ĀLAMBANAPARĪKṢĀ
ĀLAMBANAPARĪKṢĀ
AND
VṛTTI
BY
DIṆṆĀGA

WITH THE COMMENTARY
OF
DHARMAPĀLA

Restored into Sanskrit from the Tibetan and Chinese Versions
and edited with English Translations and Notes and with
copious extracts from Vinitadeva's Commentary

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Dedicated
To
THEM
Who laboured for the cause of cultural
and spiritual advancement of all
living beings
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PREFATORY NOTE

In the scheme of publications planned for the Adyar Library, Buddhistic literature forms one important branch of study. Special attention has been paid in recent years to the study of Tibetan and Chinese versions of certain Buddhistic Texts in Sanskrit which had been lost and could only be reconstructed on the basis of their Tibetan and Chinese versions. The Bhavasāṅkrānti-sūtra and Nāgarjuna’s Bhavasāṅkrānti sāstra published by the Adyar Library in 1938, under the editorship of Paṇḍit N. Aiyawami Sastri, were our first attempts in the direction of such restoration.

Encouraged by the reception which the Bhavasāṅkrānti-sūtra received at the hands of the scholars, we are now issuing the second of the series, the Ālambana-parikṣā and Vṛtti of Ācārya Diśnāga under the same editorship. A fortunate circumstance has preserved this important Buddhistic work in their Chinese and Tibetan versions while the Sanskrit original has been lost. The Journal Asiatique (Vol. CCXIV, No. 1) contains a French translation of this work with copious extracts from the commentary of Vinītadeva under the joint efforts of Mr. Susumu Yamaguchi of Japan and Henry Meyer of Paris. For increasing its usefulness, it was felt necessary to have the treatise reconstructed into Sanskrit along with an English translation. Paṇḍit Aiyaswami Sastri who is eminently fitted for the task, kindly undertook to prepare and edit the work and has now carried it through to a successful completion. In the
present edition, he has incorporated all the salient features of the French translation including the extracts from the commentary of Vinitadeva and has also gone much farther. The Commentary of Dharmapāla in the Chinese version of I-tsing has been rendered into both Sanskrit and English and incorporated in this edition. It is noteworthy that this Dharmapāla is earlier in point of time to Vinitadeva. He is further stated to be different from his South Indian namesake who lived near Negapatam. Valuable information on Dimnāga is also presented in the Editor's preface. It is hoped that the ‘Additional Notes’ and four Appendixes will be helpful to students of research on the subject.

The need for a reorientation of Indological studies from the point of view of cultural contact with the Far East and China, has not yet been adequately provided for in our country. Only a few institutions and Universities have made provision for the study of Tibetan and Chinese Literature and fewer still for original research. It is earnestly hoped that our Universities and other cultural centres will realize the imperative need for providing for this branch of study as early as possible. A chair in each University to promote the study of the cultural contributions of the literature of the Far Eastern countries may well be expected to open up new and fascinating fields of research.

It is with great pleasure that I record here our obligations to Paṇḍit N. Aiyaswami Sastri for placing his most valuable and scholarly services at the disposal of the Library, freely and generously.

Adyar

G. Srinivasa Murti,
7th April, 1942. Honorary Director.
PREFACE

The Alambanaparīkṣā is one of the smaller treatises on the selected subjects composed by Ācārya Diṇnāga, the father of mediaeval Indian logic. The treatise, as its title denotes, starts an enquiry about the true nature of the alambana, object of consciousness. The author, after a thorough examination of the standpoints of the Realists such as Vaibhāṣikas, Vaiśeṣikas and others who hold the external things to be real, and proving their views untenable, establishes that the alambana, as it appears to us, is unreal and that consciousness alone is real—a dogma which has been held by his predecessors, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, two eminent teachers of the Yogācāra school of Buddhism. The main contribution of Diṇnāga to that school in his present treatise lies in putting the dogma on a logical basis.

This position of the author provoked a vehement protest from the dialecticians of the opposite camp, more specially Kumārilabhaṭṭa and Saṅkarācārya, two great thinkers and up-holders of the Brāhmanical tradition and culture. According to Yogācāras, only the pure consciousness appears into subject and object; and there exists, for them, nothing external apart from consciousness. What causes consciousness to arise is only its part known as ṣrāhyabhāga, knowable aspect, and
the same is regarded as the object-cause (alambana-pratyaya). The opponent asks: "How can a part of consciousness and appearing simultaneously be a condition to the consciousness itself?" Dīnāgā answers this question in two ways. The first answer is: It is, though simultaneous, a condition, because it is associated invariably with consciousness: प्रस्थयो अन्यभिचारित्वात् सह.

The second answer is: It becomes also a condition in succession by transmitting the force (s'akti): शक्त्वपरचार त्रिभवात् || (Alam. parikṣa, 7 a-b). Both these answers, according to Kumārila, are unsatisfactory and do not stand the strict scrutiny of the logicians. So he takes up the question for an impartial investigation and proves invalidity of those arguments of Dīnāgā in these verses:

अन्योन्यनिरपेक्षस्तवाङ्गस्पष्टः जनमनि ||
मानमेहतस्तस्तितवं किं याकारक्रियानात् || etc.
न च शक्त्वपरचारं कमेणालम्बनं भवेत् || etc.

(Slokavartika, Śūnyavāda, 150-158 and 158-167).

Similarly Saṅkarācārya\(^1\) also has, in his Bhāṣya on the Brahma-sūtras, summarized and demolished the whole structure of Dīnāgā's arguments found in the present work; and in doing so he quotes this line: यदन्त्तीर्यहूँ तु शङ्करविद्वेदवभासते। (Alam. par. 6 a-b) in the course of setting forth his own siddhānta. Similar criticisms

are also met with in the works of Udyotakara, (Nyāya-
vārtikā), Vācaspatimis'ra (N. tatparyatika) and Sālikanātha (Prakaraṇapañcikā) and others. I, therefore, need not say how thought-provoking and epoch-making the treatise was in those days. Their arguments and counter-arguments will be more understandable, if one could get acquainted with the present work. Further, the work, as it is stated, forms one of the author's original contributions to the logic-minded Yogācāra school of Buddhism. All these circumstances necessitate us to undertake the publication of the present treatise.

It is most unfortunate that such an important work should have been lost to us in its original Sanskrit, though available in translations of foreign languages, Chinese and Tibetan. The work has two commentaries, one by Dharmapāla of Nālandā, preserved in Chinese version of I-tsing, and the other by Vinītadeva available in Tibetan version. Mr. Susumu Yamaguchi in collaboration with H. Meyer has translated into French and published in the Journal Asiatique T. CCXIV, (Jan.-March, 1929) this work with copious extracts from the commentary of Vinītadeva, and also edited the Tibetan and Chinese versions of the text. But he did not study systematically the commentary of Dharmapāla. I have restored into Sanskrit this important treatise, text with author's own vṛtti from the Tibetan version (Tang. ḥgyur. vol. Ge, XCV), with the commentary of Dharmapāla from the Chinese version of I-tsing, A.D. 671-695 (Nanjio, No. 1174, Taisho ed. vol. 31, No. 1625) and also translated them all into English. Dharmapāla's
commentary is incomplete and abruptly breaks off in the seventh verse. I have added to my English translation of the text almost all important portions of Vinitadeva's comment translated into English from its French translation of S. Yamaguchi and H. Mayer. There are two translations in Chinese of the text, one by Paramārtha (Nanjio, No. 1172, Taisho ed. vol. 31, No. 1619; Shanghai ed. "lai" part 10, pp. 13-14) and the other by Hiuen Tsang (Nanjio, No. 1173, Taisho ed. vol. 31. No. 1924, and Shanghai ed. "lai" part 10, pp. 12-13). Literal Sanskrit renderings of these two versions are made and printed in parallel columns so that the readers may themselves note their differences. For preparation of the edition of this work of Diūnāga, I have made use of the above specified and other reference books of the Adyar Library which is one of the richest and well-equipped Libraries of India, and more specially so in regard to rare collections of Buddhist literature including Tibetan and Chinese. I have only consulted for Dharmapala's comment the Nanking edition of the Chinese version of I-tsing in my possession.¹ Romanised Tibetan text of the treatise has also been added at the end with a view to facilitating the beginner in these studies. As no printing facilities are available in the Press, I refrain from publishing any Chinese portion or word-index in Chinese of the work.

¹ A copy of this edition was presented to me by my friend and student Mr. Shilu of China during my stay at Santiniketan in 1938-1939.
Before closing this short preface, it will not be out of place to say a few words about the author and his commentators. The following accounts of Diñnāga are narrated by the Chinese traveller, Hiuen Tsang:

"Above twenty 里 further south west of the monastery of Achala near the capital of Pundhra was an isolated hill on the ridge of which was a stone tope where Chenna (= Diñnāga) Pusa composed a Yin-ming-lun or a treatise on logic. The pilgrim then relates about the circumstances connected the production of this Sāstra in exposition of Buddha's teaching on Yin-ming. Chenna, the pilgrim relates, after the Buddha departed from this life, came under his influence, and entered the Order. The aspirations of his spiritual knowledge were vast and his intellectual strength was deep and sure. Pitying the helplessness of the state of his age he thought to give expansion to Buddhism. As the Sāstra on the Science of Inference was deep and terse, and students wrought at it in vain, unable to acquire a knowledge of his teachings, he went apart to live in calm seclusion to examine the qualities of the writings on it and investigate their characteristics of style and meaning. Hereupon a mountain-God took the Pusa up in the air and proclaimed that the sense of Yin-ming-lun originally uttered by the Buddha, had been lost and that it would, that day, be set forth at large again by Chenna. This latter sent abroad a great light which illuminated the darkness. The sight of this light led to the King's request, that Chenna should at once
proceed to the attainment of Arhatship. When the Pusa reluctantly agreed to do so, Mañjusri appeared and recalled him to his high design and aspirations for the salvation of others and summoned him to develop for the benefit of prosperity, the Yogacarabhumiastra, originally delivered by Maitreya. On this Chenna renounced the idea of an arhat’s career, and devoted himself to a thorough study and development of the treatise on the Science of Inference. When he had finished his work on this subject, he proceeded to the propagation of the rich teaching of Yoga system, and had disciples who were of note among their contemporaries” (v. On Yuan Chwang’s travels in India by Thomas Watters, Vol. II, pp. 209-10).

We learn from the above extract that Diinnaga composed his Yin-ming-lun, probably the Pramana-samuccaya in the monastery of Achala in the Maharastra country, identified with Ajanta caves (Ibid., p. 240) and stayed much in that monastery, and also there have been some legends connected with further development of his logic. But some more particulars of the early part of his life may be gathered from the Tibetan historians, Buaston and Taranaatha. The former relates the following:

“Diinnaga was of Brahmanic caste and ordained by a teacher of the Vaitsiputriya sect. Having received a perfect education in the school of worldly sciences, he received from his preceptor, the instructions about the concentrated meditation for the removal (of Obscurations). Then he was told to meditate over the principle of the Ego which was said to be inexpressible as being neither
identcial with the groups of elements, nor differing from them. Having accordingly practised meditation, he could nowhere find such an Ego. He practised severe penance sitting betwixt fires at four directions. While he was doing so, the preceptor asked him what he was doing. He replied he was searching for the Ego. The preceptor said: "Thou art overthrowing our own philosophical system. Therefore, be gone." He departed and finally came to the teacher, Vasubandhu. With the latter he studied the texts of 3 Vehicles and became specially versed in the Vijñānavāda and in logic. He composed the commentary on the Abhidharmakosā, the commentary on the Guṇaparantarastotra, the Alambanaparīkṣā and other fragmentary works, 100 in number. But as these treatises were mere fragments (without any system), he resolved to compose the Pramāṇasamuccaya. And it is stated that he composed it being induced by Mañjuśrī for the benefit of the world. One of his pupils was Isvarasena who was versed in 5 branches of the science and composed a sub-commentary on the Pramāṇasamuccaya.” (v. Ober Miller’s translation, History of Buddhism, part II, pp. 149-50).

The following accounts of his life are given by Thomas Watters from the Tibetan Channels, vis., from Tārānātha:

“He was born in Simha-vaktra, a suburb of Kānci in the south, and he was of a Brahmin family and well trained in the orthodox learning. He afterwards joined the Vatsiputra sect of the Hinayāna Buddhists, but c.
having incurred displeasure of his teacher, he was expelled, and he then joined the school of Vasubandhu. Then he lived for some time in a cave on Bhora S'aila in Odivisa, sojourned in Nālandā, where he disputed successfully with several defenders of various schools and afterwards returned to Odivisa. Here he resolved to devote himself to the compilation of a treatise on logic, and the resolve was followed by an earthquake, a great light and a noise in the air. When he began to despair of success in his understanding, Māñjusrī appeared to him, and roused him to renewed application by advice and encouragement. The king of the country also became of his friend and patron.” (v. On Yuan Chwang's travels in India, Vol. II, p. 212).

From the above narratives we may conjuncturally construe his life as below: He was born in a Brahmin family in a suburb of Kāñci, then capital of Pallava kings in South India. Being educated in the orthodox teachings of Brahmans and Buddhists, he joined first the Vātsiputriya sect of Buddhists. Being unsatisfied with its teachings he started for search of truth and finally came to Vasubandhu in Nālandā and studied with him the logic and Viṣṇunāvāda. He composed there several smaller treatises such as commentary on the Abhidharmakosā, the Ālambanaparikṣā, Nyāyamukha and others. After retirement from Nālandā, he settled in a cave on Bhora S'aila in Odivisa and also frequently staying in Achala’s monastery (=Ajanta caves) where he composed his Pramāṇasamuccaya, the standard treatise
on the Buddhist logic. His date may roughly be fixed about 400 A.D., as he is stated to have studied with Vasubandhu in Sri Nālandā, whose life-period has been fixed as c. A. D. 280 to 360 by V. A. Smith (History of India, 3rd ed. p. 328) on the authority of N. Peri (Bulletin de L’Ecole France d’Extreme Orient, t. XI, pp. 339-90).

Turning to Dharmapāla, his commentator, I should, at the outset, like to stress on one point, namely that he is not to be confounded with a person of his namesake viz., Dharmapāla of the Theravāda school. The latter is said to be a resident of Badaritittha (v. Visuddhimaggatika, colophon) which is simply stated in the Sāsanavamsa to have been situated in the country of Damiṣa, not far from the island of Ceylon (P.T.T. edn. p. 33). However, the latest Archaeological finds help us to identify it with some place near Negapatam, a small seaport town in South India. The present commentator, Dharmapāla is nowhere mentioned to have been connected any way with Badaritittha. He, on the other hand, is stated to have fled away from Kāñci towards the north in his youth and remained there until his death. I have discussed at length all the points relating to the persons and dates of these two Dharmapālas in a separate paper entitled “On Dharmapāla” published in the Journal of Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Institute, Tirupati, (Vol. II, part 2, p. 347 ff.). The following accounts of the life of the present Dharmapāla are narrated by the Chinese traveller:
“The capital (Kāñci) was the birth-place of Dharmapāla who was the eldest son of a high official of the city. He was a boy of good natural parts which received great development as he grew up. When he came of age a daughter of the King was assigned to him as wife, but on the night before the ceremony of marriage was to be performed, being greatly distressed in mind he prayed earnestly before an image of Buddha. In answer to his prayer, a god bore him away to a mountain monastery some hundreds of li from the capital. When the Brethren of the monastery had his story told, they complied with his request and gave him ordination and the king on ascertaining what had become of him, treated him with increased reverence and distinction.” (v. T. Watters, op. cit. p. 226). The direction to which he fled on the eve of distress is not mentioned there; yet we may assume that it was North where he spent major part of his life.

It is stated that he drew up the following works: Sabdavidyaśasanyauktasāstra in 25,000 ślokas; a commentary on the Satasāstravaipulya; on the Vidyamatrasiddhi; and on Nyāyadvaratarkasāstra (=Nyāyamukha of Diānāga). The first of the above four works seems to be the same as the commentary on Bhartṛhari’s treatise called pei-na, mentioned by I-tsing. Takakusu suggests that pei-na is probably ‘Beda’ or ‘Veda.’ But this is improbable, because Bhartṛhari is unknown to have composed any treatise on Veda, and much more so, that Dharmapāla should have commented upon it. So it may, perhaps, be Vyākaraṇa.
This commentary and the commentary on Nyāyamukha are not now available. Nanjio's Catalogue mentions four works in his credit: (1) Ālambanāparikṣāvyakhyā No. 1174, (2) Vidyāmatrasiddhi No. 1197, (3) Satasāstravaipulyāvyakhyā No. 1198, (4) Vidyāmatrasiddhisāstra No. 1210.

As regards his date, I-tsing A.D. 671-695 speaks of him as contemporary of Bhartṛhari who, according to the same Chinese authority died in about A.D. 651-52. It is also believed that he was the elder contemporary of Dharmakīrti who flourished in the middle of the 7th century A.D., and that the latter was the pupil of the former. In the present commentary of Dharmapāla, there are two quotations, both agreeing in spirit with the verses of Pramāṇavārtika of Dharmakīrti (v. pp. 61, 67). It is not certain whether the former quotes from the latter or they both cite them from a common source.¹ This Dharmapāla seems to be the same as the teacher of Stīlabhadra who received Hiuen Tsang at Nālandā in 635 A.D. (v. Takakusu, Record of the Bud. Religion by I-tsing, XIV). Prof. H. Ui has, however, fixed 539-70 A.D. as Dharmapala's palmy days on the authority of Kwechi's commentary on the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi which is reported to have stated that Dharmapāla died in the 32nd year of his age and was one year younger.

¹ Instances are not lacking to make us believe that Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārtika contains quotation from some earlier works; e.g., the verses आत्मर्थिनियति प्रसंग, etc., of the Ratnāvali of Nāgārjuna (ed. G. Tucci. in Journal of R.A.S. 1934, April) found in the Pramāṇavārtika, L. 221, p. 87.
than Sīlabhadra. This Sīlabhadra, says H. Ui, was, according to the Siyuki of Hiuen Tsang, 30 years old while studying with Dharmapāla, and was 106 years old when Hiuen Tsang met him. The Chinese pilgrim started from China in 629 A.D. and arrived at Rājagṛha and saw him in 633 A.D. So Dharmapāla was still living in 557 A.D. These are circumstances which prompted H. Ui to arrive at the opinion in regard to the date of Dharmapāla above stated (v. Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, p. 10). Though the tradition of Kwechi and others is earlier and more trustworthy, yet it is not supported by I-tsing and the Tibetan authorities, (e.g., Tārānātha, pp. 161-2). Therefore we may, as it has been stated above, assign our commentator to the second quarter of the 7th Century A.D. (cf. Tattvasaṅgraha, Intro. xcv).

Scholars will themselves see how lucid, and elucidative his commentary is even in the translation of so linguistically unfamiliar and foreign language as Chinese, and how much more useful purpose would have been served, if the Sanskrit original of it were recovered. It is also equally regrettable that the commentary is incomplete.

As for Vinītadeva, the other commentator, we know very little of his life, and we have to content ourselves with what Tārānātha briefly remarks: "Zu der zeit liebten die Zauberkundigen: Konig Sahajavilāsa (Lhan.skyes.rol.pa), in Sri Nalanda der Ācārya Vinītadeva (er verfasste einen commenter zu dem Pramāṇa in Sieben Abtheilungen), der Sautrāntika S'ubhamitra und der Ācārya S'ilapālīta," . . . (Schiefler's translation,
p. 197-8). He was a great logician and commentator of his time, and was one of the gems of Nālandā University. He is said to have flourished in about 700 A.D. His commentary on the present treatise is very learned and helpful to understand fully the position and motive of Diṅnāga in writing the present work. Almost all important portions of this commentary have been translated into French by S. Yamaguchi and H. Meyer from its Tibetan translation, and again translated into English by me and added as notes to my English translation of the treatise.

In concluding the preface I should offer my sincere thanks to the authorities of the Adyar Library, especially the Director, Dr. G. Srinivasamurthi, B.A., B.L., M.B. & C.M., Vaidyaratna, and the Editor Dr. C. Kunhan Raja, M.A., D. Phil. (Oxon.) for kindly publishing this book in the Adyar Library Series. I should like also to thank M. Bhikshu Ārya Asaṅga (formerly A. J. Hamerster) Jt. Director and Curator for the Western section of the Library for the help he has kindly rendered by going through some portions of my English translation of the French passages. However, I must say that I hold myself responsible for those portions as printed in this volume.

N. Aiyaswami Sastri
Substitute the following for the verse 7a-b on page 2, line 5 and p. 6, ll. 7 and 11:

प्रत्योज्यभिचारित्वात् सह श्रव्यपर्णात् क्रमात् 

(cited by Pārthasārathi Mis'ra in his comment on S'lokavārtika, pp. 311 and 312.)
आलम्बनपरीक्षा *

आचार्यदिन्नागकुंता

नमः सर्वदृढ़बोधिसत्त्वेभ्

१. यथपीत्रियविपर्ययास्थांशः (=अणव:) कारणं भवेत्।
अतदाभित्या तस्या नाशवद्विपयः स तु१ (अणव:)॥

२. यदाभासा न तस्मात् सा दृष्याभावात् द्विचन्द्रवत्।
एवं वाश्रद्धश्रेयव न युतं मतिगोचरः॥

३. सातनं सशिक्ताभारमिच्छन्निति किल केचन²।
अण्वाकारो न विश्वसंर्थं: कृतिनाधिनव।॥

४. भवेद्वशारावदेशस्था सति समा मति:।
आकार्येद्वशीदेशेत् नासितु दृष्यसत्त्वणो॥

* Tanjur (Narthaḥ), Mdo, ce, (XCV) No. 4.

¹ This verse is quoted in the Tattvisaṅgrahapaṇijīka (GOS.) p. 582. The reading 'अणव:' given within bracket is according to the Tibetan version.

² This line being put literally, may read thus: केचिद् सशिक्ताभारमि

³ Lit. विश्वसंर्थ, अर्थ.
5. प्रमाणेदामावात त्वः, अद्व्येदास्ति ततः स हि।
अशुनां परिहरे हि तदाभ्यानविश्रुतां।

6. यद्रत्तेयहरूं तु बहिरविद्वामाते।
सोद्वों विज्ञानरूपिकृतत्वत्त्यत्यत्यतयापि।

7. एकांशः प्रत्ययोविनेतात् शक्तययांसात्कल्पणः।
सहकारिवशायद्दि शक्तिरूपं [तत्] इत्त्रप्रुम।

8. सा चाच्यिरह्दा विषयेर्वेच विषयरूपम्।
प्रयेतेनानांतां शक्तिशान्योन्योऽयेतुकेः।

इत्याचार्यदिक्षानकान्ता आङ्ग्यवनपरीक्षा अभिलक्षमकरणकारिका समासः

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4 The two quarters 4d and 5a form one idea, and they may be put literally thus: त्वः अद्व्येदास्ति भास्ति प्रमाणेदामावात।

5 This may literally read thus: अशु परिहरे तदाभ्यानविश्रुत।. The reading 'किश्वात' is adopted from the Tibetan version of the विठ्ठी.

6 This verse is quoted in the Tattvasastra. p. 582. Mr. S. Yamaguchi suggests in Tib. 6b the reading 'de' for 'te' relying upon Vinitadeva’s commentary (Tib.). It is also supported by the Sanskrit original. The first half of this verse is cited by Saṅkara in his Bhāṣya ad II, 2, 28, with the reading 'तत्' for 'तु'.

7 = gcig. cha haŋ. So reads S. Yamaguchi’s edition of the Tib. version. But the Xylograph reads gcig. naḥaŋ = एकोऽधिपि।

8 = अविनामं अविस्थितम = mir (ma) hkhrl.

9 This quarter is cited in the Tattvasastra. p. 582 along with the prose passage of the विठ्ठी thus: अथ वा शक्तययांसात्कल्पणापि, etc.
अलम्बनपरिसाधिति: *

आचार्येत्रिकृतामः

नमः सर्वबुद्धबोधिसत्वे भवि.

ये च द्वा ज्ञांश्च यात्राम्बने बाघारूड्योक्ती तितीच्छंदिति। ननु ते कल्प-यन्ति परमाणुः; तत्कारणत्वात् [ज्ञानस्य]। संघात्¹ बा तदाभभेदाः प्राप्ते जायमान्यात्। तत्र तावद्।

विषयं विद्रव्यविष्कर्मणांशा: (=अणवः) कारणं भवेत्।

अत्तताभव्यं कस्य नाशवेद्धियं: स तु (अणवः) || १ ॥

विषयं हृति। ज्ञानं स्वरूप [मेव] निर्धार्येति। तदाभव्यं ² जायमान्यात्। ³विषयंव: तत्कारणम्। तथा पि न ताहा: अक्षबत्।

एवं नाशवेद्धियं विष्कर्मणम्। संघास्तु तदाभभेदि [ज्ञानस्य नाल-म्बनम्। यतः।

* Tanjur (Narthan), Mdo, ce (XCV) No. 5. The Tibetan version has been edited by Mr. Susumu Yamaguchi with French translation in the Journal Asiatique T. CCXIV, No 1 (1929).

¹ hduis. pa.

