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A HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

BY

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PREFACE

Nine years have passed away since the first volume of this work was published, and the present volume has been in the press for more than two years. During the last seven years bad health has been responsible for many interruptions. In the first volume manuscripts were sparingly used, but in the present work numerous unpublished and almost unknown manuscripts have been referred to. These could not be collected easily, and it took time to read them; many of them were old and moth-eaten and it was not often easy to decipher the handwriting. It has not always been possible, however, to give an elaborate account of the content of all these manuscripts, for in many cases they contained no new matter and had therefore only been mentioned by name, a fact which could be ascertained only after long and patient study, since records of them were previously unknown. A considerable delay was also caused in the writing of this volume by the fact that large portions of what will appear in the third volume had to be compiled before the manuscripts had left the author's hands. In any event, the author offers his sincere apologies for the delay.

The manuscript of the third volume has made good progress and, barring illness and other accidents, will soon be sent to press. This volume will contain a fairly elaborate account of the principal dualistic and pluralistic systems, such as the philosophy of the Pañca-rātra, Bhāskara, Yāmuna, Rāmānuja and his followers, Madhva and his followers, the Bhāgavata-purāṇa and the Gaudīya school of Vaiśṇavism. The fourth and the fifth volumes will deal with the philosophy of Vallabha and some other lesser known schools of Vaiśṇavism, the philosophy of the Purāṇas, Tantras, the different schools of Śaivas, Sāktas, Indian Aesthetics, the philosophy of right and law and the religious systems that have found their expression in some of the leading vernaculars of India.

A new impression of the first volume is now in the press. The present volume contains four chapters on Śaṅkara Vedānta, the Medical Speculations of the Ancient Hindus, and the Philosophy of the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha and the Bhagavad-gītā. A good deal of the Śaṅkara Vedānta, especially in regard to its controversy with
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Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Madhva and their followers, still remains to be treated in the third volume.

A word of explanation may be needed with regard to the inclusion in a work on Indian philosophy of the speculations of the Indian medical schools. Biology has recently played a great part in liberating philosophy from its old-world ideas. In ancient India, Biology had not grown into a separate science; whatever biological ideas were current in India were mixed up with medical, osteological and physiological speculations, the only branches of study in ancient India which may be regarded as constituting an experimental science. It was therefore thought that a comprehensive work on the history of Indian philosophy would be sadly defective without a chapter on these speculations, which introduce also some distinctly new ethical and eschatological concepts and a view of life which is wholly original. The biological notions of growth, development and heredity of these schools are no less interesting, and their relations to the logical categories of Nyāya are very instructive.

No attempt has been made to draw any comparisons or contrasts with Western philosophy, since in a work of this type it would most likely have been misleading and would have obscured the real philosophical issues. The study here presented is strictly faithful to the original Sanskrit texts within the limits of the present writer's capacities. Often the ground covered has been wholly new and the materials have been obtained by a direct and first-hand study of all available texts and manuscripts. Nevertheless some sources, containing, possibly, valuable materials, inevitably remain unconsulted, for many new manuscripts will be discovered in future, and our knowledge of Indian philosophy must advance but slowly. In spite of the greatest care, errors of interpretation, exposition and expression may have crept in and for these the author craves the indulgence of sympathetic readers.

Since the publication of the first volume of the present work, many treatises on Indian philosophy have appeared in India and elsewhere. But it has not been possible to refer to many of these. The present attempt is mainly intended to give an exposition of Indian thought strictly on the basis of the original texts and commentaries, and not to eradicate false views by indulging in controversy; and, since the author takes upon himself the responsibility of all the interpretations of the texts that he has used, and since
he has drawn his materials mostly from them, it has seldom been possible to refer to the efforts of his fellow-workers in the field. Occasionally, however, he has had to discuss and sometimes to borrow the views of other writers in the assessment of chronological facts, and he also expresses his indebtedness to such other writers who have worked upon some of the special problems of Indian thought. It has been suggested to him that it would have been better if the views of other writers had been fully criticized, but however that may be, such criticism has been considered as beyond the scope of this work, which, as at present planned, will cover some 3000 pages when completed.

The chronological views regarding the antiquity of the Gītā may appear heretical, but it is hoped that they may be deemed excusable, for this is an age of toleration, and they are not more heretical than the views of many distinguished writers on Indian chronology. In the chapter on the Gītā, some repetition of the same views in different contexts was inevitable on account of the looseness of the structure of the Gītā, which is an ethico-religious treatise and not a system of philosophy. This, however, has been studiously avoided in the other chapters. Neither the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha nor the Gītā are systematic works on philosophy, and yet no treatment of Indian philosophy can legitimately ignore their claims. For in a country where philosophy and religion have been inseparably associated, the value of such writings as breathe the spirit of philosophy cannot be over-estimated, and no history of Indian philosophy worth the name can do without them.

I have no words sufficient to express my gratitude to my esteemed friend, Dr F. W. Thomas, Boden Professor of Sanskrit, Oxford, who went through the proofs in two of their stages and thus co-operated with me in the trouble of correcting them. I fear that in spite of our joint efforts many errors have escaped our eyes, but had it not been for his kind help the imperfections of the book would have been greater. I must similarly thank my friend, Mr Douglas Ainstie, for help with the proofs. My thanks are also due to my pupils, Dr M. Eleade (Bucharest), Mr Janakiballabh Bhattacharyya, M.A., and my other friends, Messrs Satkari Mookerjee, M.A., Durgacharan Chatterjee, M.A., Srish Chandra Das Gupta, M.A., and my daughter, Miss Maitreyi Devi, for the assistance they rendered me in getting the manuscript
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ready for the press, inserting diacritical marks, comparing the references and the like, and also in arranging the index cards. But as none of them had the whole charge of any of these tasks, and as their help was only of an occasional nature, the responsibility for imperfections belongs to the author and not to them.

SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA

Calcutta, 1931
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### CHAPTER XIV

**THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE BHAGAVAD-GĪṬĀ**

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CHAPTER XI

THE ŚAṆKARA SCHOOL OF VEDĀNTA (continued)

The treatment of the school of Śaṅkara Vedānta in the preceding chapter may be considered fairly sufficient for all ordinary purposes. But the reputation of this school of thought stands so high, and so many people are interested in it, that it was pointed out to me that it would be desirable to go into a little more detailed study of it. An additional justification for such a suggestion is to be found in the regrettable fact that, though numerous elementary and half-informed treatises have been published both in this country and in Europe, I do not know of any systematic study of the system in any of the modern languages of Europe or Asia which has been based on a first-hand study of the works of the great thinkers of this school who followed Śaṅkara and developed his system in a remarkably recondite manner. The comparatively small compass of this chapter in a History of Indian Philosophy cannot be expected to fulfil adequately such a demand; but still it may be expected that an attempt to bring out some of these materials by some amount of detailed study will be excusable, though it may seem slightly to disturb the general plan of this work.

The World-Appearance.

The Upaniṣads, called also the Vedānta, contain passages which indicate very different lines of thought, theistic, pantheistic, of self as the only ultimate reality, creationism, etc. The works of those commentators who wrote commentaries on the Upaniṣads before Śaṅkara and tried to interpret them on the supposition that there was one uniform, systematic, dogmatic philosophy in them are now practically all lost, and all that we can know of them is contained in the meagre references that are found in Śaṅkara’s commentaries or the works of other, later, commentators. As an example I may refer to Bhartṛprapañça, who tried to give a realistic interpretation of the Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad by treating the world and souls as real emanations from God or Brahman.

1 Fragments of Bhartṛprapañça from the writings of Śaṅkara and his commentator Ānandajñāna and from Suresvara’s Vārttika have been collected by Prof. Hiriyantha, Mysore, in a short paper read at the Third Oriental Conference in Madras in 1924, published in Madras in 1925.
Šaṅkara inherited from his predecessors the opinion that the Upaniṣads teach us one consistent systematic philosophy, but, being under the influence of Gauḍapāda, differed from them on the nature of this philosophy, which he propounded so elaborately in all his commentaries on the Upaniṣads and the Brahma-sūtras.

The main thesis of Šaṅkara, as has already been pointed out in the preceding chapter, consists of the view that Brahman alone is the ultimate reality, while everything else is false. He was interested in proving that this philosophy was preached in the Upaniṣads; but in the Upaniṣads there are many passages which are clearly of a theistic and dualistic purport, and no amount of linguistic trickery could convincingly show that these could yield a meaning which would support Šaṅkara’s thesis. Šaṅkara therefore introduces the distinction of a common-sense view (cyāva-hārīka) and a philosophic view (pāramārthika), and explains the Upaniṣads on the supposition that, while there are some passages in them which describe things from a purely philosophic point of view, there are many others which speak of things only from a common-sense dualistic view of a real world, real souls and a real God as creator. Šaṅkara has applied this method of interpretation not only in his commentary on the Upaniṣads, but also in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra. Judging by the sūtras alone, it does not seem to me that the Brahma-sūtra supports the philosophical doctrine of Šaṅkara, and there are some sūtras which Šaṅkara himself interpreted in a dualistic manner. He was never afraid of indulging in realistic interpretations; for he could easily get out of the difficulty by asserting that all the realistic conceptions found in the sūtras or in the Upaniṣad passages were merely an estimate of things from the common-sense point of view. Though on the basis of Šaṅkara’s own statements, as well as those of his later commentators and other adherents of his school, there is hardly any room for doubt regarding the meaning and force of Šaṅkara’s philosophy, yet at least one Indian scholar has sought to prove that Šaṅkara’s philosophy was realistic.1 That there was some amount of realism in Šaṅkara is proved by his own confession, when he criticizes the uncompromising Buddhistic idealists (vijñāna-vādins) or the so-called Buddhistic nihilists (śūnya-vādins).

1 Advaita Philosophy by K. Vidyāratna, published by the Calcutta University Press, 1924.
I have already discussed in a general way in what sense according to the Vedānta, from the point of view of the Śaṅkara school of Vedānta as interpreted by his later adherents, the world is an illusion. But in the present section I propose to discuss Śaṅkara’s own statements, as well as the statements of some of his important followers, on the subject of the nature of world-illusion. This is one of the most important points of the Śaṅkara school of philosophy and needs a discussion in some detail.

But before I take it up, I am naturally reminded of the views of Buddhist idealism and the so-called Buddhistic nihilism, and it seems desirable that Śaṅkara’s doctrine of illusion should be treated in connection with the doctrines of illusion in those systems of Buddhistic thought which preceded Śaṅkara. Taking the Śānyavāda theory of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, we see that they also introduced the distinction between limited truth and absolute truth. Thus Nāgārjuna says in his Mādhyaṃika-sūtras that the Buddhas preach their philosophy on the basis of two kinds of truth, truth as veiled by ignorance and depending on common-sense presuppositions and judgments (sāmyrtī-satya) and truth as unqualified and ultimate (paramārtha-satya)\(^1\). The word sāmyrtī literally means “closed.” Candrakīrti explains sāmyrtī as meaning “closing on all sides” and says that it is ignorance (ajñāna) which is denoted by the term sāmyrtī here, because it covers the truth of all things\(^2\).

In this sense the whole of the world of our experience of causes and effects, which we perceive and of which we speak, presents an appearance which is hidden by ignorance. This world is not contradicted in our world-experience; but, as each and every entity of this world is produced by other things or entities, and they again by others, and as we cannot specify the nature of each one of them without referring to others which produced them or from which they originated, and tracing those again to other causes and

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\(^2\) Ajñānaṃ hi saṃantāt sarvā-paddārtha-tattvevacchādanāṃ saṃvetir ity ucyate. Ibid. Candrakīrti however gives two other meanings of the word saṃvetī, which do not seem to be so closely connected with the etymology. In the first of the two meanings saṃvetī means interdependent origination or prattīva-saṃutpāda, and in the second it means the conventional world of common-sense, which can be expressed or indicated by speech and language and which we are supposed to know and refer to in all our experiences involving the knower and the known—saṃvetīḥ saṃketo loka-śāyavāhāraḥ, sa ca abhidhānābhidheya-jñāna-śriyeṣu-dilakṣaṇāḥ.
The Saṅkara School of Vedānta

so on, it is not possible to assert anything as to the nature or characteristic (svabhāva) of anything as it is. Things are known to us only as being the result of the combination of many entities or as product complexes. Nothing is produced of itself, and so the products are never by themselves self-existent, but exist only through the coming together of different entities. That which has any nature of its own cannot owe its origination to other complexes, and so there is nothing in our world-experience which has a nature of its own. The apparent reality of the world has therefore the mysterious veil of ignorance over it, and it is this veil of ignorance which is referred to by the term loka-samvṛta. This is spoken of also as tathya-samvṛti (real ignorance), as distinguished from mithyā-samvṛti (false ignorance), properly used of the ordinary illusions and hallucinations of magic, mirage reflections, etc.¹ Those appearances which are due to sense-defects or other causes and are therefore contradicted in experience are called mithyā-samvṛta, because their falsehood is discovered in experience. The falsehood of the world-appearances, however, can be realized only when their real nature (paramārtha-rūpa) as a succession of essenceless products of causal complexes is properly understood. The world holds good and remains uncontradicted and has all the appearance of reality in all our practical experiences, and it is only when it is understood that these phenomena have no nature of their own that they are considered false. All teachings in philosophy take for granted the world-appearances, subjective and objective, and try to give a rational analysis and estimate of them; and it is only through an experience of these world-phenomena and a rational understanding of them that one realizes their truth as being a mere flow of causes and effects devoid of essence. The appearance of the world as reality is therefore true only in a limited manner during the period when the veil of ignorance is not removed from our eyes; and this is signified by designating the truth (satya) of the world as only loka-samvṛta. This world-appearance is however relatively true when compared with the ordinary illusions of perception (when, e.g., a piece of rope is perceived as a snake, or when one sees a mirage in a desert).

But a question arises—if the world-appearance has no essence of its own, how is it that it appears to have one, or how is it that the world-phenomena appear at all? To such a question Nāgārjuna’s answer is that the appearance of the world is like the

¹ Bodhi-caryāvatāra-paññikā, p. 353, Bibliotheca Indica Series, 1902.
appearance of mirages or dreams, which have no reality of their own, but still present an objective appearance of reality. The world is not a mere nothing, like a lotus of the sky or the hare’s horn, which are simply non-existent (avidyamāna). Thus there is not only the ultimate truth (paramārtha); there is also the relative truth of the phenomenal world (loka-samvṛti-satya); there are, further, the sense-illusions, hallucinations and the like which are contradicted in ordinary experience (aloka-samvṛta or mithyā-samvṛta), and also that which is merely non-existent, like the hare’s horn. The error (viparyāśa) of world-appearance is considered as being of four kinds, viz. the consideration of the momentary as eternal, the consideration of the painful as being pleasurable, the consideration of the unholy as holy, and of that which has no soul as having a soul. And this error is due to ignorance (avidyā). Candrakīrti quotes a passage from the Ārya-dṛḍhāsaya-paripṛcchā, in which it is said that, just as a man may see in a dream that he is spending the night with the wife of the king, and, suddenly realizing that he is discovered, tries to fly for fear of his life (thus perceiving the presence of a woman, where there is none), so we are always falling into the error of asserting that we have perceived the manifold world-appearance where there is none.

Such analogies of error naturally suggest the supposition that there must be some reality which is mistaken as some other thing; but, as has already been explained, the Buddhists emphasized the fact that, in dreams, the illusory appearances were no doubt objectively known as objective presentations of which we had previously become aware—experiences through which we pass, though there is no reality on which these appearances rest or are imposed. It was here that Śaṅkara differed. Thus, in his introduction to the commentary on the Brahma-sūtra he says that the essence of all illusory perception is that one thing is mistaken for another, that the qualities, characteristics or attributes of one thing are taken for the qualities, characteristics or attributes of another. Illusion is defined as the false appearance in some object of something

1 Mādhyamika-sūtra, xxiii. 8.
2 Iha cātāro viparyāśā ceyante: tadyathā pratikṣaṇa-viaśini skandha-paścāye yo niyam iti grāhah sa viparyāśāh...duhkhiṃ make skandha-paścāye yah sukham iti viparīto grāhah so 'paro viparyāśāh...śatram aśucī-vabhaścaḥ tatra yo sūcīvāna grāhah sa viparyāśāh...paścā-khandham nīrāmākam tasmin ya ātmā-grāhah anātmanā ātmābhūnaśeḥ sa viparyāśāh. Candrakīrti’s commentary on ibid. xxiii. 13. Compare it with the Yoga-sūtra, ii. 5, Ānandāśrama Series.
3 Candrakīrti’s commentary on the Mādhyamika-sūtra, xxiii. 13.
experienced before, resembling a memory image. It is explained by some as being the false affirmation of the characteristics of one thing in regard to another; others explain it as an error due to the non-apprehension of the difference between that which is wrongly apprehended and the misapprehended object which the former is wrongly supposed to be; others think that, when one thing is misapprehended as another, the illusion consists in the fancying of the former entity as being endowed with strange characteristics (viparita-dharmatva); but in all these different ways of analysis illusion fundamentally is nothing but the false appearance of one thing with the characteristics of another. So also it may be that a conch-shell appears as silver or that one moon appears as two moons. Śaṅkara then suggests that, since the universal self (pratyag-ātman) is felt through our feeling of “I” and since it is immediate in all experience (aparokṣa), it is not absolutely unrelated and unindicated (āvīṣaya) in experience, and consequently it is quite possible that the non-self (anātman) and its characteristics may be illusorily imposed upon the universal self. This illusory imposition of the non-self and its characteristics on the universal self is called nescience (avidyā).

In his commentary on Gauḍapāda’s Kārikā, i. 17, Śaṅkara says that, when a piece of rope falsely appears as a snake, this is merely false imposition or appearance, not existence. The illusory appearance of the snake did not really bring into existence a snake, which later on became non-existent when right knowledge supervened. It was a mere illusion, and the rope-snake had no existence at all. Śaṅkara in commenting on Gauḍapāda’s Kārikā explains with approval Gauḍapāda’s view that the world of common experience is as illusory as a dream. Dreams are false; for in a dream a man may have the experience of going to distant places, and yet, when he wakes up, he finds that he has been asleep for a few seconds only, and has not moved a foot from his bed. The dream experiences are therefore false, because they are contradicted by the waking experiences. But the waking experiences, being similar to dream experiences, are equally false. For both sets of experiences involve the duality of subject and object, and are therefore

1 Śaṅkara’s Adhyāta-bhāṣya on the Brahma-sūtra, Nīrṇaya-Sūgama Press, Bombay, 1904.
2 Rājjuvāṁ sarpa iva kalpitaśvāt na tu sa vidyate…na hi rājjuvāṁ bhrānti-buddhyā kalpitaḥ sarpo vidyamānāḥ san vivekato nācytāḥ; tathedaṁ prapañ-cākhyam māyā-mātram. Gauḍapāda’s Kārikā, i. 17, Ānandāśrama Series.
fundamentally more or less the same: so that, if one of them is false, the other also is false. The world-experience is like other well-known instances of illusion—the mirage, for example. Since it had no existence in the beginning, and will not have any existence in the end, neither can it have existence in the intervening period of appearance. The objection that our waking experiences fulfil practical purposes and have thus associated with them the pragmatic test of truth, which is absent in the case of dream experiences, is invalid; for the pragmatic tests of the waking experiences may well be contradicted by dream experiences; a man who goes to sleep after a sumptuous feast may well dream that he has been starving for days together. Both our inner world of mind and its experiences and the outer objective world are thus false creations. But Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara differ from the Śūnyavādins Buddhists in this—that they think that even false creations must have some basis in truth. If a rope appears as a snake, the false creation of the snake has some basis in the truth of the rope: there could not be false creations and false appearances without any firm basis of truth (āspada) underlying them. Nāgārjuna, it will be remembered, tried to prove the falsity of all appearances on the ground of their being interdependent and not having anything which could be pointed out as their own nature. The dialectic being applicable to all appearances, there was nothing left which was not relative and interdependent, nothing which was self-evident by nature and which was intelligible by itself without reference to anything else. It is this interdependence and relativity of all appearances that was called “nothingness” or śūnyatā by Nāgārjuna. There was nothing which could be affirmed of anything independently by itself without reference to something else; nothing therefore could be conceived as having any essence by itself. All appearances were therefore only interdependent phantom creations; and it was precisely this interdependence that proved the essencelessness of their natures. There was no basis of truth anywhere. There was nothing which had any essence. But neither Śaṅkara nor Gauḍapāda appears to have tried to show why the inner world of thoughts, ideas, emotions, volitions and the outer world of objects should be considered as being illusory appearances.

1 Śaṅkara’s commentary on Gauḍapāda’s Kārikā, ii. 1–12.
2 Na hi nīrāspadā rajju-sarpa-mrgatṛṣṇikādayāḥ kvacit upalabhyaṁte. Ibid. 1. 6.
Their main point seems to consist in a dogmatic statement that all appearances or experiences are false just as dream experiences are false. The imperfect analogy of waking experiences is made into an argument, and the entire manifold of appearances is declared to be false. But it is urged at the same time that these false creations must have some basis of truth; the changing appearances must have some unchanging basis on which they are imposed—and this basis is the self (ātman), or Brahman, which is the only thing that is permanent, unchanging and real. This self is the being of pure intelligence, which is one identical unit, negating all differences and duality (viśuddha-vijñapti-mātra-sattā-dvaya-rūpena)\(^1\). Just as the false creation of "snake" appears in the case of the "rope," so all such judgments as "I am happy," "I am unhappy," "I am ignorant," "I am born," "I am old," "I am with a body," "I perceive," etc., are all merely false predications associated with the self; they are all false, changing and illusory predications, and it is only the self which remains permanent through all such judgments. The self is entirely different from all such predications; it is self-luminous and self-manifesting, shining independently by itself.

By applying the dialectic of mutual interdependence, pratityasamutpāda, Nāgārjuna tried to prove that there was nothing which could be pointed out as the essence of anything as it is; but he did not explain how the appearances which were nothing more than phantom creations came to be what they were. How did the world-appearance of essenceless interdependent phenomena show itself? Śaṅkara did not try to prove with a keen logical dialectic that the world-appearance was false: he simply took it for granted, since the Upaniṣads proclaimed Brahman as the ultimate reality. But how did the world-appearance manifest itself? Śaṅkara does not seem to go deeply into this question and simply passes it over in asserting that this world-appearance is all due to ignorance (avidyā); it could not be spoken of as either existing or non-existing; it was merely illusory, like the conch-shell silver. But Padmapāda, who wrote the commentary known as Pañca-pādikā on the first four sūtras of Śaṅkara’s commentary on the Brahmasūtras, says that the precise meaning of the term “false conception” (mithyā-jñāna) in Śaṅkara’s introduction to his commentary on the Brahmasūtras is that there is a force or power or potency (śakti) of

\(^1\) Gaudapāda’s Kārikā, ii. 17.
nescience which constitutes materiality (jaḍātmikā avidyā-śaktiḥ), and that it is this potency which transforms itself into the stuff (upādāna) of the world-appearance. It is well to remember in this connection that, according to Śaṅkara's philosophy, it is not only the objective world that constitutes the world of appearance, but also the subjective world of all experiences and predicates that may be associated with the self. Thus, when one says "I," this ego-hood is analysed as involving two parts—the one, pure intelligence or pure consciousness; and the other, the concept of subjectivity, which is illuminated, expressed or manifested by the underlying pure intelligence with which it is falsely associated. The concept of subjectivity stands here as materiality, or objectivity, which is made to float up by the power of pure intelligence, thus causing the judgment "I am" or "I am a man.") This avidyā-śakti, or power of avidyā, subsists in the pure self and, on the one hand, arrests the revelation of its true nature as Brahman, and, on the other hand, transforms itself into the various concepts associated with the psychological self of our ordinary experience. The illusion consists in the association of the psychological qualities of thinking, feeling, willing, etc. with the transcendent or universal self (pratyak-citi). These psychological determinations are all mutually connected with one another. Thus, to be able to enjoy pleasures, one must first act; one can only act when one has attachments, antipathies and desires, and one can have attachments and desires only when one has experienced joys and sorrows—so these psychological determinations in a beginningless cycle are always naturally associated with the transcendent self-luminous self.

It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that, as Padmapāda or Prakāśatman explains, ajñāna or nescience is some kind of indefinable stuff out of the transformations of which subjective psychological experiences and the world of objects have come into being. This ajñāna is not the ajñāna of the Buddhists, i.e. a wrong notion or misconception, and this adhyāsa, or illusion,

1 Pañca-pādiṣṭha, p. 4, the Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, 1891.
2 asmāt-pratyayye yo 'nidam-āmsaś cid-eka-rasaḥ tasmiś tad-bala-nirbhāsita-
tavya lañcanato yusmād-arthaśa manuṣya-bhimānasya sambheda-vātābhasaḥ sa
eva adhyāsaḥ. Ibid. p. 3.
3 atāḥ sā pratyak-citi brahma-svarūpa-vahānasya pratibadhanīti ahamkāra-
yy-atah-rūpa-pratibhāsyavahānamiṣṭā ca bhavati. Ibid. p. 5.
4 Prakāśatman’s Pañca-pādiṣṭha-vistarāna, p. 10, the Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, 1892.
is not the viparyaya of Nāgārjuna; for here it is a positive power or stuff. Thus Prakāśātman argues that all effects have at their back some cause, which forms their stuff or material; the world-appearance, being also an effect, must have some stuff out of which it has evolved or was made up; and ajñāna, lying in the transcendent self as a separate power, is such a material cause. This avidyā-potency in the transcendent self is positive in its nature. This positive ajñāna is directly perceived in such immediate perceptions as “I do not know myself or others,” and can also be inferred or comprehended by implication. The fact that ajñāna or avidyā is spoken of as a power inherent in the transcendent self shows that it is dependent thereon; avidyā is not, however, a power, but a substance or entity which has certain powers by which it transforms itself into the cosmic appearances, subjective and objective; yet it is called a power, or sakti, because of its dependence (para-tantratā) on the transcendent self, and it is in consideration of the entire dependence of avidyā and its transformations on the self that the self is regarded as the material cause of all effects—the cosmic appearances of the world and the mind. The self thus not only holds the ajñāna within it as a dependent function, but in spite of its self-luminosity it can be reacted upon by the ajñāna with its manifold powers in such a way that it can be veiled by this ajñāna and made the underlying basis of all world-appearances of ajñāna-transformations.

Appaya Dikṣita, referring in his Siddhānta-lesa to the view of the writer of the Padārtha-tattvā, summarizes the matter thus: Brahman and Māyā form together the material cause (ubhayam upādānam), and hence it is that in the world-appearance there are two distinct characteristics, “being” (sattā) from Brahman and materiality (jādyā) from Māyā. Brahman is the cause, as the unchanging basis of the Māyā, which is the cause as being the

1 sarvaṃ ca kāryam sopādānām bhāva-kārya-tvāt ghaṭaādīvad ity anumānāt ...tasmān mithyārtha-taj-jñānātmakaṁ mithyā-bhātvam adhyāsām upādāna-kāraṇa-sāpekṣaṁ ...mithyā-jñānam eva adhyāsopādānam. Pañcā-pādikā-vivaraṇa, pp. 11–12.
2 Ibid. p. 13.
stuff that actually undergoes transformation. Vācaspati Mīśra also conceives Brahman, jointly with its avidyā, to be the material cause of the world (avidyā-sahita-brhmopādānam). In his adoration hymn at the beginning of his Bhāmattī he describes Brahman as being in association with its companion, the indefinable avidyā, the unchanging cause of the entire objective universe. Sarvajñāta Muni, however, does not wish to give māyā the same degree of co-operation in the production of the world-appearance as Brahman, and considers the latter to be the real material cause of the world through the instrumentality of Māyā; for Brahman, being absolutely changeless, cannot by itself be considered as cause, so that, when Brahman is spoken of as cause, this can only be in a remote and modified sense (upalakṣana), through the instrumentality of māyā. The author of the Siddhānta-muktavali is referred to by Appaya Dīkṣita as holding that it is the māyā and māyā alone that forms the stuff of the world-appearance; and that Brahman is not in any way the material cause of the universe, but that it is only the basis of the subsistence of māyā and is only from that point of view spoken of as being the material cause.

It is clear that the above differences of view regarding the nature of the relation between māyā and the self or Brahman in the production of the world-appearance are mere scholastic disputes over words or modes of expression, and have but little philosophical significance. As has already been said, these questions do not seem to have arisen in Śaṅkara's mind. He did not think it worth while to explain anything definitely regarding the nature of avidyā and its relation with Brahman, and the part that it played in supplying the material stuff of the universe. The world was an illusion, and Brahman was the basis of truth on which these illusions appeared; for even illusions required something on which they could appear. He never faced squarely the difficulties that are naturally connected with the theory, and was not therefore concerned to explain the definite relation of māyā to Brahman in connection with the production of the phantom show of the universe. The natural objection against such views is that the term

1 Siddhānta-īśita, p. 12, V.S. Series, 1890.
2 Bhāmattī on Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya, i. i. 2, Nirṛtaya-Sāgara Press, 1904.
4 Sāmkṣepa-sūtrātra, i. 333, 334, Bhaū Śāstrī's edition.
5 Siddhānta-īśita, p. 13, V.S. Series, 1890.
avidyā (formed by compounding the negative particle a and vidyā “knowledge”) may mean either absence of knowledge (vidyā-bhāvaḥ) or false knowledge (mithyā-jñānam); and in neither of these meanings can it be supposed to behave as the material cause or substance-stuff of anything; for a false knowledge cannot be a substance out of which other things are made. The answer given by Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭāraka to such an objection is that this avidyā is not a psychological ignorance, but a special technical category, which is beginningless and indefinable (anādy-anirvācyāvidyāśrayanāt). The acceptance of such a category is a hypothesis which one is justified in holding as valid, since it explains the facts. Effects must have some cause behind them, and a mere instrumental cause cannot explain the origination of the substratum of the effect; again, effects which are not true cannot have for their material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) that which is true, nor can they have for their material cause that which is absolutely non-existent. So, since the material cause of the world can neither be true nor be anything which is absolutely non-existent, the hypothesis is naturally forced upon the Vedāntists that the material cause of this false world-appearance is an entity which is neither existent nor non-existent. Ānandabodha in his Pramāṇa-mālā quotes approvingly from the Brahma-tattva-samikṣā of Vācaspati to show that avidyā is called avidyā or nescience because it is a hypothetic category which is neither “is” nor “is not,” and is therefore unintelligible; avidyā signifies particularly the unintelligibility of this category. Ānandabodha points out that the acceptance of avidyā is merely the logical consequence of indicating some possible cause of the world-appearance—considering the nature of the world-appearance as it is, its cause can only be something which neither is nor is not; but what we understand by such a category, we cannot say; it is plainly unintelligible; the logical requirements of such a category merely indicate that that which is the material cause of this false world-appearance cannot be regarded either as existing or as non-existing; but this does not

1 avidyā hi vidyābhavo mithyā-jñānam vā na cobbhaṃ kasya cit samavāyikāraṇam adhavyatvāt. Ānandabodha’s Nyāya-mākaraṇa, p. 122, Chowkhambā Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1901.
Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedānta.

The Vedānta takes a twofold view of things; the first view refers to ultimate reality and the second to appearance. This ultimate reality is pure intelligence, as identical with pure bliss and pure being. This is called ultimately real in the sense that it is regarded as changeless. By pure intelligence the Vedānta does not mean the ordinary cognitional states; for these have a subjective and an objective content which are extraneous to them. This pure intelligence is pure immediacy, identical with the fact of revelation found in all our conscious states. Our apprehensions of objects are in some sense events involving both a subjective and an objective content; but their special feature in every case is a revelatory inwardness or immediacy which is non-temporal and changeless. The fact that we see, hear, feel, touch, think, remember is equivalent to saying that there are various kinds of cognizings. But what is the nature of this cognizing? Is it an act or a fact? When I see a blue colour, there is a blue object, there is a peculiar revelation of an appearance as blue and a revelation of the "I" as perceiver. The revelation is such that it is both a revelation of a certain character as blue and of a certain thing called the blue object. When a revelation occurs in perception, it is one and it reveals both the object and its appearance in a certain character as blue. The revelation is not the product of a certain relation which happens to subsist at any time between the character-appearance and the object; for both the character-appearance as blue and the object are given in revelation. The revelation is self-evident and stands unique by itself. Whether I see, or hear, or feel, or change, the fact remains that there is some sort of an awareness which does not change. Awareness is ever present by itself and does not undergo the changes that its contents undergo. I may remember that I had seen a blue object five minutes previously; but, when I do this, what I perceive is the image of a blue object, with certain temporal and spatial relations, which arises or

becomes revealed; but the revelation itself cannot be revealed again. I may be conscious, but I cannot be conscious of consciousness. For consciousness as such, though ever present in its immediacy, cannot become an object of any other consciousness. There cannot be any such thing as the awareness of an awareness or the awareness of the awareness of an awareness, though we may multiply such phrases in language at our pleasure. When I remember that I have been to Trinity College this morning, that only means that I have an image of the way across the commons, through Church Street and Trinity Street; my movements through them are temporally pushed backward, but all this is a revelation as image at the present moment and not a revelation of a past revelation. I cannot say that this present image in any way reveals that particular image as the object of the present revelation. But the former revelation could not be held to be distinct from the present one; for distinction is always based on content and not on revelation. Revelation as such is identical and, since this is so, one revelation cannot be the object of another. It is incorrect to say that "A is A" means that one A becomes itself over again. It is owing to the limitations of grammatical terminology that identity is thus described. Identity thus understood is different from what we understand by identity as a relation. Identity understood as a relation presupposes some difference or otherness and thus is not self-contained. And it is because it is not self-contained that it can be called a relation. When it is said that A is identical with A, it means that on all the various occasions or contents in which A appeared it always signified the same thing, or that it had the same shape or that it was the same first letter of the English alphabet. Identity in this sense is a function of thought not existing by itself, but in relation to a sense of opponency or otherness. But revelation has no otherness in it; it is absolutely ubiquitous and homogeneous. But the identity of revelation of which we are speaking does not mean that the revelation signifies the same thing amidst a diversity of contents: it is simply the one essence identical in itself and devoid of any numerical or other kinds of difference. It is absolutely free from "now" and "then," "here" and "there," "such" or "not such" and "this" or "that." Consciousness of the self-shining self taken in this way cannot be regarded as the relation of an appearance to an object, but it is the fact of the revelation or the entity of the self. If we conceive
of revelation in this way, it is an error to make any distinction in revelation as the revelation of the past or the revelation of the present moment. For moments are revealed as objects are revealed; they do not constitute revelation or form any part of it. This revelation is identical with the self-shining self to which everything else has to be related in order to be known.

"Is cognizing an act or a fact?" Before this can be answered the point to be made clear is what is meant by cognizing. If we ignore the aspect of revelation and speak of mental states which can be looked at from the point of view of temporal or qualitative change of character, we must speak of them as acts or events. If we look at any mental state as possessing certain characters and relations to its objects, we have to speak of these aspects. But, if we look at cognizing from the point of view of its ultimate truth and reality as revelation, we cannot call it either an act or a fact; for, as revelation, it is unique and unchangeable in itself. All relations and characters are revealed in it, it is self-evident and is at once in and beyond them all. Whether we dream or wake, whether we experience an illusion or a truth, revelation is always there. When we look at our mental states, we find that they are always changing, but this is so only with reference to the contents. Apart from this there is a continuity in our conscious life. By this continuity the Vedânta apprehends not any sort of coherence in our ideas, but the fact of the permanence of revelation. It may be asked what remains of revelation, if the mental states are taken away. This question is not admissible; for the mental states do not form part of revelation; they are rendered conscious by coming into relation with revelation. This category is the ultimate reality. It is not self or subject in the sense in which self or ego is ordinarily understood. For what is ordinarily understood as the ego or the "I" is as much a content of the perception of the moment as any other objective content. It is not impossible that any particular objective content may be revealed at any time without the corresponding "I perceive" being explicitly revealed at the same time. The notion of ego or "I" does not refer to an everlasting abiding independent self or person; for this notion is as changing as any other objective content. The "I" has no definite real content as referring to an existing entity, but is only a particular mode of mind which is often associated, as a relatively abiding content, with other changing contents of the
mind. As such, it is as changeable as is any other object. "I know this" only means that there is a revelation which at one sweep reveals both the "this" and the "I." So far as the revelation appears as revealing the "this" and the "I," it is manifested in a subjective mental state having a particular conscious centre different from other similar centres. But, since revelation cannot in reality be individuated, all that we may say about "I" or "mine," "thou" or "thine," falls outside it. They are all contents, having some indefinite existence of their own and revealed by this principle of revelation under certain conditions. This principle of revelation thus has a reality in quite a different sense from that which is used to designate the existence of any other object. All other objects are dependent upon this principle of revelation for their manifestation, and their nature or essence, out of connection with it, cannot be defined or described. They are not self-evident, but are only expressed by coming into some sort of relation with this principle. We have already seen that this principle cannot be either subjective or objective. For all considerations of subject or object fall outside it and do not in any way qualify it, but are only revealed by it. There are thus two principles, the principle of revelation and all that which is revealed by it. The principle of revelation is one; for there is nothing else like it; it alone is real in the highest and truest sense. It is absolute in the sense that there is no growth, decay, evolution or change in it, and it is perfectly complete in itself. It is infinite in the sense that no finitude can form part of it, though through it all finitude is being constantly revealed. It is all-pervading in the sense that no spatial or temporal limits can be said to affect it in any way, though all these are being constantly revealed by it. It is neither in my head nor in my body nor in the space before me; but yet there is nowhere that it is not. It has sometimes been designated as the "Self" or ātman, but only in the sense of denoting its nature as the supreme essence and transcendent reality of all—the Brahman.

Apart from this principle of revelation, all else is constituted of a substanceless indefinable stuff called māyā. In some schools of Śaṅkara Vedānta it is said that all is pure and simple illusion, that things exist only when they are perceived and dissolve into nothingness as soon as we cease to perceive them; this school has been designated the Dr̥ṣṭi-sṛṣṭi school, a doctrine which has been
briefly explained in the tenth chapter of the present work. One of the most important texts of this school is the Siddhānta-muktāvalī by Prakāśānanda. Prakāśānanda seems to have taken his inspiration from the Yoga-vāsaṭṭha, and he denied the existence of things when they are not perceived (ajñāta-sattvānabhavyapagama). He tried to show that there were no grounds for holding that external objects existed even when they were not perceived or that external objects had a reality independent of their perceptions. Examining the capacity of perception as a proof to establish this difference between perception and its object, he argued that, since the difference between the awareness and its object was a quality of the awareness, the awareness itself was not competent to grasp this quality in the object, as it was one of the constituents of the complex quality involving a difference of the awareness and its object; to assert the contrary would be a fallacy of self-dependence (ātmāsrayatava). If the apprehended difference is a complex, such as "difference-between-awareness-and-its-object," and if this complex is a quality which is apprehended as existing in the object, it has to be assumed that, in order that the nature of awareness may be realized, vindicated or established, it must depend upon itself involved as a constituent in the complex "difference-between-awareness-and-its-object" directly and immediately—which comes to the same thing as saying that awareness becomes aware of itself by being aware of itself; this is impossible and is called the logical fallacy of self-


2 Prakāśānanda refers to the arguments of Prakāśātman’s (A.D. 1200) *Pañcādikā-cīvaraṇa* and Sarvajñātma Muni’s (A.D. 900) *Saṃkṣepa-iśārakha* and refers approvingly to Suresvara, the author of the *Naśākarma-siddhi*. Appaya Dīkṣita (A.D. 1620) refers to Prakāśānanda in his *Siddhānta-leśa* (pp. 13, 72). Nānā Dīkṣita, a follower of the school of Prakāśānanda and author of the *Siddhānta-dīpikā*, in a commentary on the *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, gives a list of Vedānta teachers. In this list he mentions the names of Prakāśānubhavānanda, Nṛsiṃha and Rāghavendra Yati. Venis thinks (see *The Pandit*, 1890, pp. 487–490) that Prakāśānubhava is the same as Prakāśātman and Nṛsiṃha the same as Nṛsiṃhārama Muni, who is said to have converted Appaya Dīkṣita to Śaṅkara Vedānta, and thinks that Prakāśānanda lived in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, being wedged in between Nṛsiṃha and Appaya. Though it would be difficult to settle his time so precisely and definitely, yet it would not be wrong to suppose that he lived some time towards the latter half of the sixteenth century. Prakāśānanda’s doctrine of *Drṣṭi-sṛṣṭi* is apparently unknown to the earlier Vedantic works and even the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, a work of the early sixteenth century, does not seem to be aware of him, and it appears that the earliest mention of his name can be traced only to Appaya, who lived in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. Prakāśānanda may thus be believed to have lived in the latter half of the sixteenth century.
dependence. If it is held that the complex quality ("difference-of-awareness-from-the-object") is directly perceived in the object through the senses, then it has to be assumed that the said complex quality existed in the object even before the production of the awareness, and this would involve the impossible supposition that the complex quality of which the awareness was a constituent was already present even before such an awareness had already come into being. If perception or direct awareness cannot be said to prove the difference between the awareness and its object, there can be no inference which may be supposed to do it. For such an inference has to take form thus—"the object is different from its own awareness, because it is associated with entirely different kinds of qualities or characteristics." But how could it be known that the object has qualities of an entirely different character from its awareness, since a difference between an awareness and its object was contested and could not be proved by perception or any other means? Prakāśānanda further says that the argument by implication (arthāpatti), that awareness involves the acceptance of something different from the awareness of which the awareness is affirmed, because there cannot be any knowledge without a corresponding object, is invalid. In proving the invalidity of the supposition that knowledge necessarily implies an object, Prakāśānanda raises the question whether such an implication of an object as conditioning knowledge refers to the production (utpatti) of knowledge, its persistence (sthiti) or its secondary cognition. As regards the first alternative Prakāśānanda says that according to the Vedānta consciousness is ever-existent and is never a product; and, even if it is regarded as a product, the process of cognition can itself be regarded as a sufficient cause for its production. It can by no means be urged that the presence of an external object is in all cases necessary for the production of knowledge; for, though it is arguable that in perception an object is necessary, no one will suggest that an external object is to be considered necessary in the production of inferential knowledge—a fact which shows that the presence of an external object is not indispensable for the production of knowledge as such. As regards the persistence of knowledge it is said

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1 Siddhānta-muktāvali, as printed in the Pandit, 1889, pp. 247-249.
2 vimato viṣayaḥ svā-viṣaya-jñānād bhidyate tad-viruddha-dharmāśrayatvāt. Ibid. p. 252.
that awareness has not the object that it knows for its locus or substance (āśraya), in such a way that the absence of the object, as apart from the awareness, would make it impossible for the awareness to persist; and, if knowledge is supposed to be persisting in anything, that something would not be a cognized object, but the cognizer itself—as in the Nyāya view, where knowledge is regarded as an attribute of the self and the self is then regarded as the substance or locus (āśraya) of knowledge. Since again cognition and its object do not exist in the same space or in the same time (this is proved by the possibility of our knowing a past or a future object), there cannot be any such concomitance between the two that it would be right for any one to infer the external presence of an object because of there being a subjective cognition or awareness. So he argues that there is no proof that cognition and cognized objects are different.

In the above account of Prakāśānanda’s views it is clear that he does not attempt to give any positive proof in support of his thesis that the world-appearance and all objects contained in it have no existence while they are not perceived or that the being of all objects cognized is their percipi. He only tries to show that it cannot be logically established that awareness of blue and blue are two different objects; or, in other words, that it cannot be proved that the cognized object is different from its cognition. It could not legitimately be held that awareness (pratiti) was different from its object (pratyetavtva). The whole universe, as we perceive it, is nothing but cognition without there being any object corresponding to it. As dreams are nothing but mere awareness, without there being any real objects behind them which manifest themselves in different ways of awareness and their objects, so also is the world of awaking consciousness. The world has thus no independent substratum, but is mere cognition or mere awareness (vijñāna-mātra or bhāva-mātra).

This scheme of Vedānta philosophy is surprisingly similar to the idealism of Vasubandhu (A.D. 280–360), as taught in his Vimsatikā with a short commentary of his own and in his Trimśikā with a commentary by Sthiramati. According to this idealism

\[\text{pratyetavtva-pratityo ca bhedah pramānikah kutaḥ pratiti-mātram evaitad bhāti viśvaṁ caračaram jñāna-jñeya-prabhedena yathā svāpnam prattyate vijñāna-mātram evaitat tathā jāgrac caračaram.}\]

Siddhānta-muktāvali, p.258.

\[\text{Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi, containing two treatises, Vimsatikā and Trimśikā,}\]

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(vijñāna-vāda) of Vasubandhu all appearances are but transformations of the principle of consciousness by its inherent movement, and none of our cognitions are produced by any external objects which to us seem to be existing outside of us and generating our ideas. Just as in dreams one experiences different objects at different places and countries without there being any objective existence of them, or as in dreams many people may come together and perform various actions, so what seems to be a real world of facts and external objects may well be explained as a mere creation of the principle of intelligence without any objective basis at all. All that we know as subjective or objective is mere ideation (vijñapti) and there is no substantive reality, or entity corresponding to it; but that does not mean that pure non-conceptual (anabhilapyenātmanā) thought, which the saints realize, is also false. It is possible that the awareness of anything may become the object of a further awareness, and that of another; but in all such cases where the awarenesses are significant (arthavātti) there is no entity or reality represented by them; this, however, should not be interpreted as a denial of the principle of intelligence or pure knowledge as such. Vasubandhu then undertakes to show that the perceptual evidence of the existence of the objective world cannot be trusted. He says that, taking visual perception as an example, we may ask ourselves if the objects of the visual perception are one as a whole or many as atoms. They cannot be mere wholes, since whole would imply parts; they cannot be of the nature of atoms, since such atoms are not separately perceived; they cannot be of the nature of combinations of atoms, since the existence of atoms cannot be proved. For, if six atoms combine from six sides, that implies that the atoms have parts; if however six atoms combine with one another at one identical point, that would mean that the combined group would not have a size larger than that of one atom and would therefore be invisible. Again, if the objects of awareness and perception were only wholes, then succession and sequence would be inexplicable, and our perception of separate and distinct things would remain unaccountable. So they have

Paris, 1925. It seems probable that Vasubandhu flourished in A.D. 280–360 rather than in A.D. 420–500 as held by me in the first volume of the present work. See B. Bhattacharya’s foreword to the Tattvā-samgraha.

1 yo bālāra dhārmājaṃ svabhāvo grāhya-grāhaḥādāḥ parikalpitaḥ tene kalpitenātmanā teṣāṃ nairātmyaṃ na te anabhilāpyenātmanā yo buddhānāṃ viṣaya iti. Commentary on Viṣṇuṭikā, p. 6.

2 Nāpi te saṃhitā viṣaya-bhavanti, yasmāt paramāṇur ekaṃ dravyaṃ na sidhyati. Ibid. p. 7.
Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedānta

no real objective existence, though perception leads us to believe that they have. People are dreaming of the world of objects in the sleep of the sub-conscious habit of false imaginative construction (vitathavikalpābhya-sa-vāsanā-nidrayā), and in their dreams they construct the objective world; it is only when they become awake with the transcendent indeterminate knowledge (lokottara-nirvikalpa-jñāna-lābhāt prabuddho bhavati) that they find the world-construction to be as false as the dream-construction of diverse appearances. In such a view there is no objective material world, and our cognitions are not influenced by external objects; how then are our minds influenced by good instructions and associations? and, since none of us have any real physical bodies, how can one kill another? Vasubandhu explains this by the theory that the thought-currents of one person can sometimes determine the thought-currents of another. Thus the idea of killing of a certain type may produce such a disturbance of the vital powers of another as to produce a cessation of the continuity of the thought-processes, which is called death. So also the good ideas of one may influence the ideas of another for good.

In the Trimsīkā of Vasubandhu and its commentary by Sthiramatī this idealism is more clearly explained. It is said that both the soul (or the knower) and all that it knows as subjective ideas or as external objects existing outside of us are but transformations of pure intelligence (vijñāna-parināma). The transformation (parināma) of pure intelligence means the production of an effect different from that of the causal moment simultaneously with the cessation of the causal moment. There is neither externality nor subjectivity in pure intelligence, but these are imposed upon it (vijñāna-svartipe parikalpita eva ātmā dharmāś ca). All erroneous impositions imply that there must be some entity which is mistaken for something else; there cannot be erroneous impositions on mere vacuity; so it has to be admitted that these erroneous impositions of various kinds of external characteristics, self, etc. have been made upon the transformations of pure intelligence. Both Vasubandhu and Sthiramatī repudiate the suggestion of those extreme idealists who

3 upacāraya ca nirādhirāsahsambhavād avatāraṁ vijñāna-parināmo vastuto 'sty upagantavyo yatra ātmā-dharmopacāraḥ pravartate. Ibid. Compare Śaṅkara's commentary on Gauḍapāda's Kārikā, "na hi nirādpaṁ mrgatṛṣṇiḥādāyaḥ."
deny also the reality of pure intelligence on grounds of interdependence or relativity (samatā). Vasubandhu holds that pure consciousness (viññāpti-mātratā) is the ultimate reality. This ultimate consciousness is a permanent entity, which by its inherent power (śakti) undergoes threefold transformations as the inherent indeterminate inner change (vipāka), which again produces the two other kinds of transformations as the inner psychoses of mental operations (manana) and as the perception of the so-called external sensibles (viṣaya-viññāpti). The apprehension of all appearances or characterized entities (dharma) as cognized objects and that of selves as cognizers, the duality of perceivers and the perceived, are due to the threefold transformations of vipāka, manana and viṣaya-viññāpti. The ultimate consciousness (viññāpti-mātra) which suffers all these modifications is called ālaya-viññāna in its modified transformations, because it is the repository of all experiences. The ultimate principle of consciousness is regarded as absolutely permanent in itself and is consequently also of the nature of pure happiness (sukha); for what is not eternal is painful, and this, being eternal, is happy. When a saint’s mind becomes fixed (pratiṣṭhita) in this pure consciousness (viññāpti-mātra), the tendency to dual thought of the subjective and the objective (grāhya-grāhakānuṣaya) ceases and there dawns the pure indeterminate (nir-vikalpa) and transcendent (lokottara) consciousness. It is a state in which the ultimate pure consciousness returns from its transformations and rests in itself. It is divested of all afflictions (kleśa) or touch of vicious tendencies and is therefore called anāśrava. It is unthinkable and undemonstrable, because it is, on the one hand, pure self-consciousness (pratyātma-vedya) and omniscience (sarvajñatā), as it is divested of all limitations (āvaraṇa), and, on the other hand, it is unique in itself. This pure consciousness is called the container of the seed of all (sarva-bīja), and, when its first indeterminate and indefinable transformations rouse the psychosis-transformations and

1 Thus Lankāvatāra, one of the most important works on Buddhist idealism, denies the real transformation of the pure intelligence or ālaya-viññāna. See Lankāvatāra, p. 46, published by the Otani University Press, Kyoto, 1923.
2 dhruva nityatvād aksayatvāyā; sukhā nityatvād eva yad aniṣṭyaṁ tad duhkham ayaṁ ca niṣṭha iti asmāt sukhaḥ. Sthiramati’s commentary on Tiṃśīkā, p. 44.
3 Ālaya-viññāna in this ultimate state of pure consciousness (viññāpti-mātratā) is called the cause (dhatu) of all virtues, and, being the ultimate state in which the dharmas or characterized appearances have lost all their limitations it is called the dharma-kāya of the Buddha (mahā-muniḥ bhūmi-pāramitādhi-bhāva-nayā klesa-āśeṣavyāraṇa-prahāṇāḥ...sarva-dharma-vibhutva-lābhāt ca dharma-kāya ity ucyate). Ibid.
also the transformations as sense-perceptions, these mutually act and react against one another, and thus the different series rise again and again and mutually determine one another. These transformations are like waves and ripples on the ocean, where each is as much the product of others as well as the generator of others.\(^1\)

In this view thought (vijñāna) is regarded as a real substance, and its transformations are also regarded as real; and it is these transformations that are manifested as the selves and the characterized appearances.\(^2\) The first type of transformations, called vipāka, is in a way the ground of the other two transformations, which contain the indeterminate materials out of which the manifestations of the other two transformations appear. But, as has already been pointed out, these three different types of transformations again mutually determine one another. The vipāka transformations contain within them the seeds of the constructive instincts (vikalpa-vāsanā) of the selves as cognizers, the constructive instincts of colours, sounds, etc., the substantive basis (āśraya) of the attribution of these twofold constructive instincts, as well as the sense-faculties and the localization of space-determinations (sthāna-vijñāpti or bhājana-loka-sanniveśa-vijñāpti). They are also associated in another mode with sense-modifications involving the triune of the sense (indriya), sense-object (viśaya) and cognition (and each of these triunes is again associated with a characteristic affective tone corresponding to the effective tones of the other two members of the triune in a one-to-one relation), attention (manaskāra), discrimination (saṃjñā), volition (cetanā) and feeling (vedanā).\(^3\) The vipāka transformations have no determinate or limited forms (apariccēchinnālambanākāra), and there are here no

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\(^1\) tac ca varttate srotasaūghavat. Ibid. p. 21.

\(^2\) avaiśyaṃ vijñāna-parināma vastuto 'sty upagantavy oyatrātmadharmpacāraḥ pravarttate. Ibid. p. 16.

\(^3\) Feeling (vedanā) is distinguished here as painful, pleasurable and as the basic entity which is neither painful nor pleasurable, which is feeling per se (vedanā amabhava-svabhāva tā punar viṣayasya dhādaka-paritāpaka-tadabhaya-hara-vishika-svarūpa-sāmkṣēparakṣaya-bhedat). This feeling per se must be distinguished again from the non-pleasurable-painful feeling existing along with the two other varieties, the painful and the pleasurable. Here the vipāka transformations are regarded as evolving the basic entity of feeling, and it is therefore undifferentiated in it as pleasure or pain and is hence called “feeling as indifference (upeksa)” and undifferentiated (avākṛta). The differentiation of feeling as pleasurable or as painful takes place only as a further determination of the basic entity of feeling evolved in the vipāka transformations of good and bad deeds (subhāsūbhakarma-vipāka). Good and bad (subhāsūba) are to be distinguished from moral and immoral as potential and actual determinations of virtuous and vicious actions.
actualized emotional states of attachment, antipathy or the like, which are associated with the actual pleasurable or painful feelings. The vipāka transformations thus give us the basic concept of mind and its principal functions with all the potentialities of determinate subject-object consciousness and its processes. There are here the constructive tendencies of selves as perceivers, the objective constructive tendencies of colours, sounds, etc., the sense-faculties, etc., attention, feeling, discrimination, volition and sense-functioning. But none of these have any determinate and actualized forms. The second grade of transformations, called manana, represents the actual evolution of moral and immoral emotions; it is here that the mind is set in motion by the ignorant references to the mental elements as the self, and from this ignorance about the self is engendered self-love (ātma-sneha) and egoism (ātma-māna). These references are again associated with the fivefold universal categories of sense-functioning, feeling, attention, volition and discrimination. Then comes the third grade of transformations, which is associated with the fivefold universal categories together with the special manifestations of concrete sense-perceptions and the various kinds of intellectual states and moral and immoral mental states, such as desire (chandaḥ) for different kinds of sense-experiences, decisions (adhimokṣa) in conclusions firmly established by perceptions, reasoning, etc., memory, attentive reflection (samādhi), wisdom (prajñā), faith and firm will for the good (śraddhā), shamefulness (hṛi) for the bad, etc. The term ālaya-vijñāna is given to all these three types of transformations, but there is underneath it, as the permanent passive ground, the eternal and unchangeable pure thought (vijñāpti-mātratā).

It may be pointed out here that in this system of philosophy the eternal and unchangeable thought-substance undergoes by virtue of its inner dynamic three different orders of superficial changes, which are compared to constantly changing streams and waves. The first of these represents the basic change which later determines all subjective and objective possibilities; the second starts the process of the psychosis by the original ignorance and false attribution of self-hood to non-self elements, self-love and egoism; and in the third grade we have all the concrete mental and extra-mental facts. The fundamental categories which make the possibility of mind, mental processes and the extra-mental relations, are evolved in the first stage of transformations; and these
abide through the other two stages of transformations and become more and more complex and concrete in course of their association with the categories of the other transformations. In analysing the knowledge situation Vasubandhu does not hold that our awareness of blue is only a modification of the "awareness," but he thinks that an awareness has always two relations, a relation with the subject or the knower (grāhaka-graha) and a relation with the object which is known (grāhya-graha). Blue as an object is essential for making an awareness of blue possible; for the awareness is not blue, but we have an awareness of the blue. But Vasubandhu argues that this psychological necessity is due to a projection of objectivity as a necessary function of determinate thought, and it does not at all follow that this implies that there are real external objects existing outside of it and generating the awareness as external agent. Psychological objectivity does not imply ontological objectivity. It is argued that, if the agency of objective entities in the production of sense-knowledge be admitted, there could not be any case where sense-knowledge could be admitted to be produced without the operation of the objective entities; but, since in dreams and illusions such sense-knowledge is universally regarded as being produced without the causal operation of such objective entities, no causal operation can be conceded to the objective entities for the production of sense-knowledge.

Śaṅkara, in attempting to refute the Buddhist idealism in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra, II. ii. 28, seems to refer to a school of idealism which is the same as that described by Śantarakṣita in his Tattva-samgraha (commented upon by Kama-laśīla), but largely different from that described in Vasubandhu's Trīśikā. The positive arguments against the impossibility of an external world constituted by partless atoms are the same1. But

1 Vācaspati, however, in his Bhāmatt commentary, II. ii. 28, introduces some new points. He says that spatial extension, as perceived in visual perception, cannot be due to the perception of partless atoms. Nor can it be said that the colour particles produced in uninterrupted succession generate the notion of spatial extension, though there is no spatial extension in the individual atom; for it is not possible that the groups of colour particles are not interrupted by taste, smell and the tactual particles. So it has to be admitted that the colour particles are at some distance from one another and are interrupted by other particles, and that the continuous appearance of colour in spatial distribution is a false appearance, like the appearance of continuous trees from a distance constituting a forest (gandha-rasa-sparśa-paramāśv-antaritā hi te rūpa-paramāśvato na nirantarāḥ; tasmād ārāt sāntareṣu vṛksate eka-ghana-pratyayavat eṣa sthūla-pratyayah paramāśvau sāntareṣu bhrānta eva).
it is further argued on behalf of the Buddhist idealists that the awareness of a pillar, the awareness of a wall or of a jug or of a piece of cloth, implies that these individual awarenesses are mutually different in nature among themselves; and that consequently the apparent differences among objects are but differences among the ideas; and that therefore the objects are of the same nature as the particular ideas by which we are supposed to know them; and, if that be so, the hypothesis of an external world of objects becomes unnecessary. Moreover the fact that both the idea of the object and the object are taken at one and the same moment proves that both the object and the idea are identical, just as the illusory second moon perceived simultaneously with the moon is identical with it\(^1\). When one of them is not perceived the other also is not perceived. If they were by nature separate and different, there would be no reason why there should be such a uniform and invariable relation between them. The reason for the diversity of our ideas is to be sought not in the diversity of external objects which are ordinarily supposed to produce them, but in the beginningless diversity of the instinctive sub-conscious roots (vāsanā) which produce all our ideas in the waking state, just as they produce dreams during sleep; as dreams are admitted by all to be produced without any external objects, so are all ideas produced without any external real objects; for as ideas the dream ideas are just the same as the waking ideas. But in both cases there are the instinctive sub-conscious roots (vāsanā), without which no ideas, whether in the dream state or in the waking state, can be produced; so these, being invariably present in all cases of production of ideas, are the cause of all ideas\(^2\).

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\(^1\) This simile is adduced by Vācaspati probably from a quotation from Diśnāga—sahopalambha-niyamād abheda nila-tad-dhiyoḥ bhedaś ca bhrānti-vijñānair dṛṣṭetendāve itādvaye.

Since both the blue and the idea of the blue are taken at the same moment, they are one and the same; for any two things which are taken simultaneously are identical. As one moon appears as two in an illusory manner, so the difference between the idea and the object is also perceived only illusorily. This argument of sahopalambha-niyama is absent in Vasubandhu’s Viṃśatikā and Trīṃśikā.

\(^2\) Vācaspati summarizes in this connection the inference of the Sautrāntikas for the existence of an external world of objects as the causes of the corresponding ideas. The argument of the Sautrāntikas runs thus: When, the old causes remaining the same, there is a new effect, that new effect must be due to a new cause. Now, though it should be admitted that in the passing series of inner consciousness each particular moment generates the succeeding one, and that this power of productivity is called vāsanā (tat-pratytti-vijñāna-janana-...
Shaṅkara in refuting the above position says that such a view is untenable because it contradicts our experience, which always distinguishes the subject and the object from the awareness. We are directly aware of our sense-contact with external objects which we perceive, and the object of awareness and the awareness are not one and the same. Our awareness itself shows that it is different from its object. The awareness of a pillar is not the same as a pillar, but a pillar is only an object of the awareness of a pillar. Even in denying external objects, the Buddhist idealists have to say that what is knowable only within appears as if it was existing outside\(^1\). Shaṅkara argues thus: if externality is absolutely non-existent, how can any sense-cognition appear as external? Viṣṇumitra cannot appear as the son of a barren woman. Again, the fact that an idea has the same form as its object does not imply that there are no objects; on the other hand, if there were no objects, how could any idea have the same form as its corresponding object? Again, the maxim that any two things which are taken simultaneously are identical is false; for, if the object and its awareness are comprehended at the same moment, the very fact that one is taken along with the other shows that they cannot be identical. Moreover, we find that in all our awarenesses of blue or yellow, a jug or a wall, it is the qualifying or predicative factors of objects of knowledge that differ; awareness as such remains just the same. The objects of knowledge are like so many extraneous qualities attributed to knowledge, just as whiteness or blackness may be attributed to a cow; so whether one perceives blue or red or yellow, that signifies that the difference of perception involves a difference in objects and not in the awareness itself. So the awareness, being one, is naturally different from the objects, which are many; and, since the objects are many, \(\text{tir vāsāndā}\), and that its tendency to effectuate itself is called its power of fruition (\text{parīpāka}), even then it would be difficult to understand how each particular moment should have a power altogether different from other moments; for, since there is nothing else to change the character of the moments, each moment is just as much a moment as any other. So it has to be admitted that there are other things which make one moment different in its power of effectuation from any other; and these are the external objects.

\(^1\) Shaṅkara says \textit{yad antar-śīyā-rūpaṁ tadbahirvad avabhāsate}. This seems to be a quotation from Diśnāga. Diśnāga’s verse, as quoted by Kamalāśīla in his commentary on the \textit{Tatva-saṅgraha}, verses 2082–2084, runs as follows: 

\textit{yad antar-śīyā-rūpaṁ tu bahirvad avabhāsate}

\textit{so 'rtho eṣādā-rūpatvāt tat-pratyayatayāpi ca}.

This shows that Shaṅkara had Diśnāga in his mind when he attempted to refute the Buddhist idealists.
they are different from the one, the awareness. The awareness is one and it is different from the objects, which are many. Moreover, the argument that the appearance of world objects may be explained on the analogy of dreams is also invalid; for there is a great difference between our knowledge of dreams and of worldly objects—dreams are contradicted by the waking experience, but the waking experiences are never found contradicted.

It is curious to note here the contradictions in Śaṅkara’s own statements. It has been already pointed out that he himself in his commentary on Gauḍapāda’s Kārikā built a powerful argument for the non-existence of all objects of waking experience on the analogy of the non-existence of the objects of dream experience. Śāntarakṣita (A.D. 705) and Kamalaśila (A.D. 728) in refuting a position similar to that of the view of Śaṅkara—that consciousness is one and unchangeable and that all objects are changing, but that the change of objects does not imply any change of the consciousness itself—argue that, had this been so, then that would imply that all sensibles of different kinds of colours, sounds, etc. were known at one and the same time, since the consciousness that would reveal those objects is constant and unchangeable. Kamalaśila therefore holds that consciousness is not unchangeable and one, but that there are only the changeable ideas of the sensibles and each idea is different from the other which follows it in time. Śaṅkara’s view that consciousness is only one and that it is only the objects that are many seems to be based on a separation due to an arbitrary abstraction. If the commentary on Gauḍapāda’s Kārikā be admitted to be a work of Śaṅkara, then it may be urged that Śaṅkara’s views had undergone a change when he was writing the commentary on the Brahma-sūtra; for in the commentary on Gauḍapāda’s Kārikā he seems again and again to emphasize the view that the objects perceived in waking experience are as false and as non-existent as objects of dream experience. His only realism there consisted in the assertion that the world was but the result of a false illusory imposition on the real Brahman, since

1 dvābhūtā ca bheda ekasya siddho bhavati ekasmāc ca dvayaḥ; tasmād artha-jñānayor bhedaḥ. Śaṅkara’s Bhāṣya, ii. ii. 28, Nirṇaya-Sāgara Press, Bombay, 1904.


Neither Śāntarakṣita nor Kamalaśila seems to be familiar with Śaṅkara.
illusions such as mirage, etc. must have some underlying basis upon which they are imposed. But in the commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* the world of objects and sensibles is seen to have an existence of some sort outside individual thought. Vācaspati in his *Bhāmati* commentary distinguishes the position of Śaṅkara from that of Buddhist idealism by saying that the Vedānta holds that the “blue” is not an idea of the form of blue, but “the blue” is merely the inexplicable and indefinable object.

In discussing the views of Vasubandhu in the *Viṃśatikā* and *Trimśikā* it has been pointed out that Vasubandhu did not try to repudiate the objectivity of the objects of awareness, but he repudiated the idea that objects of awareness existed outside of thought and produced the different kinds of awareness. His idea seems to have been that the sensibles are made up of thought-stuff and, though they are the psychological objects of awareness, they do not exist outside of thought and determine the different ideas that we have of them. But both the sensibles and their ideas are determined by some inner law of thought, which determines the nature and methods of the whole process of the growth and development of the psychosis, and which determines not only its cognitional character, but also its moral and emotional character. All the arguments of Śaṅkara in which he emphasizes the psychological duality of awareness and its object would have no force against Vasubandhu, as Vasubandhu admits it himself and holds that “blue” (*nīla*) is different from the idea of blue; the blue is an object (*ālambana*) and the idea of the blue is an awareness. According to him thought splits itself into subject and object; the idea therefore expresses itself as a subject-object awareness. The subject and the object are as much products of thought as the idea itself; the fact that he considers the blue to be thought does not mean that he denies the objectivity of the blue or that the only existence of the blue is the blue-idea. The blue is objectively present before the idea of blue as a presentation, just as there is the subject to perceive it, but this objectivity does not imply that the blue is somewhere outside thought in the space outside; for even space-locations are thought-products, and so there is no sense in attributing the sensibles of presentation to the outside world. The sensibles are objects of awareness, but they are not the excitants.

of the corresponding awareness. It does not seem that Śaṅkara says anything to refute such a view. Śaṅkara's position in the commentary on Gauḍapāda's Kārikā seems to have been the same sort of view as that of Diṅnāga, which he takes so much pains to refute in the Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya, and as such it was opposed to the view of Nāgārjuna that there must be some essence or reality on which the illusory impositions are made. But in the Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya he maintains the view that the objective world, as it appears to our consciousness, is present before it objectively and independently—only its ultimate nature is inexplicable. The difference of the objects from the awareness and their independent existence and activity have been accepted by most of the later Vedānta teachers of the Śaṅkara school; and it is well known that in sense-perception the need of the mind-contact with the object of perception through the specific sense is considered indispensable.

Prakāśātman (A.D. 1200) in his Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa raises this point and says that the great difference between the Mahāyānists and the Vedāntins consists in the fact that the former hold that the objects (viśaya) have neither any separate existence nor any independent purpose or action to fulfil as distinguished from the momentary ideas, while the latter hold that, though the objects are in essence identical with the one pure consciousness, yet they can fulfil independent purposes or functions and have separate, abiding and uncontradicted existences. Both Padmapāda and Prakāśātman argue that, since the awareness remains the same while there is a constant variation of its objects, and therefore that which remains constant (anuvṛttta) and that which changes (vyāvṛttta) cannot be considered identical, the object cannot be regarded as being only a modification of the idea. It is suggested that the Buddhist idealist urges that, if the object (e.g. blue) is different from the awareness, it cannot be revealed in it, and, if the blue can be revealed in the awareness, at that moment all the other things of the world might as well be revealed; for there is no such

1 See Vedānta-paribhāṣā, ch. 1, Śrīvenkatesvar Press, Bombay, 1911.
2 tattvā-darśinas tu advityat samvedanāt abhede 'pi viśayasya bhedenāpi artha-kriyā-sāmartha-satve vishayitvām ca bhūtāt ca adhītam asṛti vaddanti. Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa, p. 73. In addition to this work Prakāśātman also wrote two independent commentaries on Brahma-sūtra called Śārtraka-mānāpa-nāyika-samgraha and Laukika-nāyika-muktāvali.
3 anuvṛttasya vyāvṛttān na bheda 'nuvṛttatvād ākāśa-ghaṭādīcāt. Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa, p. 73.
specific relation with the blue that the blue alone should appear in consciousness at that moment. If it is urged that the blue produces the awareness of the blue, then what would be the function of the visual organ? It is better, therefore, the Buddhist suggests, to admit a natural and unique relation of identity of the idea and the object.1 The Vedāntist objects to this and says that such a supposition cannot be true, since we perceive that the subject, object and the idea are not one and the same. To such an objection the Buddhist is supposed to reply that these three do not form a complex unity, but arise at three successive moments of time, and then by virtue of their potency or root-impression a complex of the three appears; and this complex should not therefore be interpreted as being due to a relating of three distinct entities.2 Thus the fact that “I perceive blue” is not to be interpreted as a conscious relating of “I,” “the blue” and the awareness, but as an ideation arising at one particular point of time, involving all the three constituents in it. Such a supposition is necessary, because all appearances are momentary, and because the relating of the three as three independent entities would necessarily be impossible without the lapse of some time for their operation of relating. The theory of momentariness naturally leads us to the above supposition, that what appears as relating is nothing but one momentary flash, which has the above three as its constituent elements; so the Buddhist is supposed to admit that, psychologic-

1 tasmāt svābhāvikāsādharaṇābhādhasambandhād eva viṣṇuṇe nīlām avabhāsate, Panca-pādikā-cīvarama, p. 74.

Arguing from a similar point of view, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla urge that, if the object was not identical with the awareness, there must be some immutable law why they should appear simultaneously. This law according to the Buddhists could only be either of identity (tādātmya) or of causality as invariability of production (tad-utpatti). The first alternative is what the Buddhists here are contending for as against the Vedāntists. There cannot be the law of causality here; for there cannot be any operation of the law of causality as production between two entities which are simultaneous. Tattva-saṅgraha and Paññikā, 2030, 2031.

2 tad vāsanā-sameta-samanantarā-pratyaya-samuttham saṅkalanātmakam pratyayāntaram etan neha saṃbandhāgamah, Padmapāda’s (A.D. 820) Pañca-pādikā, p. 25. This work exerted the greatest influence on the development of Vedāntic thought for about six or seven centuries, and several commentaries were written on it. Most important of these are Prakāśatman’s Pañcapādikā-cīvarama, Pañca-pādikābhyāsa-bhāṣya-cvākhyā, Pañca-pādikāśāstra-darpaṇa by Amṛtānanda, Tattva-dṛpaṇa by Amṛtānandanaṅtha, and also a commentary by Ānanda-prapūra Yaṭi. Prakāśatman’s commentary on it, called Pañcapādikā-cīvarama, was commented upon by Akhaṇḍānanda Muni in his Tattva-dṛpaṇa, by Rāmānanda Sarasvatī in his Vivaranapanyāsa, and by Nṛsiṃhaśrama in his Pañca-pādikācīvarama-bhāva-prakāśikā.
ally, the awareness and its object seem to be different, but such a psychological appearance can at best be considered as a mental illusion or fiction; for logically the Buddhist cannot admit that a momentary appearance could subsist long enough to have the possibility of being related to the self and the awareness, as in “I know the blue”; and, if the blue was not considered to be identical with awareness, there would remain no way to explain the possibility of the appearance of the blue in the awareness.

Padmapāda points out that the main point with the Buddhists is the doctrine of causal efficiency (artha-kriyā-kāriteva), or the maxim that that alone exists which can prove its existence by effecting some purpose or action. They hold further that this criterion of existence can be satisfied only if all existents are momentary and if all things are momentary; the only epistemological view that can consistently be accepted is the identity of the awareness and the object. The main reason why only momentary existents can satisfy the criterion of causal efficiency is that, if the existents were not assumed to be momentary, they could not effect any purpose or action. Padmapāda urges in refutation of this that, if causal efficiency means the productivity of its own awareness (sva-visaya-jñāna-jananam), then an awareness or idea has no existence; for it does not produce any other knowledge of itself (sva-samvit sva-visaya-

jñāna-jananād asallakṣaṇatvam), and the awareness of one cannot be known by others except by inference, which again would not be direct cognition. If causal efficiency means the production of another moment, then the last moment, having no other moment to produce, would itself be non-existent; and, if the last moment is proved to be non-existent, then by turns all the other moments would be non-existent. Existence is a nature of things; and even when a thing remains silent after an operation it does not on that account cease to exist. On such a basis Prakāśatman points out

\[1\] namabham āśriyā saṃvedanaḥ abhināma nāma brūmaḥ hindu visaya jñāna nālasya pratibhādnyathānapapattyaḥ; kṣaṇikasya tv āgantuha-sambandhābhāve... pratibhāna eva na syāt. Paṇcā-pādikā-vivaraṇa, p. 74.

\[2\] See the first volume of this work, pp. 163–164, where the reasons in justification of the doctrine are briefly stated.

\[3\] Padmapāda derives the possibility of one’s being aware of an awareness, which however hardly appears to be convincing. He thinks that an awareness, being of the nature of light, does not stand in need of any other light to illuminate it. na ca samvit saṃvido visayaḥ saṃvid-ātmanā bhedābhavat pradīpasyeva pratipañcaram. Paṇcā-pādikā, p. 27.

\[4\] nārtha-kriyā-kāriteva-lakṣāṇam sattvam hindu svābhāvekam iti sakṛt kāryaṁ kṛtoc tuṣṭāmbhātasyāpi sthāyinaḥ sattvam na virudhyate. Paṇcā-pādikā-vivaraṇa, p. 80.
that the supposed three notions of "I," "awareness" and the object are really not three distinct notions appearing as one on account of their similarity, but all the three are joined together in one identical subject-object-awareness which does not involve the three successive stages which the Buddhists suppose. This identity is proved by the fact that they are recognized (pratyabhijñā) to be so. We are, again, all conscious of our own identity, that we persist in all our changing states of consciousness, and that, though our ideas are continually changing with the changing objects, we remain unchanged all the same; and this shows that in knowing ourselves as pure awareness we are successively connected with the changing objects. But the question arises who is to be convinced of this identity, a notion of which can be produced only by a relating of the previous existence (through sub-conscious impressions of memory) to the existence of the present moment; and this cannot be done by the Vedāntic self, which is pure self-revealing consciousness that cannot further be made an object of any other conscious state; for it is unchangeable, indestructible, and there cannot be in it a consciousness of relating between a past state and a present state through the sub-conscious impressions of memory. The mere persistence of the same consciousness is not the recognition of identity; for the recognition of identity would be a relation uniting the past as past with the present as present; and, since there is no one to perceive the relation of identity, the appearance of identity is false. The Vedāntic answer to such an objection is that, though the pure consciousness cannot behave as an individual, yet the same consciousness associated with mind (antaḥkaraṇa-viśiṣṭa) may behave as an individual who can recognize his own identity as well as that of others. The mind is associated with the sub-conscious impressions of a felt ego (ahamṛtti-saṁskāra-sahitam), due to the experience of the self as associated with a past time; being responsible for the experience of the self as associated with the present time, it produces the notion of the identity of the self as persisting both in the past and in the present. A natural objection against such an explanation is that, since the Vedānta does not admit that one awareness can be the object of another awareness, the revival of a past awareness is

1 pūrvāntābha-saṁskāra-sahitād idāntānta-vastu-pramiti-kāraṇāj jātam ekāya kāla-duṣya-sambandha-vipayakaṁ pratyakṣa-jñānaṁ pratyabhijñāḥ iti cet, na tarhi तत्रनि तद्यथेः संभवति viṣṇu-svabhāvasya hy ātmanaḥ... jñānta-rāgamyatvāt... Pañca-pādikā-vivarana, p. 75.
impossible, without which recognition of identity would be impossible. The answer of the Vedāntist is that, just as an idea is remembered through its sub-conscious impressions, so, though recognition of identity was absent in the preceding moment, yet it could arise through the operation of the sub-conscious impressions at a later moment. According to the Vedānta the pure consciousness is the only unchanging substance underlying; it is this consciousness associated with mind (antahkaraṇa) that behaves as the knower or the subject, and it is the same consciousness associated with the previous and later time that appears as the objective self with which the identity is felt and which is known to be identical with the knower—the mind-associated consciousness. We all have notions of self-identity and we feel it as “I am the same”; and the only way in which this can be explained is on the basis of the fact that consciousness, though one and universal, can yet be supposed to perform diverse functions by virtue of the diverse nature of its associations, by which it seems to transform itself as the knower and the thousand varieties of relations and objects which it knows. The main point which is to be noted in connection with this realization of the identity of the self is that the previous experience and its memory prove that the self existed in the past; but how are we to prove that what existed is also existing at the present moment? Knowledge of identity of the self is something different from the experience of self in the past and in the present. But the process consists in this, that the two experiences manifest the self as one identical entity which persisted through both the experiences, and this new experience makes the self known in the aforesaid relation of identity. Again, when I remember a past experience, it is the self as associated with that experience that is remembered; so it is the self as associated with the different time relations that is apprehended in an experience of the identity of self.

From all these discussions one thing that comes out clearly is that according to the Śaṅkara Vedānta, as explained by the Vivaraṇa school of Padmapāda and his followers, the sense-data and the objects have an existence independent of their being perceived; and there is also the mind called antahkaraṇa, which operates in its own way for the apprehension of this or that object. Are objects already there and presented to the pure consciousness through the

1 Pañca-pāḍikā-vivaraṇa, p. 76.
mind? But what then are the objects? and the Śaṅkarite’s answer is that they in themselves are unspeakable and indescribable. It is easy to notice the difference of such a view from that of the Buddhistic idealism of Dīnāga or the Laṅkāvatāra on the one hand and that of Vasubandhu in his Trīṃśikā on the other. For in the case of the former there were no objects independent of their being perceived, and in the case of the latter the objects are transformations of a thought-principle and are as such objective to the subject which apprehends them. Both the subject and the object are grounded in the higher and superior principle, the principle of thought. This grounding implies that this principle of thought and its transformations are responsible for both the subject and the object, as regards material and also as regards form. According to the Śaṅkara Vedānta, however, the stuff of world-objects, mind, the senses and all their activities, functionings and the like are but modifications of māyā, which is indescribable (anirvācyā) in itself, but which is always related to pure consciousness as its underlying principle, and which in its forms as material objects hides from the view and is made self-conscious by the illuminating flash of the underlying principle of pure consciousness in its forms as intellectual states or ideas. As already described, the Śūnyavādins also admitted the objective existence of all things and appearances; but, as these did not stand the test of criticism, considered them as being essenceless (niḥsvabhāva). The only difference that one can make out between this doctrine of essencelessness and the doctrine of indescribability of the Śaṅkara school is that this “indescribable” is yet regarded as an indescribable something, as some stuff which undergoes changes and which has transformed itself into all the objects of the world. The idealism of the Śaṅkara Vedānta does not believe in the sahopalabhā-niyama of the Buddhist idealists, that to exist is to be perceived. The world is there even if it be not perceived by the individual; it has an objective existence quite independent of my ideas and sensations; but, though independent of my sensations or ideas, it is not independent of consciousness, with which it is associated and on which it is dependent. This consciousness is not ordinary psychological thought, but it is the principle that underlies all conscious thought. This pure thought is independent and self-revealing, because in all conscious thought the consciousness shines by itself; all else is manifested by this consciousness and
when considered apart from it, is inconceivable and unmeaning. This independent and uncontradicted self-shiningness constitutes being (abādhita-svayam-prakāśataiva asya sattā). All being is pure consciousness, and all appearance hangs on it as something which is expressed by a reference to it and apart from which it has no conceivable status or meaning. This is so not only epistemologically or logically, but also ontologically. The object-forms of the world are there as transformations of the indescribable stuff of māyā, which is not "being," but dependent on "being"; but they can only be expressed when they are reflected in mental states and presented as ideas. Analogies of world objects with dream objects or illusions can therefore be taken only as popular examples to make the conception of māyā popularly intelligible; and this gives the Vedāntic idealism its unique position.

Śaṅkara’s Defence of Vedānta; Philosophy of Bādarāyaṇa and Bhartṛprapañca.

Śaṅkara’s defensive arguments consisted in the refutation of the objections that may be made against the Vedāntic conception of the world. The first objection anticipated is that from the followers of Śaṅkhya philosophy. Thus it is urged that the effect must be largely of the same nature as the cause. Brahman, which is believed to be intelligent (cetana) and pure (suddha), could not be the cause of a world which is unintelligent (jāta and acetana) and impure (aśuddha). And it is only because the world is so different in nature from the intelligent spirits that it can be useful to them. Two things which are identical in their nature can hardly be of any use to each other—two lamps cannot be illuminating to each other. So it is only by being different from the intelligent spirits that the world can best serve them and exist for them. Śaṅkara’s answer to this objection is that it is not true that the effect should in every way be similar to the cause—there are instances of inanimate hair and nails growing from living beings, and of living insects growing out of inanimate objects like cow-dung. Nor can it be denied that there is at least some similarity between Brahman and the world in this, that both have being. It cannot be urged that, because Brahman is intelligent, the world also should be intelligent; for there is no reason for such

1 Vācaspati Miśra’s Bhāmati, p. 13, Nirṇaya-Sāgara edition, 1904.
an expectation. The converse of it also has not been found to be true—it has not been found that what is unintelligent has been known to have been derived from a source other than Brahman\(^1\). The whole point of this argument seems to lie in the fact that, since the Upaniṣads assert that Brahman is the cause of the world, the apparent incompatibility of the production of an impure and unintelligent world from the intelligent and pure Brahman has to be explained away; for such ultimate truths can be discovered not by reason, but by the testimony of the Upaniṣads. Another objection supposed to be raised by Śaṅkhyā against Vedānta is that at the time of dissolution (pralaya), when the world of effects will dissolve back into Brahman the cause, the impurities of the worldly state might also make the causal state of Brahmahood impure. Śaṅkara refutes it by pointing out two sets of instances in which the effects do not affect the causal state when they return to it. Of these, one set of instances is to be found in those cases where articles of gold, silver, etc. are melted back into their original material states as unformed gold and silver, and are not seen to affect them with their specific peculiarities as formed articles. The other instance is to be found in the manifestation of magic by a magician. The magical creations of a magician are controlled by him and, when they vanish in this way, they cannot in any way affect the magician himself; for the magical creations have no reality. So also a dreamer is not affected by his dreams when he is awake. So the reality is one which remains altogether untouched by the changing states. The appearance of this reality as all the changing states is mere false show (māyā-mātram), like the appearance of a rope as a snake. Again, as a man may in deep sleep pass into a state where there is no trace of his mundane experiences and may yet, when he becomes awake, resume his normal vocation in life, so after the dissolution of the world into its causal state there may again be the same kind of creation as there was before the dissolution. So there can be no objection that the world of impure effects will affect the pure state of Brahman at the time of dissolution or that there could be no creation after dissolution.

These arguments of Śaṅkara in answer to a supposed objection

\(^1\) kim hi yac caityanyenānāvītaṁ tad abraham-prakṛtikam drśtam iti brahma-
vādinam praty udāhiyeta samastasya vastujātasya brahma-prakṛtikato bhūy-
pagamāt. Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya, II. i. 6.
that the world of effects, impure and unintelligent as it is, could not have been the product of pure and intelligent Brahman are not only weak but rather uncalled for. If the world of effects is mere māyā and magic and has no essence (vastutva), the best course for him was to rush straight to his own view of effects as having no substantiality or essence and not to adopt the parināma view of real transformations of causes into effects to show that the effects could be largely dissimilar from their causes. Had he started with the reply that the effects had no real existence and that they were merely magical creations and a false show, the objection that the impure world could not come out of pure Brahman would have at once fallen to the ground; for such an objection would have validity only with those who believed in the real transformations of effects from causes, and not with a philosopher like Śaṅkara, who did not believe in the reality of effects at all. Instead of doing that he proceeded to give examples of the realistic return of golden articles into gold in order to show that the peculiar defects or other characteristics of the effect cannot affect the purity of the cause. Side by side with this he gives another instance, how magical creations may vanish without affecting the nature of the magician. This example, however, does not at all fit in with the context, and it is surprising how Śaṅkara failed to see that, if his examples of realistic transformations were to hold good, his example of the magic and the magician would be quite out of place. If the parināma view of causation is to be adopted, the vivarta view is to be given up. It seems however that Śaṅkara here was obliged to take refuge in such a confusion of issues by introducing stealthily an example of the vivarta view of unreality of effects in the commentary on sūtras which could only yield a realistic interpretation. The sūtras here seem to be so convincingly realistic that the ultimate reply to the suggested incompatibility of the production of effects dissimilar from their causes is found in the fact that the Upaniṣads hold that this impure and unintelligent world had come out of Brahman; and that, since the Upaniṣads assert it, no objection can be raised against it on grounds of reason.

In the next section the theory of realistic transformation of causes is further supported by the sūtra which asserts that in spite of the identity of effects with their cause their plurality or diversity may also be explained on the analogy of many popular illustrations. Thus, though the waves are identical with the sea, yet they have
an existence in their plurality and diversity as well. Here also Śaṅkara has to follow the implication of the sūtra in his interpretation. He, however, in concluding his commentary on this sūtra, says that the world is not a result of any real transformation of Brahman as effect; Brahman alone exists, but yet, when Brahman is under the conditioning phenomena of a world-creation, there is room for apparent diversity and plurality. It may be pointed out, however, that such a supplementary explanation is wholly incompatible with the general meaning of the rule, which is decidedly in favour of a realistic transformation. It is unfortunate that here also Śaṅkara does not give any reason for his supplementary remark, which is not in keeping with the general spirit of the sūtra and the interpretation which he himself gave of it.

In the next section the sūtras seem plainly to assert the identity of cause and effect, "because of the possibility of the effect, because the cause exists, because the effect exists in the cause and is due to an elaboration of the cause and also for other reasons and the testimony of the Upaniṣads." Such a meaning is quite in keeping with the general meaning of the previous sections. Śaṅkara, however, interprets the sūtra as meaning that it is Brahman, the cause, which alone is true. There cannot therefore be any real transformation of causes into effects. The omniscience of Brahman and His being the creator of the world have thus only a limited validity; for they depend upon the relative reality of the world. From the absolute point of view therefore there is no Iśvara who is the omniscient creator of the world\(^1\). Śaṅkara supports this generally on the ground of the testimony of some Upaniṣad texts (e.g. mṛttiketyeva satyam, etc.). He however introduces an argument in support of the sat-kārya-vāda theory, or the theory that the effect is already existent in the cause. This theory is indeed common both to the parināma view of real transformation and the vivarta view, in two different ways. It is curious however that he should support the sat-kārya-vāda theory on parināma lines, as against the generative view of a-sat-kārya-vāda of the Nyāya, but not on vivarta lines, where effects are treated as non-existent and false. Thus he

\(^1\) kūṭa-stha-brahmātma-vādinaḥ ekatvaikāntyat tīrtrīśāvayabhāvāḥ tīvara-kāraṇa-pratiṣṭhā-virodha iti cet; na; avidyātmasaka-nāma-rūpa-bhīja-vyākaranāpāpee satvaḥ sarvajñateṣvaya. Śaṅkara’s Bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra, 11.1.14.

na tattvākham aścaryyaḥ sarvajñateṣaḥ ca brahmaṇaḥ kinto avidyopādiḥkam iti taddāśrayam pratijñā-sūtram, tattvādāyaḥ tu tad ananyateva-sūtram. Bhāmati on the above Bhāṣya.
says that the fact that curd is produced from milk and not from mud shows that there is some such intimate relation of curd with milk which it has not with anything else. This intimate relation consists in the special power or capacity (śakti) in the cause (e.g. the milk), which can produce the special effect (e.g. the curd). This power is the very essence of the cause, and the very essence of this power is the effect itself. If a power determines the nature of the effect, it must be already existent in the cause as the essence of the effect. Arguing against the Nyāya view that the cause is different from the effect, though they are mutually connected in an inseparable relation of inherence (samavāya), he says that, if such a samavāya is deemed necessary to connect the cause with the effect, then this also may require a further something to connect the samavāya with the cause or the effect and that another and that another ad infinitum. If it is urged that samavāya, being a relation, does not require any further relation to connect it with anything else, it may well be asked in reply how "conjunction" (samyoga), which is also regarded as a relation, should require the relation of inherence (samavāya) to connect it with the objects which are in conjunction (samyogin). The conception of samavāya connecting substances with their qualities is unnecessary; for the latter always appear identified with the former (tādātmya-pratiti). If the effect, say a whole, is supposed to be existing in the cause, the parts, it must exist in them all taken together or in each of the separate parts. If the whole exist only in the totality of the parts, then, since all the parts cannot be assembled together, the whole as such would be invisible. If the whole exist in the parts in parts, then one has to conceive other parts of the whole different from its constituent parts; and, if the same questions be again repeated, these parts should have other parts and these others; and thus there would be a vicious infinite. If the whole exists wholly in each of the parts at the same time, then there would be many wholes. If it exists successively in each of the parts, then the whole would at one time be existent only in one part, and so at that time the functions of the whole would be absent in the other parts. If it is said that, just as a class-concept (e.g. cow) exists wholly in each of the individuals and yet is not many, so a whole may also be wholly existent in each of the parts, it may well be replied that the experience of wholes is not like the experience of class-concepts. The class-concept of cow is realized in each and every cow; but
a whole is not realized in each and every part. Again, if the effect is non-existent before its production, then, production being an action, such an action would have nothing as its agent, which is impossible—for, since the effect is non-existent before its production, it could not be the agent of its production; and, since being non-existent, it cannot be the agent of its production, such a production would be either itself non-existent or would be without any agent. If, however, production is not defined as an action, but as a relationing of an effect with its cause (svakāraṇa-sattā-samavāya), then also it may be objected that a relation is only possible when there are two terms which are related, and, since the effect is as yet non-existent, it cannot be related to its cause.

But, if the effect is already existent, what then is the necessity of the causal operation (kāraṇa-vyāpāra)? The answer to such a question is to be found in the view that the effect is but an elaboration of the cause into its effect. Just as a man may sit with his limbs collected together or stretched out and yet would be considered the same man, so an effect also is to be regarded as an expansion of the cause and as such identical with it. The effect is thus only a transformed state of the cause; and hence the causal operation is necessary for bringing about this transformation; but in spite of such a transformation the effect is not already existing in the cause as its potency or power.

There are seven other smaller sections. In the first of these the objection that, if the world is a direct product of the intelligent Brahman, there is no reason why such an intelligent being should create a world which is full of misery and is a prison-house to himself, is easily answered by pointing out that the transcendent creator is far above the mundane spirits that suffer misery in the prison-house of the world. Here also Śaṅkara adds as a supplementary note the remark that, since there is no real creation and the whole world is but a magical appearance, no such objection that the creator should not have created an undesirable world for its own suffering is valid. But the sūtras gave him no occasion for such a remark; so that indeed, as was the case with the previous sections, here also his māyā theory is not in keeping even with his general interpretation of the sūtras, and his remarks have to be appended as a note which hangs loosely and which does not appear to have any relevancy to the general meaning and purport of the sūtras.
In the next section an objection is raised that Brahman cannot without the help of any other accessory agents create the world; the reply to such an objection is found in the fact that Brahman has all powers in Himself and can as such create the world out of Himself without the help of anything else.

In the next section an objection is raised that, if the world is a transformation of Brahman, then, since Brahman is partless, the transformation must apply to the whole of Brahman; for a partial transformation is possible only when the substance which is undergoing the transformation has parts. A reply to such an objection is to be found in the analogy of the human self, which is in itself formless and, though transforming itself into various kinds of dream experiences, yet remains unchanged and unaffected as a whole by such transformations. Moreover, such objections may be levelled against the objectors themselves; for Sāmkhya also admits the transformation of the formless prakṛti.

In another section it is urged that, since Brahman is complete in Himself, there is no reason why He should create this great world, when He has nothing to gain by it. The reply is based on the analogy of play, where one has nothing to gain and yet one is pleased to indulge in it. So Brahman also creates the world by His līlā or play. Śaṅkara, however, never forgets to sing his old song of the māyā theory, however irrelevant it may be, with regard to the purpose of the sūtras, which he himself could not avoid following. Thus in this section, after interpreting the sūtra as attributing the world-creation to God’s playful activity, he remarks that it ought not to be forgotten that all the world-creation is but a fanciful appearance due to nescience and that the ultimate reality is the identity of the self and Brahman.

The above discussion seems to prove convincingly that Bādarāyana’s philosophy was some kind of bhedābheda-vāda or a theory of transcendence and immanence of God (Brahman)—even in the light of Śaṅkara’s own commentary. He believed that the world was the product of a real transformation of Brahman, or rather of His powers and energies (śakti). God Himself was not exhausted by such a transformation and always remained as the master creator who by His play created the world and who could by His own powers create the world without any extraneous assistance. The world was thus a real transformation of God’s powers, while He Himself, though remaining immanent in the
world through His powers, transcended it at the same time, and remained as its controller, and punished or rewarded the created mundane souls in accordance with their bad and good deeds.

The doctrine of *bhedabheda-vāda* is certainly prior to Śaṅkara, as it is the dominant view of most of the *purāṇas*. It seems probable also that Bhartṛprapāṇa refers to Bodhāyana, who is referred to as *vṛttikāra* by Rāmānuja, and as *vṛttikāra* and *Upavarga* by Śaṅkara, and to Dramiḍācārya, referred to by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja; all held some form of *bhedabheda* doctrine¹. Bhartṛprapāṇa has been referred to by Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*; and Ānandajñāna, in his commentary on Śaṅkara’s commentary, gives a number of extracts from Bhartṛprapāṇa’s *Bhāṣya* on the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*. Prof. M. Hiriyanna collected these fragments in a paper read before the Third Oriental Congress in Madras, 1924, and there he describes Bhartṛprapāṇa’s philosophy as follows. The doctrine of Bhartṛprapāṇa is monism, and it is of the *bhedabheda* type. The relation between Brahman and the *jīva*, as that between Brahman and the world, is one of identity in difference. An implication of this view is that both the *jīva* and the physical world evolve out of Brahman, so that the doctrine may be described as *Brahma-parināma-vāda*. On the spiritual side Brahman is transformed into the antaryāmin and the *jīva*; on the physical side into *avyakta*, *sūtra*, *virāj* and *devata*, which are all cosmic; and *jāti* and *piṇḍa*, which are not

¹ Prof. S. Kuppusvāmi Śāstrī, in an article read before the Third Oriental Conference, quotes a passage from Veṅkaṭa’s *Tattva-sīkha* on Rāmānuja’s commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras*, in which he says that Upavarga is a name of Bodhāyana—*vṛttikāra*ya Bodhāyanasyāvaca hi Upavarga iti svān nāma—Proceedings of the Third Oriental Conference, Madras, 1924. The commentators on Śaṅkara’s *Bhāṣya* say that, when he refers to *Vṛttikāra* in i. i. 9, i. 23, i. ii. 23 and iii. iii. 53, he refers to Upavarga by name. From the views of Upavarga referred to in these *sūtras* it appears that Upavarga believed in the theory of *jñāna-karma-samuccaya*, held also by Bhāskara (an adherent of the *bhedabheda* theory), Rāmānuja and others, but vehemently opposed by Śaṅkara, who wanted to repudiate the idea of his opponents that the performance of sacrificial and Vedic duties could be conceived as a preliminary preparation for making oneself fit for Brāhma-knowledge.

References to Dramiḍācārya’s commentary on the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* are made by Ānandagiri in his commentary on Śaṅkara’s commentary on the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. In the commentary of Sarvajñātmak Muni’s *Saṃkṣepa-śāstra*, iii. 217–227, by Nṛsiṁhasārma, the Vākyakāra referred to by Sarvajñātmak Muni as Ātreyya has been identified with Brahmāndin or Śaṅkka and the bhāṣyakāra (a quotation from whose Bhāṣya appears in *Saṃkṣepa-śāstra*, iii. 221, *antar-guṇā bhavavati paravatetī*, is referred to as a quotation from Dramiḍācārya in Rāmānuja’s *Vedārtha-saṃgraha*, p. 138, Pandit edition) is identified with Dramiḍācārya, who wrote a commentary on Brahmāndin’s *Chāndogya-paniṣad-vārttika*. 
cosmic. These are the avasthäuser or modes of Brahman, and represent the eight classes into which the variety of the universe may be divided. They are again classified into three rāsis, paramātma-rāsi, jīva-rāsi and mūrttāmūrtta-rāsi, which correspond to the triple subject-matter of Religion and Philosophy, viz. God, soul and matter. Bhartrprapana recognized what is known as pramāṇa-samuccayaya, by which it follows that the testimony of common experience is quite as valid as that of the Veda. The former vouches for the reality of variety and the latter for that of unity (as taught in the Upaniṣads). Hence the ultimate truth is dvaitādvaita. Mokṣa, or life’s end, is conceived as being achieved in two stages—the first leading to apavarga, where saṁsāra is overcome through the overcoming of āsanga; and the second leading to Brahmahood through the dispelling of avidyā. This means of reaching either stage is jñāna-karma-samuccayaya, which is a corollary on the practical side to pramāṇa-samuccayaya on the theoretical side.

It is indeed difficult to say what were the exact characteristics of Badarāyaṇa’s bhedābheda doctrine of Vedānta; but there is very little doubt that it was some special type of bhedābheda doctrine, and, as has already been repeatedly pointed out, even Śaṅkara’s own commentary (if we exclude only his parenthetic remarks, which are often inconsistent with the general drift of his own commentary and the context of the sūtras, as well as with their purpose and meaning, so far as it can be made out from such a context) shows that it was so. If, however, it is contended that this view of real transformation is only from a relative point of view (vyavahārika), then there must at least be one sūtra where the absolute (para-mārthika) point of view is given; but no such sūtra has been discovered even by Śaṅkara himself. If experience always shows the causal transformation to be real, then how is one to know that in the ultimate point of view all effects are false and unreal? If, however, it is contended that there is a real transformation (parināma) of the māyā stuff, whereas Brahman remains always unchanged, and if māyā is regarded as the power (śakti) of Brahman, how then can the śakti of Brahman as well as its transformations be regarded as unreal and false, while the possessor of the śakti (or the śaktimat, Brahman) is regarded as real and absolute? There is a great diversity of opinion on this point among the Vedāntic writers of the Śaṅkara school. Thus Appaya Dīksita in his Sūdāhānta-leśa refers to the author of Padārtha-nirṇaya as saying that
Brahman and māyā are both material causes of the world-appearance—Brahman the vivarta cause, and māyā the parināma cause. Others are said to find a definition of causation intermediate between vivarta and parināma by defining material cause as that which can produce effects which are not different from itself (svā-bhinna-kāraṇa janakato’maṇi upādānato’maṇi). The world is identical with Brahman inasmuch as it has being, and it is identical with nescience inasmuch as it has its characteristics of materiality and change. So from two different points of view both Brahman and māyā are the cause of the world. Vācaspāti Maśra holds that māyā is only an accessory cause (sahakārī), whereas Brahman is the real vivarta cause. The author of the Siddhānta-muktāvalī, Prakāśānanda, however, thinks that it is the māyā energy (māyā-sakti) which is the material cause of the world and not Brahman. Brahman is unchangeable and is the support of māyā; and is thus the cause of the world in a remote sense. Sarvajñātma Muni, however, believes Brahman alone to be the vivarta cause, and māyā to be only an instrument for the purpose. The difficulty that many of the sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa give us a parināma view of causation was realized by Sarvajñātma Muni, who tried to explain it away by suggesting that the parināma theory was discussed approvingly in the sūtras only because this theory was nearest to the vivarta, and by initiating people to the parināma theory it would be easier to lead them to the vivarta theory, as hinted in sūtra II. i. 14. This explanation could have some probability, if the arrangement of the sūtras was

1 Vācaspāti Maśra flourished in about A.D. 840. In addition to his Bhāmatī commentary on the Brahma-sūtra he wrote many other works and commentaries on other systems of philosophy. His important works are: Tatīvya-binding, Tatīvya-valśārādī (yoga), Tatīvya-samkṣaṭa Brahma-siddhi-pāka, Nyāya-kaṇiṣṭha pada Viśīvēka, Nyāya-tattvālāka, Nyāya-rata-pāka, Nyāya-vārttiṇa-tātparya-pāka, Brahma-tatīvya-saṃhitottadipanc, Yuḥti-dīpikā (Śāṅkhya), Śāṅkhyā-tatīvya-kaumudi, Vedānta-tatīvya-kaumudi.

2 He lived about A.D. 900 during the reign of King Manukulāditya and was a pupil of Devesvara.

Vivarta-vādasya hi pūrbav-bhūmīra
vedānta-vāde parināma-vādah
vyavasthitāśmin parināma-vāde
svayam samāyati vivarta-vādah.
Śaṅkṣepa-sātrāka, 11. 61.

Upāyaṁ atishatī pūrvaṁ uccair
upeyaṁ āptum janatā yathaṁva
śrutir mūntindrā ca vivarta-siddhyān
vikāra-vādāṁ vadatas tathāva.
Ibid. 11. 62.

vikāra-vādāṁ Kapilādi-paścaṁ
upetaṁ vādāna tu sūtra-kāraṇa
śrutī ca samājapati pūrvabhrāmu
sītvā vivarta-pratipādānya.
Ibid. 11. 64.
such as to support the view that the parināma view was introduced only to prepare the reader's mind for the vivarta view, which was ultimately definitely approved as the true view; but it has been shown that the content of almost all the sūtras of II. i. consistently support the parināma view, and that even the sūtra II. i. 14 cannot be explained as holding the vivarta view of causation as the right one, since the other sūtras of the same section have been explained by Śaṅkara himself on the parināma view; and, if the content be taken into consideration, this sūtra also has to be explained on the parināma view of bhedābheda type.

Teachers and Pupils in Vedānta.

The central emphasis of Śaṅkara's philosophy of the Upaniṣads and the Brahma-sūtra is on Brahman, the self-revealed identity of pure consciousness, bliss and being, which does not await the performance of any of the obligatory Vedic duties for its realization. A right realization of such Upaniṣad texts as "That art thou," instilled by the right teacher, is by itself sufficient to dispel all the false illusions of world-appearance. This, however, was directly against the Mīmāṃsā view of the obligatoriness of certain duties, and Śaṅkara and his followers had to fight hard on this point with the Mīmāṃsakas. Different Mīmāṃsā writers emphasized in different ways the necessity of the association of duties with Brahma-wisdom; and a brief reference to some of these has been made in the section on Suresvara. Another question arose regarding the nature of the obligation of listening to the unity texts (e.g. "that art thou") of the Vedānta; and later Vedānta writers have understood it differently. Thus the author of the Prakāṭārtha, who probably flourished in the twelfth century, holds that it is only by virtue of the mandate of the Upaniṣads (such as "thou shouldst listen to these texts, understand the meaning and meditate") that one learns for the first time that one ought to listen to the Vedānta texts—a view which is technically called apūrva-vidhi. Others, however, think that people might themselves engage in reading all kinds of texts in their attempts to attain salvation and that they might go on the wrong track; and it is just to draw them on to the right path, viz. that of listening to the unity texts of the Upaniṣads, that the Upaniṣads direct men to listen to the unity texts—this view is technically called niyama-vidhi.
The followers of Sarvajñātma Muni, however, maintain that there can in no sense be a duty in regard to the attainment of wisdom of Brahma-knowledge, and the force of the duty lies in enjoining the holding of discussions for the clarification of one’s understanding; and the meaning of the obligatory sentence “thou shouldst listen to” means that one should hold proper discussions for the clarification of his intellect. Other followers of Sureśvara, however, think that the force of the obligation lies in directing the student of Vedānta steadily to realize the truth of the Vedānta texts without any interruption; and this view is technically called pariṣamkhyā-vidhi. Vācaspati Miśra and his followers, however, think that no obligation of duties is implied in these commands; they are simply put in the form of commands in order to show the great importance of listening to Vedānta texts and holding discussions on them, as a means of advancement in the Vedāntic course of progress.

But the central philosophical problem of the Vedānta is the conception of Brahman—the nature of its causality, its relation with māyā and the phenomenal world of world-appearance, and with individual persons. Śaṅkara’s own writings do not always manifest the same uniform and clear answer; and many passages in different parts of his work show tendencies which could be more or less diversely interpreted, though of course the general scheme was always more or less well-defined. Appaya Dīkṣita notes in the beginning of his Siddhānta-leśa that the ancients were more concerned with the fundamental problem of the identity of the self and the Brahman, and neglected to explain clearly the order of phenomenal appearance; and that therefore many divergent views have sprung up on the subject. Thus shortly after Śaṅkara’s death we have four important teachers, Sureśvara and his pupil Sarvajñātma Muni, Padmapāda and Vācaspati Miśra, who represent three distinct tendencies in the monistic interpretation of the Vedānta. Sureśvara and his pupil Sarvajñātma Muni held that māyā was only an instrument (deśāra), through which the one Brahman appeared as many, and had its real nature hidden from the gaze of its individual appearances as individual persons. In this view māyā was hardly recognized as a substance, though it was regarded as positive; and it was held that māyā had, both for its object and its support, the Brahman. It is the pure Brahman that is the real cause underlying all appearances, and the māyā only hangs on it like a veil of illusion which makes this one thing
appear as many unreal appearances. It is easy to see that this view ignores altogether the importance of giving philosophical explanations of phenomenal appearance, and is only concerned to emphasize the reality of Brahman as the only truth. Vācaspati's view gives a little more substantiability to māyā in the sense that he holds that māyā is coexistent with Brahman, as an accessory through the operation of which the creation of world-appearance is possible; māyā hides the Brahman as its object, but it rests on individual persons, who are again dependent on māyā, and māyā on them, in a beginningless cycle. The world-appearance is not mere subjective ideas or sensations, but it has an objective existence, though the nature of its existence is inexplicable and indescribable; and at the time of dissolution of the world (or pralaya) its constitutive stuff, psychical and physical, will remain hidden in avidyā, to be revived again at the time of the next world-appearance, otherwise called creation. But the third view, namely that of Padmapāda, gives māyā a little more substantiability, regarding it as the stuff which contains the double activity or power of cognitive activity and vibratory activity, one determining the psychical process and the other the physical process, and regarding Brahman in association with māyā, with these two powers as Īśvara, as the root cause of the world. But the roots of a very thoroughgoing subjective idealism also may be traced even in the writings of Śaṅkara himself. Thus in the Brhadāranyaka-bhūṣya he says that, leaving aside theories of limitation (avaccheda) or reflection (pratibimba), it may be pointed out that, as the son of Kunti is the same as Rādhéya, so it is the Brahman that appears as individual persons through beginningless avidyā; the individual persons so formed again delusively create the world-appearance through their own avidyā. It will be pointed out in a later section that Maṇḍana also elaborated the same tendency shortly after Śaṅkara in the ninth century. Thus in the same century we have four distinct lines of Vedāntic development, which began to expand through the later centuries in the writers that followed one or the other of these schools; and some additional tendencies also developed. The tenth century seems to have been very barren in the field of the Vedānta, and, excepting probably Jñānottama Miśra, who wrote a commentary on Suresvara's Vārttika, no writer of great reputation is known to us to have lived in this period. In other fields of philosophical development also this century was more or
less barren, and, excepting Udayana and Śridhara in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Utpala in Astronomy and Abhinavagupta in Saivism, probably no other persons of great reputation can be mentioned. There were, however, a few Buddhistic writers of repute in this period, such as Candragomin (junior) of Rajshahi, the author of Nyāya-loka-siddhi, Prajñākara Gupta of Vikramasilā, author of Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra and Sahopalambha-niṣcaya, Ācārya Jetāri of Rajshahi, the author of Hetu-tattvopadeśa, Dharma-dharmi-
viniscaya and Bālavatāra-tarka, Jina, the author of Pramāṇa-
vārtikālaṅkāra-tīkā, Ratnakirti, the author of the Apoha-siddhi,
Kṣaṇa-bhāṅga-siddhi and Sthira-siddhi-dūṣana, and Ratna Vajra,
the author of the Yuktī-prayoga. The eleventh century also does
not seem to have been very fruitful for Vedānta philosophy.
The only author of great reputation seems to have been Ānandabodha
Bhaṭṭārakācārya, who appears to have lived probably in the latter
half of the eleventh century and the first half of the twelfth century.
The mahāvidyā syllogisms of Kulārka Paṇḍita, however, probably
began from some time in the eleventh century, and these were often
referred to for refutation by Vedāntic writers till the fourteenth
century, as will be pointed out in a later section. But it is certain
that quite a large number of Vedāntic writers must have worked on
the Vedānta before Ānandabodha, although we cannot properly
trace them now. Ānandabodha says in his Nyāya-makaranda that
his work was a compilation (samgraha) from a large number of
Vedāntic monographs (nibandha-puspāñjali). Citsukha in his com-
mentary on the Nyāya-makaranda points out (p. 346) that Ānandab-
odha was refuting a view of the author of the Brahma-prakāśikā.
According to Govindānanda’s statement in his Ratna-prabhā,
p. 311, Amalānanda of the thirteenth century refuted a view of
the author of the Prakāṭārtha. The author of the Prakāṭārtha may
thus be believed to have lived either in the eleventh or in the
twelfth century. It was a commentary on Śaṅkara’s Bhāṣya, and
its full name was Śārīraka-bhāṣya-prakāṭārtha; and Ānandajñāna
(called also Janārdana) wrote his Tatvāloka on the lines of Vedāntic
interpretation of this work. Mr Tripathi says in his introduction
to the Tarka-samgraha that a copy of this work is available in
Tekka Maṭha; but the present writer had the good fortune of
going through it from a manuscript in the Adyar Library, and
a short account of its philosophical views is given below in a
separate section. In the Siddhānta-lesa of Appaya Dīkṣita we
hear of a commentary on it called Prakāśārtha-vivaraṇa. But, though Ānandajñāna wrote his Tattvāloka on the lines of the Prakāśārtha, yet the general views of Ānandajñāna were not the same as those of the author thereof; Ānandajñāna’s position was very much like that of Sarvajñātma Muni, and he did not admit many ajñānas, nor did he admit any difference between māyā and avidyā. But the author of the Prakāśārtha, so far as can be judged from references to him in the Siddhānta-lesa, gave a separate place to the antahkaranaṇas of individual persons and thought that, just as the jīvas could be cognizers through the reflection of pure intelligence in the antahkaranaṇa states, so Īśvara is omniscient by knowing everything through māyā modifications. The views of the author of the Prakāśārtha regarding the nature of vidhi have already been noted. But the way in which Ānandajñāna refers to the Prakāśārtha in Muṇḍaka, p. 32, and Kena, p. 23, shows that he was either the author of the Prakāśārtha or had written some commentary to it. But he could not have been the author of this work, since he refers to it as the model on which his Tattvāloka was written; so it seems very probable that he had written a commentary to it. But it is surprising that Ānandajñāna, who wrote commentaries on most of the important commentaries of Śaṅkara, should also trouble himself to write another commentary on the Prakāśārtha, which is itself a commentary on Śaṅkara’s commentary. It may be surmised, therefore, that he had some special reasons for respecting it, and it may have been the work of some eminent teacher of his or of someone in his parental line. However it may be, it is quite unlikely that the work should have been written later than the middle of the twelfth century.1

It is probable that Gaṅgāpuri Bhāṭṭāraka also lived earlier than Ānandabodha, as Citsukha points out. Gaṅgāpuri must then have lived either towards the latter part of the tenth century or the first half of the eleventh century. It is not improbable that he may have been a senior contemporary of Ānandabodha. His work, Padartha-tattva-nirṇaya, was commented on by Ānandajñāna. According to him both māyā and Brahman are to be regarded as the cause of the world. All kinds of world-phenomena exist, and being may therefore be attributed to them; and being is the same whatever may be the nature of things that exist. Brahman is thus the changeless cause in the world or the vivarta-kāraṇa; but all the

1 See Tripathi’s introduction to the Tarka-saṅgraha.
changing contents or individual existents must also be regarded as products of the transformation of some substance, and in this sense māyā is to be regarded as the pariṇāmi-kāraṇa of the world. Thus the world has Brahman as its vivarta-kāraṇa and māyā as its pariṇāmi-kāraṇa. The world manifests both aspects, the aspect of changeless being and that of changing materiality; so both māyā and Brahman form the material cause of the world in two different ways (Brahma māyā caityaubhayopādānam; sattra-jādyarūpobhayadharmānugatay-upapattiś ca). Tarka-viveka and Siddhānta-viveka are the names of two chapters of this book, giving a summary of Vaiśeṣika and Vedānta philosophy respectively. The view of Gaṅgāpūrī in the Padārthata-tattva-nirṇaya just referred to seems to have been definitely rejected by Ānandabodha in his Pramāṇa-mālā, p. 16.

When Kulārka had started the mahā-vidyā syllogisms, and great Nyāya authors such as Jayanta and Udayana in the ninth and tenth centuries had been vigorously introducing logical methods in philosophy and were trying to define all that is knowable, the Vedāntic doctrine that all that is knowable is indefinable was probably losing its hold; and it is probable that works like Ānandabodha’s Pramāṇa-mālā and Nyāya-dipāvali in the eleventh century or in the early part of the twelfth century were weakly attempting to hold fast to the Vedāntic position on logical grounds. It was Śrīharṣa who in the third quarter of the twelfth century for the first time attempted to refute the entire logical apparatus of the Naiyāyikas. Śrīharṣa’s work was carried on in Citsukha’s Tattva-pradīpikā in the early part of the thirteenth century, by Ānandajñāna in the latter part of the same century in his Tarka-samgraha and by Nṛśimhāśrama Muni in his Bheda-dhikkāra in the sixteenth century. On the last-named a pupil, Nārāyaṇāśrama, wrote his Bheda-dhikkāra-satkeriyā, and this had a sub-commentary, called Bheda-dhikkāra-satkeriyojjvala. The beginnings of the dialectical arguments can be traced to Śaṅkara and further back to the great Buddhist writers, Nāgarjuna, Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, etc. Interest in these dialectical arguments was continuously kept up by commentaries written on these works all through the later centuries. The names of these commentators have been mentioned in the sections on Śrīharṣa, Citsukha and Ānandajñāna.

