Hindu Law Texts, p. 79).

“When it is said that the Vedas are the source of Dharma, it is not meant that the Vedas lay down precepts or injunctions
(vidhi) on points of Hindu Law, as later works like Manusmṛti or Yājñavalkyasmṛti do. All that is meant is that the Vedas contain incidental references to matters that are of interest to students of Hindu Law, that they take certain facts as well-known and make use of them for various purposes. The information that is contained in the Vedas on matters of Hindu Law is in the nature of what are known as arthavādas in the Mīmāṃsa system. As arthavādas form a syntactical unity with the positive injunctions (vidhis) laid down in the Vedas, they are authoritative. They indicate with sufficient clearness what the state of things then was. If one were to collect together the scattered Vedic texts on such topics of Hindu Law as marriage, adoption, joint family, partition, inheritance, strīdhana, he would find that the information is of considerable importance and is not quite so meagre as one is apt to suppose. The conclusion will irresistibly force itself upon us that the foundations of the Hindu Law are deeply laid in the Vedic age itself, that the peculiar characteristics that distinguish the Hindu Law of modern times from other systems of law had their germ in the Vedic period and that later Hindu jurists were not wrong when they relied upon the Veda as the first source of Dharma. Mr. P. V. Kane, who has made the above observations, has collected a number of illustrations in justification of the conclusions in a valuable paper on the Vedic Basis of Hindu Law, published in 1939.

13, ll. 14-15. Doctrine of Option (Vikalpa)

The option or vikalpa can only be when there is a conflict between two vedic passages, and not when a śmṛti rule runs against a sruti, because the latter over-rides the former. But it is open to argue that with due diligence a sruti-pramāṇa may be discovered for the śmṛti rule in question. To assume otherwise will lead to the summary and easy rejection of many śmṛti rules on the ground of their not being traced to sruti. This is the
orthodox Mīmāṃsaka standpoint, which further is that action in such a case should be suspended pending the discovery (Fictions in Hindu Law Texts, p. 116).

13, ll. 16-27. CONFLICTS OF LAW NOT REAL

Strict interpretation according to Mīmāṃsa will hold all conflict to be apparent only and not real, because of the canonical authority claimed for both Arthasastra and Dharmasastra. But such a possibility is envisaged in the smṛti texts on conflicts of laws, e.g. Yājñavalkya’s dictum (II, 21):

Arthasastrāt-tu balavad dharmasastram iti sthitih

The same principle is enunciated by Nāradasmṛti (I, 99):

Yatra vipratipattis-syāt dharmasastrā-rthasastryoḥ
Arthasastroktamutsṛjya dharmasastroktamācāre

The doctrine of infallibility of the common source of both śāstras might justify the conclusion that sruti can not be opposed to equity and logic (nyāya) and the position taken by Kauṭilya in the following passage:

Śāstram vipratipadyetā dharma-nyāyena kenacit
Nyāyas-tatra pramāṇam syāt, tatra paṭho hi nasyaṁ

See Ancient Indian Polity, pp. 164-172.

The facile assumption that Arthasastra is an inferior authority and should therefore be overlooked when it runs counter to Dharmasastra is repugnant to the orthodox tradition. Accordingly, in explaining the dictum of Yājñavalkya (II, 21) the Mitākṣarā maintains that the word “arthasastra” in the rule is not to well-known writers like Us’anas (S’ukra) but to the arthasastra contained in Dharmasastra works. If there is a conflict within the Dharmasastra between the two classes of rules, the Dharma rule should
prevail. He illustrates it by two cases. (1) Manu (VIII, 350-351) enjoins the summary killing of an ātatāyin (manifest assassin, and his like) even if he be a learned Brāhmaṇa. To act on the direction will be to go against a rule of Manu (XI, 89) that there is no explanation for the deliberate killing of a Brāhmaṇa. The former is an arthā text, which should give way to the latter, a Dhārma rule. The reconciliation comes from taking the reference to the learned Brāhmaṇa ātatāyin as a rhetorical statement emphasising the force of the injunction on the treatment of assassins, patent and constructive, and applying the dictum to cases other than those of Brāhmaṇas. (2) Yājñavalkya, I, 352 gives a rule of prudence, vis. that the making of a friend is better than the acquisition of land and wealth, but he has also the high moral rule (II, 1) that free from anger and covetousness the judge should decide in accordance with Dharmasāstra. If a wealthy suitor is to be unjustly favored, the first rule may be observed, but it should not, being an artha precept opposed to a dharma rule.

Vijñānās'vara in discussing the texts dealing with gains of science, etc. (II, 118-119), which, if acquired without detriment to ancestral property (pitṛ-dravyāvirodhena), belong to the acquirer and cannot be claimed by co-parceners, states that the section of the code is full of texts based on worldly experience:

Lokasiddhāṣṭa anuvādatāṇyena prāyenā asmin prakaranē vacanāni.

21

14, l. 10. Schools of Arthasastra

There was no appreciable development of the subject after Kauṭilya. He cites seventeen authorities. See Ancient Indian Polity, p. 50. Among them are writers with names which became famous in smṛti literature, like Kātyāyana, Nārada, Parāś'ara and Bṛhaspati. It is not improbable that the same writers could have written on both sāstras.
14, i. 11. APPLICATION OF MĪMĀMSA TO DHARMAŚĀTRA AND ARTHASĀTRA

Bhaṭṭasvāmin’s commentary on the Kauṭilyya of which a fragment has been edited (Jayaswal and Banerji-Sastri, Patna, 1926) shows familiarity with Mīmāmsa methods of interpretation. Saṅkarārya’s commentary on Kāmandakṣyā Nītisāra (ed. Gaṇapati S'āstri, 1912) shows similar training. But they are inferior to great commentators like Medhātithi, Viśvarūpa and Viśnānesvāra, and even to men like Nandapāṇḍita.

14, ii. 17-18. ARTHASĀTRA CORE OF SMṚTIS

There is a good deal of Arthasāstra in Manu, and even more of it in Yājñavalkya, with whose code Jolly made a detailed comparison of the Kauṭilyya (Z. D. M. G., 1913, pp. 43-96) collecting in an appendix parallels from the smṛtis to over 200 passages of the Arthasāstra. Kauṭilya’s doctrines are not merely more like those of Yājñavalkya than those of any other smṛti, but the points of verbal identity are greater between the two. Jolly held that Kauṭilya was the borrower. I have shown grounds for thinking otherwise. See Ancient Indian Polity, pp. 34-37.

14, ii. 14-16. BRAMANICAL REACTION FROM THE FIRST CENTURY A.D. FAVORS DHARMAŚĀTRA

In an epoch of Vedic revival and sacrifices, the Mīmāṃsaka finds the attraction of the smṛti and the Kalpaśūtras greater than that of the Arthasāstra. He specializes in Vedic exegesis (e.g. S'abarasyāmin, Kumārila). He states emphatically that as “the Veda is the only source of Dharma, so Dharma is the only topic dealt with by the Veda, (S'ankararama S'āstri, op. cit., p. 52). Bhāṣya, Samgraha, and Nibandha forms of composition rapidly progress with the means supplied by Mīmāṃsa for subtle and exact analysis and interpretation. The comparative study of smṛtis gains ground.
14, ll. 20-22. Kāmandaka’s Nītisāra

Kāmandaka attempts to write his book in Kāvya style. In fact, his commentator, Sankarārya regarded it as a mahā-kāvya and made his comments on the assumption. Not only does Kāmandaka use the ordinary anuśṭhūpa metre, but he tries more ornate metres also. Though he begins with a panegyric on Viṣṇu-gupta (i.e. Kauṭilya), his book is not a summary of the Kauṭilya, of which not over-much use is made. Kāmandaka apparently intended his work to be an artha-samhitā, just as the Manusmṛti is a dharma-samhitā. The Nītisāra is divided into sargas or cantos like a classical poem. It begins with the praise of the king, and was apparently not familiar with other forms of Government:

Rājāsya jagato hetur vrddher-vrddhābhisammataḥ |
Nayanāndajanananaḥ sasvānka iva tojadheḥ II

The second line, which states that the king delights the eye as the moon gladdens the ocean, appears to contain a half-veiled reference to Candragupta II, the son and successor of Samudragupta. Sasvānka is Candra, and Toyadhī is Samudra.

The Nītisāra is generally supposed to be a work of the Gupta epoch. Formichi (cited in Sarkar’s Hindu Positivism, p. 385) would assign its composition to the third or fourth century A.D. He regards it as anterior to the Brhat-samhitā of Varāhamihira (sixth century). Formichi’s estimate will fit in with my suggestion that the Nītisāra is a work of the time of Candragupta II.

Kāmandaka’s simile will recall to one’s mind Kālidāsa’s verse (Raghuvamsa, III, 41).

Nīvātāpaḍamastimitena caṅsūṣa nyāsya kāntam |
piṭataḥ sūtananaṁ I
Mahodadheḥ pūra ivendu-darsanāt guruh praḥarṣaḥ |
prababhūva nātmanti II

See below the note to p. 56, ll 29-30.
17, ll., 8-9. SūTRA FORM OF COMPOSITION

Dr T. W. Rhys Davids pointed out in the introduction to his translation of the Dialogues of the Buddha (I, pp. xx-xxii) that the chief characteristic of the sūtra was that it was not intended to be read but to be memorised. See also, E. J. Rapson, Ancient India, 1914, pp. 76-77 and my Ancient Indian Polity, pp. 19-20. The use of the sūtra form was dictated by considerations of economy, oral transmission, and secrecy.

27

17, ll. 21-25. FORMAL PUBLIC RECITATIONS OF SŪTRAS

The Buddhists having adopted the sūtra form for their sacred canon were obliged, like the Brahmans when they devised means for the accurate preservation and transmission of the Veda, to resort to public recitations in their convocations of the suttas of the Tripiṭaka. The permutations of syllables in different forms (pātha) by which the Vedas were conserved, were not adopted by the Buddhists as their suttas would not lend themselves, by lack of accentuation, to such devices. A sūtra work will be often nothing more than a list of headings. The late Mahāmahopādhyāya T. Gaṇapati Sāstri suggested that in the Kauṭiliya the sūtras were all in the adhikaraṇa-samuddesa in the first chapter, and that the rest of the book was Kauṭilya’s own commentary on them, as he had declared that in order to avoid in the case of his work the errors of commentators he had himself composed both the sūtra and the commentary.

28

18, ll. 7-10. LOST SMṛTI-BHĀSYAS

Vide, Kane, op. cit., p. 724 (Yajñasvāmin’s bhāṣya on Vāṣistha-Dharmasūtra mentioned by Govindasvāmi in his commentary on
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Bodhāyana-Dharmasūtra, II, 2, 51); p. 248 and p. 680 on Asahā-ya’s bhāṣya on Gautama and Manu; the loss of the other commentaries is inferential.

29

18, ll. 10-15. DISTANCE OF TIME BETWEEN SMṚTIS AND COMMENTARIES

Karka, the commentator on the sūtras of Pāraskara is a writer of about A.D. 1000, while his text belongs to the sūtra age. Maskarin, the commentator of Gautamadharṣmaṇa (one of the oldest) belongs probably to the same period as Karka. Haradatta, who wrote commentaries on the sūstras of Āpastamba and the Gṛhyasūtra of Āśvalāyana and the Dharṣmaṇa of Gautama, must have been separated by over twelve centuries at least from his originals.

30

19, ll. 5-10. KAUṬILYA’S OWN BHĀṢYA ON THE ARTHASĀSTRA

See Note 27 supra. The search for a lost bhāṣya of Kauṭilya is unnecessary in view of Dr. Gaṅapaṭi Sāstri’s convincing explanation. The declaration of Kauṭilya occurs at the end of his work; (p. 429).

Drṣṭvā vipratipattim bahudhā sāstresu bhāṣyakārānāṃ
Svayameva Viśnuguptas-cakāra sūtram ca bhāṣyam ca

Even if this verse is not Kauṭilya’s, it will have to be accepted as representing an authentic tradition.

31

20, ll. 1-5. MĀDHAVA’S TREATMENT OF VYAVAHĀRA AND RĀJADHARMA

This portion of his commentary stands out of the main bhāṣya like an appendix, which it is. It is virtually a separate nibandha. A similar South Indian nibandha on Vyavahāra, not tacked on to
smṛti like Mādhava’s, is Varadarāja’s Vyavahāranirṇāṇaya, which I am about to publish.

32

20, ll. 6-7. RECENT BHĀŚYAS AND NIBHANDHAS

Mahārāja S’arabhoji of Tanjore (A.D. 1798-1833), who had left himself no kingdom to govern, compiled a digest on civil law named Smṛtisāra-samuccaya. The second Maharājā of Kāśmir and Jammu, Ranbir Singh (A.D. 1857-1885) commissioned a nibandha of which the Prāyahascitta-kāṇḍa was completed and published. It contains over 40,000 granthas. Ācarendu of Nārāyaṇa (printed by the Ānandrāṣṭrama) was written in A.D. 1838 (Kane, op. cit., p. 514).

The famous Bālambhaṭṭya on the Mitakṣarā was composed by Balakṛṣṇa alias Bālambhaṭṭa Pāyagūnde at Benares towards the end of the eighteenth century. The date of the writer is given by the late Babu Govinda Das as 1740-1830. He was known to Colebrooke. Keśavadāsa composed between 1770 and 1830 the digest Ahalyā-kāmadhenu, so named so after Ahalyā Bai Holkar. Warren Hastings, Sir William Jones and H. T. Colebrooke were responsible for getting written the Vivādārṇavasetu, (1773), Vivādasārārṇava (1789) and Vivāda-bhaṅgārṇava (before 1796) by a board of pandits, Sarvoroṣ’tarman Trivedi and Jagannātha Tarkāpañcāṇama respectively.

33

20, ll. 26-29. NON-INCLUSION OF YĀJÑAVALKYASMṚTI IN “THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE ĖAST” SERIES

A translation of Yājñavalkyasmṛti was advertised in the series in 1876 (p. xlvi of Vol I.) and it is not clear why it was dropped, Max Müller’s Life and Autobiography throw no light on the cause of the omission. Perhaps it was dropped owing to the publication of V. N. Mandlik’s translation in 1880.
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34

20, II. 28-32. ATTITUDE OF INDIAN COURTS TO DHARMAŚĀTRA

A criticism of my observation that revived interest in the sources of Hindu law is due to Indian judges and lawyers possessed of a knowledge of Sanskrit is that Indian judges have been often more anxious to ignore the sources and change the law than European judges. There is an element of truth in the criticism. Hindu law is parting more and more from the traditional law through judicial interpretation chiefly; and such interpretations are due as often to the importation of exotic notions into Hindu jurisprudence as to the wish to bring law into conformity with the "modern conscience." Sir Henry Maine was never tired of attacking European judges in India as being more scrupulous about the religion and the religious usages of Hindus than the Hindus were. The following is a sample of his attack. "It has been said by an eminent Indian lawyer that, when the judges of the Sudder Courts were first set to administer native law, they appear to have felt as if they had got into fairyland, so strange and grotesque were the legal principles on which they were called upon to act. But after a while they were accustomed to the new region, and began to behave themselves as if all were real and substantial. As a matter of fact they acted as if they believed in it more than did the native inhabitants." (Village Communities, p. 45) J. H. Nelson, like Maine, attacked the substitution by the courts of smṛti law for customary law, which alone should be upheld for castes other Brāhmaṇa (see Nelson's View of the Hindoo Law and his Scientific Study of the Hindu Law, 1881).

35

21, II. 1-3. COLEBROOKE'S STUDY OF MĪMĀMSA

See Max Mueller, Chips from a German Workshop, IV, pp. 377-433, containing his review (1872) of the Life of Colebrooke. Colebrooke is said to have preferred to remain undisturbed as
Judge at Mirzapur, owing to its nearness to Benares from which he was able to obtain both pandits to guide his studies and manuscripts for study. His study of *Mīmāṃsā* probably began even earlier as he had recognised the necessity for a mastery of it for understanding the texts of Hindu law. "The disquisitions of *Mīmāṃsā*," he pointed out years later in his paper on the subject (*Miscellaneous Essays*, Madras reprint, Vol. I, pp. 295-324), "bear a certain resemblance to juridical questions; and, in fact, the Hindu law being blended with the religion of the people, the same modes of reasoning are applicable, and are applied to the one as to the other. The logic of *Mīmāṃsā* is the logic of law; the rule of interpretation of civil and religious ordinances. Each case is examined and determined upon general principles; and from the cases decided the principles may be collected. A well-ordered arrangement of them would constitute the philosophy of law; and this is, in truth, what has been attempted in the *Mīmāṃsā*." (*op. cit.*, p. 317).

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21, ll. 16-17. ALLEGATION OF PRIESTLY INFLUENCE ON HINDU LAW

Sir Henry Maine regarded the Hindu law of *strīdhana* as having been tampered with by Brāhmaṇa jurists (*vide*, *Early History of Institutions*, pp. 321-36). He concludes: "These inquiries, pushed much further, have shown that the Hindu laws, religious and civil, have for centuries been undergoing transmutation, development, and, in some points, depravation at the hands of successive Brahmanical expositors, and that no rules have been so uniformly changed—as we should say for the worse—as those which affect the legal position of women."

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21, ll. 22-24. SĀBARA'S MODERNITY IN CRITICISM

In commenting on Baudhāyana’s famous prescription of celibacy for forty years (*brahmacarya*) (II,1), Sābara suggests that
the rule was possibly introduced into Baudhāyana’s sūtra by an impotent person who wished to conceal his defect. He remarks that the smṛti text ‘the food of the sacrificer who has bought soma deserves to be eaten (kṛitarājaka bhojyānamah’ as due to one in starvation. A smṛti rule declaring that the adhvaryu in entitled to the cloth used in the Vaisarjana homa is characterised by Śabara as due to priestly avarice. Again he rejected some smṛtis and accepted others, anticipating the modern method.

(See Fictions in Hindu Law Texts, pp. 100-101)

38

21, ll. 23-24. KAṬILYA AND HIS GURU

Kaṭilya cites the views of his teacher, to whom he shows reverence in Hindu style by referring to him not by name but by the word Acārya in the honorific plural, as many as thirty-nine times, and each citation is for the purpose of dissenting from the teacher’s views. The references are collected on pp, 177-179 of Dr. Shama Sastri’s Index Verborum to the Arthasaśtra.

39

23, Para 1. CRITICISED VIEWS ON THE NATURE OF DHARMASAŚTRA

(1) J. J. Meyer (Altindischen Rechts-schriften, Leipzig, 1927, pp. 86-88) holds that smṛti literature, does not offer anything like a development of secular law, but represents the slow incorporation of secular law, which had its birth and development in a different milieu into Brahmanical works. He is apparently thinking of the older sūtras with an insignificant legal content, for which the explanation is that the law proper was preserved only in recollection and was unwritten. The procedure in judicial trials emphasises the functions of the sabhyas, or assessors, whose selection according to different vedic sākhas, implies the utilisation of divergent types of remembered rules. The sabhyas really decided the suit, the
presiding judge merely conducting the trial and the king delivering and carrying out the judgment.

Meyer also holds that smṛtis merely represent a literature of magic, and objects to their being described as law-books. But he overlooks the fact that what society enforces is law, and that there is no evidence that “secular” law developed first through Arthasaśstra and then crept into smṛti.

For Benoy Kumar Sarkar’s views that Arthasaśstra is “public” while Dharmasaśstra is “private” law (which overlooks the close connection in India between state and family, and the duty of the state to correct and punish irregularities in family life) and that Arthasaśstra is real-politik, while Dharmasaśstra represents only pious wishes (an old view of Maine), see his Hindu Positivism, and particularly, pp. 203 and 251. For his conception of Dharmasaśstra as a ‘hotch-patch of materials emanating from different sources and reflecting life and history’, see ib. p. 197. Even in modern polity and law there is an element of idealism. It was much more so in ancient institutions. Breloer’s view that Arthasaśstra is “planned economy,” apparently suggests a human planner. In a wider sense Dharma is planned economy but the author is held to be the Supreme Being.

40

24, ll. 9-16. JAYASWAL’S VIEWS OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ARTHASAŚTRA, DHARMASAŚTRA AND RĀJANĪTI

They are expressed in his Manu and Yājñavalkya. To him artha-sāstra and daṇḍanīti are identical and constitute “secular” law (pp. 5, 7, 9, 16, 25, 26, 41, 42, 50, 84, 93, 263, and 273). He thinks that artha law was known as vyavahāra in the time of Gautama (p. 16) and that it is not the same as dharma law (p. 17). The distinction rests on a hypothesis of a differentiation of secular and religious sides in Hindu life for which there is no warrant in the Kaṭṭhaka. His statements rest on no secure authority. e.g., ‘Dharma is penance law” (p. 13); “vyavahāra
is municipal law and secular law” (p. 13); and “rājaniti is constitutional law” (p. 255).

B. K. Sarkar has a glimpse of the truth when he states: “In a sense, every student of Dharmasāstra was a student of Rāja-dharma, “and on the other hand every student of Rājadharma, Nitisāstra Daṇḍaniti or Arthasāstra was a student of Dharmasāstra from the earliest history.” (op. cit. p. 514).

41

24, ll. 16-20. THE WAY OF THE MĀHĀJANA THE PATH OF DHARMA

The famous sloka on the subject occurs in the Yakṣa-prasna (Mahābhārata, Vanaparva, ch. 314, sl. 119, Kumbakonam edn.).

It runs thus:

Tarko apratiṣṭhah srutayo vibhinnā
Naiko munir yasya matam pramāṇam Ⅰ
dharmasya tatvam nihitam guhāyām
Mahājāno yena gataḥ sa panthāḥ Ⅱ

Māhājana does not mean, as it has sometimes been interpreted in recent times, the leader of a popular assembly. It stands for sīṣṭa or sādhū, whose ācāra (usage) is one of the recognised sources of Dharma. (Manu, II, 6; Yājñavalkya, I, 7.)

42

24-25. CONNOTATION OF DHARMA

The discussion of what constitutes Dharma in Viramitrodaya Paribhāṣāprakāśa (pp. 26-32) is illustrative. The Kalpataru also begins with such a discussion.

Āpastamba (I, 20, 6) says:

Na dharmādharmau carata ‘Āvām svā’ iti; na deva-gan
dharvā na pitarah ācaksate ‘Ayam dharmo, ayam
adharma’ iti.
"Dharma and adharma do not wander about saying 'Here we are'; nor do the gods nor the Manes nor the Gandharvas declare 'this is Dharma, this is A-dharma.'

The Naiyāyika definition of Dharma is that it is a quality of the Soul (Ātmagunau dharmādharman). It is invisible, and has to be inferred. Dharma is what is done by enjoined action, and is a quality of men. (Vihitakriyayā sādhyo dharmah pumso guṇo mataḥ). The view of the Mīmāṃsā is contained in Jaimini's definition "that which is signified by a command and leads to a benefit is termed Dharma." (Codanālakṣaṇārtho dharmaḥ). According to Kumārila, both the act enjoined by and the material connected with it come within the scope of Dharma. The Naiyāyikas hold that Dharma carries with it the idea that an invisible (adarśa) effect known as apūrvā attaches to the soul from the performance of a religious act, and that it lasts until the benefit contemplated by the act is attained.

The ways in which the different schools elaborated the idea may be gathered from their summary in Mahāmahopādhyāya Bhīmācārya Jhālkikar's Nyāyakos'a, 3rd edn., 1928, pp. 386-388.

See Dr. Ganaganāth Jha's introduction to his translation of the Slokavārtika of Kumārila (Bibliotheca Indica, 1900-1908) pp. v-xviii.

26, first para. Classifications of Dharma

The classification in the text follows the Mitākṣara, on Yājñavalkya, I, 1. See my Ancient Indian Polity, p. 89.

26, ll. 14-16. Dharma Comprehends All Knowledge

There are two fundamental hypotheses, viz., that the Veda is the source of all knowledge and that its draws it authority from itself (svataḥ pramāṇam). They relieve the Mīmāṃsaka of the-
onus of proving the doctrine and lay upon the opponent (*pūrvapa*kṣa) the burden of disproving it, if he could. The self-evident nature of the *Veda* implies that it is valid by itself. But as knowledge springs from the *Veda* alone, all knowledge is valid. As *Dharma* is the *only* subject of *sruti*, *i.e.*, the *Veda*, *Dharma* embraces all knowledge. *Vijñānes'vara* in commenting on *Yājñavalkya*, II, 21, says.

*Dharmasāstrāntargatameva rājanīti-lakṣaṇam artha-sāstram iha vivakṣitam.*

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26, II. 19-25. **THE VIDYĀSTHĀNAS OR DHARMASTHĀNAS**

*Yājñavalkya* (I, 3) reckons them as fourteen, *viz.*, the four Vedas, the six *Vedāṅgas*, and *Purāṇa, Nyāya, Mimāṃsā* and *Dharmasāstra*. The *Viṣṇupurāṇa* (as cited by Aparārka) adds four to the *dharma-vidyāḥ*, *viz.*, *Āyurveda, Dhanurveda, Gāndharvaveda*, and *Arthasāstra*. Aparārka holds that these fourteen or eighteen constitute the sources of *vidyā* (knowledge) and not of *dharma*. The distinction which he makes between the two is illogical, for, knowledge and *dharma* are equated. The *Viramitrodaya* has sections named *Cikitsā-prakāśa, Jyotiṣa-prakāśa* and *Lakṣaṇa-prakāśa* (the last has been printed) and the *Toḍarānanda* has a *Jyautiṣa-saukhyā*.

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27. **THE KṚTYA-KALPATARU**

I have summarised the relevant information about this great digest, in two papers on *Lakṣmīdhara* and the *Kṛtya-Kalpataru* and *Vijñānes'vara and Lakṣmīdhara*, published in the Golden Jubilee volume of the Madras Law Journal, (1941), pp. 148-168 and 199-222.

I have discovered what purport to be two of the lost books of the *Kalpataru*. They deal with *vrata* and *pūjā*. A fragment which relates *prāyasccitta* has also been found.
28, II. 28-31. OMISSION OF RĀJADHARMA AND VYAVAHĀRA IN DIGESTS

The Smṛticandrīkā, which Mr. Kane regards as the most complete of the earlier South Indian digests, (op. cit., p. 343) deals only with Samskāra, Āhnikā, Vyavahāra, Srāddha, Āsauca, and Prāyascicatta. The Smṛti-muktāphala of Vaidyanātha Dikṣita has sections on Varnāśrama, Āhnikā, Āsauca, Srāddha, Sudhī Kāla, and Prāyascicatta. Mr. Kane (p. 671) mentions a Vyavahāra section of it, and Mr. J. R. Gharpure of Poona has personally mentioned to me that he has seen a copy of it, but it seems unknown in South India. The date c. 1600 is suggested by Mr. Kane for Vaidyanātha Dikṣita.

29, II. 2-5. SECTIONS OMITTED IN THE RATNĀKARA BY CAŅDEŚVARA

They are those dealing with pratiṣṭhā, prāyascicatta, svānti and mokṣa, for all of which he had originals in the Kalpataru, on which he has built his own nibandha.

29-30. THE HYPOTHESES OF MĪMĀMSĀ

See Śankararāma Śāstri’s Fictions in Hindu Law Texts, passim, and Medhātithi’s long comment on Manu Smṛti, II, 6.

30-31. CONSIDERATION OF APPARENT CONFLICTS OF AUTHORITIES

In resolving such apparent conflicts (the reality of such conflicts will not be accepted) a number of principles are utilised. “A Vedic basis is presumed only in those cases where an invisible
effect or an effect not accountable to any visible, tangible cause is deemed to be produced. Some *smṛtis* are *drṣṭārtha*, that is, are intended to produce a visible result; and, some are *adṛṣṭārtha*, that is, are intended to produce an invisible result. The ultimate objects aimed at by the former class of *smṛtis* are *Arthā* and *Kāma*, that is, wealth and pleasure; of the latter, are *Dharma* and *Mokṣa*, that is, virtue and salvation. Even in the case of *adṛṣṭārtha smṛtis*, where a particular text is obviously due to interested causes or motives like avarice, ignorance etc., it is not necessary to resume a Vedic origin for it.” (*Fictions in Hindu Law Texts*, p. 105). Or, the conflict may be due to incorrect exegesis or failure to reject a manifest interpolation into the *smṛti* from which the controverted passage is taken.

The distinction between *drṣṭārtha* and *adṛṣṭārtha* is also sometimes treated as a distinction between *nyāyamūla* and *vacanamūla*, and *lokasiddha* and *vedasiddha smṛtis*.

Again, in considering contradictions arising from conflicting usage, a principle to be borne in mind is that the *acāra* of a good man (*sādhuḥ*) is not binding if he disbelieves in the *Veda*. This rules out Buddhist and Jaina customs unless they have independent Vedic or *smṛti* authority. Precedents of conduct even in *sruti* are valid only if such conduct was clearly due to a conscious sense of rectitude, *i.e.*, of doing a meritorious act, in the performer (*op. cit.*, p. 138).

The *Bḥaviṣya-purāṇa*, cited by the *Vrāmitrodaya* (Paribh., p. 19) classifies *smṛtis* as under:

*Drṣṭārthā tu smṛtiḥ kācit adṛṣṭārthā tathāparā ||
Drṣṭādṛṣṭārtharūpānyā nyāyamūlā tathāparā ||
Anuvādasmṛtistvanyā sīṣṭair-dṛṣṭā tu pācamī ||
Sarvā etā Vedaṁūlā dṛṣṭārthā pariḥṛtya tu ||

The *Dṛṣṭārthasmr̥ti* is said to deal with the following topics, according to the same *Purāṇa*:

*Saḍгуṇasya prayojayasya prayogāḥ kāryagauravāt ||
Sāmādīnāṁ upāyānāṁ yogo-vyāsasamāsataḥ ||

13
Adhyakṣāṇāṃ ca nikṣeṣaḥ kaṇṭakānām nirūpāṇam ।
Dṛṣṭārthe yam smṛtiḥ prōktā ṛṣibhiḥ Garuḍātmaja ॥

The Arthasastra under this classification is a dṛṣṭārtha smṛti, and has no Vedic source (a-vedamūla). The smṛtis with a Vedic basis are classifiable as (1) other-worldly, (2) worldly as well as other-wordly, (3) ratiocinative and (4) digests.

51

31, ii. 14-20. Alleged Rule of Kālikā-Purāṇa on the Adoption of a Boy Who Has Had Samskaras

The adoption of a boy, who has undergone his upanayana in his father’s house, is prohibited by Kamalākara, on the authority of a passage of the Kālikā-Purāṇa, which is thus translated by V. N. Mandlik, (Trn. of Vyavahāramayūkha, p. 58):

“A son whose ceremonies upto tonsure have been performed with the gotra or family name of his father, does not attain the sonship of another man.”

Nilakanṭha (Vyavahāramayūkha, ed. Kane, p. 114) rejects the passage on the ground that in two or three copies of the Kālikā-Purāṇa it is not to be seen:

Idam tu vaco na tathā visrambhāṇīyam, dvi-tri-Kālikā-

dūrāṇa-pustakesu adarsvanāt.

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31, ii. 30-31. Judges and Assessors to be Trained Lawyers

A trained Judge replaces the King in trials (Manu, VIII, 9, 11) and he judges along with three assessors (sabhyāḥ). The same procedure is laid down by Yājñavalkya (II, 3):

Apasyatā kāryavasāt vyavahārān nṛpeṇa tu ।
Sabhyaiḥ saha nīyoktavyo brāhmaṇah sarvadharmaṇīv ॥

Nārada indicates the manner in which the judge should proceed to discharge their duty:

Dharmaśāstram puraskṛtya prādvivākamate sthitah ।
Samāhitamatiḥ pasyet vyavahārān anukramāt ॥
The duties of the assessors are laid down by *Manu* (VIII, 10-19).

