IN GRATEFUL MEMORY OF

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THE KATHA UPANISHAD

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THE
KATHA UPAVISAD

An Introductory Study
in the Hindu Doctrine of God
and of Human Destiny

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श्रौगुरुभ्यो नमः

TO THE

MEMORY OF MY TEACHERS

ARTHUR ANTHONY MACDONELL

AND

JOHN NICOL FARQUHAR,

ALSO TO

SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA

as representing my Indian friends, in the University of Calcutta and elsewhere, who, in gracious hospitality of spirit, have admitted one who was once a stranger to share the riches of the Mother-land, enabling him in some degree to apprehend, what never can be learned from books alone, the living meaning of the past.

अन्नामाज्ज्ञी: ||
PREFACE

1. Purpose. The _Katha Upaniṣad_, though not the oldest or perhaps the profoundest, is certainly from its comparative brevity, clearness and connectedness, and also from its artistic form and dramatic interest, deservedly the most popular of the Upaniṣads. As such it has probably seen more editions than any other. Then why add a new one?

(1) In the first place, though there have been issued in recent years many editions and translations of the chief Upaniṣads, there has been a strange lack of commentaries, which, while setting forth the traditional interpretations, also make an attempt to arrive at an independent judgment as to the meaning in the light of modern knowledge. I have attempted to deal with the _Katha Upaniṣad_ as I would with a Biblical text, and my friend Principal S. N. Dasgupta, of the Calcutta Sanskrit College, from whom none should know better, assures me that he knows of no similar work. Though deeply conscious of my temerity I am still more conscious of the need of this type of study. I plead a reverence desire to appreciate and understand and I shall be justified if I have shown the way to those better qualified.

(2) Some ten years ago my friend and teacher, Dr. J. N. Farquhar, suggested that I should write for one of his series a book on _The Hindu Doctrine of God_. The attempt to do so convinced me that certain preliminary studies were first necessary. I began with a study of what is perhaps the most central document for Hindu theology,—the _Vedānta Sūtras_, making a translation of the commentary of Nimbārka, which in its conciseness and absence of sectarian polemic seemed to me unique, and comparing also the interpretations of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, etc., with a view to discover, if possible, the original meaning of the _Sūtras_ and to evaluate the whole movement of thought. But it soon became clear that to do this a preliminary study of the Upaniṣad texts cited was first necessary, and, for one Upaniṣad at least, an attempt at an independent valuation. I chose the _Katha_ as most central to the development of Hindu theism. I have therefore entitled this book, 'A preliminary study in the Hindu Doctrine of God'.

(3) I have hopes that this study may be of interest to students of the History and Philosophy of Religion generally. It has also a more specific purpose. The Senate of Serampore College, which directs the studies of all the Theological Colleges in India of University grade, has prescribed the _Katha Upaniṣad_ as one of the texts to be studied by students of the Philosophy of Religion; it is also prescribed for special study by those who take Sanskrit. This book has in mind the needs of both these classes of students. The portion in large type is more
especially intended for students of the Philosophy of Religion who may be ignorant of, or possess a slight knowledge of, Sanskrit. Linguistic and critical notes intended for those who are making a study of the Sanskrit text, as well as details not needed by those making a general study, are put in small type. The Serampore Senate believes that it is essential that Indian students of Christian theology should be trained to appreciate India's great heritage of thought and culture,—that Indian Christian thought must be organically and not merely geographically Indian, and must consciously seek to relate the new to the old. A _deracinated_ theology, like any other rootless plant, can hardly be vital or vigorous. A truly original Indian development of Christian theology must of course have its roots in the Christian scriptures and in Christian experience, but it must also spring from knowledge of and reverence for all that is true in the religious thought and experience of India's past. Hence the prescription of such books as the _Katha Upanishad_ and the _Gita_ in a course of studies in Christian theology.

It is my earnest hope that Hindu students also will find this study of value. They have their own problem of relating new and old, and the lesson of the _Katha Upanishad_ is still needed in India to-day.

(4) Not only Indian students but also British and American students of theology may find this book of value. For those of them who contemplate missionary work in India something of the kind is essential, and even for those who do not contemplate work in India the study of certain non-Christian sacred books is necessary for a just appreciation of religious values and should find a place in every theological curriculum. The time has surely passed when the mere study of manuals of comparative religion could be regarded as sufficient.

2. Scope. This volume consists of (a) an Introduction, (b) the Sanskrit text of the _Katha Upanishad_ printed in Devanagari, (c) a transliterated text, (d) an original translation, and (e) a commentary.

(a) The Introduction is made as brief as possible. Students may, if they wish, omit it at first reading, since the attempt is made in the commentary to deal as fully as necessary with all important points as they arise in the text.

(b) The text does not pretend to be critical. I have compared the chief printed editions: A—the Ānandārama edition, B—the Bombay text of Tukārāma Jāvaji, and C—the Calcutta Bibliotheca Indica text, and have noted where they differ. I have also endeavoured in such cases to take into account the MSS. evidence cited in A, but this is not of much value. Fortunately the variations are very slight, and in only one case are they important.

(c) It may seem redundant to print a transliterated text also, but this has been done for the benefit of students who know little or no Sanskrit. South Indian students in particular are not usually familiar with Devanagari, but their knowledge of Sanskrit terms in their vernacular enables them to follow the argument with the aid of a transliterated text. For
Western students also who are not Sanskritists the transliteration should be of help, and may, I hope, lure some of them on to the study of Sanskrit by making a difficult path somewhat easier.

(d) In the translation I have been tempted by the success of my revered teacher, Professor A. A. Macdonell, in his *Hymns from the Rigveda*, to attempt to indicate the poetry of the Upaniṣad by rendering it in a free verse, corresponding as nearly as possible to the original metres. This, I am afraid, in many cases only means that an anusṭubḥ verse is rendered by four octosyllabic and a triṇūṭubḥ by four eleven-syllabled lines, but as a correct translation has been my first consideration even this measure of adherence to the metre has not always been possible.

(e) In the commentary I have endeavoured to approach the text without assumptions, seeking to apprehend the sananeṣṭya, or the connected meaning of the whole, and guided chiefly by this in the interpretation of the parts. Right through I have of course been indebted to the great commentary of Śaṅkara (A.D. 788–850) from which, wherever helpful, I have freely quoted. Most later commentators have, however, been far too dominated by Śaṅkara, and this is true not only of Indians but also of Europeans like Gough and Deussen. I too started out under the guidance of Śaṅkara and Deussen, regarding the Upaniṣad as a monistic Vedānta work with certain dualist (Sāṃkhya) and theistic accommodations, but have been forced to a different conclusion. The first adhyāya is a unity in its thought, and the second, though probably somewhat later, occupies substantially the same standpoint. This standpoint I now view as definitely theistic, sometimes emphasizing the unity of all in a way that approaches positive or realistic pantheism but never recognizing the doctrine of illusion, and never therefore teaching the negative idealistic pantheism or acosmism of Śaṅkara.

Unfortunately Rāmānuja (c. 1050–1137) did not comment directly on the Kaṭha, but he quotes from it extensively in his great commentary on the Vedānta-sūtras,—the Śrībhāṣya, and discusses what is its sananeṣṭya or connected meaning. I have quoted some of the relevant passages. On the whole I believe his interpretations are correct, though he is sometimes too scholastic. I have also consulted and occasionally quoted the Vedānta-sūtra commentaries of Nimbārka (? 1100–1162) and Mādhva (1190–1278). Mādhva’s Kaṭha-bhāṣya is definitely sectarian and is of little help for the interpretation of the Upaniṣad. Belonging to the school of Rāmānuja is the Kaṭha-bhāṣya of Raigārāmānuja, but this is very late and I have made no use of it.

In conclusion I must acknowledge my debt of gratitude to teachers and friends who have helped me to gain whatever knowledge I have of Indian thought, many of whom have read through the present work at various stages and offered valuable suggestions. My first debt is to two successive occupants of the Boden Sanskrit Chair at Oxford. It was my privilege to read Sanskrit for two years with Professor A. A. Macdonell, most
genial and encouraging of teachers, and I have ventured to dedicate this book first of all to him as a tribute of gratitude from an unworthy pupil. Professor F. W. Thomas, who has succeeded him, has kindly read through the manuscript of the Introduction and the proofs of the text and commentary and given me most generous help. To two other old Oxford teachers I am also greatly indebted,—to Dr. J. N. Farquhar, late Professor of Comparative Religion at Manchester University, who made such notable contribution to the study of Indian Religion both by his own writings and by the encouragement he gave to others, and to Dr. Clement C. J. Webb, sometime Oriel Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion, for the inspiration of his teaching and friendship. In the land of my adoption I owe most to Principal S. N. Dasgupta of the Calcutta Sanskrit College, whose erudition I vainly admire from far but whose friendship has been an unfailing stimulation. Another friend whose scholarly judgment and knowledge of philology have been of help is Dr. R. L. Turner, Professor of Sanskrit in London University. It is impossible to acknowledge all the help received from published works but I owe a special debt, which will be evident to readers of the Introduction, to a fellow-pupil of Professor Macdonell (though even then far exalted)—Professor A. Berriedale Keith of Edinburgh. To Dr. H. N. Randle of the India Office Library, Dr. Van Manen of the Asiatic Society of Bengal and Dr. Adityanath Mukherji, Registrar of Calcutta University, I am grateful for help with literature, and to Dr. Satkari Mookerjee of Calcutta University and my colleague Professor H. P. Sengupta of Serampore College, for help in correction of proofs. The mistakes that remain are my own. If I waited to correct them all this work would never be published. I send it forth in the hope that through the cooperation of friendly critics something more worthy may eventuate.

10th January, 1934. J. N. R.
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ABBREVIATIONS

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I. EDITIONS OF THE Sanskrit Text of the Katha.


II. TRANSLATIONS, ETC., OF THE KATHA UPAŅISHĀD.


ABBREVIATIONS


M.M.: Max Müller ... F. Max Müller: *The Upanishads*, 2 vols., 1879, 1884. (S.B.E., Vols. 1 and 15.)


Ram Mohan Ray ... Raja Ram Mohun Roy: *The Katha-Upanishad of the Ujoor-Ved*, Calcutta, 1819.

Röer ... E. Röer: *Nine Upanishads translated*, B.I., Calcutta, 1853.


Śaṅkara ... (Unless otherwise stated) *Kāṭhopaniṣad-bhashya*, see śA.

Śarmā ... D. S. Sarma: *The Kathopanisad and the Gita*, Madras, 1932. (Appeared when this book was in the press.)

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Tattvabhaṣaṇa ... Sitānātha Tattvabhūshana: *The Upanishads*, Vol. 1, Calcutta, 1900.


Whitney (or W.) ... W. D. Whitney: *Translation of the Katha Upaniṣad*, (Transactions of the American Philological Association, Vol. 21, pp. 88–112), Boston, 1890.

III. OTHER ABBREVIATIONS, (A. LITERARY).

Ā. ... Āranyaka.

A.Ā. ... Aitareya Āranyaka.

A.B. ... Aitareya Brāhmaṇa.

Ait. ... Aitareya Upaniṣad.

B. ... Brāhmaṇa.

Bṛ., B.A.U. ... Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B.I.</td>
<td>Bibliotheca Indica series, (published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.R.</td>
<td>Böhtlingk and Roth's St. Petersburg Lexicon, Sanskrit and German, 7 vols., 1852–75.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhandarkar, V.S.</td>
<td>Sir R. G. Bhandarkar: Vaiṣṇavism and Saivism, (Grundriss), Strassburg, 1913.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch., Chānd</td>
<td>Chāndogya Upanisad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.Sk.</td>
<td>Classical Sanskrit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dasgupta, H.I.P.</td>
<td>Surendranath Dasgupta: History of Indian Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 1, 1922, Vol. 2, 1932. (References, unless otherwise stated are to Vol. 1.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deussen, P.U.</td>
<td>The Philosophy of the Upanishads, (tr. A. S. Geden), Edinburgh, 1919.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geldner, R.V.</td>
<td>K. F. Geldner: Der Rigveda, (Quellen der Religions Geschichte), Göttingen, 1923. (Up to iv. 58. Promised complete in H.O.S.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gītā</td>
<td>Bhagavad-gītā.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grundriss</td>
<td>Grundriss der Indo-Arischen Philologie und Altertumskunde, (Encyclopaedia of Indo-Aryan Research), Strassburg.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
ABBREVIATIONS

Iśāa
Jacob. C.
K.B.
Kaus.
Kaṭha
K.S.
Kaegi, R.V.
Keith, A. A.
Keith, R. P. V.
Keith, R. V. B.
Keith, S. S.
Keith, V. B. Y. S.
M. or Macdonell, S. G.
Macdonell, H. R. V.
Macdonell, S. D.
Macdonell, S. L.
Macdonell, V. G. S.
Macdonell, V. R. S.
Macdonell, V. M.
Macdonell, V. I.
Madhva
Mahān.
Mait.
M. S.
Mānd
Mund
Max Müller, A. S. L.
Nimbārka

Iśā Upaniṣad.
Kaṇḍitaki Brāhmaṇa.
Kaṇḍitaki Upaniṣad.
Kaṭha Upaniṣad.
Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā.
The Rigveda, (tr. Arrowsmith), Boston, 1898.
The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upaniṣad, H.O.S., 31, 32, 1925.
The Śāmkhya System, Oxford, 1918.
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Hymns from the Rigveda, (Heritage of India Series), Calcutta and Oxford.
Vedic Mythology, Grundriss, Strassburg, 1897.
Madhvācārya: Pūrvaprajñā-dārśanān, (Vedānta-sātra-bhāṣya), Calcutta, 1882.
Tr. S. Subha Rau, Madras, 1904.
Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad.
Maitri or Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad.
Maitrāyaṇi Saṁhitā.
Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.
Māṇḍukaka Upaniṣad.
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabhāṁ nāma brahma-mimāṃsa-bhāṣyaṁ, Chowkhamba Sanskrit series, 152, Benares, 1907.
Nimbärka .. .. Śrī-brāhma-sūtram, bhāṣya-trayopetam, (Nimbārka, Śrīnīvāsa, Kośava Kāśmiri), Brindaban.

Oldenberg, Buddha .. .. Hermann Oldenberg, Buddha, his life, his doctrine, his order, tr. Hoey, Calcutta, 1927.

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Oltramare .. .. L’histoire des idées théosophiques dans l’Inde, Paris, 1907.


Peterson, H.R.V. .. .. Hymns from the Rigveda, (Bombay Sanskrit Series, 36), 1924.


Rāmānuja, Śr. .. .. The Śrībhāṣya, Rāmānujaśācārya’s commentary on the Vedānta-sūtras, Sanskrit text, Bombay Sanskrit Series, LXVIII, 1914.

Tr. G. Thibaut, S.B.E. 48, Oxford, 1904; also, (First Pada only) Rangacharya and Varadaraja, Madras, 1899.

Rg or R.V. .. .. Rg-Veda Saṃhitā, Saṃhitā and Pada text with Sāyaṇa’s commentary, ed. Max Müller, 4 vols., London, 1890–2.

Śaṅkara, Śr. .. .. Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya, (Brahma-sūtraṁ nāma vedānta-darśānam), B.I. Calcutta, 1863. [1890].


Ś.B. .. .. Svetāvatara Upaniṣad.

Sāyaṇa .. .. See Rg-Veda Saṃhitā.

Tait. .. .. Taittiriya Upaniṣad.

Tait.Ā. .. .. Taittiriya Āranyaka.

Tait.B. .. .. Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa.

T.S. .. .. Taittiriya Saṃhitā, of the Black Yajur-Veda.

Thibaut .. .. George Thibaut: The Vedānta-sūtras, with the commentary by Śaṅkaraśācārya, S.B.E. 34, 38; with the commentary of Rāmānuja, S.B.E. 48.
### ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tr.</td>
<td>Translated by.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.</td>
<td>Upaniṣad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.S.</td>
<td>Vājasaneyi Samhitā, of the White Yajur-Veda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.Sk.</td>
<td>Vedic Sanskrit.</td>
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### B. MOSTLY GRAMMATICAL.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Ātmanepada</td>
<td>ft. future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ab.</td>
<td>ablative</td>
<td>g. genitive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ac.</td>
<td>accusative</td>
<td>Gk. Greek.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adj.</td>
<td>adjective</td>
<td>Heb. Hebrew.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adv.</td>
<td>adverb</td>
<td>ibid. in the same place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aor.</td>
<td>aorist</td>
<td>imperf. imperfect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>circa, about</td>
<td>impv. imperative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cf.</td>
<td>confer, compare</td>
<td>in. instrumental.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cp.</td>
<td>comparative</td>
<td>ind. indicative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>dative, died</td>
<td>L. Latin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>feminine</td>
<td>lec. locative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ff.</td>
<td>and the following</td>
<td>m. masculine.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n. noun or neuter.  
P. Parasmaipada.  
pl. plural.  
pp. perfect passive participle.  
pr. present.  
g.v. *quod vide*, which see.  
s. singular.  
sv. sub voce, under the word.  
v.l. *varia lectio*, variant reading.  
vr. with variations.  

\(\ddot{\text{e}}\) indicates that a sandhi has been disjoined.
INTRODUCTION

TO THE GENERAL READER.

No one can doubt the importance of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad in the history of the development of Indian thought,—and this study stresses its significance and maintains its central position in that development. But has this ancient scripture any living meaning for to-day?

Writing in the Observer, concerning the opening days of the World Economic Conference, Mr. J. L. Garvin remarks, "The overwhelming feeling was against that peculiar post-war disease—the doctrines of ego-centric nationalism and self-sufficiency. Signor Jung, the leader of the Italian delegates, coined the epigram of the week, 'Economic isolation means self-mutilation.'"¹

But why the qualifying adjectives? It is not only economic isolation that means self-mutilation. Nor are ego-centrism and self-sufficiency merely post-war diseases. The Babylonian account of the Fall says, "Themselves they exalted", and the Buddha depicts the whole world as in the grip of the demon Ahamkāra (Egoism). It is not new moreover that the demon should masquerade as divine patriotism, for naked selfishness can never long deceive. So it cloaks itself with herd-feeling and takes a fine name. Nineteen centuries ago Jesus Christ was crucified for sin,—but the particular sin which directly caused his death was (Jewish) ego-centric nationalism. What is new, however, to-day, is the world-wide extent of the destruction wrought by the demon, and the world-wide extent of the glamour which nevertheless moves men to worship him. So it needs a World Conference to discover that "Isolation is self-mutilation", and even then men and nations do not act as if they believed it. Consequently our modern world, both east and west, answers very well to the picture of hell drawn in the Isā Upaniṣad:

"Sunless, in truth, are those worlds called,
And with blind darkness covered o'er,
INTRODUCTION

To which on passing forth they go—
Whatever folk are slayers of the soul.”

There is, then, no message that the modern world needs more than the great Upaniṣad doctrine of Unity (advaita). “He who sees things (men, communities, nations), as separate, runs to waste after them.” “He obtains death after death, who sees things as if separate here.”

The disease is patent, what of the remedy? (Certainly not in Conferences which in endless tarka (argumentation) seem only to discover the lowest common measure of our humanity.)

Our first need, so the Upaniṣads teach, is Vision,—Ātma-darśana,—“to see the greatness of the Self”. If we have seen the impotence and futility of our isolated, distracted, egocentric selves, then, in our despair, we need to realise that the One Power behind the universe is yet the inmost reality of our own souls and capable there of His fullest manifestation. Vision of God, the Highest Self, is the first and most essential step toward liberation from the obsession of ego-centrism.

Secondly—and this is the special teaching of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad)—Vision must lead to Yoga,—to the yoked life. The Kaṭha Upaniṣad teaches mysticism, but it is a very practical mysticism. Yoga is in the first place (in St. Paul’s language) athlesis,—“the athletic life”, an ordered, disciplined training of all our powers much more radical than any merely physical athleticism.2 Men are continually being led astray by uncurbed instinct or desire for pleasure, and only when all our powers are yoked and rightly directed can there be harmonious and victorious living. Now this first type of Yoga is widely recognised as necessary, but the problem that has confronted ethics in all ages is to find power for discipline. The distinctive answer of the Kaṭha, its message for India and the world to-day, is that this power can only spring from a higher Yoga,—the yoga of communion, the yoking of our individual powers with the higher, essential Self, which is their basis as it is the ground of reality of the whole universe.

1 Observer, June 18th, 1933.
2 St. Paul does not actually use ἀθλεῖν but he uses the verb ἀθλέω and other words expressing the same idea. See 2 Timothy ii, 3–5; Phil. iii, 13, 14; 1 Cor. ix, 25.
This answer has been widely misunderstood. In India its effect has been largely nullified, partly through the growth of a totally different conception of Yoga,—a yoga of suppression and trance, and partly because the Upaniṣadic doctrine of unity has been too often interpreted as a pure metaphysical monism. But Śaṅkara’s over-stress on oneness, which made him treat all diversity, including human personality, as illusion, brought its nemesis in a doctrine of two orders of knowledge which made it possible to acquiesce for practical life in a degree of diversity in religious and social life (e.g. in polytheism and caste-division) unparalleled throughout the whole world.

In the West a very different development of thought has led to very similar practical results. The characteristic teachings of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad are just as essential in Christianity, and nowhere have they been so powerfully set forth as by Jesus himself followed by St. John and St. Paul. Christian theology also gave in more developed form the answer of the Kaṭha regarding the relation between man and God, though with an even more radical recognition of the essential sin of ego-centrism and an attempt, in the doctrine of atonement, to set forth the historic operation of Divine Grace to overcome it. But European thought, in large measure, has treated all this as impractical mysticism.

So ultra-monism and ultra-individualism alike have led to an agnosticism which treats religion as a matter of the imagination. Human life, therefore, has ceased to be divinely based, and, with the weakening everywhere of the ties of custom, chaos has resulted. I know of no escape save by the rediscovery of God, not merely as the philosophic Absolute or the transcendent, numinous Other, but as the Spirit,—the very basis of human personality and its ever-renewing, vitalising power.

(N.B.—The general reader may omit the rest of the Introduction except the Argument. The student of Indian religious philosophy may also perhaps, with advantage, read the Introduction after the Commentary).
INTRODUCTION

GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE UPAŅIŠADS.

The Upaniṣads, their nature and classification.

It is now fairly well agreed that the word Upaniṣad is derived from upa (near) + ni (down) + sad (to sit), i.e. “sitting down near”, and denotes primarily the sitting down of a little group of pupils at the feet of their teacher. The name would thus naturally be transferred to denote the teaching itself thus privately given. We thus obtain the meaning, “secret word”, “secret or mystic meaning or doctrine”. This is the most usual meaning in the Upaniṣads themselves, as for example when Yājñavalkya in Br. ii. 1. 20 says of the Soul (ātman) from which all powers and all beings come forth like sparks from fire, “Its upaniṣad is satyasya satyam”,—“Its mystic meaning is ‘Reality of reality’.” Thirdly the word is used to denote the books in which such secret or mystic teaching, handed down in different schools, was afterward reduced to writing.

The Upaniṣads are philosophical and mystical-religious treatises which form what is called the jñāna-kāṇḍa or “knowledge-section of the Veda. The earlier or karmā-kāṇḍa (“work-section”) comprises (1) the Saṃhitās (Hymn-books) or collections of mantras (mostly hymns in praise of the gods), and, especially in the Yajur-veda, sacrificial formulæ, and (2) the Brāhmaṇas (Ritual-books) consisting of directions for the performance of the sacrificial ritual and explanations of its meaning. There are thus three divisions of the Veda, (1) Saṃhitās or Mantras, (2) Brāhmaṇas, (3) Upaniṣads, which “may be roughly characterised as the utterances of poet, priest, and philosopher”. Another way of stating it is that the Brāhmaṇas are ritual appendices to the Saṃhitās and the Upaniṣads are usually philosophical appendices to the Brāhmaṇas of which they form a part. Later a fourth division of the Veda,—the Sūtras or systematised synopses of ritual, ethics, and doctrine, was added.
INTRODUCTION

The Veda is also fourfold in another way, consisting of the Rg, Sāna, Yajur, and Atharva Vedas, and each of these Vedas, in its fourfold division of Saṁhitā, Brāhmaṇa, Upaniṣad, and Sūtra, is preserved in different recensions by various Vedic schools (sūkhas or caraṇas). In the case of the Saṁhitās these recensions do not in most cases differ very greatly. In the case of the Upaniṣads, however, a number of quite different books were composed, redacted and handed down in the various schools.

It is quite uncertain how many books there were which bore the title "Upaniṣad". Probably more than 300. Nārāyaṇa's collection (c. 1400 A.D.), which formed the basis of Colebrooke's, contained 52. Prince Dārā Shukhōh's collection translated into Persian (1656-7), and then translated into Latin by Anquetil Duperron (1801) under the title "Oupnekhat", contained about 50.¹ The late Muktikā Upaniṣad gives a list of 108 Upaniṣads, and this is regarded as authoritative in South and West India. (These 108 have been printed by Tukārāma Jāvajī, Nirnayasāgara Press, Bombay, in what is probably the most handy edition of the Sanskrit text. Of European translations Deussen's, Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda is the most compendious.)

Though the number of Upaniṣads is thus very large most of them are comparatively late, as is seen by the fact that they are sectarian in character. Śaṅkara (c. 800 A.D.) is said to have written commentaries on eleven Upaniṣads, 1. Brhadāranyaka; 2. Chāndogya; 3. Aitareya; 4. Taittiriya; 5. Kena; 6. Kaṭha; 7. Īṣā; 8. Śvetāsvatara; 9. Munḍaka; 10. Praśna; 11. Māṇḍūkya. Śaṅkara did not apparently write a separate commentary on (12) the Kauśitaki (commentary by Śaṅkarāṇanda, c. 1350) or (13) the Mahānārāyanā, but he made use of them in his great commentary on the Vedānta-sūtras. The addition of (14) the Maitrāyanīya or Maitri completes the list of what are often called the classical Upaniṣads,² i.e. those generally accepted as ancient and authoritative in the time of the great commentators.³ In addition, even in their time there were a number of later works (loosely attached to the Atharva-veda) which were regarded as

¹
²
³
having a claim to rank as Upaniṣads, and this number has
since been very considerably added to.
Six of the fourteen classical Upaniṣads are (mainly) written
in archaic prose, similar to that of the Brāhmaṇas; five are
written in somewhat archaic (pre-epic) metre; and three are
in later, more classical prose. Deussen interpreted this distinc-
tion as chronologically determinative, and in this he has been
very widely followed. Taking his division we may classify
as follows:—

I. ANCIENT PROSE UPANIṢADS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Veda</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Upaniṣads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Rg</td>
<td>Aitareyn</td>
<td>Aitareya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kauśitakin</td>
<td>Kauśitaki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Sāma</td>
<td>Tāṇḍin or Kauṭhumā</td>
<td>Chāndogya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Talavakāra</td>
<td>Kena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Black Yajur</td>
<td>Taittirīya</td>
<td>Taittirīya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Yajur</td>
<td>Vājasaneyin</td>
<td>Brhadāranyaka</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. EARLY METRICAL UPANIṢADS.

|             |                               |                    |
| C. Black Yajur | Kāṭhaka                      | Kaṭha              |
|              | Śvetāsvatara                  | Śvetāsvatara        |
|              | Taittirīya                    | Mahānārāyaṇa       |
| White Yajur  | Vājasaneyin                   | Īśā               |
| D. Atharva   | ? Šaunaka                      | Munḍaka            |

III. LATER PROSE UPANIṢADS.

| C. Black Yajur | Maitrāyaṇī                    | Maitri             |
| D. Atharva     | ? Paippalāda                  | Praśna             |
|                | ? Šaunaka                      | Māṇḍūkya           |

1 For lists of Upaniṣads in the various collections, see Deussen,

2 These 14, with the omission of Mahānārāyaṇa, are translated in
Dr. R. E. Hume's "The Thirteen Principal Upanishads" (Oxford
University Press), which is invaluable for English-speaking students.

3 We may note that Rāmānuja makes use of all 14, Śaṅkara of all
except the Maitri. Śaṅkara also uses subsidiarily the later Ātharvāṇa
Upaniṣads, Jābāla and Pāṇgi; and Rāmānuja the Subāla, Cūlikā,
Jābāla, and Mahā.

INTRODUCTION

Relative date and order of development of the Upaniṣads.

The six old prose Upaniṣads are almost unanimously, by most European and modern Indian authorities,¹ regarded as the oldest. As to the order of composition among these six, Deussen ² followed by Macdonell ³ and Winternitz ⁴ ranks as follows, 1. Brhadāraṇyaka, 2. Chāndogya, 3. Aitareya, 4. Taитtirǐyā, 5. Kauṣitaki, 6. Kena. The Kaṭha followed by the Īṣā is regarded as the earliest of the next group. Oldenberg ⁵ takes the Aitareya along with the Brhadāraṇyaka and Chāndogya as the oldest, and follows Indian tradition in suggesting that the Īṣā should be included in the earliest group. Keith says, “The first place must probably be accorded to the Aitareya Āranyaka in its philosophical portion, that is the first three sections of the second book, and probably the Aitareya Upaniṣad, which fills the remaining three sections of the second book, is not to be dated later than any of the other Upaniṣads. After these must certainly come the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad in its main portion, books i–iv, and the Chāndogya Upaniṣad,” which is secondary in its versions of matter which it shares with the Brhadāraṇyaka. Much later and in the following order come the Kauṣitaki, Taittirǐyā, and Kena.⁶

Belvækar, however, dissents from these conclusions, urging that “the merely external difference between prose and verse, unless used in conjunction with other more vital differences, does not deserve that exaggerated importance which Deussen assigns to it”.⁷ He points out ⁸ that while earlier authorities (including Deussen) have admitted that many of the Upaniṣads are composite, they have made very little attempt to separate the older from the later sections, and this failure very largely vitiates their attempt to arrange them in chronological order. He himself, applying stypometric tests and considering mutual quotation and ideological development, arranges in four groups very different from Deussen’s. I. Brāhmaṇic, II. Brāhmaṇo-Upaniṣadic, III. Upaniṣadic, IV. Neo-Upaniṣadic.⁹

¹ E.g. Dægupta, Ranade, Radhakrishnan.
² P.U. 23. ³ S.L. 228. ⁴ G.L.L. i. 205. ⁵ L.U. 341.
⁶ R.P.V. 498. ⁷ H.I.P. 90. ⁸ Ibid. xxiv. ⁹ Ibid. 135.
Omitting Belvulkar’s sub-groups, except in group III where we are most concerned, we may condense as follows:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group I</th>
<th>Group II</th>
<th>Group III(a)</th>
<th>Group III(b)</th>
<th>Group IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Āt. Ār. ii. 1-3</td>
<td>Iṣṭā</td>
<td>Kaṭha I. i, ii.</td>
<td>Kaṭha II.</td>
<td>Ch. vii.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. i. ii.</td>
<td>Āt.</td>
<td>Br. vi. 2.</td>
<td>&quot; iii. 7-10.</td>
<td>Br. v. vi. 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Āt. Ār. iii.</td>
<td>Br. i. 4-6.</td>
<td>Kaṇḍ. i.</td>
<td>Ch. viii. 1-12.</td>
<td>Svēt. ii, iii, iv.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; iv. 16-17.</td>
<td>Svēt. i.</td>
<td>Kaṇḍ. ii, iii, iv.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chāgaleya.¹</td>
<td>&quot; iv. 1-2.</td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Arṣeya.¹</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A systematic chronological grouping like this obviously requires detailed discussion such as we cannot possibly give in this brief introduction,—more detailed indeed than that which Belvulkar himself gives. We shall later deal with some of the points raised when we discuss the date of the Kaṭha. For the present, we would concentrate attention on what we take to be the most important point,—the very different position assigned to the Yājñavalkya section of the Brhadāraṇyaka (ii. 4, iii, and iv.) as compared with the generally accepted chronologies given above. Deussen of course holds that the idealistic monism of Yājñavalkya (which is the foundation of that of Śaṅkara) “is the main doctrine of the Upaniṣads in the sense that it was (first) definitely formulated and laid down, and that other doctrines (pantheism, cosmogonism, theism), are really deviations from it, caused by the inability of man to remain on the high level of thought postulated in the distinction (between empirical reality and the thing in itself), and by the constant effort to apply empirical categories.

¹The Bāskala, Chāgaleya, and Arṣeya Upaniṣads, previously only known from their occurrence in the Oupnekhat, have been discovered and edited by Prof. F. O. Schrader, who would date them somewhere between the old prose and the early metrical Upaniṣads. Dr. S. P. Belvulkar, who has translated them, seems to rank the Bāskala still higher. This, as well as the position he gives to the Iṣṭā, may well be doubted. (See Four Unpublished Upaniṣadic Texts, Proceedings of the Third Indian Philosophical Congress, Madras, 1925.)
to the thing in itself. From the tendency to regard the universe, however, as actually real and an absolute thing, there grew up the view that the Ātman is the universe which we know, that is a system of pantheism.... But this standpoint was also liable to difficulties: the identity was difficult to hold fast and gave way to the simpler empirical conception of causality: the Ātman produces the Universe, and he enters into it with his self. This doctrine is found, he thinks, nowhere in the Brhadāraṇyaka, but in the Chāndogya, the Taittirīya, the Aitareya, and later. The pantheism thus passes into cosmogonism. The next stage of thought produces theism: the relation of the Ātman to the soul in man is conceived as no longer one of identity, but as one of some degree of contrast and independence: the Ātman of the individual is set over against the Ātman in its highest aspect, tentatively even in some old passages, then definitely and openly in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad and still more markedly in the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad. The road was now open for the disappearance of the deity (i.e. in the Sāmkhya) since the individual souls were now independent entities.”¹

Or, if we may sum up in Deussen’s own words, the doctrine of the Upaniṣads “begins with a bold and blunt Idealism, and from thence (by accommodation to popular thought) through the phases of Pantheism, Cosmogonism, and Theism, it finally leads to the Atheism of the later Sāmkhya and eventually to the Apsychism of early Buddhism.”²

Keith characterizes Deussen’s view of Upaniṣad development as “a brilliant and attractive theory”, but “one impossible to accept”. “The obvious history of the Upaniṣads,” he says, “would suggest that the cosmogonic is the oldest form of the doctrine of the Brahman or Ātman... The view of Yājñavalkya cannot, save by paradox, be deemed the earliest view or the dominating view expressed in the Upaniṣads:... independent and older are the cosmogonic and pantheistic views which appear in the Aitareya Āranyaka and in the Brāhmaṇas, and the dominating influence of the view of Yājñavalkya ascribed to it by Deussen cannot be established.”³

¹ Keith, R.P.V. 509.
² Deussen, A.G.P., quoted Belvalkar, H.I.P. 89. See also P.U. viii.
³ R.P.V. 510, 512.
Even so late an Upaniṣad as the Śvetāsvatara, Keith says "shows no trace of the presupposition of the doctrine of Yājñavalkya: it is adequately explained as the mere development of primitive pantheism or cosmogonism". When in addition he repeatedly (in effect) remarks, "The prominence of Yājñavalkya can hardly be historical", one might suppose that he is arguing for the comparatively late date of this "the most characteristically individual of the doctrines of the Upaniṣads".

Belvarkar, using very much the same arguments as Keith reaches the conclusion, "Upaniṣadic idealism may thus have come toward the end of the process, and not initiated it". He tries to show that there is a definite and natural evolution of thought. In groups one and two the interest is centred on cosmology. In group three there is a double movement, in one direction toward a more positive theism, in the other toward idealism. In group four this leads toward negativism and māyā-vāda. Keith on the other hand says, "An advanced and profound doctrine may be early in appearance, as Yājñavalkya's view in B.A.U.; for philosophy does not present any orderly advance of ideas, and Yājñavalkya was evidently too subtle for his age, which however was strongly influenced by views which it could not wholly adopt". Of these two positions we confess that we feel more inclined to Belvarkar's with its late dating of the Yājñavalkya kāṇḍa, but do not feel competent to decide. But whether he is right in his contention that "chronology and logic have thus joined hands", or whether Keith is justified in his opposite contention, both are agreed on the main point which we wish to make, namely, that the theistic (or panentheistic) cosmogonism of the Katha Upaniṣad is not a late declension from a pure monistic idealism (which is to be regarded as the main teaching of the Upaniṣads), but is rather on the central and direct line of Upaniṣad development, which derives from the Vedic cosmogonism and leads to the Gitā and the Śūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. Conversely, the idealism of Yājñavalkya, which issued in the absolute monism

1 R.P.V. 524. Keith does not like Deussen distinguish between pantheism and cosmogonism, but regards them as two aspects of one phase of thought.
2 Ibid. 495.  3 H.I.P. 359.  4 R.P.V. 498 n.  5 H.I.P. xxv.
of Śaṅkara, is an aberrant development from the main teaching of the Upaniṣads.

It is impossible to give any absolute dates for the Upaniṣads but the six early prose Upaniṣads, in their main portions, the Īśā and the first adhyāya at least of the Kaṭha, are almost certainly pre-Buddhistic and may be roughly assigned to the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. (See the discussion of the date of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad.)

The beginnings of Indian Philosophy in the Rg Veda.

The common root of religion and philosophy is seen very clearly in the Rg Veda. Religion is born of the awe and wonder created in the mind of man both by the splendour and mystery of the outer world and by the mysterious events and powers of his own life and being. Philosophy, as Plato said, is also born of wonder. It is the search for meaning and unity amid the seemingly endless variety of the world of our experience. So the Rg Veda is the record of how the Vedic Indians both wondered and adored, and wondered and sought to understand.

At first all the nature powers which provoked wonder and awe were regarded as separately existing, and the Vedic Indians worshipped numerous devas or 'shining ones'. Naturally, however, the spirits associated with the greater nature powers were singled out for special worship. The heaven gods (Dyaus, Varuṇa), and the sun gods (Sūrya, Savitṛ, Mitra, Viṣṇu), the gods of the Wind (Vāyu) and the thunderstorm (Indra, Rudra), and the god of fire (Agni), thus became the great objects of Vedic worship. While the Vedic Indians never attained to a monotheism like that of the Hebrews, or of the Persians under Zoroaster, nevertheless at a certain time Varuṇa almost attained such a position. For the most part, however, Vedic Hinduism may be described as polytheism, qualified by what Max Müller called henotheism (better kathenotheism), or the worship of various gods treating the one who is immediately being praised as relatively supreme.

Various causes tended to the evolution of a quasi-monotheism or pantheism from this primitive polytheism. It was natural that the various devas presiding over groups of natural phenomena should tend to be identified. So the various Sun gods
tended to be looked upon as one; and Fire became regarded as one deity in three forms and was thus identified with the sun, or celestial fire, the lightning or atmospheric fire, as well as being the earthly Fire-god, manifest on the altar and in the homes of men. Thus the triune Agni was identified with Sūrya, Savitṛ, and all the sun gods, and with Indra, Rudra and Vāyu, and all the atmospheric gods. The sun and the fire thus became the great later Vedic symbols for one supreme numinous or adorable reality. This process was also aided by the fact that many of the names of the gods were descriptive, e.g. Savitṛ—inspirer or vivifier; Prajāpati—lord of the people; Viśvakarma—world-maker. The name of one god is therefore often applied to another and the two tend to become identified.

Philosophical speculation began very early,—how early we cannot say, and in time it led to philosophical discussions. We have records of these in the brahmodya, or theological riddles, with which some of the Brahmins entertained one another and their hearers when they were assembled for the great sacrifices.

The Riddle-hymn of Dirghatamas. One example of a brahmodya which is preserved in the Rg Veda (I. 164.) is the riddle-hymn ascribed to the rṣi Dirghatamas. It begins thus:

1. Of this love-worthy priest, ancient of days,
   Whose middle brother is the hungry-eater,
   There is a butter-backed third brother:
   Here I beheld the Lord of men with seven sons.¹

One might not guess at first (for the riddle is distinctly ambiguous), that the Priest and Lord referred to is the Sun (Sūrya) with his seven solar rays (the Ādityas), his brothers being Lightning and the sacrificial Fire. The three are brothers since all are forms of fire,—heavenly, atmospheric, and earthly,—the triune Agni.

¹ Both the terms used and the construction are more than ambiguous, and this is reflected in the extraordinary variety of the translations. Cf. Griffith, Hymns of the Rig Veda; M. N. Dutt, Rigveda Samhitā; Geldner, Der Rigveda; Regnaud, L’Enigme du Rig-Veda; and also Sāyaṇa’s Commentary. It has also been translated by Ludwig and Grassmann, and as an Atharva Veda hymn, (ix. 9 and 10) by Henry and Whitney, H.O.S., vol. viii, 552–561. For notes marked * see Appendix V (page 229), where I have attempted to justify my translation and have also given alternatives.
The next riddle is easier, plainly referring to the chariot of the sun with its seven horses. It is the first chariot-parable in Indian literature and has a long progeny, through the chariot-parable of the *Kātha* to the present car of Jagannāth.\(^1\)

2. They yoke the seven to the one-wheeled car,
   One horse, with seven names, draws it along;
   The three-naved wheel is ageless, never loosened,
   Whereon depend all these created beings.\(^2\)

The seven horses are the seven solar rays, sevenfold yet one effulgent radiance (or the seven Ādityas who are yet one). The one wheel is time, with three naves or axles,—past, present, and future (or else, according to Yāska, the year with three seasons). Again, in verse 11, the sun itself as identified with the year is typified by the wheel, which is then said to have twelve spokes (the months), and on this wheel as it revolves round the heaven stand in pairs seven hundred and twenty children (the nights and days). The hymn is long and the themes discussed various, often in riddles too obscure for any certainty as to the meaning, but the recurring theme which gives a certain unity to the whole is that of the Sun as the symbol of the manifold yet one, the ever-changing yet eternal reality, the source of all life and order.

Almost in the fashion of an Upaniṣad sage Dirghatamas questions about the *ātman*:

4. Who has beheld the First one, being born,
   Which being boneless sustains what has bones?
   From earth are breath and blood: where is the soul (*ātman*)?
   Who may approach a man who knows to ask this?\(^3\)

Various interpretations are possible, but we venture to suggest that the verse refers to the invisible soul, which though unsubstantial sustains the body, and equates it with the Primeval one which, coming into manifest being, produces and sustains the world. So he continues:

6. As ignorant I ask of those who know, the sages,—
   Not knowing, for the sake of gaining knowledge,—
   What is that One, in form of the unborn,
   Who has established firm these six world-regions.\(^4\)

[One should not perhaps stress the point here, but the “unborn” (*āja*) almost becomes a technical name for the *ātman* (both the individual soul and the supreme Lord) in later literature.]\(^2\)

\(^1\) See next page. \(^2\) See *Kātha* ii. 18, *Svet.* iv. 5, *Gītā* ii. 20, 21.
THE HYMN OF DīRGHATAMAS

The sun is again introduced in v. 7, under the figure of a bird, as the visible form of the "unborn". This (after various other figures, including again the sun-wheel, 11–14), leads on to the parable of the birds on the tree, 20–22, which begins,

20. Two birds, close yoked companions,
    Clasp close the self-same tree;
    Of these one eats the sweet fruit,
    Uneating the other looks on. 5

This is interpreted by Sāyaṇa as referring to the two forms of the ātman, the individual soul and the paramātman, and is quoted in this sense by Muni. iii. 1. 1 and Śvet. iv. 6, and apparently referred to in Kaṭha iii. 1.

The seer also recognises his kinship with the whole universe 6:

33. Heaven is my father and begetter: here's the navel;
    My kin and mother is the spacious earth.

Then comes the verse so often quoted as the real beginning of Indian philosophy:

46. Indraṃ Mitraṃ Varuṇaṃ Agnim āhur,
    atho divyaḥ sasuparno Garutmān :
    Ekaṃ sad vīprā bahudhā vaināṃti,
    Agnīṃ Yamāṃ Mātariśvānam āhūḥ.

They call it Indra, Mitra, Varuṇa, and Agni,
And also heavenly, beauteous-winged Garutmān:
The Real is One, though sages name it variously,—
    They call it Agni, Yama, Mātariśvān.

The Cosmogonic Hymns of the Tenth Book.

It is in the tenth book of the Rg Veda that its philosophic ideas are most clearly defined in a number of very striking cosmogonic hymns. We will concentrate mainly on three of these which lay the foundation for much of the thought of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad. These are (1) The Creation hymn (X. 129); (2) The Hiranyagarbha hymn (X. 121); and (3) The Puruṣa hymn (X. 90).

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1 Twenty miles north of Puri is the great Temple of the Sun at Konarak, built in the form of a stone chariot drawn by seven horses. The Jagannath car is a development of the same idea. Sūrya worship was very prevalent in Orissa, though it is difficult to say how far it dates back. It is interesting to note that legend connects the rṣi Dirghatamas with Orissa, making him the real father of Kakṣīvat, reputed son of King Kaliṅga. (See Max Müller, A.S.L. 57.)
The Creation hymn (Nāsadiya-sūkta) is in many ways the most remarkable hymn in the Rg Veda.

1. Non-being then existed not nor being,
   There was no air, nor sky which is beyond it;
   What was concealed? Wherein? In whose protection?
   And was there deep unfathomable water?

2. Death then existed not, nor life immortal;
   Of neither night nor day was any token;
   By its inherent force the One breathed breathless;
   No other thing than that beyond existed.

3. Darkness there was at first, by darkness hidden;
   Without distinctive mark this all was water;
   That which, becoming, by the void was covered,
   That one, by force of heat (tapas) came into being.

4. Desire (kāma) entered that one in the beginning,—
   Desire that was the earliest seed of mind.
   The sages seeking in their hearts with wisdom,
   Found out the bond of being in non-being.

5. Their ray extended light across the darkness;
   But was the one above or was it under?
   Creative force was there and fertile power,
   Below was energy, above was impulse.

6. Who knows for certain? Who shall here declare it?
   Whence was it born and whence came this creation?
   The gods were born after this world's creation;
   Then who can know from whence it has arisen?

7. Wherefrom then this creation has arisen,
   And whether He has or has not produced it,—
   He who surveys it in the highest heaven,
   He only knows, or even He may know not. ¹

Macdonell says: "Apart from its high literary merit this poem is noteworthy for the daring speculations which found utterance in so remote an age. But even here may be traced some of the main defects of Indian philosophy,—lack of clearness and consistency and tending to make reasoning depend on mere words." Nevertheless its truly philosophical candour cannot but command our admiration. Summing up the main ideas, the hymn says that before the beginning of determinate, empirical existence the One existed. It was apparently conceived as Spirit, hence the words, "The One breathed

¹ Translation from Macdonell, H.R.V., slightly modified by suggestions from his V.R.S.
breathless". Verse 2 says that nothing else existed, but verse 3 speaks also of primæval matter, pictured as a dark void or abyss of waters (note the similarity to Genesis I. 2). By the power of his own tapas (heat or creative fervour) the One evolved into determinate being. Desire also (possibly another name for tapas) is said to produce thought, and this thought or wisdom manifested in the hearts of sages, enables them in some degree to understand whence they and the whole creation have arisen. Yet the writer of the hymn also confesses that all this is only surmise, for how is it possible to be sure of things which lie so far beyond determinate knowledge.

The Hymn of the Golden Germ (*Hiranyagarbha-sūkta*). This hymn is far more definitely theistic than the preceding. In it the first existent being is called Prajāpati. We have here also the picture of a chaos of waters, apparently created by the one Lord, but later we are told that He became manifest on them in the form of a golden germ or egg, from which the whole universe developed. He is called the one Life or Soul of the gods (*devānām asur ekaḥ*), the true and faithful (*satya-dharmā*), who created the world and ever sustains it, the only God supreme over the gods (*devesv adhi deva ekaḥ*), the Lord of creatures (*Prajāpati*), giver of life and strength, who rules over all.

1. Hiranyagarbha came in the beginning,
   Of every creature born the one sole Lord;
The earth he has supported and the heaven;
   What God shall we adore with our oblation?
2. Who gave the breath of life and vital power,
   To whose commands the gods all render homage,
   Whose shade is death, and also life immortal,—
   What god shall we adore with our oblation?
3. Who by his might alone became the monarch,
   Of all that breathes, of all that wakes or slumbers,
   Of all, both man and beast, the Lord eternal,—
   What god shall we adore with our oblation?
4. Whose might and majesty these snowy mountains,
   The oceans and the distant streams exhibit,
   Whose arms extended are these spreading regions,—
   What god shall we adore with our oblation?

1 Cf. the *Ruah Elohim* (Spirit of God) which, in Genesis i. 2, is said to move upon the face of the waters.
INTRODUCTION

5. Who made the heavens bright, the earth enduring,
   Who fixed the firmament, the heaven of heavens,
Who measured out the air’s extended spaces,—
   What god shall we adore with our oblation?
7. When the great waters swept the universe,
   Bringing the Germ, also producing fire,
Then He arose, the One Life of the gods,—
   What god shall we adore with our oblation?
8. Who overlooked the waters in his might,
   As they brought power and bore the sacrifice,
The only God supreme above the gods,
   What god shall we adore with our oblation?
9. May He not injure us, the earth-begetter,
   He who begat the sky,—the true and faithful,
He who begat the great and shining waters,—
   What god shall we adore with our oblation?
10. Prajāpati, thou rulest over all,
   And there is none in all the world beside thee;
Give unto us that pray our heart’s desire,
   May we become the lords of all good things.¹

The Puruṣa Hymn (Puruṣa-sūkta). The third of the creation hymns, the Puruṣa-sūkta differs considerably in outlook from the other two. It repeats in rather more concrete form the idea of the Hiranyagarbha hymn of a primæval being, existing before any determinate existence, and then evolving himself or coming to birth in the empirical universe. This being is called the Puruṣa, i.e. Man or Person, and seems to be conceived as a giant with a thousand heads, eyes, and feet, who filled the whole universe but extended far beyond it,—the universe being said to be constituted from one-fourth of his body. Here both the immanence and the transcendence of the Supreme Being are expressed. The first stage in creation was apparently the evolution of another being called Virāj (“the resplendent”), which may represent primæval matter,—the “waters” of the Hiranyagarbha hymn, but corresponds better to the Kaṭha Aṣṭādhyāyī, (see 132–141),—
and again Puruṣa is said to be evolved from Virāj, just as Hiranyagarbha as the life or soul of the gods and other beings, was born in the matter of his own creation. The second half of the hymn seems to express a different view of creation, representing it as a sacrifice, in which the gods, who strangely appear from nowhere, offer up the Puruṣa. The various parts

¹ With acknowledgments to Kaegi, R.V. and Peterson, H.R.V.
of the sacrificial victim produced the parts of the universe. His head produced the sky, from his feet came the earth, from his eyes the sun, and from his mind the moon. In this hymn also we first have mention of the four castes, for we are told that the Brāhmaṇa was created from his mouth, the Rājanya or Kṣatriya from his arms, the Vaiśya or agriculturist from his thighs, and the Śūdra or lowest caste from his feet.

1. The Person (Puruṣa) had a thousand heads,
   A thousand eyes, a thousand feet;
   He filled the earth on every side,
   Yet stood ten fingers length beyond.

2. The Person truly is this all
   What has been and what is to be;
   The Lord of immortality,
   He was all that which grows by food.

3. Such is his greatness, and yet more,
   Than all this is the Puruṣa;
   All beings are one-fourth of him,—
   Three-fourths immortal in the heaven.

4. For with three-fourths he went on high,
   One-fourth of him remained below,
   Thence spread abroad on every side,
   Over the lifeless and living.

5. From it was Virāj first evolved,
   Again from Virāj, Puruṣa:
   When born he thence stretched far beyond,
   Behind the earth, also before.

6. With Puruṣa as offering,
   The gods performed a sacrifice,
   Its melted butter was the spring,
   Summer its fuel, autumn its oblation.

9. From that oblation fully made,
   Were born the Rg and Śāma chanta,
   From it were born the sacred hymns,
   From it was born the Yajur Ved.

12. His mouth became the Brāhmaṇa,
    His two arms formed the kingly class,
    His thighs became the husbandman,
    From his feet was the Śūdra born.

13. From his mouth was born the moon,
    From his eyes the sun was born,
    Indra and Agni from his mouth,
    While from his breath was Vāyu born.
14. From his navel was the mid-world (antarikṣa)
From his head there rolled the sky,
From feet the earth, from ear came space (dīṣaḥ):
Thus fashioned they the worlds.

Are the Upaniṣads a direct development of Rg-Vedic philosophy?

It is the opinion of some scholars that the Upaniṣad doctrines “were not directly developed from the monotheistic tendencies of the later Rg-Vedic speculations” 1 Some regard them as an entirely new development, produced by reaction against, rather than growth from, what had preceded. The theological interest of the Vedic hymns gave place, it is said, to the ritualist interest of the Brāhmaṇas, in which the sacrifice became more powerful than the gods, and the thought of the Upaniṣads (particularly the doctrine of the ātman) developed as a revolt, originally particularly in Kṣatriya circles, against a ritual which had become arid and profitless. Dasgupta agrees with Deussen and Garbe 2 in the former view but dissents from them in the latter, pointing out that many of the Upaniṣads show signs of development in Brahmin circles, not as an entire revolt from sacrificial ritual to something quite different but rather by a natural development from the ritual by allegorisation and meditation upon its inner meaning.

We doubt whether there is such lack of connection as Dasgupta suggests between the cosmogonic hymns of the Rg Veda and the early Upaniṣads. It is true that Prajāpati-Hiranyagarbha is not referred to by name in the early Upaniṣads, but the ideas of the myths are clearly referred to in Ś. B. vi. 1. 1., Br. i. 2, i. 4., Ch. iii. 19, Ait. i ; and, as we have said, underlie the whole thought of the Katha. This is obvious in such passages as iv. 6, 7, but it is also true of iii. 11, and vi. 7, 8.

(There, in the series Puruṣa-Avyakta-Mahān ātman, we have reference to the One supreme who evolves the other, the many, which is yet non-different from himself, being an expression of his own nature, and then entering into it becomes life or soul. The Sāmkhya philosophy was probably derived from the ideas of the Puruṣa-Hiranyagarbha myth by looking on the waters

1 Dasgupta, H.I.P. 52.
or primitive matter as independently existing, antar the Puruṣa as first coming to determinate consciousness in the intelligence (mahat or buddhi) which is a product of matter (avyakta). With Śaṅkara also the supreme is not a conscious person, but in alliance with an other,—in this case Ignorance, it becomes an apparent world-soul or deity. Both of these views are later distortions of the Upaniṣada teaching which, descending from the Rg-Vedic hymns through such early Upaniṣad passages as those quoted above, finds expression in the Kaṭha and the Gitā in the theistic doctrine of a supreme personal Spirit who expresses himself in nature, which is his own and not an independent principle, and in individual souls who are one with him in that he is the basis of their being and within whom he dwells as inner guide. But this at present is an anticipation. We shall recur to it later in due course.)