Moreover, the lines of Vedānta interpretation which started with Sureśvara, Padmapāda and Vācaspati were vigorously
continued in commentaries and in independent works throughout the later centuries. Thus in the middle of the thirteenth century Vācaspati’s Bhāmatti was commented on by Amalānanda in his Kalpa-taru; and this Kalpa-taru was again commented on by Appaya Dīkṣita in the latter part of the sixteenth century and the first quarter of the seventeenth century, and by Lakṣmīnārāma in his Abhoga towards the end of the seventeenth century or the beginning of the eighteenth.

Padmapāda’s Paṅca-pādikā was commented on by Prakāśātman in the thirteenth century in his Paṅca-pādikā-vivarana, by Akhaṇḍananda in the fourteenth century in his Tattva-dīpana, by Vidyāraṇya in the same century in his Vivaraṇa-prameya-samgraha, by Ānandapūrṇa and Nṛsiṃha in the sixteenth century and by Rāma Tirtha in the seventeenth century. The line of Suresvara also continued in the summary of his great Vārttika (called Vārttika-sāra) by Vidyāraṇya and its commentaries, and also in the commentaries on the Saṃkṣepa-sātraṇa from the sixteenth century onwards. Many independent works were also written by persons holding more or less the same kinds of views as Sarvajñātma Muni. The philosophy of dṛṣṭi-rṣṭi-vāda Vedānta, which was probably started by Maṇḍana, had doubtless some adherents too; but we do not meet with any notable writer on this line, except Prakāśānanda in the sixteenth century and his pupil Nānā Dīkṣita. The Vedānta-kaumudi is an important work which is

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1 Allāla Sūri, son of Trivikramacārya, wrote a commentary on the Bhāmatti, called the Bhāmatti-tilaka.
2 Samyagbodhendra Samyamim, pupil of Gīrṇāndra (A.D. 1450), wrote a summary of the main contents of the Paṅca-pādikā-vivarana in six chapters (varṇaka), and this work is called by two names, Advaita-bhūṣana and Vivaraṇa-prameya-samgraha. There are again two other commentaries on Prakāśātman’s Paṅca-pādikā-vivarana: the Rju-vivarana by Viṣṇubhaṭṭa, son of Janārdana Sarvajña and pupil of Svāmindrapūrṇa, and the Ṭīkā-ratna by Ānandapūrṇa. The Rju-vivarana had again another commentary on it, called the Trayaṇanta-bhāva-pradīpiṇī, by Rāmānanda, pupil of Bhāratī Tirtha.
3 There are, however, two other commentaries on the Paṅca-pādikā called Paṅca-pādikā-vyākhyā (by an author whose name is not definitely known) and the Prabandha-paṇḍitāmī by Ātmasvarūpā, pupil of Nṛsiṃhasvarūpā. Dharmānyādhyāninda also wrote a commentary on Paṅca-pādikā, called the Paṅca-pādikā-pāṭha.
4 Apart from the two published commentaries on the Saṃkṣepa-sātraṇa, there is another work called the Saṃkṣepa-sātraṇa-sambandhodhini by Vedānanda, pupil of Vedānanda-bhagavat-pūjajeygāḍha, in which the author tries to show the mutual relation of the verses of it as yielding a consistent meaning. Nṛsiṃhaśrama also wrote a commentary on the Saṃkṣepa-sātraṇa, called the Tattvābodhini. One Sarvajñātma Bhagavat wrote a small Vedāntic work, called Paṅca-prakriyā; but it is not probable that he is the same as Sarvajñātma Muni.
referred to by Appaya Dīkṣita in his Siddhānta-leśa. In this work the omniscience of Brahman consists in the fact that the pure consciousness as Brahman manifests all that exists either as actually transformed or as potentially transformed, as future, or as latently transformed, as the past in the māyā; and it is the Paramēśvara who manifests Himself as the underlying consciousness (sākṣīn) in individual persons, manifesting the ājñāna transformations in them, and also their potential ājñāna in dreamless sleep. Many other important Vedānta views of an original character are expressed in this book. This work of Ramādvaya has been found by the present writer in the Govt. Oriental MSS. Library, Madras, and a separate section has been devoted to its philosophy. From references in it to followers of Madhva it may be assumed that the Vedānta-kaumudi was written probably in the fourteenth century.

From the fourteenth century, however, we have a large number of Vedānta writers in all the succeeding centuries; but with the notable exception of Prakāśānanda, Madhusūdana Sarasvati in his Advaita-siddhi (in which he tried to refute the objections of Vyāsa Tīrtha against the monistic Vedānta in the sixteenth century) and probably Vidyāraṇya's Vivarāṇa-prameya-saṃgraha and Dharmarājādhirāṇḍra’s Paribhāṣā, and its Śikhāmaṇi commentary by Rāmakṛṣṇa, there are few writers who can be said to reveal any great originality in Vedāntic interpretations. Most of the writers of this later period were good compilers, who revered all sorts of past Vedāntic ideas and collected them in well-arranged forms in their works. The influence of the Pañca-pādikā-vivarāṇa, however, is very strong in most of these writers, and the Vivarāṇa school of thought probably played the most important part in Vedāntic thought throughout all this period.

These Vedāntic writers grew up in particular circles inspired by particular teachers, whose works were carried on either in their own families or among their pupils; a few examples may make this clear. Thus Jagannāthāśrama was a great teacher of south India in the latter half of the fifteenth century; he had a pupil in Nṛśimhāśrama, one of the most reputed teachers of Vedānta in the early half of the sixteenth century. He was generally inspired on the one hand by the Vivarāṇa and on the other by Śrīharṣa and Citsukha and Sarvajñātma Muni: he wrote a number of Vedānta works, such as Advaita-dīpikā (his pupil, Nārāyaṇāśrama, wrote a commentary called Advaita-dīpikā-vivarāṇa on it), Advaita-paṅca-
ratna, Advaita-bodha-dipikā, Advaita-ratna-kośa, Tatvott-bodhinī, a commentary on the Saṁkṣepa-sārīraka, Tatvott-viveka (which had two commentaries, Tatvott-viveka-dīpana of Nārāyanaśrāma and Tatvott-vivecanā of Agnīhotra, pupil of Jñānendrā Sarasvatī), Pañca-pādikā-vivarana-prakāśikā, Bheda-dhīkkāra, Advaita-ratna-vyākhyaṇa (a commentary on Mallanārodiya's Advaita-ratna), and Vedānta-tatvott-viveka. The fact that he could write commentaries both on Sarvajñātma Muni's work and also on the Vivaraṇa, and also write a Bheda-dhīkkāra (a work on dialectic Vedānta on the lines of Śrīharṣa's dialectical work) shows the syncretistic tendencies of the age, in which the individual differences within the school were all accepted as different views of one Vedānta, and in which people were more interested in Vedānta as a whole and felt no hesitation in accepting all the Vedāntic ideas in their works. Nṛśimhāśrāma had a pupil Dharmarājādhvaṁdra, who wrote a Vedānta-paribhāṣā, a commentary called Tarka-cūḍāmaṇi on the Tatvott-cintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa, and also on the Nyāya-siddhānta-dīpa of Śaśadhara Ācārya, and a commentary on the Pañca-pādikā of Padmapāda. His son and pupil Rāmakṛṣṇa Dīkṣita wrote a commentary on the first, called Vedānta-sīkhāmaṇi; and Amaradāsa, the pupil of Brahmapāsā, wrote another commentary on this Śīkhāmaṇi of Rāmakṛṣṇa. Rāmakṛṣṇa had also written a commentary on Rucidatta's Tatvott-cintāmaṇi-prakāśa, called Nyāya-sīkhāmaṇi, and a commentary on the Vedānta-sūtra. Other authors, such as Kāśinātha Śastrī and Brahendrā Sarasvatī, had also written separate works bearing the name Vedānta-paribhāṣā after the Vedānta-paribhāṣā of Dharmarāja in the seventeenth century. Under the sphere of Nṛśimha's influence, but in the Śaiva and Mīmāṃsaka family of Raṅgarāja Adhvaṁtra, was born Appaya Dīkṣita, who became one of the most reputed teachers of the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. His works have all been noted in the section devoted to him. He again was a teacher of Bhāṭṭojī Dīkṣita, who in addition to many works on grammar, law and ritual (smṛtī) wrote two important works on Vedānta, called Tatvott-kāustubha and Vedānta-tatvott-dīpana-vyākhyā, the latter a commentary on the commentary, Tatvott-viveka-dīpana, of Nārāyanaśrāma (a pupil of Nṛśimhāśrāma) on the latter's work, Vedānta-tatvott-viveka. This Nārāyanaśrāma had also written another commentary on

1 Pettā Dīkṣita, son of Nārāyaṇa Dīkṣita, also wrote a commentary on the Vedānta-paribhāṣā, called Vedānta-paribhāṣa-prakāśikā.
Nṛsiṁhāśrama’s *Bheda-dhikkāra*, called *Bheda-dhikkāra-satkriyā*; and later on in the eighteenth century another commentary was written on Nṛsiṁha’s *Bheda-dhikkāra*, called *Advaita-candrika*, by Narasimha Bhaṭṭa, pupil of Rāmabhadrāśrama and Nāgeśvara in the eighteenth century. Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita’s son Bhānuji Dīkṣita was a commentator on the *Amara-hoṣa* (*Vyākyā-sudhā* or *Subodhini*). Bhaṭṭoji was, however, a pupil not only of Appaya, but also of Nṛsiṁhāśrama Muni. Bhaṭṭoji’s younger brother and pupil, Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa, wrote two works, the *Advaita-cintāmaṇi* and the *Advaita-śāstra-sāroddhāra*, more or less on the same lines, containing a refutation of Vaiśeṣika categories, a determination of the nature of the self, a determination of the nature of *ajñāna* and the nature of the doctrine of reflection, proofs of the falsity of world-appearance and an exposition of the nature of Brahman and how Brahmahood is to be attained. His son Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa was mainly a grammarian, who wrote also on Vaiśeṣika. Again Madhusūdana Sarasvati, who was a pupil of Viśveśvara Sarasvati (pupil of Sarvajña Viśveśa and pupil’s pupil of Govinda Sarasvati), lived in the early half of the sixteenth century and was probably under the influence of Nṛsiṁhāśrama, who is reputed to have defeated Madhusūdana Sarasvati’s teacher, Mādhava Sarasvatī. Madhusūdana had at least three pupils, Puruṣottama, who wrote on Madhusūdana’s commentary the *Siddhānta-tattva-bindu* a commentary called *Siddhānta-tattva-bindu-ṭikā*; the others were Bālabhadra and Śeṣāgovinda (the latter of whom wrote a commentary on Śaṅkara’s *Sarva-darśana-siddhānta-samgraha*, called *Sarva-siddhānta-rahasya-ṭikā*). Again Sadānanda, the author of the *Vedānta-sāra*, one of the most popular and well-read syncretistic works on Vedānta, was a contemporary of Nṛsiṁhāśrama; Nṛsiṁha Sarasvatī wrote in 1588 a commentary thereon, called *Subodhini*. Devendra, the author of the *Śvānubhūti-prakāśa*, was also a contemporary of Nṛsiṁhāśrama. It has already been pointed out that Prakāśānanda was probably a contemporary of Nṛsiṁhāśrama, though he does not seem to have been under his influence. This shows how some of the foremost Vedānta writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries grew up together in a Vedāntic circle, many of whom were directly or indirectly under the influence of Nṛsiṁhāśrama and Appaya Dīkṣita.

1 Brahānanda wrote on the *Siddhānta-bindu* another commentary, called *Siddhānta-bindu-ṭikā*. 
Passing to another circle of writers, we see that Bhāskara Dikṣita, who lived in the latter half of the seventeenth century, wrote a commentary, Ratna-tālīkā, on the Siddhānta-siddhāṇjana of his teacher Kṛṣṇānanda. The Siddhānta-siddhāṇjana is an excellent syncretistic work on Vedānta, which contains most of the important Vedānta doctrines regarding the difference of dharma-vicāra and brahma-vicāra, the relation of Mīmāṃsā theories of commands, and the need of Brahma-knowledge; it introduces many Mīmāṃsā subjects and treats of their relations to many relevant Vedānta topics. It also introduces elaborate discussions on the nature of knowledge and ignorance. It seems, however, to be largely free from the influence of the Vivaraṇa, and it does not enter into theories of perception or the nature of the antahkarana and its vyātī. It is thus very different from most of the works produced in the sixteenth century in the circles of Nṛsimha or Appaya. Kṛṣṇānanda lived probably in the middle of the seventeenth century. He had for teacher Rāmabhadrānanda; and Rāmabhadrānanda was taught by Svayaṃprakāśānanda, the author of the Vedānta-naya-bhūṣaṇa, a commentary on the Brahma-sūtra on the lines of Vācaspati Miśra’s Bhāmati. This Svayaṃprakāśa must be distinguished from the other Svayaṃprakāśa, probably of the same century, who was a pupil of Kaivalyānanda Yogīndra and the author of the Rasābhi-vyāñjikā, a commentary of Advaita-makaranda of Lakṣmidhara Kāvī. Rāmabhadrānanda had as his teacher Rāmānanda Sarasvatī, the author of the Vedānta-siddhānta-candrikā, on which a commentary was written by Gaṅgādharendra Sarasvatī (A.D. 1826), pupil of Rāmacandra Sarasvatī and pupil’s pupil of Sarvajña Sarasvatī, and author of the Sāmrāja-siddhi with its commentary, the Kaivalya-kalpadruma. Prakāśānanda was a pupil of Advaitānanda, author of the Brahma-vidyābharana, a commentary on Śaṅkara’s Śaṅkara-bhāṣya—Advaitānanda was a disciple of Rāmatīrtha, author of the Anvaya-prakāśikā (a commentary on the Saṃkṣepa-sārīraka of Sarvajña Muni) and a disciple of Kṛṣṇatīrtha, a contemporary of Jagannāthāśrama, the teacher of Nṛsiṃhāśrama. Rāmatīrtha’s Anvaya-prakāśikā shows an acquaintance with Madhusūdana’s Advaita-siddhi; and he may thus be considered to have lived in the middle of the seventeenth century. Svayaṃprakāśānanda, again, had for pupil Mahādevānanda, or Vedāntin Mahādeva, the author of the Advaita-cintā-kaustubha or Tatvānusandhāna. It seems very clear that these writers of the seventeenth and the early eighteenth
centuries flourished in a different circle of Vedântic ideas, where the views of Vâcaspati, Surešvara and Sarvajñâta Muni had greater influence than the authors of the Vivaraṇa school of Vedânta. Another important syncretistic Vedânta writer is Sadânanda Kâśmiraka, author of the Advaita-brahma-siddhi, who lived in the early part of the eighteenth century. The Advaita-brahma-siddhi is an excellent summary of all the most important Vedânta doctrines, written in an easy style and explaining the chief features of the Vedântic doctrines in the different schools of Advaita teachers. Narahari’s Bodha-sâra may be mentioned as one of the important products of the late eighteenth century.

The sort of relationship of teachers and students in particular circles that has been pointed out holds good of the earlier authors also, though it is difficult to trace them as well as can be done in the later years, since many of the earlier books are now missing and the footprints of older traditions are becoming more and more faint. Thus it may be pointed out that Vidyâraṇya was a contemporary of Amalânanda in the fourteenth century, as both of them

1 A number of other important Vedânta works, written mostly during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, may also be mentioned. Thus Lokanâtha, son of Sarvajñâna-râyaṇa and grandson of Nraśhâraṇa, wrote a metrical work in three chapters refuting the views of the dualists, called Advaita-muktâsāra with a commentary on it called Kânti; Brahmananda Sarasvati wrote the Advaita-siddhânta-vidyotana; Gopâlânanda Sarasvati, pupil of Yogânanda, wrote the Akhaṇḍâna-prakâśikâ; Harîhara Paramahamsa, pupil of Sivârâma, pupil of Visvâsvarârama, wrote the Anubhava-tilôsa, and early in the nineteenth century Sàmin, a pupil of Brahmananda, wrote a big work in twelve chapters, called Brahmananda-tilôsa. In this connection it may not be out of place to mention the names of some important works of Vedânta dialectics in refutation of other systems of philosophical views more or less on the lines of those dialectical writings which have been noticed in the present volume. Thus Ânanda-pûrṇa (A.D. 1600), who commented on Śrîharśa’s Khaṇḍâna-khaṇḍa-khâdyâ, wrote the Nyâya-candrikâ in four chapters, refuting the views of the Nyâya, Mîmâṃsâ and Vaiśeṣika; Anandânubhava, pupil of Nârâyana Jyotisâra, who lived probably in the same century, wrote a similar work, called Pudârtha-tattva-nirnaya; Jânanaghana, who probably lived in the thirteenth century, wrote an elaborate dialectical work in thirty-three chapters (prakarana), called Tatva-suddhi; Śrînivâsa Yâjvan, who probably lived in the sixteenth century, wrote the Vîdâvali in twenty-six chapters in refutation of Viśiṣṭâdvaita and Dvaita views; Bhavânîsankara also wrote a similar dialectical work, called Siddhânta-dipikâ. As examples of semi-popular Vedânta works of a syncretistic type, such works as the Tattva-bodha of Vâsudevendra, the Guna-traya-viveka of Svanaprakâśa Yogindra, the Jâgan-mîthya-tva-dipikâ of Râmendra Yogin, the Ânanda-dipa of Śvânânda Yati (which had a commentary called Ânanda-dipa-thârî by Râmânâtha), the Svaṭama-yoga-pradipa by Yogâsvara (which had a commentary by Âmarânânda) and the Vedânta-hrdaya (on the lines of the Yoga-târâthâ and Gauḍâpâda) by Varada Panḍita may be mentioned. This latter work was probably later than Prâkâśanânda’s Vedânta-siddhânta-muktâvali, which followed the same line of thought.
were pupils of Saṅkarānanda and Anubhavānanda respectively; these in turn were both pupils of Ānandātman. Saṅkarānanda was the author of the Gita-tātparya-bodhini and of a number of commentaries on the various Upaniṣads, and also of a summary of the Upaniṣads, called Upaniṣad-ratna. Amalānanda, however, had as teacher not only Anubhavānanda, but also Sukhaprakāśa Muni, who again was a disciple of Citsukha, himself a disciple of Gauḍēśvara Ācārya (called also Jñānottama).

Vedānta Doctrine of Soul and the Buddhist Doctrine of Soullessness.

One of the most important points of Saṅkara’s criticism of Buddhism is directed against its denial of a permanent soul which could unite the different psychological constituents or could behave as the enjoyer of experiences and the controller of all thoughts and actions.

The Buddhists argue that for the production of sense-cognition, as the awareness of a colour or sound, what is required in addition to the sense-data of colours, etc. is the corresponding sense-faculties, while the existence of a soul cannot be deemed indispensable for the purpose. Vasubandhu argues that what is experienced is the sense-data and the psychological elements in groups called skandhas. What one calls self (ātman) cannot be anything more than a mere apparent cognitional existence (prajñāpti-sat) of what in reality is but a conglomeration of psychological elements. Had the apparent self been something as different from the psychological elements as colours are from sounds, it would then be regarded as an individual (pudgala); but, if its difference from these psychological elements be of the same nature as the difference of the constituents of milk from the appearance of milk, then the self could be admitted only to have a cognitional existence (prajñāpti-sat). The self has, in fact, only a cognitional appearance of separateness from the psychological elements; just as, though

1 The arguments here followed are those of Vasubandhu, as found in his Abhidharma-kośa, and are based on Prof. Stcherbatsky’s translation of the appendix to ch. viii of that work, called the Pudgala-viniścaya, and Yasomitra’s commentary in manuscript from Nepal, borrowed from Visvabhūrati, Santiniketan, Bengal.

2 yadi yathā rūpāduḥ śabdāder bhāvāntaram abhipreyate pudgala iti abhyupagato bhavauti bhīma-lakṣyanaṁ hi rūpam śabdād ityādi kṣīrāniḥ samudāyasā cet prajñāptitah. Abhidharma-kośa-vyākhyā, Visvabhūrati MS. p. 337.
milk appears to have a separate existence from the proper combination of its constituent elements, yet it is in reality nothing more than a definite kind of combination of its constituent elements, so the self is nothing more than a certain conglomeration of the psychological elements (skandha), though it may appear to have a separate and independent existence. The Vātsīputriyas, however, think that the individual is something different from the skandhas or psychological entities, as its nature is different from the nature of them. The Vātsīputriyas deny the existence of a permanent soul, but believe in momentary individuals (pudgala) as a category separate and distinct from the skandhas. Just as fire is something different from the fuel that conditioned it, so the name “individual” (pudgala) is given to something conditioned by the skandhas at a given moment in a personal life. Vasubandhu, however, argues against the acceptance of such an individual and says that there is no meaning in accepting such an individual. Rain and sun have no effects on mere vacuous space, they are of use only to the skin; if the individual is, like the skin, a determiner of the value of experiences, then it must be accepted as external; if it is like vacuous space, then no purpose is fulfilled by accepting it. The Vātsīputriyas, however, thought that, just as the fuel conditioned the fire, so the personal elements conditioned the individual. By this conditioning the Vātsīputriyas meant that the personal elements were some sort of a coexisting support. What is meant by saying that the pudgala is conditioned by the personal elements is that, when the skandhas or psychological elements are present, the pudgala is also present there. But Vasubandhu urges that a mere conditioning of this kind is not sufficient to establish the cognitional existence of an individual; for even colour is conditioned by the visual sense, light and attention in such a way that, these being present, there is the perception of light; but can anybody on that ground consider the

2 The exact text of Vasubandhu, as translated from Tibetan in a note, runs thus: gṛhita-pratyutpānaṁ bhāyyantara-skandham upādāya pudgala-prajñāpātiḥ. Ibid. p. 935.
3 Varṣāṭa-pāḥbhyaṁ kīṁ vyommaṁ caryayasya asti tayaḥ phalam caryopamaṁ ceta nityaḥ khatulyaṁ ceto asatphalaṁ.
4 MS. of Yāsūmītra’s commentary, p. 338.
5 rūpasya-prajñāpātīr vaktavya ca kṣaṭur-ādiṣu tāsam tasyopalambḥat, tāni caksur-āditya upādāya rūpam prajñāpyate. Ibid.
existence of colour to be a cognitional one? And would cognitional entities deserve to be enumerated as separate categories? Again it may be asked, if such an individual exists, how is it experienced? For, if it be experienced by any of the senses, it must be a sense-datum: for the senses can grasp only their appropriate sense-data, and the individual is no sense-datum. Therefore, just as milk is nothing but the collected sense-data of colour, taste, etc., so also the so-called individual is nothing more than the conglomerated psychological elements. The Vatsiputriyas argue that, since the psychological elements, the sense-data, etc., are the causes of our experience of the individual, the individual cannot be regarded as being identical with these causal elements which are responsible for their experience; if it were so, then even light, eye, attention, etc., which are causes of the experience of the sense-data, would have to be regarded as being identical in nature with the individual. But it is not so maintained; the sense-datum of sounds and colours is always regarded as being different from the individual, and one always distinguishes an individual from a sense-datum and says “this is sound,” “this is colour” and “this is individual.” But the individual is not felt to be as distinct from the psychological elements as colour is from sound. The principle of difference or distinctness consists in nothing but a difference of moments; a colour is different from a sound because it is experienced at a different moment, while the psychological elements and the individual are not experienced at different moments. But it is argued in reply that, as the sense-data and the individual are neither different nor identical (ratio essendi), so their cognition also is neither different nor identical in experience (ratio cognoscendi). But Vasubandhu says that, if such a view is taken in this case, then it might as well be taken in all cases wherever there is any conglomeration. Moreover, the separate senses are all limited to their special fields, and the mind which acts with them is also limited

1 yathā rūpādingya eva samastāni samudītāni kṣtram iti udakāni iti vā prajñāpyate, tathā skandhās ca samastā pudgala iti prajñāpyate, iti siddham. MS. of Yāsomintra’s commentary, p. 339 A.
2 yathā rūpam pudgalopalabdeh kāraṇam bhavati sa ca tehyo 'nyo na vaktavyah āloka-caśṣūr-manaskārā api rūpapalabdeh kāraṇam bhavati tad api tad-abhinna-svabhāvatā pudgalah prāṇoṣṇi. Ibid.
3 Ibid. p. 339 B.
4 svalaksṣyāpi kṣaṇāntaram anyad ity udāharyam. Ibid.
5 yathā rūpā-pudgalayor anyānanyatvam avaktavyam evan tadupalabdhya api anyānanyatvam avaktavyam. Ibid.
6 yo 'yam Siddhāntah pudgala eva vaktavyah sa 'yam bhidyate samukṛtam api avaktavyam iti kṛtvā. Ibid.
to the data supplied by them; there is, therefore, no way in which the so-called individual can be experienced. In the Ajita sermon Buddha is supposed to say: "A visual consciousness depends upon the organ of sight and a visible object. When these three (object, sense organ and consciousness) combine, a sensation is produced. It is accompanied by a feeling, a representation and a volition. Only so much is meant, when we are speaking of a human being. To these (five sets of elements) different names are given, such as a sentient being, a man, Manu's progeny, a son of Manu, a child, an individual, a life, a soul. If with respect to them the expression is used 'he sees the object with his own eyes,' it is false imputation (there being in reality nobody possessing eyes of his own). In common life such expressions with respect to them are current as 'that is the name of this venerable man, he belongs to such a caste and such a family, he eats such food, this pleases him, he has reached such an age, he has lived so many years, he has died at such an age.' These O brethren! accordingly are mere words, mere conventional designations.

'Expressions are they, (but not truth)!
Real elements have no duration:
Vitality makes them combine
In mutually dependent apparitions."

The Vātsiputrīyas however refer to the Bhāra-hāra-sūtra, in which Buddha is supposed to say: "O brethren, I shall explain unto you the burden (of life), and moreover I shall explain the taking up of the burden, the laying aside of it and who the carrier is.... What is the burden? All the five aggregates of elements—the substrates of personal life. What is meant by the taking up of the burden? The force of craving for a continuous life, accompanied by passionate desires, the rejoicing at many an object. What is the laying aside of the burden? It is the wholesale rejection of this craving for a continuation of life, accompanied as it is by passionate desires and rejoicings at many an object, the getting rid of it in every circumstance, its extinction, its end, its suppression, an aversion to it, its restraint, its disappearance. Who is the carrier? We must answer: it is the individual, i.e. 'this venerable man having this name, of such a caste, of such a family, eating such food, finding pleasure or displeasure at such things, of such an age, who after a

1 Stcherbatsky's translation in Bulletin de l'Académie des Sciences de Russie.
life of such length will pass away having reached such an age. But Vasubandhu points out that the carrier of the burden is not to be supposed to be some eternal soul or real individual. It is the momentary group of elements of the preceding moment that is designated as the burden, and the immediately succeeding one the carrier of the burden (bhāra-hāra).

The Vātsiputriyas again argue that activity implies an active agent, and, since knowing is an action, it also implies the knower who knows, just as the walking of Devadatta implies a Devadatta who walks. But Vasubandhu’s reply to such a contention is that there is nowhere such a unity. There is no individual like Devadatta: what we call Devadatta is but a conglomeration of elements. “The light of a lamp is a common metaphorical designation for an uninterrupted production of a series of flashing flames. When this production changes its place, we say that the light has moved. Similarly consciousness is a conventional name for a chain of conscious moments. When it changes its place (i.e. appears in co-ordination with another objective element), we say that it apprehends that object. And in the same way we speak about the existence of material elements. We say matter ‘is produced,’ ‘it exists’; but there is no difference between existence and the element which does exist. The same applies to consciousness (there is nothing that cognizes, apart from the evanescent flashing of consciousness itself).”

It is easy to see that the analysis of consciousness offered by the Vedānta philosophy of the Śaṅkara school is entirely different from this. The Vedānta holds that the fact of consciousness is entirely different from everything else. So long as the assemblage of the physical or physiological conditions antecedent to the rise of any cognition, as for instance, the presence of illumination, sense-object contact, etc., is being prepared, there is no knowledge, and it is only at a particular moment that the cognition of an object arises. This cognition is in its nature so much different from each and all the elements constituting the so-called assemblage of conditions, that it cannot in any sense be regarded as the product of

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1 Stcherbatsky’s translation.
2 Yasomitra points out that there is no carrier of the burden different from the collection of the skandhas—bhāradvājan na skandhekyo ‘rikṣāntara-bhūtah pudgala ity arthaḥ. Abhidharma-kōśa-cāsūkhyā, Viśvabhāratī MS.
any collocation of conditions. Consciousness thus, not being a product of anything and not being further analysable into any constituents, cannot also be regarded as a momentary flashing. Uncaused and unproduced, it is eternal, infinite and unlimited. The main point in which consciousness differs from everything else is the fact of its self-revelation. There is no complexity in consciousness. It is extremely simple, and its only essence or characteristic is pure self-revelation. The so-called momentary flashing of consciousness is not due to the fact that it is momentary, that it rises into being and is then destroyed the next moment, but to the fact that the objects that are revealed by it are reflected through it from time to time. But the consciousness is always steady and unchangeable in itself. The immediacy (aparokṣatva) of this consciousness is proved by the fact that, though everything else is manifested by coming in touch with it, it itself is never expressed, indicated or manifested by inference or by any other process, but is always self-manifested and self-revealed. All objects become directly revealed to us as soon as they come in touch with it. Consciousness (samvid) is one. It is neither identical with its objects nor on the same plane with them as a constituent element in a collocation of them and consciousness. The objects of consciousness or all that is manifested in consciousness come in touch with consciousness and themselves appear as consciousness. This appearance is such that, when they come in touch with consciousness, they themselves flash forth as consciousness, though that operation is nothing but a false appearance of the non-conscious objects and mental states in the light of consciousness, as being identical with it. But the intrinsic difference between consciousness and its objects is that the former is universal (pratyak) and constant (anuvṛttta), while the latter are particular (apratyak) and alternating (vyāvṛttta). The awarenesses of a book, a table, etc. appear to be different not because these are different flashings of knowledge, but because of the changing association of consciousness with these objects. The objects do not come into being with the flashings of their awareness, but they have their separate existence and spheres of operation\(^1\). Consciousness is one and unchanging; it is only when the objects get associated with it that

\(^1\) tatva-darśit tu nityam adevīyam vijnānam viṣayā ca tatrādhyaṁ prthiṅgartha-kriyā-samarthāḥ teṣāṁ cabādhitam sthāyitvam astīti vadati. Vitarāṇa-prameya-saṅgraha, p. 74, the Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1893.
they appear in consciousness and as identical with it in such a way that the flashing of an object in consciousness appears as the flashing of the consciousness itself. It is through an illusion that the object of consciousness and consciousness appear to be welded together into such an integrated whole, that their mutual difference escapes our notice, and that the object of consciousness, which is only like an extraneous colour applied to consciousness, does not appear different or extraneous to it, but as a specific mode of the consciousness itself. Thus what appear as but different awarenesses, as book-cognition, table-cognition, are not in reality different awarenesses, but one unchangeable consciousness successively associated with ever-changing objects which falsely appear to be integrated with it and give rise to the appearance that qualitatively different kinds of consciousness are flashing forth from moment to moment. Consciousness cannot be regarded as momentary. For, had it been so, it would have appeared different at every different moment. If it is urged that, though different consciousnesses are arising at each different moment, yet on account of extreme similarity this is not noticed; then it may be replied that, if there is difference between the two consciousnesses of two successive moments, then such difference must be grasped either by a different consciousness or by the same consciousness. In the first alternative the third awareness, which grasps the first two awarenesses and their difference, must either be identical with them, and in that case the difference between the three awarenesses would vanish; or it may be different from them, and in that case, if another awareness be required to comprehend their difference and that requires another and so on, there would be a vicious infinite. If the difference be itself said to be identical with the nature of the consciousness (saṃvīt-svarūpa-bhūto bhedāḥ), and if there is nothing to apprehend this difference, then the non-appearance of the difference implies the non-appearance of the consciousness itself; for by hypothesis the difference has been held to be identical with the consciousness itself. The non-appearance of difference, implying the non-appearance of consciousness, would mean utter blindness. The difference between the awareness of one moment and another cannot thus either be logically proved, or realized in experience, which always testifies to the unity of awareness through all moments of its appearance. It may be held that the appearance of unity is erroneous, and that, as such, it
presumes that the awarenesses are similar; for without such a similarity there could not have been the erroneous appearance of unity. But, unless the difference of the awarenesses and their similarity be previously proved, there is nothing which can even suggest that the appearance of unity is erroneous\(^1\). It cannot be urged that, if the existence of difference and similarity between the awarenesses of two different moments can be proved to be false, then only can the appearance of unity be proved to be true; for the appearance of unity is primary and directly proved by experience. Its evidence can be challenged only if the existence of difference between the awarenesses and their similarity be otherwise proved. The unity of awareness is a recognition of the identity of the awarenesses (pratyabhijñā), which is self-evident.

It has also been pointed out that the Buddhists give a different analysis of the fact of recognition. They hold that perception reveals the existence of things at the moment of perception, whereas recognition involves the supposition of their existence through a period of past time, and this cannot be apprehended by perception, which is limited to the present moment only. If it is suggested that recognition is due to present perception as associated with the impressions (samskāra) of previous experience, then such a recognition of identity would not prove the identity of the self as “I am he”—for in the self-luminous self there cannot be any impressions. The mere consciousness as the flash cannot prove any identity; for that is limited to the present moment and cannot refer to past experience and unite it with the experience of the present moment. The Buddhists on their side deny the existence of recognition as the perception of identity, and think that it is in reality not one but two concepts—“I” and “that”—and not a separate experience of the identity of the self as persisting through time. To this the Vedāntic reply is that, though there cannot be any impressions in the self as pure consciousness, yet the self as associated with the mind (antaḥkaraṇa) can well have impressions (samskāra), and so recognition is possible\(^2\). But it may be objected that the complex of the self and mind would then be playing the double rôle of knower and the known; for it is the mind containing the impressions and the self that together

\(^1\) Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha, p. 76.
\(^2\) kevala cidāttamā jānya-jñāna-tat-saṁskārayor asambhāve 'py antaḥkaraṇa-viśiṣte tat-saṁbhavād ukta-pratyabhijñā kim na syāt. Ibid. p. 76.
play the part of the recognizer, and it is exactly those impressions
together with the self that form the content of recognition also—and
hence in this view the agent and the object have to be regarded
as one. But in reply to this Vidyārānya Muni urges that all systems
of philosophy infer the existence of soul as different from the
body; and, as such an inference is made by the self, the self is thus
both the agent and the object of such inferences. Vidyārānya says
that it may further be urged that the recognizer is constituted of
the self in association with the mind, whereas the recognized entity
is constituted of the self as qualified by past and present time.1
Thus the recognition of self-identity does not strictly involve the
fact of the oneness of the agent and its object. If it is urged that,
since recognition of identity of self involves two concepts, it also
involves two moments, then the assertion that all knowledge is
momentary also involves two concepts, for momentariness cannot
be regarded as being identical with knowledge. The complexity
of a concept does not mean that it is not one but two different
concepts occurring at two different moments. If such a maxim is
accepted, then the theory that all knowledge is momentary cannot
be admitted as one concept, but two concepts occurring at two
moments; and hence momentariness cannot be ascribed to know-
ledge, as is done by the Buddhists. Nor can it be supposed, in
accordance with the Prabhākara view, that the existence of the
permanent "this self" is admitted merely on the strength of the
recognizing notion of "self-identity"; for the self which abides
through the past and exists in the present cannot be said to depend
on a momentary concept of recognition of self-identity. The notion
of self-identity is only a momentary notion, which lasts only at the
present time; and hence the real and abiding self cannot owe its
reality or existence merely to a psychological notion of the moment.

Again, if it is argued that memory, such as "I had an
awareness of a book," shows that the self was existing at the past
time when the book was perceived, it may be replied that such
memory and previous experience may prove the past existence of
the self, but it cannot prove that the self that was existing in the
past is identical with the self that is now experiencing. The mere
existence of self at two moments of time does not prove that the
self had persisted through the intervening times. Two notions of

1 antahkarana-viśiṣṭatayaiva vātmanah pratyabhijñātātvaṁ pūrvaparaka-kāla-vi-
śiṣṭataya ca pratyabhijñeyatvaṁ. Viveka-śramaṇa-saṃgraha, p. 77.
two different times cannot serve to explain the idea of recognition, which presupposes the notion of persistence. If it were held that the two notions produce the notion of self-persistence through the notion of recognition, then that would mean that the Buddhist admits that one can recognize himself as "I am he." It cannot be said that, since the self itself cannot be perceived, there is no possibility of the perception of the identity of the self through recognition; for, when one remembers "I had an experience," that very remembrance proves that the self was perceived. Though at the time when one remembers it the self at the time of such memory is felt as the perceiver and not as the object of that self-perception, yet at the time of the previous experience which is now being remembered the self must have been itself the object of the perception. If it is argued that it is only the past awareness that is the object of memory and this awareness, when remembered, expresses the self as its cognizer, then to this it may be replied that since at the time of remembering there is no longer the past awareness, the cognizer on whom this awareness had to rest itself is also absent. It is only when an awareness reveals itself that it also reveals the cognizer on whom it rests; but, if an awareness is remembered, then the awareness which is remembered is only made an object of present awareness which is self-revealed. But the past awareness which is supposed to be remembered is past and lost and, as such, it neither requires a cognizer on which it has to rest nor actually reveals such a cognizer. It is only the self-revealed cognition that also immediately reveals the cognizer with its own revelation. But, when a cognition is mediated through memory, its cognizer is not manifested with its remembrance. So the self which experienced an awareness in the past can be referred to only through the mediation of memory. So, when the Prabhākaras hold that the existence of the self is realized through such a complex notion as "I am he," it has to be admitted that it is only through the process of recognition (pratyabhijñā) that the persistence of the self is established. The main point that Vidyāranya Muni urges in his Vīvarāṇa-prameya-saṅgraha is that the fact of recognition or the experience of self-identity cannot be explained by any assumption of two separate concepts, such as the memory of a past cognition or cognizer and the present awareness.

1 svayamprakāśamānāṁ hi saṁvedanāṁ śūrayaṁ sūdhayati na tu smṛti-viśayatayā para-prakāśyam. Vīvarāṇa-prameya-saṅgraha, p. 78.
We all feel that our selves are persisting through time and that I who experienced pleasure yesterday and I who am experiencing new pleasures to-day are identical; and the only theory by which this notion of self-persistence or self-identity can be explained is by supposing that the self exists and persists through time. The Buddhist attempts at explaining this notion of self-identity by the supposition of the operation of two separate concepts are wholly inadequate, as has already been shown. The perception of self-identity can therefore be explained only on the basis of a permanently existing self.

Again, the existence of self is not to be argued merely through the inference that cognition, will and feeling presuppose some entity to which they belong and that it is this entity that is called self; for, if that were the case, then no one would be able to distinguish his own self from that of others. For, if the self is only an entity which has to be presupposed as the possessor of cognition, will, etc., then how does one recognize one’s own cognition of things as differing from that of others? What is it that distinguishes my experience from that of others? My self must be immediately perceived by me in order that I may relate any experience to myself. So the self must be admitted as being self-manifested in all experience; without admitting the self to be self-luminous in all experience the difference between an experience as being my own and as belonging to others could not be explained. It may be objected by some that the self is not self-luminous by itself, but only because, in self-consciousness, the self is an object of the cognizing operation (samskrit-karma). But this is hardly valid; for the self is not only cognized as an object of self-consciousness, but also in itself in all cognitional operations. The self cannot be also regarded as being manifested by ideas or percepts. It is not true that the cognition of the self occurs after the cognition of the book or at any different time from it. For it is true that the cognition of the self and that of the book take place at the same point of time; for the same awareness cannot comprehend two different kinds of objects at the same time. If this was done at different points of time, then that would not explain our experience—"I have known this." For such a notion implies a relation between the knower and the known; and, if the knower and the known were grasped in knowledge at two different points of time, there is nothing which could unite them together in the
same act of knowledge. It is also wrong to maintain that the self is manifested only as the upholder of ideas; for the self is manifested in the knowing operation itself. So, since the self cannot be regarded as being either the upholder or cognizer of ideas or their object, there is but one way in which it can be considered as self-manifesting or self-revealing (sva-prakāśa). The immediacy of the self is thus its self-revealing and self-manifesting nature. The existence of self is thus proved by the self-luminous nature of the self. The self is the cognizer of the objects only in the sense that under certain conditions of the operation of the mind there is the mind-object contact through a particular sense, and, as the result thereof, these objects appear in consciousness by a strange illusion; so also ideas of the mind, concepts, volitions and emotions appear in consciousness and themselves appear as conscious states, as if consciousness was their natural and normal character, though in reality they are only illusorily imposed upon the consciousness—the self-luminous self.

Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭārakācārya, from whom Vidyārānya often borrows his arguments, says that the self-luminosity of the self has to be admitted, because it cannot be determined as being manifested by anything else. The self cannot be regarded as being perceived by a mental perception (mānasa pratyakṣa); for that would involve the supposition that the self is the object of its own operation; for cognition is at any rate a function of the self. The functions of cognition belonging to the self cannot affect the self itself. The Vedānta has also to fight against the Prabhākara view which regards cognition as manifesting the object and the self along with itself, as against its own view that it is the self which is identical with knowledge and which is self-manifesting. Ānandabodha thus objects to the Prabhākara view, that it is the object-cognition which expresses both the self and the not-self, and holds that the self cannot be regarded as an object of awareness. Ānandabodha points out that it may be enunciated as a universal proposition that what is manifested by cognition must necessarily be an object of cognition, and that therefore, if the self is not an object of cognition, it is not manifested by cognition. Therefore the self or the cognizer is not manifested by cognition; for, like

cognition, it is self-manifested and immediate without being an
object of cognition.\(^1\)

The self-luminosity of cognition is argued by Ānandabodha.
He says that, if it is held that cognition does not manifest itself,
though it manifests its objects, it may be replied that, if it were so,
then at the time when an object is cognized the cognizer would have
doubted if he had any cognition at the time or not. If anyone is
asked whether he has seen a certain person or not, he is sure about
his own knowledge that he has seen him and never doubts it. It is
therefore certain that, when an object is revealed by any cognition,
the cognition is itself revealed as well. If it is argued that such a
cognition is revealed by some other cognition, then it might require
some other cognition and that another and so on \textit{ad infinitum};
and thus there is a vicious infinite. Nor can it be held that there
is some other mental cognition (occurring either simultaneously
with the awareness of the object or at a later moment) by which
the awareness of the awareness of the object is further cognized.
For from the same mind-contact there cannot be two different
awarenesses of the type discussed. If at a later moment, then, there
is mind-activity, cessation of one mind-contact, and again another
mind-activity and the rise of another mind-contact, that would
imply many intervening moments, and thus the cognition which is
supposed to cognize an awareness of an object would take place at
a much later moment, when the awareness which it has to reveal is
already passed. It has therefore to be admitted that cognition is itself
self-luminous and that, while manifesting other objects, it manifests
itself also. The objection raised is that the self or the cognition cannot
affect itself by its own functioning (\textit{vyrtti}); the reply is that cognition
is like light and has no intervening operation by which it affects
itself or its objects. Just as light removes darkness, helps the
operation of the eye and illuminates the object and manifests itself
all in one moment without any intervening operation of any other
light, so cognition also in one flash manifests itself and its objects,
and there is no functioning of it by which it has to affect itself.
This cognition cannot be described as being mere momentary
flashes, on the ground that, when there is the blue awareness, there
is not the yellow awareness; for apart from the blue awareness, the

\(^1\) \textit{saṃveditā na saṃvid-adhāna-prakāśaḥ saṃvit-karmatāṁ antareṇa aparok-
śatvāt saṃvedanavat. Nyāya-makaranda, p. 135. This argument is borrowed
verbatim by Vidyāraṇya in his \textit{Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha}, p. 85.}
yellow awareness or the white awareness there is also the natural basic awareness or consciousness, which cannot be denied. It would be wrong to say that there are only the particular awarenesses which appear and vanish from moment to moment; for, had there been only a series of particular awarenesses, then there would be nothing by which their differences could be realized. Each awareness in the series would be of a particular and definite character, and, as it passed away, would give place to another, and that again to another, so that there would be no way of distinguishing one awareness from another; for according to the theory under discussion there is no consciousness except the passing awarenesses, and thus there would be no way by which their differences could be noticed; for, even though the object of awareness, such as blue and yellow, differed amongst themselves, that would fail to explain how the difference of a blue awareness and a yellow awareness could be apprehended. So the best would be to admit the self to be of the nature of pure consciousness.

It will appear from the above discussion that the Vedânta had to refute three opponents in establishing its doctrine that the self is of the nature of pure consciousness and that it is permanent and not momentary. The first opponent was the Buddhist, who believed neither in the existence of the self nor in the nature of any pure permanent consciousness. The Buddhist objection that there was no permanent self could be well warded off by the Vedânta by appealing to the verdict of our notion of self-identity—which could not be explained on the Buddhist method by the supposition of two separate notions of a past "that self" and the present "I am." Nor can consciousness be regarded as being nothing more than a series of passing ideas or particular awarenesses; for on such a theory it would be impossible to explain how we can react upon our mental states and note their differences. Consciousness has thus to be admitted as permanent. Against the second opponent, the Naiyâyika, the Vedânta urges that the self is not the inferred object to which awarenesses, volitions or feelings belong, but is directly and immediately intuited. For, had it not been so, how could one distinguish his own experiences as his own and as different from those of others? The internalness of my own experiences shows that they are directly intuited as my own, and not merely supposed as belonging to some self who was the possessor of his experiences. For inference cannot reveal the
internalness of any cognition or feeling. Against the third opponent, the Mīmāṃsaka, the Vedānta urges that the self-revealing character belongs to the self which is identical with thought—as against the Mīmāṃsā view, that thought as a self-revealing entity revealed the self and the objects as different from it. The identity of the self and thought and the self-revealing character of it are also urged; and it is shown by a variety of dialectical reasoning that such a supposition is the only reasonable alternative that is left to us.

This self as pure consciousness is absolutely impersonal, unlimited and infinite. In order to make it possible that this one self should appear as many individuals and as God, it is supposed that it manifests itself differently through the veil of māyā. Thus, according to the Siddhānta-lesa, it is said in the Prakāṭrtha-vivarana that, when this pure consciousness is reflected through the beginningless, indescribable māyā, it is called Īśvara or God. But, when it is reflected through the limited parts of māyā containing powers of veiling and of diverse creation (called avidyā), there are the manifestations of individual souls or jivas. It is again said in the Tatvaviveka of Nṛśimhāśrama that, when this pure consciousness is reflected through the pure sattva qualities, as dominating over other impure parts of prakṛti, there is the manifestation of God. Whereas, when the pure consciousness is reflected through the impure parts of rajas and tamas, as dominating over the sattva part of prakṛti (called also avidyā), there are the manifestations of the individual selves or jivas. The same prakṛti in its two aspects, as predominating in sattva and as predominating in rajas and tamas, goes by the name of māyā and avidyā and forms the conditioning factors (upādhi) of the pure consciousness, which on account of the different characters of the conditioning factors of māyā and avidyā appear as the omniscient God and the ignorant individual souls. Sarvajñātma Muni thinks that, when the pure consciousness is reflected through avidyā, it is called Īśvara, and, when it is reflected through mind (antahkarana), it is called jīva.

These various methods of accounting for the origin of individual selves and God have but little philosophical significance. But they go to show that the principal interest of the Vedānta lies in establishing the supreme reality of a transcendental principle of pure consciousness, which, though always untouched and unattached in its own nature, is yet the underlying principle which
can explain all the facts of the enlivening and enlightening of all our conscious experiences. All that is limited, be it an individual self or an individual object of awareness, is in some sense or other an illusory imposition of the modification of a non-conscious principle on the principle of consciousness. The Vedânta is both unwilling and incapable of explaining the nature of the world-process in all its details, in which philosophy and science are equally interested. Its only interest is to prove that the world-process presupposes the existence of a principle of pure consciousness which is absolutely and ultimately real, as it is immediate and intuitive. Reality means what is not determined by anything else; and in this sense pure consciousness is the only reality—and all else is indescribable—neither real nor unreal; and the Vedânta is not interested to discover what may be its nature.

Vedântic Cosmology.

From what has been said above it is evident that mâyâ (also called avidyâ or ajñâna) is in itself an indefinable mysterious stuff, which has not merely a psychological existence, but also an ontological existence as well. It is this ajñâna which on the one hand forms on the subjective plane the mind and the senses (the self alone being Brahmân and ultimately real), and on the other hand, on the objective plane, the whole of the objective universe. This ajñâna has two powers, the power of veiling or covering (avarâna) and the power of creation (vikṣepa). The power of veiling, though small, like a little cloud veiling the sun with a diameter of millions of miles, may, in spite of its limited nature, cover up the infinite, unchangeable self by veiling its self-luminosity as cognizer. The veiling of the self means veiling the shining unchangeable self-perception of the self, as infinite, eternal and limitless, pure consciousness, which as an effect of such veiling appears as limited, bound to sense-cognitions and sense-enjoyments and functioning as individual selves. It is through this covering power of ajñâna that the self appears as an agent and an enjoyer of pleasures and pains and subject to ignorant fears of rebirth, like the illusory perception of a piece of rope in darkness as a snake. Just as through the creative power of ignorance a piece of

rope, the real nature of which is hidden from view, appears as a
snake, so does ignorance by its creative power create on the hidden
self the manifold world-appearance. As the ajñāna is supposed to
veil by its veiling power (āvarana-śakti) only the self-cognizing
and self-revealing aspect of the self, the other aspect of the self as
pure being is left open as the basis on which the entire world-
appearance is created by the creative power thereof. The pure
consciousness, veiled as it is by ajñāna with its two powers, can
be regarded as an important causal agent (nimitta), when its nature
as pure consciousness forming the basis of the creation of the world-
appearance is emphasized; it can be regarded as the material cause,
when the emphasis is put on its covering part, the ajñāna. It is
like a spider, which, so far as it weaves its web, can be regarded as
a causal agent, and, so far as it supplies from its own body the
materials of the web, can be regarded as the material cause of the
web, when its body aspect is emphasized. The creative powers
(vikṣepa-śakti) of ajñāna are characterized as being threefold, after
the manner of Sāmkhya prakṛti, as sattva, rajas and tamas. With
the pure consciousness as the basis and with the associated creative
power of ajñāna predominating in tamas, space (ākāśa) is first
produced; from ākāśa comes air, from air fire, from fire water, from
water earth. It is these elements in their fine and uncompounded
state that in the Sāmkhya and the Purāṇas are called tan-mātras.
It is out of these that the grosser materials are evolved as also the
subtle bodies. The subtle bodies are made up of seventeen parts,

1 As to how the subtle elements are combined for the production of grosser
elements there are two different theories, viz. the triyug-karaṇa and the pañcik-
araṇa. The triyug-karaṇa means that fire, water and earth (as subtle elements)
are each divided into two halves, thus producing two equal parts of each; then
the three half parts of the three subtle elements are again each divided into two
halves, thus producing two quarter parts of each. Then the original first half of
each element is combined with the two quarters of other two elements. Thus
each element has half of itself with two quarter parts of other two elements.
Vācaspati and Amalānanda prefer triyug-karaṇa to pañcik-karaṇa; for they think
that there is no point in admitting that air and ākāśa have also parts of other
elements integrated in them, and the Vedic texts speak of triyug-karaṇa and not of
pañcik-karaṇa. The pañcik-karaṇa theory holds that the five subtle elements are
divided firstly into two halves, and then one of the two halves of these five
elements is divided again into four parts, and then the first half of each subtle
element is combined with the one-fourth of each half of all the other elements
excepting the element of which there is the full half as a constituent. Thus each
element is made up of one-half of itself, and the other half of it is constituted of
the one-fourth of each of the other elements (i.e. one-eighth of each of the
other four elements), and thus each element has at least some part of other
elements integrated into it. This view is supported by the Vedānta-paribhāṣā
and its Śikhāmaṇi commentary, p. 363.
excluding the subtle elements, and are called sūkṣma-śarīra or āṇga-śarīra. This subtle body is composed of the five cognitive senses, the five conative senses, the five vāyus or biomotor activities, buddhi (intellect) and manas, together with the five subtle elements in tanmātric forms. The five cognitive senses, the auditory, tactile, visual, gustatory and olfactory senses, are derived from the sattva parts of the five elements, ākāśa, vāyu, agni, ap and prthivi respectively. Buddhi, or intellect, means the mental state of determination or affirmation (niścayātmikā antahkaraṇa-vṛtti). Manas means the two mental functions of vikalpa and sankalpa or of sankalpa alone resulting in doubt. The function of mind (citta) and the function of egoism (ahaṃkāra) are included in buddhi and manas. They are all produced from the sattva parts of the five elements and are therefore elemental. Though they are elemental, yet, since they are produced from the compounded sattva parts of all the elements, they have the revealing function displayed in their cognitive operations. Buddhi with the cognitive senses is called the sheath of knowledge (vijñānamaya-koṣa). Manas with the cognitive senses is called the sheath of manas (manomaya-koṣa). It is the self as associated with the vijñānamaya-koṣa that feels itself as the agent, enjoyer, happy or unhappy, the individual self (jīva) that passes through worldly experience and rebirth. The conative senses are produced from the rajas parts of the five elements. The five vāyus or biomotor activities are called Prāṇa or the breathing activity, Udāna or the upward activity and Samāna or the digestive activity. There are some who add another five vāyus such as the Nāga, the vomiting Apana troyānes activity, Kūrma, the reflex activity of opening the eyelids, Kṛkala, the activity of coughing, Devadatta, the activity of yawning, and Dhananāyaya, the nourishing activity. These prāṇas

1 The Vedānta-sūtra speaks of sankalpa and vikalpa, and this is explained by the Subodhini as meaning doubt. See Vedānta-sūtra and Subodhini, p. 17. The Vedānta-paribhāṣā and its commentators speak of sankalpa as being the only function of manas, but it means "doubt." See pp. 88-89 and 358.

2 smaranākāra-vṛttimad antahkaraṇaṃ cittam (Vedānta-paribhāṣā-Maṇiprabhā, p. 89). anayor eva cittāhāṃkārayor antarbhāvah (Vedānta-sūtra, p. 17). But the Vedānta-paribhāṣā says that manas, buddhi, ahaṃkāra and citta, all four, constitute the inner organ (antahkaraṇa). See Vedānta-paribhāṣā, p. 88. The Vedānta-sūtra however does not count four functions buddhi, manas, citta, ahaṃkāra; citta and ahaṃkāra are regarded as the same as buddhi and manas. Thus according to the Vedānta-sūtra there are only two categories. But since the Vedānta-paribhāṣā only mentions buddhi and manas as constituents of the subtle body, one need not think that there is ultimately any difference between it and the Vedānta-sūtra.
together with the cognitive senses form the active sheath of prāṇa (prāṇamaya-kośa). Of these three sheaths, the vijnānamaya, manomaya and prāṇamaya, the vijnānamaya sheath plays the part of the active agent (karta-rūpaḥ); the manomaya is the source of all desires and volition, and is therefore regarded as having an instrumental function; the prāṇamaya sheath represents the motor functions. These three sheaths make up together the subtle body or the sūkṣma-śarira. Hiranyagarbha (also called Sūtraṁā or prāṇa) is the god who presides over the combined subtle bodies of all living beings. Individually each subtle body is supposed to belong to every being. These three sheaths, involving as they do all the subconscious impressions from which our conscious experience is derived, are therefore called a dream (jāgrat-vāsanāmayatvat svapna).

The process of the formation of the gross elements from the subtle parts of the elements is technically called pāṇcikaraṇa. It consists in a compounding of the elements in which one half of each rudimentary element is mixed with the eighth part of each other rudimentary element. It is through such a process of compounding that each element possesses some of the properties of the other elements. The entire universe consists of seven upper worlds (Bhuh, Bhuvah, Svar, Mahar, Janah, Tapah and Satyam), seven lower worlds (Atala, Vitala, Sutala, Rasātala, Talātala, Mahātala and Pātāla) and all the gross bodies of all living beings. There is a cosmic deity who presides over the combined physical bodies of all beings, and this deity is called Virāṭ. There is also the person, the individual who presides over each one of the bodies, and, in this aspect, the individual is called Viśva.

The ajñāna as constituting antahkaraṇa or mind, involving the operative functions of buddhi and manas, is always associated with the self; it is by the difference of these antahkaraṇas that one self appears as many individual selves, and it is through the states of these antahkaraṇas that the veil over the self and the objects are removed, and as a result of this there is the cognition of objects. The antahkaraṇa is situated within the body, which it thoroughly pervades. It is made up of the sattvā parts of the five rudimentary elements, and, being extremely transparent, comes into touch with the sense objects through the specific senses and assumes their forms. It being a material stuff, there is one part inside the body, another part in touch with the sense-objects, and a third part between the two and connected with them both as one whole.
The interior part of the *antaḥkaraṇa* is the ego or the agent. The intervening part has the action of knowledge, called also *vytti-jñāna*. The third part, which at the time of cognition is transformed into the form of the sense-objects, has the function of making them manifested in knowledge as its objects. The *antaḥkaraṇa* of three parts being transparent, pure consciousness can well be manifested in it. Though pure consciousness is one, yet it manifests the three different parts of the *antaḥkaraṇa* in three different ways, as the cognizer (*pramāṇa*), cognitive operation (*pramāṇa*) and the cognition, or the percep (*pramitī*). In each of the three cases the reality is the part of the pure consciousness, as it expresses itself through the three different modifications of the *antaḥkaraṇa*. The sense-objects in themselves are but the veiled pure consciousness, *brahman*, as forming their substance. The difference between the individual consciousness (*jīva-caitanya*) and the *brahman*-consciousness (*brahma-caitanya*) is that the former represents pure consciousness, as conditioned by or as reflected through the *antaḥkaraṇa*, while the latter is the unentangled infinite consciousness, on the basis of which all the cosmic creations of *māyā* are made. The covering of *avidyā*, for the breaking of which the operation of the *antaḥkaraṇa* is deemed necessary, is of two kinds, viz. subjective ignorance and objective ignorance. When I say that I do not know a book, that implies subjective ignorance as signified by "I do not know," and objective ignorance as referring to the book. The removal of the first is a precondition of all kinds of knowledge, perceptual or inferential, while the second is removed only in perceptual knowledge. It is diverse in kind according to the form and content of the sense-objects; and each perceptual cognition removes only one specific ignorance, through which the particular cognition arises.

### Śaṅkara and his School.

It is difficult to say exactly how many books were written by Śaṅkara himself. There is little doubt that quite a number of books attributed to Śaṅkara were not written by him. I give here a list of those books that seem to me to be his genuine works, though it is extremely difficult to be absolutely certain.

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I have chosen only those works which have been commented on by other writers, since this shows that these have the strength of tradition behind them to support their authenticity. The most important works of Śaṅkara are his commentaries on the ten Upaniṣads, Ḥūṇa, Kena, Kaṭha, Praśna, Muṇḍaka, Māṇḍūkya, Aitareya, Taittiriya, Chāndogya and Brhad-āraṇyaka and the Śūrīraka-mimāṃsā-bhāṣya. The main reasons why a number of works which probably were not written by him were attributed to him seem to be twofold; first, because there was another writer of the same name, i.e. Śaṅkarācārya, and second, the tendency of Indian writers to increase the dignity of later works by attributing them to great writers of the past. The attribution of all the Purāṇas to Vyāsa illustrates this very clearly. Śaṅkara’s Isopaniṣad-bhāṣya has one commentary by Anandajñāna and another, Dipikā, by the other Śaṅkara Acārya. His Kenopaniṣad-bhāṣya has two commentaries, Kenopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vivaraṇa and a commentary by Anandajñāna. The Kāṭhakopaniṣad-bhāṣya has two commentaries, by Anandajñāna and by Bālagopāla Yogindra. The Praśnopaniṣad-bhāṣya has two commentaries, by Anandajñāna and Nārāyaṇendra Sarasvati. The Muṇḍakopaniṣad-bhāṣya has two commentaries, by Anandajñāna and Abhinavanārāyaṇendra Sarasvati. The Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad-bhāṣya has two commentaries, by Anandajñāna and Mathurānātha Śukla, and a summary, called Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad-bhāṣyārtha-saṃgraha, by Rāghavānanda. The Aitareyopaniṣad-bhāṣya has six commentaries, by Anandajñāna, Abhinavanārāyaṇa, Nṛsimha Acārya, Bālakṛṣṇadāsa, Jñānāmṛta Yati, and Viśvesvara Tīrtha. The Taittiriyoṇopaniṣad-bhāṣya seems to have only one commentary on it, by Anandajñāna. The Chāndogyoṣopaniṣad has two commentaries, called Bhāṣya-tippana, and a commentary by Anandajñāna. The Brhad-āraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya has a commentary by Anandajñāna and a big independent work on it by Suresvara, called Brhad-āraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vaṛtti, or simply Vaṛtti, which has also a number of commentaries; these have been noticed in the section on Suresvara. His Aparokṣānubhava has four commentaries, by Saṅkara Acārya, by Bālagopāla, by Caṇḍesvara Varman (Anubhava-dīpikā), and by Vidyāraṇya. His commentary on Gaṇḍapāda’s Māṇḍūkya-kārikā, called Gaṇḍapādiya-bhāṣya or Agamasastra-vivaraṇa, has two commentaries, one by Sudhānanda and one by Anandajñāna. His Ātma-jñānopadeśa has two commentaries, by Anandajñāna and by Pūrṇānanda Tīrtha; the Eka-śloka has a
commentary called *Tattva-dipana*, by Svayaṃprakāśa Yati; no commentary however is attributed to the *Viveka-cūḍāmaṇi*, which seems to be genuinely attributed to Śaṅkara; the *Ātma-bodha* has at least five commentaries, by Advayānanda, Bhāsurānanda, Bodhendra (*Bhāva-prakāśika*), Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and Rāmānanda Tirtha; The *Ātmānātma-viveka* has at least four commentaries, by Padmapāda, Pūrṇānanda Tirtha, Śāyaṇa and Svayaṃprakāśa Yati. The *Ātmopadeśa-vidhi* is said to have a commentary by Ānandajñāna; the *Ānanda-lahari* has about twenty-four commentaries, by Appaya Dikṣita, Kavirāja, Kṛṣṇa Ācārya (*Maṇī-bhāṣīṇa*), Keśava-bhaṭṭa, Kaivalyāśrama (*Saubhāgya-vardhini*), Gaṅgāharī (*Tattva-dipikā*), Gaṅgādhara, Gopīrāma, Gopikānta Sārvabhauma (*Ānanda-lahari-tarti*), Jagadīśa?, Jagannātha Paṇcānana, Narasimha, Brahmānanda (*Bhāvārtha-dipikā*), Malla Bhaṭṭa, Mahādeva Vidyāvagiśa, Mahādeva Vaidya, Rāmacandra, Rāmabhadrā, Rāmānanda Tirtha, Lakṣmīdhara Dēṣika and Viśvambhara and Śrīkanṭha Bhaṭṭa and another called *Vidvan-manoramā*. The *Upadeśa-sāhasrī* has at least four commentaries, by Ānandajñāna, by Rāmā Tirtha (*Pada-yojanikā*), Bodha-vidhi by a pupil of Vidyādāman, and by Śaṅkarācārya. His *Cid-ānanda-stava-rāja*, called also *Cid-ānanda-daśaśloki* or simply *Daśa-sloki*, has also a number of commentaries and sub-commentaries, such as the *Siddhānta-tattva-bindu* by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī; Madhusūdana’s commentary was commented on by a number of persons, such as Nārāyaṇa Yati (*Laghu-ṭīkā*), Puruṣottama Sarasvatī (*Siddhānta-bindu-sandipana*), Pūrṇānanda Sarasvatī (*Tattva-viveka*), Gauḍa Brahmānanda Sarasvatī (*Siddhānta-bindu-nyāya-ratnāvali*), by Saccidananda and Śivalāla Sarman. Gauḍa Brahmānanda’s commentary, *Siddhānta-bindu-nyāya-ratnāvali*, was further commented on by Kṛṣnakānta (*Siddhānta-nyāya-ratna-pradīpikā*). Śaṅkara’s *Drg-drṣya-prakaraṇa* was commented on by Rāmacandra Tirtha; his *Paṇṭikaraṇa-prakriyā* has again a number of commentaries—that by Sureśvara is *Paṇṭikaraṇa-vārttiṅa*, and this has a further commentary, called *Paṇṭikaraṇa-vārttikābharana*, by Abhinavanāraṇaṇendra Sarasvatī, pupil of Jñānendra Sarasvatī. Other commentaries on the *Paṇṭikaraṇa-prakriyā* are *Paṇṭikaraṇa-bhāva-prakāśīkā*, *Paṇṭikaraṇa-ṭikā-tattva-candrikā*, *Paṇṭikaraṇa-tātparyā-candrikā* and *Paṇṭikaraṇa-vivaraṇa* by Ānandajñāna, *Paṇṭikaraṇa-vivaraṇa* by Svayaṃprakāśa Yati and by Prajñānandana, and a sub-commentary called *Tattva-candrikā*. Śaṅkara also commented on the *Bhagavad-
gitā; this commentary has been examined in the chapter on the 
Bhagavad-gitā in the present volume. His Laghu-vākyavṛtti 
has a commentary called Puspānjali, and another, called Laghu-
vākyavṛtti-prakāśikā, by Rāmānanda Sarasvatī; his Vākyavṛtti 
has a commentary by Ānandajñāna, and another commentary, 
called Vākyavṛtti-prakāśikā, by Visveśvara Paṇḍita. He starts his 
Vākyavṛtti in the same manner as Īśvarakṛṣṇa starts his Sāṃkhya-
karikā, namely by stating that, suffering from the threefold sorrows 
of life, the pupil approaches a good teacher for instruction regarding 
the ways in which he may be liberated from them. Sureśvara in his 
Naiśkarmya-siddhi also starts in the same manner and thus gives 
a practical turn to the study of philosophy, a procedure which one 
does not find in his Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya. The answer, of course, is 
the same as that given in so many other places, that one is liberated 
only by the proper realization of the Upaniṣad texts that declare 
the unity of the self with Brahman. He then goes on to show that 
all external things and all that is called mind or mental or psychical 
is extraneous to self, which is of the nature of pure consciousness; 
he also declares here that the effects of one’s deeds are disposed 
by God (Īśvara), the superior illusory form of Brahman, and not 
by the mysterious power of apūrva admitted by the Mimāṃsists. 
He concludes this short work of fifty-three verses by insisting on the 
fact that, though the unity texts (advaita-sūri) of the Upaniṣads, 
such as “that (Brahman) art thou,” may have a verbal construction 
that implies some kind of duality, yet their main force is in the direct 
and immediate apperception of the pure self without any intel-
lectual process as implied by relations of identity. The Vākyavṛtti 
is thus conceived differently from the Aparokṣānubhūti, where yoga 
processes of posture and breath-regulations are described, as being 
helpful for the realization of the true nature of self. This may, of 
course, give rise to some doubts regarding the true authorship of 
the Aparokṣānubhūti, though it may be explained as being due to 
the different stages of the development of Śaṅkara’s own mind; 
divergences of attitude are also noticeable in his thoroughgoing 
idealism in his commentary on Gauḍapāda’s Kārikā, where the 
waking life is regarded as being exactly the same as dream life, and 
external objects are deemed to have no existence whatsoever, 
being absolutely like dream-perceptions—as contrasted with his 
Śūrtraka-mimāṃsā-bhāṣya, where external objects are considered 
to have an indescribable existence, very different from dream-
creations. The Upadeśa-sāhasri, which in its nineteen chapters contains only six hundred and seventy-five stanzas, is more in a line with the Vākya-vr̥tti, and, though the well-known Vedānta topics are all slightly touched upon, greater emphasis is laid on the proper realization of the Vedāntic unity texts, such as “that art thou,” as means to the attainment of Brahmahood. There are also a number of short poems and hymns attributed to Śaṅkarācārya, such as the Advaitānubhūti, Ātma-bodha, Tattvopadesa, Praudhānubhūti, etc., some of which are undoubtedly his, while there are many others which may not be so; but in the absence of further evidence it is difficult to come to any decisive conclusion. These hymns do not contain any additional philosophical materials, but are intended to stir up a religious fervour and emotion in favour of the monistic faith. In some cases, however, the commentators have found an excuse for extracting from them Vedāntic doctrines which cannot be said to follow directly from them. As an illustration of this, it may be pointed out that out of the ten ślokas of Śaṅkara Madhusūdana made a big commentary, and Brahmānanda Saravatī wrote another big commentary on that of Madhusūdana and elaborated many of the complex doctrines of the Vedānta which have but little direct bearing upon the verses themselves. But Śaṅkara’s most important work is the Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya, which was commented on by Vācaspati Miśra in the ninth century, Ānandajñāna in the thirteenth, and Govindānanda in the fourteenth century. Commentaries on Vācaspati’s commentary will be noticed in the section on Vācaspati Miśra. Subrahmanya wrote a verse summary of Śaṅkara’s commentary which he calls Bhāsyārtha-nyāya-mālā; and Bhāratī Tīrtha wrote also the Vaiyāsika-nyāya-mālā, in which he tried to deal with the general arguments of the Brahma-sūtra on the lines of Śaṅkara’s commentary. Many other persons, such as Vaidyanātha Dikṣita, Devarāma Bhaṭṭa, etc., also wrote topical summaries of the main lines of the general arguments of the Brahma-sūtra on the lines of Śaṅkara’s commentary, called Nyāya-mālā or Adhikarana-mālā. But many other persons were inspired by Śaṅkara’s commentary (or by the commentaries of Vācaspati Miśra and other great writers of the Śaṅkara school) and under the name of independent commentaries on the Brahma-sūtra merely repeated what was contained in these. Thus

1 The Ātma-bodha was commented upon by Padmapāda in his commentary Ātma-bodha-nyākhyāna, called also Vedānta-sūra.
Amalānanda wrote his Śāstra-darpaṇa imitating the main lines of Vācaspati’s commentary on Śaṅkara’s commentary; and Svayamprakāśa also wrote his Vedānta-naya-bhāṣaṇa, in which for the most part he summarized the views of Vācaspati’s Bhāmati commentary. Hari Dikṣita wrote his Brahma-sūtra-vṛtti, Śaṅkarānanda his Brahma-sūtra-dīpikā and Brahmānanda his Vedānta-sūtra-muktāvali as independent interpretations of the Brahma-sūtra, but these were all written mainly on the lines of Śaṅkara’s own commentary, supplementing it with additional Vedāntic ideas that had been developed after Śaṅkara by the philosophers of his school of thought or explaining Śaṅkara’s Bhāṣya.

Maṇḍana, Sureśvara and Viśvarūpa.

General tradition has always identified Maṇḍana with Sureśvara and Viśvarūpa; and Col. G. A. Jacob in his introduction to the second edition of the Naiṣkarmya-siddhi seems willing to believe this tradition. The tradition probably started from Vidyārāṇya’s Śaṅkara-dig-vidyā, where Maṇḍana is spoken of as being named not only Umbeka, but also Viśvarūpa (viii. 63). He further says in x. 4 of the same work that, when Maṇḍana became a follower of Śaṅkara, he received from him the name Sureśvara. But the Śaṅkara-dig-vidyā is a mythical biography, and it is certainly very risky to believe any of its statements, unless corroborated by other reliable evidences. There is little doubt that Sureśvara was

1 Some of these commentaries are: Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya-vyākhyā-saṅgraha by Brahmānanda Yati, pupil of Viśvesvarānanda, Brahma-sūtrārtha-dīpikā by Venkāṭa, son of Gaurī and Šiva, Brahma-sūtra-vṛtti (called also Mitākṣara) by Annam Bhaṭṭa, and Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya-vyākhyā (called also Viśyā-Śīrī) by Jānottama Bhaṭṭāraka, pupil of Jñānaghana. The peculiarity of this last work is that it is the only commentary on the eka-jīva-vāda line that the present writer could trace. In addition to these some more commentaries may be mentioned, such as Brahma-sūtra-vṛtti by Dharma Bhaṭṭa, pupil of Rāmacandrāya and pupil’s pupil of Mukundārāma, Sūtra-bhāṣya-vyākhyāna (called also Brahma-vidyā-bharana) by Advaitānanda, pupil of Rāmacandrā and pupil’s pupil of Brahmānanda, Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya-vyākhyā (called also Nyāya-raṣṭā-ṃaṇī) by Appaya Dikṣita, Brahma-tattva-prakāśikā (which is different from an earlier treatise called Brahma-prakāśikā) by Sadāśivendra Sarasvati, Brahma-sūtra-parṇyāsa by Rāmeśvara Bhaṭṛi, by a pupil of Rāmacandrā, Śaṅkarā-mūlāśā-sūtra-siddhānta-kaumūḍa by Subrahmanya Agnīc Makhindra, Vedānta-kauṭum-bha by Śīrāma; none of which seem to be earlier than the sixteenth century. But Ananyānubhava, the teacher of Prakāśatman (a.d. 1200), seems to have written another commentary, called Śātraka-nīḍyā-maṇimāla. Prakāśatman himself also wrote a metrical summary of the main contents of Śaṅkara’s Bhāṣya called Śātraka-mūlāśa-nīḍyā-saṅgraha, and Kṣaṇānubhūti, in much later times, wrote a similar metrical summary, called Śātraka-mūlāśa-saṅgraha.
the author of a Vārttika, or commentary in verse, on Śaṅkara's Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad (which was also summarized by Vidyāranya in a work called Vārttika-sāra, which latter was further commented on by Maheśvara Tīrtha in his commentary, called the Laghu-samgraha). The Vārttika of Suresvara was commented on by at least two commentators, Ānandagiri in his Śāstra-prakāśikā and Ānandapūrṇa in his Nyāya-kalpa-latikā. In a commentary on the Parāśara-smṛti published in the Bib. Ind. series (p. 51) a quotation from this Vārttika is attributed to Viśvarūpa; but this commentary is a late work, and in all probability it relied on Vidyāranya's testimony that Viśvarūpa and Suresvara were identically the same person. Vidyāranya also, in his Vivaraṇa-prameya-samgraha, p. 92, quotes a passage from Suresvara's Vārttika (iv. 8), attributing it to Viśvarūpa. But in another passage of the Vivaraṇa-prameya-samgraha (p. 224) he refers to a Vedānta doctrine, attributing it to the author of the Brahma-siddhi. But the work has not yet been published, and its manuscripts are very scarce: the present writer had the good fortune to obtain one. A fairly detailed examination of the philosophy of this work will be given in a separate section. The Brahma-siddhi is an important work, and it was commented on by Vācaspati in his Tattva-samikṣā, by Ānandapūrṇa in his Brahma-siddhi-vyākhyā-ratna, by Śaṅkkhapāṇi in his Brahma-siddhi-tikā, and by Citsukha in his Abhiprāya-prakāśikā. But only the latter two works are available in manuscripts. Many important works however refer to the Brahma-siddhi and its views generally as coming from the author of Brahma-siddhi (Brahma-siddhi-kāra). But in none of these references, so far as it is known to the present writer, has the author of Brahma-siddhi been referred to as Suresvara. The Brahma-siddhi was written in verse and prose, since two quotations from it in Citsukha's Tattva-pradīpikā (p. 381, Nirṇaya-Sāgara Press) and Nyāya-kanikā (p. 80) are in verse, while there are other references, such as Tattva-pradīpikā (p. 140) and elsewhere, which are in prose. There is, however, little doubt that the Brahma-siddhi was written by Maṇḍana or Maṇḍana Miśra; for both Śrīdhara in his Nyāya-kandali (p. 218) and Citsukha in his Tattva-pradīpikā (p. 140) refer to Maṇḍana as the author of the Brahma-siddhi. Of these the evidence of Śrīdhara, who belonged to the middle of the tenth century, ought to be considered very reliable, as he lived within a hundred years of the death of Maṇḍana; whoever Maṇḍana may have been,
since he lived after Śaṅkara (A.D. 820), he could not have flourished very much earlier than the middle of the ninth century. It is, therefore, definitely known that the Naiśkarmya-siddhi and the Vārttika were written by Śuresvara, and the Brahma-siddhi by Maṇḍana. The question regarding the identity of these two persons may be settled, if the views or opinions of the Brahma-siddhi can be compared or contrasted with the views of the Naiśkarmya-siddhi or the Vārttika. From the few quotations that can be traced in the writings of the various writers who refer to it it is possible to come to some fairly decisive conclusions.

Of all passages the most important is that quoted from the Brahma-siddhi in the Vivaraṇa-prameya-samgraha (p. 224). It is said there that according to the author of the Brahma-siddhi it is the individual persons (jīvāḥ, in the plural) who by their own individual ignorance (svāvidyayā) create for themselves on the changeless Brahman the false world-appearance. Neither in itself, nor with the māyā, or as reflection in māyā, is Brahman the cause of the world (Brahma na jagat-kāraṇam). The appearances then are but creations of individual ignorance, and individual false experiences of the world have therefore no objective basis. The agreement of individual experiences is due to similarity of illusions in different persons who are suffering under the delusive effects of the same kinds of ignorance; this may thus be compared with the delusive experience of two moons by a number of persons. Not all persons experience the same world; their delusive experiences are similar, but the objective basis of their experience is not the same (sāmevādas tu bahu-puruṣāvagata-devitya-candraevat śādāsvāda upapadyate). If this account is correct, as may well be supposed, then Maṇḍana Miśra may be regarded as the originator of the Vedāntic doctrine of dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda, which was in later times so forcefully formulated by Prakāśānanda. Again, in Prakāśatman's Paṇca-pādikā-vivaraṇa (p. 32), it is held that according to the author of the Brahma-siddhi both māyā and avidyā are nothing but false experiences (avidyā māyā mithyā-pratyaya iti). About the function

1 A copy of the manuscript of the Brahma-siddhi and its commentary was consulted by me in the Adyar and the Govt. Sanskrit MSS. Libraries after the above section had been written, and a thorough examination of its contents, I am happy to say, corroborates the above surmises. The Brahma-siddhi is expected to be shortly published by Prof. Kuppusvāmi Śāstri, and I consulted the tarka-pāda of it in proof by the kind courtesy of Prof. Śāstri in Madras in December 1928. A separate section has been devoted to the philosophy of Maṇḍana's Brahma-siddhi.
of knowledge as removing doubts he is said to hold the view (as reported in the Nyāya-kandali, p. 218) that doubt regarding the validity of what is known is removed by knowledge itself. In the Nyāya-kaṇikā (p. 80) it is said that Maṇḍana held that reality manifests itself in unlimited conceptions of unity or universality, whereas differences appear only as a result of limited experience. Again, in the Laghu-candrikā (p. 112, Kumbakonam edition) Maṇḍana is introduced in the course of a discussion regarding the nature of the dispersion of ignorance and its relation to Brahma-knowledge or Brahmadhoo. According to Śaṅkara, as interpreted by many of his followers, including Sureśvara, the dissolution of ignorance (avidyā-nivṛtti) is not a negation, since negation as a separate category has no existence. So dissolution of ignorance means only Brahman. But according to Maṇḍana there is no harm in admitting the existence of such a negation as the cessation of ignorance; for the monism of Brahman means that there is only one positive entity. It has no reference to negations, i.e. the negation of duality only means the negation of all positive entities other than Brahman (bhāva-bandha). The existence of such a negation as the cessation of ignorance does not hurt the monistic creed. Again, Sarvajñātma Muni in his Saṁkṣepa-sārāraka (11.174) says that ignorance (avidyā) is supported (āśraya) in pure consciousness (cin-mātraśrita-viśayam ajñānam), and that, even where from the context of Śaṅkara’s Bhāṣya it may appear as if he was speaking of the individual person (jīva) as being the support of ajñāna, it has to be interpreted in this sense. Objections of Maṇḍana, therefore, to such a view, viz. that ignorance rests with the individuals, are not to be given any consideration; for Maṇḍana’s views lead to quite different conclusions (parihṛtya Maṇḍana-vācaḥ tad dhy anyathā prasthitam). The commentator of the Saṁkṣepa-sārāraka, Rāmatīrtha Svāmin, also, in commenting on the passage referred to, contrasts the above view of Maṇḍana with that of Sureśvara, who according to him is referred to by an adjective bahu-srūta in the Saṁkṣepa-sārāraka text, and who is reported to have been in agreement with the views of Sarvajñātma Muni, as against the views of Maṇḍana. Now many of these views which have been attributed to Maṇḍana are not shared by Sureśvara, as will appear from what will be said below concerning him. It does not therefore appear that Maṇḍana Miśra and Sureśvara were the same.

1 Mr Hiriyanna, in J.R.A.S. 1923, mentions this point as well as the point concerning avidyā-nivṛtti in Maṇḍana’s view as admission of negation.
person. But, if Vidyārānya, who knows so much about the views of Maṇḍana, had identified them in the Śaṅkara-dig-vijaya, that might lead one to pause. Now Mr Hiriyanā seems to have removed this difficulty for us by his short note in J.R.A.S. 1924, where he points out that Vidyārānya in his Vārttika-sāra refers to the author of the Brahma-siddhi as a different authority from the author of the Vārttika, viz. Suresvara. Now, if Vidyārānya, the author of the Vārttika-sāra, knew that Maṇḍana, the author of the Brahma-siddhi, was not the same person as Suresvara, he could not have identified them in his Śaṅkara-dig-vijaya. This naturally leads one to suspect that the Vidyārānya who was the author of the Vivaraṇa-prameya-samgraha and the Vārttika-sāra was not the same Vidyārānya as the author of Śaṅkara-dig-vijaya. Another consideration also leads one to think that Vidyārānya (the author of the Vivaraṇa-prameya-samgraha) could not have written the Śaṅkara-dig-vijaya.

Ānandātman had two disciples, Anubhavānanda and Śaṅkarānanda. Anubhavānanda had as his disciple Amalānanda, and Śaṅkarānanda had Vidyārānya as his disciple. So Amalānanda may be taken as a contemporary of Vidyārānya. Now Amalānanda had another teacher in Sukhaprakāśa, who had Citsukha as his teacher. Thus Citsukha may be taken to be a contemporary of the grand teacher (parama-guru), Ānandātman, of Vidyārānya. If this was the case, he could not have written in his Śaṅkara-dig-vijaya (xiii. 5) that Citsukha, who lived several centuries after Padmapāda, was a disciple of Padmapāda. It may therefore be safely asserted that the author of the Śaṅkara-dig-vijaya was not the author of the Vivaraṇa-prameya-samgraha. Now, if this is so, our reliance on the author of the Vivaraṇa-prameya-samgraha cannot be considered to be risky and unsafe. But on p. 92 of the Vivaraṇa-prameya-samgraha a passage from the Vārttika of Suresvara (iv. 8) is attributed to Viśvāraṇa Ācārya. It may therefore be concluded that Maṇḍana, the author of the Brahma-siddhi, was not the same person as Suresvara, unless we suppose that Maṇḍana was not only a Māmsā writer, but also a Vedānta writer of great repute and that his conversion by Śaṅkara meant only that he changed some of his Vedāntic views and accepted those of Śaṅkara, and it was at this stage that he was called Suresvara. On this theory his Brahma-siddhi was probably written before his conversion to Śaṅkara's views. It seems likely that this theory may be correct, and that the author of the Vidhi-viveka was also the author of the
Brahma-siddhi; for the passage of the Brahma-siddhi quoted by Vācaspati in his Nyāya-kaṇṭikā is quoted in a manner which suggests that in all probability the author of the Vidhi-viveka was also the author of the Brahma-siddhi. It may also be concluded that in all probability Viśvarūpa was the same person as Suresvara, though on this subject no references of value are known to the present writer other than by the author of the Vivaraṇa-prameya-samgraha.

Maṇḍana (A.D. 800).

Maṇḍana Miśra’s Brahma-siddhi with the commentary of Śaṅkhapāṇi is available in manuscript, and Mahāmahopādhyāya Kuppusvāmi Śastri of Madras is expected soon to bring out a critical edition of this important work. Through the courtesy of Mahāmahopādhyāya Kuppusvāmi Śastri the present writer had an opportunity of going through the proofs of the Brahma-siddhi and through the courtesy of Mr C. Kunhan Raja, the Honorary Director of the Adyar Library, he was able also to utilize the manuscript of Śaṅkhapāṇi’s commentary. The Brahma-siddhi is in four chapters, Brahma-kāṇḍa, Tarka-kāṇḍa, Niyoga-kāṇḍa, and Siddhi-kāṇḍa, in the form of verses (kārikā) and long annotations (çṛitti). That Maṇḍana must have been a contemporary of Śaṅkara is evident from the fact that, though he quotes some writers who flourished before Śaṅkara, such as Śabara, Kumārila or Vyāsa, the author of the Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya, and makes profuse references to the Upaniṣad texts, he never refers to any writer who flourished after Śaṅkara.

Vācaspati also wrote a commentary, called Tattva-samikṣa, on Maṇḍana’s Brahma-siddhi; but unfortunately this text, so far as is known to the present writer, has not yet been published.

1 Citsukha, the pupil of Jñānottama, also wrote a commentary on it, called Abhiprāya-prakāśikā, almost the whole of which, except some portions at the beginning, is available in the Government Oriental Manuscript Library, R. No. 3853. Anandapūrṇa also wrote a commentary on the Brahma-siddhi, called Bhāva-siddhi.

2 Maṇḍana’s other works are Bhāvanā-viveka, Vidhi-viveka, Vibhrama-viveka and Sphoṭa-siddhi. Of these the Vidhi-viveka was commented upon by Vācaspati Miśra in his Nyāya-kaṇṭikā, and the Sphoṭa-siddhi was commented upon by the son of Bhavadāsa, who had also written a commentary, called Tattva-svabhāvanā, on Vācaspati Miśra’s Tattva-bindu. The commentary on the Sphoṭa-siddhi is called Gopālīka. Maṇḍana’s Vibhrama-viveka is a small work devoted to the discussion of the four theories of illusion (khyāti), ātma-khyāti, asat-khyāti, anyathā-khyāti and akiphyāti. Up till now only his Bhāvanā-viveka and Vidhi-viveka have been published.
discovered. In the Brahma-kāṇḍa chapter Maṇḍana discusses the nature of Brahman; in the Tarka-kāṇḍa he tries to prove that we cannot perceive “difference” through perception and that therefore one should not think of interpreting the Upaniṣad texts on dualistic lines on the ground that perception reveals difference. In the third chapter, the Niyoga-kāṇḍa, he tries to refute the Mīmāṃsā view that the Upaniṣad texts are to be interpreted in accordance with the Mīmāṃsā principle of interpretation, that all Vedic texts command us to engage in some kind of action or to restrain ourselves from certain other kinds of action. This is by far the longest chapter of the book. The fourth chapter, the Siddhi-kāṇḍa, is the shortest: Maṇḍana says here that the Upaniṣad texts show that the manifold world of appearance does not exist at all and that its apparent existence is due to the avidyā of jīva.

In the Brahma-kāṇḍa the most important Vedāntic concepts are explained by Maṇḍana according to his own view. He first introduces the problem of the subject (dṛṣṭr) and the object (dṛṣṭya) and says that it is only by abolishing the apparent duality of subject and object that the fact of experience can be explained. For, if there was any real duality of subject and object, that duality could not be bridged over and no relation between the two could be established; if, on the other hand, there is only the subject, then all things that are perceived can best be explained as being illusory creations imposed on self, the only reality. Proceeding further with the same argument, he says that attempts have been made to bring about this subject-object relation through the theory of the operation of an intermediary mind (antahkaraṇa); but whatever may be the nature of this intermediary, the pure unchangeable intelligence, the self or the subject, could not change with its varying changes in accordance with its connection with different objects; if it is held that the self does not undergo any transformation or change, but there is only the appearance of a transformation through its reflection in the antahkaraṇa, then it is plainly admitted that objects are not in reality perceived and that there is only an appearance of perception. If objects are not perceived in reality, it is wrong to think that they have a separate

and independent existence from the self. Just as the very same man sees his own image in the mirror to be different from him and to exist outside of him as an object, so the same self appears as all the diverse objects outside of it. It is difficult to conceive how one could admit the existence of external objects outside the pure intelligence (cit); for in that case it would be impossible to relate the two.

According to Maṇḍana avidyā is called māyā, or false appearance, because it is neither a characteristic (sva-bhāva) of Brahman nor different from it, neither existent nor non-existent. If it was the characteristic of anything, then, whether one with that or different from it, it would be real and could not therefore be called avidyā; if it was absolutely non-existent, it would be like the lotus of the sky and thereby would have no practical bearing in experience (na vyavahāra-bijam) such as avidyā has; it has thus to be admitted that avidyā is indescribable or unspeakable (anirvacanīyā).

According to Maṇḍana avidyā belongs to the individual souls (jīva). He admits that there is an inconsistency in such a view; but he thinks that, avidyā being itself an inconsistent category, there is no wonder that its relation with jīva should also be incon-

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1 ekāntahkarana-samkrāntāv asty eva sambandha iti cet, na, cīte śuddhatvād aparināmād aprati-saṃkramāc ca; druṣṭa buddhiḥ cīte-saṃnideḥ chāyaya vivektata iti ced atha kevaṁ tac chāyataḥ? a-tad-ātmanaḥ tad-avabhāsaḥ; na tarhi paramārthaḥ druṣṭa druṣṭe, paramārthataḥ ca druṣṭamānāḥ druṣṭe-vyatiriktaṁ asti iti dur-bhayaṁ. Ibid. Śaṅkhaṇāy in commenting on this discards the view that objects pass through the sense-channels and become superimposed on the antahkarana or durbhayaṁ and thereby become related to the pure intelligence of the self and objectified: na tu sphaṭikopame cetasi indriya-praṇālī-saṃkrāntānām arthādhaṁ tatra eva saṃkrāntena ātma-caitanyena sambaddhānāṁ tad-druṣṭavām ghaṭiṣayate. Adyar MS. p. 75.

It may not be out of place to point out in this connection that the theory of Padmapāda, Prakāśātman, as developed later on by Dharmārājādīvarṇā, which held that the mind (antahkarana) becomes superimposed on external objects in perception, was in all probability borrowed from the Śaṅkhaṇa doctrine of cīc-chāyāpatti in perception, which was somehow forced into Śaṅkara’s loose epistemological doctrines and worked out as a systematic epistemological theory. The fact that Maṇḍana discards this epistemological doctrine shows, on the one hand, that he did not admit it to be a right interpretation of Śaṅkara and may, on the other hand, be regarded as a criticism of the contemporary interpretation of Padmapāda. But probably the reply of that school would be that, though they admitted extra-individual reality of objects, they did not admit the reality of objects outside of pure intelligence (cit).

2 tathā hi darpāna-tala-stham ātmānaṃ vibhāktam ivātmanaḥ pratyeṣi; cīte tu vibhāktam asaṃnuṣṭam tayā cētaya iti dur-avaganyam. Ibid.

3 Ibid. p. 9. It may not be out of place here to point out that Ānandabodha’s argument in his Nyāya-maharanda regarding the unspeakable nature of avidyā, which has been treated in a later section of this chapter, is based on this argument of Maṇḍana.
sistent and unexplainable. The inconsistency of the relationship of avidyā with the jīvas arises as follows: the jīvas are essentially identical with Brahman, and the diversity of jīvas is due to imagination (kalpanā); but this imagination cannot be of Brahman, since Brahman is devoid of all imagination (tasyā vidyātmanah kalpanā-sūnyatvāt); it cannot be the imagination of the jīvas, since the jīvas themselves are regarded as being the product of imagination. Two solutions may be proposed regarding this difficulty, firstly, that the word māyā implies what is inconsistent; had it been a consistent and explainable concept, it would be reality and not māyā. Secondly, it may be said that from avidyā come the jīvas and from the jīvas comes the avidyā, and that this cycle is beginningless and therefore there is no ultimate beginning either of the jīvas or of the avidyā. This view is held by those who think that avidyā is not the material cause of the world: these are technically called avidyopādāna-bheda-vādins. It is through this avidyā that the jīvas suffer the cycle of births and rebirths, and this avidyā is natural to the jīvas, since the jīvas themselves are the products of avidyā. And it is through listening to the Vedāntic texts, right thinking, meditation, etc. that true knowledge dawns and the avidyā is destroyed; it was through this avidyā that the jīvas were separated from Brahman; with its destruction they attain Brahmahood.

In defining the nature of Brahman as pure bliss Śaṅkhāpani the commentator raises some very interesting discussions. He starts by criticizing the negative definition of happiness as cessation of pain or as a positive mental state qualified by such a negative condition. He says that there are indeed negative pleasures which are enjoyed as negation of pain (e.g. a plunge into cold water is an escape from the painful heat); but he holds that there are cases where pleasures and pains are experienced simultaneously.

1. Itaretarārāya prasaṅgāt kalpanādāhino hi jīva vibhāgah, jīvārārayā kalpanā. Ibid. p. 10.
2. amapadyamānārthaiva hi māyā; upapadyamānārthaive yathārtha-bhāvāna na māyā śyāt. Ibid.
3. anādītvān netaretarārārayateva-dojah. Ibid.
4. na ha jīveṣu nisarga-jā vidyāstī, avidyaive hi naisargikā, āgantukyā vidyāyāh pravilayaḥ. Ibid. pp. 11–12.
5. avidyāyaive tu brahmaṇo jīvo vibhaktah, tan-niyātav bhrama-svarūpam eva bhacati, yathā ghaṭādi-bhede tad-ākāśam parisuddham paramākāśam eva bhavati. Ibid.
and not as negation of each other. A man may feel painful heat in the upper part of his body and yet feel the lower part of his body delightfully cool and thus experience pleasure and pain simultaneously (sukha-duḥkhe yugapaj janyete). Again, according to the scriptures there is unmixed pain in Hell, and this shows that pain need not necessarily be relative. Again, there are many cases (e.g. in the smelling of a delightful odour of camphor) where it cannot be denied that we have an experience of positive pleasure. Śaṅkhapāṇi then refutes the theory of pain as unsatisfied desire and happiness as satisfaction or annulment of desires (viṣayaprāptīm vinā kāma eva duḥkham atāḥ tan-nirūttir eva sukham bhāvisyatī) by holding that positive experiences of happiness are possible even when one has not desired them. An objection to this is that experience of pleasures satisfies the natural, but temporarily inactive, desires in a sub-conscious or potential condition. Again, certain experiences produce more pleasures in some than in others, and this is obviously due to the fact that one had more latent desires to be fulfilled than the other. In reply to these objections Śaṅkhapāṇi points out that, even if a thing is much desired, yet, if it is secured after much trouble, it does not satisfy one so much as a pleasure which comes easily. If pleasure is defined as removal of desires, then one should feel happy before the pleasurable experience or after the pleasurable experience, when all traces of the desires are wiped out, but not at the time of enjoying the pleasurable experience; for the desires are not wholly extinct at that time. Even at the time of enjoying the satisfaction of most earnest desires one may feel pain. So it is to be admitted that pleasure is not a relative concept which owes its origin to the sublation of desires, but that it is a positive concept which has its existence even before the desires are sublated. If negation of desires be defined as happiness, then even disinclination to food through bilious attacks is to be called happiness. So it is to be admitted that positive pleasures are in the first instance experienced and then are desired. The theory that pains and pleasures are relative and that without pain there can be no experience of pleasure and that there can be no experience of pain without an

1 Ibid. pp. 20, 21.  
2 Ibid. p. 22.  
3 sahajo hi rāgah sarvapaṃsām asti sa tu viṣaya-viśeṣena ādeva-bhavati. Ibid. p. 23.  
4 atāḥ kāma-nirūtteḥ prāg-bhāvi sukha-vastu-bhūtam ēśavyam. Ibid. p. 27.  
5 Ibid. p. 25.
experience of pleasure is false and consequently the Vedantic view is that the state of emancipation as Brahmahood may well be described as an experience of positive pure bliss¹.

Śaṅkara in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra and in his commentaries on some of the Upaniṣads and the Māndūkyakārikā had employed some elements of dialectical criticism, the principles of which had long been introduced in well-developed forms by the Buddhists. The names of the three great dialecticians, Śrīharṣa, Ānandajñāna and Citsukha, of the Śaṅkara school, are well known, and proper notice has been taken of them in this chapter. But among the disciples of Śaṅkara the man who really started the dialectical forms of argument, who was second to none in his dialectical powers and who influenced all other dialecticians of the Śaṅkara school, Ānandabodha, Śrīharṣa, Ānandajñāna, Citsukha, Nṛsiṁhāśrama and others, was Maṅdana. Maṅdana’s great dialectical achievement is found in his refutation of the perception of difference (bheda) in the Tarka-kāṇḍa chapter of his Brahma-siddhi.

The argument arose as follows: the category of difference (bheda) is revealed in perception, and, if this is so, the reality of difference cannot be denied, and therefore the Upaniṣad texts should not be interpreted in such a way as to annul the reality of “difference.” Against such a view-point Maṅdana undertakes to prove that “difference,” whether as a quality or characteristic of things or as an independent entity, is never experienced by perception (pratyakṣa)². He starts by saying that perception yields three possible alternatives, viz. (1) that it manifests a positive object, (2) that it presents differences from other objects, (3) that it both manifests a positive object and distinguishes it from other objects³. In the third alternative there may again be three other alternatives, viz. (i) simultaneous presentation of the positive object and its distinction from others, (ii) first the presentation of the positive object and then the presentation of the difference, (iii) first the presentation of the difference and then the presentation of the positive object⁴. If by perception differences

¹ yādī duḥkhaḥ-bhāvaḥ sukham syāt tataḥ syād evaṃ bhāvāntare tu sukle duḥkhaḥbhāvaḥ ca tathā syād eva. Ibid. p. 161.

² This discussion runs from page 44 of the Brahma-siddhi (in the press) to the end of the second chapter.

³ tatra pratyakṣe trayāḥ kalpaḥ, vastu-svarūpa-siddhiḥ vastu-antarasya vyavacchedaḥ ubhayaṃ va. Brahma-siddhi, ii.

⁴ ubhayamminn apī trayavidyam, yaugapadyam, vyavaccheda-pārvak ho vidhiḥ, vidhi-pārvako vyavacchedaḥ. Ibid.
from other objects are experienced, or if it manifests both the object and its differences, then it has to be admitted that "difference" is presented in perception; but, if it can be proved that only positive objects are presented in perception, unassociated with any presentation of difference, then it has to be admitted that the notion of difference is not conveyed to us by perception, and in that case the verdict of the Upaniṣads that reality is one and that no diversity can be real is not contradicted by perceptual experience. Now follows the argument.

Perception does not reveal merely the difference, nor does it first reveal the difference and then the positive object, nor both of them simultaneously; for the positive object must first be revealed, before any difference can be manifested. Difference must concern itself in a relation between two positive objects, e.g. the cow is different from the horse, or there is no jug here. The negation involved in the notion of difference can have no bearing without that which is negated or that of which it is negated, and both these are positive in their notion. The negation of a chimerical entity (e.g. the lotus of the sky) is to be interpreted as negation of a false relation of its constituents, which are positive in themselves (e.g. both the lotus and the sky are existents, the incompatibility is due to their relationing, and it is such a relation between these two positive entities that is denied), or as denying the objective existence of such entities, which can be imagined only as a mental idea. If the category of difference distinguishes two objects from one another, the objects between which the difference is manifested must first be known. Again, it cannot be held that perception, after revealing the positive object, reveals also its difference from other objects; for perception is one unique process of cognition, and there are no two moments in it such that it should first reveal the object with which there is present sense-contact and then reveal other objects which are not at that moment in contact with sense, as also the difference between the two. In the case of the discovery of one's own illusion, such as "this is not silver, but conch-shell," only the latter knowledge is perceptual, and this knowledge refers to and negates after the previous knowledge of the object as silver has been negated. It was

1 kutaicin nimittād buddhau labdha-rūpaṃ bāhir niṣedhah kriyate. Brahma-siddhi, 11.
2 kramaḥ samacchate yuktṝa naika-vijñāna-karmaṇoḥ na sanvhitā-jaṁ tac ca tadanyāmariś jāyate. Ibid. 11. Kārikā 3.
only when the presented object was perceived as “this before” that it was denied as being the silver for which it was taken, and when it was thus negated there was the perception of the conchshell. There is no negative without there first being a positive concept; but it does not therefore follow that a positive concept cannot be preceded by a negative concept. This is therefore not a case where there are two moments in one unique perception, but there are here different cognitive experiences.

Again, there is a view (Buddhist) that it is by the power or potency of the indeterminate cognition of an object that both the positive determinate cognition and its difference from others are produced. Though the positive and the negative are two cognitions, yet, since they are both derived from the indeterminate cognition, it can well be said that by one positive experience we may also have its difference from others also manifested (eka-vidhir eva anyavacchedah). Against such a view Maṇḍana urges that one positive experience cannot also reveal its differences from all other kinds of possible and impossible objects. A colour perceived at a particular time and particular place may negate another colour at that particular place and time, but it cannot negate the presence of taste properties at that particular place and time; but, if the very perception of a colour should negate everything else which is not that colour, then these taste properties would also be negated, and, since this is not possible, it has to be admitted that perception of a positive entity does not necessarily involve as a result of that very process the negation of all other entities.

There is again a view that objects are by their very nature different from one another (prakṛtyaiva bhinnā bhāvāḥ), and thus, when by perception an object is experienced, its difference from other objects is also grasped by that very act. In reply to this objection Maṇḍana says that things cannot be of the nature of differences; firstly, in that case all objects would be of the nature of difference, and hence there would be no difference among them; secondly, as

2 na ca tatra eka-jñānyaya kramavat-vyāpāratā ubhaya-rūpavya utpatteh. Ibid.
3 nīlasya nirvikalpaka-darśanasya yat śāmṛthyam niyataika-kāraṇatvaṁ tena anādi-vāsanā-vaśāt pratibhāsitaṁ janitam idam nedaṁ iti vikalpo bhāvabhāva-vyāvahāram pravartayati...satyaṁ jñāna-devyam idam savikalpakaṁ tu nirvikalpakaṁ tayor mūla-bhūtam tat pratyakṣaṁ tatra ca eka-vidhir eva anyavaccheda iti brūma iti. Śaṅkhapāṇi’s commentary, ibid.
“difference” has no form, the objects themselves would be formless; thirdly, difference being essentially of the nature of negation, the objects themselves would be of the nature of negation; fourthly, since difference involves duality or plurality in its concept, no object could be regarded as one; a thing cannot be regarded as both one and many\(^1\). In reply to this the objector says that a thing is of the nature of difference only in relation to others (parāpekṣam vastuno bheda-svabhāvah nātmāpekṣam), but not in relation to itself. In reply to this objection Maṇḍana says that things which have been produced by their own causes cannot stand in need of a relation to other entities for their existence; all relating is mental and as such depends on persons who conceive the things, and so relating cannot be a constituent of objective things\(^2\). If relating with other things constituted their essence, then each thing would depend on others—they would depend on one another for their existence (itaretarāśraya-prasaṅgāt). In reply to this it may be urged that differences are different, corresponding to each and every oppositional term, and that each object has a different specific nature in accordance with the different other objects with which it may be in a relation of opposition; but, if this is so, then objects are not produced solely by their own causes; for, if differences are regarded as their constituent essences, these essences should vary in accordance with every object with which a thing may be opposed. In reply to this it is urged by the objector that, though an object is produced by its own causes, yet its nature as differences appears in relation to other objects with which it is held in opposition. Maṇḍana rejoins that on such a view it would be difficult to understand the meaning and function of this oppositional relation (apekṣā); for it does not produce the object, which is produced by its own causes, and it has no causal efficiency and it is also not experienced, except as associated with the other objects (nānakṣa-pratiyogināṃ bhedaḥ pratyayate). Difference also cannot be regarded as being of the essence of oppositional relation; it is only when there is an oppositional relation between objects already experienced that difference manifests

\(^1\) na bheda vastuno rūpam tad-abhāva-prasaṅgatah 
arūpena ca bhimatavam vastuno nāvakałpate.

\(^2\) nāpekkṣā nāma kaścid vastu-dharmo yena vastuni vyavasthāperyam, na khalu 
sva-hetu-prāpitodayeu sva-bhāva-vyavasthiteu vastuṣu sva-bhāva-sthitaye vastu-
antarāpekṣā yujyate. Ibid. 11. 6, vytti.
itself. Relations are internal and are experienced in the minds of those who perceive and conceive. But it is further objected to this that concepts like father and son are both relational and obviously externally constitutive. To this Māṇḍana’s reply is that these two concepts are not based on relation, but on the notion of production; that which produces is the father and that which is produced is the son. Similarly also the notions of long and short depend upon the one occupying greater or less space at the time of measurement and not on relations as constituting their essence.

In reply to this the objector says that, if relations are not regarded as ultimate, and if they are derived from different kinds of actions, then on the same ground the existence of differences may also be admitted. If there were no different kinds of things, it would not be possible to explain different kinds of actions. But Māṇḍana’s reply is that the so-called differences may be but differences in name; the burning activity of the same fire is described sometimes as burning and sometimes as cooking. In the Vedānta view it is held that all the so-called varied kinds of actions appear in one object, the Brahman, and so the objection that varied kinds of actions necessarily imply the existence of difference in the agents which produce them is not valid. Again, the difficulty in the case of the Buddhist is in its own way none the less; for according to him all appearances are momentary, and, if this be so, how does he explain the similarities of effects that we notice? It can be according to them only on the basis of an illusory notion of the sameness of causes; so, if the Buddhist can explain our experience of similarity on the false appearance of sameness of causes, the Vedāntist may also in his turn explain all appearances of diversity through illusory notions of difference, and there is thus no necessity of admitting the reality of differences in order to explain our notions of difference in experience. Others again argue that the world must be a world of diversity, as the various objects of our experience serve our various purposes, and it is impossible that one and the same thing should serve different purposes. But this objection is not valid, because even the selfsame thing can serve diverse purposes; the same fire can burn, illuminate and cook. There is no objection to there being a number of limited (acacchitta) qualities.

1 paunrṣeyāṁ apekṣāṁ na vastu anuvartate, ato na vastu-svabhāvaḥ. Ibid.
2 atha nir-anvaya-vinādānām api kalpanā-viṣayād abhedāt kāryāya tuḥyata hanta tarhi bhedād eva kalpanā-viṣayāt kāryābheda-siddher mādhā kāraṇa-bheda-kalpanā. Ibid.
or characters in the self-same thing. It is sometimes urged that
things are different from one another because of their divergent
powers (e.g. milk is different from sesamum because curd is
produced from milk and not from sesamum); but divergence of
powers is like divergence of qualities, and, just as the same fire
may have two different kinds of powers or qualities, namely, that
of burning and cooking, so the same entity may at different
moments both possess and not possess a power, and this does
not in the least imply a divergence or difference of entity. It is
a great mystery that the one self-same thing should have such
a special efficiency (sāmarthyātīṣaya) that it can be the basis of
innumerable divergent appearances. As one entity is supposed
to possess many divergent powers, so one self-same entity may
on the same principle be regarded as the cause of divergent
appearances.

Again, it is held by some that “difference” consists in the
negation of one entity in another. Such negations, it may be
replied, cannot be indefinite in their nature; for then negations of
all things in all places would make them empty. If, however,
specific negations are implied with reference to determinate
entities, then, since the character of these entities, as different from
one another, depends on these implied negations, and since these
implied negations can operate only when there are these different
entities, they depend mutually upon one another (itaretarāśraya)
and cannot therefore hold their own. Again, it cannot be said that
the notion of “difference” arises out of the operation of perceptual
processes like determinate perception (occurring as the culmination
of the perceptual process); for there is no proof whatsoever that
“difference,” as apart from mutual negation, can be definitely
experienced. Again, if unity of all things as “existents” (sat) was
not realized in experience, it would be difficult to explain how one
could recognize the sameness of things. This sameness or unity of
things is by far the most fundamental of experiences, and it is first
manifested as indeterminate experience, which later on transforms
itself into various notions of difference. In this connection
Maṇḍana also takes great pains in refuting the view that things
are twofold in their nature, both unity and difference, and also

1 pratyekam anubidhavād abhedena mṛṣā mataḥ
bheda yathā tarangāṇām bhedād bhedād kalāvataḥ,
the Jaina view that unity and difference are both true in their own respective ways. But it is not necessary to enter into these details. The main point in his refutation of the category of difference consists in this, that he shows that it is inconceivable and dialectically monstrous to suppose that the category of difference can be experienced through perception and that it is philosophically more convenient to suppose that there is but one thing which through ignorance yields the various notions of difference than to suppose that there are in reality the infinite agreements of unity and difference just as they are experienced in perception.

In the third chapter of the Brahma-siddhi, called the Niyoga-
kāṇḍa, Maṇḍana refutes the Mīmāṃsā view that the Vedāntic texts are to be interpreted in accordance with the Mīmāṃsā canon of interpretation, viz. that Vedic texts imply either a command or a prohibition. But, as this discussion is not of much philosophical importance, it is not desirable to enter into it. In the fourth chapter, called the Siddhi-kāṇḍa, Maṇḍana reiterates the view that the chief import of the Upaniṣad texts consists in showing that the manifold world of appearance does not exist and that its manifestation is due to the ignorance (avidyā) of the individual souls (jīva). The sort of ultimate reality that is described in the Upaniṣad texts is entirely different from all that we see around us, and it is as propounding this great truth, which cannot be known by ordinary experience, that the Upaniṣads are regarded as the only source from which knowledge of Brahman can be obtained.

Sureśvara (A.D. 800).

Sureśvara's chief works are the Naiṣkarmya-siddhi and Bhad-
āranyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārttika. The Naiṣkarmya-siddhi has at least five commentaries, such as the Bhāva-tattva-prakāśikā by Citsukha, which is based on Jñānottama's Candrikā. This Candrikā is thus the earliest commentary on the Naiṣkarmya-siddhi. It is difficult to determine Jñānottama's date. In the concluding verses of this commentary the two names Satyabodha and Jñānottama occur; and Mr Hiriyanna points out in his introduction to the Naiṣkarmya-
siddhi that these two names also occur in the Sarvajña-pīṭha of Con-
jeeveram, to which he claims to have belonged as teacher and pupil,

1

\[ \text{eharyaivāstus mahimā yan nāneva prakāśate} \\
\text{lāghavān na tu bhūmānām yac ca kāśyaty abhīnavat.} \\
\text{Brahma-siddhi, 11. Kārikā 32.} \]
and according to the list of teachers of that Maṭha Jñānottama was the fourth from Śaṅkara. This would place Jñānottama at a very early date; if, however, the concluding verses are not his, but inserted by someone else, then of course they give no clue to his date except the fact that he must have lived before Citsukha, since Citsukha’s commentary was based on Jñānottama’s commentary Candrikā. Another commentary is the Vidyā-surabhi of Jñānāmṛta, the pupil of Uttamāmṛta; another is the Naiśkarmya-siddhi-vivarana of Akhilātman, pupil of Daśarathapriya; and there is also another commentary, called Sārārtha, by Rāmadatta, which is of comparatively recent date.

Sureśvara’s Naiśkarmya-siddhi is divided into four chapters. The first chapter deals with discussions regarding the relation of Vedic duties to the attainment of Vedāntic wisdom. Avidyā is here defined as the non-perception in one’s experience of the ultimate oneness of the self: through this rebirths take place, and it is the destruction of this ignorance which is emancipation (tannāśo muktir ātmanah). The Mīmāṃsāists think that, if one ceases to perform actions due to desire (kāmya-karma) and prohibited actions, then the actions which have already accumulated will naturally exhaust themselves in time by yielding fruits, and so, since the obligatory duties do not produce any new karma, and since no other new karmas accumulate, the person will naturally be emancipated from karma. There is, however, in the Vedas no injunction in favour of the attainment of right knowledge. So one should attain emancipation through the performance of the Vedic duties alone. As against this Mīmāṃsā view Sureśvara maintains that emancipation has nothing to do with the performance of actions. Performance of Vedic duties may have an indirect and remote bearing, in the way of purifying one’s mind, but it has certainly no direct bearing on the attainment of salvation. Sureśvara states a view attributed to Brahmadatta in the Vidyā-surabhi commentary, that ignorance is not removed merely by the knowledge of the identity of oneself with Brahma, as propounded in Vedānta texts, but through long and continuous meditation on the same. So the right apprehension of the Upaniṣadic passages on the identity of the Brahman and the individual does not immediately produce salvation; one has to continue to meditate for a long time on such ideas of identity; and all the time one has to perform all one’s obligatory duties, since, if one ceased to perform them, this
would be a transgression of one's duties and would naturally produce sins, and hence one would not be able to obtain emancipation. So knowledge must be combined with the performance of duties (*jñāna-karma-samuccaya*), which is vehemently opposed by Śaṅkara. Another view which occurs also in the *Vārttika*, and is there referred to by the commentator Ānandajñāna as being that of Maṇḍana, is that, as the knowledge derived from the Vedāntic texts is verbal and conceptual, it cannot of itself lead to Brahma-knowledge, but, when these texts are continually repeated, they produce a knowledge of Brahmā as a mysterious effect by just the same kind of process as gives rise to the mysterious effects of sacrificial or other Vedic duties. The *Vārttika* refers to various schools among the adherents of the joint operation of knowledge and of duties (*jñāna-karma-samuccaya*), some regarding *jñāna* as being the more important, others regarding *karma* as more important, and still others regarding them both as being equally important, thus giving rise to three different schools of *jñāna-karma-samuccaya*. Sureśvara tries to refute all these views by saying that true knowledge and emancipation are one and the same thing, and that it does not in the least require the performance of any kind of Vedic duties. Sureśvara also refutes the doctrine of the joint necessity of *karma* and *jñāna* on the view of those modified dualists, like Bhartṛprapaṅca, who thought that reality was a unity in differences, so that the doctrine of differences was as true as that of unity, and that, therefore, duties have to be performed even in the emancipated state, because, the differences being also real, the necessity of duties cannot be ignored at any stage of progress, even in the emancipated state, though true knowledge is also necessary for the realization of truth as unity. Sureśvara’s refutation of this view is based upon two considerations, viz. that the conception of reality as being both unity and difference is self-contradictory, and that, when the oneness is realized through true knowledge and the sense of otherness and differences is removed, it is not possible that any duties can be performed at that stage; for the performance of duties implies experience of duality and difference.¹

The second chapter of the *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* is devoted to the exposition of the nature of self-realization, as won through the proper interpretation of the unity texts of the Upaniṣads by a

¹ See also Prof. Hiriyanna’s introduction to his edition of the *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*. 
proper teacher. The experience of the ego and all its associated experiences of attachment, antipathy, etc., vanish with the dawn of true self-knowledge of unity. The notion of ego is a changeful and extraneous element, and hence outside the element of pure consciousness. All manifestations of duality are due to the distracting effects of the antahkarana. When true knowledge dawns, the self together with all that is objectivity in knowledge vanishes. All the illusory appearances are due to the imposition of ajñana on the pure self, which, however, cannot thereby disturb the unperturbed unity of this pure self. It is the antahkarana, or the intellect, that suffers all modifications in the cognitive operations; the underlying pure consciousness remains undisturbed all the same. Yet this non-self which appears as mind, intellect, and its objects is not a substantive entity like the prakriti of the Sāmkhya; for its appearance is due merely to ignorance and delusion. This world-appearance is only a product of nescience (ajñana) or false and indescribable illusion on the self, and is no real product of any real substance as the Sāmkhya holds. Thus it is that the whole of the world-appearance vanishes like the illusory silver in the conch-shell as soon as truth is realized.