² Lit.-करण अजनमा।

³ This sentence may also read thus: अणवः द्वा ज्ञापनात्तेति न तथाभवः: अक्षबत्।
अालम्बनपरीक्षा

यदामासā न तस्मासाः

योक्ते: स्वाभाविकिशिशिष्याद्वितीयति सभालम्बनं युञ्जये। यत: स एव हृद्यचिन्तित्वं उच्यये। संपारति नैवम्।

द्वायभावादुः द्विचिन्द्रवतः।

हिर्नियवैकल्यात् द्विचिन्द्रदर्शनस्य तदामेवेक्षि न तत्स्य विषयोहिति।

dhātū संपार: हिर्नियोपस्तर्चेन अकारणत्वात् नालम्बनम्।

एवं वाद्यायैव न सुरक्ष मतिनोचर: II २ II

अनु: क्लापशेति वाद्याये: नालम्बनम्, एकाकाल्यात् II तत्र साधनं संशिताकाराभिचित्रित्तिं किल केचन‘।

सर्वोऽयो वद्याकारः: ५ अत: तत्र केनचिराकारेन प्रत्यक्ष दृष्टे।

परमाणुव्यवस्थित संशिताम्बज्ञानोपत्तिकारणमावः।

अष्ठाकारो न विज्ञारस्यं: कठिनतात्दिवं II ३ II

‘Representative of this view in later periods seems to be Bhadanta S'ubhagupta; cf. Tattvas. paññ. p. 551: समृद्धिता एवोपस्तरे विनिवृत्तिः शेति स्वाभास्त नैवैकालप्रतिमास्तिः। योक्ते विद्यतायुपस्तरे—

प्रत्यक्षपरमाणकं स्वात्मोपस्तरेहिति संरम:। (Read असंते)। अतोपि परमाणुमेकाकार-प्रतिमास्तिः।

‘= rnam. pa. du. ma. can. yin. pas. So reads S. Yamaguchi's edition. But the Xylograph reads simply ' yin pas'.

6 Cf. the opinion of Sumati, a Digambara, cited in the Tattvas. paññ. p. 554: समामण्यविख्यातीत्वात् सर्वपरमाणानि तुल्यतुल्यश्चेष्येश्ब्रह्म: परमाणवः।

तत्र सामान्यं बुद्धृं तत्तद्विशिष्टं नालम्बनम्। तत्तद्वैकारं विप्रान्तस्वल्पकुक्कुटितति

प्राल्पसिद्धाः परमाणवः।
आध्यात्मज्ञानपरमीतः:

यथा कठिनतादिर विद्वा मानमपि न चाक्षुशबुद्धिविषयः। "पठ-  
मणिलमपि ||

भवेनकस्रवादेषुतः सति समा मति: ।

घटशराबादिपरमाणुयं बहुपविषयं न कोषपि विशेषोद्विति।

आकारमेदादेश्वेत,  

यदि मन्यसे श्रीवाधा: विशेषक्रिया, वेन वुज्जुविशेषंमुपाधि-  
भेवेत । इति । अयुपाधष्टार्दशविश्वासः।

नासि हु द्रव्यस्थली: । ॥ ॥

प्रमाणमेदाभावात् सः;

परमाणुयं द्रव्यान्तरेन्द्विपि पारिस्थितिष्ठल्ये मेदो नासि।

अद्वेष्टित तत: स हि।

आकारमेद: संद्रुतिस्तवेवासित न हु परमाणुयं। घटाद्यवध  
संद्रुतिस्तन्त एव ॥

अणूनां परिहारे हि तदाभ्यानविहावात् । ॥ ॥

द्रव्यस्थलु "अपनीतसम्बन्धिणिपि [नील-] वर्णांदिवः स्वसुक्लिनः  
ल्ययते। तथा सति इन्द्रियबुद्धीनां विषयो वाहिनास्तीतिपृयते।

यदन्तोयस्युपं तु वाहिनास्तवमासते।

सौर्श्र: 

7 Lit. अशुचसचः:

8 =zlam. po.

9 More lit. सम्बन्धिणि अपनविधि; or सम्बन्धिणि अपनषोधि।
बालम्बनपरीक्षा

बालाकृष्णमाने अन्तःस्तेव बहुविद्वानामालम्बनप्रत्ययः।

विज्ञानसुपत्वविद्यतयतयारिपुः ॥ ६ ॥

अन्तःविज्ञानः ्सम्भवततथात्माते ततो उत्पादते चेति धर्मसाधनसुपत्वविद्यतयतयािपुः।

वदि ताब्देवस्थवमान्य एव वेधते। कचि तदेकः सहजातः प्रत्ययः।

एकांशः प्रत्ययोऽविवेकतः।

सहभूतोपपि अव्यविभारात्। अन्यज्ञाततय प्रत्ययोऽविवेकतः। नैवायिकवा स्वामहुः। कर्मेण जायमानोद्वेदहुःस्थमतोः। भावाभवतद्वा लक्षणः। एकांशः प्रत्ययोऽविवेकतः।

शक्त्यर्पणात् कर्मेण [वा]।

कर्मेणापि सोडेशमान्यः। स्वानुपुरुषकारोहितवचे शर्कि विज्ञानाधाराः। करोति तत्वतीविविधः। वदि तदहि स्वानुपुरुषवालम्बनप्रत्ययः। कचि तत्तु [रूपं] चक्रुध्योपाद्य चक्रुविज्ञानसमस्थितेऽ इति।

१० Or. कर्मः अभासाते।

११ द्विग्वर्तः। cf. व्र्त्ति ad 2a.

१२ Lit. अव्यवहारण, भावहुः।

१३ Cf. न्यायसूत्रा, IV, 1, 49: प्राणपराप्तं विद्यतयतयारिपुः भावाभवतद्वा लक्षणः।

१४ The passage, अक्षरः ... अविरोधः: is quoted in the Tattvas. पानि. p. 582. The पाणिकाय cites this passage omitting the words कर्मेण वा in the quarter b of the verse 7.

१५ Xylograph reads वर्षघातः, ra. sna. ba.——

१६ ra. gni. gzugs.
अध्यावनपरीक्षा

सहकारिवशाध्यदि शक्तिरूपः [तवृ] इत्नियम् १६ ॥ ७ ॥
इत्नियम् स्वकार्यावत् शक्तिरूपमेवानुमानीयते न तु भौतिकम्।

सा चाविरुद्धा विज्ञे:

१७शक्तिस्तु विज्ञाने वास्तू। अतिदैवेऽस्स्त् १८ रूपे वास्तू कार्योऽत्यन्तिः न विशेषः।

एवं विषयरूपकम्।

प्रवृत्तेऽनादिकां शक्तिधायोऽन्येऽहुँकु। ८ ॥

चक्षुराल्यां शक्तिमन्तः १९रूपधारा पदाय विज्ञानमार्थमभासि आलम्बनादिविभिक्षमुपथाते। इत्य द्राक्षाय परानादिकालम्योण्येवेतुकम्।
कदाचिद्विज्ञास्य शक्तिरिपिपतस्तु विषयाकारात् भवति। कदाचिच तदकारशक्ति: २०। विज्ञानम् सा च उभयमन्येवनान्येवन च यथेष्ठ-मुन्यताम्। एवमन्तरालम्भने २१। धन्ताध्वस्विचिश्वातु विषयतवा उपपादः।

इत्याचार्यदिवेशनाग्राकम् आलम्बनपरीक्षात्रिः समासा।

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१६ Cf. Madhyamakāvatāra, Sanskrit text VI, 62 and bhāṣya thereon.
१७ = nus. pa. ni. Xylograph omits it.
१८ Or. तस्ये = raṇ. gi. नो. bo. la.
१९ = naṇ. gi. gzugs.
२० = de. hi. rnam. pahi. nus. po.
२१ Better reading will be अनुविषया। Cf. vṛtti ad 6c-d.
PARAMĀRTHA'S CHINESE VERSION

अनाकारचितविषयशाख्मू

1. यथपुर्वये अणु: इन्द्रि [विज्ञि:] कारणम् असंरूपतत् अस्वय विषय:।

2. विज्ञि: संघातामा भवति न तस्माजायते। संघातोक्ष्यूपः
    द्विचल्लित। अनेन दौ बाञ्चार्वि न विषयी।

3. केचिह्नि:ति। अणु: समूह पदार्थसाधनानि विषया: सिद्धन्नति,
    विज्ञानय सदाभनत्। अणुस्स्रुपः द्रव्यसङ्क्षणे न विषय:।
    रजोवतृ
    विज्ञानास्स्रुपतत्।

4. अणुंरिपायुशेऽत, तदा विज्ञिसिरिष्या [स्वत्]। यथाकारामेव
    बदसि तदा विज्ञिसिरिष्या [स्वत्]। आरामेव: प्रज्ञिस्थ:। अत
    आकारो न तथ्य:।

5. अणुप्रमाणं सर्वेषाभिमम्। यथाऽन्त परिहरि:सि, विषयविज्ञि
    नेंदियत। तस्मात् विषया: प्रज्ञिनामाति।

¹ Chén=dust. dirt. This character is also used for विषय. But in the corresponding passage of the वर्तित of Paramārtha's and Hsuan Chuan's versions, the character 'chien' is used which exactly corresponds to कठिनता of the Tibetan. So 'chén' is, I think, a mistake for 'chien'==कठिनता.
6- अन्तर्विषयरूपं बहिःश्वंभासमां विज्ञानिशिष्यः सिध्यति।
विज्ञानस्य द्वारकार्यात् इदं विज्ञानमालम्बनप्रत्ययः।

7. उत्तरचिन्तामणि दुःखपति [प्रत्ययः] सिध्यति। क्रेन्द्र वा
शक्तिज्ञानयति। "स्वतंत्रमिन्द्रियं—सहजातशक्तिविशेषः
इन्द्रियं भवति।

8. विज्ञानस्यापत्तिः।3 अन्योन्न्यकु शक्तिविशेषविषयात्मके
अनादिकालमन्योन्न्यप्रत्ययः॥

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3 There are two kinds of sense organs, sthūla and sūkṣma.
The latter seems to be meant here.
3 =अविरोधी,
Paramārtha's Chinese Version

अनाकारनिचितविषयकारणम्

1. ये तक्षित स्वेदवर्तित चक्षुनायननिन्न भाषमया प्रतीय उत्थान्त इत। ते कल्याणित परमाणूः वा विषयम्। विज्ञानहेतु
हृत्वान्। परमाणुस्थानं वा विषयम्। सम्बन्धविज्ञानस्योदयायात।

Hsuan Chuang's Chinese Version

आलम्बनप्रम्यपरीक्षाशास्त्रम्

1. केचित चक्षुरादिपितविज्ञानना वाच्यमाल्लम्बनप्रक्रियां कर्ष्णां: परमाणु​ूः वा कल्याणित वस्तुस्तुत्त अस्त्वीति। विज्ञानजनकवानां। साध्यां वा गृहृत्ति। जायमानविज्ञानस्य तदाकारवन्धात। उम्मयमपि
न युक्तम्। कस्मात्।

अष्टुः पश्चविज्ञानाणां
कारणमपि नालम्बनम्।
तदाकारविज्ञानाभवात्।
चक्षुरादिशवत्।

आलम्बनप्रम्यो वद्व तदाकारविषयः इति विन्दुः। ‘यत्र
विज्ञानविज्ञाप्तम्। तदक्षणः। यथा
तदक्षणं विज्ञानमुदेति। तस्मात
विषयू उच्यते। परमाणु मैत्रेयाः।

11


2. तथा ज्ञानक: तथापि नालम्बनम्।
चक्षुरक्षादिवर्त्। चक्षुरादिव तदाकार-
विज्ञानाभावात्। एवं परमाणु‌
रादिविज्ञानस्य नालम्बनम्।

2. सहायत: पश्चविज्ञानाना-
मालम्बनमपि न प्रत्ययः।
तदव्याभावात्
द्वितीयचन्द्रवर्त्॥

रूपादिसहायत: यथापि आलम्बनी-
कियते। चक्षुविज्ञानादीनां तदाकार-
कलावात्। तथापि न प्रत्ययः।
संज्ञाभितिनेत्रदग्धद्वितीयचन्द्रवर्त। तत्स्य
द्रव्यो नास्तिक्कारणावात्। एवं
सहायतः चक्षुरादिविज्ञानानां प्रत्ययो
न भवति। अतो वाक्येन द्रार्थेन
आलम्बनप्रत्ययों मिथेन एकां
विकल्पैः। अत एवं न युक्तः।
न विज्ञानगोचरः। द्वयो विकलाङ्कात्।

2. केवलाचार्यं बदन्ति। अनव: सचिवताः पदार्थसाधनानि बढ़ाकारसंपन्नाः। तान् गोचरं सधयाम:। कस्मात् आकारान्तर्युक्त: प्रत्यक्षजनक:। न केवल: परमाणु: परमाणुसंहातस्तथ। तस्मात् परमाणू: परमाणुसंहाते च अस्त्याकार:। य: शब्देऽजनानां विषयः कियते। आण्वकारो न विषयः कठिनाताविवत्। परमाणू सचिव कठिनव्रीतिवाचार्यवस्थाः। ते च द्व्यसनो न चाकुषविज्ञानगोचरा:। चाकुषविज्ञानस्य अताहस्वतात्। परमाणुविशेषद्वर्ते [आकार] श्रैवथः।

2. केवल गृहीति रूपादीनां प्रत्येकं बढ़कारा: सचिव। तत्र एकाकारं प्रत्यक्षसंगम:। अत: परमाणु:मात्राकारसंहातामास्ति प्रत्येकं सजिताकार:। अयमाकारो द्व्यसनो प्रत्येकं [तद्] आकारान्तर्युक्त: प्रत्येकं मिजानोपस्त्यायाम्भक हृति पश्चविज्ञानात्मावलम्बनप्रत्यक्ष्येक्प्रविष्टे। हृति। तदापि न युक्मः। कस्मात्।

सचिव[आकार]: कठिनाताविवत्।
चाकुषविज्ञानाः।
प्रत्येकं नालम्बनम्।
अन्वकारायुङ्गमात्।

यथा कठिनाताकार: यथापि
कस्मात् चाकुषविज्ञानाः प्रत्यथभावं भजते। तथापि नालम्बनम्।
चाकुषविज्ञानेषु तदाकारायुङ्गात्।
४. कस्मात् पदार्थमध्यवर्त्ती परमाणु यथि विज्ञानजनकः। तदादि इति विज्ञान न भिषेत्। पदार्थ-
मध्यवर्तिपरमाणुमेद्राभावात्। यदि बदसि आकारमेदात् विज्ञानमेदो जावते। घटादिपदार्थार्थश्च न समाः।
तदाकारकारणज्ञात् जायमानं विज्ञानं भिषवते। इति। अयमार्यों न युज्यते।
कस्मात्। तादाकारमेदात्: घटादिपदार्थनिः। न तु उपरमाणु-
द्रवबर्तिः।

४. चक्षुरादिविज्ञानकारणपरमा-
णसंज्ञातिकारवादे पुनरस्ति दो-
पान्तरम्।

घटशरीवादातिः:
तदृहम्नी अभिव्र स्थात्।
नाकारभद्रात् भेदः:
आकारभद्राद्रवद्रवल्वत्।

घटशरावादिमहंदवपदार्थार्थसाधन-
परमाणु बहुभु अलङ्कार वा सा-
म्यात् तलकारणा मतिरभिज्ञा स्थात्।
तत्वदार्थकारभद्रातुष्क्याकारभद्र इति
बदसि चेतः। न तथा युक्तन।
श्रीवाकारभद्र: केवलं घटादिपदार्थ-
सिस्मेशास्ति। न तु परमाणु।
अतस्तत्त भाष्यं परमाणवोधिपि भिवाकारात्ति।
Parmārtha's Chinese Version

5. "अणुप्रमाणसंयत् मेदामावत्। पदार्थार्थपरमाणुप्रमाण बल्वरिमाण्डल्यां [तत्] अभिषम्।
तस्मात् पदार्थार्थाकारा नस्तुसंसत्। [किन्तु] प्रज्ञासंसन्तः।
घटाविद्याविश्वेत्र प्रज्ञास्याकारा हि।

अणुभाऊ परिहरे घटाताकारविज्ञानस्यानुसरे। द्रव्यं पंसेत्यमार्गा
भमाध्यैत [तदापि] द्रव्याकारविज्ञानं ननस्तयति। अभिमर्मकार इव घर
पद्धविश्वयविज्ञान्तयते। भमायं धवनिविश्वयविज्ञानसंसतात्। अनेन अणुस्स्हंत
पद्धार्थों न विज्ञानस्तयते। तस्मात्

6. तथा चेत् को धमों विज्ञान।
अन्तविश्वयुष्म वहिंधरवभासते। अंवविज्ञानविश्वय हि।
बाधविश्वये बल्लटोडविज्ञाने, अन्तविश्वे स-

Hsuan Chuang's Chinese Version

5. अणुप्रमाणसंयत्।
अकारादेत्। प्रज्ञासंसत्।
tहुँद्रद्व्याबायाः

न घटाताकारविज्ञानस्यानुसारे। द्रव्याकारविज्ञानं ननस्तयति।
परिहरे घटाताकारविज्ञानं नस्तुसंसतात्।
अभिमर्मकार इव घरे
पद्धविश्वयविज्ञान्तयते। भमायं धवनिविश्वयविज्ञानसंसतात्।
अनेन अणुस्स्हंत
पद्धार्थों न विज्ञानस्तयते। तस्मात्

6. ननु तदालम्बनप्रस्थं सर्वथा नास्ति। नैव सर्वथा नास्तीति।
तथा चेत् किम्।
Paramärtha's Chinese Version

स्वानं सुभविचिविकल्पतु पद्धिताय-विभावः प्रकर्ति | अर्थं विषयो यथा विनियमाति तथा अवसराति |
चतुष्कूर्तं सर्वायं अर्थं नाम विज्ञानालेखनप्रकर्ति |
अस्य विज्ञानन्यु-व्याव अस्मातिज्ञानस्य जननाति |
क्षमात् इत्य विज्ञानं, अन्तर्विषयं रूपं सोवितं, अन्तर्विषयार्ज्जाते इति धर्मादेव संपादितम् | तस्मादतत्त्विषयो गोचर आस्थायते।

Hsuan Chuang's Chinese Version

अन्त: रूपं वर्धितं विवर्तमानं |
निर्णयालंकारप्रकर्ति: |
तदार्थारो विज्ञानवर्ती |
विज्ञानजनकश्रु इत्यभयमात्। |
वाश्विषयो यथायथस्य तथाभवति |
अन्त: रूपं वर्धितं विवर्तमानं संभासानामालेखनप्रकर्ति: |
चतुष्कूर्तं इतिविज्ञानं तदार्थारं इति उपस्थते च इति कर्मवर्त्युक्तिमित्य-भयमात्। |

७. प्रछयते | यथाविषयं विज्ञानं संभवति इतीमेव युक्तम् |
अन्तर्विषयोज्ञनं विज्ञानेनकेदेश एक-काल उपलब्ध: कृपालेखनप्रकर्ति: भवति। |
उत्ग्रे: आलंबन-प्रकर्ति: संतुष्टि इति। आलंबन-प्रकर्ति: संभवति अस्मातिज्ञानात् |
प्रत्यय इति। क्राहित्तं एक-काल उत्क्रोषितं अन्यत्रात्म सर्वभूतस्य साधनम्। उत्पतिविनाशयों मिया- 
तानून्यक्षिलतात्। प्रछयते। क्रमेण |

७. अवस्थानतिविषयकार: विज्ञानान्विनयं |
बिज्ञानकारणप्रकर्ति: कर्मं भवति |

सहस्त्रसैन्यवत

युक्तपदपि कारणप्रकर्ति: |
पौराणिक वा प्रत्यय:

तत्कालकर्मणात् |

विषयाकारो विज्ञानेन सहस्यसैनिक्यायत्त्यात् युक्तपदाटोपि विज्ञान- 
कारणप्रकर्ति: | नैयायिकां आहु: |

यथवं तैन असहवर्ती भवति |
अथ वा शक्तिचं गताद्विविज्ञानाकार:
पश्चादि विज्ञान। स्वयंत्रपक्षायोऽपूर्वकत्वाक्सकपरिधानाद्यति। इति दुक्षितविशेषः
धातृः।
आह। इन्द्रियं किंस्वरपम्।
उच्यते। शक्तिविशेषवरपम्।
तत्त्वरुपं केन कारणेनानुमीयते।
स्वकार्यत्तचं शक्तिविशेषपुः विज्ञायते। न च चुम्हे।चामुकरपम्।

8. सता शक्तिविज्ञानस्य अविद्धा। सता शक्तिविज्ञाने बतेते
विज्ञानविभक्ता। अनिदेशं वा
तत्त्वरुपम्। यथा मया साधित
विन्द्रियं भवता साधित विन्द्रियानुभुतं समम्। तथोः को
मेदः। एवं शक्तिविषयारम्भस्य
भास्थं अन्योन्यमेहतुको। तथा
शक्ति विषयारम्भमयस्योत्थं अनादिकालात्या आच्छदतः।
इन्द्रियावत्सक्षात्वयास्त्रीलं अर्थाध्रमनीति
विषयरुपम् प्रतीत्य संश्चितत्व विज्ञानमनदेशरुपम्।
अथ भे अन्योन्यमेहतुकः अनादिकालुक्ष प्रवत
ततेत। कस्मात्। कलाचित् शक्ति-
परिपार्था विज्ञान विषयकारं

8. विज्ञाने शक्तिरुपाणि
इन्द्रियारणे युज्यते।
शक्तिविषयारम्भा-
विद्या मयान्येहुतको॥

विज्ञानमनानुभुतमेव ज्ञाते इन्द्रि
यमतीति। तत् केवलं शक्ति: न
tु बाबुकंतमिति। अति बुद्धे विज्ञाने
पदशक्तिरुपाणि चहुरायेन्द्रियाणि
आह्यायते। [हैतीद्र] न युक्तिः
विन्द्रियं। शक्तिविज्ञानारम्भम्या
वामेदात् विज्ञानवर्तिनी अन्यवर्तिनी
वा। अनिदेश्यापि [वा]। बाबुरम्येने
युक्तब्रह्मात् सा विज्ञानवर्तिनी
नान्यवर्तिनी हि नियमनायुपग
नत्यम्। कत्चक्काश्रितं वूर्वविषय-
रुपम् अनादिकालाद्योन्येहुतके।
Paramārtha's Chinese Version

तथापि । सा शक्ति: परिपक्वमात्रा विज्ञाने पञ्चाङ्गरूपणि अवभासयति ।
इमानि अन्तर्विपरीतः पुन: पकान्तरेण विज्ञाने पञ्चेन्द्रयक्षस्तरंयति ।
इन्द्रयज्ञियः
[एव]स्त्रयः विज्ञानादृश्यमिब्धिज्ञानयविविधतां यथेष्टः क्रियमि ॥
एवं विज्ञानानामेवतीपियाकार एवाल्म्बनप्रस्थयः
हसुपत्या विलिपुण्य साधितम् ॥

Hsuan Chuang's Chinese Version

अनाकारचित्रविपरीताश्रयम्

1. Lit. यदि.
2. Lit. ब्रम्ह तदाकारः
3. The chinese text has a negative particle 'wu, just before these two words. It is to be omitted to make the sense more correct.
4. No case sign in Chinese
5. Lit. विकारते.
7. Or—अनुमत्तवताः
8. Lit. हसुपत्यम्
10. न कोः पिते: इति श्रेष्ठः ।

11. नाना उद्देश्यः
12. लिंगमात्रामात्रमात्रानि
13. = ou = bowl.
14. नायम एक मन्यम्, अथवा नैक ना: यद्वा।

आल्म्बनप्रत्यपरीक्षा शास्त्रम्
CORRECTIONS AND ALTERATIONS
IN THE COMMENTARY OF DHARMAPĀLA

Page 21  line 7-9  Read  तत्र आदिवचनं परस्समंतं रूपेन्द्रियाश्रय-
पञ्चविषविज्ञानं संग्रहायत।

,, 11  यथापि मनोविज्ञानमवयविद्वद्वपत्यमक्षी
कियते।

22  ,, 4  स्वसमुत्तरो for स्वसंतति

23  ,, 6  इन्द्रियविज्ञानाहतमावर्त्ता मनोविज्ञानम्

23  ,, 12  चुर्वराधिविज्ञानानं रूपमात्यपत्यः सत्
आयतनं भवति।

23  ,, 14  स आदिवचनं: यः: प्रत्ययेतु विज्ञानस्य
उत्पादकहु: इति।

24  ,, 20  यत्वं विज्ञानं यदाकारयुक्त...

24  ,, 4  धर्मविनिरोधवेष्ठ: स्वात्। तथा
धर्मचनमश्रुसिद्धम्।

25  ,, 8  तदिकारयोगो हेदु भैतेव।

25  ,, 2  स्वरुपं स्वाकारेऽउच्यते। निर्गृहयते
निच्छियते।

26  ,, 16  यदि यथोत्तमरं कारण...

26  ,, 1  तथा चेतु आह for यथप्यवम्...

28  ,, 1  य एव जनक: स एव...

28  ,, 2-3  स एव... व्यवहिते।

29  ,, 4  सत्कृतांकिः। अतो न विद्यस्तं...