The Contribution of the Brāhmaṇas: Dasgupta is right, however, in his emphasis. Upaniṣad thought is not merely a development of the monotheistic tendencies of later Rg-Vedic speculation. The Brāhmaṇas intervened and their sacrificial ideas coloured, whether by direct development or reaction, the whole trend of subsequent thought. In the Rg Veda the object of devotion was the gods, the sacrifice being merely a means of expressing that devotion and influencing their will in favour of the offerer. By the time of the Yajur Veda and the older Brāhmaṇas the sacrifice itself became the focus of thought and desire, its correct performance in every detail being all important. Even in the Rg Veda the gods were regarded as nourished by the sacrifice,—Indra, for example, is said to have conquered the drought-demons through the inspiring power of the soma. In the Brāhmaṇas, however, this idea is carried much further. The creative activity of Prajāpati is represented as exhausting him, so that his power requires to be continually renewed partly by his own tapas or asceticism and partly by the food of the sacrifice.1 Again there are oft repeated stories of how the gods and the asuras competed for world-power, and how the gods only won through the correct knowledge of the sacrifice.2

1 Cf. Tāṇḍya B. iv. 10. 1; Belvalkar, H.I.P. 66.
2 Kaṭha Saṃhitā, xxii. 9; Tait. S. v. 3. 3; Tāṇḍya B. xviii. 1. 2.
What wonder then if the priests, whose business it was to know the sacrifice, soon came to be regarded as exercising compelling power even over the gods, and the sacrifice itself became a huge machinery of magic.

But this is not the whole truth. The sacerdotal trade is the worst enemy of true religion, but even among priests it can never quite kill devotion. The stories of Puruṣa-Prajāpati show that the sacrifice was regarded as having cosmic significance, and the true priest regarded himself as an ally of Prajāpati in his work of sustaining the universe. Moreover there were those who not only had fellowship with him in partaking, with him, of the renewing sacrifice, but who also devoted themselves to meditation upon its symbolic meaning. So, as Belvulkar says, "It can safely be asserted that among the new ideas occurring in the Upaniṣads there is hardly one that is not implicit in and logically deducible from the ideas present in different portions of the Brāhmaṇas. Thus the continuity of tradition was maintained; and this circumstance was given an outward expression inasmuch as the Brāhmaṇas, the Āranyakas, and the Upaniṣads were made to constitute part of one whole revealed text."¹

The Āranyakas² or "Forest-books" are appendices to the Brāhmaṇas which form a connecting link between them and the Upaniṣads. Certain specially sacred rites were performed not in the village but in the seclusion of the forest, and it is probable also that for the purpose of meditation on the mystic meaning of the sacrifice certain priests, and then teachers and their pupils, would retire to the forest. Others regard the Āranyaka as the Brāhmaṇa of the Vānaprasthas,—those who, having served their apprenticeship as Brahmin students and performed their duties as householders had retired to the forest for meditation. But, as Keith remarks, this is

¹ Belvulkar, H.I.P. 84.
² Excluding the Brahadāraṇyaka there are only three extant Āranyakas, the Atareya, Kauṣitakī or Sākhāyana, and Taิตtiriya. The Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad is both an Āranyaka and an Upaniṣad, and many Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads contain portions Āranyaka-like in character but not formally so called, e.g. the Jaiminiya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa, of which the Kena Upaniṣad is a part.
probably a later conception. No clear line can be drawn between Brāhmaṇas, Āranyakas, and Upaniṣads, but the Āranyakas consist in the main of meditations on the symbolic meaning of the sacrifice. See, for example the meditation on the meaning of the āsvamedha or horse sacrifice in the opening section of the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. Sometimes such meditations took the place of the actual sacrifice. "Suppose", asked Janaka of Yājñavalkya, "you had no milk or rice or barley to perform the agnihotra, with what would you sacrifice?" "With fruits of trees or whatever herbs there were." "If there were none?" "Then with water." "If there were no water?" "Then indeed there would be nothing here, yet this would be offered,—the truth in faith." (Ś.B. xi 3. 1.)

There thus grew up the idea of what the Gītā later called contemplative sacrifices (dhyāna- or jñāna-yajña), and with them the idea of a certain preparatory moral and ascetic discipline was specially associated. This idea later finds expression in the great teaching of Ghora Aṅgirasa to Kṛṣṇa Devaki putra (which may be the original germ of the Gītā), which interprets all life as a sacrifice. "When a man (who is a sacrificer) hungers, thirsts, and abstains from pleasure, that is the dīkṣā (initiatory rite)....Austerity (tapas), liberality, uprightness, harmlessness, truthfulness,—these are the gifts for the priests." This idea of discipline, taught in connection with the contemplative sacrifices, was not however new. As Prajāpati practised tapas so ought the sacrificer, and this not merely in the sense of physical asceticism: even as early as the Saṁhitās of the Yajur Veda stress is also laid on a certain mental discipline. So the whole idea of Yoga, which the Kaṭha, a Yajur Veda Upaniṣad, is the first to teach in any systematic way, may be traced back to the passage which both the Kaṭhaka and Taittirīya Saṁhitās and a number of Brāhmaṇas of the Yajur Veda quote from Rg Veda v. 81. 1:

"The sages of the great wise Sage (i.e. Savitṛ or Prajāpati)
Yoke their minds and yoke their thoughts."

And the whole object of the sacrifice is said to be that—

"With mind well yoked are we,
By the inspiration of God Savitṛ,
With strength for gaining heaven."
The new element in the Upaniṣads: Salvation by knowledge of the Brahman-Ātman.

But while it is true that there is a continuity between the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads (and a Yajur Veda Upaniṣad like the Kaṭha emphasises this), nevertheless those who see in the Upaniṣads a reaction against Brāhmaṇic ritualism are also right. It is very evident that there were many who, like the Hebrew prophets, felt an unbearable dissatisfaction with the whole sacrificial system and radically revolted against it, seeking in knowledge a way of deliverance. As the commentators on Vedānta-sūtra iii. 4. 9 say, “The ṛṣis descended from Kavasa said, For what purpose should we study the Veda? For what purpose should we sacrifice? Knowing this indeed the ancient ones did not offer the Agnihotra.” It is also clear from this passage that the knowledge which they sought was not merely knowledge of the Veda but something new; and that new knowledge was knowledge of the Brahman-Ātman.

In one sense neither of these ideas were new,—both can be traced in the Saṃhitās and find a place in the Brāhmaṇas.¹ But the emphasis of the doctrine was distinctly new, so that we may say that, while the Upaniṣads teach a Nature-mysticism derived from the Vedic hymns, and a Sacrificial-mysticism derived from the Brāhmaṇas and Āraṇyakas, their distinctive doctrine is Ātman- or Soul-mysticism: since it is at the centre of our inner being, in the Soul, that they find the secret of the universe.

The word “‘Brahman’”² in most of its occurrences in the Rg-vedic Hymns clearly means “prayer”, usually in an objective sense, i.e. the sacred word (mantra), and hence it comes to denote the Vedic hymns themselves and then their sacred potency. In the Atharva-veda the word first means prayer or magic spell, and then the mysterious power of which these are the expression. As such is it repeatedly coupled with

¹ So Keith: “It is impossible to deny that the Ātman-Brahman doctrine has a long previous history in the Brāhmaṇas and is a logical development of the idea of unity of the Rigveda”. (R.P.V. 494.)

² For a discussion of the derivation and original meaning of brahman see Keith, R.P.V. 442ff.; Belvarkar, H.I.P. 346ff.; Hildebrandt, E.R.E. ii. 796–9; Hertel, IF. xli. 185ff.
tejas and tapas (brilliance and heat, i.e. energy) as though practically synonymous. It supports the earth, causes the ground to produce life, shines in the sun and fire, and “into it all the gods are woven”.¹ As in the Rig Veda the brahman is specially associated with Bṛhaspati or Brāhmaṇaspati,—“the Lord of prayer”, who is personally called the brāhmaṇa or priest and impersonally the brahman or sacred energy of the gods, so also in the Atharva-veda it occupies a similar position toward Prajāpati, called also Virāj, Praṇa (Life or Spirit), and the Brahmacārin (regarded as a personal form of brahman). Sometimes the personal is given priority and the brahman is said to spring from Prajāpati, and sometimes the impersonal is put first and the brahman is said to sustain the Highest Lord.² What has been said of the A.V. applies also to the early Brāhmaṇas. There Prajāpati occupies without doubt the position of supreme Creator-god, but more and more Brahman comes to the fore, not merely as a power attached to prayer or sacrifice, gods or nature, but as the highest principle of the universe, the mysterium tremendum, the one mysterious, supremely great and adorably reality.

A passage in the Kena Upaniṣad seems to preserve the memory of the gradual supplanting of the Vedic nature-gods by the one supreme Brahman. There Brahman is represented as appearing to the gods as a mysterious stranger. They deputed Agni to find out who the wonderful being was. The stranger, however, took the initiative and asked Agni, “Who are you and what power have you?” “I am Agni”, he replied, “and can burn up anything”. The stranger put a straw before him and said, “Burn that”. Agni tried with all his might but could do nothing. Vāyu was next sent. He, boasting of his power to blow away everything, was challenged to blow away a straw: but his stormiest winds could not move it. Indra the thunderer then rushed toward the strange being but it disappeared before him. Umā, the daughter of Himavat, then appeared, and Indra asked her, “What is this wonderful

¹ A.V. xi. 5. 24 (Bloomfield, H.A.V. 217).
² Contrast A.V. xi. 5 and xix. 53. For other references see my lecture on The concept of Brahman in the Atharva Veda.
being?” “It is Brahman”, she said; “In this victory of Brahman, exult ye”. Brahman is thus seen to be that supreme Being through whose power alone the gods enjoy greatness, and without which they can do nothing. As Kaṭha vi. 3 says,

“Through fear of Him Agni doth burn,
Through fear of Him Sūrya gives heat,
Through fear Indra and Vāyu both,
With Death as fifth, speed on their way.”

The Upaniṣads do not deny the existence of the Vedic gods any more than did Xenophanes those of the Greeks but they are reduced to the rank of dependent nature-powers. Some गृहस however, like the radical Yājñavalkya treat them very freely.

“How many gods are there Yājñavalkya?” asked Śākyāya. He first gave the traditional answer, 3,306 divine powers, 33 gods. But when further questioned he said successively 6, 3, 2, 1, and lastly one only. “What is that One God?” “Prāṇa” (Life-power), said he, “Men call him Brahman, the Yon”. (Br. iii. 9.)

This Upaniṣad doctrine of Unity, it cannot be too strongly insisted, is not a mere metaphysical speculation: those who thus regard it entirely fail to grasp its value. As against the popular polytheism and materialism it is a liberating gospel.

As a unity only it must be looked upon,
This undemonstrable, enduring Being.
He obtains death after death,
Who views things as if separate here. (Br. iv. 20; 19.)

As water rained upon a height
Runs various ways among the hills,
So he who views things as diverse
Distractedly runs after them. (Kaṭha iv. 14.)

Moreover, though often abstractly stated, it is not to be regarded as merely abstract Unity. It has supreme numinous value, it is a divine Unity; and, as Professor Otto has pointed out,² this numinous value persists even in interpreters like Śaṅkara who, formally, state it most abstractly. Western scholars have often gone astray through failing to do justice to this aspect.

The Upaniṣads begin then, with what has been called a

¹ This is an etymological pun, and is probably satirical.
naturalistic pantheism, or more accurately, with the conception of a unitary divine world-ground realistically viewed as the basic substance and productive, sustaining, immanent energy of all things; and when they attempt to define it they do so naturally first of all in terms of one or other of its most striking manifestations. Thus, frequently in the Bṛahmanda, and occasionally in preliminary stages of Upaniṣad discussions, the sun, the fire or ākāśa (space or ether) are said to be Brahman. Very striking is Bharadvāja’s statement in the Ārṣeya Upaniṣad,1 “That light which shines in yonder orb, incessantly throbbing, glittering, flaring, throwing brilliant shimmer and suffusing all, that is my Brahman, . . . none can transcend its greatness.” Equally striking is Gautama’s reply, “You are then merely worshipping what is only the greatness of that other Brahman which is within this (sun) as the ‘Golden person, golden haired, and golden bearded, resplendent even to the finger-tips’” (quotation from Ch. i. 6. 6). Here we have not a return to the Vedic worship of Sūrya-deva, but the puruṣa (person or spirit) in the sun is taken as a symbol of Brahman. A further step is taken in the “instruction of the fires” to Upakosala (Ch. iv. 11–13) where the teaching is first given that Brahman is the person in the sun, the moon and the lightning, but Satyakāma, his guru, then told Upakosala that the fires had only told him Brahman’s environment but he would teach him something deeper. “That person who is seen in the eye, He is Atman,—that is Brahman.” (Ch. iv. 15.)

The concept of the Ātman was probably originally developed independently of that of the Brahman. The etymology of the word has been a matter of much dispute, but the most usually accepted view is that put forward by Böhtlingk-Roth who derive it from an- to breathe, and it is almost certainly cognate with the old High German ātum, “breath” (Anglo-Saxon, æðm; Modern German, ätem).2

Deussen points out that it is often found in the Rg Veda (especially as the reflexive pronoun, “one’s self”), in the form tman, and suggests that ātman is a euphonic expansion. He regards it as meaning, “This I”. Keith, however, points out that ātman certainly does in four places in the Rg Veda mean “wind” and normally means “the breath of life”. Also that it is far easier to derive the meanings,
"self", "body", and the use as reflexive pronoun, from "wind" or "breath" than vice versa.

Ātman, then, seems to have originally meant wind or breath, and then life, soul, self or essential nature.

Older words than ātman to express the same idea were Asu and Prāṇa. So, in Rg x. 121. 7, Hiranyakarbhā is called "the one asu (life-breath or spirit) of the gods". Much more frequently however, prāṇa, the commonest name for the life-breath, is used to denote the chief principle of the universe. Atharva Veda xi. 4, for example, is a hymn to Prāṇa, described as both the roaring wind and the supreme spirit of the universe, Vīrāj (the lustre), Desṛ (the guiding power) and Prajāpati (the Lord of all creatures). A theme which continually recurs in the Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas and earliest Upaniṣads is the dispute between the devas for precedence (see e.g. Ś.B. x. 3. 3; Jaim. U.B. iv. 11–13; Ait. Ār. ii. 1–3; Br. i. 3; Ch. i. 2). Here the cosmic deities are equated with the prāṇas, i.e. the life-powers or faculties of man, and the mukhya-prāṇa or chief life-breath is said to be the uktha or chief principle both of man and the universe. In Ait. Ār. iii. this chief prāṇa is called puruṣa, and just as all the cosmic powers and all the human functions had each its prāṇa or vital power so they are now said to have puruṣas,—hence we now read of "the person in the sun", "the person in the eye", etc. Ait. Ār. iv. makes a similar identification of the chief prāṇa with the ātman, and henceforward the term prāṇa tends to be dropped in favour of puruṣa or ātman.

Notes to previous page.

1 See Belvèla, Four Unpublished Upaniṣad Texts, 18.

2 It has been suggested that ātman may also be cognate with the Greek ἀγμός (smoke, vapour), and the Homeric ἄγμος (breath). This however is very doubtful. Uhlenbeck (Etymologisches Wörterbuch der altindischen Sprache) denies any connection. Boissac (Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue-grecque qv. ἀγμος) notes that it is doubtful whether the a is long or short. If long ἀγμός = ἀερμός (from ἀερ = Sk. av or e, to blow), and is not connected with ātman. If short there may just possibly be connection with ātman. ἄγμος he connects with ἀερμός, and so not with ātman. Prof. R. L. Turner doubts the connection of ātman with either of these Greek words. All of these authorities however, agree on the connection of ātman with ātem.
The term Purusa goes back to the primaeval cosmic “Man” or “Person” of Rg Veda x. 90, who through his self-sacrifice created the universe. The etymology of the word is uncertain, but the conception is clearly anthropomorphic, originally denoting man with all his bodily attributes. Then secondarily it was used to denote the inner or essential man,—the soul. But still the term denoted something more concrete than prana or atman. Kaṭha iv. 12 seems to be the earliest mention of the aṅgusṭha-mātra purusa or “thumb-sized person” dwelling in the human heart, yet the conception must be much older, probably prehistoric. Later, through purusa in many cases being used as practically equivalent to prana (as indicated above), and so used to denote powers or functions, it tended to become depersonalised in meaning; yet the suggestion of concrete personality, which was part of its original meaning, seems to have persisted at least on the fringe of its connotation (and so could be revived by the author of the Kaṭha and those who followed him).

At present our aim is to show the related growth of the ideas of purusa and atman in the early Upaniṣads. The myth of creation given in the Purusa-sūkta is repeated in Atharva x. 7 and Ś.B. vi. 1. 1. In it all the worlds, the gods and orders of men are formed from the various parts of the primæval Person. The sun came from his eye, the moon from his mind, fire from his mouth, etc. In Ait. i. 1. 1. we have a development of the myth. There we are told that the gods or nature powers when thus created found no fitting home. Hence the creator led a human person to them. Fire then became speech and entered his mouth, the sun became sight and entered his eyes, the moon became mind and entered his heart. The creator (here called Ātman) then himself entered the man and thence looked around on all beings. He saw nothing as different from himself. “He saw this very person as veriest Brahman.” Here we see the development of a doctrine which goes back to the Hymn of Dirghatamas as well as the Purusa-sūkta. There, as we saw, the sage said, “Heaven is my father, earth my kin and mother”. All the parts of the world (the macrocosm) were thus recognised as standing in a relation of kinship with man (the
microcosm). Hence, in a different sense from Protagoras, it was recognised that "Man is the measure of all things", or, as Br. i. 4 says in its account of the ātmā puruṣavidhaḥ ("Self in the form of a person") from whom the world evolved,—"One should worship with the thought that He is just one’s self, for this self is the footprint (padanīya) of the All, for by it one knows this All".

The identification of the Brahman with the Ātman.

We have advanced, then, from the conception of the praṇa or "breath", which is the life-principle or spirit both of man and the universe, to that of the antarātman puruṣa ("person who is inner-self") who is called praṇasya ātmā ("the soul of praṇa"); and from the old mythic conception of the cosmic "Man" to the more spiritual aupaniṣada puruṣa ("person taught in the Upaniṣads"), who is identified with the ātman (Br. iii. 9. 26) and who is in Br. ii. 1. 16 called the vijnānamaya puruṣa,—"the person who consists of intelligence". What we have said involves implicitly (and in the quotation from Aīt. i. 3. 13, explicitly) the identification of this puruṣa or ātman with the Brahman. Let us however trace the process a little further.

The second adhyāya of the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad commences with an interesting dialogue between the learned and proud Brahmin, Bālāki Gārgya, and Ajātaśatru, King of Kāsī. This dialogue is interesting from two points of view. In the first place we see the Brahmin, who came to the king to teach him the nature of Brahman, unable to do so, and becoming in his turn the pupil of the king. In the second place we notice that Bālāki in his conception of the Brahman sets forth the view of naturalistic pantheism, which, as we have seen, was probably the first stage in the development of the idea. Ajātaśatru, on the other hand, while admitting all that Bālāki says, shows that it is quite insufficient. Bālāki has defined the Brahman first as the person in the sun (āditye puruṣa). Then successively as the person in the moon, in lightning, in space (akāśa), in wind (vāyu), in fire (agni), in the waters; also as the person in the mirror, in the shadow, in echo and in the body. The king says in reference to all these, "But is that all?" When Bālāki confesses that he can go no further, the
king first, according to the parallel version in the Kauśitaki U., says, "He who is the maker of all these persons, He verily should be known". Then Ajātaśatru took Bālāki to a sleeping man whom he thus addressed, "O great one with white robes! Soma! King!"—and thus woke him. The king then asked, "When the man was asleep, where was the intelligent person (vijñānamaya puruṣa) and whence did he come back?" Bālāki did not know. Ajātaśatru then said, "When the man slept the intelligent person, having drawn in the prāṇas (i.e. the senses), lay in the ether within the heart; there enjoying bliss he was at rest... Just as a spider sends out its threads and sparks come forth from fire, so from this Self come forth all vital powers (prāṇas), all worlds, all gods, all beings. Its secret name (upaniṣad) is satyasya satyam (the reality of the real). The prāṇas are satyam (real). He is their satyam."

This is one of the most important passages in the Upaniṣads. Bālāki in his exegesis of Brahman sets it forth as pantheistic world-ground. To the king, however, this is misleadingly inadequate. If one would come to any adequate comprehension of Brahman it is best known as intelligent Spirit, the enduring upholder of one's own psychic existence. It is the Soul or Self (ātman), and this Self is the source of all existing things. They are real, but only because it constitutes their reality.

We see then, as Deussen says, that "All the thoughts of the Upaniṣads move round two fundamental ideas. These are (1) the Brahman, and (2) the Ātman. As a rule these terms are employed synonymously. Where a difference reveals itself, Brahman appears as the older and less intelligible expression, Ātman as the later and more significant; Brahman as the unknown that needs to be explained, Ātman as the known through which the other unknown finds its explanation; Brahman as the first principle so far as it is comprehended in the universe, Ātman so far as it is known in the inner self of man."¹ We have already given several examples but perhaps the most explicit of all is the Śāndilya-vidyā (Ś.B. x. 6. 3 and Ch. iii. 14) where it is first stated that, "This whole universe is Brahman" (sarvam khalu īdāṁ brahma), and then it is said

¹ Deussen, P.U. 38.
that this Brahman is to be identified with the self within,—
"This soul of mine within the heart, this is Brahman" (esa me ātmā antar-hṛdaye etad brahma).

"If then", says Deussen, "we hold fast to this distinction of the Brahman as the cosmical principle of the universe, the Ātman as the psychical, the fundamental thought of Upanisad philosophy may be expressed by the simple equation: Brahman = Ātman. That is to say,—the Brahman, the power which presents itself to us materialised in all existing things, which creates, sustains, preserves, and receives back into itself again all worlds, this eternal, infinite, divine power is identical with the Ātman, with that which, after stripping off everything external, we discover in ourselves as our real, most essential being."\(^1\) It is this identity of the Brahman and the Ātman which is expressed in the great sayings, tat tvam asī ("That thou art", Ch. vi. 8. 7) and aham brahma āsymi ("I am Brahman", Br. i. 4. 10)—the central texts of the Vedānta philosophy.

Here we must pause to discriminate. What has happened so far is that two diverse and in some degree independently developed conceptions, the Brahman,—the power behind the universe, and the Ātman,—the inmost reality of the individual soul, have been brought into relation, and the Brahman, the world-ground, is viewed as world-soul. But the word ātman is ambiguous, since it denotes both the individual and the supreme soul. If we distinguish between Ātman as supreme Soul and ātman as individual soul (jīva) by the use of a capital for the first, then it is clear that the Upaniṣads teach Brahman = Ātman, but do they also teach Brahman = Ātman = ātman? This of course is Śaṅkara’s interpretation. He takes the statements “That thou art” and “I am Brahman” quite literally as the statement of a pure identity. In reality there is only one Soul, though to the unenlightened, under the sway of avidyā (ignorance) and māyā (illusion), there may appear to be many. Deussen also, though in some points he dissent from Śaṅkara’s exposition of the Upaniṣads, agrees with him in the main, and says that their central doctrine is “a daring, uncompromising, eccentric idealism (comparable to that of

\(^1\) P.U. 39.
Parmenides)."¹ This earliest and most fundamental teaching he finds in the Yājñavalkya discourses of the Brhadāranyaka. Now these do undoubtedly teach that the Ātman is (1) the one knowing subject, (2) which is itself unknowable, and (3) which is the sole reality (the world being the apparent projection of its thought). "That Imperishable is the unseen seer, the unthought thinker. Other than it is none that sees, other than it is none that thinks."² "Thou canst not see the seer of seeing, thou canst not think the thinker of the thought, thou canst not know the knower of what is known."³ "Where there is duality, as it were, there one sees another, there one knows another. But where everything has become just one's own self, whereby and whom should one see? whereby and whom should one know?" ⁴

"These three thoughts", says Deussen, "are the kernel of the Upaniṣad teaching, and with it became permanently the kernel of the entire religious and philosophical belief of India".⁵ In a sense we may give a qualified acceptance to the latter half of the statement, since the Yājñavalkya doctrine was the basis of that of Śaṅkara, and Śaṅkara's interpretation, till recently, commanded the assent of probably three-quarters of the thinking minds of India. Nevertheless Deussen unwittingly uses the just word when he himself describes it as an "eccentric" idealism, since it is a departure from the central line of Hindu thought which is seen, we hold, in the Katha, the Gītā, and the Śūtras of Bādarāyana (most truly interpreted by Rāmānuja and Nimbārka). With regard to the Upaniṣads we have already in our discussion of their relative date and order of development shown reason to doubt whether the Yājñavalkya sections of the Brhadāranyaka were either so early, so central or so influential as Deussen supposes. He himself is compelled to admit that if the Yājñavalkya teaching is the kernel of the Upaniṣads, it had (from the point of view of a subjective idealist) a very thick husk.⁶ Further, that even in the Yājñavalkya sections the idealist position is not consistently upheld, lapsing into a pantheism which was perilously close to theism when he describes the Ātman as the antaryāmin or inner ruler.⁷

¹ P.U. 399. ² Br. iii. 8. 11. ³ Br. iii. 4. 2. ⁴ Br. ii. 4. 14. ⁵ P.U. 400. ⁶ P.U. 400. ⁷ P.U. 405, 175-6.
he admits that Yajñavalkya's views found the consciousness of his contemporaries already occupied with traditional views to which they had to accommodate themselves.\(^1\) Chief among these traditional views was the pantheistic or quasi-theistic view of the Brahman-Ātman as the evolver and ruler of a real universe which, we maintain, is the direct outgrowth of the teaching of the Saṃhitās, the Brāhmaṇas and the Āranyakas.

**The individual soul:** Among these traditional views which were accepted by the majority of the Upaniṣad thinkers, was, we hold, the belief in a plurality of real souls or selves. It is true there is no insistence on this doctrine in the early Upaniṣads, and at first sight one might suppose that the one Soul theory was far more widely accepted than is really the case. But that was just because the belief in a plurality of souls was so widely and so implicitly accepted as to render such teaching unnecessary. All the insistence is therefore upon the unity of the one supreme Self, who is the constitutive reality of the world and of individuals. As we have said before, the doctrine of unity is preached as a liberating gospel. Later, however, when the one Self theory had been sufficiently accepted to make such teaching necessary, the early metrical Upaniṣads definitely teach a plurality of individual immortal souls. This is not a new teaching as some (e.g. Stcherbatsky,\(^2\) Jacobi\(^3\)) suppose,—it was only a statement of what had long been implicitly accepted.

We repeat then that the central doctrine of the Upaniṣads, “This Ātman is that Brahman”, means that self-consciousness, our awareness of our own inner-selves, is a revelation of the nature of Brahman,—the supreme, adorable reality, in that He too is essentially Ātman,—the supreme Self. But this is different from saying, as Yajñavalkya and Śaṅkara do, that there is only one knowing Self who is both subject and object, for that involves that the Self is unknowable,—that the Self-knowledge which the Upaniṣads teach must above all be sought, is really unattainable.

\(^1\) P.U. 401.

\(^2\) Stcherbatsky: *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, 69ff.

\(^3\) Jacobi: *Die Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei den Indern*, 19ff. For an account and criticism see Keith, *R.P.V.* 545ff.
Do the Upaniṣads teach that the Brahman-Ātman is knowable?

We have already very largely answered this question, but must press it further and sum up. We have said that the central thought of the Upaniṣads is that Brahman is to be known as Ātman. So Deussen rightly says, "The general view that lies at the basis of the Upaniṣads is that Brahman is an object of knowledge".1 "The Ātman should be seen, comprehended, reflected on." (Br. ii. 4.) "The Self...that is what we should search for and endeavour to know." (Ch. viii. 7. 1.) The very object then of the Upaniṣads is to communicate the knowledge of the Brahman-Ātman as a means of salvation, and so they are said to teach the jñāna-mārga, the way of salvation through knowledge.

If we ask what are the attributes commonly ascribed to Brahman, conceived as the reality of the universe and essentially Ātman or Self, the orthodox answer is summed up in the word saccidānanda (sat, cit, ānanda, i.e. real existence, intelligence and bliss). This word does not occur in the older Upaniṣads but the ideas which it expresses are found in Br. iii. 9. 28, where Yājñavalkya says, "Brahman is knowledge and bliss" (vijñānam ānandaṃ Brahma), and in Tait. ii. 1, where we read, "He who knows Brahman as reality, knowledge, infinite (satyam jñānam anantam), he obtains every wish together with the intelligent Brahman". This latter passage occurs at the opening of a section called the Ānanda-valki in which the whole stress is upon the supreme bliss of Brahman, so that it is a natural conjecture that for anantam we should read ānandam. Ait. iii. takes intelligent consciousness (prajñāna) as the essential attribute of Brahman, called intelligent Self (prajñātman) and says, "Everything that heart and mind are,—sensation, perception, discrimination, conception, understanding, insight, resolve, thought, imagination, feeling, memory, volition, purpose, life, love and will,—all these are names of intelligent consciousness".

On the other hand, as we have seen, Yājñavalkya in the Brhadāraṇyaka, in teaching which reminds us of Kant's doctrine of the transcendental self, asserts that just because the Self is

1 P.U. 74.
the knower it cannot be known. Over and over again it is said, "That Self is not this, not that (neti, neti)"; and since there is no duality it is impossible to know it; yet at the same time it is said, "Lo verily, it is the Self that must be seen, thought on, pondered on. Lo verily, in the Self's being understood, this world-all is known" (iv. 5. 6.), and in iii. 8. 10, Yājñavalkya says, "Verily, O Gārgi, he who departs from this world not knowing that Imperishable, is pitiable".

Śaṅkara’s answer to this puzzle is his doctrine of the two orders of knowledge,—empirical (vyāvahārika) and ultimate or transcendental (pāramārthika), corresponding to which there are two forms of Brahman,—the higher (para) or unqualified (nirguṇa) Brahman, and the lower (apara) or qualified (saṅguṇa) Brahman. The lower Brahman is knowable, and all the passages in the Upaniṣads which speak of Brahman in positive terms as world-soul, or psychical principle, or God, Śaṅkara takes as referring to the lower Brahman only. This lower Brahman, though called Iśvara (Lord or God), is only empirically real (i.e. as real as the world of our sense-experience), but from the deeper (pāramārthika) point of view he is an illusory being, due to the imposition of a principle called Avidyā or Māyā upon the real. The only real Brahman is the higher, who is one and without attributes (an undifferentiated unity) and therefore unknowable. So, though Śaṅkara applies to Brahman the epithets sat, cit, ānanda, he explains the latter two away, speaking of ānanda as the mere absence of sorrow ("bliss without the fruition of happiness") and regarding cit as abstract intelligence or knowledge, denying that Brahman is a knowing Self.

It is perfectly clear, however, that there is no mention of Avidyā or Ajñāna (in the technical sense of a cosmic principle of Ignorance) in any of the older Upaniṣads, nor yet of Māyā in the sense of illusion. Nor is there any support for Śaṅkara’s doctrine of the two orders of knowledge or the two forms of Brahman, which, if imposed, distort the sense of the Upaniṣads. It is true that there are different ways of conceiving Brahman and Br. ii. 3. 6 does speak of two forms of Brahman,—the formed (mūrta) Brahman which is empirically knowable, and
the formless (amūrta) which is not an object of empirical knowledge. But though Śaṅkara claims the support of this passage, the distinction between the two forms here described and those of Śaṅkara is evident. For the mūrta brahman is just the universe of which the formless Brahma constitutes the Reality of reality (satyasya satyam). We shall see in our commentary to what desperate expedients of exegesis Śaṅkara has to resort to maintain his position. As Keith says, his whole attempt is "a clever tour de force without final validity, and its ingenuity is as great as its improbability".  

The Mysticism of Yājñavalkya. It may further, I think, be said that while Śaṅkara’s teaching was based upon Yājñavalkya’s it does not quite correctly interpret what Yājñavalkya was trying to express. It is difficult to discern in the Yājñavalkya passages any consistent philosophy, but it is evident that his epistemological agnosticism was coupled with and subservient to a mystical religion,—he denies an intellectual understanding of a Self but seeks for an intuitive immediacy of apprehension. “As a man in the embrace of a beloved wife knows nothing within or without, so this person, when in the embrace of the intelligent Self, knows nothing within or without. Verily that is his (true) form, in which his desire is satisfied, in which the Self is his desire.” (Br. iv. 3, 21.) Specially interesting is the passage in which he teaches that while those who trust in the intellect cannot attain Brahma, yet there is an apprehension of his being by those who are childlike. “Therefore let a Brahmin, flinging away learning, take his stand on childlikeness”, though even in that he is not to trust, nor in any state, but in the Self alone. (Br. iii. 5.) Moreover it is through quietening the strivings of the will and the empirically directed intellect that the conditions are realised for the being of Brahma to shine clearly within the individual soul. “Therefore having become calm, subdued, quiet, patiently enduring and collected, one sees the Self just in the self” (iv. 4. 23).

The purpose of Upaniṣad anti-intellectualism. We cannot treat in detail the teaching of the other Upaniṣads, but

1 R.P.V. 508.
a study of the Isā and Kena (which devote special attention to this subject, and which stress the need for knowing Brahman yet assert that He transcends knowledge), shows that their polemic against knowledge is not based upon any metaphysical puzzle but upon a view of religious knowledge which should be quite familiar to Christians. There is (1) a sense of the uniqueness and surpassing greatness of the Supreme, which makes his apprehension quite distinct from that of finite, empirically discerned objects; (2) A Socratic (as Christ-taught) humility,—a realisation of ignorance, coupled with earnest search and childlike teachableness; (3) A realisation that while Brahman is unknowable in the sense of unfathomable, incomprehensible, He may yet be apprehended, and so truly, though partially, known, by those who truly seek. The Katha adds the thought (found also in the Chāndogya and Taittirīya), (4) that the nature of religious truth is such that a teacher is necessary to impart it; and goes on also to add that (5) the ultimate source of illumination is Divine grace.

The teaching of the Katha, though at first sight somewhat contradictory, is quite clear and consistent, not being complicated by the metaphysical puzzle of the unknowability of the knower. It first, like most of the Upaniṣads, emphasises the mystery and wonder of the Supreme being. “That which is hard to see, entered into the hidden, dwelling in the deep,... whom many cannot even hear of, whom many even hearing do not know.” In characteristic Upaniṣad language, also, the antinomies which perplex human reason when it strives to understand Him are set forth. “Less than an atom, greater than the great.” “Sitting He travels afar, lying He goes everywhere.” He thus transcends the limitations of space and time, and yet is “Lord of the past and the future” and evolver and guide of a real universe. He is proclaimed by the Vedas as Brahman, and the sacrifices are means to his partial attainment, but He is above all to be recognised as the Self, “set in every creature’s heart”. Yet though so near He is not accessible to the senses or to the unaided intellect. “Not by reasoning is this thought obtainable.”

For in the first place moral preparation is necessary.
Who has not ceased from evil ways,
Who is untranquil, unprepared,
And he whose mind is not at peace,
By knowledge cannot win to Him.

In the second place a spiritual teacher (acārya or guru) is necessary. "Save by another taught there's no way thither." This follows from the very nature of spiritual truth, which is not a doctrine communicated through words but a light of vision, which requires a receptivity, an attitude of faith, which can best be communicated from one person to another. But the guru's work, though so important, is only preliminary. As in Christianity the Divine vision which brings salvation can only be the work of Divine grace.

Not by instruction may this Self be gained,
Nor intellect, nor by much scripture-learning;
Whomso He chooses, by him He may be gained,
To him this Self reveals His own (true) person.
Less than an atom, greater than the great,
The Self is hid in every creature's heart:
The unstriving man beholds Him, freed from sorrow,
Through the Creator's grace he sees the greatness of the Self.

Very definitely then the Katha Upanishad teaches the knowability of the Self. It is true that,

Not in the range of vision stands His form,
By outward eye no one soever sees Him.

But it is none the less true that for one who seeks in the right way,

By heart, by thought, by mind, He is apprehended;
Those who know Him thereby become immortal.
SPECIAL INTRODUCTION TO THE KĀTHA UPAŅIṢAD.

The Kaṭha Upaṇiṣad, as its name implies, belongs to the Black Yajur Veda school of the Kaṭhas or Kāṭhakas, and was almost certainly composed in the original home of that school, the Kuru-Paṇcāla country (the Agra-Delhi district).

According to Patañjali, the traditional founder of the school, was a pupil of Vaiśampāyana. The Kaṭhaka school now finds its chief home in Kāśmir, and the commentary on the Carana-vyūha describes how, on the separation of the Black Yajur Veda schools, the Kaṭhas and Kaṭha-Kapiṣṭhalas spread in the Panjāb and Kāśmir, the Maitrāyanīyas in Gujarāt, and the Taittirīyas in the South, while the White Yajur Veda school of the Vājasaneyins spread to the North-east (Kosala and Videha, the home of Buddhism). The original home of all of them was however the madhya-deṣa or Kuru-Paṇcāla country. The Taittirīya Samhitā, Brāhmaṇa, and Āranyaka, continually address themselves to the Bhāratas or Kuru-Paṇcālas; the Rāmāyana (ii. 3. 16) describes the Kaṭha school, together with the Taittirīya, as being in Ayodhya; and Uddālaka Āruṇi, from whom the father of Nāciketas is supposed to be descended, is described in Ś.B. xi. 4. 1, as a Kuru-Paṇcāla Brāhmin.

In the Black Yajur Veda there are normally no separate Brāhmaṇas, the prose explanations of the ritual not being (as in the case of the White Yajur) separated from the Samhitās. The Kaṭhaka Samhitā therefore has no Brāhmaṇa. In the Taittirīya school, however, in addition to the Brāhmaṇa material in the Samhitā, there is a supplement dealing with certain sacrifices omitted in the Samhitā and this is called the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa. Macdonell considers that the last three sections of Book iii. of this Brāhmaṇa (as well as the first two books of the Āranyaka) originally belonged to the Kāṭhaka school. “The different origin of these parts”, he says, is indicated by the absence of the change of ɣ and ɣ to iy and uv respectively, which otherwise prevails in the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa and

1 Mahābhārata on Pāṇini iv. 3. 104.
2 See Keith, Veda of the Black Yajur School, xcii. 3 ibid. xciii.
"Āraṇyaka." ¹ In one of these Kāṭhaka sections, Tait. B. iii, 11, by way of illustrating the significance of a particular fire-sacrifice called Nāciketa, the story is told of a boy, Naciketas, to whom the sacrifice was first revealed by the god of the dead. On this story is based the Kāṭha Upaniṣad.

The Integrity of the Kāṭha,

(a) The Kāṭha Upaniṣad is divided into two adhyāyas, each of three vallis. That the two adhyāyas were once distinct units, or rather that the first adhyāya formed a complete Upaniṣad to which the second was later added is shown by:—

1. The two summings up and phala-śrutis (declarations of the result of the teaching) in iii. 16, 17 and vi. 14, 15.

2. The absence of quotations in the first adhyāya as against their comparative frequency in the second; among the latter also are quotations from the first adhyāya.

3. The orderly development of the first adhyāya contrasted with the comparative absence of plan in the second.

4. The completeness of the first adhyāya in itself. The second makes a new beginning and repeats certain of the teachings of the first, though with differences.

5. The greater development in the conception of Yoga found in the second adhyāya, and the use of technical terms like indriya-dhāranā, apramatta; there is development also in theology, e.g. the conception of the sarva-bhūtāntarātman, which implies the antaryāmin doctrine, and in eschatology.

(b) There are also small later additions to the Upaniṣad, thus formed.

1. vi. 16, 17, and vi. 18 are clearly two later appendices.

2. i. 16–18, may be a later insertion, though this is doubtful.

All these parts, however, form a remarkably coherent whole so that it is possible for Charpentier to argue for the unity of the Upaniṣad by saying that the phala-śruti verses, iii. 16, 17 are apparently a late addition, and therefore "do not in the slightest degree prove that the original Upaniṣad was at an end here."²

¹ S.L. 212. ² Indian Antiquary, Dec., 1928, p. 229.
Belvālkara, on the other hand, maintains that the Upaniṣad is rather more composite than we have suggested, the original Upaniṣad consisting of vallīs i and ii only, vallī iii being added after some considerable interval and adhyāya II (vallīs iv–vi) again after rather a shorter interval. This, as to the comparative gap between the three parts, does not agree with his table of grouping, which puts a large mass of Upaniṣad material, including practically the whole Yājñavalkya section of the Brhadāranyaka, between Kaṭha I and II, and very little between I. i, ii and I. iii. It is true that the third vallī forms a characteristic whole, which shows distinct advance in thought, but it also completes the argument of the first two vallīs and Belvālkara has shown no adequate reason for separating it. (A possible reason however is given on page 48.)

The Date of the Kaṭha.

(a) Points of contact with Buddhism.

(1) Oldenberg argued that the Kaṭha must be pre-Buddhist because of the very close similarity between the story of the temptation of Gautama the Buddha by Māra and the story of the temptation of Gautama Naciketas by Mṛtyu told so vividly in the first vallī of the Upaniṣad. Keith says that this ignores the fact that the story is already found in the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa. This, however, is not the case. The Naciketas legend of course dates back to the Brāhmaṇa, which establishes its general priority over the Buddhist legend, but the story of the temptation of Naciketas occurs for the first time in the Upaniṣad.

(2) The prevalence of Nāstika-vādins, i.e. those who reply "nāsti" "He does not exist"), to the question as to what happens to a man after death (see Kaṭha i. 20), has been taken by some to be an evidence of post-Buddhist date. Here, it is said, we see the influence of the Buddhist doctrine of anattā (an-ātman),—the denial that man has an immortal soul. But though Buddha might say of himself as enlightened, "Rebirth has been extinguished, after this life there is no beyond ".

1 H.I.P. 92, 135. 2 Buddha, (Calcutta, 1927), 53–8. 3 R.P.V. 502. 4 Sermon in the Deer-Park, Mahāvagga i. 6, 46.
he does not seem for the ordinary man to have denied a transmigrating entity, and Aśoka's edicts show how prevalent the hope of heaven was among the early Buddhists. Later Buddhist thinkers might draw the logical conclusion from the Master's teaching, but Buddha himself was said to have forbidden his disciples to dwell on the view, "I have not a self", just as on the view "I have a self". Certainly the early Buddhists would have repudiated the title nāstika-vādin, for the term is found in Buddhist literature applied to such materialistic teaching as that of Ajita Kesakambalin. His was a doctrine of sceptical materialism directed both against Brahmanic ritualism and the doctrines of karman and the ātman. To all he said, "Nāsti",—"there is neither fruit of good or evil. A human being is built of the four elements. When he dies earth returns to earth, the fluid in him to water, the heat to fire, the breath to air, the īndriyāni or faculties into space. Fools and wise men alike on the dissolution of the body are cut off, are annihilated; after death they do not exist". We find his teaching set forth among the views of contemporary philosophers given by Ajātasattu, King of Magadha, as reported in the Sāmañña-phala-sutta. He was thus, if this tradition is correct, a contemporary of the Buddha, and this date, the latter half of the sixth century B.C., when such doubts were prevalent but before Buddha's own teaching had spread, is a possible date for the composition of the first part of the Katha Upaniṣad. Arguing on this ground alone a century later would of course be equally possible, as Buddhism does not seem to have spread in the Kuru-Pañcāla country, the probable place of composition of the Upaniṣad, for some considerable time after Buddha's death. In any case the argument from silence is precarious; the only point we are entitled to make is that as there is no trace of Buddhist ideas in the first adhyāya of the Katha there is nothing to make a pre-Buddhist date impossible.

Charpentier views the matter differently. "To me" he says, "it appears that the surroundings are entirely the same that we meet with in the old Buddhism. The question put to Yama in verse i. 20, is exactly the same as that repeatedly

1 Belvulkar, H.I.P. 452, Dasgupta, H.I.P. 80.
2 Dīgha Nikāya, ii.
3 Ind. Ant. Nov. 1928, p. 207.
put to the Buddha, viz. ‘does the Tathāgata survive after death, or does he not survive?’ In v. 11-12 duḥkha and suṣṭha seem to have the same sense of ‘unrest’ and ‘rest’ that they have in Buddhist philosophy, as is proved by Professor Stcherbatsky; śānti is just as well Buddhist as Upaniṣadic, etc. It thus seems probable that our text belongs to about the same time as the oldest Buddhist texts—perhaps the fourth century B.C.—and that it originated in the same spiritual surroundings as did these works.” The argument is very slight. It is really a matter of impression. (Also Charpentier does not distinguish between the two adhyāyas.)

Even when we come to the second adhyāya there is no clear indication of contact with Buddhist thought. Even the use of the term apramāṇa (vi. 11), may be perhaps sufficiently explained by reference to the undistractedness in meditation which Chāndogya i. 3, 12, says is necessary to fulfil one’s desire. But I cannot resist the impression that the stress on apramāṇa, vigilant concentration, in the Buddhist discipline as reflected in the Dhammapada, and its importance in the Yoga discipline of the Kaṭha and Munḍaka (as later in the Yoga-sūtras) are not unconnected. The mention of apramāṇa as one of the three most important ethical requisites in the Bhāgavata religion, as seen in the Besnagar pillar inscription, and the fact that the dhamma of Aśoka which consisted in vigilant and unremitting unselfish exertion might equally be characterised by the same term, seem significant of the spirit of the age.

(b) The Metre of the Kaṭha.

An argument for a comparatively early date is afforded by what Keith calls “the really antique character of the metre” of the Kaṭha, Kena, and Īṣā as compared with the Epic or with such early Buddhist texts as the Sutta-Nipāta. ¹ Stcherbatsky ² seems to take the metrically pre-Buddhist character of the Kaṭha for granted, but Keith points out the difficulty of comparison with texts written in a different language (i.e. Pāli) and Charpentier that here “pre-Buddhist” can only mean “pre-Aśokan”. Keith says that a more secure standard of comparison is with the Bhīṣaddevatā, which is with much plausibility assigned to the fourth century B.C. and suggests that the metre of the Kaṭha is older.
(c) Quotations by the Kaṭha.

(1) A comparative study of the common and similar passages found in the Kaṭha and other literature brings out very strikingly the originality of the first adhyāya and its difference from the second. Apart from the quotations from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa with which it begins, I have not been able to trace any clear quotations. It is true that the saying Anandā nāma te lokas ("Joyless surely are those worlds", i. 3a) occurs also in Br. iv. 4. 11, but one would judge that it was a common saying, describing the penalty for various offences (i.e. "He will certainly go to hell who does so and so"). Kaṭha i. 8 also contains some phrases which are found almost identically in Br. vi. 4. 12 and the idea behind is similar. But Br. vi. 4 is an appendix to the Upaniṣad, which, though it contains much ancient Vedic material, is in its present form certainly later than the Kaṭha. (Belvalkar calls it Neo-upaniṣadic.) We are, I think, justified in saying that Kaṭha I contains no quotations from other Upaniṣads.

(2) The second adhyāya of the Kaṭha, however, quotes several times from the Vedic Samhitās, at least four times (possibly nine) from the Brhadāraṇyaka, once perhaps from the Taittirīya, and possibly refers to the Kaṭaṇḍa. Its appendix, vi. 16 is quoted from the Chāndogya (viii. 6. 6).

Kaṭha iv. 5b. =vr. Br. iv. 4. 15b. Kaṭha iv. 13d. = Br. i. 5. 23d.
" iv. 5cd. = Br. iv. 4. 15cd. " v. 2. = Rg. iv. 40. 10.
" iv. 8. = Sāma. i. 2. 3. 7. " " = Tait. S. i. 8. 15.
" iv. 9ab. = Atharva. x. 18. 16. " v. 7d. cf. Kaṭaṇḍa. i. 2.
" " = Br. i. 5. 23ab. " v. 9b. = Rg. vi. 47. 18.
" iv. 9c. =vr. Br. ii. 5. 15. " " = Br. ii. 5. 19.
" iv. 12cd. = Br. iv. 4. 15cd.

With regard to the metrical portion of Br. iv. 4 (even by Deussen admitted to be late) it is not clear whether this is prior to the Kaṭha, or whether it is (as Belvalkar holds) largely

1 R.P.V. 502. 2 C.C.B. 68.

3 I started out with the presupposition of the priority of the Brhadāraṇyaka, even in its metrical portions, and the commentary sometimes betrays this. I have moved more and more however toward Belvalkar's view that the Kaṭha is here prior.
made up of quotations from the *Kātha* and the *Īṣā*, or whether there was a common store of verses which teachers of different schools felt free to use and adapt. Leaving these *Br.* iv. 4 passages aside it is curious how little definite quotation from Upaniṣad sources remains. Two of the four remaining *Br.* passages are originally quotations from the Saṃhitās. The passage *sa evādyā sa u śvaḥ* (*Br.* i. 5. 23d = *Kātha* iv. 13d) also occurs in the *Br.* as a quotation from another source, but I have not been able to trace it. *Tām devāḥ sarve arpitās* (*Kātha* iv. 9c.) = (vr.) *asmin ātmani sarve devāḥ samarpitāḥ* (*Br.* ii. 5. 15) is the residuum of what seemed at first sight such an impressive list of quotations from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. It is quite possible therefore that the author even of *Kātha* II made no direct use of the text of any other Upaniṣad.¹ On the other hand it seems quite clear that he was in touch with the school of thought represented in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. Among the most characteristic doctrines of the Yājñavalkya section is that of the *antaryāmin* or Inner-controller, who dwells in fire, wind and sun, in the breath and bodily powers, and also in mind and understanding, and yet is other than all these. "He is your Soul, the Inner-controller, the Immortal." (*Br.* iii. 7.) Our author does not use the word *antaryāmin*, but he speaks of the *antarāman* (Inner-soul) who is also *eko vaśi* (One controller), immanent yet transcendent, in very similar terms. It seems clear that he knew and used Yājñavalkya's conception, adapting it so as to bring out more clearly its theistic nature.

¹ Re the verse in common with *Tait*. there is really nothing to show that the one Upaniṣad quotes the other.

Notes on page 47:

² R.P.V. 500. ³ H.I.P. 95.

4 Muniḍa and Śvetāsvatara parallels with Kātha.


"ii. 2. 10. = " v. 15. " iii. 20. =vr. " ii. 20. "

"iii. 2. 3. = " ii. 23. " iv. 11.cd.=vr. " i. 17cd. "


"vi. 14. = " v. 15."

*(Keith quoting this parallel says, "Muniḍa. apparently uses *Śvet* ". But there is nothing to show this.)
(d) Quotations from the Kaṭha.

Keith says that "the Ḡṛṣṇa is clearly dependent on the Kaṭha", and cites Ḡṛṣṇa 8 cf. Kaṭha v. 13. The case cited is not clear, but Ḡṛṣṇa 4, 5, and 6, 7, may be dependent on Kaṭha ii. 21, and iv. 5, 12. Belvalkar holds that Munḍaka is intermediate between Kaṭha I and Kaṭha II, holding that Munḍ. ii. 2. 10 is more original than Kaṭha v. 15. Here we dissent. The Munḍaka, though probably not much later than Kaṭha II, quotes from and is dependent on both sections of the Kaṭha. The Śvetāśvatara also is clearly dependent on both Kaṭha I and II. It is probably somewhat later than the Munḍaka, its theology and its yoga showing much more advance on the Kaṭha than does the Munḍaka. Then, in order, probably come Mahānārāmayana, Praśna and Maitri, the last of which very freely quotes the Kaṭha and expands some of its ideas.

The Gitā has a specially close relation to the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, being virtually an expansion of the parable of the chariot. Not only does it freely quote from the Kaṭha, but it uses its characteristic phrases and adopts and develops its characteristic thoughts. It is also clearly dependent on the Śvetāśvatara.

5 The Gitā is dependent on the Kaṭha in the following passages:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gitā</th>
<th>Kaṭha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ii.  19, 20, on</td>
<td>ii.  19, 18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii.  29</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. 42</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viii. 11</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xi.  53, 54, on</td>
<td>ii.  23.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xiii. 31–33</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xv.  1</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xv.  6</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compare also the following phrases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gitā</th>
<th>Kaṭha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nāyam loko 'sti na paraḥ. (4. 40)</td>
<td>Ayam loko nāsti paraḥ. (2. 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prāk śarīra vimokṣaṇāt. (5. 23)</td>
<td>Prāk śarīrasya vīrasaḥ. (6. 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanta te kathayiśyāmi. (10. 19)</td>
<td>Hanta te īdaṁ pravakṣyāmi (5. 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tad dhāma paramaṁ mama. (8. 21)</td>
<td>Tad viṇoḥ paramaṁ padam. (3. 9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ya īdaṁ paramaṁ guhyam, (18. 68)</td>
<td>Ya īmaṁ paramaṁ guhyam, (3. 17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mad-bhakteṣo abhikāṣyati.</td>
<td>śrāvayet brahma-saṁsādi.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here we have not only obviously reminiscent phraseology which shows a very close acquaintance of the Gitākāra with the Kaṭha, but, allied with it, conscious development of the thought which can surely leave no doubt which way the dependence lies. Yet only ten years ago Sir S. Radhakrishnan could write, "The Kaṭha Upaniṣad...quotes freely from the Bhagavadgitā", and append a note, "Some scholars are inclined to the
Conclusion:

The first *adhyāya* of the *Kāṭha* shows close acquaintance with the modes of thought prevalent in the Brāhmaṇaśas and no trace of acquaintance with Buddhist thought, though a strong interest in the problems which moved men during Buddha’s time. Spite of its metrical form all the evidence goes to favour a fairly early date, though it obviously does not belong to the earliest group of Upaniṣads. All this suggests a date somewhere about 550 to 500 B.C.

In the third *vallī*, however, we have hints for the first time of a new development of thought,—there is explicit recognition of a distinction between the individual and the supreme soul, a doctrine of *yoga*, and a suggestion of a distinction within the Supreme being which provides a basis for theism.

These hints are taken up and developed in the second *adhyāya*, and then in the *Mundaka* and *Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣads*, and the movement of thought culminates in the theology of the *Gītā*,—the doctrine of Kṛṣṇa as the Highest Person; of Brahman or the *aṅśara avyakta* (eternal unexpressed) as his higher nature, the basis of individual souls and their goal and abode when saved by grace; and of the world as a lower expression of that same nature. The linkage is clear and the whole movement of thought may not have required more than a century.

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*Kāṭha and Gītā (continued from previous page).* View that the Kāṭha is older than the Gītā*. (I.P. vol. I. 142.) Indian opinion is curiously inclined to cling to the antiquity of the Gītā, even as against other śāstras. Even Principal Dasgupta, who in the first volume of his H.I.P. could write, “Though we may be slow to believe such an early date as has been assigned to the Bhagavadgītā by Telang (4th century B.C.) yet I suppose that its date could safely be placed so far back as the first half of the first century B.C. or the last part of the second century” (p. 421) now, at the end of his second volume, suggests that it was pre-Buddhist. But the discussion of this subject demands another volume—from him.