In the third chapter Sureśvara discusses the nature of ajñana, its relation with the self, and the manner of its dissolution. There are two entities, the self and the non-self; now the non-self, being itself a product of ajñana (nescience or ignorance), cannot be regarded as its support or object; so the ajñana has for its support and object the pure self or Brahman; the ignorance of the self is also in regard to itself, since there is no other object regarding which ignorance is possible—the entire field of objective appearance being regarded as the product of ignorance itself. It is the ignorance of the real nature of the self that transforms itself into all that is subjective and objective, the intellect and its objects. It is thus clear that according to Sureśvara, unlike Vācaspati Miśra and Maṇḍana, the avidyā is based not upon individual persons (jīva), but upon the pure intelligence itself. It is this ignorance which, being connected and based upon the pure self, produces the appearances of individual persons and their subjective and objective experiences. This ajñana, as mere ignorance, is experienced in deep dreamless sleep, when all its modifications and appearances shrink within it and it is experienced in itself as pure ignorance, which again in the waking state manifests itself in the whole series of experiences. It is easy to
see that this view of the relation of ājñāna to pure intelligence is different from the idealism preached by Maṇḍana, as noticed in the previous section. An objection is raised that, if the ego were as much an extraneous product of ājñāna as the so-called external objects, then the ego should have appeared not as a subject, but as an object like other external or internal objects (e.g. pleasure, pain, etc.). To this Sureśvara replies that, when the antahkarana or mind is transformed into the form of the external objects, then, in order to give subjectivity to it, the category of the ego (aḥaṃkāra) is produced to associate objective experiences with particular subjective centres, and then through the reflection of the pure intelligence by way of this category of the ego the objective experience, as associated with this category of the ego, appears as subjective experience. The category of the ego, being immediately and intimately related to the pure intelligence, itself appears as the knower, and the objectivity of the ego is not apparent, just as in burning wood the fire and that which it burns cannot be separated. It is only when the pure intelligence is reflected through the ājñāna product of the category of the ego that the notion of subjectivity applies to it, and all that is associated with it is experienced as the “this,” the object, though in reality the ego is itself as much an object as the objects themselves. All this false experience, however, is destroyed in the realization of Brahman, when Vedāntic texts of unity are realized. In the third chapter of the Naiṣkarmya-siddhi the central ideas of the other three chapters are recapitulated. In the Vārttika Sureśvara discusses the very same problems in a much more elaborate manner, but it is not useful for our present purposes to enter into these details.

Padmapāda (A.D. 820).

Padmapāda is universally reputed to be a direct disciple of Śaṅkarācārya, and, since the manner of his own salutation to Śaṅkarācārya confirms this tradition, and since no facts are known that can contradict such a view, it may safely be assumed that he was a younger contemporary of Śaṅkarācārya. There are many traditional stories about him and his relations with Śaṅkarācārya; but, since their truth cannot be attested by reliable evidence, it is not possible to pronounce any judgment on them. Only two works are attributed to him, viz. the Paṇca-pādikā, which is a commentary on
Śaṅkara's commentary on the first four sūtras of the Brahma-sūtra and Śaṅkara's introduction to his commentary known as the adhyāṣa and the sambhācanā-bhāṣya, and the Ātma-bodha-vyākhyāna, called also Vedānta-sāra. This Pañca-pādikā is one of the most important of the Vedānta works known to us. It was commented on by Prakāśātman (A.D. 1200) in his Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa. The Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa was further commented on by Akhaṇḍānanda (A.D. 1350), a pupil of Ānandagiri, in his Tattva-dipana. Ānanda-pūrṇa (A.D. 1600), who wrote his Vidyā-sāgara commentary on Śrīharṣa's Khandana-khaṇḍa-khādyā and also a commentary on the Mahā-vidyā-viṣāmbana, wrote a commentary on the Pañca-pādikā. Nṛśimhāśrama also wrote a commentary on the Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa, called the Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa-prakāśikā, and Śrīkṛṣṇa also wrote one on the Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa. Aufrecht refers to another commentary by Amalānanda as Pañca-pādikā-sāstra-darpaṇa; but this is undoubtedly a mistake for his Śāstra-darpaṇa, which is noticed below. Amalānanda was a follower of the Vācaspati line and not of the line of Padmapāda and Prakāśātman. Rāmānanda Sarasvatī, a pupil of Govindānanda, the author of the Ratna-prabhā commentary on the Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, wrote his Vivaraṇapanyāsa (a summary of the main theses of the Vivaraṇa) as a commentary on Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya; but this was strictly on the lines of the Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa, though it was not a direct commentary thereon. Vidyārāṇya also wrote a separate monograph, called Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha, in which he interpreted the Vedāntic doctrines on the lines of the Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa. Of all these the Vivaraṇapanyāsa of Rāmānanda Sarasvatī was probably the last important work on the Vivaraṇa line; for Rāmānanda's teacher Govindānanda, the pupil of Gopāla Sarasvatī and the pupil's pupil of Śivarāma, refers in his Ratna-prabhā commentary to Jagannāthāśrama's commentary on the Śaṅkara-bhāṣya, called the Bhāṣya-dīpikā, and also to Ānandagiri's commentary as "vyādhiḥ," p. 5 (Nirṇaya-Sāgara Press, 1904). Jagannātha was the teacher of Nṛśimhāśrama; Govindānanda must therefore have lived towards the end of the sixteenth century. Rāmānanda may

1 Prakāśātman also wrote a metrical summary of Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya and a work called Śatā-nirnaya, in which he tried to prove the claims of scriptural testimony as valid cognition.

2 As Mr Telang points out in his introduction to the Mahā-vidyā-viṣāmbana, it seems that Ānanda-pūrṇa lived after Śaṅkara Miśra (A.D. 1529), as is seen from his criticism of his reading of a passage of the Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādyā, p. 586 (Chowkhambā).
therefore be placed in the early part of the seventeenth century. Govindānanda himself also in his Ratna-prabhā commentary followed the Vivaraṇa line of interpretation, and he refers to Prakāśātman with great respect as Prakāśātma-śrī-caraṇaṁ (Ratna-prabhā, p. 3).

Padmapāda’s method of treatment, as interpreted by Prakāśātman, has been taken in the first and the second volumes of the present work as the guide to the exposition of the Vedānta. It is not therefore necessary that much should be said in separate sections regarding the Vedantic doctrines of these two great teachers. But still a few words on Padmapāda’s philosophy may with advantage be read separately. Padmapāda says that māyā, aevākṛta, prakṛti, agrahaṇa, aevyakta, tamah, kāraṇa, laya, śakti, mahāsupti, nidrā, kṣara and ākāśa are the terms which are used in older literature as synonymous with avidyā. It is this entity that obstructs the pure and independently self-revealing nature of Brahman, and thus, standing as the painted canvas (citra-bhitti) of ignorance (avidyā), deeds (karma) and past impressions of knowledge (pūrvaprajñā-saṁskāra) produce the individual persons (jivatvāpādikā). Undergoing its peculiar transformations with God as its support, it manifests itself as the two powers of knowledge and activity (vijñāna-kriyā-śakti-dvayaśraya) and functions as the doer of all actions and the enjoyer of all experiences (kārtya-bhoktya-vaiṅkā-āhāraḥ). In association with the pure unchangeable light of Brahman it is the complex of these transformations which appears as the immediate ego (ahamkāra). It is through the association with this ego that the pure self is falsely regarded as the enjoyer of experiences. This transformation is called antaḥkaraṇa, manas, buddhi and the ego or the ego-feeler (aham-pratyayin) on the side of its cognitive activity, while on the vibratory side of its activity (spanda-śaktyā), it is called prāṇa or biomotor functions. The association of the ego with the pure ātman, like the association of the redness of a japā flower with a crystal, is a complex (granthi) which manifests the dual characteristics of activity of the avidyā stuff and the consciousness of the pure self (saṁbhinnobhaya-rūpatvāt).

On the question as to whether avidyā has for both support (āśraya) and object (viṣaya) Brahman Padmapāda’s own attitude does not seem to be very clear. He only says that avidyā manifests itself in the individual person (jīva) by obstructing the real nature of the Brahman as pure self-luminosity and that the
Brahman by its limitation (avaccheda) through beginningless avidyā is the cause of the appearance of infinite individual persons. But Prakāśātmāna introduces a long discussion, trying to prove that Brahman is both the support and the object of avidyā as against the view of Vācaspati Miśra that avidyā has the Brahman as its object and the jīva as its support (āśraya). This is thus one of the fundamental points of difference between the Vivaraṇa line of interpretation and the interpretation of the Vācaspati line. In this Prakāśātmāna agrees with the view of Suresvara and his pupil Sarvajñātmāna, though, as will be noticed, Sarvajñātmāna draws some nice distinctions which are not noticed by Suresvara.

Padmapāda draws a distinction between two meanings of falsehood (mithyā), viz. falsehood as simple negation (apahna-vacana) and falsehood as the unspeakable and indescribable (anivacanayatā-vacana). It is probably he who of all the interpreters first described ajñāna or avidyā as being of a material nature (jaḍātmikā) and of the nature of a power (jaḍātmikā avidyā-sakti), and interpreted Śaṅkara's phrase "mithyā-jñāna-nimittaḥ" as meaning that it is this material power of ajñāna that is the constitutive or the material cause of the world-appearance. Prakāśātmāna, however, elaborates the conception further in his attempts to give proofs in support of the view that avidyā is something positive (bhāva-rūpa). These proofs have been repeatedly given by many other later writers, and have already been dealt with in the first volume of the present work. Padmapāda is also probably the first to attempt an explanation of the process of Vedāntic perception which was later on elaborated by Prakāśātmāna and later writers, and his views were all collected and systematized in the exposition of the Vedānta-paribhāṣā of Dharmarāja Adhvarinda in the sixteenth century. Describing this process, Padmapāda says that, as a result of the cognitive activity of the ego, the objects with which that is concerned become connected with it, and, as a result of that, certain changes are produced in it, and it is these changes that constitute the subject-object relation of knowledge (jñātur jñeya-sambandhaḥ). The antahkarana, or psychical frame of mind, can lead to the limited expression of the pure consciousness only so far as it is associated with its object. The perceptual experience of immediacy (aparokṣa) of objects means nothing more than the expression of the pure consciousness through the changing states of the antahkarana. The ego thus becomes a perceiver (pramātṛ) through its connection
with the underlying consciousness. Prakāśātman, however, elaborates it by supposing that the antahkaraṇa goes out to the objective spatial positions, and assumes the spatial form of the objects perceived. Hence what Padmapāda conceived merely as the change of the antahkaraṇa states through the varying relation of the antahkaraṇa with its objects, is interpreted in the definite meaning of this relation as being nothing more than spatial superposition of the antahkaraṇa on its objects. In inference, however, there is no immediate knowledge, as this is mediated through relations with the reason (liṅga). Knowledge however would mean both mediate and immediate knowledge; for it is defined as being the manifestation of the object (arthā-prakāśa).

On the subject of the causality of Brahman Padmapāda says that that on which the world-appearance is manifested, the Brahman, is the cause of the world. On this point Prakāśātman offers three alternative views, viz. (1) that, like two twisted threads in a rope, māyā and Brahman are together the joint cause of the world, (2) that that which has māyā as its power is the cause, and (3) that the Brahman which has māyā supported on it is the cause of the world, but in all these the ultimate causality rests with Brahman, since māyā is dependent thereon. Brahman is sarva-jñā (omniscient) in the sense that it manifests all that is associated with it, and it is the Brahman that through its māyā appears as the world of experience. The doctrines of avaccheda-vāda and pratibimba-vāda explained in the first volume of the present work are also at least as old as Padmapāda’s Pañca-pādikā, and both Padmapāda and Prakāśātman seem to support the reflection theory (pratibimba-vāda), the theory that the jīva is but a reflected image of Brahman1.

Vācaspati Miśra (A.D. 840).

Vācaspati Miśra, the celebrated author of a commentary called Bhāmatīn Śaṅkara’s commentary, is the author of a Tattvā-samikṣā, a commentary on Maṇḍana’s Brahma-siddhi; he also commented on the Śāṅkhya-kārikā, Vidhi-viveka, Nyāya-vārttika, and he was

1 See volume 1, pp. 475, 476. These two doctrines were probably present in germinal forms as early as the ninth century. But gradually more and more attention seems to have been paid to them. Appaya Dikṣita gives a fairly good summary of these two doctrines in the Parimala, pp. 335-343, Śri Vāṇi Vilāsa Press, Srirangam, without committing either himself or Vācaspati to any one of these views.
the author of a number of other works. In his Nyāya-sūcini-bandha he gives his date as 898 (vaso-anika-vasu-vatsare), which in all probability has to be understood as of the Vikrama-saṃvat, and consequently he can safely be placed in A.D. 842. In his commentary called Bhāmattī he offers salutation to Mārtanda-tilaka-svāmin, which has been understood to refer to his teacher. But Amalānanda in commenting thereon rightly points out that this word is a compound of the two names Mārtanda and Tilakasvāmin, belonging to gods adored with a view to the fruition of one's actions. Tilakasvāmin is referred to in Yājñavalkya, i. 294 as a god, and the Mitākṣara explains it as being the name of the god Kārttikeya or Skanda. Udayana, however, in his Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-parisuddhi (p. 9), a commentary on Vācaspati’s Tātparya-ṭīkā, refers to one Trilocana as being the teacher of Vācaspati, and Vardhamāna in his commentary on it, called Nyāya-nibandha-prakāśa, confirms this: Vācaspati himself also refers to Trilocananaguru, whom he followed in interpreting the word vyavasāya (Nyāya-sūtra, i. i. 4) as determinate knowledge (sāvikalpa)\(^1\). It is however interesting to note that in the Nyāya-kaṇikā (verse 3) he refers to the author of the Nyāya-mañjarī (in all probability Jayanta) as his teacher (vidyātaru)\(^2\). Vācaspati says at the end of his Bhāmattī commentary that he wrote that work when the great king Nṛga was reigning. This king, so far as the present writer is aware, has not yet been historically traced. Bhāmattī was Vācaspati’s last great work; for in the colophon at the end of the Bhāmattī he says that he had already written his Nyāya-kaṇikā, Tatvava-samikṣā, Tatvava-bindu and other works on Nyāya, Sāmkhya and Yoga.

Vācaspati’s Vedāntic works are Bhāmattī and Tatvava-samikṣā (on Brahma-siddhi). The last work has not yet been published. Aufrecht, referring to his work, Tatvava-bindu, says that it is a Vedānta work. This is however a mistake, as the work deals with the sphaṭa doctrines of sound, and has nothing to do with Vedānta. In the absence of Vācaspati’s Tatvava-samikṣā, which has not been published, and manuscripts of which have become extremely scarce, it is difficult to give an entirely satisfactory account of the special features of Vācaspati’s view of Vedānta. But his Bhāmattī

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1. trilocana-gurūmātā-mārgaṇugamanamukhaiḥ
   yathāmānam yathā-vastu vyākhyātam idam idṛṣṭam.

2. ajñāna-timira-lamanāṃ nyāya-mañjarirm rucirām
   prasavatre prabhavitre vidyā-taraṇe nāma gurave.
   Nyāya-kaṇikā, introductory verse.
commentary is a great work, and it is possible to collect from it some of the main features of his views. As to the method of Vācaspati’s commentary, he always tries to explain the text as faithfully as he can, keeping himself in the background and directing his great knowledge of the subject to the elucidation of the problems which directly arise from the texts and to explaining the allusions and contexts of thoughts, objections and ideas of other schools of thought referred to in the text. The Bhāmatti commentary on Śaṅkara’s Bhāṣya is a very important one, and it had a number of important sub-commentaries. The most important and earliest of these is the Vedānta-kalpa-taru of Amalānanda (A.D. 1247–1260), on which Appaya Dīkṣita (about A.D. 1600) wrote another commentary called Vedānta-kalpa taru-parimala\(^1\). The Vedānta-kalpa-taru was also commented on by Lakṣmīnṛṣimha, author of the Tarka-dīpikā, son of Koṇḍa-bhaṭṭa and grandson of Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa, towards the end of the seventeenth century, and this commentary is called Ābhoga. The Ābhoga commentary is largely inspired by the Vedānta-kalpa-taru-parimala, though in many cases it differs from and criticizes it. In addition to these there are also other commentaries on the Bhāmatti, such as the Bhāmatti-tilaka, the Bhāmatti-vilāsa, the Bhāmatti-vyākhyā by Śrīraṅganātha and another commentary on the Vedānta-kalpa-taru, by Vaidyanātha Payaguṇḍa, called the Vedānta-kalpa-taru-mañjari.

Vācaspati defines truth and reality as immediate self-revelation (sva-prakāśatā) which is never contradicted (abādhita). Only the pure self can be said to be in this sense ultimately real. He thus definitely rejects the definition of reality as the participation of the class-concept of being, as the Naiyāyikas hold, or capacity of doing work (artha-kriyā-kārītva), as the Buddhists hold. He admits two kinds of ajñāna, as psychological and as forming the material cause of the mind and the inner psychical nature of man or as the material world outside. Thus he says in his commentary on the Śaṅkara-

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\(^1\) Amalānanda also wrote another work, called Śāstra-darpana, in which, taking the different topics (adhihkarāṇas) of the Brahma-sūtras, he tried to give a plain and simple general explanation of the whole topic without entering into much discussion on the interpretations of the different sūtras on the topic. These general lectures on the adhihkarāṇas of the Brahma-sūtras did not, however, reveal any originality of views on the part of Amalānanda, but were based on Vācaspati’s interpretation, and were but reflections of his views, as Amalānanda himself admits in the second verse of the Śāstra-darpana (Vācaspati-mati-vimbi-
tam ādāram prārabhe vimalam)—Śrī Vāṇī Vilāsa Press, 1913, Srirangam, Madras.
bhāsyā, i. iii. 30, that at the time of the great dissolution (mahā-pralaya) all products of avidyā, such as the psychical frame (antaḥkaraṇa), cease to have any functions of their own, but are not on account of that destroyed; they are at that time merged in the indescribable avidyā, their root cause, and abide there as potential capacities (sūkṣmena īakti-rūpena) together with the wrong impressions and psychological tendencies of illusion. When the state of mahā-pralaya is at an end, moved by the will of God, they come out like the limbs of a tortoise or like the rejuvenation during rains of the bodies of frogs which have remained inert and lifeless all the year round, and then, being associated with their proper tendencies and impressions, they assume their particular names and forms as of old before the mahā-pralaya. Though all creation takes place through God’s will, yet God’s will is also determined by the conditions of karma and the impressions produced by it. This statement proves that he believed in avidyā as an objective entity of an indescribable nature (anirvācyā avidyā), into which all world-products disappear during the mahā-pralaya and out of which they reappear in the end and become associated with psychological ignorance and wrong impressions which had also disappeared into it at the time of the mahā-pralaya. Avidyā thus described resembles very much the prakṛti of Yoga, into which all the world-products disappear during a mahā-pralaya together with the fivefold avidyā and their impressions, which at the time of creation become associated with their own proper buddhis. In the very adoration hymn of the Bhāmati Vācaspati speaks of avidyā being twofold (avidyā-dvītaya), and says that all appearances originate from Brahman in association with or with the accessory cause (sahākāri-kāraṇa) of the two avidyās (avidyā-dvītaya-sacīvasya). In explaining this passage Amalānanda points out that this refers to two avidyās, one as a beginningless positive entity and the other as the preceding series of beginningless false impressions (anyā pūrvā-pūrva-bhrama-samskārah). There is thus one aspect of avidyā which forms the material stuff of the appearances; but the appearances could not have been appearances if they were not illusorily identified with the immediate and pure self-revelation (sva-prakāśā cit). Each individual person (jīva) confuses and misapprehends his psychical frame and mental experiences as intelligent in themselves, and it is by such an illusory confusion that these psychical states
attain any meaning as appearances; for otherwise these appearances could not have been expressed at all. But how does the person come in, since the concept of a person itself presupposes the very confusion which it is supposed to make? To this Vācaspati’s reply is that the appearance of the personality is due to a previous false confusion, and that to another previous false confusion (cf. Maṇḍana). So each false confusion has for its cause a previous false confusion, and that another false confusion and so on in a beginningless series. It is only through such a beginningless series of confusions that all the later states of confusion are to be explained. Thus on the one hand the avidyā operates in the individual person, the jīva, as its locus or support (āśraya), and on the other hand it has the Brahman or pure self-revealing intelligence as its object (viṣaya), which it obscures and through which it makes its false appearances to be expressed, thereby giving them a false semblance of reality, whereby all the world-appearances seem to be manifestations of reality. It is easy to see how this view differs from the view of the Śaṅkṣepa-śātrṭaka of Sarvajñātma Muni; for in the opinion of the latter, the Brahman is both the support (āśraya) and the object (viṣaya) of ajñāna, which means that the illusion does not belong to the individual person, but is of a transcendental character. It is not the individual person as such (jīva), but the pure intelligence that shines through each individual person (pratyak-cit), that is both obscured and diversified into a manifold of appearances in a transcendental manner. In Vācaspati’s view, however, the illusion is a psychological one for which the individual person is responsible, and it is caused through a beginningless chain of illusions or confusions, where each succeeding illusory experience is explained by a previous illusory mode of experience, and that by another and so on. The content of the illusory experiences is also derived from the indescribable avidyā, which is made to appear as real by their association with Brahman, the ultimately real and self-revealing Being. The illusory appearances, as they are, cannot be described as being existent or non-existent; for, though they seem to have their individual existences, they are always negated by other existences, and none of them have that kind of reality which can be said to defy all negation and contradiction; and it is only such uncontradicted self-revelation that can be said to be

1 It is in the latter view that Vācaspati differs from Maṇḍana, on whose Brahma-siddhi he wrote his Tattva-samkhṣā.
ultimately real. The unreality of world-appearances consists in the fact that they are negated and contradicted; and yet they are not absolutely non-existent like a hare's horn, since, had they been so, they could not have been experienced at all. So in spite of the fact that the appearances are made out of avidyā, they have so far as any modified existence can be ascribed to them, the Brahman as their underlying ground, and it is for this reason that Brahman is to be regarded as the ultimate cause of the world. As soon as this Brahman is realized, the appearances vanish; for the root of all appearances is their illusory confusion with reality, the Brahman.

In the Bhāmati commentary on Śaṅkara’s commentary, II. ii. 28, Vācaspati points out that according to the Śaṅkara Vedānta the objects of knowledge are themselves indescribable in their nature (anirvacantyaṁ nilādi) and not mere mental ideas (na hi brahma-vādino nilādy-ākārāṁ vittim abhyupagacchanti kintu anirvacantyaṁ nilādi). The external objects therefore are already existent outside of the perceiver, only their nature and stuff are indescribable and irrational (anīr vacya). Our perceptions therefore refer always to such objects as their excitants or producers, and they are not of the nature of pure sensations or ideas generated from within, without the aid of such external objects.

Sarvajñātma Muni (A.D. 900).

Sarvajñātma Muni was a disciple of Suresvarācārya, the direct disciple of Śaṅkara, to whom at the beginning of his work Saṅkṣepa-śārtraka he offers salutation by the name Devesvara, the word being a synonym of the word sura in Suresvara. The identification of Devesvara with Suresvara is made by Rāma Tiṛtha, the commentator on the Saṅkṣepa-śārtraka, and this identification does not come into conflict with anything else that is known about Sarvajñātma Muni either from the text of his work or from other references to him in general. It is said that his other name was Nityabodhācārya. The exact date of neither Suresvara nor Sarvajñātma can be definitely determined. Mr Pandit in his introduction to the Gauḍa-vaho expresses the view that, since Bhavabhūti was a pupil of Kumārila, Kumārila must have lived in the middle of the seventh century, and, since Śaṅkara was a contemporary of Kumārila (on the testimony of the Śaṅkara-dig-vijaya), he must have lived either in the seventh century or in the first half of the eighth century. In the
first volume of the present work Šaṅkara was placed between A.D. 780–820. The arguments of Mr Pandit do not raise any new point for consideration. His theory that Bhavabhūti was a pupil of Kumārila is based on the evidence of two manuscripts, where, at the end of an act of the Mālatti-Mādhava, it is said that the work was written by a pupil of Kumārila. This evidence, as I have noticed elsewhere, is very slender. The tradition that Šaṅkara was a contemporary of Kumārila, based as it is on the testimony of the Šaṅkara-dig-vijaya, cannot be seriously believed. All that can be said is that Kumārila probably lived not long before Šaṅkara, if one can infer this from the fact that Šaṅkara does not make any reference to Kumārila. Hence there seems to be no reason why the traditionally accepted view that Šaṅkara was born in Saṃvat 844, or A.D. 788, or Kali age 3889, should be given up1. Taking the approximate date of Šaṅkara’s death to be about A.D. 820 and taking into consideration that Suresvara, the teacher of Sarvajñātman, occupied his high pontifical position for a long time, the supposition that Sarvajñātman lived in A.D. 900 may not be very far wrong. Moreover, this does not come into conflict with the fact that Vācaspati, who probably wrote his earlier work the Nyāya-sūci-nibandha in A.D. 842, also wrote his commentary on Maṇḍana’s Brahmasiddhi when Suresvara was occupying the pontifical position.

Sarvajñātma Muni was thus probably a younger contemporary of Vācaspati Miśra. In his Saṃkṣepa-śāriraka he tries to describe the fundamental problems of the Vedānta philosophy, as explained by Šaṅkara. This work, which is probably the only work of his that is known to us, is divided into four chapters, written in verses of different metres. It contains in the first chapter 563 verses, in the second 248, in the third 365 and in the fourth 63. In the first chapter of the work he maintains that pure Brahman is the ultimate cause of everything through the instrumentality (dvāra) of ajñāna. The ajñāna, which rests on (āśraya) the pure self and operates on it as its object (vīṣaya), covers its real nature (ācchādya) and creates delusory appearances (vikṣipta), thereby producing the threefold appearances of God (Īśvara), soul (jīva) and the world. This ajñāna has no independent existence, and its effects are seen only through the pure self (cid-ātmā) as its ground and object, and its creations are all false. The pure self is directly perceived in the state of dreamless sleep as being of the nature

1 See Ārya-vidyā-sudhā-kara, pp. 226, 227.
of pure bliss and happiness without the slightest touch of sorrow; and pure bliss can only be defined as that which is the ultimate end and not under any circumstances a means to anything else; such is also the pure self, which cannot be regarded as being a means to anything else; moreover, there is the fact that everyone always desires his self as the ultimate object of attainment which he loves above anything else. Such an infinite love and such an ultimate end cannot be this limited self, which is referred to as the agent of our ordinary actions and the sufferer in the daily concerns of life. The intuitive perception of the seers of the Upaniṣads also confirms the truth of the self as pure bliss and the infinite. The illusory impositions on the other hand are limited appearances of the subject and the object which merely contribute to the possibility of false attribution and cannot therefore be real (na vāstavam tat). When the Brahma is associated with ajñāna there are two false entities, viz. the ajñāna and the Brahma as associated with the ajñāna; but this does not imply that the pure Brahma, which underlies all these false associations, is itself also false, since this might lead to the criticism that, everything being false, there is no reality at all, as some of the Buddhists contend. A distinction is drawn here between ādhūra and adhiṣṭhāna. The pure Brahma that underlies all appearances is the true adhiṣṭhāna (ground), while the Brahma as modified by the false ajñāna is a false ādhūra or a false object to which the false appearances directly refer. All illusory appearances are similarly experienced. Thus in the experience "I perceive this piece of silver" (in the case of the false appearance of a piece of conch-shell as silver) the silvery character or the false appearance of the silver is associated with the "this" element before the perceiver, and the "this" element in its turn, as the false object, becomes associated with the false silver as the "this silver." But, though the objectivity of the false silver as the "this" before the perceiver is false, the "this" of the true object of the conch-shell is not false. It is the above kind of double imposition of the false appearance on the object and of the false object on the false appearance that is known as parasparādhyāsya. It is only the false object that appears in the illusory appearance and the real object lies untouched. The inner psychical frame (antahkarana) to a certain extent on account of its translucent character resembles pure Brahma, and on account of this similarity it is often mistaken for the pure self and the pure
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self is mistaken for the antahkarana. It may be contended that there could be no antahkarana without the illusory imposition, and so it could not itself explain the nature of illusion. The reply given to such an objection is that the illusory imposition and its consequences are beginningless and there is no point of time to which one could assign its beginning. Hence, though the present illusion may be said to have taken its start with the antahkarana, the antahkarana is itself the product of a previous imposition, and that of a previous antahkarana, and so on without a beginning. Just as in the illusion of the silver in the conch-shell, though there is the piece of conch-shell actually existing, yet it is not separately seen, and all that is seen to exist is the unreal silver, so the real Brahman exists as the ground, though the world during the time of its appearance is felt to be the only existing thing and the Brahman is not felt to be existent separately from it. Yet this ajñāna has no real existence and exists only for the ignorant. It can only be removed when the true knowledge of Brahman dawns, and it is only through the testimony of the Upaniṣads that this knowledge can dawn; for there is no other means of insight into the nature of Brahman. Truth again is defined not as that which is amenable to proof, but as that which can be independently and directly felt. The ajñāna, again, is defined as being positive in its nature (bhāva-rūpam) and, though it rests on the pure Brahman, yet, like butter in contact with fire, it also at its touch under certain circumstances melts away. The positive character of ajñāna is felt in the world in its materiality and in ourselves as our ignorance. The real ground cause, however, according to the testimony of the Upaniṣads, is the pure Brahman, and the ajñāna is only the instrument or the means by which it can become the cause of all appearances; but, ajñāna not being itself in any way the material cause of the world, Sarvajñātman strongly holds that Brahman in association and jointly with ajñāna cannot be regarded as the material cause of the world. The ajñāna is only a secondary means, without which the transformation of appearances is indeed not possible, but which has no share in the ultimate cause that underlies them. He definitely denies that Brahman could be proved by any inference to the effect that that which is the cause of the production, existence and dissolution of the world is Brahman, since the nature of Brahman can be understood only by the testimony of the scriptures. He indulges in long discussions in order to show how the Upaniṣads
can lead to a direct and immediate apprehension of reality as Brahman.

The second chapter of the book is devoted mainly to the further elucidation of these doctrines. In that chapter Sarvajñātma Muni tries to show the difference of the Vedānta view from the Buddhist, which difference lies mainly in the fact that, in spite of the doctrine of illusion, the Vedānta admits the ultimate reality to be Brahman, which is not admitted by the Buddhists. He also shows how the experiences of waking life may be compared with those of dreams. He then tries to show that neither perception nor other means of proof can prove the reality of the world-appearance and criticizes the philosophic views of the Sāmkhya, Nyāya and other systems. He further clarifies his doctrine of the relation of Brahman to ajñāna and points out that the association of ajñāna is not with the one pure Brahman, nor with individual souls, but with the pure light of Brahman, which shines as the basis and ground of individual souls (pratyakta); for it is only in connection with this that the ajñāna appears and is perceived. When with the dawn of right knowledge pure Brahman as one is realized, the ajñāna is not felt. It is only in the light of Brahman as underlying the individual souls that the ajñāna is perceived, as when one says, "I do not know what you say"; so it is neither the individual soul nor the pure one which is Brahman, but the pure light as it reveals itself through each and every individual soul. The true light of Brahman is always there, and emancipation means nothing more than the destruction of the ajñāna. In the third chapter Sarvajñātman describes the ways (sādhana) by which one should try to destroy this ajñāna and prepare oneself for this result and for the final Brahma knowledge. In the last chapter he describes the nature of emancipation and the attainment of Brahmahood.

The Saṃkṣepa-sūtraka was commented upon by a number of distinguished writers, none of whom seem to be very old. Thus Nṛsiṃhāsrama wrote a commentary called Tatteca-bodhini, Purushottama Dīkṣita wrote another called Subodhini, Rāghavānanda another called Vidyāmṛta-varṣini, Viśvađa another called Siddhānta-dīpa, on which Rāma Tīrtha, pupil of Kṛṣṇa Tīrtha,
based his commentary Anvayārtha-prakāśikā. Madhusūdana Sarva-
svatī also wrote another commentary, called Saṃkṣepa-sāriraka-
sāra-samgraha.

Ānandabodha Yati.

Ānandabodha is a great name in the school of Śaṅkara Vedānta. He lived probably in the eleventh or the twelfth century. He refers to Vācaspati’s Tattva-samikṣa and criticizes, but without mentioning his name, Sarvājñātman’s view of the interpretation of the nature of self as pure bliss. He wrote at least three works on Śaṅkara Vedānta, viz. Nyāya-mārakanda, Nyāya-dīpāvali and Pramāṇa-mālā. Of these the Nyāya-mārakanda was commented upon by Cītsukha and his pupil Sukhaprakāśa in works called Nyāya-mārakanda-tīkā and Nyāya-mārakanda-vivecānti. Sukhaprakāśa also wrote a commentary on the Nyāya-dīpāvali, called Nyāya-dīpāvali-tātparya-tīkā. Anubhūtisvarūpā Ācārya (late thirteenth century), the teacher of Ānandajñāna, also wrote commentaries on all the three works of Ānandabodha. Ānandabodha does not pretend to have made any original contribution and says that he collected his materials from other works which existed in his time. He starts his Nyāya-mārakanda with the thesis that the apparent difference of different selves is false, since not only do the Upaniṣads hold this doctrine, but it is also intelligible on grounds of reason that the apparent multiplicity of selves can be explained on an imaginary supposition of diversity (kālpanika-
purūṣa-bheda), even though in reality there is but one soul. Arguing on the fact that even the illusory supposition of an imaginary diversity may explain all appearances of diversity, Ānandabodha tries to refute the argument of the Saṃkhya-kārikā that the diversity of souls is proved by the fact that with the birth and death of some there is not birth or death of others. Having refuted the plurality of subjects in his own way, he turns to the refutation of plurality of objects. He holds that difference (bheda) cannot be perceived by sense-perception, since difference cannot be perceived without perceiving both the object and all else from which it differs. It cannot be said that first the object is perceived and then the difference; for perception will naturally

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1 Mr Tripathi in his introduction to Ānandajñāna’s Tarka-samgraha gives Ānandabodha’s date as A.D. 1200.
2 Nayā-nibandha-kusuma-prabhavānudātā-
nayāpadeśa-mārakanda-kadamba eṣa.
Nyāya-mārakanda, p. 359.
cease with awareness of its object, and there is no way in which it can operate for the comprehension of difference; neither can it be held that the comprehension of difference can in any way be regarded as simultaneous with the perception of the sensibles. Nor is it possible that, when two sensibles are perceived at two different points of time, there could be any way in which their difference could be perceived; for the two sensibles cannot be perceived at one and the same time. It cannot, again, be said that the perception of any sensible, say blue, involves with it the perception of all that is not blue, the yellow, the white, the red, etc.; for in that case the perception of any sensible would involve the perception of all other objects of the world. The negation of the difference of an entity does not mean anything more than the actual position of it. It is not, however, right to hold that all positive entities are of the nature of differences; for this is directly against all experience. If differences are perceived as positive entities, then to comprehend their differences further differences would be required, and there would thus be a vicious infinite. Moreover, differences, being negative in their nature, cannot be regarded as capable of being perceived as positive sensibles. Whether difference is taken as a subject or a predicate in the form “the difference of the jug from the pillar,” or “the jug is different from the pillar,” in either case there is comprehension of an earlier and more primitive difference between the two objects, on the basis of which the category of difference is realized.

Ānandabodha then discusses the different theories of error held by the Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Buddhism, etc. and supports the anirvācanīya theory of error\textsuperscript{1}. In this connection he records his view as to why nescience (avidyā) has to be admitted as the cause of world-appearance. He points out that the variety and multiplicity of world-appearance cannot be explained without the assumption of a cause which forms its substance. Since this world-appearance is unreal, it cannot come out of a substance that is real, nor can it come out of something absolutely non-existent and unreal, since such a thing evidently could not be the cause of anything; hence, since the cause of world-appearance cannot be either real or unreal, it must have for its cause something which is neither real nor unreal, and the neither-real-nor-unreal entity is avidyā\textsuperscript{2}.

\textsuperscript{1} See the first volume of the present work, ch. x, p. 485.
\textsuperscript{2} Nyāya-mahārāṇa, pp. 122, 123.
He next proceeds to prove the doctrine that the self is of the nature of pure consciousness (ātmānath samvid-rūpatava). This he does, firstly, by stating the view that awareness in revealing itself reveals also immediately its objects, and secondly, by arguing that even though objects of awareness may be varying, there is still the unvarying consciousness which continues the same even when there is no object. If there were only the series of awarenesses arising and ceasing and if there were constant and persistent awarenesses abiding all the time, how could one note the difference between one awareness and another, between blue and yellow? Referring to avidyā, he justifies the view of its being supported on Brahman, because avidyā, being indefinable in its nature, i.e. being neither negative nor positive, there can be no objection to its being regarded as supported on Brahman. Moreover, Brahman can only be regarded as omniscient in its association with avidyā, since all relations are of the nature of avidyā and there cannot be any omniscience without a knowledge of the relations. In his Nyāya-dīpavālī he tries by inference to prove the falsity of the world-appearance on the analogy of the falsity of the illusory silver. His method of treatment is more or less the same as the treatment in the Advaita-siddhi of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī at a much later period. There is practically nothing new in his Pramāṇa-mālā. It is a small work of about twenty-five pages, and one can recognize here the arguments of the Nyāya-mahārāṇa in a somewhat different form and with a different emphasis. Most of Ānandabodha’s arguments were borrowed by the later writers of the Vedānta school. Vyāsatīrtha of the Madhva school of Vedānta collected most of the standard Vedānta arguments from Ānandabodha and Prakāśatman for refutation in his Nyāyāmṛta, and these were again refuted by Madhusūdana’s great work, the Advaita-siddhi, and these refuted in their turn in Rāma Tīrtha’s Nyāyāmṛta-taraṅgīnt. The history of this controversy will be dealt with in the third volume of the present work.

Mahā-vidyā and the Development of Logical Formalism.

The Buddhists had taken to the use of the dialectic method of logical discussions even from the time of Nāgārjuna. But this was by no means limited to the Buddhists. The Naiyāyikas had also adopted these methods, as is well illustrated by the writings
of Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati, Udayana and others. Śaṅkara himself had utilized this method in the refutation of Buddhistic, Jaina, Vaiśeṣika and other systems of Indian philosophy. But, though these writers largely adopted the dialectic methods of Nāgārjuna's arguments, there seems to be little attempt on their part to develop the purely formal side of Nāgārjuna's logical arguments, viz. the attempt to formulate definitions with the strictest formal rigour and to offer criticisms with that over-emphasis of formalism and scholasticism which attained their culmination in the writings of later Nyāya writers such as Raghunātha Śiromani, Jagadiśa Bhāṭṭācārya, Mathurānātha Bhāṭṭācārya and Gadādhara Bhāṭṭācārya. It is generally believed that such methods of overtrained logical formalism were first started by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya of Mithilā early in the thirteenth century. But the truth seems to be that this method of logical formalism was steadily growing among certain writers from as early as the tenth and eleventh centuries. One notable instance of it is the formulation of the mahā-vidyā modes of syllogism by Kulārka Paṇḍita in the eleventh century. There is practically no reference to this mahā-vidyā syllogism earlier than Śrīharṣa (A.D. 1187). References to this syllogism are found in the writings of Citsukha Ācārya (A.D. 1220), Amalānanda, called also Vyāsāśrama (A.D. 1247), Ānandajñāna (A.D. 1260), Veṇkaṭa (A.D. 1369), Śeṣa Śārīgadhara (A.D. 1450) and others. The mahā-vidyā syllogisms were started probably some time in the eleventh century, and they continued to be referred to or refuted by writers till the fifteenth century, though it is curious to notice that they were not mentioned by Gaṅgeśa or any of his followers, such as Raghunātha, Jagadiśa and others, in their discussions on the nature of kēvalānvaṇyai types of inference.

1 Gandhe gandhāntara-prasaṇākā ca ca yuktir asti; tadastīte vā kā no hānīḥ; tasyā api asmābhīḥ khaṇḍanāyātāt. Śrīharṣa’s Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādyā, p. 1181, Chowkhambā edition.

In all probability mahā-vidyā syllogisms were first started by Kulārka Paṇḍita in his Daśa-ślokamahā-vidyā-sūtra containing sixteen different types of definitions for sixteen different types of mahā-vidyā syllogisms. Assuming that Kulārka Paṇḍita, the founder of mahā-vidyā syllogisms, flourished in the eleventh century, it may well be suggested that many other writers had written on this subject before Vādindra refuted them in the first quarter of the thirteenth century. Not only does Vādindra refer to the arguments of previous writers in support of mahā-vidyā and in refutation of it in his Mahā-vidyā-vidāmbana, but Bhuvana-sundara Sūri also in his commentary on the Mahā-vidyā-vidāmbana refers to other critics of mahā-vidyā. Recently two different commentaries have been discovered on mahā-vidyā, by Puruşottama-vana and Pūrṇaprajña. Veṅkaṭa in his Nyāya-parīṣuddhi refers to the Mahā-vidyā, the Māna-mano-hara and the Pramāṇa-mañjarī, and Śrīni-vāsa in his commentary Nyāya-sāra on the Nyāya-parīṣuddhi describes them as works which deal with roundabout syllogisms (vakhramāṇa). This shows that for four or five centuries mahā-vidyā syllogisms were in certain quarters supported and refuted from the eleventh century to the sixteenth century.

It is well known that the great Mīmāṃsā writers, such as Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and his followers, believed in the doctrine of the eternity of sounds, while the followers of the Nyāya and Vaiṣeṣika, called also Yauggācāryas, regarded sound as non-eternal (anītya). Mahā-vidyā modes were special modes of syllogism, invented probably by Kulārka Paṇḍita for refuting the Mīmāṃsā arguments of the eternity of sounds and proving the non-eternity of sounds. If these modes of syllogism could be regarded as valid, they would also have other kinds of application for the proving or disproving of other theories and doctrines. The special feature of the mahā-vidyā syllogisms consisted in their attempt to prove a thesis by the kevalaṇvayi method. Ordinarily concomittance (vyāpti) consists in the existence of the reason (hetu) in association with the probandum and its non-existence in all places where the probandum is absent (sādhyābhāvavady-avṛttitvam). But the kevalaṇvayi form of inference which is admitted by the Naiyāyikas applies to those cases where the probandum is so universal that there is no case where it is absent, and consequently it cannot have a reason (hetu) whose concomittance with it can be determined by

1 See M. R. Telang’s introduction to the Mahā-vidyā-vidāmbana.
its non-existence in all cases where the probandum is absent and its existence in all cases where the probandum is present. Thus in the proposition, “This is describable or nameable (idam abhidheyam) because it is knowable (prameyatvāt),” both the probandum and the reason are so universal that there is no case where their concomitance can be tested by negative instances. Mahā-vidyā syllogisms were forms of kevalānvyāi inference of this type, and there were sixteen different varieties of it which had this advantage associated with them, that, they being kevalānvyāi forms of syllogism, it was not easy to criticize them by pointing out defects or lapses of concomitance of the reason and the probandum, as no negative instances are available in their case. In order to make it possible that a kevalānvyāi form of syllogism should be applicable for affirming the non-eternity of sound, Kulārka tried to formulate propositions in sixteen different ways so that on kevalānvyāi lines such an affirmation might be made about a subject that by virtue of it the non-eternity of sound should follow necessarily as the only consequence, other possible alternatives being ruled out. It is this indirect approach of inference that has been by the critics of mahā-vidyā styled roundabout syllogism. Thus mahā-vidyā has been defined as that method of syllogism by which a specific probandum which it is desired to prove by the joint method of agreement and difference (3, anvaya-vyatireki-sādhya-viśeṣam vādy-abhimatam sādhayati) is proved by the necessary implication of the existence of a particular probandum in a particular subject (2, pakṣe vyāpaka-pratitya-paryavasāna-balāt), affirmed by the existence of hetu in the subject on kevalānvyāi lines (1, kevalānvyāini vyāpake pravartamāno hetuh). In other words, a reason which exists in a probandum inseparably abiding in a subject (pakṣa) without failure (proposition 1) proves (sādhayati), by virtue of the fact, that such an unailing existence of that probandum in that subject in that way is only possible under one supposition (proposition 2), namely, the affirmation of another probandum in another subject (e.g. the affirmation of the probandum “non-eternity” to the subject “sound”), which is generally sought to be proved by the direct method of agreement and difference (proposition 3). This may be understood by following a typical mahā-vidyā syllogism. Thus it is said that by reason of knowability (meyatvā) as such the self, dissociated from the relations of all eternal and non-eternal qualities of all other objects excepting
sound, is related to a non-eternal entity (ātmā śabdarāṇītya-nitya-
vaśrītāvānādikaranāṇītya-vṛtti-dharmavān meyātvād ghaṭavat).
Now by the qualifying adjunct of "self" the self is dissociated from
all qualities that it shares with all other eternal and non-eternal
objects excepting sound, and the consequence is that it is left only
with some kind of non-eternal quality in relation with sound, as
this was left out of consideration in the qualifying adjunct, which
did not take sound within its purview. Since many relations are
also on the Nyāya view treated as qualities, such a non-eternal
relation of the self to sound may be their mutual difference or
their mutual negation (anyonyābhāva). Now, if the self, which is
incontestably admitted to be eternal, has such a non-eternal quality
or relation to sound, then this can only be under one supposition,
viz. that sound is non-eternal. But, since all other non-eternal
relations that the self may have to other non-eternal objects,
and all other eternal relations that it may have to other eternal
objects, and all other such relations that it may have to all
eternal and non-eternal objects jointly, except sound, have already
been taken out of consideration by the qualifying phrase, the in-
separable and unfailing non-eternal quality that the self may have,
in the absence of any negative instances, is in relation to sound;
but, if it has a non-eternal quality in relation to sound, then this
can be so only under one supposition, viz. that sound is itself
non-eternal; for the self is incontestably known as eternal. This
indirect and roundabout method of syllogism is known as mahā-
vidyā. It is needless to multiply examples to illustrate all the
sixteen types of propositions of mahā-vidyā syllogism, as they are
all formed on the same principle with slight variations.

Vādindra in his Mahā-vidyā-vidāmbana refuted these types of
syllogism as false, and it is not known that any one else tried to
revive them by refuting Vādindra’s criticisms. Vādindra styles
himself in the colophon at the end of the first chapter of his
Mahā-vidyā-vidāmbana “Hara-kiṅkara-nyāyācārya-parama-
pandita-bhaṭṭa-vādindra,” and in the concluding verse of his work
refers to Yogīsvara as his preceptor. The above epithets of Hara-
kiṅkara, nyāyācārya, etc. do not show however what his real name
was. Mr Telang points out in his introduction to the Mahā-vidyā-
vidāmbana that his pupil Bhaṭṭa Rāghava in his commentary on
Bhāsarvajña’s Nyāya-sūra, called Nyāya-sūra-vicāra, refers to him
by the name Mahādeva. Vādindra’s real name, then, was Mahādeva,
and the rest of the epithets were his titles. Bhaṭṭa Rāghava says that the name of Vādindra’s father was Sāraṅga. Bhaṭṭa Rāghava gives his own date in the Śaka era. The sentence however is liable to two different constructions, giving us two different dates, viz. A.D. 1252 and 1352. But, judging from the fact that Vādindra was a religious counsellor of King Śrīsimha (also called Śīghanā), who reigned in Devagiri A.D. 1210–1247, and that in all probability he lived before Veṅkaṭa (A.D. 1267–1369), who refers to his Mahā-vidyā-vidambana, Mr Telang suggests that we should take A.D. 1252 to be the date of Bhaṭṭa Rāghava; and, since he was a pupil of Vādindra, one may deduce about 27 years from his date and fix Vādindra’s date as A.D. 1225. Mr Telang points out that such a date would agree with the view that he was a religious counsellor of King Śrīsimha. Vādindra refers to Udayana (A.D. 984) and Śivādiṭya Mīṣra (A.D. 975–1025). Mr Telang also refers to two other works of Vādindra, viz. Rasa-sāra and Kaṇāda-sūtra-nibandha, and argues from allusions contained in Vādindra’s Mahā-vidyā-vidambana that he must have written other works in refutation of mahā-vidyā. Vādindra’s Mahā-vidyā-vidambana consists of three chapters. In the first chapter he gives an exposition of the mahā-vidyā syllogisms; the second and third chapters are devoted to the refutation of these syllogisms. Vādindra’s Mahā-vidyā-vidambana has two commentaries, one called Mahā-vidyā-vidambana-vyākhyāna, by Ānandapūrṇa (A.D. 1600), and the other, called Vyākhyāna-dīpikā, by Bhuvana-sundara Sūri (A.D. 1400). In addition to these Bhuvanasundara Sūri also wrote a small work called the Laghu-mahā-vidyā-vidambana and a commentary, Mahā-vidyā-vivarana-tippana, on a Mahā-vidyā-dāśālokt-vivarana by an unknown author.

The main points of Vādindra’s criticisms may briefly be stated as follows: He says that it is not possible that there should be a proper reason (hetu) which has no negative instances (kevalānvyayi-hetor eva nirvaktum asakyatvāt). It is difficult to prove that any particular quality should exist everywhere and that there should not be any instance or case where it does not occur. In the third chapter he shows that not only is it not possible to have kevalānvyayi hetus, but that even in arguments on the basis of such kevalānvyayi hetu there would be great scope for fallacies of self-contradiction (sva-vyāghāta) and fallacies of illicit distribution of the middle term (anaikāntikatva) and the like. He also shows how all these fallacies apply to all the mahā-vidyā syllogisms invented by Kulārka Pāṇḍita.
It is needless for our present purposes to enter into any elaborate logical discussion of Vādindra; for the present digression on mahā-vidyā syllogisms is introduced here only to show that scholastic logicisms were not first introduced by Śrīharṣa, but had already come into fashion a few centuries before him, though Śrīharṣa was undoubtedly the most prominent of those who sought to apply these scholastic methods in philosophy.

It will thus be seen that the fashion of emphasizing the employment of logical formalism as a method in philosophy was inherited by the Naiyāyikas and Vedāntists alike from Buddhists like Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and others in the third and the fourth centuries and their later successors in the fifth, sixth and seventh centuries. But during the eighth, ninth and tenth centuries one notices a steady development on this side in the works of prominent Nyāya writers such as Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana and Vedāntic authors such as the great master Śaṅkarācārya, Vācaspati Miśra and Ānandabodha Yati. But the school of abstract and dry formalism may be said to have properly begun with Kulārka Paṇḍita, or the authors of the Māṇa-manohara and Pramāṇa-mañjarī in the latter part of the eleventh century, and to have been carried on in the works of a number of other writers, until we come to Gaṅgeśa of the early thirteenth century, who enlivened it with the subtleties of his acute mind by the introduction of the new concepts of avacchedakāta, which may be regarded as a new turning point after vyāpti. This work was further carried on extremely elaborately by his later successors, the great writers of this new school of logic (nātya-nyāya), Raghunātha Śīromāni, Jagadiśa Bhaṭṭācārya, Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya and others. On the Vedānta side this formalism was carried on by Śrīharṣa (A.D. 1187), Citsukha of about A.D. 1220 (of whom Vādindra was a contemporary), Ānandajñāna or Ānandagiri of about A.D. 1260 and through a number of minor writers until we come to Nṛsiṃhāśrama and Madhusūdana Sarasvati of the seventeenth century. It may be surmised that formal criticisms of Śrīharṣa were probably largely responsible for a new awakening in the Naiyāyikas, who began to direct their entire attention to a perfecting of their definitions and discussions on strict lines of formal accuracy and preciseness to the utter neglect of the collection of new data, new experiences or the investigation of new problems or new lines of enquiry, which is so essential for the development of true philo-
sophy. But, when once they started perfecting the purely logical appliances and began to employ them successfully in debates, it became essential for all Vedântists also to master the ways of this new formalism for the defence of their old views, with utter neglect of new creations in philosophy. Thus in the growth of the history of the dialectic of logical formalism in the Vedânta system of thought it is found that during the eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh centuries the element of formalism was at its lowest and the controversies of the Vedânta with the Buddhists, Mîmâmsists and Naiyâyikas were based largely on the analysis of experience from the Vedântic standpoint and its general approach to philosophy. But in the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries the controversy was largely with the Nyâya and Vaisësika and dominated by considerations of logical formalism above everything else. Criticisms became for the most part nothing more than criticisms of Nyâya and Vaisësika definitions. Parallel to this a new force was gradually growing during these centuries in the writings of Râmânuja and his followers, and in the succeeding centuries the followers of Madhva, the great Vaisësava writer, began to criticize the Vedântists (of the Śaṅkara school) very strongly. It is found therefore that from the thirteenth or fourteenth century the Vedântic attack was largely directed against the followers of Râmânuja and Madhva. A history of this controversy will be given in the third and fourth volumes of the present work. But the method of logical formalism had attained such an importance by this time that, though the Vaisënavas brought in many new considerations and points of view in philosophy, the method of logical formalism never lost its high place in dialectic discussions.

Vedânta Dialectic of Śrîharṣa (A.D. 1150).

Śrîharṣa flourished probably during the middle of the twelfth century A.D. Udayana, the great Nyâya writer, lived towards the end of the tenth century, as is evident from the colophon of his Laksanâvali. Śrîharṣa often refutes the definitions of Udayana, and therefore must have flourished after him. Again, the great logician Gaṅgeśa of Mithilâ refers to Śrîharṣa and refutes his

1 tarkâmbarânâka(906)pramiteṣv atiteṣu sakântatah
varjesūdayanai cakre subodhâm laksanâvalim.
Laksanâvali, p. 72, Surendrâlâl Gosvâmin's edition, Benares, 1900.
views, and, since Gaṅgeśa lived in A.D. 1200, Śriharṣa must have lived before that date. Accordingly Śriharṣa was after Udayana and before Gaṅgeśa, i.e. between the tenth and twelfth centuries A.D. At the end of his book he refers to himself as honoured by the King of Kanauj (Kānyakubjēśvara). It is probable that this king may be Jayacandra of Kanauj, who was dethroned about A.D. 1195. In his poetical work Naiṣadha-carita he mentions at the end of the several chapters many works of his, such as Arṇava-varṇana, Gauḍorviṣa-kula-praśasti, Nava-sāhasāṅka-carita, Vijaya-praśasti, Śīva-śakti-siddhi, Sthairya-vicāraṇa, Chandaḥ-praśasti, and also Iṣvarābhisandhi and Pañcanalita kāvya. The fact that he wrote a work eulogizing the race of the kings of Gauda leads one to suspect that he may have been one of the five Brahmins invited by Ādiśūra of Bengal from Kanauj in the early part of the eleventh century, in which case Śriharṣa would have to be placed at that time, and cannot be associated with Jayacandra, who was dethroned in A.D. 1195. Śriharṣa’s most important philosophical contribution was the Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya (lit. “the sweets of refutation”), in which he attempts to refute all definitions of the Nyāya system intended to justify the reality of the categories of experience and tries to show that the world and all world-experiences are purely phenomenal and have no reality behind them. The only reality is the self-luminous Brahman of pure consciousness. His polemic is against the Nyāya, which holds that

1 Ānandapūrṇa in his commentary on the Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya, called Khaṇḍana-prakrīti, explains Kānyakubjēśvara as Kāśīrāja, i.e. King of Kāśi or Benares.

2 None of these however are available.

3 Śriharṣa at the end of this work speaks of having purposely made it extremely knotty here and there, so that no one could understand its difficulties easily except when explained by the teacher. Thus he says:

grantham-granthir iha kvacit kvacid api nyāsi prayatnān mayā
prājñammanya-manā haṭhena paṭhitāmāsin khalāh khelatu,
śraddhārađāha-guruḥ sālahkṛta-dhīha-granthih samāśitañyat
tv etat-tarkarāsormi-majjana sukheśv āsaṁjanam sajñānāh.


Several commentaries have been written on this celebrated work by various people, e.g. Khaṇḍana-manḍana by Paramānanda, Khaṇḍana-manḍana by Bhavanānātha, Dīdhī by Raghunāṭha Śīromaṇi, Prakāśa by Vardhamāna, Vidyā-bharati by Vidyābharati, Vidyā-sāgara by Vidyāsāgara, Khaṇḍana-pāka by Padmanābha Panḍita, Ananda-vardhana by Śaṅkara Miśra, Śri-darpaṇa by Subhaṅkara, Khaṇḍana-mahā-tarka by Caritraśīlpa, Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍana by Pragalbha Miśra, Siṣya-hitaiṣṭa by Padmanābha, Khaṇḍana-kathāra by Gokulanātha Upādhyāya. At least one refutation of it was attempted by the Naiyāyikas, as is evidenced by the work of a later Vācaspati (A.D. 1350) from Bengal, called Khaṇḍanodādhāra.
whatever is known has a well-defined real existence, and Śriharṣa’s main point is to prove that all that is known is indefinable and unreal, being only of a phenomenal nature and having only a relative existence based on practical modes of acceptance, customs and conventions. But, though his chief polemic is against the Nyāya, yet, since his criticisms are almost wholly of a destructive nature like those of Nāgārjuna, they could be used, with modifications, no less effectively against any other system. Those who criticize with the object of establishing positive definitions would object only to certain definitions or views of other schools; but both Śriharṣa and the nihilists are interested in the refutation of all definitions as such, and therefore his dialectic would be valid against all views and definitions of other systems.  

He starts with the proposition that none of our awarenesses ever stand in need of being further known or are capable of being the objects of any further act of knowledge. The difference of the Vedānta from the idealistic Buddhists consists in this, that the latter hold that everything is unreal and indefinable, not even excepting cognitions (viññāna); while the Vedānta makes an exception of cognitions and holds that all the world, excepting knowledge or awareness, is indefinable either as existent or non-existent (sad-asadbhyām vilakṣaṇam) and is unreal. This indefinableness is in the nature of all things in the world and all experiences (meya-svabhāvānugāminyām anirvacaniyātā), and no amount of ingenuity or scholarship can succeed in defining the nature of that which has no definable nature or existence. Śriharṣa undertakes to show that all definitions of things or categories put forward by the Nyāya writers are absolutely hollow and faulty even according to the canons of logical discussions and definitions accepted by the Naiyāyika; and, if no definition can stand or be supported, it necessarily follows that there can be no definitions, or, in other words, that no definitions of the phenomenal world are possible and that the world of phenomena and all our so-called experiences

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1 Śriharṣa himself admits the similarity of his criticisms to those of Nāgārjuna and says: “tathā hi yadi darıaneṣu śunyavādāṁ nirvācānīyam tada tāvatma amāyaṁ nir-bādeha ra śāvacya-pathiṇatā,” etc. Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādyā, pp. 229–230, Chowkambā Sanskrit Book Depot, Benares, 1914.

2 By the idealistic Buddhists Śriharṣa here means the idealism of the Lāṅkāvatāra, from which he quotes the following verse:

_buddhyā vigasamātināṁ svabhūvo nāvadhāryate_
_ato mirabhīlapyāṁ te nīsavabhāvāca desītaḥ._

_Lāṅkāvatāra-sūtra, p. 287, Otani University Press, 1923._
of it are indefinable. So the Vedāntist can say that the unreality of the world is proved. It is useless for any one to attempt to find out what is true by resorting to arguments; for the arguments can be proved to be false even by the canons on which they are based. If anyone, however, says that the arguments of Śriharśa are open to the same objection and are not true, then that would only establish his own contention. For Śriharśa does not believe in the reality of his arguments and enters into them without any assumption of their reality or unreality. It can be contended that it is not possible to argue without first admitting the reality of the arguments. But such reality cannot be established without first employing the pramāṇas or valid means of proof; and the employment of the pramāṇas would require further arguments, and these further employment of the pramāṇas and so on until we have vicious infinite regress. If, however, the very arguments employed in accordance with the canons of the opponents to destroy their definitions be regarded as false, this would mean that the opponents reject their own canons, so that the Vedāntic arguments in refuting their position would be effective. The Vedānta is here interested only in destroying the definitions and positions of the opponents; and so, unless the opponents are successful in defending their own positions against the attacks of the Vedānta, the Vedānta point of view is not refuted. So the manifold world of our experience is indefinable, and the one Brahman is absolutely and ultimately real.

Regarding the proof that may be demanded of the ultimate oneness Śriharśa says that the very demand proves that the idea of ultimate oneness already exists, since, if the idea were not realized, no one could think of asking for a proof of it. Now, if it is admitted that the idea of absolute oneness is realized (pratīta), then the question arises whether such realization is right knowledge (pramāṇa) or error (apramāṇa). If it is a right idea, then, whatever may have produced it, this right idea is to be regarded as valid proof. If such an idea is false, one cannot legitimately ask the Vedāntist to adduce any proofs to demonstrate what is false. It may be urged that, though the Naiyāyika considers it false, it is regarded by the Vedāntist as true and hence the Vedāntist may be called upon to prove that the way in which or the means of proof through which he came to have his idea was true. This, however, the Vedāntist would readily deny; for, even though the idea of the absolute oneness may
be right, yet the way in which one happened to come by this idea may be wrong. There may be a fire on a hill; but yet, if one infers the existence of such a fire from fog appearing as smoke, then such an inference is false, even though the idea of the fire may itself be right. Leaving aside the discussion of the propriety of such demands on the part of the opponents, the Vedántist says that the Upaniṣadic texts demonstrate the truth of the ultimate oneness of reality.

The ultimate oneness of all things, taught in the Upaniṣad texts, cannot be said to be negatived by our perceptual experience of "many." For our perception deals with individual things of the moment and therefore cannot apply to all things of the past, present, and future and establish the fact of their all being different from one another. Perception applies to the experience of the immediate present and is therefore not competent to contradict the universal proposition of the oneness of all things, as taught by the Upaniṣads. Again, as Śrīharṣa says, in our perception of the things of experience we do not realize the differences of the perceptual objects from ourselves, but the differences among the objects themselves. The self-revelation of knowledge also fails to show its difference from all objects of the world. The difference, again, of the perceived objects from all other things is not revealed in the nature of the perceived objects themselves as svarūpa-bheda, or difference as being of the nature of the objects which are differentiated—if that were the case, then the false and erroneous perception of silver would also at once manifest its difference from the object (the conch-shell) on which the false silver is imposed. In this way Śrīharṣa tried to prove that the purport of non-duality, as asserted in the Vedic texts, is not contradicted by any other, stronger, proof. Most of these arguments, being of a verbal nature, may better here be dropped. The main stress seems to rest on the idea that the immediate differences between the things perceived do not in the least suggest or imply that they, in their essence or in their totality, could not ultimately, as a result of our progressive and better knowledge of things, be considered as one identical reality (as is asserted in the Upaniṣads). If perception cannot prove anything, inferences by themselves cannot stand alone or contradict the non-duality taught in the Upaniṣads. In our world of phenomenal experience our minds are always impressed with the concept of difference; but Śrīharṣa says that the
mere existence of an idea does not prove its reality. Words can give rise to ideas relating even to absolutely non-existing things.

Again, the concept of "difference" can hardly be defined. If it lies involved within the essential nature of all things that differ, then difference would be identical with the nature of the things that differ. If difference were different from the things that differ, then it would be necessary to find out some way of establishing a relation between "difference" and the things that differ, and this might require another connection, and that another, and so we should have a vicious endless series. He says that "difference" may be looked upon from a number of possible points of view. Firstly, "difference" is supposed to be of the nature of things. But a "difference" which is of the nature of the things which differ must involve them all in one; for there cannot be any difference without referring to the things from which there is difference. If by "book" we mean its difference from table, then the table has to enter into the nature of the book, and that would mean the identity of the table and the book. There is no meaning in speaking of "difference" as being the thing, when such differences can only be determined by a reference to other things. If "difference" be the nature of a thing, such a nature cannot be in need of being determined by other things. One thing, say a book, is realized as being different from a table—the nature of the difference may here be described as being "the quality of being distinguished from a table"; but "the quality of being distinguished" would have no meaning or locus standi, unless "the table" were also taken with it. If anyone says that a book is identical with "the quality of being distinguished from," then this will invariably include "the table" also within the essence of the book, as "the table" is a constituent of the complex quality "to be distinguished from," which necessarily means "to be distinguished from a table." So on this view also "the table" and all other things which could be distinguished from the book are involved in the very essence of all things—a conclusion which contradicts the very concept of difference. It may also be pointed out that the concept of difference is entirely extraneous to the concept of things as they are understood or perceived. The notion of "difference" is itself different from the notion of the book and the table, whether jointly or separately. The joint notion of the book and the table is different
from the notion that "the book differs from the table." For understanding the nature of a book it is not necessary that one should understand previously its difference from a table. Moreover, even though the notion of difference may in some sense be said to lead to our apprehension of individual things, the apprehension of such individual things does not carry with it the idea that it is on account of such difference that the individual things are perceived. It is through similarity or resemblance between two things—say between a wild cow (gavaya) and the domestic cow (go)—that a man can recognize an animal as a wild cow; but yet, when he so considers an animal as a wild cow, he does not invariably because of such a resemblance to a cow think the animal to be a wild cow. The mental decision regarding an animal as a cow or a wild cow takes place immediately without any direct participation of the cause which produced it. So, even though the notion of difference may be admitted to be responsible for our apprehension of the different individual things, an apprehension of an individual thing does not involve as a constituent any notion of difference. It is therefore wrong to think that things are of the nature of difference.

In another view, wherein difference is interpreted as "mental negation" or "otherness" (anyonyabhava), this "otherness" (say of the book from the table) is explained as being the negation of the identity of one with the other. When one says that the book is other than the table, what is meant is that identity of the book with the table is denied. Srimarga here raises the objection that, if the identity of the book with the table was absolutely chimerical, like the hare's horn, such a denial of identity would be absolutely meaningless. It cannot, again, be suggested that this mental negation, or negation as otherness, means the denial of one class-concept in respect of another (e.g. that of book on the table); for there is in these class-concepts no such special characteristic (dharma) by virtue of which one could be denied of the other or they could be distinguished from each other, since the Naiyayika, against whom Srimarga's arguments are directed, does not admit that class-concepts possess any distinguishing qualities. In the absence of such distinguishing qualities they may be regarded as identical: but in that case the denial of one class-concept (say of the table) would involve the denial of the class-concept of the thing itself (e.g. the book), since the class-concepts of the book and the table, not having
any distinguishing qualities, are identical; and, further, through mental denial both the book and the table would be devoid of the class-concepts of book and table, and so there would be no way of distinguishing one thing from another, book from table. It is easy to see therefore that there is no way of making a special case regarding negation as otherness (anyaḥyābhāva). Again, if difference is regarded as the possession of opposite characters (vaidharmya), then also it may be asked whether the opposite characters have further opposite characters to distinguish them from one another, and these again others, and so there is a vicious infinite; if these are supposed to stop anywhere, then the final characters at that stage, not having any further opposite characters to distinguish them, would be identical, and hence all opposite characters in the backward series would be meaningless and all things would be identical. If on the contrary it is admitted at the very first stage that opposite or differing characters have no differing characters to distinguish them from one another, then the characters will be identical. Again, it may be asked whether these distinguishing characters are themselves different from the objects which possess them or not. If they are different, one may again ask concerning the opposing characters which lead to this difference and then again about other opposing characters of these, and so on. If these infinite differences were to hold good, they could not arrive in less than infinite time, whereas the object is finite and limited in time. If, again, they came all at once, there would be such a disorderly medley of these infinite differences that there would be no way of determining their respective substrates and their orderly successive dependence on one another. And, since in the series the earlier terms of difference can only be established by the establishment of the later terms of difference, the forward movement in search of the later terms of difference, in support of the earlier terms of difference, makes these earlier terms of difference unnecessary.

It cannot, therefore, be said that our perception of differences has any such intrinsic validity that it can contradict the ultimate unity taught in the Upaniṣad texts. Śrīharṣa does not deny that we perceive seeming differences in all things, but he denies their

ultimate validity, since he considers them to be due to avidyā or nescience alone.

The chief method of Śriharṣa’s dialectic depends upon the assumption that the reality of the things that one defines depends upon the unimpeachable character of the definitions; but all definitions are faulty, as they involve the fallacy of argument in a circle (cakraka), and hence there is no way in which the real nature of things can be demonstrated or defined. Our world of experience consists of knower, known and knowledge; if a knower is defined as the possessor of knowledge, knowledge can only be understood by a reference to the knower; the known, again, can be understood only by a reference to knowledge and the knower, and so there is a circle of relativity which defies all attempts at giving an independent definition of any of these things. It is mainly this relativity that in specific forms baffles all attempts at definition of all categories.

Application of the Dialectic to the Different Categories and Concepts.

Śriharṣa first takes for his criticism the definitions of right cognition. Assuming the definition of right cognition to be the direct apprehension of the real nature of things, he first urges that such a definition is faulty, since, if one accidentally guesses rightly certain things hidden under a cover and not perceived, or makes a right inference from faulty data or by fallacious methods, though the awareness may be right, it cannot be called right cognition. It is urged that cognition, in order to be valid, must be produced through unerring instruments; here, however, is a case of chance guesses which may sometimes be right without being produced by unerring instruments of senses. Nor can correspondence of the cognition with its object (yathārthānubhavah pramā) be regarded as a proper definition of right cognition. Such correspondence can be defined as meaning either that which represents the reality of the object itself or similarity to the object. The real nature of

2 E.g. when a man rightly guesses the number of shells closed in another man’s hand, or when one makes a false inference of fire on a hill from a fog looking like smoke from a distance and there is fire on the hill by chance—his judgment may be right though his inference may be false.
an object is indeterminable, and so correspondence of awareness with the object may rather be defined as similarity of the former to the latter. If this similarity means that the awareness must have such a character as is possessed by the object (jñānaviṣayikṛtena rūpeṇa sādṛṣyam), then this is clearly impossible; for qualities that belong to the object cannot belong to the awareness—there may be an awareness of two white hard marbles, but the awareness is neither two, nor white, nor hard. It may be urged that the correspondence consists in this, that the whiteness etc. belong to the object as qualities possessed by it, whereas they belong to awareness as being qualities which it reveals. But that would not hold good in the case of illusory perception of silver in a conch-shell; the awareness of “before me” in the perception of “before me the silver” has to be admitted as being a right cognition. If this is admitted to be a right cognition, then it was meaningless to define right cognition as true correspondence; it might as well have been defined as mere cognition, since all cognition would have some object to which it referred and so far as that only was concerned all cognitions would be valid. If, however, entire correspondence of thought and object be urged, then partial correspondence like the above can hardly be considered satisfactory. But, if entire correspondence is considered indispensable, then the correctness of the partial correspondence has to be ignored, whereas it is admitted by the Naiyāyika that, so far as reference to an object is concerned, all cognitions are valid; only the nature of cognition may be disputed as to right or wrong, when we are considering the correspondence of the nature of the object and the nature characterized by the awareness of the object. If entire correspondence with the object is not assured, then cognition of an object with imperfect or partial correspondence, due to obstructive circumstances, has also to be rejected as false. Again, since the correspondence always refers to the character, form or appearance of the thing, all our affirmations regarding the objects to which the characters are supposed to belong would be false.

Referring to Udayana’s definition of right cognition as samyak paricchitti, or proper discernment, Śrīharṣa says that the word

2 arthasya hi yathā samavāyād rūpaṁ viśeṣaṁbhavati tathā viṣayabhāvaj jñānasyāpī tad-viśeṣaṇam bhavaty eva. Khaṇḍana, p. 399.
“samyak” (proper) is meaningless; for, if samyak means “entire,” then the definition is useless, since it is impossible to see all the visible and invisible constituent parts of a thing, and no one but an omniscient being could perceive a thing with all its characters, properties or qualities. If right discernment means the discernment of an object with its special distinguishing features, this again is unintelligible; for even in wrong cognition, say of conch-shell as silver, the perceiver seems to perceive the distinguishing marks of silver in the conch-shell. The whole point lies in the difficulty of judging whether the distinguishing marks observed are real or not, and there is no way of determining this. If, again, the distinguishing features be described as being those characteristics without the perception of which there can be no certain knowledge and the perception of which ensures right cognition, then it may well be pointed out that it is impossible to discover any feature of any cognition of which one can be positively certain that it is not wrong. A dreamer confuses all sorts of characters and appearances and conceives them all to be right. It may be urged that in the case of right perception the object is perceived with its special distinguishing features, as in the case of the true perception of silver, whereas in the case of the false perception of silver in the conch-shell no such distinguishing features are observed. But even in this case it would be difficult to define the essential nature of the distinguishing features; for, if any kind of distinguishing feature would do, then in the case of the false perception of silver in the conch-shell the distinguishing feature of being before the eyes is also possessed by the conch-shell. If all the particular distinguishing features are insisted on, then there will be endless distinguishing features, and it would be impossible to make any definition which would include them all. The certitude of a cognition which contradicts a previous wrong cognition would often be liable to the same objection as the wrong cognition itself, since the nature of the special distinguishing features which would establish its validity cannot be established by any definition of right knowledge.

Arguing against the definition of right cognition as “apprehension which is not incorrect or not defective” (avyabhicārī anubhavaḥ), Śrīharṣa says that “not incorrect” or “not defective” cannot mean that the cognition must exist only at the time when the object exists; for then inferential cognition, which often refers
to past and future things, would be false. Neither can it mean that the cognition coexists in space with its objects; nor can it mean that the right cognition is similar to its object in all respects, since cognition is so different in nature from the object that it is not possible that there should be any case in which it would be similar thereto in all respects. And, if the view that an awareness and its object are one and the same be accepted, then this would apply even to those cases where one object is wrongly perceived as another; and hence the word "avyabhicāri" is not sufficient to distinguish right knowledge from wrong cognition.

Arguing against the Buddhist definition of right cognition as "an apprehension which is not incompatible (avisamvādi) with the object known," Śrīharṣa tries to refute the definition in all the possible senses of incompatibility of cognition with object which determines wrong knowledge. If the definition is supposed to restrict right cognition to cognition which is cognized by another cognition as being in agreement with its object, then a wrong cognition, repeated successively through a number of moments and found to be in agreement with its object through all the successive moments until it is contradicted, would also have to be admitted as right, because in this case the previous cognition is certified by the cognition of the succeeding moments. If, again, right cognition is defined as a cognition the incompatibility of which with its object is not realized by any other cognition, then also there are difficulties in the way. For even a wrong cognition may for some time be not contradicted by any other cognition. Moreover, the vision of the conch-shell by the normal eye as white may be contradicted by the later vision by the jaundiced eye as yellow. If it is urged that the contradiction must be by a faultless later cognition, then it may be pointed out that, if there had been any way of defining faultless cognition, the definition of right cognition would have been very easy. On the other hand, unless right cognition is properly defined, there is no meaning in speaking of faulty or wrong cognition. If right cognition is defined as a cognition which has causal efficiency, that in fact is not a proper definition; for even the wrong cognition of a snake might cause fear and even death. If it is urged that the causal efficiency must be exercised by the object in the same form in which it is perceived, then it is very difficult to ascertain this; and there may be a false cognition of causal effi-
ciency also; hence it would be very difficult to ascertain the nature of right cognition on the basis of causal efficiency. Śrīharṣa points out again that in a similar way Dharmakīrtī’s definition of right cognition as enabling one to attain the object (artha-prāpakatva) is also unintelligible, since it is difficult to determine which object can be actually attained and which not, and the notion that the thing may be attained as it is perceived may be present even in the case of the wrong perception of silver in the conch-shell. If right cognition is defined as cognition which is not contradicted, then it may be asked whether the absence of contradiction is at the time of perception only, in which case even the wrong perception of silver in the conch-shell would be a right cognition, since it is uncontradicted at least at the time when the illusion is produced. If it is urged that a right cognition is that which is not contradicted at any time, then we are not in a position to assert the rightness of any cognition; for it is impossible to be certain that any particular cognition will never at any time be contradicted.

After showing that it is impossible to define right cognition (pramāṇa) Śrīharṣa tries to show that it is impossible to define the idea of instruments (karaṇa) or their operative action (vyāpāra) as involved in the idea of instruments of cognition (pramāṇa). Śrīharṣa attempts to show that instrumentality as an agent cannot be separately conceived as having an independent existence, since it is difficult to determine its separate existence. It would be a long tale to go into all the details of this discussion as set forth by Śrīharṣa, and for our present purposes it is enough to know that Śrīharṣa refuted the concept of “instrumentality” as a separate agent, both as popularly conceived or as conceived in Sanskrit grammar. He also discusses a number of alternative meanings which could be attributed to the concept of “karaṇa,” or instrument, and shows that none of these meanings can be satisfactorily justified.\(^1\)

In refuting the definition of perception he introduces a long discussion showing the uselessness of defining perception as an instrument of right knowledge. Perception is defined in the Nyāya as cognition which arises through the contact of a particular sense with its object; but it is impossible to know whether any cognition has originated from sense-contact, since the fact of the production

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\(^1\) Among many other definitions Śrīharṣa also refutes the definition of karaṇa as given by Uddyotakara—“yādeva eva karoti tat karaṇam.” Khaṇḍana, p. 506.
of knowledge from sense-contact cannot itself be directly perceived or known by any other means. Since in perception the senses are in contact on the one hand with the self and on the other hand with the external objects, Śrīharṣa urges by a series of arguments that, unless the specific object with which the sense is in contact is mentioned in each case, it would be difficult to formulate a definition of perception in such a way that it would imply only the revelation of the external object and not the self, which is as much in contact with the sense as is the object. Again, the specification of the object in the case of each perception would make it particular, and this would defeat the purposes of definition, which can only apply to universal concepts. Arguing against a possible definition of perception as immediateness, Śrīharṣa supposes that, if perception reveals some specific quality of the object as its permanent attribute, then, in order that this quality may be cognized, there ought to be another attribute, and this would presuppose another attribute, and so there would be an infinite regress; and, if at any stage of the infinite regress it is supposed that no further attribute is necessary, then this involves the omission of the preceding determining attributes, until the possibility of the perception is also negated. If this immediateness be explained as a cognition produced by the instrumentality of the sense-organs, this again is unintelligible; for the instrumentality of sense-organs is incomprehensible. Śrīharṣa takes a number of alternative definitions of perceptions and tries to refute them all more or less in the same way, mostly by pointing out verbal faults in the formulation of the definitions.

Citsukha Ācārya, a commentator on Śrīharṣa’s Khaṇḍana-kaṇḍa-khādyā, offers a refutation of the definition of perception in a much more condensed form. He points out that the definition of perception by Akṣapāda as an uncontradicted cognition arising out of sense-contact with the object is unintelligible. How can we know that a cognition would not be contradicted? It cannot be known from a knowledge of the faultlessness of the collocating circumstances, since the faultlessness can be known only if there is no contradiction, and hence faultlessness cannot be known previously and independently, and the collocating circumstances would contain many elements which are unperceivable. It is also impossible to say whether any experience will for ever remain uncontradicted. Nor can it again be urged that right cognition is that which can
produce an effort on the part of the perceiver (pravṛtti-sāmarthya); for even an illusory knowledge can produce an effort on the part of the perceiver who is deceived by it. Mere achievement of the result is no test for the rightness of the cognition; for a man may see the lustre of a gem and think it to be a gem and really get the gem, yet it cannot be doubted that his apprehension of the ray of the gem as the gem was erroneous. In the case of the perception of stars and planets there is no chance of any actual attainment of those objects, and yet there is no reason to deny the validity of the cognitions.

Passing over the more or less verbal arguments of Śrīharṣa in refutation of the definitions of inference (anumāṇa) as liṅga-parā-marśa or the realization of the presence in the minor term (pākṣa, e.g. the mountain) of a reason or probans (liṅga, e.g. smoke) which is always concomitant with the major term (sādhya, e.g. fire), or as invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum or the major term (sādhya, e.g. fire), and its other slightly modified varieties, I pass on to his criticism of the nature of concomitance (vyāpti), which is at the root of the notion of inference. It is urged that the universal relationship of invariable concomitance required in vyāpti cannot be established unless the invariable concomitance of all the individuals involved in a class be known, which is impossible. The Naiyāyika holds that the mind by a sort of mental contact with class-concepts or universals, called sāmānya-pratyāsatti, may affirm of all individuals of a class without actually experiencing all the individuals. It is in this way that, perceiving the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire in a large number of cases, one understands the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire by experiencing a sort of mental contact with the class-concept "smoke" when perceiving smoke on a distant hill. Śrīharṣa argues in refutation of such an interpretation that, if all individual smoke may be known in such a way by a mental contact with class-concepts, then by a mental contact with the class-concept "knowable" we might know all individual knowables and thus be omniscient as well. A thing is knowable only as an individual with its specific qualities as such, and therefore to know a thing as a knowable would involve the knowledge of all such specific qualities; for the

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class-concept "knowable" would involve all individuals which have a specific knowable character. It may be urged that knowability is one single character, and that things may be otherwise completely different and may yet be one so far as knowability is concerned, and hence the things may remain wholly unknown in their diversity of characters and may yet be known so far as they are merely knowable. To this Śrīhārṣa answers that the class-concept "knowable" would involve all knowables and so even the diversity of characters would be involved within the meaning of the term "knowable."

Again, assuming for the sake of argument that it is possible to have a mental contact with class-concepts through individuals, how can the invariable concomitance itself be observed? If our senses could by themselves observe such relations of concomitance, then there would be no possibility of mistakes in the observation of such concomitance. But such mistakes are committed and corrected by later experience, and there is no way in which one can account for the mistake in the sense-judgment. Again, if this invariable concomitance be defined as avinābhāva, which means that when one is absent the other is also absent, such a definition is faulty; for it may apply to those cases where there is no real invariable concomitance. Thus there is no real concomitance between "earth" and "possibility of being cut"; yet in ākāsa there is absence of earth and also the absence of "possibility of being cut." If it is urged that concomitance cannot be determined by a single instance of the absence of one tallying with the absence of the other, it must be proved that universally in all instances of the absence of the one, e.g. the fire, there is also the absence of the other, e.g. the smoke. But it is as difficult to ascertain such universal absence as it is to ascertain universal concomitance. Again, if this concomitance be defined as the impossibility of the presence of the middle term, the reason or the probans, where the major term or the probandum is also absent, then also it may be said that it is not possible to determine such an impossibility either by sense-knowledge or by any other means.

Now tarka or eliminatory consideration in judging of possibilities cannot be considered as establishing invariable concomitance; for all arguments are based on invariable concomitance, and such an assumption would lead to a vicious mutual interdependence. The great logician Udayana objects to this and says that, if invariable concomitance between smoke and fire be denied, then
there are strong arguments (tarka) against such a denial (bādhakas tarkaḥ), namely, that, if smoke is not regarded as concomitant with fire, then smoke would either exist without any cause or not exist at all, which is impossible. But Śrīharṣa says that there is room for an alternative proposition which Udayana misses, namely, that smoke is due to some cause other than fire. It may be that there are smokes which are not caused by fire. How can one be sure that all smokes are caused by fire? There may be differences in these two classes of fire which remain unnoticed by us, and so there is always room for the supposition that any particular smoke may not be caused by fire, and such doubts would make inference impossible. Udayana had however contended that, if you entertain the doubt, with regard to a future case, that it is possible that there may be a case in which the concomitance may be found wrong, then the possibility of such a doubt (saṅkā) must be supported by inference, and the admission of this would involve the admission of inference. If such an exaggerated doubt be considered illegitimate, there is no obstruction in the way of inference. Doubts can be entertained only so long as such entertainment of doubts is compatible with practical life. Doubts which make our daily life impossible are illegitimate. Every day one finds that food appeases hunger, and, if in spite of that one begins to doubt whether on any particular day when he is hungry he should take food or not, then life would be impossible. Śrīharṣa, however, replies to this contention by twisting the words of Udayana’s own kārikā, in which he says that, so long as there is doubt, inference is invalid; if there is no doubt, this can only be when the invalidity of the inference has been made manifest, and until such invalidity is found there will always be doubts. Hence the argument of possibilities (tarka) can never remove doubts.

Śrīharṣa also objects to the definition of “invariable concomitance” as a natural relation (svābhāvikaḥ sambandhah). He rejects the term “natural relation” and says that invariable concomitance

\begin{align*}
\text{saṅkā} & \text{ ced anumāasty eva } \\
\text{na cec chaṅkā tatastarām } \\
\text{vyāghātvadhir āśaṅkā } \\
\text{tarkaḥ saṅkātvadhir mataḥ.}
\end{align*}


\begin{align*}
\text{vyāghātō yadi saṅkātī } \\
\text{na cec chaṅkā tatastarām } \\
\text{vyāghātvadhir āśaṅkā } \\
\text{tarkaḥ saṅkātvadhir kutah.}
\end{align*}

Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādyā, p. 693.
would not be justifiable in any of its possible meanings, such as (i) depending on the nature of the related (sambandhi-svabhāva-
śrīta), (ii) produced by the nature of the related (sambandhi-sva-
hāva-janya), (iii) not different from the nature constituting the re-
latedness, since, as these would be too wide and would apply even
to those things which are not invariable concomitants, e.g. all that
is earthen can be scratched with an iron needle. Though in some
cases earthen objects may be scratched with an iron needle, not all
earthen objects can be so scratched. He further refutes the definition
of invariable concomitance as a relation not depending upon con-
ditional circumstances (upādhi). Without entering into the
details of Śrīharṣa’s argument it may be pointed out that it rests
very largely on his contention that conditionality of relations can-
not be determined without knowledge of the nature of invariable
concomitance and also that invariable concomitance cannot be
determined without a previous determination of the conditionality
of relations.

Śrīharṣa’s brief refutation of analogy, implication and testimony,
as also his refutation of the definitions of the different fallacies of
inference, are not of much importance from a philosophical point
of view, and need not be detailed here.

Turning now to Śrīharṣa’s refutation of the Nyāya categories,
we note that he begins with the refutation of “being” or positivity
(bhāvatvā). He says that being cannot be defined as being existent
in itself, since non-being is also existent in itself; we can with as
much right speak of being as existing as of non-being as existing;
both non-being and being may stand as grammatical nominatives
of the verb “exists.” Again, each existing thing being unique in
itself, there is no common quality, such as “existence” or “being,”
which is possessed by them all. Again, “being” is as much a
negation of “non-being” as “non-being” of “being”; hence
“being” cannot be defined as that which is not a negation of
anything. Negation is a mere form of speech, and both being and
non-being may be expressed in a negative form.

Turning to the category of non-being (abhāva), Śrīharṣa says
that it cannot be defined as negation of anything; for being may
as well be interpreted as a negation of non-being as non-being of
being (bhāvabhāvayor dvayor api parāprāya-pratikṣepātmakatvāt).
Nor again can non-being be defined as that which opposes being;
for not all non-being is opposed to all being (e.g. in “there is no jug
on the ground” the absence of jug does not oppose the ground in respect of which the jug is denied); if non-being opposes some existent things, then that does not differentiate negation; for there are many existent things which are opposed to one another (e.g. the horse and the bull).

In refuting the Nyāya definition of substance (dravya) as that which is the support of qualities, Śrīharṣa says that even qualities appear to have numeral and other qualities (e.g. we speak of two or three colours, of a colour being deep or light, mixed or primary—and colour is regarded as quality). If it is urged that this is a mistake, then the appearance of the so-called substances as being endowed with qualities may also be regarded as equally erroneous. Again, what is meant by defining substance as the support (āśraya) of qualities? Since qualities may subsist in the class-concept of quality (gunatva), the class-concept of quality ought to be regarded as substance according to the definition. It may be urged that a substance is that in which the qualities inhere. But what would be the meaning here of the particle “in”? How would one distinguish the false appearance, to a jaundiced eye, of yellowness in a white conch-shell and the real appearance of whiteness in the conch-shell? Unless the falsity of the appearance of yellow in the conch-shell is realized, there can be no difference between the one case and the other. Again, substance cannot be defined as the inhering or the material cause (saṃvāyi-kāraṇa), since it is not possible to know which is the inhering cause and which is not; for number is counted as a quality, and colour also is counted as a quality, and yet one specifies colours by numbers, as one, two, or many colours.

Furthermore, the Nyāya definition of quality as that which has a genus and is devoid of qualities is unintelligible; for the definition involves the concept of quality, which is sought to be defined. Moreover, as pointed out above, even qualities, such as colours, have numeral qualities; for we speak of one, two or many colours. It is only by holding to this appearance of qualities endowed with numeral qualities that the definition of quality can be made to stand, and it is again on the strength of the definition of quality that such appearances are to be rejected as false. If colours are known as qualities in consideration of other reasons, then these, being endowed with numeral qualities, could not for that very reason be called qualities; for qualities belong according to definition only to
substances. Even the numerals themselves are endowed with the quality of separateness. So there would not be a single instance that the Naiyāyika could point to as an example of quality.

Speaking of relations, Śriharṣa points out that, if relation is to be conceived as something subsisting in a thing, then its meaning is unintelligible. The meaning of relation as “in” or “herein” is not at all clear; for the notion of something being a container (ādhāra) is dependent on the notion of the concept of “in” or “herein,” and that concept again depends on the notion of a container, and there is no other notion which can explain either of the concepts independently. The container cannot be supposed to be an inhering cause; for in that case such examples as “there is a grape in this vessel” or “the absence of horns in a hare” would be unexplainable. He then takes a number of possible meanings which can be given to the notion of a container; but these, not being philosophically important, are omitted here. He also deals with the impossibility of defining the nature of the subject-object relation (viṣaya-viṣayi-bhāva) of knowledge.

In refuting the definition of cause Śriharṣa says that cause cannot be defined as immediate antecedence; for immediate antecedence can be ascribed only to the causal operation, which is always an intervening factor between the cause and the effect. If, on the theory that what (e.g. the causal operation) belongs to a thing (e.g. the cause) cannot be considered as a factor which stands between it (cause) and that which follows it (effect), the causal operation be not regarded as a separate and independent factor, then even the cause of the cause would have to be regarded as one with the cause and therefore cause. But, if it is urged that, since the cause of the cause is not an operation, it cannot be regarded as being one with the cause, one may well ask the opponent to define the meaning of operation. If the opponent should define it as that factor without which the cause cannot produce the effect, then the accessory circumstances and common and abiding conditions, such as the natural laws, space, and so forth, without which an effect cannot be produced, are also to be regarded as operation, which is impossible. Further, “operation” cannot be qualified as being itself produced by the cause; for it is the meaning of the concept of cause that has still to be explained and defined. If, again, cause is defined as the antecedence of that which is other than the not-cause, then this again would be faulty; for one cannot understand
the "not-cause" of the definition without understanding what is
the nature of cause, and vice-versa. Moreover, space, being a per-
manent substance, is always present as a not-cause of anything,
and is yet regarded as the cause of sound. If, again, cause is defined
as that which is present when the effect is present and absent when
the effect is absent, this would not explain the causality of space,
which is never known to be absent. If, again, cause is defined as
invariable antecedence, then permanent substances such as space
are to be regarded as the sole causes of effects. If, however, in-
variable antecedence be understood to mean unconditional ante-
cedence, then two coexistent entities such as the taste and the
colour of an earthen pot which is being burnt must mutually be
the cause of the colour and the taste of the burnt earthen pot; for
neither does the colour condition taste, nor does the taste condition
colour. Moreover, if mere invariable antecedents be regarded as
cause, then the invariably preceding symptoms of a disease are to
be regarded as the cause of the disease on account of their in-
variable antecedence. Again, causality cannot be regarded as a
specific character or quality belonging to certain things, which
quality can be directly perceived by us as existing in things. Thus
we may perceive the stick of the potter's wheel to be the cause
of the particular jugs produced by it, but it is not possible to
perceive causality as a general quality of a stick or of any other
thing. If causality existed only with reference to things in general,
then it would be impossible to conceive of the production of
individual things, and it would not be possible for anyone to know
which particular cause would produce a particular effect. On the
other hand, it is not possible to perceive by the senses that an
individual thing is the cause of a number of individual effects; for
until these individual effects are actually produced it is not possible
to perceive them, since perception involves sense-contact as its
necessary condition. It is not necessary for our present purposes
to enter into all the different possible concepts of cause which
Śrīhāraṇa seeks to refute: the above examination is expected to
give a fairly comprehensive idea of the methods of Śrīhāraṇa's
refutation of the category of cause.

Nor is it possible within the limited range of the present work
to give a full account of all the different alternative defences of the
various categories accepted in Nyāya philosophy, or of all the
various ways in which Śrīhāraṇa sought to refute them in his
Khanda-khanda-khadya. I have therefore attempted to give here only some specimens of the more important parts of his dialectical argument. The chief defect of Sriharsha's criticisms is that they often tend to grow into verbal sophisms, and lay greater stress on the faults of expression of the opponent's definitions and do not do him the justice of liberally dealing with his general ideas. It is easy to see how these refutations of the verbal definitions of the Nyaya roused the defensive spirit of the Naiyayikas into re-stating their definitions with proper qualifying phrases and adjuncts, by which they avoided the loopholes left in their former definitions for the attack of Sriharsha and other critics. In one sense, therefore, the criticisms of Sriharsha and some of his followers had done a great disservice to the development of later Nyaya thought; for, unlike the older Nyaya thinkers, later Nyaya writers, like Gangeśa, Raghuṇātha and others, were mainly occupied in inventing suitable qualifying adjuncts and phrases by which they could define their categories in such a way that the undesirable applications and issues of their definitions, as pointed out by the criticisms of their opponents, could be avoided. If these criticisms had mainly been directed towards the defects of Nyaya thought, later writers would not have been forced to take the course of developing verbal expressions at the expense of philosophical profundity and acuteness. Sriharsha may therefore be said to be the first great writer who is responsible indirectly for the growth of verbalism in later Nyaya thought.

Another defect of Sriharsha's criticisms is that he mainly limits himself to criticizing the definitions of Nyaya categories and does not deal so fully with the general ideas involved in such categories of thought. It ought, however, in all fairness to Sriharsha to be said that, though he took the Nyaya definitions as the main objective of his criticisms, yet in dealing with the various alternative variations and points of view of such definitions he often gives an exhaustive treatment of the problems involved in the discussion. But in many cases his omissions become very glaring. Thus, for example, in his treatment of relations he only tries to refute the definitions of relation as container and contained, as inherence, and as subject-object relation of cognitions, and leaves out many other varieties of relation which might well have been dealt with. Another characteristic feature of his refutation is, as has already been pointed out, that he has only a destructive point of view and is
Citsukha’s Interpretations of the Concepts of Śaṅkara Vedānta.

Citsukha (about A.D. 1220), a commentator on Śrīharṣa, had all Śrīharṣa’s powers of acute dialectical thought, but he not only furnishes, like Śrīharṣa, a concise refutation of the Nyāya categories, but also, in his Tattva-pradīpikā, commented on by Pratyagbhāgavān (A.D. 1400) in his Nayana-prasādini1, gives us a very acute

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1 Citsukha, a pupil of Gaudeśvara Ācārya, called also Jānottama, wrote a commentary on Anandabodha Bhaṭṭarakācārya’s Nyāya-maharāṇa and also on Śrīharṣa’s Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khaḍya and an independent work called Tattva-pradīpikā or Citsukha, on which the study of the present section is based. In this work he quotes Udayana, Uddyotakara, Kumārila, Padmapāda, Vallabha (Lilāvatī), Śalikanātha, Suresvara, Sīvāditya, Kulārka Paṇḍita and Śridhara.
analysis and interpretation of some of the most important concepts of Śaṅkara Vedānta. He is not only a protector of the Advaita doctrine of the Vedānta, but also an interpreter of the Vedāntic concepts. The work is written in four chapters. In the first chapter Citsukha deals with the interpretation of the Vedānta concepts of self-revelation (śva-prakāśa), the nature of self as consciousness (ātmānāh saṃvid-rūpataca), the nature of ignorance as darkness, the nature of falsity (mithyāteva), the nature of nescience (avidyā), the nature of the truth of all ideas (sarva-pratyayānām yathārthatvam), the nature of illusions, etc. In the second chapter he refutes the Nyāya categories of difference, separateness, quality, action, class-concepts, specific particulars (viśeṣa), the relation of inherence (samavēya), perception, doubt, illusion, memory, inference, invariable concomitance (vyāpti), induction (vyāpti-graha), existence of the reason in the minor term (pakṣa-dharmatā), reason (hetu), analogy (upamāna), implication, being, non-being, duality, measure, causality, time, space, etc. In the third chapter, the smallest of the book, he deals with the possibility of the realization of Brahman and the nature of release through knowledge. In the fourth chapter, which is much smaller than the first two, he deals with the nature of the ultimate state of emancipation.

Citsukha starts with a formal definition of the most fundamental concept of the Vedānta, namely the concept of self-revelation or self-illumination (śva-prakāśa). Both Padmapāda and Prakāśātmaka in the Pañca-pādikā and Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa had distinguished the self from the ego as self-revelation or self-illumination (Nyāya-kandati). In addition to these he also wrote a commentary on the Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya of Śaṅkara, called Bhāṣya-bhāva-prakāśikā, Vivaraṇa-tātparyā-dīpikā, a commentary on the Pramāṇa-māla of Ānandabodha, a commentary on Maṇḍana’s Brahma-siddhi, called Abhiprāṇa-prakāśikā, and an index to the adhikaraṇas of the Brahma-sūtra, called Adhikaraṇa-mañjarī. His teacher Jñānottama wrote two works on Vedānta, called Nyāya-sūkha and Jñāna-siddhi; but he seems to have been a different person from the Jñānottama who wrote a commentary on Sūrēśvara’s Naiṣkarmya-siddhi; for the latter was a householder (as he styles himself with a householder’s title, mītra), and an inhabitant of the village of Mangala in the Cola country, while the former was an ascetic and a preceptor of the King of Gauḍa, as Citsukha describes him in his colophon to his Tatvā-pradīpikā. He is also said to have written the Brahma-stuti, Vīśṇu-purāṇa-tīkā, Śaṅkararaṇa-saṃgraha-vyākhyā, Adhikaraṇa-saṅgati (a work explaining the inter-relation of the topics of the Brahma-sūtra) and a commentary on the Naiṣkarmya-siddhi, called the Naiṣkarmya-siddhi-tīkā or the Bhāva-tatvā-prakāśikā. His pupil Sukhaprakāśa wrote a work on the topics of the Brahma-sūtra, called Adhikaraṇa-ratna-māla. 3

1 Thus Paṇḍita Harinātha Śarmā in his Sanskrit introduction to the Tatvā-pradīpikā or Citsukha speaks of this work as advaita-siddhānta-rakṣaka ‘py advaita-siddhānta-prakāśaka vyutpādakaś ca.
nation (svayam-prakāśa). Thus Prakāśātman says that consciousness (samvid) is self-revealing and that its self-revelation is not due to any other self-revealing cause\(^1\). It is on account of this natural self-revelation of consciousness that its objects also appear as self-revealing\(^2\). Padmapāda also says the same thing, when he states that the self is of the nature of pure self-revealing consciousness; when this consciousness appears in connection with other objects and manifests them, it is called experience (anubhava), and, when it is by itself, it is called the self or ātman\(^3\). But Citsukha was probably the first to give a formal definition of the nature of this self-revelation.

Citsukha defines it as that which is entitled to be called immediate (aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogya), though it is not an object of any cognition or any cognizing activity (avedyate 'pi)\(^4\). It may be objected that desires, feelings, etc. also are not objects of any cognition and yet are entitled to be regarded as immediate, and hence the definition might as well apply to them; for the object of cognition has a separate objective existence, and by a mind-object contact the mind is transformed into the form of the object, and thereby the one consciousness, which was apparently split up into two forms as the object-consciousness which appeared as material objects and the subject-consciousness which appeared as the cognizer, is again restored to its unity by the super-imposition of the subjective form on the objective form, and the object-form is revealed in consciousness as a jug or a book. But in the case of our experience of our will or our feelings these have no existence separate from our own mind and hence are not cognized in the same way as external objects are cognized. According to Vedānta epistemology these subjective experiences of will, emotions, etc. are different mental constituents, forms or states, which, being directly and illusorily imposed upon the self-revealing consciousness, become experienced. These subjective states are therefore not cognized in the same way as external objects. But, since the

\(^1\) samvedanaṁ tu svayam-prakāśa eva na prakāśāntara-hetuḥ. Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa, p. 52.
\(^2\) tamād anubhavā sajātīya-prakāśāntara-nirapekṣaḥ prakāśāmāna eva viśaye prakāśādi-vyavahāra-nimittam bhavitum arhati avyavadhünena viśaye prakāśādi-vyavahāra-nimittataḥ. Ibid.
\(^3\) tamād cit-svabhāva evātmā dēnā prameya-bhedena upadhyayamāno 'nubha-vābhidhūntyakam labhate avivaktotpādhir ātmādi-sabdaiḥ. Pañca-pādikā, p. 19.
experience of these states is possible only through a process of illusory imposition, they are not entitled to be called immediate\(^1\). So, though they appear as immediate, they have no proper yogyātā, or, in other words, they are not entitled to be called immediate. But in the true sense even external objects are but illusory impositions on the self-revealing consciousness, and hence they also cannot be said to be entitled to be called immediate. There is therefore no meaning in trying to distinguish the self-revealing consciousness as one which is not an object of cognition; for on the Vedānta theory there is nothing which is entitled to be called immediate, and hence the phrase avedyatve (not being an object of cognition) is unnecessary as a special distinguishing feature of the self-revealing consciousness; the epithet “immediate” is therefore also unnecessary. To such an objection Citṣukha’s reply is that the experience of external objects is only in the last stage of world-dissolution and Brahmahood found non-immediate and illusory, and, since in all our ordinary stages of experience the experience of world-objects is immediate, the epithet avedyatva successfully distinguishes self-revealing consciousness from all cognitions of external objects which are entitled to be called immediate and are to be excluded from the range of self-revealing consciousness only by being objects of cognition. In the field of ordinary experience the perceived world-objects are found to be entitled to be called immediate no less than the self-revealing consciousness, and it is only because they are objects of cognition that they can be distinguished from the self-revealing consciousness.

The main argument in favour of the admission of the category of independent self-revealing consciousness is that, unless an independent self-revealing consciousness is admitted, there would be a vicious series in the process preceding the rise of any cognition; for, if the pure experience of self-revealing consciousness has to be further subjected to another process before it can be understood, then that also might require another process, and that another, and so there would be an unending series. Moreover, that the pure experience is self-revealing is proved by the very fact of the experience itself; for no one doubts his own experience or stands in need of any further corroboration or confirmation as to whether he experienced or not. It may be objected

that it is well known that we may be aware of our awareness of anything (anu-vyavasāya), and in such a case the self-revealing consciousness may become further cognized. Citsukha's reply to this is that, when one perceives a jug, there is the mental activity, then a cessation of that activity, then a further starting of new activity and then the knowledge that I know the jug, or rather I know that I know the jug—and hence such a cognition cannot be said to be directly and immediately cognizing the first awareness, which could not have stayed through so many moments. Again, since neither the senses nor the external objects can of themselves produce the self-revelation of knowledge, if knowledge were not admitted as self-revealing, the whole world would be blind and there would be no self-revelation. When one knows that he knows a book or a jug, it is the cognized object that is known and not the awareness that is cognized; there can be no awareness of awareness, but only of the cognized object. If the previous awareness could be made the object of subsequent awareness, then this would amount to an admission of the possibility of the self being known by the self (svasyāpi svena vedyatvatpāt)—a theory which would accord not with the Vedānta idealism, but with the Buddhistic. It is true, no doubt, that the pure self-revealing consciousness shows itself only on the occasion of a mental state; but its difference from other cognitive states lies in the fact that it has no form or object, and hence, though it may be focussed by a mental state, yet it stands on a different footing from the objects illuminated by it.

The next point that Citsukha urges is that the self is of the nature of pure self-revealing consciousness (ātmanah samvid-rūpatva). This is, of course, no new contribution by Citsukha, since this view had been maintained in the Upaniṣads and repeated by Śaṅkara, Padmapāda, Prakāśātman and others. Citsukha says that, like knowledge, the self also is immediately revealed or experienced without itself being the object of any cognizing activity or cognition, and therefore the self is also of the nature of knowledge. No one doubts about his own self; for the self always stands directly and


2 vidāto ghāṭa ity atra amucyavasāyena ghāṭasyaiva viditatvam avastyate na tu vittēḥ. Ibid. p. 18.
immediately self-revealed. Self and knowledge being identical, there is no relation between the two save that of identity (jñānātmanoḥ sambandhasyaiva abhāvāt).

Citsukha defines falsity (mithyātva) as the non-existence of a thing in that which is considered to be its cause. He shows this by pointing out that a whole, if it is to exist anywhere, must exist in the parts of which it is made, and, if it does not exist even there, it does not exist anywhere and is false. It is, however, evident that a whole cannot exist in the parts, since, being a whole, it cannot be in the parts. Another argument adduced by Citsukha for the falsity of the world-appearance is that it is impossible that there should be any relation between the self-revealing consciousness, the knower (drṣk), and the objects which are cognized (drṣya). Knowledge cannot be said to arise through sense-contact; for in the illusory perception of silver there is the false perception of silver without any actual sense-contact with silver. A reference to subject-object relation (viṣaya-viṣayi-bhāva) cannot explain it, since the idea of subject-object relation is itself obscure and unexplainable. Arguing as to the impossibility of properly explaining the subject-object relation (viṣaya-viṣayi-bhāva) in knowledge, Citsukha says that it cannot be held that the subject-object relation means that knowledge produces some change in the object (viṣaya) and that the knower produces such a change. For what may be the nature of such a change? If it be described as jñātatā, or the character of being known, how can such a character be by my knowledge at the present moment generated as a positive quality in an object which has now ceased to exist? If such a quality can be produced even in past objects, then there would be no fixed law according to which such qualities should be produced. Nor can such a relationship be explained on a pragmatic basis by a reference to actual physical practical action with reference to objects that we know or the internal volitions or emotions associated with our knowledge of things. For in picking up a piece of silver that we see in front of us we may quite unknowingly be drawing with it the drop contained in the silver, and hence the fact of the physical

1 sarveṣām api bhāvānām ādvrayatvena sammate pratyayogitvam atyantabhāvam prati mṛṣātmata. Cit-sukha, p. 39.
Some of these definitions of falsity are collected in Madhusūdana's Advaitasiddhi, a work composed much later than the Cit-sukha.

2 amśinaḥ svāmī-gātāntabhāvaya pratyayoginaṁ amśātīvad itarāntīvad... vimataḥ paṭaḥ etat-tantu-niśṭhāntabhāva-pratyayogāvayavīvad pañāntaravat. Cit-sukha, pp. 40, 41.
drawing of the dross cannot on that ground alone make it an object of my knowledge, and hence the subject-object relation of knowledge cannot be defined as a mere physical action following cognition. The internal mental states of volition and the emotions associated with knowledge belong to the knower and have nothing to do with the object of knowledge. If, however, it is urged that objectivity consists in the fact that whatever is known appears in consciousness, the question arises, what does this appearing in consciousness mean? It cannot mean that consciousness is the container and the object is contained in it; for, consciousness being internal and the object external, the object cannot be contained in it. It cannot be a mere undefined relatedness; for in that case the object may as well be considered subject and the subject, object. If objectivity be defined as that which can induce knowledge, then even the senses, the light and other accessories which help the rise of knowledge may as well be regarded as objects. Object cannot be defined as that to which knowledge owes its particular form; for, knowledge being identical with its form, all that helps the rise of knowledge, the senses, light, etc., may as well be regarded as objects. So, in whatever way one may try to conceive the nature of the subject-object relation, he will be disappointed.

Citsukha follows the traditional view of nescience (ajñāna) as a positive entity without beginning which disappears with the rise of true knowledge. Nescience is different from the conception of positivity as well as of negativity, yet it is called only positive because of the fact that it is not negative. Ignorance or nescience is described as a positive state and not a mere negation of knowledge; and so it is said that the rise of right knowledge of any object in a person destroys the positive entity of ignorance with reference to that object and that this ignorance is something different from what one would understand by negation of right knowledge. Citsukha says that the positive character of ignorance becomes apparent when we say that "We do not know whether what you say is true." Here there is the right knowledge of the fact that

1 anādi-bhūva-rūpaṃ yad-vijñānena viśtyate tad ajñānam iti prajñā-lakṣaṇam sampracaikate anādite satī bhūva-rūpaṃ vijñāna-nirūhyam ajñānam iti lakṣaṇam iha vivakṣitaṃ. Cit-sukha, p. 57.

2 bhāvābhāva-viśeṣaṇaṃ aajñānasya abhāva-viśeṣaṇātva-mātreṇa bhāvābhāva-pacāraḥ. Ibid.

3 vigātām Deva-datta-astha-pramāṇa-jñānam Devadatta-astha-pramābhāva-tirikṭaṇādernivarttakām pramānato vād Yajñadattādīgata-pramāṇa-jñānavad ity amunānam. Ibid. p. 58.
what is said is known, but it is not known whether what is said is valid. Here also there is a positive knowledge of ignorance of fact, which is not the same as mere absence of knowledge. Such an ignorance, however, is not experienced through sense-contact or sense-processes, but directly by the self-revealing consciousness—the sākṣīn. Just before the rise of right knowledge about an object there is ignorance (ajñāna), and the object, as qualified by such an ignorance, is experienced as being unknown. All things are the objects of the inner unmoved intuitive consciousness either as known or as unknown. Our reference to deep dreamless sleep as a state in which we did not know anything (na kīncid-avediṣam) is also referred to as a positive experience of ignorance in the dreamless state.

One of the chief tenets of Vedānta epistemology lies in the supposition that a presentation of the false is a fact of experience. The opposite view is that of Prabhākara, that the false is never presented in experience and that falsehood consists in the wrong construction imposed upon experience by the mind, which fails to note the actual want of association between two things which are falsely associated as one. According to this theory all illusion consists of a false association or a false relating of two things which are not presented in experience as related. This false association is not due to an active operation of the mind, but to a failure to note that no such association was actually presented in experience (asamsargāgṛaha). According to Prabhākara, the great Mīmāṃsā authority, the false is never presented in experience, nor is the false experience due to an arbitrary positive activity of wrong construction of the mind, but merely to a failure to note certain distinctions presented in experience. On account of such a failure things which are distinct are not observed as distinct, and hence things which are distinct and different are falsely associated as one, and the conch-shell is thus regarded as silver. But here there is no false presentation in experience. Whatever is known is true; falsehood is due to omissions of knowledge and failure in noting differences.

Citsukha objects to this view and urges that such an explanation


2. *Asman-mate aṣṭāṅgasya sākṣi-siddhātayā pramāṇābhyateśāt, pramāṇa-jñāno-dwayāt prākhāle aṣṭāṅgam tad-viṣayaṁ trīḥ sākṣi-siddhāḥ aṣṭāṁ ity anuvadā gocaraḥ ... sarvāṁ vastu jñātatayā aṣṭāṁ aṣṭāṁ viṣayaḥ. Ibid. p. 60.*
can never explain all cases of false apprehension. Take the proposition, "There are false apprehensions and false presentations"; if this proposition is admitted to be correct, then Prabhākara’s contention is false; if it is admitted to be false, then here is a false proposition, the falsehood of which is not due to a failure to note differences. If the falsity of all propositions be said to be due to a failure to note differences, then it would be hard to find out any true proposition or true experience. On the analogy of our false experience of the everchanging flame of a lamp as the same identical one all cases of true recognition might no less be regarded as false, and therefore all inferences would be doubtful. All cases of real and true association could be explained as being due to a failure to note differences. There could be no case in which one could assure himself that he was dealing with a real association and not a failure to apprehend the absence of association (asamsargā-graha). Citsukha therefore contends that it is too much to expect that all cases of false knowledge can be explained as being due to a mere non-apprehension of difference, since it is quite reasonable to suppose that false knowledge is produced by defective senses which oppose the rise of true knowledge and positively induce false appearance\(^1\). Thus in the case of the illusory perception of conch-shell as silver it is the conch-shell that appears as a piece of silver. But what is the nature of the presentation that forms the object (ālambana) of false perception? It cannot be regarded as absolutely non-existent (asat), since that which is absolutely non-existent cannot be the object of even a false perception, and moreover it cannot through such a perception (e.g. the tendency of a man to pick up the piece of silver, which is but a false perception of a piece of conch-shell) induce a practical movement on the part of the perceiver. Neither can it be regarded as existent; for the later experience contradicts the previous false perception, and one says that there is no silver at the present time and there was no silver in the past—it was only the conch-shell that appeared as silver. Therefore the false presentation, though it serves all the purposes of a perceptual object, cannot be described either as existent or as non-existent, and it is precisely this character that constitutes the indefinable nature (anirvacanītya) of all illusions\(^2\).

\(^1\) tathā doṣāḥ āpi yathārtha-jñāna-pratibandhakato ’ham ayathārtha-jñāna-janakato ’h ca kim na syāt. Citsukha, p. 66.

\(^2\) pratyekam sad asatvābhāvam vīcāra-paddaḥ na yad gāhate tad anirvācyam āhur vedānta-vedinaḥ. Ibid. p. 79.
It is unnecessary to deal with the other doctrines of Vedānta which Citsukha describes, since there is nothing new in them and they have already been described in chapter x of volume i of this work. It is therefore desirable to pass on to his dialectic criticism of the Nyāya categories. It will suffice, however, to give only a few of these criticisms, as they mostly refer to the refutation of such kinds of categories as are discussed in Śriharṣa’s great work Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khaḍya, and it would be tedious to follow the refutation of the same kinds of categories by two different writers, though the arguments of Citsukha are in many cases new and different from those given by Śriharṣa. Citsukha’s general approach to such refutations is also slightly different from that of Śriharṣa. For, unlike Śriharṣa, Citsukha dealt with the principal propositions of the Vedānta, and his refutations of the Nyāya categories were not intended so much to show that they were inexplicable or indefinable as to show that they were false appearances, and that the pure self-revealing Brahman was the only reality and truth.