32  ,, 17  परमाशृङ्गो वहुलेव्विष्य अविशेषात्, इन्द्रिय-
विज्ञानान्तु विशेषाकारवात्।

38  ,, 11  omit “। अनेन”
आलम्बनपरीक्षाव्याख्या

आचार्यर्मपालकुटा

दुर्मृगसां प्रजा प्रदीपिकां दोषावरण सिरस्कुल्लाक यो ॥ जगाद ॥

[त] प्रणम्य अववर्ष: परिीवते ॥

चौंडरादिविज्ञानानां [ . . . ] कल्पयन्ति । इति ।

हेयस्य हानुयादेशस्य वोपादानं परीक्षाफलम् । अतो हेयार्थस्य
[त] द्विपरीतत्वं च हेतु: प्रदश्यते । तत्र स्वयं वदन्ति । यत्
रूपं चौंडरादिस्त्रित्वं पञ्चविद्विज्ञानानि [भवन्ति] इति परे कल्पयन्ति ।
[तत्] संगृहीतम् इति । परे तानि "एकोमुखानि कस्तुप्रत्ययानि इति
प्रतिपादने । अतो मनोविज्ञानं न युक्तम् । एकोमुखवामवात् रथादिक्
[तत्] संश्वैरस्वत्तत्ववर्त्तयायमात् । यथापि मनोविज्ञानं गोचरं कस्तु प्रतीतस्य
साकारम् । [तथापि] विज्ञानाष्टरिविभीनस्मित्वस्यमपि गुरुहाति । चौंडरादि-
विज्ञानस्य अविनामूत: "प्रसिद्दो विषय: आकार: । सिद्ध: । तस्मात् नास्य

* This commentary has been rendered into Sanskrit from the Chinese version of I-Ching.

1 Lit. यदि.

2 Lit. गदिभ श्रवः.

3 नित्यात्मावज्जिथार्यगोपायणि.

4 Lit. सार्ववामसः.

5 Or अतिनमुदो विषय: प्रसिद्ध (or सिद्धि लक्ष्य), etc.

6 Lit. प्रदेशः = fang.
भाषाविज्ञानयोगवृधंत्रस्य तक्षकोचरवातुः
दृश्यवत् प्रतिशिल्पायुः इत्यदेः [तत्थवं] श्रवणनन्तनभवानाजन्यान्त्यांमात्र-विधमृः। तथा मनोविज्ञानालंभनार्थोऽयन्तमव्यः सिद्धिः। अस्य स्वनन्ततावशक्तम्यायवातुः। ग्याननागतप्रत्ययोऽऽुनरकस्तल्वातुः असंवेष्ठतवतुः। तदश्रेष्ठमाध्यमवनं पश्चविज्ञानकायसंबंधकमृः।

tतस्य इतिदियविज्ञानगृहीतं सर्वे मनो विज्ञानाति। इति चेतुः। तदयि
कथम्। नैतिकदियविज्ञानसम्कालमृः। अनन्तरं वा। रुपावलम्बनस्य
निरुक्तवात्। न वा वर्तमान [आलम्बन] प्रत्ययः। इतिदियविज्ञानगृही-
tवात्। तस्मनोविज्ञानं स्वतो बालार्थमहणस्मवाभ[के]त्। तत्व बधिअरं
रान्नव्यावहमवः प्रथात्। अनुमानविरोधः च इतिदियवान्ततमृ। अधिकरुप-
निराकरणस्य इत्यवात्। तथा मनोविज्ञानेन पुनरात्रः। चतुरादिविज्ञानानि
रुपमाधिकृत्य आकारवन्ति। अनाबरणमकियावस्मवामात्रमृ। अतोडमावः
स्वसचिपुग्रभयते। तथैव करं मनः। तदालम्बनं
प्रत्यक्षावधि। बालार्थमात्वेन अत्यन्तविषयगतिवात्। तदालम्बनतानि-
राकरणम् सम्बूकः मन्यामहं। तेन च तदालम्बनिराकरणम्। सम-
कालीनशक्तिरेपेन्द्रं तक्षत्विषयंति। अथपि आह।

वालार्थ हृतिः।

7 Or व्यवस्था।
8 Lit. अभ्यासाचार्यशान।
9 tsun-huai, to preserve and cherish.
10 Lit. स्वसचिप्रत्येकाभिः।
11 Lit. प्रतेशणान्।
12 pen=root, मूल, etc.
13 The translation (तदालम्बनं...कल्पविषय) is tentative.
परमाणु वा कल्पयन्ति। इति।

यथापि परमाणुः समद्वयमालसंरूपः हृद्। तथापि द्रव्याद्वयः प्रत्येकः
न सघनः। यथा रूपादिनी इन्द्रियाणं वर्त्तमानविचया अपि असंक्षीप्तः।
इन्द्रियशक्ति: प्रतिनियत्वात्। नेतृपि द्रव्यं सचासम्भवं द्रव्यमूकमालम्बनं
सिद्धति।

तत्कारणलादिति।

तस्य चक्षुरादिविज्ञानस्य कारणवात्। तद्धि अवयवार्थसंस्कर्षः
समुत्था। तथाचाहु:। तदालम्बनायो विज्ञानस्य जननहेतु: सर्वप्रगत्यः
इत्वतः।

तस्मात: वा। इति।

तद्दृशिनो भदन्ति। परमाणुभावायसमुदायस्तदालम्बनमिति।

तदालम्बविज्ञानस्य जायमानवात्। इति।

सम्मातस्य एतव्याज्ञाननात् निर्मितीयते स आलम्बनमिति।

यथाह कथिति। १४ यत् विज्ञानं तदालम्बयुक्तं, सोष्य विषय इति। इम्यी

१४ Lit. यथि
अलम्बनपरीक्षा

दौ वादिनौ आहुः। तदाकारयुक्तवेदेहुनेव्यते। हेतुवादिसाधनहेतवादेव- 
रिव अस्य हेतोदेहान्तो नास्तिति नेतु। परमाणुसामान्यक्षणमालम्बनान 
तस्ताध्यति। न च विज्ञानश्च बहिर्द्वैयं प्रत्ययः। इति यदि स्वःपक्षं 
स्वीकरोष्य। [तदा] धर्मिनां स्वक्षणविरोधः।।१६स्यात्। तथा न धर्मानुसारसं 
प्रसिद्धेत्। यत् हर्दं परस्य संमतं तदेव ह्यान्तीकिषयते। इति यथोक्तेमेव 
इति नेतु। साध्वेदिपि तस्मानं।। इति। प्रमाणाध्यमस्वर्त: आह। 
वादूर्द्वम हेतुहर्द वेन हेतुना विदितम्। साध्वाणसद्दह्यान्ताभावात् नैवान- 
स्यां हेतु।। अतः केन तथा तदाकारयुक्तादेहुनेव्यते। 

अथ गुणः स्ववादस्य युक्तिर्वत्वभिवचारणी प्रदर्शिविषयः। पद्माकी- 
बिकिनिनिर्देशेन परसंस्नित्यः प्रकाशिता। 

यथपि कारणः।।१६।। इति। 

यथासंस्मतः।।१७अनुपलभ्यानिपदार्थस्य असत्वात् परमाणु- 
कारणः। किन्तु परमाणुकायस्य तकारणता तथापि केबलमस्यक्षण 
आलम्बनता उच्चव्यते। 

तदाकार[विज्ञन]भावात्।। इति। 

परमाण्वाकार इत्येवदाह। 

इन्द्रियविज्ञानस्य परमाणुः विषयः। अक्षब्वतृ इति। 

यथा इन्द्रिय विज्ञानसंस्कारविरोधेहृदुपरि न तद्दीषयः।। अनिन्द्रि- 
गयाकारस्वात्। तथा परमाणुरपि। अतदाकारा न तद्दीषया इति यत्। 

तद्भवभावः।।

१२ लिट. निरोधकोषः। 
१६ कार. १, a-b. 
१७ लिट. अविदमानः।
स विषय हितादि।
स्वभावे यदृच स्वसमानाकारःभूत्याननिधिर्जनम। कथं पुनःस्तत्त्मतीयते।

तदाकारः' जायमानलबादृ इति।
एतनमो वचनम्। तदाकारसरूपं विज्ञानमुदेदिति॥ यत्॥ २० तदानु-रूपं ततु तद्विषयप्रत्ययनसुच्चते। बल्हातो विज्ञानं विना विज्ञेयान्तर-स्नातं: विज्ञानोपलापकेतुता कुत:। तथापि अस्तेव पूर्वं विषयाकार:।
स तदालौनि आद्येऽविम्बवव्यप्ते। इदंमेव तद्विषयप्रत्ययकलेन संवंतम।
द्रव्यकस्तरूपं तु विज्ञानाकारं नानुवर्तते। इदं परस्मारपिर्वशः स्वातः।
कारणमणि इति।

नैतावता कारणमालूमम्।

अक्षवत् इति।
कारणलेकपि नालूक्मम्। यदि कारणलेवन आलम्बनं स्वीकारिते।
इन्द्रियमणि एतत्समानं २२ ततु साधयेत्। तदाकारयुक्तकलेवतोरसिद्धिद्वाप: पूर्बःसुमक्ष एव इत्युक्तं भवति। तथा च मनो न केवलं कारणतया प्रथिते।
इन्द्रियतया आलम्बनानकारतया। यद्यप्परि या कारण साधयति। तदा
तस्य कारणलबादृ कथमालूमवलम्। इन्द्रियस्यापि [कारण] मस्ति।

१८ लिट. प्रत्येकः।
१९ लिट. तदाकारः।
२० लिट. तदुपातस्याधि।
२१ = विज्ञानालब्धि।
२२ = आलम्बनम्।
अडम्बरपरीक्षा

[आडम्बरलं स्वातुः] इत्यनेकान्तिकद्वपः सिद्धवतः। वचनयेवम्। [तथापि
नार्यं दोषः।]

अतदारम्यु इति।

किमर्थमिदम्। स्वपतिज्ञापसाधनार्थम्। न परपक्षदोषकथनमात्रेन
स्वर्थः। सिद्धवतः। स्वपतित्वानिहाराणकल्वारः न किंयः। परमाणुशुिरुवारदि-
भतः। इति प्रतिपादनार्थमिदं वचनम्। यदि इति तद्धृतावचनम्, शाख-
कारः। पर्यावरणः युज्ज्वल""  परस्तातारण मतं ॥ विशालवतिः इति भवेत्। तदा
परमात्मिक्षे मनः। प्रकाशः सिद्धार्थः। तद्विचरे प्रतिक्षिपेत्। तदेकान्तिकः
पक्षः। स्वीकितेः। अनेकान्तिकः। परपक्षः। असंभावितीः।

पूर्वः परः। अनेकान्तिकदृष्टाणुसः। कथं दुर्गः। स्वपक्षानुमानं
कल्पवसि। प्राणताः। वदवति। व्यभिचारि। अनियतमसाधनामिति।
तत्। संदेहमार्गम्। तस्मात्। अन्यतः प्रमाणः स्थापनीयम्। अतदाम इतीवे
अनियःतस्वभावे परमाणु परमाणु कवाचित् स्वातं। यथाकरं विज्ञानमुदेतीति
वज्ञायितम्। तदभावानु स्पर्ध ज्ञातः। निर्वापणायायपस्यायनवकाशः इति।
अनियःतस्वभावचनीन्द्रियात्। तक्कारणं नालम्बनमिन्द्रयपरमाणुत्
इति। केवलं भवति। अन्वेषेपि विज्ञानकरणविशेषः। चक्षुविज्ञानसाधनाः।
प्रथमे न पुनः। परमाणुक्रियाया यथा।। अतदारत्वात्। इन्द्रिय-
विज्ञानबत्। विज्ञानार्थिणी वाच्यानि। अक्षवधनचन्तवक्तुः। प्रदार्शनार्थम्।
इतीत: तत्तत्त्वार्थस्यव्याप्तिः। अतरफः। इति।

"" Lit. पुरःसाधित्वा
"" or परस्मतम्
तस्य कारणांतःचिन्तेदलि नालम्बनता। एवं सार्थकमिति। 23वथा शब्दादिसर्वपरमाणवः अन्येन्द्रियविज्ञानजनकनारणानि मा भूविति। कथितः। विज्ञानस्य स्वहृद्यंसंश्चात्तलोप्यभावनात् नालम्बनम्। इन्द्रियपरमाणुवत् इति। विज्ञाने विष्णुवाकार्यप्रार्थनार्थ तदाकारता। इत्येऽदर्स्यमवात् युज्यत एव तस्यासंवाहतोपलम्भः।

एवव्य न परमाणव आलम्बनम्। इति कथितम्। तस्य साधनमनाकार्यात् प्रमाणसंस्कृत्तीविधयताच् इति।

तहि संबावते विवेकोष्ठ्यु। उक्ममासानां साधनेन यदि पक्षस्थापनं वाण्ड्यनि [वदा] असिद्धता स्थायू तत्थर्यं न्यायः।

संघातस्तदाकारयुक्तोद्विति।

आलम्बनं भवेत। न कारणस्य।

तदाकारविष्णुजः न जायते।

संघाताकारं संघातविष्णुम। न स [संघातः] तद्विष्णुन्जनयति। कथमवः तत्स्यः। आलम्बनकल्पणायोगात् नास्त्यालम्बनार्।

पूर्वकस्यु तु तदाकारयुक्तोदितं। तथा चेतु किमालम्बनकल्पणम्।

सर्वोर्धं तस्मानस्वरूपं विज्ञानमुखाद्यतीति युज्यते।

23 Lit. तथा or एवम्
24 Lit. इत्यें न्यायत्वम्
25 Lit. आकारणत्वात्
26 यदामासा न तस्मात् सा, Kar. 2, a.
27 Lit. अकारणत्वात्।
विषयविज्ञानमनुस्तं स एव जनकः स एवाल्म्बनम्। केसिः
दाहः। सबोऽधिधिकेतानां कारणं इत्यवर्तं युज्यते। एतं एवोत्सर यथा-
विषयमहं शंभेन व्यवहीयन्ते। ३० अनादिकाः सम्मेल अल्म्बनविषया अण्वुयायन्ते।
३१ यदीवं द्विमिथलस्यं, तद्धागुणकालम्बनं भद्वति। जनक-
tथायं सत्यायनम्बनार्थं। आगमे उत्करं। अभिमन्यु सति इदं भद्वति इति
प्रतिलक्षणस्वतंत्रता अभिधानं। इति।

तद्विज्ञानोपविकारणम् तद्विकारणम् इति अवं तद्भावनार्थं: सम्मतः।
स्वलक्षणस्वपन्ध्ये। नालाधिकारिस्तं इत्यत्त्वतोच्यते।

संबंधतो नोत्यादकः। ३२ द्विमिथलस्यं। इति।

स संबंधतो न इन्युम्। तस्य संबंधतिः एकवाय्यवाय्यामिनिवचनी-
यत्वाः। न चाद्रवम्नुस्यं ३३ उत्सचिकित्साशक्तिः संभवति।

द्विन्द्रवतं। इति।

यथा द्वितीयश्चन्द्रः न द्वितीयचन्द्रविज्ञानस्योत्वादकः। किं तदां
तदाकारसततिमासकारणम्।

इन्द्रियसाक्षात्। इति।

यदा चर्चारित्रं तिमिराधयुतपहतपकाॅधकम्। तदा इन्द्रियसाक्षात्
द्विन्द्रविधभवति न ज्वाललेन।

३० लिट. अनेकादरो।
३१ मोरलिट. यथाः द्विविष्ट्टस्यंस्प्रिं। तदद्धागुणोऽऽ अल्म्बनं नाम भवति।
३२ कार. २. ६।
३३ लिट. उत्पतिकान्तिक्रिया।
भार्म्मनपरीक्षान्यायः

धिकन्दर[दर्शन]स्य तदामलेखपि न तस्य विषयोऽस्यति।

इति।

धिकन्द्रवतः। तद्विज्ञानस्य तदाकार्कयुक्तेऽपि अनुवादकल्वतः न स विषय आह्यायते।

"तद्वत् संघातः द्रव्यतोसस्वचेन तद्विज्ञानस्य न कारणम्। इति।

अद्रव्यत्वात् धिकन्द्रवतः। तदं शस्याकारणन्वसिद्धः।

नाल्म्यनम्। इति।

धिकन्द्रवत् इत्यावयते। धिकन्द्रद्वान्तेन" तदाकार्हेतोरनैकालिक-कपोऽज्ञेयः। विज्ञानार्थस्य न्यायसिद्धवात् विरोधवेषध। चशुः प्रतीत्य विज्ञान[भवति]। न नीतादिविधातं परमाणु वा। तेनाजनितवात् अन्येन स्थिरविज्ञानवर्तः। अथ द्वान्त्य: सर्वसंस्त:। अन्तर्य्यो नोच्यते।

धिकन्द्रद्वान्ततः अद्रव्यत्वात् स अकारणतायं: भवन् तां साप्तायति
इति इयम्। यथोकस्य सार्क्यलेखपि न स विषयोऽस्यति। तद्वतनू पुनस्तत्कारणध्व विनेव भवति। धिकन्द्रद्वान्त्रो नान्ती कथमाकार्वन् प्रत्यक्ष दस्यते इति बदत्ति चेतु। तथा हि। अन्तन्तर्कतिष्ठकतिविशेषात् तर्कति
[त]समानाकारं विज्ञानं प्रवत्तते। यथा शयो विषयार्थ पश्यति।
ततो मिथ्याकारित्राणि तानि अध्यक्षवति। [एवं] तद्वतनूः अन्यमारोपण
पश्यति।

\^{24} Add here in the Chinese text the character ju "as"
\^{25} fang = अंश or भाग?
\^{26} Lit. श्यान्तमाध्याय.
केचिदाहुः। चक्षुविज्ञानोः सहोपल्पे कथितकाव्यस्थानप्रदृष्टाः ते
समकालं य्यामिब्यते । द्विविधाकैर्यत्वाधिकं मनोविज्ञानं भवति चन्द्रवर्ण
पदियामीति ।

अन्यः कथिदाहु । [एकलेन] सर्वंसंयुक्तं चन्द्रे संघाविप्रयेयः ।
इति बायाथ्पक्षं नेच्छसि । तदा स्थूलसाधिरभिमानाः
मात्रं स्याम । [इति] । न हि चक्षुविज्ञानात्मकसमन्तरं मनोविज्ञानं
प्रवर्तते । एककालमेव सहोपल्पाः प्रतिनीतेः प्रवर्तते । कथे तद्दश्यके संयुक्तकालेः
चन्द्रवर्ण पदियामीति । शब्दाविप्रयत्वाधिकान्ततोंशरं शवेद्दयोपल्पम्
एककालिकं कृतो न शायते । स्वस्थानेतस्य मनोविज्ञानं कथितमपि
दुर्भावसायम् । किं निषिद्धं रुपेनिद्रायविज्ञानप्रमेयः द्वितीयाः बहुः भाषा
सिद्धान्तं । एकं चन्द्रे द्विपरं समनुपस्यामि इति यदा विज्ञानातिरिक्तं
द्रव्यं स्वीकरोति । सोडगी किं कृता बदेत् चन्द्रवर्णामानं संघाविप्रयेयम् ।

विज्ञानं बायाथ्यवर्यम्।

परमाणोः संघात्स्य च एकात्मकवैकल्यात् यथोक्तसाधनसंशोधनक
युक्तीबलासः।

तद्विषयमेव न युक्तम्। एकात्मकवैकल्यात्।

स्वाक्षरपतिभासं उपयोगकता चेछेतलिङ्गभास्मालम्बनम्। परमाणो-
रायाथ्यवैकल्यम्। द्वितीयाः द्वितीयाङ्गाहिनः। यथाविचारितपूर्वं दोषेण
पुनः ।३९ भेदं आहृतयि ॥

३२ Kar. 2. c.
३३ Kar. 2. d.
३४ Ie. विज्ञानायः:
सचिवताकारमिति हृदितु सल ॥
परमाणु मृत्युः सचिवताकारोऽद्वितिः। स एव स्थूलविशयः परमाणुः
तत्त्वमात्रवन्नमनुष्य साक्षः। प्रतिभासते। स च वस्तुतः। परमाणोः
सचिवताकारः स्वाक्षरविज्ञानजनकः द्रष्यवातः
आलम्बनं स्वात् ॥
अस्य तु उभयार्थश्चावतः। स च पूर्व सिद्ध एव। कुतो
वि कष्ट्यः किं च सचिवताकारः। परमाणुः किं वा न तथा इति ॥
सर्वोऽयों वहाकार इति ॥
त एवाभोज्ज्वाकारः: सचिवताकाराथ्य स्वीक्षता:। कथमेकं स्वतः
द्रष्याकारं यथावेदम्। वहाकारः। सर्वभावा:। रूपसमुदायरूपाः। प्रत्यथ्यादिरूपाः
चतुर्मेहाभूतात्मकः।। ते स्वभावतो विशिष्टाशक्तिकुष्ठितः।। नीरवनीपाकारः
द्रष्यवर्तीतः इन्द्रियवर्तीतः च विभिन्नः। प्रतीतः।। सोडपि वहाकारेऽयों परमाणोः
अतिर सचिवताकारः।
अयोऽयोऽयोऽ चकुरार्दिविज्ञानगोचरतावतः
प्रत्यक्षवतः।
यथेवतः। अणूमां विज्ञानं सचिवताकारकथितं किं नाह। अणू:
सचिवताकारः। किं नाह विज्ञानं सचिवताकारकथितं। केन पुनराह

49 रामाणुवेषति सचिवताकार इति ॥

40 लिट. श्रद्धिः
41 कर. 3, a-b.
42 लिट. अभमवत्या or अभमवशिष्या दुन्धगते ।
43 लिट. अणू
इति वचनमेव तत्प्रयोगाशंकं सत्तु प्रदर्श्यति विषाणं परमाणु-
संविदातारमित्यष्टि। तथा चेतु ह्रवणुकः "तदाकारमु। कस्मात्
संविदातारमु। रूपपरमाणुसंविदा विभिन्न एतच्छासब्रिह्यताः। त
पुंव संविदातारमु न इत्यसंतः इति पूर्ववत् प्रदर्श्यतम्। किमवें
पुनर्चनमु। अस्याशयान्तरमु। बस्तुनि विभिन्नलुपेधिपि अयमाकारः
सम्यकमात्रसंमिश्रित इति प्रत्येकवत्यम्। विविच्छ कथनें संविदातारो न
शिष्यते। किष्ट यथापि सर्वभावः परमाणुसंविदातामकः। तथापि एकै-
कस्य बस्तुनस्तातसमयमिष्टि। ""यथावस्तु तत्प्रयामः। यथा च ""नीतहुप्य
तत्त्वाभिविधाति।"" एवमादि तत्कथाचन्यवियमु। एवसमयपगमे बस्तुनि
"अत्यन्ताभाव (?) बलं उत्तरे: प्राप्तां अतिमात्रासमभवमनुवर्तेनु। संभवस्यवर्
निश्चित्य क्रंतीयं मिथ्याविवहरी। तथा चेतु कथं परमाणवो नेन्द्रवहः।
कथं वा पुनःवत्ततात्त्वाणमात्रदर्शना: परमाणवः।

अय्यावाकारो न विज्ञासर्थि:। इति।

नायमिन्दिर्यजबिज्ञसेरविषय हत्यासिद्धि।। अनिन्दिर्यार्थि: केवलं
तथातात्त्वानमात्रित्।। का पुनःयुक्ति।। न हि प्रत्यक्ष: परमाणवाकारो हृदः।।
कठिनन्तदिवशु।

यथा कठिनन्तीततादि।

तत् नीतादि

बस्तुसद्धि न चक्षुरादिविज्ञसेरविषयः।

"" = ह्रवणुकः।
"" = प्रतिश्लो
"" Chi, extremely : chih, (R. 155) empty. This means also " red" रङ्कः।
भास्करनन्दीकारल्य

इन्द्रयस्रसः प्रतिनियतवाचः

एवमणुरपि

न सर्वसम्मतिवाचः न ननु अणुभादु न किंतु न स्वभावान्तर्वाचः

उच्चये भौतिकात्मकशायतनसाधारणवेषः पञ्चध्रमः स्वीकृतः

अत इदं बचनमद्यमः तथायुकः

"तद्दशरावादिमतिरिति

एवं पश्यते घटे शास्त्रेये निण्यण इन्द्रियबुद्धि

समाश्च त्रस्ये ४ १

विशेषे " स्वविषये मेदाभावात् इन्द्रियबुद्धि पुरोवार्तविषयमनस्यत्रै

आकारोद्याचः कथं ज्ञाते विज्ञानिविषयो न भिन्नते हि इति

न घटशरावादीनां बहुव्र परमाणुपुरिषोद्धति

इदं बचनमाद् यथपि परमाणवः सध्यातोकारण विषया भवति

नैवस्तित हु घटदिस्मवर्गपकारकावे बहुपु संघातेतु अवयवविशेषप्रपपमः

तेषां वास्तववाकारतु वहि विशेषसध्यातोकारस्यानुलभ्यात्

तत्ततीत्व निष्प्रव इन्द्रियविज्ञानिमित्ताकाय स्यात्

अनेनाशिन अणुस्वरूपे आभूषनता स्थितिः न पुनः तेषांविशेषाकारे प्रस्तावमशीश्य प्रत्ययः

अध्यवसायान्तर्वाचः यथा नीलाद्रि प्रतीति

"आकारमेदाझ्नित उच्चये चेतः

१२ Kar. ४ a-b.

१२ More lit. स्वविषये विशेषमेदात्.

१२ Kar. ४ c.
आकार: मेदकल्पक विम्बम्।

घटश्रावयो भौढदरपाददिरिविभिन्नाकारशवात्।
विवयवेशन विशेषबुद्धिरिपि विभिन्नानुवर्तते।