(Re the relation of the Kāṭha and the Gītā, students may further consult Prof. D. S. Sarma’s excellent little book, The Kāṭha and the Gītā, Madras, 1932.) Also for a description of the age and circumstances in which the Gītā was probably written, the chapter on “The Age of the Gītā” in the Introduction to his Bhagavad Gītā.
The *Kaṭha* then is linked with the Brāhmaṇas on the one side and with the *Gitā* on the other. Intermediate is the third *vālī* which is part of the first *adhyāya* yet is the fountain-head of the new development. (It is for this reason, no doubt, that Belvarkar suggests an intermediate date for its composition.) As to the date of the *Gitā* there is still much uncertainty, but all the evidence (summarised in the Introduction to Hill's *Bhagavadgītā*, I–18), suggests that on the one hand it is post-Aśokan and on the other not much later than the Ghasunḍī and Besnagar inscriptions, i.e. 230 to 150 B.C.

If then we may venture to suggest dates which fit the evidence we have been trying to summarize.

*Kaṭha* I may have been composed about 500 B.C.  
" I iiii (if separate) " 400 "
" II " 350–300 "
*Mundaka*  
" 280 "
*Svētāsvatāra*  
" 250–200 "
*The Gitā*  
" 200 "

But there are so many elements of uncertainty that all this is still tentative.

**The Argument of the Kaṭha.**

*Caveat.* A synopsis, if it is not a colourless list of headings, is necessarily also an interpretation. For its justification and also, in places, for material for quite different interpretations, the reader is referred to the commentary.

**Valī I. The story of Naciketas in the house of Death.**

1–9. To keep his father's word Naciketas goes to the house of Death, where for three days he remains unfed. To atone for inhospitality Death offers him three gifts.

10–11. For the First Gift he chooses return to his father.

12–19. For the Second Gift, knowledge of the Nāciketa fire-sacrifice, leading to immortality.

20–29. For the Third Gift he chooses knowledge concerning the meaning of "the great Passing-beyond". Death tests Naciketas by offering instead all that men usually value,—sons, wealth, power, long life, and every kind of pleasure. Naciketas rejects them all, for in the presence of Death he has seen their vanity. He asks again therefore to know the secret of what lies beyond death.
**INTRODUCTION**

*Valli II. Death's teaching concerning Immortality,—the discernment and attainment of eternal reality.*

1–6. There are two ways,—the way of knowledge and of good, and the way of ignorance and pleasure. Men, deluded by the fair shows of life and grasping at fancied gain, fall into a childish materialism which is the cause of their slavery to death.

7–11. Wonderful and hard to comprehend is the supreme Reality,—unattainable indeed by human reasoning. Such knowledge can only be imparted by a true spiritual teacher to a fit pupil. Yama therefore accepts Naciketas as his disciple, but recognises that in one respect he is superior to himself. For Yama, through sacrifice, has obtained the sovereignty of heaven, while Naciketas is ready to surrender all wealth, heavenly as well as earthly, that he may know ultimate reality.

Verses 12 and 13 begin the instruction. The reality Naciketas seeks is very deeply hidden, yet through *adhyātma-yoga* (spiritual yoking, or meditation on the inner self) its divine nature may be realised. Apprehending it as Spirit a true inquirer like Naciketas attains that which is of supreme value.

14. That is what I want, said Naciketas. I do not ask about religious duties or merits, or their results. I seek to know that which is deeper than all the happenings of time. Tell me about eternal Reality.

15–17. In the first place, replied Yama, eternal Reality is symbolised by the word "Om" which is, or represents, the imperishable Brahman,—the supreme goal, the supreme stay of all, and the only source of true greatness.

18–20. Now look within. Birth and death are only bodily changes. There, at the centre of your being, in the undying Soul, is eternal reality. There in your own heart you may, by Divine grace, have a vision of the greatness of the Ātman,—your own self, yet the Self of all, and so may be delivered from all sorrow.

21–25. Yet how may the Self be gained? For ordinary men with ordinary methods He seems a baffling enigma. Keenness of intellect, scripture learning, religious instruction,
ARGUMENT

all these by themselves are vain. But to the purified, tranquil, collected soul the Supreme Soul, in grace, manifests himself. Other men, no matter what their social or supposed religious status, are but the food of Death.

Valli III. The Parable of the Chariot, teaching adhyatma-yoga,—the yoking of the soul with the eternal reality which is its basis.

1–9. The third valli begins by distinguishing two souls, called shadow and light (i.e. the individual and the supreme souls). The relation of the two, and the way by which the individual may yoke all his powers for the attainment of the highest, are set forth in the parable of the chariot.

The individual soul is lord of the chariot of the body. Its active powers (the indriyani or "senses", pictured as horses) may be potent for good or evil. Only when well yoked and controlled by mind and reason can they be guided to the right goal (described as "the highest place of Vishnu"). Here then we are introduced to the way of Yoga defined later as indriya-dhāranā,—"control of the senses", i.e. to the yoga of discipline.

10–13. The next section seems to teach a higher yoga,—the yoga of communion. Reason, the "charioteer", is a faculty of the ātman,—the individual soul, called "great" because it is lord of all the faculties. But the soul can only rise to the height of its powers and effectively control the "senses" when it realises that it is the expression of a deeper principle,—the divine nature or energy called Avyakta ("the Unexpressed"), the ground both of the world and of all individual souls. Still more ultimate is the Purusha, the highest Self or "Person".

14, 15. This way which goes beyond all outward, empirically describable things, beyond our finite separate personality to the eternal ground of all being, is said to be "sharp as a razor's edge". Yet for keen, earnest souls it leads beyond death to immortality.

16, 17. Here probably ended the original Upaniṣad, and these two verses describe the result of its recital. (But it raised problems concerning the nature of the Self and the meaning of yoga, which a later teacher sought to solve, possibly with reference to discussions in other schools of the Yajur Veda.)
Vallī IV. The need for Inner Vision, leading to the perception and attainment of unity.

1, 2. Our normal vision is outward, through the senses to the world: but a certain sage (possibly Naciketas) desiring immortality turned his vision inward and saw the Self.

3–5. What is meant by the Self? Verses 3 and 4 define it as the perceiving and knowing subject. But the experiencer, called in verse 5, ātman jīva, "the living soul", is not a mere individual. It is one with the eternal Lord, and knowledge of this truth strips away all fear.

6–9. Verses 6–9 quote or refer to a number of Vedic mantras which show that the One Lord, who has entered the human heart as the soul, is also the universal Soul, from which all creation has sprung. He is the supreme life-power, worshipped in the sacrifice through the sacred fire. He is seen also in the sun, which like all nature powers has its being in Him.

10, 11. All beings then, ultimately regarded, are one, and it is failure to realise this unity which is the cause of death.

12, 13. The human soul was popularly supposed to reside as a "thumb-sized person" in the heart. Yet the inner person is not to be viewed as a separate individual, for it is one with the eternal Lord.

14, 15. So, it is repeated, failure to perceive unity leads to distraction and waste. Perception of unity leads to unity.

Vallī V. The Inner-soul, immanent yet transcendent.

1–8. The Lord of the city of the body is also immanent Lord of the world. He is eternal Brahman yet as individual soul He dwells (like a dwarf) in human bodies. As such He is subject to transmigration, which is determined by knowledge and deeds. His essential nature as Self is seen in that He is eternally conscious even in those who are asleep. He is also the Brahman, the eternal world-ground.

9–11. He is, then, the Antarātman,—the one Inner-soul of all beings. Like air and fire he is immanent and all-pervading, "enwrapped in every form". Yet He is also transcendent: none can fully express Him. He also transcends the sorrow and imperfection of the world, being like the sun, which reveals the faults in visible things but is itself untainted by them.
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12-14. As Inner-Soul He stands within the individual soul, and they are truly wise who direct their vision within and find Him there. Such vision alone brings enduring joy and peace. But how is such vision possible. Only as He himself shines into the seeking soul.

Valli VI. The way of adhyātma-yoga further expounded.

Verses 1-3 begin by comparing the world to an inverted pipal tree, whose unseen root is Brahman. He is the mysterious awful living energy from whom the universe originates and whom its powers must ever obey.

4, 5. Through knowledge of Him a man is saved and fitted for higher life. Such vision is possible in all the worlds through which the soul may pass in its long transmigration, but nowhere is clearer vision possible than here and now, within one’s soul.

6-8. In order to obtain this liberating vision a man must penetrate within to the inmost recesses of his being; beyond the senses and instincts, beyond mind, beyond reason to the great soul. Beyond that also to its unexpressed basis (the Anyakta). Beyond that to the highest Person (Puruṣa).

9-13. That Person, being all-pervading and bodiless, can never appear to outward vision, yet by heart and thought inward apprehension is possible. The senses and mind must be withdrawn from outward objects, even reason must cease to strive, and, with all one’s powers held in control, one must vigilantly concentrate all one’s attention within. To do this, faith in the existence of the inmost Person is first necessary, but this leads on to immediate experience in which his inner being, which transcends all description, is made manifest.

14, 15. Thus all the knots that bind the heart are cut. Desiring only Brahman one attains Brahman, and so attains to immortality.

THE KĀTHA UPANIŚAD

Introductory Prayer.

Om!

May He protect us both!
May He be pleased with us!
With vigour may we work together!
Successful may our study be!
Let there be no variance between us!
Om! Peace! Peace! Peace!

The Introductory Prayer is not part of the Upaniṣad proper and is not found (or occurs in abbreviated form) in many MSS. It is found prefixed to other Upaniṣads also, e.g. the 2nd and 3rd vallis of the Taittiriya. Teacher and pupil recite it together before they begin their study. Harmonious co-operation between teacher and pupil in vigorous keen study will, by God’s help, lead to success. Tejasvin (keen, bright, energetic, successful) may refer to the brightness and keenness of the study or the splendour of its successful result, or to both.
First Valli.—The legend of Naciketas, found in the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, III. 11. 8 (given in Appendix I, page 214) is taken to provide a dramatic setting for a discussion on the nature and conditions of immortality. The original Brāhmaṇa story is told to explain the origin and title of the so-called Nāciketa fire sacrifice and to extol the blessings which it confers. The Brahmin boy, Naciketas, is told by his father in a fit of anger to go to Death. He goes to Yama’s house and finds him absent, and so for three days and nights remains there unfed. Yama, on his return, thus convicted of the sin of inhospitality to a Brahmin, offers three gifts in recompense. For the first Naciketas said, “Let me return alive to my father.” For the second, “Tell me how my good works (iṣṭā-pūrte) may not be exhausted”. For the third, “Tell me the conquest of re-death (punar-mṛtyu)”. In answer to both the second and the third questions we are told, “He (Yama) told him this Nāciketa fire”.

In Ṛg-Vedic times men looked forward after death to a happy immortality in which they would unite with the fathers and the gods and enjoy the reward of their good works (iṣṭā-pūrte, “sacrifices and works of charity”) in highest heaven. (See Ṛg. X. 14, quoted p. 63.) In the Brāhmaṇas we see a growing doubt and fear that such happiness may not last. What if the effect of the good deeds wears out and in place of the desired immortality in the next world there comes renewed death? Hence the priestly teaching that many sacrificial rites are required to save from this: and among these is the Nāciketa fire. Still later, in the early Upaniṣad period, came fear of rebirth on earth (see Keith, R.P.V. 570–3).

The author of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, teaching in a period when not only the doctrine of transmigration but also materialist and other nāstika doubts as to any continuing self had developed, substitutes for Naciketas’s third request as given in the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa (which is only a repetition of the second), the request that he may be taught the real meaning of the “great transition” which men call death, and by this knowledge may be set free. With the answer to this third question, which begins with the second valli, the Upaniṣad teaching proper begins. The first valli, with its account of the Nāciketa
Prathamā Vallī.

1. Uśan ha vai Vājaśravasaḥ sarva-vedasaṃ dadau;
   Tasya ha Naciketā nāma putra āsa.
2. Tam ha kumāram santam daksinās tuñyamānāsū
   śraddhā 'viveśa so 'manyata.
3. Pitodakā jagdha-trṇā,
   dugdha-dohā nirindriyāḥ;
   Anandā nāma te lokās,
   tān sa gacchati tā dadat.

FIRST VALLĪ.

Naciketas and his father.

1. Being desirous (of reward) Vājaśravasaḥ gave all his goods
   (in sacrifice). Now he had a son named Naciketas.
2. Though he was but a boy, as the offerings were being led
   away faith entered into him, and he thought:
3. Their water drunk, their grass eaten,
   Their milk milked, their strength worn out:
   Joyless, surely, are those worlds,
   To which he goes who gives these (cows).

₁ Or, Uśan Vājaśravasa.

fire, is simply a dramatic introduction, though it is interesting
as representing a type of thought which, first developed in
the Brāhmaṇas, still persisted alongside of the thought of the
Upaniṣads and was indeed far more widely prevalent.

1. Being desirous (uśan): The first word of the Upaniṣad
strikes the key-note of the religion of the Brāhmaṇas,—desire
for earthly or heavenly gain, prompting sacrifices to the gods
and gifts to the priests. The key-note of the *Upaniṣads* is sounded in II. 20: “One who is free from desire beholds Him”. This is the note also on which the Upaniṣad ends:

When all desires are given up
That dwell within the human heart,
Then mortal man becomes immortal,—
Even here to Brahmān he attaineth.

Sometimes in the Upaniṣads and in later literature this liberation from desire tends to be spoken of as the attainment of an infra-human, stone-like indifference. The story of Nāciketas is valuable as showing that this is not the true way of regarding it. The story links up the religion of the Brāhmaṇas and the religion of the Upaniṣads and shows that the latter was not merely the antithesis but also the true fulfilment of the former. In the Brāhmaṇas sacrifice had become mechanical and soulless. But there was a right idea behind it. Vājaśravasa’s vow to give all that he had in sacrifice and in gifts to the priests was only a conventional exaggeration, and he interpreted it like Ananias. But his son Nāciketas, into whose heart faith had entered with the enthusiasm of youth, was shocked when he saw the selection of old cattle his father really offered, and it seemed to him sheer sacrilege. Both to save his father and to keep faith, he felt bound to offer himself. Dedication of the whole self in faith is the true sacrifice. It is desireless in the sense that it is prompted by no desire of reward, but it leads to “fulfilment of desire” in the highest sense.

Re *Uśan*, we have followed the traditional interpretation given by Śaṅkara and all commentators on the Upaniṣad. In his bhāṣya on the *Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa*, however, Bhāṭṭabhāskara Miśra, commenting on *Uśan ha vai vājaśravasah*, says, *Uśan nāma vājaśravasaḥ pañyan—“The offspring of Vājaśravas named Uśan”, and this certainly seems a more natural reading of the Sanskrit. There still remains the possibility that the name was invented in Bunyan’s fashion to suit the story,—“Mr. Desirous”; (or perhaps “Willing” or “Zealous”; for in the Brāhmaṇa there is no criticism of the offering on the ground that the cows were so poor or that Vājaśravasa was not sincere, but simply a feeling on the part of Nāciketas that a son was needed to complete the offering).

Note that verses 1, 2, and 4 are in prose, and are an almost exact quotation from the *Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa*. The reflections of Nāciketas in verses 3, 5, and 6, are in verse (like the rest of the Upaniṣad) and are an addition to the original Brāhmaṇa story. 3c is a tag which may possibly be quoted from *Br*., iv. 4. 11a, but more likely is a current saying variously applied in various contexts (cf. also *Isā* 3).
4. Then he said to his father, “Father, to whom will you give me?”
   Twice he asked and thrice. Then (being angry) he answered, “To Death do I give you.”

5. (Naciketas thought),
   Out of many I go foremost,
   Out of many I go midmost;
   What, I wonder, does Death need done,
   That he will do by me to-day.

4. To whom will you give me? Saṅkara says, Kasmai ātvig-viśeśāya daksinārtham mām dāsyasi—“To whom, i.e. to what particular priest will you give me as a daksīna or offering?” The explanation seems reasonable. Naciketas was willing to be given as a servant to make up as far as he could for the defect of his father’s offering. His father, however, angered by the persistence of his “priggish” son, bursts forth with the equivalent of an angry Englishman’s “Go to hell”. His words were probably a mere expression of annoyance but Naciketas, in his piety, takes them literally, and sets out for the house of Yama, the god of death.

Quite what we are to understand by this is not clear,—the story in the Tait. B. as well as in the Kaṭha is very sketchily told. In Vedic times Yama’s house was conceived as in highest heaven, usually in the sun, and inaccessible to mortals. Max Müller supposes that “the father, having once said so, though
6. Anupaśya yathā pūrve,
pratipaśya tathā 'pare;
Sasyam Īva marthāḥ pacayate,
sasyam Īva ājñayate punah.

6. Look back, as (fared) the former men,
Look on, so will the after ones:
Like corn a mortal ripeneth,
Like corn, is hither born again.
in haste, had to be true to his word and sacrifice his son"). Whitney is however probably correct when he says, "To suppose anything of the kind is quite out of the spirit of the story. He simply goes, as naturally as in folk-lore stories everywhere people go to the (prosaically) most impossible places."

5, 6. Śaṅkara represents Naciketas, startled at what has happened, going apart to reflect. Is it just that he should have to die? He has tried to do his duty and cannot help knowing that he is better than many sons ("Among many I go first"). At least he is not worse than the average ("Among many I go midmost"). His father has obviously spoken without purpose but there must be purpose behind. It must be, he reflects, that God has some special need of him. Then, seeing his father full of grief, Naciketas comforts him with the words of verse 6, which following Śaṅkara, we should render,

"Look back, how men of old behaved,
Look round, so others now behave."
i.e. Your ancestors never falsified their word, and good men to-day never do so. Besides, what gain would there be? Man at best is transitory,—what will happen must have happened very soon. Do not grieve for what is inevitable and don't think of breaking your word.

We have given Śaṅkara's explanation as it merits consideration, and is followed by practically all Indian commentators, but it is surely more ingenious than convincing. We are rather inclined, with Max Müller and Whitney, to regard both, vv. 5 and 6 as a meditation of Naciketas, the subject of both being the same, the transitoriness of human life. After all it is nothing unique that has happened to him. He is one of a large company moving toward the world of the departed,—the first of many who will come after, the midst of many of his contemporaries. The important thing is to find out the meaning of it all, for it must have a meaning. Why is Yama singling him out?—what will he do through
Naciketas in the house of Death.

7. Like unto Fire a Brahmin guest
   Makes entry into houses:
   They make this his peace-offering,—
   “Bring water, O Vaivasvata”.

him? The same idea is repeated in another and more generalised form in verse 6. As Whitney says, “He sends his gaze first along after (anu) his predecessors, and then in the other direction to meet (prati) those who are coming after him,”—all fare alike. Then comes the classic couplet on transmigration,—man is like corn which ripens and rots that it may be born again.

Verse 6 may possibly be an interpolation. It is unnecessary after verse 5. It is an anachronism if we have in view the supposed date of the Naciketas story (Tait. B. mentions punar-mṛtyu but not punar-janma). It is dramatically incorrect in that Naciketas is here represented as already knowing a good deal about “the great passing-beyond.” On the other hand if we view the matter from the standpoint of the author of the Kātha Upaniṣad, transmigration had by his time become an established doctrine and stood in the forefront of men’s minds. The Brhadāraṇyaka had first explicitly taught it, and thereafter all the Upaniṣads assume it and seek deliverance from it. It is not unnatural therefore that it should find mention at this point where Naciketas is setting out on his search for eternal reality.

Between verses 6 and 7 there is a gap. In the Brāhmaṇa story Naciketas goes to Yama’s house at the command of a divine Voice. Śaṅkara however fills in as follows: “Thus addressed, the father sent him to Death to keep his word, and he having gone to the mansion of Yama fasted for three nights, Yama being away. When Yama returned his ministers or wife said to him,”—then follow verses 7 and 8.

7. Vaiśvānara means “belonging to all men”. It is an epithet of Agni, occurring 60 times in the Rg Veda, and is used to designate fire in all its aspects.

Vaivasvata, i.e. Yama, son of Vivasvat (the sun).
8. **Aśā-pratīkṣe saṅgataṁ sūnṛtāṁ,**  
*ca jīṣṭā-pūrte putra-paśūṁś ca sarvān,*  
Etad vṛṇkte puruṣasya alpa-medhaso,  
yasya anaśnan vasati brāhmaṇo grhe.

8. Hope and expectation, friendship and joy,  
Sacrifices and good works, sons, cattle, all,—  
All this is wrenched from him of little wit  
In whose house a Brahmin abides unfed.

Just as fire is appeased by water, so a Brahmin guest must  
be pleased with hospitable entertainment, beginning with  
water to wash his feet, otherwise his presence, like fire, is  
destructive to the house. Note the high position of the Brahmins  
at this period; even a god is represented as guilty and liable  
to great loss if he offends one of them. As the Śatapatha  
Brāhmaṇa said, “There are two kinds of devas, the gods in  
heaven and the Brahmins on earth.” (II. ii. 2. 6.) To some  
extent, however, the Kaṭha may be regarded as a piece of  
Brahmin propaganda. It represents the supreme knowledge  
of the Ātman as having been divinely revealed to a Brahmin,  
whereas the older Upaniṣads represent this knowledge as first  
atained by Kṣatriyas and communicated by them to Brahmins.  
Thus the Brhadāraṇyaka and the Chāndogya represent the Brah-  
min sage Gautama Āruṇi, the teacher of the great Yājñavalkya,  
as receiving instruction from Pravāhaṇa Jaivali, King of the  
Pañcālas, who says, “This knowledge has never come to  
Brahmins before you”. (Br. vi. 2, Ch. v. 3, esp. 7.) In the  
Kauṭitaki (i. 1) Āruṇi is also said to have gone as pupil to King  
Citra Gārgyāyaṇa, and in Br. ii. 1 and Kauś. iv. the proud  
Brahmin Gārgya is represented as a pupil of Ajātaśatru, King  
of Kāši. (But see Keith, R.P.V. 492–6 and Dasgupta, H.I.P.,  
31, 33–35.)

8. **Saṅgata =** fellowship, friendly intercourse.  
**Sūnṛtā** in Vedic Sanskrit means “joy” (see Macdonell, S.D.). In later  
Sanskrit, especially among the Jains, it meant the virtue of kindly speech.  
(Sometimes also “truth,” opp. of anṛta.) Śaṅkara interprets, “The  
fruit resulting from fellowship with good men and from true and pleasant  
speech.”
9. "Sacrifices and good works" (Iṣṭā-pūrte):

Iṣṭā, pp. of yaj=sacrificed, so things sacrificed, sacrifice.
Pūrta, pp. of pṛ=filled, fulfilled, so n.(1) fulfilment, (2) merit or charitable work.

Śaṅkara says, iṣṭā-pūrte—iṣṭam yāgaṇaṁ phalam, pūrtam ārāmādi-
kriyājanāṁ phalam. "Iṣṭam means fruit produced by sacrifice, pūrtam—fruit resulting from such works as planting gardens, etc."

This agrees with the regular Vedic use of the phrase. Cf. for example the great funeral hymn, Rg Veda X. 14, where the departed soul is addressed as follows:

San ācchasva pīrabhṛḥ, san Yamena,  
iṣṭā-pūrtena parame vioman.

"Unite thou with the fathers and with Yama,  
With the reward of thy sacrifices and good works in highest heaven."

(See Macdonell, V.R.S. 170.)

Vṛṇkte, 3 s. pr. A. of vrj, P. vrṇaksi, to turn, twist. A.=to remove, wrench away (from anyone, g. or ab.). The subject is brāhmaṇaḥ, and the literal translation, "A Brahmin wrenches away all this, (i.e. all the things enumerated in the first half verse) from the man of little understanding in whose house he remains unfed". Śaṅkara: vṛṇkte—āvar-
jayati, vināśayati. ("Vṛṇkte=removes, destroys.")

With verse 8 cf. Br. vi. 4. 12, where a Brahmin who has been injured curses his injurer with the words, "I take away your sons and cattle (puṇā-paśūms-te, ādade), I take away your sacrifices and meritorious deeds (iṣṭā-sukṛte), I take away your hope and expectation (āśā-parākāśau)".

9. Welfare to me (svasti me, āstū), i.e. Pardon me and let me be freed from the sin of inhospitality.
The First Gift.

10. (Naciketas said):

That with anxiety allayed and anger gone,
Gautama may be gracious to me, O Death,—
That he may know and welcome me, by you sent back,—
This choose I as the first gift of the three.

11. (Yama replied):

Auddālaki Āruṇi having known you
Sent back by me, will be just as before:
Sweet will he sleep at night, his anger gone,
On seeing you from Death’s (dread) maw released.

11. Mat-prasṛṣṭah, “sent back by me,” is nom. in apposition with the subject, Auddālaki-Āruṇi. But this gives an unsuitable meaning, since the one sent back is Naciketas, not his father. Śaṅkara interprets as mayā anujñātaḥ, “permitted or instructed by me”. This is quite different from the obvious meaning of the phrase in the previous verse, and cannot be accepted. Bohtlingk amends the text to prasṛṣṭe, “Having recognised (you) A-A will be just as before to one by me dismissed”. Whitney suggests prasṛṣṭaṁ, and we accept his emendation as almost inevitable. Se we render, “Just as before will A-A be, having recognised
(you as) one sent back by me”. Whitney himself however renders, “As of old shall A-A be cheerful (toward thee) sent forth by me,”—somewhat doubtfully accepting the second meaning of pratița.

Pratița, pp. of prati+ı, gone toward and therefore (1) recognised, known, acknowledged, and so (2) convinced, satisfied, cheerful. Commenting on pratița, in verse 10, Sañkara says, pratițo labdha-smrīthiḥ—sa eva evam putro samāgataḥ ity-evam pratyabhijñanam ity-arthaḥ. “Pratița means recollected, recognising this is my very own son come back again.” On the whole we prefer to follow Sañkara here, though Hume and Deussen join Whitney in rendering, “cheerful” or “happy,” and this gives rather a better order to the sentence. Deussen keeps the reading, mal-praṣṭaṭha, but interprets quite differently from Sañkara:

“Auddālaki Āruṇi will be just as before, Happy will he be, released by me (from his words).”

If we wish to avoid emendation, this is probably the best rendering.¹

Gautama and Auddālaki-Āruṇi are names of Vājaśravas.¹ Gautama is probably a clan name, and the other name may mean either Auddālaki, son of Aruṇa, or the son (or descendant) of Uddālaka and Aruṇa. What then is his relation to the famous ṛṣi Uddālaka Āruṇi, so prominent in Br., Ch. and Kauś.? (See note on 7.) Possibly an unworthy son, i.e. Auddālaki, son of Uddālaka, son of Aruṇa,—Yājñavalkya being his spiritual descendant. (See the traditional list of teachers in the Vājaśaneyi school, Br. vi. 5.) Vājaśravas is also a patronymic, son or descendant of Vājaśravas, a name which occurs third before Aruṇa.

But probably the names, which are all patronymics, are not intended to be historical.

¹ See note on Usan (page 58) pointing out that Bhaṭṭabhāskara Miśra in his commentary on the Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa takes Usan as the personal name of Vājaśravas. (See A. Mahādeva Sāstri’s edition, Asṭaka III, pt. II, 234. (Mysore 1913). Also Macdonell and Keith, V.I. 282.)

Charpentier (Indian Antiquary, 1928, pp. 205, 223) considers that the Kaṭha identifies Usan Vājaśravas, the father of Nāciketas, with the famous Uddālaka Āruṇi. Auddālaki Āruṇi therefore means Nāciketas. So he renders verse 11 “As of old he will be full of joy; (since) the son of Uddālaka Āruṇi has (already) been let loose by me”, i.e. Yamā implicitly tells Nāciketas that he is already free to go back. So too Hillebrandt, “Āruṇi, son of Uddālaka, is (herewith) released by me”. (Aus Brāhmansas und Upanisaden, 117.)
12. *Svarge loke na bhayam kińcana asti,*
   *na tatra tvam na jarayā bibheti:*
   *Ubhe tīrīvā sānāyā-pipāse,*
   *soka atīgo modate svargaloke.*

**The Second Gift:**

**Knowledge of the Sacrifice, leading to Immortality.**

12. (Naciketas said:)

   *In the heaven-world there is no fear whatever:*
   *Thou art not there, nor does one fear old age:*
   *Having crossed over both hunger and thirst,*
   *Sorrow o'er-past, one rejoices in heaven.*

   12. *Thou art not there*: i.e. death, in the sense of the cause of decay and fear. But Yama, the god of death, though in later mythology a gloomy and fearful being, was in Vedic times regarded as the leader of men to the joys of the heaven-world, often conceived as located in the sun, where ruled his father Vivasvat. So the great Funeral Hymn, *Rg X. 14*, says:

   "Yama was first to find for us the pathway."

   And the departing soul is addressed as follows:

   "Go forth, go forth along the ancient pathway,
   By which our former fathers have departed.
   Thou shalt behold god Varuṇa and Yama.
   ...........Leaving behind all blemish."

   With regard to the joy of the heaven-world *Rg IX. 113*, says:

   "Where radiance inexhaustible
   Dwells, and the light of heaven is set,
   Place me, clear flowing one, in that
   Imperishable deathless world."

   "Make me immortal in that world,
   Where dwells the King Vaivasvata,
   Where stands the inmost shrine of heaven
   And where the living waters are."

When the Kaṭha Upaniṣad was written, however, this bright faith had passed away. Though Naciketas seems to give
Sa tvam agnim svargyam adhyesi mṛtyo,
prabrūhi tamā śraddadhānāya mahyam:
Svargalokā amṛtatvam bhajante,
etad dvitiyena vrṇe vareṇa.

Pra te bravīmi tad-u me nibodha,
svargyam agnim Naciketaḥ prajānan:
Ananta-lokāptim ato pratiṣṭhām
viddhi tvam etam nihitaṃ guhāyām.

Thyself, O Death, know'st well the heavenly fire,
To me do thou declare it, who have faith:
(By it) heaven's people share immortal life:
This choose I as the second of the gifts.

(Death said :)
To thee do I declare it, mark me well,
Knowing well the heavenly fire, Naciketas:
The means of attaining the infinite world
And its foundation,—know this hidden in the cave.

e xpression to it in this verse, it is clear from his later questions
that the doubts as to the future life which came in toward the end of the Brāhmaṇa period and which developed into the agnosticism of Buddhism, had affected him also.

13 ff. These verses reflect the thought of the Brāhmaṇa period. In it the sacrifice became of predominant importance,—more important even than the gods. It was through the power of the sacrifice that the gods were said to have gained the victory over the asuras and to have gained immortality. See for example Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, III. 6. 1, 28 and 29.

13.b. tam, so B. and C. A. reads tvam but against the weight of cited Mss. evidence.
14. The fire of the sacrifice is called "heavenly," first because it is identical in nature with that Agni which in his heavenly form shines in the sun, and secondly because it leads to heaven.

"He who sacrifices doubtless does so that he also may obtain a place in the world of the gods. That sacrifice of his goes forth towards the world of the gods; after it follows the sacrificer. ...He now strides the Viṣṇu strides. Gratifying the gods by sacrifice he acquires a share among them, and having acquired a share among them he goes to them. ...When one has thus ascended these worlds, that is the goal, that is the safe refuge" (or abode, pratiṣṭhā). (Śatapatha B. I. 9. 3.)

The word pratiṣṭhā means that on which anything stands or rests, and so "foundation," "abode," "refuge". In the passage just quoted the heaven-world itself, identified with the sun, is spoken of as the pratiṣṭhā or safe abode of the blessed departed. "He looks up toward the sun, for that is the final goal, that is the safe refuge." (Ś.B. I. 9. 3. 15.) In our verse however the sacrificial fire is spoken of as the pratiṣṭhā or support of the heaven world, as later, in II. 11, it is said to be the support of the universe.

The phrase "Hidden in the Cave" (nihitām guhāyām) is one of the characteristic phrases of the Upaniṣads.¹ It is possible that here it may primarily refer to the fire which is hidden in the fire-sticks until it is set free by friction. (See IV. 8.) But the more usual reference is to the cave of the human heart,—"the cave in the midst of the body" (guhā sārīrasya madhye, Tait. Brāhmaṇa, I. 2. 1. 3). The prime meaning then is that Nāciketas should know that that fire which is both the means of attainment and the support of the heaven-world is also the vital heat or energy in his own heart. But there is a second and deeper meaning behind which Yama will later make explicit and which forms the central teaching of the Upaniṣads: fire being the symbol of that ultimate power which is the foundation or support of the universe and which may be intuitively known as the inner Self.

The Kaṭha Upaniṣad thus begins with the ritual religion of

¹ Like the similar phrase guhā-hita (II. 12.) it is used in the Rg Veda of the treasure (of rain) which the drought-demons (vrtra, Ahi), hid in the cloud-caves. See I. 130. 3; X. 71. 1.
the Brāhmaṇas, but then it is shown that it is not the sacrifice itself but realisation of its inner meaning which gives salvation.

15. Lokādim anīm tam uvāca tasmai,
    yā iṣṭakā yāvatīr vā yathā vā:
    Sa ca api tat prayavadad yathoktam,
    Atha āśya mṛtyuḥ punar ev’ āha tuṣṭaḥ.

16. Tam abrahit priyamāṇo mahātmā,
    varam tava iha adya dādāmi bhūyāḥ:
    Tava eva nāmnā bhavitā, ’yam agniḥ
    srūkām ca, imām aneka-rūpām grhaṇā.

15. He told him of that fire, source of the world:
    What bricks (are required for the altar), how many,
    and how best arranged;
    And he in turn repeated it as told.
    Then, pleased with him, Death spoke even yet again:

16. Being delighted, the Great-soul addressed him:
    I give you here to-day another boon,—
    By thy name only shall this fire be called;
    Accept also this many-pattern’d chain.

15. That fire, source of the worlds (lokādim anīm). lokādi=loka
    +ūdi=lokānām ādi. Loka means world in the sense of a division
    of the universe. So there are often said to be two lokas, earth and
    heaven; or three (+air); or seven, variously named.

    The most obvious rendering of lokādi is source or origin of the
    worlds. Agni in the Ṛg Veda is often identified with Prajāpati, the
    creator. Again in Kaṭha v. 9, we are told that the one Fire, having
    entered the universe,
assumed all forms. (Cf. Heracleitus.) Also with regard to the sacrificial fire we are told in Br. i. 2. 7., “This fire is the arka, the worlds are its embodiment.”

Lokādi might also mean ‘first of the worlds’. So Śaṅkara says, “Fire is lokādi udi because it was the first embodied existence”. So in the Rg Veda, Agni is often represented as the first born son of Dyaus. Also Ch. vi. 8. 4, says that all other things evolved from fire (tejās) which was itself the first product of essential Being (sat.).

The simplest interpretation is that Yama taught Naciketas the proper arrangement of the fire-sacrifice, glorified in Brāhmaṇa fashion as source and support of the worlds.

16. Max Møller (Introd. S.B.E. XIV, p. xxv), considers that verses 16–18 are an insertion. “Death had granted three boons to Naciketas and no more. In a later portion of the Upaniṣad (ii. 3), however, the expression srīkā vittamayā occurs, which I have translated by ‘the road that leads to wealth’. As it is said that Naciketas did not choose that srīkā, some reader must have supposed that a srīkā was offered him by Death. Srīkā, however, meant commonly a string or necklace, and hence arose the idea that Death must have offered a necklace as an additional gift to Naciketas.”

Re Srīkā, we do not know Max Møller’s authority for saying that it commonly means necklace, since apparently it only occurs in these two Kaṭha verses. In this verse, joined with aneka-rūpā we may infer a meaning like necklace or garland, but in ii. 3, it seems to mean a road. So Śaṅkara in this verse hesitates between the two meanings, “a necklace of precious stones” (ratnamayā mālā), and “the way or knowledge of works (karmamayā gatiḥ) (i.e. the sacrifice) which is not to be despised because it is productive of many fruits”. Deussen, however, suggests “chain,” as suiting both cases, here an ornamental chain and in ii. 3, a golden fetter.

We accept Deussen’s suggestion and point out in support that srīkā may very well be connected with the common word for chain, śrīkhalā, which in Prākrit appears without the aspirate as though from a Sanskrit form śrīkhalā. For the variation between s and ś cf. śṛgula and śṛgula (jackal). (See Turner, Nepali Dictionary, s.v. sū̄hālo.)

The chain is called aneka-rūpā, which might be rendered “many-coloured” if referring to a jewelled chain, but more literally means “multiform”, “many-pattern’d”. This may merely refer to the rich ornamentation of the chain, or the chain may have been a kind of talisman, engraved with various mantras or with figures possessing a symbolic (sacred or magic) meaning. This would lend significance to nicāyya, imām of the next verse if we interpret it as meaning, as Prof. F. W. Thomas suggests, “gazing at this (chain)”.
17. *Trīnāciketa* tribhir etya sandhim, 
   trikarma-kṛt tarati janma-mṛtyuḥ: 
   Brahma-ja-jñāṃ devam īḍyam vidītvā 
   nicāyyaṁ, imāṁ śāntim atyantam eti.

18. *Trīnāciketa* trayam etad vidītvā 
   ya evaṁ vidvāṁśa cintute nāciketam: 
   Sa mṛtyu-pāśāṁ purataḥ pranodya 
   śoka, atigo modate svargaloke.

17. Who thrice has lit the Nāciketa fire, 
   Having attained to union with the three,— 
   The doer of the triple work, 
   He crosses over birth and death: 
   Knowing the god adorable, 
   Who knoweth what is Brahma-born, 
   Revering (him) one goes for ever to this peace.

18. Having a triple Nāciketa, having known this three, 
   He who, thus knowing builds the Nāciketa (fire), 
   Having thrust off before the bonds of death, 
   Sorrow o'er-past rejoices in the heaven-world.

17. The story of Naciketas as we have said first occurs in the Taittī- 
   riya Brāhmaṇa in connection with the Nāciketa fire sacrifice. Yama 
   reveals the sacrifice to Naciketas and does him the honour of calling it 
   by his name. Nāciketa is thus treated as an adjective derived from 
   Naciketas (i.e. relating or belonging to Naciketas). Whitney points 
   out that in this case the form should be Nāciketa.

   *Trīnāciketa* (bahuvrihi compound): “Having a triple Nāciketa,” i.e. 
   “He by whom the fire of the Nāciketa sacrifice has been thrice kindled,” 
   or, “He who has kindled three Nāciketa fires”. The Nāciketa seems 
   to have been a form of the Agnihotra. For a description of this with 
   its three fires (Gāhapatya, Āhavanīya and Dakṣinā) see, e.g. the 2nd 
   kāṇḍa of the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa. (S.B.E. XII.)
17, 18. Union with the three: Having known this three: Śaṅkara explains "the three" of verse 17, with whom one must have union in performing the sacrifice, as "father, mother and spiritual teacher" (ācārya), or alternatively "Veda, smṛti and good men". The explanation is not convincing. The triple work he explains as "sacrifice, study and almsgiving" (iṣṭā-ādhyayana-dāna).

"This three," of verse 18, he explains differently, referring back to the instruction of Yama in verse 15, "What bricks, how many, and how arranged".

17b. Brahma-ja-jña: Śaṅkara takes ja and jña as in apposition, and interprets as "the omniscient one who is born of Brahman". He takes it as referring to Hiranyagarbha ("the golden germ" from which according to Rg Veda X. 121, the universe developed). This Śaṅkara takes to be a name of Saguña-Brahman. This however is reading much later Vedantic conceptions into the Upaniṣad. (See pp. 88, 133ff.)

The most natural interpretation is to take Brahma-ja-jña as a name of Agni, i.e. the knower (jña) of Brahma-ja, i.e. what is born of Brahman, i.e. the universe. That is to say the name is equivalent to Jātavedas (the all-knonwer)—a constant Vedic name for Agni, who is here also called ṛṣya (adorable) and deva (resplendent or divine).1

Hume points out that nicāyya may carry a double meaning: "revering" (Agni) and "building up" (the fire which is his symbol). It might also mean "gazing at", "perceiving".

(So Śaṅkara comments, tam . . . viditvā śāsrutah nicāyya dṛṣṭvā ca, jātmabhāveṇa,—"Having known him from scripture and having realised him as the self.")

1 Brahma-jajñānaḥ viditvā nicāyya: Quite a different rendering is proposed by Hillebrandt (followed by Charpentier),—"Having known and meditated upon (the texts) brahma jajñānam (A.V. iv. 1. 1) and devam ṛṣyam (some unidentified Agni hymn), he for eternal time goes to this peace". See Hillebrandt, T.K. and A.B.U. 118; Charpentier, I.A. (1928).

Geldner, (V.B. 158, note 895), also says, "Because he has known and beheld the Brahman of the well-known verses brahma jajñānam, A.V. 4. 1."

For these texts see Bloomfield, Vedic Concordance, sv. brahma jajñānam prathamam purastāt, 656. In most of the passages the reference is to the sun or heavenly fire, called, "the brahman born first in the east" (jajñāna pp. p. A. of jān, cf. Gk. γιγνομαι). See for example T.S. iv. 2. 8. d. (Keith V.B.Y.S. 321) and Ś.B. vii. 4. 1. 14. (S.B.E. 41, 366.)
19. Eṣa te 'gnir Naciketaḥ svargyo
    yam avṛṇiḍhā dvitiyena varena:
    Etam agniṁ tava ṑeva pravakṣyanti janāsas,
    Tṛṣṇyam varam Naciketo vṛṇīṣva.

19. This is thy heavenly fire, Naciketas,
    Which thou hast chosen for the second gift:
    This fire thine alone will people call:
    Choose now, O Naciketas, the third gift.

    “This peace” (imāṁ śāntim)—Śaṅkara explains as svabuddhi-
pratyakṣāṁ śāntim,—the peace which is immediately realised in one’s
own experience. But the phrase “this peace” is grammatically awkward
since, apart from verse 7, this is the first reference to śānti. Whitney
therefore takes imāṁ śāntim as governed by nicāya, regarding śāntim,
in the sense of “appeasement”, as referring to the Naciketa fire.
“Revering this appeasement he goes to the endless.” Grammatically,
however, it would be natural to separate imāṁ and śāntim, taking imāṁ
dictically as referring to srūkām. On the other hand we note that in
Svet. iv. 11, where our verse is partially quoted, nicāya clearly governs
devam idyam, and imāṁ śāntim governed by eti can only mean “this
peace”.

Returning to the Three, which the sacrificer has to know
and with which he is to be united, we suggest that the reference
is to the agni-traya, the three sacrificial fires, but to these as
representing or symbolising the triune Agni (trivṛt agni) who is
later identified with Brahma. See again Śatapatha B. I. 9. 3,
and after the passage quoted (p. 68) note verses 14 and 15.
“He looks on the āhavanīya fire saying, ‘We have united with
the splendour’. He then looks up toward the sun (the heavenly
fire) for that is the final goal, that is the safe resort. To that
goal, to that resort, he thereby goes.” This whole passage then
(Kaṭha I. 12–19) moves within the sphere of ideas of the
Brāhmaṇas, but note the insistence on knowledge of the sym-
bolism of the sacrifice by which we pass to the thought of the
Upaniṣads. Read again the note on verse 14.
20. Yā, iyaṁ prete vicikitsā manusye,
asti ity-eke, na ayaṁ asti iti ca eke;
Etad vidyāṁ anuśīṣtas tvaya 'ham,
varāṇām eṣa varas īṭīyaḥ.

21. Devair atra api vicikitsitam purā,
na hi sujñeyam anūr eṣa dharmaḥ;
Anyāṁ varam Naciketo vṛṇişva,
mā mā uparotsīr ati mā srja, enam.

22. Devair atra api vicikitsitam kila,
tvam ca Mrtyo yan na sujñeyam āttha:
Vaktā ca, asya tvādṛg anyo na labhyo,
na, anyo varas tulya etasya kaścit.

23. Śatāyuṣaḥ putra-pautrān vṛṇiṣva,
baḥūn paśūn hasti-hiranyam āsvān;
Bhūmer mahād āyatanam vṛṇiṣva,
svayam ca jīva sarado yāvad icchasi.

24. Etat-tulyaṁ yadi manyase varam,
vṛṇiṣva vittam cira-jīvikāṁ ca:
Mahābhūmayau Naciketas tvam edhi,
kāmānāṁ tvā kāma-bhājaṁ karomi.
The Third Gift:

Knowledge concerning the great Passing-beyond.

20. (Naciketas said:)
This doubt there is about a man departed,—
Some say, 'He is,' some, 'He does not exist';
This would I know, instructed well by thee:
Of the three gifts, this gift is the third.

21. (Death said:)
Even the gods of old on this point doubted,
For subtle is this truth and hard to know.
Choose then another boon, O Naciketas!
Do not entreat me, give this up I pray!

22. (Naciketas said:)
Even the gods indeed on this point doubted,
Which thou too say'st, O Death, is hard to know:
Of it no other teacher can be found like you,
Nor is there other boon to equal this.

23. (Death said:)
Centenarian sons and grandsons choose thou,
Many cattle, elephants, gold, and horses:
Choose thou far-flung dominion of the earth,
And live thyself as many autumns as thou wilt.

24. Or, if thou thinkest other boon equal to this,
Choose—riches and a long extended life:
On the great earth, O Naciketas, be thou (king);
Of thy desires I make thee free-enjoyer.

20. Na...asti—"he does not exist". The prevalence of such nāstikas or unbelievers in the soul's eternal existence has been considered by some to be an indication of a post-Buddhist date for the Upaniṣad. Or the reference may be to the Cārvākas, a school of materialists which dates from quite ancient times. But such doubts are natural to man in all ages. See Introduction.

21. d. Literally, "Do not importune me, let this go for me". Mā uparoteṣiḥ, aor. without augment used as imperative. rudh=to obstruct, aor. 3. s. aroṣit. upa+rudh=to besiege, importune.
25. Ye ye kāmā durlabhā martyr-loke, 
sarvān kāmāṁs chandataḥ prarthayasya:
Imā rāmāḥ sarathāḥ saturyā 
na hi idrśā lambhanīyā manusyaṁ, 
Ābhir mat-prattābhīḥ paricārayasya,
Naciketo maranaṁ mā 'nuprākṣīṁ.

26. Svobhāvā martyasya yad antaka etat 
sarvendriyānāṁ jarayanti tejaḥ:
Api sarvam jīvitam alpam eva, 
tava eva vāhās tava nṛtya-gite.

27. Na vittanā tarpanīyo manusyaḥ, 
lapsyāmahe vittam advākṣma cet tvā :
Jīvisyāmo yāvad iśīyasi tvam, 
varas tu me varanīyaḥ sa eva.

28. Ajiryatam amṛtānāṁ upetya 
jiryan martyah kvadhastah prajānan, 
Abhidhyāyan varṇa-rati-pramodān 
atidirghe jīvite ko rameta.

28.b. One Mss. has kvavasthāḥ; two, kvadhastah.
Śaṅkara gives the v.I., kva tadāśtaḥ.
Hillebrandt, T.K., adopts kv-avasthāḥ.
25. Whate'er desires in mortal world are hard to win,—
    For all desires at pleasure make request:
    These lovely girls, with chariots and lutes,
    Such as are not obtainable by men,—
    By these, by me bestowed, be waited on:
    O Naciketas, ask not about dying.

26. (Naciketas said :)
    Ephemeral things! They wear away, O Death,
    Whatever vigour of his powers a man may have.
    All life, moreover, at the best is brief:
    Thine be the chariots, thine the dance and song!

27. Never with wealth can man be satisfied.
    Shall we get wealth if we have seen thee?
    Shall we even live as long as thou shalt reign?
    That boon then must I choose, and that alone.

28. Drawing near the agelessness of the immortals,
    What aging mortal here below that understands,
    Weighing the joys of beauty and of love,
    Would delight in an over-long life?

23. bhūmer mahādāyatanam—"a great expanse of earth". Śaṅkara,—
    prthivāḥ vistirṇam sāmrājyaṁ.

24. c. translates literally the text, mahābhūmau, etc. and the word "king" has to be supplied. Probably we should amend to mahān bhū- 
    mau.—"On earth, O Naciketas, be thou great".

25. The story of the temptation of Naciketas presents points of 
    similarity with that told of Buddha. A vision of Apsarasas is suggested.

26. Stobhāvāḥ: "existing till to-morrow," so "things of a day".

27. Śaṅkara treats lines b, c, as an affirmation,—"We shall obtain 
    wealth if we have seen thee, we shall live as long as thou shalt rule,"—
    "for how could a man after approaching thee be poor or short-lived". 
    Treated as interrogative however the sense is much better. So, Müller, 
    Hume, Whitney, etc.

    With line c. cf. Hebrews, ii. 15, "That he might deliver them who 
    through fear of death were in all their living subject to bondage". Fear 
    of death is an obsession which destroys both the power and the zest 
    of real living.

28. Ajīrśatāṁ—Śaṅkara and others who follow him seem to take 
    this for a g. pl. agreeing with amṛtānāṁ. But why should upetya govern
29. **Yasminn idam vicikitsanti Mṛtyo,**
yat sāṃparāye mahati brūhi nas tat:
Yo ’yan varo gūḍham anupraviṣṭo,
Na anyaṃ tasmān Naciketā vṛṇīte.

29. Tell me this thing whereon they doubt, O Death,
What is the meaning of the great transition:
This boon which penetrates the mystery,
Naught else than that doth Naciketas choose.

the g.? We have taken as acc. s. of ajûryatā (only here). Max Müller suggests ajûryatā and Whitney, ajûryatā or ajûryatā. Kwadhaṭsthāḥ. (another dr. ley.) we have taken as=ku (deprecatory +adhaḥ-stha (standing below), i.e. on this wretched earth. Two dvaḍ leyómeva in one verse surely suggest a corrupt text. varṇarati (“beauty and love”): varṇa—external appearance, colour (so caste), beauty; rati=sense-delight, sexual pleasure, love.

29. *yat sāṃparāye mahati*—“what there is in the great passing beyond,” i.e. the meaning of the great transition.

*Sāṃparāya=sam+parā+aya; sāṃparāya, adj. relating to the sāṃparāya, noun—the meaning of the passing beyond, the other life or world to which it leads, or (=sāṃparāya) the passing beyond, i.e. death itself.

*gūḍham anupraviṣṭa* : entered into the hidden, penetrated the mystery.

It is clear from Naciketas’s restatement of his question in verse 29 that verse 20 did not fully express his meaning. The question was not merely, “Does a man continue to exist after death?” It is clear, as Rāmānuja points out, that the first two requests are meaningless except as implying a belief in such existence (Śb. I. 2. 12.). In the Brāhmaṇa story the question was, How shall one overcome the danger of re-death and so secure immortality? Here the question is, What is the meaning of death? What is the nature of the state to which death leads? And this is later seen to mean, What is the nature of eternal Reality? What is man’s relation to it? and how can he reach it?
SECOND VALLĪ

The Second Vallī begins the Upaniṣad teaching proper; from this point on Death is supposed to be the speaker.

There are two ways: the way of good and the way of pleasure, i.e. the way of illusion of a seeming material wealth, obtainable by the senses, which leads to repeated death. To enter the way of good, which is the way of knowledge of true reality, a spiritual teacher is first needed. Verses 10 and 11 next seem to point out that not only must the way of pleasure be given up but also that good which seeks heavenly satisfaction, if the highest good of all is to be obtained. This consists in the vision of the inmost reality by adhyātma-yoga. This reality is symbolised by "Om" and is called Brahman. It is identical with the Ātman, the self hidden in the heart. It is both too great and too subtle and deeply hidden to be gained by intellectual knowledge yet it reveals itself to those it chooses. Those alone are fit to be chosen who have gone along the way of good to a collected and peaceful mind.

The Two Ways,—of good and of knowledge, and of pleasure and ignorance. The Upaniṣads are said to teach the jñāna-mārga, the way of salvation through knowledge, and are often criticised as being too purely intellectual. The criticism is not unfounded, especially if Śaṅkara is taken as guide to their meaning. Knowledge is far too often conceived as intellectual assent to a philosophy of pure monism. It is fair to point out, however, that Śaṅkara, like all the commentators on the Upaniṣads and Vedānta-sūtras, emphasises preconditions for entering on the way of knowledge which are largely moral in nature. So, commenting on the first verse of the Vedānta-sūtras,—"Then therefore the inquiry into Brahman,"—he says that the preconditions for such an inquiry are, (1) Discrimination between eternal and transient things; (2) Renunciation of the desire for the enjoyment of reward; (3) Acquisition of tranquillity, self-control, patient endurance and reverence (śraddhā); and (4) Desire for salvation. (1. Nityānitya-vastu-viveka, 2. śāmāmutrārtha-phala-bhoga-virāgaḥ, 3. sāmadādi-sādbhana-sampat, 4. mumukṣutva.) The story of Nāciketas is an excellent illustration of these requirements.
वन्धुमयोऽन्यदुते रूपसे उभे गानार्थ पूजनं सिनोतः।
तथाः श्रेय वादानसा साधु मवलि चौरतेः प्रायः उ प्रयो गायते ॥ १ ॥
श्रेय स्नाय नमोऽभेदेशसो संपारौ विविघ्नः घीरः।
श्रेयो च्छ घीरोऽभिमियासो गायते प्रयो मन्द्रो योगचेरमालिते ॥ २ ॥
सं लां प्रणायम्यहुः सत्त्वाभिमात्राय नीविकेतोऽविकाचारः।
नेता बुद्र विच्छमनवासो यस्यां मनान्ति बहुवा मनुष्या। ॥ ३ ॥
दूरसेते विप्रीते विषृवी भविष्या या च विच्छेदि खाता।
विशारमसिंगं निधित्यं समे न तत्र कामा बहुवोऽनुवृत्तं ॥ ४ ॥
भविष्यातिमन्त्रव वर्तमानः खंत्र घीरः पावित्रं मन्यवानः।
द्विन्यमानः प्रियान्ति मूढः पुरैनैर्नीयमाना धान्यायः। ॥ ५ ॥

Dvitiyā Vallī.

1. Anyat, śreyo 'nyaď uta eva preyas te,
ubhe nānārthe puruṣam siniṣaḥ;
[Tayok] śreyo ādadānasya sādhu bhavati,
hiyate 'rthād ya u preyo vrniye.

2. Śreyaś-ca preyaś-ca manusyam etaḥ,
tau samparītya viviṇaktya dhīrāḥ;
Śreyo hi dhīro [abhi] preyasō vrniye,
preyo mando yoga-kṣemād vrniye.

3. Sa tvam priyān priya-rūpāṁ ca kāmān,
abhidhāyān Naciketo 'tyasrāksīḥ;
Na etām śrṅkām vitamayim avāpto,
yasyām majjanti bahavo manusyāḥ.