Thus, in refuting time (kāla), Citsukha says that time cannot be perceived either by the visual sense or by the tactual sense, nor can it be apprehended by the mind (manas), as the mind only operates in association with the external senses. Moreover, since there are no perceptual data, it cannot be inferred. The notions of before and after, succession and simultaneity, quickness and duration, cannot by themselves indicate the nature of time as it is in itself. It may be urged that, since the solar vibrations can only be associated with human bodies and worldly things, making them appear as young or old only through some other agency such as days, months, etc., such an agency, which brings about the connection of solar vibrations with worldly things, is called time. To this Citsukha replies that, since the self itself can be regarded as the cause of the manifestation of time in events and things in accordance with the varying conditions of their appearance, it is unnecessary to suppose the existence of a new category called time. Again, it cannot be said that the notions of before and after have time as their material cause; for the validity of these notions is challenged by the Vedāntist. They may be regarded as the im-

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pressions produced by a greater or lesser quantity of solar vibrations. There is therefore no necessity to admit time as a separate category, since its apprehension can be explained on the basis of our known data of experience. From considerations of some data relative space (dik) has to be discarded; for relative space cannot be perceived by the senses or inferred for want of data of experience. Both time and relative space originate from a sense of relativity (apekṣā-buddhi), and, given that sense of relativity, the mind can in association with our experience of bodily movements form the notion of relative space. It is therefore unnecessary to admit the existence of relative space as a separate category.

In refuting the atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣikas Citsukha says that there is no ground for admitting the Vaiśeṣika atoms. If these atoms are to be admitted on the ground that all things are to be conceived as being divisible into smaller and smaller parts, then the same may apply to the atoms as well. If it is urged that one must stop somewhere, that the atoms are therefore regarded as the last state, and are uniform in size and not further divisible, then the specks of dust that are seen in the windows when the sun is shining (called trasarenus) may equally be regarded as the last stage of divisible size. If it is contended that, since these are visible, they have parts and cannot therefore be considered as indivisible, it may be said in reply that, since the Nyāya writers admit that the atoms can be perceived by the yogins, visibility of the trasarenus could not be put forward as a reason why they could not be regarded as indivisible. Moreover, if the atoms were partless, how could they be admitted to combine to produce the grosser material forms? Again, it is not indispensable that atoms should combine to form bigger particles or make grosser appearances possible; for, like threads in a sheet, many particles may make gross appearances possible even without combining. Citsukha then repeats Śaṅkara’s refutation of the concept of wholes and parts, saying that, if the wholes are different from the parts, then they must be in the parts or they would not be there; if they are not in the parts, it would be difficult to maintain that the wholes were made of parts; if they are in the parts, they must be either wholly or partly in them; if they are wholly in the parts, then there would be many such wholes, or in each part the whole would be found; and, if they are partly in the parts, then the same difficulty of wholes and parts would appear.

Again, the concept of contact (saṃyoga) is also inexplicable. It
cannot be defined as the coming together of any two things which are not in contact (aprāptayoh prāptih samyogaḥ); for, until one knows the meaning of the concept of contact, one cannot understand the meaning of the phrase “not in contact.” If it is defined as the coming together of two things which are unrelated, then contact (samyoga) would include even the relation of inherence, such as that which exists between a piece of cloth and the threads. If it is defined as a relation which is produced in time and is transitory (anityah sambandhah janyatva-viññito vā), then cases of beginningless contact would not be included, and even the possession of an article by purchase would have to be included as contact, since this relation of possession is also produced in time. It cannot be objected that “possession” is not a relation, since a relation to be such must be between two things; for, if the objection were valid, the relation between substance and quality would not be a relation, since quality and substance exist together, and there are no two separate things which can be related. If the objector means that the relation must be between two terms, then there are two terms here also, namely, the article possessed and the possessor. Moreover, if contact is defined as relation which does not connect two things in their entirety (avyāpya-ṛttītvā-viññito), then again it would be wrong, since in the case of partless entities the relation of contact cannot connect the parts, as they have no parts. Citsukha refutes the concept of separation (vibhāga) on the same lines and passes over to the refutation of number, as two, three and the like.

Citsukha urges that there is no necessity of admitting the existence of two, three, etc. as separate numbers, since what we perceive is but the one thing, and then by a sense of oscillation and mutual reference (āpeksā-buddhi) we associate them together and form the notions of two, three, etc. These numbers therefore do not exist separately and independently, but are imaginatively produced by mental oscillation and association from the experience of single objects. There is therefore no necessity of thinking that the numbers, two, three, etc., are actually produced. We simply deal with the notions of two, three, etc. on the strength of our powers of mental association.

Citsukha then refutes the notion of class-concept (jāti) on the ground that it cannot be proved either by perception or by inference. The question is what exactly is meant by class-concept. If it is said that, when in perceiving one individual animal we have the notion of a cow, and in perceiving other individual animals also we have the same notion of cow, there is jāti, then it may be replied that this does not necessarily imply the admission of a separate class-concept of cow; for, just as one individual had certain peculiarities which entitled it to be called a cow, so the other individuals had their peculiarities which entitled them to be called cows. We see reflections of the moon in different places and call each of them the moon. What constitutes the essentials of the concept of cow? It is difficult to formulate one universal characteristic of cows; if one such characteristic could be found, then there would be no necessity of admitting the class-concept of cow. For it would then be an individual characteristic, and one would recognize it as a cow everywhere, and there would be no necessity of admitting a separate class-concept. If one admits a class-concept, one has to point out some trait or quality as that which indicates the class-concept. Then again one could not get at this trait or quality independently of the class-concept or at the class-concept independently of it, and this mutual dependence would make the definition of either of them impossible. Even if one admits the class-concept, one has to show what constitutes the essentials of it in each case, and, if such essentials have to be found in each case, then those essentials would be a sufficient justification for knowing a cow as cow and a horse as horse: what then is the good of admitting a class-concept? Again, even if a class-concept be admitted, it is difficult to see how it can be conceived to be related to the individuals. It cannot be a relation of contact, identity, inherence or any other kind of relation existing anywhere. If all class-concepts existed everywhere, there would be a medley of all class-concepts together, and all things would be everywhere. Again, if it is held that the class-concept of cow exists only in the existing cows, then how does it jump to a new cow when it is born? Nor has the class-concept any parts, so as to be partly here and partly there. If each class-concept of cow were wholly existent in each of the individual cows, then there would be a number of class-concepts; and, if each class-concept of cow were spread out over all the individual cows, then, unless all the individual cows were
brought together, one could not have the notion of any class-concept.

Speaking of the refutation of cause (kāraṇa), Citsukha says that cause cannot be defined as mere antecedence (pūreva-kāla-bhāvitva); for then the ass which is always found in the house of a washerman and on the back of which the washerman carries his clothes might be regarded as a thing antecedent to the smoky fire kindled in the washerman’s house and thus as a cause of fire. If this antecedence be further qualified as that which is present in all cases of the presence of the effect and absent in all cases of the absence of the effect, then also the washerman’s ass may be considered to satisfy the conditions of such an antecedence with reference to the fire in the washerman’s house (when the washerman is away from the house with his ass, the fire in the washerman’s house is also absent, and it is again kindled when he returns to his house with his ass). If “unconditionality” (ananyathā-siddha) is further added as a qualifying condition of antecedence, even then the ass and the common abiding elements such as space, ether and the like may be regarded as causes of the fire. If it be argued that the ass is present only because of the presence of other conditioning factors, the same may be said of seeds, earth, water, etc., which are all however regarded as being causes for the production of the shoots of plants. If objection be raised against the possibility of ether (ākāśa) being regarded as the cause of smoke on the ground of its being a common, abiding and all-pervasive element, then the same argument ought to stand as an objection against the soul (which is an all-pervasive entity) being regarded on the Nyāya view as the cause of the production of pleasure and pain. The cause cannot be defined as that which being there the effect follows; for then a seed cannot be regarded as the cause of the shoot of the plant, since the shoots cannot be produced from seeds without the help of other co-operating factors, such as earth, water, light, air, etc. Cause, again, cannot be defined as that which being present in the midst of the co-operating factors or even accessories (sahakāri), the effect follows; for an irrelevant thing, like an ass, may be present among a number of co-operating circumstances, but this would not justify anybody calling an irrelevant thing a cause. Moreover, such a definition would not apply to those cases where by the joint operation of many co-operating entities the effect is produced. Furthermore, unless the cause can be properly defined, there is
no way of defining the co-operating conditions. Nor can a cause be defined as that which being there the effect follows, and which not being there there is no effect (sati bhāvo 'saty abhāva eva); for such a maxim is invalidated by the plurality of causes (fire may be produced by rubbing two pieces of wood, by striking hard against a flint, or by a lens). It may be urged that there are differences in each kind of fire produced by the different agencies: to which it may be replied that, even if there were any such difference, it is impossible to know it by observation. Even when differences are noticeable, such differences do not necessarily imply that the different effects belong to different classes; for the differences might well be due to various attendant circumstances. Again, a cause cannot be defined as a collocation of things, since such a collocation may well be one of irrelevant things. A cause cannot be defined as a collocation of different causes, since it has not so far been possible to define what is meant by "cause." The phrase "collocation of causes" will therefore be meaningless. Moreover, it may be asked whether a collocation of causes (sāmagri) be something different from the causes, or identical with them. If the former alternative be accepted, then effects would follow from individual causes as well, and the supposition of a collocation of causes as producing the effects would be uncalled-for. If the latter alternative be accepted, then, since the individuals are the causes of the collocation, the individuals being there, there is always the collocation and so always the effect, which is absurd. Again, what does this collocation of causes mean? It cannot mean occurrence in the same time or place; for, there being no sameness of time and place for time and place respectively, they themselves would be without any cause. Again, it cannot be said that, if the existence of cause be not admitted, then things, being causeless, would be non-existent; for the Nyāya holds that there are eternal substances such as atoms, souls, etc., which have no cause.

Since cause cannot be defined, neither can effect (kārya) be satisfactorily defined, as the conception of effect always depends upon the notion of cause.

In refuting the conception of substance (dravya) Citsukha says that a substance can be defined only as being that in which the qualities inhere. But, since even qualities are seen to have qualities and a substance is believed by the Naiyāyikas to be without any quality at the moment of its origination, such a definition cannot
properly distinguish or define a substance. If a substance be defined in a roundabout way as that in which there is no presence of the absolute negation of possessing qualities (guna\textsubscript{va}t\textsubscript{an}t\textsubscript{ā}bhāv\textsubscript{ā}vānadhik\textsubscript{a}n\textsubscript{a}t\textsubscript{a}), then also it may be objected that such a definition would make us regard even negation (abhā\textsubscript{a}va) as a quality, since the absence of the negation of qualities, being itself a negation, cannot exist in a negation\textsuperscript{1}. It may again be asked whether the absence of the negation of qualities refers to the negation of a number of qualities or the negation of all qualities; in either case it is wrong. For in the first case a substance, which contains only some qualities and does not possess others, would not be called a substance, and in the latter case it would be difficult to find anything that cannot be called a substance; for where is the substance which lacks all qualities? The fact also remains that even such a roundabout definition cannot distinguish a substance from a quality; for even qualities have the numerical qualities and the qualities of separateness\textsuperscript{3}. If it is argued that, if qualities are admitted to have further qualities, there will be a vicious infinite, it may be said in reply that the charge of vicious infinite cannot be made, since the qualities of number and separateness cannot be said to have any further qualities. Substances, again, have nothing in common by virtue of which they could be regarded as coming under the class-concept of substances\textsuperscript{3}. Gold and mud and trees are all regarded as substances, but there is nothing common in them by virtue of which one can think that gold is the same as mud or tree; therefore it cannot be admitted that in the substances one finds any characteristic which remains the same in them all\textsuperscript{4}.

Referring to qualities (guna), Citsukha deals with the definition of guna in the Vaiśeṣika-bhāṣya of Praśastapāda. There Praśastapāda defines guna as that which inheres in a substance, is associated with the class-concept of substance, is itself without any quality

\textsuperscript{1} tatra\textsubscript{a}iva atya\textsubscript{t}ābhāv\textsubscript{e}t\textsubscript{Ī}c\textsubscript{a}t\textsubscript{e}\textsubscript{t}; sopī hi guna\textsubscript{va}t\textsubscript{a}t\textsubscript{a}nt\textsubscript{ā}bhāv\textsubscript{ā}vas tasya\textsubscript{dhi}h\textsubscript{a}ra\textsubscript{na}t\textsubscript{ā}m svarya\textsubscript{s}v\textsubscript{a}m\textsubscript{n}in\textsubscript{n}a\textsubscript{v}r\textsubscript{t}t\textsubscript{t}t\textsubscript{h}. Cits-sukhī, p. 176.

\textsuperscript{2} asminnu\textsubscript{a}pi va\textsubscript{v}k\textsubscript{r}a-lak\textsubscript{s}aṇe guṇā\textsubscript{di}ṣu api saṁk\textsubscript{h}kṣyā-p\textsubscript{r}thak\textsubscript{t}var-guṇ\textsubscript{a}y\textsubscript{a}ḥ pr\textsubscript{r}at\textsubscript{t}\textsubscript{e}ḥ kathām nāti\textsubscript{v}yā\textsubscript{p}t\textsubscript{ē}ḥ. Ibid. p. 177.

\textsuperscript{3} jātīm abhyupagacch\textsubscript{a}tā tajjā\textsubscript{t}tī-tya\textsubscript{ṇ}jak\textsubscript{a}m kiṃcid-av\textsubscript{a}l\textsubscript{y}am abhy\textsubscript{u}pe\textsubscript{y}am na ca tamini\textsubscript{p}r\textsubscript{a}ṇam su\textsubscript{i}jak\textsubscript{a}m. Ibid. p. 178.

\textsuperscript{4} dru\textsubscript{v}y\textsubscript{a}ṃ dru\textsubscript{v}y\textsubscript{a}ṃ iti anu\textsubscript{g}a\textsubscript{t}a-prat\textsubscript{y}ay\textsubscript{a}ḥ pramā\textsubscript{ṇ}aṃ iti cenna sv\textsubscript{a}r\textsubscript{n}aṁ-upal\textsubscript{a}bh\textsubscript{y}a mṛt\textsubscript{t}tīm-upal\textsubscript{a}bh\textsubscript{y}amān\textsubscript{a}na\textsubscript{y}a lāv\textsubscript{h}kh\textsubscript{a}ṣya tād ev\textsubscript{e}vaṃ dru\textsubscript{v}y\textsubscript{a}ṃ iti prat\textsubscript{y}ay\textsubscript{a}ḥ-bhād\textsubscript{v}āt part\textsubscript{h}yak\textsubscript{a}ṇ\textsubscript{a}ṃ cānu\textsubscript{g}a\textsubscript{t}a-prat\textsubscript{y}ay\textsubscript{e} vīpr\textsubscript{a}tip\textsubscript{a}ṭ\textsubscript{t}t\textsubscript{ē}. Ibid. p. 179.
and which has no motion (niśkriya)\textsuperscript{1}. But the definition of a quality cannot involve the phrase “without a quality”; for quality is still to be defined. Again, unless the guṇa is properly defined, its difference from motion is not known, and so the phrase “which has no motion” is meaningless. The class-concept of quality, again, can be determined only when the general character of qualities is known and the nature of class-concepts also is determined. Hence, from whatever point of view one may look at the question, it is impossible to define qualities.

It is needless now to multiply examples of such refutation by Citsukha. It will appear from what has been adduced that Citsukha enters into detail concerning most concepts of particular categories and tries to show their intrinsic impossibility. In some cases, however, he was not equal to the task and remained content with criticizing the definitions given by the Naiyāyikas. But it may be well to point out here that, though Śrīharṣa and Citsukha carried out an elaborate scheme of a critique of the different categories in order to show that the definitions of these categories, as given by the Nyāya, are impossible, yet neither of them can be regarded as the originator of the application of the dialectic method in the Vedānta. Śaṅkara himself had started it in his refutation of the Nyāya and other systems in his commentary on the Vedānta-sūtras, II. 11.

The Dialectic of Nāgārjuna and the Vedānta Dialectic.

The dialectic of Śrīharṣa was a protest against the realistic definitions of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which supposed that all that was knowable was also definable. It aimed at refuting these definitions in order to prove that the natures of all things are indefinable, as their existence and nature are all involved in māyā. The only reality is Brahman. That it is easy to pick holes in all definitions was taught long ago by Nāgārjuna, and in that sense (except for a tendency to find faults of a purely verbal nature in Nyāya definitions) Śrīharṣa’s method was a continuation of Nāgārjuna’s, and an application of it to the actual definitions of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. But the most important part of Nāgārjuna’s method was deliberately ignored by Śrīharṣa and his followers, who made no attempt to refute Nāgārjuna’s conclusions. Nāgārjuna’s main thesis is that all things are relative and hence indefinable in

\textsuperscript{1} rūpāndnām guṇāndnām sarveṣām guṇatvābhīṣambandho svayārītītvaṁ nirguṇatvaṁ niśkriyātvam. Praśastāpāda-bhāṣya, p. 94, The Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1895.
themselves, and so there is no way of discovering their essences; and, since their essences are not only indefinable and indescribable, but incomprehensible as well, they cannot be said to possess any essences of their own. Nāgārjuna was followed by Āryadeva, a Ceylonese by birth, who wrote a separate work on the same subject in 400 verses. For about two centuries after this the doctrines of Nāgārjuna lay dormant, as is evidenced by the fact that Buddhaghoṣa of the fourth century A.D. does not refer to them. During the Gupta empire, in the fifth century A.D., Asaṅga and Vasubandhu flourished. In the sixth century A.D. the relativist philosophy of Nāgārjuna again flourished in the hands of Buddhapañjita, of Valabhi in Surat, and of Bhavya, or Bhāvaviveka, of Orissa. The school of Bhavya was called Mādhyamika-Sautrāntika on account of his supplementing Nāgārjuna’s arguments with special arguments of his own. At this time the Yogācāra school of Mahāyāna monism developed in the north, and the aim of this school was to show that for the true knowledge of the one consciousness (vijñāna) all logical arguments were futile. All logical arguments showed only their own inconsistency. It seems very probable that Śrīharṣa was inspired by these Yogācāra authors, and their relativist allies from Nāgārjuna to Bhavya, and Candrakīrti, the master commentator on Nāgārjuna’s Mādhyamika-kārikā. Buddhapañjita sought to prove that the apprehension and realization of the idealistic monism cannot be made by any logical argument, since all logic is futile and inconsistent, while Bhāvaviveka sought to establish his idealistic monism by logical arguments. Candrakīrti finally supported Buddhapañjita’s scheme as against the scheme of Bhāvaviveka and tried to prove the futility of all logical arguments. It was this Mādhyamika scheme of Candrakīrti that finally was utilized in Tibet and Mongolia for the realization of idealistic monism.

In taking up his refutation of the various categories of being Nāgārjuna begins with the examination of causation. Causation in the non-Buddhist systems of philosophy is regarded as being production from the inner changes of some permanent or abiding stuff or through the conglomerate (sāmagri) of several factors or through some factors operating upon an unchangeable and abiding stuff. But Nāgārjuna denies not only that anything is ever produced, but also that it is ever produced in any one of the above ways. Buddhapañjita holds that things cannot arise

1 The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, pp. 66–67. Published by the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. Leningrad, 1927.
of themselves, since, if they are already existing, there is no meaning in their being produced; if things that are existing are regarded as capable of being produced again, then things would eternally continue to be produced. Bhāvaviveka, criticizing Buddhapālīta, says that the refutation of Buddhapālīta should have been supplemented with reasons and examples and that his refutation would imply the undesirable thesis that, if things are not produced of themselves, they must be produced by other factors. But Candrakīrti objects to this criticism of Bhāvaviveka and says that the burden of proof in establishing the identity of cause and effect lies with the opponents, the Śāmkhyists, who hold that view. There is no meaning in the production of what already exists, and, if that which is existent has to be produced again, and that again, there will be an infinite regress. It is unnecessary to give any new argument to refute the Śāmkhya sat-kārya-vāda view; it is enough to point out the inconsistency of the Śāmkhya view. Thus Āryadeva says that the Mādhyamika view has no thesis of its own which it seeks to establish, since it does not believe in the reality or unreality of anything or in the combination of reality and unreality. This was exactly the point of view that was taken by Śrīharṣa. Śrīharṣa says that the Vedāntists have no view of their own regarding the things of the world and the various categories involved in them. Therefore there was no way in which the Vedānta view could be attacked. The Vedānta, however, is free to find fault with other views, and, when once this is done and the inconsistencies of other positions are pointed out, its business is finished; for it has no view of its own to establish. Nāgārjuna writes in his Vīgraha-vyāvartant thus:

When I have these (of my own to prove),
I can commit mistakes just for the sake (of proving);
But I have none. I cannot be accused (of being inconsistent).
If I did (really) cognize some (separate) things,
I could then make an affirmation or a denial
Upon the basis of these things perceived or (inferred).
But these (separate) things do not exist for me.
Therefore I cannot be assailed on such a basis.

sad asat sad-asac ceti yasya pakṣo na vidyate
upālamḥaṁ cireṇaṁ tasya vaktum na šakyate.

Mādhyamika-vṛtti, p. 16.

anyat pratiṣṭya yadi nāma paro 'bhavat-sāvityat
jāyeta tarhi bahulaḥ sikhino 'ndhakāraḥ
sarvasya janma ca bhavet khalu sarvataḥ ca
tulyam paraṁvam akhile 'janake 'pi yasmāt.

Ibid. p. 36.
Candrakīrti thus emphasizes the fact that it is not possible for the Mādhyamikas to offer new arguments or new examples in criticizing any view, since they have no view of their own to support. They cannot even prove their own affirmations, and, if their affirmations contain any thesis, they quarrel with it also themselves. So the Mādhyamika scheme of criticism consists only in finding fault with all theses, whatever they may be, and in replying to the counter-charges so far as inconsistencies can be found in the opponents’ theses and methods, but not in adducing any new arguments or any new counter-theses, since the Mādhyamikas have no theses of their own. In an argument one can only follow the principles that one admits; no one can be defeated by arguments carried on on the basis of principles admitted only by his opponents.

Things are not produced by any conglomeration of foreign factors or causes; for, were it so, there would be no law of such production and anything might come from any other thing, e.g. darkness from light. And, if a thing cannot be produced out of itself or out of others, it cannot be produced by a combination of them both. Again, the world could not have sprung into being without any cause (ahetutah).

The Buddhist logicians try to controvert this view by pointing out that, whatever a view may be, it must be established by proper proof. So, in order to prove the thesis that all existents are unproduced, the Mādhyamikas must give some proofs, and this would involve a further specification of the nature of such proofs and a specification of the number of valid proofs admitted by them. But, if the thesis that “all existents are unproved” is a mere assertion without any proof to support it, then any number of counter-assertions may be made for which no proof need be shown; and, if proofs are not required in one case, they cannot be required in the other. So one could with equal validity assert that all existents are real and are produced from causes. The Mādhyamika answer to such an objection, as formulated by Candrakīrti, is that the Mādhyamika has no thesis of his own and so the question whether his thesis is supported by valid proof or not is as meaningless as the question regarding the smallness or the greatness of a mule’s horn. Since there is no thesis, the Mādhyamika has nothing to

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1 Mādhyamika-vyākhyā, p. 36. See also Stcherbatsky’s *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, to which the author is indebted for the translation and some of the materials of the last two paragraphs.
say regarding the nature of valid proofs (pramāṇa) or their number. But it may well be asked why, if the Mādhyamika has no thesis of his own, should he hold the proposition that all existents are unproduced (sarve bhāvānupannāḥ)? To this the Mādhyamika replies that such propositions appear as definite views only to ordinary people, not to the wise. The proper attitude for the wise is always to remain silent. They impart instruction only from a popular point of view to those who want to listen to them. Their arguments are not their own or those which they believe to be right, but only such as would appeal to their hearers.

It is not out of place here to mention that the Mādhyamika school wishes to keep the phenomenal and the real or the transcendental views wide apart. In the phenomenal view things are admitted to be as they are perceived, and their relations are also conceived as real. It is interesting to refer to the discussion of Candrakīrti with Diśnūga regarding the nature of sense-perceptions. While Diśnūga urges that a thing is what it is in itself (sva-lakṣaṇa), Candrakīrti holds that, since relations are also perceived to be true, things are relational as well. Phenomenally substances exist as well as their qualities. The “thing in itself” of Diśnūga was as much a relative concept as the relational things that are popularly perceived as true; that being so, it is meaningless to define perception as being only the thing in itself. Candrakīrti thus does not think that any good can be done by criticizing the realistic logic of the Naiyāyikas, since, so far as popular perceptions or conceptions go, the Nyāya logic is quite competent to deal with them and give an account of them. There is a phenomenal reality and order which is true for the man in the street and on which all our linguistic and other usages are based. Diśnūga, in defining perception, restricts it to the unique thing in itself (sva-lakṣaṇa) and thinks that all associations of quality and relations are extraneous to perceptions and should be included under imagination or inference. This however does violence to our ordinary experience and yet serves no better purpose; for the definition of perception as given by Diśnūga is not from the transcendental point of view. If that is so, why not accept the realistic conceptions of the Nyāya school, which fit in with the popular experience? This reminds us of the attitude of the Vedāntists, who on the one hand accepted the view-point of popular experience and regarded all things as having a real objective existence, and on the other
hand considered them as false and unreal from the transcendental point of view of ultimate reality. The attitude of the Vedāntists on this point seems to have been directly inspired by that of the Mādhyamikas. The attempts of Śrīharṣa to refute the realistic definitions of the Nyāya were intended to show that the definitions of the Nyāya could not be regarded as absolute and true, as the Naiyāyikas used to think. But, while the Mādhyamikas, who had no view-points of their own to support, could leave the field of experience absolutely undisturbed and allow the realistic definitions of the Nyāya to explain the popular experience in any way they liked, the Vedānta had a thesis of its own, namely, that the self-luminous Brahman was the only reality and that it was through it that everything else was manifested. The Vedānta therefore could not agree with Nyāya interpretations of experience and their definitions. But, as the Vedānta was unable to give the manifold world-appearance a footing in reality, it regarded it as somehow existing by itself and invented a theory of perception by which it could be considered as being manifested by coming in touch with Brahman and being illusorily imposed on it.

Continuing the discussion on the nature of causation, Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti hold that collocations of causal conditions which are different from the effect cannot produce the effect, as is held by the Hinayāna Buddhists; for, since the effect is not perceived in those causal conditions, it cannot be produced out of them, and, if it is already existent in them, its production becomes useless. Production of anything out of some foreign or extraneous causes implies that it is related to them, and this relation must mean that it was in some way existent in them. The main principle which Nāgārjuna employs in refuting the idea of causation or production in various ways is that, if a thing exists, it cannot be produced, and, if it does not exist, it cannot be produced at all. That which has no essence in itself cannot be caused by anything else, and, having no essence in itself, it cannot be the cause of anything else.

Nāgārjuna similarly examines the concepts of going and coming and says that the action of going is not to be found in the space traversed, nor is it to be found in that which is not traversed; and apart from the space traversed and not traversed there cannot be any action of going. If it is urged that going is neither in the space

1 Mādhyamika-vyāti, p. 90, l. 6.
traversed nor in the space untraversed, but in the person who continues to go, since going is in him in whom there is the effort of going, then this again cannot be right. For, if the action of going is to be associated with the person who goes, it cannot be associated with the space traversed. One action cannot be connected with both; and, unless some space is gone over, there cannot be a goer. If going is in the goer alone, then even without going one could be called a goer, which is impossible. If both the goer and the space traversed have to be associated with going, then there must be two actions and not one; and, if there are two actions, that implies that there are also two agents. It may be urged that the movement of going is associated with the goer and that therefore going belongs to the goer; but, if there is no going without the goer and if there is no goer without going, how can going be associated with the goer at all? Again, in the proposition "the goer goes" (gantā gacchati) there is only one action of going, and that is satisfied by the verb "goes"; what separate "going" is there by virtue of association with which a "goer" can be so called? and, since there are no two actions of going, there cannot be a goer. Again, the movement of going cannot even be begun; for, when there is the motion of going, there is no beginning and when there is no motion of going, there cannot be any beginning. Again, it cannot be urged that "going" must exist, since its opposite, "remaining at rest" (sthiti), exists; for who is at rest? The goer cannot be at rest, since no one can be a goer unless he goes; he who is not a goer, being already at rest, cannot be the agent of another action of being at rest. If the goer and going be regarded as identical, then there would be neither verb nor agent. So there is no reality in going. "Going" stands here for any kind of passage or becoming, and the refutation of "going" implies the refutation of all kinds of passage (niśkarsana) as well. If seeds passed into the state of shoots (aṅkura), then they would be seeds and not shoots; the shoots neither are seeds nor are different from them; yet, the seeds being there, there are the shoots. A pea is from another pea, yet no pea becomes another pea. A pea is neither in another pea nor different from it. It is as one may see in a mirror the beautiful face of a woman and feel attracted by it and run after her, though the face never passed into the mirror and there was no human face in the reflected image. Just as the essenceless reflected image of a woman's face may rouse attachment in fools,
so are world-appearances the causes of our delusion and attachment.

It is needless to multiply examples and describe elaborately Nāgārjuna's method of applying his dialectic to the refutation of the various Buddhistic and other categories. But from what has been said it may be possible to compare or contrast Nāgārjuna's dialectic with that of Śrīharśa. Neither Nāgārjuna nor Śrīharśa is interested to give any rational explanation of the world-process, nor are they interested to give a scientific reconstruction of our world-experience. They are agreed in discarding the validity of world-experience as such. But, while Nāgārjuna had no thesis of his own to uphold, Śrīharśa sought to establish the validity and ultimate reality of Brahman. But, it does not appear that he ever properly tried to apply his own dialectic to his thesis and attempted to show that the definition of Brahman could stand the test of the criticism of his own dialectic. Both Nāgārjuna and Śrīharśa were, however, agreed in the view that there was no theory of the reconstruction of world-appearance which could be supported as valid. But, while Śrīharśa attacked only the definitions of the Nyāya, Nāgārjuna mainly attacked the accepted Buddhistic categories and also some other relevant categories which were directly connected with them. But the entire efforts of Śrīharśa were directed to showing that the definitions of the Nyāya were faulty and that there was no way in which the Nyāya could define its categories properly. From the fact that the Nyāya could not define its categories he rushed to the conclusion that they were intrinsically indefinable and that therefore the world-appearance which was measured and scanned in terms of those categories was also false. Nāgārjuna's methods differ considerably from those of Śrīharśa in this, that the concepts which he criticized were shown by him to have been intrinsically based and constructed on notions which had no essential nature of their own, but were understood only in relation to others. No concept revealed any intrinsic nature of its own, and one could understand a concept only through another, and that again through the former or through another, and so on. The entire world-appearance would thus be based on relative conceptions and be false. Nāgārjuna's criticisms are, however, largely of an a priori nature, and do not treat the concepts in a concrete manner and are not based on the testimony of our psychological experience. The oppositions shown are therefore
very often of an abstract nature and occasionally degenerate into verbalism. But as a rule they are based on the fundamentally relative nature of our experience. They are never half so elaborate as the criticisms of Śrīharṣa; but at the same time they are fundamentally more convincing and more direct than the elaborate roundabout logical subtleties of Śrīharṣa’s dialectic. It cannot be denied that, based on the dialectical methods of Nāgārjuna, Buddhāpālita and Candrakīrti, Śrīharṣa’s criticisms, following an altogether different plan of approach, show wonderful powers of logical subtlety and finesse, though the total effect can hardly be regarded as an advance from the strictly philosophical point of view, while the frequent verbalism of many of his criticisms is a discredit to his whole venture.

Dialectical criticisms of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (A.D. 760) as forerunners of Vedānta Dialectics.

(a) Criticisms of the Sāṃkhya Pariṇāma Doctrine.

In tracing the history of the dialectical ways of thinking in the Vedānta it has been pointed out in the previous sections that the influence of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti on Śaṅkara and some of his followers, such as Śrīharṣa, Citsukha and others, was very great. It has also been pointed out that not only Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, but many other Buddhist writers, had taken to critical and dialectical ways of discussion. The criticism of the different schools of Indian thought, as contained in Śāntarakṣita’s Tatvā-samgraha with Kamalaśīla’s commentary Pañjikā, is a remarkable instance of this. Śāntarakṣita lived in the first half of the eighth century A.D., and Kamalaśīla was probably his junior contemporary. They refuted the views of Kambalāśvatara, a follower of the Lokāyata school, the Buddhist Vasumitra (A.D. 100), Dharmatrāta (A.D. 100), Ghoṣaka (A.D. 150), Buddhadeva (A.D. 200), the Naiyāyika Vātsyāyana (A.D. 300), the Mīmāṃsik Śabaravāmin (A.D. 300), the Sāṃkhyaist Vindhyasvāmin (A.D. 300), the Buddhist Saṁghabhadra (A.D. 350), Vasubandhu (A.D. 350), the Sāṃkhyaist Īśvarakṛṣṇa (A.D. 390), the Buddhist Diṇnāga (A.D. 400), the Jaina Ācāryasūri (A.D. 478), the Sāṃkhyaist Māthāra Ācārya (A.D. 500), the Naiyāyika Udyotakara (A.D. 600), the rhetorician Bhāmaha (A.D. 640), the Buddhist Dharmakīrti (A.D. 650), the grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari (A.D. 650), the Mīmāṃsik Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (A.D. 680),
the Jaina Subhagupta (A.D. 700), the Buddhist Yugasena (A.D. 700),
the Naiyāyika Āviddhakarna (A.D. 700), Śaṅkarasvāmin (A.D. 700),
Praśastamati (A.D. 700), Bhāvivikta (A.D. 700), the Jaina Pātṛasvāmin
(A.D. 700), Āhrika (A.D. 700), Sumati (A.D. 700), and the Mīmāṁsakist
Uveyaka (A.D. 700). It is not possible here, of course, to enter into
a complete analysis of all the criticisms of the different philosophers
by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla; yet some of the important points
of these criticisms may be noted in order to show the nature
and importance of this work, which also reveals the nature of
the critical thinking that prevailed among the Buddhists before
Śaṅkara and by which Śaṅkara and his followers, like Śrīharṣa,
Citsukha or Ānandajñāna, were in all probability greatly in-
fluenced.

In criticizing the Śāṁkhya views they say that, if the effects,
the evolutes, be identical with the cause, the pradhāna, why should
they be produced from the pradhāna? If they are identical, then the
evolutes themselves might be regarded as cause or the pradhāna
as effect. The ordinary way of determining causality is invariable
antecedence, and that is avowedly not available here. The idea of
parināma, which means identity in diversity, the causal scheme
of the Śāṁkhya, is also inadmissible; for, if it is urged that any
entity changes into diverse forms, it may be asked whether the
nature of the causal entity also changes or does not change. If
it does not change, then the causal and the effect states should
abide together in the later product, which is impossible; if it
changes, then there is nothing that remains as a permanent
cause; for this would only mean that a previous state is arrested
and a new state is produced. If it is urged that causal trans-
formation means the assumption of new qualities, it may be
asked whether such qualities are different from the causal sub-
stance or not; if they are, then the occurrence of new qualities
cannot entitle one to hold the view that the causal substance is
undergoing transformations (parināma). If the changing qualities
and the causal substance are identical, then the first part of the
argument would reappear. Again, the very arguments that are
given in favour of the sat-kārya-vāda (existence of the effect in the
cause) could be turned against it. Thus, if curds, etc. already exist

1 These dates are collected from Dr B. Bhattacharya’s foreword to the Tatva-
saṃgraha. The present author, though he thinks that many of these dates are
generally approximately correct, yet, since he cannot spare the room for proper
discussions, does not take responsibility for them.
in the nature of the milk, then what is the meaning of their being produced from it? If there is no idea of production, there is no idea of causality. If it is urged that the effects are potentially existent in the cause, and causal operations only actualize them, then it is admitted that the effects are actually non-existent in the cause, and we have to admit in the cause some specific characteristic, brought about by the causal operation, on account of the absence of which the effects remained in the potential state in the cause, and that the causal operations which actualize the effects produce some specific determinations in the cause, in consequence of which the effect, which was non-existent before, is actualized; this would mean that what was non-existent could be produced, which would be against the sat-kārya-vāda theory. In the light of the above criticisms, since according to the sat-kārya-vāda theory causal productions are impossible, the arguments of Sāṃkhya in favour of sat-kārya-vāda, that only particular kinds of effects are produced from particular kinds of causes, are also inadmissible.

Again, according to Sāṃkhya, nothing ought to be capable of being definitely asserted, since according to the sat-kārya-vāda theory doubts and errors are always existent as a modification of either buddhi, manas or caitanya. Again, the application of all Sāṃkhya arguments might be regarded as futile, since all arguments are intended to arrive at decisive conclusions; but decisive conclusions, being effects, are already existent. If, however, it is contended that decisive conclusions were not existent before, but were produced by the application of arguments, then there is production of what was non-existent, and thus the sat-kārya-vāda theory fails. If it is urged that, though the decisive conclusion (niścaya) is already existent before the application of the argumentative premises, yet it may be regarded as being manifested by the application of those premises, the Sāṃkhyst may be asked to define what he means by such manifestation (abhiveyakti). This manifestation may mean either some new characteristic or some knowledge or the withdrawal of some obscuration to the comprehension. In the first alternative, it may again be asked whether this new character (svabhāvatisaya) that is generated by the application of the premises is different from the decisive conclusion itself or identical with it. If it is identical, there is no meaning in its introduction; if it is different, no relation is admissible between these two, since any attempt to introduce a relation between
two unrelated entities would launch us into a vicious infinite (anavasthā). It cannot mean the rise of the knowledge about that particular object for the manifestation of which the premises are applied; for, according to the sat-kārya-vāda theory, that knowledge is already there. Again, it cannot mean the removal of the obscuration of knowledge; for, if there is obscuration, that also must be ever-existent. As a matter of fact, the whole of the teachings of Sāmkhya philosophy directed to the rise of true knowledge ought to be false, for true knowledge is ever-existent, and therefore there ought to be no bondage, and therefore all persons should always remain emancipated. Again, if there is any false knowledge, it could not be destroyed, and therefore there could be no emancipation.

Śāntarakṣīta and Kamalāśīla then urge that, though the above refutation of the sat-kārya-vāda ought naturally to prove the a-sat-kārya-vāda (the production of that which did not exist before) doctrine, yet a few words may be said in reply to the Sāmkhya refutation of a-sat-kārya-vāda. Thus the argument that that which is non-existent has no form (nairūpya) and therefore cannot be produced is false; for the operation of production represents itself the character of the thing that is being produced. As the Satkāryavādins think that out of the same three guṇas different kinds of effects may be produced according to causal collocations, so here also, according to the law of different kinds of causal forces (karaṇa-sakti-pratiniyamāt), different kinds of non-existing effects come into being. It is meaningless to hold that the limitation of causal forces is to be found in the pre-existence of effects; for, in reality, it is on account of the varying capacities of the causal forces that the various effects of the causes are produced. The production of various effects is thus solely due to the diverse nature of the causal forces that produce them. The law of causal forces is thus ultimately fundamental. The name a-sat-kārya-vāda, however, is a misnomer; for certainly there is no such non-existent entity which comes into being. Production in reality means nothing more than the characteristic of the moment only, divested from all associations of a previous and a succeeding point of time. The meaning of a-sat-kārya-vāda is that an entity called the effect is seen immediately

1 na hy asan-nāma kīṣcid asi yat upatītām avīśet, kintu kālpaniho 'yaṃ syava-ḥāro yad asad utpadyata iti yāvat. Tatvā-samgraha-pañjikā, p. 33.
2 vastānām pārvāpara-kōśi-lānya-kṣaṇa-mātrāvasthāyi svabhāva eva utpādaḥ iti ucye. Ibid.
after a particular causal operation; and it certainly did not exist before this second moment, since, if it did exist at the first moment of the causal operation, it would have been perceived; it is therefore said that the effect did not exist before; but this should not be interpreted to mean that the Buddhists believed in the non-existing existence of the effect, which suddenly came into being after the causal operation.

Refuting the other Sāṃkhya doctrines, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla point out that, if an effect (e.g. curd) is said to exist in the cause (e.g. milk), it cannot do so in the actual form of the effect, since then milk would have tasted as curd. If it is said to exist in the form of a special capacity or potency (śakti), then the existence of the effect in the cause is naturally denied; for it is the potency of the effect that exists in the cause and not the effect itself. Again, the Śāṅkhyaists believe that all sensible things are of the nature of pleasure and pain; this, however, is obviously impossible, since only conscious states can be regarded as pleasurable or painful. There is no sense at all in describing material things as of the nature of pleasure or pain. Again, if objective material things were themselves pleasurable or painful, then the fact that the same objects may appear pleasurable to some and painful to others would be unexplainable. If, however, it is held that even pleasurable objects may appear painful to someone, on account of his particular state of mind or bad destiny, then the objects themselves cannot be pleasurable or painful. Again, if objects are regarded as being made up of three guṇas, there is no reason for admitting one eternal prakṛti as the source of them all. If causes are similar to effects, then from the fact that the world of objects is many and limited and non-eternal one ought to suppose that the cause of the objects also should be many, limited and non-eternal. It is sometimes held that, as all earthen things are produced from one earth, so all objects are produced from one prakṛti; but this also is a fallacious argument, since all earthen things are produced not out of one lump of earth, but from different lumps. Thus, though it may be inferred that the world of effects must have its causes, this cannot lead us to infer that there is one such cause as the prakṛti of the Śāṅkhyaists.
(b) Criticism of Īsvara.

One of the chief arguments of the Naiyāyika theists in favour of the existence of God is based on the fact that the specific forms and shapes of the different objects in the world cannot be explained except on the supposition of an intelligent organizer or shaper. To this Śāntaraṅgiṇa and Kamalaśīla reply that we perceive only the different kinds of visual and tactile sensibles and that there are no further shaped wholes or so-called objects, which men fancy themselves to be perceiving. It is meaningless to think that the visual sensibles and tactile sensibles go together to form one whole object. When people say that it is the same coloured object, seen in the day, that we touched in the night when we did not see it, they are wrong; for colour sensibles or sense-data are entirely different kinds of entities from tactile sense-data, and it is meaningless to say that it is the same object or whole which has both the colour and tactile characteristics. If two colour sensibles, say yellow and blue, are different, then still more different are the colour sensibles and the tactile ones. What exist therefore are not wholes having colour and tactile characters, but only discrete elements of colour and tactile sense-data; the combining of them into wholes is due only to false imagination. There are no objects which can be perceived by the two senses; there is no proof that it is one identical object that is perceived by the eye as well as touched. There exist therefore only loose and discrete sense-data. There being thus no shaped wholes, the supposition of the existence of God as shaper and organizer is inadmissible. The mere fact that there are the effects cannot lead to the inference that there is one intelligent creator and organizer, since a causal inference cannot be made from mere similarity of any description; there must be a law of unconditional and invariable connection (pratibandha). The argument that, since jugs, etc. are made by an intelligent potter, so trees, etc. must also have been made by an intelligent creator, is faulty; for trees, etc., are so different in nature from jugs, etc., that it is wrong to make any assertion from the former to the latter. The general Buddhist arguments against the existence of any eternal entity will also apply against the existence of any eternal God. The argument that, since a state of arrest breaks up into a state of motion or production in all natural phenomena, there must be an intelligent creator, is wrong;
for there is no state of arrest in nature; all things in the world are momentary. Again, if things are happening in succession, at intervals, through the operation of a causal agent, then God also must be operating at intervals and, by the arguments of the opponents themselves, He must have another being to guide His operations, and that another, and that another, and there would thus be a vicious infinite. If God had been the creator, then everything would have sprung into being all at once. He ought not to depend on accessory assistance; for, He being the creator of all such accessory circumstances, they could not render Him any assistance in His creation. Again, if it is urged that the above argument does not hold, because God only creates when He wishes, then it may be replied that, since God’s will is regarded as eternal and one, the old objection of simultaneous production holds good. Moreover, since God is eternal and since His will depends only on Him and Him alone, His will cannot be transitory. Now, if He and His will will be always present, and yet at the moment of the production of any particular phenomenon all other phenomena are not produced, then those phenomena cannot be regarded as being caused by God or by His will. Again, even if for argument’s sake it may be granted that all natural objects, such as trees, hills, etc., presuppose intelligent creators, there is no argument for supposing that one intelligent creator is the cause of all diverse natural objects and phenomena. Therefore there is no argument in favour of the existence of one omniscient creator.

The arguments urged in refutation of prakṛti and Īśvara would also apply against the Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya, which admits the joint causality of Īśvara and prakṛti; for here also, prakṛti and Īśvara being eternal causes, one would expect to have simultaneous production of all effects. If it is urged that the three guṇas behave as accessory causes with reference to God’s operation, then also it may be asked whether at the time of productive activity (sarga) the activity of dissolution or of maintenance (sthiti) may also be expected to be operated, or whether at the time of dissolution, there might be productive operation as well. If it is urged that, though all kinds of forces are existent in prakṛti, yet it is only those that become operative that take effect, it may be objected that some other kind of cause has to be admitted for making some powers of prakṛti operative, while others are inoperative, and this would introduce a third factor; thus the joint causality of puruṣa.
and *prakrti* is also easily refuted. Again, the view that God produces the world through kindness is also false; for, had it been so, the world would not have been so full of misery. Again, there being before creation no beings, God could not feel kindness to non-existent beings. He would not have destroyed the world had He been so kind; if He created and destroyed the world in accordance with the good or bad deeds, then He would not be independent. Had He been independent, He would not have allowed Himself to be influenced by the consequences of bad deeds in producing misery in the world. If He created the world out of mere playful instincts, then these playful instincts would be superior to Him. If He derived much enjoyment from His productive and destructive play, then, if He were able, He would have created and destroyed the world simultaneously. If He is not capable of creating and destroying the world simultaneously, then there is no reason to suppose that He would be able to do it at intervals. If it is urged that the world was produced naturally by His own existence, then there would be simultaneous production. If it is objected that, just as spiders, though they naturally go on producing webs, yet do not produce them all at once, so God also may be producing the world gradually and not all at once, it may then be pointed out that the analogy of spider’s webs is false, since the spider does not naturally produce webs, but only through greed for eating insects, and its activities are determined by such motives. God, however, is One who can have only one uniform motive. If it is urged that creation flows from God unconsciously, as it were, it may readily be objected that a being who creates such a great universe without any intelligent purpose would indeed be very unintelligent.

(c) Refutation of the Soul Theory.

The Nyāya view of the soul, that our thoughts must have a knower and that our desires and feelings must have some entity in which they may inhere and that this entity is soul and that it is the existence of this one soul that explains the fact of the unity of all our conscious states as the experience of one individual, is objected to by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. They hold that no thought or knowledge requires any further knower for its illumination; if it had been so, there would be a vicious infinite. Again, desires, feelings, etc., are not like material objects, which would
require a receptacle in which they might be placed. The so-called unity of consciousness is due to a false unifying imagination of the momentary ones as one. It is also well known that different entities may be regarded as combined on account of their fulfilling the same kinds of functions. It is knowledge in its aspect of ego that is often described as the self, though there is no objective entity corresponding to it. It is sometimes argued that the existence of the soul is proved by the fact that a man is living only so long as his vital currents are connected with the soul, and that he dies when they are disconnected from it; but this is false, since, unless the existence of soul be proved, the supposition of its connection with vital currents as determining life is untenable. Some, however, say that the self is directly perceived in experience; if it had not been, there would not have been such diversity of opinion about its existence. The sense of ego cannot be said to refer to the self; for the sense of ego is not eternal, as it is supposed to be. On the other hand, it refers sometimes to our body (as when I say, "I am white"), sometimes to the senses (as when I say, "I am deaf"), and sometimes to intellectual states. It cannot be said that its reference to body or to senses is only indirect; for no other permanent and direct realization of its nature is found in experience. Feelings, desires, etc., also often arise in succession and cannot therefore be regarded as inhering in a permanent self. The conclusion is that, as all material objects are soulless, so also are human beings. The supposed eternal soul is so different from the body that it cannot be conceived how one can help the other or even be related to it. Thus there is hardly any argument in favour of the soul theory of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika.

(d) Refutation of the Mīmāṃsā Theory of the Self.

Kumārila believed that, though the nature of the self as pure consciousness was eternal and unchangeable, yet it passed through various changing phases of other feeling and volitional states. That the self was of the nature of pure consciousness was proved by the fact that it perceives itself to be knower in the past and in the present. So the existence of the self is proved by the fact of self-consciousness. To this Sāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla reply that, if the self is regarded as one eternal consciousness, then knowledge or the knowing faculty (buddhi) ought also to be regarded as similarly one and eternal; but seemingly Kumārila does not
consider buddhi to be such. If the knowing faculty be regarded as
eternal and one, how are the varying states of cognition, such as
colour-cognition, taste-cognition, etc., to be explained? If it is
urged that, though the knowing faculty is one, yet (just as a fire,
though it has always a capacity of burning, yet burns only when
combustible substances are put in it) it only passes through
various kinds of perception according as various kinds of objects
are presented to it; or, just as a mirror, though it has always the
power of reflecting, yet only reflects when the objects are presented
to it, so the selves are eternally conscious and yet operate only in
connection with their specific bodies and grasp the various kinds of
sense-data, and all cognitions are forged from them(selves). If the
change of cognitions is due to the changing operations of the senses
and the sense-objects, then such a cognizing faculty cannot be
regarded as eternal and one. If the knowing faculty is to be re-
garded as eternal owing to an experience of continuity of conscious-
ness, then how can one explain the variety of cognitions? If it is
urged that the variety of cognitions is due to the assumption by the
cognizing faculty of various forms of objects, then how can one
explain the experience of the variety of cognitions in hallucinations,
when there are no objects? Moreover the Mīmāṃsāist does not
think that the cognizing faculty assumes the forms of the objects
cognized, but believes that cognition reveals the objects in the
objective world and the cognizing faculty has itself no forms
(mirākāra buddhiḥ). The fact that there may be cognitions without
a corresponding real objective presentation proves that our cogni-
tions are subjective and self-revealed and that they do not reveal
objective entities. If it is urged that the knowing faculty has always
the power of revealing all things, then sound-cognition would be
the same as colour-cognition. The analogy of fire is also false, since
there is not one fire that is constant; the analogy of the reflecting
mirror is also false, since there is really no reflection in the mirror
itself; one can see a reflection in a mirror at a particular angle,
the mirror therefore is only an apparatus for producing an illusory
cognition. Again, the buddhi cannot be compared to a mirror as
an apparatus for producing illusory images; for then some other
buddhi would be necessary for perceiving illusory images. Again,
if the self is regarded as one and eternal, then it cannot pass through
the varying feeling and volitional states. If these states are not
entirely different from the self, then their changes would imply
the change of the self; and again, if they are entirely different from
the self, how should their change affect the self? Again, if these states all belong to the self and it is urged that it is when the pleasurable state is submerged in the nature of the common self, that the painful state may arise, it may be pointed out in objection that, if the pleasurable states could be submerged in the nature of the self in identity with itself, then they would be identical with the nature of the self. It is also wrong to suppose that the sense of self-consciousness refers to a really existing entity corresponding to it. It has in reality no specific object to refer to as the self. It may therefore be safely asserted that the existence of the self is not proved by the evidence of self-consciousness.

(e) Refutation of the Sāṃkhya View of the Self.

Against the Sāṃkhya view of the self it is pointed out that the Sāṃkhya regards the self as pure consciousness, one and eternal, and that, as such, it ought not to be able to enjoy diverse kinds of experiences. If it is held that enjoyment, etc., all belong to buddhi and the puruṣa only enjoys the reflections in the buddhi, it may well be objected that if the reflections in the buddhi are identical with puruṣa, then with their change the puruṣa also undergoes a change; and if they are different, the puruṣa cannot be considered to be their enjoyer. Again, if the prakṛti concentrates all its activities for the enjoyment of the puruṣa, how can it be regarded as unconscious? Again, if all actions and deeds belong to buddhi, and if buddhi be different from puruṣa, why should the puruṣa suffer for what is done by the buddhi? If, again, the nature of puruṣa cannot be affected by the varying states of pleasure and pain, then it cannot be regarded as an enjoyer; and, if it could be affected, it would itself be changeable.

(f) The Refutation of the Upaniṣad View of the Self.

The Upaniṣadic thinkers hold that it is one eternal consciousness that illusorily appears as all objects, and that there is in reality no perceiver and perceived, but only one eternal consciousness. Against this view it is urged by Śaṅtaraksita and Kamalaśīla that, apart from the individual cognitions of colour, taste, etc., no eternal, unchangeable consciousness is experienced. If one eternal consciousness is the one reality, then there cannot be a distinction of false knowledge and right knowledge, bondage and emancipation. There being only one reality, there is no right knowledge which need be attained.
(g) Refutation of the Theory of the Persistence of Existing Entities.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla point out that the Naiyāyikas divide existing entities into two classes, as produced (kṛtaka) and unproduced (a-kṛtaka), and they hold that those which are produced are destructible. The Vātsiputriyās also similarly divide existing entities into momentary (e.g. ideas, sound, flame, etc.) and non-momentary (e.g. earth, sky, etc.). On this point Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla urge that whatever is produced is momentary, since the destructibility of momentary things does not depend on any cause excepting the fact that they are produced; for, had the destructibility of such entities depended on conditions or causes other than the fact of their being produced, then the premise that whatever is produced is necessarily destructible would be false. The Naiyāyika view, therefore, that produced entities depend for their destruction on other conditions, is false. If produced entities do not depend for their destruction on any other condition or cause than the fact of their being produced, then they must be destroyed the moment they are produced, or in other words they are momentary. Moreover, destruction, being negation, is not a positive entity and is absolutely contentless, and only positive entities depend on other conditions or causes for their production. Destruction, being negation, is not produced by any conditions or causes like a positive entity. Destruction therefore is not generated by any separate causal apparatus, but the very causes that lead to the production of an entity lead also to its destruction the next moment. Destructibility being a necessary characteristic of productibility, destruction cannot need the interference of any causes. It has also been stated above that destruction is pure negation and has therefore no characteristics which have to be generated by any positive set of causes or conditions.¹

¹ The word kṣaṇīka, which is translated as "momentary," is, according to Śāntarakṣita, a technical term. The character in an entity of dying immediately after production, is technically called kṣaṇa, and whatever has this quality is called kṣaṇīka (utpādānāntara-vināśī-vvabhūvo vāstunāh kṣaṇa ucyate, sa yasyāsti sa kṣaṇīka iti. Tattva-samgraha, p. 143); kṣaṇa therefore does not mean time-moment. It means the character of dying immediately after being produced. The objection of Uddyotakara that what only stays for a moment of time (kṣaṇa) cannot be called kṣaṇīka, because at the expiry of the moment nothing remains which can be characterized as momentary, is therefore inadmissible. There is, however, no entity separate from the momentary character, and the use of the term kṣaṇīka, which grammatically distinguishes the possessor of the momentary character from the momentary character itself, is due only to verbal license.
Kumārasīla and Saṅtarakṣita urge that existence (sattva) can be affirmed only of those entities which are capable of serving a purpose (artha-kriyā-samarthā). They urge that entities can only serve a purpose, if they are momentary. Entities that persist cannot serve any purpose and therefore cannot have any existence. In order to prove their thesis they enter into the following argument. If any purpose is to be served, then that can be either in succession or simultaneously, and no middle alternative is possible. If an existing entity persists in time, then all its effects ought to come about simultaneously; for, the complete cause being there, the effects must also be there, and there is no reason why the effects should happen in succession; but it is well known in experience that effects happen only in succession and not simultaneously. If, however, it is objected that even a persisting entity can perform actions in succession owing to its association with successive accessories (kraminah sahakārinah), then one may well enquire as to the nature of the assistance given by the successive accessories to the persisting entity in the production of the effect; is it by producing a special modification (atiśayādhāna) of the persisting cause or by independent working in consonance with the productive action of the persisting entity? In the first alternative, the special modification may be either identical with or different from the nature of the persisting entity, and both these alternatives are impossible; for, if it is identical, then, since the effect follows in consequence of the special modification of the accessories, it is the element of this special modification that is to be regarded as the cause of the effect, and not the persisting entity. If it is again urged that the effect is due to the association of the special modification with the persisting entity, then it would be impossible to define the nature of such association; for an association may be either of identity or of productivity (tādātmya and tād-utpatti), and neither of them is possible in the present case, since the special modification is recognized as being different from the persisting entity and is acknowledged by assumption to be produced by the accessories. Again, such association cannot be regarded as being of the nature of samavāya; for this special modification, being of the nature of an additional assistance (upakāra), cannot be regarded as being of the nature of inseparable inherence (samavāya). If this special modification be regarded as being neither of the nature of an additional assistance (upakāra) nor of the nature of an essence
identical with the persisting entity, and if it is still regarded as being associated with the persisting entity in a relation of samavāya, then anything in the world could be regarded as being in the samavāya relation with anything else. In the other alternative, in which it is maintained that the persisting entity awaits only the independent working of the accessories, it may well be asked whether the causal nature of the persisting entity is the same together with the totality of the accessories as it is without them? In the former case, the accessories would also be persistent. In the latter case, the persisting entity can no longer be regarded as persisting.

Regarding the objection of Bhadanta Yogasena, that the same difficulties would arise in the assumption of entities as momentary, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśila reply that in their view the accessories behave in two ways, firstly, as independent co-operation (ekārthakahṛiyā-kāriṇī) and, secondly, as mutual help (parasparopakāritā). Thus in the first moment the different accessory-units are only independently co-operant, since, in one moment, their mutual actions cannot help one another; but in the second moment, the effects may be regarded as being of a joint nature, and therefore mutually determining one another, in the production of the effect of the third moment. In this view, though each entity operates independently, yet none of their operations are irrelevant. They are all being produced and determined by the respective causes and conditions in a beginningless series.

The objection against the momentariness of all things on the ground that things are perceived and recognized to be the same, and as persisting, is not a valid one. For the fact of persistence cannot be perceived by the senses and must be regarded as due to false imagination. All recognition is due to the operation of memory, which is almost universally recognized as invalid for purposes of right knowledge. On this point it may be argued that in recognition, if the entity now perceived be the same as the entity perceived at a previous time, then how can a cognition in the past comprehend an entity of the present time? If they are held to be different, then it is acknowledged that the entities perceived as the same in recognition are not really the same. The objector’s argument that, since things pass by the same name, they must be persistent is invalid; for it is well known that even in ordinary perception, where a flame is known to be destroyed every moment, and produced anew, it is still said in common verbal usage to be
the same flame. Thus all existing things must be regarded as momentary.

(h) Refutation of Criticisms of the Non-permanency of Entities.

It is objected by the Naiyāyikas and others that, if things are momentary, then the theory of karma would fail; for how can it be understood that the deeds be performed by one, and the fruits reaped by another? How, again, can it be understood that a momentary cause which does not abide till the rise of the effect should produce the same? Again, if objects are momentary, how can they be perceived by the eye? The phenomena of recognition would also be inexplicable, as there would be no permanent perceiver who would identify the present and the past as being one. How, again, would the phenomenon of bondage and of emancipation apply to a non-permanent being? In reply to this Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla say that, just as a seed by means of its invariable power produces the shoots, without being superintended by any conscious agent, so the inner states of a man may generate other states, without being superintended by any permanent conscious agent; the formula (dharmasamketa) for all production is, “this happening, that happens”; “this being produced, that is produced.” It is through ignorance that a man cannot discern that all subsequent states are determined by the natural forces of the preceding ones and thinks of himself as performing this or that action or as striving for emancipation. The true nature of things cannot be determined by the illusory experience of ignorant people. It is sometimes objected that the parts of a seed attain a due constitution by assimilating nutritive elements at the second stage, and then again at the third stage attain a new constitution by further accretion of new nutritive elements, and that therefore it cannot be held that the parts of the seed are entirely destroyed at the second stage. To this the reply of Śāntarakṣita is that in the second moment the effect is produced in dependence on the undestroyed causal efficiency of the first causal moment; so that the effect is produced by the causal efficiency of the first moment, when the cause is not destroyed. The cause however perishes in the second moment; for, once the cause has produced the effect, it cannot be producing it again and again; if it did, there would be a vicious infinite. It must therefore be admitted that the causal
efficiency of the cause ceases immediately after production. The view that the effect is produced simultaneously with the cause (sahabhātām kāryam) is unreasonable, since the cause cannot produce the effect before it is itself produced; again, it cannot produce after it is itself produced; for then the effect also has to be acknowledged to be of the same nature as the cause; but at the same moment it can have no scope for its efficiency. Thus the cause and effect cannot be produced simultaneously. There is no necessity also for admitting a causal operation (vyāpāra), as separate and distinct from the cause. Invariable antecedence is the only qualification of cause. If a causal operation has to be admitted for connecting the cause with the effect, then that would require another operation, and that another, and there would be a vicious infinite. If the causal operation is admitted to be able to generate the effect independently by itself, so can the cause be also admitted to be able to produce the effect. The objection that, if antecedence be admitted to be alone the determinant of causality, then the fact, that a thing is smelted after it is seen may also lead one to infer that colour is the cause of smell, is invalid, for the Buddhists have no objection to regarding colour as an accessory cause of smell. It must also be remembered that the Buddhists do not regard mere antecedence as the definition of cause, but invariable and necessary antecedence. Again, no difficulty need be experienced in perception, if the objects are admitted to be momentary; for ideas may be considered to have forms akin to the objects, or to be formless, but revealing the objects. In either case the ideas are produced by their causes, and the momentariness or permanence of objects has nothing to do with their determination. There are in reality no agent and no enjoyer, but only the series of passing mental phenomena. Causality consists in the determination of the succeeding states by the previous ones. The objection of Uddhyotakara, that, if the mind is momentary, it cannot be modified (vāsanā) by deeds (karma), is invalid; for, in the Buddhist view, this modification

1 The Vaibhāṣikas are spoken of by Sāntarakṣita as holding the view that the effect is produced at the third moment. In this view the effect is produced by the destroyed cause.

2 idam eva hi kāryasya kāraṇāpeksā yat tad-anantara-bhūcitvam. Tatvavacaraḥ, p. 177.

3 na hi vayam ānantaryā-mātraṁ kārya-kāraṇa-bhāṇavādhiśaṁ nibandaṁ...yasyavānantaram yad bhavati tat tasya kāraṇam iṣyate. Ibid. p. 180.

4 Sāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are Buddhists who style themselves māra-vijñāna-vādin.
(vāsanā) means nothing more than the production of a new mental state of a modified nature. There is again no permanent perceiver who remembers and recognizes; it is only when in a particular series of conscious states, on account of the strength of a particular perception, such particularly modified mental states are generated as may be said to contain seeds of memory, that memory is possible. The Buddhists also do not consider that there is one person who suffers bondage and is liberated; they think that bondage means nothing more than the production of painful states due to ignorance (avidyā) and other mental causes, and that liberation also means nothing more than purity of the mental states due to cessation of ignorance through right knowledge.

(i) Refutation of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika Categories.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla attempt to refute the categories of substance (dravya) with its subdivisions, quality (guna), action (karma), generality, or class concepts (sāmānya), specific peculiarities (viśeṣa), relation of inherence (samavāya), and the connotation and denotation of words (śabdārtha). This refutation may briefly be set out here.

Speaking against the eternity of atoms, they hold that, since no special excellence can be produced in eternal entities, no conditions or collocations of any kind can produce any change in the nature of the atoms; thus, the atoms being always the same in nature, all objects should be produced from them either at once, or not at all. The mere fact that no cause of atoms is known is no ground for thinking that they are causeless. Again, substance, as different from characters and qualities, is never perceived. The refutation of wholes (avaya), which has already been effected, also goes against the acceptance of substantive wholes, and so the four substances earth, water, air and fire, which are ordinarily regarded as substantive—wholes made up of atoms—also stand refuted. Again, it is not easy to prove the existence of separate and independent time and space entities; for spatial and temporal determinations may well be explained as mental modifications due, like other facts of experience, to their specific causes. The Buddhists of course accept the existence of manas as an instrument separate from the sense-organs, but they do not admit its existence as an eternal and single entity.

The refutation of substances implies the refutation of guṇas,
which are supposed to be dependent on substances. If the substances do not exist, there can also be no relation of inherence, in which relation the guṇas are supposed to exist in substances. There is, again, no meaning in acknowledging colours, etc., as different from the atoms in which they are supposed to exist. The perception of numbers also ought to be regarded as due to mental modifications associated with particular cognitions. There is no reason for holding that numbers should stand as separate qualities. In a similar manner Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla proceed with the refutation of the other Nyāya qualities.

Proceeding with the refutation of action (karma), they hold that, if all things are admitted to be momentary, then action cannot be attributed to them; for action, involving as it does successive separation of parts and association of contact-points, implies many moments for its execution. If things are admitted to be persistent or eternal, then also movement cannot be explained. If things are admitted to be always moving, then they will be in motion while they are perceived to be at rest, which is impossible. If things are at rest by nature, there cannot be any vibratory movement in them. The main principle involved in the refutation of guṇas and karmas consists in the fact that the guṇas and karmas are regarded by the Buddhists as being identical with the particular sense-data cognized. It is wrong, in their view, to analyse the sense-data as substances having qualities and motion as different categories inhering in them. Whatever may be the substance, that is also the quality which is supposed to be inhering in it, as also the motion which it is supposed to execute.

Regarding the refutation of class-concepts the main drift of Buddhist argument is that, though the perception of class-natures may be supposed to be due to some cause, yet it is wrong to assume the existence of eternal class-nature existing constantly in all the changing and diverse individual members of a class. For, howsoever we may try to explain it, it is difficult to see how one thing can remain constantly the same, though all the individual members in which it is supposed to exist are constantly changing. If class-natures are said to inhere owing to specific qualities, e.g. cooking in the cook, then also it may be objected that, since the operation of cooking is different in each case, there is no one character "cooking" by virtue of which the class-nature of cook is admissible. Moreover, a cook is called a cook even when
he is not cooking. Considerations like these should lead any thinking person to deny the existence of eternal class-natures.

Regarding the refutation of specific qualities (viṣeṣa) it is held that, if yogins can perceive the ultimate specific qualities as different from one another, they might equally perceive the atoms to be different from one another; if the atoms cannot be perceived as different except through some other properties, then the same may be required of the specific properties themselves.

Regarding the refutation of samavāya, or relation of inherence, the Buddhist objects mainly to the admission of a permanent samavāya relation, though all the individuals in which this relation may be supposed to exist should be changing or perishing. It is a false supposition that the relation of inherence, such as that of the cloth in the thread, is ever felt to be, as if the one (e.g. the cloth) was existing in the other (threads), as the Naiyāyikas suppose.

Dialectic of Śaṅkara and Ānandajñāna.

It is well known that Śaṅkarācārya in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra, ii. ii 11–17, criticizes the atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣikas. His first thesis is that the production of an effect different in nature from the cause, as in the case of the production of the impure world from pure Brahman, can be justified on the analogy of even the critics of the Vedānta, the Vaiśeṣikas. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that in the production of the devy-anuṣka (containing two atoms) from the paramāṇu (single atom) and of the catur-anuṣka (containing four atoms) from the devy-anuṣka, all other qualities of the paramāṇu and the devy-anuṣka are transferred to the devy-anuṣka and catur-anuṣka respectively, excepting the specific measures of pārīmāṇḍalya (specific atomic measure) and anu-hrasva (specific measure of the dyads), which are peculiar to paramāṇu and devy-anuṣka respectively. Thus, though all other qualities of paramāṇus pass over to devy-anuṣkas produced by their combination, yet the specific pārīmāṇḍalya measure of the paramāṇus does not pass to the devy-anuṣkas, which are of the anu-hrasva parimāṇa. So also, though all the qualities of devy-anuṣkas would pass on to the catur-anuṣkas made out of their combination, yet their own specific anu-hrasva parimāṇa would not pass on to the catur-anuṣkas, which are possessed of their own measure, viz. the mahat parimāṇa, uncaused by the parimāṇa of the devy-anuṣkas. This shows that the
Vaiśeṣikas believe that the pārimāṇḍalya measure (parimāṇa) of the paramāṇus may produce an altogether different measure in their product, the dvy-anukas, and so the anu-hrasva measure of the dvy-anukas may produce an altogether different measure in their product, the catur-anukas, viz. the mahat parimāṇa. On this analogy it may be contended that the Vaiśeṣikas have nothing to object to in the production of an altogether different effect (viz. the impure world) from an altogether different cause, the pure Brahman. If it is urged that the measure of the paramāṇu cannot pass on to the dvy-anuka only because its passage is rendered impossible by the taking possession of it by an opposite quality (the anu-hrasva parimāṇa), then a similar reply may be given in the case of the difference between the world and Brahman. Moreover, since, according to the Vaiśeṣika theory, all products remain for a moment without qualities, there is no reason why, when the dvy-anuka was produced, the pārimāṇḍalya measure should not pass on to it. At that moment, since the pārimāṇḍalya measure did not pass on to it as did the other qualities, it follows, not that the passing of the pārimāṇḍalya measure is opposed by the other parimāṇa, but that it naturally did not pass on to it. Again, it cannot be objected that the analogy of dissimilarity of qualities (guna) cannot be cited in support of the dissimilarity of substances.

Śaṅkara’s second thesis is that the Vaiśeṣika view that atoms combine is wrong, because, since the atoms are partless, and since combination implies contact and contact implies parts which come in contact, there cannot be any combination of atoms. Moreover, since before creation there is no one who can make an effort, and since the contact of atoms cannot be effected without effort, and since the selves, being unconscious at that time, cannot themselves make any effort, it is impossible to account for the activity without which the contact of the atoms would also be impossible. So the atoms cannot combine, for want of the effort needed for such a contact. Śaṅkara’s third point is that the relation of samavāya upheld by the Vaiśeṣikas cannot be admitted; for, if to unite two different objects the relation of samavāya is needed, then samavāya, being itself different from them, would require another samavāya to connect itself with them, and that another, and that another, and so on ad infinitum. If the relation of contact requires a further relation of samavāya to connect it with the objects in contact, there is no reason why samavāya should not require some other relation.
in its turn. Again, if the atoms are regarded as always operative and combining, then there can be no dissolution (*pralaya*), and, if they are always disintegrating, then creation would be impossible. Again, since the atoms possess the qualities of colour, etc., they must be the product of some simpler causes, just as other objects having qualities are made up of simpler entities. Moreover, it is not right to suppose that, since we have the idea of non-eternity, this must imply eternity and that therefore the atoms must be eternal; for, even though it implies the existence of eternity, it does not imply that the atoms should be eternal, since there is such an eternal thing as Brahman. Again, the fact that the cause of the destruction of the atoms is not known does not imply that they are eternal; for mere ignorance of the ways of destruction does not imply eternity. Again, the Vaiśēśikas are wrong in speaking of six different categories and yet hold that all the five other categories depend on substance for their existence or manifestation. A substance and its quality do not appear to be as different as two substances. A substance appears black or white, and this implies that the qualities are at bottom identical with the substance (*dravyātmakatā guṇasya*). It cannot, moreover, be urged that the dependence of other categories on substance consists in their inseparableness (*ayuta-siddhatva*) from it. This inseparableness cannot be inseparableness of space; for, when threads constitute as their product a piece of cloth, then the threads and the cloth cannot be regarded as having the same space, yet, being cause and effect, they are to be regarded as *ayuta-siddha*, or inseparable; and yet the whiteness of the cloth is not regarded as abiding in the threads. If inseparableness means inseparableness of time, then the two horns of a bull, which exist at the same time, should also be regarded as inseparable; and, if inseparableness means inseparableness of character or sameness of character, then quality cannot be regarded as being different from substance. Again, since the cause exists prior to the effect, it cannot be regarded as inseparable from the cause, and yet it is asserted by the Vaiśēśikas that their relation is one of *samaṇāya*, since they are inseparable in their nature.

Śaṅkara, however, seldom indulges in logical dialectic like the above, and there are only a few rare instances in which he attacks his opponents from a purely logical point of view. But even here he does not so much criticize the definitions of the Vaiśēśikas as point out the general logical and metaphysical confusions that
result from some of the important Vaiśeṣika theories. It is easy to note the difference of a criticism like this from the criticism of Śrīharṣa in his Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya, where he uses all the power of his dialectical subtleties to demolish the cherished principles of pure logic as formulated by the Nyāya logicians. It is not a criticism of certain doctrines in support of others, but it is a criticism which aims at destroying the possibility of logical or perceptual knowledge as a whole. It does not touch any specific metaphysical views, but it denies the power of perception and inference to give us right knowledge, and it supposes that it achieves its purpose by proving that the Nyāya modes of definition of perception and inference are faulty and self-contradictory. Citsukha's attempts are more positive; for he criticizes not only the Nyāya categories of logic, but also the categories of Vaiśeṣika metaphysics, and makes some positive and important statements, too, about the Vedānta doctrine itself. Ānandajñāna's Tarkasamgraha is another important work of negative criticism of the Vaiśeṣika categories and in that sense a continuation on a more elaborate scale of Citsukha's criticisms of the Vaiśeṣika categories. The importance of the Vaiśeṣika was gradually increasing, as it was gradually more and more adopted by Vaiṣṇava realistic writers, such as Madhva and his followers, and it was supposed that a refutation of the Vaiśeṣika would also imply a refutation of the dualistic writers who draw their chief support from Vaiśeṣika physics and metaphysics.

Ānandajñāna, also called Ānandagiri, was probably a native of Gujarat and lived in the middle of the thirteenth century. Mr Tripathi points out in his introduction to Ānandajñāna's Tarkasamgraha that Ānandajñāna was a spiritual head of the Dwārakā monastery of Śaṅkara, of which Śureśvarācārya was the first teacher. He was a pupil of two teachers, Anubhūtisvarūpācārya and Śuddhānanda. Anubhūtisvarūpācārya wrote five works, viz. (1) a grammatical work called Sārasvata-prakriyā, (2) a commentary on Śaṅkara's commentary on Gauḍapāda's Māṇḍūkya-kārikā, (3) a commentary on Ānandabodha Yati's Nyāya-makaranda, called Nyāya-makaranda-samgraha, (4) a commentary, called Candrikā, on Ānandabodha's Nyāya-dīpāvalī, and (5) another commentary, called Nibandha, on Ānandabodha's Pramāṇa-mālā. Nothing is known about his other teacher, Śuddhānanda, who is different from the other Śuddhānanda, the teacher of Svayamprakāśa of the
seventeenth century, author of the Advaita-makaranda-ṭīkā. One of the most distinguished of Ānandagiri’s pupils was Akhaṇḍānanda, author of the Tattva-dīpana, a commentary on Prakāśātman’s Pañca-pādikā-vivarana, as he refers to him as śrīmad-ānanda-śailāhava-paṇcāsyaṁ satatam bhaje in the fourth verse of his Tattva-dīpana. Ānandagiri wrote a large number of works, which are mostly commentaries. Of these his Isāvāsya-bhāsyā-ṭīpāṇa, Kenopaniṣad-bhāsyā-ṭīpāṇa, Vākya-vivarana-vyākhya, Kathopaniṣad-bhāsyā-ṭīkā, Muṇḍaka-bhāsyā-vyākhyāna, Muṇḍukya-Gauḍapādiya-bhāsyāvyākhyā, Taittirīya-bhāsyā-ṭīpāṇa, Chāndogya-bhāsyā-ṭīkā, Taittirīya-bhāsyā-vārttika-ṭīkā, Śāstra-prakāṣikā, Bhād-āranya-bhāsyā-vārttika-ṭīkā, Bhād-āranya-bhāsyā-ṭīkā, Śāriraka-bhāsyā-ṭīkā (called also Nyāya-nirnaya), Gītā-bhāsyā-vivecana, Pañcikarana-vivarana, with a commentary called Tattva-candrikā by Rāma Tīrtha, a pupil of Jagannāthāśrama (latter part of the fifteenth century), and Tarka-saṅgraha have already been printed. But some of his other works, such as Upadeśa-sāhasri-viérti, Vākya-vṛtti-ṭīkā, Atma-jñānopadeśa-ṭīkā, Śvarūpa-nirnaya-ṭīkā, Tripuri-prakaraṇa-ṭīkā, Padārtha-tattva-nirnaya-vivarana and Tattvāloka, still remain to be printed. It will thus be seen that almost all his works are but commentaries on Śaṅkara’s commentaries and other works. The Tarka-saṅgraha and Tattvāloka (attributed to “Janārdana,” which was probably the name of Ānandagiri when he was a householder) seem to be his only two independent works. Of these the manuscript of the second work, in which he refutes the doctrines of many other philosophers, including Bhāskara’s parināma doctrines, has, unfortunately, not been available to the present writer. The Tarka-saṅgraha is devoted almost wholly to a detailed refutation of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. The book is divided into three chapters. In the first chapter, dealing with the criticism of substances (dvaya), he starts with a refutation of the concepts of duality, reality (tattva), existence (sattva), non-existence, positivity (bhāva) and negativity (abhāva). Ānandojñāna then passes on to a refutation of the definition of substance and its division into nine kinds (according to the Vaiśeṣika philosophy). He then criticizes the first substance, earth, and its diverse forms, as atoms (paramāṇu) and molecules (dvyaṇuca), and its grosser forms and their modified states,

1 See Mr. Tripathi’s introduction to his edition of the Tarka-saṅgraha, Baroda, 1917.
as bodies, senses and sense-objects, and continues to criticize the other substances such as water, fire, air, and the theory of creation and dissolution, ākāśa, time, space, self (ātman) and manas. In the second chapter he goes on to the criticism of qualities (guna), such as colour (rupa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha), touch (sparśa), the effects of heat on the transformations of objects through molecular or atomic changes (pīlu-pāka and pithara-pāka), number (sankhyā), measure (parimāṇa), separateness (prthaktva), contact (samyoga), separation (vibhāga), the nature of knowledge, illusion and dreams, the nature of right knowledge and its means (pramāṇa and pramā), perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), concomitance (vyāpti), reason (hetu), fallacies (hetvābhāsa), examples (dṛṣṭānta), discussions, disputations and wranglings, testimony of the scriptures (āgama), analogy (upamāṇa), memory, pleasure, pain, will, antipathy (dveṣa), effort (prayatna), heaviness, liquidity (draacatva), virtue, vice, etc. In the third chapter he refutes the notion of action, class-concept or universality (jāti), the relation of inherence (samavāya) and different kinds of negation. The thesis designed to be proved in all these refutations is the same as that of Śrīharṣa or Citsukha, viz. that in whatsoever manner the Vaiśeṣikas have attempted to divide, classify or define the world of appearances they have failed.

The conclusion at which he arrives after this long series of criticisms and refutations reminds us of Ānandabodha's conclusions in his Nyāya-makaranda, on which a commentary was written by his teacher Anubhūtisvarūpa Ācārya, to which reference has already been made when Ānandabodha's views were under discussion. Thus Ānandajñāna says that an illusory imposition cannot be regarded as existent (sat); for, since it is non-existent in the substratum (adhiṣṭhāna) of its appearance, it cannot be existent anywhere else. Neither can it be regarded as absolutely non-existent (atyauntāsat); for, had it been so, it would not have appeared as immediately perceived (aparokṣa-pratiti-virodhāt); nor can it be regarded as existent and non-existent in the same object. The only alternative left is that the illusory imposition is indescribable in its nature. This indescribability (anirvācyatva) means that, in whichever way one may try to describe it, it is found that none of those ways can be affirmed of it or, in other words, that it is indescribable.
in each and every one of those ways\(^1\). Now, since all appearances must have something for their cause and since that which is not a real thing cannot have a real thing as its material cause \((\text{na ca avastuno vastu upādānam upapadyate})\), and, since they are all indescribable in their nature, their cause must also be of that nature, the nescience of the substratum\(^2\).

He then asserts that this nescience \((\text{ajñāna})\), which is the material out of which all appearances take their form, is associated with Brahman; for Brahman could not be regarded as omniscient or the knower of all \((\text{sarva-jñā})\) without its association with \(\text{ajñāna}\), which is the material stuff of the all \((\text{the knower, the means of knowledge, the objects and their relations})\)\(^3\). Everything else that appears except the one reality, the self, the Brahman, is the product of this \(\text{ajñāna}\). This one \(\text{ajñāna}\) then can explain the infinite kinds of appearances, and there is not the slightest necessity of admitting a number of \(\text{ajñānas}\) in order to explain the diversity or the plurality of appearances. The many selves are thus but appearances produced by this one \(\text{ajñāna}\) in association with Brahman\(^4\). It is the one \(\text{ajñāna}\) that is responsible for appearances of the dream state as well as of the waking state. It is the one \(\text{ajñāna}\) which produces all kinds of diversity by its diversity of functions or modes of operation. If there is only one reality, which through one \(\text{ajñāna}\) appears in all diverse forms of appearances, how is the phenomenon of self-consciousness or self-recognition to be explained? To this difficulty Ānandajñāna's reply is that both the perceiving and the perceived self are but false appearances in the \(\text{antahkarana}\) (an \(\text{ajñāna}\) product), and that it does not in any way infect the one true self with any kind of activity. Thus there is the one Brahman and there is one beginningless, indescribable \(\text{ajñāna}\) in connection with it, which is the cause of all the infinitely diverse appearances through which the former appears impure and suffers bondage, as it were, and again appears liberated, as it were, through the

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\(^1\) yena yena prakāreṇa paro nirevaktum icchati tona tenātmadā 'yogas tad-anirūcyātā matā. Tarka-saṅgraha, p. 136.

\(^2\) tasmād rūpyādi-kāryasyānirūcyātāt tad-upādānam api adhiśthāṇajñānam upādeyam. Ibid. p. 137.


\(^4\) ekas tāvad ātmā ēcavor api ēcavah sampratipannu 'sti, tasya svājñānād eva avivāda-siddhād ekasām ātiktam sarvam pratiḥhitāḥ...samastasyaiva bhedabhāṇasyāpāraṃmāṇah kājñāna-sāmarthyād eva sambhavān nājñāna-bhede hetur asti. Ibid. pp. 138, 139.
realization of the Vedantic truth of the real nature of the self. In fact there is neither bondage nor emancipation.

In view of the above it may be suggested that Ānandajñāna is following the same line of interpretation of the relation of ajñāna to Brahman which was upheld by Vācaspati and Ānandabodha. Ānandajñāna’s position as an interpreter of Śaṅkara’s philosophy is evident from the number of able commentaries which he wrote on the commentaries of Śaṅkara and also from the references made to him by later writers. Mr Tripathi collects the names of some of these writers, as Prajñānānanda, Šeṣa Sārṅgadhara, Vādvāgīśvara, Vādindra, Rāmānanda Sarasvatī, Sadānanda Kaśmiraka (A.D. 1547), Kṛṣṇānanda (A.D. 1650), Maheśvara Tirtha (A.D. 1650) and others.

Philosophy of the Prakāṣārtha-vivaraṇa (A.D. 1200).

The Prakāṣārtha-vivaraṇa (as the writer himself calls it in the colophon of the work—prārabhyate vivaraṇaṁ prakāṣārtham etat) is an important commentary still in manuscript on Śaṅkara’s commentary on the Brahma-sūtra, which the present writer had an opportunity of going through from a copy in the Adyar Library, Madras, through the kind courtesy of the Librarian, Mr T. R. Chintamani, who is intending to bring out an edition. The author, however, does not anywhere in the work reveal his own name and the references which can be found in other works are all to its name as Prakaṭar or to the author of the Prakāṣārtha (prakāṣārtha-kāra), and not to the author’s personal name. This work has been referred to by Ānandajñāna, of the thirteenth century (Mundaka, p. 32; Kena, p. 23; Ānandāśrama editions A.D. 1918 and 1917), and it may well be supposed that the author of the work lived in the latter half of the twelfth

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2 The colophon of the work runs as follows: jñātepya yasya bahu-kālam acintana viśākhyātum akṣamatayā parītāpi cetaḥ tasyoṣatāpa-haraṇāya maye bhāyē prārabhyate vivaraṇaṁ prakaṭārtham etat.

MS. No. I, 38. 27, Govt. MSS. Library, Madras.
century. He certainly preceded Rāmādvaya, the author of the Vedānta-kaumudi, who not only refers to the Prakāṣṭārtha, but has been largely influenced in many of his conceptions by the argument of this work\(^1\). The author of the latter holds that the indefinable māyā in association with pure consciousness (cin-mātra-sambandhini) is the mother of all existence (bhūta-prakṛti). Through the reflection of pure consciousness in māyā is producedĪśvara (God), and by a transformation of Him there arises the creator Brahmag, and it is by the reflection of the pure consciousness in the infinite parts of this Brahmag that there arise the infinite number of individual souls through the veiling and creating functions of the māyā. Māyā or ajñāna is not negation, but a positive material cause, just as the earth is of the jug (ajñānam nābīva upādānato mṛdovat). But, being of the nature of veiling (āvaranatvāt) and being destructible through right knowledge (prakāśa-heyatvāt), it cannot be known as it is: still it may well be regarded as the positive cause of all illusions\(^2\). The well-known Vedāntic term svaprakāśa is defined in the Prakāṣṭārtha as illumination without the cognition of its own idea (sva-saṁvijnanairapekṣena sphuranam). The self is to be regarded as self-revealing; for without such a supposition the revelation of the self would be inexplicable\(^3\). The author of the Prakāṣṭārtha then criticizes the Kumārila view of cognition as being a subjective act, inferable from the fact of a particular awareness, as also the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Prabhakara views of knowledge as an illumination of the object inhering in the subject (ātma-saṁvāya viṣaya-prakāśo jñānam), and the Bhāskara view of knowledge as merely a particular kind of activity of the self; and he ultimately holds the view that the mind or manas is a substance with a preponderance of sattva, which has an illuminating nature, and that it is this manas which, being helped by the moral destiny (adrśṭādi-sahākṛtam), arrives at the place where the objects stand like a long ray of light and comes in contact with it, and then as a result thereof pure consciousness is reflected upon the object, and this leads to its cognition. Perceptual cognition, thus defined, would be a mental transformation which can excite the

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\(^1\) Vedānta-kaumudi, MS. transcript copy, p. 99.


\(^3\) ātma svā-prakāśas tato 'nyathā'nuṣapadyamānac cati prakāśamānatevān na ya evaṁ na sa evaṁ yathā kumbhaḥ. Prakāṣṭārtha MS.
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revelation of an object (manah-parināmah samvid-vyañjakoññanam). In the case of inference, however, the transformation of manas takes place without any actual touch with the objects; and there is therefore no direct excitation revealing the object; for the manas there, being in direct touch with the reason or the linga, is prevented from being in contact with the object that is inferred. There is here not an operation by which the knowledge of the object can be directly revealed, but only such a transformation of the manas that a rise of the idea about the object may not be obstructed.

The author of the Prakāśartha accepted the distinction between māyā and ajñāna as conditioning Isvara and jīva.

Vimuktañāman (A.D. 1200).

Vimuktañāman, a disciple of Avyayatman Bhagavat Puñjyapāda, wrote his Iṣṭa-siddhi probably not later than the early years of the thirteenth century. He is quoted and referred to by Madhusūdana in his Advaita-siddhi and by Rāmādvaya in his Vedānta-kumudī of the fourteenth century. It was commented upon by Jñānottama, the teacher of Citsukha, and this commentary is called Iṣṭa-siddhi-vyākhyā or Iṣṭa-siddhi-vivarana. For reasons stated elsewhere Jñānottama could not have flourished later than the latter half of the thirteenth century. Vimuktañāman wrote also another work, called Pramāṇa-vyātti-nirñaya, to which he refers in his Iṣṭa-siddhi (MS. p. 72). The work has not yet been published, and the manuscript from the Adyar Library, which is a transcript copy of a manuscript of the Naḍuvil Maṭham, Cochin State, and which has been available to the present writer, is very fragmentary in many parts; so much so, that it is often extremely difficult to follow properly the meaning of the discussions. The work is divided into eight chapters, and is devoted in a very large part to discussions relating to the analysis of illusions in the Vedānta school and in the other schools of philosophy. This work is to be regarded as one of the four traditional Siddhis, such as the Brahma-siddhi by Maṇḍana, the Naṅkarma-siddhi by Sureśvara,

1 MS. p. 54.
2 upalabdha-sambandhrthā kāreṇa parinātam mano
   'nāvabhāsa-vyāvhit-mātrahalam, na tu samvid-vyañjakaṁ
   ligādi-samvid-vyavadhāna-pratibhandhūt. MS. p. 54.

It is easy to see how Dharmarājādhirāṇa elaborated his Vedāntic theory of perception and inference with these and other data worked out by his predecessors.
the Iṣṭa-siddhi by Vimuktatman and the Advaita-siddhi by Madhusūdana. Hitherto only the Naiṣkarmya-siddhi and the Advaita-siddhi have been published. The Brahma-siddhi is expected to be published soon in Madras; but as yet the present writer is not aware of any venture regarding this important work.

The work begins with the interpretation of a salutation made by the author, in which he offers his adoration to that birthless, incognizable, infinite intuitive consciousness of the nature of self-joy which is the canvas on which the illusory world-appearance has been painted. Thus he starts the discussion regarding the nature of the ultimate reality as pure intuitive consciousness (anubhūti). Nothing can be beginningless and eternal, except pure consciousness. The atoms are often regarded as beginningless; but, since they have colours and other sense-properties, they are like other objects of nature, and they have parts also, as without them no combination of atoms would be possible. Only that can be indivisible which is partless and beginningless, and it is only the intuitive consciousness that can be said to be so. The difference between consciousness and other objects is this, that, while the latter can be described as the "this" or the object, the former is clearly not such. But, though this difference is generally accepted, dialectical reasoning shows that the two are not intrinsically different. There cannot logically be any difference between the perceiving principle (dṛṇā) and the perceived (dṛṣṭya); for the former is unperceived (adṛṣṭyatvāt).

No difference can be realized between a perceived and an unperceived entity; for all difference relates two cognized entities. But it may be argued that, though the perceiver may not be cognized, yet he is self-luminous, and therefore the notion of difference ought to be manifested. A reply to this objection involves a consideration regarding the nature of difference. If difference were of the nature of the entities that differed, then difference should not be dependent on a reference to another (na svarūpa-dṛṣṭī prati-yogy-apekṣā). The difference has thus to be regarded as a characteristic (dharma) different from the nature of the differing entities and cognized by a distinct knowing process like colours, tastes, etc.¹ But this view also is not correct, since it is difficult to admit "difference" as an entity different from the

¹ tasmāt kathaṅcit bhinnā jñānāntara-gamyo rūpa-rasādivad bheda 'bhuyupeyāḥ. Adyut Iṣṭa-siddhi MS. p. 5.
differing entities; for such a difference would involve another difference by which it is known, and that another and that another, we should have an infinite regress; and the same objection applies to the admission of mutual negation as a separate entity. This being so, it is difficult to imagine how "difference" or mutual negation between the perceiver and the perceived can be cognized; for it is impossible that there should be any other cognition by which this "difference," or mutual negation which has the perceiver as one of its alternating poles, could be perceived. Moreover, the self-luminous perceiving power is always present, and it is impossible that it could be negated—a condition without which neither difference nor negation could be possible. Moreover, if it is admitted that such a difference is cognized, then that very fact proves that it is not a characteristic of the perceiving self. If this difference is admitted to be self-luminous, then it would not await a reference to another, which is a condition for all notions of difference or mutual negation. Therefore, "difference" or "mutual negation" cannot be established, either as the essence of the perceiving self or as its characteristics; and as there is no other way in which this difference can be conceived, it is clear that there is no difference between the perceiving self and its characteristics.

Again, negation is defined as the non-perception of a perceivable thing; but the perceiving self is of the very nature of perception, and its non-perception would be impossible. Admitting for the sake of argument that the perceiving self could be negated, how could there be any knowledge of such a negation? for without the self there could be no perception, as it is itself of the nature of perception. So the notion of the negation of the perceiving self cannot be anything but illusion. Thus the perceiving self and the perceived (drśk and drśya) cannot be differentiated from each other. The difficulty, however, arises that, if the perceiving self and the perceived were identical, then the infinite limitations and differences that are characteristic of the perceived would also be characteristic of the perceiver; and there are the further objections to such a supposition that it is against all ordinary usage and experience. It may be argued that the two are identical, since they are both

1 evam ca sati na drś-drśyavoy bheda draṣṭum śakyaḥ
nāpi anyonyābhāṣeḥ na hi drśeḥ svayam drśeḥ
prati-yogy-apekṣa-drśy-antara-drśyam rūpāntaram svam
samanati svayam drśitva-hānāt.

MS. p. 6.
experienced simultaneously (sahopalambha-niyamāt); but the reply is that, as two are experienced and not one, they cannot be regarded as identical, for in the very experience of the two their difference is also manifested. In spite of such obvious contradiction of experience one could not venture to affirm the identity of the perceiver and the perceived. The maxim of identity of the perceiver and the perceived because of simultaneous perception cannot be regarded as true; for, firstly, the perceiver is never a cognized object, and the perceived is never self-luminous, secondly, the perceiver is always self-revealing, but not so the perceived, and, thirdly, though the "perceived" cannot be revealed without the perceiver, the latter is always self-revealed. There is thus plainly no simultaneity of the perceiver and the perceived. When a perceived object $A$ is illuminated in consciousness, the other objects $B, C, D$, etc. are not illuminated, and, when the perceived object $B$ is illuminated, $A$ is not illuminated, but the consciousness (samvid) is always self-illuminated; so no consciousness can be regarded as being always qualified by a particular objective content; for, had it been so, that particular content would always have stood self-revealed. Moreover, each particular cognition (e.g. awareness of blue) is momentary and self-revealed and, as such, cannot be the object of any other cognition; and, if any particular awareness could be the object of any other awareness, then it would not be awareness, but a mere object, like a jug or a book. There is thus an intrinsic difference between awareness and the object, and so the perceiver, as pure awareness, cannot be identified with its object. It has already been pointed out that the perceiver and the perceived cannot be regarded as different, and now it is shown that they cannot be regarded as identical. There is another alternative, viz. that they may be both identical and different (which is the bhedābheda view of Bhāskara and Rāmānuja and others), and Vimuktatman tries to show that this alternative is also impossible and that the perceiver and the

1 abhede saha-bhānāyogād devayor hi saha-bhānām na ekayaiva na hi dṛṣṭai dṛṣṭa bhāttit bhavatāpy ucyate, nāpi dṛṣṭenaiva dṛṣṭaṃ saha bhāttī kintu dṛṣṭaḥ saha bhānām ucyate atas tayor bheda bhāty eva. MS. p. 25.
2 tamśt saresa-svayahāra-lopa-prasāṅgāna bheda dṛṣṭaḥ. Ibid.
3 kiṃ vidyut-viśeṣitataba nāma samvidāḥ svarūpam uta samvedayasya, yadi samvidāḥ sāpi bhāty eva samvid-bhānāt samvedya-svarūpaṃ cait tadbhān na samvido bhānām. Ibid. p. 27.
4 asamvedayāvāca samvid samvedyāṃ cāsamvid eva, atāḥ samvedyāsyāya ghṛta-sukhādeḥ samvidai cābheda-gandho 'pi na pramāṇavān. Ibid. p. 31.
perceived cannot be regarded as being both identical and different. The upholder of the bhedabheda view is supposed to say that, though the perceiver and the perceived cannot, as such, be regarded as identical, yet they may be regarded as one in their nature as Brahman. But in reply to this it may be urged that, if they are both one and identical with Brahman, there would be no difference between them. If it is argued that their identity with Brahman is in another form, then also the question arises whether their forms as perceiver and perceived are identical with the form in which they are identical with Brahman; and no one is aware of any form of the perceiver and the perceived other than their forms as such, and therefore it cannot be admitted that in spite of their difference they have any form in which they are one and identical. If again it is objected that it is quite possible that an identical entity should have two different forms, then also the question arises whether these forms are one, different or both identical with that entity and different. In the first alternative the forms would not be different; in the second they would not be one with the entity. Moreover, if any part of the entity be identical with any particular form, it cannot also be identical with other forms; for then these different forms would not be different from one another; and, if again the forms are identical with the entity, how can one distinguish the entity (röpin) from the forms (röpa)? In the third alternative the question arises whether the entity is identical with one particular form of it and different from other forms, or whether it is both identical with the same form and different. In the first case each form would have two forms, and these again other two forms in which they are identical and different, and these other two forms, and so on, and we should have infinite regress: and the same kind of infinite regress would appear in the relation between the entity and its forms. For these and similar reasons it is impossible to hold that the perceiver and the perceived are different as such and yet one and identical as Brahman.

If the manifold world is neither different nor identical nor both different and identical with the perceiver, what then is its status? The perceiver is indeed the same as pure perception and pure bliss, and, if it is neither identical nor different nor both identical with the manifold world and different, the manifold world must necessarily be unsubstantial (avastu); for, if it had any substantiality, it might have been related in one of the above three
ways of relation. But, if it is unsubstantial, then none of the above objections would apply. But it may again be objected that, if the world were unsubstantial, then both our common experience and our practical dealing with this world would be contradicted. To this Vimuktatman’s reply is that, since the world is admitted to be made up of māyā (māyā-nirmitatvābhyupagamāt), and since the effects of māyā cannot be regarded either as substantial or as unsubstantial, none of the above objections would be applicable to this view. Since the manifold world is not a substance, its admission cannot disturb the monistic view, and, since it is not unsubstantial, the facts of experience may also be justified. As an instance of such an appearance which is neither vāstu (substance) nor avāstu, one may refer to dream-appearances, which are not regarded as unreal because of their nature as neither substance nor not-substance, but because they are contradicted in experience. Just as a canvas is neither the material of the picture painted on it nor a constituent of the picture, and just as the picture cannot be regarded as being a modification of the canvas in the same way as a jug is a modification of clay, or as a change of quality, like the redness in ripe mangoes, and just as the canvas was there before the painting, and just as it would remain even if the painting were washed away, whereas the painting would not be there without the canvas, so the pure consciousness also is related to this world-appearance, which is but a painting of māyā on it.

Māyā is unspeakable and indescribable (anirvacanīyā), not as different from both being and non-being, but as involving the characters of both being and non-being. It is thus regarded as a power of ignorance (avideyā-saktī) which is the material cause of all objects of perception otherwise called matter (sarva-jaḍopādāna-bhūtā). But, just as fire springing from bamboos may burn up the same bamboos even to their very roots, so Brahma-knowledge, which is itself a product of ignorance and its processes, destroys the self-same ignorance from which it was produced and its processes and at last itself subsides and leaves the Brahman to

1 prapañcasya vastutvābhāvān nādvaita-hāniḥ avastutvābhāvāc ca pratyaksādy- aprāmānyam apy-ukta-dośābhāvāt. MS. p. 64.
2 yatha citrasya bhūtīh sākhāt nopaśānam nāpi sahajaṃ citraṃ tasyāḥ nāpi avasthitaraṃ mṛrdā iva ghaṭādiḥ nāpi guṇāntaraṃ gamaḥ āmrasyeva raktatādiḥ na cāyāḥ jammādīḥ citrāt prāg ārdham ca bhāvāt, yady api bhūtīṃ vinā citraṃ na bhūtī tathāpi na sā citraṃ vinā bhūtī ity evam-ādy-anubhūtīr bhūtī-jagac-citrāyor yo' yo'yaṃ. Ibid. p. 73.
shine in its own radiance\(^1\). The functions of the pramāṇas, which are all mere processes of ignorance, ajñāna or avidyā, consist only in the removal of obstructions veiling the illumination of the self-luminous consciousness, just as the digging of a well means the removal of all earth that was obstructing the omnipresent ākāśa or space; the pramāṇas have thus no function of manifesting the self-luminous consciousness, and only remove the veiling ajñāna\(^2\). So Brahma-knowledge also means the removal of the last remnants of ajñāna, after which Brahma-knowledge as conceptual knowledge, being the last vestige of ajñāna, also ceases of itself. This cessation of ajñāna is as unspeakable as ajñāna itself. Unlike Maṇḍana, Vimuktātman does not consider avidyā to be merely subjective, but regards it as being both subjective and objective, involving within it not only all phenomena, but all their mutual relations and also the relation with which it is supposed to be related to the pure consciousness, which is in reality beyond all relations. Vimuktātman devotes a large part of his work to the criticism of the different kinds of theories of illusion (khyāti), and more particularly to the criticism of anyathākhyāti. These contain many new and important points; but, as the essential features of these theories of illusion and their criticisms have already been dealt with in the tenth chapter of the first volume, it is not desirable to enter into these fresh criticisms of Vimuktātman, which do not involve any new point of view in Vedāntic interpretation. He also deals with some of the principal Vedāntic topics of discussion, such as the nature of bondage, emancipation, and the reconciliation of the pluralistic experience of practical life with the monistic doctrine of the Vedānta; but, as there are not here any strikingly new modes of approach, these may be left out in the present work.

Rāmādvaya (A.D. 1300).

Rāmādvaya, a pupil of Advayāśrama, wrote an important work, called Vedānta-kaumudi, in four chapters, in which he discussed in a polemical way many Vedāntic problems while dealing with the subject matter of Śaṅkara’s commentary on the first four topics of the Brahma-sūtra. The work has not yet been published; but at least one manuscript of it is available in the Government

\(^1\) MS. p. 137.
\(^2\) Ibid. p. 143.
Oriental Manuscript Library, Madras: this through the kindness of the Curator the present author had the opportunity of utilizing. Rāmādvaya also wrote a commentary on his Vedānta-kaumudi, called Vedānta-kaumudi-vyākhyāna, a manuscript of the first chapter of which has been available to the present writer in the library of the Calcutta Asiatic Society. These are probably the only manuscripts of this work known till now. The date of the writing of the copy of the Vedānta-kaumudi-vyākhyāna is given by the copyist Śeṣanāsirṣa as A.D. 1512. It is therefore certain that the work cannot have been written later than the fifteenth century. Rāmādvaya in the course of his discussions refers to many noted authors on Nyāya and Vedānta, none of whom are later than the thirteenth century. Vicuṇṭatman, author of the Iṣṭa-siddhi, has been placed by the present author in the early half of the thirteenth century; but Rāmādvaya always refers to him approvingly, as if his views were largely guided by his; he also in his Vedānta-kaumudi-vyākhyāna (MS. p. 14) refers to Janārdana, which is Ānandajñāna’s name as a householder; but Janārdana lived in the middle of the thirteenth century; it seems therefore probable that Rāmādvaya lived in the first half of the fourteenth century.

In the enunciation of the Vedāntic theory of perception and inference Rāmādvaya seems to have been very much under the influence of the views of the author of the Prakāśārthika; for, though he does not refer to his name in this connection, he repeats his very phrases with a slight elaboration. Just as the cloudless sky covers itself with clouds and assumes various forms, so the pure consciousness veils itself with the indefinable acidyā and appears in diverse limited forms. It is this consciousness that forms the real ground of all that is known. Just as a spark of fire cannot manifest itself as fire if there are no fuels as its condition, so the pure consciousness, which is the underlying reality of all objects, cannot illuminate them if there are not the proper conditions to help it in its work. Such a conditioning factor is found in

1 See Vedānta-kaumudi, MS. transcript copy, pp. 36 and 47.
2 Rāmādvaya refers here to the dāharaḍhikarana of Śaṅkara’s commentary on the Brahma-sūtra, presumably to 1. 3. 19, where Śaṅkara refers to the supposed distinction between the individual soul (jīva) and Brahman. Here Śaṅkara says that his commentary is directed towards the regulation of those views, both outside and inside the circle of Upaniṣadic interpreters, which regard individual souls as real (apare tu vādinaḥ pāramārthikam eva jaivaṃ rūpam ti manyante asmadyā ca kecit). Such a view militates against the correct understanding of
manas, which is of the stuff of pure sattva: on the occasion of sense-object contact this manas, being propelled by the moral destiny (adṛṣṭādi-kṣubdhaṁ), transforms itself into the form of a long ray reaching to the object itself\(^1\). The pure consciousness, as conditioned or limited by the antahkaraṇa (antahkaranavacchinnam caitanyaṁ), does by such a process remove its veil of avidyā, (though in its limited condition as individual soul this avidyā formed its own body), and the object also being in contact with it is manifested by the same process. The two manifestations of the subject and the object, having taken place in the same process (vṛtti) there, are joined together in the same cognition as “this object is known by me” (vṛttier ubhayasamālagnatvāc ca tad-abhisyakta-caitanyasyāpi tathātvena mayedam viditam iti saṁśleṣa-pratyayah); and, as its other effect, the consciousness limited by the antahkaraṇa, transformed into the form of the process (vṛtti) of right knowledge (pramāṇa), appears as the cognizer (vṛtti-lakṣaṇa-pramāṣrayāntahkaranavacchinnas tat-pramātetyapi vyapadisyaṁ)\(^2\). The object also attains a new status in being manifested and is thus known as the object (karma-kārakābhivyaktam ca tat prakāśitamanā phalavyapadesa-bhāk). In reality it is the underlying consciousness that manifests the vṛtti transformation of the antahkaraṇa; but, as it is illusorily identified with the antahkaraṇa (antahkaranacaitanyayor aikyādhyāsūt), like fire and iron in the heated iron, it is also identified with the vṛtti transformation of the antahkaraṇa, and, as the vṛtti becomes superimposed on the object, by manifesting the vṛtti it also manifests the object, and thus apart from the subjective illumination as awareness, there is also the objective fact of an illumination of the object (evam vṛtti-avyāniyakam api taptāy-phaṇḍa-nyāyena tad-ekatām ivāptam vṛttivad-visaya-Prakāśitamanā Sampadisyaṁ)\(^3\). The moments in the cognitive process in perception according to RāmādvaYa may thus be described. The

the self as the only reality which through avidyā manifests itself as individual souls and with its removal reveals itself in its real nature in right knowledge as prameśvara, just as an illusory snake shows itself as a piece of rope. Prameśvara, the eternal unchangeable and upholding consciousness, is the one reality which, like a magician, appears as many through avidyā. There is no consciousness other than this (eka eva prameśvaraḥ kūḍastha-mityo vijnaya-daḥtur avidyayā-māyaya māyayevad anekadha vihāyate naṁyo vijnaya-daḥtur atti).

\(^1\) This passage seems to be borrowed directly from the Prakāśārtha, as may be inferred from their verbal agreement. But it may well be that both the Vedānta-kumudī and the Prakāśārtha borrowed it from the Paṇca-pādikā-vivaraṇa.

\(^2\) Vedānta-kumudī, MS. transcript copy, p. 36.

\(^3\) Ibid, p. 37.
sense-object contact offers an occasion for the moral destiny (adṛśta) to stir up the antahkaraṇa, and, as a result thereof, the antahkaraṇa or mind is transformed into a particular state called vṛtti. The pure consciousness underlying the antahkaraṇa was lying dormant and veiled, as it were, and, as soon as there is a transformation of the antahkaraṇa into a vṛtti, the consciousness brightens up and overcomes for the moment the veil that was covering it. The vṛtti thus no longer veils the underlying consciousness, but serves as a transparent transmitter of the light of consciousness to the object on which the vṛtti is superimposed, and, as a result thereof, the object has an objective manifestation, separate from the brightening up of consciousness at the first moment of the vṛtti transformation. Now, since the vṛtti joins up the subjective brightening up of consciousness and the objective illumination of the object, these two are joined up (samsēsa-pratyaya) and this results in the cognition “this object is known by me”; and out of this cognition it is possible to differentiate the knower as the underlying consciousness, as limited by the antahkaraṇa as transformed into the vṛtti, and the known as that which has been objectively illuminated. In the Vedānta-paribhāṣā we hear of three consciousnesses (caitaṇya), the pramāṇa-caitaṇya (the consciousness conditioned by the antahkaraṇa), the pramāṇa-caitaṇya (the same consciousness conditioned by the vṛtti of the antahkaraṇa), and the viśaya-caitaṇya (the same consciousness conditioned by the object). According to this perception (pratyakṣa) can be characterized either from the point of view of cognition (jñāna-gata-pratyakṣateva) or from the point of view of the object, both being regarded as two distinct phases, cognitional and objective, of the same perceptual revelation. From the point of view of cognition it is defined as the non-distinction (abheda) of the pramāṇa-caitaṇya from the viśaya-caitaṇya through spatial superimposition of the vṛtti on the object. Perception from the point of view of the object (viśaya-gata-pratyakṣateva) is defined as the non-distinction of the object from the pramāṇa-caitaṇya or the perceiver, which is consciousness conditioned by the antahkaraṇa. This latter view, viz. the definition of perception from the point of view of the object as the non-distinction of the object from the consciousness as limited by antahkaraṇa (gātāder antahkaraṇāvaca-chinna-caitaṇyābhedāh), is open to the serious objection that really the non-distinction of the object (or the consciousness conditioned
by the antahkaraṇa—antahkaranāvacchinnā-caitanya) but with the
cognition (pramāṇa-caitanya or vṛtti-caitanya); for the cognition
or the vṛtti intervenes between the object and the perceiver, and
the object is in immediate contact with the vṛtti and not with the
perceiver (antahkaranāvacchinnā-caitanya). That this is so is also
admitted by Dharmarāja Adhvarindra, son of Rāmakṛṣṇa Adhvarin,
in his Śikṣā-mañi commentary on the Vedānta-paribhāṣā¹. But he
tries to justify Dharmarāja Adhvarindra by pointing out that he was
forced to define viṣayā-gata-pratyakṣatva as non-distinction of the
object from the subject, since this view was taken in Prakāśātman’s
Vivarana and also in other traditional works on Vedānta². This
however seems to be an error. For the passage of the Vivarana to
which reference is made here expounds an entirely different view³.
It says there that the perceptibility of the object consists in
its directly and immediately qualifying the cognitional state or
sense-knowledge (samvid)⁴. That other traditional Vedantic inter-
preters entirely disagreed with the view of Dharmarāja Adhvarindra
is also evident from the account of the analysis of the perceptual
process given by Rāmādvaya. Rāmādvaya says, as has just been
pointed out, that it is the illuminated cognitive process, or the
vṛtti, that has the subject and the object at its two poles and
thus unites the subject and the object in the complex subject-
predicate form “this is known by me.” The object is thus
illuminated by the vṛtti, and it is not directly with the subject, but
with the vṛtti, that the object is united. Dharmarāja Adhvarindra
himself raises an objection against his interpretation, that it might
be urged, if in perception there was non-distinction of the
object from the subject, then in perceiving an object, e.g. a book,
one should feel “I am the book,” and not “I perceive the book”; in
reply to such an objection he says that in the perceptual process

¹ Yad va yogyate sati viṣayā-caitanyābhinnā-pramāṇa-caitanya-viṣayatvam
ghatāder viṣayasya pratyakṣatvam tathāpi viṣayasyāprakṛtātvaṁ samvida-
bhedat iti vivarane tatra tatra ca sāṃpradāyikaiḥ pramāṇaśabdaśaṁ viṣay-
pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇatvenaśbhidhānād evam uktam. Śikṣā-mañi on Vedānta-
paribhāṣā, p. 75, Bombay, 1911, Venkatesvara Press.
² Ibid.
³ Tasmād atyavadhānena samvid-upādhitayāprakṛtā viṣayasya. Pañca-
pādikā-citvarana, p. 50, Benares, 1892.
⁴ It should be noted here that samvid means cognitional idea or sense-
knowledge and not the perceiver (antahkaranāvacchinnā-caitanya), as the author
of the Śikṣā-mañi says. Thus Akhandananda in his Tatthā-dipana commentary
explains the word samvid as samvid-chabdendra indriyārtha-samprayoga-ja-jñānasya
vivakṣitavā. Tatthā-dipana, p. 194, Benares, 1902.
there is only a non-distinction between the consciousness underlying the object and the consciousness underlying the perceiver, and this non-distinction, being non-relational, does not imply the assertion of a relation of identity resulting in the notion “I am the book”\(^1\). This is undoubtedly so, but it is hardly an answer to the objection that has been raised. It is true that the object and the subject are both but impositions of avidyā on one distinctionless pure consciousness; but that fact can hardly be taken as an explanation of the various modes of experiences of the complex world of subject-object experience. The difference of the Vedântic view of perception, as expounded in the Pañca-pâdikā-vivaraṇa, from the Buddhist idealism (vijñāna-vāda) consists in this, that, while the Buddhists did not accord any independent status to objects as outside the ideas or percepts, the Vedânta accepted the independent manifestation of the objects in perception in the external world.\(^2\) There is thus a distinction between visual percepts and the object; but there is also a direct and immediate connection between them, and it is this immediate relationship of the object to its awareness that constitutes the perceptivity of the object (avyavadhânena samvid-upâdhitâ aparokṣatâ visayasya—Vivaraṇa, p. 50). The object is revealed in perception only as an object of awareness, whereas the awareness and the subject reveal themselves directly and immediately and not as an object of any further intuition or inference (prameyam karmatvena aparokṣam pramāṇ-pramit prun aparokṣe eva kevalam na karmatayo)\(^3\).