सत्यं कुञ्जयते।

"नायं वस्तु।"

नेन्द्रियविज्ञानादियिष्यं परमाणवों भिशा भवति। यथापि अर्थं संवातं सांहृतं। तत्थापि न संवातं। अण्यां विभिन्नान: इन्द्रिय-विज्ञानादियिष्यं। न पुनःविशेषविषयः। विभिन्नविज्ञानाकारस्य कारकों कुञ्जयते। कथं ज्ञातें परमाणुं आकारमें दो नास्तीत।

"परमाणवाकारर्तिमें दामावात्।"

सत्यं पदार्थं शास्त्रयं वैज्ञानिकतमबन्धे आकारमें। संभव्यति। परमाणु कुलं तु निरंशमतिस्वतं। कथमस्थापतमें दो भेषयत।

घटश्रावयादिपु द्वन्द्वान्तरेण्रिपि परमाणुविभावों में दो नास्त।

एकवहस्यास्य उपचयापचयाभावात्।

"Lit. ऐश।"
"Kar. 4d।"
"Lit. सविशेषविषयं। अध्ययं।"
"Kar. 5a।"
"Or ब्रह्मविशेषतः।"
अतो शायते

संघाते

न बस्तुभावोऽदस्ति। इति।

सर्वमबयः आरोपिताकां नेन्द्रियविज्ञानगोचरः। एवं तावत्
पुरस्तादागतं संघाता आकारमेदवर्धिकतया इश्यमाणा: परीक्षा दृष्टः
इति। अतो घटशरावाविद्वयो न भिन्नवस्त्रावलम्बनविभयः। सुख-
दुःखवेदनवत्। तथा च परमाणवो न विषयवेदका:। आकारः न
tद्विषयरूपम्।

आकारमेदावक्यमेद उच्चते चेत्।

इदं वाक्यं न अविशेषबस्तु विषयो मवत्ति इति बबुमिष्टं सिद्ध-
साधनम्। ते हि मन्यन्ते। परमाणुवस्तुतोदभिविभयः। तथापि
आकारमेदावक्यं। इति। परमाणुरभित्र इति ममापि संततम्। अतः
सिद्धसाधनम्। परमाणुमाण्मेदमाभावात्। इतिदं [बाक्यं] बबुमेदः
अर्थमेदकं इत्यस्य । असिद्धं द्विषयति। अथ वा इदं धोतिवति।
घटशरावाविद्यविज्ञानां परमाण्याकारलब्धात् नास्त्यालत्मं [पर-
माणु:] यथायविज्ञानस्य। मनो वा अन्येन्द्रियविज्ञानं वा अन्यविज्ञान-
मुच्यते। नीःलयेऽ पीतकाराभावात्। इति। परमाण्यां संघातः
अविशेषादि प्रत्येकविज्ञानां विशेषाकारतन्त्र अयं तावत् नाश्वाकृति-

35 Kar. 56.
36 Then follows another interpretation (Chinese Editor).
37 Lit. बचम्।
38 Lit. असिद्धप्रतिप्रचारम्।
रूपमिति संस्थिथिति। श्रोके परमाणूनां विशेषवचनं वा अनुपूर्वेण प्रमूहा प्रतिवक्तव्यम्। यदि संघातो व्यासस्ताकारः स्वीकितये। आकारो न दृष्ट्यमिति न्यायसाध्यम्। एवं न्यायविशेषः साधितत्वः। अनुपूर्वां परिहारे हृद्यादि।

"यदु ते अनवः" परिप्रेयन्ते तदा तदुबुद्धं भवावात।

मेनादिवस्तु घटादिवचनं न दृष्ट्यम्। अतो दृष्ट्यते नाशित। इत्यं पञ्चान्तरप्रदेशशनम्—

[यानि] [न]दृष्ट्यविदाहिनानि न सन्ति। न [तानि] तद्धयावर्तकानि इति।

अयमाकारविशेषः व्यासस्ताकारः घटादिविशेषवाक्रादिति बस्तु-विहद्धम्। यथा शब्दादृहि सति न नीलुबद्धरति। यथपि संघातो श्रृंखले अन्तयूऽ हुआते इति युक्तम्। तथापि परमाणुस्वरूपे विशेषोऽस्तीति प्रदर्शित्तितमस्तमस्तक्यम्॥

[यत्] "अन्तस्यहरूम्।

इति स्वप्पेण आल्मनवस्तु साध्यते। यदि, सामान्यतो विभागे नास्त्याल्मनम्। तदा लोकविरोधः स्वप्पक्ष्यदोषः। सुने चतुर्विधानां प्रत्यायामुक्तवार्तः। तत्र अनस्तावः विज्ञान विना आल्मन नास्त्तिति प्रदर्शिताम्। इत्यत् आश्चर्यः विज्ञानपरिणामः विषयाकारोऽयोऽभिति।

"See Paramārtha's version, vṛtti ad Kar. 5.

"अनुपूर्वां परिहारे तदाम्भावविद्वान्। Kar. 5c-d.

"Here I have changed the punctuation in the Chinese text so as to suit the sense.

"Kar. 6a."
अङ्गवनपरीक्षाव्याह्या

इति [पदव्रत्यः]। अतो विज्ञाने बायाविकरलो विषयलेन स्थापितो गृहते। लोकरिपेष: पुन: पूर्ववक्ते। लोकिकानां हि समर्थं विषयवश बहियर्वतेन-भिन्नति। [अतं:] उच्चते बहियर्वदिति। स विज्ञानं विना नासि। तत्र आयांशः:

53बहियर्वदितवभास्ते।

विषयं पश्यामीति वचनमामभिमानिकै, वसूलसत्तुकाम्। यथा केषायवभाषि चाक्षुषविज्ञानम्।

बायार्थेभि विद्मानेविद्वपि।

बायार्थों बसुतलो नासि। अतर्वत्तिवाद्। न हि युक्तादि चितारे नियतंवस्वरूपं बहि: प्रतीयते। यथापि बायालक्षणं बसुतसत् इति ने स्वीकृततिः। तथापि न [तत्] विज्ञानालंकरं भावति। अतदाकारस्तवाव न परमात्माकारोजेवभास्ते।

बायाकारक्वस्वभासा समासमितालाॆम्ब्रवनालयः।

तदाकारयुक्तवाद्। यथ: 64 [यद्र्-] आकारयुक्तं तत् तदेष। यथा कारणतत्विः: स्वाकारयुक्तः।

पुनरालघणनस्य विशेषवस्वरूपं पदव्रत्यः। यथाह।

65विज्ञानस्य तदाकारस्वत्वाविद्यार्थि।

62 Kar. 6b.
64 This sentence will literally read: यदि आकारयुक्तवाद तत तदेष।
65 = विज्ञानस्वत्वाद्, etc. Kar. 6c-d.
भाषामूलं वाचवस्तु विषयत्या नास्तीति स्पष्टम्। यथातकिलं विज्ञानकारोऽद्वृत्ते। यतः तहतिं विज्ञानमुक्तेषु बहिनासित्।

tद्रविष्याकारो विज्ञानं विना स्वतु नासित्।

तेन अन्तेष्यभूपमित्यालया। अत्र अन्तश्राव्दे विज्ञानं विना नास्तीति बदति। तद्रहीः स्वतः अविधमानतं: "हृद्यते।

tतत उत्थरते च।

स भाग: जायते तत् [एव] कदाचित्। पञ्चसत्तमतिपदार्थिः ॥८ तत्वं विना विज्ञानं नास्तीति: स एव भाग: विज्ञान-जनितः। न पञ्चम [प्रत्ययजनित] उच्यते।

तथेऽवर्त्त्वदिश्विष्यत्।

स आलम्बनं, न्यायवृत्तात्। [अनेन] साधनं प्रस्तितमिति स्पष्टम्। इर्दे साधारणाकारं ॥८६ श्रेयवेव साधनं भवति। यदि विज्ञान- [-आकृति], तद्रविज्ञानं न वाचवस्तु आलम्बनं, [यथा] स्वमावस्थायं प्रकाशमानम्। यथोक्तिप्रकाराकरं साधनं भवति। विज्ञानं तद्रास्त्रवस्तु पुनर्विज्ञानजनतकः। इमे त्रुटी प्रतीत्य भाग एवं ॥८७ प्रारम्भाणं सिद्ध्वति।

॥८४ अन्तस्तदेव इति स्वीकारेदयि।

॥८६ अन्तस्तदेव इति स्वीकारेदयि।

॥८७ अन्तस्तदेव इति स्वीकारेदयि।

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64 In the Chinese text (Nankin Ed.) we have to read mo "plan" for shui "who", as in the page 3b, line last.
65 विज्ञानत्वः.
66 Or विज्ञानत्वः, yu-pieh.
67 Lit. विषय or अर्थः.
68 = साधनम्.
69 More lit. स आन्तराकार, etc.
वाम्यार्थस्य मिथ्यामूलाकारस्य परिक्षिततत्वादेव नासिन् ॥

यथाविकल्पं विषयो वेधते। विषयाकारस्य अन्तर्विर्तवे न्याय्यो भविष्यति।

कथें तदेकांश: सहजातः ॥

ग्रामांशस्य विज्ञानं विना अभावात् अस्य एकांश: पुनर्विज्ञानं जनयति।

तदा सिध्यति स्वरूपविरोधोप:। पुनस्तदेकांशालयां।

ग्रामांशस्य। अस्य हि तदा जनकता न सिध्यति। विज्ञानं केवल वाम्याकारिक्षं प्रस्तुतेः। स एवाकारांशो विज्ञानसहजात:। न द्वयोः

समकालीनोऽ: कार्यार्थकरणभास्वेतः। यथा श्रृणुःवम्। किंव न तदभिं स्तु एककां भस्तपि 

पहुँचते इत्यच्छे।। सहजारथस्तु तस्यसंगेतार्थिः।

नापि विज्ञानभिंशो विन्योस्तीतियुच्छ्यते:। अस्य तु कथें विज्ञानसहजातमिथ्याक्ष्यः।

सत्येवम्। तथापि आकारविशेषलङ्गस्तु तत् भिन्न व्याक्तिने किरुच्छ्यते।

द्वयांशकाराणस्योऽभेदोक्तितम् तत् विज्ञानं सविशेषं गृह्नसे ।

यथेवम्। ॥

प्रार्थयत्वमेव आकार स्थान्। न विकल्पितं वस्तु सत्यभास्वम्।

तदा अस्य सिध्येत्। अप्रत्ययवम्।

इरस्विरुऽन्दम्। अन्याबाचविशेषविश्वायं प्रत्यय इति सर्वमूलम्।

यथा सार्वतनिरोधः। समागविज्ञाने निरुध्यमाने तदेव विज्ञानं चुँवविधिः। प्रत्येकः प्रत्ययो भविष्यति॥

72 bhūmi, ti “earth” is probably an error for anya, ta, “another” as has been noted by the Chinese Editor.
73 Or सहजातमिथ्याक्ष्यः.
74 Lit. सहजातमिथ्यार्थेन सहस्त्राश्च नतस्याश्चास्त्रितम्.
75 Lit. प्रार्थयत्वमेव.
76 Here ends the Chinese text. The Chinese Editor notes that the commentary on remaining portion of the text is not known.
ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE
ĀLAMBANAPARĪKṢĀ

WITH COPIOUS EXTRACTS FROM VINĪTADEVĀ'S
COMMENTARY

A TREATISE ON THE EXAMINATION OF THE OBJECT-[CAUSE]
OF CONSCIOUSNESS

ADORATION TO ALL BUDDHAS AND BODHISATTVAS!

Those who accept that there exists an external thing which
serves as the object-cause (ālambana) of the consciousness of
the eye, etc. imagine either atoms to be [the ultimate object];
because they serve as causes of the consciousness; or aggre-
gates of atoms; because the consciousness arises representing
the image of the aggregates. Now [says the author:]

1. Though atoms serve as causes of the consciousness (vijñāpti) of the sense-organs, they are not its actual
objects like the sense-organs; because the consciousness
does not represent the image of the atoms.
[As regards the nature of] the object, [declares the author,] consciousness grasps only the form of its own; because it arises in that form. Though the atoms are causes of consciousness, they do not possess the form reflected in consciousness just like the sense-organs. Therefore they cannot become its actual objects (ālambana).

Though aggregates of atoms are alike the image of consciousness, [they cannot become its actual objects;] because

2a. The consciousness does not arise from what is represented in it.

What object produces the consciousness endowed with the image of the object, is properly said to be the actual

The following extracts are translations from the French of Vinitadeva's commentary on the Ālambanaparikṣā. They are first translated into French from the Tibetan version of the commentary by Mrs. Susumu Yamaguchi and H. Meyer, and incorporated into their French translations of the Ālambanaparikṣā published in the Journal Asiatique, Jan.-Mar. 1929.

1 [The opponent says:] If consciousness were not capable of being what possesses the form of atoms; it could perceive itself. Why will not [then] the atoms, while producing the perception, become the object (viṣaya)? The author replies the following.

2 Speaking otherwise, beyond the production of the form of object, consciousness cannot conceive the object (viṣaya).

3 That is to say, if a consciousness does not manifest itself under one form particularly adapted (pratiniyata) to the atoms, how can it conceive their proper existence? [And] if it does not conceive [the atoms], how can they (atoms) become the object?

4 Though [the organ] is the cause [that produces consciousness], it is not capable of being the object itself; because the consciousness which is born of this [organ] does not grasp the proper nature of the organ.

5 In order to refute the opinion of the opponent who maintains that the aggregate is the object (artha), the author says the following.

6 [The opponent asks:] When one understands that [the representation] is not produced by this aggregate, why could not
object (ālambana) of the consciousness; because that alone is spoken of [in the Sūtra] as the productive cause of consciousness. But the aggregates of atoms are not so (i.e. do not give rise to consciousness);

2b. Because they do not exist in substance just like the double moon.

The double moon is perceived [by a man] on account of defects of his sense-organs. But [this perception is not produced by the double moon, as] there exists no object like the double moon. Similarly the aggregates of atoms do not exist in substance and cannot act as causes of consciousness. Hence they are not its actual objects.

2c-d. Thus both the external things are unfit to be real objects of consciousness.

This [aggregate] be the perceivable object (ālambana)? The author replies the following.

When consciousness occurs according to the form of the object and this object produces consciousness, this object (artha) is capable of being the perceivable object (ālambana).

The following is reply to the question: Why is that which produces [consciousness] only the perceivable object?

The Sūtra explains further that this object (artha) which is the cause (hetu) of the production of the mind and mental things (cittacaitta) and which gives the designations (vyavahāra) to this object (artha) when the mind and mental things have been produced, is [precisely] the perceivable object (ālambana).

This is reply to the question: Why is not the aggregate what produces [the representation]?

For example, since a second moon does not exist in substance (dravyatas), it is not capable of being the object (bhāva) of the cause of the perception (jñāna) which appears as if it is a second moon: in the same way the aggregate is no longer the cause of the perception which appears as if it is [the aggregate] itself.
The external things, atoms and their aggregates cannot
serve as the actual objects of consciousness, as both of them
are defective in one or other respect.  

3a-b. Some [ācāryas] hold that the combined
form of atoms (sancitākāra) is the cause of con-
sciousness.

All things are possessed of many forms; they are
perceived in one or other form of many. Even in atoms,
therefore, there exists the aspect which produces the con-
sciousness possessed of the combined form.

That is, (1) when, for the thesis of atoms, though there is
causality (hetutva), there is no form (ākarū), and (2) when, for the
thesis of aggregate, though there is form, there is no causality.

Having thus refuted these two theses, the author examines a
third thesis of some of the advocates of the external things
(bāhyārtha), viz., Vāgbhaṭa, etc.

What does it matter what exists in atoms, they all exist
substantially (dharṣyatas). Therefore, since they exist substantially,
the state of combination (sancitākāra) is capable of being itself the
cause of knowledge (viṣṭhāna). The atoms are thus the object
(viṣṭhāna) in another manner.

[The author asks of these opponents:] Is it not that the
character of atoms is well-known to be very subtle? [Now] where
is found in these [very subtle atoms] such a state of combination
(sancitā-kāra)? How can there be two contradictory characters in
a single [thing]?

[The opponents reply:] All the material things are composed
of four great elements (caturmahābhūta) and since these latter
possess the characters of colour, of odour, etc., there is what
possesses several characters. Just as there are several characters in
the atoms which are composed of four great elements, so also there
are several characters in the state of combination. Thus all things
have several characters, but one cannot see all of them at the
same time.

Because their powers being differently affected, the organs
cannot cognise all the objects (artha) at the same time.

Having proved that in the atoms there is the combination,
one, further proves that in the atoms there is the cause which
3c-d. The atomic form does not become the object of consciousness just like the attributes such as solidity, etc.

Just as the attributes, solidity and others, though existent in atoms, are not perceived by the visual consciousness, so also the atomic form.

4a-b. In that case, the [different] perceptions of a pot, cup, etc. will be identical.

Though the atoms of a pot are greater in number and that of a cup [less], there exists no distinction whatever amongst the atoms.

produces the perception manifesting itself as if it is a combination. It is, one asserts, the two parts of the perceivable objects (ālambana-nāsaṣya dvibhāga) which lack in the two [previous] propositions. When one says that the existence of cause produces the perception, he asserts the causality. When one says that what manifests itself as if a combination [produces the perception], he supposes the form, and he proves the reality (astiiva) of the state of combination.

If there is in the atoms the state of combination which is their gross character, how can one call them atoms? [The opponent continues the following].

It is so because the powers of the organs are differently affected (prativisiśṭa). Likewise, though [there are atoms] they are no longer [capable of being object of the visual perception].

The author, wishing to refute the third proposition, asks: What state of combination do you want to assert in the atoms?, [and he adds:] In all cases, it is well-known that the vase and cup, etc., are combinations [of atoms]. In such case, what state exists in the atoms? If you say: "It is the state of vase," the perception of vase will arise in all the combinations of the cup, etc. If you say: "It is the state of the cup," the perception of the cup will arise in all [the combinations of the vase, etc.]. Therefore the [different] perceptions (prthagbuddhi) called in certain case "perception of the vase" and in some other case "perception of the cup" will not arise.

The opponent says: With regard to the vase, atoms are numerous; with regard to the cup, they are a few; one recognises
4c. If [the opponent says that] the perception differs in accordance with differences in the forms of the pot and others;

If you think that the parts of the pot, etc. neck, etc. [and that of the cup] are different, whereby these differentiating elements differentiate their respective cognitions. True, this differentiating element exists in the pot, etc.

4d-5a. But it never exists in the atoms which exist in substance, because the atoms are absolutely identical in their dimensions 21.

Though 22 the atoms are different in substance, there exists absolutely no distinction in their atomic size 23 (pārimāṇḍalya).

equally atoms either many or a few in other cases; therefore there exists a distinction (vīṣeṣa) of perception made by “many” or “a few”.

The author replies: The distinction in the perception (buddhi-viṣeṣa) is not capable of being made by “a few,” or “many”: for though in the vase there are many atoms and [a few] in the cup, however there is, when the question is the character of atoms, no difference which exists in itself. Therefore it will happen that in the case of numerous atoms, one will have a large vessel, and in the case of a few atoms, one will have a small one; but it will not happen that in the same state of combination the perception of the vase will arise in the case where there are many atoms; and that the perception of the cup will arise in the case where there are a few.

21 The difference is not found any longer in what is called the exiguous sphericity (pārimāṇḍalya) of atoms.

22 The opponent asks: Is it not that the atoms of the vase are precisely of one substance (dravya) other [than the cup], and that the atoms of the cup are also of one substance other [than the vase]? And how can one say that there is no difference in measure? The author replies the following.

23 The difference in form does not reside in the atoms. Just as whatever they may be and however numerous they may be, they all exist in the substance, so whatever may be their measures, the atoms are all of an exiguous sphericity, and this sphericity of the atoms is
ENGLISH TRANSLATION

5b. Therefore the differentiation goes along with things substantially non-existent.

The difference in forms lies only in the empirical things, but not in the atoms. The pot and other things are only empirically true.

5c-d. For, if you remove one by one the atoms [of the pot, etc.] the perception illuminating the image of the pot, etc. will immediately vanish away.

Even if that which is connected with them (sambandhin) is excluded, what substantially exist, do not cease to produce their own cognitions, as for example, the colour [blue, etc. precisely their unique character. Therefore how could one differentiate the perception [by means of] the difference of atoms? One will assert to this that the state of combination is gross. Now, since the atoms exist in substance, they ought to exist in "being which has no extension", otherwise, if they had extension (digbhāga), they would not be capable of existing in substance. Therefore, since the atoms are not extended, wherefrom comes the difference of arrangement?

Having thus refuted the difference of forms of atoms, the author concludes the following.

Because they are extended.

Because they are not extended.

According to the Vaiśeṣikas, the vase, [cup], etc. are substantially existent. If the Vaiśeṣika asks: How do you know that what are called vase, [cup], etc. exist by convention? The author replies the following.

[The Vaiśeṣika continues:] If one would exclude [entirely] the atoms one after another, the perception which possesses the representation of the vase, etc. having not arisen, how might it result form this that the vase, [cup], etc. might exist conventionally? The author replies the following.

If the vase, [cup] etc. were substantial beings, if even what is connected with them, was entirely excluded, they would not cease [to produce] the perception [of colour, etc].

[The Vaiśeṣika replies:] If one excludes entirely the atoms one after another, the cohesion (samsyoga) which produces (ārambha)
It is⁸⁰, therefore, rationally deduced that the objects of different sensual cognitions do not exist externally.

6a-c. It⁸¹ is the object (artha) which exists internally in knowledge itself as a knowable aspect and which appears to us as if it exists externally.

Though⁸² the external things are denied, what exists internally in knowledge itself [i.e. its knowable aspect] the substance, being destroyed, and [consequently, if] the vase is destroyed, is it not that the perception does not arise any more? What prevents the vase, [cup] etc. from being existent [substantially] always (sarvadā) and wherever this may be (sarvatra) [without their destruction].

(The author replies:) If the vase and other substantial things formed of parts (avayavidravya) exist beyond the atoms, when one says that the vase, [cup] etc. are constituted by atoms, is he willing to say (1) that the atoms exist in proper being as numerous as they may be, or (2) that they exist partly? In the [second] case, what is beyond the elements that produce one whole (avayavin) exists by means of a single element of this whole owing to which this [whole] is going to exist there; if [as in the first case] what is beyond the constituent elements does not exist that is going to exist in [its] proper nature [svarūpeya] however numerous the atoms may be; thus, the atoms as numerous as they may be, become one whole: vase, [cup,] etc. consequently, when the unity component (that is to say the atoms) of the whole is destroyed, this whole does not exist any more substantially; because if it existed again, one would assert simultaneously several contradictory states (bhāva).

Having thus proved that three propositions are not capable of [demonstrating] that the external object is the perceivable object (ālambana), [the author says] in conclusion: Since the atoms are not capable of being the perceivable object, therefore, etc.

Having thus refuted the principal doctrines of other schools whose proposed theories could be destroyed by means of well-established reasonings, the author, now, wishing to establish his principal doctrine on the perceivable object, says the following.

The opponent says: If there was no external object, is it not true that there would not be any conditional cause (pratyaya) of the perceivable object of consciousness?

(The author replies:) Here, one is not in the error of non-existence of the conditional cause of the perceivable object; for,
and appears to us as though it is existent externally, serves as a condition of the actual object (ālambanapratyaya) [to consciousness].

6c-d. Because consciousness is the essence [of the external object] and that [object essence of which is consciousness] acts as the condition [to consciousness].

The internal consciousness appears as [manifold external] object (arthā) and also arises from that [objective aspect of its own]. Thus the internal consciousness is endowed with two parts (i.e. image and cause) [which circumstance is absent in all the previous propositions] and therefore what exists internally in the consciousness (i.e. the objective aspect) is the object-condition (ālambanapratyaya) to the consciousness.

If only the objective appearance of consciousness is experienced, [it will be a part of the consciousness and appearing simultaneously with it]. How can a part of

For example, for the eye-diseased person (tāmirika), appearances of hairs, flies, etc., appear in the perception with the forms of hairs, flies, etc., [real]. Likewise, since the knowable aspect (grāhya-bhāga) is capable of being characteristic of the object (arthā), one calls it the conditional cause of the perceivable object (ālambana).

The opponent asks again: Then how could the knowable aspect, be the characteristic of the perceivable object? The author answers the following.

And also because, thanks to the maturity of impregnations (vāsanā = perfume) frequently repeated of the blue, yellow, etc., the perception (jñāna) arises in possessing the characteristic of the blue, yellow, etc., this characteristic is the conditional cause of consciousness.

Mrs. S. Yamaguchi and H. Meyer, probably on the authority of Vīṇātādeva, translate this passage thus: As consciousness, [through the characteristics] of the object (arthā) [which exists] internally (i.e., subjectively) ( = the knowable aspect) possesses the characteristic of this object, this characteristic existing, the consciousness arises.
consciousness and appearing simultaneously be a condition to the consciousness? [itself]?

7a. [Though the external object] is only a part [of the internal consciousness,] it is a condition (pratyaya) [to the consciousness], because it is invariably associated with the consciousness.