4. Dūram ete viparīte viśūcī,
avidyā ya ca vidyā iti jñātā;
Vidyā-'bhūspinām Naciketasam manye,
na tvā kāmā bahavo 'lolupanta.
5. "Avidyāyāṁ antare vartamānāḥ, svayam dhīraḥ paramānmayam manyaṁ anāḥ; Dandramyāmānāḥ pariṇantī mudhā, andhena eva niyamaṁ yathā ‘ndhāḥ.

The Two Ways.

1. One thing is the good (śreyas), quite other the pleasant (preyas):
   Both these with different aim bind man (to action):
   Well is it for him who takes hold of the good;
   He fails of his aim who chooses the pleasant.

2. Both the good and the pleasant approach a man:
   Going all round them the wise discriminates:
   For good before pleasure a wise man chooses;
   The fool, for¹ property, prefers the pleasant.

3. But thou, the pleasant and sweet-seeming objects,
   Examining, O Naciketas, hast renounced,
   Not having fastened on that chain² of riches
   Wherein so many mortals sink to ruin.

4. Far opposite are these two and divergent,—
   Ignorance and what is known as knowledge:
   Eager for knowledge deem I Naciketas;
   Many delightful things did not distract you.

5. Abiding in the midst of ignorance,
   Self-wise, thinking themselves learned,
   Fools go about, rushing round and round,
   Like blind men led by the blind.

¹ Or, to property.
² Or, Not having taken to that way of riches.

1. Śreyas, cp. of śrī, splendour, beauty, fortune, means generally superior. Here, and a number of times in the Gāṭā, it means the morally excellent, the good.
   preyas, cp. of priya=dearer; here means the pleasant, that which to most is dearer than the good.
   "He fails of his aim" or "misses the goal" (hīyate arthād). Many of the Biblical words for sin mark it as a missing of the aim or goal of life. (So Gk. ἀμαρτλα and Heb. נְשָׁם, hātha' and its derivatives.)
2. **Yoga-kṣema** is generally interpreted as “getting and keeping”. So Śaṅkara here takes as meaning ṣarirādi-upacaya-rakṣaṇa-nimittam, i.e. “The fool prefers the pleasant,—such things as cattle, etc. for the purpose of fattening and preserving his body”. But this does not bring out the ironic punning of the text. The most usual meaning of yoga-kṣema is “property”, “possession”, “prosperity”. So, the fool, i.e. the worldly-wise materialist, for the sake of getting and keeping, i.e. for property, prefers things which give bodily comfort. But the ablative may also mean “in preference to”, “rather than”. So, the fool to (real abiding) property (i.e. the good) prefers the pleasant. This agrees with the use of the phrase in Gītā ix. 22, where it is said that Kṛṣṇa himself undertakes the maintenance of his devotees, or provides their yoga-kṣema, i.e. property, security, all that they really need.

> “Those men who think on me alone,  
> Who worship me and naught beside,  
> Of these, my constant devotees,  
> I myself take the maintenance.”

(Or, “I furnish full prosperity”,

**Yoga-kṣemam vahāmy aham.**)

Our text, we take it, plays on the two meanings of the ablative to point the folly of the materialist view of life. Compare Matthew vi. 19-34.

3. **Chain of riches (ṣrākā vittamayī)**: As we said in commenting on I. 16, the meaning of ṣrākā is uncertain. Śaṅkara treats it there as meaning “necklace” and here as meaning “way”. Hume, to be consistent, renders by “garland” in this verse also, which obviously does not suit the context. Whitney says “The use of mājantī, ‘sink’ indicates that ṣrākā means something like ‘slough’ or ‘pool’”, but that does not suit I. 16. Deussen’s ‘chain’ (Kette), which might in I. 16 mean an ornamental chain set with jewels and here a fetter, is the only conjecture which suits both cases. Following him we read, “Not having fastened on that chain of riches”.

All difficulties would disappear if, following Geldner and Charpentier, we amend mājantī to sajjantī and so read, “Not having fastened on (or accepted) this chain of riches, wherein so many mortals are entangled”.

4. **Divergent**: viśūci, f. dual of viśvaśc (viśu=on both sides, and aṅc=to go or lead).

**Distract**: āloṣupanta, 3 pl. imperf. A. intensive of lup, to injure, tear. The intensive is said to have the meaning ‘confound’ but Whitney thinks it is invented to suit this case. He and Hume take the primary meaning and render “Many desires do not rend thee”. (? amend to lolupyante.) We have taken kāmā objectively.

5. Cf. Matthew xv. 14. “If the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch.” The words refer to the obstinate self-conceit of the Pharisees.
The cause of repeated death.

6. The passing-beyond is not clear to the childish, Careless, befooled with the glamour of wealth: "This world exists, there is no other,"—thinking, Again and again he falls within my power.

6. *Na sāṃparāyah pratibhāti bālam:* The meaning of the passing-beyond (i.e. death) does not shine (i.e. is not clear, intelligible) to the child.

Child (*bāla*) is here synonymous with fool, and so is rendered "childish". It ironically refers to the materialistically minded man who prides himself upon his hard sense.

It is interesting to contrast this with the quite opposite conception of the child-mind set forth in *Bṛhadāraṇyakā* III. 5. 1. Uṣasta asks Yājñavalkya to explain the Brahman who is the self within. Yājñavalkya says negatively, "Thou canst not see the seer of the sight, . . . thou canst not know the knower of what is known". How then, asks Kahola, is it possible to come into touch with the inner-self? Yājñavalkya then replied, "Let a Brahmin, casting aside his learning, take his stand on childhood" (*pāṇḍityam nirvidya bālyena tiṣṭhāset*). Here *bālya* (childhood) evidently betokens a state of simplicity and intuitive understanding, and the saying may be compared with that of Jesus, "Except ye become like little children ye shall not see the kingdom of God". Although the conception of childhood differs in the two passages, the *Kātha Upaniṣad*, in the verses which follow, resembles the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (I.c.) in that it sets small value on argumentative reasoning as a means of reaching the Self. So verse 9 announces very emphatically, "Not by reasoning (*tarka*) is this thought to be obtained". This thought may be the thought of the *sāṃparāya,*
the meaning of the great transition beyond death. But it evidently means also the thought of the ultimate reality to which that transition leads if one has been enlightened and delivered.

7. Sravanāya api bahubhir yo na labhyah, 
   sravanto 'pi bahavo yam na vidyuḥ; 
   Āścaryo vaktā kuśalo 'syā labdhaḥ, 
   āścaryo jñātā kuśalānuśiṣṭaḥ.

8. Na nareṇa, avareṇa proktā esa 
   swijñeyo bahudhā cintyamānāḥ; 
   Ananya-prokte gatir atra nāsti, 
   anīyān hy atarkyam anvupramānāt.

The Need of a Spiritual Teacher.

7. He whom many cannot even hear of,
   Whom many, even hearing, do not know,—
   Wondrous His teacher, skilful His attainer,
   Wondrous His knower, skilfully instructed.

8. Not taught by an inferior man can He
   Be truly understood, though much considered;
   Save by another taught there's no way thither,
   For He is inconceivably subtler than the subtle.

7—9. One of the things on which Hinduism has always most strongly insisted is the need for a guru or spiritual teacher. This has sometimes been extravagantly and unintelligently stated, but in essence it is correct and follows from the very nature of religious truth.

7. Literally, "He who by many is not obtainable even for hearing". Śaṅkara comments, "Of thousands who seek good, it is only some one like you who becomes the knower of the ātman". This is due to (1) the subtlety of the self which is beyond argumentative reasoning or
9. Not by reasoning is this thought obtainable,
   Though, by another taught, well may one know it,
   friend:
   Thou hast obtained it, being true and steadfast;—
   May we find, Naciketas, a questioner like thee!

demonstration, (2) the need of an absolutely sincere and steadfast purpose
(satya-dhṛti) on the part of the seeker, (3) the need of a guru who him-
self has realised the highest.

8. Though much (or manifoldly) considered (bahuśā cintya-
mānāḥ): We have supplied the word “though”. Śaṅkara supplies “be-
cause” and obtains an opposite meaning. For him an inferior teacher
means a dualist. “Taught by a man of inferior, i.e. worldly, understanding
the Ātman is not easily knowable, because He is variously discussed by
disputants. But if the Ātman is taught by a preceptor who is free from
the notion of duality and has become one with the Brahman, there is
no doubt,—for there is nothing else knowable.” The explanation
seems forced: the simple meaning is that no amount of individual think-
ing will supply the place of a good teacher.

Ananya-prokte gatir agra nāsti: We have rendered, “Not taught
by another there is no way thither,” i.e. to Brahman or the true Self.
Śaṅkara takes ananya-prokte as meaning, “taught by one who is non-
different”—i.e. who has realised his oneness with Brahman. Then,
“there is no way thither” means there is no way beyond Brahman,—
knowledge stops there; or else, “there is no further travelling into
samsāra”.

Almost certainly Śaṅkara is here, as in so many places, forcing his
own interpretation upon the text.

8. Subtler than the subtle (anīyān anusparśaṁāṇā): literally, “more
atomic in measure than an atom”.

Atarkyaṁ may be taken in two senses. (a) It may be used adverbially;
in that case anīyān hi atarkyam anusparśaṁāṇā will be rendered as above:
so M.M., W., H. (b) Śaṅkara, however, takes it as an adjective qualifying
the subject—“For He is subtler than the subtle and unprovable by
argument.” So most Indian commentators. This suits the general mean-
ing of the passage.
In verses 7–9, then, the reality reached by the great transition,—the Supreme Self, is with equal emphasis said to be quite unknowable if sought by argumentative reasoning and readily knowable if revealed by a true teacher. This is because the object sought is so “subtle” as to be beyond the reach of the senses and of the understanding based upon sense-perception; also because religious truth is of the nature of an intuition, an immediate apprehension of value, communicated through faith or suggestive illumination from one person to another, but only capable of very partial expression through abstract concepts. This should be borne in mind in our subsequent discussion as to whether Brahman is or is not knowable.

जानाम् चेदविधिरिखनिनः न छःयुःः प्राप्यते चि स्वं तत् ।
ततो मया नातिचेतनस्सतोमयिनिवेष्यः प्रात्सवानस्स नित्यम् ॥ १० ॥

10. Jānāmy ahām ēvadhir īty-anityam,
na hy adhruvaiḥ prāpyate hi dhruvāṁ tat;
Tato mayā Nāciketaś cito ’gnir,
anityair dravyaiḥ prāptavān asmi nityam.

Naciketas superior to Yama.

The worthlessness of wealth,—heavenly as well as earthly.
10. I know full well that wealth, so called, is transient,
   For not by the unsteadfast is what is firm obtained:
   Yet is the Nāciketa fire laid by me,—
   By transient things I have obtained the enduring.

Who is the speaker in verse 10? Max Müller and Hume attribute to Naciketas. (Whitney also, though with some doubt, saying that it is so without recognisable pertinence as to seem an intrusion.) But Naciketas has not yet performed the sacrifice called by his name. Śaṅkara therefore, we judge rightly, attributes the words to Yama, who glorifies the sacrificial fire because by it, most transient of transient things, he has obtained the enduring sovereignty of heaven. Yet he goes on to commend Naciketas because he seeks something more enduring still.

10. ēvadhi, n.m., a rare Vedic word.  ēva-dhi=treasure-receptacle, treasury, also treasure, wealth. (ēva, like śiva, adj. dear, kind, precious; n.n. treasure.)
Not by the unsteadfast (na ādhiruvaśaḥ): Hume has, "those who are unsteadfast". We have left the translation ambiguous like the original, but it should probably be taken as referring to means rather than men,—to all earth's transient treasures.

Yet: the two halves of the verse are joined by the word tataḥ, which usually denotes consecution ("then", "after that"). Saṅkara takes it as equivalent to tasmāt ("therefore"). So also M.M., H., W., D. But this seems to leave a contradiction between the two halves of the verse,—a distinct non sequitur. We follow therefore the suggestion of Ānanda-jñāna that tataḥ here should be taken as equivalent to "yet" or "nevertheless". Sarvānanda, who agrees, says, "The commentator Ānanda-jñāna suggests that Yama here eulogises Naciketas, saying that he himself, though fully aware of the ephemeral nature of karman and its results, and that nothing permanent can be achieved by it, nevertheless performed the sacrifice to attain the Yama state (i.e. the sovereignty of the heaven-world), but Naciketas is his superior since he looked beyond to a truer eternity."

Kāmasyāptiṃ jagataḥ pratiśṭhām,
krator anantyam abhayasya pāram;
Stoma-mahad urugāyaṃ pratiśṭhām, [dṛṣṭvā],
dhṛtyā dhīro Naciketo 'tyasrākṣiḥ.

11. The attainment of desire, the world's foundation,
The endless fruit of rites, the fearless shore,
The exceeding praised, the far-stretching, the goal,—
Being wise, Naciketas, firmly hast thou let go.

11. B. ānantyam; stomaṃ mahad. dṛṣṭvā ("having seen"), at the end of line c, has been omitted as hypermetric and redundant.

Kāmasya-āpti: the fulfilment of desire, that by obtaining which, all desire is satisfied.

jagataḥ pratiśṭhā: pratiśṭhā means that on which anything stands or rests, so—foundation, abode or refuge.

krator anantyam: kratu may mean (1) power or will, (2) sacrificial rites. Hume takes in the first sense and renders "the endlessness of will" with a note, "or perhaps work?" Saṅkara takes kratu in the second sense and inserts phalam: "Krator upūsanāyāḥ phalaṃ ānantyam"—"The endlessness which is the fruit of kratu, i.e. worship".

abhayasya pāra: the further shore of fearlessness.

stoma-mahat: Hume and Deussen render, "The greatness of praise".
Max Müller, "That which is magnified by praise". Saṅkara follows the v.l. stomaṃ mahat, (so B.) "The praiseworthy and great," and says,
stomam = stomyam, stutyam. We have taken as a bahuvrīhi compound,—"having great praise".

ūru-gāya: "wide-going,"—used in the Rg Veda as an epithet of Soma who is called "wide-spreading" (Rg IX. 62. 13), of Viṣṇu ("far-striding" VIII. 29. 7), and of the wide-spreading glory of the dawn (VI. 65. 6).

What is it, described in such high sounding language, that Nāciketas has let go?

Śaṅkara interprets the passage as referring to what he calls the state of Hiranyagarbha (Hairanyagarbha-pada).

Hiranyagarbha—the Golden Germ—is first mentioned in the famous Creation Hymn, Rg X. 121, as the first born of creation, which appeared on the face of the primeval waters and gave rise to the rest of the world. With regard to it Deussen says (P.U., 199) "Because it is the first principle itself which appears in its creation as first-born, therefore the latter also is denoted by Brahmān (masc.), as though it were Brahmān personified." In the text of the older Upaniṣads this conception is but little developed. It is first developed in the Śvetāśvatara (iii. 4, iv. 12, v. 2, 3, 5, 6), where the great primæval Puruṣa is said to develop his own nature and so behold the birth of Hiranyagarbha, called also the Great Soul (mahātman) and Brahmā. In the still later Nṛsiṁhottara Upaniṣad it is called the Universal Self-consciousness. Śaṅkara takes it therefore as a name for one aspect of his Saguṇa Brahmān, and the Hairanyagarbha-pada is the state of those who, not being able to realise the unreality of all that is phenomenal and knowing Brahmā not as the One Self within but as a divinity opposed to themselves, worship him by sacrifice and meditation and so obtain aśvaryam,—a lordship and a joy which though illusory from a higher point of view are yet as real as anything in our experience.

Ram Mohan Ray, following this interpretation of Śaṅkara, has translated the verse as follows:—

"Thou, O Nāciketas, hast through firmness refused, though offered, the state of Brahmā, which satisfies every desire and which is the support of the world,—the best consequence of the performance of rites, without limit and without fear, praiseworthy, full of superhuman power, extensive and stable."

Śaṅkara's explanation is natural from his point of view but it is an anachronism. A much simpler interpretation is possible if we look at the text not in the light of later Vedantism but of the mode of thought of the Brāhmaṇas. It seems to us almost certain that the passage, with its double use of the word "pratiṣṭhā," refers back to the description of the sacrifice and the heaven-world obtained by it given in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa I. ix. 3.
"He who sacrifices assuredly does so with the desire that there may be a place for him in the world of the gods,... The sacrifice being complete it goes forth toward the world of the gods, and after it follows the sacrificer.... He strides the Viṣṇu strides (i.e. from earth, through the intermediate region, to heaven). Having acquired a share among the gods (i.e. by sacrifice) he goes thither. When one has thus ascended these worlds, that is the goal, that is the safe abode (pratiṣṭhā)."

"He (the sacrificer) looks toward the east. He looks with the text, 'We have gone toward the realm of light; we have united with the splendour,'—meaning 'We have united with the gods'. He then looks up toward the sun, for that is the final goal, that is the safe refuge (pratiṣṭhā)."

These passages, with their repeated reference to the world of the gods, particularly the sun, as the final goal or refuge, pratiṣṭhā, seem to show that the most natural interpretation of verse 11 is to take it as a description of the Heaven-world attained by the sacrifice, which Naciketas has not cared to claim because of his desire for something better. That is to say, he has renounced the old Vedic ideal of immortality and is seeking the new ideal of the Upaniṣads,—immediate realisation of unity with the Supreme Being. These two ideals are set in close and sharp contrast in verses 11 and 12, 11 giving the old Vedic ideal of the goal of life and 12 giving the ideal of the Upaniṣads.

(Additional note.) In fairness to Śaṅkara's interpretation it should perhaps be pointed out that there are certain verses in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa account which suggest that already at that time a more mystical interpretation was beginning. Eg. I. ix. 3. 10, says, "When one has ascended these worlds, that is the goal, that is the pratiṣṭhā. The rays of the sun which burns there are the righteous departed, and the highest light—that is Prajāpati or the heavenly world". "Also he looks up with the text, 'Self-existent art thou, best ray of light. The sun, indeed, is the best ray of light.'" Here in this passage the general reference is still to the Heaven-world as the place of refuge of the departed, but the statement, 'That is Prajāpati' and the ascription of self-existence, point to a personal power behind the heaven-world as its basis." In Rg IV. 53. 2. Savitṛ is called Prajāpati and in Rg X. 121, Hiranyagarbha is called Prajāpati.

There is thus an identification between Prajāpati (the Creator-god), the Sun-god, and Hiranyagarbha. In Epic and Sūtra times, i.e. shortly after the time when the Kaṭhā was probably written, the Creator and Father-god was usually known (in popular religion) as Brahmā, and the world to which the righteous go as the Brahma-world.

There is a certain justification therefore for taking II. 11, as referring
to the state of Brahmā or Hiraṇyagarbha. The difficulty however comes in here. Śaṅkara's Hiraṇyagarbha is not the "Golden Germ" of the Veda but a very specialised conception,—his name for Saṅguṇa Brahma as illusorily associated with a cosmic subtle body. The root objection to Śaṅkara's interpretation is that it unwarrantably imports into the Upaniṣad his doctrine of the two-fold Brahma, with its corollary, the doctrine of illusion.

(For a fuller treatment of the Hiraṇyagarbha conception, see pp. 133 and 156.)

तं दुर्दशः गुढःप्रविस्तं गुष्कास्विं गम्बरेषां पुराणम्।
बाध्यायोगाधिगम्येन देवं मला घोरो हर्षंशोकों ज्ञाति \ १२ \ ॥

12. Tam dur-dārṣaṁ guḍham anupraviṣṭam,
guhā-hitam gahvareṣṭham purāṇam;
Adhyātma-yoga adhiṣṭhita devam
matvā dhīro harṣa-sokau jahāti.

Apprehension of the Supreme Being through adhyātma-yoga.

12. He who is hard to see, entered into the hidd'n,
   Set in the cave, dwelling in the deep, ancient,—
Perceiving God through spiritual concentration,¹
   The wise man leaves behind both joy and sorrow.

¹ or, Spiritual communion.
   or, Communion (yoking) with the Essential Self.

Naciketas, in I. 29, has asked to be instructed in the meaning of the great passing-beyond, a boon which he says penetrates the mystery (or, has entered into the hidden). He refuses to be put off with transient earthly joys, or even with the joys of heaven. Yama therefore now speaks to him of that mysterious divine being, hidden behind all the phenomena of the world and in the depths of his own being, so difficult of access by any ordinary means, yet accessible by what is called adhyātma-yoga.

Entered into the hidden (gūḍham anupraviṣṭa): This epithet is used in I. 29 to describe the third boon, the instruction by which Yama will penetrate and make plain the mystery of that which lies beyond death. Here it describes the inmost, deepest, reality.
Set in the cave (guhā-hita): This phrase occurs a number of times in the Rg Veda as applied to drought demons (e.g. Vṛtra or Ahi, “the dragon”) who lurk in the cloud caves and hold back the waters (see, e.g. II. 11. 5). Here, like the similar phrase nihitaḥ guhāyām (see I. 14); it is used to describe the supreme reality as inner self, the cave being usually regarded as the cave of the heart. (Śaṅkara comments buddhau sthita—“located in the intellect.”)

Dwelling in the deep (gahvare-stha): Repeats the idea expressed by the preceding phrases, emphasising as strongly as possible the mystery and difficulty of access of the inmost reality which is the object of search.

Perceiving God (devam matvā): tam from line a should probably be understood with devam: so we should render, “Perceiving (or recognising) him as God (or, as divine)”. Or deva may possibly be used in its root sense of “shining,”—“perceiving that resplendent one”.

Adhyātma-yoga. This is the only occurrence of the phrase in the Upaniṣads so there is difference of view as to its exact meaning. Moreover, except for a reference in Tait. II. 4. 1, which does not help, and for the phrase yoga-kṣema in II. 2, this seems to be the earliest use of the word yoga in the Upaniṣads.

As this is a very important passage it may be of interest to quote several translations, particularly of the third line.

“The wise who, by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient, who is difficult to be seen, etc., as God.” (Max Müller.)

“Regarding (him) as god by study of devotion to the overself.” (Whitney.)

“By considering him as God through Yoga-study of what pertains to self.” (Hume.)

“He who lays hold of God by means of devotion within his own soul.” (Deussen.)

“Having known him as God by means of meditation on his Self.” (Thibaut, S.B.E. 48, p. 361.)

“Knowing the resplendent soul through a mind abstracted from earthly objects.” (Ram Mohan Ray.)

“Having realised, by the knowledge obtained through spiritual communion, that Divine Being.” (Tattvabhūṣaṇa.)
Yoga comes from the root *yuj*, to join or unite, and signifies both the act or state, and the means of union. A primitive Vedic (and apparently Indo-European) meaning was that of the yoke by which oxen were coupled for ploughing (cf. L. *jugum*, Gk. *ζυγόν*, Eng. *yoke*). It is also used of the harness of horses, and so came to mean any kind of equipment or arrangement. More often it meant the act of yoking or harnessing, and so more generally, setting to action. Perhaps the most usual meaning of yoga is therefore, (1) exertion, disciplined activity. With regard to the mind it means (2) meditative concentration or control, i.e. the yoking or uniting of all the powers of the mind for a single end, and then, negatively, as a means to this (2b) abstraction from outward sense objects. So Śaṅkara, combining these two says that “Yoga means deep meditation (sāmādhi) with thought abstracted from external objects”. In the early yoga of the *Kaṭha* the positive aspect is prominent; in the later yoga of Patañjali, the negative, so that yoga comes to mean sense-suppression and the ceasing of bodily activity. The Gītā on the other hand usually stresses activity, using yoga in sense (1), i.e. activity not merely in meditation but in the ordinary duties of life.

So far yoga has no religious connotation (and much of the later yoga is only very casually theistic), but we maintain that while in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* yoga certainly means yoking in the sense of control through meditative concentration, back of this it also means (3) yoking in the sense of union or communion with God,—the divine reality realised as one’s inmost self. So Keith, speaking of the development of the idea of yoga as first clearly revealed in the *Kaṭha* and Śvetāsvatara *Upaniṣads* says, “In the conception of Yoga, literally yoking, there seems to be an almost necessary, or at least normal, reference to a fixing of the mind on God”. (S.S. 55).

Adhyātma is used both as a noun and as an adjective. The prefix “*adhi*” has (1) the primary meaning “above,” but it is also used with the sense (2) “within”, and (3) “pertaining to”. So the noun adhyātma may mean (1) higher self, (2) inner or essential self. As an adjective the word may mean (3a) spiritual, or (3b) pertaining to the self.

Here adhyātma-yoga may be rendered “spiritual concentra-
tion” or, more specifically, “concentrated meditation upon the Self.” Later, the idea of yoking or communion with the Essential Self is farther developed. (See pp. 105, 142, 205.)

1 Re the meaning of Yoga, see Keith, S.S. 54 ff.; R.P.V. 549, 589 ff.; Dasgupta, H.L.P. 226; Edgerton, M.S.Y. 37 ff.; Oltramare, H.I.T. i. 300 ff.; Tuxen, Yoga, 20 ff.

Dasgupta points out that “in Pāṇini’s time the word yoga had attained its technical meaning, and he distinguished the root ‘yuj samādhau’ (yuj in the sense of concentration) from ‘yujir yoga’ (root yujir in the sense of connecting)”. Charpentier (Z.D.M.G. xlv. 846 ff.) considers that neither of these meanings are original but rather “praxis”, practical effort (as opposed to Śāṅkhya knowledge and abandonment of action). Edgerton agrees.

We have thus three views as to the primary sense of yoga:
1) praxis or active effort. (Charpentier, Edgerton.)
2) samādhi or concentration. (Tuxen).
3) yoking or union. (Oltramare, Keith.)

The variation is largely due to the section of Yoga literature on which attention is focused. In the Kaṭha and Svet. yoga is mainly 2+3, in the Gītā 1+3, in the Yoga-sūtras—2.

2 Yoga in the Gītā: Note that in the Gītā, yoga is used in three (or four) senses.

(1) When used alone yoga usually means karma-yoga or nīṣkāma
carṇa-yoga, the method of the selfless performance of duty, irrespective of results. This is clearly a development of the first meaning given above, i.e. disciplined exertion, as opposed to the śāṅkhya-yoga (or jñāna-yoga), the method of saṃnyāsa or abandonment of action and trust in knowledge only.

(1b) A subsidiary but very frequent sense of yoga in the Gītā is that of “method” or “rule”, or more fully “the method of control by means of”. So the Gītā speaks of the three methods, karma-yoga, jñāna-yoga, and bhakti-yoga.

(2) In the sixth adhyāya is described a meditative yoga very like that of the Kaṭha but more distinctly ascetic.

(3) “It must also be borne in mind that for the Gītā, unlike the Yoga
sūtras, yoga could retain its fuller, more original content, control that leads to union with Vāsudeva-Brahman.” (Hill, B. 41.)

3 The Yoga of Paññājali’s Yoga-sūtras should be carefully distinguishe
from that of the Kaṭha and the Gītā. It is entirely a yoga of samādhi in the more negative sense, a method of control of the bodily and mental powers but not a method of union, since no supreme Self was recognised. Its aim was by the restraint or suppression of the activity of the senses and mind (ciṭta-vṛtti-nirodha) to realise kaivalya, the release of the self by its isolation from saught beside. It is of this Paññājala Yoga that Otto is speaking when he says that, “Yoga is not a mysticism of union, but purely a mysticism of the soul.” (M.E.W. 143.)
4 Adhyātma is used repeatedly in the earlier Upaniṣads, (e.g. Br. I. 5. 21; II. 3. 4; II. 5. 1; III. 1. 10; III. 7. 15; Ch. I. 2. 4; I. 5. 3; I. 7. 1; III. 18. 1; Taist. I. 3. 1; Kauś. II. 12; but always in the sense (3b) —“pertaining to one’s self” as opposed to adhībhūta, “pertaining to the material elements,” or adhīdaiva, “pertaining to the deities”.

In the Gītā however the meaning is a combination of (2) and (3). It is applied to Brahman with the sense “essential self.” (Gītā VII. 28; VIII. 1; VIII. 3; XI. 1. Śaṅkara commenting on VII. 28,—“They know that Brahman, the whole essential self” (Te brahma tad vidhiḥ kṛṣṇam adhyātmanam) says “the reality underlying the individual self” (pratyagātma-viṣayam vastu). The word adhyātma is used elsewhere in the Kaṭha only once,—in the closing verse which says, “Then Nāciketas having obtained this knowledge and yoga-vidhi, declared by Death, and so having attained to Brahman, became free from passion, free from death, and so may any other who thus knows the adhyātma.” The meaning here seems to be the same as in the Gītā, i.e. “knows the Supreme Self who is also his essential self,” though it may also be rendered “who knows what relates to the self”.

We append in full Śaṅkara’s commentary on the two important verses 12 and 13:


“That self you wish to know is “hard to see” since it is extremely subtle; “entered into the hidden”, i.e. concealed by the modifications of consciousness due to material objects; “set in the cave”, i.e. located in the intellect (since he is there realised); “dwelling in the deep”, i.e. he stands amid many difficulties, (i.e. in the body). Since he is thus concealed by material objects and located in the intellect, hence he dwells in a difficult situation, hence he is hard to see. “By attaining that ancient one through adhyātma-yoga”, i.e. deep meditation on the self with thought abstracted from external objects, thus “perceiving the divine” Self, “the wise man leaves behind both joy and sorrow”, since there is neither elevation nor depression of the Self.


—as Spirit.

13. Hearing and comprehending this a mortal
Extracts its essence,¹ gaining that Subtle (Being):
He joys as gaining that which is joy-worthy:
An open house, I think, is Naciketas.

¹ or, Tears off the qualified, or, Discerns the Holy, or, Puts off the conventional.

13. The general purport of the verse is clear: it repeats and completes the thought of the previous verse, calling the deep-hidden divine reality, perceived through adhyātma-yoga, “that Subtle Being” (anum etam), i.e. intangible Spirit, as opposed to that which is gross or material. To perceive Him (says v. 12), is to be carried beyond all distracting emotions,—the elation of joy as well as the depression of sorrow,—largely organic in character,—as one realises, in the depths of one’s own self, one’s unity with the deepest reality who is also Self or Spirit. But does this mean the fading out of all the colour of feeling,—the merging in a characterless absolute,—“the night in which all cows are black”? This is how the teaching of the Upaniṣads and the Vedānta has been often interpreted.

ātmānam “labdhvā”. Tad-etaṃ-evaṃ-vidhāṃ brahma “sadma” bhavanaṃ “Naciketasāṃ” tvāṃ prati apāvṛta-dvāraṃ “viivṛtaṃ” abhīmukhi- bhūtāṃ “manye”: mokṣārthaṃ tvāṃ manye iti abhīpṛavyaḥ.

Again, “having heard” from a religious teacher “this” truth about the Self which I shall tell you, “and having grasped” or apprehended it truly and entirely as self, “a mortal” man “extracting”, i.e. lifting up or separating “the dharmaṃ” (i.e. that which is possessed of dharma) from the body, etc. so “obtaining that subtle” self,—“he,” i.e. the wise man “rejoices” “because he has obtained the joy-worthy”, i.e. the Self, in which one ought to find delight. I think that such a Brahma-abode is wide open to you, Naciketas, (is facing you with open door): the meaning is, I think you worthy of salvation.
(see Lanman, p. 207) and Yoga practice has often been directed toward this end. But our text goes on to say that the deepest Being is the highest Value,—the supremely joy-worthy, and to attain Him is to gain supreme, abiding bliss (see V. 12–14).

**Pravṛṣya dharmyam**: The one difficulty is the interpretation of the phrase *pravṛṣya dharmyam*.

*Pravṛṣya* is from the root *vrśḥ, vrḥ, vrḥḥ*—to pull out or root up (distinguish from similar root—*to grow*). So *pravṛṣya* means “having torn or pulled out,” “extracted”. See VI. 17, where it is said of the soul, *tam svūt satirvāt pravṛṣet*:

“For ones own body one should draw it out,
Firmly, as from its sheath (one pulls) a reed.”

Having heard and comprehended the truth expressed in v. 12, and “having extracted the *dharmyam*”, one attains “that Subtle Being” and so supreme bliss.

*Dharmyam*, which occurs only here in the Upaniṣads, is an adj. from *dharma* used as a neuter noun.

*dharma* is from the root *dhṛḥ*—to hold. Hence it means “that which is held fast”, so “law”, “custom”, “anything proper to any state, person or thing.” (So justice is the *dharma* of a king, courage of a warrior, ferocity of a tiger.) Hence philosophically *dharma* means “characteristic quality”. Ethically it is specialised to mean “duty”, “right”, “virtue”, and this in ordinary usage is its most common meaning.

*dharmanya*, therefore, may mean (1) ethically—“lawful”, “righteous”, “connected with duty”. (So three times in the Gītā, and once apparently—“sacred” or “holy” XVIII. 70, also perhaps XII. 20.) Or (2) in a more general philosophical sense it may mean “qualified” or “possessed of a certain character or essential nature”.

Now one may extract a thing either to get rid of it or to preserve it. So one may regard the *dharmanya* (whichever meaning we give it) either (A) as something alien from “that Subtle Being”, which is to be pulled off before one can reach it; or (B) as something fundamentally one with the “Subtle”, which must be extracted, i.e. discriminated from other things, before its real (subtle) nature can be realised.

(A) **Most European commentators**, connecting the verse with that which follows rather than that which precedes, take the *dharmanya* as “the qualified”, whether (1) ethically, or (2) in the more general philosophical sense, and its qualities must be stripped off to attain to absolute, unqualified ("subtle") being. So—

1. Hume . . “Has torn off what is concerned with the right.”
2. Whitney . . “Having flung away what is concerned with duty.”
3. M. Müller . . “Who has separated it all qualities.”
4. Deussen . . “Who has put off what is external.”

The occurrence of the phrase “Apart from dharma and adharma,” apparently in an ethical sense, in the next verse favours (1).
The contrast (or close connection) of the dharmyam and the subtle supports (2).

(B) Śaṅkara, whom one might expect to take the above line of explanation, lending support as it does to his general position, explains quite differently, in the light of the previous verse, taking dharmyam = ātman etam = ātmānam, and interpreting prayṛya dharmyam as “Separating (i.e. clearly distinguishing) the dharmyam, i.e. the Self, from the body, etc. (all that is not-self) and so realising that subtle one, i.e. the Self.” Śaṅkara defines dharmyam as dharmād-anapetam, not separated from, i.e. possessed of, dharma, which leaves it ambiguous whether it is to be taken in senses (1) or (2).

(1) Most of his modern Indian followers take in an ethical sense as the Righteous or Pure one. So—

Arabinda Ghose .. “When he has separated the Righteous one from the body.”

Tattvacāra .. “Having discriminated the Pure one from other things.”

Śīrāma Śāstri .. “Having abstracted the virtuous ātman from the body, etc.”

We have suggested that dharmyam should be given a numinous rather than an ethical meaning, and in this sense have given the alternative rendering “Discerns the Holy”, i.e. the mysterious Being of v. 12, realising Him as Spirit.

(2) Taking the more general philosophic meaning Tattvacāra as an alternative suggests dharmyam = guṇa-viśeṣtham (ātmānam), i.e. by discriminating the qualified, i.e. individual embodied Self from its material environment one learns the true nature of the ātman and so attains that subtle (i.e. unqualified) Self. This gives excellent sense and fits Śaṅkara, but it is curious that if this is his meaning he did not say so more specifically.

On the whole, we are inclined to the simple rendering suggested in the text. Hearing and comprehending that truth about the deepest reality given in v. 12, a man extracts its essential nature, or discerns its real character, and so attains that subtle, i.e. essentially spiritual, Being. Alternatively we suggest either, “Discerns the Holy”, or, (bearing in mind the next verse), “Puts off the conventional”, i.e. all that is merely customary, whether in thought, morals or religion.

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1 Abhat was äusserlich. S.U. 273.
2 This is an interpretation of Tattvacāra’s Bengali commentary. Röer apparently intends a similar meaning: “Having distinguished the (soul as) endowed with qualities (dharmyam) (from the body) and obtained it in its subtle nature, the mortal rejoices”. 
An open house, i.e. for the habitation of the Supreme Self. Cf. 
Muniḍ. III. 2. 3. (which follows a verse identical with Katha II. 23).
"Into his Brahma-abode this Self enters." Also Chānd. VIII. 1. 1.
Śaṅkara inserts “teṣām prati” after “Nāciketasam”, “Such a Brahma-
abode is I think wide open to thee, Nāciketas”. This apparently
involves an amendment of the text to Nāciketas,—“Wide open seems
the house to Nāciketas”. Or to “Nāciketo” (voc.), with “teṣām prati”
understood, making the line metrical. But the text as it stands (pace
Whitney who thinks it senseless) gives a good meaning. Alternatively
we might punctuate differently and read, “Hearing and comprehending
this, extracting its essence, gaining that subtle being, a man rejoices:
so I consider Nāciketas one who has obtained a joyful open house.”

अन्यत्र धर्मादिवर्गादि
अन्यत्र भूतादि मथिच यत्तमक्षिरस्थि तदह म १४

14. Anyatra dharma[anyatra] adharma,

anyatra asmāt kṛta-akṛtāt,

Anyatra bhūtā[ca] bhavyā[ca]:
yat tat paśyasi tad vada.

14. Apart from duty (dharma) and non-duty (adharma),
Apart from what is done or not done,
Apart from past and future time,—
What thus thou seest, that declare.

14. Anyatra (adv.)—as other than, different from, independent of.
Adharma is always used in an ethical (or at least quasi-ethical, i.e.
legal or social) sense. In this verse therefore Dharma must be used in
the same sense. There is however some difference as to the exact mean-
ing.

“Independent of good and evil” (Deussen, Gough).

“Apart from right and apart from unright” (Hume).

“Different from virtue and vice” (Röer, Śāstrī, Tattvabhūṣaṇa).

“Apart from duty, apart from non-duty” (Whitney).

It is interesting to note Śaṅkara’s different shades of meaning in different
contexts, of which Thibaut’s translations are a fair reflection. So Sūtra-
bhāṣya I. 2. 11. (T. 118) has “That which thou seest as different from
religious duty and its contrary”. I. 1. 4 (T. 28), “Different from merit
and demerit”, with the comment, “That bodiless entity to which merit
and demerit, with their consequences and threefold time do not apply”.
In a number of places however Thibaut considers that dharma and
adharma are used in the general philosophical sense and renders, “That
which thou seest as neither this nor that” (231, 248, 251). This is also
Max Müller’s rendering. Śaṅkara’s comment in the Kathaka-bhāṣya is
given below.
Anyatra āsmāt kṛta-akṛtāt. Śaṅkara says, "Kṛtam=kāryam, effect; akṛtam=kāraṇam, cause".

Just as the previous verse has been interpreted as meaning that one must strip off all attributes to reach the (negatively) Absolute Being, so this verse has been understood as asserting that among those attributes to be stripped are all moral qualities,—that the Supreme Reality is supra-temporal, supra-causal and supra-moral, beyond good and evil. Undoubtedly the Param Brahman of Śaṅkara, like the Absolute of Plotinus, is "beyond the Good". Ethical distinctions, like all other distinctions, belong to the phenomenal world and are transcended in the Absolute. We doubt however whether this is the meaning here.

In the first place we note that it is misleading to translate dharma and adharma by "good and evil". This is responsible for much of the disagreement of Indian and European scholars. Dharma usually means "duty" in the sense of what ought to be done under particular conditions: what St. Paul called "the law of commandments contained in ordinances" (Eph. 2. 15), which does not bind the freed man, much less God. Good is for man an infinite ideal, and in God an eternal actuality. Śaṅkara commenting on our verse says, "Other than dharma, means different from acts enjoined by the scriptures and from their results and means of attainment".

In the second place, instead of treating the Upaniṣad as a collection of disjointed texts let us note the context. Naciketas is dissatisfied with the religion of works, no matter how productive of prosperity. He has refused even the happiness of the heaven-world obtained by sacrifices and good works, and is seeking that salvation which comes from knowledge of supreme reality. Yama, therefore, seeing he is fit for the revelation, has spoken of that mysterious Divine Being, set in the cave of the heart, which may be gained not by outward works but by adhyātma-yoga, inner concentration. Stripping off extraneous externalities, discerning divine reality, laying hold of its essential nature as Spirit (the different interpretations of v. 13 are complementary), a sincere inquirer like Naciketas may obtain that which is supremely joy-worthy. "That is what I want", says Naciketas. I am not asking about religious duties or works of merit or the results of doing or not doing them.
I wish to know that which is deeper than all the happenings of time. If you know such an eternal reality, which is beyond all worldly experience, tell me that.\(^1\)

Apart from the past and the future: Even if we interpret lines b and c with Śaṅkara as “independent of causality and time”, or with Deussen, “independent of becoming and time”, this does not necessarily mean that Brahman is here viewed as timeless in the sense that time is an illusion (though that is Śaṅkara’s view). “Independent of past and future” means not timeless but eternal, imperishable (akṣara). So in Br. iii. 8. 9, discriminate time is derived from the Imperishable, and in Br. iv. 4. 15, and Kaṭha iv. 5. 12. 13, Brahman is spoken of as “Lord of the past and future”, i.e. Lord of the time-order. (See note on iv. 13. Also Keith, R.P.V. 560.)

\[15] \text{वर्त्तमानमन्त्रि तपांसि वर्थिति च याहनि।} \\
\text{वदिष्कते व्रज्ञवर्यैः परिपूर्वे पदं संयंहिष्ठित ज्ञोत्सोमथिविभवः।} \]

\[16] \text{एतत्वोवाचारं नक्षत्र एतत्तावाचारं परम्।} \\
\text{एतत्वोवाचारं शाल्या चो वदिष्कति तस्य तत्।} \]

\[17] \text{एतत्तावाचारं अंचलमेतदानमं परम्।} \\
\text{एतत्तावाचारं शाल्या ब्रह्मलोके महोत्सिते।} \]

15. \text{Surve vedā yat padam āmananti,} \\
\text{tapāṃsi sarvāṇi-ca yad vadanti,} \\
\text{Yad icchanto brahma-caryam caranti,} \\
\text{tat te padam saṃgrāhena bravimi:} \\
\text{Om iī, etat.}

16. \text{Etad hi, eva, akṣaram brahma,} \\
\text{etad hi, eva, akṣaram param,} \\
\text{Etad hi, eva, akṣaram jñātvā,} \\
\text{yo yad icchati tasya tat.}

17. \text{Etad ālambanaṁ śreṣṭham,} \\
\text{etad ālambanaṁ param,} \\
\text{Etad ālambanaṁ jñātvā,} \\
\text{brahma-loke mahīyate.}

\(^1\) \text{Yad idṛṣam vastu sarva-nyavahāragocarūtikām paśyasi jānāti, tad vada mahyam.—Śaṅkara.}
"Om"—the symbol of Brahman.

15. That word which all the Vedas glorify,
    And which all austere practices proclaim,
Desiring which men follow holy living (brahmacharya),—
    That word to thee I briefly do declare:

That (word) is "Om".

16. For truly this word is Brahman,
    This word indeed is the highest:
Knowing indeed this very word,
    What any man desires is his.

17. This support is best (of all),
    This support is the highest:
Knowing this support a man
    Grows great within the Brahma-world.

Naciketas has asked to be taught eternal reality. The answer is here given that all revelation and religious practice declare the eternal Brahman, symbolised by the word "Om". Then in verses 18 ff. Yama goes on to declare that that Brahman is the Ātman, the eternal Self.

15. Word (pada).—Pada means footprint, sign, word; also place, abode, goal. Śaṅkara here takes it as meaning goal (padanīyam, gamanīyam). The goal is Brahman of whom Om is the symbol. Acts of austerity declare Him because they have Him as their goal,—otherwise they would be senseless.

Brahmacarya denotes the condition of life of a brahmacārin or religious student. This is first referred to in Rg Veda x. 109, and is described in Atharva Veda xi. 5. It normally lasted twelve years but might be longer. Śvetaketu (Ch. U. vi. 1. 2.) was a brahmacārin from 12 to 24. The student lived in the house of his teacher, and served him, tending the house and the cattle, often begging his own and his master's food, looking after the sacrificial fires and studying the Veda. He was required to be chaste, obedient, to drink only water and not to sleep in the daytime (see Āśvalāyana Grhya-sūtra i. 22, 1. 2). The word later became generalised to mean holy living, particularly continence and self-restraint.
16. **Word** in this verse translates *ākṣara*, which may also mean “imperishable”. There is thus as in the previous verse a double meaning; there is reference to the word “Om” but still more to that which the word symbolises,—the goal of all study and discipline,—the highest Imperishable One who is our support (*ālambanam*) and only source of true greatness.

**Re. Om**—Deussen says, “Essentially it was the unknowableness of the first principle of the universe, the Brahman, and the impossibility of expressing it by word or illustration, which compelled the choice of something so entirely meaningless as the symbol Om as a symbol of Brahman”. The statement is misleading since, by the time Om became a symbol of Brahman it had acquired a meaning.

The word Om (not found in the Rg or Atharva Vedas) occurs in the *Taittiriya Samhitā* of the Black Yajur Veda (iii. 2. 9. 6) where it is called the *praṇava* which, says Keith, indicates the prolongation and nasification of the last syllable of the offering verse, uttered by the *hotṛ*. It first becomes frequent in the Brāhmaṇas where it is generally a response by the *adhvaryu* (offering priest) to each Rg-Vedic verse uttered by the *hotṛ*. It thus corresponds to the Hebrew ‘Amen’ and like it comes to be used as a solemn “Yes, So be it”.

Already by the time of *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* v. 32, Om, regarded as =$AUM$, had acquired such numinous value that it is treated as a mystic syllable representing the essence of the Vedas and the universe. Prajāpati by *tapas* created the three worlds and their light-givers: earth, air and sky: Agni, Vāyu and Āditya. From these he produced the three Vedas and the three pure sounds: *Agni*⇒Rg⇒*bhūḥ*; *Vāyu*⇒*Yajur*⇒*bhuvah*; *Āditya*⇒Śāma⇒*svar*. These sacred sounds are called the internal fastenings of the Vedas and expiate any errors in recitation. Again from these, representing their essence A, U, M were produced. So Aum (=Om) represents all these,—the threefold sacred knowledge, the world-powers and the One whence all these proceed. The *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* does not here attempt an etymological derivation of Om, but it was natural that later some should say A=Agni, U=Vāyu, therefore M=the Āditya Mitra. Om is also in *Maitri* vi. 5 identified with the later trinity, Brahmā, Rudra, Viṣṇu.

When therefore the Upaniṣads take Om as the symbol of Brahman the thought behind is surely not, as Deussen suggests, that an unknowable absolute is fitly expressed by an unintelligible word. For the word by usage in worship had been charged with sacred meaning and expressed not something abstract (however difficult of definition), but rather the whole fullness of numinous (mysterious yet adorable) reality. Further, just as AMEN, used as a response to solemn statement or prayer with the meaning, ‘It is true’ or ‘May it be true’, is converted by St. John into a most impressive name for God revealed in Christ (“The Amen, the
faithful and true witness”, Rev. iii. 14), so we believe it is not fanciful to say that OM, used originally as a response in worship, becomes in such phrases as ॐ satyam and ॐ tat sat, expressive of the Hindu belief in the truth and reality behind all.

(See Keith, article “Om”, E.R.E., ix; Deussen, P.U., 390-2; Gough, P.U., 67-74. Also Keith, R.V.B., 256. We do not of course deny the absurdities and the magic that have often attached to the use of Om.)

न जायते बिययते वा वियस्त्रियां कूलबिन्दुः सम्बृह कल्यित्।
अणो निन्द्रः प्रास्वतोप्य प्रार्यो न हन्यते जन्मसारे प्रभृतीः। १६॥

हन्तः चेष्मन्ते च नहुं चत्वर्यमन्ते चतम्।
उसम पौ न विजयानीतो नायं चृन्ति न हन्यते। १६॥

18. Na jāyate mriyate vā vipaścit,
na, aṣṭam kutaścit na babhīva kaścit :
Ajo nityah sāsvato 'yam purāno
na hanyate hanyamāne sarvire.

19. Hantā cet manyate hantum,
hataś-cet manyate hatam,
Ubbhau tau na vijānito :
na, aṣṭam hanti na hanyate.

The Unborn Eternal Self.

18. The wise (self) is not born and does not die,
From naught else comes it nor does aught become:
Unborn, eternal, endless, this the Ancient,
Is slain not with the slaying of the body.

19. If the slayer think he slays,
Or if the slain think he is slain,
Both of them do not understand,
This slays not, neither is it slain.

Here and in the following verses the answer to both the questions of Naciketas, in I. 29 and II. 14, is given. The meaning of the great transition, that which lies beyond the mystery of death, is just this: the soul or self is eternal and death a mere bodily appearance. Also, that eternal changeless reality of which Naciketas has inquired is just the Soul. These verses are quoted in Gītā ii. 20. 19, and form the substance of Kṛṣṇa’s
teaching to Arjuna when he hesitates to engage in battle against his kinsfolk. In the Gītā they occur in a section called Śāṅkhyya-yoga and seem to refer to the eternity and changelessness of the individual soul. Here however, in the verses which follow, it is clear that it is the One Supreme Soul (ātman) that is referred to as individuating itself and constituting the inner reality of each living being.

In verses 15–17, the eternal reality is called Brahman. In verses 20 ff. it is called Ātman. We have here then, by implication, the central thesis of the Upaniṣads,—Brahman = Ātman, i.e. the mysterious power behind the world is one with the central reality of our own inner being. So in the Śāṅdilya-vidyā (Ś.B. x. 6. 3 and Ch. iii. 14) it is first stated, "Verily this whole world is Brahman" (sarvam khalu idam Brahma), and then it is said, "This soul of mine within the heart, this is Brahman" (esa me ātmāntarḥdaye etad Brahma).

But does this mean, as Yājñavalkya usually taught (Br. ii. 4. 12. 14; iii. 8. 23, etc.) and Śaṅkara taught consistently, that there is really only one Soul, that the Soul is a pure undifferentiated Unity, and that all plurality, of souls as well as objects, is an illusion? It is not till Vālī III that the Kaṭha Upaniṣad draws any explicit distinction between the individual and the Supreme Souls, and right through the basic unity of the two, the fact that the individual soul owes all its reality to the

1 Relation of the Kaṭha and the Gītā in this passage.


Gītā II. 19. a. b. has, Ya enaṁ vetti hantāram, yaś-cainam manyate hatam.
He who thinks of him as slayer,
And he who thinks of him as slain.

Gītā II. 20. a. b.—Na jāyate mriyate vā kadācit
Na ayaṁ bhūtvā bhavitā vā na bhūyaḥ.
He is not ever born, and never dies,
He came not into being, nor shall come hereafter.

Some have thought that the Kaṭha verses are an interpolation from the Gītā. But kadācit for the Vedic viptācit is surely a deliberate simplification on the part of the Gītākāra: it is improbable that the change took place the other way. The Kaṭha version of 19. a. b. also seems the more original.
Supreme, is insisted on. But though the writer concentrates attention on the Supreme Soul he seems, even in this valli, to assume the reality of individual souls who see and attain the Supreme.

In this connection the name here given to the Soul, i.e. *Vipaścit*, is surely significant. This word means literally ‘knowing inspiration’ and therefore ‘inspiring’ or ‘inspired’, and is used of Savitṛ in *Rg Veda* v. 81. 1, in a passage which seems to be the fountain-head of the idea of Yoga:

“Yuñjate mano uta yuñjate dhiyo, viprā viprasya bhato vipaścitaḥ.”

“The sages of the great wise (i.e. inspiring) Sage,
Yoke their minds and yoke their thoughts.”

This passage is quoted (and elaborated) again and again in the *Samhitās* of the *Yajur Veda*, the *Brāhmaṇas*, and later in Śvet. U.: and in a number of passages Savitṛ, the life-giving Sun-god, is identified with Prajāpati, and, as in the Gāyatrī, taken as representing the Supreme Being. Especially we should note the central position of this passage in the directions for the piling of the Fire Altar in both the Taittiriya and Kāthaka *Samhitās* of the Black Yajur Veda. (See Keith, V.B.Y.S., 289.) This surely makes it clear that it is not by accident that the word *Vipaścit* is here used for the Ātman. The whole object of the sacrifice is said to be:

“With mind well-yoked are we,
By the inspiration of God Savitṛ,
With strength for gaining heaven.”

(Taittiriya *Samhitā* iv. 1. 1. c.)

And now the Upaniṣad goes on to teach that immortality consists in the yoking of the individual soul with the Supreme Soul which constitutes its inmost being and inspires it for the highest.

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1 *Vipaścit* comes from the root *vip=a* to quiver or tremble; hence the adj. *vip=ī* inwardly stirred, inspired; noun *vīpas=inspiration; vipaś-cit=knowing inspiration*. Sāyaṇa renders by *medhāvin=wise*. It occurs as we have said,

(1) *Rg Veda* v. 81. 1, and this passage is quoted, V.S. v. 14, xi. 4; T.S. i. 2. 13. 1, iv. 1. 1. d.; K.S. ii. 10, xv. 11; M.S. i. 2. 9, ii. 7. 1; also in the following *Brāhmaṇas*, A.B. iv. 30. 4; K. B. xx. 2, xxii. 1; Ś.B. iii. 5. 3. 11; vi. 3. 1. 16; xiv. 1. 2. 8. Also Śvet. U. ii. 4.

(2) *Rg Veda* ix. 86. 44; *vipaścīte pavamānāya gāyata.*

“Praise the wise (or inspiring) Purifier”, i.e. Soma.
(3) Tait. U. ii. 1. 1 refers to Brahman as identical with the Ātman perceived in the soul within, yet transcendant in heaven. "He who knows Him who is hidden in the cave and set in highest heaven, he obtains all desires, together with the wise Brahman (brahmaṇa vipāścitā)."

(4) Gītā ii. 60 refers to men. "The senses even of a wise man (puruṣasya vipāścitāḥ) carry away his mind."

"वशोर्योयियाम्बद्वतमहियानताम्बस्तुजन्तोरिच्छितोगुहायास्।"
"तमसौषु प्रक्षितो वौऽग्रोहो धातुः प्रशादात्मतिमानमात्मनः॥ २० ॥"

20. Anor aniyaṇaṁ, mahato mahiyaṁ,
ātmā 'syā jantor nihito guhāyāṁ :
Tam akratuḥ pasyati vita-soko,
dhātuḥ prasādāt. mahimānām ātmanaḥ.

1 A. dhātu-prasādāt.

Opposite characteristics of the Self:

Vision through Grace.

20. Less than an atom, greater than the great,
The Self is hid in every creature’s heart:
The unstriving man beholds Him, freed from sorrow,
Through the Creator’s grace* (he sees) the greatness of the Self.

* Or, With tranquil mind.