The views of the Vedânta-kaumudī, however, cannot be regarded as original in any sense, since they are only a reflection of the exposition of the subject in Padmapāda’s Pañca-pâdikā and Prakāśatman’s Pañca-pâdikā-vivaraṇa. The development of the whole theory of perception may be attributed to the Pañca-pâdikā-vivaraṇa, since all the essential points of the perceptual theory can be traced in that work. Thus it holds that all the world objects are veiled by avidyā; that, as the antahkaraṇa is transformed into states by superimposition on objects, it is illuminated by the underlying consciousness; and that through the spatial contact with the objects the veil of the objects is removed by these antahkaraṇa transformations; there are thus two illuminations, namely

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\(^1\) Vedânta-paribhāṣā, pp. 76, 77.
\(^2\) na ca vijñānābhedād eva aparokṣyam avabhūsate bahiṣṭvāvayāpi rajatāder aparokṣyāt. Pañca-pâdikā-vivaraṇa, p. 50.
\(^3\) Pañca-pâdikā, p. 17, Benares, 1891.
of the antahkarana transformations (called vṛtti in the Vedānta-
kaumūdi, and Vedānta-paribhāṣā and pure consciousness); to
the question that, if there were unity of the consciousness
underlying the object and the consciousness underlying the antah-
karana (i.e. the subject) and the consciousness underlying the
antahkarana modification (or vṛtti), there would be nothing to
explain the duality in perception (e.g. “I perceive the book,” and
not “I am the book,” and it is only the latter form that could
be expected from the unity of the three consciousnesses), Prakā-
sātman’s reply is that, since the unity of the object-consciousness
with the antahkarana-consciousness (subject) is effected through
the modification or the vṛtti of the antahkarana and, since the
antahkarana is one with its vṛtti, the vṛtti operation is rightly
attributed to the antahkarana as its agent, and this is illuminated
by the consciousness underlying the antahkarana resulting in the
perception of the knower as distinguished from the illumination
of object to which the operation of the vṛtti is directed in spatial
superimposition—the difference between the subject and the
object in perception is thus due to the difference in the mode or
the condition of the vṛtti with reference to the subject and the
object. This is exactly the interpretation of the Vedānta-kaumūdi,
and it has been pointed out above that the explanations of the
Vedānta-paribhāṣā are largely different therefrom and are in all
probability inexact. As this unity is effected between individual
subjects (consciousness limited by specific antahkaranas) and
individual objects (consciousness limited by specific avidyā
materials constituting the objects) through the vṛtti, it can result
only in revelation of a particular subject and a particular object
and not in the revelation of all subjects and all objects. This has
been elaborated into the view that there is an infinite number of
ajñāna-veils, and that each cognitive illumination removes only one
ajñāna corresponding to the illumination of one object. But this
also is not an original contribution of Rāmādvaya, since it was
also propounded by his predecessor Ānandajñāna in his Tarka-

1 See Pānca-pādikā-vivaraṇa, p. 70, and Tatvā-dīpana, pp. 256-259,
Benares, 1902.
2 etat pramāṇa-caitanyābhimatayaiva abhiśayaktaṁ tad viśaya-caitanyam na
pramāṇa-antara-caitanyābhedena abhiśayaktam ato na sarveṣu avabhāsyatvam.
Pānca-pādikā-vivaraṇa, p. 71.
3 yāvanti jñānāmi tāvanti svatva-tantrāṇi para-tantrāṇi vā ajñānāmi tato na doṣah.
Vedānta-kaumūdi, MS. copy, p. 43.
sangraha and by others. The upshot of the whole discussion is that on the occasion of a cognitive operation of the mind both the mind and the cognitive operation become enlivened and illuminated by the indwelling pure consciousness as subject-consciousness and awareness, and through contact with this cognitive operation the object also becomes revealed not as a mere content of awareness, but as an objective fact shining forth in the external world. Cognition of objects is thus not a mere quality of the self as knower, as the Nyāya holds, nor is there any immediate contact of the self with the object (the contact being only through the cognitive operation); the cognition is also not to be regarded as unperceived movement, modification or transformation of the self which may be inferred from the fact of the enlightenment of the object (jñātatā), as Kumārila held, nor is the illumination of the object to be regarded mere form of awareness without there being a corresponding as a objective entity (viṣayabhīvyaktir nāma viññāne tad-ākārolekhamātraṁ na bahir-anga-rūpaṁ viññānabhīvyāptih), as is held by the Buddhist subjective idealists. The cognitive operation before its contact with the object is a mere undifferentiated awareness, having only an objective reference and devoid of all specifications of sense characters, which later on assumes the sense characteristics in accordance with the object with which it comes in contact. It must be noted, however, that the cognitive operation is not an abstract idea, but an active transformation of a real sattva stuff, the mind (antaḥkaraṇa).

Since in the continuous perception of the same object we have only a rapid succession of cognitive acts, each

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1 The theory is that there is an infinite number of the ajñāna-veils; as soon as there is the vyrtti-object contact, the veil is removed and the object is illuminated; the next moment there is again an ajñāna-veil covering the object, and again there is the vyrtti-object contact, and again illumination of the object, and thus there is very quick succession of veils and their removals, as the perception of the object continues in time. On account of the rapidity of this succession it is not possible to notice it (vyrtti-viññānasya sāavyavatvāc ca hrāsa-dalāyāṁ ditpa-jveāyāṁ eva tamo 'ntaram mohāntaram āvaritum viṣayam pravartate tato 'pi kramamānan kṣaṇāntare sāmagray-anusāreṇa viññānāntaram viṣayāvaranā-haṅgenaiva svā-kāryam karoti, tathā sarvāpy api asaṅghyāt tu jñāna-bhedavad ācarāntarāntaram na lakṣyate. Vedānta-kaumudi, MS. copy, p. 46). This view of the Vedānta-kaumudi is different from the view of the Vedānta-paribhāṣā, which holds that in the case of continuous perception of the same object there are not different successive awarenesses, but there is one unchanged continuous vyrtti and not different vyrtis removing different ajñānas (kiṁ ca siddhānte dhārā-vākha-buddhi-sthale na jñāna-bhedah hintu yācūd ghaṭa-sphuraṇam tācav ghaṭakāraṇaḥkaraṇaṁ vyrttir ehaiva na tu nānā vyrtteḥ svā-virodhi-vyrtty-upatītyantyanātmaṁ sthāyītvabhayupagamāt. Vedānta-paribhāṣā, pp. 26, 27, Bombay, 1911).

2 atah sāvayava-sattvādhamaham antaḥkaraṇam eva anudhāta-rūpa-sparśam adṛṣyam asṛṣyam ca viṣayākāreṇa pariṣamate. Vedānta-kaumudi, MS. copy, p. 42.
dispelling an intellectual darkness enfold ing the object before its illumination, there is no separate perception of time as an entity standing apart from the objects; perception of time is but the perception of the succession of cognitive acts, and what is regarded as the present time is that in which the successive time-moments have been fused together into one concrete duration: it is this concrete duration, which is in reality but a fusion of momentary cognitive acts and awarenesses, that is designated as the present time. According to Rāmādvaya the definition of perception would not therefore include the present time as a separate element over and above the object as a separate datum of perception; for his view denies time as an objective entity and regards it only as a mode of cognitive process.

Rāmādvaya's definition of right knowledge is also different from that of Dharmarāja Adhvarindra. Rāmādvaya defines right knowledge (pramā) as experience which does not wrongly represent its object (yathārthānubhavah pramā), and he defines the instrument of right knowledge as that which leads to it. Verbally this definition is entirely different from that of Dharmarāja Adhvarindra, with whom the two conditions of pramā or right knowledge are that it should not be acquaintance with what was already known (anadhigata) and that it should be uncontradicted. The latter condition, however, seems to point only to a verbal difference from Rāmādvaya's definition; but it may really mean very much more than a verbal difference. For, though want of contradiction (Dharmarāja Adhvarindra's condition) and want of wrong representation (Rāmādvaya's condition) may mean the same thing, yet in the former case the definition of truth becomes more subjective than in the latter case; for want of wrong representation refers to an objective correspondence and objective certainty. An awareness may wrongly represent an object, but yet may not be found contradicted in the personal history of one or even many observers. Such a definition of truth becomes very relative, since its limits are not fixed by correspondence with its object. Considering the fact

1 na kālaḥ pratyakṣa-gocaraḥ...stambhādir eva prāg-ahāva-nivṛttī-pradhravam-
sāmutpatti-rūpo vartamānaḥ tad-avacchinaḥ kālo 'pi vartamānaḥ sa ca tathā-
vidho 'naha-jñāna-sādhnāraṇa eva, na caṣṣāvatā jñāna-yaugapadyāpatiḥ sūkma-
hālāpekṣayā krama-sambhavāt, na ca sūkma-kālopaḥān apratitiḥ kārya-
2 Ibid. p. 16.
that the Vedānta speaks of a real spatial superimposition of the modification of the antahkarana (which is its cognitive operation) on the object, a Vedānta definition of truth might well be expected to be realistic and not subjectivistic or relativistic. The idealism of the Vedānta rests content in the view that, however realistic these cognitive relations to objects may be, they are impositions and appearances which have as their ultimate ground one changeless consciousness. The definition of pramāṇa by Rāmādvaya as an awareness which does not give a wrong representation (yathārthā-nubhava) of objects could not be found faulty because of the fact that according to the Vedānta all dual experience of the world was false; for, though it was ultimately so, for all practical purposes it had a real existence, and Rāmādvaya refers to the Iṣṭa-siddhi to justify his view on this point.

As to the other point, viz. that a pramāṇa must always be that which acquaints us with what is unknown before (anadhisthita), Rāmādvaya definitely repudiates such a suggestion. He says that it often happens that we perceive things that we perceived before, and this makes recognition possible, and, if we deny that these are cases of right knowledge, we shall have to exclude much that is universally acknowledged as right knowledge. Also it cannot be conceived how in the case of the continuous perception of an object there can be new qualities accruing to the object, so as to justify the validity of the consciousness as right knowledge at every moment; nor can it be said that the sense-organs after producing the right knowledge of an object (which lasts for some time and is not momentary) may cease to operate until a new awareness is produced. There is therefore no justification for introducing anadhisthita as a condition of perception. Turning to the difference between perception and inference, Rāmādvaya says that in inference the inferred object does not form a datum and there is no direct and immediate contact of the antahkarana with the inferred object (e.g. fire). In inference the antahkarana is in touch only with the reason or the linga (e.g. smoke), and through this there arises (lingādi-bala-labdhākārölekkha-mātrenā) an idea in the mind (e.g. regarding the existence of fire) which is called inference.

1 ajñāta-jñāpanam pramāṇam iti tad asāram. Vedānta-kaumudi, MS. copy, p. 18.
2 Ibid. p. 47. One of the earliest explanations of the Vedāntic view of inference occurs in the Prakāśārtha-vivaraṇa, to which the Vedānta-kaumudi is in all probability indebted.
On the subject of the self-validity of knowledge (svatath-pramāṇya) Rāmādvaya does not, like Dharmarājādhvarīndra, include the absence of defects (doṣabhāva) in the definition of svatath-pramāṇya. It may well be remembered that Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra defines validity (pramāṇa) of knowledge as an awareness that characterizes an object as it is (tadvati tat-prakāraka-jñānavecam), while self-validity (svatath-pramāṇya) is defined as the acceptance by the underlying sākṣi consciousness of this validity in accordance with the exact modes of the awareness (of which the validity is affirmed), and in accordance with the exact objective conditions of the awareness, in absence of any defects. Rāmādvaya, however, closely follows Kumārila’s view of the self-validity of knowledge and defines it as that which, being produced by the actual data of that cognition, does not contain any element which is derived from other sources. Later knowledge of the presence of any defects or distorting elements may invalidate any cognition; but, so long as such defects are not known, each cognition is valid of itself for reasons similar to those held by Kumārila and already discussed. In this connection Rāmādvaya points out that our cognitions are entirely internal phenomena and are not in touch with objects, and that, though the objects are revealed outside, yet it is through our own internal conditions, merit and demerit, that they may be perceived by us.

Vidyāraṇya (A.D. 1350).

In addition to the Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha Mādhava wrote two works on the Śaṅkara Vedānta system, viz., Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha and Pañcadasā; and also Jīvan-mukti-viveka. Of these the former is an independent study of Prakāśatman’s Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa, in which Mādhava elaborates the latter’s arguments in his own way. His other work, Pañcadasā, is a popular compendium in verse. Both these works attained great celebrity on account of

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3 ājñātvā jñāna-jñāpaka-saṅmāra-jñāpyatvam svatastavam. Ibid. p. 61.


5 prākāra-hen ye vayu-saṅgāra sa-sa-sa-prakārān api prākārasa kavyasidda veda-yogājī vahuti na guṇatve jñānasya kathācārī artha-yogāja samastati. Vedānta-kaumudi, MS. copy, pp. 67, 68.
their clear and forcible style and diction. Vidyāranya is reputed to be the same as Mādhava, brother of Śāyāna, the great Vedic commentator. He was a pupil of Śaṅkarānanda, who had written some works of minor importance on the Upaniṣads.

Vidyāranya in his Pañcadasaī repeats the Vivaraṇa view of the Vedānta, that, whether in our awakened state or in our dreams or in our dreamless condition, there is no moment when there is no consciousness; for even in dreamless sleep there must be some consciousness, as is evident from the later remembrance of the experience of the dreamless state. The light of consciousness is thus itself ever present without any change or flickering of any kind. It should therefore be regarded as ultimately real. It is self-luminous and neither rises nor sets. Thus self is pure bliss, because nothing is so much loved by us as our own selves. If the nature of self had been unobscured, we could not have found any enjoyment in sense-objects. It is only because the self is largely obscured to us that we do not rest content with self-realization and crave for other pleasures from sense-objects. Māyā is the cause of this obscuration, and it is described as that power by which can be produced the manifold world-appearance. This power (śakti), cannot be regarded either as absolutely real or as unreal. It is, however, associated only with a part of Brahman and not with the whole of it, and it is only in association with a part of Brahman that it transforms itself into the various elements and their modifications. All objects of the world are thus but a complex of Brahman and māyā. The existence or being of all things is the Brahman, and all that appears identified with being is the māyā part. Māyā as the power of Brahman regulates all relation and order of the universe. In association with the intelligence of Brahman this behaves as an intelligent power which is responsible for the orderliness of all qualities of things, their inter-relations and interactions. He compares the world-appearance to a painting, where the white canvas stands for the pure Brahman, the white paste for the inner controller (antaryāmin), the dark colour for the dispenser of the crude elements (śūtratman) and the coloration for

1 Bhāratātirtha and his teacher Vidyātirtha also were teachers of Vidyāranya. Vidyāranya thus seems to have had three teachers, Bhārati Tīrtha, Vidyā Tīrtha and Śaṅkarānanda.
3 śaktir asty aśeṣāt kācit sarva-vastu-nīyāmikā, 38. ...cic-chāyāveśataḥ śaktiḥ cetaneva vibhāti sā. 40. Ibid. III.
the dispenser of the concrete elemental world (vīraññī), and all the figures that are manifested thereon are the living beings and other objects of the world. It is Brahman that, being reflected through the māyā, assumes the diverse forms and characters. The false appearance of individual selves is due to the false identification of subjectivity—a product of māyā—with the underlying pure consciousness—Brahman. Vidyāranya then goes on to describe the usual topics of the Vedānta, which have already been dealt with. The chief and important feature of Vidyāranya’s Pañcadaśā is the continual repetition of the well-established Vedāntic principles in a clear, popular and attractive way, which is very helpful to those who wish to initiate their minds into the Vedāntic ways of self-realization. His Vivaraṇa-prameyasaṅgrahā is a more scholarly work; but, as it is of the nature of an elaboration of the ideas contained in Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa, which has generally been followed as the main guide in the account of Vedānta given in this and the preceding chapter, and there being but few ideas which can be considered as an original contribution of Vidyāranya to the development of Vedāntic thought, no separate account of its contents need be given here. The jīvan-muktiviveka, the substance of which has already been utilized in section 17 of chapter X, volume I of the present work, is an ethical treatise, covering more or less the same ground as the Naiśākmya-siddhi of Suresvara.

Nṛśimhāśrama Muni (A.D. 1500).

Nṛśimhāśrama Muni (A.D. 1500) was a pupil of Gīrvāṇendra Sarasvati and Jagannāthāśrama and teacher of Nārāyaṇāśrama, who wrote a commentary on his Bheda-dhikāra. He wrote many works, such as Advaita-dipikā, Advaita-paṇcā-ratna, Advaita-bodha-dipikā, Advaita-vāda, Bheda-dhikāra, Vācārambhaṇa, Vedānta-tattvaviveka, and commentaries on the Saṃkṣepa-sārīraka and Pañca-

1 There are four commentaries on the Pañcadaśā:—Tattva-bodhini, Vṛtti-prabhākara by Niścalādāsa Svāmin, Tattparya-bodhini by Rāmakṛṣṇa and another commentary by Sadānanda. It is traditionally believed that the Pañcadaśā was written jointly by Vidyāranya and Bhārati Tīrtha. Niścalādāsa Svāmin points out in his Vṛtti-prabhākara that Vidyāranya was author of the first ten chapters of the Pañcadaśā and Bhārati Tīrtha of the other five. Rāmakṛṣṇa, however, in the beginning of his commentary on the seventh chapter, attributes that chapter to Bhārati Tīrtha, and this fits in with the other tradition that the first six chapters were written by Vidyāranya and the other nine by Bhārati Tīrtha.

2 He also wrote another work on the Vivaraṇa, called Vivaranopanyāsa, which is referred to by Appaya Dikṣita in his Siddhānta-lesa, p. 68—Vivaranaopanyāsa Bhārati Tīrtha-vacanam.
pādikā-vivaraṇa, called Tattva-bodhini and Paśca-pādikā-vivaraṇaprabhāśikā. Nṛśimhāśrama was very well reputed among his contemporaries, but it does not seem that he introduced any new ideas into the Vedānta. He is more interested in emphasizing the fact of the identity of Brahman with the self and the illusory character of the world-appearance than in investigating the nature and constitution of māyā and the way in which it can be regarded as the material stuff of world-appearance. He defines the falsehood of world-appearance as its non-existence in the locus in which it appears (pratipannopādhanabhāva-pratīyogiteva). When a piece of conch-shell appears to be silver, the silver appears to be existent and real (sat), but silver cannot be the same as being or existence (nā tāvad rajata-svarūpam sat). So also, when we take the world-appearance as existent, the world-appearance cannot be identical with being or existence; its apparent identification with these is thus necessarily false. So also the appearance of subjectivity or egoistic characters in the self-luminous self is false, because the two are entirely different and cannot be identified. Nṛśimhāśrama, however, cannot show by logical arguments or by a reference to experience that subjectivity or egoism (ahānkarā, which he also calls antahkarana or mind) is different from self, and he relies on the texts of the Upaniṣads to prove this point, which is of fundamental importance for the Vedānta thesis. In explaining the nature of the perceptual process he gives us the same sort of account as is given by his pupil Dharmarāja Adhvarindra in his Vedānta-paribhāṣā, as described in the tenth chapter in the first volume of this work.

He considers the self to be bliss itself (sukha-rūpa) and does not admit that there is any difference between the self and bliss (sa catmā sukhān na bhidyate). His definition of ajñāna is the same as that of Citsukha, viz. that it is a beginningless constitutive cause, which is removable by true knowledge. There is thus practically

1 Vedānta-tattva-viveka, p. 12. The Pandit, vol. xxv, May 1903. This work has two important commentaries, viz. Tattva-viveka-āḍipana, and one called Tattva-viveka-āḍipana-vyākhyā by Bhaṭṭoji.

2 Vedānta-tattva-viveka, p. 15.

3 yadā antahkarana-tyṛtyā ghaṭāvacchinnam caityam upadhiyate tadā antahkarana-vacchinnam ghaṭāvacchinnam caityanyayor vastuta ekatve 'py upādhi-bheddā bhimayor abhedopādhi-sambandhena aikyād bhavatī ahūkṣa ity antahkarana-vacchinnam caityanyaya viṣayābhima-tad-adhiṣṭhāna-caityanyayabheda-siddhyartham vyiter nirgamanām vacyam. Ibid. p. 22.

4 Ibid. p. 29.

5 Andīy upādānātve sati jñāna-nivartyam ajñānam, nikhila-prapañcopādānabrahma-gocaram eva ajñānam. Ibid. p. 43.
no new line of argument in his presentation of the Vedānta. On
the side of dialectical arguments, in his attempts to refute "difference" (bheda) in his Bheda-dhikāra he was anticipated by his great
predecessors Śrīharṣa and Citsukha.

Appaya Dīkṣita¹ (A.D. 1550).

Appaya Dīkṣita lived probably in the middle of the sixteenth
century, as he refers to Nṛsiṃhāśrama Muni, who lived early in
that century. He was a great scholar, well-read in many branches
of Sanskrit learning, and wrote a large number of works on
many subjects. His grandfather was Ācārya Dīkṣita, who is said
to have been famous for his scholarship from the Himalayas to
the south point of India: the name of his father was Raṅgarāja
Makhīndra (or simply Rāja Makhīndra). There is, however,
nothing very noteworthy in his Vedāntic doctrines. For, in spite
of his scholarship, he was only a good compiler and not an original
thinker, and on many occasions where he had opportunities of
giving original views he contents himself with the views of others.
It is sometimes said that he had two different religious views at two
different periods of his life, Śaiva and the Vedānta. But of this one
cannot be certain; for he was such an all-round scholar that the
fact that he wrote a Śaiva commentary and a Vedāntic commentary
need not lead to the supposition that he changed his faith. In
the beginning of his commentary Śivārka-mani-āṭpikā on Śrikanṭha's
Śaiva commentary to the Brahma-sūtra he says that, though the
right interpretation of the Brahma-sūtra is the monistic inter-
pretation, as attempted by Śaṅkara and others, yet the desire for
attaining this right wisdom of oneness (advaita-vāsanā) arises only
through the grace of Śiva, and it is for this reason that Vyāsa in
his Brahma-sūtra tried to establish the superiority of the qualified
Brahman Śiva as interpreted by Śrikanṭhācārya. This shows that
even while writing his commentary on Śrikanṭha's Śaiva-bhāṣya
he had not lost respect for the monistic interpretations of Śaṅkara,
and he was somehow able to reconcile in his mind the Śaiva
doctrine of qualified Brahman (saguṇa-brahma) as Śiva with the
Śaṅkara doctrine of unqualified pure Brahman. It is possible,

¹ He was also called Appayya Dikṣita and Avadhāni Yajvā, and he studied
Logic (tarka) with Yaśñesvara Makhīndra. See colophon to Appaya Dikṣita's
commentary on the Nyāya-siddhānta-māñjarī of Jānakīnātha, called Nyāya-
siddhānta-māñjarī-vyākhyāna (MS.).
however, that his sympathies with the monistic Vedānta, which at the beginning were only lukewarm, deepened with age. He says in his Śivārka-manī-dipika that he lived in the reign of King Cinnabomma (whose land-grant inscriptions date from Sādāśiva, mahārāja of Vijayanagara, A.D. 1566 to 1575; vide Hultzsch, S.I. Inscriptions, vol. 1), under whose orders he wrote the Śivārka-manī-dipika commentary on Śrikanṭha’s commentary. His grandson Nilakanṭha Dikṣita says in his Śiva-lilārṇava that Appaya Dikṣita lived to the good old age of seventy-two. In the Oriental Historical Manuscripts catalogued by Taylor, vol. ii, it is related that at the request of the Pāṇḍya king Tirumalai Nayaka he came to the Pāṇḍya country in A.D. 1626 to settle certain disputes between the Śaivas and the Vaiṣṇavas. Kālahasti-saRaṇa-Sivānanda Yogendra, in his commentary on the Ātmārpana-stava, gives the date of Appaya Dikṣita’s birth as Kali age 4654, or A.D. 1554, as pointed out by Mahāmahopādhyāya Kuppusvami Sastri in his Sanskrit introduction to the Śiva-lilārṇava. Since he lived seventy-two years, he must have died some time in 1626, the very year when he came to the Pāṇḍya country. He had for his pupil Bhaṭṭoṇī Dikṣita, as is indicated by his own statement in the Tantra-siddhānta-dipika by the latter author. Bhaṭṭoṇī Dikṣita must therefore have been a junior contemporary of Appaya Dikṣita, as is also evidenced by his other statement in his Tattva-kaustubha that he wrote this work at the request of King Keladi-Weṅkaṭendra, who reigned from 1604 to 1626 (vide Hultzsch’s second volume of Reports on Sanskrit Manuscripts).

It is said that Appaya Dikṣita wrote about four hundred works. Some of them may be mentioned here: Advaita-nirṇaya, Catur-mata-sāra-samgraha (containing in the first chapter, called Nyāya-muktāvalī, a brief summary of the doctrines of Madhva, in the second chapter, called Naya-mayūkha-mālikā, the doctrines of Rāmānuja, in the third chapter the decisive conclusions from the point of view of Śrikanṭha’s commentary called Naya-māṇi-mālā and in the fourth chapter, called Naya-māṇijāri, decisive conclusions in accordance with the views of Saṅkarācārya); Tattva-muktāvalī, a work on Vedānta; Vyākaraṇa-vāda-nakṣatra-mālā, a work on grammar; Pūrvottara-mimāṁsā-vāda-nakṣatra-mālā (containing various separate topics of discussion in Mimāṁsā and

1 See Mahāmahopādhyāya Kuppusvami Sastri’s introduction to the Śiva-lilārṇava, Srirangam, 1911.
Vedānta; Nyāya-raksā-mani, a commentary on the Brahma-sūtra following the monistic lines of Śaṅkara; Vedānta-kalpa-taru-parimala, a commentary on Amalānanda’s Vedānta-kalpa-taru, a commentary on Vācaspati’s Bhāmati commentary; Siddhānta-leśa-saṁgraha, a collection of the views of different philosophers of the monistic school of Śaṅkara on some of the most important points of the Vedānta, without any attempt at harmonizing them or showing his own preference by reasoned arguments, and comprising a number of commentaries by Acyutakṛṣṇānanda Tīrtha (Kṛṣṇa-laṅkāra), Gaṅgādharendra Sarasvatī (Siddhānta-bindu-śikara), Rāmacandra Yajvan (Gūḍhārtha-prakāśa), Viśvanātha Tīrtha, Dharmaya Dīkṣita and others; Śivāra-mani-dīpikā, a commentary on Śrīkanṭha’s Śaiva-bhāṣya on the Brahma-sūtra; Śiva-karṇāmya; Śiva-tattva-viveka; Śiva-puruṣa-tāmasatva-khaṇḍana; Śivādevaita-nirṇaya; Śivānanda-lahari-candrika, a commentary on Śaṅkara’s Śivānanda-lahari; Śivārcana-candrika; Śivotkarṣa-candrika; Śivotkarṣa-māṇjarī; Śaiva-kalpa-druma; Siddhānta-ratnākara; Madhva-mukha-bhaṅga, an attempt to show that Madhvā’s interpretation of the Brahma-sūtra is not in accordance with the meaning of the texts of the Upaniṣads; Rāmānuja-mata-khaṇḍana; Rāmāyana-tātparya-nirṇaya; Rāmāyana-tātparya-saṅgraha; Rāmāyana-bhārata-sāra-saṅgraha; Rāmāyana-sāra; Rāmāyana-sāra-saṅgraha; Rāmāyana-sāra-stava; Mimāṁsādhikarana-mulā Upa-krama-parākrama, a short Mimāṁsa work; Dharma-mimāṁsā-paribhāṣā; Nāma-saṅgraha-mālikā; Vidhi-rasāyana; Vidhi-rasāyanopajīvani; Vyrtti-vārttika, a short work on the threefold meanings of words; Kuvalayānanda, a work on rhetoric on which no less than ten commentaries have been written; Citra-mimāṁsā, a work on rhetoric; Jayollāśa-nidhi, a commentary on the Bhāgavata-purāṇa; Yādava-bhyudaya-ṭīkā, a commentary on Veṅkaṭa’s Yādava-bhyudaya; a commentary on the Prabodha-candrodaya nāṭaka, etc.

Prakāśānanda (A.D. 1550—1600).

It has been pointed out that the Vedānta doctrine of monism as preached by Śaṅkara could not shake off its apparent duality in association with māyā, which in the hands of the later followers of Śaṅkara gradually thickened into a positive stuff through the evolution or transformation of which all the phenomena of world-appearance could be explained. The Vedāntists held that this māyā,
though it adhered to Brahman and spread its magical creations thereon, was unspeakable, indescribable, indefinable, changeable and unthinkable and was thus entirely different from the self-revealing, unchangeable Brahman. The charge of dualism against such a system of philosophy could be dodged by the teachers of Vedānta only by holding that, since Brahman was the ultimate reality, māyā was unreal and illusory, and hence the charge of duality would be false. But when one considers that māyā is regarded as positive and as the stuff of the transformations of world-appearance, it is hardly intelligible how it can be kept out of consideration as having no kind of existence at all. The positive character of māyā as being the stuff of all world-appearance has to be given up, if the strictly monistic doctrine is to be consistently kept. Almost all the followers of Śaṅkara had, however, been interpreting their master’s views in such a way that the positive existence of an objective world with its infinite varieties as the ground of perceptual presentation was never denied. The whole course of the development of Vedānta doctrine in the hands of these Vedānta teachers began to crystallize compactly in the view that, since the variety and multiplicity of world-appearance cannot be explained by the pure changeless Brahman, an indefinable stuff, the māyā, has necessarily to be admitted as the ground of this world. Prakāśānanda was probably the first who tried to explain Vedānta from a purely sensationalistic view-point of idealism and denied the objective existence of any stuff. The existence of objects is nothing more than their perception (drṣṭi). The central doctrine of Prakāśānanda has already been briefly described in chapter x, section 15, of volume 1 of the present work, and his analysis of the nature of perceptual cognition has already been referred to in a preceding section of the present chapter.

Speaking on the subject of the causality of Brahman, he says that the attribution of causality to Brahman cannot be regarded as strictly correct; for ordinarily causality implies the dual relation of cause and effect; since there is nothing else but Brahman, it cannot, under the circumstances, be called a cause. Nescience (avidyā), again, cannot be called a cause of the world; for causality is based upon the false notion of duality, which is itself the outcome of nescience. The theory of cause and effect thus lies outside the scope of the Vedānta (kārya-kāraṇa-vādasya vedānta-bahir-bhūtavāt). When in reply to the question, “what is the cause of
the world?" it is said that nescience (ajñāna—literally, want of knowledge) is the cause, the respondent simply wants to obviate the awkward silence. The nature of this nescience cannot, however, be proved by any of the pramānas; for it is like darkness and the pramānas or the valid ways of cognition are like light, and it is impossible to perceive darkness by light. Nescience is that which cannot be known except through something else, by its relation to something else, and it is inexplicable in itself, yet beginningless and positive. It will be futile for any one to try to understand it as it is in itself. Nescience is proved by one's own consciousness: so it is useless to ask how nescience is proved. Yet it is destroyed when the identity of the self with the immediately presented Brahman is realized. The destruction of nescience cannot mean its cessation together with its products, as Prakṣātman holds in the Vivaraṇa; for such a definition would not apply, whether taken simply or jointly. Prakṣāśāntanda, therefore, defines it as the conviction, following the realization of the underlying ground, that the appearance which was illusorily imposed on it did not exist. This view is different from the anyathā-khyāti view, that the surmised appearance was elsewhere and not on the ground on which it was imposed; for here, when the underlying ground is immediately intuited, the false appearance absolutely vanishes, and it is felt that it was not there, it is not anywhere, and it will not be anywhere; and it is this conviction that is technically called bādha.

The indefinability of nescience is its negation on the ground on which it appears (pratipannopādhau nisedha-pratīyogitvam). This negation of all else excepting Brahman has thus two forms; in one form it is negation and in another form this negation, being included within "all else except Brahman," is itself an illusory imposition, and this latter form thus is itself contradicted and negated by its former form. Thus it would be wrong to argue that, since this negation remains after the realization of Brahman, it would not itself be negated, and hence it would be a dual principle existing side by side with Brahman1.

True knowledge is opposed to false knowledge in such a way

1 Brahman adhyayamānān sarvaṁ kālatraye nāstittinīcayasya asti rūpadvaya ekam bādhātmakam aparam adhyayamānātvam; tatra adhyayamānaṁ abhājanaṁ rūpena svā-viśayatvam; bādhakālakāravam itī nātmārāya itī arthaḥ tathā ca nādvaita-kaśṭiḥ. Compare also Bhāmati on Adhyāsa-bhāga. Nānā Dikṣita seems to have borrowed his whole argument from the Bhāmati. See his commentary on the Siddhānta-muktavārtti. The Pandit, 1899, p. 108.

This idea, however, is not by any means a new contribution of Prakṣāśāntanda. Thus Citsukha writes the same thing in his Tatvav-dīpikā (also called Pratyak-tatt-
that, when the former dawns, the latter is dispelled altogether. An
objection is sometimes raised that, if this be so, then the person
who has realized Brahma knowledge will cease to have a bodily
existence; for bodily existence is based on illusion and all illusion
must vanish when true knowledge dawns. And, if this is so, there
will be no competent Vedānta teacher. To this Prakāśānanda
replies that, even though the Vedānta teacher may be himself an
illusory production, he may all the same lead any one to the true
path, just as the Vedas, which are themselves but illusory products,
may lead any one to the right path.1

On the subject of the nature of the self as pure bliss (ānanda)
he differs from Sarvajñātma Muni’s view that what is meant by
the statement that the self is of the nature of pure bliss is that there
is entire absence of all sorrows or negation of bliss in the self.
Bliss, according to Sarvajñātma Muni, thus means the absence
of the negation of bliss (an-ānanda-vyacṛtti-mātram ānandatvam).2
He differs also from the view of Prakāśātman that ānanda, or bliss,
means the substance which appears as blissful, since it is the object
that we really desire. Prakāśātman holds that it is the self on
which the character of blissfulness is imposed. The self is called
blissful, because it is the ground of the appearance of blissfulness.
What people consider of value and desire is not the blissfulness,
but that which is blissful. Prakāśānanda holds that this view is not
correct, since the self appears not only as blissful, but also as pain-
ful, and it would therefore be as right to call the self blissful as
to call it painful. Moreover, not the object of blissfulness, which
in itself is dissociated from blissfulness, is called blissful, but that
which is endowed with bliss is called blissful (vīśīṣṭasaiva ānanda-
padārthatvāt).3 If blissfulness is not a natural character of the self,
it cannot be called blissful because it happens to be the ground on
which blissfulness is illusorily imposed. So Prakāśānanda holds
that the self is naturally of a blissful character.

Prakāśānanda raises the question regarding the beholder of the
va-pradīpta), p. 39, as follows: "sarveṣaṁ api bhūvānuṁ ārrayatvena sammatē
pratīyogitvam atyantabhāvam prati mṛśātmatā," which is the same as prati-
pannopādau niṣedha-pratīyogitvam. Compare also Vedānta-paribhāṣā, pp. 219
and 220, mithyātam ca svārrayatvenābhīmata-yāvatnāṁātyantābhīva-pratī-
yogitvam. In later times Madhusūdana freely used this definition in his
Advaita-siddhī.

1. kalpito 'pyupaḍeṣṭā syād yathā-liṣṭam samādiṣet
na cāsviṣyanga dōpa 'cidyāvattvena nirṣayāt.

The Pandit, 1890, p. 160.


experienced duality and says that it is Brahman who has this experience of duality; but, though Brahman alone exists, yet there is no actual modification or transformation (parināma) of Brahman into all its experiences, since such a view would be open to the objections brought against the alternative assumptions of the whole of Brahman or a part of it, and both of them would land us in impossible consequences. The vivarta view holds that the effect has no reality apart from the underlying ground or substance. So vivarta really means oneness with the substance, and it virtually denies all else that may appear to be growing out of this one substance. The false perception of world-appearance thus consists in the appearance of all kinds of characters in Brahman, which is absolutely characterless (nisprakārikāyath sapakārakatvena bhāvah). Since the self and its cognition are identical and since there is nothing else but this self, there is no meaning in saying that the Vedānta admits the vivarta view of causation; for, strictly speaking, there is no causation at all (vivaratasya bala-uyutpati-prayojanatayā). If anything existed apart from self, then the Vedāntic monism would be disturbed. If one looks at māyā in accordance with the texts of the Vedas, māyā will appear to be an absolutely fictitious non-entity (tuccha), like the hare’s horn; if an attempt is made to interpret it logically, it is indefinable (anirvacanīya), though common people would always think of it as being real (vāstavī). Prakāśānanda thus preaches the extreme view of the Vedānta, that there is no kind of objectivity that can be attributed to the world, that māyā is absolutely non-existent, that our ideas have no objective substratum to which they correspond, that the self is the one and only ultimate reality, and that there is no causation or creation of the world. In this view he has often to fight with Sarvajñātma Muni, Prakāśātman, and with others who developed a more realistic conception of māyā transformation; but it was he who, developing probably on the lines of Maṇḍana, tried for the first time to give a consistent presentation of the Vedānta from the most thorough-going idealistic point of view. In the colophon of his work he says that the essence of the Vedānta as

1. bālān prati vivarto 'yaṃ brahmaṇaḥ sakalaṃ jagat avivartittam ānandam āsthitah kṛtināḥ sadā.

2. tuccchānirvacanīyā ca vāstavī cety asau tridhā jñeyā māyā tribhīr bodhaiḥ śravata-yauktika-laukikaiḥ.

The Pandit, 1890, p. 326.
Ibid. p. 420.
preached by him is unknown to his contemporaries and that it was he who first thoroughly expounded this doctrine of philosophy. Prakāśananda wrote many other works in addition to his Siddhānta-muktāvalī, such as Tārā-bhakti-tarangini, Manoramā tantra-rāja-tīkā, Mahā-lakṣmi-paddhati and Śrī-vidyā-paddhati, and this shows that, though a thoroughgoing Vedāntist, he was religiously attached to tantra forms of worship. Nāṇā Dikṣīta wrote a commentary on the Muktāvalī, called Siddhānta-pradīpikā, at a time when different countries of India had become pervaded by the disciples and disciples of the disciples of Prakāśananda.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (A.D. 1500).

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, who was a pupil of Viśvesvara Sarasvatī and teacher of Puruṣottama Sarasvatī, in all probability flourished in the first half of the sixteenth century. His chief works are Vedānta-kalpa-latikā, Advaita-siddhi, Advaita-mañjari, Advaita-ratna-raksana, Ātma-bodha-tīkā, Ananda-mandākini, Krṣṇa-kutūhala-nāṭaka, Prsthāna-bhedha, Bhakti-sāmānya-nirāpana, Bhagavad-gītā-guḍhārtha-dīpikā, Bhagavad-bhakti-rasāyaṇa, Bhāgavata-purāṇa-prathama-slokā-vyākhyā, Veda-stuti-tīkā, Śaṅdilya-sūtra-tīkā, Śāstra-siddhānta-leśa-tīkā, Saṁkṣepa-śāriraka-sāra-samgraha, Siddhānta-tattva-bindu, Hari-līlā-vyākhyā. His most important work, however, is his Advaita-siddhi, in which he tries to refute the objections raised in Vyāsatirtha’s Nyāyāmṛta.

1 vedānta-sāra-sarvarvam ajñeyam adhunātanaḥ aśeṣeya mayoktaṁ tat puruṣottama-yatnataḥ.

2 yacchidyā-sūrya-sandoha-vyāptā bhārata-bhūmayah vande tam yatibhir vandyam Prakāśānandam tivaram.

3 Rāmāyānī Pāṇḍeya in his edition of Madhusūdana’s Vedānta-kalpa-latikā suggests that he was a Bengali by birth. His pupil Puruṣottama Sarasvatī in his commentary on the Siddhānta-bindu-tīkā refers to Balabhadrā Bhaṭṭācārya as a favourite pupil of his, and Pāṇḍeya argues that, since Bhaṭṭācārya is a Bengali surname and since his favourite pupil was a Bengali, he also must have been a Bengali. It is also pointed out that in a family genealogy (Kula-paṇḍitikā) of Kotalipara of Faridpur, Bengal, Madhusūdana’s father is said to have been Pramodapurananda Ācārya, who had four sons—Śrīnātha Cūḍāmāni, Yadavānanda Nyāyācārya, Kamalajananaya and Vagśā Gosvāmin. Some of the important details of Madhusūdana’s philosophical dialectics will be taken up in the treatment of the philosophy of Madhya and his followers in the third volume of the present work in connection with Madhusūdana’s discussions with Vyāsatirtha.

4 The Advaita-siddhi has three commentaries, Advaita-siddhi-upanyāsa, Bṛhat-tīkā, and Laghu-candrikā, by Brahmananda Sarasvatī.
against the monistic Vedānta of Śaṅkara and his followers. Materials from this book have already been utilized in sections 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the tenth chapter of the present work. More will be utilized in the third volume in connection with the controversy between Vyāsātīrtha and Madhusūdana, which is the subject-matter of Advaita-siddhi. Madhusūdana's Siddhānta-bindu does not contain anything of importance, excepting that he gives a connected account of the perceptual process, already dealt with in the tenth chapter and also in the section "Vedāntic Cosmology" of the present volume. His Advaita-ratna-rakṣaṇa deals with such subjects as the validity of the Upaniṣads: the Upaniṣads do not admit duality; perception does not prove the reality of duality; the duality involved in mutual negation is false; indeterminate knowledge does not admit duality; duality cannot be proved by any valid means of proof, and so forth. There is practically nothing new in the work, as it only repeats some of the important arguments of the bigger work Advaita-siddhi and tries to refute the view of dualists like the followers of Madhva, with whom Madhusūdana was in constant controversy. It is unnecessary, therefore, for our present purposes to enter into any of the details of this work. It is, however, interesting to note that, though he was such a confirmed monist in his philosophy, he was a theist in his religion and followed the path of bhakti, or devotion, as is evidenced by his numerous works promulgating the bhakti creed. These works, however, have nothing to do with the philosophy of the Vedānta, with which we are concerned in the present chapter. Madhusūdana's Vedānta-kalpa-latikā was written earlier than his Advaita-siddhi and his commentary on the Mahimnaḥ stotra¹. Rāmājñā Pāṇḍeya points out in his introduction to the Vedānta-kalpa-latikā that the Advaita-siddhi contains a reference to his Gitā-nibandhana; the Gitā-nibandhana and the Śrimad-bhāgavata-tīkā contain references to his Bhakti-rasāyana, and the Bhakti-rasāyana refers to the Vedānta-kalpa-latikā; and this shows that the Vedānta-kalpa-latikā was written prior to all these works. The Advaita-ratna-rakṣaṇa refers to the Advaita-siddhi and may therefore be regarded as a much later work. There is nothing particularly new in the Vedānta-kalpa-latikā that deserves special mention as a contribution to Vedāntic thought. The special feature of the work consists in the frequent

¹ He refers to the Vedānta-kalpa-latikā and Siddhānta-bindu in his Advaita-siddhi, p. 537 (Nirṇaya-Sāgara edition). See also Mahimnaḥ-stotra-tīkā, p. 5.
brief summaries of doctrines of other systems of Indian philosophy and contrasts them with important Vedânta views. The first problem discussed is the nature of emancipation (mokṣa) and the ways of realizing it: Madhusūdana attempts to prove that it is only the Vedântic concept of salvation that can appeal to men, all other views being unsatisfactory and invalid. But it does not seem that he does proper justice to other views. Thus, for example, in refuting the Sāṃkhya view of salvation he says that, since the Sāṃkhya thinks that what is existent cannot be destroyed, sorrow, being an existent entity, cannot be destroyed, so there cannot be any emancipation from sorrow. This is an evident misrepresentation of the Sāṃkhya; for with the Sāṃkhya the destruction of sorrow in emancipation means that the buddhi, a product of prakṛti which is the source of all sorrow, ceases in emancipation to have any contact with purusa, and hence, even though sorrow may not be destroyed, there is no inconsistency in having emancipation from sorrow. It is unnecessary for our present purposes, however, to multiply examples of misrepresentation by Madhusūdana of the views of other systems of thought in regard to the same problem. In the course of the discussions he describes negation (abhāva) also as being made up of the stuff of nescience, which, like other things, makes its appearance in connection with pure consciousness. He next introduces a discussion of the nature of self-knowledge, and then, since Brahma knowledge can be attained only through the Upaniṣadic propositions of identity, he passes over to the discussion of import of propositions and the doctrines of abhīhitān-vāya-vāda, anvātābhidhihāna-vāda and the like. He then treats of the destruction of nescience. He concludes the work with a discussion of the substantial nature of the senses. Thus the mind-organ is said to be made up of five elements, whereas other senses are regarded as being constituted of one element only. Manas is said to pervade the whole of the body and not to be atomic, as the Naiyāyikas hold. Finally, Madhusūdana returns again to the problem of emancipation, and holds that it is the self freed from nescience that should be regarded as the real nature of emancipation.
CHAPTER XII

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE YOGA-VĀSIŚTHA

The philosophical elements in the various Purāṇas will be taken in a later volume. The Yoga-vāśīṣṭha-Rāmāyaṇa may be included among the purāṇas, but it is devoid of the general characteristics of the purāṇas and is throughout occupied with discussions of Vedāntic problems of a radically monistic type, resembling the Vedāntic doctrines as interpreted by Śaṅkara. This extensive philosophical poem, which contains twenty-three thousand seven hundred and thirty-four verses (ignoring possible differences in different manuscripts or editions) and is thus very much larger than the Śrīmad-bhagavad-gītā, is a unique work. The philosophical view with which it is concerned, and which it is never tired of reiterating, is so much like the view of Śaṅkara and of Vijñānavāda Buddhism, that its claim to treatment immediately after Śaṅkara seems to me to be particularly strong. Moreover, the various interpretations of the Vedānta-sūtra which will follow are so much opposed to Śaṅkara’s views as to make it hard to find a suitable place for a treatment like that of the Yoga-vāśīṣṭha unless it is taken up immediately after the chapter dealing with Śaṅkara.

The work begins with a story. A certain Brahmin went to the hermitage of the sage Agastya and asked him whether knowledge or work was the direct cause of salvation (mokṣa-sādhana). Agastya replied that, as a bird flies with its two wings, so a man can attain the highest (paramam padam) only through knowledge and work. To illustrate this idea he narrates a story in which Kārunya, the son of Agniveśya, having returned from the teacher’s house after the completion of his studies, remained silent and did no work. When he was asked for the reason of this attitude of his, he said that he was perplexed over the question as to whether the action of a man in accordance with scriptural injunction was or was not more fitted for the attainment of his highest than following a course of self-abnegation and desirelessness (tyāga-mātra). On hearing this question of Kārunya Agniveśya told him that he could answer his question only by narrating a story, after hearing which he might decide as he chose. A heavenly damsel (apsarāh), Suruci by name, sitting on one of the peaks of the
Himālayas, once saw a messenger of Indra flying through the sky. She asked him where he was going. In reply he said that a certain king, Ariśṭanemi by name, having given his kingdom to his son and having become free from all passions, was performing a course of asceticism (tapas), and that he had had to go to him on duty and was returning from him. The damsel wanted to know in detail what happened there between the messenger and the king. The messenger replied that he was asked by Indra to take a well-decorated chariot and bring the king in it to heaven, but while doing so he was asked by the king to describe the advantages and defects of heaven, on hearing which he would make up his mind whether he would like to go there or not. In heaven, he was answered, people enjoyed superior, medium and inferior pleasures according as their merits were superior, medium or inferior: when they had exhausted their merits by enjoyment, they were reborn again on earth, and during their stay there they were subject to mutual jealousy on account of the inequality of their enjoyments. On hearing this the king had refused to go to heaven, and, when this was reported to Indra, he was very much surprised and he asked the messenger to carry the king to Vālmiki’s hermitage and make Vālmiki acquainted with the king’s refusal to enjoy the fruits of heaven and request him to give him proper instructions for the attainment of right knowledge, leading to emancipation (mokṣa). When this was done, the king asked Vālmiki how he might attain mokṣa, and Vālmiki in reply wished to narrate the dialogue of Vaśiṣṭha and Rāma (Vaśiṣṭha-rāma-samvāda) on the subject.

Vālmiki said that, when he had finished the story of Rāma—the work properly known as Rāmāyaṇa—and taught it to Bharadvāja, Bharadvāja recited it once to Brahmā (the god), and he, being pleased, wished to confer a boon on him. Bharadvāja in reply said that he would like to receive such instructions as would enable people to escape from sorrow. Brahmā told him to apply to Vālmiki and went himself to him (Vālmiki), accompanied by Bharadvāja, and asked him not to cease working until he finished describing the entire character of Rāma, by listening to which people will be saved from the dangers of the world. When Brahmā disappeared from the hermitage after giving this instruction, Bharadvāja also asked Vālmiki to describe how Rāma and his wife, brother and followers behaved in this sorrowful and dangerous world and lived in sorrowless tranquillity.
In answer to the above question Vālmīki replied that Rāma, after finishing his studies, went out on his travels to see the various places of pilgrimage and hermitages. On his return, however, he looked very sad every day and would not tell anyone the cause of his sorrow. King Daśaratha, Rāma's father, became very much concerned about Rāma's sadness and asked Vaśiṣṭha if he knew what might be the cause of it. At this time the sage Viśvāmitra also visited the city of Ayodhyā to invite Rāma to kill the demons. Rāma's dejected mental state at this time created much anxiety, and Viśvāmitra asked him the cause of his dejection.

Rāma said in reply that a new enquiry had come into his mind and had made him averse from all enjoyments. There is no happiness in this world, people are born to die and they die to be born again. Everything is impermanent (asthira) in this world. All existent things are unconnected (bhāvāḥ...parasparam asaṅgīnāḥ). They are collected and associated together only by our mental imagination (manah-kalpanayā). The world of enjoyment is created by the mind (manah), and this mind itself appears to be non-existent. Everything is like a mirage.

Vaśiṣṭha then explained the nature of the world-appearance, and it is this answer which forms the content of the book. When Vālmīki narrated this dialogue of Vaśiṣṭha and Rāma, king Arīṣṭanemi found himself enlightened, and the damsel was also pleased and dismissed the heavenly messenger. Kārunya, on hearing all this from his father Agniveśya, felt as if he realized the ultimate truth and thought that, since he realized the philosophical truth, and since work and passivity mean the same, it was his clear duty to follow the customary duties of life. When Agastya finished narrating the story, the Brahmin Sutikṣṇa felt himself enlightened.

There is at least one point which may be considered as a very clear indication of later date, much later than would be implied by the claim that the work was written by the author of the Rāmāyaṇa. It contains a śloka which may be noted as almost identical with a verse of Kālidāsa's Kumāra-sambhava1. It may, in my opinion, be almost unhesitatingly assumed that the author borrowed it from Kālidāsa, and it is true, as is generally supposed, that Kālidāsa

1 Yoga-vāśiṣṭha, iii. 16. 50:
atha tām atimātra-viśvalaṁ
sahṛpaṁ kāśīabhavaṁ saravatt
sapharīṁ krada-saṁsa-viśvalaṁ
prathamā vr̥ṣṭīr ivāvakampata.
lived in the fifth century A.D. The author of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*, whoever he may have been, flourished at least some time after Kālidāsa. It may also be assumed that the interval between Kālidāsa’s time and that of the author of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* had been long enough to establish Kālidāsa’s reputation as a poet. There is another fact which deserves consideration in this connection. In spite of the fact that the views of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* and Śaṅkara’s interpretation of Vedānta have important points of agreement neither of them refers to the other. Again, the views of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* so much resemble those of the idealistic school of Buddhists, that the whole work seems to be a Brahmanic modification of idealistic Buddhism. One other important instance can be given of such a tendency to assimilate Buddhistic idealism and modify it on Brahmanic lines, viz. the writings of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara. I am therefore inclined to think that the author of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* was probably a contemporary of Gauḍapāda or Śaṅkara, about A.D. 800 or a century anterior to them.

The work contains six books, or prakaraṇas, namely, *Vairāgya*, *Mumukṣu-vyavahāra*, *Utpatti*, *Sthiti*, *Upāsama* and *Nīrūṇa*. It is known also by the names of *Ārṣa-Rāmāyana*, *Jñāna-vāsiṣṭha*, *Mahā-Rāmāyana*, *Vāsiṣṭha-Rāmāyana* or *Vāsiṣṭha*. Several commentaries have been written on it. Of these commentaries I am particularly indebted to the *Tātparya-prakāśa* of Ānandabodhendra.

The *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* is throughout a philosophical work, in the form of popular lectures, and the same idea is often repeated again and again in various kinds of expressions and poetical imagery. But the writer seems to have been endowed with extraordinary poetical gifts. Almost every verse is full of the finest poetical imagery; the choice of words is exceedingly pleasing to the ear, and they often produce the effect of interesting us more by their poetical value than by the extremely idealistic thought which they are intended to convey.

The *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* had a number of commentaries, and it was also summarized in verse by some writers whose works also had commentaries written upon them. Thus Advayāranya, son of Narahari, wrote a commentary on it, called *Vāsiṣṭha-Rāmāyana-candrikā*. Ānandabodhendra Sarasvatī, pupil of Gaṅgādhrendra Sarasvatī of the nineteenth century, wrote the *Tātparya-prakāśa*. Gaṅgādha-rendra also is said to have written a commentary of the same name. Rāmadeva and Sadānanda also wrote two commentaries on
the work, and in addition to these there is another commentary, called Yoga-vāśīṣṭha-tātparya-samgraha, and another commentary, the Pada-candrika, was written by Madhava Sarasvati. The names of some of its summaries are Brhad-yoga-vāśīṣṭha, Laghu-jñāna-vāśīṣṭha, Yoga-vāśīṣṭha-slokāḥ and Yoga-vāśīṣṭha-sanmṛṣepa by Gauḍa Abhinanda of the ninth century, Yoga-vāśīṣṭha-sāra or Jñāna-sāra, Yoga-vāśīṣṭha-sāra-samgraha and Vāśīṣṭha-sāra or Vāśīṣṭha-sāra-guḍhārtha by Ramānanda Tirtha, pupil of Advaitānanda. The Yoga-vāśīṣṭha-sanmṛṣepa of Gauḍa Abhinanda had a commentary by Ātmasukha, called Candrika, and another called Saṃsāra-tāraṇi, by Mummadideva. The Yoga-vāśīṣṭha-sāra also had two commentaries by Pūrṇānanda and Mahīdhara. Mr Sivaprasad Bhattacharya in an article on the Yoga-vāśīṣṭha-Rāmāyana in the Proceedings of the Madras Oriental Conference of 1924 says that the Mokṣopāya-sāra, which is another name for the Yoga-vāśīṣṭha-sāra, was written by an Abhinanda who is not to be confused with Gauḍa Abhinanda. But he misses the fact that Gauḍa Abhinanda had also written another summary of it, called Yoga-vāśīṣṭha-sanmṛṣepa. Incidentally this also refutes his view that the Yoga-vāśīṣṭha is to be placed between the tenth and the twelfth centuries. For, if a summary of it was written by Gauḍa Abhinanda of the ninth century, the Yoga-vāśīṣṭha must have been written at least in the eighth century. The date of the Yoga-vāśīṣṭha may thus be regarded as being the seventh or the eighth century.

The Ultimate Entity.

The third book of the Yoga-vāśīṣṭha deals with origination (utpatti). All bondage (bandha) is due to the existence of the perceptible universe (drṣya), and it is the main thesis of this work that it does not exist. At the time of each dissolution the entire universe of appearance is destroyed, like dreams in deep sleep (suṣupti). What is left is deep and static (stimita-gambhira), neither light nor darkness, indescribable and unmanifested (anākhya anabhivyaktam), but a somehow existent entity. This entity manifests itself as another (svayam anya icollasah); and through this dynamic aspect it appears as the ever-active mind (manas)—like moving ripples from the motionless ocean. But in reality whatever appears as the diversified universe is altogether non-existent; for, if it was existent,
it could not cease under any circumstances. It does not exist at all. The ultimate indefinite and indescribable entity, which is pure extinction (nirvāṇa-mātra), or pure intelligence (paro bodhah), remains always in itself and does not really suffer any transformations or modifications. Out of the first movement of this entity arises ego (svatā), which, in spite of its appearance, is in reality nothing but the ultimate entity. Gradually, by a series of movements (spanda) like waves in the air, there springs forth the entire world-appearance. The ultimate entity is a mere entity of pure conceiving or imagining (saṃkalpa-puruṣa). The Muni held that what appears before us is due to the imagination of manas, like dreamland or fairyland (yathā saṃkalpa-nagaram yathā gandhara-pattanam). There is nothing in essence except that ultimate entity, and whatever else appears does not exist at all—it is all mere mental creations, proceeding out of the substanceless, essenceless mental creations of the ultimate entity. It is only by the realization that this world-appearance has no possibility of existence that the false notion of ourselves as knowers ceases, and, though the false appearance may continue as such, there is emancipation (mokṣa).

This manas, however, by whose mental creations everything springs forth in appearance, has no proper form, it is merely a name, mere nothingness. It does not exist outside or subjectively inside us; it is like the vacuity surrounding us everywhere. That anything has come out of it is merely like the production of a mirage stream. All characteristics of forms and existence are like momentary imaginations. Whatever appears and seems to have existence is nothing but manas, though this manas itself is merely a hypothetical starting-point, having no actual reality. For the manas is not different from the dreams of appearance and cannot be separated from them, just as one cannot separate liquidity from water or movement from air. Manas is thus nothing but the hypothetical entity from which all the dreams of appearance proceed, though these dreams and manas are merely the same and

1 Yoga-vāsishtha, III. 3.
2 sarveṣaṁ bhūta-jātānāṁ saṁsūra-vyavahārināṁ prathamo 'sau pratispandai citta-dehah svatodayah asmāt pūrvāt pratispandād ananyaitat-reactipti śyaṁ pravistāt sṛṣṭīṁ spanda-sṛṣṭir ivānīlāt.
3 rāmasya manaso rūpaṁ na kinecid api driyate nāma-mātrād 'te vyomno yathā śunya-jadākāteḥ.

III. 3. 14, 15.

III. 4. 38.
it is impossible to distinguish between them. Avidyā, saṃśrīti, citta, manas, bandha, mala, tamas are thus but synonyms for the same concept. It is the perceiver that appears as the perceived, and it is but the perceptions that appear as the perceiver and the perceived. The state of emancipation is the cessation of this world-appearance. There is in reality no perceiver, perceived or perceptions, no vacuity (śūnya), no matter, no spirit or consciousness, but pure cessation or pure negation, and this is what we mean by Brahman. Its nature is that of pure cessation (śānta), and it is this that the Sāmkhyaists call puruṣa, the Vedāntins call “Brahman,” the idealistic Buddhists call “pure idea” (vijñāna-mātra) and the nihilists “pure essencelessness” (śūnya). It is of the nature of pure annihilation and cessation, pervading the inner and the outer world. It is described as that essencelessness (śūnya) which does not appear to be so, and in which lies the ground and being of the essenceless world-appearance (yasmin śūnyam jagat sthitam), and which, in spite of all creations, is essenceless. The illusory world-appearance has to be considered as absolutely non-existent, like the water of the mirage or the son of a barren woman. The ultimate entity is thus neither existent nor non-existent and is both statical and dynamical (spandāspandātmaka); it is indescribable and un-nameable (kimapy avyapadesātmā) and neither being nor non-being nor being-non-being, neither statical being nor becoming (na bhūvo bhavānām na ca). The similarity of the philosophy of the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha to the idealistic philosophy of the Lāṅkāvatāra-sūtra is so definite and deep that the subject does not require any elaborate discussion and the readers are referred to the philosophy of the Lāṅkāvatāra in the first volume of the present work. On Vedānta lines it is very similar to Prakāśānanda’s interpretation of the Vedānta in later times, called drṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda, which can probably be traced at least as far back as Gauḍapāda or Maṇḍana. Prakāśātman refers to the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha as one of his main authorities.

1 pūrṇe pūrṇam prasarati sānte śāntam vyavasthitam vyomany evoditaṁ vyoma brahmaṁ brahma tiṣṭhati na dṛṣṭam asti sad-rūpaṁ na draṣṭā na ca dārśanam na śūnyam na jaḍam no cicitām evam ātataṁ.

2 III. 4. 46.

3 III. 5. 6–7.

4 nāśa-rūpa vināśātmā. III. 5. 16.

5 III. 7. 22.

6 III. 9. 59.

7 III. 9. 49.
Origination.

The world as such never existed in the past, nor exists now, nor will exist hereafter; so it has no production or destruction in any real sense. But yet there is the appearance, and its genesis has somehow to be accounted for. The ultimate entity is, of course, of the nature of pure cessation (śānta), as described above. The order of moments leading to the manifestation of the world-appearance can be described in this way: At first there is something like a self-reflecting thought in the ultimate entity, producing some indescribable objectivity which gives rise to an egohood. Thus, on a further movement, which is akin to thought, is produced a state which can be described as a self-thinking entity, which is clear pure intelligence, in which everything may be reflected. It is only this entity that can be called conscious intelligence (cit). As the thought-activity becomes more and more concrete (ghana-samvedana), other conditions of soul (jīva) arise out of it. At this stage it forgets, as it were, its subject-objectless ultimate state, and desires to flow out of itself as a pure essence of creative movement (bhāvanā-mātra-sāra). The first objectivity is ākāśa, manifested as pure vacuity. At this moment arise the ego (ahaṃtā) and time (kāla). This creation is, however, in no sense real, and is nothing but the seeming appearances of the self-conscious movement (sva-samvedana-mātrakam) of the ultimate being. All the network of being is non-existent, and has only an appearance of existing. Thought (sānveit), which at this moment is like the ākāśa and the ego and which is the seed (biṣa) of all the conceptions of thought (bhāvanā), formulates by its movement air. Again,

1 bandhyā-putra-tyoma-bane yathā na staḥ kādāca
jagad-ādy akhilam drīyam tathā nāsti kādāca
na cotpannam na ca dhvāmaṃ yat kilādau na vidyate
utpattiḥ kārtū taryu nāśa-kāmārya hā kathā.

2 manaḥ sampadyate lolaṃ kalanā-kalanomukham;
kalyantī manaḥ sakārā dādau bhāvyatī kṣaṇat;
ākāśa-bhāvanāmacakham labha-biṣa-raṃomukham;
tatas tāṃ ghanatāṃ jātaṃ ghana-spandā-kramān manaḥ.

A comparison of numerous passages like these shows that each mental creation is the result of a creative thought-movement called bhāvanā, and each successive movement in the chain of a succession of developing creative movements is said to be ghana, or concrete. Ghana has been paraphrased in the Tātparyaprañāśa as accretion (upacaya). Bhāvanā is the same as spanda; as the result of each thought-movement, there was thought-accretion (ghana), and corresponding to each ghana there was a semi-statistical creation, and following each ghana there was a spanda (ghana-spanda-kramā).
following the ākāśa moment and from it as a more concrete state (ghanibhūya), comes forth the sound-potential (kha-tan-mātra). This sound-potential is the root of the production of all the Vedas, with their words, sentences and valid means of proof. Gradually the conceivings of the other tan-mātras of sparśa, tejas, rasa and gandha follow, and from them the entire objective world, which has no other reality than the fact that they are conceptions of the self-conscious thought. The stages then are, that in the state of equilibrium (sama) of the ultimate indescribable entity called the Brahman, which, though pure consciousness in essence, is in an unmanifested state, there first arises an objectivity (cetyatva) through its self-directed self-consciousness of the objectivity inherent in it (sataś cetyāmśa-cetanāt); next arises the soul, where there is objective consciousness only through the touch or connection of objectivity (cetya-samyoga-cetanāt) instead of the self-directed consciousness of objectivity inherent in itself. Then comes the illusory notion of subjectivity, through which the soul thinks that it is only the conscious subject and as such is different from the object (cetyāika-paratā-vasāt). This moment naturally leads to the state of the subjective ego, which conceives actively (buddhitvākalanam), and it is this conceiving activity which leads to the objective conceptions of the different tan-mātras and the world-appearance. These are all, however, ideal creations, and as such have no reality apart from their being as mere appearance. Since their nature is purely conceptual (vikalpa), they cannot be real at any time. All that appears as existent does so only as a result of the conceptual activity of thought. Through its desire, “I shall see,” there comes the appearance of the two hollows of the eye, and similarly in the case of touch, smell, hearing and taste. There is no single soul, far less an infinite number of them. It is by the all-powerful conceptual activity of Brahman that there arises the appearance of so many centres of subjective thought, as the souls (jīvas). In reality, however, the jīvas have no other existence than the conceptualizing activity which produces their appearance. There is no materiality or form: these are nothing but the self-flashings of thought (citta-camatkāra).

Manas, according to this theory, is nothing but that function of pure consciousness through which it posits out of itself an object of itself. Here the pure conscious part may be called the spiritual

¹ iii. 12.
part and its objectivity aspect the material part. In its objectivity also the cit perceives nothing but itself, though it appears to perceive something other than itself (svam evanyatayā drstvā), and this objectivity takes its first start with the rise of egohood (ahamta).

But to the most important question, namely, how the original equilibrium is disturbed and how the present development of the conceptual creation has come about, the answer given in the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha is that it is by pure accident (hakatālya-yogena) that such a course of events took place. It is indeed disappointing that such a wonderful creation of world-appearance should have ultimately to depend on accident for its origin. It is considered irrelevant to enquire into the possibility of some other cause of the ultimate cause, the Brahman.

Karma, Manas and the Categories.

Karma in this view is nothing but the activity of the manas. The active states of manas are again determined by their preceding moments and may in their turn be considered as determining the succeeding moments. When any particular state determines any succeeding state, it may be considered as an agent, or kartā; but, as this state is determined by the activity of the previous state, otherwise called the karma, it may be said that the karma generates the kartā, the kartā by its activity again produces karma, so that karma and kartā are mutually determinative. As in the case of the seed coming from the tree and the tree coming from the seed, the cycle proceeds on from kartā to karma and from karma to kartā, and no ultimate priority can be affirmed of any one of them. But, if this is so, then the responsibility of karma ceases; the root desire (vāsanā) through which a man is born also makes him suffer or enjoy in accordance with it; but, if kartā and karma spring forth together, then a particular birth ought not to be determined by the karma of previous birth, and this would mean

1 cito yac cetya-kalanam tan-manastvam udāhṛtam cid-bhūgo 'trājādo bhūgo jádyam atra hi cetyatā. III. 91. 37.
2 III. 96. 15, IV. 54. 7.
3 Brahmaṇaḥ kāraṇam kim syād iti vaktum na yujyate svabhavo nirvīśeṣatāt para vaktum na yujyate. IV. 18. 22.
4 yathā karma ca kartā ca paryāyeneha saṃgatau karmanā kriyate kartā kriyate kartā karma pṛṇyate bijāṅkūda-vānaḥ-nyāyo loha-vedokta eva saḥ. III. 95. 19, 20.
that man’s enjoyment and sorrow did not depend on his *karma*. In answer to such a question, raised by Rāmacandra, Vāsiṣṭha says that *karma* is due not to *ātman*, but to *manas*. It is the mental movement which constitutes *karma*. When first the category of *manas* rises into being from Brahman, *karma* also begins from that moment, and, as a result thereof, the soul and the body associated with it are supposed to be manifested. *Karma* and *manas* are in one sense the same. In this world the movement generated by action (*kriyā-spanda*) is called *karma*, and, as it is by the movement of *manas* that all effects take place, and the bodies with all their associated sufferings or enjoyments are produced, so even the body, which is associated with physical, external *karma*, is in reality nothing but the *manas* and its activity. *Manas* is essentially of the nature of *karma*, or activity, and the cessation of activity means the destruction of *manas* (*karma-nāše mano-nāśaḥ*). As heat cannot be separated from fire or blackness from collyrium, so movement and activity cannot be separated from *manas*. If one ceases, the other also necessarily ceases. *Manas* means that activity which subsists between being and non-being and induces being through non-being: it is essentially dynamic in its nature and passes by the name of *manas*. It is by the activity of *manas* that the subject-objectless pure consciousness assumes the form of a self-conscious ego. *Manas* thus consists of this constantly positing activity (*ekānta-kalanāḥ*). The seed of *karma* is to be sought in the activity of *manas* (*karma-bijaṃ manah-spanda*), and the actions (*kriyā*) which follow are indeed very diverse. It is the synthetic function (*tad-anusandhatte*) of *manas* that is called the functioning of the conative senses, by which all actions are performed, and it is for this reason that *karma* is nothing but *manas*. *Manas*, *buddhi*, *ahāmkāra*, *citta*, *karma*, *kalpanā*, *saṃśrīti*, *vāsanā*, *vidyā*, *prayatna*, *smṛti*, *indriya*, *prakṛti*, *māyā* and *kriyā* are different only in name, and they create confusion by these varied names; in reality, however, they signify the same concept, namely, the active functioning of *manas* or *citta*. These different names are current only because they lay stress on the different aspects of the same active functioning. They do not mean different entities, but only different moments, stages or aspects. Thus the first moment of self-conscious activity leading in different directions is called *manas*. When, after such oscillating movement, there is

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1 iii. 95.
the position of either of the alternatives, as "the thus," it is called buddhi. When by the false notions of associations of body and soul there is the feeling of a concrete individual as "I," it is called ahamkāra. When there is reflective thought associated with the memory of the past and the anticipations of the future, it is called citta. When the activity is taken in its actual form as motion or action towards any point, it is called karma. When, leaving its self-contained state, it desires anything, we have kalpanā. When the citta turns itself to anything previously seen or unseen, as being previously experienced, we have what is called memory (smṛti). When certain impressions are produced in a very subtle, subdued form, dominating all other inclinations, as if certain attractions or repulsions to certain things were really experienced, we have the root inclinations (vāsanā). In the realization that there is such a thing as self-knowledge, and that there is also such a thing as the false and illusory world-appearance, we have what is called right knowledge (vidyā). When the true knowledge is forgotten and the impressions of the false world-appearance gain ground, we have what are called the impure states (mala). The functions of the five kinds of cognition please us and are called the senses (indriya). As all world-appearance has its origin and ground in the highest self, it is called the origin (prakṛti). As the true state can neither be called existent nor non-existent, and as it gives rise to all kinds of appearance, it is called illusion (māyā). Thus it is the same appearance which goes by the various names of jīva, manas, citta and buddhi.

One of the peculiarities of this work is that it is not a philosophical treatise of the ordinary type, but its main purpose lies in the attempt to create a firm conviction on the part of its readers, by repeating the same idea in various ways by means of stories and elaborate descriptions often abounding in the richest poetical imagery of undeniably high aesthetic value, hardly inferior to that of the greatest Sanskrit poet, Kālidāsa.

1 III. 96. 17-31.
2 jīva ity ucayate loke manas ity api kathyate
cittam ity ucayate saiva buddhir ity ucayate tathā.
III. 96. 34.
The World-Appearance.

The Yoga-vāsiṣṭha is never tired of repeating that this world is like a hare’s horn, a forest in the sky, or a lotus in the sky. The state of Brahman is higher than the state of manas. It is by becoming manas that Brahman transforms itself into thought-activity and thus produces the seeming changeful appearances. But Brahman in itself cannot have anything else (brahma-tatte ’nyutā nāsti). But, though there is this change into manas, and through it the production of the world-appearance, yet such a change is not real, but illusory; for during all the time when this change makes its appearance and seems to stay, Brahman remains shut up within itself, changeless and unchangeable. All objective appearance is thus nothing but identically the same as the Brahman, and all that appears has simply no existence. The seer never transforms himself into objectivity, but remains simply identical with himself in all appearances of objectivity. But the question arises, how, if the world-appearance is nothing but the illusory creative conception of manas, can the order of the world-appearance be explained? The natural answer to such a question in this system is that the seeming correspondence and agreement depend upon the similarity of the imaginary products in certain spheres, and also upon accident. It is by accident that certain dream series correspond with certain other dream series. But in reality they are all empty dream constructions of one manas. It is by the dream desires that physical objects gradually come to be considered as persistent objects existing outside of us. But, though during the continuance of the dreams they appear to be real, they are all the while nothing but mere dream conceptions. The self-alienation by which the pure consciousness constructs the dream conception is such that, though it always remains identical with itself, yet it seems to posit itself as its other, and as diversified by space, time, action and substance (desa-kāla-kriyā-dravyaiḥ).

The difference between the ordinary waking state and the dream state consists in this, that the former is considered by us as associated with permanent convictions (sthira-pratyaya), whereas the latter is generally thought to have no permanent basis. Any experience which persists, whether it be dream or not,

1 melanam api svakāya-parakāya-svapnānām daivat kvacit saṃvādavat svāntah-
kulpanātmaham eva. Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-tātparya-prahāla, iv. 18. 46.
comes to be regarded as permanent, whereas, if even our waking conceptions come to be regarded as changeful, they lose their validity as representing permanent objects, and our faith in them becomes shaken. If the dream experiences persisted in time and the waking experiences were momentary, then the waking state would be considered as a dream and the dream experiences would be considered as ordinary experiences in the dream state. It is only with the coming of the waking state that there is a break of the dream experiences, and it is then that the latter are contradicted and therefore regarded as false. But so long as the dream experiences lasted in the dream state, we did not consider them to be false; for during that time those dream experiences appeared somehow to be permanent and therefore real. There is thus no difference between dream states and waking states except this, that the latter are relatively persistent, continuous and permanent (sthira), while the former are changeful and impermanent (asthira)\(^1\).

There is within us a principle of pure consciousness, which is also the vital principle (jīva-dhātu), vitality (vīrya), and body heat (tejas). In the active condition, when the body is associated with manas, action and speech, the vital principle moves through the body, and on account of this all sorts of knowledge arise, and the illusion of world-appearance inherent in it is manifested as coming from outside through the various sense apertures. This being of a steady and fixed character is called the waking state (jāgrat). The susūpta, or deep sleep state, is that in which the body is not disturbed by the movement of the manas, action or speech. The vital principle remains still in itself, in a potential state without any external manifestation, as the oil remains in the sesameum (taila-sanvid yathā tile)\(^2\). When the vital principle (jīva-dhātu) is very much disturbed, we have experiences of the dream state.

Whenever the manas strongly identifies itself with any of its concepts, it appears to itself as that concept, just as an iron ball in fire becomes itself like fire. It is the manas that is both the perceiver (purusa) and the perceived universe (viśva-rūpatā)\(^3\).

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\(^1\) jāgrat-svapna-dalā-bheda na sthīrāsthirate vinā samaḥ sadāiva sarvatra samasto nubhavo nayoḥ svapno 'pi svapna-samaye sthāryōj jāgratte ca yechati asthāryāt jāgrad evaṁ svapnaṁ tādriḥ-bodhataḥ.

\(^2\) IV. 19. 23.

\(^3\) IV. 20. 4.
The followers of the Sāṃkhya consider manas to be pure consciousness; they have also explained their doctrines in other details, and they think that emancipation cannot be attained by any way other than that which the Sāṃkhya suggests. The followers of the Vedānta also consider that emancipation is attained if one understands that all this world is Brahman and if there is self-control and cessation of desires together with this knowledge, and that this is the only way of salvation. The Vijñānavādins (Idealistic Buddhists) think that, provided there is complete self-control and cessation of all sense desires, one may attain emancipation, if he understands that the world-appearance is nothing but his own illusion. Thus each system of thought thinks too much of its own false methods of salvation (svair eva niyama-bhramaiḥ), springing from the traditional wrong notions. But the truth underlying all these conceptions is that manas is the root of all creations. There is nothing intrinsically pleasurable or painful, sweet or bitter, cold or hot, and such appearances arise only through the habitual creations of the mind. When one believes and thinks with strong faith in any particular manner, he begins to perceive things in that particular manner during that particular time.

Nature of Agency (Kartrtvā) and the Illusion of World Creation.

Whenever we ascribe agency (kartrtvā) to any person in respect of deeds producing pleasure or pain, or deeds requiring strenuous exercise of will-power, as those of the Yoga discipline, we do it wrongly; for agency consists in the grasp of will and resolution, and so it is an internal determination of the mind, of the nature of dominant and instinctive desires and inclinations (vāsanābhidhānāh). The inner movement of feeling in the person towards the enjoyment of experiences takes place in accordance with these fixed desires or inclinations leading him to specific forms of enjoyment. All enjoyment is thus a natural consequence of our nature and character as active agents. Since all active agency (kartrtvā) consists in the

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1. na jñeneha padārtheṣu rūpam ekam uditreyate
dṛṣṭa-bhāvanayā ceto yathā bhāvatayty atam
tat tat-phaḷam tad-ākāraṁ tāvat-kālaṁ prapasyati,
na tad ati na yat satyaṁ na tad ati na yan mṛṣā.
iv. 21. 56, 57.

2. yohyantara-sthāyāḥ manovṛttāṁ niṣayāyaṁ udāpyata-pratyayo vāsanābhidhānātyaṁ kartrtvā-sabdānta.
iv. 38. 2.
inner effort of will, the enjoyment following such an inner exercise of will is nothing but the feeling modifications of the mind following the lead of the active exercise of the will. All action or active agency is thus associated with root inclinations (vāsanā), and is thus possible only for those who do not know the truth and have their minds full of the root inclinations. But those who have no vāsanā cannot be said to have the nature of active agents or of enjoying anything. Their minds are no doubt always active and they are active all the time; but, as they have no vāsanā, they are not attached to fruit, and there is the movement without any attachment. Whatever is done by manas is done, and what is not done by it is not done; so it is the manas that is the active agent, and not the body; the world has appeared from the mind (citta or manas), is of the essence of manas, and is upheld in manas. Everything is but a mental creation and has no other existence.

Ultimately, everything comes from Brahman; for that is the source of all powers, and therefore all powers (śaktayah) are seen in Brahman—existence, non-existence, unity, duality and multiplicity all proceed from Brahman. The citta, or mind, has evolved out of pure consciousness (cit) or Brahman, as has already been mentioned, and it is through the latter that all power of action (karma), root desires (vāsanā), and all mental modifications appear. But, if everything has proceeded from Brahman, how is it that the world-appearance happens to be so different from its source, the Brahman? When anything comes out of any other thing, it is naturally expected to be similar thereto in substance. If, therefore, the world-appearance has sprung forth from Brahman, it ought to be similar in nature thereto; but Brahman is sorrowless, while the world-appearance is full of sorrow; how is this to be explained? To such a question the answer is, that to a person who has a perfect realization of the nature of the world-appearance, as being a mere conceptual creation from the Brahman and having no existence at all, there is no sorrow in this world-appearance nor any such quality which is different from Brahman. Only in the eyes of a person who has not the complete realization does this difference between the world-appearance and Brahman seem to be so great, and the mere notion of the identity of Brahman and the universe, without its complete realization, may lead to all sorts of mischief. On this account instruction in the identity of the Brahman and the world-appearance should never be given to
anyone whose mind has not been properly purified by the essential virtues of self-control and disinclination to worldly pleasures. As in magic (indrajāla), non-existent things are produced and existent things are destroyed, a jug becomes a cloth, and a cloth becomes a jug, and all sorts of wonderful sights are shown, though none of these appearances have the slightest essence of their own; so is the entire world-appearance produced out of the imagination of the mind. There is no active agent (kartr) and no one enjoyer (bhokty) of the pleasures and sorrows of the world, and there is no destruction whatsoever.

Though the ultimate state is the indescribable Brahman or cit, yet it is from manas that all creation and destruction from cycle to cycle take their start. At the beginning of each so-called creation the creative movement of manas energy is roused. At the very first the outflow of this manas energy in the direction of a conceptual creation means an accumulation of energy in manas, called ghanā, which is a sort of statical aspect of the dynamical energy (spanda). At the next stage there is a combination of this statical state of energy with the next outflow of energy, and the result is the stabilized accretion of energy of the second order; this is again followed by another outflow of energy, and that leads to the formation of the stabilized energy of the third order, and so on. The course of thought-creation is thus through the interaction of the actualized energy of thought with the active forms of the energy of thought, which join together, at each successive outflow from the supreme fund of potential energy. Thus it is said that the first creative movement of manas manifests itself as the ākāśa creation, and that, as a result of this creative outflow of energy, there is an accretion of energy in manas; at this moment there is another outflow (spanda) or movement on the part of manas, as modified by the accretion of energy of the previous state, and this outflow of manas thus modified is the creation of air. The outflow of this second order, again, modifies manas by its accretion, and there is a third outflow of energy of the manas as modified by the previous accretion, and so on. This process of the modification of energy by the outflow of the manas modified at each stage by the accretion of the outflow of energy at each of the preceding states is called

1 ādau śama-dama-pratyāṅgaṁ guṇoṁ śiṣyāṁ viśodhayet
paścāt sarvam idaṁ brahma luddhas team iti bodhayet.

2 nātra haścit kartā na bhoktā na vināśām eti.
ghana-spanda-krama. The creation of all the so-called tan-mātras (subtle states) of ākāśa, vāyu, tejas, ap and kṣīti takes place in this order, and afterwards that of the ahamkāra and buddhi, and thus of the subtle body (pury-aṣṭaka); thereafter the cosmic body of Brahman is formed and developed in accordance with the root desire (vāsanā) inherent in manas. Thus here we have first the ākāśa tan-mātra, then the vāyu tan-mātra from the ākāśa tan-mātra plus the outflow of energy, then, from the ākāśa tan-mātra plus the vāyu tan-mātra plus the outflow of energy of the third order, tejas tan-mātra, and so on. Then, after the tan-mātra, the ahamkāra and the buddhi, we have the subtle body of eight constituents (five tan-mātras, ahamkāra, buddhi and the root manas), called the pury-aṣṭaka of Brahmā. From this develops the body of Brahmā, and from the creative imagination of Brahmā we have the grosser materials and all the rest of the world-appearance. But all this is pure mental creation, and hence unreal, and so also are all the scriptures, gods and goddesses and all else that passes as real.

The Stage of the Saint (Jivan-mukta).

Emancipation (mukti) in this system can be attained in the lifetime of a person or after his death; in the former case it is called sa-deha-muktatā, or jivan-muktatā. The jivan-mukta state is that in which the saint has ceased to have any desires (apagatai-ṣaṇāh), as if he were in a state of deep sleep (susuptavat). He is self-contained and thinks as if nothing existed. He has always an inward eye, even though he may be perceiving all things with his external eye and using his limbs in all directions. He does not wait for the future, nor remain in the present, nor remember the past. Though sleeping, he is awake and, though awake, he is asleep. He may be doing all kinds of actions externally, though he remains altogether unaffected by them internally. He internally renounces all actions, and does not desire anything for himself. He is full of bliss and happiness, and therefore appears to ordinary eyes to be an ordinary happy man; but in reality, though he may be doing all kinds of things, he has not the delusion of being himself an active agent (tyakta-kartrvavibhramah). He has no antipathy, grief, emotions, or outbursts of pleasure. He is quite neutral to all who

1 iv. 44. 13-30.
do him ill or well; he shows sympathetic interest in each person in his own way; he plays with a child, is serious with an old man, an enjoyable companion to a young man, sympathetic with the sorrows of a suffering man. He is wise and pleasant and loving to all with whom he comes in contact. He is not interested in his own virtuous deeds, enjoyments, sins, in bondage or emancipation. He has a true philosophic knowledge of the essence and nature of all phenomena, and, being firm in his convictions, he remains neutral to all kinds of happenings, good, bad, or indifferent. But from the descriptions it appears that this indifference on the part of a saint does not make him an exclusive and unnatural man; for, though unaffected in every way within himself, he can take part in the enjoyment of others, he can play like a child and can sympathize with the sorrows of sufferers.\(^1\)

\textit{Jīvan-mukti}, or emancipation while living, is considered by Śaṅkara also as a possible state, though he does not seem to have used the term in his works. Thus, on the basis of \textit{Chāndogya}, vi. 14. 2, he says that knowledge destroys only those actions which have not already begun to yield their fruits; those actions which have already begun to yield fruits cannot be destroyed by true knowledge, and so it is not possible for anyone to escape from their effects, good or bad; and it has to be admitted that even after the dawning of true knowledge the body remains until the effects of the actions which have already begun to yield fruits are exhausted by enjoyment or suffering. In explaining such a condition Śaṅkara gives two analogies: (1) as a potter’s wheel goes on revolving when the vessel that it was forming is completed, so the body, which was necessary till the attainment of true knowledge, may continue to exist for some time even after the rise of knowledge; (2) as, when a man through some eye-disease sees two moons instead of one, he continues to do so even when he is convinced that there are not two moons but one, so, even when the saint is firmly convinced of the unreality of the world-appearance, he may still continue to have the illusion of world-appearance, though internally he may remain unaffected by it.\(^2\) Of the Upaniṣads only the later \textit{Muktika Upaniṣad}, which seems to have drawn its inspiration from the \textit{Yoga-vaśiṣṭha}, mentions the word \textit{jīvan-mukta}, meaning those saints who live till their fruit-yielding

\(^1\) v. 77.
\(^2\) Śaṅkara’s \textit{Śārīraka-bhāṣya} or the \textit{Brahma-sūtra}, iv. i. 15, 19.
actions (prārabdha-karma) are exhausted. But, though the word is not mentioned, the idea seems to be pretty old.

The conception of sthita-prajña in the Śrimad-bhagavad-gītā reminds us of the state of a jīvan-mukta saint. A sthita-prajña (man of steady wisdom) has no desires, but is contented in himself, has no attachment, fear or anger, is not perturbed by sorrow nor longs for pleasure, and is absolutely devoid of all likes and dislikes. Like a tortoise within its shell, he draws himself away from the sense-objects. This conception of the Śrimad-bhagavad-gītā is referred to in the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, which gives a summary of it in its own way. But it seems as if the conception of the saint in the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha has this advantage over the other, that here the saint, though absolutely unaffected by all pleasures and sufferings, by virtue and vice, is yet not absolutely cut off from us; for, though he has no interest in his own good, he can show enjoyment in the enjoyment of others and sympathy with the sufferings of others; he can be as gay as a child when with children, and as serious as any philosopher when with philosophers or old men. The Śrimad-bhagavad-gītā, though it does not deny such qualities to a saint, yet does not mention them either, and seems to lay stress on the aspect of the passivity and neutral character of the saint; whereas the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, as we have already said, lays equal stress on both these special features of a saint. He is absolutely unattached to anything, but is not cut off from society and can seemingly take part in everything without losing his mental balance in any way. The Gītā, of course, always recommends even the unattached saint to join in all kinds of good actions; but what one misses there is the taking of a full and proper interest in life along with all others, though the saint is internally absolutely unaffected by all that he may do.

The saint in the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha not only performs his own actions in an unattached manner, but to all appearance mixes with the sorrows and joys of others.

The question whether a saint is above the tyranny of the effects of his own deeds was also raised in Buddhist quarters. Thus we find in the Kathā-vatthu that a discussion is raised as to whether a saint can be killed before his proper time of death, and it is said that no one can attain nirvāṇa without enjoying the

1 Muktika Upāniṣad, i. 42, also ii. 33, 35, 76.
2 Śrimad-bhagavad-gītā, ii. 55-58.
3 Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, vi. 52-58.
fruits of accumulated intentional deeds\(^1\). A story is told in the *Dhamma-pada* commentary (the date of which, according to E. W. Burlingame, is about A.D. 450), how the great saint Moggallāṇa was torn in pieces by thieves, and his bones were pounded until they were as small as grains of rice; such a miserable death of such a great saint naturally raised doubts among his disciples, and these were explained by Buddha, who said that this was due to the crime of parricide, which Moggallāṇa had committed in some previous birth; even though he had attained sainthood (*arhatvā*) in that life, he could not escape suffering the effect of his misdeeds, which were on the point of bearing fruit\(^2\). This would naturally imply the view that sainthood does not necessarily mean destruction of the body, but that even after the attainment of sainthood the body may continue to exist for the suffering of the effects of such actions as are on the point of bearing fruit.

The different Indian systems are, however, not all agreed regarding the possibility of the *jivan-mukta* state. Thus, according to the Nyāya, *apavarga*, or emancipation, occurs only when the soul is absolutely dissociated from all the nine kinds of qualities (will, antipathy, pleasure, pain, knowledge, effort, virtue, vice and rooted instincts). Unless such a dissociation actually occurs, there cannot be emancipation; and it is easy to see that this cannot happen except after death, and so emancipation during the period while the body remains is not possible\(^3\). The point is noticed by Vātsyāyana in a discussion on *Nyāya-sūtra*, iv. 2. 42–45, where he raises the question of the possibility of knowledge of external objects through the senses and denies it by declaring that in emancipation (*apavarga*) the soul is dissociated from the body and all the senses, and hence there is no possibility of knowledge; and that with the extinction of all knowledge there is also ultimate and absolute destruction of pain\(^4\). The Vaiśeṣika holds the same view on the subject. Thus Śrīharṣa says that, when through right knowledge (*paramārtha-darsana*) all merit ceases, then the

\(^1\) *Kathā-vatthu*, xvii. 2.

\(^2\) *Buddhist Legends* by E. W. Burlingame, vol. ii. p. 304. The same legend is repeated in the introduction to *Jātaka* 522.

\(^3\) *Nyāya-mānjari*, p. 508.

\(^4\) *Nyāya-sūtra*, iv. 2. 43.
soul, being devoid of the seeds of merit and demerit, which produce the body and the senses, etc., and the present body having been destroyed by the exhaustive enjoyment of the fruits of merit and demerit, and there being no further production of any new body by reason of the destruction of all the seeds of karma, there is absolute cessation of the production of body, like the extinction of fire by the burning up of all the fuel; and such an eternal non-production of body is called mokṣa (emancipation).

Prabhākara seems to hold a similar view. Thus Śālikanātha, in explaining the Prabhākara view in his Prakaraṇa-panicika, says that emancipation means the absolute and ultimate destruction of the body, due to the total exhaustion of merit and demerit. The difficulty is raised that it is not possible to exhaust by enjoyment or suffering the fruits of all the karmas accumulated since beginningless time; he who, being averse to worldly sorrows and all pleasures which are mixed with traces of sorrow, works for emancipation, desists from committing the actions prohibited by Vedic injunctions, which produce sins, exhausts by enjoyment and suffering the good and bad fruits of previous actions, attains true knowledge, and is equipped with the moral qualities of passionless tranquillity, self-restraint and absolute sex-control, exhausts in the end all the potencies of his karmas (niḥśeṣa-karmāśaya) and attains emancipation. This view, however, no doubt has reference to a very advanced state in this life, when no further karma is accumulating; but it does not call this state mokṣa during life; for mokṣa, according to this view, is absolute and ultimate non-production of body.

The Sāmkhya-kārikā, however, holds that, when true knowledge is attained (sanyagijñānādhitāna), and when in consequence none of the karmas of undetermined fruition (aniyata-vipāka), accumulated through beginningless time, are able to ripen for bearing fruit, the body may still continue to remain simply by the inertia, as it were, of the old avidyā; just as even after the potter has ceased to operate the potter’s wheel may continue to move as a

1 yathā dagdhsenayānālasayopalamah punar anutpāda evam punah śari-
   Praśastapāda also writes: tattā nirodhāt nīrhajyātmanah śarīrādi-nīrytthī
dūnaḥ śarīrādy-anutpattau dagdhsenayānālasayopalamah mokṣa iti. Praśastapāda-
bhāṣya, p. 282.
2 aśīyatikas tu dehochedo niḥśeṣa-dharmādharma-parikṣaya-nībandhano mokṣa iti. Prakaraṇa-panicika, p. 156.
3 Ibid. p. 157.
result of the momentum which it has acquired (cakra-bhramivad dhṛta-śāriraḥ)\(^1\).

The word jīvan-mukta is not used either in the Kārikā or in the Tattva-kaumudi or in the Tattva-vibhākara. The Sāmkhya-sūtra, however, uses the term and justifies it on the same grounds as does Vācaspati\(^2\). The Sāmkhya-sūtra, more particularly the Pravacana-bhāṣya, raises the threefold conception of manda-viveka (feeble discrimination), madhya-viveka (middle discrimination), and viveka-nisphatti (finished discrimination)\(^3\). The stage of manda-viveka is that in which the enquirer has not attained the desired discrimination of the difference between prakṛti and puruṣa, but is endeavouring to attain it; the madhya-viveka stage is the state of the jīvan-mukta. But this is an asamprajñāta state, i.e. a state in which there is still subject-object knowledge and a full conscious discrimination. The last stage, viveka-nisphatti, is an asamprajñāta state in which there is no subject-object knowledge, and therefore there cannot in this stage be any reflection of pleasure or sorrow (due to the fructifying karma—prārabdha-karma) on the puruṣa.

The Yoga also agrees with the general conclusion of the Sāmkhya on the subject. A man who nears the state of emancipation ceases to have doubts about the nature of the self, and begins to re-live the nature of his own self and to discriminate himself as being entirely different from his psychosis (sattva); but, as a result of the persistence of some decayed roots of old impressions and instincts, there may, in the intervals of the flow of true discriminative knowledge, emerge other ordinary cognitive states, such as “I am,” “mine,” “I know,” “I do not know”; yet, inasmuch as the roots of the old impressions have already been burnt, these occasional ordinary cognitive states cannot produce further new impressions. The general impressions of cognition (jñāna-samskāra), however, remain until the final destruction of citta. The point here is that, the roots in the world of subconscious impressions being destroyed, and the occasional appearance of ordinary cognitive states being but remnants produced by some of the old impressions, the roots of which have already

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\(^1\) Sāmkhya-kārikā, 67, 68. The Tattva-kaumudi here essays to base its remarks on Chāndogya, vi. 14. 2, as Śaṅkara did in his bhāṣya on the Brahma-sūtra. The Tattva-vibhākara of Varādāhara Miśra, in commenting on Vācaspati’s Tattva-kaumudi, quotes Mundha Upānīṣad, ii. 2. 8, and also Śrīmad-bhāgavat-adītā, iv. 37, for its support. Compare Yoga-vāsiṣṭha: ghanā na vāsanā vasya punar-janana-vairjita.

\(^2\) Sāmkhya-sūtra, III. 77–83.

\(^3\) Ibid. III. 77, 78.
been burnt, these occasional ordinary cognitive states are like passing shadows which have no basis anywhere; they cannot, therefore, produce any further impressions and thus cannot be a cause of bondage to the saint. With the advance of this state the sage ceases to have inclinations even towards his processes of concentration, and there is only discriminative knowledge; this state of samādhi is called dharma-megha. At this stage all the roots of ignorance and other afflictions become absolutely destroyed, and in such a state the sage, though living (jīvann eva), becomes emancipated (vimukta). The next stage is, of course, the state of absolute emancipation (kaivalya), when the citra returns back to prakṛti, never to find the puruṣa again.  

Among later writers Vidyāraṇya wrote on this subject a treatise which he called jīvan-mukti-viveka. It is divided into five chapters. In the first he deals with the authorities who support jīvan-mukti; in the second, with the nature of the destruction of instinctive root inclinations (vāsanā); in the third, with the destruction of manas (mano-nāśa); in the fourth, with the final object for which jīvan-mukti is sought; and in the fifth, with the nature and characteristics of those saints who have attained jīvan-mukti by wisdom and right knowledge (vidvat-saṁnyāsa), and have virtually renounced the world, though living. The work is more a textual compilation from various sources than an acute philosophical work examining the subject on its own merits. The writer seems to have derived his main inspiration from the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, though he refers to relevant passages in several other works, such as Brhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad, Maitreyi-brāhmaṇa, Kahola-brāhmaṇa, Śāstra-brāhmaṇa, Jābāla-brāhmaṇa, Kaṭha-valli, Gitā, Bhāgavata, Brhaspati-smṛti, Śūta-saṁhitā, Gauḍa-pāda-kārikā, Śankara-bhāṣya, Brahma-sūtra, Paṇca-pādikā, Viṣṇu-puruṣa, Taittirtya-brāhmaṇa, Yoga-sūtra, Naiṣkarmya-siddhi, Kaushitaki, Pañcadaśi, Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa, Vyāsa-bhāṣya, Brahma-upaniṣad, the works of Yama, Parāśara, Bodhāyana, Medhātithi, Viśvarūpa Ācārya, etc.  

Disinclination to passions and desires (virakti) is, according to him, of two kinds, intense (tīrta) and very intense (tīratāra).  

1 Yoga-sūtra and Vyāsa-bhāṣya, iv. 29–32.  
2 This Vidyāraṇya seems to be later than the Vidyāraṇya who wrote the Pañcadaśi, as quotations from the chapter Brahmrāṇa of the Pañcadaśi are found in it (chap. ii, pp. 105, 106, Chowkhamba edition). So my identification of the Vidyāraṇya of the Pañcadaśi with the writer of Jīvan-mukti-viveka in the first volume (p. 419) of the present work seems to be erroneous.
Intense virakti is that in which the person does not desire anything in this life, whereas very intense virakti is that in which the person ceases to have any desires for all future lives. Vidyārānya takes great pains to prove, by reference to various scriptural texts, that there are these two distinct classes of renunciation (sannyāsin), though one might develop into the other. As regards the nature of jīvan-mukti, Vidyārānya follows the view of the Yoga-vasiṣṭha, though he supports it by other scriptural quotations. On the subject of bodiless emancipation (videha-mukti) also he refers to passages from the Yoga-vasiṣṭha. Jīvan-mukti is the direct result of the cessation of all instinctive root desires (vāsanā-kṣaya), the dawning of right knowledge (tattva-jñāna), and the destruction of manas (mano-nāśa). Vidyārānya, however, holds that on account of steady right knowledge even the seeming appearance of passions and attachment cannot do any harm to a jīvan-mukta, just as the bite of a snake whose fangs have been drawn cannot do him any harm. Thus he gives the example of Yājñavalkya, who killed Śākalya by cursing and yet did not suffer on that account, because he was already a jīvan-mukta, firm in his knowledge of the unreality of the world. So his anger was not real anger, rooted in instinctive passions, but a mere appearance (ābhāsa) of it.

Energy of Free-will (Pauruṣa).

One of the special features of the Yoga-vasiṣṭha is the special emphasis that it lays upon free-will and its immense possibilities, and its power of overruling the limitations and bondage of past karmas. Pauruṣa is defined in the Yoga-vasiṣṭha as mental and physical exertions made in properly advised ways (sādhūpadīṣṭa-

1 If the ascetic has ordinary desires he is called haṃsa; if he desires emancipation, he is called parama-haṃsa. The course of their conduct is described in the Parāśara-smṛti, Jīvan-mukti-viveka, i. 11. When a man renounces the world for the attainment of right knowledge, it is called vividitā-samnyāsa (renunciation for thirst of knowledge), as distinguished from vidvāt-samnyāsa (renunciation of the wise) in the case of those who have already attained right knowledge. The latter kind of samnyāsa is with reference to those who are jīvan-mukta.

2 It is pointed out by Vidyārānya that the Arunikopanīṣad describes the conduct and character of vividitā-samnyāsa, in which one is asked to have a staff, one loin-cloth and to repeat the Āranyakas and the Upaniṣads only, and the Parama-haṃsopanīṣad describes the conduct and character of vidvāt-samnyāsa, in which no such repetition of the Upaniṣads is held necessary, since such a person is fixed and steady in his Brahma knowledge. This makes the difference between the final stages of the two kinds of renunciation (Jīvan-mukti-viveka, i. 20–24).

3 Jīvan-mukti-viveka, pp. 183–186.
mārgena), since only such actions can succeed\(^1\). If a person desires anything and works accordingly in the proper way, he is certain to attain it, if he does not turn back in midway\(^2\). Pauruṣa is of two kinds, of the past life (prāktana) and of this life (aihika), and the past pauruṣa can be overcome by the present pauruṣa\(^3\). The karma of past life and the karma of this life are thus always in conflict with each other, and one or the other gains ground according to their respective strength. Not only so, but the endeavours of any individual may be in conflict with the opposing endeavours of other persons, and of these two also that which is stronger wins\(^4\). By strong and firm resolution and effort of will the endeavours of this life can conquer the effect of past deeds. The idea that one is being led in a particular way by the influence of past karmas has to be shaken off from the mind; for the efforts of the past life are certainly not stronger than the visible efforts of the moment.

All efforts have indeed to be made in accordance with the direction of the scriptures (śāstra). There is, of course, always a limit beyond which human endeavours are not possible, and therefore it is necessary that proper economy of endeavours should be observed by following the directions of the scriptures, by cultivating the company of good friends, and by adhering to right conduct, since mere random endeavours or endeavours on a wrong line cannot be expected to produce good results\(^5\). If one exerts his will and directs his efforts in the proper way, he is bound to be successful. There is nothing like destiny (daiva), standing as a separate force: it has a continuity with the power of other actions performed in this life, so that it is possible by superior exertions to destroy the power of the actions of previous lives, which would have led to many evil results. Whenever a great effort is made or a great energy is exerted, there is victory. The whole question, whether the daiva of the past life or the pauruṣa of this life will win, depends upon the relative strength of the two, and any part of the daiva which becomes weaker than the efforts of the present life

\(^1\) sādhāpadiṣṭa-mārgena yan mano-ṅga-viçeṣṭītam
tat pauruṣam tat saphalam anyad unmattra-çeṣṭītam.
Yoga-vāśiṣṭha, II. 4. 11.

\(^2\) yo yam artham prārthayate tad-artham cehate kramā
avasyaṃ sa tam ēpnoti na ced ardhan nivartate.
Ibid. II. 4. 12.

\(^3\) Ibid. II. 4. 17.

\(^4\) Ibid. II. 5. 5. 7.

\(^5\) sa ca sac-chātra-sat-saṅga-sad-daērāir nījaṃ phalam
dudāttī svabhāvo ’yam anyathā nārtha-nīdhayē.
Ibid. II. 5. 25.
in a contrary direction is naturally annulled. It is only he who
thinks that destiny must lead him on, and consequently does not
strive properly to overcome the evil destiny, that becomes like an
animal at the mercy of destiny or God, which may take him to
heaven or to hell. The object of all endeavours and efforts in this
life is to destroy the power of the so-called destiny, or daiva, and
to exert oneself to his utmost to attain the supreme end of life.

The Yoga-vāsiṣṭha not only holds that pauruṣa can conquer and
annul daiva, but it even goes to the extreme of denying daiva and
calling it a mere fiction, that, properly speaking, does not exist at all.
Thus it is said that endeavours and efforts manifest themselves as
the movement of thought (samvit-spanda), the movement of manas
(manas-spanda), and the movement of the senses (aindrīya). Thought
movement is followed by movement of the psychosis or cetas;
the body moves accordingly, and there is also a corresponding
enjoyment or suffering. If this view is true, then daiva is never
seen anywhere. Properly speaking, there is no daiva, and wherever
any achievement is possible, it is always by continual strenuous effort
of will, standing on its own account, or exercised in accordance
with the śāstra or with the directions of a teacher\(^1\). It is for all
of us to exert ourselves for good and to withdraw our minds from
evil. By all the pramāṇas at our disposal it is found that nothing
but the firm exercise of will and effort achieves its end, and that
nothing is effected by pure daiva; it is only by the effort of eating
that there is the satisfaction of hunger, it is only by the effort of
the vocal organs that speech is effected, and it is only by the effort
of the legs and corresponding muscles that one can walk. So
everything is effected by personal efforts, when directed with the
aid of the śāstra and proper advisers or teachers. What passes as
daiva is a mere fiction; no one has ever experienced it, and it cannot
be used by any of the senses; and the nature of efforts being
essentially vibratory (spanda), one can never expect such move-
ment from the formless, insensible, so-called daiva, which is only
imagined and can never be proved. Visible efforts are all tangible
and open to immediate perception; and, even if it is admitted
that daiva exists, how can this supposed formless (amūrta) entity
come in contact with it? It is only fools who conceive the

\(^1\) śāstrato gurutai caiva svatai ceti tri-nidhayaḥ
sarevatra puruṣārthasya na daivasya hadācana.

Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, II. 7. 11.
existence of *daiva*, and depend on it, and are ruined, whereas those who are heroes, who are learned and wise, always attain their highest by their free-will and endeavour\(^1\).

Rāma points out to Vaśiṣṭha in II. 9 that *daiva* is fairly well accepted amongst all people, and asks how, if it did not exist, did it come to be accepted, and what does it mean after all? In answer to this Vaśiṣṭha says that, when any endeavour (*pauruṣa*) comes to fruition or is baffled, and a good or a bad result is gained, people speak of it as being *daiva*. There is no *daiva*, it is mere vacuity, and it can neither help nor obstruct anyone in any way. At the time of taking any step people have a particular idea, a particular resolution; there may be success or failure as the result of operation in a particular way, and the whole thing is referred to by ordinary people as being due to *daiva*, which is a mere name, a mere consolatory word. The instinctive root inclinations (*vāsanā*) of a prior state become transformed into *karma*. A man works in accordance with his *vāsanā* and by *vāsanā* gets what he wants. *Vāsanā* and *karma* are, therefore, more or less like the potential and actual states of the same entity. *Daiva* is but another name for the *karmas* performed with strong desire for fruit, *karma* thus being the same as *vāsanā*, and *vāsanā* being the same as *manas*, and *manas* being the same as the agent or the person (*puruṣa*); so *daiva* does not exist as an entity separate from the *puruṣa*, and they are all merely synonyms for the same indescribable entity (*durniścaya*). Whatever the *manas* strives to do is done by itself, which is the same as being done by *daiva*. There are always in *manas* two distinct groups of *vāsanās*, operating towards the good and towards the evil, and it is our clear duty to rouse the former against the latter, so that the latter may be overcome and dominated by the former. But, since man is by essence a free source of active energy, it is meaningless to say that he could be determined by anything but himself; if it is held that any other entity could determine him, the question arises, what other thing would determine that entity, and what else that entity, and there would thus be an endless vicious regression\(^2\). Man is thus a free source

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1. *mūḍhaiḥ prakalpitam daivaṁ tat-parāṁ te kṣayam gatāṁ prajñāṁ tu pauruṣārthena padam uttamatāṁ gatāṁ.*

2. *anyas tvāṁ cetayati cet taṁ cetayati ko ’parah ka imaṁ cetayet tasmād anavasthā na vāstavi.*

of activity, and that which appears to be limiting his activity is but one side of him, which he can overcome by rousing up his virtuous side. This view of puruṣa-kāra and karma seems to be rather unique in Indian literature.

Prāṇa and its Control.

The mind (citta), which naturally transforms itself into its states (vṛtti), does so for two reasons, which are said to be like its two seeds. One of these is the vibration (parispanda) of prāṇa, and the other, strong and deep-rooted desires and inclinations which construct (drśya-bhūvanā)\(^1\). When the prāṇa vibrates and is on the point of passing through the nerves (nādi-saṃsparśanodyata), then there appears the mind full of its thought processes (saṃveda-namaya). But when the prāṇa lies dormant in the hollow of the veins (śīrā-saraṇi-kotare), then there is no manifestation of mind, and its processes and the cognitive functions do not operate\(^2\). It is the vibration of the prāṇa (prāṇa-spanda) that manifests itself through the citta and causes the world-appearance out of nothing. The cessation of the vibration of prāṇa means cessation of all cognitive functions. As a result of the vibration of prāṇa, the cognitive function is set in motion like a top (vītā). As a top spins round in the yard when struck, so, roused by the vibration of prāṇa, knowledge is manifested; and in order to stop the course of knowledge, it is necessary that the cause of knowledge should be first attacked. When the citta remains awake to the inner sense, while shut to all extraneous cognitive activities, we have the highest state. For the cessation of citta the yogins control prāṇa through prānāyāma (breath-regulation) and meditation (dhyāna), in accordance with proper instructions\(^3\).

Again, there is a very intimate relation between vāsanā and prāṇa-spanda, such that vāsanā is created and stimulated into activity, prāṇa-spanda, and prāṇa-spanda is set in motion through vāsanā. When by strong ideation and without any proper deliberation of the past and the present, things are conceived to be one’s own—the body, the senses, the ego and the like—we have what is

\(^1\) Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, v. 91. 14.

\(^2\) I have translated śīrā as veins, though I am not properly authorized to do it. For the difference between veins and arteries does not seem to have been known.

\(^3\) Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, v. 91. 20–27.
called vāsanā. Those who have not the proper wisdom always believe in the representations of the ideations of vāsanā without any hesitation and consider them to be true; and, since both the vāsanā and the prāṇa-spanda are the ground and cause of the manifestations of citta, the cessation of one promptly leads to the cessation of the other. The two are connected with each other in the relation of seed and shoot (bijānkuravat); from prāṇa-spanda there is vāsanā, and from vāsanā there is prāṇa-spanda. The object of knowledge is inherent in the knowledge itself, and so with the cessation of knowledge the object of knowledge also ceases.

As a description of prāṇa we find in the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha that it is said to be vibratory activity (spanda-sakti) situated in the upper part of the body, while apāna is the vibratory activity in the lower part of the body. There is a natural prāṇāyāma going on in the body in waking states as well as in sleep. The mental outgoing tendency of the prāṇas from the cavity of the heart is called recaka, and the drawing in of the prāṇas (dvādaśāṅguli) by the apāna activity is called pūraka. The interval between the cessation of one effort of apāna and the rise of the effort of prāṇa is the stage of kumbhaka. Bhusunḍa, the venerable old crow who was enjoying an exceptionally long life, is supposed to instruct Vasiṣṭha in vi. 24 on the subject of prāṇa. He compares the body to a house with the ego (ahamkāra) as the householder. It is supposed to be supported by pillars of three kinds, provided with nine doors (seven apertures in the head and two below), tightly fitted with the tendons (snāyu) as fastening materials and cemented with blood, flesh and fat. On the two sides of it there are the two nādiṣis, idā and pingalā, lying passive and unmanifested (nimilite). There is also a machine (yantra) of bone and flesh (asti-māṇsa-maya) in the shape of three double lotuses (padma-yugma-traya) having pipes attached to them running both upwards and downwards and with their petals closing upon one another (anyonya-milat-komala-saddala). When it is slowly

1 samīlāṁ nakyatāḥ kṣipramḥ mūla-cchedād ita drūmaḥ. 
        saṃvidām viddhi saṃvedyaṁ bījaṁ dharataṁ vinā 
        na saṃbhavati saṃvedyaṁ tālāṁ hinas tilo yathā 
        na bahir nāntare kīmeit saṃvedyaṁ vidyate prthak.

Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, v. 91. 66 and 67.

2 tri-prakāra-mahā-sthūnam, vi. 24. 14. The commentator explains the three kinds of pillars as referring to the three primal entities of Indian medicine—vāyu (air), pitta (bile) and kapha (phlegm)—vāta-pitta-kapha-lakṣaṇa-tri-prakāra mahāntaṁ sthīnutā viśambha-kāśṭhāni yasya. I am myself inclined to take the three kinds of pillars as referring to the bony structure of three parts of the body—the skull, the trunk, and the legs.
filled with air, the petals move, and by the movement of the petals the air increases. Thus increased, the air, passing upwards and downwards through different places, is differently named as prāna, apāna, samāna, etc. It is in the threefold machinery of the lotus of the heart (ḥṛt-padma-yantra-tritaye) that all the prāna forces operate and spread forth upwards and downwards like the rays from the moon’s disc. They go out, return, repulse and draw and circulate. Located in the heart, the air is called prāna: it is through its power that there is the movement of the eyes, the operation of the tactual sense, breathing through the nose, digesting of food and the power of speech. The prāna current of air stands for exhalation (recaka) and the apāna for inhalation (pūraka), and the moment of respite between the two operations is called kumbhaka; consequently, if the prāna and apāna can be made to cease there is an unbroken continuity of kumbhaka. But all the functions of the prāna, as well as the upholding of the body, are ultimately due to the movement of citta. Though in its movement in the body the prāna is associated with air currents, still it is in reality nothing but the vibratory activity proceeding out of the thought-activity, and these two act and react upon each other, so that, if the vibratory activity of the body be made to cease, the thought-activity will automatically cease, and vice-versa. Thus through spanda-nirodha we have prāna-nirodha and through prāna-nirodha we have spanda-nirodha. In the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, III. 13. 31, vāyu is said to be nothing but a vibratory entity (spandate yat sa tad vāyuḥ).

In v. 78 it is said that citta and movement are in reality one and the same, and are therefore altogether inseparable, like the snow and its whiteness, and consequently with the destruction of one the other is also destroyed. There are two ways of destroying the citta, one by Yoga, consisting of the cessation of mental states, and the other by right knowledge. As water enters through the crevices of the earth, so air (vāta) moves in the body through the nādis and is called prāna. It is this prāna air which, on account of its diverse functions and works, is differently named as apāna, etc.

1 Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, vi. 24. It is curious to note in this connection that in the whole literature of the Āyur-veda there is probably no passage where there is such a clear description of the respiratory process. Pupphusa, or lungs, are mentioned only by name in Suiruṭa-saṃhitā, but none of their functions and modes of operation are at all mentioned. It is probable that the discovery of the respiratory functions of the lungs was made by a school of thought different from that of the medical school.

2 Ibid. vi. 25. 61–74.
But it is identical with *citta*. From the movement of *prāṇa* there is the movement of *citta*, and from that there is knowledge (*samvid*). As regards the control of the movement of *prāṇa*, the Yoga-*vāsiṣṭha* advises several alternatives. Thus it holds that through concentrating one’s mind on one subject, or through fixed habits of long inhalation associated with meditation, or through exhaustive exhalation, or the practice of not taking breath and maintaining *kumbhaka*, or through stopping the inner respiratory passage by attaching the tip of the tongue to the uvula, or, again, through concentration of the mind or thoughts on the point between the two brows, there dawns all of a sudden the right knowledge and the consequent cessation of *prāṇa* activities.

Professor Macdonell, writing on *prāṇa* in the *Vedic Index*, vol. II, says, “*prāṇa*, properly denoting ‘breath,’ is a term of wide and vague significance in Vedic literature.” In the narrow sense *prāṇa* denotes one of the vital airs, of which five are usually enumerated, viz. *prāṇa*, *apāṇa*, *vyāna*, *udāna* and *samāna*. The exact sense of each of these breaths, when all are mentioned, cannot be determined. The word *prāṇa* has sometimes merely the general sense of breath, even when opposed to *apāṇa*. But its proper sense is beyond question “breathing forth,” “expiration.” But, though in a few cases the word may have been used for “breath” in its remote sense, the general meaning of the word in the Upaniṣads is not air current, but some sort of biomotor force, energy or vitality often causing these air currents. It would be tedious to refer to the large number of relevant Upaniṣad texts and to try to ascertain after suitable discussion their exact significance in each

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2. It is important to notice in this connection that most of the forms of *prāṇa-yāma* as herein described, except the *haṭha-yoga* process of arresting the inner air passage by the tongue, otherwise known as *khecari-mūḍrā*, are the same as described in the *sūtras* of Patañjali and the *bhāṣya* of Vyāsa; and this fact has also been pointed out by the commentator Ānandabodhendhra Bhikṣu in his commentary on the above.