[The objective aspect of consciousness,] though arising simultaneously with it, becomes condition to [the consciousness] which is produced by other [conditions]. Logicians (naiyāyika) say as below: The possession of existence (bhāva) [by existence] and of non-existence (abhāva) [by non-existence] is the characteristic sign of successive productions of the cause and result, [this result] possessing the cause.

37 [The opponent says:] In all cases, one comprehends that what is perceivable internally existent (i.e., subjectively) in the consciousness, be thus the appearance itself (=what appears). But, he will say, if this perceivable object (ālambana) appears as an appearance designed (dessinée) by the character of what is perceivable (jñeyākūra), this perceivable object will be what appears at the same time as a part of this [appearance]. How could [such an appearance] be conditional cause (pratyaya) [of the object perceivable by the consciousness]?

If it was possible, this would be "oneself made by oneself" or, the knowable aspect (grāhyabhāga) would produce the knowable aspect (grāhyabhāga); horns of the right and left of the ox would themselves produce one by the other; this would be a formidable error (atiprasanga) [there].

38 [To this objection the author replies the following].

39 [The opponent says:] By means of discrimination of parts, it would be possible that oneself makes oneself, how would it be possible that it is what possesses the determinate cause (nimitta) without the confusion between the being of cause and of its result? The author replies the following.

40 That is to say, at the moment when the knowable aspect exists, the perception exists also; when it does not exist, [the perception] exists no more. Consequently these two [existences] which arise simultaneously are capable of being the cause and its result,
Or,41

7b. It becomes condition also in succession by transmitting the force 42 (sakti).

It 43 is also possible successively that the objective appearance of consciousness (arthavabhāsa), in order to give rise to a result homogeneous with itself, makes the force (sakti) seated in the [store-house] consciousness, and it is not contradictory 44 [to the reasoning].

41 Having thus explained that the existence (bhāva) of the object (viṣaya) and the existence of that which perceives the object (viṣayin) exist at the same time, the author, now, explains that the existence of the object (viṣaya) and the existence of that which perceives the object (viṣayin) arise also successively (kramena).

42 When the knowable aspect disposes (dispose) the dominant force, it objectivizes itself into a proper being which produces successively [consciousness]; for, while destroying itself, this knowable aspect deposits at this moment its dominant force on the Ālayaviññāna. If therefore this dominant force produces accompanying factors (sahakārini) at the second moment, it will produce a consciousness homogeneous with [the dominant force], but at this moment only.

If the [dominant force] at this moment, does not produce the accompanying factors, when they arise in the third, fourth, or no matter what instant, this [dominant force], they having matured, will produce the same consciousness as this.

When one has this comprehension, he has no more difficulties “oneself is made by oneself” or “they arise at the same time” and others.

Thus this blue and other [colours], the characteristics of the knowable aspect, which existed in the precedent perception produce the following perception which will have the characteristics of blue, yellow, red and other [colours].

43 The opponent says: If the dominant force (sakti) produces the perception (jñāna), the dominant force will be precisely the object (viṣaya), while the precedent knowable aspect will not be the object. [The author replies the following.]

44 If the dominant force is not determined (vyavasthita) [to the action] by the knowable aspect, this dominant force will not produce any more such perception. Consequently, since the perception
[The opponent says:] If only the self of consciousness constitutes the object-condition; how should we explain [the saying that] the visual consciousness arises depending upon the eye and [form \(rūpa\)]?

[The author replies:]

7c-d. What is the sense-organ is [nothing but] the force itself [in consciousness] by virtue of its acting simultaneously [with the object] as an auxiliary cause (sahakārin) [for raising up of consciousness].

The sense-organs are inferred from [the nature of] their results to be only the forces of consciousness, but never constituted of matters.

which is born of the dominant force, is also product of the knowable aspect, there is no any contradiction (virodha).

[The idea that the interior] possesses two modalities is precisely possible according to the former proposition (pakṣa), for, the knowable aspect producing the perception similar to itself, [the interior] possesses two modalities.

It is so because, the eye acting simultaneously with the force which had already appeared, had produced [visual] consciousness. But if the interior form had not appeared previously to the eye, how could it produce the visual consciousness in acting simultaneously with the interior form?

If the organs are made by elements, [as the Sarvāstivadins assert,] there will be this difficulty raised by the opponent, but in our opinion, the proper nature of the dominant force (sakti) which one believes as the organ itself and which acts simultaneously [with the object (viṣaya)] is precisely the organ. Therefore, for us, just as the form is interior, the eye also is an interior proper being.

[The opponent asks:] How could one know that the organ is the proper being of the dominant force? [The author replies the following.]

For, one could infer merely some cause in considering the result, but one could not infer the genus (vīseṣa) of the cause. For example, one could infer the fire on merely seeing the smoke, but one could not infer the genus of the fire and say if these are of herbs, of leaves [that burning]; likewise, one could, solely by the
8a. That force is not contradictory to the consciousness.\textsuperscript{49}

That force be in consciousness, or in its self which is of indescribable nature\textsuperscript{50}; there\textsuperscript{51} is no difference in production of the result.

8b-d. Thus\textsuperscript{52} the objective aspect (\textit{viṣayarūpa}) [of consciousness] and the force (\textit{sakti}) [called fruit characteristic of consciousness, make inference on the cause, but one could not deduce the genus of the cause, that is to say that which has been made by the elements, etc.

\textsuperscript{49} The opponent says: The dominant force (\textit{sakti}) depends on the possessor of that force (\textit{saktināt}); for, without basis (\textit{ādhāra}), the dominant force is not capable to exist. The possessor of the force (\textit{saktimāt}) is one of the organs; now this [organ] itself has been constituted by the elements.

The author answers: If one considers the representation (\textit{vijñapti}) of consciousness, [the conception] of one basis for the dominant force is not contradictory. This being admitted, if one basis is necessary, the consciousness (\textit{vijñāna}) itself is capable of being this basis (\textit{āśraya}); for, in the consciousness, there is a proper being which knows the object (\textit{viṣaya}) and [at the same time] a proper being which knows itself (\textit{svasamvedana}).

\textsuperscript{50} The opponent replies: While the dominant force residing in this [organ] made by the elements, produces one fruit different [from that of consciousness] the dominant force residing in consciousness produces [in its turn] one fruit different [from that which a compound of elements would produce]. [Now, you assert that] the organ consists in the dominant force [and] however the fruit of elements and that of consciousness are different: the organ does not reside thus in the dominant force, but it is necessarily composed of the elements, \textit{thus the dominant force would be capable of being sometime in consciousness and sometime in the proper nature inexplicable (anirdeṣya) (that is to say in the organ).}

\textsuperscript{51} The author replies: There is no any difference in the production of the fruit; for, in all manner (\textit{sarvathā}), to see the form, [to hear the sound,] etc. are simply productions of the dominant force.

\textsuperscript{52} [The opponent asks:] Then what is thus the cause of the dominant force of the organ?

The author replies: Just as consciousness arises from the dominant force of the organ, so this dominant force of the
sense-organ] go mutually conditioned from immemorial time.

Depending upon the force (sakti) called eye, and the interior form (antah rūpa) arises the consciousness which appears as though it is the external object, but it arises undifferentiated from the perceivable object. These two act mutually conditioned without beginning in time (anādikāla). Sometime when the force [called vāsanā] gets matured, consciousness is transformed into a form of object (viṣayā-kāratā) and sometime the force arises from [the consciousness] endowed with the form of object. The consciousness and force, both may be said to be either different organ arises equally from the previous consciousness which causes the activity (āvedha) of the organ, and this previous consciousness arises from the dominant force of the organ still more anterior. Thus, etc.

The opponent asks: Then wherefrom does this dominant force proceed?

The author replies: The dominant force proceeds also from the anterior consciousness which causes the activity of the organ; this consciousness in its turn proceeds from a dominant force more anterior, and this same dominant force proceeds from a consciousness still more anterior which has caused the activity of the organ. Thus these two, etc.

Having thus explained that the dominant force of the organ and consciousness are beings (bhūva) of the cause (hetu) and of the fruit (phala), the author, now, in order to explain that the dominant force and consciousness are reciprocally mutual causes and this without commencement in time, says: Sometime, etc.

The translation of this passage is done according to Paramārtha. According to Vinitadeva, French translators have done thus: Sometime, in [the mind which possesses] the form of this [object] it is the dominant force [which is produced].

Then at this moment, the cause and its fruit arising reciprocally in an uninterrupted continuity, one says that the time is without commencement.
from or identical with one another as one may37 like. Thus38 the interior object [which is not different from consciousness] is endowed with two factors, [image and cause] and therefore it is logically concluded that consciousness [alone] is transformed into [external] object (viṣayā).

The treatise on the examination of the object composed by Ācārya Diṇnāga is complete.

37 The opponent asks: Are the dominant force of the organ and that of the object different from the consciousness or not? If they are different, there is only difference in denominations, but the object is the same; because [at this moment] one admits (pratiṣṭhā) an organ and a perceivable object (ālambana) apart from consciousness. If they are not different, one could not say that this dominant force is the organ and that this dominant force is the object.

The author replies: The dominant forces are the proper nature (ātman) of differentiations (vīṣeṣa) of a stage (avasthā) and they exist conventionally (samvṛtyā); therefore, relying upon the mundane designation (laukikavyavahāra) one could, as he likes, say that [sometime] consciousness on the one hand and [the organ and the object] on the other are of different nature (anyatva) and [sometime] of non-different nature (ananyatva). See additional notes.

For, thus, some things which exist conventionally are in certain case designated by different denominations; for example, one says “the perfume of the sandalwood” [now, the perfume is not the same thing as the sandalwood] and in some other case they are designated by non different [denominations]; for example, one says “the vase is in such matter”, etc. [now, the vase could not exist beyond the matter which constitutes].

38 Thus, having demonstrated that the perceivable object (ālambana) is truly interior, the author in conclusion, says the following.
ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF DHARMA-
PĀLA'S COMMENTARY ON THE
ĀLAMBARAPARĪKṢĀ

In order to light up the wisdom
In the vicious-and-dull-minded men, and
In order to let them extirpate their evils who spoke,
I pay homage to Him and investigate the [true]
meaning [of the text].

Some philosophers accept the external things
as object-causes of the consciousness of the
eye and others.

The fruit of investigation comprises the rejection
of what is rejectable and the adoption of what is worth
adopting; therefore the cause for both is set forth here.
The word ¹ "others" includes the five-fold conscious-
ness which arises having the support of material objects
and the senses as accepted by other schools of philosophy.
They conceive that the senses are directed each to an
[invariable external] real object. But the conscious-
ness born of the mind [as the sixth organ] is not to be
accepted as correct; for, it is not directed to an

¹ Read in the Sanskrit text p. 21, lines 7—9, तत्र आदिचरण
परसंभवं स्पष्टिर्व्याधिनोन्तविधिहां स्वप्नगाति।
invariable real object, but to an object which is only conventionally true, for example, the chariot\(^7\) and the like. Though it may be permitted that the mental consciousness is conditioned by a real object endowed with parts\(^8\) (\textit{avayavin}); yet it grasps also an object which is not its own and which lacks a form similar to one reflected in consciousness. But for the consciousness of the eye and others, there is well-known separate object invariably associated with each of the senses. No such fixity of object is arrived at in the case of mental consciousness.

Moreover, the Truth in its essence is to be realised inwardly by a knowledge born of the repeated practice of trance, and never becomes the object of the discriminative thought (\textit{tarka=manas}); and again it appears as though it is perceivable, yet it shines as object only of a supreme knowledge born of contemplating what is heard and what is thought out, [and not at all of the mental consciousness]. Thus the object of the mental consciousness becomes absolutely non-existent. For, this object can be no capable of being condition-cause at the moment of its origination;\(^4\) nor can it be so in the past and future moments, because the things of past and future are non-entities just like the uncompositive elements of existence, [ether, etc]. For this

\(^7\) Cf. Tattvas. pass. p. 206; Nyāyavārtika, p. 80—1 where different explanations are given for \textit{rathādivat}.

\(^8\) Read in the Sanskrit text p. 21, line 11, \textit{वधिपि मनोविहानमवविक्ष्यप्लतते}.

\(^4\) Read in the Sanskrit text p. 22, line 4 \textit{स्वस्मूतप्तो for स्वसंततो}.\
reason, the word "others" is said to include the body of five sorts of consciousness.

Then, if [you say that] the mental consciousness owes its existence to what is brought home by the sensual consciousness; how is that also possible? It cannot take place either in the same moment as the sensual consciousness or in the immediate next moment. It is not possible in the immediate next moment, because the object like the colour, etc., has already been vanished away in the immediate next moment. Nor does the object of the present moment become condition to it, because it has been grasped by sensual consciousness.

[If you say that] the mental consciousness grasps naturally the external object of its own accord, then there will be no possibility of existence of the blind or deaf, etc. [To accept] a sense faculty other than the eye, etc. is contradictory to the inferential knowledge. The denial of extra material object [which may suit to the mental consciousness being gladly admitted, why should we entertain a bias for the mental consciousness alone? To the visual and other consciousness material things serving as supporting causes become bases.] [But to the mental consciousness there is no such thing as basis.] What is short of basis, has by nature no

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5 Read in the text, p. 22, line 6, इन्द्रियविद्यानाहुतमात्रायं मनोविद्यानम्। Whole discussion below, cf. प्रमाणवातिक्षत्ति, II, 239—244.
7 Read in the Sanskrit text, p. 22, line 12, चर्चराविद्यानां स्वपनायंप्रत्ययं:सदू ज्ञातान्म भवति।
function to perform, and therefore is to be non-existent; [e.g. ether]. So also is the case with the mind.

[Though] the object (ālambana) may be [proved by] the perceptive knowledge, yet, since it consists in the nature of being grasped⁸ (grāhyasvabhāva), it is absolutely unreal. So we consider it right to reject the nature of its being object (ālambanatā) and thereby the nature of its being basis (āśrayatā). However, the force (sākṣī) which constitutes the sense faculty and which acts simultaneously [with consciousness] will imagin it to exist.

An external thing, etc.

It is perceived that there is some object other than this [consciousness]. This [consciousness] makes known [to us] something opposite [to itself]. That something is called object since it is [as it were] capable of being grasped by an entity other than itself.

How could one say that something (e.g. perception) depends upon mere collocation⁹ (sāmagri) ? For, the collocation is not properly a substance. [If one argues that we should accept that principle in accordance with the Tathāgata’s teaching in respect of the two-fold Truth, failing which] the Tathāgata’s Truth will be far amiss from correctly understood. This argument goes by itself against the reasonings preceding and

⁸ Cf. Nyāyavārttika, p. 521 where some anumāna is referred to thus: न चित्तवितरिक्त विषयः प्राकृतवादः वेदनाबिन्त। तत्सन्यक्तोः p. 656: अत्र विज्ञानवादी व्यष्टे प्रमाणमाहं—न चित्त।

⁹ This seems to be a reference to the Mādhyamika’s standpoint. Cf. सामव्य द्वैति, etc., in the Bhavasaṅkranti sūtra, § 11.
succeeding. But, for my own part; where is [the possibility of] incurring such a fallacy? For, I have accepted that it depends upon a substance (dravya) as well as collocation (sāmagrī). Now it follows that even if some other objection is raised, that also may be taken to be answered.

"They postulate the subtle atom"

Though the subtle atom perishes as soon as it appears, yet two substances serve as a cause, but not collocation [of atoms]. For example, things, colour and others, though they are simultaneously present before the senses, become objects [only of their respective senses] without any confusion on account of the fact that the faculty of grasping a particular object is fixedly assigned to each sense. All substances are perishing, yet the double atom which is capable of existing [at the time of grasping] serves as the object-cause.

"Because the atom serves as cause for that."

The word "that" means the consciousness of the eye, etc. It arises on a contact [of the sense-organ] with the object constituted of parts. So say some [Ācāryas]: Among the causes, that which acts as the productive cause becomes its actual object."


"Read in the Sanskrit text p. 23, line 14: स आत्मवाचः । न: प्रत्येकुय वन्यनामव उन्दैत्तेणु: । Cf. Slokavārtika, p. 285: उन्दैत्तेत्येवा-लम्बन्तव्यृ।"
"Or some others postulate the aggregate of atoms"

The advocates of this doctrine say that the aggregate formed of atoms serves as the actual object of consciousness.

"Because consciousness arises representing the image of the aggregate of atoms."

The aggregate is believed to be the actual object of consciousness, since it is born of the aggregate [and endowed with its image]. It is as somebody says: "A thing whose form is represented in a consciousness is really its object." Both these disputants say: [Here the following thesis is intended to be formulated: consciousness has an aggregate thing as its object; because it is endowed with the form of that aggregate object]. Now, if [the idealist objects that] this reason is invalid and cannot be formulated as such; for, it lacks an appropriate example just as the second reason which could prove the validity of the first one does. [Moreover, says the idealist, the reason is not recognised by us; because we do not accept that the image represented in consciousness pertains to an external aggregate thing, nor do we consider real the aggregate apart from its parts i.e. atoms. Therefore we do not have anything external corresponding to the gross form found in consciousness. We may now, answer that] the general quality of atoms (paramāṇusamāṇyalakṣaṇa) while acting as actual

"We may conveniently read in Sanskrit p. 23, line 20, यत् विज्ञान यदाकारुपमु, etc. Cf. Pramāṇavārttika: तत्र शुद्धिनिदर्शनार तत्त्वस्था स्त्रृत्तन्त्रासुयम्यते II Vṛtti: प्राणमुन्नवल्लो अणुवंशम्: ।
object of consciousness will cause a gross form to appear in it. But if you assume that there is no external thing which may serve as a cause to consciousness\textsuperscript{13}; [then] there is a fault of the subject of your thesis being contradicted in its own character. So also is your probandum (dharma = sādhyadharma) unknown to us.\textsuperscript{14} If you say that what has been recognised by the opponent as an accepted fact, can only be formulated as an appropriate example, then the same is also to be applied in respect of Probandum [you cannot prove by means of inference a thing which is impossible to prove].

However, one whose mind is bent on supreme pramāṇa, says: By what reason the two reasons, source of dispute can be made valid, that reason is not to be found because of lack of example which is recognised both by us. Hence in what manner may the representation of the image in consciousness be established as valid reason?\textsuperscript{15}

"Though atoms serve as causes," etc. as accepted [by the advocates of atoms, that is, some of the early Buddhists and Jains]. The atom by itself cannot serve as the cause of the consciousness for the reason that it is not perceived and hence non-existent;

\textsuperscript{13} Vijñānāntah Svāhāsālambanah is the thesis of the Vijñānānta-vādin. This view has been much criticised by Kumārila and Udyotakara; (Slokavārtika and N. Vārtika with Tikā and N. Sūtra IV, 2, 26).

\textsuperscript{14} Read in Sanskrit p 24, line 4: भस्मिणः स्वस्वविरोधशुषःस्वालः । तथा धर्मचन्दनप्रसिद्धम् ।

\textsuperscript{15} Read in Sanskrit: तदाकार्योगः हेतुभवेत् ।
yet the body of atoms does so. However, they become objects mutually unconnected.  

"Like the senses".

Just as a sense-faculty, though it serves as a basis of the association of consciousness, never becomes its object; because it does not bear the image of the sense-faculty; so also atoms. What do not possess the image of consciousness are not considered to be its objects. Therefore it is said:

[25] "That is the object"

"The form of its own" means the image of consciousness itself. "Consciousness grasps" means it determines.  

How is it known that consciousness grasps only the form of its own?

"Because it arises in that form."

This refers to the mind, [the preceding moment of consciousness]. Consciousness arises in a form which resembles the mind. When there is a mutual correspondence or co-ordination (sāraṇya) between the consciousness and the object-image, then we call it grasping of the object by consciousness. In fact, for you, there is no object grasped beyond consciousness. How could you, then, explain the causality of the object non-existent apart from consciousness for rising up of its

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16 According to Kāśmira Vaibhāṣikas and Bhadanta Vasubandhu atoms never get combined, (na spṛṣvanti), see. Additional Notes below.

17 Read in Sanskrit: स्वप्रत्येक स्वाकार उत्पन्न निर्मायते। निर्मायते निर्मीयते।

18 Cf. Pramāṇavār. vṛtti, p. 230: आकाराधिकतर्विषयविक्षणम्।
consciousness? Yet there is already in the preceding moment the object-image. When this object-image is brought home in the self of consciousness just like an image in the mirror, it is considered that the consciousness has grasped its object, [and also that the latter has produced the former]. The self of the double atom does not represent the image reflected upon consciousness. If it does so, then we may consider the atom also to be its object.

"Like the sense organ"

Though it serves as the cause, it becomes no object. If you accept that whichever is cause, is object, then the sense-faculty also could possibly become object. [It is also not possible to argue that mere causality is not criterion for its being object of consciousness, but a causal element which is endowed with the image felt in consciousness is so; because] it has already been stated that the reason, the possession of the image in consciousness suffers a fallacy of its being not established. Thus we have to concede that the mind, i.e. the preceding moment of consciousness serves not merely as cause [of the following moment of consciousness], but it appears both as the sense-faculty as well the image of the object.

If you establish as the cause what has been stated above, i.e., atoms 19; then, atoms being the cause, how does it follow that the same becomes object? [If you say that the causality and objectivity are mutually concomitant and found invariably together]

19 Read in Sanskrit p. 25, line 16: यद्य यथोक्तमकरणां, etc.
then, the sense-faculty being the cause, that also will become object. [Because the sense-faculty never becomes object of any consciousness] the said concomitance incurs [26] a fallacy of inconclusiveness. Such being your proposition, we establish 30 this:

"Because atoms do not possess the form reflected in consciousness," etc.

Why is this sentence? It purports to establish our own proposition. One cannot consider one's proposition to be established by merely criticising other's thesis. In order to formulate his own proposition, (Ācārya says thus:) thesis: atoms do not become objects of consciousness; reason: because they do not manifest the form found in their consciousness; example: like a sense-faculty.

If the above phrase indicates that this is the reason for this proposition, it would follow that the author of the Sāstra having first set forth his opponent's proposition, propounds his own one which goes in agreement with his opponent's. And now the author, having paid his attention to the refutation of the opponent's proposition, would exhibit many defects upon it and set it aside ultimately. [In arguing thus] the thesis which never varies that (i.e. reason) will be asserted. Other thesis which always varies [the reason] will be dissented.

At the outset the opponent raises an objection (dūṣāṇa) [to the above proposition] pointing out to its inconclusive reasoning. How false a syllogism you

30 Read in Sanskrit p. 26, line 1: तथा चेत | [अह ।]
have formulated! Even the ordinary folk says that the reason which is found separated from and never associated with the object to be proved (ṣādhyā) is not at all a reason, but such reason gives rise to the doubt as to the existence of the object to be proved. Therefore you should formulate some other syllogism. Your reason "The atoms do not possess the form reflected in consciousness" may sometimes exist in the atoms whose innate natures are undetermined. But the resolve is not correct that consciousness always arises in co-ordination with the image [of the object]. Therefore there is no room for your determination that the atoms do not possess the form reflected in consciousness. It ought to be stated on the other hand, that they are of indeterminate natures. However, this much is certain that what produces consciousness does not become its object just like the atom of sense-faculty. There are well-known other different causes which produce the visual consciousness; none of them makes known to us the innate natures of atoms, because consciousness never exhibits their forms.

What has been stated in respect of the sensual consciousness may also be equally applied to the other types of consciousness. The sense-faculty given above as example is in fact stated with a view of particularisation (pradarsanārtham) and other example may also be obtained by way of implication (arthāpatti). Thus the statement of the above reason also becomes useless.

[27] [The author replies:] The atom, though it functions as cause, becomes no actual object of consciousness,
and with this intention the above statement was made. It is so lest the sound and other atoms should cause to raise up the consciousness of other sense-organ. Someone says: In the self of consciousness the gross form is not perceived; hence it is not object of itself just like the atom of the sense-faculty. Because the theory that the image of consciousness is due to the bringing home of the real object-image upon consciousness is not reasonable, the saying that no gross-form is perceived as appertaining to consciousness is very appropriate.

Thus we have spoken that

"atoms are not objects of consciousness."

The reason for this is that they do not possess the form [that is experienced in consciousness] and that the hypothesis that they are its objects is not well proved by any means of knowledge (pramāna).

If so, [the opponent says,] then, let the aggregate of atoms be its object. [That could not not be possible.] If you, [says the author,] desire to prove your proposition on the ground that all things spoken of (in the world) are established (as real); [then, I may reply that] your reason is not an established one; this will be a true logic.

"Though the aggregate possesses the image of consciousness "

"Cf. Pramāṇav. vṛtti, II, 211: तत्साधारे न च भाने स्वृत्ताभासत्तदास्तमः"

"It is not clear what the author has replied in regard to the fallacy of reason that has been pointed out by the opponent."
And it may become object; yet it does not act as its cause. For,

"consciousness does not arise from the aggregate."

Aggregate-consciousness bears a form (similar to) the aggregate. But it does not produce consciousness. How can this be the cause for it? Since it has no characteristic of an object (ālambanalakṣaṇa), it could not (be proved to) exist. As regards the nature of what has been previously spoken of, i.e., atom, it lacks the form felt in consciousness. What is, then, characterised as object?

"Every object which necessarily produces the consciousness possessed of the image similar to itself (i.e., the object), is said to be its proper object."