20. Less than an atom (anor aniyaṇaṁ): When the ātman is
thought of as psychical principle its smallness is emphasised.
So in v. 3, using old animistic language, it is called “the
dwarf”, and in iv. 12, “thumb-sized”. It is also said to be
“smaller than a grain of rice, or mustard, or millet” (Ch. iii.
14. 3), and here “more atomic than an atom”. On the other
hand when the Soul is thought of as cosmic its vastness is
emphasised. So in ii. 22 it is called “the great, all-pervading
Self”, and in Ch. iii. 14. 3, “greater than the earth, greater than
the sky, greater than all these worlds”. When the two aspects
as here and in the Śaṅkilya-vidyā, are set in contrast side by
side, it is clear that the ātman is regarded as essentially
spaceless, i.e. not limited by the form of space. This means, as
Śaṅkara remarks, that all things, however small or great, exist
only through the Self and apart from the Self have no reality.
But it does not mean, as he goes on to say, that all things
small or great are only names and forms (illusorily) imposed
upon it.

The latter translation does not give the right colour here. It is true that the Indian religious ideal has often expressed itself in complete inaction and the suppression of all desire and will. But here the negative is for the sake of a positive. If like Śaṅkara we interpret as “desireless”, then that means as he says, freedom from those desires for external objects, whether earthly or heavenly, which distract the soul and prevent vision. As in the case of Naciketas it is clear that *mumukṣutva*, desire for salvation, thus becomes all the keener. Yet even desire for salvation may be over-anxious. “Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after righteousness”, said Jesus. “Strive to enter in at the straight gate.” But there comes a point where striving must cease and the soul must rest in God alone. Here, then, we have rendered the word *akratuh*, which might grammatically mean ‘actionless’ or ‘will-less’, by ‘unstriving’. It denotes the man whose will is at peace, who possesses what the Greeks called *ataraxia*. Christian *ataraxia*, the untroubled peace of true faith, of trust which leads to vision, is taught very emphatically by Jesus in the passage in *John* 14 beginning, *Mη ταρασσόμεθα* (“Let not your hearts be troubled”), and in the Sermon on the Mount with its repeated warning against anxious striving as a hindrance in the way of entrance into the Kingdom of Heaven.

The Grace of the Creator.

The first line of *Katha* ii. 20 suggests the difficulty of knowing Brahman, the infinitely subtle and infinitely great, though as Self He dwells in our own hearts. The third line says that nevertheless the man of tranquil unselfish will may have a vision of Him? How? Does the fourth line add anything new? Śaṅkara says, No,—it simply further explains ‘*akratuh*’ and says that it is through the tranquillity of the senses and the mind that the vision comes. If on the other hand our text is correct the vision is through the self-revelation of a personal and gracious God.
Note that there is here an important difference of reading.

(1) dhātuḥ prasādāt : Bibliotheca Indica text (C) and the Bombay text of Tukarāma Jāvaji (B).

(2) dhātu-prasādāt : Ānandāśrama text (A) and most Indian editions that follow Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya.

Dhātuḥ is the genitive of dhātr = sustainer or creator.
dhātu means “element” and is interpreted by Śaṅkara as referring to the mental elements,—the mind and the senses.
prasāda is from the root sad, to sink down.
pra+sad = to grow calm, bright, pleased, gracious.
So the noun prasāda may mean (1) calmness, (2) clearness, (3) kindness, grace.

(1) Adopting the first reading,
Max Müller  ... “By the grace of the Creator”.
Hume  ... “Through the grace of the Creator”.
Whitney  ... “By the power of the Creator”.
Regnaud  ... “Par la faveur du Créateur”.
Geldner  ... “Durch die Gnade des Schöpfers”.

(2) Adopting the second reading,
Rammohan Ray  ... “Through the steadiness of the senses”.
Röer  ... “By the tranquillity of the senses”.
Gough  ... “In the limpid clearness of his faculties”.
Sitarama Sastrī  ... “With his mind and senses composed”.

Hume, in an important note (p. 350) says: “This is an important passage as being the first explicit statement of the doctrine of Grace (prasāda). The idea is found earlier in the celebrated Hymn of the Word (Vāc), R.V. x. 125.5. c.d. This same stanza occurs with slight verbal variations at Śvet. iii. 20 and Mahānārāyana viii. 3 (= Taittirīya Āranyaka x. 10. 1).

“Inasmuch as the method of salvation ‘through the grace of the creator’ is directly opposed to the general Upaniṣadic doctrine of salvation ‘through knowledge’, Śaṅkara interprets dhātuḥ prasādāt as dhātu-samprasādāt, ‘through the tranquillity of the senses’ according to the practice of the Yoga method.”

Now Śaṅkara, it is true, is sometimes rather arbitrary in his interpretations, bending texts to suit his philosophy. Here however, he may not be so arbitrary as Hume suggests. In the first place the difference of reading may date back before his time (Hume does not mention it). In the second place ‘tranquillity’ is quite as primary a meaning of prasāda as ‘grace’.
This Hume admits when he goes on to say, "There is this possibility of different interpretation of the word prasāda; for it occurs unquestionably in the sense of 'tranquillity', at Maitri vi. 20 and 34; compare also the compounds jñāna-prasāda, 'the peace of knowledge', at Munḍ. iii. 1. 8, and varna-prasāda, 'clearness of complexion', at Śvet. ii. 13. In the Bhagavad-Gītā there is the same double use; 'peace', or 'tranquillity' at 2. 64, 65; 18. 37; and 'the grace of Krishna', at 18. 56, 58, 62, 73.'"

Deussen, who generally leans toward Śaṅkara in his interpretations, remarks concerning this verse, "Another verse which in all probability promised the vision of the ātman concealed in the heart to him who 'by pacifying the organs of sense' has become 'indifferent' (akratu), has received a theistic colouring in Śvet. 3. 20, and Māhānār. 8. 3, in that it represents the knowledge of the ātman as received 'by the favour of the creator'.'" (P.U. 78.) Immediately before this, however, he has recognised that Kaṭha ii. 23 does contain a doctrine of grace, when he says: "The knowledge of the ātman cannot be gained by speculation concerning it, but only by a revelation communicated through the teacher. According as the ātman is conceived as a divine person this revelation is represented as an act of his grace."

"Not through instruction is the ātman won,  
Not through genius or much book-learning;  
Only by the man whom he chooses is he comprehended:  
To him the ātman reveals his essence." ii. 23.1

In conclusion, we may sum up with the judgment that apart from verse 23, and following only the general trend of the teaching of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad so far, Śaṅkara's interpretation of verse 20 would seem to be intrinsically the more probable. Apart from verse 23 we might conclude with Deussen that the version given in Śvet. 3. 20 and Māhānārāyaṇa 8. 3,

"Paśyati . . dhatuḥ prasādāt mahimānam īsam".

"Through the grace of the Creator he sees the Lord and his greatness",—is a later theistic modification. Taken in conjunction with verse 23, however (which Deussen admits does teach a doctrine of grace), we conclude that the reading 'dhatuḥ prasādāt' represents the original text, and in Kaṭha ii. 20 as in Śvet. iii. 20 we should render, "By the grace of the Creator".
It should be noted however that Śaṅkara interprets Kaṭha ii. 23 quite differently and does not admit that it contains a doctrine of grace, and if we were to accept his interpretation there our judgment on ii. 20 might be quite different.²

चारीनो दूवं ब्रजति श्रवणो याति सवैः ।
कल्लं मदामदं देवं मद्यो छातुमर्विति ॥ २१ ॥
च्छरीौं श्रैरिङ्गवस्ववस्स्यम्भितम् ।
मद्वात्स्मविश्वपामान्म मल्ला घोरो न ग्रोविति ॥ २२ ॥

21. Āśīno dūrāṁ vrajati,
   śayāno yāti sarvataḥ,
   Kas tam mada-amadaṁ devaṁ
   mād-anyo jñātum arhati.

22. Aśārīrām sarīresu,
   anavastrēṣu avasthitam,
   Mahāntam vibhum ātmānām
   matvā dhiro na scati.

¹ See note on ii. 23 and mark how Deussen here departs from Śaṅkara’s guidance.

² There is another argument for the originality of the reading dhātuḥ prasādāt which is worth mentioning. Regnaud considers that it is a reminiscence of dhātur dyutanāś (Rg Veda X. 181).

   Dhātur dyutanāś savitūś-ca viṇo (k)
   Rathantaram ā jābhārā Vasiśṭhaṁ,
   Aviṣṇan te atithitām yad āśīt
   Yajñasya dhāma paramaṁ guhā yat,
   Dhātur dyutanāś savitūś-ca viṇor
   Bharadvājo bhṛhad ā cakre agneḥ.

   From radiant Dḥāṭṛ, Savītṛ, and Viṣṇu,
   Vasiṣṭha cultivated the rathantara;
   From radiant Dḥāṭṛ, Savītṛ, and Viṣṇu,—
   From Agni,—Bharadvāja brought the byḥat;
   They found out what was very deeply hidden,
   That cave which was the high abode of yajña.
   (Or, The sacrifice’s loftiest secret essence.)

This certainly fits in with one of the main themes of the Kaṭha. It begins with the sacrifice but seeks to find its inner meaning. It is intended to yoke the mind for perception of and communion with the Self. But for this divine inspiration is needed. See the previous note on the Self as Vipaścīt.
21. Sitting, He travels afar;  
    Lying, He goes everywhere:  
    Who else than I is able to know  
    That active yet tranquil God?*

22. The bodiless amid bodies,  
    The stable amid the unstable,—  
    The great and omnipresent Self  
    Knowing, a wise man does not grieve.  
* Or, That joyful-joyless deity.

Compare Ṛṣa Up. 4, 5.  
"One motionless, yet swift as thought;  
Standing still, He yet o'ertakes all runners.  
Resting is He and yet restless,  
Afar is He and yet near;  
He is within all,  
And yet yonder outside all."

Deussen (P.U. 149) says, "Here opposite predicates are ascribed to Brahman in such a manner that they mutually cancel one another, and serve only to illustrate the impossibility of conceiving Brahman by means of empirical definitions".

Śaṅkara's comment is much the same,—"He has mutually opposed characteristics, hence, because it is impossible to know him (i.e. for ordinary men with ordinary methods),—'Who else but I can know this joyful-joyless deity?' It is only by persons like us (Yama), of subtle intellect and learning, that the Self can be known." 3

Śaṅkara, however, does not balance impartially between the antinomies. He always inclines to the negative or static side as giving a nearer approach to ultimate reality. So here he goes on to say, "Though fixed in its own nature, because it is invested with qualifying conditions (upādhis) through the motion of the mind and other organs it seems to travel to a distance. In reality however it remains here alone." 4

Madāmada: Whitney, following the St. Petersburg Lexicon, takes as a reduplicated formation from mad=to be intoxicated or excited. So "that

3 Viruddha-dharmavān ato śakyate jñātum, Kaś tam madāmadām devaṁ, mad-anyo jñātum arhati.

4 Sveta rūpena sthitā eva san, mana ādi gatiṣu tād-upādhiṇatavād dūraṁ vrajaṁ īva. Sa ca śīḥa eva varīte.
ever-excited divine one”. Deussen also in S.U. apparently takes in the same way, translating,

"The god’s moving (rolling) hither and thither,
Who but I can understand?"

Taking madāmada with Śaṅkara as mada, amada-viśiṣṭha we might render ‘exhilarated yet sober’, i.e. ‘energetic yet tranquil’.

We doubt whether the opposites are intended to cancel. We take it that the contrast of the whole verse is between the energy and peaceful stability of the Self. Both are real, but only one who is inspired by the divine Self can understand it.

22. Realising the essential nature of the Self, knowing that though now embodied and therefore subject to change, he is one in nature with the enduring omnipresent Self, a wise man has no need for fear.

नायमार्थमा प्रवचनेन लघुः न मेघया न वज्रता अर्नेन।
समेतेवैशिष्ट्येते तेन लघुत्वकेष बालमा विवर्तुः तल्लुः खाम्। २३ ||

23. Na ayam ātma pravacanena labhyo,
na medhayā na bahunā śrutena,
Yam eva esa vrṇute tene labhyas,
tasya esa ātma vivṛṇute tanum svām.

The Supreme Self knowable through self-revelation to a fit person.

23. Not by instruction may this Self be gained,
Nor intellect, nor by much scripture-learning:
Whomso He chooses, by him He may be gained,
To him this Self reveals His own (true) person.

23. There are two roots vr meaning (1) to choose, (2) to cover. (cf. Latin, velle and aperio.) So here vrṇute means chooses; vivṛṇute= uncovers, reveals.

tasya="to him",—genitive instead of dative of indirect object with verb of showing (Macdonell, S. G., 202. e.)
tanum svām=literally “his own body”, i.e. person, or character.

This verse teaches that while the Supreme Self is difficult to know, and indeed unknowable by the unaided intellect even though that intellect is directed to the study of the Scriptures,—yet He is knowable through His own self-revelation to the man whom He chooses. Quite clearly then, if the translation we have given is correct, this verse teaches a doctrine of Divine Grace and conceives the Supreme Self as personal God.
Şaṅkara, however, interprets quite differently.—He changes the subject in the second half of the verse, taking ēṣa ("he") as meaning not the Self but the man who chooses, i.e. seeks and meditates on, his own inner self, and so obtains it.

*Yam eva ēṣa vṛṇute, tenalabhyas,* literally translated means, "Whom this one chooses, by him he is obtainable".

Şaṅkara comments:

*Yam eva—svāmātmānam. Eṣa—sādhako.*

"Whom" (*Yam*) means "his own self". "He" (*ēṣa*) means "the aspirant". "The passionless man chooses, i.e. meditates on, his own self, and so the self is obtained by the self."

So he would render the second half of the verse—

"It is obtainable by the man who chooses (i.e. seeks) it alone,

To him this self shows its own real nature."

By this inversion of subject and object Şaṅkara turns a verse which would tell strongly against his doctrine into a means of support. It is very clever exegetical acrobatics, but we doubt whether it can be grammatically justified.

Rāmānuja, who supports the interpretation we have given above, takes the first half of the verse to refer to that hearing the scripture (*śravaṇa*), reflecting on it (*manana=pravacana*), and steady meditation (*nīdīdhyāsana=medhā*) which are the preliminary stages of knowing God. So, commenting on this verse he says, "By this it is said that the gaining of the Self is not effected by mere hearing, reflection and meditation.

'Whom the Self chooses, by him it may be gained.' Now a chosen one means a most beloved one. And he is most beloved of the Self by whom the Self is held most dear. That Bhagavān Himself endeavours that this most beloved person should gain the Self, He himself declares:

'To those who are constantly devoted and worship with love,

I give that knowledge by which they reach Me.' (*Gītā* x. 10.)

Hence he who possesses steady remembrance (which is a form of direct perception), which is dear to him above all things because of the inexpressible dearness of its object,—he is
chosen by the Highest Self and by him alone is the Highest Self obtained. Such steady remembrance (dhrvā smṛti) is denoted by the word ‘bhakti’”.

Rāmānuja’s exposition is of course a development rather than a strict exegesis of our text,—but if what we have said is correct it is a legitimate development. Moreover though Rāmānuja’s own Bhāgavatism is some 1,500 years later than the Kaṭha, there is fairly good evidence that the Bhāgavata religion was already in existence when the Kaṭha was written and passages like this seem to have been influenced by it or a kindred theistic development.

24. Na avirato duścaritāt,
na asānto na asamāhitaḥ,
Na aśānta-mānasā va’pi,
prajñānena enam āpnuyāt.

Additional Note on Śaṅkara’s Exegesis of ii. 23.
We append Śaṅkara’s comment in full.


“Although this self is hard to know, still by proper means it can be well known. So it is said, ‘Not by instruction’ (pravacana),—i.e. the correct exposition of many Vedas, ‘is this self obtainable’ (i.e. knowable), ‘nor yet by intellect’ (medhā)—i.e. power of grasping the meaning of books,—‘nor by any amount of mere scripture-learning’.

How then is it obtainable? It is explained as follows: ‘Him alone’ (i.e. his own self) ‘whom he’ (i.e. the aspirant) ‘chooses’ (i.e. seeks), ‘by that same self’ (i.e. by the seeker) ‘is it’ (i.e. his own self) ‘obtainable’ (i.e. known)—this is the meaning. The passionless man seeks only the self; by the self alone can the self be obtained. How is it obtained? ‘To him’ (i.e. to the one who seeks the self) ‘that self reveals’ (i.e. manifests) ‘its own’ essential ‘form’ (i.e. its own ‘real nature’).”
24. Who has not ceased from evil ways,  
Who is untranquil, unprepared,  
Or he whose mind is not at peace,  
By knowledge cannot win to Him.

24. May be either a repetition of the first half of 23,—i.e. one cannot obtain the Self by mere intellectual knowledge; or prajñāna may mean wisdom, saving knowledge, which cannot be had without the moral qualifications here described.

Rāmānuja (Śribhāṣya iv. i. 13) says that "this verse teaches that meditation, which should become more perfect day by day, cannot be accomplished without the devotee having broken with all evil. This is the indispensable condition of pleasing the Lord and winning His grace."

Concerning the moral qualifications for the vision of the Self the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad says,

"This Self is obtainable by truth, by austerity (tapas).  
By proper knowledge (samyag-jñāna), by the student's life of chastity (brahmācārya), constantly practised" (iii. 1. 5).  
"Not by sight is it grasped, nor by speech,  
Nor by any sense organ, austerity, or work:  
By the peace (or clear light) of knowledge (jñāna-prasāda), one's nature purified—  
In that way, by meditating, does one behold Him who is without parts." (iii. 1. 8).

Concerning this verse Ranade (C.S. 341) says, "The Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad tells us that it is only when a perfect katharsis of the whole moral being takes place by the clearness of illumination, that one is able to realise the immaculate God after meditation."

Then, immediately after Muṇḍ. iii. 2. 3 (which is identical with Katha ii. 23), and corresponding therefore with our verse, Muṇḍ. has

Na, ayaṁ ātmā balahinena labhyo,  
Na ca pramādāt, tapaso vāpy alingāt;  
Etair upāyair yatate yas-tu vidvāne,  
Tasya, eva ātmā viśate brahma-dhāma.

"This Soul is not to be obtained by one destitute of fortitude,  
Nor through slackness, nor without distinctive mark of discipline,  
But he who strives by these means, being wise,—  
Into his Brahma-abode this Soul enters."

Asamāhita, unprepared, unconcentrated, possibly refers back to Br. iv. 2. 1, where Yājñavalkya says to Janaka, "Verily, as
a king about to go on a great journey would prepare a chariot or a ship, even so you have a soul prepared with these mystic doctrines (upaniṣadhīḥ samāhita-ātmā).” And the whole passage may have in view Br. iv. 4. 23, “Therefore having this knowledge, having become calm, controlled, quiet, patiently enduring and collected (śānto dānta uparatā titikṣuḥ samāhito) one sees the self just in the Self. One sees everything in the Self. Evil does not overcome him; he overcomes all evil. .... This is the Brahma-world, O king.” (Cf. Galatians v. 22, 23).

It is right that we should do justice to Hinduism by keeping in mind these moral qualifications which are insisted on in many Upaniṣad passages. At the same time it remains true that there are numerous other passages in Hindu scripture which teach that morality, though a necessary propædeutic, belongs to the phenomenal world which must be transcended.

Yasya brahma-ca cha ṣaḥ cha ubhe bhavata odanah,
Mṛtur yasya upaśecanaṁ,
ka itthā veda yatra saḥ.

25. For whom the priest and warrior both,
Are as a meal of cooked rice,
Of which death is the curry-spice:
Who knows for certain where He is?

25. This verse reads like an agnostic interpolation on the part of one who objected to the teaching of the knowability of the Supreme Being contained in the previous verses. It reminds one of Rg Veda x. 129,

“Who knows for certain? Who shall here declare it?
Whence it was born, and whence came this creation.”

If it is not an interpolation but fits into the context, then we must accept Śaṅkara’s suggestion that its purpose is to declare emphatically the impossibility of knowing Brahman on the part
of those who lack the qualifications described in the previous verse.  

The vivid picture of Brahman as the universal destroyer reminds one of Brhadāraṇyaka i. 2. 1, where the creation of the universe is ascribed to Death, Mṛtyu being there evidently a name for the Supreme. “In the beginning nothing existed. All was concealed by Death. He thought, Let me be possessed of a body. By worshipping he produced water, foam, earth, fire and air .... men, cattle. Whatever he brought forth, that he began to eat. Verily he eats (attī) everything: that is the aditi nature of Aditi” (i.e. the Infinite, here explained as the Eater).

In our text however death is not a name of Brahman but is said to be the Destroyer’s spice or curry powder as though it were that which gives flavour to an otherwise dull universe.

The Brahmin and the Kṣatriya are mentioned as the two highest orders of creatures, those regarded as fitted to inquire into the nature of Brahman. Yet after all how little fitted they are.

“As for man, his days are as grass, As the flower of the field, so he withereth.” (Psalm 103: 15).
“What is man that thou art mindful of him?” (Psalm 8: 4).

And yet, in grace, He is mindful. (See Hebrews ii. 9.)

1 And so, adds Rāmānuja, lack Divine grace. “The clause, ‘Who knows him where he is?’ clearly shows that we have to recognise here the Self (or highest Brahman, which is the topic of the entire section), of whom it has been said that He is hard to know unless He assists us with His grace.” (Sū. I. 2. 10.) He further says that the clause, “To whom (or of which) death is a condiment”, means that death leads to the reabsorption by Brahman of the entire world in which the Brahmins and Kṣatriyas hold the foremost place, death itself also being absorbed in the Eternal.
1. Two drink the ṛta in the righteous world,
   Lodged in the cave in the high upper realm:
   Shadow and Light do Brahma-knowers call them,—
   And those who tend five fires, three Nāciketas.¹

¹ Pious householders, especially those who tend the Nāciketa fire.

The connection of thought seems to be as follows:

The First Valli, which is introductory, ends with the third
and chief request of Nāciketas that he may be taught the
meaning of the “great passing-beyond”. The Second Valli
first points out that there are two ways, the way of pleasure
and ignorance which leads to repeated death, and the way
of good and of knowledge which alone leads to that which
is enduring. This eternal reality, greater than anything this
world or the heaven of the gods can give, is deeply hidden but
may be obtained, not indeed by ordinary empirical (scientific)
knowledge, but by meditation on one’s own inner self. To the
one whose will is at peace (from foolish egotistic striving) and
thus concentrated, the Supreme Self manifests Himself: other-
wise it is impossible for human knowledge to reach Him. The
Third Valli again takes up more in detail the question how
Brahman,—the Supreme Self, may be known and the goal
of immortality attained. The first verse seems to teach that
meditation on the inner self leads to knowledge of the Supreme
because the Supreme Self dwells in close fellowship with the individual self in the cave of the human intelligence. The parable of the chariot then goes on to set forth the method of yoga, the yoking of all the powers of our nature so that our whole being may be controlled and guided to its goal by the Supreme Person.

Rāmānuja, whose guidance we have largely followed in the above exposition, summarises Vallī III as follows: "The sloka, iii. 1, 'There are two drinking, etc.' shows that, as the object of devout meditation and the devotee abide together, meditation is easily performed. Then the section, 'Know the Self to be him who drives in the chariot', teaches the true mode of meditation and how the devotee reaches the highest abode of Viṣṇu." (Śrībhāṣya, 1. 4. 6.)

This interpretation is not without its difficulties and requires justification in detail, but if the first three vallīs are to be taken as a literary unity it provides the best clue we have discovered to their meaning.

1. "There are two drinking the ṛta" (ṛtaṁ pibantau).

Ṛta, from the root ṛ=to move, means as an adjective 'fitting', 'right', 'true'. As a noun it is one of the great key words of the Veda and means established order, divine law or truth. It signifies the divinely established order of the universe, both natural and moral. Hume here renders 'righteousness'. This is hardly the right shade of meaning in this context. It probably here refers to that law or divine order connecting deeds with their results. So Śaṅkara comments, "Ṛtaṁ,—satyom avāyambhāavitāt karma-phalaṁ pibantau"—"There are two that drink ṛta, i.e. true because inescapable fruit of action".

"In the world of righteousness"—The two words sukṛtasya loke naturally go together. Macdonell, S.D. notes the phrase as Vedic and renders as above, referring to heaven. Śaṅkara, however, takes sukṛtasya as equivalent to sva-kṛtasya and construes with ṛta (phala). So he would render—"There are two who eat the fruit of their own deeds". Loke he takes separately as=asmin karire: "In the world, i.e. in this body".

Another possibility is to take sukṛtasya loke together but to interpret as svakṛtasya loke: so Thibaut in his translation of Rāmānuja's Śrībhāṣya I. 2. 10 (p. 267) has, "There are two drinking their reward in the world of their own works," i.e. the world created by their own deeds. This seems preferable to Śaṅkara's reading, but we prefer to keep sukṛtasya and render—"There are two that drink their recompense in the world of righteousness".
Who are the two here referred to?

We should probably interpret in the light of a passage which occurs identically in *Mund.* iii. 1, and *Śvet.* iv. 6 and 7, and goes back to *Rg Veda* I. 164. 20. (Introduction, p. 15.)

"Two birds, fast bound companions,
Clasp close the self-same tree:
Of these, one eats the sweet fruit,
The other looks on without eating.

On the self-same tree a person, dejected,
Grieves for his impotence, deluded:
But when he sees the other, his loved Lord—
And all his greatness—sorrow is departed."

The two birds are evidently the individual soul (*jīvātman*) and the Supreme soul (*Paramātman*) personified as the Lord (*Īśa*), and the two here referred to are evidently the same, though with less personification. Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka in their comments on *Vedānta-sūtra* I. 2. 11, all agree in this view. But how can the Supreme Self, which in *Śvet.* and *Mund.* is said to look on without eating, be here said to drink the recompense or reward of deeds? Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Śrīnivāsa (in his supercommentary on Nimbārka) all explain away the difficulty by citing the example of two men walking under an umbrella, of whom one might loosely say, "There go the umbrella-bearers", whereas only one carries the umbrella. Probably however the intention in our passage is to emphasise the close fellowship of the two selves, spite of the fact that they are so different that they are called "Shadow and Light". The Supreme Self dwells with the individual self in the cave of the heart, making it possible by His fellowship for the individual to drink the recompense of reward in the world of righteousness, and, by sympathy, sharing in that reward. So Madhva quotes the *Bṛhat-Saṁhitā* and says, "The Lord Hari dwells in the heart of beings and accepts the pure pleasure arising from their good works".

"In the highest upper sphere"—may indicate that the "cave" of the heart is not to be understood in the bodily sense. Deussen has, "On high, in the world beyond" ("*Droben im Jenseits*"), which is quite a literal translation of *parame parārdhe.*
The heaven, however, referred to here and in the phrase *sukṛtasya loke* is surely that kingdom of heaven which Jesus said is within us, the deepest and highest reaches of our personality where the human soul holds fellowship with God.

The last line shows that the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, while extolling the way of meditation or of spiritual knowledge of the Brahma-knowers, does not regard the older way of sacrifice or ritual religion as valueless. Pious householders may also reach a measure of spiritual understanding through due performance of the appointed sacrifices.

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यः सेतुरीज़नानामचरं ब्रह्म यत्यथा ।
बन्धयं तितीर्भैरं पारं नाचिकेतं प्रक्रेमिष। ॥ २ ॥
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2. *Yah setur ijananam,*
   *aksaram brahma yat param,*
   *Abhayam titirshatam param,*
   *naciketam sakemahi.*

2. That bridge for sacrificers,
The imperishable highest Brahman,
For crossers to the fearless shore:
That Nāciketa may we master.

*Verse 2* continues the theme of 1.d. There are two ways of crossing the river of *samsāra* (over the change and sorrow of this world), (1) the sacrifice, by which (so the Vedas-taught) men cross to the heaven of the gods, and (2) the knowledge of Brahman, which is the supreme means. The first is in that it symbolises the second, and should prepare the way for it. So it is said in B.A.U. iv. 4. 22, "Him Brahmins desire to know through sacrifice".

The verse seems to be a prayer in which master and pupil unite before commencing the *yoga-vidhi* which is the real Nāciketa,—the new and characteristic contribution that the Kaṭha Upaniṣad has to make to human salvation.
3. Ātmānāṁ rathināṁ viddhi, 
śāriṁ ratham eva tu;
Buddhiṁ tu sārathim viddhi, 
manah pragrabham eva-ca.

4. Indriyāṇi hayāṁ āhur, 
viśayāṁs teśu gocarāṁ;
Ātmā indriya-mano-yuktaṁ, 
bhoktā ity āhur maniṣināḥ.

5. Yas tv avijñānāvān bhavaty- 
ayuktena manasā sadā; 
Tasya indriyāṇy avaśyāni, 
duṣṭāsvā iva sārathēḥ.

6. Yas tv avijñānāvān bhavati 
yuktena manasā sadā; 
Tasya indriyāṇi vaśyāni, 
sadaśvā iva sārathēḥ.

7. Yas tv avijñānāvān bhavaty- 
amanaskāḥ sadā 'suciḥ; 
Na sa tat padam āpnoti 
saṁsāraṁ ca ādhigacchati.
8. *Yas tu vijñānāvān bhavatī samanaskāh sadā būciḥ; Sa tu tat padam āṣṇotī yasmād bhūyo na jāyate.*

The Parable of the Chariot (*Ratha-rūpaka*).

3. Know the soul (*ātman*) as lord of a chariot,
   The body the chariot itself;
   Know reason (*buddhi*) as chariot-driver,
   And the mind (*manas*) as bridle and reins.

4. The senses (*indriyāni*), they say, are the horses,
   The objects of sense (*viṣaya*) are their path;
   The soul, yoked with mind and the senses,
   Learned men call the ‘enjoyer’ (*bhoktr*).

5. He who has no understanding,
   Always of unrestrained mind (*ayuktena manasā*),
   His senses are out of control,
   Like a charioteer’s bad horses.

6. But he who has right understanding
   Always with mind well restrained (*yuktena manasā*).
   His senses are under control,
   Like a charioteer’s good horses.

7. He who has no understanding,
   Careless and ever impure,
   Never attains to that goal,
   But goes on to transmigration (*saṃsāra*).

8. But he who has right understanding,
   Always attentive and pure,
   Attains at length to that goal,
   Whence he is no more reborn.

The Parable of the Chariot constitutes quite a distinct section of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad and introduces its most characteristic teaching. The soul (*ātman*) is compared to the lord or
owner of a chariot (rathin), (the chariot being of course the body). There is a driver (sāyrathī) called buddhi (reason, intellect), or vijñāna (true or discriminating understanding). The horses are said to be the indriyāṇi. This word is usually rendered “senses” but “life-powers” would perhaps be more appropriate. They fall into two groups,—the five jñānendriyāṇi or powers of knowing, i.e. the five senses, and the five karmendriyāṇi or powers of acting,—generally enumerated as the organs of speech, reproduction, evacuation and the hands and the feet (by which is meant not simply the organs themselves but the powers or functions they express). The indriyāṇi are therefore, in modern language, the senses and the instincts.¹

As horses must be controlled by the driver by means of bridle and reins (pragāraḥ) so intelligence, the driver of the chariot of the soul needs an instrument, the manas through which it may control the senses and instincts (indriyāṇi).

The term “manas” has passed through very various shades of meaning in the course of the long history of Indian thought. It is derived from the root man to think, and at first meant mind in its widest sense as the seat of thought, feeling and will. In this wide sense it is often used as synonymous with soul (ātman). This is the meaning in the Rg Veda and it has persisted in popular usage till the present day. Quite early however a narrower specialised meaning was also developed. So in a number of passages in the Brhadāraṇyaka and Chāndogya, manas is one of the five prāṇāḥ or organs, i.e. breath (smell), speech, eye, ear and manas. All these are organs or functions of the ātman. “As breathing he is called breath, as under-

¹ N.B.—We have enumerated the indriyāṇi as in the developed Sāṃkhya and Vedānta philosophy. The first clear reference to ten indriyāṇi is in Praśna iv. 2, which is distinctly later than the Katha. In the earlier Upaniṣads (Br. and Ch.) indriyam means vital power and prāṇāḥ is generally used for the organs. These are usually given as five but the five are not our five senses (the jñānendriyāṇi) since speech is almost invariably put first among them. In Br. iii. 2. 2-9, eight organs are mentioned (called grāhāḥ, i.e. ‘graspers’)—breath (prāṇa), speech, hands, eye, ear, tongue, skin and manas. The exact number thought of by the Katha is not clear, but the powers symbolised by the horses must include both those by which we become aware of objects and those by which we react upon them.
standing mind (manas): all these are only names for his effects”. (Br. i. 4. 7.) The other organs or powers are however subordinated to the manas. So it is said in Br. i. 5. 3, “I was elsewhere with my mind, therefore I did not see. For only with the mind do we see, and only with the mind do we hear” (cf. Plato: Theaetetus, 184. C.D.).

In our passage then the manas is the central organ of the conscious life which shapes into perceptions the impressions of the senses, and also translates these perceptions into conative acts expressed through the organs of action. The mind should be under the control of a higher power,—the reason, intelligence or discriminating understanding (buddhi or vijñāna). He who has such a discriminating understanding controlling the impulses of the mind, which is then said to be yoked (yukta), is called vijñānavān (wise, of right understanding); while the man without such a discriminating controlling judgment, whose mind therefore is unyoked (ayukta), is called avijñānavān (without understanding). A controlling understanding makes a man attentive and steady-minded (samanaska) while without it the mind is inattentive and shiftly (amanaska). Such an inattentive mind cannot control the senses and instincts. Mind in verse 9 means a steady or attentive mind.

Plato’s Parable of the Chariot.—The Parable of the Chariot reminds one very strongly of Plato’s similar parable in the Phaedrus.¹

“Every soul is immortal. ... For every body which derives motion from without is soulless, but that which has motion within itself has a soul, since that is the nature of the soul.”

“About its form we must speak in the following manner. To tell what it really is would be a matter quite superhuman and of long discourse but it is within human power and a shorter matter to say what it is like. Let it then be likened to the combined power of a pair of winged horses and a charioteer. Now the horses and charioteers of the gods are all good but those of others are mixed. Our ruling power (δ ἀρχή) then, drives a pair of horses, one being beautiful and noble and the other quite the opposite in breed and character. Therefore in our case the driving is necessarily difficult and troublesome.

Now the chariots of the gods, whose well-matched horses obey the rein, advance easily; but the others with difficulty, for the horse of evil nature weighs the chariot down, making it heavy and pulling toward the earth the charioteer whose horse is not well-trained. There the utmost toil and struggle await the soul. ... Yearning for the upper region but unable to reach it, they (i.e. earth-bound souls) are carried round and round beneath, trampling upon and colliding with one another, each striving to pass his neighbour. So there is the greatest confusion and sweat of rivalry, wherein many are lamed and many wings are broken through the incompetence of the drivers.”

The charioteer (ὁ ἡνόχος) or ruling power (ὁ ἀρχων) Plato, calls νοῦς, i.e. intelligence or reason. The two horses symbolise (1) θυμός the spirited principle of the soul,—the higher emotions, which on the whole side with reason, and (2) τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, the lower, more animal appetites and instincts.

These two parables, which must be almost contemporaneous in composition, show differences which are probably too great for any dependence, one way or the other. The Kaṭha parable, for example, differs from Plato’s in that it does not explicitly recognise a double nature of our life-activities (the horses); and even if, in accord with later thought, we distinguish two classes of indriyāṇi, these two classes do not correspond to Plato’s and there is no moral difference between them.3

Spite of various differences, however, the Kaṭha Upaniṣad and the Phaedrus agree in the main purpose of the parable.

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2 i.e. upward, toward heaven (ὑπὸ τήν ὑπουράνον ὄψις). Cf. St. Paul’s conception of the Christian life in Ephesians as ἐν τοῖς ἐπουράνιοι.

3 It would be a more serious difference if we were to treat literally the remark of the Phaedrus that the soul is a composite power made up of three parts. This is opposed to the trend of the argument on the immortality of the soul which immediately precedes the parable of the chariot and still more opposed to the whole argument of the Phaedo which asserts that the soul is one and indivisible. As Fowler says, “It is important to bear in mind that the description of the soul in the Phaedrus is figurative, otherwise we are involved in hopeless confusion.” “It is evident that Plato did not consider the soul a composite creature, but a single being. The two horses then represent not distinct parts of the soul, but modes of the soul as it is affected by its contact with the body.” 4 Loeb Library, Plato, Vol. I., 408, 409.
They agree in their insistence that the ruling power of the soul, called by the Kaṭha buddhi or vijnāna, and by Plato nous, must really rule and set in order and direct to one end all the powers of our nature. So Plato elsewhere (in the Republic, Bk. IV. 443 4) remarks, “The just man sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and at peace with himself; and when he has bound together the three principles within him (i.e. reason, emotion and the sensual appetites), and is no longer many but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he will proceed to act, if he has to act, whether in state affairs or in private business of his own.” This is in entire agreement of spirit with the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, and like it sets forth the true nature of yoga,—not as it is often conceived a kind of magic or a set of rules about breathing and posture but the yoking or complete control of all the powers of our complex psychical and physical nature and their direction to the highest end.

9. Vijñāna-sārathir yas tu, 
maṇaḥ pragrahavān naraḥ,
So ’dhvanah pāram āpnoti,
tad Viṣṇoḥ paramam padam.

9. With reason for chariot-driver,
The man who has mind well-reined,
Reaches the end of the journey,—
The highest abode of Viṣṇu.

Viṣṇoḥ paramam padam. The end of the journey is said to be the highest step or place of Viṣṇu. This is a reference to Rg Veda, I, 154.,

1. I will proclaim the mighty deeds of Viṣṇu,
   Of him who measured out the earthly spaces:
   Who, firmly holding up the higher station,
   Strode out in triple regions, widely-pacing.

4. I would attain to that dear home of his,
   Where men devoted to the gods rejoice;
   There is the friendship of the mighty-strider,—
In Viṣṇu’s highest step a spring of nectar.
   (“Viṣṇoḥ pade parame madhva utsah ”.)
Śaṅkara comments: "What the goal is, is now explained: the man who has discerning intelligence for driver, whose mind is under control and thought concentrated, and who is pure, i.e. the wise man, reaches the end of the road of samsāra. That is to say that wise man reaches ‘the highest place of Viṣṇu’, i.e. the nature of the all-pervading Brahman, the Paramātman known as Vāsudeva’.

This seems to be the first place in the Upaniṣads in which the personal name Viṣṇu is used for the Supreme Self, but the identification is regularly made in the Gītā and later Vaiṣṇava literature. The Kaṭha Upaniṣad is not a sectarian Vaiṣṇava book (this is the only occurrence of the name Viṣṇu) but it seems to be on the direct line of development of Bhāgavata or Vaiṣṇava ideas.

10. Indriyebhyāḥ parā hy arthā
    arthebhyā-ḥ ca param manah,
    Manasas-tu parā buddhir
    buddher ātmā mahān paraḥ.

11. Mahataḥ param avyaktam
    avyaktāḥ puruṣāḥ paraḥ,
    Puruṣān na param kiṅcīt
    sā kāśṭhā sā parā gatiḥ.

12. Eṣa sarvesu bhūteṣu
    gūḍho ‘tmā na prakāśate,
    Drṣyate tv agryayā buddhyā
    sūkṣmayā sūkṣma-darśibhiḥ.
13. \textit{Yacched vān-manasi prājñās}
   \textit{tad yacchet, jñāna ātmani,}
   \textit{Jñānam ātmani mahati niyacchet}
   \textit{tad yacchet, śānta ātmani.}

The order of progression to the Highest Person:
The Way of Yoga.

10. Beyond the senses are sense-objects, \textit{(artha)}
   Beyond the objects is the mind, \textit{(manas)}
   Beyond the mind is the reason, \textit{(buddhi)}
   Beyond the reason, the great self. \textit{(ātmā mahān)}

11. Beyond the Great \textit{(mahat)} is the Unexpressed, \textit{(avyakta)}
   Beyond the Unexpressed, the Person, \textit{(puruṣa)}
   Beyond the Person there is nothing;
   That is the end, that is the final goal.

12. Hidden in all living beings
   This Self does not shine forth:
   Yet he is seen by subtle seers,
   With subtle keen intelligence.

13. The wise man should restrain speech and mind,
   He should restrain it in the knowing self,
   The knowing one he should restrain in the Great Self,
   That he should restrain in the Self of Peace.

The parable of the chariot has taught that the lower elements of our being must be controlled by the higher if the goal of life is to be attained. An attempt is now made to formulate a progressive order of superiority in these elements, which however does not stop with the individual self but leads beyond it to a cosmic principle or being called the Unexpressed \textit{(avyakta)}, and beyond that again to the ultimate being, the \textit{Puruṣa}, who is the final goal.

In these verses we meet with a kind of hierarchy of principles or beings which are described by names which have become technical terms in the later Sāmkhya and Vedānta philosophies, and the difficulty is to avoid being unduly influenced by these later developments of thought in our interpretation of the passage.
Let us note certain preliminary details.

First of all, What exactly is the kind of superiority or ultimateness indicated by para? Does it indicate causal priority, and is the series therefore to be regarded as evolutionary? This is how Rāmānuja takes it (so that one point in his attack on a Sāmkhya interpretation is that in Kapila's system the objects are not viewed as causes of the senses nor the mind as cause of the objects, all these being the effects of āhaṃkāra). Or perhaps it would be more correct to say that he considers that the series would have to be regarded as causal and evolutionary if given a Sāmkhya interpretation.

The statement, "Higher than the senses are the sense-objects", certainly cannot be interpreted causally. Moreover, however we interpret para, the objects come in rather oddly in a series, the other members of which have to do with the self, and they are omitted in the order of yoking in verse 13. We suggest that the passage is a vidyā or meditation in which, starting from the outward life of sense, the aspirant moves inward and upward till he reaches the central and highest reality of his own being. But at the first step comes the reflection that sensation is dependent on objects, and that might have led to quite another path of meditation such as we have in Br. iii. 8, where one passes from outward nature to the one world-ground,—the Aksara (Avyakta). But here, in our passage, stopping at the first step outward the aspirant turns inward, reflecting that the life of sense, though dependent on sense-objects, is still more dependent on the mind,—as also are the objects, because "the relation of the senses and their objects (i.e. sense-perception) is based upon the mind".

In verse 13, vān-manasi seems to be clearly a dvandva, i.e. "speech and mind". Śaṅkara however says, vāk-vācam, manasi-manasi, chāndasam dvairgyam. The suggestion is that in Vedic language manasi may optionally be written for the usual locative form manasi, while vāk is written for vācam. The translation will then be, "A wise man should restrain speech in mind". But this is surely an unnecessary straining of grammar (though Śaṅkara has distinguished followers). Speech here stands for all the indriyāni. The dual compound "speech-and-mind" indicates the perceptive (and active) self. Beyond and controlling this is the jñāna ātman,—the self of knowledge, called for short jñāna, which is identical with the buddhi and vijñāna of the preceding passage and the sattva of vi. 7. Beyond this the mahān ātman. Beyond this the sānta ātman, or peaceful self, which is probably to be identified with the avyakta (cf. Praśna v. 7.) or else represents the inmost Self as avyakta-puruṣa combined.

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1 Sṛbhāṣya, i. 4. 1. (Th. 357).
2 It is interesting to note that in the theistic Sāmkhya of the Mokṣadharma section of the Śānti-parvan of the Mahābhārata (Bk. xii, 306. 27-8, Bombay edn.) the mind is spoken of as the cause of the five elements.
3 Śaṅkara, Sb. i. 4. 1. (Th. I. 239).
We will now consider various traditional interpretations.

(i) Is a Sāṃkhya interpretation permissible?

The Sāṃkhya philosophers maintain that this passage gives scriptural warrant for their philosophy, because there is here enumerated, by the same names and in the same order, the three highest principles of the universe as taught in the Sāṃkhya system, i.e. the mahat, avyakta and puruṣa, and because the whole passage is best interpreted on the supposition that the elements here enumerated are the 25 principles of the Sāṃkhya.

The twenty-five principles of the Sāṃkhya are as follows:—

1. Avyakta (the unevolved), called also Prakṛti (Nature or undifferentiated energy-matter) and Pradhāna (or chief principle, since it is the productive cause of all others except Puruṣa). From this, when its equilibrium (the balance of its three guṇas, i.e. moods or constituent elements) is disturbed by the attraction of Puruṣa, proceeds the evolution or sṛṣṭi, of the whole of the manifest (the world of experience), consisting of the following 23 principles.

2. Mahat (the great principle) or Buddhi (intelligence)—the first product of avyakta. This gives rise to—

3. Ahamkāra (egoism or self-consciousness, the principle of individuation). From it are evolved—

4. Manas (“mind”)—the central co-ordinating sense-organ, the organ of perception;

(5–9) Five buddhindriyāṇi or sense-organs.

(10–14) Five karmendriyāṇi or organs of action.

(15–19) Five tanmātrāṇi or subtle objects of sense,—the primary elements of touch, sound, colour, taste and smell. Also called sūkṣma-bhūtāṇi or subtle elements, i.e. subtle ether, air, light, water and earth. From these subtle elements are evolved—

(20–24) The five sthūla-bhūtāṇi or gross elements, i.e. perceptible ether, air, light, water and earth, and the material bodies of which they are the constituents.

Lastly, there is the 25th principle—

25. Puruṣa or spirit—an infinite multiplicity of souls, totally distinct in nature from all the other principles, being neither producer or produced, though by its influence on Prakṛti it produces consciousness and causes the evolution of the manifest world. In itself it is quite inactive, a spectator only, and is compared to a lame man who has to be carried on the shoulder of a blind man (unperceiving matter) before he can do any thing. The simile however is not quite accurate as Puruṣa though called a spectator, only rises to consciousness through its material instruments,—the intelligence and the mind.

Essentially then the Sāṃkhya is dualistic—explaining the universe by two fundamental principles,—Puruṣa (a multiplicity of so-called “souls”)
and the one Prakṛti, or energy-matter, existing in two forms, unmanifest (avyakta) and manifest (vyakta)—all the other principles, i.e. intelligence, self-consciousness, mind, the senses and organs of action and all material objects being only manifestations of Prakṛti.

We have given above an outline of the classical Śāṁkhya as it appears in the Sāṁkhya-kārikā. This cannot be dated at the earliest before the fourth century A.D., but the essential features of the system are found in the great Epic (particularly the Anugītā and the Mokṣadharma section, c. 3rd century A.D.). Traces of Śāṁkhya ideas, however, are found much earlier, e.g. the Gītā. Can we say that Kaṭha iii. 10–13 is a still earlier expression of them?

We note first the absence in the Kaṭha list of the principle of ahamkāra. This however is not a serious difference for, as Keith remarks in dealing with the early Śāṁkhya of the great Epic, “The distinction between intellect and individualization is a slight one and is not normally made. Rather it is assumed that intellect per se involves individualization”. (S.S. 35.)

Much more serious is the criticism made by Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and all the chief Vedantic commentators, that the Kaṭha Upaniṣad does not identify the buddhi and the mahat but specifically distinguishes them. “Beyond the buddhi is the ātmā mahān” (also called mahat). Moreover in Kapila’s system the mahat, which is a manifestation of prakṛti could not be called a ‘self’.

Further, as Śaṅkara remarks, from the general purport of the passage it is obvious that the terms avyakta and puruṣa as used here mean something quite different from the avyakta and puruṣa of the Śāṁkhya. The puruṣa of the Śāṁkhya is not beyond the avyakta which is an ultimate principle, i.e. there is no Supreme Puruṣa. If then there are Śāṁkhya ideas in our passage it is not the classical Śāṁkhya but a theistic Śāṁkhya of the type found in the Gītā, which recognises a Puruṣottama or Highest Person.

Again as Śaṅkara says, the word avyakta in itself merely indicates something unexpressed, unevolved or unmanifested,

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4 See the Sāṁkhya-kārikā, secs. 22 ff. (Davies, Hindu Philosophy, pp. 54 ff.). Also with its commentary the Tatva-Kaumudi in Gangā Nāth Jhā’s Edn., 60 ff.
and the fact it occurs here between the mahat and the puruṣa no more proves that it refers to the pradhāna or unintelligent matter of the Sāmkhyas as cause of the world than the fact that a cow is tied in a place usually occupied by a horse proves that it is a horse. (See Śaṅkara’s comment on Vedānta-sūtra I. 4. 1.) Further verse 13 seems to refer to the avyakta as ‘the Self of peace’ or else it omits to refer to it at all, either of which suppositions would preclude its being the prakṛti of the Sāmkhya.

Kāṭha iii. 10–13, we conclude, does not give scriptural warrant for the (classical) Sāmkhya, nor is it permissible to interpret it according to Sāmkhya ideas. If however, by the Sāmkhya we mean not merely the atheistic dualism later formulated byĪśvara Kṛṣṇa (the author of the Kārikā) but also the qualified monistic theism called in the Gītā by that name, then it is probable that in our passage we have the earliest extant basis for certain Sāmkhya ways of thought.

(2) Can Śaṅkara’s interpretation be adopted?

(a) Re. the Mahat or Mahān Ātmā.

In his Kāṭhaka-bhāṣya Śaṅkara interprets the mahat or mahān ātmā as referring to Hiranyagarbha, the Great-soul of the universe, the internal principle of the intelligence of all living beings, who is said to be the first-born of Avyakta.

In his Śūtra-bhāṣya I. 4. 1, however, he says, “Higher than the intellect is the Great Self which was represented as Lord of the chariot. The same self is referred to in both passages. The soul is appropriately called ‘Great’ as it is the master” (i.e. of all its powers represented by the chariot, etc.). He proceeds, however, to give as an alternative the same explanation as in the Kāṭhaka-bhāṣya: “Or else the phrase ‘the Great Self’ may here denote the intellect of the first-born Hiranyagarbha which is the basis of all intellects.”

The conception of Hiranyagarbha: This conception of a world-soul goes back to Rg Veda X. 121,—the Hymn of the Golden Germ. There we read that in the beginning there was a chaos of waters, floating on which appeared Hiranyagarbha—‘the Golden Germ’—the first-born of creation and the creator of all other beings. Concerning the conception Deussen says
(P.U. 199), "Because it is the first principle itself which appears in its creation as first-born, therefore it also is denoted by Brāhmān (with a change of gender and accent), as though it were Brāhma (neut.) personified". That is to say, Śaṅkara takes the Great Soul, or Hiranyagarbha, as another name for his Saguna Brahman or Īśvara, the product of the imposition of avidyā (cosmic ignorance) or māyā (illusion) upon the absolute unqualified Brahman.

Deussen goes on to say concerning our passage (see P.U. 201), "To the series of primaeval being, primaeval waters, and first-born (Brahmān, Hiranyagarbha) there corresponds the description of puruṣa, avyaktam, and mahān ātmā, given after abandoning the mythological form in Kaṭh. 3. 10-11, 6. 7-8, as the three earliest principles. Here, in contrast with the individual ātman, the Mahān ātmā is the soul of the universe, i.e. the 'self-conscious of all' Hiranyagarbha... For the metaphysical comprehension of the universe this idea is indispensable. We know that the entire objective universe is possible only in so far as it is sustained by a knowing subject. This subject as sustainer of the objective universe is manifested in all individual subjects, but is by no means identical with them. For the individual subjects pass away, but the objective universe continues to exist without them; there exists therefore the eternal knowing subject also (Hiranyagarbha) by whom it is sustained."

On this Dasgupta comments (H.I.P. vol. I. 52),—"This seems to me wholly irrelevant, since the Hiranyagarbha doctrine cannot be supposed to have any philosophical importance in the Upaniṣads". Moreover, we would add, it is gratuitous, for Śaṅkara in his polemic against the Sāṃkhya interpretation of our passage has said, "We must avoid the mistake of abandoning the matter in hand and taking up a new subject". And he has also said, "Higher than the intellect is the Great Self which was represented as the lord of the chariot. That the same Self is referred to in both passages is manifest." Why then bring in Hiranyagarbha (except as a support for

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1 Base ब्रह्मन brāhmaṇ, nom. sing. ब्राह्म brāhma, neuter.

,, ब्राह्मन brahmān,, ,, ब्रह्म brahmā, masc.
his doctrine of the two forms of Brahman? As a commentator Śaṅkara cannot help admitting that the mahān atmā of our text most naturally refers to the individual self, but as a philosopher seeking support for his particular doctrine, he puts forward as an alternative the Hīranyagarbha view.

(b) Re. Avyakta.

Following out the principle of interpretation that the beings or principles mentioned in verses 10 and 11 are the same as those spoken of symbolically in the parable of the chariot, Śaṅkara says that avyakta must mean the body (symbolised by the chariot). But the term avyakta which means ‘unmanifest’ cannot refer to the gross body. It must, therefore, mean the subtle body. (Śūtra-bhāṣya I. 4. 2.) This has Ignorance (avidyā) as its cause and is of the nature of illusion (māyā), “For Māyā is properly called undeveloped or non-manifested since it cannot be defined as that which is or that which is not’. (Śūtra-b. I. 4. 3. Th. 243.) In support he quotes Śvet. iv. 10, “Know that prakṛti is māyā”. Śaṅkara thus objects to the Sāmkhya teaching that avyakta means independent matter or prakṛti but interprets it as that illusory power which imposes itself on the supreme Brahman to produce Saguṇa Brahman and the whole world, of which from the empirical standpoint he is regarded as the soul.

All this, however, is a much later theory, imposed upon our text and not naturally deduced from it.

(3) Rāmānuja’s interpretation.

Rāmānuja has a very full discussion of our passage which occupies the greater part of the fourth pada of the first adhyāya of the Śrībhāṣya. (See S.B.E. xlvi, 354–407.)

(a) Re. the meaning of the mahat or mahān ātmā.

Rāmānuja says that the text under discussion refers only to those entities which have previously appeared in the parable of the chariot. The intellect is compared to the chariot-driver. “Higher than the intellect is the individual self, for that self (symbolised by the owner of the chariot) is the agent whom the intellect serves. And as all this (intellect, mind and senses) is subject to the wishes of the Self the text characterises it as ‘the great Self’.”
Then, quoting Kaṭha iii. 12. 13, Rāmānuja comments, "This passage, after stating that the Highest Self is difficult to see with the outer and inner organs (of knowledge) unsubdued, describes the mode in which the 'senses,' compared to horses, are to be held in control. He should restrain speech, which stands for the karmendriyāṇi and jñanendriyāṇi of which it is the first, in the mind; that he should restrain in the knowing self or buddhi; the knower or intellect he should restrain in the great Self, i.e. the active individual Self (kārtr); that he should restrain in the Self of Peace, i.e. that active (individual) self he should restrain in the highest Brahman who is the Inner Ruler (antaryāmin) of all. By such a chariot-owner the place of Viṣṇu must be attained." (I. 4. 1.)

Rāmānuja, we conclude, is correct in regarding the mahat or mahān ātmā as the individual self, not however as being a separate and self-sufficient being like the Śāmkhya puruṣa but as indwelt by the Highest Self.

(b) Re. Avyakta.