The *sabhyas* had to be of an odd number (three according to Kauṭilya and *Manu* and any number up to seven, so long as it was odd) for the sake of getting a decision in case of difference of opinion, as pointed out by Mitramiśra:

*Samkhya-vaiśamyaṃ tu, bhūyo alpavi-rodhe bhūyasām syāt iti* (*Viramitrodaya*, p. 35).

The judge must abide by the finding of the assessors, according to *Bṛhaspāti* (*Trn. Jolly*, I, 24).

32. *Pariṣads*

In determining doubtful points of law, the rule to follow was the opinion of those conversant with law and usage (*Dharmajña-samayāḥ pramānam*); *Manu*, XII, 108, laid down that in cases in which the law was not known (*anājñateṣu*, accepting the text of the *Kalpitaru* instead of ‘*anāmnāteṣu*’ in the printed editions, the law should unhesitatingly be taken to be what the cultured and holy men (*sīṭāḥ*) lay down:

*Anājñateṣu tu dharmesu kathamsyāt iti cet-bhavet 1*

Yam sīṭā brāhmaṇā brūyuḥ sa dharmas-syāt asavākitaḥ 2

According to Jayaswal (*Manu and Yājñavalkya*, p. 78) the *Samiti* or *pariṣad* was the body which settled disputed law in Vedic times. The name was kept by later *ad hoc* committees with reduced numbers, and they became also bodies of experts. *Manu* lays down that if a *pariṣad* cannot be constituted the opinion of even one ‘excellent brāhmaṇa’ will suffice.

Who are the men qualified to sit on a *pariṣad*? The answer is that they should be *sīṭas* (who are described as *akāmātmā*), they should be sympathetic to all living beings (*samāḥ sarvabhūtesu*), and learned in the Vedas (*bahusrutāḥ*), they should accept the validity of both Veda and perception (*sruti-pratyakṣahetavah*) and they should be skilled in logical inference (*ūha-apoha-kusālabh*),

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practical-minded (desa-kāla-vibhāga'jñāh) full of resource (yukti-mantaḥ) and of blameless character (sadācarāḥ).

In constituting a pariṣad certain considerations were to be borne in mind: representation of all sākhas of the Vedas, and in cases of trial requiring special knowledge of arms etc. the inclusion of experts in such branches of knowledge. The strength of a pariṣad may be increased if it is instituted for the determination of special matters like penance (then its strength should not exceed seven), māṁsa (when its strength should be under twenty-one) and for grave sins (when it can go up to a hundred members). The pariṣads for ṣatvīyas and vāisyas may be still larger in size. The Kṛtya-kalpaṭaru (Brahmacāri-kāṇḍa, f. 69) limits the scope of caste pariṣads to the determination of anuloma, utkṛṣṭavarna-vadha, utkṛṣṭastrigamanādi, vrata, and svuddhi. This restriction of scope in pariṣads for non-Brāhmaṇas is interesting as it must reflect the practice in the eleventh century.

Sankha-Likhita, cited in Kalpaṭaru, (ib. fol. 60) limit the scope of a Brāhmaṇa pariṣad to the determination of the correctness of Vedic texts, (Sruti-grahaṇam), smṛti rules, custom and usage (ācāra) and Dharma generally. It will be seen that a Brāhmaṇa-pariṣad's scope was much wider than that of pariṣads, for other varṇas. The difference is probably due to the fact that the former were the bodies normally convened to determine rules for judicial guidance.

After the seventh century A. D., the pariṣad apparently ceases to function, and the Paṇḍita (who bears the title of Vinaya-Sthiti-Sthāpaka in the Gupta inscriptions) comes into prominence as a Legal Remembrancer. Later on, heads of religious Maṭhas claim the right to constitute pariṣads or exercise themselves the functions of pariṣads.

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33, line 2. VASTNESS OF DHARMAŚĀTRA LITERATURE

An idea of its present size may be gained by the following data. "If all the smṛtis cited in later nibandhas be taken into
account, the number will be found to be about a hundred." (Kane, op. cit., p. 134). Mr. Mandlik, who made elaborate calculations of the authorities quoted by certain nibandha writers found for instance, that Kamalākara quotes in the Nirṇayasindhu alone 13 works on srauta, 131 smṛtis, 68 purāṇas, and 272 bhāṣyas, nibandhas etc., making in all 484. See p. lxxvi of the Introduction to his Vyavahāra-mayūkha, 1880.

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A point to note is that the earlier nibandha writers like Lakṣmīdhara quote a relatively smaller number of smṛtis and purāṇas than writers like Hemādri and Kamalākara. Even if we allow for Lakṣmīdhara’s claim that he made it his rule not to cite ordinarily more than one or two authorities when a point had to be established, the very large number of later smṛtis calls for enquiry. Mr. Kane’s list of works on Dharmasāstra runs to 170 printed pages of double-columns, and his list of authors runs to 83 pages.

33. DHARMASĀASTRA ACTIVITY IN THE MIDDLE OF CIVIL TROUBLES

A reading of Mr. Kane’s work or of Jolly’s Hindu Law and Custom will show how great was the activity during the period of internecine wars which preceded the Musalmān conquest and during the Muhammadan period itself.

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34, II. 7-10. IDEA OF UNION OF INTEREST BETWEEN KING AND SUBJECT

This is stated forcibly by Kauṭilya (I, 19):

Prajāsukhe sukham rājñah prajānām ca hite hitam
Nātmapiyam hitam rājñah prajānām tu priyam hitam

The whole of the Rājadharma-paṛva of the Mahābhārata is an elaboration of this dictum.

See Ancient Indian Polity, pp. 85-87.
34, ll. 12. King and Daṇḍa Divinely Created

The creation of the King by the Supreme Being is found in the stories of the Social Contract in the Mahābhārata (Sāntiparava ch. 67-68). See also,

Manusmṛti, VII, 3, Kauṭilyya, I, 13 and Sukraṇiti, I 125-140.

See Ancient Indian Polity, pp. 39, 80, 81.

34, ll. 14-16. Horror of Anarchy

See Arājata.

See ib., pp. 49, and 82-83.

34, ll. 19-24 Influence of Good Government on the Seasons

Vide ib. 108. Somadevasūri puts the point pithily:

Nyāyataḥ pariḥālakā rājīṁ prajānāṁ kāmadughā disvāḥ

34, ll. 24-25 Rājā Kālasya Kāraṇam

The dictum that the king is the cause of the complexion of his age is a picturesque way of saying that on the king rests the responsibility for good and bad government, through which, according to ancient Indian belief, the complexion (or, as we would say the atmosphere) of the yuga in which he lives will be changed for better or worse. It occurs in a long passage expounding regal responsibility in the Sāntiparva of the Mahābhārata, where it may be studied in its context. (ch. 69, vv. 74-105). The responsibility consists in duly enforcing the law, i.e. Daṇḍanīti. A careless, idle, indifferent
or unjust king will not observe the rules of the science of government. Then he will incur the odium for not only going himself wrong but ruining the people. The passage may be rendered thus:

“Danḍaniti compels men to observe the duties of the castes and orders. Duly observed, it makes people act virtuously. If the four varṇas attend to their appointed duties, and wholesome barriers are maintained, then peace and contentment flow from the due enforcement of law, people are freed from fear, the dvijas attend to their prescribed social duties, and the people are truly happy. Whether (this result having been produced) it is the king who makes the age, or the age it is which makes the king (i.e. do what he does) admits of no doubt; for, it is the king who makes the age. (Rāja kālasya kāraṇam). The first yuga (thus) i.e. the Golden Age, comes into being when a king governs in strict accord with Danḍaniti. Righteousness is the feature of the Kṛtayuga (the first Age); there is no wrong-doing in it. The men of all the four orders (cāturvarṇa) find no satisfaction in unrighteousness. Every one gets what he desires and keeps it (in such an epoch). The Vedic rites are productive (then) of spiritual merit (puruṣya). The seasons are joyous, and free from evil . . . Diseases disappear. Men live long. Wives are not widowed. Misers disappear. The earth yields in abundance even without being tilled . . . Nothing but virtue exists. These are the marks, Yudhiṣṭhira, of the Kṛtayuga. When a king relies only on discharging three parts of his duties (according to Danḍaniti), the epoch becomes like Tretāyuga. . . The earth (then) yields crops only when tilled. If a king neglects half his duties of government, an age like the Dvāpara-yuga sets in. The tilled earth now yields but half of what it could yield. When the king totally ignores the Danḍaniti and governs oppressively, then the Kaliyuga sets in. During this epoch vice is rampant, and virtue is disappears. Men fall away from their appointed duties. Śūdras live by mendicancy and Brāhmaṇas by service (reversing their appointed modes of life).
People fail to get what they aim to secure, and what they obtain they are unable to keep. The intermixture of castes by marriage (varnasamkara) becomes common. The performance of Vedic rites is ineffective. The seasons are fraught with evil. Disease thrives, and men die prematurely. The clouds do not rain, and the crops wither. The earth dries up when the king does not observe the rules of the Daṇḍaniti. The king is (thus) the maker of the Kṛtayuga (in his own life-time), of the Tretayuga and of the Dwāparayuga; he also causes the Kaliyuga, and . . . incurs great sin. Sinking in the sins of his subjects he becomes infamous and plunges into Hell.”

It will be seen that the aim of the passage is to impress on kings the duty and the wisdom of ruling according to the sūstrās. There is nothing in it to suggest that the king has special powers to act contrary to established law and usage.

Sukraniti (IV, i, 11. 90—125) paraphrases, as is its practice, the chapter of the Mahābhārata in which the dictum ‘Rājā Kālasya Kāraṇam’ occurs. It puts the matter pithily:

Yugapraṃtako rājā dharmadharma-prasikṣayāt  
Yugānām na praṣānām na dosaḥ kintu niṣpaṣya hi  
Suṣṭhāyatra niṣpatiḥ dharmiṣṭaḥ tatra hi praśāliḥ  
Mahāpūrīyatratra rājā tatrādharmaparo janaḥ

Mr. B. K. Sarkar, who translated the expression yugapraṃtako Rājā as “the King is the maker of the Age” (possibly to bring it into line with the Mahābhārata expression), added a pointed warning: “This is the exact opposite of the dictum ‘the King can do no wrong.’ To rule in strict accord with the sūstrās was in India a personal responsibility of the King. He could do wrong and great wrong, by negligence or inattention to the sūstrās in the act of governing.

By a curious anomaly this telling sentence, torn from its setting, has been wrongly interpreted and cited in defence of change in social usage initiated the state. The drift of the injunction is conservative, and will not justify a reformist interpretation.
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34, ll. 25-26 Rāmarājya

See the picture of the return of the Golden Age in the Rāmāyaṇa, VI, 131, sl. 97-104:

Rāghavas-cāpi dharmātmā prāpya rājyam anuttamam ||
Īje bahuvidhair yaṇñaiḥ sa-suta-bhrāty-bāndhavaḥ ||
Na ṭaryadevayan-vidhavā na ca vyālakṛtam bhayam ||
Na vyādhijam bhayam cāsit Rāme rājyam prasāsati ||
Nirdasyurabhavan loko nānartham kascit aśpṛvat ||
Na ca smavyddhā bālāṇāṁ preta-kāryāṇī kurvate ||
Sarvam muditamevāsit sarvo dharmāparo bhavat ||
Rāmamevānupasyanto nābhayahimsan-parasparam ||
Āsan varṣa-sahasrāṇī tathā ṭutrasahasriṇāḥ ||
Nirāmayaṁ visokāsca Rāme rājyam prāsāsati ||
Nityamūlā nityaphalāḥ taravah tatra puṣpitāḥ ||
Kāmavarṣi ca ṭarjanyah sukhas-sphārvasca māruteḥ ||
Svakarmasu pravartante tuṣṭāḥ svaiṁe karmabhīḥ ||
Āsan praśā dharmāparā Rāme sāsati nāṁtāḥ ||
Sarve lakṣaṇa-sampannāḥ sarve dharmā-parāyanāḥ ||
Dasa varṣa-sahasrāṇī Rāmo rājyam akārayat ||

The way in which a righteous king changes his age into the Golden Age is described in Mahābhārata, Sāntiparva, Ch. 69, vv., 74-105.

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34, ll. 27-30. Kārta-vīryārjuna

Kālidāsa (Raghuvasva, VI, 39) describes Kārtavīryārjuna’s miraculous power of projecting himself before an offender, when an offence was about to be committed and then restraining him from committing the offence, instead of waiting to punish him after the offence:

Akāryacintā-samakālāṁ eva prātur-bhavān
cāpañḍharāḥ purastat ||

14
Kārtavīryārjuna was the king of the Haihayas, with his capital at Māhiṣmatī. By propitiating Dattātreya he obtained from him these boons: a thousand arms; the extirpation of all evil desires from his kingdom; the subjugation of the world by just government; victory over enemies; and death only from the hands of a person renowned through the universe. He took Rāvaṇa a prisoner. He was killed by Parasūrāma. The Viṣṇupurāṇa says of him (IV, 11):

Na nūnām Kārtavīryasya gatim yāsyanti pārthivāh
Yajñair-dānair-tapobhir-vā praśrayeṇa srutena vā

32, ll. 30-32. RĀMA AS THE RESTORER OF THE GOLDEN AGE IN TRETĀ-YUGA

The description Tretā-yuga-pravartita-Kārtayuga-vṛttānta is applied to Rāma by the Vaiṣṇava saint Vedānta Desīka in his Raghuvīra-gadāya-stotra.

35, l. 2. EXPULSION OR EXECUTION OF AN EVIL RULER

A coronation oath (pratijñā) had to be taken by the King on his abhiṣeka. If he failed to keep the pledge, he was stigmatized as an asatya-pratijñā and was held to have automatically forfeited the throne. The boast of the satrap Rudradāman (A.D. 128-150), who was a Sāka, that he was satya-pratijñā meant not that he was faithful to his international or treaty engagements, but that he truthfully adhered to the terms of his coronation oath. The killing of the last Maurya, Bṛhadratha, by Puṣyamitra, was on the ground of pratijñā-durbala (Bāṇa’s Harṣacarita) (Trn., p. 193). The traditions mention the destruction of king Vena for mis-government.
The Mahābhārata (Ānus'. Parva., lxi, 32-33) specifies the kind of rulers who could be killed:

A-rakṣitāram hartāram vilōptāram anāyakam 
Tam vai rāja-kalim hanyuh prajās-sannahya nirghṛṇam 
‘Aham va rakṣitā’ ityuktvā yo na rakṣati bhūmipaḥ 
Sa samhatya nihantavyaṁ sveda sonmādāturaṁ

65

35, II. 2-3. Taxes are the King’s Wages

This is indicated in the Mahābhārata (XII, ch. 71, s’l. 10):

Balīṣaṭṭena sulkena daṇḍena athāparādhhinām 
Sāstrāṇitena lipsethā vetanena dhanāgamanām

The King is made the servant of the people by being given his share, says Śūkra (I, 375):

Swabhāgabhṛtyā dāsaytve prajānāṁ ca niṣpāḥ kṛtāḥ

The same idea is attributed to the Buddhist teacher Āryadeva, who retorted to a king, when he claimed that he was the fountain of all transactions: “What conceit is yours, King, when you are a mere servant of the gaṇa, receiving one-sixth share as your wage?” (Cited from Catusvatikākā in Dr. U. N. Ghosal’s Hindu Political Theories, p. 209).

See my Ancient Indian Economic Thought, p. 114 and p. 189.

66

35, I. 4. King’s Freedom ends with Coronation

The King had to take with deep faith the coronation oath, which is described thus by the Mahābhārata (Sāntiparva, lviii, 115-116, Kumbakonam ed.):

Pratijñāmca abhirohasva, manasā, karanā, girā 
“Pālayisyāmi aham bhouman, Brahma,” ityevacāsakṛt
Yascātra Dharmo nityukto, daṇḍaniti-vyapāśrayaḥ 
Tam avamāḥ kariṣyāmi, sva-vaso na kadācana”

35, ll. 15-16. VIṣṇU RESIDES IN SUBJECT AS IN KING

Caṇḍesvara (Rajanītiratnākara p. 74,) cites this text:

"Adyārabhya na me rājyan, rājāyan rākṣatu praśāh"
Iti sarvam praśā-viṣṇum sākṣiṇam srāvayen-muhuh
d

The last line is added to the verse from the Mahābhārata, as it perhaps occurred in Caṇḍesvara’s copy of the epic.

The dictum “Nāviṣṇuḥ ṇṛītvat-paṭih,” i.e. there is no king who is not “Viṣṇu” is well-known.

68

35, ll. 16-18. THE King’S DUTY TO KNOW DHARMA

This is laid down in the following precept for which paraphrases occur in the smṛtis:

Dharmādharmau vijānan hi sāsate abhiratas-satām
Prajām rakṣet nṛpas-sādhuh hanyācca pariṇānthaṁ

69

35, l. 20. UNHAPPINESS IS DUE TO ERROR IN GOVERNMENT

The classical example is that given in the Uttarakāṇḍa of the Rāmāyaṇa, ch. 73 and 76. A Brāhmaṇa brought his dead son, who was hardly more than a boy, to the palace of Rāma and complained that the death was due to the fault of the king. Rāma admitted responsibility, convened a pariśad of sages to consider the cause of the misfortune, and was informed by Nārada that it was owing to a sūdra performing austerities. Having preserved the corpse of the boy in oil, Rāma proceeded to search for the sūdra whom he found in the south. The ascetic reveals himself as a sūdra named Śambhūka, who performed the austerities to attain the status of a god. Rāma decapitated him, and prayed for the restoration of the life of the dead child, who promptly revived. Kālidāsa (Raghuvaṃsa, XV, 42-57) retails the incident and adds that the Śambhūka (so spelt here) obtained Heaven, since he had undergone punishment at the hands of the King for his transgression:

Kṛtadāṇḍaḥ svyam rājña lebhe sūdraḥ satām gatim
NOTES

Bhavabhūti, who introduces the incident in the second act of Uttararāmācarita, makes Rāma raise Sambhūka to the Vairāja heaven for his tapas, even though it was against Dharma for him to have performed it.

The relevant verses in the Rāmāyaṇa are:

Rājadosair vipadyante praṇā hy avidhiplātih
Asad-vṛtte hi nṛpatav akāle mriyate janaḥ
Yadvā puresvayuktīni janā janaṇaḍēsu ca
Kurvate naca raksastī tadā Kālakṛtam bhayam
Suyaktam rājadosī hi bhavisyati na samsāyah
Puruṣ janaṇade ca pī ti thāthā bālavadho hyayam

(ch. 73, 16-19)

Yo hyadharmamakāryam vā viṣaye pārthivasya tu
Karoītī cāsṛīmūlam tat āpure vā durmatir-narah
Kṣīρam ca narakam yāti sa ca rājā na samsāyay

(ch. 74, 28-29)

36, 1. 1. ADJUSTMENT OF DHARMA TO CAPACITY

This is the fundamental reason for having different dharmas or rules for the same acts when done by women and non-dvijas, or by the young and the very old, by the diseased, or by persons in special situations (e.g. soldiers in camp, kings on the battle-field persons attending festivals, funerals, marriages, times of desavīplava or revolution) or by persons in this yuga as compared with those in former yugas.

71

36, 11. 10-12. ADJUSTMENT OF LAW TO CHANGING SOCIETY

The locus classicus on the subject is the following passage in Sir Henry Maine’s Ancient Law (ed. Pollock, p. 29):

“'A general proposition of some value may be advanced with respect to the agencies by which Law is brought into harmony with society. These instrumentalities seem to me to be three in
number, Legal Fictions, Equity and Legislation. Their historical order is that in which I have placed them. Sometimes, two of them will be seen operating together, and there are legal systems which have escaped the influence of one or other of them. But I know of no instance in which the order of their appearance has been changed or inverted.”

72

36, ll. 12-18. ABSENCE OF THE INFLUENCE OF LEGAL FICTIONS IN HINDU DHARMA

My statement is in flat opposition to the basic idea of Mr. C. S’ankararāma S’āstri’s scholarly work, *Fictions in the Development of Hindu Law Texts*, 1926. He has brought to his task knowledge of modern law, and familiarity with the technique and literature of Mīmāṃsa. But he has succumbed to the influence of analogy, and finding that the nyāyas of Mīmāṃsa (which Col. G. A. Jacob would translate as ‘popular maxims’) have helped the development of interpretation, he has taken them to be *fictions*. The assumption conceals two errors: the error of attributing to the Hindu thinkers and smārta, who handled the nyāyas, an attitude of tepid belief or scepticism, which we now entertain and they could not have had, and secondly, the mistake of overlooking the element of disbelief in the reality of the assumptions underlying ‘legal fictions’ which constitutes the real test of ‘fiction.’ Maine’s generalisation was based on his experience of European jurisprudence. There is no need to force the sense of non-European jural ideas to bring them within his generalisation. This is the temptation to which Mr. S’ankararāma S’āstri has yielded. The value of his work, as a helpful introduction to the Mīmāṃsa way of approach to Hindu law, is not diminished sensibly by the wrong assumption with which he starts, and which gives the title to his book. *Fictio* in Roman law was a term of pleading and “signified a false averment on the part of the plaintiff which the defendant was not allowed to traverse; such for example as that the plaintiff was a Roman citizen, when in truth he was a
foreigner. The object of the fictions was, of course, to give jurisdiction, and they therefore strongly resembled the allegations in the writs of the English Queen's Bench and Exchequer, by which those courts used to usurp the jurisdiction of Common Pleas: the allegation that the defendant was in the custody of the King's Marshal, or that the plaintiff was the King's debtor, and could not pay his debt by reason of the defendant's default. But I now employ the term Legal Fiction to signify any assumption which conceals, or affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of law has undergone alteration, its letter remaining unchanged, its operation being modified. . . . The fact is that the law has been changed; the fiction is that it remains what it always was." (Ancient Law, pp. 30-31.)

Adoption is named as an example of fiction in Roman law. In Hindu law the belief in the adopted son being a real son, after adoption, is as vivid as the belief in the change which the Roman Church believes to have taken place in the Sacrament, which is visible only to the eye of faith.

The pursuit to its logical ends of the idea of the transformation of the dattaka (adoptee) into a real son in Hindu law will not have been possible if there had ever lurked, as it is bound to do in fictions, a disbelief in the effectiveness of the transformation brought about by the datta-homa. The doctrine of spiritual benefit, against which Maine has many a fling, was implicitly believed in by those who applied it, and who were affected by it. To construe it as a fiction imposed by designing Brāhamaṇas is not only injustice to them but is a misreading of history.

36, II. 24-28. CONSERVATISM NOT CHARACTERISTIC OF EARLIER, AND LIBERAL VIEWS OF LATER SMĀRTAS

A telling instance is afforded in Mīmāṁsa literature, which shows the modernism of S'abarasvāmin, the bhāsyakāra, and another in bhāsyas of Dharmasāstra by Medhātithi. The 'modernism' of
Sābara is corrected by the much later Kumārila, Pārthasārathi Miśra and Mādhava. The attitude revealed in smārta writings on such topics as women’s property, nīyoga, and sahāmaraṇa, as well as melccha-prāyascitva illustrate the dictum. Conservatism and liberalism are qualities of the mind which are not necessarily responsive absolutely to environment or the time-spirit.

37, ll. 2-7. SCHOOLS OF DHARMASĀSTRA

Unity of thought constitutes the bond uniting writers, who may be classed for convenience into “schools”, particularly if they can be seen as exercising reciprocal influence. Ordinarily such groups form around a teacher of eminence, whose influence is transmitted by his disciples, and their disciples, in uninterrupted succession. The existence of such groups in Arthasastra is well-known, as seventeen of them are alluded to in the Kauṭilya, schools of rhetoric and grammar are also known, and of course of philosophy. The hypothesis of the dependence of smṛti on sruti and the doctrine of ekavākyatvam, helped the attempts to fuse opinion and overcome discord. When in such matters as sraddha, Mitramiśra or Kamalākara criticises the views of the Maithilas, or the Gauḍas, he merely implies that the views so classed enshrine wrong interpretations of rules. The arbitrary division of Hindu Law into schools is an achievement of modern lawyers. It has emphasised and stabilized differences of opinion, which were originally personal, by giving them a regional base, in spite of the fact that outside the field of customs, geography had nothing to do with opinion. To followers of Jīmūtavāhana it is self-evident that the only views that should properly be enforced all over India are his, just as to the followers of other writers, like Vijnānesvara, the opinions of their own sages must have equally wide pre-eminence. Common ancestry, physical or spiritual, need not create homogeneity in creed. This is shown by Kauṭilya’s marked opposition to the views of his own teacher, by differences in rules or sūtras belonging to a
common sākhā or Vedic branch, and by divergent views expressed by cousins like Nilakanṭha and Kamalākara, who had also a common spiritual ancestry, even on such topics of every-day applicability as the adoption of grown-up persons.

38, ll. 10-11. KAŬTILYA AND MANU ON THE AUTHORITY OF NYĀYA

Kaŭtilya states thus his position in a passage on the conflict of laws. (III, 1):

Samsthayā Dharmasāstreṇa Sāstram vā Vyāvahārikam ||
Yasminnarthe virudhyeta dharmaṇārtham vinirṇayet ||
Sāstram vipratipadyeta dharman-nyāyena kenacit ||
Nyayāstatra pramāṇam syāt tatra pātho hi nasyati ||

In a sloka preceding those cited above, Kaŭtilya declares that the king conquers the earth to the limits of the four quarters who follows Dharma, Vyavahāra, Samstā and Nyāyā:

Anusāśādhi dharmena vyavahāreṇa samsthayā ||
Nyāyena ca caturthena caturantām mahīm jayet ||

Manu was contemptuous of those who showed disrespect towards the source of Dharma in Veda, and applied mere reason to determine it, and ordained that they should be excommunicated as atheists and revilers of the Veda (II, 10):

Yo avamanyeta te mule hetuṣāṣṭrasrayat dvijāḥ ||
Sa sādhubhir bahiṣkāryo nāstiko vedanindakaḥ ||

Yājñavalkya, though he held that Dharmasāstra was superior to Arthasāstra, admitted the superiority of the smṛti, which was upheld by nyāya over that which was supported by vyavahāra (rule of procedure):

Smṛtyorvirodhe nyāyastu balavān vyavahārataḥ ||
Arthasāstrattu balavad-dharmasāstram iti sthitih ||

(II, 21)
Nārada (p. 17) admitted the force of nyāya in deciding on the validity of conflicting Dharma texts:

Dharma-āstravirodhe tu yuktī-yukto vidhiḥ smṛtaḥ.

Bṛhaspati went further (ed. Rangaswami, I, 111):

Kevalam sāstramāśriyā na kartavyo vicāraṇā
dharmahāniḥ prajāyate

In cases of conflict between two opposed Dharma text, Manu (II, 14) simply followed the old practice upheld by Gautama (I, 3-6):

Dṛṣṭot dharmavyātikramah
Na tu dṛṣṭārthe avaradaurbalyāt tulyabala-virodhes
Sāhasam ca mahatām
vikalpaḥ

38, II. 13-14. CUSTOMARY LAW SYSTEMATISED, RECORDED AND APPLIED

The following passages of the Kauṭiliya will show how it was to be done:

1) In preparing a ‘Domesday-survey’ the laws and customs have to be digested and recorded in a book:

Desa-grāma-jāti-kula-sanghātānāṁ dharmo-vyavahāra-
caritra-samsthanām ... nibandhapustakastham kārayet.

(p. 62)

2) The King should promulgate the recorded customs (p. 63):

pracārayaritarasamsthanām ca nibandhena prayaccet.

3) In a conquered country, for the purpose of pacification, he should establish its old laws and customs, (p. 408):

Caritram akṛtam dharmyam kṛtām cānaiḥ pravartayet
Pravartayenna cādharmyam kṛtam cānaiṁ nivartayet.
38, ll. 19-21. RECOMMENDATION OF FAITH IN GOD IN PREference to SACRIFICES, etc.

Bhakti literature is full of citations in support of this prescription. For example, there are the injunctions of the Bhagavadgītā, which are merely illustrative:

Puruṣaḥ sa paraḥ Pārtha bhaktya labhyastvanyayā  
Yasyāntasthāni bhūtāni yena sarvamidam tatam  
(VIII, 22)

Yānti devavratā devān pitāṁ yānti pitṛvratāh  
Bhūtāni yānti bhutejyā yānti madyājino hi mām  
(IX, 24)

Kṣipram bhavati dharmātmā sasvat sāntim nigacchati  
Kaunteya pratijānāhi na me bhaktah Īśvāryatāh  
(IX, 31)

Mām hi Pārtha vyapāsritya ye hi svāhu Īśvāryaḥ  
Strīyo vaisyās-tathā sūdrāste hi yānti parām gatam  
(IX, 32)

The Bhāktiprakāśa of Vīramitrodāya cites this sloka (p. 3-4):

Yat-karmabhir yat-tāpasā jñāna-vairāgyatascā yat  
Yogena dānadharmena sreyobhiritarairapi  
Sarve mad-bhaktiyogena mad-bhakto labhateṣījasā  

38, ll. 19-21. GIFTS (DĀNA) PREFERRED

Bṛhaspāti (ed. Rangaswami, p. 231, sl. 4):

Tapo dharmah kṛtyuge jñānam tretāyuge sṃṛtam  
Doāpore adhvaram prakta-tiṣye dānām dāyā damaḥ  

The last three prescriptions may be compared to the words with which the inscription of Heliodorus at Besnagar ends:

Sanskritised they read—Trīṇi amṛta-pādāṇi nayanti svargam: damaḥ, tvāgaḥ, apramādaḥ (E. J. Rapson, Ancient India, 1914, p. 157).

See the praise of gifts (dānaprāvamsā) in Hemādrī's Dānakhaṇḍa, (ed. Benares, I, pp. 4-13).
38, ii. 4-5. Authoritativeness of a Smṛti Due to Its Own Merit

See the passage from Medhātithi in the note below.

The test of merit is harmony with Vedic injunction. Even in the case of Manusmrṭi to which pre-eminent authority has been given in a famous passage of Brhaspati (ed. Rangaswami, p. 233, sl. 13):

\[
\text{Vedārtha-pratibaddhatvāt prāmāṇyam tu Manohḥ smṛtam } \\
\text{Manvartha-viparitā tu yā smṛthāḥ sā na sasyate} \\
\]

the grounds of its superiority are stated to be its reliable reproduction of the drift of the Vedas. This point is elaborated by Medhātithi in this comment on Manusmrṭi, II, 6, thus:

"Now, as regards the work of Manu, what happened was that he got together pupils who had studied several Vedic texts, as also other Vedic scholars, and having heard from them the several texts, he compiled his work; and he has therefore clearly stated that Vedic texts are the sources of what he has written, and thereby established the trustworthy character of his work. Others who came after him performed the several duties relying upon Manu's own words, and did not try to trace his words to their source in the Vedas." (Dr. Gangānāth Jhā's Trn., I, p. 196).