3. Difference between *prāṇa* and *vāyu*, *Aitareya*, II. 4; the *nāṣikya* *prāṇa*, I. 4. Relation of *prāṇa* to other functions, *Kauśitaki*, II. 5; *prāṇa* as life, II. 8; *prāṇa* connected with *vāyu*, II. 12; *prāṇa* as the most important function of life, II. 14; *prāṇa* as consciousness, III. 2. Distinction of *nāṣikya* and *mukhya* *prāṇa*, *Chāndogya*, II. 1–9; the function of the five *vāyus*, III. 3–5; *prāṇa* as the result of food, I. 8. 4; of water, VI. 5. 2, VI. 6. 5, VI. 7. 6; *prāṇa* connected with ātman, as everything else connected with *prāṇa*, like spokes of a wheel, *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka*, II. 5. 15; *prāṇa* as strength, *ibid.* v. 14. 4; *prāṇa* as force running through the *sūṣumṇa* nerve, *Maitri*, VI. 21; etc.
case. The best way to proceed therefore is to refer to the earliest traditional meaning of the word, as accepted by the highest Hindu authorities. I refer to the Vedānta-sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, which may be supposed to be the earliest research into the doctrines discussed in the Upaniṣads. Thus the Vedānta-sūtra, II. 4. 9 (na vāyu-kriye prthag upadesāt), speaking of what may be the nature of prāṇa, says that it is neither air current (vāyu) nor action (kriyā), since prāṇa has been considered as different from air and action (in the Upaniṣads). Śaṅkara, commenting on this, says that from such passages as yah prāṇah sa eṣa vāyuḥ paṇca 'vidhaḥ prāṇo pāṇo vyāna udāṇaḥ samānaḥ (what is prāṇa is vāyu and it is fivefold, prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna, samāna), it may be supposed that vāyu (air) is prāṇa, but it is not so, since in Chāndogya, III. 18. 4, it is stated that they are different. Again, it is not the action of the senses, as the Śāṅkhya supposes; for it is regarded as different from the senses in Mundaka, II. 1. 3. The passage which identifies vāyu with prāṇa is intended to prove that it is the nature of vāyu that has transformed itself into the entity known as prāṇa (just as the human body itself may be regarded as a modification or transformation of kṣiti, earth). It is not vāyu, but, as Vācaspati says, “vāyu-bhedā,” which Amalānanda explains in his Vedānta-kalpataru as vāyoḥ parināma-rūpa-kārya-viśeṣaḥ, i.e. it is a particular evolutionary product of the category of vāyu. Śaṅkara’s own statement is equally explicit on the point. He says, “vāyuḥ evāyaṁ adhyātmaṁ āpannāḥ paṇca-vyāho viśeṣātmanāvatiśthamānaḥ prāṇo nāma bhanyate na tatvāntaram näpi vāyu-mātram,” i.e. it is vāyu which, having transformed itself into the body, differentiates itself into a group of five that is called vāyu; prāṇa is not altogether a different category, nor simply air. In explaining the nature of prāṇa in II. 4. 10–12, Śaṅkara says that prāṇa is not as independent as jīva (soul), but performs everything on its behalf, like a prime minister (rāja-māntreṇa jīvasya sarvārtho-karanaṇvēṇa upakarana-bhūto na svatantrāḥ). Prāṇa is not an instrument like the senses, which operate only in relation to particular objects; for, as is said in Chāndogya, v. 1. 6, 7, Brhad-āranyaka, iv. 3. 12 and Brhad-āranyaka, i. 3. 19, when all the senses leave the body the prāṇa continues to operate. It is that by the functioning of which the existence of the soul in the body, or life (jīva-sthiti), and the passage of the jīva out of the body, or death (jīvotkṛṇiti), are possible. The five vāyus are the five functionings of this vital
principle, just as the fivefold mental states of right knowledge, illusion, imagination (vikalpa), sleep and memory are the different states of the mind. Vācaspati, in commenting on Vedānta-sūtra, II. 4. 11, says that it is the cause which upholds the body and the senses (dehendriya-vidhāraṇa-kāraṇam prāṇah), though it must be remembered that it has still other functions over and above the upholding of the body and the senses (na kevalam sarirendriya-

dhāraṇaṁ asya kāryam, Vācaspati, ibid.). In Vedānta-sūtra, II.
4. 13, it is described as being atomic (ānu), which is explained
by Śaṅkara as "subtle" (sūkṣma), on account of its pervading the
whole body by its fivefold functionings. Vācaspati in explaining it
says that it is called "atomic" only in a derivative figurative sense
(upacaryate) and only on account of its inaccessible or indefinable
character (duradhigamata), though pervading the whole body.
Govindānanda, in commenting upon Vedānta-sūtra, II. 4. 9, says
that prāṇa is a vibratory activity which upholds the process of
life and it has no other direct operation than that (parispanda-rupa-
prāṇanānukūlatvād avāntara-vyāpārabhāvāt). This seems to be
something like biomotor or life force. With reference to the
relation of prāṇa to the motor organs or faculties of speech, etc.,
Śaṅkara says that their vibratory activity is derived from prāṇa
(vāg-ādiṣu parispanda-labhasya prāṇāyattattvam, II. 4. 19). There are
some passages in the Vedānta-sūtra which may lead us to think
that the five vāyus may mean air currents, but that it is not so is
evident from the fact that the substance of the prāṇa is not air (etat
prāṇa-dī-paṅcakam ākāśādi-gata-rajo-'mṛṣeṣhymiltebhya utpadyate),
and the rajas element is said to be produced from the five bhūtas,
and the prāṇas are called kriyātmana, or consisting of activity.
Rāma Tirtha, commenting on the above passage of the Vedānta-
sūtra, says that it is an evolutionary product of the essence of vāyu
and the other bhūtas, but it is not in any sense the external air
which performs certain physiological functions in the body (tathā
mukhya-prāṇo 'pi vāyor bāhyasya sūtrātmakasya vikāro na sārira-
madhye nabhavad vṛtti-lābha-mātreṇa avasthitō bāhyas-vāyur eva)
1. Having proved that in Vedānta prāṇa or any of the five vāyus means
biomotor force and not air current, I propose now to turn to the
Śaṅkhya-Yoga.

The Śaṅkhya-Yoga differs from the Vedānta in rejecting the
view that the prāṇa is in any sense an evolutionary product of the

nature of vāyu. Thus Viśnunadhikṣu in his Viśnunāṁṛta-bhāṣya on Vedānta-sūtra, II. 4. 10, says that prāṇa is called vāyu because it is self-active like the latter (sva-tat kriyāvattvena ubhayoh prāṇa-vāyuvoh sājātyāt). Again, in II. 4. 9, he says that prāṇa is neither air nor the upward or downward air current (mukhyapraṇo na vāyuḥ nāpi sājātasya ārdh-ādho-vgamanalakṣaṇā vāyu-κriyā).

What is prāṇa, then, according to Śaṅkhya-Yoga? It is mahat-tattva, which is evolved from prakṛti, which is called buddhi with reference to its intellective power and prāṇa with reference to its power as activity. The so-called five vāyus are the different functionings of the mahat-tattva (sāmānyaka-śādhāraṇam yat kāraṇam mahat-tattvam tasyaiva vṛtti-bhedaḥ prāṇāpayādayah; see Viśnunāṁṛta-bhāṣya, II. 4. 11). Again, referring to Śaṅkhya-kārikā, 29, we find that the five vāyus are spoken of as the common functioning of buddhi, ahamkāra and manas, and Vācaspati says that the five vāyus are their life. This means that the three, buddhi, ahamkāra and manas, are each energizing, in their own way, and it is the joint operation of these energies that is called the fivefold prāṇa which upholds the body. Thus in this view also prāṇa is biomotor force and no air current. The special feature of this view is that this biomotor force is in essence a mental energy consisting of the specific functionings of buddhi, ahamkāra and manas.1 It is due to the evolutionary activity of antaḥkaraṇa. In support of this view the Śaṅkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya, II. 31, Vyūsa-bhāṣya, III. 39, Vācaspati’s Tattva-vaiśārādī, Bhikṣu’s Yoga-varttika, and Nāgēsa’s Chāyāvyākhya thereon may be referred to. It is true, no doubt, that sometimes inspiration and expiration of external air are also called prāṇa; but that is because in inspiration and expiration the function of prāṇa is active or it vibrates. It is thus the entity which moves and not mere motion that is called prāṇa.2 Rāmacanuja agrees with Śaṅkara in holding that prāṇa is not air (vāyu), but a transformation of the nature of air. But it should be noted that this modification of air is such a modification as can only be known by Yoga methods.3

The Vaiśeṣika, however, holds that it is the external air which

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1 Gauḍapāda’s bhāṣya on the Śaṅkhya-kārikā, 29 compares the action of prāṇa to the movement of birds enclosed in a cage which moves the cage: compare Śaṅkara’s reference to Vedānta-sūtra, II. 4. 9.
2 Rāmacanuja-bhāṣya on Vedānta-sūtra, II. 4. 8.
3 See the Tattva-muktā-kalāpa, 53–55, and also Rāmacanuja-bhāṣya and Śruta-prakāśikā, II. 4. 1–15.
according to its place in the body performs various physiological functions\(^1\). The medical authorities also support the view that \textit{vāyu} is a sort of driving and upholding power. Thus the \textit{Bhāva-prakāśa} describes \textit{vāyu} as follows: It takes quickly the \textit{doṣas}, \textit{dhātus} and the \textit{malas} from one place to another, is subtle, composed of \textit{rajo-guna}; is dry, cold, light and moving. By its movement it produces all energy, regulates inspiration and expiration and generates all movement and action, and by upholding the keenness of the senses and the \textit{dhātus} holds together the heat, senses and the mind\(^2\). Vāhaṭa in his \textit{Aṣṭāṅga-saṁgraha} also regards \textit{vāyu} as the one cause of all body movements, and there is nothing to suggest that he meant air currents\(^3\). The long description of Caraka (i. 12), as will be noticed in the next chapter, seems to suggest that he considered the \textit{vāyu} as the constructive and destructive force of the universe, and as fulfilling the same kinds of functions inside the body as well. It is not only a physical force regulating the physiological functions of the body, but is also the mover and controller of the mind in all its operations, as knowing, feeling and willing. Suśruta holds that it is in itself \textit{avyakta} (unmanifested or unknowable), and that only its actions as operating in the body are manifested (\textit{avyakta vyakta-karma ca}).

In the \textit{Yoga-vāsiṣṭha}, as we have already seen above, \textit{prāṇa} or \textit{vāyu} is defined as that entity which vibrates (\textit{spandate yat sa tad vāyuh}, III. 13) and it has no other reality than vibration. \textit{Prāṇa} itself is, again, nothing but the movement of the intellect as \textit{ahāmkāra}\(^4\).

\textit{Prāṇa} is essentially of the nature of vibration (\textit{spanda}), and mind is but a form of \textit{prāṇa} energy, and so by the control of the mind the five \textit{vāyus} are controlled\(^5\). The Śaiva authorities also agree with the view that \textit{prāṇa} is identical with cognitive activity, which passes through the \textit{nāḍis} (nerves) and maintains all the body movement and the movement of the senses. Thus Kṣemarāja says that it is the cognitive force which passes in the form of \textit{prāṇa} through the \textit{nāḍis}, and he refers to Bhaṭṭa Kallata as also holding the same view, and \textit{prāṇa} is definitely spoken of by him as force (\textit{kuṭila-vāhini prāṇa-saktih})\(^6\). Śivopādhyaya in his \textit{Viveśī} on the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{Nyāya-handal} of Śrīdhara, p. 48.
  \item \textit{Bhāva-prakāśa}, Sen’s edition, Calcutta, p. 47.
  \item Vāhaṭa’s \textit{Aṣṭāṅga-saṁgraha} and the commentary by Indu, Trichur, 1914, pp. 136, 212.
  \item \textit{Yoga-vāsiṣṭha}, III. 14.
  \item \textit{Śiva-sūtra-vimarlīnt}, III. 43, 44.
  \item \textit{Ibid.} v. 13, 78.
\end{itemize}
Vijñāna-bhairava also describes praṇa as force (śakti), and the Vijñāna-bhairava itself does the same. Bhaṭṭa Ānanda in his Vijñāna-kaumudi describes praṇa as a functioning of the mind (citta-vṛtti).

Stages of Progress.

It has been already said that the study of philosophy and association with saintly characters are the principal means with which a beginner has to set out on his toil for the attainment of salvation. In the first stage (prathamā bhūmikā) the enquirer has to increase his wisdom by study and association with saintly persons. The second stage is the stage of critical thinking (vicāraṇā); the third is that of the mental practice of dissociation from all passions, etc. (asaṅga-bhāvanā); the fourth stage (vīlāpani) is that in which through a right understanding of the nature of truth the world-appearance shows itself to be false; the fifth stage is that in which the saint is in a state of pure knowledge and bliss (suddha-saṃvīt-mayānanda-rūpa). This stage is that of the jīvan-muktā, in which the saint may be said to be half-asleep and half-awake (ardha-supta-prabuddha). The sixth stage is that in which the saint is in a state of pure bliss; it is a state which is more like that of deep dreamless sleep (suṣupta-sadṛśa-sthiti). The seventh stage is the last transcendental state (turyātita), which cannot be experienced by any saint while he is living. Of these the first three stages are called the waking state (jāgrat), the fourth stage is called the dream state (svāpna), the fifth stage is called the dreamless (suṣupta) state, the sixth stage is an unconscious state called the turya, and the seventh stage is called the turyātita².

Desire (icchā) is at the root of all our troubles. It is like a mad elephant rushing through our system and trying to destroy it. The senses are like its young, and the instinctive root inclinations (vāsanā) are like its flow of ichor. It can only be conquered by the close application of patience (dhairya). Desire means the imaginations of the mind, such as “let this happen to me,” and this is also called sankalpa. The proper way to stop this sort of imagining is to cease by sheer force of will from hoping or desiring in this manner, and for this one has to forget his memory; for

2. See the Nyāya-kandāl of Śrīdharma, p. 48, and also Dinakarī and Rāmarūdrī on the Siddhānta-muktāvalī on Bhāṣā-parichcheda, p. 44.
3. Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, vi. 120.
so long as memory continues such hopes and desires cannot be stopped. The last stage, when all movement has ceased (aspaṛa) and all thoughts and imaginations have ceased, is a state of unconsciousness (avedanam). Yoga is also defined as the ultimate state of unconsciousness (avedana), the eternal state when everything else has ceased. In this state cittā is destroyed, and one is reduced to the ultimate entity of consciousness; and thus, being free of all relations and differentiations of subject and object, one has no knowledge in this state, though it is characterized as bodhātmaka (identical with consciousness). This last state is indeed absolutely indescribable (avyapadesya), though it is variously described as the state of Brahman, Śiva, or the realization of the distinction of prakṛti and puruṣa. The Yoga-vāśiṣṭha, however, describes this state not as being essentially one of bliss, but as a state of unconsciousness unthinkable and indescribable. It is only the fifth state that manifests itself as being of the nature of ānanda; the sixth state is one of unconsciousness, which, it seems, can somehow be grasped; but the seventh is absolutely transcendental and indescribable.

The division of the progressive process into seven stages naturally reminds one of the seven stages of prajña (wisdom) in Patañjali’s Yoga-sūtra and Vyāsa-bhāṣya. The seven stages of prajña are there divided into two parts, the first containing four and the second three. Of these the four are psychological and the three are ontological, showing the stages of the disintegration of cittā before its final destruction or cittā-vimukti. Here also the first four stages, ending with vilāpaṇi, are psychological, whereas the last three stages represent the advance of the evolution of cittā towards its final disruption. But, apart from this, it does not seem that there is any one to one correspondence of the prajña states of the Yoga-vāśiṣṭha with those of Patañjali. The Yoga-vāśiṣṭha occasionally mentions the name Yoga as denoting the highest state and defines it as the ultimate state of unconsciousness (avedanam vidur yogam) or as the cessation of the poisonous effects of desire.

In the first half of the sixth book, chapter 125, the ultimate state is described as the state of universal negation (sarvacatpahavacca). Existence of cittā is pain, and its destruction bliss; the destruction

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1 Yoga-vāśiṣṭha, vi. 126.  2 Ibid. vi. 126. 99.  3 Ibid. vi. 126. 71-72.  4 See my A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. i, Cambridge, 1922, p. 273.  5 Tcha-viṣṭa-vikāraṣya viyogam yoga-nāmakam. Yoga-vāśiṣṭha, vi. 37. 1; also ibid. vi. 126. 99.
of citta by cessation of knowledge—a state of neither pain nor pleasure nor any intermediate state—a state as feelingless as that of the stone (pāśānavat-samam), is the ultimate state aimed at.\(^1\)

Karma, according to the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, is nothing but thought-activity manifesting itself as subject-object knowledge. Abandonment of karma therefore means nothing short of abandonment of thought-activity or the process of knowledge.\(^2\) Cessation of karma thus means the annihilation of knowledge. The stirring of karma or activity of thought is without any cause; but it is due to this activity that the ego and all other objects of thought come into being; the goal of all our endeavours should be the destruction of all knowledge, the unconscious, stone-like knowledgeless state.\(^3\)

As there are seven progressive stages, so there are also seven kinds of beings according to the weakness or strength of their vāsanās. There are svapna-jāgara, sankalpa-jāgara, kevala-jāgrat-sthita, cirāj-jāgrat-sthita, ghana-jāgrat-sthita, jāgrat-vaṃpa and kṣīna-jāgaraka. Svapna-jāgara (dream-awake) persons are those who in some past state of existence realized in dream experience all our present states of being and worked as dream persons (svapna-nara). The commentator in trying to explain this says that it is not impossible; for everything is present everywhere in the spirit, so it is possible that we, as dream persons of their dream experience, should be present in their minds in their vāsanā forms (tad-antah-karane vāsanātmanā sthitāḥ).\(^4\) As both past and present have no existence except in thought, time is in thought reversible, so that our existence at a time future to theirs does not necessarily prevent their having an experience of us in dreams. For the limitations of time and space do not hold for thought, and as elements in thought everything exists everywhere (sarvam sarvatram vidyate)\(^5\). By dreams these persons may experience changes of life and even attain to final emancipation. The second class, the sankalpa-jāgaras, are those who without sleeping can by mere imagination continue to conceive all sorts of activities and existences, and may ultimately attain emancipation. The third class, the kevala-jāgaras, are those who are born in this life for the first time. When such beings pass

\(^1\) This turīyāttita stage should not be confused with the sixth stage of suṣupti, which is often described as a stage of pure bliss.

\(^2\) sarveṣāṁ karmanāṁ evaṁ vedanaṁ bijam uttānam svārāpan cetayitvāntas tataḥ spandah pravartate.

\(^3\) Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, vi. 11 2 26.

\(^4\) Ibid. iii. 15. 16.

\(^5\) Ibid. vi. 2. 50. 9. Tatparya-prakāśa.

\(^8\) Ibid.
through more than one life, they are called cira-jāgaras. Such beings, on account of their sins, may be born as trees, etc., in which case they are called ghanā-jāgaras. Those of such beings suffering rebirth who by study and good association attain right knowledge are called jāgrat-swapna-sthita; and finally, those that have reached the turya state of deliverance are called kṣīna-jāgaraka.

Bondage (bandha), according to the Yoga-vāśiṣṭha, remains so long as our knowledge has an object associated with it, and deliverance (mokṣa) is realized when knowledge is absolutely and ultimately dissociated from all objects and remains in its transcendent purity, having neither an object nor a subject1.

Methods of Right Conduct.

The Yoga-vāśiṣṭha does not enjoin severe asceticism or the ordinary kinds of religious gifts, ablutions or the like for the realization of our highest ends, which can only be achieved by the control of attachment (rāga), antipathy (dvesa), ignorance (tamaḥ), anger (krodha), pride (mada), and jealousy (mātsarya), followed by the right apprehension of the nature of reality2. So long as the mind is not chastened by the clearing out of all evil passions, the performance of religious observances leads only to pride and vanity and does not produce any good. The essential duty of an enquirer consists in energetic exertion for the achievement of the highest end, for which he must read the right sort of scriptures (sac-chāstra) and associate with good men3. He should somehow continue his living and abandon even the slightest desire of enjoyment (bhogagandham parityajet), and should continue critical thinking (vicāra). On the question whether knowledge or work, jñāna or karma, is to be accepted for the achievement of the highest end, the Yoga-vāśiṣṭha does not, like Śaṅkara, think that the two cannot jointly be taken up, but on the contrary emphatically says that, just as

1 jñānasya jñeyatāpattir bandha ity abhidhāyate
tasyai ca jñeyatā-lañntir mokṣa ity abhidhāyate.

2 sva-pauruṣa-prayatnena vivekena vihātinā
sa devo jñāyate rāma na tapaḥ-smāna-karmabhīḥ.

3 Good men are defined in the Yoga-vāśiṣṭha as follows:
deśe yam nujana-prāyā lokāh sādhun pracaḥgate
sa viśiṣṭaḥ sa sādhvat syāt tām prayatnena samārayet.

Ibid. III. 6. 9.

Ibid. III. 6. 20.
a bird flies with its two wings, so an enquirer can reach his goal through the joint operation of knowledge and work\(^1\).

The main object of the enquirer being the destruction of citta, all his endeavours should be directed towards the uprooting of instinctive root inclinations (vāsanā), which are the very substance and root of the citta. The realization of the truth (tattejñāna), the destruction of the vāsanās and the destruction of the citta all mean the same identical state and are interdependent on one another, so that none of them can be attained without the other. So, abandoning the desire for enjoyment, one has to try for these three together; and for this one has to control one’s desires on one hand and practise breath-control (prāṇa-nirodhena) on the other; and these two would thus jointly co-operate steadily towards the final goal. Such an advancement is naturally slow, but this progress, provided it is steady, is to be preferred to any violent efforts to hasten (hathā) the result\(^2\). Great stress is also laid on the necessity of self-criticism as a means of loosening the bonds of desire and the false illusions of world-appearance and realizing the dissociation from attachment (asaṅga)\(^3\).

\[ \text{Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, Śaṅkara Vedānta and Buddhist Vijñānavāda.} \]

To a superficial reader the idealism of the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha may appear to be identical with the Vedānta as interpreted by Śaṅkara; and in some of the later Vedānta works of the Śaṅkara school, such as the jīvan-mukti-viveka, etc., so large a number of questions dealt with in the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha occur that one does not readily imagine that there may be any difference between this idealism and that of Śaṅkara. This point therefore needs some discussion.

The main features of Śaṅkara’s idealism consist in the doctrine that the self-manifested subject-objectless Intelligence forms the ultimate and unchangeable substance of both the mind (antahkarāṇa) and the external world. Whatever there is of change and mutation is outside of this Intelligence, which is also the Reality. But, nevertheless, changes are found associated with this reality or Brahman, such as the external forms of objects and the diverse mental states. These are mutable and have therefore a different kind of indescribable existence from Brahman; but still they are

\(^1\) Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, 1. 1. 7, 8.  
\(^2\) Ibid. v. 92.  
\(^3\) Ibid. v. 93.
somehow essentially of a positive nature. Śaṅkara's idealism does not allow him to deny the existence of external objects as apart from perceiving minds, and he does not adhere to the doctrine of esse est percipi. Thus he severely criticizes the views of the Buddhist idealists, who refuse to believe in the existence of external objects as apart from the thoughts which seem to represent them. Some of these arguments are of great philosophical interest and remind one of similar arguments put forth by a contemporary British Neo-realist in refutation of Idealism.

The Buddhists there are made to argue as follows: When two entities are invariably perceived simultaneously they are identical; now knowledge and its objects are perceived simultaneously; therefore the objects are identical with their percepts. Our ideas have nothing in the external world to which they correspond, and their existence during dreams, when the sense-organs are universally agreed to be inoperative, shows that for the appearance of ideas the operation of the sense-organs, indispensable for establishing connection with the so-called external world, is unnecessary. If it is asked how, if there are no external objects, can the diversity of percepts be explained, the answer is that such diversity may be due to the force of vāsanās or the special capacity of the particular moment associated with the cognition. If the so-called external objects are said to possess different special capacities which would account for the diversity of percepts, the successive moments of the mental order may also be considered as possessing special distinctive capacities which would account for the diversity of percepts generated by those cognition moments. In dreams it is these diverse cognition moments which produce diversity of percepts.

Śaṅkara, in relating the above argument of the Buddhist idealist, says that external objects are directly perceived in all our perceptions, and how then can they be denied? In answer to this, if it is held that there is no object for the percepts excepting the sensations, or that the existence of anything consists in its being perceived, that can be refuted by pointing to the fact that the independent existence of the objects of perception, as apart from their being perceived, can be known from the perception itself, since the

1 See the account of Śaṅkara Vedānta in my A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I., Cambridge, 1922, chapter x.

perceiving of an object is not the object itself; it is always felt that the perception of the blue is different from the blue which is perceived; the blue stands forth as the object of perception and the two can never be identical. This is universally felt and acknowledged, and the Buddhist idealist, even while trying to refute it, admits it in a way, since he says that what is inner perception appears as if it exists outside of us, externally. If externality as such never existed, how could there be an appearance of it in consciousness? When all experiences testify to this difference between knowledge and its object, the inner mental world of thoughts and ideas and the external world of objects, how can such a difference be denied? You may see a jug or remember it: the mental operation in these two cases varies, but the object remains the same.

The above argument of Śaṅkara against Buddhist idealism conclusively proves that he admitted the independent existence of objects, which did not owe their existence to anybody's knowing them. External objects had an existence different from and independent of the existence of the diversity of our ideas or percepts.

But the idealism of the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha is more like the doctrine of the Buddhist idealists than the idealism of Śaṅkara. For according to the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha it is only ideas that have some sort of existence. Apart from ideas or percepts there is no physical or external world having a separate or independent existence. Esse est percipi is the doctrine of the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, while Śaṅkara most emphatically refutes such a doctrine. A later exposition of Vedānta by Prakāśānanda, known as Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvali, seems to derive its inspiration from the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha in its exposition of Vedānta on lines similar to the idealism of the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, by denying the existence of objects not perceived (ajñāta-sattvānabhyutagama). Prakāśānanda disputes the ordinarily accepted view that cognition of objects arises out of the contact of senses with objects; for objects for him exist only so long as they are perceived, i.e. there is no independent external existence of objects apart from their perception. All objects have only perceptual existence (prātiṣṭhā-sattva). Both Prakāśānanda and the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha deny the existence of objects when they are not perceived, while Śaṅkara not only admits their existence, but also holds that they exist in the same form in which they are known; and this amounts virtually to the admission that our knowing an object does not add

1 Śaṅkara's bhāṣya on the Brahma-sūtra, ii. 2. 28.
anything to it or modify it to any extent, except that it becomes known to us through knowledge. Things are what they are, even though they may not be perceived. This is in a way realism. The idealism of Śaṅkara's Vedānta consists in this, that he held that the Brahman is the immanent self within us, which transcends all changeful experience and is also ultimate reality underlying all objects perceived outside of us in the external world. Whatever forms and characters there are in our experience, internal as well as external, have an indescribable and indefinite nature which passes by the name of māyā¹. Śaṅkara Vedānta takes it for granted that that alone is real which is unchangeable; what is changeful, though it is positive, is therefore unreal. The world is only unreal in that special sense; māyā belongs to a category different from affirmation and negation, namely the category of the indefinite.

The relation of the real, the Brahman, to this māyā in Śaṅkara Vedānta is therefore as indefinite as the māyā; the real is the unchangeable, but how the changeful forms and characters become associated with it or what is their origin or what is their essence, Śaṅkara is not in a position to tell us. The *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* however holds that formless and characterless entity is the ultimate truth; it is said to be the Brahman, *cit*, or void (śūnya); but, whatever it may be, it is this characterless entity which is the ultimate truth. This ultimate entity is associated with an energy of movement, by virtue of which it can reveal all the diverse forms of appearances. The relation between the appearances and the reality is not external, indefinite and indescribable, as it is to Śaṅkara, but the appearances, which are but the unreal and illusory manifestations of the reality, are produced by the operation of this inner activity of the characterless spirit, which is in itself nothing but a subject-objectless pure consciousness. But this inner and immanent movement does not seem to have any dialectic of its own, and no definite formula of the method of its operation for its productions can be given; the imaginary shapes of ideas and objects, which have nothing but a mere perceptual existence, are due not to a definite order, but to accident or chance (kākatāltya). Such a conception is indeed very barren, and it is here that the system of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* is particularly defective. Another important defect of the system is that it does not either criticize knowledge or admit its validity, and the characterless entity which forms its absolute is never revealed in experience.

¹ See my *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 1, ch. x.
With Śaṅkara the case is different; for he holds that this absolute Brahman is also the self which is present in every experience and is immediate and self-revealed. But the absolute of the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha is characterless and beyond experience. The state of final emancipation, the seventh stage, is not a stage of bliss, like the Brahmahood of the Vedānta, but a state of characterlessness and vacuity almost. In several places in the work it is said that this ultimate state is differently described by various systems as Brahman, distinction of prakṛti and puruṣa, pure vijñāna and void (śūnya), while in truth it is nothing but a characterless entity. Its state of mukti (emancipation) is therefore described, as we have already seen above, as pāśāñavat or like a stone, which strongly reminds us of the Vaiśeṣika view of mukti. On the practical side it lays great stress on pauruṣa, or exertion of free-will and energy, it emphatically denies daiva as having the power of weakening pauruṣa or even exerting a superior dominating force, and it gives us a new view of karma as meaning only thought-activity. As against Śaṅkara, it holds that knowledge (jñāna) and karma may be combined together, and that they are not for two different classes of people, but are both indispensable for each and every right-minded enquirer. The principal practical means for the achievement of the highest end of the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha are the study of philosophical scripture, association with good men and self-criticism. It denounces external religious observances without the right spiritual exertions as being worse than useless. Its doctrine of esse est percipi and that no experiences have any objective validity outside of themselves, that there are no external objects to which they correspond and that all are but forms of knowledge, reminds us very strongly of what this system owes to Vijñānavāda Buddhism. But, while an important Vijñānavāda work like the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra tries to explain through its various categories the origin of the various appearances in knowledge, no such attempt is made in the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, where it is left to chance. It is curious that in the Sanskrit account of Vijñānavāda by Hindu writers, such as Vācaspati and others, these important contributions of the system are never referred to either for the descriptive interpretation of the system or for its refutation. While there are thus unmistakable influences of Vijñānavāda and Gaudapāda on the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, it seems to have developed in close association with the Śaiva, as its doctrine of spanda, or immanent activity, so clearly shows. This point will, however, be more fully discussed in my treatment of Śaiva philosophy.
CHAPTER XIII
SPECULATIONS IN THE MEDICAL SCHOOLS

It may be urged that the speculations of the thinkers of the medical schools do not deserve to be recorded in a History of Indian Philosophy. But the force of such an objection will lose much in strength if it is remembered that medicine was the most important of all the physical sciences which were cultivated in ancient India, was directly and intimately connected with the Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika physics and was probably the origin of the logical speculations subsequently codified in the Nyāya-sūtras. The literature contains, moreover, many other interesting ethical instructions and reveals a view of life which differs considerably from that found in works on philosophy; further, it treats of many other interesting details which throw a flood of light on the scholastic methods of Indian thinkers. Those, again, who are aware of the great importance of Hatha Yoga or Tantra physiology or anatomy in relation to some of the Yoga practices of those schools will no doubt be interested to know for purposes of comparison or contrast the speculations of the medical schools on kindred points of interest. Their speculations regarding embryology, heredity and other such points of general enquiry are likely to prove interesting even to a student of pure philosophy.

Āyur-veda and the Atharva-Veda.

Suśruta says that Āyur-veda (the science of life) is an upāṅga of the Atharva-Veda and originally consisted of 100,000 verses in one thousand chapters and was composed by Brahmā before he created all beings (Suśruta-samhitā, 1. 1. 5). What upāṅga exactly means in this connection cannot easily be satisfactorily explained. Ṛalhaṇa (A.D. 1100) in explaining the word in his Nibandha-saṅgraha, says that an upāṅga is a smaller āṅga (part)—“āṅgam eva alpatvād upāṅgam.” Thus, while hands and legs are regarded as āṅgas, the toes or the palms of the hands are called upāṅga. The Atharva-Veda contains six thousand verses and about

1 The system of Sāṃkhya philosophy taught in Caraka-samhitā, iv. 1, has already been described in the first volume of the present work, pp. 213–217.
one thousand prose lines. If the Āyur-veda originally contained 100,000 verses, it cannot be called an upāṅga of the Atharva-Veda, if upāṅga is to mean a small appendage, as Ḍaḻhaṇa explains it. For, far from being a small appendage, it was more than ten times as extensive as the Atharva-Veda. Caraka, in discussing the nature of Āyur-veda, says that there was never a time when life did not exist or when intelligent people did not exist, and so there were always plenty of people who knew about life, and there were always medicines which acted on the human body according to the principles which we find enumerated in the Āyur-veda. Āyur-veda was not produced at any time out of nothing, but there was always a continuity of the science of life; when we hear of its being produced, it can only be with reference to a beginning of the comprehension of its principles by some original thinker or the initiation of a new course of instruction at the hands of a gifted teacher. The science of life has always been in existence, and there have always been people who understood it in their own way; it is only with reference to its first systematized comprehension or instruction that it may be said to have a beginning. Again, Caraka distinguishes Āyur-veda as a distinct Veda, which is superior to the other Vedas because it gives us life, which is the basis of all other enjoymnts or benefits, whether they be of this world or of another. Vāgbhaṇa, the elder, speaks of Āyur-veda not as an upāṅga, but as an upaveda of the Atharva-Veda. The Mahā-bhārata, II. 11. 33, speaks of upaveda, and Nilakanṭha, explaining this, says that there are four upavedas, Āyur-veda, Dhanur-veda, Gāṇḍharva and Artha-sāstra. Brahma-vaivarta, a later purāṇa, says that after creating the Rk, Yajus, Sāma and Atharva Brahmā created the Āyur-veda as the fifth Veda. Roth has a quotation in his Wörterbuch to the effect that Brahmā taught Āyur-veda, which was a vedāṅga, in all its eight parts.

1 Caraka, 1. 30. 24. This passage seems to be at variance with Caraka, 1. 1. 6; for it supposes that diseases also existed always, while Caraka, 1. 1. 6 supposes that diseases broke out at a certain point of time. Is it an addition by the reviser Drīḍhabala?
2 Caraka, 1. 1. 42 and Āyur-veda-dīpikā of Cakrapāṇi on it.
3 Āstāṅga-samgraha, 1. 1. 8. Gopāla-Brahmaṇa, 1. 10, however, mentions five vedas, viz. Sarpa-veda, Piśāca-veda, Asura-veda, Ithiḥaṣa-veda and Purāṇa-veda, probably in the sense of upāveda, but Āyur-veda is not mentioned in this connection.
4 Brahma-vaivarta-purāṇa, 1. 16. 9, 10.
5 Brahmā vedāṅgam aṣṭāṅgam āyur-vedam abhāṣata. This quotation, which occurs in the Wörterbuch in connection with the word āyur-veda, could not
We thus find that Āyu-r-veda was regarded by some as a Veda superior to the other Vedas and respected by their followers as a fifth Veda, as an upaveda of the Atharva- Veda, as an independent upaveda, as an upāṇga of the Atharva- Veda and lastly as a vedāṅga. All that can be understood from these conflicting references is that it was traditionally believed that there was a Veda known as Āyu-r-veda which was almost co-existent with the other Vedas, was entitled to great respect, and was associated with the Atharva- Veda in a special way. It seems, however, that the nature of this association consisted in the fact that both of them dealt with the curing of diseases and the attainment of long life; the one principally by incantations and charms, and the other by medicines. What Suśruta understands by calling Āyu-r-veda an upāṇga of the Atharva- Veda is probably nothing more than this. Both the Atharva- Veda and Āyu-r-veda dealt with the curing of diseases, and this generally linked them together in the popular mind, and, the former being the holier of the two, on account of its religious value, the latter was associated with it as its literary accessory. Dārila Bhaṭṭa, in commenting upon Kauśīka- sūtra, 25. 2, gives us a hint as to what may have been the points of contact and of difference between Āyu-r-veda and the Atharva- Veda. Thus he says that there are two kinds of diseases; those that are produced by unwholesome diet, and those produced by sins and transgressions. The Āyu-r-veda was made for curing the former, and the Atharvān practices for the latter. Caraka himself counts penance (prāyaś-citta) as a name of medicine (bheṣaja) and Cakrapāṇi, in commenting on this, says that as prāyaś-citta removes the diseases produced by sins, so medicines (bheṣaja) also remove diseases, and thus prāyaś-citta is synonymous with bheṣaja.

But what is this Āyu-r-veda? We now possess only the treatises of Caraka and Suśruta, as modified and supplemented by later revisers. But Suśruta tells us that Brahma had originally produced the Āyu-r-veda, which contained 100,000 verses spread over one thousand chapters, and then, finding the people weak in intelligence and short-lived, later on divided it into eight subjects, be verified owing to some omission in the reference. It should be noted that vedāṅga is generally used to mean the six aṅgas, viz. Śikṣā, Kalpa, Vyākaraṇa, Chandas, Jyotiṣ and Nirukta.

1 dvi-prakārā vyādhyāyaḥ aḥāra-nimitā aśubhamimittā ti ceti; tatra aḥāra- samutthānām vaśajmya ayurvedaḥ caḥāra adharma-samutthānāṁ tu śāstramidam ucyate. Dārilā’s comment on Kauśīka-sūtra, 25. 2.

2 Caraka, vi. 1. 3 and Ayur-veda-dīpikā, ibid.
Speculations in the Medical Schools

viz. surgery (śalya), treatment of diseases of the head (śālākya), treatment of ordinary diseases (kāya-cikitsā), the processes of counteracting the influences of evil spirits (bhūta-vidyā), treatment of child diseases (kaumāra-bhrtya), antidotes to poisons (agadatantra), the science of rejuvenating the body (rasāyana) and the science of acquiring sex-strength (vājikaraṇa). The statement of Suṣruta that Āyur-veda was originally a great work in which the later subdivisions of its eight different kinds of studies were not differentiated seems to be fairly trustworthy. The fact that Āyurveda is called an upānga, an upaveda, or a vedānga also points to its existence in some state during the period when the Vedic literature was being composed. We hear of compendiums of medicine as early as the Prātiśākhyas. It is curious, however, that nowhere in the Upaniṣads or the Vedas does the name “Āyur-veda” occur, though different branches of study are mentioned in the former. The Aṣṭāṅga Āyur-veda is, however, mentioned in the Mahā-bhārata, and the three constituents (dhātu), vāyu (wind), pitta (bile) and ślesman (mucus), are also mentioned; there is reference to a theory that by these three the body is sustained and that by their decay the body decays (etaiḥ kṣiṇaiḥ ca kṣiyate), and Krṣṇātreyya is alluded to as being the founder of medical science (cikitsītam). One of the earliest systematic mentions of medicines unmixed with incantations and charms is to be found in the Mahā-vagga of the Vinaya-Piṭaka, where the Buddha is prescribing medicines for his disciples. These medicines are of a simple nature, but they bear undeniable marks of methodical arrangement. We are also told there of a surgeon, named Ākāśagototto, who made surgical operations (satthakamma) on fistula (bhagandara). In Rockhill’s Life of the Buddha we hear of Jivaka as having studied medicine in the Taxila Univer-

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1 Suṣruta-saṃhitā, 1. 1. 5–9.
2 R.V. Prātiśākhyā, 16. 54 (55), mentioned by Bloomfield in The Atharvaveda and Gopatha-Brāhmaṇa, p. 10. The name of the medical work mentioned is Subheṣaja.
3 Ṛg-vedāṃ bhagavo ‘dhyemi Yajur-vedāṃ sāma-vedāṃ ārharvaṇai caturthaṁ itihāsa-puṣaṇa pañcamaṇaṇaṁ vedānaye pañcamaṇaṇaṁ vedānaye pitṛyāṁ rāśiṁ daivaṁ nāḥiṁ vāko-vākyam eva saṁhāraṁ brahma-vidyāṁ bhūta-vidyāṁ kṣatra-vidyāṁ naksatra-vidyāṁ sarpa-deva-jana-vidyāṁ, Chāndogya, vii. 1. 2. Of these bhūta-vidyā is counted as one of the eight tantras of Āyur-veda, as we find it in the Suṣruta-saṃhitā or elsewhere.
4 Mahā-bhārata, xi. 11. 25, xii. 342. 86, 87, xii. 210. 21. Krṣṇātreyya is referred to in Caraka-saṃhitā, vi. 15. 129, and Cakrapāṇi, commenting on this, says that Krṣṇātreyya and Ātreyya are two authorities who are different from Ātreyya Panarvasu, the great teacher of the Caraka-saṃhitā.
5 Vinaya-Piṭaka, Mahā-vagga, vi. 1–14.
sity under Ātreya. That even at the time of the Atharva-Veda there were hundreds of physicians and an elaborate pharmacopoeia, treating diseases with drugs, is indicated by a mantra therein which extols the virtues of amulets, and speaks of their powers as being equal to thousands of medicines employed by thousands of medical practitioners. Thus it can hardly be denied that the practice of medicine was in full swing even at the time of the Atharva-Veda; and, though we have no other proofs in support of the view that there existed a literature on the treatment of diseases, known by the name of Ayur-veda, in which the different branches, which developed in later times, were all in an undifferentiated condition, yet we have no evidence which can lead us to disbelieve Suśruta, when he alludes definitely to such a literature. The Caraka-samhitā also alludes to the existence of a beginningless traditional continuity of Ayur-veda, under which term he includes life, the constancy of the qualities of medical herbs, diet, etc., and their effects on the human body and the intelligent enquirer. The early works that are now available to us, viz. the Caraka-samhitā and Suśruta-samhitā, are both known as tantras. Even Agniveṣa’s work (Agniveṣa-samhitā), which Caraka revised and which was available at the time of Cakrpati, was a tantra. What then was the Ayurveda, which has been variously described as a fifth Veda or an upaveda, if not a literature distinctly separate from the tantras now available to us? It seems probable, therefore, that such a literature existed, that the systematized works of Agniveṣa and others superseded it and that, as a consequence, it came ultimately to be lost. Caraka, however, uses the word “Ayur-veda” in the general sense of “science of life.” Life is divided by Caraka into four kinds, viz. sukhā (happy), duḥkhā (unhappy), hita (good) and ahita (bad). Sukham āyuh is a life which is not affected by bodily or mental diseases, is endowed with vigour, strength, energy, vitality, activity and is full of all sorts of enjoyments and successes. The opposite of this is the asukham āyuh. Hitam āyuh is the life of a person who is always willing to do good to all beings, never steals others’ property, is truthful, self-controlled, self-restrained and works

1 Rockhill’s Life of the Buddha, p. 65.
2 Atharva-veda, ii. 9. 3, iṣṭam hy aṣya bhīṣajaḥ sahaṇam uta vṛudhaḥ.
3 Gure-ājñā-labhāñantaraiṁ etat-tantra-karaṇam. Cakrpati’s Ayur-veda-dīpikā, i. 1. 1; also Caraka-samhitā, i. 1. 52.
4 Cakrpati quotes the Agniveṣa-samhitā in his Ayur-veda-dīpikā, vi. 3. 177-185.
with careful consideration, does not transgress the moral injunctions, takes to virtue and to enjoyment with equal zeal, honours revered persons, is charitable and does what is beneficial to this world and to the other. The opposite of this is called *ahita*. The object of the science of life is to teach what is conducive to all these four kinds of life and also to determine the length of such a life\(^1\).

But, if *Āyur-veda* means "science of life," what is its connection with the *Athravā-Veda*? We find in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* that a physician should particularly be attached (*bhaktir ādeśyā*) to the *Athravā-Veda*. The *Athravā-Veda* deals with the treatment of diseases (*cikitsā*) by advising the propitiatory rites (*svastyayana*), offerings (*bali*), auspicious oblations (*maṅgala-homa*), penances (*niyama*), purificatory rites (*prāyaś-citta*), fasting (*upavāsa*) and incantations (*mantra*). Cakrapāṇi, in commenting on this, says that, since it is advised that physicians should be attached to the *Athravā-Veda*, it comes to this, that the *Athravā-Veda* becomes *Āyur-veda* (*Athravā-vedasya āyurvedatvam uktaṁ bhavati*). The *Athravā-Veda*, no doubt, deals with different kinds of subjects, and so *Āyur-veda* is to be considered as being only a part of the *Athravā-Veda* (*Athravā-vedaikadesa eva āyur-vedah*). Viewed in the light of Cakrapāṇi's interpretation, it seems that the school of medical teaching to which Caraka belonged was most intimately connected with the *Athravā-Veda*. This is further corroborated by a comparison of the system of bones found in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* with that of the *Athravā-Veda*. Suśruta himself remarks that, while he considers the number of bones in the human body to be three hundred, the adherents of the Vedas hold them to be three hundred and sixty; and this is exactly the number counted by Caraka\(^2\). The *Athravā-Veda* does not count the bones; but there are with regard to the description of bones some very important points in

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1 *Caraka*, I. 1. 40 and I. 30. 20-23:

hitāhitam sukham dukkham āyus tasya hitāhitam
mānam ca tāc ca yatroktam āyur-vedah sa ucyate.

In I. 30. 20 the derivation of *Āyur-veda* is given as *āyur vedayati iti āyur-vedah*, i.e. that which instructs us about life. Suśruta suggests two alternative derivations—*āyur asmin vidyate anena vā āyur vindattty āyur-vedah*, i.e. that by which life is known or examined, or that by which life is attained. *Suśruta-saṃhitā*, I. 1. 14.

2 *Caraka*, I. 30. 20.

which the school to which Caraka belonged was in agreement with the Atharva-Veda, and not with Susruta. Dr Hoernle, who has carefully discussed the whole question, thus remarks: "A really important circumstance is that the Atharvic system shares with the Charakiyan one of the most striking points in which the latter differs from the system of Susruta, namely, the assumption of a central facial bone in the structure of the skull. It may be added that the Atharvic term pratiṣṭhā for the base of the long bones obviously agrees with the Charakiyan term adhiṣṭhāna and widely differs from the Susrutiyan kūrca." The Satapatha-brāhmaṇa, which, as Dr Hoernle has pointed out, shows an acquaintance with both the schools to which Caraka and Susruta respectively belonged, counts, however, 260 bones, as Caraka did². The word veda-vādino in Susruta-samhitā, III. 5. 18 does not mean the followers of Āyur-veda as distinguished from the Vedas, as Dalhana interprets it, but is literally true in the sense that it gives us the view which is shared by Caraka with the Atharva-Veda, the Satapatha-brāhmaṇa, the legal literature and the purāṇas, which according to all orthodox estimates derive their validity from the Vedas. If this agreement of the Vedic ideas with those of the Ātreya school of medicine, as represented by Caraka, be viewed together with the identification by the latter of Āyur-Veda with Atharva-Veda, it may be not unreasonable to suppose that the Ātreya school, as represented by Caraka, developed from the Atharva-Veda. This does not preclude the possibility of there being an Āyur-veda of another school, to which Susruta refers and from which, through the teachings of a series of teachers, the Susruta-samhitā developed. This literature probably tried to win the respect of the people by associating itself with the Atharva-Veda, and by characterizing itself as an upāṅga of the Atharva-Veda³.

Jayanta argues that the validity of the Vedas depends on the fact that they have been composed by an absolutely trustworthy

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¹ A. F. Rudolf Hoernle's Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India, p. 113.
² Ibid. pp. 105–106. See also Satapatha-brāhmaṇa, X. 5. 4. 12, also XII. 3. 2. 3 and 4, XII. 2. 4. 9–14, VIII. 6. 2. 7 and 10. The Yajñavalkya-Dharma-śāstra, Viṣṇu-sūrti, Viṣṇu-dharmottara and Agni-Purāṇa also enumerate the bones of the human body in agreement with Caraka as 360. The source of the last three was probably the first (Yajñavalkya-Dharma-śāstra), as has been suggested by Dr Hoernle in his Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India, pp. 40–46. But none of these non-medical recensions are of an early date: probably they are not earlier than the third or the fourth century C.E.
³ The word upāṅga may have been used, however, in the sense that it was a supplementary work having the same scope as the Atharva-Veda.
person (āpta). As an analogy he refers to Āyur-veda, the validity of which is due to the fact that it has been composed by trustworthy persons (āpta). That the medical instructions of the Āyur-veda are regarded as valid is due to the fact that they are the instructions of trustworthy persons (yato yatāptavādatram tatram prāmāṇyam iti vyāpī prakhyate). But it may be argued that the validity of Āyur-veda is not because it has for its author trustworthy persons, but because its instructions can be verified by experience (nānava-yur-vedādu prāmāṇyaṃ pratyaksādi-samvādāt pratipannam nāpta-prāmāṇyaḥ). Jayanta in reply says that the validity of Āyur-veda is due to the fact of its being composed by trustworthy persons; and it can be also verified by experience. He argues also that the very large number of medicines, their combinations and applications, are of such an infinite variety that it would be absolutely impossible for any one man to know them by employing the experimental methods of agreement and difference. It is only because the medical authorities are almost omniscient in their knowledge of things that they can display such superhuman knowledge regarding diseases and their cures, which can be taken only on trust on their authority. His attempts at refuting the view that medical discoveries may have been carried on by the applications of the experimental methods of agreement and difference and then accumulated through long ages are very weak and need not be considered here.

The fourth Veda, known as the Atharva-Veda or the Brāhma-Veda, deals mainly with curatives and charms. There is no reason to suppose that the composition of this Veda was later than even the earliest Rg-Vedic hymns; for never, probably, in the history

1 Some of the sacred texts speak of four Vedas and some of three Vedas, e.g. "arya mahato bhūtasya mihīvaistam etad rg-vedovajur-vedah sāma-vedo 'tharvāngirasah," Brh. 11. 4. 10 speaks of four Vedas; again "Yam ṛjāyas traya-vido viduh ṛcah sāmāni yajyāni," Taṭṭṭāṭṭya-brāhmaṇa, 1. 11. 1. 26 speaks of three Vedas. Sāyaṇa refers to the Mīmāṁsā-sūtra, 11. 1. 37 "śeṣe Yajuḥ-sabdah" and says that all the other Vedas which are neither Ṛk nor Sāma are Yajus (Sāyaṇa's Upodghāta to the Atharva-Veda, p. 4, Bombay edition, 1895). According to this interpretation the Atharva-Veda is entitled to be included within Yajus, and this explains the references to the three Vedas. The Atharva-Veda is referred to in the Gopatha-Brāhmaṇa, 11. 16 as Brahma-Veda, and two different reasons are adduced. Firstly, it is said that the Atharva-Veda was produced by the ascetic penances of Brahmā; secondly it is suggested in the Gopatha-Brāhmaṇa that all Atharvānic hymns are curative (bhēṣaja), and whatever is curative is immortal, and whatever is immortal is Brahmā—"Ye tharvaṇas tad bhēṣajam, yad bhēṣajam tad amṛtam, yad amṛtam tad Brahma." Gopatha-brāhmaṇa, III. 4. See also Nyāya-mañjari, pp. 250–261.
of India was there any time when people did not take to charms and incantations for curing diseases or repelling calamities and injuring enemies. The Rg-Veda itself may be regarded in a large measure as a special development of such magic rites. The hold of the Atharvanic charms on the mind of the people was probably very strong, since they had occasion to use them in all their daily concerns. Even now, when the Rg-Vedic sacrifices have become extremely rare, the use of Atharvanic charms and of their descendants, the Tantric charms of comparatively later times, is very common amongst all classes of Hindus. A very large part of the income of the priestly class is derived from the performance of auspicious rites (svāstīyāyana), purificatory penances (prāyāstcittā), and oblations (homa) for curing chronic and serious illnesses, winning a law-suit, alleviating sufferings, securing a male issue to the family, cursing an enemy, and the like. Amulets are used almost as freely as they were three or four thousand years ago, and snake-charms and charms for dog-bite and others are still things which the medical people find it difficult to combat. Faith in the mysterious powers of occult rites and charms forms an essential feature of the popular Hindu mind and it oftentimes takes the place of religion in the ordinary Hindu household. It may therefore be presumed that a good number of Atharvanic hymns were current when most of the Rg-Vedic hymns were not yet composed. By the time, however, that the Atharva-Veda was compiled in its present form some new hymns were incorporated with it, the philosophic character of which does not tally with the outlook of the majority of the hymns. The Atharva-Veda, as Sāyaṇa points out in the introduction to his commentary, was indispensable to kings for warding off their enemies and securing many other advantages, and the royal priests had to be versed in the Atharvanic practices. These practices were mostly for the alleviation of the troubles of an ordinary householder, and accordingly the Gṛhya-sūtras draw largely from them. The oldest name of the Atharva-Veda is Atharvāṅgirasah, and this generally suggested a twofold division of it into hymns attributed to Atharvan and others attributed to Āṅgiras; the former dealt with the holy (śānta), promoting of welfare (pauṣṭika) and the curatives (bheṣajāṇi), and the latter with offensive rites for molesting an enemy (ābhi-cārika), also called terrible (ghora). The purposes which the Atharvanic charms were supposed to fulfil were numerous. These may
be briefly summed up in accordance with the Kauśika-sūtra as follows: quickening of intelligence, accomplishment of the virtues of a Brahmacārin (religious student); acquisition of villages, cities, fortresses and kingdoms, of cattle, riches, food grains, children, wives, elephants, horses, chariots, etc.; production of unanimity (aikamatyā) and contentment among the people; frightening the elephants of enemies, winning a battle, warding off all kinds of weapons, stupefying, frightening and ruining the enemy army, encouraging and protecting one’s own army, knowing the future result of a battle, winning the minds of generals and chief persons, throwing a charmed snare, sword, or string into the fields where the enemy army may be moving, ascending a chariot for winning a battle, charming all instruments of war music, killing enemies, winning back a lost city demolished by the enemy; performing the coronation ceremony, expiating sins, cursing, strengthening cows, procuring prosperity; amulets for promoting welfare, agriculture, the conditions of bulls, bringing about various household properties, making a new-built house auspicious, letting loose a bull (as a part of the general rites—śrāddha), performing the rites of the harvesting month of Agrahāyana (the middle of November to the middle of December); securing curatives for various otherwise incurable diseases produced by the sins of past life; curing all diseases generally, Fever, Cholera, and Diabetes; stopping the flow of blood from wounds caused by injuries from weapons, preventing epileptic fits and possession by the different species of evil spirits, such as the bhūta, piśāca, Brahma-rākṣasa, etc.; curing vāta, pitta and śleṣman, heart diseases, Jaundice, white leprosy, different kinds of Fever, Pthisis, Dropped; curing worms in cows and horses, providing antidotes against all kinds of poisons, supplying curatives for the diseases of the head, eyes, nose, ears, tongue, neck and inflammation of the neck; warding off the evil effects of a Brahmin’s curse; arranging women’s rites for securing sons, securing easy delivery and the welfare of the foetus; securing prosperity, appeasing a king’s anger, knowledge of future success or failure; stopping too much rain and thunder, winning in debates and stopping brawls, making rivers flow according to one’s wish, securing rain, winning in gambling, securing the welfare of cattle and horses, securing large gains in trade, stopping inauspicious marks in women, performing auspicious rites for a new house, removing the sins of prohibited
acceptance of gifts and prohibited priestly services; preventing bad dreams, removing the evil effects of unlucky stars under whose influence an infant may have been born, paying off debts, removing the evils of bad omens, molesting an enemy; counteracting the molesting influence of the charms of an enemy, performing auspicious rites, securing long life, performing the ceremonies at birth, naming, tonsure, the wearing of holy thread, marriage, etc.; performing funer al rites, warding off calamities due to the disturbance of nature, such as rain of dust, blood, etc., the appearance of yakṣas, rākṣasas, etc., earthquakes, the appearance of comets, and eclipses of the sun and moon.

The above long list of advantages which can be secured by the performance of Atharvānic rites gives us a picture of the time when these Atharvānic charms were used. Whether all these functions were discovered when first the Atharvānic verses were composed is more than can be definitely ascertained. At present the evidence we possess is limited to that supplied by the Kauṣīka-sūtra. According to the Indian tradition accepted by Śāyaṇa the compilation of the Atharva-Veda was current in nine different collections, the readings of which differed more or less from one another. These different recensions, or śākhās, were Paiippalāda, Tāṇḍa, Maṇḍa, Śaunakīya, Jājala, Jalada, Brāhmaṇa, Devādāsa, and Cāraṇa-vaidya. Of these only the Paiippalāda and Śaunakīya recensions are available. The Paiippalāda recension exists only in a single unpublished Tübingen manuscript first discovered by Roth. It has been edited in facsimile and partly also in print. The Śaunakīya recension is what is now available in print. The Śaunakīya school has the Gopatha-brāhmaṇa as its Brāhmaṇa and five sūtra works, viz. Kauṣīka, Vaitāna, Naksatra-kalpa, Āṅgirasa-kalpa and Śānti-kalpa; these are also known as the five kalpas (pañca-kalpa). Of these the Kauṣīka-sūtra is probably the earliest and most important, since all the other four depend upon it. The Naksatra-kalpa and Śānti-kalpa are more or less of an astrological character. No manuscript of the Āṅgirasa-kalpa seems to be available; but from the brief notice of Śāyaṇa it appears to

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1 Der Atharvaaveda in Kashmir by Roth.
2 The Kauṣīka-sūtra is also known as Saṃhitā-vidhī and Saṃhitā-kalpa. The three kalpas, Naksatra, Āṅgirasa and Śānti, are actually Pārśītās.
3 "tatra Śākalyena saṃhitā-mantrāṇāṃ sāntika-paustikādiṣu karanau vinīyogavidhānāt saṃhitā-vidhīr nūma Kauṣīkam śūtraṃ; tad eva itarair upajjyatyāt. Upodhghāta of Śāyaṇa to the Atharva-Veda, p. 25."
have been a manual for molesting one's enemies (abhicāra-karma). The Vaitāṇa-sūtra dealt with some sacrificial and ritualistic details. The Kauśika-sūtra was commented on by Dārila, Keśava, Bhadra and Rudra. The existence of the Cārāṇa-vaidya (wandering medical practitioners) sākhā reveals to us the particular sākhā of the Atharva-Veda, which probably formed the old Ayur-veda of the Ātreya-Caraka school, who identified the Atharva-Veda with Ayur-veda. The suggestion, contained in the word Cārāṇa-vaidya, that the medical practitioners of those days went about from place to place, and that the sufferers on hearing of the arrival of such persons approached them, and sought their help, is interesting\textsuperscript{1}.

Bones in the Atharva-Veda and Ayur-veda.

The main interest of the present chapter is in that part of the Atharva-Veda which deals with curative instructions, and for this the Kauśika-sūtra has to be taken as the principal guide. Let us first start with the anatomical features of the Atharva-Veda\textsuperscript{2}. The bones counted are as follows: 1. heels (pāṛṣṇi, in the dual number, in the two feet)\textsuperscript{3}; 2. ankle-bones (gulphau in the dual number)\textsuperscript{4};

\textsuperscript{1} Is it likely that the word Caraka (literally, a wanderer) had anything to do with the itinerant character of Caraka's profession as a medical practitioner?
\textsuperscript{2} Hymns ii. 33 and x. 2 are particularly important in this connection.
\textsuperscript{3} Caraka also counts one pāṛṣṇi for each foot. Hoernle (Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India, p. 128) remarks on the fact, that Caraka means the backward and downward projections of the os calcis, that is, that portion of it which can be superficially seen and felt, and is popularly known as the heel. The same may be the case with the Atharva-Veda. Suśruta probably knew the real nature of it as a cluster (kūrca); for in Sārira-sthāna vii he speaks of the astragalus as kūrca-sūras, or head of the cluster, but he counts the pāṛṣṇi separately. Hoernle suggests that by pāṛṣṇi Suśruta meant the os calcis, and probably did not think that it was a member of the tarsal cluster (kūrca). It is curious that Vāgīśaṇa I makes a strange confusion by attributing one pāṛṣṇi to each hand (Aṣṭāṅga-saṃgraha, ii. 5; also Hoernle, pp. 91–96).
\textsuperscript{4} Gulpha means the distal processes of the two bones of the leg, known as the malleoli. As counted by Caraka and also by Suśruta, there are four gulphas. See Hoernle's comment on Suśruta's division, Hoernle, pp. 81, 82, 102–104. Suśruta, iii. v. 19, has "tala-kūrca-gulpha-saṃśritam daśa," which Dalhaṇa explains as tala (5 silākās and the one bone to which they are attached)—6 bones, kūrca—2 bones, gulpha—2 bones. Hoernle misinterpreted Dalhaṇa, and, supposing that he spoke of two kūrca and two gulphas in the same leg, pointed out a number of inconsistencies and suggested a different reading of the Suśruta text. His translation of valaya as "ornament" in this connection is also hardly correct; valaya probably means "circular." Following Dalhaṇa, it is possible that the interpretation is that there are two bones in one cluster (kūrca) in each leg, and the two bones form one circular bone (valayāsthi) of one gulpha for each leg. If this is accepted, much of what Hoernle has said on the point loses its value and becomes hypercritical. There are two gulphas, one in each leg, according as the constituent pieces, or the one whole valayāsthi, is referred to. On my interpretation Suśruta...
3. digits (angulayah in the plural number); 4. metacarpal and metatarsal bones (ucchlanakau in the dual number, i.e. of the hands and feet); 5. base (pratiṣṭhāḥ); 6. the knee-caps (aṣṭhvanta in the dual); 7. the knee-joints (jānumoh sandhīḥ); 8. the shanks (janghe in the dual); 9. the pelvic cavity (t Curso in the dual); 10. the thigh bones (ūru in the dual); 11. the breast bones knew of only two bones as forming the kārcā, and there is no passage in Suśruta to show that he knew of more. The os calcis would be the pāṛṣaṇi, the astragalus, the kārcā-sīras, the two malleoli bones and the two gupha bones.

Both Caraka and Suśruta count sixty of these phalanges (pāṇi-pāda-anguli), whereas their actual number is fifty-six only.

Caraka counts these metacarpal and metatarsal bones (pāṇi-pāda-salākā) as twenty, the actual number. Suśruta collects them under tala, a special term used by him. His combined tala-kārcā-gulpha includes all the bones of the hand and foot excluding the anguli bones (phalanges).

Caraka uses the term pāṇi-pāda-salākādhīṣṭhāna, Yaśānavalkya, sthāna, and Suśruta, kārcā. Caraka seems to count it as one bone. Kārcā means a network of (1) flesh (māṃsā), (2) sīra, (3) snāyu, (4) bones (māṃsā-sīra-sīroya-astiṣṭhī-fālān). All these four kinds of network exist in the two joints of the hands and feet.

Hoernle remarks that in the Atharva-Veda aṣṭhvataḥ and jānu are synonymous; but the text, x. 2. 2, seems clearly to enumerate them separately. The aṣṭhvata is probably the patella bone. Caraka uses the terms jānu and kapaliśā, probably for the knee-caps (patella) and the elbow pan (kapaliśā). Kapaliśā means a small shallow basin, and this analogy suits the construction of the elbow pan. Suśruta uses the term kūropath (elbow pan), not in the ordinary list of bones in Sārīra, v. 19, but at the time of counting the marma in ibid. vi. 25.

This seems to be different from aṣṭhvata (patella).

The tibia and the fibula in the leg. Caraka, Bheda, Suśruta and Vāgbhaṭa I describe this organ rightly as consisting of two bones. The Atharva-Veda justly describes the figure made by them as being a fourfold frame having its ends closely connected together (catuṣṭhyam yuyyate samhitāntam). The corresponding two bones of the fore-arm (aratmi)—radius and ulna—are correctly counted by Caraka. Curiously enough, Suśruta does not refer to them in the bone-list. The bāhu is not enumerated in this connection.

Caraka speaks of two bones in the pelvic cavity, viz. the os innominatum on both sides. Modern anatomists think that each os innominatum is composed of three different bones: ilium, the upper portion, ischium, the lower part, and the pubis, the portion joined to the other innominate bone. The ilium and ischium, however, though they are two bones in the body of an infant, become fused together as one bone in adult life, and from this point of view the counting of ilium and ischium as one bone is justifiable. In addition to these a separate bhagāsthi is counted by Caraka. He probably considered (as Hoernle suggests) the sacrum and coccyx to be one bone which formed a part of the vertebral column. By bhagāsthi he probably meant the pubic bone; for Cakrapāṇī, commenting upon bhagāsthi, describes it as "abhinukham katिः sandhāna-kārakam tiryag-asthi" (the cross bone which binds together the haunch bones in front). Suśruta, however, counts five bones: four in the guda, bhaga, nitamba and one in the trika. Nitamba corresponds to the two tīrona-phālaka of Caraka, bhaga to the bhagāsthi, or pubic bone, guda to the coccyx and trika to the triangular bone sacrum. Suśruta’s main difference from Caraka is this, that, while the latter counts the sacrum and coccyx as one bone forming part of the vertebral column, the former considers them as two bones and as separate from the vertebral column. Vāgbhaṭa takes trika and guda as one bone, but separates it from the vertebral column.

Caraka, Suśruta and Vāgbhaṭa I count it correctly as one bone in each leg. Caraka calls it āru-nalaka.
Speculations in the Medical Schools

12. the windpipe (gṛcāh in the plural); 13. the breast (stanau in the dual); 14. the shoulder-blade (kaphodau in the dual); 15. the shoulder-bones (skandhān in the plural); 16. the backbone (prṣṭiḥ)

1 Caraka counts fourteen bones in the breast. Indian anatomists counted cartilages as new bones (taruṇa asthi). There are altogether ten costal cartilages on either side of the sternum. But the eighth, ninth and tenth cartilages are attached to the seventh. So, if the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth cartilages are considered as a single bone, there are altogether seven bones on either side of the sternum. This gives us the total number of fourteen which Caraka counts. The sternum was not counted by Caraka separately. With him this was the result of the continuation of the costal cartilages attached to one another without a break. Suśruta and Vyāghaṭa I curiously count eight bones in the breast, and this can hardly be accounted for. Hoernle's fancied restoration of the ten of Suśruta does not appear to be proved. Yājñavalkya, however, counts seventeen, i.e. adds the sternum and the eighth costal cartilage on either side to Caraka's fourteen bones, which included these three. Hoernle supposes that Yājñavalkya's number was the real reading in Suśruta; but his argument is hardly convincing.

2 The windpipe is composed of four parts, viz. larynx, trachea, and two bronchi. It is again not a bone, but a cartilage; but it is yet counted as a bone by the Indian anatomists, e.g. Caraka calls it "jatu" and Suśruta "kantha-nāḍī." Hoernle has successfully shown that the word jatu was used in medical books as synonymous with windpipe or neck generally. Hoernle says that originally the word denoted cartilaginous portions of the neck and breast (the windpipe and the costal cartilages), as we read in the Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa: "tasmā imā ubhayaatra pariavo baddhāḥ khasāṃ ca jatraṃ" (the ribs are fastened at either end, exteriorly to the thoracic vertebrae and interiorly to the costal cartilages—jatu). In medical works it means the cartilaginous portion of the neck, i.e. the windpipe (Caraka), and hence is applied either to the neck generally or to the sterno-clavicular articulation at the base of the neck (Suśruta). It is only as late as the sixth or seventh century A.D. that, owing to a misinterpretation of the anatomical terms sandhi and aṁsa, it was made to mean clavicle. See Hoernle's Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India, p. 168.

3 "Pārīcayo catur-vimśatīḥ pārīcayo tāvanti caiva sthālakāmā tāvanti caiva sthālakārābudāmī," i.e. there are twenty-four bones in the pārīca (ribs), twenty-four sthālakas (sockets), and twenty-four sthālakahārudas (tubercles). Suśruta speaks of there being thirty-six ribs on either side. A rib consists of a shaft and a head; "at the point of junction of these two parts there is a tubercle which articulates with the transverse process of corresponding vertebrae, and probably this tubercle is arbudā." There are, no doubt, twenty-four ribs. The sthālakas and arbudas cannot properly be counted as separate bones; but, even if they are counted, the total number ought to be 68 bones, as Hoernle points out, and not 72, since the two lowest have no tubercles.

4 Kaphoda probably means scapula or shoulder-blade. Caraka uses the word aṁsa-phalaḥ. Caraka uses two other terms, aṁsaka (collar-bone) and aṁsa. This word aṁsa seems to be a wrong reading, as Hoernle points out; for in reality there are only two bones, the scapula and the collar-bone. But could it not mean the acromion process of the scapula? Though Suśruta omits the shoulder-blade in the counting of bones in Śānaka, v. (for this term is aṁsaka-samīṇe), yet he distinctly names aṁsa-phalaḥ in Śānaka, vi. 27, and describes it as triangular (triḥ-sambaddhe); and this term has been erroneously interpreted as gṛcāh aṁsa-dvayasya ca yaḥ saṁyojas sa trikāḥ by Daḥana. The junction of the collar-bone with the neck cannot be called trika.

5 Caraka counts fifteen bones in the neck. According to modern anatomists there are, however, only seven. He probably counted the transverse processes
in the plural); 17. the collar-bones (amsau in the dual); 18. the brow (lalāta); 19. the central facial bone (kakāṭhā); 20. the pile of the jaw (hanu-citya); 21. the cranium with temples (kapālam).

and got the number fourteen, to which he added the vertebrae as constituting one single bone.

Susūrata counts nine bones. The seventh bone contains spinous and transverse processes and was probably therefore counted by him as three bones, which, together with the other six, made the total number nine.

Caraka counts forty-three bones in the vertebral column (prsthā-gatāsthi), while the actual number is only twenty-six. Each bone consists of four parts, viz. the body, the spinous process, and the two transverse processes, and Caraka counts them all as four bones. Susūrata considers the body and the spinous process as one and the two transverse processes as two; thus for the four bones of Caraka, Susūrata has three. In Caraka the body and the spinous process of the twelve thoracic vertebrae make the number twenty-four; the five lumbar vertebrae (body + spine + two transverses) make twenty. He adds to this the sacrum and the coccyx as one pelvic bone, thus making the number forty-five; with Susūrata we have twelve thoracic vertebrae, twelve lumbar vertebrae, twelve transverses, i.e. thirty bones. The word kikasa (A.V. ii. 33. 2) means the whole of the spinal column, anukya (A.V. ii. 33. 2) means the thoracic portion of the spine, and udara the abdominal portion.

Both Caraka and Susūrata call this aksaka and count it correctly as two bones. Cakrapāni describes it as "aksā-vivakṣākah jatru-sandheḥ kkalakau" (they are called aksaka because they are like two beams—the fastening-pegts of the junction of the neck-bones).

Susūrata further speaks of amla-pitha (the glenoid cavity into which the head of the humerus is inserted) as a samudga (casket) bone. The joint of each of the anal bones, the pubic bone and the hip bone (nimba) is also described by him as a samudga. This is the "acetabulum, or cotyloid cavity, in which the head of the femur, is lodged" (Susūrata, Sūtra, v. 27, amla-pitha-guda-bhaga-nimba-samudgā).

Lalāta is probably the two superciliary ridges at the eye-brow and kakāṭhā the lower portion, comprising the body of the superior maxillary together with the molar and nasal bones. Caraka counts the two molars (ganyā-kūpā), the two nasal, and the two superciliary ridges at the eye-brows as forming one continuous bone (ekaṭṣṭhi nāṭhā-ganyā-kūṭa-lalāṭa).

According to Caraka, the lower jaw only is counted as a separate bone (ekam hanu-asthi), and the two attachments are counted as two bones (dvē hanu-mula-bandihane). Susūrata, however, counts the upper and the lower jaws as two bones (hanvor dvē). Though actually each of these bones consists of two bones, they are so fused together that they may be considered as one, as was done by Susūrata. Caraka did not count the upper jaw, so he counted the sockets of the teeth (dantolūkhala) and the hard palate (taluṣaka). Susūrata's counting of the upper hanu did not include the palatine process; so he also counts the tālu (ekam tālum).

Śankha is the term denoting the temples, of which both Caraka and Susūrata count two. Caraka counts four cranial bones (catavāri śirah-kapālān) and Susūrata six (śirasāḥ sat). The brain-case consists of eight bones. Of these two are inside and hence not open to view from outside. So there are only six bones which are externally visible. Of these the temporal bones have already been counted as śankha, thus leaving a remainder of four bones. Susūrata divides the frontal, parietal and occipital bones into two halves and considers them as separate bones, and he thus gets the number six. Both the frontal and occipital are really each composed of two bones, which become fused in later life.

Though the author has often differed from Dr Hoernle, yet he is highly indebted to his scholarly explanations and criticisms in writing out this particular section of this chapter.
Organs in the Atharva-Veda and Āyur-veda.

We have no proofs through which we could assert that the writer of the *Atharva-Veda* verse knew the number of the different bones to which he refers; but it does not seem possible that the references made to bones could have been possible without a careful study of the human skeleton. Whether this was done by some crude forms of dissection or by a study of the skeletons of dead bodies in a state of decay is more than can be decided. Many of the organs are also mentioned, such as the heart (*ḥṛdaya*), the lungs (*kloma*)\(^1\), the gall-bladder (*halikṣṇa*)\(^2\), the kidneys (*matsnābhyaṁ*)\(^3\), the liver (*yakna*), the spleen (*plīhan*), the stomach and the smaller intestine (*antrebhyāḥ*), the rectum and the portion above it (*gudābhyaḥ*), the

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1 Caraka counts *kloma* as an organ near the heart, but he does not count *punphusa*. In another place (Cīhīta, xvii. 34) he speaks of *kloma* as one of the organs connected with hiccough (*ḥṛdayaṁ kloma ṭaṅṭhaṁ ca taṅṭhaṁ ca samāśritā myēś tā ṭaṅṭra-hīktēti ṭṛṇāṁ sādhyāḥ prakārtitaḥ*). Cakrapāṇi describes it as *pīpāsā-sthāna* (seat of thirst). But, whatever that may be, since Caraka considers its importance in connection with hiccough, and, since he does not mention *punphusa* (lungs—*Mahā-tyoutpati*, 100), *kloma* must mean with him the one organ of the two lungs. Suśruta speaks of *punphusa* as being on the left side and *kloma* as being on the right. Since the two lungs vary in size, it is quite possible that Suśruta called the left lung *punphusa* and the right one *kloma*. Vāgbhaṭa I follows Suśruta. The *Atharva-Veda*, Caraka, Suśruta, Vāgbhaṭa, and other authorities use the word in the singular, but in *Byad-āranyaka*, 1, the word *kloma* is used in the plural number; and Sāṅkara, in commenting on this, says that, though it is one organ, it is always used in the plural (*niya-bahu-va-canānta*). This, however, is evidently erroneous, as all the authorities use the word in the singular. His description of it as being located on the left of the heart (*yakṣa ca klomānaḥ ca ṭaṅṭhaṁ yadadāhastād adhiṣṭattara māṁsa-kaṇḍaḥ*, Br. i. 1, commentary of Sāṅkara) is against the verdict of Suśruta, who places it on the same side of the heart as the liver. The *Bhāva-prāhāśa* describes it as the root of the veins, where water is born or secreted. That *kloma* was an organ which formed a member of the system of respiratory organs is further proved by its being often associated with the other organs of the neighbourhood, such as the throat (*kaṇṭha*) and the root of the palate (*tālu-mūla*). Thus Caraka says, "*udaka-vahānāṁ rtaṭaṁ tālu-mūlaṁ kloma ca... jīhvā-tālu-oṣṭha-kaṇṭha-kloma-soṣam... dṛṣṭaṁ*" (*Vimāna*, v. 10). Śāṅgadāraka, i. v. 45, however, describes it as a gland of watery secretions near the liver (*jala-vāhā-śīrā-mūlaṁ trṣṇā-chūdanakaṁ tilam*).

2 This word does not occur in the medical literature. Sāyaṇa describes it as "*etat-saṁjñākāt tat-saṁbandhāt māṁsa-piṇḍa-veṣṣita*." This, however, is quite useless for identification. Weber thinks that it may mean "gall" (*Indische Studien*, 13, 206). Macdonell considers it to be "some particular intestine" (*Vedic Index*, vol. ii, p. 500).

3 Sāyaṇa paraphrases *matsnābhyaṁ* as *vṛkyābhyaṁ*. Caraka's reading is *vuhka*. Sāyaṇa gives an alternative explanation: "*matsnābhyaṁ ubhaya-pārītha-saṁbandhābhyaṁ vṛkyābhyaṁ tat-saṁpa-stha-pitā-kāraḥ pātraḥbhyaṁ*."]* If this explanation is accepted, then *matsnā* would mean the two sacs of *piṭṭa* (bile) near the kidneys. The two *matsnā* in this explanation would probably be the gall bladder and the pancreas, which latter, on account of its secretions, was probably considered as another *pittākhara*.}
larger intestine (vaniśthu, explained by Sāyaṇa as sthavirāṇtra), the abdomen (udara), the colon (plāśi), the umbilicus (nābhi), the marrow (majābbhyāḥ), the veins (sāvabhhyāḥ) and the arteries (dhamaniṇbhīyāḥ). Thus we see that almost all the important organs reported in the later Ātreya-Caraka school or the Suśruta school were known to the composers of the Atharvānic hymns.

Bolling raises the point whether the Atharva-Veda people knew the difference between the śirā and the dhamani, and says, "The apparent distinction between veins and arteries in i. 17. 3 is offset by the occurrence of the same words in vii. 35. 2 with the more general sense of 'internal canals' meaning entrails, vagina, etc.—showing how vague were the ideas held with regard to such subjects." But this is not correct; for there is nothing in i. 17. 3 which suggests a knowledge of the distinction between veins and arteries in the modern sense of the terms, such as is not found in vii. 35. 2. The sūkta i. 17 is a charm for stopping the flow of blood from an injury or too much hemorrhage of women. A handful of street-dust was to be thrown on the injured part and the hymn was to be uttered. In i. 17. 1 it is said, "Those hirās (veins?) wearing red garment (or the receptacles of blood) of woman which are constantly flowing should remain dispirited, like daughters without a brother." Sāyaṇa, in explaining the next verse, i. 17. 2, says that it is a prayer to dhamani. This verse runs as follows: "Thou (Sāyaṇa says 'thou śirā') of the lower part, remain (i.e. 'cease from letting out blood,' as Sāyaṇa says), so thou of the upper part remain, so thou of the middle part, so thou

1 Plāśi is paraphrased by Sāyaṇa as "bahu-chhidrān mala-pātrāt" (the vessel of the excreta with many holes). These holes are probably the orifices of the glands inside the colon (mala-pātra). The Satapatha-brāhmaṇa, xii. 9. 1. 3 enumerates all these organs as being sacred to certain gods and sacrificial instruments—hrdayam evāyāindrayaś purodāśah, yakṛt sāvitraḥ, kloām vārūṇaḥ, matene evāyāīcatthāṁ ca pātram aidedumbaram ca pītam nāyagrodham antraṅgī sthālyah gudā upālayāni śyena-pātre pthāsāndī nābhiḥ humbho vanīṣṭhūḥ plāśiḥ ṣatāśtyā no tad yat sa bahudhā vrīṇā bhavatī tasmāt plāśiḥ bahudhā vikṛtyāḥ. Vasti, or bladder, is regarded as the place where the urine collects (A.V. i. 3. 6).

2 Sāyaṇa says that bhaṅga means here the smaller śirās and dhamani the thicker ones (the arteries)—sāhīsmāḥ śirāḥ bhaṅga-sabdena ucyante dhamani-sabdena sthāloḥ (A.V. ii. 33).

3 A.V. x. 9 shows that probably dissection of animals was also practised. Most of the organs of a cow are mentioned. Along with the organs of human beings mentioned above two other organs are mentioned, viz. the pericardium (purattat) and the bronchial tubes (saha-kaṇṭhikā). A.V. x. 9. 15.

4 Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, "Diseases and medicine: Vedic.

5 Sāyaṇa paraphrases hirā as śirā and describes it as a canal (nāḍi) for carrying blood (raja-vahana-nāḍiyāḥ), and the epithet "loka-taśāsah" as either "wearing red garment" or "red," or "the receptacle of blood" (rudhirāṣya nivāsa-bhūtāḥ).
small, so thou the big dhamani. In the third verse both the hiräs and dhamanis are mentioned. "These in the middle were formerly (letting out blood) among a hundred dhamanis and thousands of hiräs (and after that) all the other (nāḍīs) were playing with (others which have ceased from letting out blood)." Hymn vii. 35 is for stopping the issue of a woman who is an enemy. The third verse says, "I close with a stone the apertures of a hundred hiräs and a thousand dhamanis." Sāyaṇā, in explaining this verse, says that the hiräs are fine nāḍīs inside the ovary (garbha-dhārānārtham antar-avasthītāḥ sūkṣmā yā nāḍyaḥ) and the dhamanis the thicker nāḍīs round the ovary for keeping it steady (garbha-sāyaṇya evaṣṭāmbhikā bāhyā sthūlā yā nāḍyaḥ). The only point of difference between this verse and those of i. 17 is that here sīrās are said to be a hundred and dhamanis a thousand, whereas in the latter, the dhamanis were said to be a hundred and the sīrās a thousand. But, if Sāyaṇā's interpretation is accepted, the dhamanis still appear as the bigger channels and the sīrās as the finer ones. Nāḍī seems to have been the general name of channels. But nowhere in the Atharva-Veda is there any passage which suggests that the distinction between veins and arteries in the modern sense of the terms was known at the time. In A.V. i. 3. 6 we hear of two nāḍīs called gavīnyau for carrying the urine from the kidneys to the bladder. The gods of the eight quarters and other gods are said to have produced the foetus and, together with the god of delivery (Sūṣā), facilitated birth by loosening the bonds of the womb.

1 The previous verse referred to sīrās as letting out blood, whereas this verse refers to dhamanis as performing the same function. Sāyaṇā also freely paraphrases dhamani as sīrā (mahā mahatt sthūlata r dhāmanī śīrā tiṣṭhād it tiṣṭhāta eva, anena prayogena niṣṛṭta-rudhirā-srācā avatāṣṭhatām).

2 Here both the dhamani and the hirā are enumerated. Sāyaṇā here says that dhamanis are the important nāḍīs in the heart (hrdaya-gatānām pradhāna-nāḍīnām), and hirās or sīrās are branch nāḍīs (śīrānāṁ śākhā-nāḍīnām). The number of dhamanis, as here given, is a hundred and thus almost agrees with the number of nāḍīs in the heart given in the Kaṭha Upaṇiṣad, vi. 16 (lataṁ caitā ca hrdayasya nāḍyaḥ).

The Praṇa Upaṇiṣad, iii. 6 also speaks of a hundred nāḍīs, of which there are thousands of branches.

3 antrehiyo vinirgaśaṇya mātrāya śāetakāya-prāpti-sādhane pārśva-deva-ṣteh nāḍyaṃ gavīnyau ity ucye. Sāyaṇā's Bhāṣya. In i. iii. 5 two nāḍīs called gavīnikā are referred to and are described by Sāyaṇā as being the two nāḍīs on the two sides of the vagina controlling delivery (gavīnikā yoneḥ pārśva-vartīṇyau nirgamana-pratibandhikā nāḍyaṃ—Sāyaṇā). In one passage (A.V. ii. 12. 7) eight dhamanis called manya are mentioned, and Sāyaṇā says that they are near the neck. A nāḍī called aṁkhaṇṭava, on which strangury depends, is mentioned in A.V. i. 17. 4.

4 Another goddess of delivery, Sūṣāṇi, is also invoked.
The term *jarāyu* is used in the sense of placenta, which is said to have no intimate connection with the flesh and marrow, so that when it falls down it is eaten by the dogs and the body is in no way hurt. A reference is found to a first aid to delivery in expanding the sides of the vagina and pressing the two *gavānākā rādas*¹. The *snāvas* (tendons) are also mentioned along with *dhāmanis*, and Śāyāna explains them as finer *sīrās* (*sukmāmā sīrāh snāva-sabdendra ucyante*). The division of *dhāmanis*, *sīrās* and *snāvas* thus seems to have been based on their relative fineness: the thicker channels (*rādas*) were called *dhāmanis*, the finer ones were called *sīrās* and the still finer ones *snāvas*. Their general functions were considered more or less the same, though these probably differed according to the place in the body where they were situated and the organs with which they were associated. It seems to have been recognized that there was a general flow of the liquid elements of the body. This probably corresponds to the notion of *srotas*, as we get it in the *Caraka-samhitā*, and which will be dealt with later on. Thus A.V. x. 2. 11 says, "who stored in him floods turned in all directions moving diverse and formed to flow in rivers, quick (tīrā), rosy (arūnā), red (lohint), and copper dark (tāmra-dhūrmā), running all ways in a man upward and downward?" This clearly refers to the diverse currents of various liquid elements in the body. The semen, again, is conceived as the thread of life which is being spun out². The intimate relation between the heart and the brain seems to have been dimly apprehended. Thus it is said, "together with his needle hath Atharvan sewn his head and heart³." The theory of the *vāyus*, which we find in all later literature, is alluded to, and the *prāṇa, apāna, vyāna* and *samāna* are mentioned⁴. It is however difficult to guess what these *prāṇa, apāna, etc.* exactly meant. In another passage of the *Atharva-Veda* we hear of nine *prāṇas* (*nava prānān navabhīḥ samānīte*), and in another seven *prāṇas* are mentioned⁵. In another passage

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¹ vi te bhinadmi vi yonim vi gavānike. A.V. i. 11. 5.
² Ko aśmin reto nyasadhat tantur ātayatām iti (Who put the semen in him, saying, Let the thread of life be spun out? A.V. x. 2. 17).
³ Mārūhānam asya samsthavātharvā krdayaṃ ca yat (A.V. x. 2. 26). See also Griffith's translations.
⁴ Ko aśmin prāṇam avayat ko apānam vyānam u samānam aśmin ko deve 'dhi śītrāya pūrṣe (Who has woven *prāṇa, apāna, vyāna* and *samāna* into him and which deity is controlling him? A.V. x. 2. 13).
⁵ Saṁpraṇān aśīvau manyaḥ (or majjīnas) tāṃs te vyācāmī brahmaṇaḥ (A.V. ii. 12. 7). The *Taittirīya-brahmaṇa*, 1. 2. 3. 3 refers to seven *prāṇas, sāptā vai
we hear of a lotus with nine gates (nava-devaram) and covered with the three gunas. This is a very familiar word in later Sanskrit literature, as referring to the nine doors of the senses, and the comparison of the heart with a lotus is also very common. But one of the most interesting points about the passage is that it seems to be a direct reference to the gūna theory, which received its elaborate exposition at the hands of the later Sāṃkhya writers: it is probably the earliest reference to that theory. As we have stated above, the real functions of the prāṇa, etc. were not properly understood; prāṇa was considered as vital power or life and it was believed to be beyond injury and fear. It was as immortal as the earth and the sky, the day and the night, the sun and the moon, the Brāhmaṇas and the Ḫsatṛīyas, truth and falsehood, the past and the future.

A prayer is made to prāṇa and apāna for protection from death (prāṇāpānau mṛtyor mā pātam svāhā). In A.V. III. 6. 8 manas and cītta are separately mentioned and Sāyaṇa explains manas as meaning antaḥkaraṇa, or inner organ, and cītta as a particular state of the manas (mano-vṛtti-viśeṣa), as thought. Here also the heart is the seat of consciousness. Thus in a prayer in III. 26. 6 it is said, "O Mitra and Varuṇa, take away the thinking power (cītta) from the heart (ḥṛt) of this woman and, making her incapable of judgment, bring her under my control." The ojas with which we are familiar in later medical works of Caraka and others is mentioned in A.V. II. 18, where

śāntasyāḥ prāṇāḥ. Again a reference to the seven senses is found in A.V. x. 2. 6: kaḥ sapta khūmi vitataraś śānti. In A.V. xv. 15. 16. 17 seven kinds of prāṇa, apāna and vyāna are described. These seem to serve cosmic functions. The seven prāṇas are agni, āditya, candramāḥ, pavamāna, āpaḥ, paścāt and prajāḥ. The seven apānas are paurṇamāś, aṣṭākā, amāvāśya, śraddhaḥ, āthā, yajya and daṇḍaḥ. The seven kinds of vyāna are bhūmi, antarikṣaḥ, dyauḥ, nakṣatraḥ, ṛtavaḥ, ārāvat and samavatsaraḥ.

(Those who know Brahmān know that being which resides in the lotus flower of nine gates covered by the three gunas. A.V. x. 8. 43.) The nādīs idā, pāṅgala and suṣumṇā, which figure so much in the later Tāntric works, do not appear in the Atharva-Veda. No reference to prāṇāvāma appears in the Atharva-Veda.

1 A.V. II. 15.
2 Ibid. II. 16. 1. Prāṇa and apāna are asked in another passage to enter a man as bulls enter a cow-shed. Sāyaṇa calls prāṇa, apāna "śātrīs-dhāraka" (A.V.III. II. 3). They are also asked not to leave the body, but to bear the limbs till old age (III. II. 6).
3 Manas and cītta are also separately counted in A.V. III. 6. 8.
4 The word cītta is sometimes used to mean men of the same ways of thinking (cīttaḥ samāna-cītta-yuktāḥ—Sāyaṇa. A.V. III. 13. 5).
Agni is described as being ojas and is asked to give ojas to the worshipper¹.

**Practice of Medicine in the Atharva-Veda.**

As we have said above, there is evidence to show that even at the time of the *Atharva-Veda* the practice of pure medicine by professional medical men had already been going on. Thus the verse II. 9. 3, as explained by Sāyana, says that there were hundreds of medical practitioners (*satam hy asya bhīṣajāḥ*) and thousands of herbs (*sahasram uta virudhah*), but what can be done by these can be effected by binding an amulet with the particular charm of this verse². Again (II. 9. 5), the Atharvan who binds the amulet is described as the best of all good doctors (*subhiṣaktama*). In VI. 68. 2 Prajāpati, who appears in the Ātreya-Caraka school as the original teacher of Āyur-veda and who learnt the science from Brahmā, is asked to treat (with medicine) a boy for the attainment of long life³. In the *Kauśika-sūtra* a disease is called *liṅga*, i.e. that which has the symptoms (*liṅga*), and medicine (*bhāiṣajya*) as that which destroys it (*upatāpa*). Dārila remarks that this *upatāpa-karma* refers not only to the disease, but also to the symptoms, i.e. a *bhāiṣajya* is that which destroys the disease and its symptoms⁴. In the *Atharva-Veda* itself only a few medicines are mentioned, such as *jangidā* (XIX. 34 and 35), *gulgulu* (XIX. 38), *kuṣṭha* (XIX. 39) and *śata-vāra* (XIX. 36), and these are all to be used as amulets for protection not only from certain diseases, but also from the witchcraft (*kṛtyā*) of enemies. The effect of these herbs was of the same miraculous nature as that of mere charms or incantations. They did not operate in the manner in which the medicines prescribed

¹ Ojo' xy ojo me dāh svāhā (A.V. II. xviii. 1). Sāyana, in explaining ojah, says, "ojah kartra-sthitih-kārayam aśāmo dāhāḥ." He quotes a passage as being spoken by the teachers (ācāryah): "kṣetrajñasya tad ojas tu kevalāśraya isyate yadā snehā pradāpya yathābhram alani-teṣāḥ" (Just as the lamp depends on the oil and the lightning on the clouds so the ojah depends on the *kṣetra-jñā* (self) alone).

² Satam yā bhēṣajāṇī te sahasram saṃgatāṇi ca bṛṣṭham āśraça-bhēṣajāṃ vasīśtham roga-nāśanam.

(Oh sick person! you may have applied hundreds or thousands of medicinal herbs; but this charm is the best specific for stopping hemorrhage. A.V. VI. 45. 2.) Here also, as in II. 9. 3, the utterance of the charm is considered to be more efficacious than the application of other herbs and medicines. Water was often applied for washing the sores (VI. 57. 2).

³ Cikitsatā Prajāpatir dirghāyutāya caṅkase (VI. 68. 2).

⁴ Dārila's comment on the *Kauśika-sūtra*, 25. 2.
in the ordinary medical literature acted, but in a supernatural way. In most of the hymns which appear as pure charms the Kauśika-sūtra directs the application of various medicines either internally or as amulets. The praise of Atharvan as physician par excellence and of the charms as being superior to all other medicines prescribed by other physicians seems to indicate a period when most of these Atharvanic charms were used as a system of treatment which was competing with the practice of ordinary physicians with the medicinal herbs. The period of the Kauśika-sūtra was probably one when the value of the medicinal herbs was being more and more realized and they were being administered along with the usual Atharvanic charms. This was probably a stage of reconciliation between the drug system and the charm system. The special hymns dedicated to the praise of certain herbs, such as jāngida, kuṣṭha, etc., show that the ordinary medical virtues of herbs were being interpreted on the miraculous lines in which the charms operated. On the other hand, the drug school also came under the influence of the Atharva-Veda and came to regard it as the source of their earliest authority. Even the later medical literature could not altogether free itself from a faith in the efficacy of charms and in the miraculous powers of medicine operating in a supernatural and non-medical manner. Thus Caraka, vi. 1. 39 directs that the herbs should be plucked according to the proper rites (yathā-vidhi), and Cakrapāṇi explains this by saying that the worship of gods and other auspicious rites have to be performed (maṅgala-devatārcanādi-pārvakam); in vi. 1. 77 a compound of herbs is advised, which, along with many other virtues, had the power of making a person invisible to all beings (adṛṣṭyo bhūtānāṁ bhavati); miraculous powers are ascribed to the fruit āmalaka (Embllic Myrobalan), such as that, if a man lives among cows for a year, drinking nothing but milk, in perfect sense-control and continence and meditating the holy gāyatri verse, and if at the end of the year on a proper lunar day in the month of Pauṣa (January), Māgha (February), or Phālguṇa (March), after fasting for three days, he should enter an āmalaka garden and, climbing upon a tree full of big fruits, should hold them and repeat (japaṅ) the name of Brahman till the āmalaka attains immortalizing virtues, then, for that moment, immortality resides in the āmalaka; and, if he should eat those āmalakas, then the goddess Śrī, the incarnation of the Vedas, appears in person to him (svayaṁ
cāsyopatiśhantā śrīr vedavākya-rūpiṇī, vi. 3. 6). In vi. 1. 80 it is said that the rasāyana medicines not only procure long life, but, if they are taken in accordance with proper rites (yathā-vidhi), a man attains the immortal Brahman. Again in vi. 1. 3 the word prāyaścitta (purificatory penance) is considered to have the same meaning as ausadha or bheṣaja. The word bheṣaja in the Atharva-Veda meant a charm or an amulet which could remove diseases and their symptoms, and though in later medical literature the word is more commonly used to denote herbs and minerals, either simple or compounded, the older meaning was not abandoned. The system of simple herbs or minerals, which existed independently of the Atharva-Veda, became thus intimately connected with the system of charm specifics of the Atharva-Veda; whatever antagonism may have before existed between the two systems vanished, and Āyur-veda came to be treated as a part of the Atharva-Veda. Prajāpati and Indra, the mythical physicians of the Atharva-Veda, came to be regarded in the Ātreya-Caraka school as the earliest teachers of Āyur-veda.

Bloomfield arranges the contents of the Atharva-Veda in fourteen classes: 1. Charms to cure diseases and possession by demons (bhaisajyāni); 2. Prayers for long life and health (āyusyāni); 3. Imprecations against demons, sorcerers and enemies (ābhcāri-

1 The A.V. terms are bheṣajam (remedy), bheṣaji (the herbs), and bheṣajth (waters). The term bhaīṣajya appears only in the Kauśika and other śūtras and Brāhmaṇas. Bloomfield says that the existence of such charms and practices is guaranteed moreover at least as early as the Indo-Iranian (Aryan) period by the stems bāṣana and bāṣasya (maṇthra bāṣana and bāṣasya; haoma bāṣasya), and by the pre-eminent position of water and plants in all prayers for health and long life. Adalbert Kuhn has pointed out some interesting and striking resemblances between Teutonic and Vedic medical charms, especially in connection with cures for worms and fractures. These may perhaps be mere anthropological coincidences, due to the similar mental endowment of the two peoples. But it is more likely that some of these folk-notions had crystallized in prehistoric times, and that these parallels reflect the continuation of a crude Indo-European folklore that had survived among the Teutons and Hindus. See Bloomfield's The Atharva-Veda and Gopatha-Brāhmaṇa, p. 58, and Kuhn's Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung, xiii. pp. 49–74 and 113–157.

2 The Atharva-Veda itself speaks (xix. 34. 7) of herbs which were current in ancient times and medicines which were new, and praises the herb jāṅgīḍa as being better than them all—na tāḥ pārva oṣadhayo na tāḥ tarantu yā navāh.

3 A.V. vi. 68. 2—Cikitsat praśaptir dhṛghāyutāya caṅkṣe; ibid. xix. 35. 1—
Indrasya nāma gṛhānto ṛṣayaḥ jāṅgīḍaṁ dadaṁ (The ṛṣis gave jāṅgīḍa, uttering
the name of Indra). This line probably suggested the story in the Caraka-sanhīta,
that Indra first instructed the ṛṣis in Āyur-veda. See ibid. xi. viii. 23—yān mātāṁ rathakīrtiṁ āmṛtaṁ vedā bheṣaṁ tād indro apsu prāveṣayat tād āpo datta
bheṣajam. The immortalizing medicine which Mātāli (the charioteer of Indra)
bought by selling the chariot was thrown into the waters by Indra, the master of
the chariot. Rivers, give us back that medicine!
kāni and kṛtyā-pratiharānāni; 4. Charms pertaining to women (strika-kāmāni); 5. Charms to secure harmony, influence in the assembly, and the like (saumanasyāni); 6. Charms pertaining to royalty (rāja-kāmāni); 7. Prayers and imprecations in the interest of Brahmins; 8. Charms to secure property and freedom from danger (paustikāni); 9. Charms in expiation of sin and defilement (prāyaścittāni); 10. Cosmogonic and theosophic hymns; 11. Ritualistic and general hymns; 12. The books dealing with individual themes (books 13–18); 13. The twentieth book; 14. The kuntāpa hymns1; of these we have here to deal briefly with 1, 2, 3, 4 and 9, more or less in the order in which they appear in the Atharva-Veda. A.V. i. 2 is a charm against fever (jvara), diarrohea (atitsāra), diabetes (atimūtra), glandular sores (mādi-erana); a string made of muniya grass is to be tied, the mud from a field or ant-hill is to be drunk, clarified butter is to be applied and the holes of the anus and penis and the mouth of the sore are to be aerated with a leather bladder and the charm is to be chanted. The disease āsṛāca, mentioned in this hymn, is explained by Sāyaṇa as meaning diabetes (mṛttāsīra)2. i. 3 is a charm against stoppage of urine and stool (mūtra-puriṣa-nirodha). Along with a chanting of the hymn the patient is to be made to drink either earth from a rat’s hole (mṛtika-mṛtikā), a pātikā plant, curd, or saw-dust from old wood, or he is to ride an elephant or a horse, or to throw an arrow; a fine iron needle was to be passed through the urinal canal. This is probably the earliest stage of what developed in later times as the vasti-kriya3. i. 7 and i. 8 are charms for driving away evil spirits, yātudhānas and kimidins, when a man is possessed by them. i. 10 is a charm for dropsey (jalodara): a jugful of water containing grass, etc. is to be sprinkled over the body of the patient. i. 11 is a charm for securing easy delivery. i. 12 is a charm for all diseases arising from disturbance of vāta, pitta and šleṣman—fat, honey and clarified butter or oil have to be drunk. Head-disease (śṛṣakti) and cough (kāsa) are specially mentioned. i. 17

1 Mr Bloomfield’s The Atharva-Veda and Gopatha-Brāhmaṇa, p. 57.
2 Bloomfield says that āsrāca means atitsāra or diarrhoea (ibid. p. 59). The same physical applications for the same diseases are directed in A.V. ii. 3. Āsrāca denotes any disease which is associated with any kind of diseased ejection. Thus in ii. 3. 2 Sāyaṇa says that āsrāca means atitsāra-timūtra-mādi-erapanādayati.
3 Pra te bhūnam meheṇāṃ varṇam veśāntyā eva eva te mṛtṛam mucyataṁ bahir bāl iti sarvaham (I open your urinal path like a canal through which the waters rush. So may the urine come out with a whizzing sound—A.V. i. 3. 7). All the verses of the hymn ask the urine to come out with a whizzing sound.
is a charm for stopping blood from an injury of the veins or arteries or for stopping too much hemorrhage of women. In the case of injuries a handful of street-dust is to be thrown on the place of injury or a bandage is to be tied with sticky mud. 1. 22 is a charm against heart-disease and jaundice—hairs of a red cow are to be drunk with water and a piece of a red cow’s skin is to be tied as an amulet. It is prayed that the red colour of the sun and the red cow may come to the patient’s body and the yellow colour due to jaundice may go to birds of yellow colour. 1. 23, which mentions kilasa or kuṣṭha (white leprosy) of the bone, flesh and skin and the disease by which hairs are turned grey (palita), is a charm against these. The white parts are to be rubbed with an ointment made of cow-dung, bhṛṅga-raja, haridrā indravarṇa and nilika until they appear red. The black medicines applied are asked to turn the white parts black. 1. 25 is a charm against takman, or fever—the patient has to be sprinkled with the water in which a red-hot iron axe has been immersed. The description shows that it was of the malarial type; it came with cold (śīta) and a burning sensation (ioci). Three types of this fever are described: that which came the next day (anyeduyah), the second day (ubhayedyuḥ), or the third day (triṣṭiyaka). It was also associated with yellow, probably because it produced jaundice. II. 9 and 10 are charms against hereditary (kṣetriya) diseases, leprosy, dyspepsia, etc. Amulets of arjuna wood, barley, sesamum and its flower had also to be tied when the charm was uttered. II. 31 is a charm against various diseases due to worms. The priest, when uttering this charm, should hold street-dust in his left hand and press it with his right hand and throw it on the patient. There are visible and invisible worms; some of them are called alganḍu and others saluna; they are generated in the intestines, head and

1. IV. 12 is also a charm for the same purpose.
2. VI. 135–137 is also a charm for strengthening the roots of the hair. Kākamāci with bhṛṅga-raja has to be drunk.
3. Namoh ittāya takmane namo rūraya iociṣe kṛnomi yo anyeduyur ubhayedyuyr abhyeti triṣṭiyāya namo astu takmane.
See also A.V. vii. 123. 10, where the third-day fever, fourth-day fever and irregular fevers are referred to.
4. The word kṣetriya has been irregularly derived in Pāṇini’s rule, v. 2. 92 (kṣetriyaṃ parakṣetre cikṣitaḥ). Commentaries like the Kālika and the Padamanjari suggest one of its meanings to be “curable in the body of another birth” (jannamāntara-lātre cikṣitaḥ), that is, incurable. I, however, prefer the meaning “hereditary,” as given by Śāyaṇa in his commentary on A.V. II. 10. 1, as being more fitting and reasonable.
5. Yakṣman is also counted as a kṣetriya disease (II. 10. 6).
heels; they go about through the body by diverse ways and cannot be killed even with various kinds of herbs. They sometimes reside in the hills and forests and in herbs and animals, and they enter into our system through sores in the body and through various kinds of food and drink. II. 33 is a charm for removing yakṣman from all parts of the body. III. 7. 1 is a charm for removing all hereditary (kṣetṛtya) diseases; the horn of a deer is to be used as an amulet. III. 11 is a charm against phthisis (rāja-yakṣman)—particularly when it is generated by too much sex-indulgence; the patient is to eat rotten fish. IV. 4 is a charm for attaining virility—the roots of the kapittha tree boiled in milk are to be drunk when the charm is uttered. IV. 6 and 7 are charms against vegetable poisoning—the essence of the krmuka tree is to be drunk. V. 4 is a charm against fever (takman) and phthisis; the patient is to take the herb kuṣṭha with water when the charm is uttered. V. 11 is a charm against fever. V. 23 is a charm against worms—the patient is given the juice of the twenty kinds of roots. VI. 15 is a charm for eye-diseases; the patient has to take various kinds of vegetable leaves fried in oil, particularly the mustard plant. VI. 20 is a charm against bilious fever (śuṣmiṇo jvarasya); it is said to produce a great burning sensation, delirium and jaundice. VI. 21 is a charm for increasing the hair—the hair is to be sprinkled with a decoction of various herbs. VI. 23 is a charm against heart-disease, dropsy and jaundice. VI. 25 is a charm for inflammation of the glands of the neck (gaṇḍa-māla). VI. 85 is a charm against consumption (rājay-aṁśman); VI. 90 for colic pain (śūla); VI. 105 for cough and

1 II. 31. 5. I have adopted Śāyaṇa's interpretation.
2 VII. 78 is also a charm for inflammation of the neck (gaṇḍa-māla) and phthisis (yakṣma).
3 Kuṣṭha was believed to be good for the head and the eyes (V. 4. 10).
4 Gāndhāra Mahāvṛṣa, Muṇjavān, and particularly Bālhika (Balkh), were regarded as the home of fever; so also the country of Aṅga and Magadha. It was accompanied by cold (śīta) and shivering (rūraḥ). It was often attended with cough (kāṣa) and consumption (vālāsa). It attacked sometimes on the third or fourth day, in summer or in autumn (jārada), or continued all through the year.
5 This is one of the few cases where a large number of roots were compounded together and used as medicine along with the charms.
6 Some of the other plants are alasālā, silaṇjālā, nilaṇalasālā.
7 Also vii. 78, where apacit appears as a name for the inflammation of the neck (gala-gaṇḍa). Three different types of the disease are described. Apacit is at first harmless, but when it grows, it continues more to secrete its discharges, like boils on the joints. These boils grow on the neck, the back, the thigh-joint and the anus. See further vi. 83, where conch-shell is to be rubbed and applied.
8 VIII. 83 is also a charm for it. Blood had to be sucked off the inflamed parts by a leech or an iguana (graṇha-godhikā).
9 A piece of iron is to be tied as an amulet.
other such diseases due to phlegm (śleṣmā); vi. 109 for diseases of the rheumatic type (vāta-vyādhi). vi. 127 is a charm for abscess (vidradha), phlegmatic diseases (valāsa) and erysipelas inflammation (visarpa). Various kinds of visarpa in different parts of the body are referred to. Heart-disease and phthisis are also mentioned. There are said to be a hundred kinds of death (mṛtyu) (A.V. viii. 5. 7), which are explained by Sāyaṇa as meaning diseases such as fever, head-disease, etc. Several diseases are mentioned in ix. 18—first the diseases of the head, ṣirṣakti, ṣirṣāmaya, karna-śūla and visalpaka, by which secretions of bad smell come out from the ear and the mouth, then fever proceeding from head troubles with shivering and cracking sensations in the limbs. Takman, the dreaded autumnal fever, is so described. Then comes consumption; then come valāsa, kāhābāha of the abdomen, diseases of kloma, the abdomen, navel and heart, diseases of the spine, the ribs, the eyes, the intestines, the visalpa, vidradha, wind-diseases (vāttkāra), alaji and diseases of the leg, knee, pelvis, veins and head.

Bolling, in his article on diseases and medicine (Vedic) in the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, makes the following remark concerning the theory of the origin of diseases. "To be noted however is the fact that the Hindu theory of the constitution of the body of three elements, bile, phlegm and wind, does not appear in early Atharvan texts. Vāti-kṛta-nāśani of vi. 44. 3 cannot be urged as proof to the contrary, as it means, not destructive of (diseases) produced by the wind in the body (vāti-kṛta-nāśani), but destructive of that which has been made into wind. Evidently, from its association with diarrhoea, it refers to wind in the intestines." This does not seem to me to be correct. The phrase which Bolling quotes is indeed of doubtful meaning; Sāyaṇa takes it as being composed of two words, vāti (healer by aeration) and kṛta-nāśani (destroyer of evil deeds which brought about the disease). But, however that may be, there are other passages on the subject, which Bolling seems to have missed. Thus in i. 12. 3 diseases are divided into three classes, viz. those produced by water, by wind, and those which are dry—yo abhrājā vātajā yaś ca śuṣmāh. The phlegm of the later medical writers was also considered watery, and the word

1 Pippalt is also to be taken along with the utterance of the charm. It is regarded as the medicine for all attacked by the diseases of the wind (vātt-kṛtasya bheṣajām). It is also said to cure madness (kṣiptasya bheṣajām).
2 Cīpudru is a medicine for valāsa. Cīpudru abhicalkaṇām (vi. 127. 2).
3 Compare also vāttkārasya (ix. 13. 20).
abhraja probably suggests the origin of the theory of phlegm, as being one of the upholders and destroyers of the body. The word vāṭaja means, very plainly, diseases produced by wind, and the pitta, or bile, which in later medical literature is regarded as a form of fire, is very well described here as śuṣma, or dry. Again in vi. 109 we have pippalt as vāṭi-kṛtasya bheṣajim. The context shows that the diseases which are referred to as being curable by pippalt are those which are considered as being produced by wind in later literature; for “madness” (kṣipta) is mentioned as a vāṭi-kṛta disease. The word śuṣma comes from the root “śuṣ,” to dry up, and in slightly modified forms is used to mean a “drying up,” “burning,” “strength,” and “fiery.” In one place at least it is used to describe the extremely burning sensation of delirious bilious fever, which is said to be burning like fire1. My own conclusion therefore is that at least some Atharvānic people had thought of a threefold classification of all diseases, viz. those produced by wind, those by water, and those by fire, or those which are dry and burning. This corresponds to the later classification of all diseases as being due to the three doṣas, wind (vāyu), phlegm (kapha or śleṣma) and bile (pitta). Apart from the ordinary diseases, many were the cases of possession by demons and evil spirits, of which we have quite a large number. Some of the prominent ones are Yātudhāna, Kimidin, Piśāca, Piśāci, Amīśa, Dvayāsin, Rakṣah, Magundī, Aliṃśa, Vatsapa, Palāla, Anupalāla, Šarku, Koka, Malimlucā, Paliṭjaka, Vārvicāsas, Āśreṣa, Rkṣagriga, Pramlin, Durṇāmā, Sunāmā, Kuḵśila, Kusūla, Kakubha, Śrima, Arāya, Karuna, Kharaja, Śakadhūmaja, Uruṇḍa, Maṭmaṇa, Kumbhamuṣka, Sāyaka, Nagnaka, Taṅgalva, Pavīnasā, Gandharva, Brahmagrāha, etc.2 Some of the diseases with their troublesome symptoms were (poetically) personified, and diseases which often went together were described as being related as brothers and sisters. Diseases due to worms were well known, in the case of both men

1 vi. 20. 4. For other references where the word śuṣma occurs in more or less modified forms see i. 12. 3, III. 9. 3, IV. 4. 3, IV. 4. 4, v. 2. 4, v. 20. 2, VI. 65. 1, VI. 73. 2, IX. 10. 20, IX. 4. 22, etc.
2 See i. 28, 35, II. 9, II. 14, VIII. 6. The last passage contains a good description of some of these beings. There were some good spirits which fought with evil ones and favoured men, such as Piṅga, who preserved the babe at birth and chased the amorous Gandharvas as wind chases cloud. VIII. 6. 19, 25 says that sometimes the higher gods are also found to bring diseases. Thus Takman was the son of Varuṇa (vi. 96. 2) and he produced dropsy (i. 10. 1–4, ii. 10. 1, iv. 16. 7, etc.). Parjanya (rain-god) produced diarrhoea, and Agni produced fever, headache and cough.
and of cattle. There were also the diseases due to sorcery, which played a very important part as an offensive measure in Vedic India. Many of the diseases were also known to be hereditary (kṣetṛiya). From the names of the diseases mentioned above it will be found that most of the diseases noted by Caraka existed in the Vedic age.

The viewpoint from which the Vedic people looked at diseases seems to have always distinguished the different diseases from their symptoms. Thus the fever was that which produced shivering, cold, burning sensation, and the like, i.e. the diagnosis was mainly symptomatic. In addition to the charms and amulets, and the herbs which were to be internally taken, water was considered to possess great medical and life-giving properties. There are many hymns which praise these qualities of water. The medicinal properties of herbs were often regarded as being due to water, which formed their essence. Charms for snake poisons and herbs which were considered to be their antidotes were in use. Scanty references to diseases and their cures are found sparsely scattered in other Rg-Vedic texts and Brāhmaṇas. But nothing in these appears to indicate any advance on the Atharva-Veda in medical knowledge. Apart from these curatives there were also the already mentioned charms, amulets and medicines for securing long life and increasing virility, corresponding to the Rasāyana and the Vāji-karaṇa chapters of Caraka and other medical works. We cannot leave this section without pointing to the fact that, though most diseases and many remedies were known, nothing in the way of nidāna, or causes of diseases, is specified. The fact that there existed a threefold classification of diseases, viz. abhraja, vātaja and śuṣma, should not be interpreted to mean that the Vedic people had any knowledge of the disturbance of these elements operating as nidānas as they were understood in later medical literature. The three important causes of diseases were evil deeds, the sorcery of enemies, and possession by evil spirits or the anger of certain gods.

1 *apsu antar amṛtam apsu bhesajam* (There is immortality and medicine in water—1. 4. 4). See also I. 5. 6, 33, II. 3, III. 7. 5, IV. 33, VI. 24. 92, VI. 24. 2, etc.

2 For a brief survey of these Rg-Vedic and other texts see Bolling's article "Disease and Medicine (Vedic)" in Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.
The Foetus and the Subtle Body.

A human body is regarded by Caraka as a modification of the five elements, ether, air, fire, water and earth, and it is also the seat of consciousness (cetanā)1. The semen itself is made of the four elements, air, fire, water and earth; ether is not a constituent of it, but becomes connected with it as soon as it issues forth, since ākāśa or antariksa (ether) is all-pervading. The semen that is ejected and passes into the ovary is constituted of equal parts of air, fire, water and earth; the ether becomes mixed with it in the ovary; for ākāśa itself is omnipresent and has no movement of its own2; the semen is the product of six kinds of fluids (rasa). But the foetus cannot be produced simply by the union of the semen of the father and the blood (śoṇita) of the mother. Such a union can produce the foetus only when the ātman with its subtle body, constituted of air, fire, water and earth, and manas (mind—the organ involved in all perception and thought), becomes connected with it by means of its karma. The four elements constituting the subtle body of the ātman, being the general causes of all productions, do not contribute to the essential bodily features of the child. The elements that contribute to the general features are, (1) the mother’s part—the blood, (2) the father’s part—the semen, (3) the karma of each individual; the part played by the assimilated food-juice of the mother need not be counted separately, as it is determined by the karma of the individual. The mental traits are determined by the state of mind of the individual in its previous birth. Thus, if the previous state of life was that of a god, the mind of the child

1 garbhas tu khalu antarikṣa vāyu-agni-toya-bhūmi-vikāraś cetanādhiṣṭhāna-bhūtah. Caraka, iv. 4. 6.
2 vāyu-agni-bhūmy-ab-gunā-pādavat tat śadbhyo rasebhyaḥ prabhāvasī ca tasya. Caraka, iv. 2. 4. ākāśaṁ tu yady-aśi śukre pāsca-bhautike ’sti tathāpi na puruṣātman nirgatya garbhasyaṃ gacchati, kintu bhūta-catuṣṭayaṃ eva kriyācād yāti ākāśaṁ tu vṛjāpakaṃ eva tatrāgatena śukreṇa saṃbaddhaṃ bhave. Cakrapāṇi’s Ayur-veda-ditpākā, iv. 2. 24. Suśruta however considers śukra (semen) as possessing the qualities of soma, and ārātā (blood) as possessing the qualities of fire. He says, however, that particles of the other bhūtas (earth, air and ether, as Dalhana enumerates them) are separately associated with them (saumyaṃ śukram ārtavam āgniyaṃ itareṣām apy atra bhūtanāṁ śanādityaṃ asty apunā viśeṣena parasparruparakārāt parānugrahāṁ pararparāmupraśeṣāc ca—Suśruta, III. 3. 1), and they mutually co-operate together for the production of the foetus.
3 yāṁ tu ātmanī sākṣamāni bhūtāni ātivāhika-rūpānī tām sarva-sādhāraṇatvena avatṛca-sādṛṣṭa-kāraṇānīḥ neha bodhavyā. Cakrapāṇi’s Ayur-veda-ditpākā, iv. 2. 23–27.
will be pure and vigorous, whereas, if it was that of an animal, it will be impure and dull. When a man dies, his soul, together with his subtle body, composed of the four elements, air, fire, water and earth, in a subtle state and manas, passes invisibly into a particular womb on account of its karma, and then, when it comes into connection with the combined semen and blood of the father and mother, the foetus begins to develop. The semen and blood can, however, operate as causes of the production of the body only when they come into connection with the subtle body transferred from the previous body of a dying being. Suśruta (III. 1. 16) says that the very subtle eternal conscious principles are manifested (abhivyayiye) when the blood and semen are in union (parama-sūksma cetanāvantaḥ śāsvatā lohita-retasaḥ sannipātē syāh abhivyayiye). But later on (III. 3. 4) this statement is modified in such a way as to agree with Caraka's account; for there it is said that the soul comes into contact with the combined semen and blood along with its subtle elemental body (bhūtātmaka). In another passage a somewhat different statement is found (Suśruta, III. 4. 3). Here it is said that the materials of the developing foetus are agni, soma, sattva, rajas, tamas, the five senses, and the bhūtātmā—all these contribute to the life of the foetus and are also called the prānas (life). Daṇḍana, in explaining this, says that the agni (fire) spoken of here is the heat-power which manifests itself in the fivefold functionings of digestion (pācaka), viz. brightening of the skin (bhrājaka), the faculty of vision

1 Teṣāṁ viśeṣād balavanti yāṁ
bhavanti mātā-pitr-karma-jānī
tāṁ vyāvasyet sadātva-līṅgaṁ
satvāṁ yathānākaṁ api vyāvasyet.