[28] In accordance with [the process of arising of] the object-consciousness, [we say that] what is a productive cause of consciousness, that is only its object. Somebody says: Every object necessarily is the cause of the mind and mental elements. This object having produced [consciousness] is spoken of as if it was really grasped [by its consciousness] and then it was always designated as its actual object. What object possesses the two-fold characteristic (i.e., causality and form) that becomes object. When there arises the fact of production, [the talk of it as] object (ālambana) also arises. It is said in the scripture: When this fact arises, (or exists), this (other) fact also arises. This formula refers to the theory of dependent causation.
Since what is the productive cause for that consciousness is a condition for production, we assume that this is a thing [to serve] as object. At the first sight of a thing only the thing-in-itself (svālakṣaṇa) is perceived and nothing more; so we do not call the more (i.e., generality) as object (ālambana).

"The aggregate of atoms does not produce consciousness; because it is not an entity in substance".

The aggregate is not a real entity; because it cannot be described either as different from or as one with its constituents. Whichever is nonentity has possibly no efficiency of producing any result.

"Like the double moon".

The second moon does not cause to raise up the consciousness of the second moon [as it does not exist in substance]. If so, what is the cause of representing that image [in consciousness]?

"Because of the defect of the senses".

When the eye has its sight disturbed by cataract and other diseases, then the appearance of the double moon appears and that, too, not as a real entity.

[29] "The double moon-cognition has not an object, though the image of the double moon is reflected in it".

The double moon does not become object of its consciousness though the latter is endowed with the image of the double moon; because this does not produce consciousness.
“Similarly the aggregate, as it does not exist in substance, does not act as cause for its consciousness”.

Since it is not a real entity just like the double moon, it proves certain that the aggregate is not at all the cause. Hence

“IT does not become object.”

Here again the word “the double moon” is repeated. The example of the double moon, it is to be understood, shows the reason, the possession of the image [by consciousness] to be an inconclusive one. The existence of an object for every consciousness can also be achieved through a common logic; hence your proposition involves the defect of contradiction. [This argument is not valid; for] the visual consciousness arises through the eye (only), but neither through the aggregate such as a patch of blue, etc. nor through the atom; since the consciousness is not produced by both of them just like the consciousness born of the senses other the eye. This example is acceptable to all. So nothing else is to be mentioned.

The example, “the double moon” does not exist in substance, hence that, having the nature of uncausal object, proves the same (i.e. absence of the cause for the aggregate-consciousness). Though the double moon-consciousness is endowed with the image of the double moon, there is no real object [corresponding to it]. The expression also happens even in the absence of its causal object.
If you ask me: Well, there exists no second moon; how does one directly perceive the two images of the moon? Let me explain this. Because of some potent force (sakti) laid down within consciousness, it appears as though it is the consciousness endowed with the image of the second moon. Just as a man, while asleep, dreams that he actually sees many objects, and also imagines in dream that he discharges so many false acts; so also he imagines another moon upon the single moon.

[30] Some philosophers say: When the eye-consciousness happens to exist simultaneously [with its alambana] and since it has been criticised that both these under such circumstances, arise in order, i.e. one after the other, immediately after these two images, a mental thought arises murmuring: 'I perceive the second moon.'

Some others say: It is due to a mistake in number [of the two instead of one] in the moon, that mistake, too, happens out of the defect in the organ of the sight. If you do not admit the proposition of an external object, then the vision of gross form will be merely a permissive thought.

[The author says:] Mental consciousness does not arise immediately after the eye-consciousness and its alambana coming into existence [as you previously stated], but it does so only simultaneously and depending upon the images of these two. Then, [asks the opponent,] how does an understanding arise that I see the

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23 See Pramāṇavārtika, II, 294: मानसं तद्विष्टिर्वेके (=कणादावरः.)
24 See Prakaraṇapaññācikā, p. 38, verses 58—60.
double moon? [The author replies: If you stick to your view,] tell me: why does not the cognition arise of the double sound at a time immediately after the sound-object and its consciousness being present? It is also impossible to assume that the mental consciousness arises successively in the case of a man who possesses the organ of the eye in a sound condition. Tell me, on what basis, are accomplished many and different things: the material objects, senses, their consciousness and their cognizable varieties [without intervention of the mental consciousness]? [So we must accept that there also arises simultaneously the mental consciousness by virtue of which we are able to cognize many and varied things.]

One who says that I perceive the single moon as double and accepts that there is the external object apart from consciousness, how will that man also explain the mistake in number causing the delusion of the double moon to arise? [That is to say, he must also resort to the aid of mental consciousness to explain it satisfactorily.]

"As both atoms and their aggregates are defective in one or other respect, they are not real objects of consciousness."

The \textit{ālambana} consists in two parts, \textit{viz.} representation of its own image and causality for its consciousness. The atom lacks in the first part, \textit{i.e.} its image is not represented in consciousness, and the aggregate is devoid of the second part, \textit{i.e.}, causality. Thus these two defects as have been discussed, point
out to the identity between the object and its consciousness.

[31] “Some Ācāryas hold that the combined form of atoms (sañcitakāra) is the cause of consciousness”.

In each atom there exists the combined form. That alone is perceived as the gross form in proportion to the number of atoms. That combined form, too, is real and produces the consciousness of the form of itself; because it exists in substance.

“ It becomes the actual object ”;

because it fulfils the said two conditions. This (combined form) is already an accomplished fact. Hence no question arises whether it is the same as the atom itself or not so.

“ All things are possessed of many forms ”.

These atoms themselves are regarded as possessed of atomic form as well as combined form. How can a single element be described to possess two forms? All things which are collocations of material elements are considered to be of four great elements, earth, etc. as their essence, and have many forms. They are naturally possessed of distinct forces [each]. [For example,] the image of the blue and other colours existing in a substance-element and the same existing in a sense-organ are known to be quite different [from each other]. In the atom, among many forms “there also exists the combined form.”
Only this form becomes object of the consciousness of the eye, etc. So it becomes

"the direct object of perception".

If so, why do you not say that cognition of atoms is possessed of combined form? [You admit that] the atom is of combined form. Why do you not likewise admit that its cognition is also of the combined form? Why do you only say:

"There exists the combined form in the atom"

[32] This sentence, having the nature of a sentence formulated to that effect, shows as well that their cognitions are possessed of the combined form of atoms. If so, binary atom has the form of binary atom, how has it combined form? Only the aggregates of different atoms are admitted in this system of thought; and these aggregates themselves constitute the combined forms. It is for this reason that they are not [considered to be] existent in substance. This point has already been mentioned; why is it repeated again? With some other motive it is done so. [That motive is his:] Though the substance-elements are each different in their nature, yet it is to be understood that this combined form is related to their mere collocation. When we analyse it, no more exists the combined form. Moreover, though all things are regarded only as the aggregates of atoms, still each thing has a relative difference, and we may perceive it in each substance. However, the scriptural passage like "What is material element, blue, (etc.), that is the earth element (prthividhatu)"
is to be interpreted as a sentence intended to demonstrate the Truth. . . ."

If so, how is it that atoms are not perceived by senses? and how are they perceived only by the knowledge of Tathāta, Suchness? [The opponent continues:]

"The atomic form becomes no object of the [sensual] consciousness."

This does not become object of the sensual consciousness; hence it is beyond the senses. The object which does not fall within the operation of senses, ought to be cognized only by the knowledge penetrating into Suchness. What is the argument for such an assumption? It is simply this: the atomic form never comes within the range of direct perception;

"just like its solidity and other attributes."

Blue and other colours

"though really existent in atoms, do not become objects of the visual and other consciousness."

[33] Because the powers of senses are related to particular objects [only, not to all].

"So also atomic form."

This is not contradicted, but consented to by both parties. The opponent objects: Let the atomic form appear as perceptible and not solidity, because they both differ one from the other in nature. We reply: That property [of atoms] is accepted as probans

"Since the exact Sanskrit equivalent of the Chinese expression, chi chiḥ is not ascertainable, the passage, एवम्युप्तम् . . . व्यवहारः is left untranslated.
which is common to all ten bases formed by the material elements; hence no fallacy of exclusion of reason from the sapakṣaṇṛṣṭānta. Therefore this formulation [of syllogism] is in no way defective.⁶⁶

"[Different] perceptions of pot, cup, etc., will be identical"

for you who hold thus, (that is, the things are mere aggregates of atoms). For, consciousness does not differ as its object does not differ; and the sensual consciousness assumes its form in accordance with the object lying ahead (or in front). The opponent asks: How do you know that there is no difference in the object of consciousness? The author answers:

"There exists no distinction among the many atoms of pot, cup, etc." [though the number "many" may vary in each case].

This sentence means this: Though the atoms in their combined forms become objects of our cognition, yet, while the self-nature of the pot, etc., being cognized, there exists even among the many aggregates of atoms, no such character that can distinguish one aggregate of atoms from the other⁷⁷. Because we do not admit [as real] the combined form distinct in each aggregate, apart from their own real [atomic] forms, the sensual consciousness that has arisen depending upon that form will be identical. It is thereby settled that only the

⁶⁶ The prayoga may be like this: अपवाकारो न विद्वद्विषयः । अपव- न्त्वात् । बच्चन्न न तद्विषयम् । यथा कठिनतादि।

⁷⁷ Read अपवविविष्यम् in the Sanskrit text, p. 33, l. 13 above.
self-nature of atoms is object (ālambana). And in the undifferentiated form of atoms, there exists no element that causes to produce some discriminating and reinvestigating thought [regarding the differentiated gross form, such as pot, etc.]; for, such thought will be a separate one, just as a thought springing up from a blue patch, etc. [That being the case, the discriminating thought of gross form, pot, etc., will arise only when there is present the causal element. That causal element being absent, our idea of gross form is baseless.]

"If [the opponent says that] the perception differs on account of differences in the forms [of the pot, etc.]."

[34] Here "the form" means the image that distinguishes itself in each case. The pot and cup are distinguishable in their forms by virtue of their different parts, neck, belly and bottom, etc., and our cognitions differ on that account.

The author replies: It is quite true,

"but the [different forms] do not exist in substance."

No atoms constituting the object cognized by the sensual consciousness, are varied [in their size]. Though the aggregates of atoms are true empirically, yet they, being closely analysed, do not fall within the cognizance of senses. [There remain as real only atoms, and never the aggregates.] The [real] objects of cognition (i.e. atoms) which are identical in form, cannot, properly
speaking, become causes for different forms of cognitions.

[The opponent asks:] How do you know that there exists no distinction in form among the atoms?

[The author replies:]

"Because the atoms are absolutely identical in their dimension”.

All objects are constituted of parts and these parts necessarily admit of distinction of forms. The proper nature of atoms, however, is devoid of any part and very subtle. Therefore how can we assign to it any distinction of form?

"Though the pot, cup, etc., are (apparently) varied objects, there exists absolutely no distinction in their atomic nature.”

For, anything destitute of parts, neither increases nor decreases.

[35] “We therefore understand that there is no reality”

in the aggregates of atoms.

Everything composed of parts, has a form which is attributed to it, and not real of its own; and as such it does not fall within the domain of senses. Thus the opinion has been above criticised after a careful study that the aggregates of atoms tend to show their different real forms. Therefore [different] cognitions of pot, cup, etc., are, in fact, destitute of real objects different [in form] just as the feelings of happiness and misery are. Thus [it is clear that] atoms do not distinguish objects.
Nor can the form [perceived by our senses] be proper nature of that object.

Or

"If the distinction in parts is inferred (lit. spoken of) on account of the distinction in forms."

This sentence intends to show that the proposition that nothing that is non-differentiated [in its nature] becomes object incurs a logical fallacy called siddhasādhana, proving of what is already well-known. The opponents hold that the atom is in fact a thing which is not distinguishable in its nature, yet the different cognitions happen on account of differences in forms. We also admit that the atom is an undistinguishable object. Therefore this proposition incurs the fallacy of siddhasādhana 28.

The sentence, "Because the atoms are absolutely identical in their dimension" shows the conclusion to be invalid that the difference in substances, (i.e., component parts, atoms) causes difference in objects [composed of substances].

Or, it makes clear that the cognitions of the pot and cup, etc., do not bear the images of atoms; hence the atoms are not their actual objects in as much as they are not objects of other cognitions; by "other cognitions" is meant either mental consciousness or one born of other senses; for, a condition of some blue patch being present, the cognition (born thereof) does not

28 This retort of the siddhasādhana dōsa is not convincing as it stands in the text of the Chinese version.
bear the image of some yellow patch. Though the qualities of atoms are many, they cannot be differentiated one another in any way; but the sensual cognitions, however, are distinguishable one another in their forms; therefore the forms felt in the cognitions are not of the atoms.\footnote{39}

[36] Or, we may take that the following idea is intended in the verse: An objection that the atoms are distinguishable by themselves has been put forth and answered in order. If the aggregates of atoms are regarded as having forms other than that of atoms, then it is logically to be established that those forms of the aggregates are not real. There is also some other reasoning, to be mentioned here thus:

"If those atoms are removed one by one, the perceptions of the pot, etc., do not arise."

Things, that we speak of, like the pot, etc., are not real things just like sena, army and other aggregates, so they do not exist in substance. The following is another mode of reasoning:

"What objects are not found separated from what objects, that former objects are not differentiated from that [latter] objects. [Aggregates are not found separated from atoms, so the aggregates are not to be differentiated from atoms]."

The distinguished form [experienced in cognising the pot, etc.,] is other than the one [pertaining to atoms];

\footnote{Read in the Sanskrit text, p. 35, l. 17: परमाण्वात् बहुतेवेवधि अवि- शयात्, इन्द्रियविज्ञानानातु विशेषाकारस्या, etc.}
because that cognition experiences the forms of the objects like the pot, etc. This inference contradicts the real state of things. For example, when the sound-object is present, no cognition of a blue patch would arise in us. However, although it may be admitted that the aggregate is grasped and some other thing is experienced; yet it is absolutely impossible to prove that there is distinction among the forms of atoms.

"[It is the object] which exists internally [in knowledge itself] as a knowable aspect."

This line establishes what the actual object of consciousness is according to the author. If, in general analysis [of a cognition], there is no object [being regarded as one separate from consciousness]; then it evolves lokavirodha, contradiction with the world—a defect for one's own proposition. For, the scriptures state four conditions [for rising up a consciousness].

The word "internally" shows that there is no object-cause apart from the inner consciousness. [37] The word "knowable aspect" shows that the thing in the form of object is consciousness-product (vijñanaparinaṇama). Thus the idea of the external that exists in consciousness is grasped as an external object. Now the contradiction with the experience of world comes in; for, men of the world all accept the objects as externally existing. Therefore the author says "as if it exists externally." The real object, however, does not exist apart from consciousness. Its knowable aspect

"appears to us as if it exists externally."
The expression "I see the object externally" is based upon wrong belief just as the visual consciousness of the hair-like thing in the sky, etc.

"Though the external things are denied."

The external thing does not exist in reality, because it is not experienced as such. If we examine it very carefully with reasoning, we do not experience it externally and in its own invariable essence. Though the opponent may admit [a thing] characterised as external and existing in substance, yet it cannot become the object-cause of consciousness. Nor is the form of atoms experienced; because the atoms possess no forms [experienced in our cognitions].

"[That grāhyāṁśa] which appears to us as though existent externally, serves as the actual object-cause."

Because [that alone] possesses the form of that (i.e., object). [To prove the above the following syllogism is formulated.] Whatever thing possesses whatever form, that thing is identical with that form; for example, the causality is possessed of its own form, [i.e., the nature of being cause; that causality is not distinct from the nature of being cause].

Again the author shows some distinct character of the actual object (ālambana) when he says:

"Because consciousness is the essence of that [i.e., object]," etc.

[38] It is clear that the external thing which is an illusion, does not exist as an object. The form of an
object follows only in conformity with our mental imagination; and it is not real; for, if that which is imagined is separated from consciousness; there is nothing left in the external.

"The forms of the experienced objects do not originally exist apart from consciousness."

Hence it is called "the knowable in its essence-existing internally". The word "internally" indicates that the knowable does not exist beyond consciousness. The knowable, [externally] non-existent by its nature is regarded as existent internally.

"It also arises from that."

A part of consciousness may arise, sometime from itself, because the seventy-fifth element (i.e. consciousness) has a special character. Since no consciousness arises in separation from its object (jñeya), that part [of consciousness] (i.e. the knowable aspect) is produced by consciousness itself, and we need not admit a fifth cause for it.

"Because (consciousness) is endowed with two parts (i.e. image and cause)."

It is clear that it is the actual object and to be shown as a proof [for our proposition] because of its being decisive argument\textsuperscript{39} (i.e. its double nature). This object of double characteristic alone is considered to be probans (sādhanā). What is the external thing other than [this object], that is not to be regarded as condition-cause for consciousness; [for example] things.

\textsuperscript{39} Omit the word "अनेन" in the Sanskrit text, p. 38, l. 11.
experienced in dream-thought [cannot at all serve as its causes].

What is said to be of a double character, becomes a single proof (ekam sadhanam); thus only consciousness (i.e. its knowable aspect) is endowed with the image of object, and also gives rise to another consciousness. Therefore a part of consciousness becomes a single proof (ekam pramāṇam) on account of its discharging these two functions.

Now, though

what exists internally in consciousness is admitted [as condition-cause];

[39] since it has been examined that the external things are of unreal character, there can be no other real character thereof. The object is experienced only in pursuance of our mental habitual imagination. But the image of object is immanent in consciousness itself, and that alone will be logically correct. [The opponent asks:]

“How can a part of consciousness and appearing simultaneously be a condition [to consciousness itself]?”

[Author replies:] The knowable aspect (grah-yāmsa), as it does not exist without consciousness, gives rise to another consciousness.

[The opponent continues:] Now, [you have] a fallacy called self-affecting (svarūpavirodha); since

31 Here prayoga may be thus: विज्ञानं स्ववातिलाभमन्त्र । यद्यविवेक न तत् भावमन्त्र । यथा स्वप्नवात्स्वायां प्रकाशामानिके ।

32 अत्मतः किम्याविशेषाचे: ।
it is yet only a part of consciousness just like its part that grasps. [When it becomes as being grasped,] it cannot at the same time serve as a cause. [We always experience that] consciousness arises as being discoloured by the forms of the external things. The image-part of consciousness springs up simultaneously with consciousness; it cannot act as cause for the latter; because no two things simultaneously arising act mutually as cause and effect; for example, a pair of horns of a cow. Moreover, we do not say that an object is co-existent with its self which is no other than that object. For, the term ‘co-existence’ denotes some connection between two distinct objects. But you do not admit that there is an object distinct from consciousness. Therefore how can you call such an object co-existent?

[The author replies:] It is true. But, as different images [in consciousness] are [experienced], we describe them [as if they are] distinct [from consciousness]. We assume that consciousness is possessed of distinctions [in itself] for the reason that there exists the divergence between the perceptible part and image-part [of consciousness].

[The opponent continues:] If it is so; then, the nature of being condition-cause (pratyayatva) will [as you assume] constitute what is grasped (grahya). 33 No object of assumed character could be regarded as possessing the self-substance. Now such an object

33 See Pārthasārathimis'ra, Ślokavārtikavyākhyā, p. 309; कारणस्येव भवति प्राह्य (V. Additional Notes, last page.)
becomes something other than the condition-cause indeed.

[The author answers:] This is not contradictory [to our experience]. [The preceding moment of] consciousness, as it has been grasped as a distinct object, is accepted as a condition-cause just like its disappearance of immediate preceding moment (samanantaranirodha) a condition-cause. The moment a consciousness of homogeneous character (sabhāga) disappears, the same consciousness is regarded as cause into four ways.⁴

⁴ Four causes are: hetu, ālambana, samanantara and adhipati.
TIBETAN VERSION OF THE 
ĀLAMBANAPARĪKṢĀ

Rgya. gar. skad. du | Ā. lam. ba. na. pa. ri. kṣā ||
Bod. skad. du | dmigs. pa. bṛtag. pa ||

Saṅs. rgyas. daṅ. byaṅ. chub. sems. dpaḥ. thams. cad. la. phyag. ḥtshal. lo ||
1. Dbaṅ. poḥi. rnam. par. rig. paḥi. rgyu l phra. rab. rdul. dag. yin. mod. kyi l der. mi. snaṅ. phyir. deḥi. yul. ni l rdul. phran. ma. yin. dbaṅ. po. bzhin ||
2. gaṅ. ltar. snaṅ. de. de. las. min l rdzas. su. med. phyir. zla. gñis. bzhin l de. ltar. phyi. rol. gñi. gar. yaṅ l blo. yi. yul. du. mi. ruṅ. no ||
3. kha. cig. ḥdus. paḥi. rnam. pa. dag l sgrub. pa. yin. par. ḥdod. par. byed l rdul. phran. rnam. pa. rnam. rig. gi l don. min. sra. śid. la. sogs. bzhin ||
4. de. dag. ltar. na. bum. pa. daṅ l kham. phor. sogs. blo. mtshuṅs. par. ḥgyur l gal. te. rnam. paḥi. dbye. bas. dbye l de. ni. rdul. phran. rdzas. yod. la ||
5. med. de. tshad. dbye. med. phyir. ro l
de. phyir. de. rdzas. med. la. yod l
rdul. phran. yoñs. su. bsal. na. ni l
der. snañ. s'es. pa. flams. ḥgyur. phyir ll

6. nañ. gi. s'es. byaḥi. ŋo. bo. ni l
phyi. rol. ltar. snañ. gañ. yin. te l
don. yin. rnam. s'es. ŋo. boḥi. phyir l
deḥi. rkyen. Ḩid. kyañ. yin. phyir. ro ll

7. gcig. chaḥañ. mi. ḥkhrul. phyir. na. rkyen l
nus. pa. ḥjog. phyir. rim. gyis. yin
lhan. cig. byed. dbañ. nus. pa. yi l
ŋo. bo. gañ. yin. dbañ. poḥañ. yin ll

8. de. yañ. rnam. rig. la. mi. ḥgal l
de. ltar. yul. gyi. ŋo. bo. dañ l
nus. pa, phan. tshun. rgyu. can. dañ l
thog. ma. med. dus. ḥjug. yin ll

Dmigs. pa. brtag. pa. rab. tu. byed. pa. slob. ḏpon.
phyogs. kyi. glañ. pos. mdzad. pa. rdzosgs. so ll
Saûs. rgyas. dañ. byañ. chub. sems. dpañ. thams. cad. la. phyag. ḥtshal. lo


dbañ. pohi. rnam. par. rig. pahi. rgyu
phra. rab. rdul. dag. yin. mod. kyi
der. mi. sñañ. phyir. deñi. yul. ni
rdul. phran. ma. yin. dbañ. po. bzhin

yul. zhes. bya. ba. ni. s'ès. pas. rañ. gi. ño. bo. ñes. par. hdzin. pa. yin. te l deñi. rnam. par. skye. bañi.
phyir. ro ll rdul. phra. mo. dag. ni. deši. rgyu. šid. yin. du. zin. kyaṅ. de. lta. ma. yin. te. dба̃. po. bzhin. no ll de. ltar. na. re. zhig. rdul. phra. mo. dag. dmigs. pa. ma. yin. no ll ḥdus. pa. ni. der. snaṅ. ba. šid. yin. du. zin. kyaṅ l
gañ. ltar. snaṅ. de. de. las. min l
don. gaan. zhig. raṅ. snaṅ. baḥi. rnam. par. rig. pa. skyed. pa. de. ni. dmigs. pa. yin. par. rigs. te l ḥdi. ltar. de. ni. skye. baḥi. rkyen. šid. du. bsad. pas. so ll ḥdus. pa. ni. de. lta. yaṅ. ma. yin. te l
rdzas. su. med. phyir. zla. gņis. bzhin l
dbaṅ. po. ma. tshaṅ. baḥi. phyir, zla. ba. gņis. mthon. ba. ni. der. snaṅ. ba. šid. yin. du. zin. kyaṅ. deši. yul. ma. yin. no ll de. bzhin. du. rdzas. su. yod. pa. ma. yin. pa. šid. kyis. rgyu. ma. yin. paḥi. phyir. ḥdus. pa. dmigs. pa. ma. yin. no ll
de. ltar. phyi. rol. gņi. gar. yaṅ l
blo. yi. yul. du. mi. ruṅ. no ll 2 ll
yan. lag. gcid. ma. tshaṅ. baḥi. phyir l phyi. rol. gyi. rdul. phra. mo. daṅ. tshogs. pa. zhes. bya. baḥi don. ni. dmigs. pa. ma. yin. no ll ḥdi. la. ni.
kha. cig. ḥdus. paḥi. rnam. pa. dag l
sgrub. pa. yin. par. ḥdod. par. byed l
don. thams. cad. ni. rnam. pa. du. ma. can. yin. pas. de. la. rnam. pa. ḥgaḥ. zhig. gis. mṅon. sum. du. ḥdod. do ll rdul. phra. rab. rnam. la. yaṅ. ḥdus. par. snaṅ. baḥi. s'es. pa. bskyed. paḥi. rgyuḥi. dnos. po. yod. do ll
rdul. phran. rnam. pa. rnam. rig. gi

don. min. sra. ŋid. la. sog. bzhiṅ || 3 ||

ji. ltar. sra. ba. ŋid. la. sog. pa. ni. yod. bzhiṅ. du.
yāṅ. mig. gi. bloḥi. yul. ma. yin. pa. ltar. rdul. phra.
mo. ŋid. kyaṅ. ḥdraḥo ||

de. dag. ltar. na. bum. pa. daṅ ||
kham. phor. sog. blo. mtshuṅs. par. ḥgyur ||

bum. pa. daṅ. kham. phor. la. sog. paḥi. rdul.
phra. mo. rnama. la. ni. maṅ. du. zin. kyaṅ. khyad. par.
ḥgaḥ. yaṅ. med. do ||

gal. te. rnam. paḥi. dbye. bas. dbye ||

gal. te. ḥdi. sṅam. du. mgrin. pa. la. sog. paḥi.
rnama. paḥi. khyad. par. las. gaṅ. gis. na. bloḥi. khyad.
par. du. ḥgyur. baḥi. khyad. par. yod. do. sṅam. du.
sems. na. khyad. par. ḥdi. ni. bum. pa. la. sog. pa. la.
yod. kyi ||

de. ni. rdul. phran. rdzas. yod. la || 4 ||
med. de. tshad. dbye. med. ḥhyir. ro ||

rdul. phra. rab. rnama. ni. rdzas. gzhan. yin. du.
zin. kyaṅ. zlum. po. la. ni. med. do ||

de. ḥhyir. de. rdzas. med. la. yod ||

rnama. paḥi. dbye. ba. ni. kun. rdzob. tu. yod. pa.
dag. kho. na. la. yod. kyi. rdul. phra. mo. rnama. la.
ma. yin. no || bum. pa. la. sog. pa. ni. kun. rdzob. tu.
yod. pa. ŋid. de ||

rdul. phran. yoṅs. su. bsal. na. ni ||
der. snaṅ. ses. pa. ŋama. ḥgyur. ḥhyir || 5 ||
rdzas. su. yod. pa. rnams. la. ni. ḡbre. pa. can-
bsal. du. zin. kyaṅ. kha. dog. la. sogs. pa. bhzin. du. raṅ-
ghi. blo. ḡdod. pa. med. do II de. lta. bas. na. dbaṅ. poḥi.
blo. rnams. kyi. yul. ni. phyi. rol. na. ma. yin. par-
ḥthad. do II

naṅ. gi. s’es. byaḥi. ņo. bo. ni I
phyi. rol. lta. snaṅ. gaṅ. yin. te I
don. yin

phyi. rol. gyi. don. med. bzhin. du. phyi. rol. lta
bur. snaṅ. ba. naṅ. na. yod. pa. kho. na. dmigs. paḥi.
rkyen. yin. no II

rnam. s’es. ņo. boḥi. phyir I
deḥi. rkyen. ŋid. kyaṅ. yin. phyir. ro II 6 II

naṅ. gi. rnam. par. s’es. pa. ni. don. du. snaṅ. ba.
daṅ I de. las. skyes. pa. yin. pas I chos. ŋid. gšis. daṅ.
ldan. paḥi. phyir. naṅ. na. yod. pa. kho. na. dmigs.
paḥi. rkyen. yin. no II
re. zhig. de. lta. snaṅ. ba. ŋid. yin. la. reg. na I
deḥi. phyogs. gcig. po. lhan. cig. skyes. pa. go. ji. lta.
rkyen. yin. zhe. na I

gcig. chaḥaṅ. mi. ḡkhrul. phyir. na. rkyen I

lhan. cig. par. gyur. du. zin. kyaṅ. ḡkhrul. ba. med.
paḥi. phyir. gzhan. las. skyes. paḥi. rkyen. du. ḡgyur.
tel ḡdi. lta. gtan. tshigs. pa. dag. ni. yod. pa. daṅ.
med. pa. dag. gi. de. daṅ. ldan. pa. ŋid. ni. rgyu. daṅ.
ḥbras. bu. rgyu. daṅ. ldan. paḥi. rim. gis. skye. ba.
dag. gi. yaṅ. mtshan. ŋid. yin. par. smraḥo II
yaṅ. na.