38, ii. 5-8. Smṛtis Endless: Recognition of a Modern Smṛti (Medhātithi)

In commenting on Manusmrṭi, II, 6, Medhātithi, and interpreting the word "smṛti-sūle" in the verse, says as follows: (Dr. Ganganath Jha's Trn., vol. I, pp. 204-205):

"There can be no reasonable ground for enumerating the names of smṛtis (recollectors) as Manu, Viṣṇu, Yama, Angiras, and so forth. For we find that many such persons as Pāṭhinasi, Baudhāyana, Pracetās and the rest are recognised by the wise
and learned as reliable smārtas (recollectors) and yet these names are not found in any of the lists (supplied by various smṛtis).

"What thus the words 'smṛtisāle ca tadvidām' mean is that when a person is found to be recognised and spoken of by all wise and learned persons as endowed with the said qualifications, and they also accept a certain work as really by that person,—the word of such a person (and of the work composed by him), even though proceeding from a human source, should be recognised as an authoritative source of the knowledge of Dharma. So that even at the present day, if there were a person possessed of the said qualifications, and he were to compose a work by reason of just those qualifications, then for later generations they would be accepted to be just as authoritative as the works of Manu and others. People of the present generation—who would be contemporaries of the said writer—would not derive their knowledge of Dharma from the words of such a writer, because the sources of information available to him would all be available to them also. Hence it is that until a teacher of the present day indicates the source from which he has derived a certain information, learned people do not accept his words as reliable. When, however, he has pointed out his source and his work has been accepted as authoritative, then at some future time, if the case of his work be found to be analogous to that of the smṛti rules, regarding aśṭaka and other acts (whose basis in the Veda we of the present day can not find) it would be only right to infer its authoritative character from the fact of its being accepted by the wise and the learned (which fact could not be explained except on the basis of its being duly authoritative)."

The original passage is to be found on p. 64 of Mr. J. R. Gharpure's edition of Medhātithi and on vol. I, pp. 67-68 of Dr. Jha's edn.:  

Ata eva smartr-parigaṇanā Manu-Viṣnur-Yamo-Angirā iti nirmūlā. Tathā hi Paiṭhinasi-Baudhāyana-Pracatah-
prabhṛtayāḥ sīstair-evamṛūpāssmaryante. Na ca pari-
ɡaṇanāyaṃ antarbhāvītaḥ. Sarvathā yamaviganena sīs-
ṭāḥ smaranti vadanti vā evam vidhaiḥ guṇaṁ-yuktam.
Tena caitat-praṇītam-iti tasya vākyam satyāpi pauru-śeyatve dharme pramāṇam syāt iti. 'Smṛtisūle ca tadvidām' itivyārthaḥ.

Adyatate ya evam-vidhāra-guṇair-yukta itdvena eva ca hetuṇā grantham uṣṇa-nibadhnyāt sa uttartresaṁ Manvādivat pramāṇi bhavet. Idanāntanāṁ tu yadeva tatra tasya bodhkāraṇaṁ tadeva teṣaṁ asti ti na tad-vākyad avagatiḥ.

Idanāntano hi yāvanmūlaṁ na darśayati tāvanna vidvām-
saḥ tadvākyam pramāṇayanti. Darśite tu mūle pramāṇiktre granthe kālaṁtare yadi kathancit aṣṭakādi-mūla-
tulyātaḥ syāt, tādā teṣaṁ siṣṭa-praṇigrahānyathānupapatyā tan-mūlānumānānaṁ yuktam.

38, ll. 21-24. THE DOCTRINE OF REPRESENTATION
(PRATINIDHITVAM)

Two principles have by their liberal application helped greatly
the development of Dharmasūstra. These are technically known
as Atidesa and Pratinidhitvam.

Atidesa may be described as the principle of extension of
applicability by analogy or resemblance. Such extensions may
be by analogy of (1) express or implied statement, vacanātidesa,
(2) identity or similarity of nomenclature, nāmātidesa, (3) and
indication of injunction, codanālingatātidesa.

As a general illustration of atidesa, Gadādhara mentions the
application of what appears in one context to another, ekatrasrutasānyatra sambandhaḥ (Vyutpattiviśāda). Vācaspatya
defines atidesa:—Itaradharmasya itarasmin prayogāya ādesaḥ.
Madhavaśārya explains the principle thus: (Jaiminīya-nyāya-
māla-vistaraḥ, VII, v, i, 1):

Prākṛtīt-karmaṇo yasmāt tat-samāneṣu karmasu
Dharmopadeso yenasyāt sotidesa iti smṛtaḥ

The two principles of atidesa and pratinidhitvam are con-
ected by doctrine and application.
Another familiar substitute is a fixed money payment for the baths and services, or penances (kṛcchra) prescribed for expiation.

In law, the most conspicuous example of the application of the principle is the validity of substitutes for sons of the body (aurasa-putrāḥ) in the son adopted (dattaka), bought (krīta) given by himself (svayaṃ-datta) etc. A substitute when allowed is held to be identical with the original. This supposition or belief leads to the principle of identity, what is equal to the original for purposes of substitution or representation, being regarded as identical with its original. Thus came deductions of the identity of husband and wife, father and son, son and daughter, master and servant, owner and slave etc. The logical corollary to identity is common personality, and the pratinidhi principle leads to the legal concept of common personality between husband and wife and parent and son, with its implications and consequences in law.

The underlying idea in pratinidhitvam is the permissibility of the use of a substitute, in cases in which either the original cannot be secured or is rendered incompetent to officiate. The justification for the use of the substitute is resemblance, real or apparent (Tulyarūpatayā mukhyakāryā-kāritvārthe nidhīyamānatvam iti Nyāyakosa, p. 530). Thus, in a vaidika ceremony, in the absence of a real son, an adopted son is permitted to function. Or even other representatives are allowed in similar circumstances, as ruled by the Skandaapurāṇa in the following sloka;

\[
\text{Putram ca vinayopteam bhaginīṁ bhrātaram tathā।}
\text{Eśāmabhāva evānyaṁ brāhmaṇam vinīyojayet॥}
\]

Or again, in case the article enjoined for use in a vaidtka ceremony is unavailable, a substitute may be used, as indicated in Śrautasūtras, e.g. Kātyāyana-sravasūtra, I, 4. Thus the use of gold (hiranya), taṇḍula (rice) as pratinidhi (substitute) for clarified butter (ājya) in sacrifices (yajña) or dāna (gifts) is well-known. The following illustrate the pratinidhi principle in operation.
Ṛhaspāti (ed. Rangaswami, p. 208, sl. 78):
Ājyam vinā yathā tailam sadbhīḥ pratinidhīḥ smṛtam ।
Tathaikādaśa ṣutrāstu ṣutrikaurasayorvināऽ
Yadṛṣekajātā bahavo bhṛtarastu saḥodarāḥ
Ekasyāḥ sute jāte sarve te ṣutrīnāḥ smṛtāḥ ॥
Bahuvinām ekaṣaṇinām esa eva vidhiḥ smṛtaḥ ।
Ekā cet ṣutrīṇi tāśāṁ sarvasāṁ piṇḍadastu saḥ.॥

S'atāpatha-Brāhmaṇa (Trn. Eggeling, S.B.E., XLIV, 187):
"The father is the same as the son and the son the same as the father".

Vājasaneya-Brāhmaṇa (cited by Kullūka, IX, 45)
Ardho ha va esa ätmanaḥ tasmād-yad-jāyām na
vindate naitāvat praṇāyaṁ asavo hi tāvad bhavati atha
yadaiva jāyām vindate atha praṇāyaṁ ta hi sarvo bhavati,
tathā caitad-vedavidū ṣivṛa vadanti yo bhartā saiva
bhāryā smṛtā.

Manuṣmṛti, IX, 45—46:
Etāvāneva ṁrūṣo yajjaśyātaḥ praṇetī ha ।
Viṣṇuḥ praśūḥ tathā caitadyo bhartā sa smṛtānām ः
Na nīśkraṇa-visārābhīyaḥ bhartur-bhāryā vimucyaṁ ।
Evaṁ dharmam viśāṁnāḥ prāk-praṇāpati-nirmītam.॥

Medhātithi on Manu, IX, 45:
Yasya bhāryā taśyaḥ-patyaṁ : yasmāt bhāryāyāḥ bhartuscāi-
katvam.

The enormity of a dispute between father and son is due to the principle of their identity (Manuṣmṛti, III, 159 ; Gautama, XV, 19.)

The principle is illustrated in the anonymous sloka cited by the Mitākṣarā (II, 32):
Guruḥ siṣya pituḥ putre dampatyoḥ svāmibhṛtyayayoh ।
Virodhe tu mithasteṣām vyavahāro na siddhyati ॥
i.e., "a suit will not lie between a preceptor and a pupil, a father and a son, between husband and wife, and between master and servant, even if they are on inimical terms." But, as the strict
application of this principle will lead to injustice and leave aggrieved sons, wives and servants without legal redress, the Mitāksarā indicates the pious character of the injunction and the obligation of the king to hear complaints from such persons, if, after they are advised to compose their differences, they insist on being heard:

'Dṛśṭāḍṛśtayoh sreyaskaro na bhavati gurvādibhir-vyavahāra' iti prathamam visyādayo nivāraṇīyāḥ rāṣṭrāḥ sa-sabhyena iti 'guroh visye' ityādi slokasya tātparyaḥ. Atyanta-nirbandhe tu visyādīnāṃ apyuktarthyā pravar-tanīyo vyavahāraḥ.

The excepted cases are those in which a father squanders property derived from the grandfather, the husband squanders the strīdhanam, and a teacher chastises a pupil more severely than allowed by law.

The principle of representation or substitution gave rise to the recognition of actions by 'near friends' on behalf of minors, women and afflicted or disabled persons, and of agents (niyuktāḥ), who were heard, as if they were principals, but with the distinct understanding that, just as in religious sacrifices, the spiritual merit accrues not to the officiating priest but to the person on whose behalf he performs the ceremony, so in the case of suits, success and failure go to the principals and not to the agents. Parents, brothers and sons could plead or act in suits, even without specific authorisation, which was required only for strangers. The interposition of unauthorised persons, claiming to act as agents, is punishable except in the above cases of near kin: vide Brhaspati-smṛti (ed. Rangaswami), I, 137-138; Kātyāyana (ed. Kane), v. 91, and Brhaspati, I, 171-2. The right of representation is denied in cases of serious crime, when the accused should plead in person: e.g. Kātyāyana, vv. 93-95. See Jimūtavāhana's Vyavahāramātyūkā, ed. Ashustosh Mookerji, pp. 287-288, and Varadarāja's Vyavahāranirṇaya, ed. Rangaswami, pp. 33-35.

The niyogakṛt is the parent of the later mukhtyār and vakil.
39, II. 9-10. CONDEMNATION OF ŚŪDRA MENDICANCY AND CELIBACY

See Ancient Indian Polity, pp. 40-41.

The rule of Kauṭilya imposing a severe punishment on those who become ascetics without providing for their wives and children, or who cause women to enter the ascetic order, is manifestly aimed against Śūdras, who, under the influence of Buddhism, were entering the monastic order:

Putradāramapratīvidhāya pravrajataḥ pūrvasāhasadānḍaḥ;
striyam ca pravrājayataḥ . . . Vānaprasthādanyāḥ pravrājitabhāvaḥ . . . nāsya janaṇapadam upanīvesa (p. 48).

The ascetic was both a celibate and a mendicant.

39, II. 10. MAGNIFICATION OF THE BRĀHMAṆA

Manuṣmyṭi enjoins due reverence to Brāhmaṇas in IV, 39, 52, 58, 135-136, 142, 162. The king is degraded by showing them irreverence, X, 43. Dr. Jayaswal held that the composition of the present Manuṣmyṭi (according to him) in the age of Puṣyamitra is responsible for several claims put forward on behalf of the Brāhmaṇa; e.g., He is Īśa in the sense of the ruler of the whole world, IX, 245; he is Īśvara (Ruler), for the protection of Dharma, I, 99; he is lord of everything (sarvoṣasyādhipati) VIII, 37; and he is entitled to all that exists (I, 100). See Jayaswal, Manu and Yājñāvalkya, passim, and particularly, pp. 102-104.

39, II. 18-23. PERFORMANCE OF AVAṀMEDHA BY KINGS OF DUBIOUS CASTE

See Note below on the similar references on p. 54 of the text.

The Bhārasṭiva Aṣvamedhas are referred to in the Dhammak and Siwani copper-plate inscriptions of Pravarasena II (Fleet, Guṭṭa
Inscriptions, pp. 235-249). Rudrasena I of the Vākātaka dynasty is referred to as the daughter’s son of “the illustrious Bhavanāga the Mahārāja of the Bhārasīivas ... who were sprinkled with the pure water of the Bhāgirathī that had been obtained by their valour, and who performed ablutions after the celebration of ten Aśvamedha sacrifices” (p. 241). The translation is Fleet’s and has been followed by students of Indian history, and the Bhārasīva king is credited with the performances of a record number of Aśvamedha sacrifices. The exact expressions used are:

Parākramādhigata-Bhāgirathyamalajala-mūrddhābhi-
ṣiktānām Daśāsvamedhā-vabhrītasnātānām, Bhārasīvā-
nām, Mahārāja Bhavanāga dauhitrasya

They appear to me to mean only that Bhavanāga had a lustral bath, after the performance of an Aśvamedha at the famous Daśāsvamedha ghat on the Ganges at Benares, whose sanctity is supposed to be derived from the performance there of Aśvamedha sacrifices by Brahma himself. It also means that he had conquered by his prowess (parākrama) the banks of the Ganges, probably Benares.

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39, II. 20-23. SAMUDRAGUPTA’S RELATION TO AN OUTCASTE CLAN

The mother of Samudragupta was a princess of the Licchavi clan, which, though famous in the days of the Buddha, was regarded as an outcaste clan in the Gupta epoch. Thus Manusmṛti classes them with other degraded castes of mixed origin;

Jhallo mallasca rājanyāt vrātyal-licchivireva ca
Naṭasca karaṇascaiva khaso dravida eva ca

The Manusmṛti is pre-Gupta on other evidence, and this origin ascribed to the powerful patrons of the Brahmanical revival in Magadha could not have been stated publicly during the hey-day of the Gupta empire.
39, II. 23-24. HELIODORUS THE VAISHNAVA GREEK

A column discovered at Besnagar near Bhilsa, in the extreme south of the Gwalior state, has the following inscription. The column must have been a flag-staff (dvajastambha) of a Vishnu temple and been surmounted by the figure of Garuda. The text of the inscription reproduced here follows the reconstruction by Prof. E. J. Rapson (Ancient India, p. 157). See also J.R.A.S., 1909, and 1910.

Devadevasa Vāsudevasa Garuḍadvaji ayam kārite ia Heliodoreṇa Bhāgavatena, Diyasa ṭutreṇa, Takśasvilākena, Yoṇa-dūtena, āgatena Mahārājasa Antalikṣitasa uṇantā sakāsam rājio Kāsiṇputrasa Bhāgabhadrasa trātārasa vasena catudaseṇṇa rājena vādhamānasa triṇi anuttāpadani—su anuṭhitāni nayanati saga dama cāga apramāda.

TRANSLATION

This Garuḍa column of Vāsudeva, the god of gods, was erected here by Heliodorus, a worshipper of Viṣṇu, the son of Dion, and an inhabitant of Takṣaśila, who came as Greek ambassador from the Great King Antialcidas to King Kāsiṇputra Bhāgabhada, the Saviour, then reigning prosperously in the fourteenth year of his kingship.

Three immortal precepts... when practised lead to Heaven: self-restraint, charity, and conscientiousness.

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39, II. 25-26. THE HUNS AS WORSHIPPERS OF VIṢṆU

On the basis of the inscriptions of Māṭrviṣṇu and Dhanyaviṣṇu at Eran in Eastern Malwa, bearing the date 165 of the Gupta era, (i.e. A.D. 484-585), the late Mr. R. D. Banerji (History of India, p. 189) states that the Huns were worshippers of Viṣṇu. The
brothers dedicated a Garuda-dhvaja i.e. a flag-staff surmounted by the figure of Garuda, (Inscription No 19, pp. 88-90, J. F. Fleet, Gupta Inscriptions, Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum, III). In the inscription, the reigning king is referred to as Budhagupta. In a second inscription incised on the base of a colossal stone image of Viṣṇu as Bṛuharāha (ibid., No. 36, pp. 158-161), the reigning king is referred to as Toramāṇa, and the inscription is dated in the first year of his reign. The object of the inscription is to record the building of the temple in which the image stands by Dhanyaviṣṇu, the brother of Mātṛviṣṇu. Both brothers claim to have performed Vedic sacrifices, studied the scriptures, and to have been Brāhmaṇaṛṣi (Svākarmaḥbhiratasya kratu-yājīnodhita-svādhyāyasya viprarseh.) They claim to belong to the Maitrāyaṇīya-Sūkha (Maitreyāni vrṣabhasya). The inscription on the flag staff ends with the pious Brahmāṇical benediction—svastyastu go-brāhmaṇa-ṭurogaḥbhaya sarva praṇābhya iti.

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40, ii. 9-10. THE EFFECTS OF THE SPREAD OF MIMĀMSA ON BUDDHISM

The assault of Pūrva-Mimāmsa on Buddhism was direct. Kumārila indicted Buddhism as opposed to the Veda, though he admitted (in order to take away any claim to originality of thought by the Buddhist) that the Buddhist systems owed their inspiration to the Upaniṣads. The assault on addiction to objects of sensual gratification is common to all serious thought, Upaniṣadic or Buddhist. Kumārila is definitely of the opinion that the Mīmāṃsa-sūtras of Jaimini contain criticisms of the views of Buddhists. This is his personal view, and should not weigh unduly in an estimation (as it has done) of the date of the Mīmāṃsa-sūtras. He was obsessed by his dislike of Buddhism, and might attribute to the founder of his school an equal dislike, overlooking the possibility of his founder being ante-Buddha. Both Dr. A. B. Keith and Mr. P. V. Kane have affirmed the absence of any explicit
reference to the Buddha or his doctrines in the sūtras. Prof. G. V. Devasthali in a recent paper (Annals of the B.O.R.I., 1940, Vol. XXII) asserts that the only mention of the word Buddha in the expression of Buddha-sāstrāt, which occurs, is not to the founder of Buddhism but is used in the sense of 'one who knows' (Mīmāṃsa-sūtra, I, 2, 33.) He concludes that Jaimini lived before the Buddha, and that his date cannot be later than 500 B.C.

But, this does not take away the fact that the Mīmāṃsa stood for the defence of the ritualism of the Veda for which the Buddhist had dislike. It “welcomes all philosophical views so long as they do not injure its central theme, viz., the transcendent importance of Dharma interpreted in the ritualistic sense. . . . The Veda is acknowledged as authoritative and its validity is established against the Buddhists, who dispute it, and the seekers of knowledge who subordinate Karma to Jñāna. . . The Mīmāṃsa accepts a realistic view of the world against the Buddhists.” (Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy I, p. 375).

The Buddhist is definitely attacked in Kumārila’s Sīlokavārtika, II, 169-172:

“169. The falsity of the scriptures of the Buddha are proved by the fact of their being due to human agency. Their character (of falsity) could not belong to the Veda, because in its case there is no author (human agency).

171-2. The assertions of the Buddha etc., that were brought forward by the atheists as examples to prove the unauthenticity of the Veda, are shown here to be non-concomitant. Because it has been shown above that the effects of these (Vedic assertions) are correct.”

The identification of the Buddhist and the Atheist is old. Vasiṣṭha lumps the atheist and the man who becomes an out-caste by neglecting his duties (Karmacāṇḍāla) and the latter is manifestly the Buddhist. Manu, (IX, 224-226) aims at Buddhists when he condemns “Sūdras in the guise of Brāhmaṇas- (sūdrāmsca dvijalingināḥ), atheists (pāvanaḍas) and persons who abjure duty (vikarmasthāḥ). Manu girds at Buddhists again in
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XII, 95, where they are characterised (correctly) as Veda-bāhyāḥ. The Viṣṇupurāṇa lumps the village-mendicant (monk) and the Jaina ascetic (Nirgrantho) as full of sins (bahuḍaśa), and the allusion is to the Buddhist. The much later Śat-trimsannata (post-Kumārila) is even more condemnatory and rules that the contaminating touch of the Buddhist can be removed only by a bath with clothes on (p. 174):

Buddhān pāśupatān jainān lokāyatika-kāpilān
Vikarmasthān dvijān śṛṣṭvā sacelo jalamaṇāviset.

The restoration of the old Karma-mārga, which was the aim of Kumārila and his group, meant naturally hostility to Buddhism. The fantastic stories of a persecution of Buddhists organized under a (mythical) king by Kumārila are the creations of the putrid imagination of later hagiologists, who treated of the life of Saṅkara. See Note lower down on the animus against the learned Śūdra.

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40, ii. 10-11. Saṅkara’s Influence in the Disappearance of Buddhism

See Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, II, pp. 470-473, and 496-497. Sir S. Radhakrishnan points out that “it is said, not without truth, that Brahmanism killed Buddhism by a fraternal embrace. We have seen already how Brahmanism silently assimilated many Buddhist practices, condemned animal sacrifices, accepted Buddha as an avatar of Viṣṇu, and thus absorbed the best elements of the Buddhist faith. Though the accidents of its first immediate form disappeared, Buddhism became, partly through Saṅkara’s influence, a vital force in the life of the country. Buddhism created in the region of thought a certain atmosphere from which no mind could escape, and it undoubtedly exercised a far-reaching influence on Saṅkara’s mind. An Indian tradition opposed of Saṅkara holds that he is a Buddhist in disguise and his māyā-vāda but crypto-Buddhism. . . . Yāmunācārya, the spiritual grand-father of Rāmānuja is of the same opinion which Rāmānuja
repeats. Vijñanabhiṣku, commenting on the Sāṅkhya system, observes: “There is not a single Brahmāsūtra in which our bondage is declared to be due to mere ignorance. As to the novel theory of Māyā propounded by persons calling themselves Vedāntists, it is only a species of the subjective idealism of the Buddhists. The theory is not a tenet of the Vedanta.” . . . These estimates imply that Śaṅkara incorporated certain Buddhist elements such as the doctrine of māyā and monasticism into the Vedanta philosophy.” In a sense it may therefore be said that Śaṅkara stole the Buddhists’ thunder. That the “borrowing” is perhaps not direct but due to both Buddhist and Advaitic thought, being directly descended from the thought of the Upaniṣads, does not alter the effect on the displacement of Buddhism by the neo-Brahmanical, i.e. Vedantic thought. The personal orthodoxy of Śaṅkara will have given point to the change. “There are similarities between the views of Buddhism and the Advaita Vedanta.”

The Buddha had meanwhile been accepted as an avatar of Viṣṇu. In some traditions he takes the place of Īśvara (i.e. Śiva) who is made to say (in the Padmapurāṇa Uttarakhanda, ch. 236) that in the form of a Brāhmaṇa (?) he had himself declared in the Kaliyuga the false doctrine of Māyāvāda. The implication of the acceptance of the Buddha as an avatar of Viṣṇu is that he re-appears as the champion of Vedic Dharma. That there is no incongruity in the legend will be manifest to those who remember that the Buddha lived and died a Hindu, and that the belief that he was opposed to the Vedas is not correct.

40, II. 27-28. Devala’s Claim to Supersede Other Smṛtis

He ends his allocution on purificatory rites for the restoration of the status of abducted women etc. with this declaration:

Prāyasccittam smākyātām yathoktam Devalena tu
Itaresām Rśinām ca nānyathā vākyam arhata
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41, ll. 1-16. DIGESTS UNDER ROYAL AUTHORSHIP OR PATRONAGE

King Bhoja of Dhāra (Dhāres‘vara Bhojadeva, first half of the eleventh century A. D.) wrote many works among which the best known to smārtas is his Bhūpāla-kṛtya-samuccaya, a digest on Dharmaśāstra from which citations occur in later nibandhas. The Mitākṣarā cites his views, but the Kalpataru makes no reference to him at all. His work is completely lost. See Mr. P. V. Kane’s article on Bhojadeva in J.B.B.R.A.S., 1925, pp. 223-224.

Gopāla is now established as the author of the Kāmadhenu, another lost digest, not only by the mention of it by Caṇḍes‘vara (Kane, op. cit., p. 295) but by an express declaration by Lakṣmīdhara in the verses introducing the Kṛtya-kalpataru. He is spoken as a “friend” (vayasya) of Lakṣmīdhara and probably belonged to the same court. For Vijñānes‘vara, Aparārka and Lakṣmīdhara, see my papers in the Madras Law Journal Golden Jubilee Volume (1941) on Lakṣmīdhara and the Kṛtyakalpataru and the Kṛtyakalpataru and Vijñānes‘vara passim.

The patron of Hemādri was Mahādeva, the Yādava king of Devagiri.

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41, ll. 14 ff. DHARMASĀASTRA IN THE MUSALMAN PERIOD

Kullūka, the commentator on Manusmṛti lived in Benares about A.D. 1250 (according to Mr. Kane, op. cit., p. 363), while it was in the area under the Delhi Sultanate. Caṇḍes‘vara (c. A.D. 1300) was minister to a feudatory of the Sultan of Delhi. Śrīdatta, author of Ācārādarsa, wrote in Mithila a little before Caṇḍes‘vara. (Kane, p. 365). Harinātha, author of Smṛtisāra, a digest, which has not yet been printed, wrote in Mithila (?) a little after Caṇḍes‘vara. Viśves‘vara Bhaṭṭa, the author of the Subodhini and the real author of the digest Madanapāriyāta, was probably a Telugu Brāhmaṇa, judging from his father’s name Peḍibhaṭṭa,
who wrote in the court of Madanapāla the chief of Kāśṭhā, a little to the north of Delhi, in the days of Sultan Firuz Shah of the Tughlakh dynasty. Madanasimha, the author of the Madanaratna, another unprinted digest, wrote from near Delhi early in the fifteenth century. Sūlapāṇi and Raghunandana in Bengal wrote when it was under the Muhammandans. So did Vācaspati Miśra (author of the famous digest, Cintāmaṇi), who wrote when the area in which he lived was under the sphere of the influence of the Sultans of Jaunpur. Dalapati, the author of the digest Nṛsimha-prasāda wrote under the patronage of a Sultan of Ahmadnagar (c. 1500). The Bhaṭṭa family of Benares (which produced many writers on Dharmavāstra, like Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, the author of Tristhalisetu and Prayogaratna, Kamalākara, Nīlakanṭha and Gāgābhaṭṭa) wrote at Benares in the heyday of Mughal rule. So did the not less famous family of the Kāśi Dharmādhikārīns, to which Nandapaṇḍita belonged. Mitramiśra wrote in the reign of Jahangir and Todarmal in that of Akbar. Anandadeva, the author of the Smṛti-kaustubha wrote in the reign of Aurangzebe. So did the famous Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa under the aegis of a small chieftain near Allahabad, in the last days of Aurangzebe. In the illustrations the names of those who wrote under independent Hindu kingdoms in the Musalman period are not reckoned.

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42, U. 7-10. Dvaita-nirṇaya

Dvaita-nirṇaya is a special form of composition. It came into vogue in the fifteenth century. The aim of the writers of this type of Smārta work was to settle, after canvassing apparently opposed authorities, controverted topics in law or usage. It necessitates a mastery of Dharmavāstra and Mīnānśa. Works on it could be in prose or verse. The best known of these are the Dvaitanirṇaya of Vācaspati Miśra (c. 1450), Dvaitaviveka of Vardhamāna (c. 1500), and three Dvaitanirṇayas by three members of the Bhaṭṭa family of Benares, Śaṅkara and his son Dāmodara, and his grandson Bhānu (c. 1580 to 1620).
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42, ll. 19-27. The Substitute for the Pariṣad in Dharma-vyavasthā

In the Gupta epoch the vinaya-sthāpaka took the place of the pariṣad. In the Sukranīti, the Paṇḍita is enjoined "to study the moral life obtaining in society in ancient and modern times which have been mentioned in the codes, which are now opposed and which go against the customs of the people, and to advise the king as to which of these are efficacious for this world and the next." He is a legal adviser. (Sukranīti II, vv. 200-203.)

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43, ll. 26-27. Medhātithi's Repudiation of the King's Power to Make a Law in Transgression of Dharma

The opinion of Medhātithi is thus expressed in his comment on Manusmṛti, VIII, 13:

Tasmād-dharmam yamiṣṭeṣu sa vyavasyen-narādhīpaḥ ।
Aṇiṣṭam cāpyaniṣṭeṣu tam dharmam na vicālayet ॥
i. e., the dharma of the king in favour of some and against others should not be transgressed.

Medhātithi's explanation is that in the course of business and in consonance with dharma and custom the king may issue edicts which cannot be transgressed. As illustrations of such edicts or proclamations, Medhātithi gives such notifications as:

'today, the city should observe a holiday,'
'all men should attend a marriage in the minister's house,'
'no animals shall be slaughtered today by the soldiers,'
'no birds shall be caught for so many days,'
'for so many days dancing girls shall be entertained by the wealthy men' (dancing girls being state slaves).

"When such decrees are issued by the beat of the drum, they should not be disobeyed. But the king has no power over the
ordinances relating to religious practices or dharma, nor on the rules of castes and stages of life, because any change of them will be contrary to smṛti texts. Accordingly the text under interpretation (i.e., Manu, VII, 13) will apply in cases where the smṛti texts are not offended against."


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43, ll. 28-30. KING’S ALLEGED POWER TO MAKE LAWS, OF HIS OWN AUTHORITY

The topic is of great value, as the alleged existence of the power is now relied on to support social legislation. In the adjudication of cases, four kinds of rules may be relied on. These are usually taken as dharma, vyavahāra, caritra, and rājasāsanam. What is the relative force of these between themselves? They are interpreted as Smṛti law, secular law custom and edicts of the king. Secular law is sometimes identified with Arthasāstra rule. (e.g. Jayaswal, Manu and Yājñavalkya, pp. 13-16). The enumeration is identical in Kauṭilya, Yājñavalkya, and Nārada:

Dharmasca vyavahārasca caritram rājasāsanam
Vivādārthas-catusphādo. . . .

The difference comes in the last quarter (pāda); Kauṭilya has (p. 150).
Pascimah pūrvabādhakaḥ (i.e. each following supersedes the preceding), while Nārada rules (I, 10):

"Uttaraḥ pūrvabādhakaḥ" (i.e. what precedes over-rides what follow)."

In a consideration of the place of the royal edict (Rājasvāsanam) it would seem to be last in the list of applicable authorities, in the order of priority, according to Dharmasāstra and the first according to Arthasāstra. It would be an obvious interpretation to take the former as an extreme claim of the sacerdotalist and the latter of the regalist. But, the interpretation is barred, if one realises that Kauṭilya, if studied with care, is not in opposition to Dharmasāstra, and that, on the other hand, his rules conform to it. Sūkra, who is also an Arthasāstra authority, gives the king power to declare the law, but it must be in accordance with Dharma and usage. He can not make a new law. The royal edict is merely declaratory, and not innovative. This is specially indicated by Kātyāyana (v. 38):

Nyāya-sāstra-avirodhena desa-dṛṣṭes-tathāvva ca
Yad-dharmanā stāpayet rāja nyāṣyam tat rājasvāsanam

The edict has to conform to dharma, nyāya and desācāra if it is to be operative. Yājñavalkya refers to the edict as ‘dharma as declared by the king’ (dharmano rājakyatasya tat). That the Arthasāstra can not supersede Dharmasāstra in any circumstances is declared in smṛtis. Thus, Yājñavalkya declares that Dharma-sāstra is more powerful (i.e., can over-ride) Arthasāstra (II, 21):

Arthasāstrāttu balavat dharmasāstram iti sthitāḥ

The reference to Arthasāstrā is held by the Mitākṣarā to refer only to the Artha content of Dharmasāstra. See Ancient Indian Polity, pp. 164-170.