Caraka, IV. 2. 27.

Antikaṁ prāktanāvyavahita deha-jātīs tena yathānākaṁ
iti yo deva-sartrād avyavadhānenāgatyā bhavati sa
deova-satvo bhāvati, etc.

Cakrapāṇi, IV. 2. 23-27.

2 bhūtaś caturbhīḥ sahitṛaḥ su-sūkṣmaṁ
mano-javo deham upaiti dehāt
karmāt-makatūṁ na tu tasya dṛśyāṁ
dityāṁ vinā dārānāṁ asti rūpaṁ.

Caraka, IV. 2. 3.

yady api śṛka-rajaṁ kāraṇe, tathāpī yadojāvāvihākāṁ sūkṣma-bhūta-rūpa-
sartrāṁ prāpnotaṁ, tadaiva te sartrāṁ janayataṁ, nānyadā.
Cakrapāṇi, IV. 2. 36.

3 This bhūtātmā, i.e. the subtle body together with the soul presiding over it, is called by Suśruta karma-puruṣa. Medical treatment is of this karma-puruṣa and his body (sa esa karma-puruṣa cihisādhiḥkṣtaḥ—Suśruta, III. 1. 16). Suśruta (I. 1. 21) again says, "pārca-mahābhūta-sartri-samavāyaḥ puruṣa ity ucyate; tasmin kriyā so 'dhīśhānam.' (In this science, the term puruṣa is applied to the unity of five elements and the self (sartri), and this is the object of medical treatment.)
(ālocaka), coloration of the blood, the intellectual operations and the heat operations involved in the formation and work of the different constituent elements (dhātu), such as chyle, blood, etc.; the soma is the root-power of all watery elements, such as mucus, chyle, semen, etc., and of the sense of taste; vāyu represents that which operates as the fivefold life-functionings of prāṇa, apāṇa, samāna, udāna, and vyāna. Đàlhaṇa says further that sattva, rajas and tamas refer to manas, the mind-organ, which is a product of their combined evolution. The five senses contribute to life by their cognitive functionings. The first passage seemed to indicate that life was manifested as a result of the union of semen and blood; the second passage considered the connection of the soul with its subtle body (bhitātmā) necessary for evolving the semen-blood into life. The third passage introduces, in addition to these, the five senses, sattva, rajas, and tamas, and the place of semen-blood is taken up by the three root-powers of agni, and vāyu. These three powers are more or less of a hypothetical nature, absorbing within them a number of functionings and body-constituents. The reason for these three views in the three successive chapters cannot be satisfactorily explained, except on the supposition that Suśruta's work underwent three different revisions at three different times. Vāgbhaṭa the elder says that the moment the semen and the blood are united, the life principle (jīva), being moved by manas (mano-jāvena), tainted, as the latter is, with the afflictions (kleśa) of attachment, etc., comes in touch with it¹.

The doctrine of a subtle body, as referred to in the medical works, may suitably be compared with the Sāṃkhya view. Cakrapāṇi himself, in explaining Caraka-saṃhitā, iv. 2. 35, says that this doctrine of a subtle body (ātivāhika sārira) is described in the āgama, and by āgama the Sāṃkhya āgama is to be understood (tenā āgama eva sāṃkhya-darśana-rūpād ātivāhika-sārīrāt). The Sāṃkhya-kārikā 39 speaks of a subtle body (sūkṣma deha) and the body inherited from

¹ gate purāṇe rajasi nave 'cathite sūdhe garbhāryāye mārga ca bijātmanā śuklam avikṛtam avikṛtena vāyunā preritam anyaś ca mahā-bhūtair amugatam ārtavena abhimārčitam aṃvākṣaṃ eva rāgādi-kleśa-vālomvartinā sva-karma-codita mano-jāvena jīvenābhāsāmisāraṃ garbhāṣayam upayāti. Aṣṭāṅga-saṃgraha, ii. 2. Indu, in explaining this, says, "bijātmanā garbha-kāraṇa-mahā-bhūta-svabhāvānā... sūkṣma-vairāpiḥ manas-sahacārībhīṣ tamāsrākhyāv mahā-bhūtair amugatam tri-kṣetra-prāptābh√karma-teṣād ārtavena mīrī bhātām anvākṣaṃ mīrī-bhātā-hina-hālaṃ eva... mano-jāvena jīvenābhāsāmisārāṃ prāpta-saṃyogān garbhāṣayāṃ śuklam upayāti." His further explanations of the nature of applications of the jīva show that he looked up Paṭanājali's Yoga-sūtras for the details of āṣṭudyā, etc., and the other kleśas.
the parents. The sūkhṣma continues to exist till salvation is attained, and at each birth it receives a new body and at each death it leaves it. It is constituted of mahat, ahamkāra, the eleven senses and the five tan-mātras. On account of its association with the buddhi, which bears the impress of virtue, vice, and other intellectual defects and accomplishments, it becomes itself associated with these, just as a cloth obtains fragrance through its connection with campak flowers of sweet odour; and hence it suffers successive rebirths, till the buddhi becomes dissociated from it by the attainment of true discriminative knowledge. The necessity of admitting a subtle body is said to lie in the fact that the buddhi, with the ahamkāra and the senses, cannot exist without a supporting body; so in the interval between one death and another birth the buddhi, etc. require a supporting body, and the subtle body is this support. In the Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya, v. 103, it is said that this subtle body is like a little tapering thing no bigger than a thumb, and that yet it pervades the whole body, just as a little flame pervades a whole room by its rays. The Vyāsa-bhāṣya, in refuting the Sāṃkhya view, says that according to it the citta (mind), like the rays of a lamp in a jug or in a palace, contracts and dilates according as the body that it occupies is bigger or smaller. Vācaspati, in explaining the Yoga view as expounded by Vyāsa, says that in the Sāṃkhya view the citta is such that it cannot, simply by contraction and expansion, leave any body at death and occupy another body without intermediate relationship with a subtle body (ātivāhika-śarīra). But, if the citta cannot itself leave a body and occupy another, how can it connect itself with a subtle body at the time of death? If this is to be done through another body, and that through another, then we are led to a vicious infinite. If it is argued that the citta is connected with such a subtle body from beginningless time, then the reply is that such a subtle body has never been perceived by anyone (na khalu etad adhyakṣa-gocaram); nor can it be regarded as indispensably necessary by inference, since the Yoga view can explain the situation without the hypothesis of any such body. The citta is all-pervading,

1 Sāṃkhya-tattva-haumudi, 39, 40, 41.
2 yathā dipasya sarva-grhya-tyāpīte 'pi kalikā-kārataṃ... tathaiva liṅga-dehasya deha-tyāpīte 'py anurūpa-parimāṇatvam. Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya, v. 103.
and each soul is associated with a separate citta. Each citta connects itself with a particular body by virtue of the fact that its manifestations (vyrtti) are seen in that body. Thus the manifestations of the all-pervading citta of a soul cease to appear in its dying body and become operative in a new body that is born. Thus there is no necessity of admitting a subtle body (ātivāhikatvac tatya na mṛgyāmahe).

The Vaiśeṣika also declines to believe in the existence of a subtle body, and assigns to it no place in the development of the foetus. The development of the foetus is thus described by Śridhara in his Nyāya-kandaṭa: “After the union of the father’s semen and the mother’s blood there is set up in the atoms constituting them a change through the heat of the womb, such that their old colour, form, etc. become destroyed and new similar qualities are produced; and in this way, through the successive formation of dyads and triads, the body of the foetus develops; and, when such a body is formed, there enters into it the mind (antahkarana), which could not have entered in the semen-blood stage, since the mind requires a body to support it (na tu śukra-sonitavasthiyāṁ suri-rāśrayatvāṁ manasah). Small quantities of food-juice of the mother go to nourish it. Then, through the unseen power (adṛṣṭa), the foetus is disintegrated by the heat in the womb into the state of atoms, and atoms of new qualities, together with those of the food-juice, conglomerate together to form a new body.” According to this view the subtle body and the mind have nothing to do with the formation and development of the foetus. Heat is the main agent responsible for all disintegration and re-combination involved in the process of the formation of the foetus.

The Nyāya does not seem to have considered this as an important question, and it also denies the existence of a subtle body. The soul, according to the Nyāya, is all-pervading, and the Mahā-bhārata passage quoted above, in which Yama draws out the puruṣa

1 Vācaspati’s Tatvavaivād, iv. 10. Reference is made to Mahā-bhārata, iii. 296. 17, anuvṛṣṭa-mātram puruṣaṁ nīcaḥkāṣa yamo balā. Vācaspati says that puruṣa is not a physical thing and hence it cannot be drawn out of the body. It must therefore be interpreted in a remote sense as referring to the cessation of manifestation of citta in the dying body (na căyā niśkāṣaḥ sambhavati, ity aupacārito vyākhyeyas tathā ca ātīte cittany ca tatra tatra vyṛty-ahātw eva niśkṛṣaṁ). The Sāṁbhāya-pravacana-bhāṣya, v. 103, says that the thumb-like puruṣa referred to in Mahā-bhārata, iii. 296. 17, which Yama drew from the body of Satyavān, has the size of the subtle body (linga-deha).

2 Nyāya-kandaṭa, Vizianagram Sanskrit series, 1895, p. 33.
of the size of a thumb, has, according to Nyāya, to be explained away\(^1\). In rebirth it is only the all-pervading soul which becomes connected with a particular body (ya eva dehāntara-saṅgamo 'syā, tam eva taj-jñāh-para-lokam āhit\(^2\)).

Candrakīrti gives us an account of the Buddhist view from the Śāli-stamba-sūtra\(^3\). The foetus is produced by the combination of the six constituents (saṃñām dhātūnām samavāyāt). That which consolidates (saṃśīlasya) the body is called earth (prthivi-dhātu); that which digests the food and drink of the body is called fire (tejo-dhātu); that which produces inhalation and exhalation is called air (vāyu-dhātu); that which produces the pores of the body (antarh-saṣiṣryam) is called ether (ākāṣa-dhātu); that by which knowledge is produced is called the vijñāna-dhātu. It is by the combination of them all that a body is produced (sarvesāṃ sama-vāyāt kāyasotpatīr bhavati). The seed of vijñāna produces the germ of name and form (nāma-rūpaṅkura) by combination with many other diverse causes. The foetus is thus produced of itself, not by another, nor by both itself and another, nor by god, nor by time, nor by nature, nor by one cause, nor by no cause, but by the combination of the mother's and the father's parts at the proper season\(^4\). The combination of father's and mother's parts gives us the five dhātus, which operate together when they are in combination with the sixth dhātu, the vijñāna.

The view that the foetus is the result of the joint effect of the six dhātus reminds us of a similar expression in Caraka, iv. 3. Caraka gives there a summary of the discussions amongst various sages on the subject of the causes of the formation and development of the foetus: where there is a union between a man with effective semen and a woman with no defect of organ, ovary and blood, if at the time of the union of the semen and blood the soul comes in touch with it through the mind, then the foetus begins to develop\(^5\). When it is taken care of by proper nourishment, etc., then at the right time

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\(^1\) tasmān na hṛt-pūndārīke yāvad-avasthānam ātmanah ata eva aṅguṣṭha-mātraṁ puruṣam nicakarṣa balād yama iti Vāsya-vacanam evam-param avaṣāntavyam (Jayanta’s Nyāya-maṇḍīr, p. 469).

\(^2\) Ibid. p. 473.

\(^3\) Mādhyamika-vṛtti (Bibliotheca Buddhica), pp. 560−61.

\(^4\) Ibid. p. 567.

\(^5\) In the Vaiśeṣika also the all-pervading ātman comes into touch with the foetus through the manas; but the difference is this, that here the manas is an operative factor causing the development of the foetus, whereas there the manas goes to the foetus when through the influence of body-heat it has already developed into a body.
the child is born, and the whole development is due to the combined effect of all the elements mentioned above (samudayād eṣāṁ bhāvānāṁ). The foetus is born of elements from the mother and the father, the self, the proper hygienic care of the parents' bodies (sātmya) and the food-juice; and there is also operant with these the sattva or manas, which is an intermediate vehicle serving to connect the soul with a former body when it leaves one (aupapāduka).\textsuperscript{1} Bharadvāja said that none of these causes can be considered as valid; for, in spite of the union of the parents, it often happens that they remain childless; the self cannot produce the self; for, if it did, did it produce itself after being born or without being born? In both cases it is impossible for it to produce itself. Moreover, if the self had the power of producing itself, it would not have cared to take birth in undesirable places and with defective powers, as sometimes happens. Again, proper hygienic habits cannot be regarded as the cause; for there are many who have these, but have no children, and there are many who have not these, but have children. If it was due to food-juice, then all people would have got children. Again, it is not true that the sattva issuing forth from one body connects itself with another; for, if it were so, we should all have remembered the events of our past life. So none of the above causes can be regarded as valid. To this Ātreya replied that it is by the combined effect of all the above elements that a child is produced, and not by any one of them separately.\textsuperscript{2} This idea is again repeated in iv. 3. 20, where it is said that just as a medical room (kītāgāram vartulākāram grham jaintāka-sveda-pratipāditam—Cakrapāni) is made up of various kinds of things, or just as a chariot is made up of a collection of its various parts, so is the foetus made up of the combination of various entities which contribute to the formation of the embryo and its development (nānāvidhānāṁ garbha-kārānāṁ bhāvānāṁ samudayād abhinirvartate).\textsuperscript{3} The idea of such a combined effect of causes as leading to the production of a perfect whole seems to have a peculiar Buddhist ring about it.

Bharadvāja, in opposing the above statement of Ātreya, asks what, if the foetus is the product of a number of combined causes,

\textsuperscript{1} Caraka-saṁhitā, iv. 3. 3.
\textsuperscript{2} neti bhagavān Ātreyaḥ sarvebhya ebhyo bhūvebhyaḥ samuditebhyo garbhō bhinirvartate. Ibid. iv. 3. 11.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid. iv. 3. 20.
is the definite order in which they co-operate together to produce the various parts (*katham ayam sandhiyate*)? Again, how is it that a child born of a woman is a human child and not that of any other animal? If, again, man is born out of man, why is not the son of a stupid person stupid, of a blind man blind, and of a madman mad? Moreover, if it is argued that the self perceives by the eye colours, by the ear sounds, by the smell odours, by the organ of taste the different tastes, and feels by the skin the different sensations of touch, and for that reason the child does not inherit the qualities of the father, then it has to be admitted that the soul can have knowledge only when there are senses and is devoid of it when there are no senses; in that case the soul is not unchangeable, but is liable to change (*yatras caitad ubhayam sambhavati jñatvam ajñatvam ca sa-vikāraś cātmā*). If the soul perceives the objects of sense through the activity of the senses, such as perceiving and the like, then it cannot know anything when it has no senses, and, when it is unconscious, it cannot be the cause of the body-movements or of any of its other activities and consequently cannot be called the soul, *ātman*. It is therefore simple nonsense to say that the soul perceives colours, etc. by its senses.

To this Ātreya replies that there are four kinds of beings, viz. those born from ovaries, eggs, sweat and vegetables. Beings in each class exist in an innumerable diversity of forms. The forms that the foetus-producing elements (*garbhā-karaṁ bhāvāḥ*) assume depend upon the form of the body where they assemble. Just as gold, silver, copper, lead, etc. assume the form of any mould in which they are poured, so, when the foetus-producing elements assemble in a particular body, the foetus takes that particular form. But a man is not infected with the defect or disease of his father, unless it be so bad or chronic as to have affected his semen. Each of our limbs and organs had their germs in the semen of the father, and, when the disease or defect of the father is so deep-rooted as to have affected (*upatāpa*) the germ part of any particular organ in the seed, then the child produced out of the semen is born defective in that limb; but, if the defect or disease of the father is so superficial that his semen remains unaffected, then the disease or defect is not inherited by the son. The child does not owe sense-organs to his parents; he alone is responsible for the goodness or badness of his sense-organs; for

1 *Caraka-samhitā*, iv. 3. 21.  
these are born from his own self (ātma-jānindriyāṇa). The presence or absence of the sense-organs is due to his own destiny or the fruits of karma (daiva). So there is no definite law that the sons of idiots or men with defective senses should necessarily be born idiots or be otherwise defective. The self (ātman) is conscious only when the sense-organs exist. The self is never without the sattva or the mind-organ, and through it there is always some kind of consciousness in the self. The self, as the agent, cannot without the sense-organs have any knowledge of the external world leading to practical work; no practical action for which several accessories are required can be performed unless these are present; a potter who knows how to make a jug cannot succeed in making it unless he has the organs with which to make it. The fact that the self has consciousness even when the senses do not operate is well illustrated by our dream-knowledge when the senses lie inoperative. Ātreyā further says that, when the senses are completely restrained and the manas, or mind-organ, is also restrained and concentrated in the self, one can have knowledge of all things even without the activity of the senses. The self is thus of itself the knower and the agent.

This view of Caraka, as interpreted by Cakrapāni, seems to be somewhat new. For the self is neither pure intelligence, like the puruṣa of the Sāmkhya-yoga, nor the unity of being, intelligence and bliss, like that of the Vedānta. Here the soul is the knower by virtue of its constant association with manas. In this, however, we are nearer to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view. But in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view the soul is not always in contact with manas and is not always conscious. The manas in that view is atomic. The view that the

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1 Caraka-sanhitā, iv. 3. 25.
2 Ibid. iv. 3. 26, na hy-asattvaḥ kadācid ātmā sattva-viśeṣāc copalabhyaṃ jñāna-viśeṣāḥ. Cakrapāni, in commenting on this, says that our knowledge of the external world is due to the operation of the sense-organs in association with the mind-organ. If these sense-organs do not exist, we cannot have any knowledge of the external world, but the internal organ of mind is always associated with the self: so the knowledge which is due to this mind-organ is ever present in the self (yat tu kevala-mano-jānyam ātma-jñānam, tad bhavaty eva sarvadā). It seems that both sattva and manas are used to denote the mind-organ.
3 The word kārya-jñānam in Caraka-sanhitā, iv. 3. 27, has been explained by Cakrapāni as kārya-pravṛtti-janaka-bhāya-viśaya-jñānam. The knowledge that the self has when it has no sense-organs operating in association with the mind has no object (nirviśaya); in other words, this knowledge which the self always has is formless.
4 Ibid. iv. 3. 31.
5 vināśārangāniṃ samādhi-balād evo yasmāt sarvajñī bhavati; tasmāj jñā-śva- bhāva eva nirindriyo 'py ātmā (Cakrapāni's Caraka-tātparya-śākā, iv. 3. 28-29).
soul has always a formless consciousness has undoubtedly a Vedântic or Sâmkhyaic tinge; but the other details evidently separate this view from the accepted interpretations of these schools. The theory of the soul, however, as here indicated comes as a digression and will have to be discussed more adequately later on.

On the subject of the existence of subtle bodies we have already quoted the views of different Indian schools of philosophy for the purpose of suggesting comparisons or contrasts with the views of Caraka. Before concluding this section reference must be made to the Vedânta views with regard to the nature of subtle bodies.

According to the Vedânta, as interpreted by Śaṅkara, the subtle body is constituted of five particles of the elements of matter (bhūta-sūkṣmaih), with which are also associated the five vāyus, prāṇa, apāṇa, etc.¹ Those who perform good deeds go to the region of the moon, and those who commit sins suffer in the kingdom of Yama and then are again born in this world². Those who, as a reward of their good deeds, go to the kingdom of the moon and afterwards practically exhaust the whole of their fund of virtue and consequently cannot stay there any longer, begin their downward journey to this earth. They pass through ākāśa, air, smoke and cloud and then are showered on the ground with the rains and absorbed by the plants and again taken into the systems of persons who eat them, and again discharged as semen into the wombs of their wives and are reborn again. In the kingdom of the moon they had watery bodies (candra-maṇḍale yad am-mayam śarīram upabhogārtham ārabdham) for the enjoyment available in that kingdom; and, when they exhaust their good deeds through enjoyment and can no longer hold that body, they get a body which is like ākāśa and are thus driven by the air and come into association with smoke and cloud. At this stage, and even when they are absorbed into the body of plants, they neither enjoy pleasure nor suffer pain. A difference must be made between the condition of those who are endowed with plant-bodies as a punishment for their misdeeds and those who pass through the plant-bodies merely as stations on their way to rebirth. In the case of the former the plant life is a life of enjoyment and sorrow, whereas in the case of the latter there is neither enjoyment nor sorrow.

¹ The Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara on the Brahma-sūtra, III. i. 1–7.
² Ibid. III. i. 13.
Even when the plant-bodies are chewed and powdered the souls residing in them as stations of passage do not suffer pain; for they are only in contact with these plant-bodies (candra-maṇḍala-
skhalitānāṁ vrihy ādi-saṁleśa-mātraṁ tad-bhāvaḥ)\(^1\).

We thus see that it is only the Śaṅkhya and the Vedānta that agree to the existence of a subtle body and are thus in accord with the view of Caraka. But Caraka is more in agreement with the Vedānta in the sense that, while according to the Śaṅkhya it is the tan-mātras which constitute the subtle body, it is the fine particles of the gross elements of matter that constitute the subtle bodies in the case both of the Vedānta and of Caraka. The soul in one atomic moment becomes associated successively with ākāśa, air, light, heat, water, and earth (and not in any other order) at the time of its entrance into the womb\(^2\).

Foetal Development\(^3\).

When the different elements of matter in conjunction with the subtle body are associated with the self, they have the appearance of a little lump of mucus (kheṭa-bhūta) with all its limbs undifferentiated and undeveloped to such an extent that they may as well be said

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\(^1\) Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara, III. i. 25, also III. i. 22–27.

\(^2\) Caraka-saṃhitā, IV. 4. 8. Cakrapāṇi, commenting on this, says that there is no special reason why the order of acceptance of gross elements should be from subtler to grosser; it has to be admitted only on the evidence of the scriptures—

\[ \text{ayaṁ ca bhūta-grahaṇa-krama āgama-siddha eva nātra yuktis tathā-vidhā hrdayayāgamāsti.} \]

\(^3\) In the Garbha Upaniṣad, the date of which is unknown, there is a description of foetal development. Its main points of interest may thus be summarized: the hard parts of the body are earth, the liquid parts are water, that which is hot (uṣṇa) is heat-light (tejāḥ), that which moves about is vāyu, that which is vacuous is ākāśa. The body is further said to depend on six tastes (ṣad-āśraya), sweet (madhura), acid (amlā), salt (lavaṇa), bitter (tiktā), hot (kaṭu) and pungent (kaśāya), and it is made up of seven dhātus of chyle (rāsa), blood (śoṇita) and flesh (māṃsa). From the six kinds of rāsa comes the śoṇita, from śoṇita comes māṃsa, from māṃsa comes fat (medas), from it the tendons (sūryu), from the sūryu bones (astha), from the bones the marrow (maṇḍa), from the marrow the semen (iṣkra). By the second night after the union of semen and blood the foetus is of the form of a round lump called halala, at the eighth night it is of the form of a vesicle called bhūḍa, after a fortnight it assumes the form of a spheroid, pīṇḍa; in two months the head appears, in three months the feet, in four months the abdomen, heels and the pelvic portions appear, in the fifth month the spine appears, in the sixth month the mouth, nose, eyes and ears develop; in the seventh month the foetus becomes endowed with life (jīvav saṃyukto bhavati), in the eighth month it becomes fully developed. By an excess of semen over blood a male child is produced, by the excess of blood a female child is produced, when the two are equal a hermaphrodite is produced. When air somehow enters and divides the semen into two, twins are produced. If the minds of the parents are disturbed (tyākṣulita-mānasah), the issue becomes either blind or lame or dwarf. In the ninth month, when the foetus is well developed
not to exist as to exist. Suśruta remarks that the two main constituents of the body, semen and blood, are respectively made up of the watery element of the moon (saumya) and the fiery element (āgneya); the other elements in atomic particles are also associated with them, and all these mutually help one another and co-operate together for the formation of the body. Suśruta further goes on to say that at the union of female and male the heat (tejāḥ) generated rouses the vāyu, and through the coming together of heat and air the semen is discharged. Caraka, however, thinks that the cause of discharge of semen is joy (harṣa). The semen is not produced from the body, but remains in all parts of the body, and it is the joy which causes the discharge and the entrance of the semen into the uterus. Thus he says that, being ejected by the self as joy (harṣa-bhūtenātatmanodāritaś cādhīṣṭhitaiś ca), the semen constituent or the seed, having come out of the man’s body, becomes combined with the menstrual product (ärtava) in the uterus (garbhaśāya) after it has entrance thereinto through the proper channel (ucitena pathā). According to Suśruta the ejected semen enters into the female organ (yonim abhiprapadyate) and comes into association there with the menstrual product. At that very moment, the soul with its subtle body comes into association with it and thus becomes associated with the material characteristics of sattva,

with all its organs, it remembers its previous birth and knows its good and bad deeds and repents that, on account of its previous karma, it is suffering the pains of the life of a foetus, and resolves that, if it can once come out, it will follow the Śāṅkhya-yoga discipline. But as soon as the child is born it comes into connection with Vaiṣṇava vāyu and forgets all its previous births and resolutions. A body is called śartra, because three fires reside in it (tārayante), viz. the kośṭhāgni, dārīanāgni and jñānāgni. The kośṭhāgni digests all kinds of food and drink, by the dārīanāgni forms and colours are perceived, by the jñānāgni one performs good and bad deeds. This Upaniṣad counts the cranial bones as being four, the vital spots (marmaṇ) as being 107, the joints as 180, the tissues (snāyu) as 109, the śīrā, or veins, as 700, the marrow places as 500, and the bones as 300.

1 Suśruta-saṃhitā, III. 3. 3.
3 Caraka-saṃhitā, IV. 4. 7.
4 Cakrapāṇi, commenting on Caraka-saṃhitā, IV. 4. 7, says that “nāṅgebhyaḥ śukram utpadyate kintu śukra-rūpata-vyājya,” i.e. the semen is not produced from the different parts of the body, but it exists as it is and is only manifested in a visible form after a particular operation (Suśruta, III. 3. 4).
5 As Daḥaṇa interprets this, the female organ here means the uterus; thus Daḥaṇa says, “jones tritįdva-vātavasiti-garbhaśāyaṁ pratiśpadyate,” i.e. the semen enters into the third chamber of the female organ, the place of the foetus. The uterus is probably considered here as the third chamber, the preceding two being probably the vulva and the vagina.
rajas and tamaś, and godly (deva), demonic (asura), and other characteristics. Caraka, referring to the question of the association of the soul with the material elements, says that this is due to the operation of the soul acting through the mind-organ (sattva-karana)\(^1\). Cakrapañi, in commenting on the above passage, says that the self (ātman) is inactive; activity is however attributed to the soul on account of the operative mind-organ which is associated with it. This, however, seems to be a compromise on the part of Cakrapañi with the views of the traditional Sāṃkhya philosophy, which holds the soul to be absolutely inactive; but the text of the Caraka-saṃhitā does not here say anything on the inactivity of the soul; for Caraka describes the soul as active (pravartate) as agent (kartri) and as universal performer (viśva-karman), and the sattva is described here only as an organ of the soul (sattva-karana).

In the first month, the foetus has a jelly-like form (kalala)\(^2\); in the second month, the material constituents of the body having undergone a chemical change (abhīprapacyamāna) due to the action of cold, heat and air (śtosmānilaiḥ), the foetus becomes hard (ghanā). If it is the foetus of a male child, it is spherical (pīnda); if it is of a female child, it is elliptical (peśī); if it is of a hermaphrodite, it is like the half of a solid sphere (arbuda)\(^3\). In the third month five special eminences are seen, as also the slight differentiation of limbs. In the fourth month the differentiation of the limbs is much more definite and well manifested; and owing to the manifestation of the heart of the foetus the entity of consciousness becomes also manifested, since the heart is the special seat of consciousness; so from the fourth month the foetus manifests a desire for the objects of the senses. In the fifth month the consciousness becomes more awakened; in the sixth intelligence begins to develop; in the seventh the division and differentiation of

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1 Sattva-karana guṇa-graḥanāya pravartate—Caraka-saṃhitā, iv. 4. 8.
2 Cakrapañi rightly points out that guṇa here means material elements which possess qualities—guṇavanti bhūtāni. The word guṇa is used in all these passages in the sense of material entity or bhūta. Though guṇa means a quality and guṇin a substance, yet the view adopted here ignores the difference between qualities and substances, and guṇa, the ordinary word for quality, stands here for substance (guṇa-gumin abhedopacārāt—Cakrapañi, ibid.).
3 Daṇḍāṇa explains kalala as singhāna-prabhyan.
4 On the meanings of the words peśī and arbuda there is a difference of opinion between Daṇḍāṇa and Gayā. Thus Gayā says that peśī means quadrangular (catur-asra) and arbuda means the form of the bud of a silk cotton tree (śālmali-mukulākārām).
limbs become complete; in the eighth, the vital element (ojas) still remains unsettled, and so, if a child is born at this time, it becomes short-lived.\(^1\)

Caraka, in describing the part played by different material elements in the formation of the body, says that from the element ākāśa are formed sound, the organ of hearing, lightness (lāghava), subtleness of structure (saṃśmya) and porosity (vireka); from vāyu (air) are formed the sensation of touch, the organ of touch, roughness, power of movement, the disposition of the constituent elements (dhātu-vyūhana), and bodily efforts; from fire, vision, the organ of vision, digestion, heat, etc.; from water, the sensation of taste and the taste-organ, cold, softness, smoothness and watery characteristics; from earth, smell, organ of smell, heaviness, steadiness and hardness. The parts of the body which are thus formed from different material elements grow and develop with the accession of those elements from which they have grown\(^2\). As the whole world is made up of five elements (bhūta), so the human body is also made up of five elements\(^3\). Caraka maintains that the senses and all other limbs of the body which grow before birth make their appearance simultaneously in the third month\(^4\). When, in the third month, the sense-organs grow, there grow in the heart feelings and desires. In the fourth month the foetus becomes hard, in the fifth it gets more flesh and blood, in the sixth there is greater development of strength and colour, in the seventh it becomes complete with all its limbs, and in the eighth month there is a constant exchange of vital power (ojas) between the mother and the foetus. The foetus being not yet perfectly developed, the vital fluid passes from the mother to the foetus; but, since the latter cannot retain it, it returns to the mother\(^5\). Cakrapāni, commenting on this, says that such an exchange is only possible because the foetus

\(^1\) Suśruta-saṃhitā, III. 3. 30.
\(^2\) Caraka-saṃhitā, IV. 4. 12.
\(^3\) evam ayaṃ loka-saṃmitaḥ puruṣaḥ—yācanto hi loke bhūva-viśeṣās tāvantaḥ puruṣe, yācanto puruṣe tāvanta loke (Caraka-saṃhitā, IV. 4. 13). In ibid. IV. 3, it is said that the foetus gets its skin, blood, flesh, fat, navel, heart, kloma, spleen, liver, kidneys, bladder, colon, stomach, the larger intestines, and the upper and the lower rectum from the mother, and its hair, beard, nails, teeth, bones, veins and semen from the father; but, however this may be, it is certain that the development of all these organs is really due to the assimilation of the five elements of matter. So the development of the human foetus is, like the development of all other things in the world, due to the accretion of material elements.
\(^4\) Ibid. IV. 4. 14.
\(^5\) mātur ojo garbhām gacchattī yad ucayate, tad-garbhaṇja eva mātya-sambuddham san mātroja iti vyapadiśyate. Cakrapāni, IV. 4. 24.
is still undeveloped, and the foetus, being associated with the mother, serves also as the mother’s vital power (ojas); for otherwise, if the ojas went out altogether from the mother, she could not live.

There is a good deal of divergence of opinion as regards the order of the appearance of the different limbs of the foetus. Two different schools of quarrelling authorities are referred to by Caraka and Suśruta. Thus, according to Kumāraśīras and Śaunaka the head appears first, because it is the seat of the senses; according to Kānkāyana, the physician of Bālhika, and Kṛtvārya the heart appears first, because according to Kṛtvārya (as reported in Suśruta) this is the seat of consciousness (cetanā) and of buddhi and manas; according to Bhadrakāpya (as reported by Caraka) the navel comes first, since this is the place where food is stored, and according to Pārāśara (as reported in Suśruta), because the whole body grows from there. According to Bhadra Śaunaka (as reported by Caraka) the smaller intestine and the larger intestine (pakvāsaya) appear first, since this is the seat of air (mārutādhi-sthānatavāt); according to Bādiśa (as reported by Caraka) the hands and feet come out first, because these are the principal organs, and according to Mārkaṇḍeya (as reported by Suśruta), because they are the main roots of all efforts (tan-mūlatvāc ceṣṭāyāḥ); according to Vaideha Janaka (as reported by Caraka) the senses appear first, for they are the seats of understanding (buddhy-adhiṣṭhāna); according to Māricī (as reported by Caraka) it is not possible to say which part of the body develops first, because it cannot be seen by anyone (parokṣatvād acintyam); according to Subhūti Gautama (as reported by Suśruta) the middle part of the body (madhya-sartra) appears first, since the development of other parts of the body is dependent on it (tan-nibaddhatvāt sarva-gātra-sambhavasya); according to Dhanvantari (as reported by both Caraka and Suśruta) all the parts of the body begin to develop together (yugapat sarvāṇābhinireṛtti), though on account of their fineness and more or less undifferentiated character such development may not be properly noticed, as with the parts of a growing bamboo-shoot or a mango fruit (garbhayaśākṣmatvān nopalabhyaṃ vamśāṅkuravat cūta-phalavac ca)\(^1\). Just as the juicy parts and the stone, which are undifferentiated in a green mango at its early stages, are all found clearly developed and differentiated when it

\(^1\) Suśruta-saṃhitā, III. 3. 32 and Caraka-saṃhitā, IV. 6. 21.
is ripe, so, when the human foetus is even in the early stages of development, all its undifferentiated parts are already developing there pari passu, though on account of their fineness of structure and growth they cannot then be distinguished.

Referring to the early process of the growth of the foetus, Suśruta says that, as the semen and blood undergo chemical changes through heat, seven different layers of skin (kalā) are successively produced, like the creamy layers (santānīkā) formed in milk. The first layer, one-eighteenth of a paddy seed (dhānya) in thickness, is called avabhāsinī; the second, one-sixteenth of a paddy seed, lohitā; the third, one-twelfth of a paddy seed, śvetā; the fourth, one-eighth, is called tāmrā; the fifth, one-fifth, vedīti; the sixth, of the size of a paddy seed, rohīti; the seventh, of the size of two paddy seeds, māṃsa-dharā. All these seven layers of skin come to about six paddy seeds, or roughly one inch. This is said to hold good only in those places of the body which are fleshy. Apart from these seven kalās of skin there are also seven kalās between the different dhātus. A dhātu (from the root dhā, to hold) is that which supports or sustains the body, such as chyle (rasa), blood (rakta), flesh (māṃsa), fat (medas), bone (asthī), marrow (majjā), semen (śukra) and the last vital fluid (ojas). Lymph (kapha), bile (pitta) and excreta (purīsa) have also to be counted as dhātus. These kalās, however, are not visible; their existence is inferred from the fact that the different dhātus must have separate places allotted to them, and the kalās are supposed to divide the layer of one dhātu from another and are covered with lymph and tissues (snāyu)¹. In the first kalā, known as the māṃsa-dharā, the veins, tissues, etc. of the flesh are found; in the second, the rakta-dharā, is found the blood inside the flesh; in the third, called the medo-dharā, there is the fat which is found in the abdomen and also between the smaller bones². The fourth kalā is the śleṣma-dharā, which exists in the joints; the fifth is the purīsa-dharā, which exists in the intestine (pakvāsaya) and separates the excreta; the sixth and the seventh are the pitta-dharā and the śukra-dharā.

Suśruta thinks that the liver and spleen are produced from

¹ The kalā is defined by Vṛddha-Vāgbhaṭa as yas tu dhātavatāyaṃtareṇa kledo 'catiṣṭhate yathāvam uṣmabhīr vipakvaḥ snāyu-śleṣma-jarāyu-ucchannāḥ kāśṭha iva sāro dhātuvāṣtra-ṣeṣoḥ 'pātāt kalā-sāmphīnāḥ (Aṣṭāṅga-samgraha, Śāstra, v).
² The fat inside the smaller bones is called medas, whereas that inside the larger ones is called majjā, or marrow, and the fat of pure flesh only is called vāpā, or fat.
blood, *pupphusa* (lungs) from the froth of blood, and *uṇḍuka* (a gland in the colon?) from the dirt of blood (*śonaīta-kīṭṭa-prabhava*). The best parts (*prasāda*) of blood and lymph are acted upon by bile, and *vāyu* works in association therewith; by this process the entrails, rectum and bladder are produced; and, when the heating process goes on in the abdomen, the tongue is produced, as the essence of lymph, blood and flesh. The air, being associated with heat, enters the flesh and changes the currents, the muscles (*peśi*) are differentiated, and by the oily part of fat the *vāyu* produces the veins (*śirā*) and tissues (*snāyu*). From the essential part of blood and fat the kidneys (*vṛkka*) are produced, from the essential part of flesh, blood, lymph and fat the testicles, and from the essence of blood and lymph the heart, which is the centre of the *dhamanis* through which flows the current of life (*prāṇa-vahā*). Underneath the heart on the left side there are the spleen and the *pupphusa*, and on the right side the liver and the *kloma* (right lung?), and this is particularly the place of consciousness. At the time of sleep, when it is covered with *śleṣman* having a super-abundance of *tamas*, the heart remains contracted.

The foetus grows through the chyle of the mother and also through the inflation of the body of the foetus by air1. The navel of the body is the heating centre (*jyotih-sthāna*), and the air, starting from here, continues to inflate the body.

It must be borne in mind that a foetus is the product of several causes operating jointly. A defect of any particular limb at birth is due to some defect in that part of one or more of the operating causes through the influence of which that particular limb was produced. The cause of foetal development is not a question of organs or limbs which were absolutely non-existent: they already existed, in the potential form, in the causes operating jointly. The joint causes did not produce something absolutely new, but their joint operation helped to actualize all that was already inherent in them. Of all the joint causes the self remains unchanged in all changes of the body. The changes of pleasure and pain or such other characteristics as are considered to be due to the soul are really due either to *sattva* or *manas*, or to the body2. Cakrapāṇi, commenting on this, says that the fact that a soul may

1 *Suśruta-saṃhitā*, III. 4. 57.
2 *nir-vikāraḥ paras te omā sarva-bhūtānāṁ nirviśeṣa-sattva-saṁrayos tu viśeṣād viśeṣopalabdhīḥ. Caraka-saṃhitā, IV. 4. 34.
take its birth as this or that animal does not imply that the soul is liable to change (paramātma-viśkāra na bhavanti); for such a change is due to the excessive preponderance of sattva, rajas or tamas, which are in reality due to virtue and vice, which in themselves are but the characteristics of mind (sattva-rajas-tamaḥ-prabalatā-rūpa-viśkāra-janajanyāna-dharmādharma-janyāny eva)\(^1\).

There are three kinds of morbid elements (doṣa) of the body, viz. vāta, pitta and sleshman, and two morbid elements which affect the mind (sattva), viz. rajas and tamas. By the disorder of the first three the body becomes diseased, and by that of the second two the mind becomes affected. These, however, will be dealt with more fully later on.

**Growth and Disease.**

The three elements, vāyu, pitta and kapha, are counted both as constituents (dhātus) and as doṣas, or morbid elements. Dhātus are those elements which uphold the body. The body is the conglomeration (samudāya) of the modification of five bhūtas, or elements, and it works properly so long as these elements are in proper proportions (sama-yoga-vāhin) in the body\(^2\). The modifications of the five elements which co-operate together to uphold the body are called dhātus. When one or more of the dhātus fall off or exceed the proper quantity (dhātu-vaiśamya), one or more dhātus may be in excess or deficient either in partial tendencies or in entirety (akārtnyena prakṛtyā ca). It has to be noted that, as Cakrapāni explains, not every kind of excess or deficiency of dhātus produces dhātu-vaiśamya, or disturbance of the equilibrium of the dhātus: it is only when such deficiency or excess produces affections of the body that it is called dhātu-vaiśamya. That amount of excess or deficiency which does not produce trouble or affection of the body is called the normal measure of the dhātus (prākṛta-māna)\(^3\). It is indeed obvious that such a definition of prākṛta-māna and dhātu-vaiśamya involves a vicious circle, since the normal measure or prākṛta-māna of dhātus is said to be that which exists when there is no trouble or affection, and dhātu-vaiśamya is that which exists when there is trouble

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1 Cakrapāni's commentary, Caraka, iv. 4.
2 Caraka-saṃhitā, iv. 6. 4. Cakrapāni, in commenting on the word sama-yoga-vāhin, explains sama as meaning ucita-pramāṇa (proper quantity).
3 etad eva dhātunāṃ prākṛta-mānam yad avikāra-kāri, Cakrapāni's comment on Caraka-saṃhitā, iv. 6. 4.
in the body; the trouble or affection of the body has thus to be defined in terms of dhātu-vaiśamya. The only escape from this charge is that dhātu-vaiśamya and disease are synonymous, and the prākrta-māna of dhātus is the same as health. When the dhātus are in their normal measure, there cannot be any vaiśamya, except of a local nature, as when, for example, the pitta existing in its own proper measure is somehow carried by vāyu to a part of the body and there is consequently a local excess. Whatever leads to the increase of any particular dhātu automatically leads also to the decrease of other dhātus which are opposed to it. Things having the same sort of composition as a particular bodily dhātu increase it, and things having a different composition decrease it (sāmānya ekatva-karam viśesas tu prthaktva-kṛt)\(^1\). The normal health of a man is but another name for his dhātu-sāmya; a man is said to be unhealthy, or to be in a state of dhātu-vaiśamya, when symptoms of disease (vikāra) are seen. Slight variations of the due proportion of dhātu do not entitle us to call them instances of dhātu-vaiśamya unless there is vikāra or symptoms of it externally expressed. The daily course of a healthy man ought to be such that the equilibrium of dhātus may be properly maintained. The sole aim of Āyur-veda is to advise diet, medicines, and a course of behaviour, such that, if they are properly followed, a normally healthy person may maintain the balance of his dhātus and a man who has lost the equilibrium of his dhātus may regain it. The aim of Āyur-veda is thus to advise men how to secure dhātu-sāmya (dhātu-sāmya-kriyā cokta tantrasāya prayojananam)\(^2\).

If a normally healthy man wishes to keep his health at its normal level, he has to take things of different tastes, so that there may not be an excess of any particular kind of substance in the body. Diseases are caused through the excessive, deficient, and wrongful administration of sense-objects, the climatic characteristics of heat and cold, and the misuse of intelligence\(^3\). Thus the sight of objects with powerful light, the hearing of loud sounds like the roaring of thunder, the smelling of very strong odours, too much eating, the touching of too much cold or heat or too much bathing or massage are examples of atiyoga, or excessive association with sense-objects. Not to see, hear, smell, taste or

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\(^1\) Caraka-sāṁhitā, i. 1. 44.
\(^2\) Ibid. i. 1. 52.
\(^3\) Kāla-buddhiṇādriyārthānām yogo mithyā na cāti ca dvayeśayāṇām vyādhistān tri-vidho hetu-saṇgrahah. Ibid. i. 1. 53.
touch at all would be ayoga, or deficient association with sense-objects. To see objects very near the eye, at a very great distance, or to see frightful, hideous, unpleasant and disturbing sights, would be examples of the improper use (mithyā-yoga) of the visual sense. To hear grating and unpleasant sounds would be examples of the improper use of the ear; to smell bad and nauseating odours would be examples of mithyā-yoga of the nose; to eat together different kinds of things, which in their combination are so opposed as to be unhealthy, is an example of the improper use of the tongue; to be exposed to sudden heat and cold are examples of the improper use of touch. Similarly, all activities of speech, mind and body, when they are performed to an excessive degree, or not performed at all, or performed in an undesirable or unhealthy manner, are to be considered respectively as examples of atiyoga, ayoga and mithyā-yoga of the effort of speech, mind and body (cānt-manaḥ-sārira-pravṛtti). But these are all due to the misuse of intelligence (prajñāparādha). When a particular season manifests its special characteristics of heat, cold or rains to an excessive degree or to a very deficient degree or in a very irregular or unnatural manner, we have what are called atiyoga, ayoga and mithyā-yoga of time (kāla). But the misuse of intelligence, or prajñāparādha, is at the root of all excessive, deficient or wrongful association with sense-objects; for, when proper things are not taken at the proper time or proper things are not done at the proper time, it is all misuse of intelligence and is therefore included under prajñāparādha. When certain sinful deeds are performed by prajñāparādha, and, by the sins (adharma) associated with those deeds, which become efficient only after a certain lapse of time, illness is produced, the real cause of the illness is primarily adharma or its root cause, prajñāparādha; kāla, or time, however, may still be regarded in some sense as the cause through which the adharma is matured and becomes productive.

The principle of growth and decay is involved in the maxim

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1 Caraka-saṃhitā, I. 11. 37.
2 Ibid. I. 11. 39, 40. Cakrapāṇi says that this includes sinful deeds which produce illness and unhappiness, śātra-mānasika-cācāniha-karma-mithyā-yoga-genaivā-dharmottāvāntara-vyāpāreyavādharma-janyānām vikārānām kriya-mānātott.
3 Three seasons only are mentioned, Śītuṣa-vārsa-lakṣaṇāh punar heman- ta-grīṣma-varṣāh. Ibid. I. 11. 42.
4 Thus Cakrapāṇi, commenting on this, says, "buddhi-aporādhayaiva indriyārthātyogādhi-hetuteśott." Ibid. I. 1. 53.
that the different constituents of the body grow when articles of food having similar constituents are taken, and that they decay when articles of food having opposite qualities are taken (evam eva sarva-dhātu-guṇānāṁ sāmānya-yogād vyadhīr viparyyāād hrāśāh)¹. Thus, flesh increases by the intake of flesh, so does blood by taking blood, fat by fat, bones by cartilages, marrow by marrow, semen by semen and a foetus by eggs². But the principle applies not only to the same kind of substances as taken in the above example, but also to substances having largely similar qualities, just as the seminal fluid may be increased by taking milk and butter (samāna-guṇa-bhūyīśṭhanāṁ anyapraṅptināṁ apy-āhara-vikārānāṁ upayogāḥ)³. The ordinary conditions of growth always hold good, namely, proper age of growth, nature, proper diet and absence of those circumstances that retard growth. The assimilation of food is effected by heat which digests, air which collects together all things for the action of heat, water which softens, fat which makes the food smooth, and time which helps the process of digestion⁴. As any particular food is digested and changed, it becomes assimilated into the body. The hard parts of the food form the hard parts of the body and the liquid parts form the liquid parts such as blood and the like; and unhealthy food, i.e. food which has qualities opposed to the natural qualities of the body, has a disintegrating influence on the body.

As regards the growth of the body through the essence of the food-juice, there are two different views summed up by Cakrapāṇi (1. 28. 3). Some say that the chyle is transformed into blood, and the blood into flesh, and so forth. As regards the method of this transformation, some say that, just as the whole milk is changed into curd, so the whole chyle is transformed into blood, while others say that this transformation is somewhat like the circulation in irrigation (kedāri-kulyā-nyāya). The rasa (chyle) produced as a result of the digestive process, coming into association with rasa as the body-constituent (dhātu-rūpa-rasa), increases it to a certain extent; another part of the rasa, having the same colour and smell as blood, goes to blood and increases it, and another part similarly goes to flesh and increases it; and the same process takes place with reference to its increasing fat, etc. Here the whole circula-

¹ Caraka-sāṃhitā, 1. 1. 43 and 44, also iv 6. 9 and particularly iv. 6. 10.
² Ibid. iv. 6. 10. Cakrapāṇi explains āma-garbha as anāja.
³ Ibid. iv. 6. 11.
⁴ Ibid. iv. 6. 14 and 15.
tion begins by the entrance of the entire chyle into the constituent rasa (rasa-dhātu); in passing through some part remains in the rasa and increases it, the unabsorbed part passes into blood, and what is unabsorbed there passes into flesh and so on to the other higher constituents of bones, marrow and semen. But others think that, just as in a farm-house pigeons of different descriptions sit together (khale kapota-nyāya), so not all the digested food-juice passes through the channel of the rasa-dhātu, but different parts of it pass through different channels from the very first stage. That part of it which nourishes rasa enters into the channel of its circulation, that part of it which nourishes the blood goes directly into that, and so on. But there is generally this time limitation, that the part which nourishes the blood enters into it only when the part which nourishes rasa-dhātu has been absorbed in it; so again the part which enters into flesh can only do so when the part which nourishes blood has been absorbed in it. Thus the circulatory system is different from the very beginning; and yet the nourishment of blood takes place later than that of rasa, the nourishment of flesh later than that of blood, and so on (rasād raktam tato māṃsam ityāder ayam arthah yad rasa-puṣṭi-kālād uttara-kālām raktam jāyate, etc.). The upholders of the last view maintain that the other theory cannot properly explain how a nourishing diet (vṛṣya), such as milk, can immediately increase the seminal fluid, and that, if it had to follow the lengthy process of passing through all the circulatory systems, it could not do its part so quickly; but on the second theory, milk through its special quality (prabhāva) can be immediately associated with the seminal fluid and thereby increase it. But Cakrapāṇi remarks that the earlier theory (kedārī-kulīyā) is as good as the later one. For on that view also it might be held that by milk its special quality (prabhāva)

¹ There are two kinds of rasa, called dhātu-rasa and poṣaka-rasa. See Cakrapāṇi's comment on Caraka-samhitā, vi. 15. 14 and 15.
² parīśāna-pāke, vṛṣya-prayogaraṇa raktādi-rūpāpattikramenāticēreṇa śukram bhavati; keśadāye ca sadya eva vṛṣyād ājneye, khale kapota-pāke tu vṛṣyōtpanno rasāḥ prabhāvād chīğhrām eva śukreṇa sambaddhaḥ san tat-puṣṭim karotti yuktam (Cakrapāṇi on Caraka-samhitā, 1. 28. 3). Elsewhere (ibid. vi. 15. 32) it is said that those articles of food which stimulate semen (vṛṣya) are, according to some authorities, changed into semen in six days and nights, whereas in the ordinary course, as is said in Suśruta, it takes a month for the transformation of ordinary articles of food into semen. But Caraka does not favour any time limitation and urges that, just as the movement of a wheel depends upon the energy spent on it, so the time that a particular food takes for getting itself transformed into semen or into any other dhātu depends upon the nature of the food and the powers of digestion.
passed quickly through the various stages and became associated with the seminal fluid. Nor can it be said that according to the first theory every case of impurity of rasa (rasa-duṣṭi) is also a case of impurity of blood (rakta-duṣṭi), as is argued; for not the whole of rasa is transformed into blood, but only a part of it. So the rasa part may be impure, but still the part that goes to form blood may be pure; thus both theories are equally strong, and nothing can be said in favour of either. In Caraka-samhitā, vi. 15. 14 and 15, it is said that from rasa there is rakta (blood), from rakta flesh, from flesh fat, from fat bones, from bones marrow, from marrow semen. The two theories above referred to deal with the supposed ways in which such transformations occur.

In addition to the seven dhātus, or body-constituents, spoken of above there are ten upa-dhātus, which are counted by Bhoja as śirā, snāyu, ovarian blood and the seven layers of skin\(^1\). Caraka says in vi. 15. 15 that from rasa is also produced milk, and from milk ovarian blood; again, the thick tissues or ligaments (kaṇḍarā) and śirās are produced from blood, and from flesh are produced fat (cāsā) and the six layers of skin, and from fat (medas) are produced the five tissues. The chyle, or rasa, becomes tinged with red by the heat of bile. The blood, again, being worked upon by vāyu and heat, becomes steady and white, and is called fat (medas). The bones are a conglomeration of earth, heat and air and therefore, though produced from flesh and fat, are hard. They are made porous by vāyu running through them, and the pores are filled in by fat, which is called marrow. From the oily parts of marrow, again, semen is produced. Just as water percolates through the pores of a new earthen jug, the semen percolates through the pores of the bones, and there is also a flow of this seminal fluid through the body by way of its own ducts. By the rousing of desires and sex joy and by the heat of the sex act the semen oozes out and collects in the testes, from which it is ultimately liberated through its proper channel\(^2\).

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\(^1\) Cakrapāṇi on Caraka-samhitā, vi. 15. 14 and 15, a quotation from Bhoja. Ojas is counted as an upa-dhātu.

\(^2\) Caraka-samhitā, vi. 15. 22-29.
Vāyu, Pitta and Kapha

The qualities of the body are briefly of two kinds, those which make the system foul, the mala, and those which sustain and purify the body, the prasāda. Thus in the pores of the body are formed many undesirable bodily growths which seek egress; some constituents of the body, such as blood, are often turned into pus; the vāyu (air), pitta (bile) and kapha (phlegm or lymph) may become less or more than their normal measure (prakupita), and there are other entities which, existing in the body, tend to weaken or destroy it; these are all called malas. Others which go towards the sustenance and the growth of the body are called prasāda\(^1\).

But vāyu, pitta and kapha are primarily responsible for all kinds of morbidities of the body, and they are therefore called doṣa. It must, however, be noted that the vāyu, pitta and kapha and all other malas, so long as they remain in their proper measure (svamāna), do not pollute or weaken the body or produce diseases. So even malas like vāyu, pitta and kapha, or sweat, urine, etc., are called dhātus, or body-constituents, so long as they do not exceed their proper measure, and thus instead of weakening the body they serve to sustain it. Both the mala-dhātus and the prasāda-dhātus in their proper measure co-operate together in sustaining the body\(^2\). When various kinds of healthy food and drink are exposed in the stomach to the internal fire of the digestive organs, they become digested by heat. The essential part of the digested food is the chyle (rasa), and the impurities which are left out and cannot be assimilated into the body as its constituents are called kiṭṭa or mala. From this kiṭṭa are produced sweat, urine, excreta, vāyu, pitta, ślesman and the dirt of ear, eye, nose, mouth and of the holes of the hairs of the body, the hair, beard, hair of the body, nails, etc.\(^3\) The impurity of food is excreta and urine, that of rasa is phlegm (kapha), that of flesh bile (pitta) and that of fat (medas) sweat\(^4\). This view of vāyu, pitta and kapha seems to indicate that these are secretions, waste-products (kiṭṭa), like the other waste-products of the body. But the theory of waste-products is that, when they are in their proper measure, they serve to sustain the body and perform important functions, but, when

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1 Caraka-saṃhitā, iv. 6. 17.
2 evam rasa-malau sva-pramānāvasthitav āśrayasya sama-dhātor dhātu-sām-
yam anuvartayataḥ (ibid. i. 28. 3).
3 Ibid. i. 28. 3.
4 Ibid. vi. 15. 30.
they exceed the proper limit or become less than their proper measure, they pollute the body and may ultimately break it. But of all waste-products vāyu, pitta and kapha are regarded as being fundamentally the most important entities, and they sustain the work of the body by their mutual co-operation in proper measure, and destroy it by the disturbance of balance due to the rise or fall of one, two or all three of them.

As has already been said, the body is composed of certain constituents, such as rasa and rakta. The food and drink which we take go to nourish the different dhātus. Not all the food and drink that we take, however, can be absorbed into the system, and consequently certain waste-products are left¹. The question arises, what is it that sustains the system or breaks it? It has already been noticed that the due proportion of the dhātus is what constitutes the health of the body. This due proportion, however, must, as is easy to see, depend on the proper absorption of food and drink in such a way that each of the dhātus may have its due share and that only, neither less nor more. It is also necessary that there should be a due functioning of the causes of waste or accretion, working in a manner conducive to the preservation of the proper proportion of the constituents with reference to themselves and the entire system. Deficiency or excess of waste-products is therefore an invariable concomitant of all disturbances of the balance of dhātus, and hence the deficiency or excess of waste-products is regarded as the cause of all dhātu-vaiśamya. So long as the waste-products are not in deficiency or excess, they are the agents which constitute the main working of the system and may themselves be therefore regarded as dhātus. It is when there is excess or deficiency of one or more of them that they oppose in various ways the general process of that working of the system and are to be regarded as doṣas or polluting agents. There are various waste-products of the body; but of all these vāyu, pitta and kapha are regarded as the three most important, being at the root of all growth and decay of the body, its health and disease. Thus

¹ Śāṅgadhara (iv. 5) counts seven visible waste-products which are different from the three malas referred to here as vāyu, pitta and kapha. These are (1) the watery secretions from tongue, eyes and cheeks, (2) the colouring pitta, (3) the dirt of ears, tongue, teeth, armpits and penis, (4) the nails, (5) the dirt of the eyes, (6) the glossy appearance of the face, (7) the eruptions which come out in youth, and beards. Radhamalla, in commenting on this, refers to Caraka-samhitā, VI. 15. 29-30, in support of the above passage of Śāṅgadhara. Most of the malas are chidra-malas, or impurities of the openings.
Ātreya says in answer to Kāpyavaca’s remarks in the learned discussions of the assembly of the sages, “In one sense you have all spoken correctly; but none of your judgments are absolutely true. Just as it is necessary that religious duties (dharma), wealth (artha) and desires (kāma) should all be equally attended to, or just as the three seasons of winter, summer and rains all go in a definite order, so all the three, vāta, pitta and ślesman or kapha, when they are in their natural state of equilibrium, contribute to the efficiency of all the sense-organs, the strength, colour and health of the body, and endow a man with long life. But, when they are disturbed, they produce opposite results and ultimately break the whole balance of the system and destroy it.” There is one important point to which the notice of the reader should particularly be drawn. I have sometimes translated mala as “polluting agents or impurities” and sometimes as “waste-products,” and naturally this may cause confusion. The term mala has reference to the production of diseases. Kiṭṭa means waste-products or secretions, and these may be called mala when they are in such proportions as to cause diseases. When, however, a mala is in such proportions that it does not produce any disease, it is not a mala proper but a mala-dhātu (nirbdha-karān malādīn prasāmde saṃcakṣmahe). In another passage of Caraka (1. 28. 3), which has been referred to above, it is said that out of the digested food and drink there are produced rasa and kiṭṭa (secretion) called mala (tatrāhāraprasādākhya-rasah kiṭṭam ca malākhyam abhinirvartate), and out of this kiṭṭa is produced sweat, urine, excreta, vāyu, pitta and ślesman. These malas are also dhātus, inasmuch as they sustain the body as much as the other dhātus, rasa or rakta, etc. do, so long as they are in their proper proportions and balance (te sarva eva dhātavo malākhyāḥ prasādākhyāḥ ca). Vāgbhaṭa, however, takes a different view of this subject. He separates the doṣa, dhātu and mala and speaks of them as being the roots of the body. Thus he says that vāyu sustains the body, contributing energy (utsāha), exhalation (ucchvāsa), inspiration (nihśvāsa), mental and bodily movement (ceṣṭā), ejective forces (vega-pravartana); pitta helps the body by

1 Caraka-samhitā, i. 12. 13.
2 tatra mala-bhātās te ye kartrasya bādhaharāḥ syuh. Caraka-samhitā, iv. 6. 17.
3 Cakrapāni on Caraka-samhitā. Compare Śāṅkagāra, iv. 8: vāyuḥ pittam kapho doṣā dhātavo ca malāt matāḥ, i.e. vāyu, pitta and kapha are known as doṣa, dhātu and mala.
4 Also evam rasa-malau sva-pramāṇāvasthitav āśrayasya sama-dhātov dhātu-sāmyam anuvartayataḥ (Caraka-samhitā, i. 28. 3).
digestive function, heat, the function of sight, imagination (medhā), power of understanding (dhi), courage (śaurya), softness of the body; and ślesman, by steadiness, smoothness, by serving to unite the joints, etc. The functions of the seven dhātus, beginning with rasa, are said to be the giving of satisfaction through the proper functioning of the senses (prīṇana or rasa), the contribution of vitality (jīvana), the production of oiliness (sneha), the supporting of the burden (dhārana) of the bones (asthi), the filling up of bone cavities (pūrana or majjā) and productivity (garbhotpāda of śukra); of males it is said that the excreta has the power of holding the body, while urine ejects the surplus water and sweat holds it back. The elder Vāgbhaṭa distinguishes the dhātus from vāyu, pitta and kapha by calling the latter doṣa (polluting agents) and the former dūṣya (the constituents which are polluted). He further definitely denies that the malas of dhātus could be the cause of disease. He thus tries to explain away this view (that of Caraka as referred to above) as being aupacārika, i.e. a metaphorical statement. The body, according to him, is a joint product of doṣa, dhātu and mala. Indu, the commentator on the Aṣṭāṅga-saṃgraha, however, emphasizes one important characteristic of the doṣas when he says that the dynamic which sets the dhātus in motion (doṣebhyā eva dhātīnāṁ prākritiḥ) is derived from the doṣas, and the circulation chemical activities, oiliness, hardness, etc. of the chyle (rasa) are derived from them. Owing to the predominance of one or other of the doṣas from the earliest period, when the foetus begins to develop, the child is said to possess the special features of one or other of the doṣas and is accordingly called vāta-prakṛti, pitta-prakṛti or ślesma-prakṛti. Vāgbhaṭa further says that disease is not dhātu-vaiṣamya, but doṣa-vaiṣamya, and the equilibrium of doṣas or doṣa-sāmya is health. A disease, on this view, is the disturbance of doṣas, and, as doṣas are entities independent of the dhātus, the disturbance of doṣas may not necessarily mean the disturbance of dhātus. In another passage the elder Vāgbhaṭa says

1 Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya, 1. 11. 1–5.
2 tajjan ity-upacāreṇa tān āhur ghṛta-dāhavat rasādīṣṭheṣu doṣeṣu vyādhayas sambhavanti ye.
3 Aṣṭāṅga-saṃgraha, 1. 1.
4 Indu, the commentator on the Aṣṭāṅga-saṃgraha, puts it as īśvara ca doṣa-dhātu-mala-samudāyaḥ (1. 1).
5 tathā ca dhātu-poṣya rasaryā vahana-pūka-sneha-kāthinyādi doṣa-pratidā-labhyaṁ eva (ibid.).
6 Ayur-veda is closely associated with the Śaṅkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which alone deal with some sort of physics in Indian philosophy. It is pointed
that, as the manifold universe is nothing but a modification of the gunas, so all diseases are but modifications of the three dosas, or, as in the ocean waves, billows and foam are seen which are in reality the same as the ocean, so all the different diseases are nothing but the three dosas. The elder Vāgbhaṭa uses also in another place the simile of the three gunas with reference to the three dosas. Thus he says, “As the three gunas co-operate together for the production of the world in all its diversity, in spite of the mutual opposition that exists among themselves, so the three dosas also co-operate together, in spite of natural opposition, for the production of the diverse diseases.” In the treatment of the bone system the present writer agrees with Dr Hoernle that Vāgbhaṭa always attempted to bring about a reconciliation between Caraka and Suśruta by explaining away the unadjustable views of one or the other. Here also the same tendency is seen. Thus, on the one hand, he explained away as being metaphorical (aupacārika) the expressed views of Caraka that the dhātu-malas are the dosas. On the other hand, he followed the statements of the Uttara-tantra that the three dosas, the dhātu, excreta and urine sustain a man’s body. He further follows the Uttara-tantra in holding that the three dosas are the three gunas (bhinnā dosās trayo gunāḥ). Daḥana identifies vāyu with rajas, pitta with sattva and kapha with tamas.

In the Sūtra-sthāna Suśruta mentions blood (sonīta) as having the same status as vāyu, pitta and kapha and holds that the body out by Narasimha Kavirāja (a writer from the south) in his Vivaraṇa-siddhānta-cintāmaṇi (the only manuscript of which is in possession of the present writer) that according to Sāmkhya it is the dosa transforming itself from a state of equilibrium to a state of unbalanced preponderance of any of them that is to be called a disease (saṣāmya-tāṇyāvasthā-bhinnāvasthā-viṣeṣāt doṣa-devam rogatvam). The Naiyāyikas, however, hold that disease is a separate entity or substance, which is produced by dosa, but which is not itself a dosa (dṛṣyatvetva sati doṣa-bhinnā doṣa-janyatvām rogatvām). So a disease is different from its symptoms or effects. Narasimha further holds that, since Caraka speaks of diseases as being fiery (āgneya) and aerial (vāyanya), he tacitly accepts the diseases as separate substances. That Caraka sometimes describes a disease as being dhātu-vaiṣāmya is to be explained as due to the fact that, since dhātu-vaiṣāmyas produce diseases, they are themselves also called diseases in a remote sense (yat tu Carakena dhātu-vaiṣāmyasya rogatvam uktam tat teṣaṁ tatha-vidha-dhūkha-kartvyād aupacārikaṁ. Vivaraṇa-siddhānta-cintāmaṇi, MS. p. 3).

1 Aṣṭāṅga-saṃgraha, 1. 22.
2 śrāmbhakam virodhe ’pi mitho yad yad guṇa-trayam viśvaśa drṣṭam yugopad vṛddher doṣa-trayam tathaḥ (ibid. 1. 21).
depends on food and drink as well as on the various combinations of vāyu, pitta, kapha and šonita in health and disease. Daḥana, in commenting on this, says that, Suśruta’s work being principally a treatise on surgery, its author holds that blood with all its impurities plays an important part in producing disturbances in all wounds. Suśruta further speaks of vāta, pitta and śleṣman as the causes of the formation of the body (deha-sambhava-hetavah). The vāta, pitta and kapha, situated in the lower, middle and upper parts of the body, are like three pillars which support the body, and blood also co-operates with them in the same work. Daḥana remarks that vāta, pitta and kapha are concomitant causes, working in cooperation with semen and blood. Suśruta further derives vāta from the root vā, to move, pitta from tap, to heat, and śleṣman from śiṣ, to connect together. The Sūtra-sthāna of Suśruta compares kapha, pitta and vāyu with the moon (soma), the sun (sūrya) and air (anīla) but not with the three guṇas, as is found in the supplementary book, called the Uttara-tantra. In discussing the nature of pitta, he says that pitta is the fire in the body and there is no other fire but pitta in the body. Pitta has all the qualities of fire, and so, when it diminishes, articles of food with fiery qualities serve to increase it, and, when it increases, articles of food with cooling properties serve to diminish it. Pitta, according to Suśruta, is situated between the stomach (āmāśaya) and the smaller intestines (pakvāśaya), and it cooks all food and drink and separates the chyle on the one hand, and the excreta, urine, etc. on the other. Being situated in the above place, between the stomach and the smaller intestines (tatra-stham eva), by its own power (ātma-śaktī) it works in other pittta centres of the body and by its heating work (agni-karma) sets up the proper activities at those places. In its function of cooking it is called pācaka, in its function in the liver and spleen, as supplying the colouring matter of blood, it is called “colouring” (raṇjaka), in its function in the heart it serves intellectual purposes (sūdhaka), in its function in the eyes it is called “perceiving,” or locaka, in its function of giving a glossy appearance to the skin it is called bhrājaka. It is hot, liquid or blue or yellow, possesses bad smell, and after

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1 etad dhī ivaṭya-tantram, ivaṭya-tantra ca vrṇaḥ pradhāna-bhūtaḥ vṛcch ca dīṣyeṣu madhye raktasya pradhānyam iti śonitopādānam (ibid.). Suśruta also uses the word doja to mean pus (pūya) (1. 5. 12).
2 Suśruta, i. 21. 3 and 4. Daḥana, commenting on this, writes: “iṣṭārātavādi sahasāristaya deha-janakā abhipretah.”
passing through unhealthy digestive actions tastes sour. Coming to ślesman, Suśruta says that the stomach is its natural place; being watery, it flows downwards and neutralizes the bile-heat, which otherwise would have destroyed the whole body by its excessive heat. Being in āmāśaya, it works in the other centres of ślesman, such as the heart, the tongue, the throat, the head and in all the joints of the body. The place of vāyu is the pelvic regions and the rectum (śroni-guda-samśraya); the main place of the blood, which is counted as dosa by Suśruta, is regarded as being the liver and the spleen. I have noticed above, that in the Atharva-Veda mention is found of three kinds of diseases, the airy (vātaja), the dry (uşma) and the wet (abhraja). In the Caraka-samhitā vāta, pitta and kapha are regarded as being produced from kiṣṭa, or secretions. They are thus regarded here as being of the nature of internal waste-products of unassimilated food-juice at the different stages of its assimilation, as chyle, flesh, etc., which have important physiological functions to perform for the preservation of the process of the growth of the body, when they are in due proportions, and they break up the body when they are in undue proportions. What exactly kiṣṭa means is difficult to determine. It may mean merely the part of the food-juice unassimilated as chyle, or the part of it unassimilated as blood, and so forth; or it may mean such unassimilated products, together with the secretions from the respective dhātus, which absorb the substantial part of the food-juice and throw off some of its impurities into the unabsorbed material; this at least is what kiṣṭa ought to mean, if it is interpreted as dhātu-mala, or impurities of dhātus. These secretions and waste-products form the source of most of the constructive and destructive forces of the body. The watery character of kapha and the fiery character of pitta are not ignored; but their essence or substance is considered to be secretive, or of the nature of waste-product. Suśruta, however, does not seem to refer to this secretive aspect, but he seems to have grasped the essential physiological activity of the body as being of the nature of digestive operation and the distribution of the heat and the products of digestion; and the analogy of cooking, as requiring fire, water and air, seems to have been well before his mind. Suśruta also seems to

1 Suśruta-samhitā, 1. 11. 8–16.
2 Ye abhraja vātajā yai ca ṣūṃṇo (Atharva-Veda, 1. 12. 3); again, agnir ivāsyā dahata eti ṣūṃṇah (ibid. vi. 20. 4).
have leant more towards the view of the physiological operations of the body as being due to elemental activities, the food-juice taking the place of earth and the other three principles being fire (pitta), water (śleṣman) and air (vāta). The reason why the principles of the body are here regarded as being transformations of fire, water and air is not explained by Suśruta. The supplementary Uttaratantra, however, thinks that they are the three guṇas. Vāgbhaṭa, always fond of taking a middle course in his endeavour to reconcile the different attempts to grasp the principles under discussion, holds that they are comparable to the three guṇas, because, though opposed to one another, they also co-operate together; and, because diseases are but modifications of the doṣas, he further thinks that doṣas, dhātu and dhātu-malas are quite different entities; but he is unable to give any definite idea as to what these doṣas are. The person who seems to have had the most definite conception of the doṣas was Caraka. In the Uttaratantra and by Vāgbhaṭa the Sāṁkhya analogy of the guṇas seems to have had a very distracting influence, and, instead of trying to find out the true physiological position of the doṣas, these writers explain away the difficulty by a vague reference to the Sāṁkhya guṇas.

Let us now return to Caraka. By him vāyu is described as being dry (rukṣa), cold (śīta), light (laghu), subtle (sūkṣma), moving (calā), scattering everything else in different directions (viśāda) and rough (kharā). It is neutralized in the body by those things which have opposite qualities. In the healthy constructive process the vāyu is said to perform physiological functions as follows: it sustains the machinery of the body (tantra-yantra-dharaḥ), it manifests itself as prāna, udāna, samāna and apāna and is the generator of diverse kinds of efforts; it is the force which controls (niyantā) the mind from all undesirables and directs (praṇetā) it to all that is desirable, is the cause of the employment of the sense-organs, is the carrier of the stimulation of sense-objects, collects together

1 Caraka-samhitā, 1.1.58. Cakrapāṇi, in commenting on this, says that, though vāyu is described as neither hot nor cold according to the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, yet, since it is found to increase by cold and decrease by heat, it is regarded as cold. Of course, when connected with pitta it is found to be hot, but that is on account of its association with the heat of pitta (yoga-vāhitā). In the Vāta-kalā-kalīya chapter (1.12.4), six qualities of vāta are mentioned; sūkṣma is not mentioned, however, and, in place of calā, dāruṇa is mentioned. Cakrapāṇi says that dāruṇa means the same as calā. In the same chapter (1.12.7) vāyu is qualified as śuṣira-kara, i.e. that which makes holes.
the *dhātu* of the body, harmonizes the functions of the body as one whole, is the mover of speech, is the cause of touch and sounds, as also of the corresponding sense-organs, the root of joy and mental energy, the air for the digestive fire, the healer of morbidities, the ejector of extraneous dirt, the operating agent for all kinds of circulation, the framer of the shape of the foetus, and is, in short, identical with the continuity of life (*āyuso 'nuvṛtti-pratyaya-bhūta*). When it is in undue proportions, it brings about all sorts of troubles, weakens the strength, colour, happiness and life, makes the mind sad, weakens the functions of the sense-organs, causes malformations of the foetus, produces diseases and all emotions of fear, grief, delirium, etc., and arrests the functions of the *prānas*.

It is interesting to note how Vāyorvīda describes the cosmic functions of air as the upholding of the earth, causing the burning of fire, the uniform motion of the planets and stars, the production of clouds, the showering of rains, the flow of rivers, the shaping of flowers and fruits, the shooting out of plants, the formation of the seasons, the formation of the strata of minerals, the production of the power of seeds to produce shoots, the growing up of crops, etc.\(^1\) In the same discussion Mārici considers fire to be contained in the *pitta* and productive of all good and bad qualities, digestion and indigestion, vision and blindness, courage and fear, anger, joy, ignorance, etc., according as it is in equilibrium or is disturbed. Kāpya maintains that *soma*, contained in *ślesman*, produces all good and bad qualities, such as firmness and looseness of the body, fatness, leanness, energy and idleness, virility and impotence, knowledge and ignorance, etc.\(^2\)

These discussions seem to indicate that before Ātreyā’s treatise was written attempts were made to explain the physiological functions of the body in health and disease by referring them to the operation of one operative principle. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* speaks of earth, water and fire as being world-principles of construction: the different *vāyu* were known as early as the *Atharva-Veda*, and *vāyu* is regarded in many of the Upaniṣads as the principle of life. It seems fairly certain that the theory of *vāta*, *pitta* and *kapha* is a later development of the view which regarded air (*pavana*), fire (*dahana*) and water (*toya*) as the fundamental constitutive principles of the body. Thus Suśruta refers to this view

\(^1\) *Caraka-sāṁhitā*, 1. 12. 8.

in III. 4. 80: "Some say that the constitution (prakṛti) of the human body is elemental (bhautikā), the three constitutive elements being air, fire and water.\(^1\) The advance of the medical schools of thought over these speculations and over others which consider the body to be a product of one bhūta or of many bhūtas is to be sought in this, that, besides allowing the material causes (upādāna) of the body to be the dhātus, they emphasized the necessity of admitting one or more inherent dynamic principles for the development and decay of the body. This explains how vāta, pitta and kapha are regarded both as dhātu and as doṣa, as prakṛti and as vikṛti. Thus Caraka says, as has already been mentioned, that from the time of the formation of the foetus the vāta, pitta and kapha are working, but in more or less diverse ways and in diverse systems, with equal vāyu, pitta, mala and kapha (sama-pittanila-kapha) or different degrees of predominance of them as vātala, pittala and ślesmala\(^2\). Men of the ślesmala type are generally healthy, whereas vātala and pittala persons are always of indifferent health. Later on, when there is a disease with the predominance of that doṣa which is predominant in man’s constitution from his birth, the newly collected doṣa produces morbidity on the lines on which the predominating doṣa of his constitution is working; but this newly collected doṣa does not augment the corresponding original doṣa. The original doṣa is never increased, and, whatever may be the predominance of a doṣa due to any disease, the constitutional condition of the doṣas remains the same. Thus a vāta-prakṛti person does not become ślesma-prakṛti or pitta-prakṛti, and vice-versa. The doṣas which are constitutional always remain as the

\(^1\) Caraka refers to a view that there are none who may be regarded as sama-vāta-pitta-ślesman (or having equal vāta, pitta and ślesman). Since all men take various kinds of diet (viṣamāhāropayogātā), they must be either vāta-prakṛti, pitta-prakṛti, or ślesma-prakṛti. Against this Caraka says that sama-vāta-pitta-ślesman is the same thing as health or freedom from disease (aroga). All medicines are applied for attaining this end, and there cannot be any doubt that such a state exists. Again, the terms vāta-prakṛti, pitta-prakṛti and ślesma-prakṛti are incorrect; for prakṛti means health. What they mean by vāta-prakṛti is that vāta is quantitatively predominant (ādikāya-bhāvāt sā doṣa-prakṛti ucye), and quantitative predominance is the same as vāhāra; so the proper terms are vātala, pittala, etc. When a vātala person takes things which increase vāta, his vāta increases at once; but when he takes things which increase pitta or ślesman, these do not increase in him as rapidly as vāta does. So in the case of a pittala person pitta increases rapidly when articles which increase pitta are taken, and so with regard to ślesman (Caraka-sanhitā, III. 6. 14–18).
constant part engaged in their physiological operations. The later accretion of the doṣas or their deficiency has a separate course of action in producing diseases, and there is no interchange between these later collections of doṣas or their deficiency and the constitutional constant parts of the doṣas known as prakṛti. The only sense (as Cakrapāni says) in which a doṣa is related to a constitutional (prakṛti) doṣa is that a doṣa grows strong in a system in which a corresponding doṣa is constitutionally predominant, and it grows weaker when the opposite is the case. It is not out of place in this connection to say that, though the doṣas are mutually opposed to one another, they do not always neutralize one another, and it is possible for them to grow simultaneously violent in a system. In the six seasons of rains (varṣā), autumn (śarar), late autumn (hemanta), winter (śita), spring (vasanta) and summer (grīṣma) there is an alternate collection (caya), disturbance (prakopa) and lowering down (praśama) of the three doṣas, pitta, śleṣman and vāyu respectively. Thus, for example, in the rains (varṣā) there is collection of pitta, in the autumn (śarar) there is disturbance of pitta, in the harvesting season (hemanta) there is lowering of pitta and collection of śleṣman, in the summer there is collection of vāta, and so forth. Contrasting the functions of the doṣas in the normal (prakṛti) and abnormal (viķṛti) states, Caraka says that in the normal state the heat of

1 Ibid. 1. 7. 38-41. The passage prakṛti-sthaṃ yadā pittāṃ mārutaḥ śleṣmanāḥ kṣaye (1. 17. 43) is often referred to in support of the view that the new accretions of doṣas affect the prakṛti-doṣas. But Cakrapāni explains it differently. He says that a disease may be caused by a doṣa which is not in excess of the constant constitutional quantity (prakṛti-māṇa) by virtue of the fact that it may be carried from one part of the body to another and thereby may produce a local accretion or excess, though the total quantity of doṣa may not be in excess.

2 samānām hi prakṛtin prāpya doṣhaḥ pravṛddha-balo bhavati, asamānām tu prāpya tathā balavān na syāt (Cakrapāni on Caraka-saṃhitā, 1. 17. 62).

3 Ibid. 1. 17. 112. See also Cakrapāni's comments on these. Daḥana, in commenting on Suśruta-saṃhitā, 1. 21. 18, says that sahacaya of doṣas means aggregation or accumulation in general (dehe 'tirupāyddhi cayaḥ); prakopa of doṣas means that the accumulated doṣas are spread through the system (vīlayana-rūpā vyrdiddh prakopā). The external signs of the caya of vāta are fullness of the stomach and want of motions; of pitta yellowish appearance and reduction of heat (maddopātā); of kapha heaviness of the limbs and feeling of laziness. In all cases of caya there is a feeling of aversion to causes which increase the particular doṣa of which there has been caya (caya-kārana-videgas ca). The stage of caya is the first stage of operation in the growth and prevention of diseases. If the doṣas can be removed or neutralized at this stage, there is no further disease. The usual indication of the disturbance (prakopa) of vāyu is disorders of the stomach; of pitta, acidity, thirst and burning; of kapha, aversion to food, palpitation (hṛdayotkleda), etc. The prakopa of blood (iṣāta) is always due to the prakopa of vāta, pitta or kapha. This is the second stage of the progress of diseases. The
pitta occasions digestion; šlesman is strength and vitality, and vāyu is the source of all activities and the life of all living beings; but in the abnormal state pitta produces many diseases; šlesman is the dirt of the system and the cause of many troubles, and vāta also produces many diseases and ultimately death. The places (sthānāni) at which the affections of vāta, pitta and kapha are mostly found are thus described by Caraka: of vāta the bladder, rectum, waist and the bones of the leg, but the smaller intestine (pakeśāya) is its particular place of affection; of pitta sweat, blood and the stomach, of which the last is the most important; of šlesman the chest, head, neck, the joints, stomach and fat, of which the chest is the most important. There are eighty affections of vāta, forty of pitta and twenty of šlesman. But in each of these various affections of vāta, pitta and šlesman the special features and characteristics of the corresponding doṣas are found. Thus Caraka in 1. 20. 12–23 describes certain symptoms as leading to a diagnosis of the disease as being due to the disturbance of vāta, pitta or kapha. But a question may arise as to what may consistently with this view be considered to be the nature of vāyu, pitta and kapha. Are they only hypothetical entities, standing as symbols of a number of symptoms without any real existence? In such an interpretation reality would belong to the symptoms, and the agents of morbidity, or the doṣas, would only be convenient symbols for collecting certain groups of these symptoms under one name. Wherever there is one particular set of symptoms, it is to be considered that there is disturbance of vāyu; wherever there is another set of symptoms, there is disturbance of pitta, and so

third stage is called prasāra. At this stage there is something like a fermentation of the doṣas (paryuṣita-hinodaka-piṣa-tamavāya eva). This is moved about by vāyu, which though inanimate, is the cause of all motor activities. When a large quantity of water accumulates at any place, it breaks the embankment and flows down and joins on its way with other streams and flows on all sides; so the doṣas also flow, sometimes alone, sometimes two conjointly, and sometimes all together. In the whole body, in the half of it, or in whatever part the fermented doṣas spread, there the symptoms of diseases are showered down, as it were, like water from the clouds (doṣa vakāraṇa nabhasi meghavat tatra varjati). When one doja, e.g. vāyu, spreads itself in the natural place of another doja, e.g. pitta, the remedy of the latter will remove the former (vāyuḥ pitta-sthānakātasya pittavat prathāraḥ). The difference between prakopa and prasāra is thus described by Dalhana: just as when butter is first stirred up, it moves a little; this slight movement is like prakopa; but, when it is continuously and violently stirred to flow out, in froths and foams, it may then be called prasāra (Suirūta-samhitā, 1. 21. 18–32). The fourth stage is when the pūrvā-rūpa is seen, and the fifth stage is the stage of rūpa or vyādhi (disease) (ibid. 38, 39).

1 Caraka-samaḥti, 1. 20. 11.
forth. But there are serious objections against such an interpretation. For, as we have shown above, there are many passages where these dosas are described as secretions and waste-products, which in their normal proportions sustain and build the body and in undue proportions produce diseases and may ultimately break up the system. These passages could not be satisfactorily explained upon the above interpretation. Moreover, there are many passages which describe pitta and kapha as entities having a particular colour and material consistency, and it is also said that there are particular places in the body where they collect, and this would be impossible upon the interpretation that they are not real entities, but hypothetical, having only a methodological value as being no more than convenient symbols for a collective grasp of different symptoms.

The attribution of a certain number of specific qualities to the dosas is due to a belief that the qualities of effects are due to the qualities of causes. So, from the diverse qualities of our bodies considered as effects, the causes were also considered as having those qualities from which those of the effects were derived. Thus, in connection with the description of the qualities of vāta, Caraka says that on account of the qualities of raukṣya the bodies of those having congenital vāta tendency are rough, lean and small, and

1 The secretory character of these dosas is amply indicated by such passages as those which regard vāta, pitta and ileyman as requiring some space in the stomach for digesting the food materials, e.g. ekam punar vāta-pitta-ileymanāṁ (ibid. III. 2. 3); ileyma hi niḍgha-ilaṁga-mru-madhura-rātra-sāndra-mandita-guru-itä-vijalalācchāḥ (ileyman is smooth, pleasing, soft, sweet, substantial, compact, inert, benumbed, heavy, cold, moist and transparent—ibid. III. 8. 14. 7. 5); pittam upaṁ ṭhakṣam dravaṁ vīram amlam kāpukām ca (pitta is hot, sharp and liquid, and possesses bad odour, and is acid and pungent and bitter—ibid. III. 8. 14. 7. 6); vātas tu rūkṣa-laghu-calo-bahu-līgha-ālta-puruṣa-vilādaḥ (vāta is rough, light, moving, manifold, quick, cold, coarse and scattering—ibid. III. 8. 14. 7. 7).

It must, however, be noted that the translation I have given of some of these words cannot be regarded as satisfactory; for in the translation I could only give one sense of a word, which in the original Sanskrit has been used in a variety of senses which the word has. Thus, for example, I have translated rūkṣa as "rough." But it also means "slim," "lean," "having insomnia," or (of a voice) "broken," and so forth. There is no English synonym which would have so many senses. Mahāmahopādhyāya Kaviraj Gajanātha Sen, of Calcutta, tries to divide the dosas into two classes, invisible (rūkṣma) and visible (sthūla)—Siddhānta-midana, pp. 9–11. But though such a distinction can doubtless be made, it has not been so distinguished in the medical literature, as it is of little value from the medical point of view; it also does not help us to understand the real nature of the dosas. The nature and the functions of the dosas do not depend in the least on their visibility or invisibility, nor can the visible dosa be regarded as always the product of the invisible one.
the voices of such people are rough, weak, grating, slow and broken, and they cannot sleep well (jāgarikā); again, on account of the quality of lightness of vāyu, the movements of a man with congenital vāta tendency would be light and quick, and so would be all his efforts, eating, speech, and so forth. It is easy to see that the resemblance of the qualities of vāyu to the qualities of the body is remote; yet, since the special features and characteristics of one's body were considered as being due to one or the other of the body-building agents, these characteristics of the body were through remote similarity referred to them.

There is another point to be noted in connection with the enumeration of the qualities of the doṣas. The disturbance of a doṣa does not necessarily mean that all its qualities have been exhibited in full strength; it is possible that one or more of the qualities of a doṣa may run to excess, leaving others intact. Thus vāyu is said to possess the qualities of rūkṣa, laghu, cala, bahu, śīghra, śīta, etc., and it is possible that in any particular case the śīta quality may run to excess, leaving others undisturbed, or so may śīta and rūkṣa, or śīta, rūkṣa and laghu, and so forth. Hence it is the business of the physician not only to discover which doṣa has run to excess, but also to examine which qualities of which doṣa have run to excess. The qualities of doṣas are variable, i.e. it is possible that a doṣa in its state of disturbance will remain a doṣa, and yet have some of its qualities increased and others decreased. The nature of the disturbance of a doṣa is determined by the nature of the disturbance of the qualities involved (aṃśāṃśa-vikalpa). The natural inference from such a theory is that, since the entities having this or that quality are but component parts of a doṣa, a doṣa cannot be regarded as a whole homogeneous in all its parts. On this view a doṣa appears to be a particular kind of secretion which is a mixture of a number of different secretions having different qualities, but which operate together on the same lines. When a particular doṣa is in a healthy order, its component entities are in certain definite proportions both with regard to themselves and to

1 Caraka-saṃhitā, 11. 1. 10. 4. Cakrapāṇi, in commenting on this, says: "tatra doṣānām aṃśāṃśa-vikalpo yathā—vāte prakūpitē 'pi kadaicit vātasya śītām vā labavān bhavati, kadaicit laghu-aṃśaḥ, kadaicit rūkṣāṃśaḥ kadaicit laghu-rūkṣāṃśaḥ." The doṣa or doṣas which become prominently disturbed in a system are called anubandha, and the doṣa or doṣas which at the time of diseases are not primarily disturbed are called anubandha. When three of the doṣas are jointly disturbed, it is called sannipāta, and when two are so disturbed it is called sāṃsarga (ibid. III. 6. 11).
the total *doṣa*. But, when it is disturbed, some of the component secretions may increase in undue proportions, while others may remain in the normal state; of course, the quantity of the whole *doṣa* may also increase or decrease. A *doṣa* such as *kapha* or *pitta* should therefore be regarded as a name for a collection of secretions rather than one secretion of a homogeneous character. It will be easily seen that, on taking into consideration the comparative strengths of the different components of a *doṣa* and the relative strengths of the other components of other *doṣas* and the relative strengths and proportions of each of the *doṣas* amongst themselves, the number of combinations is innumerable, and the diseases proceeding from such combinations are also innumerable. The whole system of Caraka’s treatment depends upon the ascertained of the nature of these affections; the names of diseases are intended to be mere collective appellations of a number of affections of a particular type.

One further point which ought to be noted with regard to the constructive and destructive operations of *vāyu, pitta* and *kapha* is that they are independent agents which work in unison with a man’s *karma* and also in unison with a man’s mind. The operations of the mind and the operations of the body, as performed by *vāyu, pitta* and *kapha* on the materials of the *dhātu*, *rasa*, *rakta*, etc., run parallel to each other; for both follow the order of human *karma*, but neither of them is determined by the other, though they correspond to each other closely. This psycho-physical parallelism is suggested throughout Caraka’s system. Caraka, in trying to formulate it, says: “śāriram api satvam anuvidhiyate satveṣam ca śāriram” (the mind corresponds to the body and the body to the mind). It may be remembered in this connection that the ultimate cause of all *dhātu-vaiśamya* or *abhīghāta* (bodily injuries through accidents, a fall and the like) is foolish action (*prajñāparādha*). Again *vāta*, *pitta* and *kapha* are found to perform not only physical operations, but also intellectual operations of various kinds. But all intellectual operations belong properly to mind. What is meant by attributing intellectual functions to *vāyu, pitta* and *kapha* seems to be a sort of psycho-physical parallelism, mind corresponding to body, body corresponding to mind, and both corresponding to *karma*.

1 yad vātārabdhavādi-jñānam eva kāraṇaṁ rogānāṁ cihāstāyām upakāri; nāma-jñānam tu vyavahāra-mātra-prayogadāsthā (Cakrapāṇi on Caraka-saṁhitā, i. 18. 53).
Head and Heart

The most vital centres of the body are the head, the heart and the pelvis (vasti). The prānas, i.e. the vital currents, and all the senses are said to depend (śrīțāh) on the head. The difference between head (śrīța) and brain (mastīșka) was known as early as the Atharvā-Veda. Thus in A.V. x. 2. 6 the word śrīța is used in the sense of “head,” and in verses 8 and 26 of the same hymn the word mastīșka is used in the sense of “brain.” Head-disease is also mentioned in the Atharvā-Veda, i. 12. 3, as śrīșaktī. The brain-matter is called mastuluṅga in Caraka-saṃhitā, viii. 9. 101; the word mastīșka is used in the same chapter in the sense of brain-matter (viii. 9. 80), as has also been explained by Cakrapāṇī.

The passage from Caraka, viii. 9. 4, quoted above shows that at least Dr̥ḍhabala considered the head to be the centre of the senses and all sense currents and life currents. Cakrapāṇī, in commenting upon this passage, says that, though the currents of sensation and life pass through other parts of the body as well, yet they are particularly connected with the head (śrīṣi viśēșa prabaddhāni), because, when there is an injury to the head, they are also injured. According to Caraka and Dr̥ḍhabala all the senses are particularly connected with the head, as well as the prānas, but the heart is regarded as the vital centre of the prānas, as well as of the manas, as I shall point out later on. Bhela, who is as old as Caraka, considers the brain to be the centre of the manas, a view which is, so far as I know, almost unique in the field of Sanskrit.

1 The different names of the heart in Caraka-saṃhitā are mahat, artha, hṛdaya (i. 30. 3).
2 Cakrapāṇī, however, explains it as śrīța īva śrīțāh, i.e. “as if they depended on” (i. 17. 12), because, when the head is hurt, all the senses are hurt. It is said in ibid. vi. 26. 1 that there are one hundred and seven vital centres (marmā), and of these the three most important are the head, the heart and the pelvis. Also in viii. 9. 16, ḥṛdi mūrdhāni ca vastau ca sṛṇāṃ prānāḥ praṭiṣṭhitāḥ. In viii. 9. 4 it is distinctly said that all the senses and the currents of senses and prāṇa are dependent on the head as the rays of the sun are dependent on the sun—śrīṣi indriyāṇi indriya-prāṇa-vahāṇi ca srotāṃśi sūryam īva gābhastayaḥ samītritāni.
3 “Which was that god who (produced) his brain, his forehead, his hindhead (hakāṭaḥ), who first his skull, who, having gathered a gathering in man’s jaw, ascended to heaven” (A.V. x. 2. 8). “Atharvan, having sewed together his head (mūrdhaṇam) and also his heart, aloft from the brain the purifying one sent (them) forth, out of the head” (ibid. 26). (Whitney’s translation, Harvard oriental series.)
4 Mastīṣkaḥ śiro-majjā. Cakrapāṇī, viii. 9. 80 of Caraka-saṃhitā. The word mastīṣka is sometimes, though rarely, used in the sense of head, as in the passage quoted by Cakrapāṇī in viii. 9. 80—mastīṣke śṭāngulam paṭṭam.
literature. He says that manas, which is the highest of all senses (sarvendriya-param), has its seat between the head and the palate (śiras-tālāv-antara-gatam). Being situated there, it knows all the sense-objects (viṣayān indriyāṇām) and the tastes which come near it (rasādikāṁ samīpa-sthān). The original cause of manas and the energy of all the senses and the cause of all feelings and judgments (buddhi), the citta, is situated in the heart. The citta is also the cause of all motor functions and activities, such that those who are possessed of good cittas follow a good course and those who are possessed of bad cittas follow a bad course. The manas knows the citta, and thence proceeds the choice of action; then comes the understanding, deciding what is worth doing and what is not. Buddha, or understanding, is the understanding of certain actions as good (śubha) and certain others as bad (aśubha)⁴. It seems plain that Bhela distinguishes between manas, citta and buddhi. Of these manas is entirely different from citta and, so far as can be made out from Bhela’s meagre statements, it is regarded as the cause of all cognitions and as having its seat in the brain. The citta was regarded as the cause of all activities, feelings and judgments, and the heart was regarded as its seat. Buddha was probably the determinate understanding and judgment which was but a function of the citta. Bhela says that the doṣas in the brain affect the manas, and, as a result of this, the heart is affected, and from the affections of the heart the understanding (buddhi) is affected, and this leads to madness⁸. In another passage, while describing the different functions of pitta, Bhela says that there is a special kind of alocaka pitta called the cakṣur-vaibhavika, which, by bringing about the contact of manas with the soul, causes cognition and, transmitting it to the citta, produces the discriminative visual knowledge by which different objects are comprehended by the eye.


⁸ urdhvam prakupitā doṣāḥ śiras-tālāv-antarē sthitāḥ, mānasāṁ duṣayanty āsū tataś cittaṁ viṣpadyate cittaṁ vyāpadaṁ āpanne buddhir nālam niyacchati tatas tu buddhi-vyāpattau kāryakāryam na budhyate evam pravartate vyādhīr ummādo nāma dāruṇāḥ. 

Ibid. p. 149.
judgmental state, however, is different, and it is produced by a special kind of 
ālocaka pitta called the buddhi-vaiśeṣika, which is situated at the point between the eyebrows, and, being there, holds together the subtle forms emanating from the self (susūkṣmān arthān ātma-kṛtān), associates the data (dīr̥rayati), integrates them with other similar known facts (pratyudāharati), remembers the past, and, after producing our knowledge in conceptual and judgmental forms, wills for future realization, generates instructive actions, and is the force which operates in meditation (dhyāna) and restraint of thoughts (dīr̥āma) 1.

Suśruta does not state anything of importance concerning the brain; but there seems to be little doubt that he knew that particular nerves in the head were connected with particular sense functions. Thus he says in III. 6. 28 that there are two nerves (śīrā) lower down the ears on their back, called vidhūrā, which, if cut, would produce deafness; on both sides of the nasal aperture inside the nasal organ there are two nerves called phañga, which, if cut, would destroy the sensation of smell; at the back of the eyebrows, below the eyes, there are the nerves called the apānga, which, if cut, would produce blindness. All these cognitive nerves meet in passing at the centre of the eyebrow (śīrgātaka) 2. He further says that the nerves are attached to the brain inside the skull on the upper part of it (majākāhyantaropariśṭhāt śīrā-sandhi-sannipāta) and this place, called the romāvarta, is the supreme superintendent (adhipati). Caraka says that the head is the place for the senses. It cannot be decided whether he took this in any deeper sense or whether he means simply that the sense-organs of ear, eyes, nose and taste are situated in the head.

Caraka considers the heart (hrdaya) to be the only seat of consciousness 3. The seats of prāṇa are said to be the head, throat, heart, navel, rectum, bladder, the vital fluid ojas, semen, blood and flesh 4. In I. 19. 3 Caraka, however, excludes navel and flesh and includes the temples (śaṅkha) in their place. It is difficult to determine what is exactly meant by prāṇa here. But in all probability the word is used here in a general way to denote the vital parts. In I. 30. 4 and 5 Caraka says that the whole body with

1 Bhela’s chapter on “Puruṣa-niścaya,” p. 81.
2 ghrāṇa-krotrākṣi-jīhvā-santarpanām śīrṇām madhye śīrā-sannipātaḥ śīrgā-
takām. Suśruta-saṃhitā, III. 6. 28.
3 Caraka-saṃhitā, iv. 7. 8, hrdayaṃ cetanādhiśṭhānam ekam.
4 Ibid. 9.
the four extremities, the trunk, and the head, collectively called śaḍ-aṅga, knowledge (vijñāna), the senses, the sense-objects, the self, manas and the objects of thought (cintya), are all supported (saṃsritā) by the heart, just as a house is supported by pillars and rafters. It is plain, as Cakrapāṇi explains, that the body cannot subsist in the heart. What is meant is that, when all is well with the heart, it is well with all the rest. Caraka holds that the manas and the soul reside in the heart and so also do cognition, pleasure and pain, not, however, in the sense that the heart is the place where these reside, but in the sense that they depend on the heart for their proper functioning; if the heart is wrong, they also go wrong, if the heart is well, they also work well. Just as rafters are supported by pillars, so are they all supported by the heart. But Cakrapāṇi does not seem to agree with this view of Caraka, and he holds that, since the heart is affected by strong thoughts, pleasure and pain, the mind and the soul actually reside in the heart and so do pleasure and pain. The self, which is the cause of all knowledge of sense-objects and the upholster (dhārin) of the system, resides in the heart. It is for this reason that, if a man is struck in the heart, he swoons away, and, if the heart bursts, he dies. It is also the place of the supreme vitality (param ojas). The heart is also regarded as the place where all consciousness is concentrated (tatra Caitanya-saṃgahāla). Caraka says that the heart is the centre of the prāṇa currents (prāṇa-vahānāṃ srotasām hṛdayam mūlam, III. 5. 9) and also of the currents of mental activity (II. 7. 3). In the Apasmāra-nidāna (II. 8. 4) Caraka speaks of the heart as being the supreme place of the inner self (antar-ātmanah śreṣṭham āyatanaṃ).

It may not be out of place here to point out that the Taитtirīya Upaniṣad (I. 6. 1) also speaks of the heart as being the space where

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1 Caraka-saṃhitā, I. 30. 5.
2 Cakrapāṇi says that the mention of param ojas here proves that Caraka believed in another, aparām ojas. The total quantity of aparām ojas in the body is half a handful (ardhānālī-parimāna), while that of param ojas is only eight drops of a white-red and slightly yellowish liquid in the heart. The dhamants of the heart contain half a handful of aparām ojas, and in the disease known as prameha (urinary disease) it is this ojas that is wasted; but even with waste of this ojas a man may live, whereas with the slightest waste of the param ojas a man cannot live. Ojas ought not to be regarded as the eighth dhātu; for it only supports (dhārayati) the body, but does not nourish it. Ojas, however, is sometimes used also in the sense of rasa (Caraka-saṃhitā I. 30. 6, Cakrapāṇi’s commentary). See also ibid. I. 17. 74 and 75 and Cakrapāṇi’s comment on the same. Ojas is, however, regarded in the Atharva-Veda, II. 17, as the eighth dhātu.
manomaya puruṣa, i.e. the mind-person, resides. In many other Upaniṣads the heart is the centre of many nāḍis, or channels. Śaṅkara, in explaining Brh. ii. 1. 19, says that the nāḍis or śirās, called hitā, which are developed out of the food-juice and are 272,000 in number, emanate from the heart and spread over the whole body (purītata). The buddhi resides in the heart and from there controls the external senses. Thus, for example, at the time of hearing in the awakened state the buddhi passes through these nāḍis to the ear and from there expands the auditory organ and superintends it. When the buddhi thus expands, we have the state of awakening, when it contracts, the state of deep sleep (suṣupti).

The Circulatory and the Nervous System.

The names śirā (also hirā) and dhamani, of two different kinds of channels in the body, seem to have been distinguished at a period as early as the Atharva-Veda. The Brhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad describes the hitā nāḍis of the heart as being as fine as a thousandth part of a hair, and they are said to carry white, blue, yellow and green liquids; Śaṅkara, commenting on this, says that these various colours are due to the various combinations of vāta, pitta and śleṣman which the nāḍis carry. He states that the seventeen elements (five bhūtas, ten senses, prāṇa and antahkarana) of the subtle body, which is the support of all instinctive desires, abide

1 See Brh. ii. 1. 19, iv. 2. 2 and 3, iv. 3. 20, iv. 4. 8 and 9; Chānd. viii. 6. 6; Kaṭha, vi. 16; Kaus. iv. 19; Mung. ii. 2. 6; Maitri, Bibliotheca Indica, 1870, vi. 21, vii. 11; Praśna, iii. 6 and 7.

2 The word purītata means principally the covering of the heart. But Śaṅkara takes it here to mean the whole body.

3 iatam hirāh sahasra dhamanir uta. Atharva-Veda, vii. 36. 2. Sāyāṇa explains hirā as garbha-dhāranārtham antar-avasthitah sūkṣma nāḍyah and dhamanī as garbhāsavya avasāṃbhikā sthūla nāḍyah. Atharva-Veda, i. 17. 1, 2, also seems to distinguish hirā from dhamanī. In i. 17. 1 the hirās are described as being of red garments (lohitā-vāsasah), which Sāyāṇa explains as lohitasya rudhirasya nicāsa-bhūtā hi (the abode of blood) and paraphrases as rajo-vahana-nāḍyah. It seems, therefore, that the larger ducts were called dhamanis. In i. 17. 3 the Atharva-Veda speaks of hundreds of dhamanis and thousands of hirās.

4 Brh. iv. 3. 20, with Śaṅkara’s commentary. Ānandagiri, in commenting on the same, quotes a passage from Śaṁcīta which is substantially the same as Sauṁcīta-sāmbhād, iii. 7. 18, to show that those śirās which carry vāta are rosy (arunā), those which carry pitta are blue, those which carry blood are red, and those which carry śleṣman are white:

arunā śirā vāta-vahā rālāḥ pitta-vahā śirāḥ
ārgh-vahā tu rohinyo gauryāḥ śleṣma-vahā śirāḥ.
in these nādis. In Brhad-āranyaka, iv. 2. 3 it is said that there is the finest essence of food-juice inside the cavity of the heart; it is this essence which, by penetrating into the finest nādis, serves to support the body. It is surrounded by a network of nādis. From the heart it rushes upwards through the extremely fine hitā nādis, which are rooted in the heart. Chāndogya, viii. 6. 6 speaks of 101 nādis proceeding from the heart, of which one goes towards the head\(^1\). In Mūnd. ii. 2. 6 it is said that, like spokes in a wheel, the nādis are connected with the heart. Praśna, iii. 6 and 7, however, says that in the heart there are one hundred nādis and in each of these are twenty-two hundred branches and the vyāna vāyu moves through these. The Maitri Upaniṣad mentions the susumna nādi proceeding upwards to the head, through which there is a flow of prána\(^2\). None of these passages tell us anything definite about the nādis. All that can be understood from these passages is that they are some kind of ducts, through which blood and other secretions flow, and many of these are extremely fine, being about the thousandth part of a hair in breadth. The naḍa, or hollow reed, is described in the Rg-Veda (viii. 1. 33) as growing in ponds and in the Atharva-Veda (iv. 19. 1) as being vārṣika, or "produced in the rains." This word may have some etymological relation with nādi\(^3\). In another place it is said that women break naḍa with stones and make mats out of them\(^4\). The word nādi is also used in the Atharva-Veda in the sense of "ducts\(^5\)." In Atharva-Veda, v. 18. 8 the word nādiṅka is used

\(^1\) This passage is sometimes referred to in later literature to show that the susumna nādi, which goes towards the head, was known as early as the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. See also Kaṭha, vi. 16.

\(^2\) Īḍhāva-gā nādi susumnaṁkṣāya práṇa-saṃcārenā. Maitri, vi. 21. Sāyaṇa, in his commentary on A.V. i. 17. 3, quotes the following verse:

\begin{center}
madhya-sthāyaḥ susumnāyāḥ parva-paṇcaka-sambhavāḥ
tākkopāśāḥatam prāptāḥ īirā laṅka-trayāṇī param
ardha-lakṣaṁ iti prāhuh sartrārtha-vācāraḥ.
\end{center}

\(^3\) Macdonell makes the following remarks in his Vedic Index, vol. i, p. 433:

"Nāda is found in several passages of the Rg-Veda (i. 32. 8; 179. 4; ii. 34. 3; viii. 60. 2; x. 11. 2; 105. 4) but its sense is still obscure. It is identified by Pischel (Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 35. 717 et seq.; Vedische Studien, i. 183 et seq.) with Naḍa, being explained by him in one passage (i. 32. 8). Here Caland and Henry, L'Agniḍoma, p. 313 would read noḷam. See also Wackernagel, Altindische Grammatik, i. 173, as a reed boat, which is split, and over which the waters go, etc."

\(^4\) yathā nāḍam kaśipone striyo bhūndanty ātmanā (Atharva-Veda, vi. 138. 5).

\(^5\) In the Atharva-Veda, vi. 138. 4, the nādis are described as ducts over the testes, through which the seminal fluid flows: ye te nāḍayau deva-hṛte yayoś tiṣṭhati vyṛṇyauṁ te te bhūnadvī (I break with a stone upon a stone those two ducts pf yours
to denote the speech organ (vāk). The word dhamanī is used in Rg-Veda, II. 11. 8 and is paraphrased by Śāyaṇa as sound (śabda) and by Macdonell as "reed" or "pipe". If Śāyaṇa's explanations are to be accepted, then in A.V. II. 33. 6 the word snāca means fine sirās (śūksamāh-sirāḥ) and dhamani the larger ducts (dhamani-sabdena sthūlāh). In vi. 90. 5 one hundred dhamanis are said to surround the body of a person suffering from colic or gout (śūla), and Śāyaṇa paraphrases dhāmani here as nāḍī. In Chāṇḍogya, III. 19. 2, the rivers are said to be dhāmani (yā dhamanayās tā nāḍyāḥ), and Śaṅkara paraphrases dhāmani as sirā. I have already referred to the use of the word hirā in the Atharva-Veda; the word is also used in the Rg-Veda.

The above references show that nāḍīs, sirās (or hirās) and dhāmanis were all ducts in the body, but sometimes the nāḍīs or sirās had also the special sense of finer channels, whereas the dhāmanis were the larger ducts. I shall now come to Caraka: it will be found that there was not much advance towards a proper understanding of the significance of their distinction and functions.

Caraka plainly regards dhāmanis, sirās and srotas (secretory currents) as ducts and thinks that different names are applied to them on account of their different functions. He says that the roots of the ten dhāmanis are in the heart. These carry throughout the body the ojas, by which all people live and without which they all die. It is the essence by which the foetus is formed, and which goes to the heart at a later stage, when the heart is formed; when it is lost, life also ceases to exist; it is the essence of the body and the seat of the prānas. These ducts are called dhāmanis, because they are filled with chyle from outside; they are called srotas, because the chyle, etc. which nourish the body are secreted (sravaṇāt) out of these; and they are called sirā,

made by God over your two testes, through which your semen flows). In x. 7. 15 and 16, the hollows of the seas are described as nāḍīs (samudro yasya nāḍyāḥ), and so also the interspace of the quarters of the sky (yasya catasraḥ pradīlo nāḍyāḥ).

1 "Dhamanī, 'reed,' appears to denote 'pipe' in a passage of the Rg-Veda (II. 11. 8) and in a citation appearing in the Nīruktā (vi. 24)." Vedic Index, vol. I, p. 390. The word sirā is spelt with a palatal "ś" in Caraka and with a dental in the Vedas, and it has therefore been differently spelt in this chapter in different contexts.

2 tvan vṛtram ādhyāmān sirāsu maho vajreṇa sīvapah. R.V. I. 121. 11. The word dhāmanī is spelt with a long "i" in Caraka and with a short "i" in the Atharva-Veda.
because they go (saraṇāt śīrāh) to the different parts of the body. The ten dhāmanis spread out in manifold branches throughout the body. In the Caraka-saṃhitā srotas means properly the path through which the successive evolutionary products of the body-constituents (dhātus) or other kinds of secretion run and accumulate together with elements of their own types. Cakrapāni explains it thus: The transformation into blood takes place in connection with chyle (rasa). The coming together of rasa with blood at a different part of the body cannot take place without a path of transmission, called srotas. So the transformation of dhātus takes place through the function of this path of transmission. So for each kind of product there is a separate srotas. Vāyu, pitta and kapha may be said to go about through all the srotas, though there are, no doubt, special channels for each of the three. Gaṅgādhara, however, takes the srotas as being the apertures through which the dhātus and other waste-products flow. In whatever way it may be looked at, the srotas is, according to Caraka, nothing but the duct of the dhāmanis. Caraka opposes the view of those who think that the body is nothing but a collection of srotas, for the simple reason that the substances which pass through these srotas and the parts of the body where they are attached are certainly different from the srotas themselves. There are separate srotas for the flow of prāṇa, water, food-juice, blood, flesh, fat, bony materials, marrow, semen, urine, excreta and sweat; vāta, pitta and śleṣman, however, flow through the body and all the channels (sarva-srotāṃsi ayana-bhūtāni). For the supply of materials for the suprasensual elements of the body, such as manas, etc., the whole of the living body serves as a channel. The heart is the root of all

1 dhūmāṇād dhāmanāya śravaṇāt srotāṃsi saraṇāt śīrāh. Caraka-saṃhitā, 1. 30. 11.  
2 Ibid. III. 5. 3.  
3 Doṣāṇāṁ tu sarva-śatra-caratvena yathā-sthūla-srotō ’bhidhāne ’pi sarva-srotāṃsy eva gamanārthaṁ vahyante...vātātmāṁ api pradhāṇa bhūtādhamanāyāṁ santy eva. Cakrapāni’s comment on ibid.  
4 dhāra-parināma-rasa hi srotāśi dhāra-rūpaṁ panthānāṁ vinā gantum na śaknoti, na ca srotai dhāra-pathena gamanaṁ vinā tad-uttarottara-dhūtavena pariṇamati, etc. Gaṅgādhara’s falpa-kalpa-taru on ibid.  
5 Gaṅgādharā, in commenting on this passage (Caraka-saṃhitā, III. 5. 7), “tadvas atindriyāṇāṁ punaḥ sattvātmāṁ kevalam cetanāvāc chartram ayana-bhūtam adhiṣṭhāna-bhūtam ca,” says, “manā atmā srotā-spariṣaṁ-nayana-rajasa-grhīṇaḥ-buddhāḥ-ahākārāddhānāṁ kevalam cetanāvāt sajñāvām śatrā-srotō ’yana-bhūtam adhiṣṭhāna-bhūtam ca.” There are several passages in Caraka where we hear of mano-vaha currents (currents carrying manas); if manas, buddhi, ahaṅkāra, etc. can all be carried in currents, they must be considered as having some material spatial existence. These manas, buddhi and ahaṅkāra may be atindriya, but they are not on that account non-physical.
prāṇa channels, i.e. the channels of the prāṇa vāyu; for vāyu in general moves through all parts of the body. When these are affected, there is either too much or too little respiration; the respiration may be very slow or very quick, and it is attended with sound and pain. From these signs therefore one can infer that the prāṇa channels have been affected. The source of water channels is the palate, and the seat of thirst is in the heart (kloma)\(^1\). When these are affected, the tongue, palate, lips, throat and kloma become dried up, and there is great thirst. The stomach is the source of all currents carrying food, and, when these are affected, there is no desire for food, but indigestion, vomiting and the like. The heart is the source, and the ten dhamanis are the paths, of the chyle (rasa) currents. The liver and spleen are the source of blood currents. The tendons and skin are the sources of flesh currents. The kidneys are the sources of fat channels; fat and pelvis, of bone channels; the bones and joints, of marrow channels; the testes and penis, of semen channels; the bladder, the pubic and the iliac regions, of urine channels; the intestines and the rectum, of the excreta channels, and the fat and pores of hairs, of perspiration channels\(^2\).