In brief he says, "The word avyakta does not denote a pradhāna (primary matter) independent of Brahman; it rather denotes the body represented as a chariot in the simile". (I. 4. 1.) But how can the term avyakta (unevolved, unmanifest) denote the evolved body? Like Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja replies that it denotes the elements in their fine or unevolved state, which, entering into a particular condition, become the body. (I. 4. 2.) Then, say the Śāmkhyas, you have admitted that avyakta means subtle matter, i.e. prakṛti or pradhāna. Not so, says, Rāmānuja. We, by no means, wish to deny prakṛti (in the sense of unevolved matter), but we do deny a prakṛti of the Śāmkhya kind—i.e. matter as an ultimate principle independent of the Lord. For the fact is that it constitutes his body or means of manifestation, He himself being both its productive and material cause. So he quotes Gitā ix. 8, "Presiding over nature (prakṛti) which is my own, I send forth again and again this whole company of beings". (See I. 4. 8.)

Moreover, even a theistic Śāmkhya view which admits a Lord as productive and ruling cause, but regards prakṛti associated with Him as the material cause of the world, is not
admissible. There is only one ultimate cause. So he maintains, “Prakṛti (or avyakta) denotes Brahma in its causal phase, when names and forms are not yet distinguished”.

Further, as against Śaṅkara, Avyakta is not māyā,—an illusory manifestation of Brahma. It is a real mode (prakāra) or development (parināma) of Brahma, through which Brahma evolves a real universe. (See esp. I. 4. 23–27.)

We may note that Madhva and Nimbārka substantially agree with Rāmānuja. Madhva says, “The word avyakta, which primarily denotes the supreme Lord alone, also denotes the other (i.e. matter) for it is dependent on Him and like unto a body of the Lord”.

He goes on to say that it is the will or creative purpose of the Lord that is spoken of as prakṛti (i.e. avyakta). So also Nimbārka, “Through the statement of reflective purpose in the words, ‘He thought, may I become many’, (Ch. vi. 2. 3.) Brahma’s state of being prakṛti or his creativeness is declared”.

All the chief schools of the theistic Vedānta, then, agree in regarding avyakta, in its higher sense as used in our passage, as a divine hypostasis, the supreme Brahma in its causal aspect, the creative, purposive energy or will of the Supreme Person.

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1 Re. Ramanuja’s interpretation of avyakta. Though justified as against the Sāṃkhyaś and Śaṅkara he is too scholastic. Like Śaṅkara he says that the text under discussion only refers to those entities which have previously appeared in the simile of the chariot. Therefore avyakta must mean the body, symbolised by the chariot itself. This involves the absurdity that the body is higher than the self, and Constrains him to go on to explain the body as meaning subtle matter or nature in its unmanifested state as a mode of the Lord. This gives quite good sense, but Rāmānuja would probably have said much less about matter if in the Sūtra-bhāṣya he had been directly interpreting our passage instead of indirectly discussing its use by the Sāṃkhyaś. That this is so seems evident from the way in which he interprets certain Gitā passages referring to avyakta (in his Gitā-bhāṣya) without any reference whatever to matter.

2 Sūtra-bhāṣya I. 4. 1. 3 Sūtra-bhāṣya I. 4. 25.

(4) Avyakta in the Gītā and Upaniṣads.

Let us now attempt a more independent treatment based upon the literature nearest in time and thought to the Kaṭha, i.e. the Gītā and early metrical Upaniṣads.

The Gītā sometimes uses the word avyakta in what we may call a quasi-Sāmkhya sense to denote prakṛti or subtle matter in the pralaya state, as when it says: "From the unmanifest sprang forth all manifest existence at the coming of day." (viii. 18.) But it goes on to say,

"But higher than that Unmanifest
Is another eternal unmanifest existence,
Which, when all beings perish, does not perish.

Unmanifest, Imperishable, (avyakta, aksara) is it named,
Men call that the highest goal,
Attaining which they come not back:
That is my highest dwelling-place.

That higher (Unmanifest) is the Person (purusa)
To be gained by undivided devotion,
Wherein do beings abide,
Whereby all this is pervaded." (viii. 20–22). 3

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3 Paras tasmāt tu bhāvo 'nyo 'vyaktāt sanātanaḥ,
Yaḥ sa sarveṣu bhūteṣu naśyati na vināśyati.

avyakto 'ksara ity uktaś, tam āhūḥ paramāṃ gatim,
Yam prāpya na nivartante, tad dhāma paramāṃ mama.

Puruṣaḥ sa paraḥ pārtha, bhaktāḥ labhyas tv ananyayā,
Yasya antaḥsthāni bhūtāni, yena sarvam idam tatam.

It is curious how variously ‘Puruṣaḥ sa paraḥ’ has been translated. If it were prose it could surely only mean, "That higher (one) is purusa". Hill renders, "This is the Person Supreme", and Barnett similarly, "This is the Supreme Male". We doubt whether this is admissible, but even if it is our interpretation would not be affected. Dr. P. M. Modi (Aksara, 148, 149.) renders verses 20, 21 and 22 as follows: "However, beyond that Unmanifest (technically so called), there is another 'eternal Unmanifest Existence' which does not perish when all beings perish. This (latter) Unmanifest Existence is (technically) called the Immutable (aksara); (the sages) call it the Highest Goal. That (Existence) (from which the liberated) after having reached it, do not return, is my Supreme Abode. Higher (than the Immutable) is that puruṣa obtainable through undivided devotion, in the interior of whom (all) beings rest and by whom all this (visible world) is permeated."

I agree with his general interpretation, but doubt whether his translation of verse 22 can be grammatically justified.
The Gītā then uses avyakta in a double sense:

(a) lower,—subtle or unevolved energy-matter, not independently existing as in the classical Sāṃkhya but a lower expression of the Lord’s nature;

(b) higher,—eternal or sanatana avyakta, called also akṣara, the Imperishable. It also uses the term prakṛti (nature) in much the same double sense: (a) the lower nature,—aparā or guṇamayī prakṛti, and (b) the higher nature,—parā prakṛti, of which it is said in vii. 5. that it is “very Life (jīvabhūtā), by which this universe is upheld”. The lower nature is called in xv. 16. kṣara (perishable), since it is subject to pralaya, and the higher, akṣara and kūṭastha (immovably exalted). Then in xv. 18. it is said, “Because I transcend the Perishable and am higher also than the Imperishable (akṣarād api ca, uttamaḥ) therefore am I known as the Person Supreme (Puruṣottama)”. Here then as in the Kaṭha the Puruṣa is said to be higher than the akṣara (avyakta). The same is true of viii. 21. since Kṛṣṇa, who is puruṣottama, says that the avyakta akṣara is his highest dwelling (dhāma paramam) and the highest goal (paramā gati) of human life (cf. Kaṭha iii. 9, Viṣṇoḥ paramam padam).

The next verse however (Gītā viii. 22.) at first sight presents a difficulty, since it identifies the higher avyakta with the puruṣa and speaks of the latter in terms which in the previous verse have been used of the avyakta. But taken in conjunction with viii. 21. and ix. 4. (which says that it is in the form of avyakta that Kṛṣṇa pervades the universe), there need surely be no doubt as to the meaning. The avyakta is one with the puruṣa in that they are not two separate beings, for the avyakta is the Supreme Person’s own nature. But though one with the Highest Person or Self there is yet a distinction, for it is that Person, not in its inner being as the One self-subsistent Reality but in its outward movement as the constitutive reality of the many,—not only the cause of the world but the source and ground and dwelling-place of souls, “in whom we live and move and have our being”. For one whose movement of thought is toward the One it is still therefore possible to say, “Beyond the avyakta is the puruṣa”.

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4 I had reached this point in the exposition and was discussing it with Professor F. W. Thomas, when he introduced me to a work which had
We have dwelt at some length on the Gītā doctrine of the akṣara-avyakta because there we see in somewhat developed form, and so are able to realise the significance of the distinction made by the Kaṭha between puruṣa and avyakta. Let us note first however that the root of the distinction is found in the old prose Upāniṣads and possibly goes back to the still older distinction between the ātman and the brahman,—the principle of personality and the more impersonal, though numinous, world-ground. These two conceptions, which probably originated independently, were afterward identified,¹ so that in the early Upāniṣads the distinction was practically obliterated. The term puruṣa ("man" or "person") goes back of course to the Puruṣa-sūkta (Ṛg. x. 90) and is probably older than ātman. It originally denoted "the human being with his peculiar bodily structure" and is distinctly personal in meaning.¹ Another term which occurs fairly frequently is akṣara. This may be an adjective meaning "imperishable" or "immutable" and so is used to qualify Brahmā. But, as Modi has pointed out it, it frequently stands alone and becomes a technical term for the eternal world basis,—a predominantly impersonal conception. See e.g. Br. iii. 8, "Across what is space (or ether) woven, warp and woof? He said, That O Gārgī, Brāhmīns call the akṣara. It is not coarse, not fine, not short, not long, etc." (i.e. avyakta, unexpressed). Contrasted with this we find in Br. iii. 7. a description of the antaryāmin, the ātman or puruṣa who is Inner-controller, a distinctly personal conception. This suggestion of a difference between an impersonal

¹ On these points see Introduction, pages 24–34.
and a personal absolute is not however maintained, (in Br. iii. 8. 11, and iii. 7. 23, the two are described in identical terms) and nowhere in the old prose Upaniṣads is there a suggestion that the one is subordinate to the other.  

The Kaṭha Upaniṣad seems to have originated a new movement for distinguishing more clearly between the aksara and the puruṣa, definitely subordinating the impersonal to the personal, regarding the former as the nature of the latter, by which He moves to manifestation in a world of matter and finite spirits. This movement may be traced through the other early metrical Upaniṣads, (i.e. the Mundaka,2 Praśna and Śvetāsvatara3) and leads to very important developments in philosophy and theology which cannot be considered here. For our present purpose its chief importance is that it led to the personal theism of the Gitā.

1 "This identification did not satisfy the philosophers of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads, who seem to have gone on reasoning ‘How could the personal and the impersonal be identified? Were they not both of them mentioned separately in the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads? If they should be kept separate what should be their relation? Can the impersonal be master of the personal? No. The personal must be higher than the impersonal.’ This seems to have been the view prevalent during the age of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads. All of them agree in placing puruṣa above aksara. (Mund. ii. 1. 1-2; Praśna v. 5. 7; Śvet. i. 7-12, v. 1.)" Modi, Aksara, 12, 13.

2 Mundaka ii. 1. 1-2, probably represents the next stage in the movement:

Just as, from a well-blazing fire, sparks
   By thousands issue forth, all of like form,
   So from the Imperishable (aksara) beings manifold
         Are born, and thither also go again.

Heavenly, formless, is the Person (puruṣa),
   He is without and within, unborn,
   Without breath, without mind (manas), pure,
         Higher than the high Imperishable.

    (aksarāt paraśaḥ paraḥ).

3 The Śvetāsvatara describes reality as a triad (trividham brahman, i. 12.) of three unborno, puruṣa (śiva, deva), aksara (avyakta, higher prakṛti), and jīva. Aksara is called ajā (female unborn) in contrast with puruṣa (male), and yoni, i.e. the womb or source of creation; also apparently devīma-ākṣa.  

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(5) Summarising the various views.

The *Mahat* of the Sāṃkhya is the intellect regarded as a material instrument.

" " Šaṅkara " either (a) the individual soul or (b) the soul of the world.

" " Rāmānuja " the individual soul.

The *Avyakta* of the Sāṃkhya is *Prakṛti*, i.e. Nature or independent matter-energy.

" " Šaṅkara " Nature or subtle matter-energy regarded as Māyā—an illusory appearance.

" " the *Gītā* " (a) Nature or subtle matter-and theistic energy as a real mode of Vedānta Brahman.

(b) The inexpressible eternal Brahman himself as having such a mode: the Divine Nature as creative cause and ground of subsistence of the world and of individual souls.

The *Purusa* of the Sāṃkhya is a multiplicity of "souls".

" " Šaṅkara " *Paramātman*, the supreme, unqualified Brahman.

" " the *Gītā* " *Puruṣottama*, the highest Self and theistic regard as supreme personal God.

(6) Conclusion.

If, for the general reader, we might venture to sum up freely in modern terms, our conclusion would be as follows:

The parable of the chariot teaches the necessity of *yoga* in the sense of the yoking or ordered control of all the elements in our nature so that they may work to a common end. So far it is at one with Plato’s parable. But vv. 10–13 carry the *Katha* teaching beyond Plato’s, teaching not merely the yoga of self-discipline but the yoga of mystical religion. Plato regards reason as the highest controlling principle. The *Katha* says that “beyond reason is the great self”. Reason is one of our highest faculties but it is not the whole self, and in our self-discipline we must keep the whole in view. But
the whole self is more than an individual self. Every stage in the process by which we rise from the life of instinct and sense to the life of scientific understanding and of reason, is a transcendence of our subjective individuality and an entrance into truth which is universal. So with morality, we realise our higher self in which we are one with others in proportion as we control our instinctive and individual desires and satisfactions. But religion puts it the other way. It is through the intuition that we are not merely separate individual selves that we find power to overcome our lower nature. Deep within and fundamental to the individual self there is another. When first we meet that other it appears mysterious and inexpressible (avyakta). Yet those who feel its reality, centre their thought upon it in recollected meditation and yield themselves to its control for ordered unselfish living, find more and more that that other behind our own lives and the world is not merely a mysterious power or energy but is essentially one with us in nature. "Higher than the unexpressed is the Person." And with that realisation religion comes to full moral as well as full devotional power.

It is to this fully religious yoga that the Gītā applies the name "Rāja-yoga"—the royal rule, and says, "On me be thy mind, to me be thy devotion,—thus having yoked thy soul, making me thine aim, to me shalt thou come". With this we may compare the saying of Jesus, "Take my yoke upon you and learn of me, for I am meek and lowly of heart, and ye shall find rest to your souls". Here the yoke of Jesus means the moral discipline to follow in His steps, but it also means the fellowship which enables one to follow.

St. Paul expresses what we may call the lower Christian yoga of self-discipline when he says, "Everyone that striveth for the mastery keeps a grip upon himself in every respect". (πᾶς δὲ ἀγωνιζόμενος πάντα ἐγκρατεῖται; i Cor. 9. 25) but he expresses the higher or royal Christian yoga when he says, "But it is not I (the separate individual) that live, but Christ liveth in me, and the life that I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God who loved me and gave himself for me". (Gal. 2. 20.)
उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राय वराहिबोधत।
चुरस्ख घारा निशिता दुर्गमा दुमृ प्रथमालये वर्धिन् ॥ १४ ॥
ब्रह्मदस्युपृण्मसवयं तथा आर्यसं निद्यमुगन्तच यतू।
आनादनस्म महत्तः परम् अव निधाय तम्म्बुसुक्थातसु यैव। ॥ १५ ॥
नाशिकेतसुपास्यानं मुख्यप्रोक्तं सनातनम्।
उज्जा शुल्वा च मेघावी ब्रजालोके माण्यते ॥ १६ ॥
व इत्यं परमं गुरुं अववेद्य ब्रजससयदिः।
प्रयतः आज्ञकालि वा तदानन्द्याय कर्यते।
तदानन्द्याय कल्यत इति ॥ १७ ॥

इति प्रथमोऽध्यायः समाप:।

14. Uttiṣṭhata jāgrata, 
prāpya varān nibodhata;
Kṣurasya dhāraṁ niśita duṛatayā, 
durgam pathas tat kavayo vadanti.

15. Asabdam asparśam arūpam anyayam, 
tathā 'rasaṁ nityam agandhavat ca yat; 
Aṇādy-antantam mahataṁ param dhrvam, 
nicāya tan mṛtyu-mukhāḥ pramucyate.

16. Nāciketam upākyānam 
mṛtyu-proktam sanātananam; 
Uktvā śrutvā ca medhāṁ 
brahma-loke mahiṣyate.

17. Ya imᾱṁ paramaṁ guhyaṁ 
śrāvyayd brahma-saṁsadi, 
Prayataṁ śṛśaḍha-kāle vā 
tad ānanta-yāya kalpate, 
tad ānanta-yāya kalpate iti.

Iti prathamo 'dhyāyaḥ samāptaḥ.
Concluding Exhortation.

14. Arise! awake!
    Obtain your boons and understand!
    Sharp as a razor's edge and hard to cross,
    So difficult that path,—sages declare.

15. That soundless, touchless, formless one, unchanging,
    Is likewise tasteless, odourless, eternal:
    Endless, beginningless, beyond the Great, abiding,—
    Discerning That from death's dread maw one finds release.

16. This Naciketas story,
    Death's immemorial teaching,—
    Hearing and telling this the wise
    Grows great within the Brahma-world.

17. Whoso then this highest secret
    Shall recite in Brahmin-session,
    Or at śrāddha-time devoutly,
    For eternity prepareth:
    For eternity prepareth.

It must be admitted that the Kaṭha Upaniṣad only adumbrates, and never fully reaches the kind of conclusion given above. These concluding verses of the Third Valli (and probably of the original Upaniṣad) make it plain that though, as we hold, the Kaṭha Upaniṣad is on the main line of development toward a personal theism which resulted in the Gītā, that development, spite of the use of the term "Puruṣa" for the highest being, had not yet proceeded very far. There is real mystical religion in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad but the writer after repeated essays toward a positive conception of the Divine repeatedly falls back to negative conceptions like v. 15. Truly he describes the difficulties of such a way, "Sharp as a razor's edge and hard to cross". The way of religion is never easy. "Strive to enter in at the strait gate, for narrow is the gate and straitened the way that leads to life, and few be they that find it",
said Jesus. But if His way was strait, how much more that of the Upaniṣads.

Though in verse 11 the puruṣa is said to be the final goal, it would seem that the Upaniṣad sage had difficulty in penetrating further than the aksara-avyakta. In the first place the negatively described being of verse 15 is described as “beyond the Great” (mahataḥ param), which in the context is most naturally taken as technical expression, referring to avyakta. In the second place the Gītā clearly has this passage in view when, in chapter xii, it discusses the two ways or goals,—the aksara-gati, or way of meditation upon the nature of the soul, and the puruṣa-gati, its own distinctive way of devotion to the Highest Person.

1. Those devotees who, constantly yoked, thus worship Thee (i.e. Kṛṣṇa as purusottama), and those who worship the Imperishable-Unmanifest (aksara-avyakta),—which of these are better versed in yoga?

2. (The Blessed One said:) Those who have fixed their minds on me, who ever-yoked worship me, who are possessed of supreme faith,—these I consider perfect in yoga.

3. But those who worship the Imperishable (aksara), the Indefinable, the Unmanifest (avyakta), that is omnipresent, inconceivable, immutably-exalted, unchanging, firm-abiding,—

4. Who hold in control the group of the senses, whose judgment is in all things balanced, who delight in the good of all beings,—these indeed win to me.

(That is to say, those who follow the avyakta-gati, the Upaniṣad way of meditation, especially as developed into the Kaṭha way of yoga, may attain the Highest Person. But the way is very difficult.)

5. Greater is the toil of those whose thoughts are fixed on the Unmanifest, for painfully is the way of the Unmanifest won by them that wear the body.

6. But those who, casting all their works on me, intent on me, meditate on me and worship me with single-hearted devotion (yoga),

7. Soon will I save them from the ocean of this life of death (mṛtyusamsāra), O son of Pritha, for their thoughts are stayed on me.

Perhaps we might rather say that the way of soul-mysticism (or as the Gītā sometimes calls it dhyāna-yoga) and the way of personal devotion or faith (bhakti-yoga) are not so much alternative as complementary paths. The way of soul-mysticism may lead to the very heights of religious experience, or, without adequate basis, it may lead to a barren ego-centrism or a vague and equally sterile pantheism. It needs as its basis the firm
objective ground of historic divine revelation. Then, in Christian language, faith in the Son or manifest Word of God, leads on to union with the unmanifest Word or creative will of God which is the true basis of the soul’s being. And such union, ever growing more complete as sin, which is creaturely self-will, is done away, issues in the realised communion of the Holy Spirit, which is God’s ever renewed self-impartation of his own power, truth and joy, of his eternal life and very being, to the soul which he created and sustains, and now in love indwells.

14. Obtain your boons (prāpya varān) Śaṅkara says varān—prakṛṭān ācāryān, i.e. most excellent religious teachers. But the primary reference is surely to the boons of Naciketas in which hearers of the Kaṭha who have his devotion and keenness are privileged to share.

17. The śrāddha or funeral feast would be a most appropriate and solemn time for reciting the Naciketas’s story which here finds an appropriate ending. The other three vallīs were probably added later.

*Here ends the First Adhyāya.*
Second Adhyāya.

FOURTH VALLĪ.

The Self is not to be sought through the senses.

1. The Self-existent pierced the senses outward:
   Therefore one looks without, not at the Inner-self.
   Desiring immortality a certain sage
   With eyes averted saw the Self-within.

   The Self-existent (Svayam-bhū). In Śat. Brāh. I. ix. 3. 10,
   the word is applied to the Sun as symbol of Prajāpati. “Self-
   existent art thou, best ray of light” (see p. 89). Tait. B. III.
   xii. 3. 1 speaks of Svayambhu Brahman. Br. three times at the
   end of genealogical lists of spiritual teachers says, “Brah-
   man is the Self-existent” (II. vi. 3; IV. vi. 3; VI. v. 4). The
   conception here is obviously theistic.

   The terms Antar-ātman and Pratyag-ātman seem to be used
   here for the first time in Upaniṣad literature. The latter
   (according to Jacob, C.) is used only here and in the Sarvo-
   paniṣad. Both here seem to indicate the One Self or Soul as
   variously embodied (a difference from the doctrine of the two
   selves in the previous valli). (Pratyag-ātman in later literature
   generally denotes the individual soul as distinguished from the
   Supreme Soul, but the two terms here are identical in meaning.)
Pierced the openings (i.e. of the senses). The eyes and ears are regarded as holes through which the soul can look.

Saṅkara comments: (In the preceding vallī) it has been said that, “This Self hidden in all living beings does not shine forth, yet it is seen (by subtle seers) with keen intellect”. Now it is asked, What is the obstacle to the keen intelligence because of which the Self is not (usually) seen? . . . The senses go outward to reveal their objects . . . . Therefore the percei-
ver sees or perceives external objects (which are not the ātman), and not the antarātman. Though this is the nature of the world some wise or discerning man, as though going against the current of a river, sees the pratyaṅgātman,—the Self which is within . . . . How he sees is thus ex-
plained,—with āyṛttacakṣu. He whose eyes, ears, etc. are averted (vyāyṛttita) from all the numberless objects of sense is called āyṛttacakṣu. Thus pre-
pared he sees the Inner-self. For it is not possible for the same man to be intent on external objects and to have vision of the Inner-self”.

We may agree with Śaṅkara in his last remark if by external objects is meant “objects of desire” (kāmāḥ), as in the next verse. But what of the unselfish intentness of the scientist,—or of the artist, who, as Plato says, “uses the beauties of earth as steps along which he mounts upward for the sake of that other Beauty, absolute and everlasting”.

Śaṅkara, in commenting on the phrase, “The Self-existent pierced the senses”, interprets it as meaning that Paramēśvara has cursed or injured them 1. It is an estimate such as this which has cursed with sterility much of India’s best effort, just as it was the verdict of Genesis, “God beheld everything that he had made and behold it was very good”, which prepared the way for modern science. And not only for science but for such a spiritual view of the world as that of Wordsworth, who, to the influence of natural objects revealed by sense owed

“That blessed mood
In which the burthen of the mystery,
Of all this unintelligible world,
Is lightened: . . . . . . . . . .
While with an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy,
We see into the life of things.”

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1 Vyātṛnāt—himsitavān hananam krtavān ityarthah. (Sitārāma Śāstrī; “Paramēśvara has damned them.”
Śarmā: “God has doomed our senses.”
Our text does not say like Śaṅkara that the senses are accursed, but it does, at first sight, seem to say they are something to be ignored. This would be quite different teaching from that of the previous Vallī where the senses are compared to horses which, properly guided, may lead us to our goal. Surely the charioteer must come to grief if he keeps his eyes averted.

Vallī IV then, if thus interpreted, would be a distinct declension from Vallī III. It would teach the negative yoga of sense-suppression instead of the positive yoga of sense-direction. This, however, I am now convinced, would be a misinterpretation. It may rather be argued that Vallī IV takes the truth stated in the parable of the chariot for granted but stresses the complementary truth reached in the sequel. Coleridge does not contradict Wordsworth when he says:

“It were a vain endeavour
Though I should gaze for ever
On that green light which lingers in the west.
I may not hope from outward forms to win
The passion and the life whose fountains are within.”

Spiritual seeking has two movements,—outward to find liberation from the narrow, self-seeking self in the vision of God’s revelation in the wonder and beauty and harmony of nature, and inward to a deeper vision in which even these are forgot in the surpassing wonder of the immediate self-revelation of God the Spirit in our inmost soul (and outward also again to find and serve God in our fellow men). These two movements, says Dean Inge, are the systole and diastole of the spiritual life, and each is helpless without the other. Indian mysticism under the domination of the doctrine of illusion has too often turned away from all the wonder and beauty of the world and taken only the inward, which has then become a negative path. On the other hand we must remember that the Indian, far more than the Westerner, has always worshipped in the open air,—his temple the river-side, his sacrament the rising or setting sun, and even where the doctrine of illusion has been most dominant it has seldom succeeded in closing the mind to the suggestions of Nature. Further, though the second adhyāya of the Kaṭha may have been somewhat influenced by the school which produced the Brhadāranyaka, the doctrine of illusion is no more to be seen there than in the first adhyāya. One of the
most interesting features of Valli IV is its use of Vedic nature-symbolism and one of our chief tasks in its exegesis is to show how Śaṅkara misinterprets it in the interest of his illusion doctrine.

The correct view of our verse, then, is that it is a summary comment on the final result reached in the first adhyāya. Most men lead a purely outward life, but a certain sage, i.e. Nāciketas, turned his gaze inward and saw the Self. But though attention is thus focussed on the final stage or result of adhīyatma-yoga, there is no intention, we take it, to ignore the necessity of the earlier stages set forth under the simile of the chariot.

2. Parācaha kāmān anuyanti bālās
   te mṛtyor yanti vitatasya pāsam;
   Atha dhūrava mṛvatvam viditvā
dhruvam adhruvesv iha na prārthayante.

2. The childish follow after outward pleasures,—
They walk into the snare of wide-spread death:
The wise, then, knowing immortality,
Seek not the eternal midst things transient here.

Verse 2. Cf. II. 6 and 10. Dhruvam adhruvesu: Seek not the stable or enduring amid the unstable or transient. Yet II. 10, speaking of the right symbolic use of so unstable a thing as fire, says, “By means of transient things I have obtained the eternal. In its feeling IV. 2 may be compared with the hymn,

"Swift to its close ebbs out life’s little day;
Earth’s joys grow dim its glories pass away;
Change and decay in all around I see:
O Thou who changest not, abide with me."

But II. 10 and Blake’s Auguries of Innocence are nearer the heights of both Hindu and Christian mystic experience:

"To see a world in a grain of sand,
And a heaven in a wild-flower;
Hold infinity in the palm of your hand,
And eternity in an hour."
Yet the Self is the agent in all perception and knowledge.

3. That by which (one perceives) form, taste, smell,
   Sounds also and touches of love,—
   By that also one gains knowledge.
   What is there here remains (unknown to it)?
   This indeed is that.

4. That whereby one both perceives
   Dream-objects and the waking state,—
   That great and omnipresent Self
   Knowing, the wise man grieves no more.

Though the Self is not manifest to the senses yet it is the agent in all sense-perception and in all knowledge, whether in the waking or the sleeping state. It is both all-pervading and all-knowing, and is that supreme Reality concerning which Naciketas has inquired.

3. What is there here remains? (kim-atra pariśiṣyate?)

Max Müller takes as a relative clause, “By that we also know what exists beside”. Pelly’s rendering, “What else is there in the world?” takes the passage as teaching a thorough-going idealism. Hume is literal and non-committal, “What is there left over here?” but may mean the same. We prefer to follow Śaṅkara who comments, “What is there in this world
remains unknowable by the Self? Nothing so remains,—
for everything is knowable by the Self. That Self to which
nothing remains unknowable is omniscient.”

This is that (Etad vai tat): Śaṅkara says, “The meaning
is that this is that which was inquired about by Naciketas
(about which even the gods were puzzled, and which has been
spoken of as ‘apart from dharma, etc.’ ‘the highest place
of Viṣṇu’, than which there is nothing higher”).

If the ultimate reality inquired about is called Brahman
(which is very seldom in the Kaṭha), then “This is that
(inquired about)” is equivalent to “This (ātman) is that
(Brahman)” or in the words of Chāndogya III. 14. 4, “Eṣa ma
ātmāntarārdaya, etad brahma”.—“This self of mine within
the heart, that is Brahman.” This is afterward summarised
in Ch. VI. 8. 6, in the phrase, “Tat tvam asī”,—“Thou art
that”.

5. Ya imam madhvādam veda
ātmānam jīvam anikāt,
Īśānam bhūta-bhavyasya
na tato vijugupsate: Etad vai tat.

The individual soul is one with the Universal.

5. He who knows this honey-eater,—
The living spirit close at hand,—
As Lord of future and the past,
No longer seeks to hide (through fear): 1
This truly is that.

1 Or, From Him he does not shrink away.

5. Madhv-ada: Honey-eater: the individual experiencing
soul, compared to a bee, obtaining pleasure from the various
objects of perception.

(Śaṅkara says, Madhvada=karma-phala-bhuja,—“the enjoyer of the
fruit of action”.)

Ātman jīva=iīvātman: “the living soul”, a term generally
used to distinguish the self as individual from the Supreme
soul (paramātman).
The soul not only experiences pleasure but also pain and fear in the midst of what is apparently a hostile and alien world. But when it realises that it is not a separate individual but is one with that Supreme soul who is Lord and ruler of the whole course of the world, then all cause of fear is removed.

_This truly is that_: means either as before, This is that which was inquired about, or, This (individual percipient) is that (supreme eternal Lord).

5d. _Na tato vijugupsate_, recurs _Br._ iv. 15d., _Īśā_ 6d., and _Kāthā_ iv. 12d. 5c. also—_Br._ iv. 15c. _Tatas may mean_ “thereafter”, “from Him” (i.e. the Ātman or God), or (in the _Īśā_) “from them” (i.e. “all beings”, at first viewed as alien but now “in the Self”). In the _Br._ passage it is clearly God from whom one does not shrink away or seek to hide.

> “When one perceives Him
   As the Self, as God, clearly,
   As Lord of the past and the future,
   One does not shrink away from Him.”

In our verse and verse 12 the shrinking may be from God, or alien things, or both. When one ceases to shrink from God one fears nothing else.

Śaṅkara comments: “_Na vijugupsate_ means ‘does not wish to hide’, because he has attained fearlessness. So long as dwelling in the midst of fear he thinks himself to be non-eternal, he desires to conceal (or protect) himself. But when he knows the Self to be eternal and without a second, then who would wish to hide what?—and from what?”

_Na vijugupsate—na gopāyitum icchati abhaya-prāptatvāt_. _Yāvad hi bhayamadyastho nityam ātmānām manyte, tāvad gopāyitum icchati ātmānam_. _Yadda tu nityam advaitam ātmānam vijñāti, tadā kim kah kuto vā gopāyitum icchet._

We doubt whether quite such a simple doctrine of non-duality or complete monism can be read into our text.

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6. _Yāḥ pūrvaṁ tapaso jātam_
   _adhyāḥ pūrvaṁ ajāyata_,
   _Guhāṁ praviśya tiṣṭhantam_
   _yo bhūtebhir vyapaśyata:_
   _Etad vai tat._
6. He who born of old from tapas
   Was formerly born of the waters,—
   Entering the cave one sees him stand
   Who looked forth through the elements: ²
   This truly is that.
   ² Or, through beings.

6. Max Müller says, “The text of these verses (6, 7) is abrupt, possibly corrupt. The two accusatives, tiṣṭham and tiṣṭhanam, seem to me to require veda to be supplied from verse 5”. Hume says, “This stanza contains an ungrammatical form and impossible constructions. The text here, as also in v. 7, is probably corrupt”.

We have supplied tam with tiṣṭham, and also paśyati used impersonally, continuing the idea of kaścid dīrāḥ aikṣad of verse 1; We also read jātaḥ for jātam, and vyapaśyata for vyapaśyata.

Pūrvam may be either an adverb meaning “first”, “formerly”, “long ago”, or an adjective meaning “before” (governing the ablative).

Almost all translators take the first “pūrvam” adverbially but many, as also Śaṅkara, take the second adjectivally; “was born before the waters”. Hume takes it as we have done above. Grammatically both are equally possible but we have taken it adverbially because it fits better the Hiranayagarbha hymn.

Śaṅkara does not need to supply paśyati because he takes vyapaśyata as = paśyati, its subject being “yo” in the sense of kaścid dīrāḥ or mumukṣuḥ. This involves taking tiṣṭham along with bhūtebhīr. Even so he does not escape the need of supplying at the end—sa etadeva paśyati. Translating under his guidance our version would be as follows:

“He (i.e. the Universal Soul) who, first produced from tapas (i.e. Brahman characterised as knowledge, etc.), was produced before the waters (i.e. the five elements),—he who sees Him (i.e. this first-born) who, (after creating bodies), entering the cave (of the heart) remains standing (i.e. perceiving) with the elements (i.e. senses):—he indeed sees that (i.e. the Brahman which is the subject of discussion).”

The objection to Śaṅkara’s rendering is that it twists the words out of the order of the text and in so doing destroys the parallelism with the following verse. “Yo bhūtebhīr vyapaśyata” is clearly parallel with “Yā bhūtebhīr vyajāyata”, and no translation which obscures this can be correct. Hume renders:

“He who was born of old from austerity (tapas)
   Was born of old from the waters,
   Who stands entered into the secret place (of the heart),
   Who looked forth through beings—This verily is that!”

This apparently involves reading “tiṣṭhati” for “tiṣṭham”, but he does not give an amended text.

We have purposely left the reference of “Entering the cave” (guhāṃ praviśya) ambiguous as in the original. The meaning may be, “Entering, i.e. looking, within oneself one sees Him”, or, “One sees Him who
has entered within one's own inner nature." Both meanings may be intended.

The One born of tapas: Hiranyagarbha?

Śaṅkara says that the subject of the verse is Hiranyagarbha,—the Universal Soul (sarvātman). We both agree and dissent.

(1) It is clear that the idea expressed in our text goes back to the Hiranyagarbha hymn, Ṛg Veda X. 121 and to the great Creation hymn, Ṛg. X. 129. For these see the Introduction, pages 16–18. Note especially 129, verses 1–4, and 121, verses 1, 7, 8, 9. See also pages 88–90 and 133–5.

The myth appears in various forms in the Brāhmaṇas (see, e.g. Śatapatha vi. 1. 1. and xi. 1. 6), and in the Upaniṣads (see, e.g. Chāndogya iii. 19). An interesting though unusual form is that in Brhadāraṇyaka i. 2 where the first-existent is called Death.

"Formerly there was nothing here whatever. By Death this was concealed. He made up his mind,—'Let me be possessed of a self (ātman, probably here = 'body'). From him as he was praising (arcan) water was produced. The foam of the water hardened and became earth. On it he toiled. From him as he toiled and became heated (tapta, performed austerity) fire was produced whose essence is brilliance (tejas). He made himself threefold—(Agni), Āditya and Vāyu. He is that thrice divided life (prāṇa).

Here the primitive being evolves himself and becomes manifold, producing the world and the gods. Here tapas is not simply natural heat but the energy of will and of austerity. The "desire" (kāma) of Rg. 129. 4 is apparently a different description of the same energy.

The developed Hiranyagarbha myth as found stated in the Manu-saṃhitā i. 5–9 is as follows:

"This (universe) was formerly immersed in darkness, unperceived, without distinctive marks.... Then the Self-born Lord (Svayambhur bhagavān), himself at first unexpressed (avyakta), making this (world), i.e. the elements, etc. discernible, became manifest, dispelling the darkness. Wishing to create various offspring from his own body, he first by thought created the waters, and put his seed in them. That seed became a golden egg, in splendour like the thousand-rayed sun. In that egg he himself was born as Brahmā, the progenitor (pūtāmahā) of the whole world."

This is of course later than the Kaṭha but practically all the elements in the myth as here given can be found in earlier literature.
Philosophically then the Hiranyagarbha myth is an attempt to explain how the first-existent evolved the world from its (or rather his) own being or energy, and then entered into it, becoming manifest as world-soul. We agree with Śaṅkara when he says that the subject of our verse,—the one born of tapas and the waters,—is that Universal Soul referred to in the Hiranyagarbha hymn, etc. Our text is therefore equivalent in meaning to Brhadāraṇyaka i. 4. 7: “Verily that which is this (i.e. the universe) was then undifferentiated. It became differentiated by name and form... He then entered in here even to the finger-nail tips.” He is manifested in life, speech, sight, mind. But these are only effects. His real nature is best expressed by Ātman—Self. “For this self is the padāniya (trace or footprint) of the All,” i.e. it is the One Self which is active and conscious in all beings and our own inner nature is therefore the clue to His nature.

(2) While we agree with Śaṅkara that the subject of our verse might legitimately be said to be Hiranyagarbha in that it is the Soul of the world referred to in the Hiranyagarbha hymn and myth, we totally dissent from the view that it is the Hiranyagarbha of his philosophy.

For Śaṅkara Hiranyagarbha is a name for Saguna Brahman or Īśvara, a being who possesses only empirical reality, the product of the imposition of avidyā or Ignorance on the highest or Nirguṇa Brahman. So here Śaṅkara explains tapas as “the Brahman defined as knowledge”, but knowledge here does not imply consciousness. The supreme Brahman only comes to apparent consciousness through the elements or creatures of its (apparent) creation. This is a conception in some ways akin to the Sāṃkhya, where puruṣa, though called pure intelligence, is not in any distinctive sense conscious, till it rises to self-consciousness through the sense-organs which are evolved from nature (prakṛti).

We may note, by the way, that both Deussen and Hume interpret the one born of tapas as the Sāṃkhya puruṣa and Aditi of v. 7 as prakṛti.

As against both Śaṅkara and the Sāṃkhya interpretation we maintain that the Self-existent of Kaṭha iv. is conceived as, from the beginning, a knowing, conscious being. It is true that He is described as looking forth through the elements or
senses of his creatures, but he does not there for the first time gain consciousness. Moreover, as against Śaṅkara, the evolution of the world and of conscious individuals, is not conceived as an illusory development from a characterless absolute but as a real evolution of the Self-existent. In other words this passage teaches not acosmism but a naturalistic (though idealistic) pantheism. There are a number of passages in the Kaṭha (and in this valli) which seem to favour Śaṅkara, but on the whole we agree with Keith when he says, "We have efforts in the Kaṭha to accept as real and deduce from the Brahman the whole of the spiritual and non-spiritual world, efforts which lead to antinomies regarding the relation of the absolute and individual souls, and end in the abolition of the absolute in the Sāmkhya, (of the individual in Śaṅkara*), and of both absolute and individual in Buddhism". (R.P.V. 513,* inserted.)

7. Ū tva

Yā prāṇena sambhavati,
aditir devatāmayi,
Guhām praviśya tiṣṭhantiṁ
yā bhūtebhīr vyajāyata : Etad vai tat.

7. She who arises \(^1\) with life,—
Aditi, soul of the gods,—
Entering the cave one sees her stand
Who was born through the elements:\(^2\)

This truly is that.

1 Or, "as Life".\(^2\) Or, "through beings".

7. **Aditi**: probably derived from \(a+diti\), not bound, boundlessness, boundlessness (Macdonell, V.M., 121), though Śaṅkara, following \(Bṛ. i. 2. 5\), derives from root \(aḍ\), to eat.

The Ādityas are sons of Aditi and she is sometimes called the mother of all the gods,—hence the epithet \(devatāmayi\) = 'containing all the gods' (Śaṅkara comments \(Śarva-devātmikā\), i.e. the soul of all the gods). Aditi sometimes seems to be a personification of the boundless sky and sometimes of universal Nature (e.g. \(Ṛg. i. 89. 10\)—"Aditi is the sky, Aditi the air,
Aditi is mother, father, and son, Aditi is all the gods and the five tribes, Aditi is whatever has been and will be born”). It is in this latter sense of universal Nature (Natura genetrix—Mother Nature) that Aditi is probably used here. Substantially this agrees with Deussen and Hume’s interpretation of Aditi as prakṛti though we deny that the idea is specifically Sāmkhya (see above).

Śaṅkara takes Aditi as another name of Hiranyagarbha to express the fact that he is the universal “eater”, i.e. enjoyer or experiencer. “That soul of the gods called Aditi, because it eats (i.e. experiences) sounds, etc. is born from the highest Brahman as prāṇa (Life), i.e. in the form of Hiranyagarbha.” Anandagiri says that the reference is to another modification of Hiranyagarbha. (Hiranyagarbhasya eva viśeṣanāntaram āha.) If by Hiranyagarbha is meant the being of the hymn (x. 121) who is described as “devānāṁ asur ekaḥ”—“the one Life of the gods”, we have no objection. If Aditi represents universal Nature it is not dead unconscious nature but that Life-power which comes to separate life and consciousness through the material elements and the living creatures which are the products of its own evolution.

Verses 6 and 7 then state that the creative energy which made the world is present in the material elements he has made as World-Soul, and Ruler. Further as supreme Life-power it is born to separate life in the creatures which are the product of the evolution of the elements. It has entered into the cave of the heart of each conscious creature, so that the wise man, looking within his own heart, realises that his own inner self is an expression of the nature of that energy, life and soul manifest in Nature, which again is an expression of that eternal reality which is the subject of inquiry.

Additional Note. Rāmānuja’s interpretation.

In the Śrī-bhāṣya I. 2. 11, Rāmānuja connects Kaṭha iv. 7 with “the two entered into the cave” of Kaṭha iii. 1, and says: “To the individual soul there refers iv. 7, ‘Who is together with the vital breath, who is Aditi, made of the deities, who entering into the cave abides therein, who was born variously through the elements’. Aditi here means the individual soul which enjoys (atti) the fruits of its works; which is associated with the vital breath; which is made of the deities, i.e. whose enjoyment is dependent on the different sense-organs; which abides in the hollow of
the heart; and which being connected with the elementary substances, earth and so on, is born in various forms, human, divine, etc.

8. Aranyor nihito jātavedā
garbha iva subhṛto garbhānābibhiḥ,
Dive dive, ēdyo jāigrvadhīr
havismadbhīr manusyebhīr aṅginīḥ : Etad vai tat.

8. All-knowing Agni hidden in the fire-sticks,
   Just like an embryo borne by pregnant women,
   Daily should be adored by the awakened,—
   By mortals offering their oblations.
   This truly is that.

8. This verse is a quotation from Śāma Veda I. i. 8. 7, and is found with slight variation in Rg III. 29. 2.

Jātavedaś, n.s. Jātavedāḥ: a title of Agni which occurs 120 times in R.V. It apparently means “He who knows (all) beings” (jātum sarvaṁ vetti iti jātavedāḥ) and so is equivalent to viśvaṁ and viśvavedaś (“all-knowing”), other titles of Agni (see Macdonell, V.M. 97).

Hidden in the fire-sticks (aranyor nihitah): the sacrificial fire, produced by friction of the upper and lower fire-sticks (uttaraṁ and adharaṁ aranī) is regarded as existing previously in the sticks.

Offering oblations (havis-mat): the havis was a burnt-offering of grain, soma, milk or butter. One who offers such a sacrifice is called havis-mat. In the Rg and Śāma Veda passages only one class of people is referred to. Men when they wake in the morning offer sacrifice to Agni. Or “awakened” (jāigrvat) may mean “watchful” (so Stevenson, Śāma V. p. 12, “By watchful attendant priests”).

Śaṅkara however distinguishes two classes: ṛtviks or karminś, those who follow karman in the sense of the Vedic ritual and offer oblations of ghee, etc., and “awakened” men, i.e. yogins, who offer in the heart contemplation and meditation (āyana—bhāvanā). Both in their different ways worship Agni and this (Agni) is that Brahman who is the subject of inquiry.
9. From whence ariseth forth the sun,
   And whither too he goes to rest,
   On him all deities are fixed,
   Beyond that none soever goes.
   This truly is that.

9. The first two lines are a quotation from Br. I. 5. 23 and also occur Atharva Veda X. 18. 16. In the Br. passage the sun, as representing all the devatāḥ, is said to rise from and set in Prāṇa, who among the cosmic powers (devatāḥ) is specially manifest in the unresting wind (Vāyu) and among the psychic powers is the life-breath.

Śaṅkara comments:

"That prāṇa from which the sun arises, in which day by day it also sets, that Life or Self (ātman) in which all the gods beginning with Agni (speaking of its adhidaiva or theistic aspect) or all the senses beginning with speech (speaking of its adhyātma or psychical aspect) are during the time of their existence fixed, like spokes in the axle of a chariot,—he is certainly Brahma. This is that Brahman who is the Self of all. Beyond that none soever goes, i.e. no one ceasing to be of that nature becomes other than that."

Note that the existence of the ancient Vedic gods is recognised by the Upaniṣads as the old Greek gods are recognised by Epicurus, but they have become shadows of their former selves, all their reality consisting in the One from whom they derive their being.

We thus see that verses 5–9, with the continual refrain etad vai tat, first (verse 5) identify the living soul which experiences sensation with the eternal Lord, then (6) the Soul of the universe with the individual percipient soul, and (7) infinite Nature or the supreme life-power with the individual soul in which it is born. In verses 8 and 9 there is no specific reference to the individual,—Fire worshipped in the daily sacrifices as itself
divine is taken as a symbol of Brahman, and the Sun and all the gods (or powers) are said to have their reality in Brahman, but probably we should again interpret the refrain, “This is that”, as meaning “This Agni and this Sūrya, all the gods or adorable nature-powers are or represent that Brahman,—that supreme reality of which you ask, of which it has been said that it is specially manifest in the cave of your own heart.

Yad-eva, iha tad amutra, 
yad amutra tad anv iha; 
Mṛtyoh sa mṛtyum āpnoti 
ya iha nānā, iva paśyati.

11. Manasā, eva, idam āptavyam, 
na, iha nānā, ‘sti kiñcana; 
Mṛtyoh sa mṛtyum gacchati 
ya iha nānā, iva paśyati.

Failure to realise unity leads to reincarnation.

10. Whate’er is here, that too is there, 
Whate’er is there, that too is here; 
Death after death that man obtains 
Who sees things as if different here.

11. By mind alone This is to be obtained: 
There is no difference here at all; 
From death to death he travels on 
Who sees things as if different here.

10. Nānā, iva, as if different, various, manifold. Iha (‘here’) usually means in this world, in this context it must mean in the ultimate reality.

These two verses then are clearly cognate with the teaching of Yājñavalkya to King Janaka in Br. iv. 4. “As a caterpillar
when it has come to the end of a blade of grass draws itself together for the next step, so with the soul... Where-to one's mind is attached—the inner self goes thereto. Obtaining the end of his action, whatever he does in this world, he comes again from that world, to this world of action. But as for the man who does not desire. Being very Brahman, he goes to Brahman.” Then comes the verse quoted Kaṭha vi. 14, and then the passage on the unity of Brahman as given above, continuing in verse 20—

“As a unity only It is to be looked upon—
This undemonstrable enduring being.”

The passage culminates in the famous saying, “That self is not this, not that” (Sa eṣa ātman neti neti).

Whereas however the Br. passage above makes rebirth (or rather re-death) dependent on desire, this passage traces it back to the very perception of plurality or difference. The doctrine of non-duality could not be stated more emphatically than in these two verses: “Death after death he obtains who sees (things) as if different here”.

It is curious that with such an emphatic statement of non-difference should be coupled the saying, “By mind indeed This is to be obtained” (manasaḥ eva idam āptavyam). If the word “idam” (this) may be interpreted, as Hume interprets it, as meaning “this truth”, then there is no difficulty. But Śaṅkara interprets ‘idam’ as ‘Brahman’, and Hume also in the parallel passage Br. iv. 4. 19 interprets in the same way.

“By the mind alone is It to be perceived” (T.P.U. 143).

Our text then is parallel to Kaṭha vi. 9, and teaches that Brahman is knowable by the mind,—not a lower Brahman but the Brahman in whom there is no difference. Yet how the mind can know a pure undifferentiated unity is unintelligible.

Śaṅkara tries to get out of the difficulty by saying, “Before the knowledge of the oneness by the mind prepared by the spiritual teacher and scripture, This, i.e. Brahman, the one essence, should be obtained,—(through such scripture passages as) ‘There is the Self alone, nothing else exists’. When obtained, through the removal of Ignorance (avidyā), which is the cause of the perception of difference, then here, i.e. in the
Brahman, there is no difference whatsoever, not even the slightest.” (Continued below).

Reassertion of the identity of the individual and the Supreme Self: The aṅguṣṭha-mātra puruṣa is the eternal Lord.

12. A person the size of a thumb
   Stands in the midst of the body:
   Lord of the past and the future:
   Therefore one does not seek to hide:¹
   This truly is that.

13. A person the size of a thumb
   Like a flame devoid of smoke:
   Lord of the past and the future,—
   Alpha and Omega He:² This truly is that.

¹ Or, From Him one does not shrink away.
² Or, literally, He is (the same) today and tomorrow.

Śaṅkara’s position has been represented as similar to that of Herbert Spencer. Just as Spencer maintained that one can know of the existence of the infinite and absolute though otherwise it is unknown, so it is said Śaṅkara maintained
that we can know the existence of the One though we cannot know anything about it except that it is One. This however is not a fair statement of Śaṅkara’s position: if an agnostic he is of the type of Mansel rather than Spencer: that is to say, he holds that while Brahman is not proveable by reason Its existence and unity are known by the mind of the prepared seeker through scripture and a qualified spiritual teacher. This knowledge is however only preliminary,—it so dispels investing Ignorance that the light of Brahman’s own self-manifestation is able to shine in the seeker’s soul producing not merely intellectual knowledge but an immediate realisation of oneness with the Supreme. (See later note on vi. 12.) At bottom he is a mystic, though His mysticism sometimes finds strangely agnostic expression.

12, 13. The term aṅguṣṭha-mātra puruṣa ("person the size of a thumb"), occurs in the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka x. 38. 1; Kaṭha iv. 12, 13; vi. 17; Śvet. iii. 13; v. 8; Maitri vi. 38; Mahānārāyana xvi. 3. See also Mahābhārata, Vana Parvan, line 16765 (Calcutta edn.), where in the story of Śāvitrī we are told,

Tataḥ Satyavatoh kāyāt, pāśabaddhaṁ vaśaṅgataṁ,
Aṅguṣṭha-mātram puruṣam, niscakaraṇa Yamo balat.

"Then from the body of Prince Satyavan,
Yama with his grim force extracted out,
A person of the measure of a thumb,—
Bound with his snare and brought in his control."

The thumb-sized person here referred to is obviously the individual soul, called "thumb-sized" because it is conceived of as occupying the cavity of the heart. It is said to stand madhye ātmanī,—ātman here clearly meaning the body.

Śaṅkara discusses the meaning of these two verses in his Sūtra-bhāṣya I. 3. 24, 25. The question at issue is, Is the person described as aṅguṣṭha-mātra the individual or the highest Self? It is natural at first sight to take it as referring to the individual soul for how can the supreme self which is infinite be said to be of the size of a thumb? But then the person here referred to is spoken of as "Lord of the past and future". Moreover the words "This verily is that" expressly identify it with the Supreme Self. Our passage teaches then
that the soul which is said to be the size of a thumb is in reality Brahman. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka agree but add that the highest self can be called thumb-sized because He dwells in the heart of the worshipper.

Perhaps the better way of stating it is to say that the "thumb-sized person is primarily the individual soul but it is here taught that this is not a separate entity in each creature but is the antarātman,—the one eternal Self present in each individual. So the Upaniṣad ends with the verse: (vi. 17):

A person of the measure of a thumb,
The inner-self, dwells in each creature's heart:
So from the body one should draw it forth
As from its sheath one firmly draws a reed:
Then know that as the deathless and the pure.

We remarked at the beginning of the vallī on the difference between vallīs iii and iv. Vallī iii spoke of two selves. Vallī iv sets forth a doctrine closely akin to the single self theory which is so prominently associated with the name of Yājñavalkya, and it is perhaps significant that it borrows very largely from the Brhadāraṇyaka, or draws from the same material.

*Lord of the past and the future,—Alpha and Omega He:* the last clause translated literally reads, "He alone is to-day, and also to-morrow" (sa eva adya sa u śvalḥ), and is a quotation from Br. i. 5. 23. Cf. Rev. i. 8. The one Self is not viewed as a timeless absolute (as with Śaṅkara) but as Lord and ruler of the time-order. This comes out even more strikingly in Br. iv. 4. 15, 16 with which 12. c.d. is connected.

At whose feet time rolling on,
   In years and days goes by;
Whom as light of lights the gods,
   Adore as immortality:

On whom the fivefold host of living things,
   And also space depend,—
Him know I, being wise, as my own soul,
   Immortal, the immortal Brahman.
14. Yathā udakam dūge vṛṣṭam
parvateṣu vidhāvati,
Evaṁ dharmān prthak paśyams
tān-eva anuvidhāvati.

15. Yathā udakam sūrūhe sūrdham
āsiktaṁ tādrg [eva] bhavati,
Evaṁ munēr vijānata
ātmā bhavati Gautama.

Perception of multiplicity and unity, and their results.

14. As water rained upon a height
Runs various ways among the hills,
So he who views things as diverse
Distractedly runs after them.

15. Just as pure water into pure
Poured forth, becomes the very same,—
So, Gautama, becomes the soul
Of the sage who really knows.

14. *Height*: Hume, “rough ground”; *dūge* means a place where it is difficult to go. Here it must mean a mountain ridge from which rain-water flows in different directions.

*Dharmān prthak paśyam*: He who views things as diverse.

Hume: He who sees qualities separately, runs to waste after them.

Deussen: He who attends to sense-impressions as distinct existences himself runs after them.

Śaṅkara: He who sees dharmān, i.e. different selves as separate, i.e. different in each separate body, runs after them only, responsive to the variety in the bodies,—i.e. again and again he obtains a separate body.
The interpretation turns on the meaning of dharmān. The various meanings of dharma are discussed in connection with ii. 13 (page 96). Philosophically we said dharma means the characteristic quality or nature of anything. Here we take it the meaning is, He who views the natures of things (and therefore things themselves) as quite separate, etc. Śaṅkara limits the things to ‘selves’ but the text is more general. It insists on the necessity of perceiving the unity of law and nature among the apparently quite separate individual things (and selves) of experience, otherwise there is not only intellectual error but moral distraction and running to waste. (If this is too much to read into anuvidhāvati we believe that it represents the spirit of the passage.) The continual warnings of the Upaniṣads against pluralism are wearisome repetitions if regarded only as the enunciation of a metaphysical monism: we only understand them if we credit the writers with something of the moral and religious feeling which animated Xenophanes and the Hebrew prophets in their protest against polytheism.