Kauṭilya’s rule of precedence will mean, under this interpretation, that the order of preference placing edicts, usages, vyavahāra (artha) and dharma as operative in sequence, simply implies that as every one of these should be in conformity with dharmsastra, and the king is enjoined to deal with causes in conformity with Dharma-sāstra (dharmsāstrāṇusāreṇa, Yājñavalkya, II, 1), the order
which the courts will naturally follow proceeds from what is explicitly stated in an edict and discoverable custom to the *smṛti* rules, which require skilled interpretation. The explanation will reconcile the contradiction, apparent, but not real. That Kauṭilya was fully conversant with the rules of interpretation, which were codified probably even before his time by the followers of *Mīmāṃsā* will be evident to his readers. Further, lower down in the same passage and context, Kauṭilya lays down that *Artha* should be interpreted in term of *Dharmasāstra* (p. 150):

Samsthāya dharmasāstreṇa sāstram vā vyāvahārikam  
Yasmin-narthe virudhyeta dharmeṇa artham viniscayet

He also indicates the order of action of a successful ruler in regard to the four (p. 150):

Anu-sāsad-dhi dharmeṇa vyavahāreṇa samsthayā  
Nyāyena ca caturthena caturantām mahīṃ jayet

That rules of logic should be applied as well of intelligent, interpretation for maintaining the integrity of *Dharmasāstra*, and that they should not be read literally and unintelligently is laid down by Bṛhaspati (*Vyav.*, II, 111):

Kevalam sāstramāsritya na kartavyo hi nirṇayah  
Yukti-hīna-vicāre tu dharma-hāniḥ praśāyate

The *sāstram* in the above *śloka* is obviously, from the context *Dharmasāstra*.

**THE KING IS UNDER, NOT ABOVE THE LAW**

This will be clear from *Manuṣmṛti* (VII, 28) which places Daṇḍa above the king:

Daṇḍo hi sumahat-tejo durdharascākṛtamabhiḥ  
Dharmāt-vicalitam hanti nyāmeva sa-bāndhavam

Kauṭilya, p. 226, lays down that the court can punish even the king as it would punish a subject:
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Uttamaśparamadhyatavam pradeṣṭā daṇḍakarmanāḥ
Rājasca prakṛtinām ca kalpayet-antarānvitaḥ

In criminal cases the king himself was deemed a party as prosecutor, and in the case of state offences judgment could be given against him.

The exaltation of Dharmasvāstra as Daṇḍanīti is the purpose of chapter 69 of the Sāntiparva of the Mahābhārata, where occurs the famous expression Rājā kālasya kāraṇam, which has been incorrectly apprehended and used to support a claim for a residual power in a king, on account of his personal responsibility, to change law and usage in harmony with the time-spirit. (vide Note 61 supra).

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43, ll. 29-33. POWER OF THE KING TO CHANGE LAW OR USAGE. THE ALLEGED CASE OF AS'OKA

The changes which As'oka is supposed to have made are the prohibition of the slaughter of animals, including the killing of animals at Vedic sacrifices, the prohibition of burning of chaff, and castration of animals, and changes in criminal law such as pardoning criminals on certain anniversaries. These are dealt with below seriatim in succeeding Notes.

A Note above (95) which cites Medhātithi's views on the alleged power of the king to change law, shows that among the examples of permissible proclamations, which he gives, come the prohibition of the killing of animals and snaring of birds on certain days, as well as the prescription of festivities, of which examples are afforded by As'oka's edicts.

98

44, ll. 4-12. ALLEGED CHANGE BY THE MAURYAS IN THE LAW OF THEFT

Daṇḍin mentions in the Dasakumārascarita (II, 44) that the Mauryas granted this boon to merchants that if they were found to
be in possession of stolen property, capital punishment should be excused in their case:

"Maurya-datta esa varo vanijām, idṛsesu aparādhesu nāsti asubhīh abhiyogaḥ"

The manifest thief was punished with death (Manusmṛiti, IX, 269) but one who was merely found in possession of stolen property, should not be put to death. "He who is taken with the stolen goods, and the implements of burglary, may without hesitation may be caused to be slain."

Na hoḍena vinā cauram ghātayet dhārmiko nṛpaḥ
Sahoḍam sopakaraṇam, ghātayet avicārayan

Thus, under the old law, which is given by Manu, one who is only found with stolen property in his possession, and is obviously not the burglar, cannot be sentenced to death or summarily killed.

The so-called vara (favour) of the Mauryas is nothing more than what Manu allows under the old law. If the Mauryas had declared it by edict, as implied by Daṇḍin, it was only a case of declaring the existing law, not changing it.

Further in dealing with cases of theft, as in other cases, the Dharmasūstra asks the circumstances to be taken into account. Thus the theft of agricultural implements, of arms, and of medicines should be dealt with only after the king has taken into account the time of the offence and the use to which the stolen object was put (Manusmṛiti, IX, 293). Traders get in the course of business property which might have been stolen. It would be obviously against the spirit of the Dharmasūstra to punish such persons with the death penalty. The example only proves that the Mauryas merely enforced Dharmasūstra, and did not change it.
penal procedure, my orders extend so far, namely: 'To prisoners convicted and sentenced to death a respite of three days is granted by me.' During this interval the relatives of some at least of the condemned men will invite them to deep meditation, hoping to save their lives, or, if that may not be so, they will present votive offerings and undergo fasts to promote the pious meditations of those about to die.

For, my desire is that the condemned, even during their imprisonment, may gain the next world, and that among the people pious practices of various kinds may grow, along with self-restraint and generous liberality.” (Vincent Smith’s trn. vide his Asoka, 1901, pp. 149-150).

Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar (Asoka, 2nd edn., 1932, p. 342) offers a somewhat different rendering, which is given below:

“For this is desirable—what?—uniformity of administration and uniformity of punishment. And even so far goes my order: to men who are bound with fetters, on whom sentence has been passed, and who have been condemned to death, have I granted three days as something rightfully and exclusively their own. (In that interval) (their) relatives will indeed propitiate some (of the Rajukas) in order to grant their life; and to propitiate Death, they (i.e. the convicts) will give alms and observe fasts pertaining to the next world. For my desire is that even when the time (for their living) has expired they may win the next world and that manifold pious practices, self-restraint and liberality may thus grow among the people.”

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44, ll. 21-27. ROYAL PARDON

Manu takes away from the King the power to annul a sentence pronounced after a due enquiry in court (IX, 233):

Tīritam cānasīṣṭam ca yatra kvacāna udbhavet ।
Kṛtam tad-dharmato vidyāt na tad bhūyo nivartayet ॥

Manu lays down that the guilt of the killer of a Brāhmaṇa, goes to him who eats his food, the guilt of an adulterous wife
falls on her negligent husband, the sinning pupil's and sacrificer's guilt on the preceptor and teacher, and the thief's sin on the king who pardons him.

Failure to punish the manifest thief is for the king a sin. When a thief, as laid down by the law (VIII, 314) approaches the king with streaming locks and confesses his guilt, he is free from sin whether he be sentenced or let off, "but the king, if he punishes not, takes upon himself the guilt of the thief." (VIII, 317).

Even if he wishes to do so the king can not let off an old offender. (Viṣṇusmṛti, III, 93).

101

44, i. 29. PROHIBITION OF VEDIC SACRIFICES

Asoka is usually held to have interdicted the performance of Vedic sacrifices throughout his kingdom, and thereby made a violent change in the practice and religious obligations of the Brahmanical community in his kingdom. The relevant passages in, the edicts are these: (1) "Here no animal may be slaughtered" (Rock Edict I); (2) by reason of Asoka's proclamations, the cessation of the slaughter of living creatures is growing (Rock Edict IV); (3) "Favours have been conferred by me on quadrupeds and bipeds, birds and aquatic animals, even up to the boon of life." (Pillar Edict II); (4) prohibition of the wanton destruction of certain named animals, (the eating of which is prohibited by custom) and acts of cruelty on certain named days of the month (Pillar Edict V, 26th year of his consecration as king)! (5) "The growth of Dharma (in the kingdom) has been effected by regulation of Dharma and by exhortation, and of the two regulation is of minor account . . . such as the prohibition of the slaughter of such and such animals and other regulations of the kind." (Pillar Edict VII).

Among these, the word "here" in clause 1 above is capable of interpretation as "here in the capital" or "in the Palace" (Bhandarkar, op. cit., p. 298) "'ihā' has been taken by some to mean 'here, on this earth' and by others as 'here' i.e. in Pāṇṭaliputra. But it had rather be taken to denote his 'palace or royal
establishment' because all other items mentioned in this edict are connected either with either Asoka personally or his royal household."

The belief that Asoka created a furious opposition among his Brāhmaṇa subjects by forbidding yajñas involving animal sacrifices is baseless. The cost of a yajña would have restricted the number of yajñas to be performed at any time. What the king probably did was to withdraw his patronage of sacrifices involving the slaughter of animals. It may be noted that there was no attempt at all at wholesale stoppage of the killing of animals, as is often assumed wrongly.

102

44, ll. 31-32. Brūṇahatyā

Brūṇahatyā or the slaying of the embryo was a heinous crime from Vedic times. (Vide Eggeling's Trn. of the Satapatha-Brāhmaṇa, Vol. XXVI, S.B.E., p. 19, XLIII, 272, and XLIV, 341n.)

The castration of animals is punishable with a fine of 100 paṇas, according to Viṣṇusmṛti quoted in Vivādaratnakara, p. 278. Kauṭiliya imposes the highest fine for violence on those who "render animals impotent, or cause abortion by use of medicine to a female slave." (Arthasastra, p. 198). Kauṭiliya recommends a king, who has conquered a new kingdom, to conciliate the subjects by various regulations among which he specifies the prohibition of the slaughter of females and young ones among animals (yoni-bālavadhah) as well as castration (ib. p. 407). This rule is suggestive, along with one just previous to it in the Arthasastra, enjoining the conqueror to prohibit the slaughter of animals in certain periods and certain days, including the royal birthdays, as this is what Asoka says he in the Fifth Pillar Edict (Smith, op. cit., pp. 150-152).

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45, ll. 5-9. ASOKA'S DHAMMA VIEWED AS BRAHMANICAL

Dr. J. F. Fleet (J.R.A.S., 1908, pp. 491-497) argues that the Dhamma of the Rock and Pillar edicts is not Buddhist but merely
the traditional Rājadharma. Dr. J. M. Macphail rejects the idea that Asoka’s Dhamma stands for Buddhism. (Asoka, p. 48) and holds that it merely denotes piety. Dr. Vincent Smith (Asoka, p. 60) says: “The Dharma or Law of Piety which he preached and propagated unceasingly with amazing faith had few, if any, distinctive features. The doctrines were essentially common to all Indian religions, although one sect or denomination might lay stress on one factor in it rather than on another.” On an analysis of the various allocutions he addressed his subjects, Dr. Smith finds that none of them are distinctive in the sense of not being Brahmanical. “The Dhamma of Asoka is Hindu Dharma with a difference” viz. its stressing ethical features rather than formal. Dr. R. K. Mookerji accepts the view. It is noteworthy that when Asoka lays down a ‘close time’ in which no animals should be killed he selects just those days, viz. the full and new moon days, the fourteenth days and the eighth days after full or new moon (aṣṭami, caturdasī, and ārava) on which even Hindu meat-eaters abstain from eating animal food. (See Rock Edict V.) The animals which he forbids being killed for eating are generally those which the smṛtis prohibit the eating of. Over and over again he enjoins respect for Brāhmaṇas and ascetics. His plea for largesses and pious pilgrimages is only the inculcation of the Hindu Dharma to make dānas and to go to tīrthas. Without going so far as to claim that these show that the king was a follower of the old Brahmanism, it might be maintained that policy as well as conviction made him unwilling to change the rules of the old Dharma.

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45, II. 9-12. DHARMAVIJAYA

That Asoka’s frequent references to Dharmavijaya are to be taken in the sense it has in the famous classification of Kauṭilya of conquests as Dharmavijaya, Lobhavijaya and Asuravijaya has been argued ably by Mr. V. R. Ramachandra Dikshit in his Mauryan Polity, (1932, pp. 128-9, and 254-257). It is appropriate to see in the edicts of Candragupta’s grandson the use of
well-known expressions popularised by Candragupta's great Minister, Kauṭilya. The translation of Dharmavijaya as 'conquest by piety,' as contrasted with 'conquest by arms', which Dr. Hultzsch adopts (Inscriptions of Asoka, 1925, C.I.I. p. 53) is a forced interpretation, when compared with the technical sense of the word which should have been familiar to the Mauryan age. The passage in the Arthasastra where Dharmavijaya is defined (ed. Mysore, p. 380) runs thus:

Trayo abhiyoktā ro dharma-lobha-asura-vijayina iti
Teṣāmabhyaṣpatyā dharmavijayī tasyātī
Tamabhyaṣpadṣeta paresāmaḥ bhayatī
Bhūmi-dravya-haraṇena lobha-vijayī tasyātī: tam arthena
abhiṣapadyeta
Bhūmi-dravya-putra-dāra-prāṇa-haraṇena asuravijayī;
tam
bhūmi-dravyabhāyam upagṛhyā agrāhyāḥ prāti kurvita

The passage may be rendered thus:

"(A weak king threatened with invasion may have to deal with invaders of three kinds.) These are the Dharma-conqueror (Dharma-vijayī), the greedy conqueror (lobha-vijayī) and the demoniac conqueror (Asura-vijayī). Of these the Dharmavijayī will be satisfied by acceptance of suzerainty through surrender. Such a conqueror should be submitted to through fear of attack by others (as he will protect his vassal against others). The greedy invader, afraid of enemies he might make, will be easily satisfied with treasure and territory; so he should be bought off by money. The demoniac invader (Asura-vijayī) will not rest content with merely taking the kingdom, treasure, sons and wives of the conquered king. Him the weak king should keep off by surrender of territory and wealth, and remain unassailed. (Against all of them, when they have begun the invasion, one should war by offers of peace and friendship, diplomacy and treacherous action.)"

In Rock Edict XIII describing the conquest of Kalinga, Asoka expresses his passionate grief at the evils which the war
-entailed on innocent persons, combatants and non-combatants, including the terrible sufferings Brāhmaṇas, ascetics and householders, and his resolve to conquer thenceforth only through Dharmaśāstra and the success he has had by the change of policy. "He is now able to spread his benign influence even in regions as distant as 600 yojanas, where dwell the Yavana king called Antiochus, the four kings called Ptolemy, Antigonus, Magas and Alexander, likewise down below, where are the Colas, the Pāṇḍyas, as far as the Tāmbraparṇi, likewise in the home dominions among the Yavanas, Kambhojas, Nābākas and Nabhapantis, the hereditary Bhoja chiefs, the Āndhras and Paimdas—and find them all practising the Dharma which he has sought to spread, and they are filled with love to him." "That love" he continues "has been attained by me through Dharmaśāstra" by sending his envoys to distant regions.

This is a clear declaration by Asoka of his preference of the method of extending his suzerainty or sphere of influence without recourse to arms as against the policy of force and violence which succeeded in Kalinga, when he conquered and annexed it early in his reign.

The Dharmaśāstra is what is inculcated in Rājadharma by the Dharmaśāstras, where it is suggested that as far as possible recourse to arms should be avoided, and after victory in battle, if a battle becomes inevitable, no harassment of the conquered royal family or people should be permitted. The war itself should be conducted as a Dharma war (Dharma-yuddha); see Rājadharma-kalpataru, ed. Rangaswami, pp. 125 ff. The desire for suzerainty or extension of supremacy is justified even by resort to war by Sānkhya-likhita (op. cit. p. 125) on the ground that a king, as a kṣatriya has the duty to perform the horse-sacrifice (asvamedha), which can be done only by the accumulation of immense resources and by the subordination of other kings. Manu’s injunction (VII, 198-199) to obtain the end by negotiation or gifts, and never by recourse to war, because the fortunes of war are uncertain, is cited by Lakṣmidhara in his treatment of the subject in Rājadharma-kāṇḍa of the
KALPATARU along with similar injunction. The difference between the king to whom these recommendations are made and the king in Kauṭilya is that the former is assumed to possess the strength to conquer, whereas Kauṭilya’s advice is to the weak ruler who is afraid of the designs of war-like neighbours, who might, according to their disposition be one of the three classes of conquerors.

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45, l. 11. DHARMA-AMĀTYA SAME AS DHARMĀDHIKARI

Dealing with Rāṣṭrakūṭa administration, Dr. A. S. Altekar writes as follows in his Rāṣṭrakūṭas and their Times, 1934, p. 169:

“The place of Purohita was taken in our period by an officer whose business it was to exercise general superintendence over religion and morality. Paṇḍita, the Minister of morality and religion in Śukraniti, seems to embody the tradition of the Dhamma-mahā-amātyas of Aśoka, and the Samaṇa-mahāmāṭas of the Āndhras (Nāsik inscriptions in Epig. Ind. VIII, p. 91) and the Vinayasthitisthāpakas of the Guptas. The tradition was continued in the north by the Čeḍis, one of whose records (Kumbhi plates of Vijayasimha. J.A.S.B., xxxi, p. 116) mentions Dharma-pradhāna in addition to the Mahā-purohita. The office existed under the early Rāṣṭrakūṭa ruler Nanna-raja in A.D. 708, and the officer bore the significant title of Dharmāṇkusa.” (Ind. Ant. xviii, p. 230). Śukraniti employs the Prādvivāka (who is the same as Dharmādhikāri) to select from Dharmas, ancient and modern, those which should be followed and bring them to the notice of the king. (II, sl. 100).

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45, ll. 13-15. TITLE OF DHARMA MAHĀ-RĀJA IN THE PALLAVA DYNASTIES

From the Hirahāḍagalli grant (Epig. Ind., I, 5 and VI, 88) dated in the eighth year of his reign, we learn that the early Pallava king Sivaskandavarman (c. 200 A.D.) had the title of Dharma-mahārāja (R. Gopalān, History of the Pallavas of South India,
1928, p. 37). Simhavarman, II, the son of Viṣṇu-gopavarman, according to the Mangadur grant (Ind. Ant., V, p. 155) had also the title of Dharmanahara. (c. 450 A.D.) Mahendravarman (A.D. 600-630) styles himself Mahābhūta Sa-dharmā, which is equal to Dharma-Mahārāja in the introduction to Mattavilāsaprahasana (Travancore Sanskrit Series, Iv, p. 3). The name Dharmanārāja-ratha by which the rock-cut temple at Mahabalipuram is known, and which Dr. E. Hultsch regarded as made in the reign of the great Narasimhavarman I, was probably so called because he was known as Dharma-rāja.

Dr. K. P. Jayaswal (History of India, p. 184) gives a fanciful interpretation of the title. He suggests that it was “a Hindu edition or rather a Hindu counter-title of the Kuśān Daivaputra Śāhunusāhi. Instead of being a Daivaputra, the Pallava king bases his claim on his adherence to the orthodox law and orthodox civilisation, which was quite in conformity with the law of the Hindu constitution. He was substituting Dharma for the divine Daivaputra.” I see no motive in the selection of the title other than that suggested in the text.

45, ll. 16-18. KADAMBA TITLE OF DHARMA-MAHĀRĀJA

The founder of the Kadamba dynasty, Mayūra-sarma (A.D. 345-370), came of a Brāhmaṇa family devoted to the study of the Vedas and the performance of sacrificial rites. In the Talagundha inscription (Epigraphia Carnatica, VII, Intn., p. 9) his name appears with the Brāhmaṇa suffix varman. This is replaced by the Kṣatriya suffix varman, by which he is known in all subsequent records. As Brāhmaṇas the Kadambas could not have rightfully become kings. Mṛgesvara-varma, the seventh ruler of the dynasty, is styled in an inscription of his queen as Dharma-Mahārāja Mṛgesvara-varma.

Dr. Jayaswal suggests, without sufficient reason, that the Kadambas and the Gaṅgas assumed the title, because they were under the Pallava empire. (History of India, p. 199).
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45, ll. 18-19. GAÂNGAS AS DHARMA-MAHÂRÂJAS

For instances see M. V. Krishna Rao, Gaângas of Talkâd, 1936, pp. 120-123. Madhava Koñganî-varma (c. 430 A. D.) was known as Koñganî-varma Dharma-Mahâdhirâja. "In the Uttanur plates (Madras Epigraphist’s Report, 1916, p. 35) Durviniita is compared to Vaivasvata-Manu (A. D. 853-869). Nitimârgha is lauded as the foremost of kings following Nitisâra. Mârasimha (A. D. 960-970) the son of Bûtuga II, took the title of Dhharma-avatâra: 'incarnation of Dhharma' (Fleet, Dynasties of the Kannarese Districts, in the Bombay Gazetteer, I, i, p. 305)."

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45, ll. 18-19. TITLE OF DHARMA-MAHÂRÂJA IN CAMPÂ

The Kauñджinya ruler of Campâ Bhadravarman (c. A. D. 400) as Dharma-Mahârâja (R. C. Majumdar, Campâ, 1927, III, Ins. 2, p. 3) Dr. Jayaswal considers that the Kauñджinya dynasty of Campâ was founded by a scion of an old and respected dynasty from North India, which had settled in the Pallava kingdom, from which the migration apparently took place to Campâ (History of India, pp. 169-170). The inscription of Bhadravarman on the Cho Dink rock is in Sanskrit prose and refers to a sacrifice performed by the king before Śiva as Bhadresaśvara.

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45, ll. 20-22. COÂLA CLAIM TO FOLLOW MANU’S LEAD

Râjakesari Râjamahendra, who was chosen as heir-apparent to the Coâla throne in A. D. 1059, has left three records in which the opening prasasti begins thus: Manu-ntti-murai-vaḷarâ, i.e., May the righteousness of Manu duly increase. The Colas claimed descent from Manu. A mythical ancestor of the Cola dynasty, named Manu Cola, is said to have sentenced his son to be killed by having a chariot driven over him, as he had killed a calf by running
over it, and the bereaved cow complained to the just king. (Nila-
kanṭha Sāstri, Colas, I, 1936, p. 12). An inscription states that
the king followed the laws of Manu and collected only one-sixth of
the produce of land (ibid. p. II, p. 327). Rajendra II (acc. A. D. 1246)
begins his inscriptions with the words—Manukulam-eḍultu neri-
uṇḍī-sūdī-arūliya i.e. He who having assumed the righteous
crown of the line of Manu.

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45, l. 21. KĀLIDĀSA ON MANU’S IDEAL
vide Raghuvamsa, I, 17:

Rekkhumātramapi kṣunṇād ā-Manor-vartamanah āram
i.e., He (Dilipa) did not swerve even to the extent of a line
from the path of Manu.

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45, II. 24-29. EVILS OF ANARCHY (Arājatā)

For the evils of interregnums, owing to the demise of kings,
and of king-lessness, i.e., arājatā, see Ramāyaṇa, II, 67, where
the following slokas occur:

Nārājake janapade yañāvasilā dvijādayāḥ
Satrāṇyanvāsatē dāntā brāhmaṇāḥ samvitavratāḥ (13)
Nārājake janapade mahāyañēsu yajvanaḥ
Brāhmaṇāḥ vasu-samburṇāḥ visṛjantyāptadakṣināḥ (14)
Nārājake janapade mālya-modaka dakṣināḥ
Devatābhyaarcanārthāya kalpyante niyatair-janaīḥ (27)
Nārājake janapade svakam bhavati kasyacit.
Matsyā īva janā nityam bhakṣayantaḥ parasparam (31)
See 66 also Mahābhārata, Sāntiparva, LIX, (LVI, Kumbakonam
ed. 2, 3, 16):

Arājākeṣu rāṣṭreṣu dharmo na vyavatīṣṭate
Parasparam ca khādanti sarvathā dhik-arājākam (3)
Nārājakeṣu rāṣṭreṣu havyam vahati pāvakaḥ. (5)
Rājā cenna bhavelloke pṛthivyā daṇḍa-dhārakaḥ
Jale matsyānnivābhakṣyan durbalam balavattarāḥ (16)
See also Kāmandaka, Nītisāra, II, 40:

Parasparāmiṣatayā jagato bhinnavartmanah
Danḍābhāve paridhvamsi mātsyo nyāyah pravartate

See also Mātsya-purāṇa, ch. 225, 8-9:

Yatra svyāmo lohitākṣo Daṇḍascarati nirbhayah
Prajāstatra na muhyanti netā cet sādhu āsyaṣṭi
Bālavṛddhāturā-yati-dhvīja-stri-vidhavā yataḥ
Mātsyannūyēṇa bhakṣyēṇā yādī daṇḍam na pātayet

Dr. K. P. Jayaswal, against the sense of the contexts in which these passages occur, took the term A-Rājatā to mean a kingless constitution. (Hindu Polity, 1924, pt. i, pp. 41, 97, 98, 100, 134.)

46, II. 1-8. ASPECTS OF BARBARIAN RULE IN INDIA

The Indian view of foreign rule is given in the Purāṇas, whose evidence is thus summarised by Dr. K. P. Jayaswal (History of India, A.D. 150 to 350, 1933, pp. 151-2):

"The Sākas not only disregarded the orthodox system but they imposed a system of social tyranny. The country under them was encouraged or forced to follow their manners, ethics and religious theories: Tannāthāste janapadās tāc-chilācāra-vādinaḥ. The Mleccha kings followed the general practice of their race;—exacted illegal taxes:

Prājāste bhakṣayisyanti mlecchā rājanya-rūpinaḥ

They killed and massacred even women and children. They killed cows. They killed Brāhmaṇas, and they took away the wives and wealth of others:

Stri-bāla-go-dvijaghnās ca para-dāra-dhanā-hṛtāḥ

They were never crowned, i.e., legal kings according to Hindu law. They indulged in constant dynastic revolutions among themselves:

Hatvā caiva parasparam; uditodita-vamsās-tu uditāstam-itāstathā
"There was thus a national cry, expressed in the Purāṇa texts, practically inviting the Gupta emperors and the Hindus of the time to eradicate this lingering canker in the North-western corner—an operation which Candragupta II was obliged to perform, and which he performed successfully."

46, II. 11-15. **Removing the Taint of Kali (Kali-rajah)**

The expression *āpāsta-kalibhiḥ* occurs in the verses introducing the *Kṛtya-Kalpataru* of Lakṣmidhara the Minister of Govinda-candra of Kanauj (A.D. 1110-1154), and reflects similar expressions in the Gāhadvāla grants.

46, II. 25-29. **Education of Princes**

The curriculum of studies, which Kauṭilya and later writers prescribe for the future king, is elaborate. The 'three Rs' are to be learnt before *uḍānapayana*. The Veda and philosophy, especially the systems of *Sāṃkhya*, *Yoga* and *Lokāyata*, are to be studied along with the *aṅgas* of the Veda, *viz.* grammar, exegetics, phonetics, metre, and ritual. *Ānvikṣikā* (Logic, Ethics and Metaphysics, according to the Somadeva) was to be a special study. Apart from theoretical studies, the prince is to learn the art of administration from officers of experience as well as Economics (*Vārtā*) and *Danḍantiti*. He is to become proficient in the use of arms, and in secular history, traditions, *Arthasāstra* and *Dharmasāstra*, after he attains his sixteenth year. This formidable list of subjects must keep a prince pretty fully engaged till he is called to the throne. (See my *Ancient Indian Polity*, 1935, pp. 38-39.)

47, II. 24-25. **Increasing Dependence on Customary Law**

*Caritra* or usage is recognized as a source of *Dharma* from early times. Āpastamba (II, 15, 1) refers to *desa-kula-dharmāḥ*
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i.e., local and family custom. Gautama (XI, 13, 20-22) declares that local caste, and family usage, not opposed to Sruti, have the force of law and so have the customs of cultivators, tradesmen, herdsmen, money-lenders and artisans; and these usages have to be ascertained before a decision is arrived at. Vasiṣṭha (I, 17) cites the authority of Manu for declaring the applicability of local, caste and family customs “in the absence of revealed texts.”

Baudhāyana, after reciting five disputed usages of the South, (I, 2, 1-4) declares that such usages are valid in the countries where they prevail (I, 2, 5-6). Kauṭilya directs a survey of customs in the empire, and apparently the Mauryan empire maintained such a record as the British have attempted to do in the case of the castes of the Punjab (Griffin, Tupper) and the Southern Maratha country (Steele):

Desa-grāma-kula-saṃghātānām dharma-vyavahāra-caritra-samsthānam

... Nibandha-pustakastham kārayet. (Arthasastra, p. 62)

Manu recognises caste-usage for all the four varṇas (II, 18) and local, guild and family usage (VIII, 41). The king should decide cases according to both Dharma and local usage (VIII, 3). Yājñavalkya gives precedence to local custom (I, 343) in the administration of justice. The King must punish members of clans (kula), castes, (jāti), guilds (śreni), corporations and provinces who depart from their respective customs (I, 361). The administration of civil law should not violate smṛti rules or usage (II, 5). The usages of guilds etc., are termed samayāḥ (conventions), and the king should enforce them, when not opposed to true Dharma (II, 186). Dr. Jayaswal maintains that such samayās do not constitute real customary law but represent delgated legislation. (Manu and Yājñavalkya, p. 76).

Bṛhaspati declares emphatically the inexpediency of not maintaining the usages of localities, castes and kulas, as the people will get discontented (if they are not maintained) and the king’s strength and wealth will suffer thereby. (I, 126, in my

Manu lays down the rule of following family usage (IV, 178):

Yenaśya pitaro yātāḥ yena yātāḥ pitaṁmahāḥ
Tena yāyāt satām mārgam tena gacchan na niṣyate

'The path by which one's fathers have gone, and that by which grandfathers have gone, by following it, one moves on the path of the good, and by following it he does not sin!'

The verse may be described as a charter of conservatism.

The theoretical basis of the validity of custom, according to Mīmāṃsā, is that it derives its authority from a lost or latent smṛti or sṛuti text. But, as one has to make two presumptions to secure recognition to usage, as against one for a smṛti rule, usage is held to be inferior to explicit smṛti rule.

Jaimini's aphorism (I, iii, 7) that sviṣṭācāra is valid without reference to its causes is to be limited to wordly matters. (K. L. Sarkar, Mīmāṃsā Rules of Interpretation as applied to Hindu Law Texts, 1909, p. 74 and pp. 238-239.)