*nus. pa. hjo. phy. rim. gyis. yin*

rim. gyis. kyaṅ. yin. te l don. du. snaṅ. ba. de. ni. raṅ. daṅ. mthun. pahi. ḭbras. bu. skyed. par. byed. pahi. nus. pa. rnam. par. s’es. pahi. rten. can. byed. pas. mi. ḭgal. lo l

gal. te. ho. na. naṅ. gi. gzugs. kho. na. dmigs. pahi. rkyen. yin. na l ji. ltar. de. daṅ. mig. la. brten. nas. mig. gi. rnam. par. s’es. pa. skye. zhe. na l

*lhan. cig. byed. dbaṅ nus. pa. yi l

ño. bo. gaṅ. yin. dbaṅ. ḭpo. lhan. yin l 7 l
dbaṅ. po. ni. raṅ. gi. ḭbras. bu. las. nus. pahi. ño. bo. ñid. du. rjes. su. dpag. gi. ḭbyuṅ. ba. las. gyur. pa. ñid. du. ni. ma. yin. no l

de. yaṅ. rnam. rig. la. mi. ḭgal l

nus. pa. ni. rnam. par. s’es. pa. la. yod. kyaṅ. ruṅ l bstan. tu. med. pahi. raṅ. gi. ño. bo. la. yod. kyaṅ. ruṅ. ste. ḭbras. bu. bskyed. pa. la. khyad. par. med. do l

de. ltar. yul. gyi. ño. bo. daṅ l

*nus. pa. phan. tshun. rgyu. can. daṅ l

thog. ma. med. dus. ḭjug. yin l 8 l

s'es. pa. dañ. de. gñis. gzhan. ñid. dañ l gzhan. ma. yin-pa. ñid. du. ci. dgar. brjod. par. byaṭo ll
del tar. na. nañ. gi. dmigs. pa. ni. chos. ñid. gñis-dañ. 1dan. paḥi. phyir. yul. ñid. du. ḫthod. do ll

Dmigs. pa. brtag. paḥi. ḫgrel. pa. slob. dpon. phyogs. kyi. glaṅ pos. mdzad. pa. rdzogs. so ll
ADDITIONAL NOTES

Page 3, line 1. विज्ञान आलंबनम् Triśūkābhāṣya ed. S. Levi, p. 21. गोचरे विज्ञान आलंबन (=आलंबन)म्। Mad. vṛtti ed. L. V. Poussin p. 364, 7. Ālambana stands for ālambana-pratya—So explain the Chinese translators, Paramārtha and Hiu'an Tsang. It may also be clear from Dharmapāla's comment, pp. 21-22 above. Ālambana-pratya is explained by Candrakīrti: उद्ययमात्र थर्मो चन आलम्बनेन उत्परते स तस्य आलंबनप्रत्ययः। Mad. vṛtti, p. 77, 2. (Cf. S'ālistamba Sūtra: चनुविज्ञानस्य... हंतमाल्मनकठयं करोति। Ibid. pp. 567, 9.) आलंबनम्-इवालंबनम्। विश्लेषकृत्त्वा तथायोगमालम्बनम् आलंबनप्रत्ययः। सर्वो धर्मोः। Madhyamakāvatāra (Sanskrit text) pp. 12, 2. Another interpretation is also given by him: इत्यद्योपत्थानवत्त् चतुर्भैवतः हेतुत उद्ययमात्र आलंबनमथित-ढुलनेन चन आलम्बनेन उत्परते स आलंबनप्रत्ययः। Ibid. p. 12, 7. According to this interpretation ālambana is an element (dharma) by support of which a consciousness arises, that is to say, a supporting element in the process of cognition is ālambana. S. Yamaguchi and H. Meyer, on the authority of the Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu (chaps. I and II, p. 307, ll. 5-6) and of the Triśūkābhāṣya of Sthiramati, p. 21 (निमित्तं तद्भ- (=विषय) विशेषो नीलपीतायालंबनमवल्प्याग्रामणोऽ।) translate everywhere the term ālambana as "perceivable object". And Yas'ōmitra's comment makes the point clearer: विश्लेषयर्थायालंबनं तद्वत् तत्तस्य आलंबनं भवेत। महेष्वरान्नतिः pp. 1, 18, 17.

P. 3, l. 1. चक्षुराभि Dharmapāla comments that the five-fold consciousness is meant here. Hiu'an Tsang follows him. But, according to Paramārtha six-fold consciousness is meant there with addition of manoviśnāna. Vinditadeva is said to agree with Paramārtha here.
P. 3, l. 2. Omit in the Sanskrit text the word "शास्त्रः" after तत्त्वात्मातः.

P. 3, ll. 1—3. Vasubandhu in his Viśṣṭikā and its bhaṣya, speaks of three different opinions on the external things: (1) The first opinion is that the object of our cognition is one (eka), i.e. one whole (avayavin); (2) the second one is that it is many, i.e. atoms, and (3) the third view is: it is the collocation of atoms (saṅghāta). The first opinion is held by Vaiśeṣikas. The holders of other two views are not named there (see Appendix A, p. 105 below). According to the commentary of Vinitadeva on the Viśṣṭākaprakaraṇa as recorded by the French translators, the second opinion, that is referred to by Diṇṇāga as the first, is that the numerous atoms exist allowing amongst themselves some intermediate space = r dul. phra. rab. phrag. can. de. gnas. du. ma. The third one that is referred to by D. as the second, affirms that the atoms exist without any intermediate space amongst themselves = rdul. phra. rab. de. dag. bar. med. par. gnas; that is to say, these atoms which have reciprocal support are united = phan. thsun. bltos. pa. dañ. bcas. pahi. rdul. phra. rab. de. dag. ḫdus. pa (French trans., p. 48, n. 3).

Again Vasubandhu in his' Koṣa, says that it is the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣikas who hold that the atoms exist with some interspace and in close vicinity, (सान्त्र: परमाल्यः) but do not get combined, and that Bhadanta [Vasubandhu] asserts that the atoms exist without any interspace, and due to this, they are called "combined" (nirantaratve tu spṛṣṭa saṁjñā). Compare Tattvasaṅgraha with Paśijkā, p. 197: समानवाचासद् क्षुद्रविधि सूक्ष्मविधिः। नैस्त्रविष्ठत्वकुलभवति समानत्वतः... तथा नैस्त्रविष्ठत्वकुलभवति समानत्वतः... See again on p. 552: Bhadanta-Subhagupta’s view: परमाल्यविष्ठत्वकुलविभाषिण्यः सजातीयानं युग्यप्रमूणां यथौ इति मानसो विद्यमो भवति। But there is no real combination of atoms (sparso na asti). See Abh. Koṣa, Tib. text, pp. 82-3). Both these schools seem to hold that the atoms are direct objects of our cognition. Therefore Diṇṇāga might have included both these opinions in the first of the two. He might have meant by the theory of saṅghāta the Vaiśeṣikas’ opinion. This may be clear from
Vinitadeva's comment p. 47 above. It may also be pointed out here that Kamalas'ila has recorded three views on the atomic theory (see his Paññikā, p. 556, 8, and my paper "Śaṅkara on Buddhist Idealism," published in the Journal of S. V. Oriental Institute, Vol. I, part 2, p. 82.) Jainas are also credited with the opinion that the atoms are direct objects of our perception. (See note 6 on p. 4 above).

P. 3, l. 4. A long note has been put on the word "vijnāpti" by S. Yamaguchi and H. Meyer.

P. 3, l. 8. According to the Chinese translations, we may read in Sanskrit: सहारेतः तद्वाम्, etc.

P. 4, l. 1. We may read in the Sanskrit स एव द्वृत्ततिश्रवण इति वचनात् (bo'ad. pas. so) for यत्र: स . . . उच्चयते। According to Vinitadeva pratyaya is meant nimittapratyaya, see French trans. p. 52, l. 7.

Ibid., p. 43, 2. Dharmapāla also here refers to the Āgama, असिन्न वाति इति भवति, etc.

P. 4, l. 9. कैश । Dharmapāla does not give any indication as to who were the advocates of this opinion. Vinitadeva says that this is the opinion of Vāgbhaṭa and others—which is not confirmed in Taranatha's Geschichte des Buddhismus (pp. 311-313). Kouechi, the commentator on the Siddhi of Hiuan Tsang presents this third thesis as that of Saṅghabhadra, (see La Siddhi, p. 45, and Fren. Trans. p. 52. n. 11). I have already pointed out that Bhadanta Subhagupta might be a representative of this view in later period (see note 4, on p. 4 above). The earlier Buddhists, Sarvāstivādins may also be said to have held this opinion. Cf. Tattvasaṅgraha, p. 197: समाज्ञालाक्षं मेव विवेक बिषय। ।।। तथा मैत्रयज्ञितामेवास्तत्त्वदार्थसंबंधम्-वेदनान्तोत्तरसूतविषयम्। प्रत्येकविषय:। cp. Ibid., p. 552, Subhagupta's view: परमाणुमात्रलिङ्गहरू भजातियालाई युगपत्रहरू स्थूल इति मानिस बिग्रामो भवति। Observe Vinitadeva's comment below: साक्षाकार: = प्रत्येकविषय:।

P. 4, l. 9. साक्ष = sgrub. pa. Hiuan Tsang translates it as pratyaya. But Paramārtha explains thus: अणि: सहिता: पदार्थासाधारण। see p. 13 above. Vinitadeva comments thus: hduqs. pa'hi. rnam. pa. rnam. par. ses. pa'hi. rgyu. nid. kgyur. ro: the state of
combination becomes as the cause of the consciousness. (See Fren. Trans. p. 52, n. 12).

P. 4, l. 9. Vinitadeva says that the state of combination is here the gross form, sañcītūkāra = sthūlākāra. See La Siddhi, p. 45. (Fren. trans., p. 53, n. 13).

P. 4, l. 12 ver. 3 a-b. According to Vinitadeva this is the statement of the opponent. Dharmapāla also seems to have meant the same. So we may supply before this the following: समक्षताकरः न अर्थाकरः। यदि स्मातः, अर्थाकः स्मातः। See Dharmapāla's comment here. But Paramārtha and Hiuan Tsang interpret that this is the refutation of the above view by the author.

P. 5, l. 3 ver. 4 c-d. Hiuan Tsang introduces this line thus: चतुरान्वितन्तत्त्वमात्रशिष्टमात्रारावै पुनर्लित दोषाल्पर्यं।

P. 5, l. 6. Note Paramārtha and Hiuan Tsang have much simplified this sentence. See p. 14 above.

P. 5, l. 15. See Paramārtha and Hiuan Tsang for clearer interpretation of the passage.

Ver. 5 c-d. cp. Nyāya Sūtra, IV, 2, 25: यदवः विवेचनातु भावान्त्व वायुप्रायनविअविन्यस्तवकर्तिः पद्धतिवायप्रायक्षितव तद्दुपलक्षितः।

P. 5, l. 17. According to Vinitadeva, the nature which is capable of being perceived is the characteristic of the object, that is to say, the knowable aspect (grāhyabhāga). (Fren. Trans.) See Dharmapāla’s comment: हेतुसं नार्याण्य: विज्ञानमहस्म: विषयाकारोऽवै स्मृति इति प्रदर्श्यति। see p. 36.

P. 6, l. 1. Here Paramārtha’s version agrees with Dharmapāla’s comment.

Ver 7 a-b: quoted by Pārthasārathi Mis'ra in him comment on S'lokavārtika, pp. 311, 312:

प्रमियोऽध्विनिधिविद्वारारस्तः शक्तिर्वैक्तिकवाटः।

P. 6, l. 8. There are 4 pratyayas, (1) hetu, (2) samantara, (3) ālambana, (4) adhipati. Abhidh-kos'avyākhyā, p. 18, 22. These are well explained in the Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 77.

P. 6, l. 9. The following is the Tibetan text: Yod. pa. daṅ, med. pa. dag. gi. de. dag. ldan. pa. ḳid. ni. rgyu. daṅ. ḳbras bu.
rgyu. daṅ. ldan. paḥi. rim. gyis. skye. ba. dag. gi. yan. mtshan. ṭid. yin. pa., lit.: भावाभावयोगस्थलार्थ हि द्वेषुत्तमसत्ववस्थायो: बहृण जायमानयोरपि लक्षणम्।
Both Paramārtha and Hiuan Tsang are not very helpful in interpreting this quotation.

P. 6, l. 13. This is a quotation from a Sūtra. See e.g. Śālistamba Sūtra: चत्व: प्रतीतव च च ... चान्बः वानमुपि. Madhya. vṛtti, p. 567, 8 and p. 6, with notes thereon by Prof. Poussin.

P. 7, l. 1. This view is much criticised by Candrakīrti. See his Madh. Avatāra, my restored Sanskrit text with Bhāṣya, VI, 62 ff. and 57-9.

P. 7, l. 4. According to Diśnāga, the nature of the organ is inexplicable. So he seems to have anticipated all criticisms levelled by Candrakīrti against his view that the sense-organs are some forces (sakti).

P. 7, l. 7. Cp. Ślokavārtika, Śūnyavāda, ver. 17: अन्योन्यवेशेऽव्यति चैव ब्युष्मशतपायोर्मादिका।

P. 7, l. 9. “The consciousness which appears as though it is the external object, but it arises undifferentiated” is explained in the commentary of Vīnītādeva thus: ma. ses. paḥi. don. gyi. rnam. pa. can. gyi, rnam. par. ses. pa = consciousness possessing the characteristics of the object not differentiated. That is, according to the doctrine of those who affirm the external object, the consciousness arises depending upon the object substantially differentiated. But the school of Vijñaptimātratā does not accept the object substantially differentiated.

Vīnītādeva, after having given another explanation on the bāhyārthajñāna, says:

“Other [school] asserts: It is the consciousness which appears as an inexpressible object. Vīnītādeva refutes this assertion in these terms: “But, in this case, there is every necessity to say “inexpressible”. For, all the proper characteristics are inexpressible. Therefore, if the perception which appears as these proper characteristics, arises, what arises in reality? (sic). If one says: “one could not assert that the perception arises in possessing the characteristic
of the object "", then, is it that which is not expressible, because there is nothing, or because it is there justly the proper characteristic? In all cases, if it is so (1) because there is nothing, this not logic, for one could express the very non-existence. For example, one could express the horns of a rabbit, etc. If it is so (2) because it is justly the proper characteristic, we have just refuted this [proposition, in saying: all the proper characteristics are inexpressible].

What Paramārtha translates on this subject by: louan che pu ko yen chi hsia̍ng (= Chunksani̍naamam̄i̍da̍n̄g) is justly this last doctrine which Vinitadeva has just refuted." (Fren. trans.) Pārtha-sārathi Mis'ra has ably presented the standpoint of the Vijñānavādins that the object, blue, etc. is not different from its consciousness, see his comment on S'lokavārtika, p. 274.

P. 7, l. 11, and p. 54. l. 12. After "different" and "non different" Paramārtha adds "inexpressible" pu ko ch'ouo, ana-bhilāpya, (or anirvācyā). One could not find this word either in the Tibetan text or in the text of Hiuan Tsang. But, if one takes account of the phrase of Vinitadeva one could explain why "inexpressible" finds its way in the text of Paramārtha. Vinitadeva in his commentary, says: (gal. te. dnos. kyi. tshul. dpyad. na. ni. dẹi. tsha. nus. pa. rnam. gnas. skabs. kyi. khyad. par. gyi. bdag. nid. yin. pas. kun. rdzod. tu. yod. pa'i. phyir. rnam. par. ves. pa. las. gzhan. nid. dam. gzhan. ma. yin. pa. nid. du. brjod. par. bya. ba. ma. yin. no.) "If one examines transcendently (paramārthena) the proper nature [of dominant forces], they are then inexpressible whether they are or not of a nature different from consciousness. For, being the proper nature of a characteristic of a stage of forces (śakti), they exist but conventionally" (śaktinām avasthāaviseṣātmakaṇṭvena saṁyptisattvāl). This explanation signifies: things being not capable of existing in proper nature, one could not give any designations "different" or "non different", but one could simply call them "different" or "non different" when they are considered as conventional things."
This is justly the principal doctrine of Nāgārjuna; for, in the opinion of Paramārtha, one finds always the trace of the ideas of Nāgārjuna rather than in that of Hiuan Tsang. Thus the thesis of a conception “inexpressible” will not be accidental, but rather fundamental. (Fren. trans.)

French translators have taken the Tibetan word “ gnas skabs” to be “ av.īkūṣa” and therefore rendered “lieu determine.” But the exact Sanskrit equivalent will be here “avasthā” = “stage” or “condition.”

P. 39, l. 13. प्रक्षेत्रभावं प्राथमितम्; cf. Pārthasarathi Misra’s comment on Slokaavar. p. 309 : कारणानात्रायं कहताः प्राथमितम्।

P. 42, l. 2. “Consciousness grasps the form of its own”: cf. Ibid., p. 325 : संवेदनात्मां नं भिन्नम्। नायात्मनं: संवेदं संमभवति।

P. 50. n. 37, horns of the right and left of the ox, etc. cp. Ibid., p. 310. संवेदक्षणार्थस्तु।

P. 50, n. 40. Cf. Ibid., p. 310. ver. 153. तद्वरभवाविभागां हेतुः।

P. 54, l. 6. Undifferentiated from the perceivable object. cf. Ibid., p. 325 : संवेदनात्माः न भिन्नम्। l. 12. Ibid., p. 342 ver. 255.

PP. 56-57 (pp. 22-23). Compare the criticism of the sixth sense, manas as accepted by Earlier Buddhists and Naiyāyikas, etc. with the verse:

न सुवादिदी प्रेमेयं ता मनो वास्तीनित्यान्तरम्।
अनिशेषाहुपात्लोचनं-येन्न्त्रकश्च ब्रह्म॥

Cited from Diṅnāga by Vācaspati Misra in his Nyāyavārt-tātparya-āṭīkā, p. 97.

It is to be understood that the Vijnānavādins deny only the material character of the manas as accepted by Realists, but do not deny it as such. Note Yasomitra’s Comm.: बचारादश्यणे श्रु धर-विज्ञानायतिरिक्तोप्यति मनोयथाय। (Abh. Kosavya p. 40, l. 24). As to the opinion of the Earlier Buddhists, the same authority remarks: तत्स्वप्निविचारो अधि इंद्रवलुक मनोविज्ञानवाहोताराम्यं कत्यावदि। तथासूद्धिताबधवच्चैव विद्य हि तेषां स्मरणितेति। आहुष्य हरित च इत्यादिम आह। आपिश्वासवद्वितिः। (Ibid.).
According to the Vaibhāṣika-Sautrāntikas, manas is defined by Vasubhandhu as below:

वण्णमन्तरातीतं विहारं वद्धि तत्मनः।
वष्णयवसिद्वधर्मं घात्योद्धादश स्वतः॥

Abh. Kos'a, I, 17.

Sāntarakṣita also explains it in the same manner:

चायुविविविकां तु मनोर्व्यामार्पयुप्तेः।
वण्णमन्तरोद्वृत्तप्रत्ययो यो हि तत्मनः॥


Speaking of the manas, Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky writes:

Yogācāra-Sautrāntikas do not admit manas as 6th organ. The Older Hinayanists reckon 6 organs of senses, 5 outer senses and one inner sense. The Realists, Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas and Sāṅkhya characterise mind as a 6th organ. The Mādhyamikas and Vedantins also do the same. (Buddh. Logic. II, p. 318, n. 9).

P. 57, l. 15 and p. 22, l. 1. (तक्षण्येन) Cf. Vasubandhu’s Viṃśikābhāṣya, ed. S. Levi, p. 11. तक्षण्येन तत्मनः सा सर्वथा गोचर हवाहि। बुधमोक्षः॥

P. 58, n. 5. Tattvas. paññikā, p. 825: तथां तत्मन (मनः) सर्वविविवम्।
तथां न तत्मन स्वात्तेऽत्तेऽत्तम्यायायक्षेत्रस्थिति। अन्यानविविवायाः स्वात्तेऽत्तमः॥


P. 61, last line. There are two views regarding saṅghāta (=paramāṇusāmāṇyaalakṣaṇa), viz. one is held by Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣikas, and the other probably by other Vaibhāṣikas. In his Kosabhāṣya, Vasubandhu has clearly expressed the former’s view thus: काश्मीर[वेदांतिक] अन्तः। [परमाणयो] न स्वस्येवः। . . . . . सार्वविविवम्। प्रक्षेतरस्य। निरस्त्वाद् हि प्रक्षेतरस्य। . . . . . श्रेयैः तत्त्वादि निरस्त्वादि बन्ध्वे नाशितं विमितं [आयोक्ष्यः।] अवि खल्ल संप्रचारः: सार्वविविवम् इव्वेजः। (Abhi. Kos'a, Tib. text, p. 82.)

a. Cf. संप्रचारस्तु परस्तरः संप्रचारस्ते हि काश्मीरवेदांतिकः। His Viṃśikābhāṣya, p. 7, l. 10., and p. 106 below.
This saṅghāta is, for them, different from atoms (v. Yaśomitra's comment: यथा वैमािकिक: तत्त्वयति | p. 89, l. 20).

Other Vaibhāṣikas, on the other hand, maintain that the aggregates are not different from atoms: न च परामाण्यवेदोऽवै च विश्वाता: त एव वि च विश्वाते स्वतंत्रते। यथा रूपाते। (Abh. Kos'a, Tib. p. 83, l. 15). यथा परामाण्यविश्वाती: न स वेदोऽवै च विश्वातम्। (Vumiśika bhāṣya, p. 7, l. 11 and p. 106 below).