15. This verse attempts to describe through a simile the state of the soul when liberated through true knowledge (i.e. of oneness with the Supreme Self). Does it become identical with the Supreme? Yes says Śaṅkara,—the perception of difference due to the limiting conditions (which are the product of Ignorance) having been destroyed then, “Just as pure water poured into pure becomes just such (tādrg eva), i.e. completely of one essence and not otherwise (eka-rasam-eva na anyathā) so also the soul of the sage, i.e. the man practised in meditation, who knows the oneness, becomes just similar (evam-eva bhavati).” The nature of the simile seems to favour Śaṅkara’s interpretation of tādrg eva and therefore we have translated it as “the very same”. Literally however it means simply “just such” or “exactly similar”.

The interpretation given by Rāmānuja and Nimbārka is not therefore excluded by this verse,—i.e. the view that the liberated soul is non-different (i.e. not in any way separate—prthak) but not metaphysically identical with the Supreme. It is one with Him in will and nature (except that it does not share His
power of ruling the world), but not identical in a sense that would exclude the supreme bliss of the contemplation of the perfection of the Supreme Lord. (See Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya iv. 4. 17–22.)

With our verse we may compare Mundaka iii. 2. 8:

Even as rivers flowing to the ocean
Merge in it and relinquish name and form,
Just so the wise, from name and form delivered,
Attains unto the highest, heavenly Person.

Prima facie this also teaches the merging of identity. Yet the highest being is conceived theistically. The oneness therefore cannot be that of bare identity but must permit of personal relationship.

It is interesting to note that a Christian mystic with so ardent a personal religion as Bernard of Clairvaux could use a simile like that of our text and say: “As a drop of water poured into wine loses itself and takes the colour and savour of wine, so in the saints all human affections melt away, by some unspeakable transmutation, into the will of God. For how could God be all in all if anything merely human remained in man? The substance will endure, but in another beauty, a higher power, a greater glory.”

St. Theresa also says, “Spiritual marriage is like rain falling from the sky into a river, becoming one and the same liquid, so that the river water and the rain cannot be divided; or it resembles a streamlet flowing into the ocean, which cannot afterward be dissevered from it”.

“Lord, we are rivers running to Thy sea,
Our waves and ripples all derived from Thee:
A nothing we should have, a nothing be,
Except for Thee.”

—Christina Rossetti.
Pañcamī Vallī.

1. Puram ekādaśa-dvāram
   ajasya, avakra-cetasaḥ;
   Anuṣṭhāya na śocati
   vimuktāś-ca vimucyate. Etad vai tat.

2. Hamsaḥ sūcīsad vasur antarikṣa-sad,
   hotā vedi-śad atithir duroṇa-sat;
   Nr-śad vara-śad āt-sad vyoma-śad,
   ab-jā go-jā rta-jā adri-jā rtaṃ brhat.

FIFTH VALLĪ.

The Lord of the city of the body is Lord of the world.

1. There is a city of eleven gates,
   Owned by the unborn uncrook’d intelligence:
   By ruling it one does not grieve,
   And being freed is freed indeed.
   This truly is that.

2. The swan in the sky, the Vasu in space,
   The priest at the altar, the guest in the house: ¹
   In men and their betters, in right and the sky,—
   Born in water and earth, born in right and in rock,
   is the Right and the Great.

¹ Or, jar.

The Fifth Vallī simply reinforces the argument of the fourth
that the soul of each individual is not a separate soul but is the
one eternal Ātman dwelling in each individual as Inner-self
(antarātman). The later verses of the vallī, however (from v. 12), seem to depart from the one soul theory, and, at least provisionally, speak of two souls,—the antarātman being spoken of as ātma-sthā (standing in the soul): an apparent return to the standpoint of the third vallī.

1. The eleven-gated city: Bunyan, in his Holy War, describes the human soul as living in a city with five gates, i.e. the five senses. So in the Gītā (v. 13) we are told that, “Renouncing with the mind all (attachment to the results of) works, the embodied soul sits happily as master in the nine-gated city”. The nine gates of the body there referred to are the two eyes, two ears, two nostrils, mouth, anus and generative opening. The other two to make up eleven are the navel and sagittal suture (vidṛti),—the opening at the top of the skull, perceptible only in children, through which the liberated soul is supposed to escape at death.

The uncrooked intelligence (avakra-cetas): uncrooked, i.e. upright, righteous. By implication there must exist, at least in appearance, crooked, perverted (human) intelligences. This verse however says nothing of such. It apparently assumes that there is only one Self eternal and perfect, which is Lord of all bodies, directly, without vicegerents.

Renderings of the second half of the verse vary according to the meaning given to anuṣṭhāya. Anu+sthā means (1) to stand near, (2) to perform, practise, (3) to rule, govern. Śaṅkara takes a modification of the second meaning and interprets anuṣṭhāya as dhyāte. “Anuṣṭhāya means contemplating that Highest Lord, the master of the city.” Following him we should translate, “Contemplating (or meditating on) Him one does not grieve.” Like Hume however we prefer the third meaning, which gives a more natural construction, the object being puram.

We take the verse as resuming the theme of iv. 1, and to some extent also reconciling it with that of the Parable of the Chariot. The senses “pierced outward” are not merely openings from which the soul must turn away; they are like the gates of a city through which its Lord receives influences from the outer world and through which also he acts upon it. As by controlling the gates the Lord of a city dwells in happy peace, secure from attack, so the soul, controlling the senses, is free from sorrow, being free from insurgent desire.
This is the true freedom which begins even here and leads after death to complete release from the task of controlling a body.

2. This verse, except the last word, occurs Rg Veda iv. 40. 5, and in full in the Taittiriya Samhitā of the Black Yajur Veda, i. 8. 15; iv. 2. 1; the Vājasaneyī Samhitā of the White Yajur Veda, x. 24; xii. 14; and the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, vi. 7. 3. 11.

As quoted in the Satapatha B. the passage refers to the triune Agni who is identified with the Sun in heaven, Vāyu (wind) in the interspace, and dwells on earth both as the divine priest (symbolised by the sacrificial fire) and as the guest in the homes of men (atithir duroṇasat).

Here in our text the triune Agni, the supreme energy that sums up all the gods, all the powers of the universe, is implicitly identified with Brahman, who is the universal Atman.

Śaṅkara says: The Self is not a dweller in one city only but dwells in all cities. He is hansa (the swan), i.e. the mover, śucisad—dwelling in the clear (sky) as the Sun (Āditya). He is the Vasu (so called because he animates all) dwelling in the interspace (antarikṣa) as the Wind (Vāyu). As a priest (hotā), i.e. as Agni at the altar, i.e. on earth. As a guest, i.e. Soma, he is called duroṇa-sat, i.e. dwelling in a jar; or else duroṇasat may mean that he dwells in houses as Brahmin guests. Nṛsat—dwelling in men; varasat—dwelling in betterers, i.e. gods (Satapatha says vara=space); rtrasat—dwelling in rta, i.e. truth (satya) or the sacrifice (yajña), vyomarasat—dwelling in the sky or ether. Ab-jāh—born in water in the form of conches, whales, etc.; go-jāh—born of earth as rice and barley, etc.; rta-jāh—born as adjuncts of the sacrifice (yajñāṅga); adrijāh—rock-born, born of mountains as rivers. Though the soul of all yet he is rta—i.e. of unchanging nature, and because he is the cause of all he is called bṛhat—great. The meaning of the mantra is that the all-pervading Soul of the world is only One and there is no distinction of self (atma-bheda).

Apart from the interpretation of rta-jāh, which we have rendered "born in right" we have on the whole followed Śaṅkara. Keith 2 renders rta—"holy order" and Eggeling—"law". "Right" is intended as including these two meanings, for rta in the Rg Veda signifies that sacred Law or order of the world which is both true, i.e. dependable, and right, i.e. morally good.

3. Upward the outbreath he leadeth,
   The inbreath downward he casts:
   The dwarf who is seated in the midst
   All the devas do worship.

4. When this embodied soul that dwells
   Within the body, is unloosed
   And from the body is set free,—
   What is there here that then remains?
   This truly is that.

5. Not by outbreath nor by inbreath
   Does any man whatever live,
   But by another do they live
   On which these (life-breaths) both depend
3. **Prāṇa and Apāṇa**: i.e. the life-breaths or vital powers. **Prāṇa** is a word of very varied meaning. Originally it meant "breath", then "life", and was also, even as early as the Atharva Veda, used as a name for the Supreme Being (so=Ātman). In the early Upaniṣads all the vital powers (e.g. speech, breath, eye, ear, manas) are called prāṇāḥ. Then a distinction is made between the prāṇāḥ, as forces of unconscious life, and the indriyāni and manas,—the forces of conscious life. The prāṇāḥ are distinguished as five,—prāṇa, apāṇa, vyāna, samāna, udāna (e.g. Br. i. 5. 3, Tait. i. 7). These are sometimes looked upon as varieties of breath and sometimes as powers presiding over different parts of the body. When prāṇa is used alone it usually means "breath" (both inspiration and expiration), but when used with apāṇa it generally means expiration, while apāṇa means inspiration. **Apāṇa** also came to mean the "wind" or power of digestion and evacuation. For a fuller discussion see Deussen, P.U. 274-280.

The dwarf (vāmana): another name for the anūṣṭha-mātra puruṣa, i.e. the embodied self. This person within, "nearer to us than breathing" is the Supreme Being whom all the gods or nature powers worship. Śaṅkara however interprets "all the devas" as the senses and vital powers (prāṇāḥ) which are subject to the person within who is their Lord and worship him by their uninterrupted activity on his account. In any case the main point of the verse is that it leads on to v. 5.

4. "Here", i.e. in the body. Śaṅkara answers, "Nothing remains". For when the soul leaves it, then this assemblage of causes and effects we call the body becomes powerless and perishes. But *atra* may equally mean there or then. What remains after the soul is freed from the body? Just the one Self,—the dehīn or embodied soul is one with the universal Soul (sarvātman). "This is that."

5. This verse may have in view the Buddhist doctrine of anattā (an-ātmān) that what we call a person is only an assemblage of parts, but is more likely to refer to the Cārvāka doctrine. Śaṅkara says, the theory may be urged that man lives only by the life-breaths, etc. and is destroyed by their exit,—that a man, like a house, is a combination of parts. But a house does not exist for itself but for one who directs the combination of its parts. So the bodily powers are not self-explanatory: they depend on and exist for another,—the Soul.

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1 See *Vedāntasāra* vi, J. 77. Also *Introduction*, 43.
6. *Hanta te idam pravakṣyāmi guhyam brahma sanātanam; Yathā ca maraṇam prāpya ātmā bhavati Gautama.*

7. *Yonim anye prapaḍyante sariratvāya dehināḥ; Sthānum anye 'nusanyanti, yathā karma yathā ārūtam.*

The Eternal yet Transmigrating Soul.

6. Come then, to you I will declare
   This hidden Brahma everlasting;
   And also, after reaching death,
   How the soul fares, O Gautama.

7. Some souls go forth into a womb,
   Unto a new embodiment;
   Some enter stationary things:
   According to their knowledge and their deeds.

6, 7. **Soul** (v. 6) = *ātmā; Souls (v. 7) = *dehināḥ.* The soul or self (*ātmā*) which in its essential nature is one with Brahmā, becomes a *dehin* (owner of a *deha* or body). How this occurs is nowhere clearly stated. Embodiment is not, as with Śaṅkara, an illusion. "In the Upaniṣads we have, on the one hand the constant efforts to show that there is but one self, and on the other hand the reality of the individual self is constantly insisted on." (Keith, R.P.V. 552.) But embodiment having occurred, souls go on after death to new embodiment—*yathā karma*—in accordance with their deeds. As Br. iv. 4. 5, says, in one of the earliest statements of the doctrine of transmigration, *yathā karma tathā bhavati,*—"as one acts so one becomes". Our verse mentions only two of the kinds of possible embodiment,—as men and trees. For a fuller statement see Chānd. v. 10. 7 and Kauṣ. i. 2.
The nature of rebirth is also said to be “according to knowledge” (Kaus. i. 2, yathā vidyām, here yathā śrutam), since knowledge is largely determinative of deeds. True knowledge however, of the kind here communicated, leads beyond all rebirth.

We have taken dehināḥ as nom. pl. agreeing with anye. (So Śaṅkara) Hume takes as gen. sing. “Some go into a womb for the embodiment of a living being.” (So apparently also Deussen and Max Müller.)

8. Ya esa supṣesu jāgarti,
   kāmāṃ kāmāṃ puruṣo nirmimāṇah;
Tad eva śukrām tad brahma,
   tad eva amṛtam ucyate.
Tasmin lokāḥ śritāḥ sarve,
   tad u na atyeti kaścana. Elad vai tat.

The Inner Soul is ground of the world.

8. He who is awake in the sleeping,
The person who fashions desire on desire,—
That is the Pure: That is Brahman:
That indeed is called the Immortal;
On that do all the worlds depend;
Beyond it none soever goes. This truly is that.

8. The Upaniṣads hold that the oneness of the individual with the supreme Self is more manifest in the sleeping than in the waking state. See for example Chānd. vi. 8. 1, where svapiti—“he sleeps” is connected with svam apīta—“he has entered into himself”: “When it is said that the man is asleep, then has he attained to union with the self-existent”. Moreover dream-consciousness is regarded as a proof of the existence of the Ātman. In sleep the prāṇāḥ—all the bodily powers, are laid to rest. What is it then that remains active?

“Striking down in sleep what is bodily,
Sleepless he contemplates the sleeping (organs).”
"There are no chariots there, no teams (of horses), no roads, but he creates for himself chariots, teams, roads. There are no blisses there or pleasures or delights, but blisses, pleasures, delights he creates for himself" (see the whole passage, B.A.U. iv. 3).

**Desire on desire (kāmam kāmam):** Kāma primarily means desire but here as in i. 24, 25, "objects of desire", probably as in the B.A.U. passage just quoted, "dream objects of desire". Śaṅkara, commenting on nīrāmānyah, i.e. fashioning or creating, adds avidyā, "by Ignorance". Rāmānuja however objects. Dream-objects, like the objects of our waking consciousness, are creations of the Supreme Person and are only māyā, not in the sense of illusion but in the sense of "wonderful".

9. **Agnir yathā eko bhuvanam praviṣṭo,**
   rūpaṁ rūpaṁ pratirūpo bahūva,
   Ekas tathā sarva-bhūta-antarātmā,
   rūpaṁ rūpaṁ pratirūpo bahiś-ca.

10. **Vāyur yathā eko bhuvanam praviṣṭo,**
    rūpaṁ rūpaṁ pratirūpo bahūva,
    Ekas tathā sarvabhūtāntarātmā,
    rūpaṁ rūpaṁ pratirūpo bahiś-ca.

**The One Inner-soul : Immanent yet Transcendent.**

9. As Fire, though one, having entered the world,
   Adapts itself in form to every form,
   So the one Inner-soul of every being,
   Enwrapped in every form is yet outside.

10. As Air, though one, having entered the world,
    Adapts itself in form to every form,
    So the one Inner-soul of every being,
    Enwrapped in every form is yet outside.
9, 10. Rūpaṁ rūpaṁ pratirūpo babhūva: literally, “Has become the counterform of every form” so also line d.: “Is the counterform of every form and is outside”.

This is a quotation from Rg Veda vi. 47. 18, the famous Māyā verse,

Rūpaṁ rūpaṁ pratirūpo babhūva,
Indro māyābhīḥ pururūpa śyate.

It tells, how, in his conflict with the demons,

“Indra went multiform through his magic powers.
He became the counterform of every form.”

The thought of the passage is, however, probably more based on Rg x. 51. 1–3, which tells how Agni, fearing to be injured by continual use in sacrificial worship, hid himself in animals and plants, assuming their forms.

The interest of this verse lies in its teaching of the immanence and yet the transcendence of the Supreme Self. The thought is evidently a development of Rg Veda x. 90 (the Puruṣa-sūkta), where it is said

“The Person had a thousand heads,
A thousand eyes, a thousand feet:
He filled the earth on every side
Yet stood ten-fingers’ length beyond.

Such is his greatness, and yet more
Than all this is the Puruṣa:
All beings are one-fourth of him;
Three-fourths immortal in the heaven.”

The Śvetāsvatara develops the thought by quoting the Puruṣa-sūkta and saying,

“By him, the Person, this whole world is filled”
“Who utterly transcends this world.” (Śvet. iii. 9. 10.)

Śaṅkara says, Bahiś-ca,—svēna avikṛtena rūpeṇa, ākāśavat. That is to say, The Self, like the ether assumes many forms and yet is outside them in its own unmodified nature. This implies that all modification is in appearance only. But this surely is going beyond the text which intends to preserve transcendence while at the same time teaching immanence.
11. Sūryo yathā sarva-lokasya caksur,  
na lipyate cāksusair bāhya-dosaiḥ,  
Ekas tathā sarvabhūtāntarātmā,  
na lipyate loka-dukkheṇa bāhyāḥ.

The Impassive Self, untouched by the world’s pain.

11. Just as the Sun, the eye of all the world,  
Is not defiled by outward faults of vision,  
So the one Inner-soul of every being  
Is touched not by earth’s pain, being outside it.

11. Śaṅkara says, “If one is the Ātman of all he may be regarded as subject to the grief of samsāra, therefore this is said. As the sun, manifesting unclean things like dung, is not tainted by their outward visible faults, so the one inner Self of all is not tainted by the misery of the world, being outside it. For the world, by ignorance (avidyā) superimposed on the Ātman, experiences misery arising from desire and karman, but that is not really in the Ātman: just as a snake superimposed on a rope (by mistaken imagination) does not really exist as a blemish in the rope. Thus the world having superimposed on the Ātman the false notion of deed, agency and fruit of action (kriyā-kāraka-phala) suffers thereby the misery of birth, old-age, death, etc. But the Ātman, although the soul of all the world, is not tainted by the misery of the world through such false attribution: because like the rope he is external to the false notion imposed upon him.”

We quote this explanation more because it is so characteristic than because we consider it gives a correct interpretation of our text. Śaṅkara denies the reality of the world’s misery: it is an illusion. The Upaniṣad admits its reality though it denies that it touches the Self. Śaṅkara’s teaching here is based on his acosmism. He denies not only the world’s pain but the world itself except as a creation of Ignorance. The teaching of the Kaṭha, though it sometimes seems to
follow the one soul theory (the absolute idealism of Yājñavalkya which is the precursor of Śaṅkara’s teaching), is on the whole a panentheism more akin to Rāmānuja’s teaching, in which the world, including individual souls, constitutes the body of Brahman, while Brahman is antarātman, not as being the only self, the sole real existence, but as the Self within all selves, their innermost reality (see ātma-stha next verse).

To return to our text. It does not deny pain and misery, and it may have been written about the time when another Gautama, the Buddha, saw in duḥkha,—human suffering, the one great indubitable fact which bulked so large it almost shut out the vision of all else. Our text however denies that human suffering (loka-duḥkha) touches (literally “smears”) that Supreme Being who is also our inner-self. May not such teaching have been one reason why Buddha found no use for God or the ātman. A reality transcendent in this sense was too out of touch with the desperate facts of life to be of any practical value.

The doctrine of the impassiveness of God has infected most theologies. Even Christian theology took it over from Aristotle and counted Patripassianism a heresy: and this spite of the teaching of the Old Testament that “In all our afflictions He was afflicted”, and of the New, that the cross of Christ is not merely an event in time but is the manifestation of the eternal spirit of God.

एको वशी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा एकं रूपं बश्च यः करोति।
तमात्मस्य वेदसुप्रभत्नि धोरास्वायं सुखं प्राप्तं नेतरेवसम्।१२।

निषेधनिधाराञ् चेतन्तिद्वितानामास्तैं हिन्दू महोदयानि ज्ञानम्।
तमात्मस्य वेदसुप्रभत्नि धोरास्वायं शान्तिः प्राप्तिः नेतरेवसम्।१३।

12. Eko vaśi sarvabhūtāntarātmā,  
ekam rūpam bahudhā yah karoti,  
Tam ātma-stham ye 'nupasyanti dhīrās  
teṣām sukham sāsvatam na, itaṛesām.
13. *Nityo nityānām cetanaś cetanānām,
    eko bahūnām yo vidadhāti kāmān,
    Tam ātmastham ye 'nupasyanti dhirās
tesām sāntiḥ sāsvati na ītaresām.*

13. Some Mss.: *Nityo nityānām.*

The Vision of God within the soul leads to eternal bliss.

12. The One Controller, Inner-soul of all things,
    Who makes his one form manifold,—
    The wise who see Him, standing in the soul,
    They and no others have perpetual joy.

13. Eternal mid the transient, Conscious mid the conscious,
    The One amid many who grants their desires,—
    The wise who see Him, standing in the soul,
    They and no others have perpetual peace.

12. *The One Controller (Eko vaśi)*: This title is a name for the supreme Self only occurs here and *Śvet. vi.* 12, but it goes back in thought to *Br.* iv. 4. 22. "Verily He is the great, unborn Soul, who is this (person) consisting of knowledge among the senses (*prāṇāḥ*). In the ether within the heart lies the Controller of all, the Lord of all, the King of all." (*Sarvasya vaśi, sarvasya īśanaḥ, sarvasya adhipatiḥ.*) Our verse is reproduced in *Śvet. vi.* 12 with the first two lines in the following form:—

    "The One Controller of the inactive many,
    Who makes the one seed manifold."

*Standing in the soul (Ātma-stha):*

Here surely we have a clear reversion to the two soul standpoint,—Brahman being regarded as the Inner-soul of our individual souls. It is true that ātman sometimes means "body". Śaṅkara, while desiring to uphold the one soul standpoint, denies that it means "body" here. He explains it as meaning the Self manifest in the form of intelligence in the buddhi (conditioned intellect) in the ether within the heart. (*Tam ātmastham—sva-sarīra-hṛdayākāśe buddhau Caitanya, ākārena abhivyaktam iti etat*). This explanation, however,
ultimately involves his illusion doctrine, which, as Rāmānuja remarks, makes nonsense of the Vedas (see Śrībhāṣya ii. 3. 42, Thibaut 561, 2). Supporting his contention that individual souls stand to the Supreme in a bhedābheda relation, i.e. are eternally distinct but not separate, Rāmānuja several times quotes Kṛṣṇa v. 13 (see Śrībhāṣya i. 1. 4; ii. 3. 43).

13. We have translated verse 13 literally keeping the order of the original, but the sense is perhaps better rendered in Thibaut's translation, "He who, one, eternal, intelligent, fulfils the desires of many, non-eternal, intelligent beings". Better still, "grants (or disposes) the objects of desire," (taking kāmān objectively as in i. 24, 25; v. 8). Deussen sees in this a doctrine of Divine providence. (P.U. 212.)

Cetanas-cetanānām—"Conscious mid the conscious", "Intelligent mid the intelligent". Śaṅkara says, The intelligence of other conscious beings, beginning with Brahmā is due to the intelligence of the Ātman (ātma-caitanya-nimittena). Yet elsewhere he denies intelligence of a conscious character to the supreme Brahman.¹

Returning to our discussion of ātma-stha, we have surely in these verses a doctrine which is not Absolutism nor mere Pantheism but something analogous to the Christian doctrine of the Spirit. We hope to discuss this more fully elsewhere. Here we will only ask whether it is fanciful to compare Śvet. vi. 6, which continues the thought of our passage, "Know Him who stands within the soul, the immortal abode of all", with i John iv. 13,—"Hereby know we that we abide in Him and He in us, because He hath given us of his Spirit." There are of course important differences, but there is surely also an equally important agreement.

तदेर्तदति मन्त्रन्दिणियनि मध्ये सुखम् ।
कथं व तत्त्वज्ञानीयं विशु भात्ति विभाति वा ॥ १४ ॥

¹ See note on cit, Vedāntasūra, Introdn. Jacob 3–5 or Rawson, Gist of the Vedānta.
FIFTH VALLĪ

14. Tad etad iti manyante,
    'nirdeśyam paramam sukham;
    Kathāṁ nu tad vijāniyāṁ,
    kim u bhāti vibhāti vā.

15. Na tatra sūryo bhāti, na candara-tārakaṁ,
    na īmā viḍyuto bhānti, kuto 'yam agnīḥ;
    Tam-eva bhāntam anubhāti sarvam,
    tasya bhāsā sarvam idam vibhāti.

14.d. One Ms.: na bhāti vā.

The Light of the World.

14. "This is that"—thus they recognise,
    The supreme indescribable bliss.
    How then may I come to know this?
    Does it shine, or does it reflect?

15. There shines not sun, nor moon, nor any star;
    These lightnings shine not, how then could this fire?
    Him, the resplendent, everything reflects,
    His shining only all this world illumines.

14. Recognising that this, the Inner-soul, the Dweller in the innermost, the Spirit, is that supreme Reality of which they are in search, the wise or steadfast taste supreme bliss. But how can one know the supreme Reality? Ordinary knowledge takes place when objects reflect back the light of the mind. Is the Supreme Being such an object or do those who have been prepared know it through its own self-luminous manifestation? (N.B.—This involves taking vibhāti here as equivalent to anubhāti—reflect.)

15. No earthly light can illumine the Supreme for He is the source of all light. So our knowledge cannot find Him out except as He communicates himself as "the master-light of all our seeing." Cf. Revelation xxii. 23.
Saṣṭhī Vallī.

1. Ūrdhva-mūlo 'vāk-śākha
eśo 'vatthah sanātanaḥ;
Tad-eva śukram tad brahma
tad-eva amṛtam ucyate,
Taśmin lokāḥ sūtāḥ sarve,
tad-u na ātyeti kaścana:
Etad vai tat.

2. Yad idam kiṃca jagat sarvaṃ
prāṇa ejati niḥsṛtam;
Mahād bhayaṃ vajram udyatam;
ye etad vidūr amṛtās te bhavanti.

3. Bhayād asya, agnis tapati,
bhayāt tapati sūryaḥ;
Bhayād indraś-ca vāyuś-ca
mṛtyur dhāvati pañcamaḥ.
SIXTH VALLI.

The World Tree.

1. With root above and branches down
   Is this eternal pipal tree.
   That is the Pure; that is Brahman,
   That indeed is called the Immortal;
   On that do all the worlds depend;
   Beyond it none soever goes.
   This truly is that.

A picture is here drawn of an *aśvattha* or pipal tree (*Ficus religiosa*) with its root upward, presumably out of sight, and its branches hanging down. The question arises, what is the point of comparison? Is the whole tree compared to Brahman? This seems the most natural interpretation if we take this verse alone into account. Taken however in conjunction with the next verse which says that the whole world springs from Brahman, we judge, with Śaṅkara, that the unseen root represents Brahman.

Śaṅkara says that the tree represents the world of experience (*samsāra*), and the object of this *vallī* is to ascertain the nature of Brahman, the root or cause, by examining the nature of the effect, i.e. the tree of the world. If so one would expect the root to be of the same essential nature as the tree. Yet in describing the tree he says, The tree of *samsāra*, always shaking to the wind of desire, like the *aśvattha* tree, has as its branches all the worlds (heaven, the world of the fathers, the world of men, etc.)—with nests thereon built by the birds (i.e. all living beings), reverberating with the singing, laughing and crying produced by mirth and grief, . . . changes in its nature every moment, like jugglery, like a mirage, like cloud-cities

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1 Some confusing the pipal with the banyan have supposed that "branches down" refers to the aerial rootlets of the banyan which drop down from its branches. Hill also commenting on this passage as partially quoted in *Gītā* xv. (p. 236) is very anxious to turn the tree right side up. This seems only to detract from a striking simile.
in the sky, and ultimately vanishes, cut down by the sword of the realisation of the Paramātmā.

But if the tree is so unreal, what of its root? That root is said to be the Highest Brahman yet in the same breath the tree is said to be produced from the seed of Ignorance (avidyā). That is the fitting source for such a tree. The reality of the world is very explicitly taught in the next verse.

**The Great Fear.**

2. The whole world, whatever here exists,
   In Life originates and moves:
   A great fear! An upraised thunder-bolt!—
   Those who know that become immortal.

3. Through fear of Him the Fire burns;
   Through fear (of Him) the Sun gives heat;
   Through fear, Indra and Vāyu both,
   With Death as fifth, speed on their way.

2, 3. Here Brahman is described as the *mysterium tremendum*, the source and the moving energy of the universe. He is called Prāṇa—Life-force (élan vital) and the universe is said to originate (literally, "be emitted"—niḥṣṛtam) from Him and to continue to move (vibrate or tremble—ejati) in Him. Evolution is no mechanical process,—the world trembles with awe as it moves to obey that Living One on whom it depends.

Verse 3 is very similar to Tait. ii. 8. 1

*Bhīṣā asmād vātāḥ pavate, bhīṣā udeti śūryāḥ.*

"Through fear of Him the Wind doth blow,
   Through fear of Him the Sun doth rise,
   Through fear of Him, Fire and the Moon,
   With Death as fifth speed on their way."

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*Note on page 187.*

4. *āśakat*, 2 aor. of *sak*, to be able, have power. So, "If a man has been able to know". Tattvabhuanas says, *āśakat=na sakat (saknyāti)* and translates, "If anyone fails to know it". So too Sarvananda "*āśakat=become unable". But this is a grammatical *tour de force. viras, V.=falling, decay, dissolution (fr. sramś to fall). visrasyaḥ (abl.) prāk=C. Sk. visrāṃsanaṭ pūrviṃ.*
4. If here a man has come to know (Him),
Ere the falling of the body,
Then in the created worlds,*
He partakes embodiment.

5. As in a mirror, so (it is seen) in the soul;
As in a dream, so in the Fathers’ world;
Just as if seen in the waters,
So in the Gandharva world;
As in shadow and light (it is seen) in the Brahma-world.

* Or, Then within the heavenly worlds.

4. *sarîratvāya kalpate* may mean “he is fit for embodiment”, but klp with the dative commonly means “to partake of”. For *sargeśu* we may amend to *svargeśu*,—“in the heavenly worlds”,—a much more suitable meaning. There is, however, no MSS. support and one wonders why such an obvious reading should have been changed.
to one more difficult. The same remark applies to Geldner's emendation. He reads sarva\textit{s}tu and emphasises the possible idea of fitness contained in \textit{kalpate}, rendering,

Then indeed in every world,
He is fit to bear a body.

If we keep the reading sar\textit{sa}tu, we may understand it as meaning "other" (and higher) created worlds, e.g. those enumerated in the next verse. Either of these interpretations however only mitigates the difficulty that this verse contradicts the theory that knowledge of Brahman produces release from reincarnation immediately after death.

Śaṅkara attempts to avoid the difficulty by treating the verse as containing an \textit{ellipsis} and renders as follows: "If here, in this life, a man is able to know the awe-inspiring Brahman before the falling of the body, he is freed from the bond of \textit{sama\textsc{\textit{śra}}}: if he is not able to know, then, for lack of knowledge, he takes embodiment in earth and other created worlds". This, however, quite changes the meaning, and it would be better frankly to emend the text and supply a negative. Max Müller says, "I doubt whether it is possible to supply so much (as Śaṅkara), and should prefer to read, \textit{t\textit{ha} cen nā\textit{śakad}}, though I find it difficult to explain why so simple a text should have been misunderstood and corrupted". Ranade (U.P. 327) also reads a negative—"Unless a man can know Him". This certainly seems the simplest way to deal with the text.

Another way to deal with the text is to understand it (as Deussen does) as teaching \textit{krama-mukti} (salvation by stages). If a man can know Brahman (e.g. by scripture and works) even though he has not attained to that intuitive vision of Him in his own soul which is attained through \textit{adhyātma-yoga}, he enters on the \textit{devayāna}, or path of the gods, from which there is no return to earth and which leads gradually to the Brahma-world. The difficulty of this interpretation is that it would require us to take the \textit{Pīr-loka} and the \textit{Gandharva-loka} of the next verse as stages on the path. But the \textit{Pīr-loka} or world of the Fathers is usually represented as the terminus of the other path,—the \textit{pitṛyāna}, by which, after a period in the world of the Fathers (usually pictured as the moon) souls return to re-incarnation on earth. This difficulty may perhaps be surmounted by regarding our text as following \textit{Kausītaki} 1. 2, which represents all souls as first going to the moon (or \textit{pīr-loka}), some returning thence to earth but others going thence by the \textit{devayāna} through the worlds of Agni, Vāyu, Varuṇa, Indra and Prajāpāti to the Brahma-world.

The \textit{Gandharvas} ("angels") are spirits which, in the \textit{Rg Veda}, are said to dwell in the fathomless spaces of air (\textit{Rg VII. 65. 5}), but they are also associated with the sun and in \textit{Atharva Veda IV. 34. 3} the best are said to live with them in heaven. In \textit{Br. IV. 3. 33}, we are told that the bliss of the world of the Fathers is a hundred times the highest bliss of men; the bliss of the Gandharva-world is a hundred
fold that of the Fathers' world; the bliss of the gods by works a hundredfold that of the Gandharva-world; the bliss of the gods by birth is a hundred-fold that of the gods by works of merit. Again the bliss of the Prajāpati-world is a hundred-fold that of the gods by birth, and the bliss of the Brahma-world and of him who is learned in the Vedas, without crookedness and free from desire, is a hundred-fold the bliss of the Prajāpati-world. Here we have a series of stages which may be stages on the devayāna corresponding in some degree with that in Kauśī I. 3, and our text may give a similar but abbreviated series. Further our text is almost certainly connected with Br. IV. 4. 4,—"As a goldsmith taking a piece of gold, reduces it to other and more beautiful forms, just so this soul, striking down the body and dispelling its ignorance, makes for itself other and more beautiful forms, like those of the Fathers, or the Gandharvas, or the gods, or Prajāpati or Brahmā".

But though it is possible to regard verse 4 as referring to krama-mukti, it is clear from verse 5 that this method of salvation is not taught in the sense of recommended. Almost in the spirit of an evangelical preacher, warning those who would put off the business of salvation to some purgatorial world hereafter, our text says in effect, "Now is the day of salvation". For, as Śaṅkara says, Here, in this world, the vision of the Ātman may be as clearly visible as one's own face reflected in a mirror, but not in other worlds except the Brahma-world. Just as in a mirror one sees oneself very clearly reflected, so here, in the soul, i.e. in one's own purified intelligence, a clear vision of the Self may be obtained. As in a dream perception is confused, so indistinct is the vision of the Self in the world of the Fathers (because one is engrossed in the enjoyment of the fruit of one's deeds). Just as in water one sees as if an image of oneself with the parts not clearly defined, so is Self-vision in the Gandharva-world. It is only in the Brahma-world that a vision may be attained clearer than that possible on earth, and that world is hard to reach. The meaning is, therefore, that one should seek to attain the vision of the Self here and now.

इन्द्रियायां प्रथमभावसुद्वास्तमयो १ वदू ।
प्रथमम्बावसमानानां मल्ला घीरो न ग्रोषति ॥ ६ ॥

इन्द्रियश: प्रथ: मनो मनस: सत्सुभासम् ।
सत्सूधारध महानात्मा महतोद्वलसुभासम् ॥ ७ ॥

वख्यातात् प्रथ: एकादेशां वाकाकोशितं एव च ।
य: भाताः मुच्छते जनुरमस्ततलं च गव्याति ॥ ८ ॥
6. Indriyāṇām prthag-bhāvam, 
udayāstamaya ca yat, 
Prthag-utpadyamānānāṃ, 
matvā dhīrō na śocati.

7. Indriyebhyaḥ paraṁ mano, 
manasaḥ sattvam uttamam; 
Sattvād adhi mahān ātmā, 
mañ्चato 'vyaktam uttamam.

8. Avyaktāt-tu paraḥ puruṣo, 
vyaāpako 'liṅga eva ca, 
Yam jñātvā mucyate jantur, 
amṛtatvam ca gacchati.

The order of progression to the inmost Self,—
to the highest Person.

6. The separate nature of the senses,
And that their rising and setting
Is of things produced separately (from the self),
The wise man notes and does not grieve.

7. Beyond the senses is the mind,
Higher than mind is its essence (sattva, i.e. reason)
Above that essence is the great self (mahān ātmā)
Higher than the Great—the Unexpressed (avyakta)

8. Beyond the Unexpressed is the Person, (puruṣa)
All-pervading and bodiless, (aliṅga)
By knowing whom a man is freed,
And goes to immortality.

6. How then is the vision of Brahman to be realised in
the mirror of the soul? The first thing is to recognise that the
senses and their objects are quite distinct from the self. Their
fluctuation does not trouble the wise and steadfast man.
Verses 7–9 are practically a repetition in slightly modified
form of iii. 10–12, and our verse stands to them in the same
relation as the Parable of the Chariot stands to iii. 10–12.
Rising and setting: i.e. activity and its cessation in the waking
and sleeping states. *Things separately produced*: i.e. the senses are regarded as produced from the subtle elements and not from the self, of which they form the instruments.

This verse lends itself naturally to a Śāmkhya interpretation:—the senses belonging to the sphere of *prakṛti*, the first essential to the attainment of salvation, which consists in *kaivalya* is the recognition of their total separateness from the *puruṣa*. We have already discussed, however, whether a distinctively Śāmkhya interpretation of iii. 10, 11, is permissible and decided in the negative. The arguments apply here also.

7, 8. Comparing the series here given with that in iii. 10, 11, we note (1) the omission of the sense-objects, (2) *sattva* corresponds to *buddhi*, i.e. reason or intelligence. *Sattva* is either used here untechnically in its primary sense of essence or reality, reason constituting the essence of mind; or semi-technically, the *buddhi* being called *sattva* because in it the *gūpa* or quality of "goodness" predominates. But with this very doubtful exception there is no trace of the Śāmkhya doctrine of the *gūpas* (*sattva, rajas and tamas*) before the much later *Maitrī Upaniṣad*.

The Aliṅga Puruṣa:

The highest being is here called the *aliṅga puruṣa*. The word "*liṅga*" has two main meanings:

1. A mark or sign, particularly a characteristic or distinctive mark. Later special applications of this meaning are—
   
   (a) to distinctive sex marks,—so the word is applied to the outward male generative organ, the phallus;
   
   (b) as a logical term *liṅga* means an invariable sign which is a basis of inference.

2. The subtle body (*sūkṣma śarira*),—the transmigrating entity consisting of *buddhi, ahaṃkāra, manas, indriyāni*, and subtle elements. (This is the sense of the term in the Śāmkhya philosophy but it is used in the other systems also.) Derivatorily—
   
   (a) it sometimes seems to be used in the general sense of 'body';
   
   (b) it may be applied to anything 'perishable'.

*Aliṅga* may have a corresponding variety of meaning¹ but there are two main meanings, (1) without distinctive mark, (2) without subtle body or psychic apparatus.

In seeking to determine the meaning here we note that this
seems to be the first occurrence of the term. Rather later occurrences are Mūla. iii. 2. 4 and Maitri vi. 31; vi. 35; vii. 2, in all of which the first meaning is most suitable. Liṅga occurs in the sense of ‘mark’ or ‘characteristic’ in Maitri ii. 5; v. 2; vi. 30. 31; Gītā xiv. 21, and in the sense of ‘subtle body’, Śvet. vi. 9 (probably); Maitri vi. 10. 19. There is however a very important earlier usage in the famous transmigration verse, Br. iv. 4. 6, and as the Kaṭha refers repeatedly to this section of the Brhadāraṇyaka it probably may be taken as determinative of the meaning here.

_Tad-eva saktaḥ sahakarmanā ēti,_
_Liṅgam mano yatra niṣaktam asya._

"Where a man's mind and liṅga (subtle body, i.e. whole psychic disposition are fixed, there he goes, together with his work, being attached to that alone.” Here ‘liṅgam’ seems clearly to refer to the transmigrating entity. Deussen, commenting on this verse (P.U. 282), says,“Here we meet, apparently already a technical term, the word liṅgam, by which the adherents of the Śāṅkhya were accustomed later to denote the subtle body.” It is perhaps to be taken in the same meaning in Kaṭha. vi. 8, and Śvet. vi. 9, where moreover the ātman is described as “Lord of the lord of the senses”, i.e. lord of the subtle body. Keith (S.S. 18) partially disagrees, preferring to adopt the meaning, “bearing a characteristic mark” in Br. iv. 4. 6, but says that Kaṭha vi. 8 and Śvet. vi. 9 may refer to the ‘subtle body’. In his later R.P.V. (565), however, he says, "The term liṅga is apparently used technically to denote the entity which transmigrates as early as the Kaṭha at least."

We take it then that the meaning is that while the individual self or person has a psychic organisation (reason, mind, senses) which of itself may be perishable, deep within it, constituting its ultimate reality, there is another Person, which needs no such psychic organs and is not subject to transmigration or decay. Truly knowing that Highest Person the individual self shares in His immortality.

If however the other meaning is preferred (i.e. ‘without mark’) we should note that this passage cannot be taken as supporting the doctrine of a characterless Absolute, which
could not by any possibility be known. Even Śaṅkara says, ² "He is called aliṅga, meaning devoid of all empirical attributes".⁹ And the Maitri Upaniṣad which takes aliṅga in the sense of 'without marks', speaks of 'the mark of Him who is without marks' and says, "He is to be apprehended by his own peculiar marks" (vi. 31). "He verily is pure, clean, tranquil, undecaying, eternal, etc." (ii. 4).

1 Here are some of the renderings of aliṅga given by different translators: Hume: "Without any mark"; Sitarama Sastri: "Devoid of distinctive marks"; Mead: "Far beyond distinction's power"; Max Müller: "Entirely imperceptible"; Tattvabhusan: "ākāriva" ("bodiless"). Deussen (S.U. 286) says that it may mean either (1) "without mark" (ohne Merkmale), (2) "imperishable" (unvergänglich), or (3) "devoid of a subtle body" (ohne feinen Leib).

² Śaṅkara’s comment is as follows:—

Aavyaktāt tu parah puruso vyāpakō, vyāpakasya āpy ākāśādeḥ sarvasya kāraṇatāt. Aliṅgaḥ—liṅgote gamyate yena tal-liṅgam—buddhyādi, tad-avidyāmānam asya, iti so'yaṃ aliṅga eva. Sarva-saṁsāra-dharma-varjīta ity etat. Yam jñātā, ābhrayataḥ āstrātaśca mucyate jantur avidyādi-hṛdaya-granthibhir jīvanam eva, patite 'pi sarve 'myratvam ca gacchati.

"Beyond the Aivyakta is the Puruṣa called ‘all-pervading’ because it is the cause of all things like the ether which are all-pervading. Re. aliṅga —that by which anything is reached or known is liṅga,—such as the buddhi, etc. and just because of its absence in His case He is called aliṅga. The meaning is, He is devoid of all empirical attributes. Knowing Him through teacher and scripture, even while living a man is freed from the knots of the heart, beginning with Ignorance, and when the body falls he goes to immortality."

³ The Śiva-liṅga: Though unnecessary for the interpretation of this passage it is interesting to note that while we have here a statement that the Highest Person is aliṅga, and while the Śvetāvatara some hundred years or so later identifies that Highest Person with Mahēśvara-Śiva and says, naivo-dvavarthe tiṃgam, "He has no liṅga at all", India is now full of stone liṅgas or phallic emblems of Śiva. It is true that as we have seen Śvet. vi. 9, uses liṅga in a different sense, but it could hardly have made the statement if the author were familiar with the stone phallices as an emblem of Śiva. Bhandarkar, V.S. 114, says that he could find no trace in literature of the Śiva-liṅga as an object of worship before the late Anuśāsana-parvan of the Mahābhārata (? c. 300 A.D.). He considers that it was borrowed by the Āryas from the aborigines of the sub-Himalayan forest region (Vṛṣṭyas, Niśādas, etc.).
9. Not in the field of vision stands His form,
   By outward eye no one so ever sees Him:
   By heart, by thought, by the mind apprehended:
   Those who know Him thereby become immortal.

9. *Of. Taittiriya Áranyaka, x. 1. 3*, and also, (probably quoted from the *Kátha*), *Svet. iii. 13; iv. 17; Mahân. i. 11.*

9. This verse is one of the most striking in the Upaniṣad. Negatively, the first half insists on the utter impossibility of forming a visual image of the Supreme Person; positively, the second half insists with equal emphasis that there is a way by which the Supreme Person may be apprehended or known. “By heart, by thought, by the mind apprehended.”

*The Heart* (hrd) is in Vedic usage the seat of the emotions and mental activities. No antithesis is therefore intended between heart and mind (in its wider sense). The reference is not to a merely emotional religious experience but to an apprehension or intuition of the supreme reality which involves the whole self through the *yoga*, i.e. yoking or concentrated direction of all its powers. The apprehension by the heart referred to here, then, is something which goes beyond the mere processes of the understanding. “Not by learning or power of intellect (medhâ) is this Self to be obtained. Only by the man whom He chooses is He obtainable. To him the Self reveals His person.” But though mere intellect can never attain Him, nevertheless intelligence or reason is not superseded. “By thought, by mind He is apprehended.”
**Maniśā** is a Vedic word meaning "reflective thought". Śaṅkara interprets as *vikalpa-varjita-buddhi*—"Intelligence freed from false notions, ruling as controller of the purposive mind".

(Note that in V.Sk. the inst. of maniśā has the same form as the nom. In C.Sk. it would be maniṣayā.)

**Manas** (see p. 124) in V.Sk. does not mean merely the organ of sense-perception as in later Sāmkhya and Vedānta usage, or as in the parable of the chariot and the scale of the faculties, iii. 10 ff. and vi. 7, but is often used in a wider sense. It is in this wider sense it is used here and is evidently intended to be synonymous with maniśā. Śaṅkara interprets as *manana-rūpena samyagdarśana*—"true insight in the form of meditation".

**Abhikṛpta** (apprehended): A common V. use of the root kṛṣ is in the sense ‘to share or partake of’ (e.g. *yajñō deveśu kalpatām*, "Let the sacrifice be partaken by the gods"). Śaṅkara explains as *abhisamarthita, abhiprakāśita*, i.e. ‘realised’ or ‘revealed’.

Śaṅkara does not attempt to explain away the force of this verse. Instead he says, "The Ātman can be known, should be added to complete the sentence" (i.e. "Being realised by heart, thought and mind the ātman can be known").

Rāmānuja has a very illuminating reference to our text in its relation to others of similar import in *Śrībhaṣya* i. 4 (Sk. text, 159). "I maintain that by such scripture texts as the following,—‘He should be heard (i.e. through scripture), reflected on, steadily meditated upon’ (Br. ii. 4. 5); ‘He who knows Brahman obtains the highest’ (Tait. ii. 1. 1); ‘Not by the eye is He apprehended nor yet by speech’ (Mv. iii. 1. 8) but by a pure mind; “By heart, by thought, by mind, He is apprehended”:—it is proved that through the injunction of meditation (*dhyāna-niyoga*) the mind becomes pure, and that the mind so purified gives rise to direct (intuitive) knowledge of Brahman" (*Nirmalam ca mano Brahma aparokṣa-jñanam janayati*).

Compare the greatly simple words of Jesus, "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God"."
10. \textit{Yadā pañca āvatiśṭhante}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{jñānāṇi manasā saha,}
\item \textit{Buddhiṣ-ca na viceṣṭati}\footnote{C. \textit{viceṣṭate}.}
\item \textit{Tām āhuḥ paramāṁ gatim.}
\end{itemize}

11. \textit{Tām yogam iti manyante,}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{sthirām indriya-dhāraṇām;}
\item \textit{Apramattas tadā bhavati,}
\item \textit{yogo hi prabhavāpyayau.}
\end{itemize}

The Way of Yoga further expounded.

10. When the five means of knowledge rest,
Together with the knowing mind,
And intellect no longer strives,—
That is, they say, the highest way.

11. This they consider as Yoga,—
The firm control of the senses:
Then one becomes concentrated,
For Yoga is acquired and lost.\footnote{Or, Yoga is creation and passing away, or, Yoga is beginning and end.}

\textit{Yoga:} In ii. 12, in the phrase \textit{adhyātma-yoga}, we have the first usage of the word \textit{“yoga”} in the Upaniṣads in a philosophical or religious sense. The verse emphasised as strongly as possible the utter mystery and inaccessibility of the supreme being yet stated that He might be perceived through \textit{adhyātma-yoga}. This theme is taken up and expounded in the Parable of the Chariot and throughout the third vallī. The word \textit{yoga} is not used, but the nature of \textit{yoga} is expressed when it is said
that the senses and all the powers of one’s nature must be yoked (yukta) so that there may be complete restraint or control of the lower by the higher,—the object being the direction and concentration of our whole being upon the goal,—the realisation of that Highest Person who is also our inmost self. Vallis iv and v emphasise this identity in various ways and point out as a prerequisite to Self-realisation what the later Yoga calls pratyāhāra—the turning aside of the senses, and mind from outward objects with a view to inner concentration. This is the state referred to in verse 10.

In verse 11, Yoga is defined as indriya-dhāranā,—the holding firm of the senses (including the mind). The term is probably here used non-technically, and means very much the same as the yoking and restraint (yama, niyama) of the senses in vallī iii. In the developed Yoga however, as set forth in the Yoga-sūtras of Patañjali (c. iv century A.D.) the eight parts or āñgas of yoga are said to be: yama, niyama, āsana, prānāyāma, pratyāhāra, dhāranā, dhyāna, samādhi. Here yama has become specialised to mean ‘abstinence’ from injury, falsehood, theft, incontinence, and greed, and niyama means such positive religious duties as cleanliness of body and mind, contentment, austerity, study and devotion to God.1 Āsana of course refers to bodily postures and prānāyāma to the control of breathing, subjects to which the later Yoga devoted disproportionate attention. These are aids to pratyāhāra and so to dhāranā, with which yoga in its higher sense begins. This is the concentration of the mind in fixed attention upon some symbol or object. In its higher stage it passes into dhyāna,—meditation or contemplation, when the object thought of completely occupies the mind, and this again into samādhi when one is so absorbed in the object that one loses sight of oneself.

Eight centuries intervene between the first exposition of Yoga in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad and its full formulation in the Yoga-sūtras, so that one obviously ought not to be particularly guided in one’s interpretation of the former by the latter. It is fairly certain, however, that the aṣṭāṅga-yoga is much earlier than its formulation in the Sūtras, and in any case it is of interest to note its relation to yoga as set forth in our text.

1 Sūtra ii. 29 (Woods, 177 ff.).
Apramatta: Resuming our exegesis: As a result of the yoga which consists in dhāraṇā,—steady control, one is said to become apramatta (concentrated). This too is a technical Yoga term. In Yoga-sūtra i. 30, pramāda, literally "intoxication", "excitement", but generally used in the sense of "carelessness" is mentioned as one of the distractions that stand in the way of yoga. Apramatta occurs Ch. i. 3. 12 and ii. 22. 2 in the sense "careful", "intent". In Mund. ii. 2. 4, it is used of undistracted or concentrated attention to one's aim. "The praṇava (Om) is the bow, the arrow is the soul, Brahman is called the mark. By the 'undistracted' man it should be pierced: like an arrow he should become one with it." Śvet. ii. 8, mano dhārayeta apramattah, is obviously a development of our passage: "Like a chariot yoked with vicious horses a wise man should control the mind, being 'undistracted'." Apramatta then means as Śaṅkara says, negatively, free from carelessness and distraction, and positively, constant endeavour toward complete concentration (apramattah—pramāda-varjitaḥ, samādhānāṁ prati nityam prayatnavān).

It is of interest to note the central importance of apramāda (Pāli, appamādo) in Buddhist ethics. All the virtues are said to have their root in it.1 (Fauböll translates it by 'vigilantia'; Max Müller, 'earnestness'; Saunders, 'zeal'; I suggest 'keenness'.) The whole of the second chapter of the Dhammapada (called by Barua the Apramāda-vaga2), is concerned with this root virtue. It begins, in the Pāli version,

\[
\text{Appamādo amata-padāṁ, pamādo maccuno padāṁ;}
\text{Apamattā na miyanti, ye pamattā yathā matā.}
\]

"Keenness is the way of immortality, slackness the way of death;
The keen never die, the slack are as if dead already."

The Dhammapada seems to have been accepted at the Council of Asoka in 240 B.C. as a collection of the sayings of Gautama Buddha, and certainly this chapter breathes the spirit of the Buddha and also of his kingly disciple, with his continual exhortation, "Let everyone exert themselves, both small and great."3

It is further of interest to note that apramāda is one of the
three virtues which, according to the short summary of the ethical requirements of the early Bhāgavata faith, given in the second part of the Besnagar pillar inscription (c. 180 B.C.), “lead to heaven”.

_Nayamti svaga dama cāga (i.e. tyāga) apramāda._

“Self-control, self-denial, and keen concentration lead to heaven.” Though the Kātha Upaniṣad is not specifically a Bhāgavata or Vaiṣṇava work it is, we hold, on the general line of development of thought which connects Chāndogya iii. 17 with the Besnagar inscription and the Gitā.

Further, on this line of development it is clear that Buddhism is not, as once supposed, an intrusion. The Buddhist ethics and Buddha’s own living example help to provide the foundation for the ethical _yoga_ here set forth. We may also surmise that the second _adhyāya_ of the Kātha may be Asokan in date, though there is no real proof of this.

_Yoγo hi prabhava_ _apyayau_: The fourth line gives a reason for the concentration of attention,—literally “Yoga is an arising and passing away”, the meaning of which is ambiguous.

(1) Śaṅkara says, _Yoγo hi yasmāt prabhava_ _apyayau—upajana- apāyadharmakah—iti arthaḥ. “Because yoga has the attributes of being acquired and being lost. Hence the meaning is that to avoid the risk of losing it vigilance is necessary.” Hence, following Śaṅkara, Max Müller translates, “For Yoga comes and goes”, and Sadananda and Sitarama Sastri, “For yoga can be acquired and lost”. The difficulty some have found is that the essential characteristic of _yoga_ is defined at the beginning of the _Yoga-sūtra_ as “the restriction of the fluctuations of the mind” (_Yogas citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ_). How can this be if yoga itself fluctuates?

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2 Barua and Mitra, _Prākrit Dhammapada_, 119 ff.
3 Read the whole chapter, Max Müller’s _Dhammapada_, S.B.E., X., 9–11, or Waghswara and Saunders, _The Buddha’s Way of Virtue_, 24, 25.
Even if with Patañjali we regard Yoga simply as mental concentration the difficulty is more dialectical than real. The mind of the Yogan is liable to fluctuation and therefore his degree of attainment of yoga. As the Yoga-bhāṣya (i. 14) says, "Practice when it has been cultivated for a long time and carried out with self-castigation and continence, with knowledge and with faith,—in a word, with earnest attention,—becomes confirmed";—not otherwise. Ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion and attachment are the five obstacles at the beginning of the path, but not at the beginning only: in various forms they recur,—for every stage of the path there is its own obstacle, and the greater the restraint the greater may be the recoil. Self-complacency, leading to heedlessness, is the most deadly spiritual foe. So in Yoga-bhāṣya ii. 34, the devotee in whose mind resentment at injury may arise is bidden to reflect, "Baked in the terrific fire of transmigration I have taken refuge in the virtue of yoga through charity and love to all beings. So if I revert to questionable paths after giving them up, I am a miserable cur, reverting as a dog to its vomit."