47, ll. 25-26. Equal Validity of all Texts. Ekavākyatvam:

Ekavākyatvam has been regarded as a conspicuous example of "legal fiction" which has been useful in the development of Dharmasāstra and Hindu law. (Sānkararāma Śāstri, op. cit., p. 170).
Absolute unanimity and concord are held to exist between all *smṛti* texts on the same subject and all *śruti* passages also. The presumption is warranted by the fundamental assumptions of *Mimāmsa* that the source of all law, and of all knowledge is the *Veda*, and that the *Veda* is eternal, infallible, universal and derives its authority from itself. It does not recognise any growth in the *Veda* or any possibility of evolution in *Veda* or *smṛti*. Homogeneity is a characteristic of the *Veda*. Self-consistency is its mark. The idea is signified as *Ekavākyatva*. The consequences of the presumptions are that consistency and harmony must be deemed to exist between one *Veda* and another, between one passage of *śruti* and all others, between one *smṛti* and another, and between *śruti* and *smṛti*, as well as between *smṛti* and *ācāra* (custom, usage). The *Sākhāntarādhiḥkaraṇa* section of *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsa* maintains that all *sākhās* speak with one voice. Inconsistency between *smṛti* precepts, as in the rules of marriage of Brāhmaṇas with women of the other three castes (Manu permitting all three, Yājñavalkya permitting only marriage with *kṣatrya* and *vaiśya* women and later *smṛtas* prohibiting marriage outside his own caste to the Brāhmaṇa) or the practice of *niyoga*, is explained away by the doctrine of limited applicability to particular epochs, or ages. The remarriage of women in the five cases sanctioned by Parāśara (IV, 30), is rejected on the ground of *Kalivarjiya*, and as simply repeating an old and defunct rule. (Madhavācārya's commentary on I, 34). Similarly, by the application of the principle of harmony involved in this *nyāya*, *smṛti* rules have to be harmonised with valid usage (samayācāra) and should be rejected if contravening them (virodhe). Many illustrations of the way in which this *nyāya* has been applied by commentators and *smartās* are quoted and explained by Mr. C. S'ankarārāma S'āstri (*Fictions in Hindu Law*, pp. 142 ff.) On the application of this principle to reconcile conflicts, the doctrine that *ācāra* or usage, which is valid, is only that of *siṣṭhas* (the elect), gives rise to apparent difficulties as many wrong acts condemned by conscience or *smṛti* are remembered of heroic characters of the past. Are such things valid if done now? The
answer is 'No', because the test of valid conduct is whether it has been pursued by its author with the consciousness of doing a thing which is meritorious. Accordingly, the moral lapses of old sages, heroes and gods, are no precedents. (Fictions in Hindu Law, p. 138).

47, ll. 26-27. ANONYMOUS TEXTS

The question of their admissibility is thus stated by Mitramiśra (Viramitrodaya, Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, pp. 17-18):

"In several works of authority, certain quotations occur, which are introduced merely thus; 'to this effect is the smṛti' 'to this effect is the sloka'. (The authorship is indeterminate). Such quotations are authoritative in as much as they have been unequivocally accepted by great men. What is styled Śat-trimsanmatam is not so authoritative, according to the Kalpaṭaru, because it is accepted only by some, being rejected by others. Bur Vijñānesvara, Aparārka, Sūlapāṇi and others regard its citation as authoritative. This is only proper."

Yadaṣti smartanāma anirdisya 'atra smṛtyāh 'atra slokaḥ ityūdi prāmāṇika-likhanam, tadaṣti avigta-mahājana-parighṛttatvād pramāṇam. 'Smṛtyantaresu' ca ityanenaiva samghṛttam veditavyam. 'Sat-trimsanmatadikam' tu kaiscideva parighṛttatvād apramāṇam ityuktam Kalpaṭaruṇā. Vijñānesvara-Aparārka-Sūlapāṇi-prabhṛtibhistu pramāṇattvena parighṛttam. Yuktam ca etat."

47, l. 27. JUSTICE AND GOOD CONSCIENCE

The rule of equity and good conscience is implicit in the dicta of Manu and Yājñavalkya on the "feeling of satisfaction, which the good get" (Sādhūnām ātmanastuṣṭih, Manu, II, 6) and what one finds to one's liking (svasya ca priyamātmanah), (Manu, II, 12, and Yājñavalkya, I, 7). To guard against caprice being-
taken as equivalent to conscience, the commentators explain that the satisfaction should be that which only those who are both learned in the Vedas and righteous feel, thereby relieving each man of the privilege of deciding what he should do according to his likes and dislikes. Medhātithī points out (ed. Jha, I, pp. 68-69) that the trustworthy character of such learned and good men is the guarantee of its not being misused. "When the learned and good feel satisfied as to the righteousness of an action, it must be taken as right, because such men will never feel satisfied with anything that is wrong."

But equity and good conscience can not over-ride clear law or revealed text. This is made clear by Viśvarūpa (Yājñā, I, 7, vol. I, pp. 13-27) who points out that the satisfaction which one feels should not be in action which runs counter to Vedic injunction, or smṛti or is due merely to fidgets. Kullūka (Manu, II, 6) lays down that "self-satisfaction" is authoritative only in regard to matters in which an option is open, following the Mitākṣarā which rules that the rule of satisfaction applies only to cases in which there are several lawful alternatives open, one of which has to be chosen. This is also the view of the Smṛticandrikā (Samskārakaṇḍa, 5).

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47, l. 29. INSIGHT OR INTUITION (Yukti)

The application of reason, or the power of inference to the resolution of difficulties in evidence is suggested in the law books e.g. Yājñavalkya, II, 212. Viśnusmṛti recommends the application of reason (yukti) to the determination of the genuineness of documents. Vyāsa, Prajāpati and other writers advocate the use of yukti for the proper construction of documents. But the most powerful advocate of the application of yukti is Bṛhaspati. Over and over again he says (XXVI, 4, 49, 50 in Vyavāharakaṇḍa) that the determination should be in accordance with intelligent apprehension (yukti) as otherwise there will be disaster:

Yuktyā vibhajanīyam tat, anyathā anarthakam bhavet
Rājadharma

He illustrates the disastrous effect of the failure to apply yukti to determine whether one is a thief or not, a good man or not, by the condemnation of the sage Māṇḍavya for theft:

Casuro-acasuro sādhvāsādhuḥ jāyate vyavahārataḥ
Yuktim vinā vicāreṇa Māṇḍavyasya-coratām gataḥ

(Vyav., I, 116)

He would apply it to determine the preference in cases of conflict of laws:

Dharmasāstra-virodhe tu yukti yukto vidhiḥ smṛtaḥ

(ib. IX, 8)

He denounces vigorously in a famous verse dependence on the letter of the written law (sāstra i.e., smṛti) without an intelligent conception of the spirit through yukti:

Kevalam sāstram-āsritya na vaktavyo vinirṇayaḥ
Yukti-hīne vicāre tu Dharma-hāniḥ praṇāyate

(ibid., I, 114)

“A decision should not be arrived at by solely depending on the sāstra, for, in an enquiry devoid of the application of reason (yukti), there is destruction of Dharma.”

It is natural that with such powerful sanction as Brhaspati’s, King Somesvara should enjoin the magistrate to award sentences, not by mechanically following smṛti precept, but by the exercise of his own reason (yukti):

Pramāṇe niscitaivāpi divyair vāpi vicārite
Yuktyā daṇḍam nṛpaḥ kuryāt yathā doṣānusārataḥ

Mānasollāsa, ed. Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, v. 1286. This is a conspicuous illustration of the extended scope of the application of yukti by a king of the twelfth century.

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48, 1. 2. Acceptance of the Usages of Pratiloma Castes

Toḍarānanda and Viramitrodaya, Vyavahāraprakāśa, (ed. Jivānanda, p. 120) cite the following verse from Kātyāyana:
NOTES

Pratiloma-prasūtesu tathā durga-nivāsiṣu
Viruddham niyatam prāhuh tam dharmam na vicālayet

i.e. "(The King) should not disregard the fixed rules of conduct among those who belong to the pratiloma castes and among the inhabitants of the forts (or inaccessible mountain places) even if they are opposed (to rules of smṛti.)" (Trn. Kane, Kātvyāyana, 1933, p. 125.)

The rule in a slightly different form is cited by Lakṣmīdhara in Vyavahārakalpataru as from Brhaspati:

Pratilomaprastātānam tathā durga-nivāsinām
Sāstravad yatnato rakṣyā sandīgduhau sādhanaṃ tu sā

One of pratiloma birth was deemed so degraded that to call a person a pratiloma was an offence (Yājñavalkya, II, 207.)

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48, ll. 5-6. THE USAGES OF THE GOOD SŪDRA

Manu gives the sources of Dharma in the following sloka:

Vedo akhilo dharma-mūlam Smṛti-sile ca tad-vidām
Ācārascaiva sādhūnām ātmanastuṣṭireva ca

Buehler translates the verse thus:

"The whole Veda is the (first) source of the sacred law, next the tradition, and the virtuous conduct of those who know the Veda (further), also the customs of holy men, and (finally) self-satisfaction." (S.B.E., XXV, p. 30.)

Medhātithi construed "the practice of good men" (sādhūnām ācāraḥ) with "learned in the Veda" (tad-vidām), and correlated goodness and Vedic learning, confining valid usage, as a source of Dharma, to those who combined both, i.e. Brāhmaṇas. The commentators following him distinguished between sūla (conduct) of those learned in the tradition (smṛti) and usage (ācāra) of good men (sādhūnām) and held, like Sarvajña-nārāyaṇa, that the latter was inferior to the former on account of the possibility of incorrectness of the tradition on which usage was based. That the distinction was not perhaps originally intended is evident from the
circumstance that Gautama, (I, 2) refers to sīla (conduct) only, while Baudhāyana (I, 4) and Vasiṣṭha (I, 5) refer only to usage or practice (āgama and ācāra). The original belief was that among those learned in the Veda and tradition (smṛti) there could be no difference between conviction and practice. But valid usage was held to be those of Brāhmaṇas only. Mitramisra (c. A.D. 1610) was the first to make a break by suggesting an alternative interpretation. In Viḍamitrodaya, Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, p. 9. (ed Chowkhamba, 1896), he suggested that, as an alternative explanation of the verse of Manu cited above, the word “ācāraḥ” should be connected with “Sādhūnām,” when the meaning would be that “even those not learned in the Veda are to be accepted as authorities, if they are men free from weakness and defects, and in such cases, the usage of good Śūdras (Saccchudrāḥ) becomes authoritative. Though Mitramisra restricted the applicability of such usage to Śūdras alone, even then, the break he made was definitely important, and a concession to the altered times. The passage is important enough for full citation:


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48, 7. 10. SUPERSESSION OF SĪṢṬĀCĀRA BY SĀDHŪNAM-ĀCĀRA

In the earlier authorities emphasis is on Sīṣṭa, explained in the Maskari-bhāṣya as "avagata-vedārthāh" (men proficient in the understanding of the meaning of the Veda) and "sva-dharmāvasthitāh" (men rooted in the discharge of their own Dharma (Gautamasmṛti, ed. Mysore, 1917, p. 453 and p. 456). Gautama (XXVIII, 49 and 51) rules that "in cases for which no rule is given, the course should be followed of which at least ten (Brāhmaṇas), who are well-instructed (in the Veda) i.e. sīṣṭāḥ skilled in reasoning and uncovetous, approve. . . . But on failure of them, the decision of one srotriya, who knows the Veda, and is properly instructed
(in the duties, shall be followed) in doubtful cases.” (Buehler, in 
S.B.E., II, 1897, p. 310).

Baudhāyana (I, 4-6,) after laying down that the source of
Dharma, after the Veda and Smṛti, was Sīṣṭācāra, proceeds to
describe the qualities of the sīṣṭa as “freedom from envy, and
pride, the possession of grain for not more than ten days’ consump-
tion, and freedom from covetousness, hypocrisy, greed, perplexity,
arrogance and anger:”

(Siṣṭāhkkhalu vigatamatsarāḥ nirahāṇkārāḥ kumbhi-dhānyāḥ
alolūpāḥ dambha-darpa-lobha-moha-krodha-vivarjitāḥ

Vasiṣṭha (I, 6) defined the sīṣṭa as “one whose heart is free from
desire” (siṣṭah punah akāmātmā.) Vedic learning, ascetic un-
wordliness and saintliness are old qualifications of the sīṣṭa, whose
practice or precept was to be followed where there was no clear
rule. While re-affirming the position of the sīṣṭa as the declarer
of Dharma in doubtful cases, Manu defines the qualifications of the
sīṣṭa (XII, 108-9): “If it be asked how it should be with respect
to (points) of Dharma which have not been clearly stated, the
answer is that what Brāhmaṇas, who are also sīṣṭas, propound
should clearly have force. Those Brāhmaṇas are deemed sīṣṭas,
who, in accordance with Dharma have studied the Vedas with
their appendages, and who perceive by the senses the revealed
texts as reason for distinguishing right and wrong.” The
appendages of the Vedas are stated by Medhātithi (ed. Jha,
II, 1839, p. 487) to be the Itihāsa and Purāṇa. To these are added
the Vedāṅgas by the Smṛticandrikā (ed. Mysore, Samskāra, 1914,
p. 6) and the Mimāmsa, Smṛti etc. by Kullūka.

Manu’s injunction (II, 6 and 12) that the ācāra (custom) of the
good (sādhunām) or sadācārāḥ should be regarded (Tantravārtika,
p. 143) as one of the sources of Dharma must be read with the
above injunction to refer doubts to sīṣṭāḥ, and the “good men” he
had in view treated as those fully qualified to be designated sīṣṭāḥ.
The equation Sīṣṭāḥ, Sādhuḥ is accepted by the commentators and
digest makers, like Vijñānesvara, Kullūka and others (Mitākṣarā,
I, 7, and Manu, II, 6) but the tendency is to both limit and broaden the old concept of the authority competent to decide doubtful cases. Thus, Vis'varūpa (c. A.D. 900) (commenting on Yājnavalkya, I, 7) would limit sadācāra to religious and spiritual, as distinguished from temporal or worldly acts of the good men. On the other side, Mādhavācārya (c. 1350) gives the power of interpretation as sādhavaḥ "to the elders of each family and tribe." (ed. Bib. Ind., p. 100), and Mitramiśra gives a purely ethical interpretation of sādhavaḥ by quoting the following fanciful etymology from Visuṇapurāṇa:

"Good men free from all defects are called sat, and their practice, ācāraṇa, is called sadācāra." Mitramiśra further brings the practice of the good Śūdra within sadācāra, so far the Dharma for the last varṇa is concerned.

The supersession is manifestly due to the impossibility of finding men with the qualifications laid down for sīṣṭāḥ, and is an illustration of silent adaptation.

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48, II. 10-14. ANIMUS AGAINST THE LEARNED ŚŪDRA

Āśvaghoṣa in his Vajracchedika claims that the Śūdra Buddhists were as learned as Brāhmaṇas. The Śūdra was excluded from Vedic but not from secular studies. Among Buddhists there was no exclusion of Śūdras from any kind of learning, and they were eligible even for the monastic life. The Buddhist monk was identified with the learned Śūdra and much of the animus against the former was transferred to the latter. Yājñavalkya (II, 235) lays down that he who feeds the Śūdra ascetic at religious and sṛāddha ceremonies is liable to punishment. This is obviously aimed against hospitality to the Buddhist monk. Such bitter statements as that the Śūdra who has learned even the alphabet should be kept at a distance reflect only the animus against the Buddhist. The Buddhist ascetic is described by Kauṭilya (Arthasastra, Mysore ed. 1909, p. 199) as viṣāla-pravrajita—i.e. Śūdra ascetic.
"Manu's hostility towards the Šūdra is primarily towards the learned Šūdra, the controversialist, claiming equality and freedom." (Jayaswal, Manu and Yājñavalkya, p. 92.)

Manu's references to "Śūdras who assume the marks of the twice-born" (Śudrāmsvca dvija-liṅginaḥ; IX, 224) and heretics (Pāśaṇḍinaḥ, IX, 225) as well as those who follow prohibited pursuits (Vikarmasthāḥ, IX, 225) are to Buddhists. In XII, 95 Manu alludes to them as those outside the Vedas (Vedabāhyāḥ). The Viṣṇupūrāṇa condemns the village mendicant and Jaina ascetic (Grāma-yājaka nirgrantho bahudoṣo durāsadaḥ). The Śat-trimsanmata, ed. Chowkhamba, p. 174, rules that a bath with clothes on is the prescribed purification when one touches Baudhās, Pāṣupatas, Jainas, Lokāyatas, Kāpilas, and the twice-born who follow forbidden pursuits.

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48, ll. 17-28. LIMITS OF ĀRYĀVARTA

Baudhāyana (I, 2, 10) lays down the limits of Aryan occupation and indicates the areas which one can visit only subject to penance:

Prāg-Adarśanāt, pratyak-Kālakavanāt, daksīṇena-Hima-
vantam, udak-Pāriyātram, etat Āryāvartam. Tasmin ya
ācāraḥ sa āramāṇam. Gaṅgā-Yamunayor-antaram ityake.

Athātra Bhāllavino gāthām udāharanti:

Pascāt-sindhur-visaraṇī Sūryasyodayanam ṣuraḥ 1
Yāvat Krṣṇo vidhāvati tāvaddhi brahmavarocasam || Iti :
Avantayo-Aṅga-Magadhāḥ Surāstrā Dakṣiṇāpathāḥ 1
Uपāvṛt Sindhu-Sauvitrā ete saṃkīrṇa-yonayaḥ-||
Ārattān Kāraskarān Puṇḍrān Sauvitrān Vaṅgān Ka-
liṅgān
Prāṇīmān iti ca gatvā ṛunas-stomena-yajeta-sarvaḥṣ-
ṭhayā vā.

Athāpyudāharanti:

Paddhīyām sa kurute pāpam yaḥ Kaliṅgān praṇapadyate 1
Ṛṣayo niṣkṛtim tasya prāhur-Vaisvānaram haviḥ. ||

(I, 2, 16.)
It will be seen that the areas which Baudhāyana excludes from Āryāvarta are the Punjab, Magadha, Aṅga, Vaṅga, Gujarāt, Sindh, the lands south of the Vindhayas, as well as Rajputāna and Mālwa north of the range.

S'ankha-Likhita lay down:

Prāk-Sindhu-Sauvīrāt, daksīṇena Himavataḥ, pascāt
Kāmpīlīyaḥ, udak Pāriyātrāt, anavadyaṃ brāhma-
varacamas.

They thus exclude the lands of Sindh and Sauvīra (Kathiawar and Gujarāt).

Paṭhīnasi lays down:

Ā-Himavataḥ, Ā-ca Kumāryāḥ Sindhu-Vaitaraṇī-nādi-
Śūryasyodayanam pūraḥ yāvad-vā kṛṣṇa-mṛgo vicarati
tatra Dharmāḥ catuspādo bhavati

The lands described as the eastern limit include Orissa. Baudhāyana (as quoted in Viśramitrodaya, Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, p. 58) adds that he who visits Aṅga, Vaṅga, Kaliṅga, Magadha and Sauvīra except on a pilgrimage must undergo new samskāras (punas-
samskāraṃ arhati).

Manusmṛti, II, 22-23, lays down that the Aryan country runs from sea to sea, east and west, and mountain to mountain, i.e. the Himālayas and the Vindhayas, north to south. He adds that where the black antelope naturally flourishes the country must be deemed fit for sacrifices, and the lands (where it does not) as those of barbarians.

Ā-samudrātta vai pūrvāt, Ā-samudrātta pascimāt
Tayorevāntar māryoh Āryāvartam vidur-budāh
Kṛṣṇasāras-tu carati mṛgo yatra svabhāvataḥ
Sa jñeyo Yajñīyo deso mleccha-desastu atah-paraḥ

The definition of the limits given by the Bhāllavins, a school of the Sāmaveda, is quoted with approval by Vasiṣṭha (I, 15):

Athāpi Bhāllavino Nidāne gāthām udāharanti—
Pascāt-Sindhu-viḍkāraṇī, Śūryasyodayanam pūraḥ
Yāvat-kṛṣṇobhidhāvati tāvad-vai brāhmaṇvarcasam
That is to say, the western boundary of Āryā-varta is the Indus, the eastern the Sūryodayana, and as to the north and south, the habitat of the black antelope.

That the lands which are free for the antelope to roam over, for barley and the kusā grass to grow, and which are full of holy places are those which the wise will live in is stated in the Ādipurāṇa, as quoted by the Vīramitrodāya (op. cit. p. 57):

Krṣṇasārair yavair darbhain catuvarnyāsramaistathā ।
Samyddho dharma-desas-tamā vṛṣyeraṇ vipāscitaḥ ॥

It will be noted that the emphasis is also on the prevalence of the vartarana-dharma in the area. This principle is stated explicitly by Viṣṇusmṛti:

Cātur-varṇya-vaavasthānam yatra dese na vidyate ।
Tam mleccha-desam jānīyāt Āryāvartaam-athā-param ॥

For other quotations see the Paribhāṣa-prakāśa of Vīramitrodāya, pp. 58-60. Dr. K. P. Jayaswal (Manu and Yājñavalkya, pp. 27-29) discusses the subject, and concludes that the extension or restriction of the area of Aryan usage coincided with the advance or retreat of Brahmanical rule in the land.

48, l. 32. ĀPAD-DHARMA

In times of distress occupations not normally allowed to a varṇa are permitted to its members. These are summarised in Manusmṛti, IV, 81-104, with specifications of the occupations which even in distress a Brāhmaṇa should not follow. Distress is held to know no law, and a Brāhmaṇa who accepts food even from the most degraded is no more tainted 'than the sky by mud' (ib. 104). Yājñavalkya deals with the same topic in the section on expiations (III, 35-44). He too holds that afflicted by distress and eating anywhere the Brāhmaṇa incurs no sin needing subsequent expiation.

Parāśāra is even more emphatic. “During revolutions, (desa-bhaṅga), foreign travel or exile (pravāsa), affliction (vyāsana), let
one save himself first, and then think of performing Dharma. . . When times of distress have to be tided over, one should not think of purity or proper conduct (saucaścāra). He should subsequently perform expiation (when the pressure is past) and act according to Dharma” (VII, 41 and 43). Again, he holds that “the Brāhmaṇa who eats in the house of a Śūdra in a time of distress is purified by his mere feeling of regret or by muttering the drupada” (XI, 21). This exemption applies only to periods of distress as the food of the Śūdra is held to be capable of making a Brāhmaṇa lose his caste (XII, 32).

For other texts on Āpad-dharma see Āpastamba, 20, 10-21; Gautama VIII, 1-26; Vasiṣṭha, II, 22-29; Baudhāyana, II, 4, 16-21, and Viṣṇu, II, 15 and LIV, 18-21, and the commentaries on the relevant passages of Manu and Yājñavalkya. The principle was capable of considerable extension, the only restriction being the avoidance of those occupations which were specifically named as inadmissible even in times of distress, i.e., when one could not live by following his varṇa occupation.

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49, II. 1-2. VOYAGES AND VISITS TO PROHIBITED AREAS

Baudhāyana (II, I, 1-2) places sea-voyage (samudra-samyānam) at the head of a number of offences which cause loss of caste (patanjyāni) which are only less heinous than the inexciable sins (mahapātakāḥ). But he also mentions sea-faring as one of the special customs which are allowed to the people of the north (I, i, 2, 4. Athottarataḥ . . . samudrayānam iti), but he rules that if the special practices of the north or the south are put in force anywhere else, it would lead to sin (I, i, 2, 5). Manu (III, 158) forbids sea-voyages by implication by laying down that those (dvijas) who do so should be avoided, (varjanīyāḥ prayatnataḥ, III, 166). Apparently the sea-trade for which he provides no fixed rates for conveyance, were to be undertaken by others.

In the Brahmāraddhya-purāṇa (cited in Dharma-pradīpā, 1937, p. 50) it is implied that the re-admission into their varṇa of
those who had gone on sea-voyages was allowed before the Kali-yuga, because they are stated as disallowed (varjyāḥ) in the Kali-yuga:

Samudra-yātrā-svīkāraḥ kamanḍalu-vidhāraṇam ।
Dvijāṇām asavaranāsu kāṇyāsūpagaṭam tathā ॥
Devaṛācca sutotpattiḥ madhuparke paśorvadhaḥ ।
Māṁsādanam yathā srāddhe vāna-prastāsramastathā ॥
Dattakṣatāyāḥ kanyāyāḥ ṣunardānam paśasya ca ।
Dīrgha-kālam brahma-acyam naramedhāśvamedhakau ॥
Mahāprasthānamanam gomēdhasca tathā makhāḥ ।
Imān dharmān Kali-yuge varjyānāhūḥ maniṣīṇāḥ. ॥

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49, ll. 6-8. RELAXATIONS OF YUGA-DHARMA

Parāśara (I, 33) lays down:

Yuge yuge tu ye dharmāḥ tatra tatra ca ye dvijāḥ ।
Teṣāṁ ninda na kartavyā yugastāpyai te dvijāḥ. ॥

This indicates that rules are to be different for the different cycles of time (yuga). The principle is that duties will be proportioned to the capacity of men in different cycles, it being held that there is a deterioration of capacity and power from the first to the fourth yuga, and in the fourth yuga itself with the lapse of time. Many rites like the sacrifice of cows and the doing of many acts by ancient sages, which now perplex us, are due to the superior potency of the people of those ages. The point is brought out by the S'loka Āpatamba:

Teṣāṁ tejo-vīzesena pratyavāyo na vidyate ।
Tad-anvīkṣya prayaṇijānaḥ śiddatmyavarakho naraḥ ॥

The point is brought out by Bṛhat-Parāśara:

Yuge yuge tu ye dharmāḥ teṣu dharmesyu ye dvijāḥ ।
Te dvijā nāvamanatavyā yugarūpā hi te dvijāḥ. ॥

A long catalogue of various practices, which are now condemned for the Kali-yuga, is given in the extracts collected on pp. 50-56 of the
recently published Dharma-pradīpa (Calcutta, 1937) from the Parāśara-Mādhaviya, ed. Islampurkar, I, i, pp. 128-142.

The reduction of the ancient rigor of duty to women and the men of the different castes is illustrated by Parāśara’s chapters on purification. A married woman is prohibited from performing vratas (vows necessitating austerity) as by doing so she would diminish the longevity of her husband (IV, 17). A married woman, who has lost her husband by flight, death, or by his sanyāsa, or impotency or becoming an out-caste, is eligible for re-marriage (IV, 30). The Śūdra need not observe fasts (to secure purification for a sin), as by making a mere gift he can secure the result. (VI, 51, repeated in XI, 28.)

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49, II. 10-12. RELAXATION OF DUTIES FOR ŚŪDRAS AND WOMEN

Śrī Bhāgavata rules:

Śrī-śūdra-dvijabandhūnām trayo na sruti-gocarā
Iti Bhāratamākhyaṇam muninā kṛpayāhṛtam

i.e. ‘For women, Śūdras and degraded Brāhmaṇas access to the Veda is shut and the compassionate sage has provided for them the Mahābhārata instead.’ Commenting on this dictum, Mitramiśra states (Paribhāṣā, p. 37) that the knowledge of Ātman which the Veda will give can be equally furnished by the epics (Purāṇas). Śūdras and women are entitled to knowledge of the Ātman but not through the Vedas. He quotes another Purāṇa to the effect that the devout Śūdra acquires true knowledge through the reading of the Purāṇas and that according to some sages there is parity between women and Śūdras:

Asti śūdrasya susṛṣṭoh purāṇenaiva vedanam
Vadanti kecin munayāḥ strīnām sūḍrā-samānatām

Like others who die at Kāśi they can obtain mukti by death there.
49, ll. 12-15. Upanayana for Women

Dr. A. S. Altekar in his Position of Women in Hindu Civilisation, 1938, shows that originally girls had upanayana performed for them like boys, and performed the daily Sandhya rites, as Sita is said to have done in the Sundarakānda of the Rāmāyaṇa (XIV, 48). Mitramisra in his Samskāra-prakāśa (pp. 402-405) deals with the question of upanayana for women. Hariita is cited to show that women are of two classes, Brahmavādint and Sadhyovadhīḥ; the former has the sacrificial fire, study of the Veda and alms within her own house; the latter has upanayana done when marriage is nigh, and then the wedding is celebrated. Yama is quoted to show that in past ages (purā-kalpe) girls used to have the girdle of upananayana (maṅghik-bandhanam), study of Veda, and the recitation of the Sāvitri, when their fathers, uncles or elder brothers used to teach them, and arrange for their daily begging within the house itself, but the girls were to abjure the wearing of the antelope skin like the boys, and matted locks. The reduction of the duties of women, or as status, as modern observers may view it, is seen in Manu:

"The samskāras, which are done for boys with Vedic mantras should be performed for girls without Vedic recitation; the completion of the samskāras for girls is for the protection of their bodies. It should be done in proper time and form!" Manu rules that for girls marriage should be regarded as the substitute for upanayana, as a Vedic ceremony, the service of the husband as equal to living in the house of the Guru, and attention to domestic duties as tantamount to attention to the sacred fire. Her association in all karma gives the wife an equal part in them with the husband, even though her function is passive.

As late as about 150 B.C. the freedom given to women to perform Vedic rites is illustrated by the Nānāghāt inscription of Queen Nāyanikā, widow of Satakarni I, who states that she lived the life of brahmacarya (after the death of her
husband, as the faithful Hindu widow is enjoined to live) and that she performed the Rājasūya and Asvamedha sacrifices. But, whether her claim relates to her association in these sacrifices as Paṭṭa-Mahīṣṭ (senior queen) with her husband, when he performed them, or by herself, as Dr. Altekar holds (op. cit. p. 243) it is hard to say, but the probability is in favor of the former view, as her description of her own life fits in with the Brahmanic ideals of the virtuous widow.

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49, ll. 16-19. REDUCTION OF STRINGENCY OF RULES OF TAINT

The rules of purification (suddhi) were made less stringent in the later smṛtis like Parāśara’s, and the rules about the acquisition of taint (doṣa) necessitating purification were made easier, by application of the principle that with waning power and the passage of cycles of time, men required more lenient construction of offences and expiation. This is illustrated by the rules regarding untouchability (aspravya) following either one’s varṇa or some special act. Thus, according to a sloka cited in Dharmapradīpa (p. 150), contamination which arises even from conversation with a low-born person or an out-caste (patita) in Kṛta-yuga, from touch in Tretā-yuga, and from eating his food in the Dvāpara-yuga, arises in the Kali-yuga only by actually doing the forbidden act. Parāśara ruled that the sin of as (association with these guilty of the five inexpiable sins (maha-pātaka) can be removed by a vrata. Another dictum states that the sin of touching a Caṇḍāla is removed by looking after the taint at the Sun, (ib. p. 152); (Caṇḍālasparśvane sadya ādityam avalokayet.) Similarly, in the Kṛta-yuga, one had to leave the country in which there were out-castes and sinners; in Tretā-yuga, it was deemed enough if one left the village in which they were found, and in Dvāpara-yuga the particular family concerned; but in the Kali-yuga, it is enough to leave the actual perpetrator of an offence. At the same time, certain general exemptions from impurity by touch were given. Thus, artisans,
cultivators, physicians, servants, (dāst-dāsa), kings, and learned Brāhmaṇas are always pure (p. 158.) In festivals, pilgrimages, marriages and sacrifices, there should be no consideration of purity or impurity following touch (p. 151.) The literature of suddhi, which is treated elaborately in the later smṛtis and nibandhas (digests), illustrates the principles suggested in the text.

Yājñavalkya (III, 28-29) lays down automatic purification (sadyas-saucam) in the following cases:

Rtvijām dikṣitānām ca yañātyam karma kurvatām ||
Satri-vrati-brahmacārī-dātr-brahmavidām tathā ||
Dāne vīvāne yañē ca samgrāme desaviplave ||
Āpadyapīhikaṣṭāyām sadyas-saucam vidhyate ||

Other dicta against the occurrence of impurity in certain cases are indicated in the following rules of Paiṭhinasi and Āṅgiras:

1. Atha deva-pratiṣṭāyām gaṇa-yātrādi-karmaṇī ||
Srāddhādau pīṭr-yañē ca kanyā-dāne ca no bhavet ||

2. Rājya-nāsastu yena syāt vinā rājñā sva-maṇḍale ||
Prayāṣyatasca samgrāme home prāsthānike sati ||
Mantrādi-tarpaṇair-vāpi pra Jainām sānti-karmaṇī ||
Go-maṅgalādau vaisyānam kṛṣi-kālātyayesvāpi ||
Āsaucaṃ na bhavel-loke sarvatra-ānyatra vidyate ||

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49, ll. 19-20. RELAXATION OF RULE FOR AGE, INFIRMITY ETC.