According to Dharmakirti, Dīnāga pleads for the external reality from the standpoint of the latter Vaibhāṣikas. This will be clear from the following extracts:

विश्वाता सवितातांवा: पञ्चविश्वाक्यं इति सिद्धान्तं। "तत्त्वज्ञानमेव-त्वात् श्वाये सामायिकोऽवै। इति चोकम् (पराराज्ञानवे)। अताह।

अर्थनिर्णयमीववादात् जाते वेदोऽवैपपरे।

उपासते सविताते हि निश्चित साधनं: || Ibid., 195.

ॐ: उष्ण: सवितातांवा: [पञ्च] विश्वाक्याकाया इत्यादि। शास्त्रविदत् एव, हि निश्चितमुक्तम्: तत्त्वज्ञानवापीतवात्वतिवादिना।

अष्टां श्वाये विश्वशब्द नानारेपयवातन्वत।

तद्विदांवादमात् शास्त्रविदम् सामायिकंवरम् || Ibid., 196.

ॐः अष्टां श् च शास्त्रविदायमात्मकोऽवैषयोऽवैषयोऽवै: . . . . . . न हि प्रत्येकमन्वो द्वया। फिल्न हि शिद्धताय एव। . . . . एकस्मन परमाणी विद्वास्तिवादात् सामायिकोवर शिद्धतपरमाणुपादविवर्त्स्यं क्रमात्स्या तत्ववादिना। न हि परमाणवतिर्विसामायिकविविधम्।

Exactly this same opinion is expressed by the opponents in saying "the general quality of atoms", etc.

P. 61, n. 12. तत्र वुर्ध्वाल्करा, etc. Pramāṇavār. II. 224, p. 73, l. 3. The holders of this view may be some of the Vaibhāṣikas who maintain that the single atoms are not objects of our cognition, but their generality (सम्य Nairobi=सहिति) does so. Cf. the above extracts from Pramāṇavār. and vṛtti thereon.
P. 85, l. 10. (=p. 39, l. 9). This objection, according to Nyāyavinis'caya of Akalaṇṭka, has been made by Bhadanta Subhaguṭa; see Subhaguṭa's passage cited by Akalaṇṭka: 

तद्भवत \( \text{तद्भवत} \) शवभण्डक ।

विधिवसयं हेतु: (स्त्रीपञ्चमम:) ।

यस्मात ।

सहस्रवधश्च लोकेष्योस्य(स्था)श्रेयवन्वेन विना कथित।

विधिवसयं ततो हेतूस्यसिद्ध सहवेदनम्॥

(Nyāyavinis'caya, Akalaṇṭkatraya, pp. 159-60).

P. 85, n. 33. The idea is well expressed by Dharmakirti in this verse:

भिन्नकार्येन प्राग्यभिति चेत प्राग्यतां विदु: ।

हेतुत्वमेव युक्तिः: हानाकारणणश्चकम्॥

Pramāṇavārtika, II, 247.

This verse is often quoted by other writers: Vācaspatimis'ra; N. Tātparyāṭikā, p. 101; Pārthasārathimis'ra: Ś'lok. Comment, p. 283 and Advayavajraśaṅgraha, p. 17.
APPENDIX

A

VASUBANDHU’S CRITICISM OF THE EXTERNAL THINGS

[The following is the extract from Vasubandhu’s Viṁśiṭikā with bhāṣya, ed. S. Levi. Vasubandhu, the earlier champion of the Vijñānavāda school, criticises, there, in his own way, the views of those who hold the external things to be real. I have reproduced the particular portion of Vasubandhu’s arguments in favour of his thesis, vijñāptimātrata, reality of only consciousness and nothing else, to facilitate comparison with Diṇṇāga’s method of argument.]

न तदेकं न चानेकं विषयः परमाणुः ।
न च ते संहता वस्मात्यरमाणूः सिद्ध्यति ॥ ११ ॥

इति किंचुकं भवति । यत्रवृद्धादिकमायतनं रूपादिविभज्ञीनां प्रवेकं विषया स्यात्, तदेकं वा स्यात् यथावच्छिन्नं कल्प्यते वैशेषिके : अनेकं वा परमाणुः । संहता वा त एव परमाणवः । न ताबदेकं विषयों भवति । अववेयेिम्योद्यस्यावच्छिन्नत्वत् कथितच्चिद्यमहान् । नाप्यनेकम् परमाणूः
प्रयेकमहणात्। नापि ते संहता विषयीभवनति। यस्मात्वरमणरेंकं द्रव्यं न सिद्धति। कथं न सिद्धति। यस्मात्।

पद्भेदः वृणोमोगालपरमाणोः पद्धशताः।

पह्यो दिःम: पाहिः परमाणुभिःगङ्गवोगो सति परमाणोः। पद्धशता प्रभृतिः। एक्षम् यो देशः तत्रान्यस्यास्मभवात्।

पण्णा समानदेशलालविण्डः स्याद्युमात्रः। ॥ १२ ॥

अथ य एवकः परमाणोदेशः स एष पण्णम्। तेन सर्वां समानदेशलालवब: पिण्डः परमाणुमात्रः स्याद् परस्पर[१]व्यतिरीकादिति न कथित्विण्डो दृश्यः स्याद्। नैव हि परमाणवः संयुज्यते, निरवयुज्यतः। मा भूदेव दोषपत्नः। संहतान्तर्वार्र्तिः संयुज्यते इति कामीवैभाषिका:।

त् इदं प्रश्न्यः। व: परमाणुः संवालो न स तेषोऽवांतरैतिः।

परमाणोसंयोगे तस्तत्त्वातेति कस्य सः।

संयोगै इति वर्तते।

न चानववयववलेन तत्संयोगे न सिद्धति। ॥ १३ ॥

१ Cf. Abhidharmakos'abhadāy (Tib.), p. 83, 17—19; and Vyākhyā, p. 89: परमाणवपरिनिमपति वक्तुकाम भाषायां विचारवति। यदि परमाणोऽरुक्रम पूर्वाक्विन्यासमेतः कृत्त्वत्त् etc. एव साधनम् न निरवर्धं: परमाण:। विमाभास्मेववल्लतः। मातारशिवत् इतिः।

२ तद्विहस्मेव विवर्णमेवत्त्वेन नेत्रचकित् वैभाषिका:। विस्माभास्मेवोः हि संवालस्यामेव कृत्त्वते। एवं ते वर्णयिता। धवधवतेव वल्लभास्मेव भिन्नदेशलयः। तेषां मैरस्तेयास्वस्यानानु अभिन्देशतं मा भूविति सावतारामपि सम्प्रतिपल्लेन

गतिः प्रतिवचन्त इति॥

३ Abh. Kos'abhadāy (Tib.), p. 82, 19: संवाल: साववयवल: स्याधिति।

Vyākhyā, p. 89, 7.

४ Ibid., p. 89, 20.
अथ संघाता अथ्यन्योन्यं न संज्ञयते। न तदहि परमाणूं निर-
वयवस्त्वसंयोगो न सत्यत्तिति वक्तव्यम्। साविक्ष्यापि हि संघातस्य
संयोगानमयुपगमात्। तस्मात् परमाणुःकेन इत्यं न सत्यति। यदि पर-
माणोः संयोग इष्ठये यदि वा नैपयते।

dिम्बागमेदो यस्यानि तत्सैकल्यं न युज्यते।

अन्यो हि परमाणोः पूर्विदि मानो याबद्धो विम्मान इति दिम्बागमेदे
सति कथं तदास्तक्तय परमाणोऽकलं योक्तये।

ढायावृत्ती कथं वा

यथेकैक्कथः परमाणोऽदिम्बागमेदो न स्यादू आदिल्योध्ये कथमन्यत्र
चाया मवति अन्यानातः। न हि तस्यान्य: प्रदेशोदक्ति यत्तापो न
स्यादू। आवरणं कथं मवति परमाण: परमाणवतरण यदि दिम्बाग-
मेदो नैपयते। न हि कथिद्रिपी परमाणोः परमाणगोपिति यत्रागमनाय्याद्वयना:
न्यास: प्रतिवात: स्यादू। अस्ति च प्रतिवाते सर्वं समावेश्यास्तवास्तवः
संघात: परमाणमात्र: स्यादिल्यक्तम। किमेव नैपयते पिण्डस्य तेन छाया-
वृत्ती न परमाणोरिति। कि ख़ल ज्ञानम्योऽन्य: पिण्ड इष्ठ्यते यथं ते
स्यात्माः। नेत्याहः।

अन्यो न पिण्डनाशने तथं ते ॥ १४ ॥

यदि नान्य: परमाणम्भय: पिण्ड इष्ठ्यते न ते तथं इति सिद्धं
भवति। संविशेषपरिक्कल्पं एष:। परमाणु: सङ्कात इति वा क्रिमयया
चिन्तया, लक्षणं रूपादि यदि न प्रतिविध्यते। कि पुनःस्तं लक्षणं
चक्रुरादिविषकं नीलादिल्यक्तं। तदेवेदं संप्रथायते। वच्चक्षुशारादीनां विषयोः
नीलायतादिकमिथ्यते। कि तदेकः द्रापमू अथवा तदनेकमिथि। किष्ठातः। अनेकले दोष उक्तः।

एकले न क्रमेनेतित्यूपेन महामही।

बिभिन्ननानेनक्रियति कुष्मानीक्षा च नो भवेत्। || १५ ||

यदि यावदविभिन्नानं नानेकं चक्षुनो विष्यः तदेकं द्रापं कर्पयते।

प्रत्येकं क्रमेनेतिनं स्वतं। गमनमिथिरं। सक्रामकाप्तेपेण सर्वस्य गतः

लात॥ अविभिमायतं च प्रह्लं परभाग्यं चामर्ह्लं युगपत स्वतं। न हि

तस्यैव तदानी अहमदामर्ह्लं युक्तं। बिभिन्नस्य चानेकस्य हस्त्वत्वाद्वादिकथा

अनेकं वृत्तं त्रिष्णं स्वातं। यवैव यों तत्रापामिथि कर्मं तयोऽविच्छेदेत

हयते। कर्थं वा तदेकं तथापि ताम्यायुं न च प्रायः तर्को तुवृत्तिर्भ्यं

अहमदामर्ह्ल। सुह्मानात्रौदकजन्तृत्वं स्थूलेः। समानहुप्प्यानानीक्षणं न स्वातं।

यदि रक्षणमेदादेव द्रापं नन्दमतं कल्पते नायण्या। तस्मातर्कं परमाणुशो

मेदः। कल्पनित्यं च। स चैवो न सिद्धन्ति। तय्यसिद्धौ रुपादीनां

चक्षुरादिविषयत्वमसिद्धमिथि सिद्धं विशिष्टायम् भवतीत्र।

प्रमाणवादादिकं नासितं वा निर्धारयते। सवेनान्त्र प्रमाणानां प्रत्यक्ष

प्रमाणं गर्डिसिल्वत्वमेव कथमिथि बुद्धिर्भवति प्रत्यक्षमिथि।

प्रत्यक्षबुद्धि: स्वामादी यथा

विनायणवेनिति पूर्बेऽव ज्ञापितम।

सा च यदा तदा।

न सोद्योऽद्यते तस्य प्रत्यक्षवर्गं कर्मं मतं। || १६ ||

यदा च सा प्रत्यक्षबुद्धि(न)भवति इदं मेघ प्रत्यक्षमिथि। तदा न

सोद्योऽद्यते। मनोविज्ञानेनीय परिच्छेदादेतु च चक्षुबिज्ञानस्य च तदा निरुद्ध-
ल्यादिति कथं तस्य प्रत्यक्षस्यनिष्ठयम्। विशेषेष्ण तु क्षणिकस्य विषयस्य
tद्वारां निरुद्धमेव तद्वृत्तें रसादित्कं वा॥

नानुभूतं मनोविज्ञानं स्यर्थ इत्यवदयमर्थार्थनुभोवेन भवितवेक्ष्यम्।
tच दर्शनमिलेवं तद्द्वियस्य रुपादेः प्रत्यक्षलं मतम्। असिद्धविद्यम्
अनुभूतस्यार्थस्य स्मरणं भवतीति। यस्मात्॥।

उकं यथा तदाभासा विज्ञति:
विनाप्यथेन यथार्थभासा चक्षुविज्ञानादिकं विज्ञसित्प्रयते तथोक्तम्।

स्मरणं ततः॥

tततो हि विज्ञते: स्मृतिसंयुक्ता तत्परिभासेऽवृत्तार्थिकलिप्तकामनोविज्ञानस्य
निष्ठयति इति न स्युतःवादार्थार्थनुभवः सिद्ध्यति॥ यदि यथा
स्यने विज्ञतिभूमतार्थविषया तथा जातितोद्भि स्यात्। तथैव तदभावं लोकः
स्यमवगच्छेद्। न च वें भवति। तस्मात् स्यम इवाधोपलब्धिः सर्वा
निरर्थिका: ह्यःमज्ञापकम्। यस्मात्॥।

स्यमः ह्यविज्ञयाभावं नाप्रबुद्धोष्वगच्छति॥ १७॥

एवं वितथविज्ञानयासवासवासातिद्रयप्रसठो लोकः स्यम इवाधार्थमयिः
पद्यनु अप्रबुद्धस्तदभावं यथावलावगच्छति। यदाः तु तत्ततिभिः
लोकोत्तरस्यार्थिनिविज्ञानसामात्रबुद्धो भवति। तदा १२तद्ध्वद्वशुद्धलोकिक-
ज्ञानसंमुखीभावात् विषयाभावं यथावलावगच्छतीति समानामेतत्॥।

1 See Mahāyānasūtrālāṅkāra XIV, 43 with Bhāṣya.
STHIRAMATI ON THE EXTERNAL THINGS

[The following extract is from the Bhāṣya (pp. 16-17) of Sthiramati on Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā, ed. S. Levi. Sthiramati is well-known to be one of the champions of the Āgamanusāri Vijñānavāda school. It will be seen from the extract below, that he has put forth for his view the arguments which are almost similar to those of his two predecessors, Vasubandhu and Diinnāga.]

...
C

YOGĀCĀRAS' CLASSIFICATION OF
PHENOMENA (DHARMAS)

महायानशतथ्यमन्त्रविवाधामुखमः

वोधिसत्वसुबन्धुकलम्

Mahāyānasatadharmavidyāmukham

[The following is the Sanskrit translation of a treatise above named from the Chinese version of Hsuan]

*Nanjio No. 1213, Shanghai ed. Vol. marked lai, part 10, fol. 11a.
Tsang. It is attributed to Bodhisattva Vasubandhu. It will be clear from the perusal of the treatise that it is merely a catalogue of a hundred dharmas into which the Yogācāras have classified the things external as well as internal as against the Vaibhāṣikas who have put them into seventy-five items. A detailed account of the classification of dharmas made by Vaibhāṣikas is given by Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky in his *Central Conception of Buddhism*; Appendix.

यथाह भगवान्। सर्वेषम् निरात्मका इति। [तत्र] के सर्वेषम्: ।
किण नैरात्मकृ। सर्वेषम्: संक्षेपे पद्धविया:— १ विचारधर्मी:, २ वैत-सिक्षधर्मी:, ३ रूपधर्मी:, ४ विचारविभेदस्तत्त्वधर्मी:, ५ असंस्कृतधर्मी।

इति।

प्रथमबिचारधर्मी: संक्षेपे अद्यप्रकारो भवति। १ चक्रविज्ञानम्:, २ श्रोतविज्ञानम्:, ३ ध्राणविज्ञानम्:, ४ जिज्ञासिज्ञानम्:, ५ कायचित्र-ज्ञानम्:, ६ मनोविज्ञानम्:, ७ मननविज्ञानम् (=किंतु मनो): ॥

बतायनमिति।

द्वितीयबिचारसिक्षधर्मी: संक्षेपे एकप्रशीशम्भिष्ठ: पद्धारिष्ठु विभक्तं।

† See Mah. Sūtrālaṅkāra, XI, 37. Prakaraṇāryavācā śāstra. as quoted by Prof. Tucci; v his article, The Idealistic School in Buddhism, p. 8, published in the Dacca University Bulletin, No. XII.

¹ The Vaibhāṣikas do not accept the last two types of consciousness, manana and Ālayavijñāna, and bring the other types under one group, viṣṇā, counted as one dharma.

² According to the Vaibhāṣikas Cetasikadharmas are only 46: (1) Cittamahābhūmikāḥ 10, (2) Kuśalamahābhūmikadharmāḥ 10, (3) Kleśamahābhūmikadharmāḥ 6, (4) Akuśalamahābhūmikadharmāḥ 2, (5) Upakleśa-(paritā) bhūmikadharmāḥ 10, (6) Aniyatabhūmikadhārmāḥ 8: Total 46.
APPENDIX

1. सर्वत्रेका: पद्ध 5
2. विनियतभूमिका: पद्ध 5
3. कुशल एकादश 11
4. क्रेशा: पद्ध 6
5. उपक्रेशा विशेषत: 20
6. अनियताध्वल्वार: हृदि 4

Total 51

(1) पद्ध सर्वत्रेका:—1 मनस्कार:, 2 स्पष्ट:, 3 वेदना, 4 संज्ञा, 5 चेतना।
(2) पद्ध विनियतभूमिका:—1 छन्द:, 2 अधिमोक्ष:, 3 स्मृति:, 4 समाधि:, 5 मति:।
(3) एकादश कुशला:—1 अभ्य: 2 बीर्ध:, 3 हि:, 4 अपत्त्व:, 5 अलोक:, 6 अलेप:, 7 अमोह:, 8 प्रतिभ:, 9 अप्रमाण:, 10 उपेश:, 11 अहिंसा।
(4) पद्ध क्रेशा:—1 राग:, 2 प्रतिभ:, 3 मान:, 4 मोह:, 5 विचित्रित्त:, 6 मिम्याध्य:।

These are mentioned by Vasubandhu in his Trīṃśikā, vers. 3 c-d and explained by Sthiramati in his Bhāṣya thereon.

Trīṃśikā, ver. 10 b-c; Bhāṣya pp. 25-6. It may be noted that this group and the previous one are put under one class, cittamahābhūmikāḥ by the Vaibhāṣikas.

Trīṃśikā, ver. 10d-11a-c; Bhāṣya, pp. 26-28. The Vaibhāṣikas omit amoha in this group.

Trīṃ. ver, 11c-12a; Bhāṣya p. 28-9. The Vaibhāṣikas count them thus: 1. moha, 2. pramāda, 3. kausūda, 4. asraddā, 5. stūna, 6. audhhatya which are, omitting moha, counted amongst 20 upakleśas by Yogācāras.

Lit. अलम्बर्णिः: Sthiramati explains it as paṇca satkāya-dṛṣṭayaḥ.
(५) विशिष्टभिंगाः:—१ कोष:, २ उपनाह:, ३ प्रदाश:, ४ प्रक:, ५ माया, ६ मध:, ७ शाष्यम, ८ विहिसा, ९ हृद्य:, १० मालस्यम:, ११ अश्रव्यम:, १२ अनपत्रायम:, १३ आश्रद्धम:, १४ कौसीयम:, १५ प्रमाद:, १६ स्पायम:, १७ उद्व:, १८ सुषिनि स्त्रिति:, १९ असंयज्ञम:, २० विशेष:।

(६) चत्वारोद्वियतः:—१ भ्रम:, २ कृत्य:, ३ वितर्क:, ४ विचार:।

tूतीयो रूपमः: संख्येन एकादशविचः—१ ब्रक्ष:, २ श्रोत्र:, ३ प्राणम:, ४ जिठ:, ५ काय:, ६ रूप:, ७ श्रव्द:, ८ गन्ध:, ९ रस:, १० स्पष्ट:, ११ धर्मविज्ञनसम्पूर्णतः १२ रूपम।

चतुर्थश्चिंचित्विन्युक्तसंस्कारधमः: संख्येन चतुर्विशिष्टतिविचाः—
१ प्रतिः, २ जीवितेम्, ३ निकायसम्बागता, ४ प्रायोजित:, ५ असंज्ञि:

*Trim. ver. 12b—13; Bhāṣya, pp. 30-31. The Vaibhāṣikas accept only the first ten upaklesas of this group.

*These two dharmas (āhrtkhya and anaputrāpya) are put by the Vaibhāṣikas under aksaalamahābhūmiṣikadarma.

*Trim. ver. 14; Bhāṣya, pp. 31-33. These are, for the Vaibhāṣikas the first four of 8 aniyataabhūmiṣikadharmāḥ. The other four aniy. dharmāḥ, rāga, dveṣa, māna, and vicikitsā are counted by Yogācāras amongst 6 kleśās. Some of the kleśā and upaklēśa groups are mentioned in the Dhammadāyasutta (Majjhima, I, 3, p. 15): lobha, dosa, kodha, upanāha, makkha, pal̄sa, issā, maccheram, māyā, sātheyyam, thambha, sārambha, māna, attimāna, mada, pamāda. These are again mentioned as upaklesa of the mind in the Vatthūpamasuttta (Maj. I, 7, p. 36f.)

*This is avijñāpti for the Vaibhāṣikas.

*According to the Vaibhāṣikas they are only 14, viz. Nos. 1-3, 5-14: thus 13 in the above list of Yogācāras and aprāpti being added, 14 dharmas are counted.

*Chinese has ming-hen which means literally "life-hatred". I think the character hen is a mistake for ken, source; so I have taken both ming-ken to mean jñitendriya or simply jñita, the 7th dharma in the Vaibhāṣikas' list.
The Vaibhāṣikas admit only the first 3 asaṁkṛtas.

The Vaibhāṣikas do not admit dharmanairātmya; dharmas for them are real entities. Nairātmya means "परिक्षितदृढ़धर्माभाव" and not "सचीन्तनवाच"; see Mah. Sūtraāṅka, XI, 47.

One may refer to S. Yamakami Sogan; System of Buddhist Thought, pp. 217-229 for a clear exposition in English of all the terms mentioned in this treatise.
CLASSIFICATION OF PHENOMENA (DHARMAS) ACCORDING TO THE SAUTRĀNTIKAS

[It is already known that the Sautrāntikas as against the Vaibhāṣikas, reduced the number of Dharmas to forty-three. But how they have worked it out actually is not as yet known either from the Sanskrit, Chinese or Tibetan source. However, some hints as to the method of their classification of things are found in the Sivajñānasidhiyar, (second part, parapakṣa) and commentary thereon. The Sidhiyar, a polemical treatise in Tamil on Śaiva philosophy was composed by Aruṇandi Sivācāryar, a great Śaivait scholar of South India, who flourished in 1275-1325 A.D. The relevant portion of the section, Sautrāntikamata¹ of the Sidhiyar is given below with the commentary which supplements the text with a very valuable necessary information on the subject.]

Text: There are only two pramāṇas, pratyakṣa² and anumāṇa. The momentary knowledge and the knowable are their objects. These objects get divided

¹This Section is studied and translated in full by the present writer and published in the Journal of the Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Institute, Tirupati, Vol. I, part 2, pp. 176-191.

²The commentator, Jñānaprakāśar in explainning pratyakṣa, quotes Dharmakirti: प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनाप्रोद्यतं। It is divided into four: idra-pratyakṣa mānasapr, yogapr. and svasānivedanāpr. See Nyāya-bindu, I. 4-11.
into four, *viz.* rūpa, arūpa, nirvāṇa and vyavahāra. Each one of these four objects is again divided into two, and therefore they become eight in all, (ver. 3).

Two kinds of rūpa are: upādānarūpa and upādaya-rūpa.

Two kinds of arūpa are: citta and karman.

Two kinds of nirvāṇa are: sopadhīṣeṣanir and nirupadhistēsanirvāṇa.

Two kinds of vyavahāra are: sad. and asadvyavahāra, (ver. 4).

Four upādānarūpas are: earth, water, fire and air.

Four upādayarūpas are: hardness, attraction, motion and heat.

**Rūpa** is what is produced from the combination of the above eight elements (4 upādānar. and 4 upādayar.).

**Citta** is that which cognizes a thing cognizable through the senses.

**Karman** is to discriminate what is good and what is bad, (ver. 5).

Commentary: The author intends to bring all the five groups of elements of the Buddhists indicated in this verse No. 5. Of these five groups, rūpa includes eight elements, four upādānarūpas and four upādayarūpas; vēdana three, kusāla, akusāla and kusālakusāla; samjña six, five sense organs and one citta;

3 This is partly in harmony with Yosōmitra’s comment: देवाषिष्ठि हि कुबे । महुत्वविधिको विविधार्थाय । सत्तानां सुरत्वाच । तत्तज्ञायमानिष्ठित। p. 24-25. See. My paper on Sarvāstivāda in Saṅkara-bhāṣya, publ. in the Jour. of Orien. Research, Madras, Vol. XI, p. 28.
viśīnāna six, viśīnānas corresponding to the six above and saṁskāra twenty, ten good acts and ten bad acts.⁴ Thus they work out forty-three in all. So says their Scripture:

“&quot;It is the siddhānta of the scriptures of the Buddhists that the forty-three [dharma] which are momentary are counted in five skandhas which are built up of eight rūpas, three vedanās, six viśīnās, their corresponding six samjñās and twenty saṁskāras.”

[It may be noted that the asaṁskṛta elements, ākāśa, etc. which are not real entities for the Sautrāntikas, are not counted in the above list.]

⁴ These ten good and ten bad acts are the same as das'a kus'ālas and das'ākus'ālas divided into three, viścika, kāyika and mānasika.
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