But the Yoga of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad differs from Patañjali's Yoga and is not definable as citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ. There are of course points of agreement, and Patañjali and his successors develop one side of the Kaṭha teaching in a way that is worthy of the attention of all aspirants after spiritual discipline. But the Yoga-sūtra and bhāṣya are painfully lacking in religious motive. True, devotion to God is mentioned along with asceticism and study as a means of attainment, but God has very little real importance in the system. The Yoga of the Kaṭha, on the other hand, is distinctively religious. It includes mental concentration and the firm control of sense and appetite, but recognises that this can only be accomplished by yoking the soul in communion with the Supreme Self. Now religious communion notoriously 'comes and goes'. It cannot, here in this life at least, remain on one level. Hence the higher we rise the greater the need for keen and vigilant attention. "Watch and pray" said, Jesus, "that ye enter not into temptation," for the tighter we hold the reins of the senses, the greater the danger of reaction unless we vigilantly maintain that communion through which alone our strength comes.
(2) Another type of interpretation of the phrase *Yoga hi prabhava apyayau* is indicated by Hume's rendering, "Yoga is the origin and end", and Deussen's, "Yoga is creation and passing away".¹ These we reject as involving much later ideas which are foreign to the *Katha*.

(a) Commenting on his rendering, "Yoga is the origin and the end" Hume says, "Perhaps of 'the world' of beings and experiences,—here too, as in *Māṇḍ 6*, where the phrase occurs. That is: the 'world' becomes created for the person when he emerges from the Yoga state, and passes away when he enters into it". The *Māṇḍūkya* says, "This self is Brahman, This self has four fourths, i.e. the waking state, the dreaming state, the state of deep sleep and 'the fourth'." Concerning the self in the third state (*swepata-sthāna*) it is said, "This is Lord of all, this is the all-knowing, this is the inner-controller, this is the source of all, for it is the origin and end of all beings". (*Eśa yoniḥ sarvasya, prabhavāpyayau hi bhūtānām.*) The self in the fourth state is described as unthinkable, ungraspable, completely one without a second. For the self in the fourth state then, in that complete *samādhi* in which yoga culminates, there is no world. But when the self passes back into the third state then the world is created in consciousness.

This doctrine of absolute idealism, however, is not the doctrine of the *Katha Upaniṣad* but is a later development.

(b) Deussen gives a similar rendering: "Yoga is creation and passing away", and comments, The world sinks down in Yoga and again is created afresh". He refers however not to the *Māṇḍūkya* passage but to *Yoga-sūtra* i. 35, which reads, "He (the Yogan) gains stability when a sense-activity arises connected with an object, bringing the central organ (*citta*) into a relation of stability", i.e. an object is needed on which to focus attention. Then, says the *Yoga-bhāṣya*, the Yogan will without hindrance acquire faith and energy and mindfulness and concentration (*samādhi*). But though a lower *samādhi* may be thus acquired, in the higher *samādhi* all consciousness of objects is transcended.

All this, however, is Patañjali's Yoga and is a later development.

(c) A third and quite different interpretation of the rendering "Yoga is the origin and the end", is possible, i.e. that Yoga in its various stages is both the alpha and omega of religion. A similar idea is expressed about *bhakti* in the *Nārada-bhakti-sūtra*, 25, 26. "It is higher than karman, jīvāna and yoga: because it is its own result". Also about 'faith' in *Romans* i. 17 where it is said of Christ's gospel that, "Therein is revealed a righteousness of God from faith unto faith."

This possibly is Whitney's interpretation when he translates "Yoga is beginning and end." The objection may be raised that *apyaya* does not mean 'end' in the sense of consummation, but if by *apyaya* we understand *brahmāpyaya* (see *Svet.* vi. 10) this may certainly be the meaning.

¹ *Yoga ist Schöpfung und vergang.*
(3) Geldner says, "For Yoga is an arising of a new inner-world and a passing away of the outer-world". As an alternative to (1) this is probably best.

Whether one has in view (1) the fluctuating character, (2c) the importance, or (3) the difficulty, of Yoga, vigilant keenness is necessary.

\begin{quote}

\begin{verse}
\text{नैव वाचा न मनसा प्राश्तुं शक्यो न चचिधा । } \\
\text{अस्तीति ब्रुवतोद्नयते कथं तदुपलभ्यते॥ १२ ॥}

\text{अस्तीति ब्रुवतोद्नयते कथं तदुपलभ्यते॥ १२ ॥}
\end{verse}
\end{quote}

12. Na eva vācā na manasā 
prāptum śakyo na caṁśusā ; 
Asti iti bruvato 'nyatra 
katham tad upalabhya te.

13. Asti ity-eva upalabdhaivas, 
tattva-bhāvena ca ubhayoh ;
Asti ity-eva upalabdhasya 
tattva-bhāvah prasidati.

Faith essential in Yoga.

12. Not by sight can one obtain Him, 
Nor yet by speech or by the mind: 
Except by* one who says, 'He is', 
How can He be experienced?

13. He should be apprehended as "He is", 
And by His real nature,—in both ways: 
When He is apprehended as "He is", 
His real nature is made manifest.

*Or, from (i.e. from a true guru).2

12. Hume's rendering, "How can He be apprehended otherwise than by one's saying 'He is'?" implies a Spencerian
agnosticism, i.e. the existence of the Absolute may be known but otherwise He is unknowable. Deussen's rendering is similar: "'He is'—by this word alone, And in no other way is he comprehended". He treats the verse as a declaration that the ātman as knowing subject can never become an object for us, and is therefore itself unknowable. (P.U. 403, 4.)

This is surely to misinterpret the emphasis of the verse by ignoring the context. The general subject is the apprehension of the Highest Person through yoga,—it is admitted that He transcends the ordinary means of apprehension, and it is therefore urged that faith in His existence is an indispensable prerequisite to that immediate experience which comes by the way of yoga. As the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews says, "He that cometh to God must believe that He is". Such faith is often criticised as an assumption at the start of that which we set out to discover: yet what adventures of discovery in science or in life start in any other way than with a conviction of the reality of that which is sought?

Śaṅkara's comment may be condensed as follows: True, Brahman cannot be apprehended by the senses or intellect as specifically this or that. Nevertheless since He is conceived as root or source of the universe He certainly exists (jagatom mūlam ity-avagatavād asti eva). The chain of effects being traced back and back leads to the conviction that real being must exist (i.e. the ontological postulate is inevitable: we cannot conceive of the world as produced from nothing). Those then who, following the general teaching of scripture and having faith, maintain His existence, are able to apprehend Him, but in the case of the atheist or nihilist (nāstika-vādin) who maintains that no ātman, the source of the world, exists, and that this world-effect, not being inseparably connected with a cause is absorbed into non-existence,—in the case of one who thus sees perversely how can Brahman be truly apprehended? It is obviously impossible.

Śaṅkara is here arguing against the atheism and nihilism of the Buddhist doctrine of anātman and exhibits a side of his teaching too often ignored by his European expositors: Śaṅkara the mystic and man of faith, as opposed to Śaṅkara the metaphysical agnostic.
13. The most obvious way of rendering the second line is "And by the real nature of both" (so Hume). So too Max Müller renders, "And by (admitting) the reality of both"; and Deussen, "In so far as he is the essence of both". But what in this case is meant by "both"? Two things have not been referred to, so the meaning is decidedly obscure. Inferring a meaning of "both" from the context Hume suggests that they are "his comprehensibility and incomprehensibility"; Max Müller, "the invisible Brahman and the visible world as coming from Brahman"; Mead, "asti and nāsti, sat and asat, the manifested and unmanifested aspects of Brahman"; most Indian commentators, "ubhayoh = sopādhika-nirupādhikayoh" (the qualified and unqualified Brahman).

Surely the plain antithesis of the text is between the astitva (existence) and the tattva-bhāva (essence, inner being or real nature) of the Supreme Being. These are the "both" referred to, and the whole difficulty disappears if ubhayoh is separated from tattva-bhāvena-ca and taken either (1) as a genitive expressing the agent (M. 202. 3)—"He should be apprehended as existent, and by His essential nature,—i.e. by both"; or (2) ubhayoh may be taken as Śaṅkara suggests as a definitive genitive (nirdhāranārthā șașthi),—

"He should be apprehended as existent,
And by His real nature: Re. these two—
When He is apprehended as existent
His real nature is made manifest."

Rational faith in the Divine existence should lead on to spiritual experience in which His nature is immediately revealed to and apprehended by the believer. This is the end or culmination of true yoga (spiritual yoking).

At first sight there seems to be a contradiction between verse 12 and verse 9 with its emphatic declaration that the Highest Person may be apprehended or realised "by the mind". This leads Ranade (U.P. 339, 340) to suggest that in verse 9 we should read a negative right through. "Never has any man been able to visualise God by sight, nor is it possible to realise Him either by the heart, or by the imagination, or by the mind. It is only those who know this sublime truth who become immortal." This is surely almost perversely gratuitous! Manas is in verse 12 used in its narrower meaning of the central organ of ordinary perception, while in verse 9 it is used in a much wider sense (see note on 9).
This verse brings to a point all that we have previously noted in the teaching of the Upaniṣad re: the knowability of Brahman. To recapitulate: II. 9 says that He is not to be obtained by argumentative reasoning (tarka) yet when taught by a fit guru He may be well known. II. 12 emphasises the difficulty of seeing Him by any ordinary means, yet says that He may be perceived by adhyātma-yoga. II. 20 and 23 set forth the greatness and subtlety of the Supreme Self and teach that He cannot be obtained by force of intellect, nor even by instruction in and knowledge of Scripture, but also affirm that to the man whose will is at rest in Him there comes, by His grace, a vision in which He makes His person manifest. The Third Vālī goes on to speak of the discipline of yoga by which a man’s whole being may be unified and concentrated on the realisation of the Highest Person who is our inner and most real Self. This subject is resumed in Vālī VI. It begins with the picture of the world tree of which Brahman is the root, and goes on to speak of Brahman as the mysterious life and energy of the universe. This Brahman must be known if we are to escape death and transmigration and attain true, abiding reality, and He may be known, not indeed by the outward ranging senses and striving intellect, but by the thought which has been disciplined and concentrated within upon the Highest who is also the inmost Person, the Inner-Self,—Brahman. Thus, though we may not be able to demonstrate the existence of Brahman (since He is ālīṅga, ‘without empirical marks’), we may have a rational conviction of His existence as root or ground of the world and of our own being (as also from scripture and the communicated experience of spiritual teachers). Religion then begins with the conviction or rational faith in the Divine existence and this opens the way to the higher faith of spiritual experience (adhyātma-yoga), in which the real nature or inner being of God, which transcends description, is revealed or immediately realised.

The Katha Upaniṣad does not describe the stages of this adhyātma or rāja-yoga,¹ but the Maitri Upaniṣad and Patañjali

¹ Nor does it give any detailed account of the practice of yoga. For this as described in the Śvetāsvatara and the Gītā see Appendix III.
later speak of them as dhārayā, dhyāna, and samādhi. Using these terms to express what we conceive to be the nature of the adhyātma-yoga of the Kaṭha we might summarize as follows. In dhārayā (concentration) the soul, when it has controlled the sense-life, concentrates attention on the thought of God. In dhyāna (contemplation) the soul is at rest in the thought of God. In samādhi (ecstasy) the thought of God wholly occupies the consciousness. “The sense of separateness, the consciousness of ‘I’ and ‘my’, disappears. We attain sayujyata,² the consciousness of being completely yoked with God.” “To him the Self reveals His own person.” “His inner nature is made manifest.”²

14. Yadda sarve pramucyante
   kāmā ye 'syā hrdayi śritāḥ,
   Atha martyo 'mrto bhavaty
   atra brahma samaśnute.

15. Yadda sarve prabhidyante
   hṛdayasya śya granthayaḥ,
   Atha martyo 'mrto bhavaty
   etāvad anusāsanam.

15.d. A. etāvadḥi anu²

¹ "So when this chariot-rider is liberated from those things wherewith he was filled full and overcome, (i.e. delusion, passion, self-conceit, and attachment to external objects), then he attains complete union (sāyujya) with the Ātman." (Maitrī iv. 4.)

² We should remind ourselves once more of the great difference between the fully theistic yoga we have been considering and the yoga of Patañjali. In the latter God (Īśvara) is simply a special puruṣa, untouched by afflictions or the fruits of karman, who assists the devotee by removing the obstructions in the lower stages of yoga. Even then meditation on him is optional. In any case completed (nirbōja) samādhi is objectless, a trance supposed to lead to dissolution of the citta (including intellect, self-consciousness and mind) and the attainment by the puruṣa of kaivalya, the freedom of absolute isolation.
The Consummation of Yoga.

14. When all desires are given up
   That dwell within the human heart,
Then a mortal becomes immortal,
   Even here to Brahman he attaineth.

15. When are cut asunder all
   The knots that fetter here the heart,
Then a mortal becomes immortal:
   Thus far is the instruction.

14, 15. These verses refer to the state of samādhi (ecstatic union) in which yoga culminates, in which all separate desires, all self-will is given up. The knots of the heart, which bind it to a lower life, are kāma (self-seeking desire), avidyā (ignorance) and saṃśaya (fear and doubt). (See Muni. ii. 1. 10, ii. 2. 8.) When self is lost sight of in the vision of God all these knots are finally cut.

Na paśyo mṛtyum paśyati, na rogam na, uṣa duḥkhatām ;
Sarvam ha paśyaḥ paśyati, sarvam upnoti sarvaśaḥ.

"The seer does not see death,
   Nor sickness nor any distress:
The seer sees only the All,
   Obtains the All entirely."

Through such firm recollection (dhrvā smṛtiḥ), Sanatkumāra taught Nārada (Ch. vii. 26. 2) "the knots (of the heart) are unloosed. To such a one, his stains wiped away, is shown the further shore of darkness."

What is the nature of the consummation here described? Lanman has said that, "The great practical aim of all the teaching (of the Upaniṣads) is, by exterminating in the soul all desires and activity, root and branch, to lead to the realisation of the unity of the soul and the Supreme Soul. This realised it is liberated; and death can only do away with what no longer exists for the emancipated soul, the last false semblance of a difference between itself and the Supreme."1

At first sight our text might seem to justify this statement. But Br. iv. 4. 7, of which it may be a quotation, speaks of the man who is freed from desire not as being entirely impassive but as one “whose desire is satisfied, whose desire is the Self”. And Ch. viii. i. 5. 6, distinguishes desires that fetter from “true desires” (satya-kāmāḥ) that liberate, and speaks of the Supreme Self also as satya-kāmāḥ satya-saṅkalpaḥ (“desiring and purposing truth”).

Lanman’s words are true of course for many Upaniṣad texts, but they are by no means generally true, the theistic element in the Upaniṣads being much stronger than was once supposed. In particular, the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, though quoting (in its second adhyāya) from the Brhadāranyaka, and possibly affected in parts by the idealistic monism of Yājñavalkya, is on the whole distinctly theistic.

Verse 14, though in its context in Br. accompanied by the comment of Yājñavalkya, “Being very Brahman he goes to Brahman”, does not in itself read like an assertion of metaphysical monism. It is rather a statement, in final answer to the third question of Naciketas, that that fellowship with God which is the consummation of spiritual experience is immortality. “This is life eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God.” “The soul utterly puts off itself (i.e. its self-centred desires) and puts on divine love; and being conformed to that beauty which it has beheld, it utterly passes into that other glory.” (Richard of St. Victor.)

Thus far is the instruction: These words seem to mark the end of the enlarged Upaniṣad (the original Upaniṣad ending at iii. 17). The remaining verses are a still later appendix.
The parting of soul from body.

16. A hundred and one are the veins of the heart;
Of these one leads up to the top of the head;
Rising by this one attains immortality;
The others are for going forth in various ways.

17. A thumb sized personage, the Inner-self,
Dwells ever in the heart of every creature:
Him from one’s body one should draw,
Firmly, as from its sheath a reed:
Him know as the pure, the immortal;
Him know as the pure, the immortal.

16. This verse is taken from Chând. viii. 6. 6. There it is said that if a man has lived the chaste life of a student of sacred knowledge (brahmacarya) and so “found the Self”, then at time of death his soul, dwelling in the heart, will pass upward by a vein or artery, known later as susumnâ (Maitri vi. 21.— ? the carotid vein) to an aperture in the crown of the skull.
known as the brahma-randhram or vidṛti (the junction of the sagittal and coronal sutures, the opening in the child’s skull known as the anterior fontanelle), by which at the beginning of life it first entered. Thence the soul arises by the sun’s rays to the sun, which is a doorway to the Brahma-world to those who know, but a stopping place for non-knowers.

Śaṅkara, very naturally from his point of view, says that the verse only applies to those who have not attained the immediate knowledge of Brahman spoken of in the preceding instruction,—to those who by knowledge of the lower Brahman and by worship attain a relative immortality. With regard to the liberated man of the preceding section who “even here attains to Brahman”, the Brhadāraṇyaka in the prose part of the section from which Kaṭha vi. 14 may be quoted, says, “His breaths (prāṇāḥ) do not go forth. Being very Brahman, he goes to Brahman”. Yājñavalkya pictures the body of the freed man as it appears to an outward observer, “As the slough of a snake lies on an ant-hill, dead, cast off, even so lies this body”. But the man himself “the incorporeal immortal life”, has not departed anywhere: being spirit, attaining Spirit, he is free from the form of space.

Chānd. viii. 6. 6 and Br. iv. 4. 6. 7, are written, then, from very different view-points. The first with its mixture of quaint physiology and cosmology is naturalistic, the second is the view-point of idealistic metaphysics. To Śaṅkara these correspond to his vyāvahārika and pāramārthika points of view and he naturally takes vi. 16 as expressing the first. The editor of the Kaṭha, however, does not seem to have minded the discrepancy in the points of view of his sources, and pace Śaṅkara he certainly intends vi. 16, b, c, to refer to the completely freed man of 14 and 15. With Śaṅkara we take line d. to mean that the other veins are for leading the unliberated soul to re-embodiment.

17. This verse is distinctly composite, consisting of half a triṣṭubh stanza united with an anuṣṭubh. The half verse 17 a, b, is identical with Śvet. iii. 13, a, b, and there the verse is completed by the words found in Kaṭha vi. 9, c, d:

By heart, by thought, by the mind apprehended:
Those who know Him thereby become immortal.
18. Mṛtyu-proktam Naciketo 'tha labdhvā, 
vidyām etām yoga-vidhiṃ-ca kṛṣṇam,
Brahma-prāpto virājo 'bhūḍ vimṛtyur,
anyo 'py evam yo vid adhyātmaṃ eva.

Iti saṣṭhī vallī samāptā.

Om!

Saha nāv avatu;
Saha nau bhunaktu;
Saha vīryaṃ karavāvahai;
Tejasvi nāv adhītam astu;
Mā vidviśāvahai;
Om! śāntih! śāntih! śāntih!¹

Iti Kaṭhopaniśat samāptā.

¹ Some Mss. read: Saha nāv-iti śāntih.

Conclusion.

18. Then Naciketas having gained the knowledge
Declared by Death, and the whole rule of Yoga,
Found Brahma and was freed from evil, freed from
death:

So may another who thus knows the Real Self.

Om! May He protect us both!
May He be pleased with us!
May we act manfully together!
Successful may our study be!
Let us not hate one another!
Om! Peace! Peace! Peace!
18. Whitney notes the use of the forms Naciketa and viraja for Naciketas and virajas as an indication of late and careless origin. Max Müller and Böhtlingk suggest that viraja may be a slip for vijara, “free from old age”. Taking it as virajas, the meaning may be “free from earth’s dust” (see the description of the gods seen by Damayanti, Nala v. 24), or ethically, “free from taint of evil”, “free from passion”. The final prayer, which repeats the opening, though not a part of the Upaniṣad is found in most manuscripts.

*Here ends The Kaṭha Upaniṣad.*
APPENDICES

I. The Taittiriya Brähmana account of the Naciketas Story, is really part of the Introduction.

II. The Parable of the Chariot, is partly introductory and in part gives the later development of the parable.

III. The Practice of Yoga in the Gītā and Śvetāsvatara illustrates the nature of yoga from the literature nearest in time and spirit to the Kaṭha and leads on to a concluding Epilogue.

IV and V are merely supplementary notes which have been placed here rather than in the body of the book so as not to distract the general reader.

The book as it stands is obviously incomplete. It was my intention to add two concluding chapters: One on The Doctrine of God in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad: the other on the whole theistic movement initiated by the Kaṭha, tracing the ideas of puruṣa, aksara-avyakta, and mahān ātmā through the other early metrical Upaniṣads, (Munḍaka, Śvetāsvatara and Praśna), the Vedānta-sūtras, and the schools of the Mahābhārata. Here, in essence, we see the assertion of an internal differentiation within the unity of the Divine Being which presents obvious analogies to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity,—the philosophical object in both cases being to provide a basis for the reality of personality both in God and man, and so for real religious experience. Actually, however, it was from a religious experience of communion, which could not but be taken as real, that the philosophical doctrine in both cases has grown.

We may also see how the concept of the aksara-avyakta has been developed in most untheistic directions into the independent prakṛti of the Śāmkhyas and the avidyā or cosmic principle of illusion of Śaṅkara’s Vedānta. Yet again the avyakta, which as divine creative energy is called in Śvet. devatma-śakti, and also the womb (yoni) from which creation is derived, being personified as female and called śakti and devī is used to provide philosophical justification for that goddess-worship which is perhaps India’s most popular religion.

All this however requires much more than two chapters. This book therefore remains a Preliminary Study in the Hindu Doctrine of God, gathering material which we hope later to develop in more systematic form.
Being desirous (of reward) Vājasravasā gave away all his wealth. Now he had a son named Nāciketas. When he was still a boy, as the offerings were being led away faith entered into him. He said, "Father, to whom will you give me?" Twice he asked and thrice. Then, overcome (with annoyance), he said, "To Death do I give you".

As he stood up (to go) a Voice addressed him. It said to young Gautama, "He has said, 'Go to Death's house. To Death have I given you'. Go therefore while he is away from home. Stay in his house for three nights without eating. If he should ask you, 'How many nights have you stayed here, boy?'—say 'Three'. (When he asks) 'What did you eat the first night?' (answer) 'Your offspring'; 'What the second?' (answer) 'Your cattle'; 'What the third?' (answer) 'Your good works'."

He went (to Death's house) when he was away from home. He stayed in his house three nights without eating. When he returned he asked him, "How many nights have you stayed here, boy?" He answered, "Three." "What did you eat the first night?" "Your offspring". "What the second?" "Your cattle." "What the third?" "Your good works."

Then he (Yama) said, "I bow to you, Sir. Choose a gift." "May I return living to my father", he said. "Choose a second". "Tell me how my sacrifices and good works (iṣṭā-pūrte) may be imperishable", he said. So he explained to him this Nāciketa fire. Thereafter his sacrifices and good works did not perish. He who prepares the Nāciketa fire and who moreover thus knows it, his sacrifices and good works do not perish.

He said, "Choose a third gift". "Tell me the conquest of re-death (punar-mṛtyu)", said he. Then he explained to him this Nāciketa fire: thus indeed he conquered re-death. He who prepares the Nāciketa fire and who moreover thus knows it, he conquers re-death.

1 Following Śaṅkara. But uḍan here, if an adjective, may mean 'willing'; "of his own free-will", or, as Bhaṭṭabhāṣkara Miśra says, Uḍan may be a proper name, "Now Uḍan Vājasravasā (i.e. descendant of Vājasravasā) gave away all his wealth". (See p. 58, 65.)

2 Commentary, kruddyha-iva,—"as though angry".

3 Gautama-kumāram iti—the translation given above is doubtful since iti should mark what is said. The commentator, Bhaṭṭabhāṣkara
APPENDIX II.

The Parable of the Chariot.

The theme of the chariot recurs many times in the history of Indian religious thought.

In Vedic mythology almost all the gods are represented as riding in cars, usually drawn by horses. In the case of the various Sun-gods this imagery is specially prominent and vivid. Sūrya is represented as riding in a golden chariot (ratha) drawn by seven bay mares. Savitr's shining chariot is drawn by two radiant horses.

So too to-day, two figures of horses precede the car of Jagannāth at Serampore, and four at Puri.

This imagery is often treated symbolically and we have a number of chariot parables. That of the Kaṭha is the most famous and important, but it may be of interest to examine some of the others.

(1) The Dirghatamas parable. The first chariot parable is that found in Rg Veda I. 164 (see Introduction, page 13ff.). There the wheeled car with seven horses primarily denotes the sun, but the sun as symbolising the one universal reality. The sage then goes on to speak of that which possesses bone (the body) as sustained by the “boneless”, i.e. by an incorporeal reality more fundamental than the blood or the life-breath, i.e. by the ātman, the invisible soul. This ātman, moreover, not only upholds the body but the whole universe.

(2) The Aitareya Āranyaka parable. Ait. Ār. II, i-iii, is considered by Keith¹ to be the earliest Upaniṣad extant. The general theme is the allegorical significance of the five-

Miśra (c. 1188 A.D.) reads Gautama kiṁ kumāram iti, and comments, Āha, ke Gautama kiṁ kumāram iti, kiṁ evam bālam mṛtyave dadāsi. Following him we should translate, “As he (Vājasravasa) stood up a Voice addressed him. It said, ‘Gautama! What of the boy?’ (‘What kind of son have you given to Death? Does this befit your Gautama race?’). He (i.e. the father) said, ‘Go to Death’s house (that I may not sin). To Death, indeed, have I given you. But go while he is away from home, etc.’”

Iṣṭāpurtyor aṁśitam; “The imperishability of sacrifices and good works”. The commentator reads, kṣitim=sthānam: “The abiding-place of...good works”.

¹ Keith, W.H., The Iṣṭāpurya or Aitareya Brähmana, 2nd ed. (1877), 6.

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fold hymn (uktha), sung in connection with the Mahāvrata rite, as symbolising the Self. "He who knows himself as the fivefold hymn from whence all springs is wise..... He who knows more and more clearly the Self obtains fuller being. In plants and trees sap only is seen, in animals consciousness. The Self is more and more clear in man for he is most endowed with intelligence. He knows to-morrow, he knows the world and what is not the world. By the mortal he desires the immortal, being thus endowed. As for animals, hunger and thirst comprise their knowledge. But this man is the sea, he is above all the world,—whatever he reaches he desires to be beyond it."

The chariot parable is introduced abruptly in II. iii. 8, as follows:

"Here are these verses: 2

"That fivefold body the undying (akṣara) enters,
That which the harnessed steeds draw to and fro,
In which is yoked the trueness of the true,
In that are all the gods in one combined.

Which, from the undying, the undying joins,—
That which the harnessed steeds draw to and fro,
In which is yoked the trueness of the true,
In that are all the gods in one combined.

In which revealed the poets did rejoice,
In it, in unity, the gods exist;
Casting aside all evil by this lore,
The wise man rises to the world of heaven."

1 Keith, The Aitareya Aranyaka (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1909), from which the translation given above is quoted.

2 Tatra āte ślokāḥ,

Yad akṣaraṁ pañcavidhamaṁ sameti,
yujo yuktā abhi yat saṃvahanti,
Satyasya satyam anu yatra yuyjate,
tatra devāḥ sarva ekaṁ bhavanti.

Yad akṣaraṁ akṣaram etī yuktam,
yujo yuktā abhi yat saṃvahanti,
Satyasya satyam anu yatra yuyjate,
tatra devāḥ sarva ekaṁ bhavanti.

Yasmin nāma samatrpyaṁ chhute 'dhi,
tatra devāḥ sarvayujo bhavanti,
Tena pāmpmānām apahatya brahmaṇā,
Svargaṁ lokam apyeti vidvān.
"There is a chariot of the gods that destroys desire. Its seat is speech, its two sides the ears, the horses the eyes, the driver the mind. This life-breath (praṇa) mounts upon it.

A Ṛṣi says (Ṛg X. 39. 12), ‘Come hither on what is quicker than the mind’, and (Ṛg VIII. 73. 2), ‘On what is quicker than the winking of an eye’."

There is much in this passage that is obscure, but yet it would seem clear that we have here (especially in the verse portion which Keith considers the older), a foreshadowing of some of the most distinctive ideas of the Kaṭha. The car of the body, made of the five elements, is drawn by horses, which the prose identifies with the eyes but the verse probably with all the indriyāṇi (described also as devāḥ). The soul, called in the prose praṇa and in the verse aṅkṣara ("the undying" or "imperishable") mounts the chariot of the body and so is united with the senses, controlling them by means of his driver, the mind (the buddhi of the Kaṭha) so that they act in unison. In the second verse the soul is called aṅkṣarād aṅkṣara ("undying from the undying"), and Sāyaṇa comments that the first "undying" is praṇa and the second Brahman. It is Brahman also that is probably described as satyasya satyam ("trueness of the true", "reality of reality"). Brahman therefore or the aṅkṣara (avyakta), being the basis of the soul, may truly be said to be yoked in the chariot, controlling all our life-powers to harmony. In verse 3 also, where Keith translates brahmaṇaḥ "by this lore", Sāyaṇa says "by this Brahman".

(3) The Chāgaleya parable. The Chāgaleya Upaniṣad also speaks of the body as a chariot, sustained by its rider, the soul. The parable is introduced by a story which seems to be based on Aitareya Brāhmaṇa ii. 19. Certain Brahmans hold a sacrificial session on the banks of the Sarasvatī, debarred Kavasa Ailīṣā from initiation because he was the son of a maid-servant. He asked by what right they did this. "Because we are Brahmans, and so it is our right." What makes

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1 Anakāma-māro 'tha deva rathos. Tasya vāg uddhiḥ, śrotre pakṣaśi, cakṣeṣu yuksa, manah samprahātā. Tad ayam praṇo 'dhitirhiṣati.

Tad uktam reśinā, Ā tena yātaṃ manaso jāviyaśā. Nimbasa cīj jāviyaśeti.

2 i.e. Yoga and the aṅkṣara-avyakta. Modi seems to have overlooked this passage which is of obvious importance for the development of the Aṅkṣara doctrine.
a Brahmin? he asked. The birth-rites and initiation (upanayana), they replied. He then took them to the corpse of the celebrated Brahmin priest, Ātreya, which was lying close at hand, and asked, Did he lack birth-rites or upanayana? Then where are his powers departed? The Brahmins, being at a loss, asked that Kavasa would teach them. Surely such a low-born one cannot teach the highest persons, he smilingly said, and sent them to the Child-sages (bāliśas) of Kurukṣetra.

The Child-sages showed the Brahmins a chariot, rushing along a road, and then, at the end of the day, the same chariot tumbled down and inert, with its horses unyoked. What is the difference, they asked; What has departed from it? The driver, of course, said the Brahmins. Quite so, said the Child-sages. “The Soul is the impeller of this (body), the senses (karaṇāṇi) the horses, the veins the straps, the bones the reins, blood the lubricant, volition the whip, speech the creaking and the skin the outer top.¹ And just as the chariot, abandoned by the driver, could not move or creak, so (this body) abandoned by the intelligent self (prajñātman) neither speaks or even breathes; it just putrifies: and dogs may run at it, crows alight on it, vultures tear it, and jackals devour it.”

No application of the teaching is made, but its obvious meaning is that the ātman is the one source of power and greatness, and caste and caste-privilege belong merely to the perishable body. The Brahmins, we are told, received the teaching and learned humility.

Belvālkār is inclined to date this parable earlier than the Kaṭha (“judged by language alone”).² Of this we are doubtful. The account of the bāliśas is surely dependent on the bālya teaching of Br. iii. 5, and they correspond to the vālakhilyas of Maitri ii. 3.³ But for our purpose the question of priority is not important as the chariot parables of the Kaṭha and the Chāgaleya are obviously independent.

¹ Ātmā vā asya pracodayitā, kraṇāṇy aśvāḥ, sirā naddhayaḥ, ’sthiny upagraha, aṣy aṭijanam, karma pratodo, vākyaṁ kvāraṁ, tvag uparaha iti. For the full text and translation see Belvālkār, Four Unpublished Upaniṣadic Texts.
² H.I.P. 132.
³ There are several other points of connection between Chāgaleya and Maitri, e.g. the description of the Ātman as pracodayitṛ (impeller) and
(4) **Buddhist chariot-parables.** There are several interesting Buddhist chariot-parables, all however later than the *Katha* parable and quite different in their teaching.

(a) **The Dhammapada parable.** The oldest of these Buddhist chariot-parables is that found in the opening verses of the Kharoṣṭhī *Dhammapada*,¹ which seem to be taken from the *Samyutta Nikāya*:

> “Straight” is the name that road is called,  
> “Fearless” the quarter it leads to;  
> The chariot is named “Silent-runner”,  
> With wheels of right-effort well-fitted.  
> “Conscience” is its leaning-board,  
> “Heedfulness” its canopy;  
> “Dharma” I say is its driver,  
> “Right views” the horses that draw it.  
> Whoso has such a chariot,  
> Be it wanderer or householder,  
> Be it a man or a woman,  
> By that very same chariot,  
> Is carried right to Nirvāṇa.

Here the chariot is the Buddhist teaching which, in its silent spiritual progress, takes one straight to fearlessness, straight toward Nirvāṇa, and the *Dharma* itself is said to be the charioteer. The metre is the same as that of the *Katha* parable.

(b) **The Milinda-pañha parable.** The most famous of the Buddhist chariot-parables is that found in *The Questions of King Milinda*,² (c. 1st century B.C.). Milinda (Menander), King of the Graeco-Bactrian kingdom which in India had its centre in Taxila, asks the Buddhist missionary Nāgasena what is his name. “I am called Nāgasena, he replies, but that is a mere name, a convenient designation, for there is no Ego here to be found.” “Then”, replies the king, “there is no Nāgasena”. “Pray sire, how did you come here?” “In a chariot.” “What is a chariot? Is it the pole?” “No.” “The wheels?” “No.” “The chariot-body?” “No”. “Then the mention of his whip or goad (pratoda) which in Chāg. is called karman (probably “acquired disposition” rather than “volition”) and in *Maitri, prakṛti-maya.*

¹ See Barua and Mitra, *Prākrit Dhammapada*, 98. The rendering is my own with acknowledgments to Dr. Barua and Mrs. Rhys Davids.

there is no chariot." Then the monk goes on to teach the king that just as the word "chariot" is a convenient name for the assemblage of pole, axle, wheels, and body, so the word "Nāgasena" is only a convenient name for body, sensations, perceptions, consciousness, etc. "In the absolute sense there is no Ātman or Ego here to be found." "So the priestess Vagirā said in the presence of the Blessed One,

"Even as the word 'chariot' means
That members join to frame a whole,
So, when the groups appear to view,
We use the term, 'A living soul'."

Here we note that the very same simile which in the Katha and all Hindu chariot-parables is used to point out that there must be a Self or Soul as the sustainer of the body and the directive power behind all its activities, is used to teach the opposite Buddhist doctrine, i.e. that of anattā, the denial of any continuing Self.

Buddhaghoṣa in the Visuddhi-magga 1 (5th century A.D.) expounds the parable as follows, "Just as the word 'chariot' is but a mode of expression for axle, wheels, body, pole, and other constituent members, placed in a certain relation to each other, but when we come to examine the members one by one we discover that in the absolute sense there is no chariot,—in exactly the same way the words 'living entity' and 'Ego' are but a mode of expression for the presence of five attachment groups, but when we come to examine the elements of being one by one we discover that in the absolute sense there is no living entity there to form a basis for such figments as 'I am' or 'Ego'."

(5) The Maitri parable. In the Maitri, which is probably the latest of the classical Upaniṣads, we have a very detailed development of the Katha chariot-parable (ii. 3 to iv. 4). Here there is no distinction made between intelligence or reason (buddhi) and mind (manas), and it is said, "The charioteer is the mind". The two classes of indriyāṇi are clearly distinguished and it is said that "the horses are the organs of action" (karmendriyāṇi) while the senses or organs of perception (jñanendriyāṇi) are likened to the reins. As in the Chāgaleya

1 See Warren, B.T.
the soul or self is called the "impeller" or "stimulator" (pracodayitṛ) of the body. As to the nature of the soul two accounts are given. According to the second prapāṭhaka there is really only one Soul. "Verily that subtle, ungraspable, invisible one called the Puruṣa turns in here (in the body) with a part (of himself)... Now assuredly that part of Him is what the intelligence-mass in every person is—the spirit (kṣetra-jūna) which has the marks of conception, determination, self-conceit (abhimāna)." This would suggest that individual souls are parts (āmsa) of the one Puruṣa, and a picture is given of the Puruṣa, called Prajāpati, differentiating himself and entering in to the living beings he creates that he may enjoy objects. But this is only appearance. The Atman or Puruṣa seems to wander from body to body but He is only covering himself with a veil of qualities—while remaining fixed like a spectator and self-abiding. "Yea He remains fixed."

The third prapāṭhaka gives a different account. It distinguishes between the inner Puruṣa, the great, immortal Ātman, and what it calls the bhūtātman,—the elemental or individual soul. This is called karty, the doer, while the other Ātman dwells apart, pure and unaffected, "like the drop of water on the lotus leaf", and yet it is called "the causer of action" (kārayitṛ). The individual soul, we are told "is overcome by the qualities (guna) of Nature (prakṛti) and goes on to confusedness. Now because of confusedness he sees not the blessed Lord, the causer of action, who stands within oneself (ātma-stha). Borne along by the stream of qualities, unsteady, wavering, bewildered, full of desire, distracted, one goes on to a state of self-conceit (abhimānatva). In thinking 'This is I' and 'That is mine', he binds himself with his self, as does a bird with a snare." Here we see certain Śaṅkhya ideas but by no means in a classical Śaṅkhya form, for we are told in the next verse (iii. 3) that the pure Self is not without responsibility for this evil state of the individual. "Assuredly the bhūtātman is overcome by the inner Puruṣa and beaten by qualities." This agrees with ii. 6.d. where the Puruṣa or Ātman, called the "Impeller", makes use of the whip or goad of prakṛti (prakṛti-maya pratodana) to drive the body. We may infer (though we are not directly told) that the over-Soul
MAITRI CHARIOT-PARABLE

goads the individual to rush round and round amid the fancied delights of material objects that it may be "fed up" with them (etāḥ paripūrṇa, iii. 5) and also with its self-conceit, and driven to seek salvation. For this the first rule is, as in the Gitā, pursuit of one's regular duty. Nothing can make up for lack of this. Then "by knowledge, by discipline (tapas), and by meditation Brahman is apprehended". "So when this chariot-rider is liberated from those things wherewith he was filled full and overcome, then he attains complete union (sāyujya) with the Ātman" (iv. 4).

APPENDIX III.

The Practice of Yoga in the Gitā and Śvetāśvatara.

The Katha Upanishad does not give any directions for the practice of Yoga. It is clear, however, that by Yoga it does not mean (as the later Yoga so often did) the production of a hypnotic trance or ecstasy in which knowledge is superseded, but rather a discipline akin to meditative prayer by which all the powers of our being are controlled and concentrated for the vision of the highest. The earliest account of the practice of such dhyāna-yoga is probably that given in Gitā vi. 10–15.

"Abiding in a secret place, alone, with mind and soul controlled, without craving and without possessions, a Yogin should constantly yoke his soul.

Setting for himself in a clean place a firm seat, neither too high or too low, with kuśa grass, a skin and a cloth spread thereon.

There, sitting on that couch, with thought and sense restrained, making his mind intent (ekāgra, 'one-pointed'), he should practise yoga for the cleansing of the soul.

Firm, holding body, head and neck erect and still, gazing at the tip of his nose and not looking around.

Tranquil, free from fear and steadfast in the vow of continence, (brahmaçāri-vrata), with mind controlled thinking on Me, so should he sit, yoked, intent only on Me.

Thus ever yoking his soul, the Yogan with mind restrained, attains the peace which culminates in bliss and which abides with Me."

The Śvetāśvatara Upanishad (ii. 8, 9, 10) gives an almost contemporary and very similar account.

"Holding his body steady, the three (upper parts) erect,

Restraining the senses with the mind in the heart,
A wise man with the Brahma-boat should cross over
All the fear-producing streams.

Repressing his breathing here (in the body), with movements controlled,
One should breathe through the nostrils with diminished breath;
Like that chariot yoked with vicious horses,
A wise man, undistracted, should restrain his mind.

In a clean place, free from pebbles, fire, and gravel,
By the sound of water and other surroundings
Favourable to thought, not offensive to the eye,
In a hidden retreat, sheltered from the wind, he should practise yoga."

In both these accounts it is clear that place and posture are not regarded as important for their own sake, but are only means to secure undistractedness of meditation. On this matter even the much later Yoga-sūtras of Patañjali are content to say, "The posture should be steady and easy" (sthira-sukham āsanam). Re breathing, the Gītā in the passage quoted says nothing, though in iv. 29, it refers to prāṇāyāma (restraint of breath) as a kind of sacrifice offered by some ascetics, and v. 27, advocates level, steady breathing during meditation. The later Yoga, on the other hand, attached exaggerated importance to prāṇāyāma, ascribing to it the acquisition of all kinds of super-normal powers, and we see the beginnings of this even in the Śvetāsvatara (see ii. 11, 12).

The point, however to which we desire to draw attention is that both in the Gītā and Śvetāsvatara the practice of yoga as quoted above is essentially of the nature of contemplative prayer. In commenting on the word Vipaścit (ii. 18, p. 105) and also in our account of contemplative sacrifice in the Introduction, p. 23, we pointed out that the fountain-head of the idea of yoga seems to be found in the prayers to Savitṛ (whose stimulation or inspiration enables the worshipper to "yoke mind and thought"), which occupy a central place in the directions for the piling of the fire-altar both in the Taittirīya and the Kāthaka Samhitās of the Yajur Veda. In introducing its description of yoga, Śvet. (ii. 1–7) first quotes these verses:

Yoking first of all the mind
And thoughts for truth, Savitṛ,
Discerning the light of Agni,  
Brought it down to earth.

With mind well-yoked are we,  
By inspiration of god Savitṛ,  
With strength for gaining heaven.

They yoke their minds and yoke their thoughts,  
The sages of the great wise Sage.

With Savitṛ as inspirer,  
One should joy in the ancient prayer,  
If there thou makest thy source,  
The past besmears thee not.

Whether the brahma pūrvyam of the last verse be rendered "ancient prayer" or "ancient Brahman" the reference to prayer as the inspiring power for ordered thought and life is very clear. It is tempting to see in "ancient prayer" a reference to the Gāyatrī, but, whether this is so or not, the use of the term pracodayitṛ ("stimulator") of the Ātman in both the Chāgaleya and Maitri chariot parables is plainly derived from the Gāyatrī. The Maitrī indeed directly quotes,

"Let us meditate upon the adorable splendour  
of that divine Vivisēr (Savitṛ):  
May He inspire our thoughts."
(dhiyo yo naḥ pracodayāt),—

and interprets of the adhyātman saying, "Assuredly the Soul of one’s soul is called the Immortal Leader" (vi. 7).

In the Gītā the matter is plainer still. "Unswerving devotion to Me through undivided yoga, resort to a solitary place and distaste for the concourse of men", in words like these the nature of yoga in its highest aspect as the prayer of communion is made manifest. In the Kaṭha it is true this intensely personal yoga of bhakti is not attained, yet it seems clear that by yoga the Kaṭha, like the Gītā, means not only the discipline of control but the prayer of communion which inspires it. (Where the Kaṭha definitely falls short of the Gītā, however, is that it does not have anything to say about karma-yoga,—the right running of the chariot along the highway of social life.)
Epilogue.

We have insisted, perhaps ad nauseam, on the religious nature of yoga in the *Katha* just because, as we have said, yoga has so often meant something quite different in spirit, though making use of somewhat the same outward practices—a negative yoga of suppression rather than a positive yoga of ordered control, a yoga which spite of its formal recognition of Isvara is often essentially atheistic, a yoga which seeks not the illumination of a higher knowledge in communion with God but hypnotic trance or ecstasy in which all things fall away and the self is left isolated, in *kaivalya*, void of all conscious content. Even in its higher expression, e.g. in the *Yoga-sutras* of Patañjali, this negative yoga, to which so much of India’s highest effort has been devoted, has been a sadly sterile aberration. Just because India so greatly needs the positive yoga of control and self-realisation through communion, the essential diversity of the negative yoga of suppression and the extinction of personality must be so strongly insisted on.

In conclusion, one might perhaps profitably inquire wherein has lain the great attraction of this negative yoga for the Indian mind. One clue is given in the words of Professor Manilal Dvivedi in his Introduction to *The Yoga-sūtra of Patañjali* (p. ii), “The rule is clear that extinction of personality is the only way to real progress and peace. When one consciously suppresses individuality....he becomes part and parcel of the immutable course of nature, and never suffers.” This attitude of mind and the negative yoga to which it leads is a relic of Buddhist pessimism. The Buddha, whether consciously or unconsciously, confused the metaphysical and the ethical meanings of *ahamkāra*. He rightly saw that *ahamkāra*, egoism or selfish individualism, is the root-cause of the sin and misery that set the world afame and he went on to teach that the only way to cure it is to eradicate the notion of *ahamkāra* in the sense of self-conscious individuality or personality. This confusion, excusable perhaps in a teaching which had lost God and therefore could not find salvation in recalling man to the divine basis of his being, was inherited by Hindu teachings which professed to condemn Buddhism as atheistic,—by the
Yoga of Patañjali and also in a different form by the Vedāntism of Śaṅkara. It has even in part infected such theistic doctrines as Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism.

There was a further inheritance also. Buddha, like the early Upaniṣad teachers, believed in the saving power of knowledge applied in a life of discipline. Some of his later followers, despairing of knowledge, sought for a short cut and they seemed to find it in the disappearance of the consciousness both of the outer world and of their own individuality in a state of trance. Hindu negative yoga also took the same fatal short cut.

So to-day the same message comes to India’s youth as came to Naciketas, “Arise, awake! Obtain your boons and understand!”—the boon of the knowledge of God, promised to those who truly seek, no philosophic abstraction but Soul of our soul, our Creator, Redeemer, and Sustainer; the boon of the knowledge of ourselves, utterly weak and unworthy if we live in selfish isolation, yet sons of God, of infinite worth and unmeasured potency if yoked in communion with Divine wisdom and power; and the boon of service, of the privilege of using all the powers of our being, raised to their highest through communion with Him, in His service through the service of our fellow-men.
APPENDIX IV.

'Faith essential in Yoga.'

Additional Note on the interpretation of Kaṭha vi. 12, 13.

\[ Asti ity bruvato 'nyatra \\
   kathāṁ tād upalabhyaṁ ? \]

We have taken \textit{bruvataḥ} as ablative after \textit{anyatra}, and render, "Otherwise than (by one) saying, ‘He is’, how is that one apprehended?" Or, more freely, "Except by one who says, ‘He is’, how can He be experienced?"

Professor F. W. Thomas has suggested that it would be better to render, "Otherwise than \textit{from} one who says, ‘He is’," i.e. from a true guru. I note that Geldner also (V.B. 168) adopts the same rendering. "Wie könntest du anders erfasst werden als von einem (Lehrer), der sagt, er ist?" "How could He otherwise be apprehended than from one (i.e. a Teacher) who says, ‘He is’?" Charpentier also who follows him says that he gives the only possible meaning. Among Indian commentators Madhva interprets the same way.

With all deference to such authorities I still venture to think that the rendering I have adopted is grammatically quite as admissible and, on the whole, preferable. In any case the assertion of the need of faith remains, even though it is in the first place the teacher's faith which is communicated to his pupil.

I note that Whitney, Arabinda Ghose, Sitarama Sastri, and Tattvabhushan render substantially as I have done. The gist of Śaṅkara’s comment is, \textit{straddhāṇād anyatra... kathāṁ tād brāhma tattvataḥ, upalabhyaṁ?} “Except by a man who has faith, how can Brahman be truly apprehended?"

Verse 13. Carrying on the idea of teacher and pupil, Professors Thomas, Geldner, and Charpentier all interpret \textit{ubhayoḥ} as meaning "for both (teacher and scholar)". So Geldner renders, "Nur mit dem Wort ‘er ist’ wird er fassbar als das wahre Wesen für beide. ‘Er ist’, wer ihn so auffasst, dem wird sein wahres Wesen klar”. "Only with the statement, ‘He is’ does He become apprehensible as the true Essence, for both (teacher and scholar). ‘He is’,—who so apprehends Him, to him His true essence (substance or nature) becomes clear". Thomas renders, "Only by the statement, ‘He is’, is He to be known in His true nature, by both parties”.

Geldner however apparently has certain doubts, for he gives the alternative, "as the true essence of both: i.e. of both the personal and the highest Ātman". He also adds, "according to Rāghavendra, however, of the Prakṛti and Puruṣa of the Sāṃkhya philosophy".
APPENDIX V.

Notes on the Dirghatamas Hymn.

1* (1) Asya vāmasya pālitavya hotus
tasya bhrātā madhyamo asty aśnaḥ,
Tṛtiya bhrātā gṛñtraprtho asya
atra apakṣyam viśpatiṁ saptaputram.

_Ancient of days_: Geldner, _altersgraue_,—hoary with age. The word _pālita_ which originally appears to mean grey or pale (cf. Gk. _πελευθός_, _πολός_, L. _pallidus_, E. _pale_), seems at first inapplicable to the sun, but though the meaning grey-haired, hoary with age, it comes, like _pολός_ to mean ancient, venerable. Cf. Daniel’s description of the Ancient of days (vii. 9) and _Revelation_ i. 13-16. Also Francis Thompson’s _Orient Ode._

_Vāma_: cf. the Upakosala-vidyā, Ch. iv. 15. 2.

_Aśna_ is taken by Sāyaṇa to mean _sarvatra vyāpta_ (all-pervading) and is interpreted as referring to Air (Vāyu). Sāyaṇa apparently derives from 1 _aś—to reach, attain, but most modern philologists from 2 _aś_ (aśnāti)—to eat (so B.R., Uhlenbeck), so that it means the voracious (B.R.) or hungry one (Geldner, _der Hungrige_). B.R. apply to Lightning, but Geldner denies both this and Sāyaṇa’s interpretation, taking the three brothers as the three sacrificial fires,—the Āhavanīya, the Dakṣiṇa and the Gārhapatya, the Dakṣiṇa being called “hungry” because the sacrifices come preferably to the Āhavanīya. This is not convincing. There is a certain truth, since the Āhavanīya represents the celestial Agni, the Dakṣiṇa is connected with the _antarikṣa_ and the Gārhapatya with the household. But, as Keith remarks, the three forms of Agni explain the three altar fires and not vice versa (R.P.V. 157). _Aśna_ then is probably the lightning fire and may perhaps be regarded as a variant of the more common name _aśani_. Now _aśani_ appears in various passages, e.g. V.S. xxxix. 8, and Ś.B. vi. 1. 3. 7 as cognate with Rudra or Mahādeva, the destroyer, and they are said to be forms of Agni.

_Atra_ (Here) may mean in the first brother (the Sun) or the third brother (so Geldner who says that the Gārhapatya fire is _Stammherrn_ (Viśpati—Lord of the race or family). Or again it may refer to all three brothers: so Sāyaṇa says _atra =atraṣu bhrāṭṛsu madhyā_,—taking Viśpati as _Paramēvora_, the supreme Lord, manifest in three forms.

2* (2) _Saptā yuṣjanti ratham ekacakram,
eko ēko vahati saptanāmā;_
_Triṣābhi cakram ajaram anaravam_
yatra_āmā vīśvā bhuvanā 'dhi tastuḥ._
(4) Ko dadarśa prathamaṇi jāyamānāṁ,
    asthanvaṃtaṇi yād anasthā bibharti ;
Bhūmyā asur asṛg atmaṁ kva svit,
    ko vidvāṁsaṁ upa gāt praśūn etat.

Geldner renders line c, "Where is the life-spirit, blood, and soul of the earth". So, in effect, Griffith, Regnaud, and Whitney. Geldner interprets of the first living being and mother earth. Śāyaṇa of the avyākta or avyākyta (the prakṛti of the Sāṃkhyaśas or Īśvarāyatta or "God-dependent" māyā of the Vedantins) and the created or manifest world.

(6) Acikivāṅ cikitusaś cīd atra
    kāvin pracāmi vidmane na vidvān,
Viṣṇu taṣṭambha saḥ ime rajāṃsy
    ajasya rūpe kim api svid ekam.

(20) Dva suparnā sayujā sahāyā
    samānaṁ vyākṣaṇi pari svasajāte,
Tayor anyaḥ pippalaṁ svādo atī
    anāśnam anyo abhi cākaśitā.

Geldner interprets the tree as the tree of knowledge, and the birds as two kinds of seekers after knowledge,—those who seek the higher wisdom and the non-speculative.

So Śāyaṇa. Regnaud considers Agni is the speaker.

(33) Dyaur me pitā janitā nābhīr atra
    bandhur me mātā prthivi mahīyaṃ.

Nābhīr atra—' Here's the navel ' or connecting link. Śāyaṇa says atra= aśmin antarikṣe—' this mid-world '. Cf. x. 90. 14, and note that x. 90. 16, is identical with I. 164. 50. Or nābhī may refer to the Sun, the seat of Vivasvat, father of Yama, the first man. (Keith, R.P.V. 113.)
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ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA

Page xviii. Square brackets in the transliterated text denote that the words enclosed should be omitted as hypermetrical.

P. 2, note 1, read S.K. for S.P.
,, 21, line 11, "Kavasa for Kavasa; also pages 218-9.
,, 45, " 8, "lokās "lokas.
,, 74, 16, "sujñeyam: so A and majority of MSS.: B.C. have
suvijñeyam.
,, 3, "sujñeyam in Nāgārī text also.
,, 110, " 11, "mada-amadām "mada-amadām.
,, 114, " 27, "ātma-kāmasya "ātmā-kāmasya.
,, 122, " 19, "ātmā or ātma? ātmā (=ātmanam) may, like
bhokta, be taken as predicative acc. with nom.
form, (see Macdonell, V.G.S. 196 β.). But Śaṅkara
reads ātma in the sense of sarira and takes it
as member of the compound ātma-indriya-manoyuktam
which is adj. qualifying ātmānam understood,
("the soul, joined with body, senses, and
mind, etc.").
,, 126, note 3, delete 4 before Loeb.
add It is interesting to note that the car of Jagannāth at
Serampore (Mahesh) has two horses, one white
and one black, but I have not been able to obtain
any traditional explanation of the symbolism.
,, 129, line 3, read [niyacceti].
Vāmanīdaśa
India - Philosophy
Philosophy - India