The rule of Cyavana (cited in Dharmapradīpa, p. 158) illustrates the equitable rule lowering the amount of expiation in the case children, old persons and women:

Bāla-vṛddha-strīnām ardham pra vyascittam; Ā śodaṣāt
bālaḥ; saptatīrduḥvaṃ vṛddhaḥ;

Similar exemptions exist in many other sections of Dharmasāstra for these three classes as well as persons who are ill.
50, II. 1-2. STRUGGLES OF BHAKTI-MĀRGA ADHERENTS WITH SMĀRTAS

The struggles of the saints of the Bhakti-mārga with the strict adherants of Dharmaśāstra are recounted in Hindu and Śaiva hagiology. To begin with, the saints were not of the first varṇa and accordingly had no right to teach religion, according to strict rule. Again, within the fold of devotees (bhaktīk) the traditional rule of superior and inferior, and the inferiority of women for spiritual exercises, was discarded. The saints often attacked caste distinctions, e.g. Kabir (R. G. Bhandarkar, Vaiṣṇavism Śaivism, 1913, pp. 70, 83), Caitanya’s repudiation of caste in admission of disciples, and by the Ucchiṣṭa-Gaṇapati sect (p. 148). Some of them scoffed at the rites prescribed by Dharmaśāstra. Thus Nāmdev derided fasts and pilgrimages (ib. p. 90) and Tukārām followed suit by condemning mere physical purification and mechanical rites (ib. p. 92) Illustrations can be easily multiplied.

50, II. 8-12. EMANCIPATION OF INDIVIDUAL EARNINGS FROM FAMILY CONTROL AND JOINT-OWNERSHIP

For the Roman Law of the growth of individual right in one’s own earnings through the application of the principle of peculium castrense, under which Augustus had conceded to a filius-familii on service the right to dispose by testament of what he had acquired in the exercise of his profession, so as to give a soldier ultimately the right to dispose of all his property, including gifts, legacies etc. see J. Muirhead, Historical Introduction to Roman Law, 1899, pp. 322-323, as well Sir H. Maine’s Ancient Law, ed. Pollock, p. 149.

The Hindu Gains of Learning Act (Act XXX of 1930) provides that notwithstanding any custom, or rule of interpretation of Hindu Law, no gains of learning shall be held not to be the exclusive property of the acquirer. It has set at rest the old controversies
about the application of the rules of Manu (IX, 206) and Yājñavalkya (II, 118-119) and the comments thereon, supported by citations from Nārada, (p. 190 ed. Jolly) verse 10, Vasiṣṭha (17, 51) Kātyāyana (ed. Kane, vv. 866 to 880) Vyāsa etc. The course of evolution in freeing individual earnings seems to have followed, as in Rome, the freeing of Saurya-dhanam (the earnings of valor) and vidyā-dhanam (the gains of science or learning), so long as they were not acquired by the use of family property, from the common estate liable to partition between co-parceners, and then extended by analogy to the fees of the sacrificial priest, gifts (dāna), commercial or trade earnings etc. The discussion may be followed in Vyavahāramayūkha (ed. Kane, pp. 124-128).

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50, II. REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF VALID MARRIAGES

The recommendation of Gāndharva unions for kṣatřiyas was a recognition of realities, as kings often added women to their antah-pura, after seduction. Inclusion of the form under marriage was in the interests of the girl. Later on, the disfavor into which it fell, owing to misuse, led to the rule that even a Gāndharva union should be subsequently sanctified by a formal celebration, with religious rites. See Altekar’s Position of Women in Hindu Civilisation, pp. 34-58. Poets like Kālidāsa invested the Gāndharva union with a halo of romance, but it is probable that it was not accepted except as an unpleasant necessity, since the subsequent form of marriage ceremony would be of one who was not a virgin (kanyā). Commentators were hard put to explain away the rule that the bride should be a virgin, and had to interpret kanyā, as merely a term for the bride. The old approval by Baudhāyana of the Gāndharva form, on the ground of ‘its naturally being the sequel to love’ (Snehiṣugatatvat, I, II, 13, 7) gives place to restriction of it to the military caste and to the imposition by Devala, for example, of a subsequent marriage ceremony:

Gāndharvesu vivāhesu punar vaivāhiko vidhiḥ
Kartavyasca tribhir varṇaiḥ samayenāgniśāksikaḥ
Devala provides for the marriage for the first three vārṇas, implying that for the last vārṇa the confirmatory religious ceremony was unnecessary (vide, commentary on Manu, VIII, 226).

50, ll. 16-17. ADOPTION

From brief rules in the older smṛtis of a vague nature (Vasiṣṭha, 15, 1-10, Baudhāyana-pariśīṣṭha, S.B.E., XIV, pp. 334-336) a mass of discussion has grown on the topic. The valid śāstraic justification for adoption is the necessity for a man to have a male child to perform his obsequies, and save him from falling into the hell, Put. A man without a son is therefore in distress (āpadi). On the other hand parents in poverty may want to give away their sons to childless men who would bring them up, and perhaps give the sons property, which they can not obtain from the natural parents. This also is distress (āpād). The power to dispose of a son is a remnant of the old patria potestas, for which there is sanction in the story of S’unasśeṣapā, told in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, whom his father sold to King Haris’candra under pinch of poverty. The power to give away a son is limited, as the act is justified, by religious necessity of a son. Hence the rule that an only son cannot be given away in adoption. A device for defeating this rule may perhaps be seen in the recognition of a son belonging to “two fathers” (Dvīyāmucṣyā-yaṇa). The filiation of an adopted son with the rights of reversioners has to be reconciled; and this leads to the rules of consent of such reversioners. As adoption is a creation by a magical act (dattahoma) of a new son, the principles of consanguinity and conformity to probability of parentage, if the son can have been a real son, arise. The disputed rule of the Kālika-ṣūrāṇa as to the invalidity of adopting a boy, whose cūdā-karma (tonsure) and initiation (uṣṭāyana) are already over, is perhaps an attempt to tide over the difficulty of adoptions by young men in articulo mortis. The whole structure has been built up by legalists.

See Ganganath Jha, Hindu Law in its Sources, II, 1933, pp. 217-219; and, Jolly, Law and Custom, ed. 1928, pp. 156-166.
50, ll. 18-32. Status of Women (General)

See my Ancient Indian Economic Thought, 1934, 53-54, and Altekar's Position of Women in Hindu Civilisation, passim.

In Hindu law a woman is always unfree or dependant, and is the terminus of the family. Gautama enunciated the rule (XVIII, 1) Asvatantarā dharme stri.

See Manu, V, 147-149, and IX, 2-3; Yājñavalkya, I, 183, 186; Viṣṇu, 25, 4-6.

See also Gurudoss Banerjee, Hindu Law of Marriage and Stridhana; Jolly, History of Hindu Law, pp. 76-81, and pp. 226, 259 (history of female property); and Jayaswal, Manu and Yājñavalkya, pp. 225-235, and pp. 256-261.

50, ll. 20-25. Workhouses for Destitute Women

See Kauṭilya, II, 23, p. 114:

Yāsca anिकःसिनयाः प्रोचिता-विधवाः न्यायः कन्याकः वा अंत्मानम् बिख्रुः; ताः स्वा-दासीभिः अपूर्वार्ह्रां खर्मा कारणितावयाः; स्वयम् अग्रवतीनम् वा सूत्रसालाम् प्रत्युपसि भूःव्या-वेतनाविनिमयम् खर्माः।
Sūtra-pariksārtha-mātraṁ pradīpaka.
Strīyā mukhasandaraṇe anya-kārya-sambhāṣāyām vā pūrva-sāhasa-dandaḥ.

51, ll. 1-2. Wife Shares in Husband’s Puṇya

Āpastamba (II, 16-19):

“No division takes place between husband and wife (16). For, from the time of marriage, they are united in religious ceremonies, (18); likewise also as regards the rewards for works (karma) by which spiritual merit is acquired, and with respect to the acquisition of property.” (Buehler, S.B.E., II, pp. 136-137).
51, **5-10. Brhaspati on the Rights of the Wife**

See *Brhaspatismrti* (ed. Rangaswami, Vyavahara, XXVI, 92-94):

Āmnāye smṛti-tantre ca pūrvacāryais ca sūrībhīḥ  
Sartrārdham smṛtā bhāryā puṇyāpuṇyaphale samā  
Yasya noṣaratā bhāryā dehārdham tasya jivati  
Jīvatyārdhasavarte tu katham anyāḥ svamāṇyaḥ

The theory of the identity of husband and wife, each being incomplete without the other, is found in a passage of the *Vājaśane-yi-Brāhmaṇa* cited by Kullūka in commenting on *Manusmrīti*, IX, 45. This passage is:

Ārdo ha eṣa ātmanah; tasmāj-jāyām na vindate, naitāvat prajāyate, asarvo hi tāvad-bhavati. Atha, yadaiva jāyām vindate, atha prajāyate, tarhi sarvo bhavati. Tathā ca, etad-vedavid vīpra vadanti—*Yo bhartā saiva bharya smṛtā*

"A man is only half his self. When he takes a wife, he is incomplete, and so not fully born. When he takes a wife only is he fully born and becomes complete. So, Brāhmaṇas versed in the Vedas declare: 'Verily he who is known as the husband is also the wife'.

The verse of Manu, for supporting which the above passage was cited by Kullūka, is worth quoting:

Etāvāneva pūruṣo yajjāyā ātmā prajeti ha  
Vīprāḥ prāhuh tathā caitat 'yo bhartā sā smṛṭāṅganā'

The connection between the Vedic passage and the dictum of Manu is self-evident.

The equality of sons and daughters, which follows from analogy, is stated by Manu (IX, 130) thus:

Yathāivaṁśa tathā putraḥ, putreṇa duhitā samā  
Tasyāṁ ātmani tiṣṭantuḥ, katham anyo dhanam haret
NOTES

“...The son and one’s self are identical. The daughter is equal to the son. So when she, as one’s self remains, how can any one else take the estate?”

It is a great progress to this stage from Āpastamba (II, 14, 4) who placed the daughter in the line of inheritance after not only the sons but the teacher and his pupils. (The sūtra runs “Or, the daughter.” Haradatta says that according to some writers the succession of daughters is on failure of sons, and that others hold that the daughter comes after the pupils of the guru, who, according to an earlier sūtra, inherits on failure of sons and sapinḍas. Buehler holds the second to be the correct interpretation of Āpastamba’s view.) (S.B.E. II, p. 132, n.).

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51, ii. 11-12. RIGHT OF UNMARRIED DAUGHTER TO EXPENSES OF MARRIAGE

The brother should spend from his share of the paternal estate atleast one-fourth on the marriage of his sister. This is the rule in both Manu (IX, 118) and Yājñavalkya, (II, 124):

(a) M. Svebhya amsebhyastu kanyābhyaḥ pradadur-bhyā-
taraḥ prthak

Svāt-svādamsāccaturbhāgam patitāḥ syur-aditsavah

(b) Y. Asamkrīṭastu samskāryā bhrātybhīḥ pūrvasamskrītāḥ

Bhaginyasca nijādamśat dattvāṃsam tu turīyakam

The rule of proportion laid down here was capable of different interpretations, and, as described by Dr. Altekar (loc. cit., p. 290-291), might lead to anomalies. The intention of the jurists is stated by Devala as making provision for the daughter’s marriage (Smṛticandrikā, p. 625). Vtramitrodaya (Vyavahāra, p. 582) holds that a brother should spend an amount equal to his share if the fourth reserved for his sister’s marriage proves insufficient. Nārada (XIII, 34) rules that a brother should meet the expenses from his own earnings if there is no ancestral property:

Avidyamāne pitrārthe svāmsamudhṛtya vā punāḥ

Avasyakāryāḥ samskārah bhrātybhīḥ pūrvasamskrītaiḥ
That the marriage expenses of the daughter were a charge on the family was established in Kauṭilya’s time, (p. 161):  
*Sannivīṣṭa-samam asannivīṣṭebhyo naivesanikam dadyuh: kanyābhyaśca prādānikam*

*i.e.* “Brothers who are unmarried should be given as much as the cost of marriage of the married brothers: and unmarried daughters shall be given what is payable at their marriage.”

Kauṭilya logically includes dowry in marriage expenses.

51, ll. 17-19. MARRIAGE AN OBLIGATION TO WOMAN

Brahmanism laid stress on the value of married life for the due performance of religious rites, and the status of the householder (gṛhi) was ennobled. This is indicated in *Manusmṛti*, II, 77:

_Yathā vāyum samāsritya vartante sarva-jantavah ī_
_Tathā gṝ̥haustham āsritya vartante sarva āṣramāh īi_

Hence, the *Taittṛīya Brāhmaṇa* (II, 2, 2, 6) declared that the wifeless person (widower or bachelor) was without _yajña_ (a-yajni-ko vā esa yo āpatnīkah). The *Mahābhārata* (Ādi. 114, 36) told a story to the effect that the husband-less woman was sinful. The obligatory nature of marriage to women is illustrated by a verse of *Yāsmāṃśrī* to the effect that a father should give a grown up maiden in marriage to a good man, if available, and if not even to a bad man:

_Dadyāt guṇavate kanyām nagnikām brāhmaṇārīne ī_
_Api vā guṇāhīnāyā noparundhyāt rajasvalām īi_

The praise of the wedded estate is thus made by Vasiṣṭha:

_Gṝ̥haustha eva pravrajet, gṝ̥haustha stūyate yatah ī_
_Caturṇām āṣramāṇāṁ tu gṝ̥haustastu visisyaṁ īi_
_Sarveṣāṁ api vai teṣāṁ veda-smṛti-vidhānātaḥ ī_
_Gṝ̥haustha ucyate sreṣṭaḥ sa trīṇ etāṁ bibharti hi īi_

The _ūpanayana_ of women was prohibited by Yājñavalkya (I, 13); and their rites upto marriage were to be done without Vedic
mantras. Marriage was the *samskāra* for women, and it was to take the place of *upanayana*, according to Manu (II, 67):

\[Vaivāhiko vidhiḥ striyām samskāro vaidīkah smṛtaḥ \]
\[Patisēvā gūrur-vāso gṛhārthe agnīparikriyā \]

51, ll. 20-24. ALLEGED BUDDHIST INFLUENCE IN SECURING SEX EQUALITY

Dr. K. P. Jayaswal, *Manu and Yājñavalkya*, pp. 234-235, argues that the mind of the Brahmin lawyer was touched by the inferiority of women as compared with men in inheritance etc., because the Buddhists recognised the right of women equally with men to entry into the monastic order. The assumption is incorrect. Hinduism does not make women spiritually inferior to man, even though it does not encourage spinsterhood or asceticism for women. Jainism made a distinction between the spiritual capacity of man and woman (E. W. Hopkins, *Religions of India*). That the ascetic life should not be undertaken by girls without due spiritual urge was the Hindu view. The *Mahābhārata* mentions a woman, named Sulabhā, who practised austerity and remained unmarried so as to achieve salvation (XII, 325, 103):

\[Sāham tasmin kule jātā bhartaryasati madvidhe \]
\[Vinītā mokṣadharmesu carāmyekā munivratam \]

51, ll. 24-25. INDISSOLUBILITY OF MARRIAGE

Divorce (*mokṣa*) has to be distinguished from separation (*tyāga*). Manu lays down the indissolubility of marriage in the following sloka (IX, 101):

\[Anyonyasya avyabhīcāro bhaved-āmaranāntikāḥ \]
\[Eṣa dharmah samāsena jñeyāḥ stri-pumsayoḥ paraḥ \]

"'Let mutual fidelity continue till death,' this may be considered the highest law for husband and wife."
The survival of the marriage tie even after death is one of the inducements held out to women persuaded to commit sati:

\[
\begin{align*}
Tisra\text{-}ko\text{\textbar}ti-ardhako\text{\textbar}ti & ca y\text{\textbar}ni rom\text{\textbar}ni m\text{\textbar}n\text{\textbar}se \mid \\
Tavat-kalam vased-svargam bhart\text{\textbar}ram y\text{\textbar}nugaccati & \parallel \\
Vy\text{\textbar}la-gr\text{\textbar}hi yath\text{\textbar}a vy\text{\textbar}lam bil\text{\textbar}d-uddharate bal\text{\textbar}t & \mid \\
Eva\text{\textbar}m uddhr\text{\textbar}tya bhart\text{\textbar}ram tenaiva saha modate & \parallel \\
\end{align*}
\]

(Par\text{\textbar}sarasm\text{\textbar}ti, IV, 31-32).

The rules of Yama, S\text{\textbar}t\text{\textbar}tatapa, and K\text{\textbar}tyayana allowing a girl married to an improper person to remarry again, are explained away by M\text{\textbar}dhav\text{\textbar}c\text{\textbar}rya (Par\text{\textbar}sarasm\text{\textbar}ti, vol. I, pt. 2, pp. 90-91) as relating to other yugas and as inapplicable to the present times:

So ayam p\text{\textbar}nar-udv\text{\textbar}ho yug\text{\textbar}ntara-vi\text{\textbar}saya\text{\textbar}h. Tath\text{\textbar}a ca \\
\text{\textbar}Aditya p\text{\textbar}r\text{\textbar}\text{\textbar}ne:
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{\textbar}U\text{\textbar}dh\text{\textbar}y\text{\textbar}h\text{\textbar}p\text{\textbar}narudv\text{\textbar}ham jye\text{\textbar}t\text{\textbar}amsam go-vadham tath\text{\textbar}a & \mid \\
Kalau p\text{\textbar}ncia ha kuru\text{\textbar}ta bh\text{\textbar}r\text{\textbar}t\text{\textbar}j\text{\textbar}y\text{\textbar}m kama\text{\textbar}ndalum & \parallel \\
\end{align*}
\]

Kau\text{\textbar}ilya accepted the rule that in Dharma-viv\text{\textbar}ha (the first four forms of marriage) there could be no divorce:

\textit{Amok\text{\textbar}so dharma-viv\text{\textbar}h\text{\textbar}\text{\textbar}\text{\textbar}\text{\textbar}h\text{\textbar}m.} (p. 155)

But if the husband and wife hate each other and agree to release one another they can do so.

The rules allowing remarriage of widows and women whose husbands have long not been heard of etc., which were probably operative once, have been explained as interdicted for this age. Among them is the famous rule of N\text{\textbar}rada (XII, 67):

\[
\begin{align*}
Na\text{\textbar}ste m\text{\textbar}te pr\text{\textbar}raja\text{\textbar}te k\text{\textbar}l\text{\textbar}be ca \text{\textbar}patite patau & \mid \\
Pa\text{\textbar}ncasu \text{\textbar}pt\text{\textbar}su n\text{\textbar}r\text{\textbar}\text{\textbar}n\text{\textbar}m \text{\textbar}patir-anyo vidhr\text{\textbar}yate & \parallel \\
\end{align*}
\]

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51, r. 27. CONDEMNATION OF PROLONGED CELIBACY

Dirgha-brahmacaryam is one of the Kalivar\text{\textbar}jas, according to Br\text{\textbar}han-n\text{\textbar}r\text{\textbar}adiya-pur\text{\textbar}\text{\textbar}na (cited in Dharma-pradiplpa, p. 50):
Dattākṣatīyāḥ kanyāyāḥ punar-dānam parasya ca
Dīrgha-kālam brahmacaryam naramedhāsvamedhakau

The relevant clause prohibiting procreating study and celibacy (which are involved in Brahmacarya) is cited from the Brahmanapurāṇa in Mādhavācārya’s bhūṣya on Parāsara-smṛti (vol. I, pt. 1, p. 133, Islampurkar’s ed.)

The authors of the Dharma-pradīpa explain that the interdiction of prolonged brahmacarya of 24 years and more prescribed in the Gṛhyaśūtras is impracticable at present (p. 53).

Manusmṛti (III, 1-2) lays down that one should have studied the three Vedas, or two, or at least one before entering the order of householder (Gṛhaustṛṣṇa) and that the vow of studying the Vedas, must be kept for 36, 18, or 9 years, or until the student has learnt the Veda perfectly. Manu’s dictum in regard to the duration of brahmacarya is identical with the dicta of all smārtas, with the exception of Baudhāyana, (I, 2, 3, 1-5) who prescribes periods of forty-eight years, or twenty-four years, or twelve years for each Veda studied, or at least one year for each Kāṇḍa of the Veda studied, or till the Veda has been mastered. He cites the Vedic injunction that one should kindle the sacred fire when one’s hair has not turned grey (Jāta-putraḥ kṛṣṇa-keso agnim ādadhīta) ‘lest the duty of offering the Srauta Agnihotra be neglected’, for, as he himself remarks, ‘life is uncertain’. This extra-ordinarily long period of brahmacarya is taken up by Sābara-svāmin’s (I, iii, 2) discussion, as the sruti (cited) and the smṛti (Baudhāyana) are in conflict. Sābara holds that the smṛti rule is invalid, and he is in line with the later smṛtis which include dīrgha-brahmacarya among the interdictions of the present age (Kaliyuga). Kumārilā attempts a reconciliation by suggesting that the dīrgha-brahmacarya rule is for those who are physically unsound and not quite fit for married life, but who are unable to remain celibate through lack of self-control. A text from the Atharva-veda is cited in support of the rule to which Baudhāyana has given his adherence, to show that Sābarasvāmin’s summary rejection of it is untenable.
51, l. 28. PRAISE OF GRHASTHASRAMA

For the panegyric on the house-holder’s life see: Manusmṛti, III, 77-80: (Buehler’s trn.)

“As all living creatures subsist by receiving support from air even so (the members) of all orders subsist by receiving support from the householder. Because men of the three (orders) are daily supported by the householder with (gifts of) sacred knowledge and food, therefore (the order) of householders is the most excellent order. (The duties of) this order, which cannot be practised by men with weak organs, must be carefully observed by him who desires imperishable (bliss in) heaven, and constant happiness in this life, the sages, the manes, the gods, the Bhūtas, and guests ask the householders (for offerings and gifts); hence he who knows (the law) must give to them (what is due to each)”.

For parallel passages, see Vasiṣṭha, VIII, 14-16, and Viṣṇu, LIX, 27-29.

52, ll. 1-2. THE WIDOW’S POWER OF ALIENATION

The relevant texts of Kātyāyana have formed the basis of discussion by the digestes. These are arranged as under by Mr. Kane in his reconstruction of Kātyāyana:

Āsurādiṣu yallabdham strīdhanaṃ prātykam striyā
Abhāve tadaḥpātyānām mātā-pitros-tadiṣyate ॥ (920)

That Strīdhana which was obtained by a woman from her parents in the forms of marriage beginning with the āsura is desired (held) to go to her parents on failure of her progeny.

Aputrā sayanam bhartuh pālayanti gurau sthitā
dhūṣita āmaranat kṣānta; dāyāda ārdhvam āpnuyuh ॥ (921)

A sonless widow, preserving the bed of her husband unsullied, and residing with her elders, and being self-controlled (or forbearing)
should enjoy her husband’s property till her death. After her
death, the other heirs of the husband will succeed to it.

Svāryate svāmini stri tu grāsācchādana-bhāgini
Avinhakte dhanāmsam tu prāṇnoti āmarāṇāntikam || (922)
Bhoktumarhati klītāmsam guru-suṣruṣane ratā
Na kuryād yadi suṣruṣām caila-πiṅde niyojāyet || (923)

When her husband is gone to heaven, the wife is entitled only
to food and raiment, if her husband was not separated, or she may
get a share in the ancestral wealth till her death. The widow
intent on serving her elders, is entitled to enjoy the share allotted to
her; if she does not serve her elders, only food and clothes should
be given her:

Mṛte bhartari bhartṛamsam labheta kulapālikā
Yāvad-jīvam; na hi svāmyam dānādhamana-vikraye ||
(924)

Vratopavāsaniratā brahma-cārye vyavasthitā
Damadānaratā nityam āputrāpi dīvatā vrajāt || (925).

‘A wife who seeks the honor of the family gets the share of her
husband till her death; but she has no power of gift, mortgage or
sale. A widow engrossed in religious observances, fixed in celibacy,
always self-restrained, and making gifts goes to heaven, even though
she is sonless.’

These rules give the widow only a life-interest in her husband’s
estate, and they form the foundation of the modern right of the
Hindu widow to her husband’s estate, and after her the reversioners.
The rules are old, as Kauṭilya (p. 153) lays down identical in-
junction:

Āputrā patisayanam pālayanti guru-samīhe strīdhanam
āyuḥksayat bhunjita; āpadartham hi strīdhanam; uḍhvam
dāyādam gaccet. (III, 2)

The rules were interpreted so as to allow the widow to incur
expenditure of various kinds, e.g., gifts on the ground of the spirit-
ual benefit accruing therefrom to her and to her husband, religious
expenditure etc. The extension is made in *Vyavahāra-mayūkha* (Kane's trn, p. 152) in explaining rule 920 of Kātyāyana:

"The text refers to a prohibition of gifts and the like intended for bards (*vandī*), panegyrists (*cūraṇa*) and the like. But gifts for unseen (i.e. spiritual) purposes and mortgages and the like conducive to those purposes are valid, on account of the rule (*vis.* 925) of Kātyāyana".

Some of the verses of Kātyāyana cited above are ascribed to *Yama* by the *Smṛticandrikā* (*Vyavahāra*, pp. 665 seq.)

Devaṇaḥ Bhaṭṭa, the author of the *Smṛticandrikā* also extends the power of the widow to make gifts etc., in spite of the apparent limitation of her power: (trn. Krishnaswami Aiyar, 1867, pp. 169, 170).

"The competency of the widow to make gifts for religious and charitable purposes, such as the maintenance of old and helpless persons, being sanctioned by law, the above passage must be held as contemplating the want of independence of a widow in making gifts etc. for purposes not being religious or charitable, but purely temporal, such as gifts to dances and the like. A widow thus possesses independent power to make gifts for religious objects, and therefore the same author enjoins the constant presentation of gifts by a widow for religious purposes. . . . The daily making of such gifts will be impracticable if the widow were held to possess no independent power. It is hence to be understood that the law does not deny the independent power of a widow even to make a *mortgage* or *sale*, for the purpose of providing herself with the necessary funds for the discharge of religious duties."

52, ii. 1-5. DIVORCE OPEN TO NON-BRĀHMAṆAS

Cf. Dr. Altekar (*op. cit.* p. 102):

"Divorce went out of vogue only in the higher sections of Hindu society. The *Sūdra-kamalākara*, written in the 17th century, expressly permits it to *Sūdras* and other lower castes." Kamalākara relies on a rule of *Nārada* (not found in Jolly's edn.):
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Na Śūdrāyāḥ smṛtaḥ kāla, na ca dharma-vyatikramaḥ
Vīsesato aprasūtāyāḥ striyāḥ samvatsarād-vidhiḥ

The verse ends samvatsara-parā sthitih in Nārada-ya-Manu-

Kauṭilyya limited divorce to the forms of marriage other than
the first four, which were in use by non-Brāhmaṇas only (III, 4
or p. 155).

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52, ll. 6-10. KALIVARJYA

See Note 128, ante (pp. 163-164) on the relaxations of Yuga-
dhārma.

The rules interdicting certain ancient practices on the ground
of their unfitness for the weakened men of the present age are
generally cited as Kalivarjya and are to be found in the Purāṇas
and some of the later smṛtis. In the Vana-parva (clix, 11-34) of
the Mahābhārata an account of the gradual decline of power and
dharma from yuga to yuga is described. Some of the practices
of the ancients may prove repugnant to present day conscience.
But they should not be condemned on that account. Thus
Parāsarasmṛti (I, 33):

Yuge yuge ca ye dharmās tatra tatra ca ye dvijāḥ
Teṣām nindā na kartayā yuga-rūpā hi te dvijāḥ

Thus, we should not condemn the injunction of Manu (VIII,
371) that the wife, who proud of her virtues or birth contravenes
the directions of her husband should be thrown by the king to the
dogs to be devoured by them. It refers to a different age.

Mādhavacārya collected a number of texts on Kalivarjya and
these have been printed in his edition of Parāsarasmṛti (I, i, pp.
131-137) with valuable comments of his own by the late Mahāmaho-
pādhyāya Vāman Sāstri Islāmpūrkar. Hemādri, Madanapārijāta
and other authorities give quotations on Kalivarjya. In the
recently published Dharma-pradīpā (pp. 50-53, and pp. 232-244) a
list of the inhibitions of the Kali-yuga is given and the
premissibility of such practices as the remarriage of widows, for
which smṛti sanction may be cited, in the present age, is discussed.
The most accessible collection of practices inhibited for the Kaliyuga is that of Mr. P. V. Kane, in a paper on Kalivarjya, which he contributed to the Eighth Oriental Conference. He has catalogued 49 practices as so forbidden, and stated in each case the older authority, enjoining or allowing the practice condemned later as Kalivarjya. He holds that the doctrine of decadence as time passes is referred to in Rgveda, X, 10, 10, where in the famous dialogue between Yama and Yami the former is reported as saying: "those later ages are yet to come when sisters will do what is not sister-like." The Nirukta implies the decadence in the contrast it makes between the intuitive knowledge of Dharma which ancient sages had and the later had not: (I, 20)

Sāksāt kṛtadharmaṇaṁ śayāḥ babhūvḥ te avarabhyo asā-ksātkṛta-dharmasya upadesena mantrān samprāduḥ

The doctrine of decadence is expressed in Āpastamba (II, 6, 13, 7-9) and Gautama (I, 3-4). The idea is that the sages of old who committed many transgressions, which are against the sāstras, incurred no sin thereby, because of their spiritual powers, and that if one of the present age, who does not possess such spiritual greatness, commits the same offences he will surely be sinful.

Mr. Kane conjectures that in the five or six centuries preceding the Christian era the theory of the four yugas, their characteristics, and of the progressive moral decline from yuga to the yugas following, was fully developed. He also holds that the theory of inhibitions of the Kali-yuga began to be current about the fourth century A.D. The yuga theory appears in its full-fledged form in the Mahābhārata (Vanaparva, ch. 149 and 183), Manu (I, 81-86) and some Purāṇas e.g. Matsya, ch. 142-143, Brāhma, ch. 122-123 and Nārādīya, pt. I, ch 41. The earliest inscription mentioning the sins of kali-yuga is one of the Pallava king Simhavarman (Epig. Ind., VIII, p. 162: Kaliyugadośāvāsanna-dharma-uddhāraṇa-nitya-sannādadhasya).

Āpastamba’s rejection of the old rule of giving all property to the eldest son as opposed to sāstras

(sāstraṁ vīpratīṣṭhdam, II, 6, 14, 10)
may be based on the *kalivarjya* idea, through he does not expressly mention it. *Uddhāra-vibhāga* or giving a larger share to the eldest son on partition was known to early *smṛtis* (*Gautama*, xxviii, 5-7, *Baudhāyana*, II, 3, 9) and is sanctioned by *Manu* (I, 112 and 1170, but it is one of the *Kalivarjyas*. It is noteworthy, as indicative of the want of unanimity as regards what is or what is not properly prohibited for the *Kali-yuga*, that 'Medhātithi, after' mentioning the *uddhāra-vibhāga* as *kalivarjya* according to some, rejects the prohibition.

When an authority allows a practice and another condemns it two ways of reconciling them, without rejecting the claim of either to count as authority, are open: one is to see in the opposition an option to follow the one or the other, and the other is to reject the older in favour of the newer rule, on the ground that the practice allowed by the former is *Kali-varjya*.

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52, ll. 10-12. CANDRAGUPTA'S MARRIAGE TO HIS BROTHER'S WIDOW

The story is given in an extract from a lost drama of Visākhadatta, named *Devi-Candragnpta*, which has been discovered in fragments in works on dramaturgy like *Nātya-darpaṇa*, and is confirmed by an explanatory passage in Sāṅkarārya's commentary on Bāṇa’s *Harṣacarita*, which contains an allusion to the slaying of the libidinous Sāka king by Candragupta disguised as a woman. The story is that the Sāka ruler desired Rāmagupta, the elder brother and predecessor of Candragupta, to send to his harem the queen Dhruvadevi, that Rāmagupta pussilanimously agreed and sent the queen, whom Candragupta rescued after slaying the enemy. According to the *Mañjusrīmūlatantra*, Rāmagupta was killed by Candragupta, who married his sister-in-law the widowed queen, Dhruvadevi. (See Jayaswal, *Imperial History of India*, 1934, p. 35, R. D. Banerji, *History of India*, 1934, pp. 168-9, and Dr. V. Raghavan’s critical summary of the discussion in the *Journal of the Benares Hindu University*, 1937).
52, ll. 14-19. **Gradual Disappearance of Niyoga**

*Niyoga*, the custom of a brother raising off-spring for a brother on his wife, is accepted by Baudhāyana (II, 2, 17, 62), Gautama, XVIII, 4-14, Vasiṣṭha, XVII, 14, 55-56, Viṣṇusmṛti XV, 3, Manu, IX, 56-63, 143-147, Yājñavalkya, II, 127-128, Ṛṣabha, XII, 80-88, and Hārīta, IV, 17. In the *Mahābhārata*, we find cases of *niyoga* applied to a wife, when the husband is alive. Later in the *Smṛtis* it is restricted to the widow. Its use in the Epic for widows was common (XIII, 12, 23):

\[ \text{Nārtu patyabhāve vai devaram kurute patim} \]

There was no restriction in the Epic on the number of off-spring that might be raised by *niyoga* on a woman. Later, it was limited to one son only. The Epic says that Kunti protested against being asked to submit to *niyoga* more than once (Ādi, 132, 63-64) on the ground of contravening *Dharma*. Earlier, three sons were allowed to be raised (ibid. I, 126). It was tantamount, as Dr. Alтекar has pointed out (op. cit. p. 172), to a virtual marriage as the birth of girls did not count for discontinuance.

Āpastamba is the earliest *smārtta* to condemn it. He held that the spiritual benefit would go to the begetter and not the putative father (II, 6, 13, 8). Manu condemned the practice as animal, (*pasvudharma*, IX, 66 ff.). The restrictions proceed by limiting the duration of *niyoga* to the birth of two sons (Manu, IX, 61), and afterwards generally to one son. The use of the device, if there were children already, was interdicted (Baudhāyana, II, 20). The disposition to use it for satisfying the carnal appetite is condemned by Ṛṣabha (XII, 80-88). The application of it for reasons of cupidity is condemned by Vasiṣṭha (XVI, 57):

\[ \text{Lobhān-nāsti niyogāh} \]

The popularity of adoption as an alternative, and stricter ideas of morality, outraged by the practice, led to its being included among the *Kalivarjyāḥ* in the enumeration of which it usually leads. (*Dharma-pradīpa*, pp. 50-53).
52, 21-22. Prohibition of Hypergamous Unions

In Mādhavacārya’s bhasya on Parāsarasmyti there is reference to the homage due from a pupil to the asavarnā or inferior caste wives of the guru (vol. I, pt. i, 328). But such unions are rejected in the present age as kalivarjya. Thus the Bhānnārādiya (cited in Dharma-pradīpa, p. 50) says:

Samudra-yātṛsvikārah kamandalu-vidhāraṇam
Dvijānam asavarnesu kanyāsūpagatam tathā

52, 30. Growth of Belief in Magical Practices

Belief in the efficacy of magic and witch-craft, which is natural in a primitive age, is reflected in the Kauṭiliya (IV, 3, 4 and XIII, 32 etc.) In fact there was wide-spread belief that it was owing to Kauṭiliya’s own powers as a magician that the Nandas were overthrown and Candragupta enthroned in their stead. Kāmandaka, who belongs to the Gupta epoch, alludes to this belief, in which he shared:

Jātavedā ivārīcīmān vedān vedavidāmvarah
Yo’dhītavān sucaturaḥ caturopyekavedavat
Yasyābīcāravajireṇa vajrajvalanatējasah
Papātāmūlabāh sritmān Suparvā Nandaparvatabaḥ
Ehākt mantrasaktyā yah saktyā Saktidharopamaḥ
Ājahāra nṛcandrāya Candraguptāya medinīm

“Who, by his genius mastered the four Vedas as if they were only one; who, by the blazing thunder-bolt of his magic, completely overthrew the mountain-like Nanda; who, single-handed by force of his intelligence (or magical spells) and with a prowess like that of the wielder of Sakti (i.e., Kārtikeya, the general of the gods) won the earth for Candragupta, delightful like the moon to men.”

It will be noted that the reference stresses Kauṭiliya’s mastery of the Atharva-veda, the Veda of spells and incantations. The
importance of the _Atharvaveda_ for the royal preceptor is indicated in the description by Kālidāsa of the sage Vasīṣṭha as _atharva-nidhi_ (Raghuvamsa, I, 59). The _Mahābhārata_ (XIII, 105, 14-45) declares the royal _purohita_, who knows the _Atharva_ spells, as worth ten _ācāryas_ (E. W. Hopkins, _Great Epic of India_, 1902, p. 380). _Manu smṛti_, which discouniences wrong practices (_vāṃścāra_) alludes to the efficacy of magic (III, 59) when it declares that the house in which women pronounce a curse for not being honoured will perish completely as if destroyed by magic. Manu also empowers the oppressed Brāhmaṇa to “use in incantations the sacred texts revealed by Atharvan and by Angiras” (XI, 33). Buddhist and Jaina monks were forbidden to practise it, but apparently the prohibition was ineffective as _Visākadaṭṭha_ (in the _Mudrārākṣasa_) refers to its practice by a Buddhist ascetic Jīvasiddhi. The incursions of Shamanist hordes, like those of the _Sākas_ and the Kuśāns, should have given an impetus to the practice of witchcraft. Bāqṣa describes a weird midnight incantation by Bhairavācārya seated on the chest of a corpse in a cremation ground for obtaining the position of a _vidyādhara_, and the dawn of prosperity to the line of _Puṣyabhūti_, the prince of _Sthānesvara_ (Thanesar) as the reward for protecting the wizard. The Purāṇas, especially the _Saiva_, and the _tantras_ popularised magic. The _Kādambarī_ and the _Dasaśakumāracarita_ contain allusions to magic and its efficacy. The spread of _Sakti_ worship emphasised the popular belief in magic, which has always lurked on the country-side.

52, ll. 24-32 and 53, ll. 1-4. SATĪ OR SAHAMARAṆA OR ANVĀROHANA

Kauṭilya condemns suicide of every kind and penalises it by post-mortuary punishments, designed to act as deterrents, and by punishments for those who defend suicide. The verses of Kauṭilya on the subject are these: (IV, 7, end):

_Rajju-vāstra-viśair-vāpi kāma-krodha-vasena yaḥ |
Ghātayet svayam ātmānanam stri va pāpena mohitā_
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Rajjunā rājamārga tān caṇḍālena aṇakarṣayet. 
Na smasāvāvidhiṣṭeṣām na sambandhikriyāṣṭathā
tu yāh kuryāt preta-kārya-kriyā-vidhim 
Tad-gatim sa caret pācāt svā-janād-vā pramucyate 
Sanvatsareṇa pātati pātitenā samācaran 
Yājanādhyāpanād-yaunād taiscānyo api samācaran

The reference in the passage to Sati is both implied and explicit (strī vā pāpēna mohitā). Dr. Altekar's statement that Kauṭilya does not mention the custom (op. cit. p. 140) is not correct.

The self-immolation of Kalanos, which the Greek writers mention, though of a sage, suggests the existence of similar practices among women also.

Viṣṇusmyṭi (C. 100 A.D.) merely mentions the custom as an alternative to brahmaçarya (mṛte bhartari brahmaçaryam tadanvārahoṇam vā, (XXV, 14) and adds that a widow by joining her husband on the pyre accompanies him (XX, 36):

Mṛtopi bāndahavah saktō nānugantum priyam janam
dāvāvarjam hi sarvasya yāmyah panthā viruddhyate

The Brāhmanical revival during the Gupta period led to its coming into prominence. Bhāsa has some characters who commit sati. Kālidāsa knows it, and so does Śūdraka as well as of course Vātsyāyana. An inscription of A.D. 510 mentions the sati of the wife of a general killed in battle (Gupta Inscriptions, ed. Fleet, p. 93). Harṣa's mother died a sumangali by burning herself before her husband's death (which is suicide, not same-marana) and his sister Rājya-strī was just saved as she was about to ascend the pyre. In the epoch of Rājput dynasties it gains support. It is the age of the late smṛtis. Critical writers like Medhātithi discounted it as opposed to the injunction against suicide. His remark on Manusmṛti, V, 156, is worth citing:

Pumvat strīṇām api pratiśiddhā ātmatyāgaḥ. . . . Satyām api pravṛttāv na dharmatvam, evam iha (anumaraṇe) api na saṃstāyatvam . . . kim ca pratyakṣa-srutī-virodho
ayam.; ato astyeva ātīmīn anumaraṇaṇepi strīyāḥ ātīmīn prati-
śedhāḥ (Jha’s ed. I, p. 492).

Devaṇaṇa Bhaṭṭa condemns it as (Vyavahāra, in Smṛti-candrikā,
ed. Mysore, p. 598), as an ‘inferior dharma,’ (niṅguṭṭa-phala).

Bāṇa naturally condemned it as the courtier of Hāṃsavardhana
(A.D. 606-649) in Kādambart, I, p. 308, ed. Nirṇayasagarā,) in
view of the known views of his master, whose mother had become
sati. The Rājakaranginiṅ refers to many cases of sati in Kāṣmir
(VII, 481, 490, 858, 1380, 1486; VIII, 448, 1447; V, 206).

“Tantra writers also joined the crusade. They pointed out
that woman was the embodiment of the Supreme Goddess, and
boldly declared that if a person burnt her with her husband he
would be condemned to eternal hell” (Altekar, p. 1, op. cit. p.147).

Bṛhaspati describes the pativrata (chaste wife) thus :

Ārtā āarte, nudite ḫṛṣṭā, ṭroṣite malinā kṛvā

Mṛte mriyeta yā patyau, sā strī jñeyā pativrata

The description of the wife as dying when the husband dies
may be poetic exaggeration or a reference to sati. (Sams. 483).

Aparārka marshals the authorities for Sati, and appears to
defend it (see p. 111, passage beginning ‘Imā nārti avidhavā’).
The chief smṛti authorities in favour of the practice are Angiras,
Hārita and Vyāṣa. Aparārka (p. 112) quotes four writers, who
prohibit brāhmaṇa widows from offering sati, and one of them
curiously is Angiras :

Yā strī brāhmaṇa-jāttya mṛtam ātīmīn anuvrajet

Sā svargam ātmaghātena nātmānam na ātīmīn nayet

Paithinasi corroborates the dictum of Angiras and states that
saha-maraṇa is the rule for others than brāhmaṇa wives :

Mṛtānugamanam nāsti brāhmaṇāyā Brahmaśāsanāt

Itaresām tu varṇānām strīdharmo ayam parah smṛtaḥ

Kamālākāra Bhaṭṭa’s mother Umā committed sati (Kane,
p. 432). Nilakanṭa was his cousin. The illustrious example of a
sati in the family is a proof of their conviction of its sāstraic
character, apart from verbal defence.
Mādhavācārya's defence of Sati, as not opposed to such Vedic precepts as those contained in Isa-úpaniṣad, 3, that those persons who commit suicide reach after death a world of intense darkness, named Asūrya-loka, is contained in his comment on Parāsvara-smṛti, II, 32 (Vol. II, pt. i, p. 55, Islampūrkar's edn.). His defence is natural, in the Brāhmaṇa revival that synchronised with the foundation of Vijayanagar.

The holocaust following the death of Gāngeyadeva of Cedi at Prayāg in A.D. 1038 is mentioned in an inscription published in Epigraphia Indica, II, p. 3.

The sati of large numbers after the death of a ruler came to mark social distinction. "When Ajit Singh of Mārwār died in 1724, 64 women burnt themselves on his funeral pyre. When Rājā Budh Singh of Būndi was drowned, 84 women became sati" (Tod's Annals of Rājasthān, II, ed. Crooke, p. 837). "When Ranjit Singh of Lahore died, four queens and seven concubines ascended the funeral pyre. . . . Three women died with Mahārājā Kharag Singh, five with Basant Singh, eleven with Kis'orī Singh, twenty-four with Hīra Singh, and 310 with Suceṭ Singh." (Altekar, op. cit., p. 155).

NOTES

53, II. 13 to 54, 18. TREATMENT OF UNCHASTE AND ABDUCTED OR OUTRAGED WOMEN

Hindu law took a strict view of unchastity, when it was voluntary, whether in man or women. Āpastamba imposes a deterrent punishment on the unfaithful husband, by ruling that his expiation is wearing the hide of a donkey for six months, and begging from door to door in that guise, everywhere announcing his offence, (I, 9, 18):

Dāravyatikrami kharājinam bahir-loma paridhāya dāravyatikramine bhikṣāmiti saptāgarāṇi caret. Sā vṛttih saṃmāsān.
The direction to wives to treat their husbands with meekness and forbearance is not coupled with any reduction of rigor in the treatment of an unchaste husband.

In the Vedic age, unchaste women were allowed to take part even in sacrifices after mere confession (Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, II, 5, 2, 20). The leniency was continued by Vasiṣṭha (XXVIII, 2):

_Svayam vipratipaññā... na tyājyā_ 1

Kauṭilya (p. 230) provides a punishment for a man who defiles the daughter of his own male or female slave, and makes the adulterer responsible for the payment of a suitable nuptial fee to enable the girl to be married. He also rules that when a man has sexual relation with a woman held as slave on account of money due from her, he has not only to be fined but to provide for her clothes and maintenance. According to Yājñavalkya, II, 290, a brāhmaṇa having intercourse with a slave woman, even though she is of lower caste, is to be punished. By a rule of Kātyāyana of general applicability, which is therefore applicable to adultery also, women should pay only half the fine that men should pay for the offence, and where the penalty is death in the case of men, women should be left off with mere mutilation. (p. 487 of Kane's edn.) The concession is on the score of the defenceless position of women, which calls for leniency.

The idea that the man is more to blame than the woman in such cases is also implicit in the Mahābhārata (XIII, 58, 5) rule that in cases of adultery or rape between persons of the same caste, the woman should not be turned adrift (tyājyā), unless she has conceived.

A wet-nurse (dhātrī) is placed by Nārada (XV, 73-75) in the same class as the mother, mother's sister, mother-in-law, maternal uncle's wife, paternal aunt, pupil, sister's female companion, daughter, preceptor's wife, a women of the same gotra, a suppliant woman, the queen, a female ascetic, and a chaste woman of the highest caste, as a person whose violation will constitute an inexpiable offence for which there is no punishment lower than the
removal of the offending organ (cited by Aparārkā, p. 857). The idea is that the abuse of a woman who has placed herself under protection is specially heinous. It is equated with incest.

The punishment for theft being death, and abduction of a woman being theft, it was punishable capitally. Vyāsa (cited in Vyaṇavahāramayukha, p. 135) includes the theft of women in nine kinds of theft. The same smṛti rules (ib. p. 236) that the abductor of a woman (stṛ-ḥartā) should be burnt in a raging fire bound to an iron bedstead:

**Stṛ-ḥartā lohasayane dagdhavyo vai kaṭāgninā**

In the Nāradaparisaśṭa (28) it is ruled that the entire property of a man should be confiscated if he abducts a woman, and he should suffer death if he abducts a virgin girl:

*Sarvasvam harato nārm, kanyām tu harato vadhah*

The abduction of a married woman is held by Brhaspati to be a crime of violence (sāhasa) as well as theft, and Nārada (XVII, 6) holds it to be among the most heinous crimes.

The ātatayin, the most culpable offender known, being usually a synonym for assassin, is classed with the committer of arson, the poisoner, the armed robber, and the violent robber of land and women. The punishment for the ātatayin is death, according to Manu, (VIII, 350) and Vasiśtha (III, 17), and he who slays him when caught red-handed can not be punished by the king, even if the culprit who has been slain is a learned Brāhmaṇa. Later on this was explained away as inoperative in the Kaliyuga in the case of Brāhmaṇas, though its applicability for offenders of other castes was conceded. By a rule of Kātyāyana (v. 830 ed. Kane) rape was to be punished by the king with death:

**Stṛiṣa kṛtopabhogasyāt prasahya puṇuṣo yathā**

**Vadhe tatra pravarteta, kāryātikramaṇam hi tat**

When tenderness for a Brāhmaṇa offender began to be shown by smartas the rule was made applicable only to non-Brāhmaṇas. (Vyaṇavahara-mayukha, p. 224 and Vivramitrodaya, p. 504.)

Un chastity, according to Manu (XI, 60) is an upa-pātaka.
The expiation prescribed for it (ib. 118) is govrata and cāndrāyaṇa. According to Manu (XI, 177-178) an unchaste wife should be merely confined to the house and made to undergo these penances; and by the general rule, already cited (infra p. 269 note) her penance will be half of what one of the male sex will have to perform.

A ravished woman is in result unchaste. But she must be maintained.

Kauṭilya deprives the habitually unchaste woman only of subsistence in excess of 2000 pañcas. (Trn. Shāma S'āstri, 1915, p. 199).

REHABILITATION OF ABDUCTED OR OUTRAGED WOMEN

Vasiṣṭha (XXVIII, 2-4):

“A wife, tainted by sin, whether quarrelsome or a voluntary run-away, or the victim of an outrage, or the victim of thieves, is not to be cast away (nāsti tyāgo). Let her courses be awaited for; by them she will become pure again.” Atri holds that a woman who has been ravished by mlecchas and evil men (pāpakarmabhiḥ) is rendered pure again by performing the prajāpatya penance and by her courses. (This verse occurs also in Parāśarasmṛti, X, 25).

Devala, who probably wrote about the time of the Musulman invasions of Sindh, rules that a woman, who has conceived through one of another varṇa (i.e., the abductor) is rendered pure either by miscarriage of the foetus (viniśte tataḥ salyā, rajaso vāpi darsvane) or by giving away the child born of the conception, so that there might be (after her restoration) no mixture of castes (varṇasamkaraḥ.) (Devalasmṛti, in Śrītinam-samuccayah, Anandāśrama ed. p. 87, vv. 47-52). This is in harmony with the principle enunciated by Yājñavalkya (I, 72) that “in adultery, purification accrues from the recurrence of the courses, but not if there has been conception, and that in the latter case, the wife should be put away.” Vīśānāvesvara shows the spirit of reaction against the lenient treatment of the woman, by explaining away the older rules
in her favour as referring to 'mental adultery' (manovyabhicāra), and that where the father of the unborn child is a Śūdra the woman must be cast away, in accordance with a rule of Manu (IX, 155). But, he shows some consideration to the unfortunate woman by laying down that by "casting away" (tyāga) all that is meant is that she should not be allowed to take part in the religious rites of the husband, as a chaste wife will be entitled to do, and that it is not intended that she should be driven out of the house, in which she may remain in confinement. (Tyagasca upā-bhoga-dharma-kāryayoh; na tu niṣkāsanam gṛhāt tasyāḥ, 'nirundhyāt eka vesmani' iti niyamāt).

The same stand is taken by Aparārka: 'etacca mānasa vyabhicare, p. 98;' sambhoga-samsparsa-sambhāsaṇa-sahādhikāra-viṣayas-tyāgaḥ kāryaḥ, na tu punar gṛhān-nirvasanānu-ruṣaḥ, p. 99.

The opinion of Caturvimsatimatam is thus given in Nanda-panḍita's commentary on Parāśarasmīti, X, 27:

Śūdra-garbhe bhavet-tyāgaḥ caṇḍālo jāyate yataḥ ǀ
Garbhasrāve dhātudosaiḥ caret-cāndrāyaṇatrayam ǁ

and

Catasra eva santyājyāḥ patañe satyāpi striyāḥ ǀ
Svaṁākopaḥataḥ yā tu bhartiḥghni pitṛ-putra-gā ǁ

(ed. Benares, pp. 311-2.)

54, l. 8. AL-BIRUNI ON HINDU TREATMENT OF FALLEN WOMEN AND RETURNED CONVERTS

The remarks of Al-Biruni, who is anterior to the great smārtas of the twelfth century, relate to both the treatment of adulteresses and the Hindu, who having been enslaved by the Muhammadan conqueror, comes back to his country. He says (ed. Sachau, 1910, II, pp. 162-163):

"An adulteress is driven out of the house of the husband and banished.

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I have repeatedly been told that when Hindu slaves (in Muslim countries) escape and return to their country and religion, the Hindus order that they should fast by way of expiation, then they bury them in dung, stale, and milk of cows for a number of days, till they get into a state of fermentation. Then they drag them out of the dirt, and give them similar dirt to eat; and more of the like.

I have asked the Brahmins if this is true, but they deny it, and maintain that there is no expiation possible for such an individual, and that he is never allowed to return to those conditions of life in which he was before he was carried off as a prisoner. And how should that be possible? If a Brahman eats in the house of a Śūdra for sundry days, he is expelled from his caste and can never regain it."

The remarks of Al-Biruni show that the rules had hardened by his time, and that Aparārka and Vijñānesvāra in explaining away the old considerate rules were only justifying current usage.

54, ll. 8-12. REHABILITATION OF THE CONVERTED HINDU

The locus classicus among śṛtis on the readmission of the patita (out-caste) is Devalasmṛti, which is devoted entirely to the enunciation of means of restoring by suitable penances such persons to their old place in Hindu society. It consists of about ninety verses. But the Devala who is quoted by the great commentators seems to have been another, or atleast, his work seems to have been mainly in prose. (Kane, op. cit., p. 121). That his rules, if they had been known in Al-Biruni's age were not operative in Hindu society is evident from Al-Biruni, (supra, Note 212.) In the fragment, which now passes as his, he states that the expiations prescribed by him alone are valid, and that the rules of other sages are invalid, if against him (verse 72).

The gist of his doctrine is that a person who had been carried away by mlecchas, and had contracted impurity by close association with them, in eating, living and even marriage, (which lead to loss
of caste), can be restored to his old status by a bath in the Ganges and the performance of specified expiatory rites (prāyascitra). Such restoration can take place even if the person had been away for twenty years:

Grhitto yo balāt mlechchaiḥ pācca-ṣat-sapta va samāḥ
Dasādī vimśatim gāvat tasya suddhir vidhiyate

The Mitakṣara has ruled that even if a person had been treated as civilly dead by the breaking of a pot, he can be taken back:

Caritavrata āyāte ninayerur-navam ghatam
Jugupseran na căpyenam samvaseyusca sarvasaḥ
(Cited in Dharma-pradīpa, p. 209).

The following verses of Yamasmiśti (V, 6-7) rule that persons who had been forced into slavery by mlechas can be taken back after performing suitable prāyascitra:

Balāt dāṣikrtā yeca mlechcha-cāṇḍāla-dasyubhiḥ
Asubham kāritāḥ karma gavādi-ṝāṇi-himsanam
Prāyaschittam ca dātavyam tāratamyena vā dvijaiḥ

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54, II. 13-26. Treatment of Vrātya. Śivāji’s Expiation and Coronation

The orthodox definition of a vrātya is given in almost identical terms by Manu (II, 39-40) and Yājñavalkya, (I, 37-38). The maximum limit for the performance of upanayana for dvijas (twice-born castes) is 16, 22 and 24 respectively for the Brähmana, Kṣatriya, and Vaisya respectively; those who have not undergone such initiation in the Śāvitrī-mantra and their descendants are vrātyas unless they are redeemed by the performance of the rite of vrātyastoma. The expiatory rites laid down for them by later writers include the Uddālaka-vrata, and the concluding bath (avabhṛta-snāna) of the Asvamedha (horse) sacrifice (V. N. Mandlik’s Trn. of Yājñavalkyasmiśti, 1880, p. 165, note 4). Manu proscribes even clandestine relations of dvijas with vrātya women.
(VIII, 373). Neglect of śāvitrī will create new vrātīyas (X, 21). Sacrificing for vrātīyas is forbidden (XI, 198).

See Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa's Vṛātīya-prāyascittanuṭṛṇaya and the Amber Mahārāja Jai Singh's Vṛātīya-prāyascitta-samgraha (Benares, 1927) for the attitude towards the rehabilitation of those who had become vrātīyas among ruling dynasties in the Mughal period.

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Vṛātyastoma

See Nagendranāth Ghose, Indo-Aryan Literature and Cultural Origins (1934) for a new view of the Vṛātīyas as a highly cultured non-Aryan people of the North East India, responsible for early Upaniṣad thought and the origin of Buddhism. They are held to have followed an exotic cult and 'become Aryanised, and Brahmanised' (D. R. Bhandarkar, Some Aspects of Ancient Indian Culture, 1940, follows the line of thought developed by Mr. N. N. Ghosh). Mr. Ghosh points out that there were four kinds of Vṛātīya-stoma (pp. 8-10) which may be classified as those of conversion, excommunication, and purification. The Aśvamedha is regarded by Mr. Ghosh as a vrātya institution, which was superseded by the Brahmanical Rājasūya (pp. 128n, and 202n). Vasiṣṭha (XI, 76-79) lays down in regard to the reclamation of the vrātya that he might undergo one of the following: the Uddālaka penance, a kind of cāndrāyaṇa, the Aśvamedha, or the Vṛātīya-stoma. Unless the ceremonies are done, the vrātīyas according to Vasiṣṭha (XI, should not have upanayana, Vedic instruction or sacrifice or intermarry with those who are still in caste. The question became important when Hindu Kings who claimed kṣatriya lineage, like Śivāji, found that they were vrātīyas, through omission of the upanayana, ceremony, which Śivāji underwent prior to his coronation, on the advice of Gāgābhaṭṭa (Viśves'vara Bhaṭṭa of Benares, the nephew of the famous Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa) who received a fee of a lakh of hons for officiating at Śivāji's coronation (A.D. 1674). The official account of the coronation shows that the great Marāṭha ruler was made to follow
strictly all the old rules laid for a Kṣatriya king’s installation, after undergoing sūddhi.

The fullest account of Sīvāji’s coronation is that in Malhar Rāmarāo Cītnis, Sīva-cchatrapatice-caritra, ed. K. N. Sane, 1924, It is an almost contemporary document, and is based on reports of eye-witnesses and court officials. When Sīvāji decided on being crowned, precedents for the long discontinued coronation rites were diligently sought. Jai Singh of Jaipur had been crowned and had performed a jyotiṣṭhoma in Ujjain, and also a paṇḍarika yajña. He was known to Sīvāji, having brought him before the emperor, on a safe conduct, which was repudiated. Under the orders of Jai Singh an extensive digest of Dharmasūstra was compiled by Ratnākara in A. D. 1713 and named Jayasimha-kalpadruma (printed, 1925: vide Kane, History, p. 548). The procedure followed by the Rājput ruler was studied. But, it was deemed necessary to get a first-rate smārta from Benares, and Gāga Bhaṭṭa whose family originally belonged to Mahārāṣtra, was invited. As laid down in the vāstras, a saptāṅga was appointed under the name of asṭaprādhān so as to officiate at the ceremony. Sīvāji took an oath (pratijñā) at the coronation: to restore the world which had been overrun by the Muhammadans (Yavanākrānta) and re-establish the Hindu dharma and to govern in accordance with the Dharmasūstras (ib. para 274), as befits a descendant of the ancient Sesodia line (sisodiyā-kulānta utpanna ho-ūna kulabhūṣaṇa hotsāta kuladharma-sthāpanā keli). That his vow was kept is shown by his ordering the arrest of Sambhāji, for outraging a woman, contrary to Dharma (ib. para, 282)

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54, ll. 25-29. Asvamedha by Kings of Dubious Kṣatriya Lineage

After the epic times, the first instance of the performance of the horse-sacrifice (asvamedha) is that of Puṣyamitra Śunga, who performed it twice in his reign (185-150 B.C.). Kharavela, the Jain king of Kalinga, performed the Rājasūya which has been regarded as even more significant than the Asvamedha, in 177 B.C. (R. D. Banerji,
History of Orissa, I, p. 91) Śrī Sātakarṇi, the Sātavāhana king, contemporary with Puṣyamitra and Kharavela, performed also the Aśvamedha twice, like his enemy, the great Śunga, whom he defeated in battle. Gautamiputra Sātakarni claims to be ‘the unique Brāhmaṇa’ and the destroyer of the pride of the Kṣatriyas. (Banerji op. cit., p. 118.) In the year 24 of the Kuśāṅ era a stone post off the horse-sacrifice (aśvamedha) was dedicated at Mathurā. “On this stone post Vāsiśka is mentioned as the reigning emperor.” (R. D. Banerji, History of Ancient India, p. 129). In the Nāṅghāṭ inscription the widowed queen Nayanikā, the consort of Sātakarni I, mentioned above, claims to have performed (participated in?) many sacrifices such as the Rājasūya and Aśvamedha (Archaeological Survey of Western India, V, p. 82). In the Gupta dynasty, Samudragupta, Kumaragupta I, and the later Gupta, Adityasena (c. A.D. 650, V. A. Smith, Early History of India, ed. 1924, p. 332) claim to have performed the Aśvamedha. The Bhārasivas are supposed to have performed at Benares ‘ten horse sacrifices’. The Vākātaka King Pravasasena did a horse sacrifice (R.D. Banerji, Anct. Hist. of Ind., p. 1877). In the Dakhan, Pulakesin I (c. 550) (Fleet, in Bombay Gazetteer, I, i, p. 181) performed it. Towards the end of the seventh century, Madhyamarāja Yasohīta of the Sailodbhava dynasty (the name is significant of the origin of the family) of Orissa claims to have done an Aśvamedha and a Vājaperiya.

In South India, the early Pallava king Sivaskanḍavarman (according to the Hirahadgalli plates, Epiq. Ind. VI, p. 88) claims to have performed the Agniṣṭoma, Vājaperiya and Aśvamedha sacrifices. The reference in the Udayendiram plates to an Aśvamedha by an unnamed king in late Pallava times is noteworthy. (Gopalan, Pallavas, p. 125). The Kadamba king Mayūravarma (who, like Puṣyamitra was a Brāhmaṇa) claims to have done an Aśvamedha. In the Cola records, there is reference to only one Aśvamedha and that in Rājadhirāja’s time (Nilakanṭha Sāstri’s Colas, II, p. 220) Kṛṣṇa Yādava, the grandfarther of Mahādeva, the patron of Hemādri, claims to have revived Vedic sacrifices.
56, ll. 5-6. Nibandhas on Dharmasāstra by Kings

The great bhāṣyas are virtually nibandhas, as they collect in the course of their comments on their originals all the relevant authorities supporting the text, or apparently going against it. Aparārka’s bhāṣya on Yājñavalkya and Mādhava’s commentary on Parāśara are practically nibandhas. Ballāla Sena (A.D. c. 1168) composed, or with the help of his guru Aniruddha, four digests named sāgara, viz., Ācārasāgara, Pratiṣṭhāsāgara, Dānasāgara, and Adbutasāgara. The last two have been printed. (Kane, op. cit., pp. 340-341).

Pratāparudradeva of Orissa, who ruled at Kaṭaka (Cuttack) from A.D. 1497-1532, is the reputed author of the digest Sarasvatīvilāsa, of which the Vyavahāra part has been published (Mysore, 1927).

56, l. 5. HEMĀDRI’S CATURVARGACINTĀMAṆI

"Hemādri and Mādhava are the Castor and Pollux in the galaxy of dākṣinātya writers on Dharmasāstra" says Mr. Kane (op. cit., p. 354). He held the post of Karanādhisvara (Keeper of Records) of Mahādeva, the Yādava king of Devagiri (Daulatabad) in the Dakhan. His modest title disguises, as in the case of the famous Nāna Faḍnavis, the position of virtual premier. His CaturvargacintāmaṆi aimed at being an encyclopaedia of Dharma, and was designed to consist of five major sections, viz. vrata, dāna, tīrtha, mokṣa and parīseṇa. The sections on tīrtha and mokṣa have yet to come to light. (Kane, p. 354). King Mahādeva under whose command Hemādri wrote his digest, reigned from A.D. 1260 to 1270.

56, ll. JAYASIMHAKALPADRUMA

See Note 217 on Śīvāji’s coronation, ante pp. 281-285. This extensive work is in 19 stabakas on kāla, vrata, svāddha, etc. Composed about A.D. 1710 (vide, Kane, p. 548).
56, ll. 17-18. SMALL CONTENT OF POLITICS AND LAW IN NIBANDHAS WRITTEN BY COMMAND

There is nothing on polity in Hemādri’s digest, and it makes only occasional excursions into the domain of vyavahāra e.g., on sources of ownership (III, i, p. 525 ff.), strīdhana, (III, i, pp. 530-531). These are his only digressions into law proper. In the bigger nibandhas, vyavahāra and rājadharma were only part of the bigger scheme. Two parts only are devoted to these in Nilakanṭha’s digest out of the twelve, and two out of fourteen in Lakṣmīdhara’s Kṛtya-kalpātara. In Caṇḍesvara’s Ratnākara, the treatment of Rājanīti was an after-thought, and vyavāhara and vivāda (law and procedure) were two sections in seven. In Smṛtīcandrika, vyavahāra was one of its six divisions, though now its best known; the others dealt with samskāra, āhnikā, svāddha, asauca, and prāyascitta. The Madanaratna-pradīpa had no section on Rājanīti and its vyavahāra section was only one of seven. Other instances can be cited.

56, ll. 19-21. THE CHARACTER OF RĀJANĪTI IN NIBANDHA LITERATURE

The only works on Rājadharma or Rājanīti now extant, which form part of a nibandha are (1) Lakṣmīdhara’s Rājadharma-kalpātara, c. A.D. 1110, (2) Caṇḍesvara’s Rājanītiratnākara, c. A.D. 1370, (3) Rājanītiprakāśa of Mitramiśra, c. 1620, (4) Niti-mayūkha of Bhaṭṭa Nilakanṭha, c. 1635 and (5) Rājadharma-kauśtubha of Anantadeva, c. 1675. Among the parts on Rājadharma in old digests which are lost must be mentioned king Bhoja’s Rājanīti (A.D. 1000-1050, mentioned by Kane, op. cit., p. 719) and Rājadharma-kāmadhenu of Gopāla a contemporary of Lakṣmīdharma as mentioned by the latter (Kane, p. 612; cited by Caṇḍesvara on pp. 2 and 4 of his Rājanītiratnākara, ed. Jayaswal, 1936).
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56, l. 23. KAṬILYĀ'S ARTHASĀSTRA

A vast literature has grown round the Kauṭilīya. For a discussion of the authenticity, character and place of the Kauṭilīya in political thought see my Ancient Indian Polity, 2nd edition, 1935, and my Ancient Indian Economic Thought, 1934 passim.

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56, l. 25. BHOJA'S YUKTIKALPATARU

This has been edited by Pandit Īśavacandra Sāstri, Calcutta, 1917. The topics it deals with are, besides polity, selection of sites for buildings and construction of buildings, furniture-making, precious stones, ornaments, weapons, draught and other animals, vehicles and the building of ships etc. Bhoja has written on Vāstuśāstra in his Samarāṅgaṇaśītra (ed. Gaṅapati Sāstri, G. O. S.). The miscellaneous character of the topics in the work, and the citation of Bhoja himself by name six times may justify the suspicion that it has been fathered on the famous king of Dhāra. The polity part is of poor quality.

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56, l. 25. MĀNASOLLĀSA OF SOMES'VARA CĀLUKYA

The Mānasollāsa is an encyclopaedic work in 100 chapters, divided into five vimsatīs, and comprising about 8000 slokas in anuṣṭubh metre. It gives a condensed account of many topics: The first two vimsatīs, which have been printed both at Mysore and Baroda, deal with politics chiefly, dealt with in a very free spirit, so as to bring in medical treatment, horses, elephants, precious stones and alchemy. There is little originality. An account of tirthas (places of pilgrimage) comes early in the work, on the ground that tirthasanāna is imperative for a king, and the holy rivers of the Dakhan within the author's dominions are specifically mentioned. The author is Somes'vara, the son
and successor of Vikramāditya VI. His reign extended from A.D. 1127 to 1138, its shortness being due to the great age to which Vikramāditya lived. It was composed in A.D. 1131 (Mr. G. K. Shrigondekar's introduction to the Baroda edn. p. vi).

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56, II. 29-30. KĀMANDAKA, SOMADEVA-SŪRI AND HEMACANDRA

All the three writers make a display of their learning and literary skill, literary effect being more their obvious aim than originality in idea or in presentation of political views. The Nītisāra of Kāmandaka is an obvious imitation of Kauṭilya's work but its administrative, legal and economic material is rejected, and attention is concentrated on such minor matters of king-craft as the maṇḍalas and diplomacy. The treatment betrays unfamiliarity with actual government. Somadeva-Sūri was a Jain teacher (c. A.D. 950). His work is in simple, readable prose of great elegance. It is chiefly a rehash of some portions of Kauṭilya's work, whose phrases are woven into the texture of Somadeva's own sentences. It has been printed at Bombay with a baffling commentary, which contains many forged texts.

For analysis of the contents of the Nītisāra and the Nītivākyāṃṛta, see—Benoy Kumar Sarkar's Introduction to Hindu Positivism, 1937, pp. 381 ff., and pp. 420 ff.

Hemacandra is another Jain writer, and a polyhistor. He lived between A.D. 1089 and 1173 under the patronage of his disciple Kumārapāla Cālukya, (A.D. 1143-1172) king of Anhilvād His Laghu-arhan-niti was printed in 1906. For an analysis of its contents see Sarkar, op. cit., p. 430.

See note 28 supra.

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57, II. 1-4. RĀJADHARMA WORKS BY COURT PAṆḌITS.

Nilakanṭha wrote under the patronage of Bhagavanta Singh of Bhareha, near the junction of the Jumna and the Cambal (Carmanvatt). Bhagavanta was a Bundela chief of the Sengara clan. The
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digest was named after the patron as Bhagavanta-bhūskara. As the work was named Bhūskara 'the Sun,' each section was called a ray of the Sun (Mayūkha). The division into twelve sections was perhaps suggested by the number of Ādityas being twelve, (see P. V. Kane's ed. of the Vyavahāra-mayūkha, 1926, Introduction, p. xvii).

Mitramiśra, the author of Vīramitrodaya, was an āsvīta of the famous Bir Singh of Orccha, who ruled from 1605-1627, and was coeval with his patron Jahāngir, for whose sake he assassinated Abul Fazl, in 1602 (Vincent Smith. Akbar, 1917, p. 305). Jahāngir promoted Bir Singh when he came to the throne and showed him so much consideration that Bir Singh was promoted to a mansab of 3000 (see my ed. of F. Gladwin's History of Jahāngir, 1930, p. 23). He was also permitted to fortify Datia and Orccha, rebuild the famous temple of Kṛṣṇa at Mathura, and build many other temples. His revivalist zeal for Hinduism is responsible for the patronage of Mitramiśra whose digest combines in its title his own name coupled as 'friend' with that of his patron.

Anantadeva the author of Rājadharmakaustubha wrote under the patronage of Baz Bahadur of Almora (1662-1675). See Kane's History of Dharmasāstra, pp. 452-453.

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57, ll. 11-31. LAKŚMĪDHARA AND THE KṚTYAKALPATARU

The relevant information on Lakṣmīdhara and his great digest and a consideration of its place in the history of Dharmasāstra is collected in my articles on Lakṣmīdhara on pp. 148-168 and 199-223 of the Madras Law Journal Commemoration Volume, 1941. The question of the alleged citation of Vijñānesvara by Lakṣmīdhara, to which currency has been given by the high authority of Mr. Kane, who brought it into notice (History of Dharmasāstra, pp. 289, 317), is examined and it is shown that the position can not be sustained. The dates of the composition of the Mitākṣara and the Kalpataru are determined as c. 1120 and 1110 respectively, in
modification of the dates given by Mr. Kane, who places the Kalpataru long after the Mitakṣara. Incidentally, from the Kalpataru confirmatory evidence of the author of the Kāmadhenu being Gopāla, as suggested by Mr. Kane (pp. 294-296), is given, and he is shown to have been a contemporary and friend (vayasyaḥ) of Lakṣmīdhara.

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58, ll. 1-6. Caṇḍesvāra

Mr. Kane in his History (pp. 370-372) and Dr. Jayaswal in his introduction to the Rājanīttiratnākara (pp. 12-22) have given the available information about the personal and family history of Caṇḍesvāra, who, while liberally "borrowing" from his predecessors, particularly Lakṣmīdhara, to whom he is inferior in ability and erudition, claims superiority over them:

Yasmin-na kiṅcidapi samsati Kamadhenur-
Yatrestamalpaṃapi Kalpatarurna datte
Dhatte na gandhamapi koṇcana Pārijataḥ
Tat-sarvamapi vivinakti nayaśravinaḥ

(Caṇḍesvāra's preface, sl. 25 to Kṛtyaratnākara, Bib. Ind., 1925, p. 6).

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58, ll. 16-32. Nītimayūkha

The paramount authority which his Vyavahāramayūkha has attained through judicial decisions in the Bombay Presidency has invested all the other sections of the Bhagavanta-bhāskara with a reputation, which is somewhat unmerited. This is particularly the case with his Nītimayūkha. It is a pedantic work. Its main reliance is on Varāhamihira's Bṛhatāṃkita and the Nītisāra of Kāmandaka. Like other writers after the Musliman conquest, he recommends kūta-yuddha and the use of poisoned weapons, destruction of the civil population etc. To show his want of realism, Mr. B. K.
Sarkar has pointed out that Nilakanṭha's authorities are of the Gupta period (op. cit., p. 547).

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59, line 1. NON-KṢATRIYA CORONATION

At the beginning of the Nātimayūkha, Nilakanṭha declares that the term Rājā is valid (sakto) only in regard to the Kṣatriya (Kṣatriya-mātro) and is not a result of assumption of a kingship (Rājya-yoga). He argues that as kingship (rājya) follows coronation, and it is laid down that the Rājā should be crowned (Rājānam abhiśīncet) which can only mean the Kṣatriya. There seems here a tacit assumption that what he says in the book is applicable only to Kṣatriya kings but the tenor shows that he was more of a realist than might appear from this initial argument. He describes the Vedic ceremony of coronation with vedic rites, (abhiṣeka-vidhiḥ, and abhiṣeka-prayogaḥ) which take up nearly two-fifths of the short treatise. It is noteworthy that the more rigid Lakṣmidhara, who, though a courtier, unlike Nilakanṭha who was a mere scholar, has omitted the Vedic rites and the full mantras from the Aitareya-brāhmaṇa in Rājadharm-Kalpataru, and given only three pages to the coronation.

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59, II. KILLING A BRAHMAN IN SELF-DEFENCE

The subject is discussed in pp. 91-100 (Gujarāthī Press ed. 1921). He quotes Manusmṛti, VIII, 350-351, that 'one may slay without hesitation an assassin who approaches him with murderous intent, even if he be his own teacher, a minor, an aged man, or a Brāhmaṇa versed in the Veda, and by killing an assassin the slayer incurs no guilt,' and Kātyāyana (a verse not found in Mr. Kane's reconstruction of this jurist) that 'by slaying in battle one who approaches the slayer with murderous intent and attacks him the killer incurs no guilt accruing to the slayer of a Brahmana,' Nilakanṭha argues that the rules refer only to one who actually
attacks and should not apply to a possible slayer who is asleep (ato jighāmsata eva viprasya maraṇam, na suптādeḥ) and that the use of the words "or" (vā) in Manu's dictum and 'even' (āpi) in Kātyāyana's, shows that the killing of a Brāhmaṇa in such circumstances is not acceptable. Vijñānesvara, in commenting on Yājñavalkya (II, 21,) by way of illustration discusses this injunction of Manu. The argument is that the words used do not constitute a vidhi (command) to the effect that a guru and others must be killed, but imply that if even the slaying of a guru, who is entitled to reverence and filial affection, an old man and a child, who are objects of compassion are liable to be slain, in such circumstances, how about others not possessing such claims to consideration—even if they approach as assassins (ātatāyinah)? The argument of the Mitākṣara, which Nilakantha accepts, is further that there would be a conflict between precepts if the meaning is that such ātatāyins (a guru etc.) should be killed; for Sumantu has ruled that though an assassin (ātatāyin) can be killed, without guilt accruing to the slayer, it is otherwise with the killing of a Brāhmaṇa or a cow. There is also the injunction of Manu (IV, 162) that the teacher who initiates one, the teacher who has explained to him the Vedas, or any other teacher, and parents should never be troubled (na himsyāt), as they are all inoffensive (tāpāsvi) persons. There will also be transgression of the Vedic injunction that one should not injure any living being (Na himsyāt sarvāṇi bhūtāni) which is a general interdict against all killing. The significance of the mention of the guru and others in the verses of Manu is that they alone should not be killed. It is concluded by Vijñānesvara, who is following Medhātithi here, that the rule of Manu about ātatāyins will apply only to those who are not Brāhmaṇas.

Aparārka holds that a Brāhmaṇa ātatāyin may be slain only when he is about to kill another, or is attempting to kill another; i.e., he can be slain when caught in the very act of murdering another. If he escapes, he can not be killed later. He also holds that if it is possible to prevent the murder short of killing the
murderer (ātatāyin) to kill the latter will result in the guilt of brahmahatyā (Brahman-slaughter). His opinion applies to ātatāyins of all castes. Medhātithi was of opinion that a murderer could be killed even after the commission of the crime, provided he is not a Brāhmaṇa, etc. Vijñānesvara held that a Brāhmaṇa or Guru ātatāyin should be punished short of death, by suitable penances etc.

The Smṛticandrīkā (Vyavahāra) dealing with the question applies the extension given, by parity of guilt, to the term ātatāyin by the smṛtis (e.g., Vasīṣṭha, III, 16 who lays down that the following six are also ātatāyins: an incendiary, a poisoner, an armed attacker, a robber of wealth, a man who ravishes another man's wife, and he who takes away a man's field; or Bhṛgu, who adds to the above list the man who curses, who uses incantations, who is an informer, and one who always picks up the weak points of others.) The conclusions of the Smṛticandrīkā are threefold:

1. All ātatāyins, including a Brāhmaṇa ātatāyin may be killed when they attempt assassination.

2. With the exception of the Brāhmaṇa, constructive ātatāyins like those who rob one of his field, or ravish another's wife, etc. may also be killed.

3. The Brāhmaṇa is not to be killed for the constructive offence of ātatāyin, as explained by Bhṛgu and Vasīṣṭha.

In his Nittimayūkha Nilakanṭha accepted all the three propositions, going thereby against the total exemption of the Brāhmaṇa by Vijñānesvara and Medhātithi. But, in his Vyavahāramayūkha, he went back on this total acceptance of the three rules laid down by Smṛticandrīkā, and argued that in no circumstances should the Brāhmaṇa be killed, as the rules in Manu etc., referred to other ages than Kaliyuga. His conclusion is that 'in the Kaliyuga a Brāhmaṇa ātatāyin is not to be killed (even in self-defence), but in other ages this was allowed.' (See Kane's notes to his edn. of Vyavahāramayūkha, 1926, pp. 417-422; and his Trn. of the same work, 1933, pp. 262-263, and particularly the notes.)
59, II. 4-9. Kūṭa-yuddha

Kūṭa-yuddha is described by Nilakanṭha (Nātimayūkha, p. 98) as slaying by the use of poisoned weapons and so forth. He cites the recommendation of Kāmundaka to carry on kūṭa-yuddha as an alternative (paryāya) or addition to open warfare. But the instances of ‘unfair’ attacks, which he gives may be unchivalrous, but are milder than those in use today among the nations of the West.

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59, II. 8-26. Anantadeva’s Doctrines

See Dr. B. Bhattacharya’s Introduction to the Rāja-dharma-Kaustubha, passim and especially, p. xiv, chief queen and her accomplishments;
p. xiv, “If the king has several queens, then the eldest son, although born of a younger queen, inherits to the exclusion of other sons by older queens.” Thus, primogeniture is laid down.
pp. xiv and xv, constitution of the ministry.
pp. xv-xviii coronation ceremony.

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60-61, II. 1-7. Mitramis’ra’s Views

His view on the question of the qualification of the king is stated in Rājanīti-prakāśa (pp. 10-11) in the following words:

Rājasabdarthah tāvad vicāryate. Kim ayam rājasabdo
Yasmin kasmimscit prajā-pālaka vartate, uta kṣatriya-
jātau, kim vā abhiśikta-kṣatriyajātāu varttata iti? Tatra
aveśṭyadhikaraṇe “Rāja Rājasūyena svārājya-kāmo
yajeta” ityatra pūrvaṇaḥ likhitam—

Rājyasyakartā rājeti sarvalokeṣu gīyate
Mahāviṣayatā caivam sāstraṇyāpi bhaviṣyati
Tasmāt brāhmaṇādayo rājyaṃ kurvāṇā rājāna iti.
Yaśkopi, ‘Rāja rājate’ iti bruvaṇa, yaugikam rājasabdam, isvara-vacanameva abhyupaiti. Rājānotkarṣasva prajā-paripālana-direva.
Vedepi, “Somo asmākam brāhmaṇānām rājā,” “Yo rāja varṣaṇīnām,” “Somo vai rājā gantharvesu” ityādau api, isvara-vacana eva pratityate.
Kose api, “Rāja tu prācātāsēsa-sāmantas-syāt”

On *primogeniture* his views are given in pp. 35-38. He cites Manu in favor of the heritage going to the eldest son, and the express injunction of the *Kālikāpurāṇa*:

Athoparicaram rājā yauvarājye abhyāsecatē ||
Jyāyāmsam aurasaṃ putram sarvarājagunāiruyutam II
and the address of Daśaratha to Rāma in the *Rāmāyaṇa*:
Ādiṣṭo hyasi me jyeṣṭāḥ prasūṭah sadṛśvo guṇaiḥ ||

Tasmāt tvam puṣṭyayogenā yauvarājayam avāpsyasi II

He lays down that a regal heritage should not be divided like a private estate: *putrebhyo rājyaṃ vibhajya na deyam* (p. 39).

**The State’s liability to make good stolen property** is limited. After citing Yājñavalkya’s injunction that stolen property should be made good by the king (II, 36), Mitramiśra adds (p. 127) the comment that what is lost through the theft of the servants of the owner need not be made good. (*Yattu dhanasvāmin eva pari-cārkair-nītam tattu rājā na deyam.*)


**The Brāhmaṇa permitted to be a soldier**

The following half-verse from the *Mahābhārata* shows that every one is bound to fight for his country, if ordered to
do so by the king, and that the Brāhmaṇa particularly should obey the mandate:

*Rājñām niyogāt yoddhavyam brāhmaṇena viseṣataḥ*

**Duties of a conqueror**

The rules from the smṛtis are summarised by Mitramiśra on pp. 409-413. The main features of the rules are that the old royal family, which has been defeated, should be restored, that private looting should be forbidden, that all spoils should be brought to the king, who will reward his soldiers as he deems fit, that if the former king is killed, one of the family should be crowned, that the conquered kingdom should not be destroyed (*i.e.*, annexed):

*Dūstasyāpi narendrasya tad-rāṣṭram na vināśvayet* (p. 411) and that the laws and usages of the conquered country should be respected and reinforced. (p. 411). The victor should conciliate the conquered people.

Obviously, these precepts if accepted by the Mughal conquerors would be beneficial to the Hindu population.
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61, ll. 14-17. KING'S PROPITIATION OF UNSEEN POWERS

Lakṣmidhara's Rājadharmakalpataru contains many directions of a detailed character on the need to propitiate unseen powers and the ways of doing so. As a srotriya he must have believed in their efficacy, and felt a special competence to advise his king on the subject. That the calamities of the Musalman invasions in the eleventh and the twelfth centuries of the Christian era turned the eyes of the orthodox Hindus to such magical rites is illustrated not only by the space given to them in the Kalpataru but by the still fuller use made of such spells and ritual in the works of his very much younger contemporary Ballālasena, whose Dānasāgara for instance gives the ritual and mantras in extenso. It may be noted that Ballālasena wrote a special work on portents (Abbhuta), viz. Abbhuta-sāgara, which was printed in 1905. This work was commenced in A.D. 1068 and was left incomplete by Ballālasena, and completed by Lakṣmaṇasena. All Ballālasena's works were written with the help of his guru Aniruddha, the author of Pitṛdayitā and Hāralatā.

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61, l. 19. CASTE OF CĀṇḍES'VARA'S MASTER. THE BRAHMAṆA AS KING

The Karnāṭa dynasty of Mithila, which had been ruling there from the last quarter of the eleventh century, when it became independent under Nānyadeva, came to an end in 1324, when Harisimhadeva retired to Simraongarh in Nepal after defeat by Ghiyāz-ud-din Tughlāk (Ind. Ant., 1884, p. 414). Cāṇḍes'vara, like his father and grandfather, had been a Minister under this king. Cāṇḍes'vara must have succeeded to the ministership by 1310, as in 1314 he performed a Tulāpuruṣadāna himself (Intrn. to Dānaratnākara, MS. in B.O.R. Institute, Poona). After the withdrawal of Harisimhadeva to Nepal, a new dynasty founded by the Rājaguru or Spiritual Preceptor of the old dynasty established itself in Mithila under the
suzerainty of the emperor of Delhi. The founder of the new kingdom was Kāmesa or Bhavesa, who commissioned Caṇḍesa'vara to compose the Rājanīti-ratnakara. Bhavesa was a Brāhmaṇa, as a Rājaguru, and Brāhamaṇas are interdicted from being kings. That Puṣyanmitra the Śunga king, did so made him a degraded "Ārya" (Ānārya) to the Brāhmaṇa poet Bāṇa, who condemned the act in the seventh century. (Trn. of Harṣacarita, Cowell and Thomas, p. 194).

The King’s duty was to fight. A Brāhmaṇa was interdicted from bearing arms, except in very abnormal circumstances. Āpastamba laid down that a Brāhmaṇa should not touch weapons even for mere examination (Parīksārthamaṇi brāhmaṇa ayudham nādadāta, I, 10, 29, 6). Baudhāyana, against the specific prohibition of it by Gautama (to which he refers) allows a Brāhmaṇa to take up the vṛttī of a Kṣatriya if he is not able to maintain himself by teaching, sacrificing and receipt of gifts, but limits it to cases in which society is distressed by the spoliation of Brāhmaṇas and ill-treatment of cows and castes get mixed up (varṇānām api samkare.)—(II, ii, 4, 16-18) In the same spirit the Mahābhārata (XII, 78, 12-36) allows the Brāhmaṇa to take up arms in defence of the subjects of a kingdom attacked by dasyus, on the failure of Kṣatriyas. Manu (VIII, 349-350) in the same spirit allowed the Brāhmaṇa to take up arms in defence of Brāhmaṇas, women and Dharma.

That, on a loose interpretation of the permission to the Brāhmaṇa to live by the pursuit of arms, a large number became at least candidates for recruitment to the army in the days of Kaútīlya, is inferrable from a discussion of the merits of a Brāhmaṇa as a soldier. (Arthasastra, p. 343). But there is nowhere any permission to a Brāhmaṇa to become king. The passages in Manu-smṛti (I, 98-101) exalting the Brāhmaṇa in the social scale have been wrongly interpreted by Dr. Jayaswal as sanction to the Brāhmaṇa to exercise sovereignty. (Manu and Yajñavalkya, pp. 102-104). Throughout India’s history in the very rare instances of a Brāhmaṇa becoming a king, he has had either to abandon his
varṇa and become a Kṣatriya, as did Mayūra, the first king of the Kadamba dynasty (J. F. Fleet, Dynasties of the Kanarese Districts, in Bombay Gazetteer, I, i, p. 286) or apologise for the act. Orthodox opinion was more outraged by Brāhmaṇa kingship than by Vaisya or Sūdra sovereignty.

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61, ll. 21-22. Recognition of the King de facto

Caṇḍesvara (Rājanītīratnākara, pp. 2-3) discussing the question of who is king, states that consecration is a consequence and not a cause of kingship (Prāja-svāmite rājatve prasiddho rāja prāja-pālanavṛtti-abhiṣekādayaḥ asya kāraṇamātraṃ,) and accepts the same view as Kullūka that the word Rājā is not restricted to Kṣatriyas (Manasmyti-vyākhyā, VII, 1)—"Rājasabdopī nātra kṣatriyaparaḥ." In classifying rulers from Samrāt to Tributary (Karadaḥ) he adopts the view that all are entitled to the title Rājā, and the Dharma applicable to Rājās would apply to all of them equally: "Sakala-rājebhyo yaḥ karagrāhī sa Samrāṭ; Samrāje karado yaḥ sa Sakaraḥ; svecchayā karado Akaraḥ. Smyttādu api Rājattvena prakhyātaḥ. Loke tu, Rājeti Sakaraḥ, Cakra-varit, Samrāṭ, Adhitivaro, Mahārājā iti prasiddhāḥ, viseṣapratipatyuparodhāt. Parantu, trayāṇām api Dharmas-samameve." (Rājanītīratnākara, p. 4).

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61, ll. 22-26. The State’s Obligations to the Poor

Rājadhane dīna-anātha-ādi-sakala-prāṣṭināṃ amsvitvam; bahunāyakatvāt rājya-vināvasaco iti yuktih iti Gopāla-Lakṣmidhara-Srikarādayaḥ. (ibid., p. 72).

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61, ll. 27-28. Burke’s Definition of Society

This occurs in the Reflections on the French Revolution. “Society is indeed a contract. Subordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional interest may be dissolved at pleasure—but the
State ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership in pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence; because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership can not be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible with the invisible world, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures in their appointed place. This law is not subject to the will of those who by an obligation above them, and infinitely superior, are bound to submit their will to that law." (cited in J. Mac Cunn, *Political Philosophy of Burke*, 1913, pp. 59-60.) The view of Burke very closely approximates to the Hindu view of the eternal social order, as I have pointed out in previous works of mine.

61, ll. 30-31. DIVINITY OF THE PEOPLE (PRAJĀH)

The idea of the king’s divinity is enshrined in the identification of the king with Viṣṇu. The same idea applied to the subject (Prajavā) invests the latter with divinity and inviolability. Thus, in the *Mahābhārata*, Śāntiparva, 59, 106, it is said in the coronation oath that the people of the country (bhauma) are God (Brahma) and that in protecting the people the king is serving God:

Pratijñām ca abhirohasva manasā karmanā girā
dharmam bhaumam Brahma’ styeva ca-asakṛt
The passage cited by Caṇḍes'vara ends thus:

'Adyaṁ abhyā na me rājyaṃ; rāja ayam rakṣatu prajāh I
Iti sarvam Prajā-Viṣṇum sāksīnaṃ sravayed-muhuh II

62, l. 6. COMPOSITION OF THE RĀJANĪTIRATNĀKARA BY ROYAL COMMAND

Caṇḍes'vara states expressly in the second verse of the introduction to the Rājanītiratnākara that he composed it by command of King Bhaves'a:

Rajñā Bhavesena aṁhāpto Rājanīti-nibandhakam I
Tanoti Mantriṇām āryaḥ svirāṃ Caṇḍes'varoḥ kṛiti II

Dr. K. P. Jayaswal (Rājanītiratnākara, Introduction, p. 23) shows that Bhaves'a was otherwise known as Bhavasimha, and that he was the younger brother Kames'a or Kames'vara, of the family of the Rājaguru of the Karnāṭa dynasty of Mithila, who was set up as king in place of the old line, by the Delhi emperor, about A.D. 1370. Caṇḍes'vara must then have been eighty-five. "Evidently he enjoyed a long life like his grandfather Devāditya. This record for old age and mental vigour is repeated in his family by Vidyāpati who lived under successive sovereigns of the dynasty of Bhaves'a." (ib., p. 25).

188 (See Note 81)

THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSTITUTION IN MĪMĀMSA (Pratinidhi)

The matter is argued in Jaimini-sūtras, VI, iii, 13-41. The pūrvapakṣa is stated in sūtra 13 that in the absence of the prescribed material no other should be used as a substitute. The reply of Jaimini is that the command being general does not interdict the use of the substitute, i.e. the command is in regard to the performance of the sacrifice (Yāga) and not its material. Sometimes the Veda indicates the substitute. But there can be no substitute for the deity invoked in a sacrifice, the fire, the mantra, and the act. (sūtra 18) nor should there be a substitute for any material expressly forbidden (sūtra 20). In regard to the attainment of the fruit of the
sacrifice (phala) there cannot be a substitute for the yajamāna. (sūtras, 9, 21.) Where a number of persons are engaged in a sacrifice and one of them is missing or incapacitated a substitute can be used (22). But the substitute is only a servant so far as the fruit is concerned (26). When any material is lost or unavailable, anything of the same class can be used (27). It is unreasonable not use a substitute (30). In the Veda it is laid down that if Soma is not available pūtikā (a plant resembling Soma) may be used:

Yadisomamavindeta pūtikānabhīṣṇuyāt

If a substitute is lost, it should be replaced by an article resembling not itself but the original (32). If the principal (mukhyā) becomes available, after the substitute is used, the former should be used, as the substitute is only to act for it, in its absence (35). This may be done even in the middle of a sacrifice (36). Sometimes the substitute may be more efficacious than the prescribed original, and in such a case can the substitute alone should be used, since the object is more important than the article to be used as prescribed? (39-40). Jaimini replies that it should not. (41).

189

A Woman's Independent Right to Perform a Sacrifice

(To be read with Note 130.)

In Mīmāṃsasūtra (VI, i, 17) it is laid down that the husband and the wife possessed of wealth are entitled to perform the same sacrifice. (Svavatostu vacanādaikakāmyam syāt) depending on the Vedic injunction:

Dharme ca arthe ca kāme ca anaticaritavyāḥ
Sahadharmāscaritavyāḥ. Sahāpatyam utpādayitavyam

"She should not be discarded in religious affairs, business and desired objects; all religious acts should be performed together; children should be brought forth together." (M. L. Sandal's Trn, p. 303).
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