It is curious, however, to note that, in spite of the fact that here the sīrās and dhamanis are regarded as synonymous, their number is differently counted in iv. 7. 13, where it is said that there are two hundred dhamanis and seven hundred sīrās, and the finer endings of these are counted as 29,956. It is reasonable to suppose, in accordance with the suggestions found in the Atharva-Veda, that, though the dhamanis and sīrās were regarded by Caraka as having the same functions, the former were larger than the latter\(^3\). Gaṅgādāra, in commenting on this passage, says that sīrās, dhamanis and srotas are different on account of their being different in number and of their having different functions and different appearances. It is well known that a distinction between sīrās and dhamanis is drawn by Suśruta, to which I shall presently refer, but Caraka positively denies any such distinction; and this

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1 Caraka-saṃhitā, III. 5. 10. Cakrapāṇi explains it (kloma) as ṛḍaya-stham pīpāsā-sthānam, and Gaṅgādāra as the point of conjunction between the throat and the heart (haṭṭhorasah sandhīh).

2 The synonyms for srotas given by Caraka are sīrā, dhamanit, rasa-vāhīnt, nādi, pānthā, mārga, sarīra-chidra, samuḥtāsamuḥtāni (open at the root, but closed at the end), sthāna, āśaya and nīketa.

3 There is one passage of Dr̥ḍhabala (Caraka-saṃhitā, VI. 29. 23) which seems to draw a distinction between sīrās and dhamanis; for there, as a symptom of a disease, it is said that the sīrās have expanded (āvyāma) and the dhamanis have become contracted (saṁkoca).
is accepted by his commentator Cakrapāṇi also. Gaṅgādhara is unable to point out any passage in Caraka to prove his opinion or to state more explicitly what is the difference of functions and appearances between the dhamanis and sīrās. In fact Gaṅgādhara's remarks are directly borrowed from Suśruta, III. 9. 3, without acknowledgment, and it is very surprising that he should not know the difference of views on this point between Caraka and Suśruta and should try to support Caraka by a quotation from Suśruta on the very point on which they materially differ.

Suśruta refers to Caraka's view that sīrās, srotas and dhamanis are the same and opposes it, saying that they are different in appearance, number and functions. Dalhaṇa, in explaining this, says that the sīrās carry vāta, pitta, kšetra, blood, etc., and are rosy, blue, white and red, whereas the dhamanis that carry sense-impressions of sound, etc. have no distinctive colour, and the srotas have the same colour as the dhātus which flow through them. Again, the principal sīrās are forty in number, the principal dhamanis twenty-four and the principal srotas twenty-two in number. The sīrās permit us to contract or expand our limbs or perform other motor functions, and they allow the mind and senses to operate in their own ways and serve also to fulfil other functions of moving rapidly (prasyāndana), etc., when vāyu works in them. When pitta flows through the sīrās, they appear shining, create desire for food, increase digestive fire and health. When kśetra passes through them, they give an oily appearance to the body, firmness of joints and strength. When blood passes through them, they become coloured and filled also with the different dhātus and produce the sense-cognition of touch. Vāyu, pitta, kšetra and blood—any one of these may flow through any and every sīrā. The dhamanis are more like sensory nerves, since they carry sensations of sound, colour, taste and smell (śabda-rūpa-rasa-gandha-vahatvadikāṃ dhamaninām). The srotas carry prāṇa, food, water, chyle, blood, flesh and fat. It is on account of their close proximity, similar functions, fineness (śaukṣmyāt), and also because of the fact that they have been referred to in similar terms by older authorities, that they have sometimes been regarded as performing the same work, though their functions are really different.

1 na ca Caraka Suśruta śca dhamanīśīrāś-srotasāṃ bheda vivakṣitah. Cakrapāṇi's commentary on Caraka, III. 5. 3.
2 Suśruta-saṃhitā, III. 7. 8–17.
3 Ḍalhaṇa on ibid. III. 9. 3.
4 Ibid.
Dalhana, in explaining this, says that, as, when a bundle of grass is burning, the burning of each separate blade of grass cannot be perceived on account of their contiguity, so the sīrās, dhāmanis and srotas are situated so close to one another that it is very difficult to observe their separate functions and work. Śirā, srotas, mārga, kha and dhāmani are the general names used to denote the canals or ducts of the body. It is on account of the similarity of action of all these ducts that their functions are sometimes confused.

The dhāmanis start from the navel; ten proceed to the upper part of the body, ten to the lower part and four crosswise (tiryag-gāh). Those ten which go to the upper part of the body, branch out, are divided into three classes, and are thirty in number. Of these there are altogether ten for carrying vāta, pitta, kapha, śoṇita and rasa, two for each; there are eight for carrying śabda, rāpa, rasa and gandha, two for each; there are two for the organ of speech, two for making noise (ghośa), as distinguished from speech; two for going to sleep, two for being awake; two for bearing tears, two for carrying milk in women, and it is the same two dhāmanis that carry the semen in men. It is by these dhāmanis that the body on the upper side of the navel (e.g. sides, back, chest, shoulders, hands, etc.) is held fast to the lower part. The carrying of vāta, etc. is the common quality of all these dhāmanis.

Those dhāmanis which branch out downwards are thirty in number. They eject vāta, urine, excreta, semen, menstrual blood, etc. downwards. They are connected with the place of pitta (pittāśaya), draw downwards the materials not fit for being absorbed, and nourish the body with the assimilable products of digestion. The dhāmanis connected with the pittāśaya carry the food-juice throughout the body, as soon as it is digested by the action of heat, by supplying it to the upper circulatory dhāmanis and through them to the heart, which is designated as the seat of rasa (rasa-sthāna). Ten dhāmanis carry vāta, pitta, śoṇita, 

1 Thus Dalhana remarks: 

ākāśyāvekāśānāṁ dehe nāmāṁ dehināṁ
śirāṁ srotāṁ mārgāṁ khaṁ dhāmanyaḥ.

2 Suśruta, Sārira, ix. 7 and 8; see also Dalhana’s commentary on it. The apertures of some dhāmanis by which the food-juice is circulated through the body are as fine as lotus fibres, and some grosser than them, as the apertures of lotus stalks. Thus some dhāmanis have very fine apertures, and others grosser apertures.

yathā svabhāvataḥ khāni mrūlaṇu biseṣu ca
dhāmanānāṁ tathā khāni raso yair upaṣṭyate. 

Ibid. ix. 10.
kapha and rasa; two, connected with the intestines, carry the food-juice; two carry water; two are connected with the bladder for ejecting urine; two are for the production of semen (śukra-
prādura-bhāva), two for its ejection, and it is these which regulate
the menstrual flow in the case of women; two, connected with
the larger intestines, eject the excreta; there are eight others which
carry perspiration. It is by these dhāmanis that the intestines,
waist, urine, excreta, rectum, bladder and penis are held together.

Each of the other four dhāmanis, which go crosswise (tiryag-gāh),
has hundreds and thousands of branches, which, innumerable as
they are, are spread all over the body, like so many windows; their
mouths are at the holes of the hairs, through which perspiration
goes out and which nourish the body with rasa, and through these
the effective principles (oṣṭya) of oil, watery sprinklings, oint-
ments, etc. enter the body after being acted on by bhrājaka (heat
of the skin). It is again these which carry the pleasurable and
painful sense-impressions of touch. The dhāmanis direct the five
senses to the five sense-objects for their cognition. There is the
cognizer (mānta) and the manas organ; the dhāmani which is con-
ected with manas on one side and the dhāmanis which carry the
different sense-impressions on the other make the sense-data
cognized by the self. The various sensory and motor dhāmanis
are further named in Suśruta, III, vi. 28. Down below the back
of the ear there are two dhāmanis, called vidhura, which, when
injured, produce deafness; inside the two nostrils there are the
two dhāmanis called phaṇa which, when hurt, arrest the sensation
of smell. Below the eyebrows on the two sides of the eye there
are the two dhāmanis, called apāṅga, which, when hurt, produce
blindness: there are also two other dhāmanis, above the eyebrows
and below them, called ācārta, which, when hurt, also produce
blindness. Suśruta also speaks in this connection of a place inside

1 Suśruta, Śārtra, ix. 7 and 8; see also Daṇḍāṇa’s commentary on it.
2 Daṇḍāṇa, in commenting on this passage of Suśruta, III, ix. 9, says: “tait eva
mano-mugatah sukhās sukha-rupaṁ sparśam karmātmā grhasthe.” (It is through
these dhāmanis, as connected by manas, that the self, as associated with the subtle
body, receives the pleasurable and painful impressions of touch.)
3 pañcābhiḥbhiḥ taṁ taṁ pañca-kṛtvāh
pañcendriyam pañcaḥ bhūvayanti
pañcendriyam pañcaḥ bhūvayitvā
pañcatam ayanti vināśa-kale.

Suśruta, III, ix. 11.
Daṇḍāṇa, in commenting on the above, says: “mantā hi sātre aha eva, manto ‘py
ekam eva, tena manasā yaice dhamanī sābhādi-vahāsu dhamanīśu abhiprappamā
saiva dhamanī sva-dharmam grāhāyati mantāraṁ nānyeti.”
the skull on the upper part of the brain, where all the śirās have met together, as the adhipati superintendent.

In describing the śirās (700 in number) Suśruta says that these are like so many canals by which the body is watered and by the contraction and expansion of which the movements of the body are rendered possible. They start from the navel and branch out like so many fibres of leaves. The principal śirās are forty in number; of these ten are for the circulation of vāta, ten for pitta, ten for kapha and ten for rakta (blood). The śirās of vāta circulation again branch out into 175 śirās, and the same is the case with those which circulate pitta, kapha and rakta. We have thus altogether 700 śirās. When vāta is properly circulated through the śirās, it becomes possible for us to move our limbs without obstruction and to exercise our intellectual functions. But it should be noted that, though some śirās are regarded as mainly circulating vāyu or pitta or kapha, yet they all, at least to some extent, circulate all three1.

There are 900 snāyus, and these have also holes within them (suśirāḥ), and these, as well as the kāndarās, which are also but special kinds of snāyus, serve to bind the joints of the body, just as the several pieces of planks are held together in a boat. Suśruta also mentions five hundred muscles. The marmas are vital spots in flesh, śirā, snāyu and bones which are particularly the seats of prāṇa: when persons are hurt in these places, they may either lose their lives or suffer various kinds of deformity. The srotas are again described by Suśruta as being ducts, other than śirā and dhāmani, which start from the cavity of the heart and spread out through the body2. These srotas carry the currents of prāṇa, food-juice, water, blood, flesh, fat, urine, excreta, semen and menstrual blood.

The Nervous System of the Tantras.

The nerve system of the Tantras, however, is entirely different from that of the medical systems of Caraka and Suśruta. It starts with the conception of the spinal column (meru-danda), which is regarded as one bone from the bottom of the back to the root of

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1 Suśruta, Śārira, ix. 13:
na hi vātām śirāh kācin na pittām kevalam tathā
sleṣmānarām vā vahanāt etāt atah sarvavahāḥ smṛtāḥ.
Suśruta, iii. vii. 16.

2 Suśruta, Śārira, ix. 13:
mulāt kḥād antaram dehe prasṛtam tv abhihāvi yat
srotas tad iti vijñeyam śirā-dhāmani-carājan.
the neck. In the passage inside this spinal column there is a nerve (nāḍī), called suṣumṇā, which is again in reality made up of three nāḍis, suṣumṇā, vajrā and citrīṇī¹. All nāḍis start from the root at the end of the vertebral column, called kāṇḍa, and they proceed upwards to the highest cerebral nerve-plexus, called sahasrāra, and are seventy-two thousand in number. The place of the root of these nāḍis (kāṇḍa) is an inch above the anus and an inch below the root of the penis. If suṣumṇā is the central nerve of the spinal cord, then on its extreme right side is the idā, and then parallel to it towards the suṣumṇā are the gāṇḍhārī, stretching from the corner of the left eye to the left leg, hasti-jihvā, stretching from the left eye to the left foot, sāṅkhīṇī, branching on the left, kuḥū (the pubic nerve on the left) and also the visvodāra, the lumbar nerves. On the extreme left of it is the pūṣā, stretching from below the corner of the right eye to the abdomen, pāṣyanti, the auricular branch or the cervical plexus, sarasvati and vāraṇā (the sacral nerve). The sāṅkhīṇī (the auricular branch or the cervical plexus on the left) goes parallel to the suṣumṇā, but takes a turn in the region of the neck and passes on to the root of the left ear-holes; in another branch it passes through the inner side of the region of the forehead, where it gets joined with the citrīṇī nāḍī and enters into the cerebral region. The suṣumṇā nāḍī is a sort of duct inside the spine, which encases within it the vajrā nāḍī, and that again encases within it the citrīṇī nāḍī, which has within it a fine aperture running all through it, which is the fine aperture running through the spinal cord². This inner passage

¹ But according to the Tantra-cidāmanī, suṣumṇā is not inside the spinal column but outside it. Thus it says, "tad-bāhye tu tayor madhye suṣumṇā vahini-samyuta." This, however, is against the view of the Śat-cakra-nirūpaṇa, which takes suṣumṇā to be inside the passage of the spine. According to the Nigama-tattvānā-sāra-tantra, idā and pīṅgalā are both inside the spine, but this is entirely against the accepted view. Dr Sir B. N. Seal thinks that suṣumṇā is the central passage or channel of the spinal cord and not a separate nāḍī (The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, pp. 219, 226, 227). Mr Rele in his The Mysterious Kundalint (pp. 35, 36) thinks that it is a nāḍī which is situated centrally and passes through the spinal column (meru-dānya); but, judging from the fact that it is said to originate in the sacrum, from which it goes upwards to the base of the skull, where it joins with the plexus of a thousand nerves called brahma-cakra (cerebrum in the vault of the skull) and is divided at the level of the larynx (kaṇṭha) into anterior and posterior parts between the two eyebrows (ājñā-cakra) and the cavity in the brain (brahma-randhra) respectively, Rele thinks that this suṣumṇā nāḍī is nothing but the spinal cord.

² Nāḍī is derived by Pāṇḍarāna Yati, in his commentary on the Śat-cakra-nirūpaṇa, from the root nāḍ, to go, as a passage or duct (nāḍa gatau tī dhātā nāḍyate gāmyate 'nāḍa padacyā tī nāḍi). Mahāmāhopādhyāya Gaṇānātha Sen makes a
within the citrini nādi is also called brahma-nādi; for there is no further duct or nādi within the citrini. The suṣumnā thus in all probability stands for our spinal cord. The suṣumnā, however, is said to take a turn and get connected with the ṣāṅkhini in the inside region of the forehead, whence it becomes connected with the aperture of the ṣāṅkhini (ṣāṅkhini-nālam ālambya) and passes to the cerebral region. All the nādis are connected with the suṣumnā. Kuṇḍalini is a name for supreme bodily energy, and, because the channel of the suṣumnā, the brahma-nādi, is the passage through which this energy flows from the lower part of the trunk to the regions of the nerve-plexus of the brain, suṣumnā is sometimes called kuṇḍalini; but kuṇḍalini itself cannot be called a nerve, and it is distinctly wrong to call it the vagus nerve, as Mr Rele does. The iḍā nādi on the left side of the suṣumnā outside the spine goes upwards to the nasal region, and piṅgalā follows a corresponding course on the right side. Other accounts of these nādis hold that the iḍā proceeds from the right testicle and the piṅgalā from the left testicle and passes on to the left and the right of the suṣumnā in a bent form (dhanur-ākāre). The three, however, meet at the root of the penis, which is thus regarded as the junction of the three rivers, as it were (triveni, viz. of suṣumnā (compared to the river Gaṅgā), iḍā (compared to Yāmuna) and piṅgalā (compared to Sarasvati). The two nādis, iḍā and piṅgalā, are also described as being like the moon and the sun respectively, and suṣumnā as fire. In addition to these nādis the Yogi-yājñavalkya mentions the name of another nādi, called alambaṣā, making the number of the important nādis fourteen, including suṣumnā and counting suṣumnā as one nādi (i.e. including vaṭrā and citrini), though the total number of nādis is regarded as being seventy-two thousand. Śrīkaṇṭāda in his Nādi-vijñāna counts the number of nādis as thirty-five millions. But, while the Tantra school, as represented in the works Śaṭ-cakra-nirūpaṇa, Jñāna-saṃkalini, Yogi-yājñavalkya, etc., regards the nādis as originating from the nerve-plexus very serious mistake in his Pratyakṣa-lātraka when he thinks that the nādis are to be regarded as being without apertures (nṛṇḍhīra). They are certainly not so regarded in the Ayur-veda or in the Śaṭ-cakra-nirūpaṇa and its commentaries. In Yoga and Tantra literature the term nādi generally supersedes the term īrā of the medical literature.

1. Śaṭda-brahma-rūpāyāḥ kuṇḍaliniyāḥ parama-siva-sannidhi-gamana-patha rūpa-citrini-nādy-antargata-lānvyā-bhāga iti. Pūrṇānanda’s commentary on Śaṭ-cakra-nirūpaṇa, St. 2.
2. Suṣumnāyai kuṇḍaliniyai. Hatha-yoga-pradīpikā, iv. 64.
3. Ṣaṭ-cakra-nirūpaṇa, St. 1 and Yogi-yājñavalkya-saṃhitā, p. 18.
lying between the root of the penis and the anus, and while Caraka regards them as originating from the heart, Śrīkaṇṭāda regards them as originating from the region of the navel (nābhi-kanda) and going upwards, downwards and sideways from there. Śrīkaṇṭāda, however, compromises with the Tantra school by holding that of these thirty-five millions there are seventy-two thousand nāḍīs which may be regarded as gross and are also called dhamanis, and which carry the sense-qualities of colour, taste, odour, touch and sound (pañcendriya-guṇāvahā). There are again seven hundred nāḍīs with fine apertures, which carry food-juice by which the body is nourished. Of these again there are twenty-four which are more prominent.

The most important feature of the Tantra school of anatomy is its theory of nerve-plexuses (cakra). Of these the first is the ādhāra-cakra, generally translated as sacro-coccygeal plexus. This plexus is situated between the penis and the anus, and there are eight elevations on it. It is in touch with the mouth of the susumnā. In the centre of the plexus there is an elevation called svayambhū-linga, like a fine bud with an aperture at its mouth. There is a fine thread-like fibre, spiral in its form, attached to the aperture of the svayambhū-linga on one side and the mouth of the susumnā on the other. This spiral and coiled fibre is called kula-kundalinī; for it is by the potential mother-energy, as manifested in its movement of a downward pressure of the apāna vāyu and an upward pressure of the prāṇa vāyu, that exhalation and inhalation are made possible and life functions operate. Next comes the svādhiṣṭhāna-cakra, the sacral plexus, near the root of the penis. Next comes the lumbar plexus (mani-pura-cakra), in the region of the navel. Next is the cardiac plexus (anāhata-cakra or viśuddha-cakra), in the heart, of twelve branches. Next is the laryngeal and pharyngeal plexus, at the junction of the spinal cord and the medulla oblongata, called the bhārati-sthāna. Next comes the lalana-cakra, opposite the uvula. Next to this is the ājñā-cakra between the eyebrows, within which is the manās-cakra, the centre of all sense-knowledge and dream-knowledge, and the seat of manas, the mind-organ. Vijñānabihīka says in his Yoga-vārttika that one branch of the susumnā goes upwards from here, which is the nāḍi for carrying the functions of manas and is called mano-vahā nāḍī; the Jñāna-saṃkalinī tantra calls it jñāna-nāḍī. It seems, therefore, that it is through this nāḍī that connection is established
between the soul, residing in the brain, and the manas, residing in
the manas-cakra. Śaṅkara Miśra argues in his commentary on
the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras, v. 2, 14 and 15, that the nāḍīs are
themselves capable of producing tactile impressions; for, had it
not been so, then eating and drinking, as associated with their
corresponding feelings, would not have been possible, as these
are effected by the automatic functions of prāṇa. Above the
ājñā-cakra comes the soma-cakra, in the middle of the cerebrum,
and finally, in the upper cerebrum, there is the sahasrāra-cakra,
the seat of the soul. The process of Yoga consists in rousing
the potential energy located in the ādāhāra-cakra, carrying it
upwards through the aperture of the citrīṇī or the brahma-nāḍī,
and bringing it to the brahma-randhra or the sahasrāra. This
kūṇḍalini is described as a fine fibre like a
lightning flash (taḍid iva vilasat tantu-rūpa-svarūpa), which
raises the question whether this is actually a physical nerve or
merely a
potential energy that is to be carried upwards to the upper cere-
brum in the sahasrāra-cakra; and it cannot, I think, be yet satis-
factorily explained. But, judging from a wide comparison of the
texts, it seems pretty certain that it is the kūṇḍali śakti or the
kūṇḍali energy which is carried upwards. If the kūṇḍali energy is
inexhaustible in its nature, the whole discussion as to whether
the ādāhāra-cakra is depleted or not or whether the kūṇḍalini
herself rises or her eject, as raised in Sir John’s Serpent Power,
pp. 301–320, loses its point. How far the cakras can themselves be called
nerve-plexuses is very doubtful, since the nerve-plexuses are all outside
the spinal aperture; but, if the kūṇḍalini is to pass through
the aperture of the citrīṇī nāḍī and at the same time pass through the
cakras, the cakras or the lotuses (padma) must be inside the spinal
cord. But, supposing that these nerve-plexuses represent the corre-
sponding places of the cakras inside the spinal cord, and also because
it has become customary to refer to the cakras as plexuses, I have
ventured to refer to the cakras as such. But it must be borne in
mind that, as the kūṇḍalini is a mysterious power, so also are the
cakras the mysterious centres in the path of the ascent of the
kūṇḍalini. A nerve-physical interpretation of them as nerve-
plexuses would be very unfaithful to the texts. A more detailed
discussion on these subjects will be found in the treatment of
Tantra philosophy in a later volume of this work. The chief
interest of the present section is only to show that the Tantra

1 See Dr Sir B. N. Seal’s Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, pp. 222–225.
anatomy is entirely different in its conception from the Āyur-veda anatomy, which has been the subject of our present enquiry. Another fact of importance also emerges from these considerations, namely, that, though in Dr̥ḍhābala’s supplementary part of the Siddhi-sthāna the head is associated with sensory consciousness, Caraka’s own part refers to the heart as the central seat of the soul. But the Tantra school points to the upper cerebrum as the seat of the soul and regards the spinal cord and its lower end as being of supreme importance for the vital functions of the body.

The Theory of Rasas and their Chemistry.

The theory of Rasas or tastes plays an important part in Āyur-veda in the selection of medicines and diet and in diagnosing diseases and arranging their cures. In 1. 26 of Caraka we hear of a great meeting of sages in the Caitraraṭha Forest, attended by Ātreya, Bhadrakāpya, Śākunteya, Pūrṇākṣa Maudgalya, Hiranyākṣa Kauśika, Kumāraśiras Bharadvāja, Vāryovida, the Vaideha king Nimi, Bādiśa and Kāṅkāyana, the physician of Balkh, for the purpose of discussing questions of food and tastes.

Bhadrakāpya held that taste, or rasa, was that which could be perceived by the organ of the tongue and it was one, viz. that of water. Śākunteya held that there were two rasas, nutritive (upāsamanitya) and denutritive (chedaniya). Pūrṇākṣa held that there were three rasas, upāsamanitya, chedaniya and neutral (sādhārana). Hiranyākṣa held that there were four rasas, sweet and good, sweet and harmful, distasteful and good, distasteful and harmful. Kumāraśiras held that there were five rasas, earthy, watery, fiery, airy and ethereal (āntarikṣa). Vāryovida held that there were six rasas, heavy (guru), light (laghu), cold (śīta), hot (uṣṇa), smooth (snigdha) and dry (rūkṣa). Nimi held that there were seven rasas, sweet (madhura), sour (amla), salt (lavana), hot (kaṭu), bitter (tikta), pungent (kaśāya) and alkaline (kṣāra). Bādiśa added one more to these, viz. unmanifested (aavyakta), and held that there were eight rasas. Kāṅkāyana held that the rasas were of infinite variety and could not be counted, on account of the diversity of substances in which they are located (āśraya), their specific properties as light or heavy (guna), their action in developing or reducing the constituents of the body (karma) and their diversity as apparent to the organ of taste. Ātreya Punarvasu held that there are six rasas only,
sweat (madhura), acid (amla), saline (lavana), hot and pungent (katu), bitter (tikta) and astringent (kasaya). The source (yoni) of all these rasas is water. Its actions are sedative (upasamana) and denutritive (chedana), and a basis of equilibrium (sadharanatva) of the rasas is reached when those having the above opposite actions are mixed together. Pleasantness (svadu) or unpleasantness (asvadu) of taste depends on liking or disliking. The seats of rasas are the essences of the five elements (pañca-mahā-bhūta-vikārāḥ) modified in accordance with five conditions, viz. (1) specific nature of the substance (prakṛti); (2) as acted upon by heat or other agents (vikṛti); (3) association with other things (vicāra); (4) the place in which the substance is grown (deśa); (5) the time at which it is produced (kāla). The guṇas of heaviness, lightness, cold, warm, moisture and dryness belong to the things to which the rasas belong. The alkaline (kṣāra) should not be counted as a separate rasa, as it is made up of more than one rasa and affects more than one sense-organ; for it has at least two important rasas (of “hot and pungent” and “saline”) and it affects not only the organ of taste, but also that of touch, and does not naturally belong to any substance, but has to be created by artificial processes. There is no such separate rasa which can be called unmanifested (avyakta). Water is the origin of all rasas; so all rasas may be considered as existing in an unmanifested state in water, but that is no reason why we should say that water has a separate taste called “unmanifested”; moreover, when a substance has two rasas, one dominant and the other extremely feeble, the feeble rasa may be regarded as unmanifested; or, when in a compound of different rasas, say, of a syrup, a slight hot taste is added, this may be considered as unmanifested; but certainly there is no rasa to which the name “unmanifested” (avyakta) could be given. The view that there is an infinite number of rasas is untenable; for, though it may be urged that the same rasa may occur differently in different objects, that would only go to show that there are various grades of forms of each particular rasa and not prove that with each variety of a particular rasa the rasa itself is wholly different. Again,

1 Thus mudga (a sort of kidney-bean), which is a bhūta-vikāra, has the rasa of astringent and sweet and is yet light by nature, though one would expect it to be heavy on account of its rasas of astringent and sweet. Vikṛti is best exemplified in the case of fried paddy, which is lighter than rice. It is well known that by composition wholly new properties may be generated in the product. Medicinal herbs vary in their properties in accordance with the time of plucking.
if different rasas are mixed together, the mixed rasa itself is not entitled to be counted as a separate rasa; for its qualities are just as the sum total of the qualities of the different rasas which are its constituents, and no independent work can be attributed to this mixed rasa (na samṣṭanām rasānāṃ karmopadiśanti buddhimantaḥ), as in the case of a compound of two or more substances, as mentioned above (vicāra).

Though on account of the predominance of one or the other of them they are called earthy (pārthīva), watery (āpya), fiery (āgneya), airy (vāyavya) or ethereal (ākāśātmaka), yet all substances are compounded of the five elements. All substances, whether animate or inanimate, are to be considered as medicines (ausadha), provided they are applied in the proper way (yukti) and for specific purposes (artha). A substance can be a medicine only when it is applied in the proper way and for specific purposes; nothing can unconditionally be considered a medicine. The medicative influence is exerted both by virtue of the specific agency of a substance (draavya-prabhāva) and by the specific agency of its qualities, as also by their joint influence. The action of medicines is called karman, its potency virya, the place where they operate adhikarana, the time of operation kāla, the mode of operation upāya, and the result achieved phala.

As regards the origin of rasas, it is suggested that water gets mixed with the five elements in the air and also after its fall on the ground. These rasas nourish the bodies of all plants and animals. All the five elements are present in all rasas; but in some rasas some of the elements predominate, and in accordance with this there are differences among the various rasas. Thus, with the predominance of soma there is a sweet taste, with the predominance of earth and fire an acid taste, with water and fire a saline taste, with air and fire, hot and pungent, with air and ākāla, bitter, with air and earth, astringent. The different elements

1 The medicinal effect of substances may be distinguished from the medicinal effect of qualities, as when by certain stones (maṣṭi) poison may be removed or by the use of certain amulets certain diseases may be cured. Again, there may be cases where simply by the application of heat a certain disease may be cured, irrespective of the substance which possesses heat as its property. It seems that only the sense-properties and mechanical properties are here counted as guṇas; other kinds of properties were considered as being due to the thing (draavya) itself. For, in addition to the sense-properties, the twenty qualities, guru, laghu, līta, uṣṇa, snigdha, rūḵṣa, manda, tāksya, sthīra, sāra, mṛdū, kāthina, visāda, picchila, śakṣīpa, kharā, stākṣma, sthūla, sāndra and dravya, are counted as guṇas (Caraka-saṃhitā, 1.1.48; 1.25.35; 1.26.11).
which take part in the formation of rasas are said to be instrumental causes (nimitta-kāraṇa) of the rasas; this explains how, though fire has no rasa, yet it may help the generation of a particular rasa\(^1\). Destiny or unknown cause (adṛṣṭa) is, however, the general cause of such combinations of elements with water.

In the very first chapter of the Caraka-saṃhitā, substances (dravya) are counted as being the five elements, viz. ākāśa, air, light, heat, water and earth, together with soul, manas, time and space. Of these those substances which possess sense-organs are called animate and those which do not are called inanimate\(^2\). The guṇas are the sense-properties of hearing, touch, colour, taste and smell, the mechanical and other properties which all elements have in common, such as heaviness, lightness, cold, heat, and moisture, dryness, dullness, sharpness, steadiness, mobility, softness, hardness, motion, slipperiness, smoothness, roughness, grossness, fineness, thickness, liquidity, etc., and desire, hatred, pleasure, pain and effort, intelligence (including memory), consciousness, patience, egoism, etc., distance (para), nearness (apara), combination (yukti), number, contact, disjunction (vibhāga), separateness, measure, inertia (sanskāra) and repetition (abhīṣa). The definition of substance (dravya) is, that which possesses quality (guna) and action (karma) in the relation of inherence and is also the inseparable material cause (samavāyi-kāraṇa) of all effects. Guṇas are things which are themselves inactive and exist in dravyas in an inseparable relation of inherence. The guṇas themselves cannot contain any further guṇas\(^3\).

The above being the theory of dravya and guṇa, the question arises as to the way in which medicines operate in human bodies. The most general and obvious way in which the different medicines were classified was by their different tastes, which were considered primarily to be six in number, as has already been pointed out. Each of the tastes was considered as being capable of producing certain good or bad physiological effects. Thus the sweet taste is

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\(^1\) Iha ca kāraṇato'ṁ bhūtānāṁ rasaya madhuravādi-videṣa eva nimitta-kāraṇato'ṁ ucayate. Cakrāpāṇi on Caraka, 1. 26. 38.

\(^2\) Caraka-saṃhitā, 1. 1. 47. Even trees were regarded as being possessed of senses and therefore animated or cetana. Cakrāpāṇi says that, since the sunflower continues to turn its face towards the sun, it may be regarded as being possessed of the sense of sight; again, since the lavali (Averrhoa cedica) plant fructifies through hearing the sound of thunder, the plants have auditory organs, etc.

\(^3\) Ibid. 1. 1. 47, 48 and 50, with Cakrāpāṇi’s commentary.
said to increase blood, flesh, fat, marrow, semen, life, to do good to the six senses, and to produce strength and colour of the body; to do good to the skin and throat, to destroy pitta, poison and mārūta (morbidity of air), and to produce moistening, cold and heaviness, etc. The acid (āmāla) is said to rouse digestion, develop the body, and to remove vāta; it is light, warm, moist, etc. The saline taste is digestive; it removes vāta, secretes kapha; and it is moist, warm, etc. And so on with the other tastes. But, of course, all these qualities cannot belong to the tastes; as has already been pointed out, the guṇas cannot possess further guṇas, and the tastes (rasa) are themselves guṇas; so, when certain functions or properties are attributed to the rasas, they must be considered as belonging to the substances which possess those specific rasas (rasā iti rasa-yuktāni dravyāṇi).¹

From Suśruta's statements it appears that there was a great difference of opinion regarding the relative prominence of dravya and its properties². There were some who held that dravya was the most important, since dravya remained permanent, whereas rasa, etc. are always changed; so dravya is relatively permanent. Again, dravya is grasped by the five senses, and not its guṇas. The dravya is also the support of the rasas, etc. All operations have to be done with the dravya, and the authoritative texts also speak of operations with the dravyas, and not with the rasas; the rasas depend largely on the nature of the dravyas. Others hold that rasas are the most important, since it is of them that we become directly aware when we take our food, and it is said that they remove the various morbidities of vāta, etc. Others hold that the potency (vīrya) of things is the most important, since it is by their potency that medicines act³. This potency is of two kinds, hot (uṣṇa) and cold (śīta); some think that it is of eight kinds, hot (uṣṇa), cold (śīta), moist (snigdha), dry (rūkṣa), moving (viśāda), slippery (picchīla), soft (mṛdu) and sharp (īkṣṇa). Sometimes potency or vīrya overcomes rasa by its power and makes its own tendencies felt; thus, though sugar-cane ought to remove vāta on account of its sweetness, it really increases it on account of its being śīta-vīrya (of cold

¹ Caraka-samhitā, 1. 26. 39, Caṅkrapāṇi's commentary.
² Suśruta, Sūtra-sūtraṇa, 40. 3. Dravya is defined by Suśruta as kriyā-guṇavat samāvāyī-kāranaṃ.
Speculations in the Medical Schools

potency). Others say that the *rasa*, as digested by the stomach (*pāka*), is most important, since things can produce good or bad effects only when they are digested. Some hold that each *rasa* remains unchanged by digestion, though according to others there are only three kinds of *rasa* resulting from digestion or *pāka*, viz. sweet, acid and hot (*kaṭu*); whereas Suśruta held that there were only two kinds of *rasa* resulting from digestion, viz. sweet and hot; for, in his view, acid was not the result of digestion (*amlo vipāko nāsti*). According to Suśruta it is the *pitta* which is turned into acid. Those objects which have more of earth and water in them are turned into sweet taste, whereas those which have *tejās*, air and ākāśa as their ingredients are turned into hot taste (*kaṭu*).

Speaking of the differences of view regarding the relative importance of *dravya*, *rasa*, *vīrya* and *vipāka*, Suśruta says that they are all important, since a medicine produces effects in all those four ways according to its own nature. The view of Suśruta, as explained by Cakrapaṇi in the *Bhānumati*, seems to be that food, drink and medicine are all products of the five *mahā-bhūtas*, and *rasa*, *vīrya* and *vipāka* are dependent on the *dravya* and are like its potency (*śakti*), through which it works. Cakrapaṇi, commenting on this in the *Bhānumati*, says that even in those cases where certain *rasas* are said to remove or increase certain morbidities (*doṣa*) it is only because of their importance that they are so described; the real agent in all such cases is the *dravya*, since the *rasa*, etc. are always dependent on the *dravya*. Apart from the *śakti* as manifested in *rasa*, etc., the *dravya* also operates by itself in an unthinkable way (*acintya*), which is also called *prabhāva* and which is comparable with the attractive force exerted by magnets on iron. The *dravya* by itself is thus differentiated from its *śakti*, and it is said to have a peculiar operative mode of its own, as distinguished from that of its *śakti* or potency, as manifested in *rasa*, *vīrya* or *vipāka*, and this mode of operation is considered to

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1. *etāni khalu vīryāṇi sva-bala-guṇothkarṣāt rasam abhīhuyātma-karma kurvanti*. Suśruta, *ibid*. The *vīrya* is said to remain both in the *dravya* and in the *rasa*. Thus in Suśruta, I. 40. 5–8, it is said that, if in those *rasas* which remove vāta there is dryness (*raukṣya*), lightness (*lāghava*) and cold (*śaitya*), then they will not remove vāyu; so, if in those which remove *pitta* there is sharpness (*taṅkṣīya*), heat (*auspya*) and lightness (*laghutila*), then they will not remove *pitta*, and so on.


be quite unthinkable (acintya) as to the way in which it operates\(^1\). Thus some medicines operate by *rasa*, some by *vipāka*, or the *rasa* resulting from the digestive operation (e.g. *śunthi*, which, though hot in taste and hot in *vīrya*, is sweet after digestive operation), some by *vīrya* (e.g. *kulattha*, though pungent, yet removes *vāyu* on account of its hot *vīrya*), some by both *rasa* and *vipāka*, some by *dravya-prabhāva*, *vīrya* and *rasa*, some by *dravya-prabhāva*, *vīrya*, *rasa* and *vipāka*.

Caraka, however, differs from Suśruta in this view of *dravya* and *rasa*, *vīrya* and *vipāka*; for, according to him, *rasa*, *vīrya* and *vipāka*, themselves being *gunas*, cannot possess further *gunas*. He does not admit a *sakti* as different from the *dravya*. Thus in the case of *prabhāva*, while Suśruta holds that it is a specific *sakti*, or the thing operating in unaccountable ways, Caraka thinks that this *sakti* is identical with the thing itself. Thus Cakrapāṇi in explaining *Caraka-samhitā*, 1. 26. 72, says, "śaktir hi svarūpam eva bhāvānām, nātiriktaṁ kincid dharmaṁ taram bhāvānām" (potency is the nature of things and is no separate property distinct from them). *Vīrya* in its general sense means "the potency or power of medicines to produce effects," and as such includes within it both *rasa* and *vipāka*; but, since these have special names, the term *vīrya* is not applied to them\(^2\). Apart from this there is special *vīrya* in a technical sense (pāribhāṣika). In the view which considers this *vīrya* to be of two kinds, *snigdha* and *rūkṣa*, these are to be taken as specific characteristics; but in the view which considers the *vīrya* to be of eight kinds, these are to be taken as a different set of characteristics of *dravya* or substance\(^3\). This *vīrya* is believed to be more powerful than *rasa*, so that, when the *vīrya* and *rasa* of a thing come into conflict, it is the *vīrya* which predominates and not the *rasa*.

Vāgbhaṭa junior makes some remarks in support of the name *vīrya*, as given to the characteristics which go by that name. He says that, since the *vīrya* characteristics of things remain unchanged even after digestion, and since the things are primarily

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\(^1\) *dravyam ātmanā śaktyā prabhāvākhyayā doṣam hanti...atra dravya-lakti-kāryodāhāram yathā kārṣaka-manir loha-sālyāṃ ākārṣati. Bhānumatt, 1. 40. 13.

\(^2\) tasya pākasya tad-rasaya vipākasya ca pyatham nirdelān na vīrya-cyavahāraḥ śāstre...Carake tu sāmānya-vīrya-sābdena te 'pi grhtāḥ. Ibid. 1. 40. 5.

\(^3\) yadda dvīvidhām vīryam tadā snigdha-rūkṣādmān...rasādi-dharmato-vyaicā kārya-grahaṇaṁ vakṣyati hi madhuro rasāḥ snigdha ity ādai astavīdha-vīrya-pakṣe tu...balavat-kārya-kārtīvṛca-vivahāyā vīryatvam iti sthitiḥ. Ibid. 1. 40. 4.
in use for medical purposes and each of them would include many substances and rasas, this character justly deserves to be called virya, or the potency-in-chief for producing medical effects\(^1\). He further says that rasa is baffled by vipāka, that rasa and vipāka can baffle virya, if they work in the same direction, and that they may all be baffled by prabhāva. These remarks, however, are true only in those cases where rasa, virya and vipāka exist in the same proportion, and it must be borne in mind that some objects may have rasa of such a predominant type that it may overcome the vipāka or the virya\(^2\). As regards the relative priority of virya and vipāka, Śivādaśa in commenting on Cakrapāṇi’s Dravya-guna-saṅgraha says that virya is prior to vipāka; and this would imply that, as virya can supersede rasa, so vipāka may supersede virya.

If we look back to the earliest history of the development of Indian medical ideas in the Atharva-VEDA, we see that there were two important classes of medicines, viz. the amulets, maṇis and water. Atharva-VEDA, 1. 4. 4, 1. 5, 1. 6, 1. 33, VI. 24, VI. 92, etc. are all in praise of water as medicine, and water is regarded there as the source of all rasa or taste. Thus from the earliest times two different kinds of medicines were used. Of these the amulets were more or less of a miraculous effect. It was not possible to judge which kind of amulet or maṇi would behave in which way; their mode of operation was unthinkable (acinṣṭya). It is easy to see that this mode of operation of medicines was what was considered a prabhāva by Caraka and Suśruta. With them prabhāva means the mysterious operation of a medicine acting in an unaccountable way, so that, though two medicines might be exactly similar in rasa, virya and vipāka, they might behave differently with regard to their medicinal effects\(^3\). Such an effect was thus naturally considered as unthinkable. But the analogy of the old maṇis was fresh in the minds of these medical thinkers when conceiving this prabhāva, and it was in reality an extension of that idea to other unaccountable effects of medicines\(^4\). As none of the chemical effects

\(^1\) Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya, 1. 9. 15.

\(^2\) Ibid. 1. 28.

\(^3\) rasa-virya-vipākānām sāmānyo yatra lakṣyate viṣeṣāh karmanām caiva prabhāvas tasya ca śmytāḥ. Caraka-saṃhitā, 1. 26. 60. Cakrapāṇi, in commenting on this, says, “rakṣā-kāyataścena yān nāvadhārayītum lakṣyate kāryam tat prabhāva-kṛtam iti śucayati; ata evaṃ prabhāva ‘cintya ucyate’ rasa-virya-vipāka-tayācintya ity arthah.”

\(^4\) maṇi-vām dhūraṅgāyānām karma yad vividhātmakān, tat-prabhāva-kṛtam teṣām prabhāvo ‘cintya ucyate. (The various actions of amulets are to be considered as being due to a prabhāva which is unthinkable—ibid. 1. 26. 72.)
(in the modern sense) of medicines on human organs were known, the most obvious way in which the medical effects of herbs, roots, etc. could be classified was on the basis of taste, and by Caraka and Suśruta we are told the effects of the different rasas on the different morbidities of the body, vāyu, pitta and kapha. As the main source of all diseases was unequal increase or decrease of vāyu, pitta and kapha, a classification which described the rasas in such a way that one could know which rasa increased or decreased which of the morbidities was particularly useful. But it is obvious that such a classification, though simple, could not be universally true; for, though the taste is some indication of the medicinal property of any substance, it is not an infallible one. But no other mode of classification was known; it was supposed that the taste (rasa) of some substances changed altogether after digestion and that in such cases the taste which changed after digestion (pāka) would be operative. Cakrapāṇi says that in those cases where the taste on the tongue (rasa) agrees with the taste as produced after the digestive process, the effect in that direction becomes very strong, but in the case where the latter differs from the former the operation of rasa becomes naturally weak, because the force of the taste produced by the final operation of the digestive process is naturally strong. Caraka thought that there were only three rasas as the result of digestion, viz. katu, madhura and amla; Suśruta rejected the last, as has already been described. But even this was not sufficient; for there were many other effects of medicine which could not be explained on the above suppositions. In explaining this, the theory of virya was introduced. In addition to taste substances were considered to possess other properties of heat and cold, as judged by inference, tactual properties of slipperiness, movement, moisture and dryness, etc., sharpness, etc. as manifested by odour, and these were supposed to produce effects in supersession of rasa and vipāka. It was only in the cases where no sensible data of any kind could be found to indicate the medical properties of the thing that the idea of prabhāva was introduced. The chapters in Āyur-veda on draṇya

1 Cakrapāṇi on Caraka, 1, 26. 65. Cakrapāṇi points out that the hot (kaṭu) taste is at first useful in cleaning the phlegm of the throat, but, since it becomes sweet after digestion, it acts as a nutrient (ṣṛṣṭo). But, except in the case of such local actions, it is difficult to understand why the rasa which was altered by digestion should have any such effect as Cakrapāṇi suggests (viparjaye tu durbalam iti jiśeyam).
and gunä deal with the enumeration of prabhäva and also of rasa, vipäka and virya wherever there is a divergence among them, as determined by empirical observation. This is very necessary not only for the selection of medicines and diet in the cure of diseases, but also for prevention of diseases. It is well to remember that many diseases were supposed to arise through eating together things which are opposed to each other in rasa, vipäka or virya.

The Psychological Views and other Ontological Categories.

Caraka in the eighth chapter of the Sūtra-sthāna counts the senses as being five in number. Though both the Sāmkhya and the Vaiśeṣika systems, to which Āyur-veda is largely indebted for its philosophical ideas, admit manas, or mind-organ, as a separate sense (indriya), Āyur-veda here differs from them and, as Cakrapāni says, separates manas from the ordinary senses by reason of the fact that it has many functions which are not possessed by any of the other senses (caksur-ādibhyo 'dhika-dharma-yogitayā)\(^1\). Caraka himself, however, in another place speaks incidentally of a sixth sense (śaḍ-indriya) in connection with the description of sweet taste\(^2\). Manas is, however, here described as transcending the senses (atindriya). Cakrapāni, in explaining the atindriya character of manas, says that it is called atindriya because it is not a cause of the knowledge of external objects like the other senses. Manas is, indeed, the direct cause of pleasure and pain, but it is the superintendent of all the senses (adhiṣṭhāyaka). Manas is also called satteva and cetas. The self is, however, the permanent subject of all acts of consciousness (cetanā-pratisandhātā). When the manas comes into contact with its objects, viz. pleasure or pain or the objects of thought, and the self makes an effort at grasping these objects, then there is a movement on the part of manas, by which it feels pleasure or pain, or thinks the objects of thought, or moves the sense-organs. Thus, when the self makes an effort and the objects of pleasure or pain or thought are present, then the manas turns to these as its objects and moves the senses, and the senses, guided by it, grasp their respective objects and produce their knowledge.

\(^1\) Cakrapāni's commentary on Caraka-samhitā, 1. 8. 3.
\(^2\) Caraka-samhitā, 1. 26. 41, tatra madhuro rasaḥ...śaḍ indriya-prasādanaḥ.
The one manas appears as diverse on account of the diversity of its objects of thought (e.g. the mind may sometimes take religious thoughts and appear religious and at other times take lustful thoughts and appear lustful), diversity of sense-objects with which it is associated (e.g. the mind may grasp colour, smell or sound, etc.), and diversity of ways of imagination (e.g. "This will do good to me" or "This will do me harm," etc.). In the same man the mind may sometimes appear as angry, ignorant or virtuous. But in reality the manas is one and the same for each person; all these differences do not appear at the same time with the same person, as might have been the case if there were many minds for one and the same person. Moreover, the manas is atomic; for otherwise many different objects or functions could be performed by one and the same manas at the same time.

It may be asked, if one and the same manas can show different kinds of moral propensities, sattva, rajas or tamas, how can any person be characterized as sāttvika, rājasika or tāmasika? The answer is that a man is called sāttvika, rājasika or tāmasika according as predominance of one or other of these guṇas is observed in that man.

Manas is supposed to move the senses, which are constituted of ākāśa, air, light, heat, water and earth; and the seats of the senses are the physical sockets of the eye, the ear, the nostrils, the tongue and the skin. The five sense-cognitions are produced through the contiguity of the senses, the sense-objects, manas and soul. They are short-lived (kṣaṇika), but not exactly momentary, as the Buddhists would like to have them. They also are of determinate nature (niścayātmikāḥ). As Cakrapāni says, it is quite possible for transitory sense-cognitions to give a determinate report of their objects. Though all the senses are made up of the five elements, yet those senses which contain any element in a preponderating degree were conceived as made up of that element. The sense that has a particular element in a preponderating degree is regarded as having by virtue of that a special capacity for grasping that particular element.

The connection of the body, the senses, the manas and the self

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1 Cakrapāni's commentary on Caraka-samhitā, 1.8.11. Kṣaṇikā ity āsūtara-vināśinyah na tu bauddha-siddhāntavād eka-kṣaṇau caśāvadānyah.

2 tatra yad-yad-ātmakam indriyam viśeṣāti tat-tad-ātmakam evaṁṛtham amu-gṛhyāti tat-evabhave vībhuto etc. (Caraka, 1.8.14.)
is called life (*jīvita*). The self is everywhere regarded as the agent which unites the acts of consciousness (*jñāna-pratisandhātā*). Cakrapāṇi says that, since the body is momentary (*śarīrasya kṣanikatvena*), it may be argued that the union of the self with the body is also momentary. The answer that Cakrapāṇi gives to such an objection is that, though the body is momentary, yet, since the momentary bodies are repeated in a series, the series as a whole may be looked upon as one; and, though the union of the self with each term of the series is momentary, yet, since the series may be looked upon as one, its union with the self may also be regarded as one (*santāṇa-vyavasthito 'yam ekatayā ucyate*)

In another place Caraka says that the *manas*, the self and the body are connected together like a tripod, on which life rests; if any one of the components is missing, the unity is broken.

It has already been pointed out that, according to Caraka, the self is active and that by its activity the mind moves; and it is by the operation of mind that the senses move. The self is also regarded as being *cetana* (conscious). But this consciousness does not belong to the self in itself, it is attained only by its connection with the senses through *manas*. It is, however, necessary to note that apart from this self there is, according to Caraka, another transcendent self (*parah ātmā*), different from the self which participates in the union of the body and the senses (which is also technically called the *samyogi-puruṣa*). The subtler, or transcendent, self is unchangeable (*nir-vikāra*). Knowledge implies a process and a change, and this self manifests consciousness only in those parts where it becomes associated with *manas* and the senses. Thus, though the self is eternal, yet the rise of consciousness in it is occasional. The unchangeableness of the self consists in its being able to unite with itself its past and future states. If the self were not permanent, it could not unite with itself all its past experiences. The sufferings and enjoyment

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1 Caraka, i. 1. 41. The other synonyms of life are *dhāri*, *nityaga* and *anubandha*.
2 Ibid. i. 1. 41.
3 *sattvam ātmā śārīraṃ ca trayam etat tri-dandaṃvat
   lokas tiṣṭhati samyogatatra sarvaṃ pratiṣṭhitam*. Ibid. i. 1. 45.
4 *idam eva cāmanāt cetanavat, yad indriya-samyogat sati jñāna-sālitvaṃ,
   na nīkṛṣṭasyātmanāt cetanavatam*. Cakrapāṇi on Caraka, i. 1. 47.
5 *nīrśvāraḥ paras tv ātmā satva-bhūta-guṇendriyaḥ*. Caraka, i. 1. 55.
6 *tena sattva-śarātma-melaka-rūpo ya ātmā-śadbena ucyate tama vyāvartayati*. Cakrapāṇi on the above.
7 *nītyavat ca cāmanāt pūrvaparāvasthānubhūtartha-pratisandhātā*. Cakrapāṇi on Caraka, i. 1. 55.
that affect us should not be attributed to the self, but to manas (drṣyamāna-rāgādī-vikāras tu manasi).

The special feature of this view of self is that it is permanent and unchangeable; this self seems to hold within it all the individual egos which operate in association with their respective senses, manas and body. It becomes endowed with consciousness only when it is in association with the senses. Pleasure, pain and the movements involved in thought-processes are attributed to manas, though the manas is also considered to derive its activity from the self. The states of consciousness that are produced are all united in the self. The self, thus diverted in its subtler aspect from the senses and manas, is eternal and unchangeable, whereas in its aspect as associated with manas and the senses it is in the sphere of change and consciousness. This view is therefore different from those of the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy.

It is well to note in this connection that the Caraka-samhitā begins with an enumeration of the Vaiṣeṣika categories, and, though it often differs from the Vaiṣeṣika view, it seems to take its start from the Vaiṣeṣika. It enumerates the five elements, manas, time, space and self as substances (dravya); it enumerates the gunas, such as the sensible qualities, the mechanical or physical qualities given in the list beginning with heaviness (gūra ādayaḥ), intelligence (buddhi), and those beginning with remoteness (para) and ending with effort (prayatna). But what is this gūra ādi list? There is no such list in the Vaiṣeṣika-sūtras. Cakrapāṇi, however, refers to an enumeration given in a later chapter (1.25.35) by Caraka, where however these gunas are not enumerated as belonging to all substances, but only to the food and drink that we take1. But the list referred to as parādi (beginning with parādi) prayatnānta (ending in prayatna) is not to be found anywhere in the Caraka-samhitā. This may be a reference to the Vaiṣeṣika-sūtra, 1.1.62. But, if this is so, it leaves out a number of other gunas enumerated in the Vaiṣeṣika-sūtra which were counted in the parādi list3. Caraka himself gives a list of gunas beginning with para which includes some of those gunas included in the Vaiṣeṣika-sūtra already

2 paravāparāvate buddhayaḥ suhha-duḥkhe icchā-dveṣā prayaṇi ca gunāḥ. Vaiṣeṣika-sūtra, 1.1.6.
3 rūpa-rasa-gandha-śparśaḥ samkhya-parimāṇaḥ prthaktaṃ saṁjñagā paravāparāvate. Ibid.
referred to and some more. The gunas enumerated are para, apara, yuki, samkhya, samyoga, vibhaga, prthaktea, parimana, sanskara, and abhyasa. Para means "superiority" or "importance" (pradhana), apara means "inferiority" or "unimportance" (apradhana). This importance or unimportance is with reference to country, time, age, measure, the rasa resulting from digestion (paka), potency (virya) and taste (rasa). Thus, a dry country is called para and a marshy one apara; the rains (visarga) of early and late autumn (sarat and hemanta) are called para, whereas the season of drought (winter, spring and summer) is called apara; with reference to paka, virya and rasa, para and apara mean "suitability" and "unsuitability"—that which is suitable to one is para and that which is unsuitable to him is apara. Yuki means proper selection of medicines with reference to certain diseases (dosady-apekshaya bhesajasya samicina-kalpana); samkhya means "number"; samyoga, the mixing up or compounding of two or more substances; vibhaga, separation; prthaktea, difference. The mountains Himalaaya and Meru are prthak, because they are situated in different places and cannot unite; again, even though a pig and a buffalo may meet together, they always remain different from each other; and again, in the same class, say in a collection of peas, each pea is different in identity from the other; in the last case difference in number constitutes a difference in identity; thus, wherever there is a numerical difference (anekata), there is difference in identity. Prthaktea thus stands for three kinds of difference, spatial difference, difference of characters and difference of identity due to numerical distinction. Parimana means measurement by weight, sanskara means the production of new qualities and abhyasa means habit due to constant practice (satata-kritya). It is evident from the above that, though the terms used are the same as those used by Kandada in the Vaisesika-sutra, yet they are mostly used in different senses in accordance, probably, with medical tradition. But this list does not end with prayatna; it seems therefore that paradi and prayatnanta stand for two different lists and should not be combined together. We have above the paradi list. The prayatnanta is a different list of gunas. It includes, as Cakrapani says, iccha (desire), dvesha (hatred), sukha

1 Paraparate yuktii ca samkhya samyoga eva ca, vibhaga ca prthaktvam ca parimanan athapi ca, sanskaraabhyasa ity ete gunah jneyah paradayah. Carahasa-samhitd, I. 26. 27-29.
(pleasure), duḥkha (pain) and prayatna (effort). Prayatna means that particular quality by the rise of which in the soul the manas is moved to activity.

Karma (movement) is described as prayatnādi-ceṣṭītam, i.e. a movement of the nature of conscious effort; the word ādi in prayatnādi is explained by Cakrapāṇi as meaning “of the nature of 1.”

Samavāya means the relation of inseparable inheritance, as in the case of qualities and substances. Cakrapāṇi, in explaining the nature of samavāya, says that it is eternal, so that, even when in a particular case it may disappear, it continues to exist in other cases. It is never destroyed or created anew, but only its appearance is or is not manifested in particular cases 2. In the case of sāmāṇya and viśeṣa, again, Caraka seems to add a new sense to the words. In the Vaiśeṣika systems the word sāmāṇya means a class concept; but here it means the concrete things which have similar constituents or characteristics; and viśeṣa, which means in Vaiśeṣika ultimate specific properties differentiating one atom from another, means in Caraka concrete things which have dissimilar and opposite constituents or characteristics. Sāmāṇya and viśeṣa thus have a significance quite different from what they have in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras. The principle of sāmāṇya and viśeṣa is the main support of Āyur-veda; for it is the principle which underlies the application of medicines and the course of diets. Substances having similar constituents or characteristics will increase each other, and those having dissimilar constituents or characteristics will decrease each other. Thus a substance having the characteristics of vāta will increase vāta and decrease ślesman, which is dissimilar to it, and so on. Sāmāṇya is thus defined as tulyārthatā, i.e. performing similar purposes. Instead of having only a conceptual value, sāmāṇya and viśeṣa are here seen to discharge a pragmatic work of supreme value for Āyur-veda. As regards the theory of substances (dravya) also, though Caraka borrowed the enumeration of categories, Cakrapāṇi says that the simpler bhūtas-formed parts of the complex ones (bhūtāntarānupraveśa), and in support of this idea he quotes a sūtra from the Nyāya-sūtra, which, however, there occurs as an opponent’s view, since the theory of bhūtānupraveśa was not believed in by the Nyāya-

1 ādi-śabdaḥ prakāravācā. Cakrapāṇi’s commentary on Caraka-samhitā, 1. r. 48.
2 Ibid. 1. 1. 49.
Vaiṣeṣika school; with that school none of the elements entered into any other, and their qualities were fixed in themselves. However, in spite of these modifications, the relation of Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika with Caraka seems to be close. But the detailed description of the school of Sāṃkhya, in IV.1, as has already been mentioned and explained in the first volume of the present work, in the chapter on Sāṃkhya, does not seem to have much bearing on the needs of Āyur-veda; and so the whole chapter does not appear to fit in with the rest of the work, and it is not referred to in other parts of the book. It is not improbable that this chapter was somehow added to the book from some other treatise.

Suśruta does not, like Caraka, enumerate the categories of the Vaiṣeṣika, and his account of Sāṃkhya is very faithful to the traditional account given in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Kārikā and in the Sāṃkhya-sūtra. Having described the Sāṃkhya theory, Suśruta says that according to medical science the causes of things are sixfold, viz. (1) nature of things (svabhāva), (2) God (Īśvara), (3) time (kāla), (4) accidental happenings (yadṛcchā), (5) destiny (niyati) and (6) evolution (parināma)\(^1\). As Ṛalhaṇa points out, Suśruta has in several places referred to the operation of all these causes. Thus the formation of the limbs of the body in the foetus-state is said to be due to nature (svabhāva); God as fire is said to operate as the digestive fire in the stomach and to help digestion; time as seasons is said to be the cause of the increase and decrease of doṣas; destiny means virtue and vice, and diseases and recovery from them are sometimes attributed to these. Jejjāta, in commenting on Suśruta (as reported by Ṛalhaṇa), says that all the above six causes, with the exception of God, are but different names of prakṛti. Gayī, however, thinks that the above six causes represent the instrumental cause, though prakṛti may still be considered as being the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa).

As Ṛalhaṇa and Gayī think, there is no reason to suppose that Suśruta described the Sāṃkhya doctrine; for, immediately after describing the sixfold causes, he speaks of the elements as being constituted of the three guṇas, satvāra, rajas and tmas. Even the senses are regarded as being material. Souls are according to Āyur-veda eternal, though they are limited to their bodies and are not all-pervasive. They are manifested when the semen and the blood combine, and it is this bodily self, suffering transmigration owing

\(^1\) Suśruta-saṃhitā, III. I. 11.
to virtue and vice (called kārma-puruṣa), with which medical science is concerned. When the self is in association with manas, it has the following qualities: pleasure, pain, desire, hatred, effort, prāṇa and apana (the upward current of breath and the downward force acting in the direction of the rectum), the opening and closing of the eyelids, the action of the intellect as decision or buddhi (niṣcaya), imagination (saṃkalpa), thought (vicāraṇā), memory (smṛti), scientific knowledge (viññāna), energy (adhyāyasāya) and sense-cognitions (viṣayopalabdhi). The qualities of manas are divided into three classes, viz. sattvika, rājas and tamasa; of these the sattvika ones are kind actions, the desire of enjoying gradually, mercy, truthfulness, virtue, faith, self-knowledge, retentive power (medhā), intelligence (buddhi), self-control (dhyāti), and sense of duty for the sake of duty (anabhīṣaṅga); the rājasa qualities are suffering, impatience, pride, untruthfulness, cruelty, boastfulness, conceit (māna), joy, passion and anger; the tamasa qualities are dullness, viciousness, want of retentive power, idleness and sleepiness.

Logical Speculations and Terms relating to Academic Dispute.

Things are either existent (sat) or non-existent (asat), and they can be investigated by the four pramāṇas, viz. the testimony of trustworthy persons (āptopadesa), perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāṇa) and the coming to a conclusion by a series of syllogisms of probability (yukti).1

Those whose minds are free from the impurities of rajas and tamas through the force of their ascetic endeavours, who possess unlimited knowledge extending through the past, present and future, are to be considered as trustworthy (āpta). Such persons neither have any deficiency of knowledge nor would they willingly say anything untrue. They must be considered as absolutely trustworthy (āpta), and their testimony may be regarded as true2.

The valid and certain knowledge that arises as the result of the relation of self, senses, manas and sense-objects is called “perception.” This contact of the sense with the object is regarded by Cakrapañi as being of five kinds, viz. (1) contact with the draiva (substance), called samyoga; (2) contact with the guṇas

1 Caraka-samhītā, i. 11. 17.

2 Ibid. i. 11. 18, 19.
(qualities) through the thing (samyukta-samavāya) in which they inhere by samavāya (inseparable) relation; (3) contact with the guṇas (such as colour, etc.) in the generic character as universals of those qualities, e.g. colouredness (rūpatva), which exist in the guṇas in the samavāya relation; this is called samyukta-samavetasaṁvaya since the eye is in contact with the thing and the colour is in the thing by samavāya relation, and in the specific colour there is the universal colour or the generic character of colour by samavāya relation; (4) the contact called samavāya by which sounds are said to be perceived by the ear: the auditory sense is ākāśa, and the sound exists in ākāśa by the samavāya relation, and thus the auditory sense can perceive sound by a peculiar kind of contact called samaveta-samavāya; (5) the generic character of sound as the sound universal (śabdatva) is perceived by the kind of contact known as samaveta-samavāya. It is only immediately resulting (tadātve) cognition of such a contact that is called perception (pratyakṣa); for inference, memory, etc. also may come in as a result of such a cognition at later stages through other successive processes (pāramparya). Cakrabāṇi further notes that the four kinds of contact spoken of here are the real causes of the phenomenon of perception; in reality, however, “knowledge that results as the effect of sense-contact” would be a sufficient definition of pratyakṣa; so in the perception of pleasure, though none of these contacts are necessary, it is regarded as a valid case of direct perception. Contact with the self is, of course, necessary for all kinds of cognition. It is easy to see that the above theory of perception is of the same type as that found in the Nyāya system. The nir-vikalpa perception is not taken into consideration; for there is nothing corresponding to the term avyapadeśya in the Nyāya-sūtra. Inference must be based on perception, by which the concomitance of the hetu can first be observed. Inference is of three kinds, viz. from kārya (effect) to kāraṇa (cause), as the inference of cohabitation from pregnancy; from cause to effect, as the inference of the future production of

1 Cakrabāṇi on Caraka-samhitā, I. 11. 20.

2 The definition of pratyakṣa given in Caraka-samhitā, I. 11. 20, is: ātmendriya-mano-rthānaṁ sannikarāti pravartate vyaktā tadātve ya buddhiḥ pratyakṣaṁ sā nirucyate. The definition of pratyakṣa in the Nyāya-sūtra is as follows: indriyārtha-sannihotpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyohicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam. For a discussion thereon see vol. I, pp. 333–343.
fruit from a seed with the other attendant causes, sprinkling with water and the like; and inference by associations other than that of cause and effect, as the inference of fire from smoke 1.

Yukti is not counted as a separate pramāṇa by any other system of Indian thought. When our intelligence judges a fact by a complex weighing in mind of a number of reasons, causes or considerations, through which one practically attains all that is desirable in life, as virtue, wealth or fruition of desires, we have what may be called yukti 2. As Cakrapañi points out, this is not in reality the nature of a separate pramāṇa; but, since it helps pramāṇas, it is counted as a pramāṇa. As an example of yukti, Caraka mentions the forecasting of a good or bad harvest from the condition of the ground, the estimated amount of rains, climatic conditions and the like. Cakrapañi rightly says that a case like this, where a conclusion is reached as the combined application of a number of reasonings, is properly called āha and is current among the people by this name. It is here counted as a separate pramāṇa. It is in reality an inference of an effect from causes and, as such, cannot be used at the present time, and hence it cannot be called tri-kāla, valid in all the three times, past, present and future, as Caraka says.

The Buddhist, writes Śāntaraksita in discussing Caraka’s doctrine of yukti as a separate pramāṇa, holds that yukti consists in the observation that, since, when this happens, that happens, and, since, when this does not happen, that does not happen, this is the cause of that. It may be argued that this is not a case of inference, since there is no proposition equivalent to the proposition with a drśṭānta, or example, in Nyāya inference (e.g. whatever is smoky is fiery, as the kitchen). It is held, as Kamalaśila interprets, that the cause-effect idea is derived from the idea of “this happening, that happens,” and there is no other idea in the notion of causality; if in any case any particular example is given, then another example might be asked for, and after that another, and we should have regressus

1 pratyakṣa-pāryaṁ tri-vidyāṁ
tri-kālaṁ cānumityate
vānir niṃśadhō dhūmema
maithunaṁ gṛbha-śarśanāt.
Evaṁ vyavavartantya attaṁ
bijāt phalaṁ anāgataṁ
drścā bijāt phalaṁ jātām
ihāeva sadāśaṃ budhāḥ.

Caraka-sanhitā, I. 11. 21, 22.

2 buddhīḥ pātayati yā bhāvāṁ bahu-kāraṇa-yogājān
yuktiṁ tri-kālaṁ tā jāneyā tri-vargāḥ madhyate yayā. Ibid. I. 11. 25.
ad infinitum\(^1\). These arguments in support of yukti as the concluding of the cause-effect relation from “this happening, that happens” relation are refuted by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, who point out that there are no separate cognitive processes which link up the relation of “this happening, that happens” with the cause-effect relation, because both these convey the same concept. The cause-effect relation is the same as “this happening, that happens.” It may be argued that, whenever anything invariably and unconditionally happens on the happening of any other thing, then the two are considered to be related as cause and effect, just as a jug, etc. are invariably seen to appear after the proper operations of the potter and his wheels. If this is yukti, then it is not a different source of knowledge.

Cakrapaṇi, however, points out that these criticisms are all beside the point, since yukti, according to Caraka, is not kārya-kāraṇatā from tad-bhāva-bhāvītā; it is the arriving at a conclusion as a result of a series of reasonings. But it is important to note that in III. 4. 6 and 7 Caraka speaks of three kinds of pramāṇas, viz. pratyakṣa, anumāṇa and śabda, and describes anumāṇa as being tarka depending on yukti. Tarka is explained by Cakrapaṇi as being the knowledge of things which cannot be perceived (tarko ‘pratyakṣa-jñānam), and yukti is here paraphrased by Cakrapaṇi as the relation of a-vinā-bhāva. It is said in this connection that a disease is to be determined by pratyakṣa, the medical texts (āptopadeśa) and inference. But in III. 8. 6. 33 and 34 Caraka counts aitihya as āptopadeśa, though ordinarily aitihya is considered in

\(^1\) drśṭante ‘py ata eva tad-bhāva-bhāvītāt kāryatā-pratipattiḥ, tatrāpi drśṭanto ’nyo ‘nveṣayātyah, tatrāpy aparā ity anavasthā. Kamalaśīla as quoted by Cakrapaṇi on Caraka-saṃhitā, I. 11. 25.

Śāntarakṣita misrepresents Caraka’s view of yukti in a very strange manner. He says that, when from the fact that in all cases when A is present B is present and in all cases when A is absent B is also absent one thinks A to be the cause of B, this is regarded by Caraka as the new pramāṇa of yukti. Śāntarakṣita’s exact words are:

\[ \text{asmin sati bhavatya eva na bhavaty asattī ca} \]
\[ \text{tasmād ato bhavaty eva yuktiṣeṣā 'bhādhyate} \]
\[ \text{pramāṇāntaram eveyam ity āna caraka munih} \]
\[ \text{nānumānām iyaṁ yasmād drśṭanto 'tra na labhyate.} \]

Tattva-saṃgraha, p. 252.

This, however, is entirely different from what Caraka says, as is pointed out by Cakrapaṇi in his commentary on Caraka-saṃhitā. Caraka’s idea of yukti is the logic of probability, i.e. when from a number of events, circumstances, or observations one comes to regard a particular judgment as probable, it is called yukti, and, as it is different from inference or any of the other accepted pramāṇas, it is to be counted as a separate pramāṇa. So far as I know, this is the only example of the introduction of the logic of probability in Indian thought.
Indian philosophy as being "tradition" or long-standing popular belief, different from āptopadesa; upamāna, under the name of aupamya, is also referred to.

It may not be out of place here to note that the obstacles to perception referred to in the Śāmkhya-kārikā are all mentioned here. Thus it is said that even those things which have colour (rūpa) cannot be perceived if they are covered by a veil, or if the senses are weak, or if the mind is unsettled, or if they are mixed up in any homogeneous medium indistinguishable from them, or when in the case of smaller lights they are overcome by stronger luminaries, or when they are too fine or too subtle.

Logic was of use with Indian medical men not only in diagnosing a disease, but also in the debates which they had with one another. The rival practitioners often had to show their skill and learning in debates on occasions of the treatment of illness of rich patients. The art of carrying on a dispute successfully was considered an important acquisition among medical practitioners. Thus we have a whole set of technical terms relating to disputes, such as are never found in any other literature, excepting the Nyāya-sūtra. In the Caraka-saṃhitā almost the whole of the chapter called the "Roga-bhiṣag-jītya-vimāna" (III. 8) is devoted to this purpose. It is well to remember that different kinds of disputes and fallacies are mentioned in the Nyāya-sūtra, and it will be useful to refer to these when dealing with similar topics from either the Caraka-saṃhitā or the Suśruta-saṃhitā.

The four terms referred to in connection with disputes in the Nyāya-sūtra are tarka, vāda, jalpa and vītanḍa. Tarka is said to be the same as uḥa, and this is explained as a process of reasoning carried on in one’s mind before one can come to any right conclusion. It is a name for the subjective weighing of different alternatives on the occasion of a doubt before a conclusive affirmation or denial (nirṇaya) is made. Disputes are said to be of three kinds, vāda, jalpa and vītanḍa. Vāda means a discussion for the ascertainment of truth, jalpa a dispute in which the main object is the overthrow of the opponent rightly or wrongly, and vītanḍa a dispute in which attempts are made to discover the faults of the opponent’s thesis without any attempt to offer any alternative thesis. Vāda is thus essentially different in its purpose from jalpa and vītanḍa; for vāda is an academical discussion with pupils,

1 Caraka-saṃhitā, i. 11. 8.
teachers, fellow-students and persons seeking truth solely for the purpose of arriving at right conclusions, and not for fame or gain. *jalpa*, on the other hand, is that dispute which a man carries on while knowing himself to be in the wrong or unable to defend himself properly from his opponents except by trickery and other unfair methods of argument.

Caraka, in III. 8, says that a medical man should hold discussions (*sambhāṣā*) with other medical men. Discussion increases zeal for knowledge (*samharsa*), clarifies knowledge, increases the power of speech and of achieving fame, removes doubts in the learning acquired before and strengthens convictions. In the course of these discussions many new things may be learnt, and often out of zeal an opponent will disclose the most cherished secret teachings of his teachers. These discussions are of two classes, friendly (*sandhāya sambhāṣā*) and hostile (*vīgrhyā sambhāṣā*). A friendly discussion is held among wise and learned persons who frankly and sincerely discuss questions and give their views without any fear of being defeated or of the fallacies of their arguments being exposed. For in such discussions, even though there may be the fallacies described, no one would try to take advantage of the other, no one is jubilant over the other’s defeat and no attempt is made to misinterpret or misstate the other’s views.

Caraka then proceeds to give instructions as to how one should behave in an assembly where one has to meet with hostile disputes. Before engaging oneself in a hostile discussion with an opponent a man ought carefully to consider whether his opponent is inferior (*para*) to him and also the nature of the assembly (*pariṣat*) in which the discussion is undertaken. A *pariṣat* may be learned (*jñānavati*) or ignorant (*mūḍhā*), and these again may be friendly (*suḥṛt*), neutral (*udāsinā*), or hostile (*pratiniśṭā*). When an opponent is to be judged, he is to be judged from two points of view, intellectual and moral. Thus, on the one hand, it has to be considered whether he is learned and wise, whether he remembers the texts and can reproduce them quickly and has powers of speech, and on the other hand, whether he is of an irritable temperament of a fearful nature, etc. A man must carefully consider whether his opponent is superior to him in these qualifications or not.

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Logical Speculations and Terms

No disputes should be undertaken in a hostile assembly; for even the best arguments might be misinterpreted. In an ignorant, friendly or neutral assembly it is possible to win a debate by proceeding tactfully against an opponent who is looked down upon by famous or otherwise great persons. In beginning conversations with such persons attempts may be made to puzzle them by reciting long sūtras and to demoralize or stun them, as it were, by jokes, banter and gestures and by using satirical language.

When a man has to enter into a dispute with his equal, he should find out the special point in which his opponent is weak and attack him there and should try to corner him in such positions as are generally unacceptable to people in general. Caraka then proceeds to explain a number of technical terms in connection with such disputes. Like the Nyāya, Caraka divides such hostile disputes (vāda) into two classes, ālpa and vītaṇḍā. Pratiṇā is the enunciation of a thesis which is sought to be proved, e.g. “The puruṣa is eternal.” Sthāpanā is the establishing of a thesis by syllogistic reasonings involving propositions with hetu, drṣṭānta, upanaya and nīgamana. Thus the above thesis (pratiṇā), “The puruṣa is eternal,” is to be supported by a reason (hetu), “because it is uncreated”; by an example (drṣṭānta), “The sky is uncreated and it is eternal”; by a proposition showing the similarity between the subject of the example and the subject of the thesis (upanaya), viz. “Just as the ākāśa is uncreated, so the puruṣa is also uncreated”; and finally by establishing the thesis (nīgamana), “Therefore the puruṣa is eternal.”

Pratiṣṭhāpanā is the attempt to establish a proposition contrary to the proposition or the thesis put forth by the opponent. Thus, when the thesis of the sthāpanā is “Puruṣa is eternal,” the pratiṣṭhāpanā proposition would be “Puruṣa is non-eternal,” because “it is perceivable by the senses,” and “The jug which is perceptible to the senses is non-eternal,” and “Puruṣa is like the jug,” so “Puruṣa is non-eternal.”

Caraka defines hetu as “the cause of knowledge” (hetur nāma upadabhi kāraṇam), and the cause of knowledge is the pramāṇas of pratyakṣa, anumāna, aitihya and aupamya. The definition of hetu in the Nyāya-sūtra refers only to the perceived hetu in the case of inference, through a similarity or dissimilarity to which a

1 It is easy to see that Caraka admitted in a syllogism all the five propositions that are admitted in the Nyāya-sūtra.
relation is established by inference\(^1\). Here Caraka points out that a *hetu* may be either perceived, inferred or found by analogy or from the scriptures, but, in whichever way it may be found, when it leads to knowledge, it is called a *hetu*. Thus, when I say, “The hill is fiery, because it smokes” (*parvato vahnimān dhūmavattētāt*), the smoke is the *hetu*, and it is directly perceived by the eye. But when I say, “He is ill, because he is of low digestion,” the *hetu* is not directly perceived, but is only inferred; for the fact of one’s being in low digestion cannot be directly perceived. Again, when it is said, “Puruṣa is eternal, because it is uncreated” (*nityāḥ puruṣah a-kṛtakavētāt*), the uncreatedness (*a-kṛtakavā* is the *hetu*, but it is neither perceived, nor inferred, but accepted from the testimony of the scriptures. Again, in the proposition, “His face is most beautiful, because it has been compared with the moon” (*asya mukham kāntatamam candropamatētāt*), the fact of being compared with the moon is the *hetu* and it is known by *upamā*\(^2\). Thus Caraka’s definition of *hetu* does not really come into conflict with that of Gautama: he only says that a *hetu* may be discovered by any of the *pramāṇas*, and, by whichever *pramāṇa* it may be discovered, it may be called a *hetu*, if it is invariably and unconditionally (*a-cinā-bhūva*) associated with the major term (*sādhyā*)\(^3\).

Caraka then proceeds to describe *uttara*, which is in purport the same as the *jāti* of the Nyāya-sūtras. When an opponent wants to prove a thesis on the basis of a similarity of the subject of the thesis with the *hetu*, attempts have to be made to upset the thesis by showing its dissimilarity to the *hetu*. Thus one may say that the feeling of cold in a man must be due to his being affected by snow, dews, or chilly air, because effects arise from causes similar to them; in reply it may be said that effects are dissimilar from their causes, since a burning fever may often be an effect of cold\(^4\).

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1. udāharana-sādharmyāt sādhyā-sādhanam hetuḥ
tathā vaidharmyāt.

Nyāya-sūtra, I, 1, 34, 35.

2. See Gaṅgādhara’s Jalpa-kalpa-taru, III, 8, 122.

3. *hetuḥ cācīndabhāva-liṅga-vacanāṁ yady api, tathāptha liṅga-pragrāhakāṇi pratyakṣaḥ-sūti-pramāṇāṇy eva yathokta-hetu-mulatvena hetu-sabdenāhā*

Cakrapāṇi on Caraka, III, 8, 6, 25.


Sādharmya-vaidharmya-sama is that in which, when an argument is given on
The long list of *jātis* given in the *Nyāya-sūtra* and explained in the commentaries and in the *Nyāya-maṇḍīra* is not referred to the basis of the similarity or dissimilarity to a certain *hetu*, it is pointed out that quite the opposite conclusions may be drawn from other points of similarity or dissimilarity with other *hetus*. Thus, when it is said, "*Sādā* is non-eternal, because it is produced by an effort, and whatever is produced by an effort is non-eternal, as a jug," it may be answered, "*Sādā* is eternal, because it is partless: a partless entity like the *ākāśa* is found to be eternal; there is no special reason why on account of its similarity to a jug sound should be non-eternal, and not eternal owing to its similarity to *ākāśa*." An escape from the dilemma is possible by enquiring as to what may constitute an unconditional and invariable (*avayaḥcāra*) similarity.

*Utkarṣa-pākārya-cāryāvarta-vākyapāda-sādhyā-sama* is that in which similarity is pressed too far. Thus it is urged that, because sound is non-eternal like a jug, it must also be visible like a jug, and, if it is not so, it cannot be non-eternal like a jug. Moreover, it may be said that the reason why sound is expected to be non-eternal like a jug is that the former is produced by an effort (*pravatnāntaryaka*). But things which are produced by efforts differ in many of their qualities; thus a cloth is soft, and a jug is hard, though both of them are produced by effort; so it may be argued that, though *sādā* is as much a product of effort as a jug, it may not agree with the jug in being non-eternal. Moreover, instead of arguing that sound is like a jug, it may as well be argued that a jug is like sound; so that the status of the jug is as uncertain as sound itself (*yadi yathā ghoṣaḥ tathā sādāḥ prāptaḥ tarkaḥ yathā sādāḥ tathā ghoṣaḥ iti sādās cāmyatayād sādhyā iti ghoṣaḥ ’pi sādhyā eva syād anyathā hi na tena tulyo bhavet—*Nyāya-maṇḍīra*, p. 624). In answer to these kinds of fault-finding the proper argument is that no similarity should be extended beyond its limits, and an example (*dṛṣṭānta*) should not be considered to have the same status as a probandum (*sādhyā*); for an example is that which is already agreed upon among the disputants and the common people (*laukika-patikṣaḥcānāṃ yāsmin arthe buddhi sāmyam sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ*).

*Prāptaḥ-prāpti-sama* is that in which it is urged that, if the *hetu* and the probandum are together, they cannot be distinguished from each other; if they are separate, *hetu* cannot lead us to the *sādhyā*. The answer to this is that a *hetu* can produce an effect either by direct contact (e.g. the rope and the stick in contact with clay produce a jug) or from a distance (e.g. the *śyena* sacrifice can destroy an enemy from a distance).

*Prasangā-sama* is that in which a reason for the *hetu* is asked. Thus, if the character of immediately following an effort (*pravatnāntaryaka*) is the cause of non-eternity, what can establish the *pravatnāntaryaka* of a jug, etc.? The answer to this is that a reason is necessary only for that which is not directly experienced as being evident in itself. That a jug immediately follows the efforts that produce it is directly experienced and does not require any argument or reason to establish it, as no light is required to see a burning lamp.

*Dṛṣṭānta-sama* is that in which from the same *hetu* two different conclusions are seen to result. Thus it may be said that both the jug and *ākāśa* have the character of immediately following an effort (e.g. as by digging new space is produced in underground wells which before the effort of digging were solid earth without space—*kāpa-khanana-pravatnāntaranam tad-upalamhāt*—and this character is therefore to be regarded as *pravatnāntaryaka*); yet, as a jug is non-eternal and *ākāśa* eternal, so *sādā*, though it immediately follows an effort, is eternal. The answer is that, if such an opposite conclusion is drawn, a separate *hetu* has to be given, which is not done in the present case.

If sound is non-eternal, it must possess the character of coming into existence immediately after an effort that produces it; but how can it possess that character before being produced or coming into existence? If it cannot at that stage
by Caraka; nor does the technical name of jāti find any place in Caraka's description of it. If these elaborate descriptions of jāti possess that character, it must be eternal, since the cause of its non-eternity is absent. This objection is called anupatti-sama. The reply is that, unless the sound is in existence, its eternity or non-eternity cannot be discussed. If it is non-existent, of what is the eternity to be affirmed by the opponent?

Again, it may be argued that sabda has prayatnāntaryakata, and therefore it may be expected to be non-eternal; it is perceived by the senses, and therefore it may be expected to be eternal, like so many other sensible objects. This doubt is called samālaya-sama. A doubt remains a doubt only so long as the special features which remove a doubt are not discovered. Though a man may have many qualities in common with a post, the doubt cannot remain when the special features of a man (e.g. his having a head and hands and feet) are known.

Prakaraṇa-sama is that in which an entity is equally related to hetus, so that no one conclusion can properly be drawn. Thus, sound has both prayatnāntaryakata and niravayavata (partlessness). Though, according to the first, it may be said to be non-eternal, according to the second it may be said to be eternal; so it is eternal. The answer is that the second hetu cannot be pressed as leading to a conclusion, because the first also is admitted to exist.

Ahetu-sama is the objection that there can be no argument from a hetu; for, if there is no sādhyā (probandum), what is it that the hetu produces? and again, if there is no hetu before the sādhyā, how can the sādhyā be produced? So, as hetu is only a concomitant of sādhyā, no inference is possible from it. The answer is that it is quite possible that from the previously existing hetu the non-existing sādhyā should be produced. Arthāpati-sama is where, for example, owing to the fact that sound is partless, it appears to be similar to akāśa and hence by implication to be eternal. This is against the previous thesis that it is non-eternal owing to its being prayatnāntaryakā. Aviseqa-sama is the objection, that if on account of having the same characteristic of prayatnāntaryakata, sabda and ghaṭa are said to be equally non-eternal, then, owing to all things having the same quality of existence (sattā), they are all the same. The answer to this is that equality in one respect does not mean equality in all respects.

Upapatti-sama is where a jug may be expected to be non-eternal owing to its prayatnāntaryakata and eternal owing to its being partless like akāśa. Upalabdhi-sama is where it is urged that, when by a terrible storm a tree is broken, there is sound which is not the result of any human effort (prayatnāntaryakata), and yet it is non-eternal; again, lightning is not the result of human effort, still it is non-eternal. The answer is that the concomitance is between prayatnāntaryakata and non-eternity and not between non-eternity and prayatnāntaryakata; so that all that is produced by human effort is non-eternal, but not vice-versa. It should also be noted that by prayatnāntaryakata emphasis is laid on the fact that all things that possess this character are produced. Anitya-sama is an objection where it is urged, for example, that, if on account of the similarity of sound to a jug, the former is non-eternal, then, since in some way or other all things in the world must have some similarity to a jug, all things must be non-eternal. The mitya-sama objection runs as follows: Is non-eternity in sound non-eternal or eternal? If the latter, then in order that an eternal quality may abide in it, sound itself must be eternal. If the former, then on some occasions at least sound must be eternal.

The kārya-sama objection suggests that prayatnāntaryakata leads to production in two ways, either by bringing into existence that which was non-existent, or by removing the veil from something which was in a veiled condition; and it remains undecided what sort of prayatnāntaryakata applies to sabda.

The above interpretations are all based on Jayanta's Nyāya-maṇjarī.
were known to Caraka, it is unlikely that he should have passed
them over without referring to them.

An example (drṣṭānta) is that on which the common folk and
the learned are of the same opinion, since examples involve facts
which are perceived by all and known to all, e.g. the fire is hot,
water is liquid, the earth is firm. A siddhānta, or conclusion, is
that to which one could arrive after a searching enquiry and
demonstration by proper reasons. This siddhānta is of four kinds,
viz. (1) sarva-tantra-siddhānta, or conclusions accepted by all, e.g.
“There are causes of diseases; there are diseases; curable ones
can be cured”; (2) prati-tantra-siddhānta, or conclusions which are
not accepted by all, but are limited to particular books or persons:
e.g. some say that there are eight rasas, others say that there are
six; some say that there are five senses, others, that there are six;
(3) adhikarana-siddhānta, or conclusions which being accepted
proved, other conclusions also become proved or accepted:
e.g. if it is proved that emancipated souls do not reap the fruits
of karma, as they are without any desire, then the doctrine of the
suffering of the fruits of karma, emancipation, the existence of
soul and existence after death will have to be considered as refuted;
(4) abhyupagama-siddhānta, or conclusions which are accepted
only for the sake of an argument, and which are neither examined
critically nor considered as proved1.

Śabda is a collection of letters which may be of four kinds, viz.
(1) drṣṭārtha—of experienced purport (e.g. “The dosas lose their
equilibrium through three causes”); (2) adrṣṭārtha—of unper-
ceivable purport (e.g. “There is after-life; there is emancipation”);
(3) satya, or truth, that which tallies with facts (e.g. “There is
Āyur-veda; there are means for curing curable diseases”); (4) anṛta,
the opposite of truth, untruth2. Samśaya, or doubt, occurs with
reference to things about which no certainty is attained. Thus
those who are unhealthy and inactive die soon, whereas those who
are healthy and active live a long life. So there is a doubt whether
in this world death happens timely or untimely. Prayojana, or the
object of action, is that for which anything is begun. Thus one
may think that, if there is untimely death, I shall form healthy
habits and leave off unhealthy habits, so that untimely death may

1 All these siddhāntas occur under the same names in the Nyāya-sūtra,
i. 1. 28, 29, 30, 31.
2 The first two divisions, drṣṭārtha and adrṣṭārtha, occur in the Nyāya-sūtra,
i. 1. 8, sa devidho drṣṭādṛṣṭārthananteit.
not touch me. *Sa-vyabhicāra* means variability, e.g. "This may or may not be a medicine for this disease." *jīnāsā* means experimenting; a medicine is to be advised after proper experiments (*jīnāsā*). *Vyavasāya* means decision (*nīcaya*), e.g. "This is a disease due to predominance of vāyu; this is the medicine for this disease." *Artha-prāpti* is the same as the well-known *arthāpati*, or implication, when on making a statement, some other thing which was not said becomes also stated; it is a case of implication, e.g. the statement, "This disease cannot be cured by allowing the patient to take his normal food and drink," implies that it can be cured by fasting, or, if it is said, "He should not eat during the day," this means that "He should eat during the night." *Sambhava* is the source from which anything springs, e.g. the six *dhātu* may be considered as the *sambhava* of the foetus; wrong diet, of disease; and right course of treatment, of health.

*Anuvyojya* means a faulty answer which omits such details as should have been given in the answer, e.g. "This disease can be cured by purificatory action"; such an answer is faulty, as it does not state whether the purification should be made by vomiting or purging. *Ananuvyojya* is what is different from *anuvyojya*. *Anuyoga* is a question put by a learned man in a discussion as an enquiry about the reason for a thesis put forward by a learned colleague: e.g. a learned man says, "*Purusa* is eternal," and another learned man asks, "What is the reason?" Such a question is called *anuyoga*. A counter-question, such as "What is the reason for your asking such a question?" is called *praty-anuyoga*.

*Vākya-doṣa*, or faulty statement, is of five kinds, viz. *nyūna*, *adhika*, *anarthaka*, *apārthaka* and *viruddha*. *Nyūna*, or the fault of omission, is that in which any of the five propositions necessary for a syllogism is omitted. It may also be applied to those cases in which, when a statement has to be supported by a number of

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1. *Prayojana*, which means pleasure and pain, is referred to in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, 1. 1. 1, though it is nowhere critically examined. It is explained by Vātsyāyana as that which goads men to action (yena *prayuktah pravartate*). Uddvatakara explains it as the realization of pleasure and the fear of pain (*sukha-prāpti-duḥkha-hām*).

2. *anakāntihā sa-vyabhicārāh*. *Nyāya-sūtra*, 1. 2. 5. E.g. "sound is eternal" because it is untouchable; but untouchability does not lead to eternality, since the touchable atoms are eternal, whereas untouchable thoughts are short-lived.

3. Cakrapāṇi says that Caraka does not think that *artha-prāpti* is a separate *pramāṇa*; according to him it is a case of inference, and hence is not included in the list of *pramāṇa*. 
reasons, only one is offered and others are omitted, materially affecting the strength of the support of the original statement. Thus several reasons are given in support of the eternity of puṇaṣa, viz. beginninglessness, not being the product of any effort, unchangeableness, etc. Proposing to give all these reasons, and giving only one, is an instance of nyūna. Adhika is where, when Aṣuṣneda is being discussed, the opponent makes irrelevant references to learned works on politics or the art of government. It may also mean cases where words or statements are needlessly repeated. Such a repetition is of two kinds, verbal repetition and sense repetition. Verbal repetition is the repetition of the same word, while the other is the repetition of the sense only, though different words may be used. Anarthaka and apārthaka mean the use of meaningless and unconnected words or expressions. Viruddha, or contrary statement, means the making of a statement contrary to the example (deṣṭānta-viruddha) or the accepted conclusion (siddhānta), e.g. cold water is hot, for so is fever; or when a medical man (vaidya) says that medicine does not cure diseases.

Samaya-viruddha is the making of any statement against the accepted conclusions of any particular śāstra. Thus, for example, if a Mīmāṃskaka says that animals should not be sacrificed, it will be against his accepted doctrine that animals should be sacrificed. Or, if in any system of philosophy treating of emancipation (mokṣa-śāstra) it be said that injury to living beings is good, then this is against the accepted tenet of that śāstra. Vākya-prāśamśa is that kind of statement in which the faults mentioned above in vākya-doṣa do not occur.

Chala means a rejoinder in which the statement of the opponent is wilfully misinterpreted. It is of two kinds, vāk-chala and sāmānya-chala. The word nava means “nine” as well as “new,” and if, when one says about one’s opponent, “This physician is nava-tantra” (has newly learnt his texts), and the opponent replies, “I have not nine text-books, I have one text,” the other person objects, “I do not say you have nine texts, I say that you are nābhvyasta-tantra” (have newly learnt the texts), navābhvyasta-tantra might also mean “read nine times”; and then the opponent might well say, “I have several times read the texts, and not nine times, as you say.” This is an example of vāk-chala.

Again, when a physician says “Medicine cures diseases,” the opponent may take the most general characteristics of the terms
and say that the above statement comes to this, that an existent entity cures another existent entity; and, if this is so, then, since bronchitis exists (san kāsāh) and consumption exists (san kṣayāh), bronchitis, being an existent entity, must cure another existent entity, consumption. This is called sāmānya-chala\(^1\).

Fallacies (a-hetu) are of three kinds, prakaraṇa-sama, saṃśayasya-sama and varṇya-sama\(^2\). Prakaraṇa-sama is where that which

\(^1\) Chala is treated in the Nyāya-sūtra exactly on the same lines as here. Thus the definition of chala there (Nyāya-sūtra, i. 2. 10) is vacana-svihāto 'rtha-vikalpopapattī chalam (to attack one’s speech by a wilful misinterpretation of it is chala). This is divided into three classes, vāh-chala, sāmānya-chala and upacāra-chala; of these vāh-chala is exactly the same as in Caraka-samhitā, and so also the sāmānya-chala (because a Brahman is well-read in scriptures, a vrātya (outcast Brahman) is also well-read, because he also is a Brahman in some sense). Upacāra-chala, which, however, resembles vāh-chala, is not mentioned in the Caraka-samhitā. Its definition in the Nyāya-sūtra, i. 2. 14, is dharmavikalpa-nirddeśī 'rtha-sad-bhāva-pratīṣedha upacāra-chalam (to make one’s statement impossible by taking it in one sense, say the primary, when the secondary one was intended). Thus, if it is said, ‘This porter is an ass,’ it may be objected that the porter, being a man, cannot at the same time be an ass. Gautama, however, tentatively raises the objection that chalas should be regarded as three in number and not two, taking upacāra-chala within sāmānya-chala. This means a criticism in view of Caraka’s division of chala into two classes. For Gautama argues that, if on account of some similarity upacāra-chala should be included within sāmānya-chala, and chalas should be counted as being of two kinds instead of three, then for the very same reason of similarity chalas may as well be regarded as being of one kind instead of two. So, in view of the specific differences that exist between the chalas, they should be regarded as being of three kinds.

\(^2\) Nyāya-sūtra, i. 2. 4, describes the fallacies (hetv-ābhāsa) as of five kinds, sa-vyabhicāra, viruddha, prakaraṇa-sama, sādhyā-sama and hālātta.

Sa-vyabhicāra hetu is that which has no invariable concomitance with the probandum, e.g. sound is eternal because it is untouchable, and that which is touchable is non-eternal, like a jug. But untouchability has no invariable concomitance with eternity; for an atom is touchable and at the same time eternal, and thoughts (budhā) are untouchable and at the same time non-eternal.

Viruddha hetu is where the reason (hetu) demolishes the very theory on which its security depends, e.g. this changeable world (bhūtā) disappears (vyakta apatti), because it is non-eternal (vityava-pratīṣedhā); but, though it disappears (apeto ‘pi), yet it exists (asti), because it is not destructible (vināśa-pratīṣedhā). Now a thing which is non-eternal cannot but be destructible. Destructibility and eternity cannot abide together.

Prakaraṇa-sama is where two opposite hetus exist in a thing, so that nothing can be affirmed by either of them. Thus it may be argued with as much force that “sound is eternal, because it has in it the qualities of eternal things,” as that “sound is non-eternal, because it has in it the qualities of non-eternal things”; so no conclusion can be drawn from either of these hetus.

Sādhyā-sama is where the hetu itself remains to be proved. Thus in the argument, “shadow is a substance because it moves,” the movability of shadows is a doubtful point and is itself in need of proof. Does a shadow move like a man, or is it that because the covering entity moves that at different places the light is veiled and this gives rise to the formation of shadows at different places?

Kālātta is where the hetu in the case of the accepted example and the case to be proved vary, because in the latter case the hetu is not properly a
is given as the hetu remains to be proved. Thus, when it is said that, since the self is different from the body, it is eternal, and because the body is unconscious it is non-eternal, it may be urged (as by the Cārvāka school of philosophers) that both the points, viz. that the self is different from the body and that the body is not endowed with consciousness, which are offered as the hetu, are themselves to be proved; for according to the Cārvākas the body is endowed with consciousness and is non-eternal. A reference to the footnote below shows that this prakaraṇa-sama is different from the prakaraṇa-sama of the Nyāya-sūtra. Saṃsāya-sama is that in which that which is the cause of doubt is offered as the hetu for a particular conclusion, e.g. This person quotes a passage from Āyur-veda—is he or is he not a physician? Even a man who is not a physician might have heard a passage somewhere and quoted it. Now, therefore, quoting a passage from Āyur-veda leaves us in doubt as to the man’s being a physician or not. If this itself is offered as the hetu for a particular conclusion and if it is said, “He is a physician because he has quoted a passage from Āyur-veda,” it becomes a case of saṃsāya-sama. Gautama speaks of saṃsāya-sama as an instance of jāti; but the former is a case where a doubt is not removed because of the fact that the thing about which anything is affirmed possesses two opposite qualities, so that no affirmation can be made on the strength of any of these characteristics. Here, however, saṃsāya-sama is used in the sense that what is itself doubtful is adduced as the reason for a particular conclusion.

Varnya-sama is where an affirmation is made about a thing on the strength of another affirmation which itself remains to be proved and is hence in the same condition as the previous affirmation, e.g. “Buddhi is non-eternal, like sound, as it is un-touchable, like the latter.” But the non-eternity of sound stands as much in need of proof as that of buddhi, and the former affirmation cannot be made on the basis of the latter. This fallacy is

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*Note: The text is a fragment and does not provide a complete context for understanding the full argument.*
similar to the jāti called sādhya-sāma and the fallacy sādhya-sāma of Gautama already described in the footnotes to page 386.

Atta-kāla is that in which that which should be said first is said later, e.g. the thesis, or pratijñā, should be stated first and the conclusion, or nigamana, last; if instead the nigamana is stated first and the pratijñā after, then we have the fault of kālattta.

Upālambha (criticism) is the finding fault with the hetus, also called a-hetu, as described above, or hetu-ābhāsas. Parihāra (reply) means the reply given to the objections pointed out by an opponent; e.g. the self is eternal, since so long as it remains in the body it shows signs of life, and, when it is away, though the body still remains the same, yet there is no sign of life; therefore the self is different from the body and is eternal. Pratijñā-hāni (to give up one’s thesis) is where, being cornered by the opponent, one is forced to give up one’s original thesis. Thus one may start with the thesis that puruṣa is eternal, but, being cornered, one may give it up and say that puruṣa is not eternal. Abhyanujñā (to bring a counter-charge) is that in which a disputant, instead of refuting the charge brought against him by his opponent, charges his opponent with the same defects\(^1\). Heto-antara (dodging with a wrong reason) is where, when the cause of some root fact (prakṛti) is asked, the reply refers to the cause of the modifications or manifestations (vikṛti) of that root fact\(^2\). Arthaṁtara (wrong answer) is where, when the definition of one thing (e.g. fever) is asked, a definition of another thing (e.g. diabetes) is given\(^3\). Nigraha-sthāna is where, in a learned assembly, a statement, though thrice repeated, is not understood by the opponent. Caraka counts among the nigraha-sthānas many of the cases which have already been enumerated and described. Thus he counts pratijñā-hāni, abhyanujñā, kālattta, a-hetu, nyūna, atirikta, vyarthka, apārthaka, punar-uktta, viruddha, hetu-antara, arthaṁtara\(^4\).

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\(^1\) This corresponds to matamujñā of the Nyāya-sūtra, v. 1. 42.

\(^2\) In Nyāya-sūtra, v. 2. 6, we hear of a hetu-antara, but that seems to be different from this. The significance of hetu-antara, as it stands there, may be illustrated as follows. An adherent of Sāṃkhya says that all this world of things is derived from one root cause, because all these are limited and whatever is limited is derived from one root cause. This may be refuted by pointing out that there are many limited things which are derived from more than one root cause. To this the Sāṃkhya adherent replies that only those which are associated with pleasure and pain and ignorance are to be regarded as proceeding from one root cause; but this is an addition which was not contained in the original thesis.

\(^3\) This is also mentioned in the Nyāya-sūtra, v. 2. 7.

\(^4\) The nigraha-sthānas mentioned in the Nyāya-sūtra, v. 2. 1, are the following: pratijñā-hāni, pratijñāntara, pratijñā- virodha, pratijñā-sannyāsa, hetu-antara,
After this Caraka further describes the ten categories, a knowledge of which he thinks is very necessary for a mastery of the subject-matter of Āyur-veda. These are kāraṇa (the agent or the mover), karana (the instrument necessary for an agent to bring about an effort), kārya-yoni (the material cause by the modification of which effects are produced), kārya (that for the production of which the mover makes his effort), kārya-phala (that for which a particular effect is intended by the agent), anubandha (the good or bad result which attaches itself to the doer after the production of the effect), deśa (place), kāla (the seasons, days, etc.), pravṛtti (the effort and the action needed for the production of the effect) and upāya (the passivity and special aptitude of the agent, the instrument and the material cause which can make the effect possible). The physician is the cause (kāraṇa), the medicines the instruments (karana); the want of equilibrium of the dhātus the kārya-yoni; the restoration of the equilibrium of the dhātus the kārya; the happy state of body and mind the kārya-phala; length of life, anubandha; the place and the diseased person, deśa; the year and the condition of the diseased person, kāla; the efforts of the physician, pravṛtti; the qualifications of the physician, the qualities of the medicine, etc., upāya.

It may be pointed out in this connection that the Uttara-tantra of Suśruta also mentions thirty-two technical terms helpful to physicians in refuting the statements of hostile critics and in establishing their own points, which are called tantra-yukti. These are said to be adhikaraṇa, yoga, padārtha, hetu-artha, uddeśa, nirdeśa, upadeśa, apadeśa, pradeśa, atideśa, apavarga, vākya-śeṣa, arthāpatti, viparyaya, prasāṅga, ekānta, anekānta, pūrva-paṅka, nirṇaya, anumāna, vidhāna, anāgatāvekṣana, atikrāntāvekṣana, saṁśaya, vyākhya, sva-samjña, nirvacana, nidarsana, niyoga, samuccaya, vikalpa and āhya. But these technical terms are maxims for the interpretation of textual topics, like the maxims of Mīmāṃsā, and are not points of dispute or logical categories. It is said that these maxims are like the sun to a group of lotuses, or like a lamp to a house.

arthaṅtara, nārarthaka, avijñātārtha, apārthaka, aprūpta-kāla, nyāna, adhiha, punar-ukta, anamabhāṣana, ajñāna, apratibha, viķeṣa, mātānijñā, paryayavijñāpekeṣa, nirvanajñayuṣyogā, apa-siddhānta, hetu-ābhāṣa. Many of these, however, are not mentioned by Caraka.

1 asad-vādi-prayuktānām vākyānām pratipeduṇānām svā-vākyā-siddhā, api ca kriyate tantra-yukti taḥ. Suśruta-sanāhitā, Uttara-tantra, 65. 5.
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for the illumination or the expression of the subject of discourse. This remark very much resembles the remark of Vātsyāyana that ānvikṣiki (logic) is like a light to all sciences (pradīpah sarva-vidyānām). But the difference between tantra-yukti and ānvikṣiki is this, that, while the former refers to the laws of thought, the latter refers to technical modes of expression in medical science in general and in the Suśruta-saṃhitā in particular. They therefore refer to the ways of deducing the inner meaning or intention of the medical texts from their abbreviated forms of expression. Thus, when one reads in the text, “about rasa or doṣa,” and nothing else is said, one understands that this style of expression signifies that it is an adhikarana (topic of discourse) and that something is going to be related about rasa or doṣa, though it is not explicitly so stated. Now the maxim (tantra-yukti) of yoga means that the verb at a distant part of the sentence may be joined with its relevant case in another part of the sentence. The maxim of padārtha means that, when a word having two or more senses is used, then that meaning alone has to be accepted which suits the previous and the later contexts. Thus, when it is said in a medical text that we shall now describe the origin of the Veda, then only Āyur-veda is to be meant and not Rg, Yajus or Atharva. The maxim of hetu-artha illustrates the condition of invisible things by visible and known examples. Thus it is said that, just as a muddy ball becomes dissolved and sticky through water, so do milk and other drugs dissolve a boil by their application. The maxim of uddeśā is the method of briefly touching a subject without going into details. Thus, when one says “disease” (śalya), it means both internal and external diseases without any kind of specification. The maxim of nirdeśā is the method of describing a thing in detail. The maxim of upadeśā is the method of giving a general instruction. Thus it is said that one should not sit up at night nor sleep during the day. This, however, only a general instruction which has its exceptions.

1 yathāmbuśa-vanaryārkaḥ pradīpo veśmano yathā prabodhyaya prakāśārthas tathā tantrasya yuktyāyah.
2 tailam pīvec cāmṛta-vallī-nimba-hiṃurābhaya-tyākṣa-pīppallībhāk siddham balābhyaṁ ca sa-devadāru hitāya nityāṁ galā-ganḍa-rogena.

In the above verse it is enjoined that a particular medical decoction is to be made with a number of drugs which are to be boiled (siddham), and this boiled decoction has to be drunk (pīvec). But the word pīvec is in the first line and the word siddham is in the third line, and it is allowed that these two distant words may be combined (yoga).
maxim of *apadesa* is the method of showing the reasons of things. Thus it is said that phlegm (*ileśmānā*) increases through the taking of sweet things (*madhureṇa śleṣmā 'bhivardhatē*). The maxim of *pradesa* is the analogy by which a present difficulty is solved in the way in which a past difficulty was solved (*prakṛtasya atikṛntena sādhanam pradesah*). Thus it may be said that, since this has cured Devadatta in this way in the past, it would also cure Yajñadvatta in a similar way now. The maxim of *atidesa* is that of anticipating a future event from a present indication or prognostication. Thus from the fact of the increase of uprising wind in a man's system it may be predicted that he will have a specific bowel-disease (*udāvarta*). The maxim of *apavarga* consists in allowing exceptions to general directions (e.g., cases of poisoning should not be fomented, except in the case of poisoning through the bites of insects). The maxim of *vākya-śeṣa* consists in supplying an idea suggested by the context, but not expressly mentioned. Thus when it is said "of the head, hands, feet, sides, back, belly, heart," it is the whole man that is to be understood though it is not expressly stated in the context. That which is understood, by implication, though not directly mentioned, is called the maxim of *arthāpatti*. Thus, when a man says "I shall eat rice," it is understood that he is not thirsty, but hungry. The maxim of *viparyaya* is that by virtue of which from a positive or a negative assertion its contrary is asserted also, e.g. when it is said that those who are lean, weak and of fearful temperament are difficult to be cured. The maxim of *prasanga* is that by virtue of which allusion is made to things repeatedly described in another chapter. The maxim of *ekānta* allows of affirming a specific action of things unexceptionably (e.g. *madana* fruit induces vomiting, i.e. under all circumstances). The maxim of *anekānta* is that by virtue of which one understands that different opinions prevail on a particular subject. Thus some teachers think that substances are the most important, while others think that *rasa* is so; others, again, think that the inner essence (*vīrya*) is the most important, while still others think that chemical action through digestion (*vipāka*) is so. The maxims of *pūrva-pakṣa* and *uttara-pakṣa* allow of discussing a matter in the form of question and answer. The maxim of *anumata* is that by virtue of which it is to be understood that, when the opinion of other authorities is referred to and not contradicted, it is signified that it is approved. The maxim of *vichāna* is that by virtue of
which one understands that, when certain descriptions follow certain enumerations, the former are to be taken in the order in which the latter are related. The maxim of anāgatāvekṣaṇa allows of leaving certain things for future description and elaboration, and atikrāntāvekṣaṇa permits alluding to things described before (e.g. it is said in the Śloka-sthāna that this matter will be described in the Cikitsā chapter, and about another matter it may be said in the Cikitsā chapter that it has been described in the Śloka-sthāna). The maxim of saṃśaya allows a way of statement which may create doubt and confusion in the mind of the reader. The method of elaborate description is called vyākhyāna. The method of using words in a sense different from what they have in other literatures is called sva-samjñā, i.e. technical use (e.g. mithuna in Āyur-veda means honey and clarified butter). A definition is called nirvacana. The maxim of nidārśana allows of describing anything after the analogy of other things. Thus it may be said that, just as fire in a room grows bigger and bigger with wind, so does a boil grow with vāta, pitta and kapha. Niyoga means a direction (e.g. “only what is good to the system is to be taken”). Samuccaya means the taking of two or more things together as having equal value. Vikalpa is the method of giving alternative or optional directions. Īhyā is the maxim by which things which are apparent from the context can be understood.

It is easy to see that of these thirty-two maxims some are ways of interpreting ideas, others are ways of interpreting the arrangement and manner of textual words and their connections, while there are others which are but descriptions of specific peculiarities of style. The reductor (Nāgārjuna) says that he has collected all these maxims as general principles of textual understanding, and he calls them śabda-nyāyārtha, i.e. the meaning of the maxims of verbal interpretation.

**Did Logic Originate in the Discussions of Āyur-veda Physicians?**

Dr Mahāmahopādhyāya Satish Chandra Vidyabhusan in his *History of Indian Logic* supposes without adducing any reason that the Caraka-samhitā gives a summary of the principal doctrines of Ānvikṣiki, possibly as propounded by Medhātithi Gautama. He further says that the doctrines of Ānvikṣiki evidently did not con-
stitute a part of the original Āyur-veda of Punarvasu Ātreya, and that these doctrines seem to have been incorporated into the Caraka-samhitā by the redactor Caraka, in whose time they were widely known and studied. Dr Vidyabhushan’s theory is that both Caraka and Aksapāda borrowed the Nyāya doctrines from Medhātithi Gautama, but, while Caraka accepted them in their crude forms, Aksapāda pruned them thoroughly before they were assimilated in the Nyāya-sūtra\(^1\).

But Dr Vidyabhushan’s Medhātithi Gautama is more or less a mythical person, and there is no proof that he ever wrote anything, or that Caraka borrowed anything from a Medhātithi Gautama, or that the Nyāya doctrines found in the Caraka-samhitā were not contained in the original treatise of Agnivesa, now lost. Dr Vidyabhushan refers to the evidence of a number of works, such as the Kusumānjali, Naiṣadha-carita and Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti, which refer to Gautama as being the founder of Ānvikṣikī. But none of these authorities are earlier than the tenth century. He refers also to the authority of the Padma-purāṇa, Skanda-purāṇa and Gandharva-tantra, none of which can be regarded as a work of any considerable antiquity. Vātsyāyana himself refers to Aksapāda as the person to whom Nyāya (the science of Logic) revealed itself\(^2\). Uddyotakara also refers to Aksapāda as the utterer of the Nyāya-sāstra, and so also does Vācaspati\(^3\). There is therefore absolutely no reason why the original authorship of Nyāya should be attributed to a Gautama, as against Aksapāda, on evidence which cannot be traced to any period earlier than the tenth century and which is collected from Purāṇa sources directly contradicted by the earliest Nyāya authorities. The Nyāya-sāstra, therefore, cannot be traced on the evidence of the earliest Nyāya authorities to any earlier Gautama; for, had this been so, it would certainly have been mentioned

\(^1\) History of Indian Logic, pp. 25 and 26, by Mahāmahopādhyāya Satish Chandra Vidyabhushan. Calcutta University, 1921.

\(^2\) Yo 'aksapādam rśiṃ nyāyāḥ prayabhād vadamāḥ varāṃ tasya Vātsyāyana idam bhāṣya-jātām avartayaḥ.

\(^3\) Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya, 2. 24, A.D. 400.

Dr Vidyabhushan’s translation of it as “The Nyāya philosophy manifested itself (in a regular form) before Aksapāda” is inexact.

yad Aksapādah pravaro mūntāṁ śaṁśyā sāstram jagato jagādā.

Nyāya-vārttikā of Uddyotakara (A.D. 600). Opening lines.

atha bhagavataḥ Aksapādahena niḥreyasa-hetau sāstrre praṇīte. Nyāya-vārttikā-tātparya-ṭikā of Vācaspati. Dr Vidyabhushan’s translation of the Nyāya-vārttikā word sāstra as “Nyāyasāstra in a systematic way” is again inexact.
by either Vatsyayana, Uddyotakara or Vacaspati. Jayanta also attributes the elaborate Nyaya work to Akṣapāda and does not seem to know that this elaborate treatise, the Nyāya-sūtra, was based on the teachings of an earlier authority. If any such authorities were known, they would certainly have been mentioned for the dignity and the prestige of the Śāstra. Gautama is an old name, and we find it attached to one of the Rsis of the Rg-veda (i. 62. 78. 85; iv. 4); he is mentioned in the Satapatha-brāhmaṇa (1. 4. 1. 10; III. 3. 4. 19, etc.); in the Taittirīya-prātiṣākhya (1. 5), in the Āśvalāyana-śrauta-sūtra (1. 3; II. 6, etc.) and in other similar older works; but nowhere is he spoken of as being the author of the Nyāya-sāstra. Gautama is also mentioned in the Mahā-bhārata several times, but nowhere is he referred to as the author of the Nyāya-sāstra. The passage of the Mahā-bhārata on which Dr Vidyabhusan bases his theory of a Medhātithi Gautama does not say that Medhātithi was the author of Āṅvikṣikī or Nyāya, nor does it say that Medhātithi and Gautama were identical persons. The name Gautama is a patronymic, and the passage of the Mahā-bhārata referred to by Dr Vidyabhusan clearly means that the highly wise Medhātithi of the Gautama race was engaged in asceticism. This is corroborated by the fact that the passage of Bāsa referred to by Dr Vidyabhusan mentions Medhātithi as a teacher of Nyāya-sāstra and does not call him Gautama, nor does it say that Medhātithi was the originator of Nyāya. Dr Vidyabhusan’s theory, therefore, of Medhātithi Gautama being the originator of the Nyāya-sāstra falls down like a house of cards. His identification of Medhātithi Gautama’s birthplace as Mithilā, his ascertainment of his date, his identification of Persian references to Medhātithi Gautama and his so-styled references to Medhātithi Gautama in the Āṅguttara-nikāya and the Brahma-jāla-sutta are no less fictitious. The Gautama tradition of Nyāya need not be followed; but it may incidentally be mentioned that an Āṭreya Gautama, who is described as being Śāmkhya (probably in the sense of wise, philosopher, or learned), is counted in the list of the

1 Akṣapāda-praṇīto hi vītato Nyāya-pādopāt.
2 Medhātithir mahā-prājña Gautamas tapasi sthitāh vīmṛṣīya tena hālena patnīyāḥ samutthiyo-vyayākramam.
5 History of Indian Logic, by Dr Satish Chandra Vidyabhusan, pp. 17–21.
sages who assembled together to discover the causes and remedies of diseases; side by side with this Ātreya, another Ātreya is also mentioned as bhikṣu Ātreya. A number of sages are mentioned in the Caraka-saṃhitā as persons who discussed the problem of the rise of diseases and how they could be removed. Among these Bharadvāja volunteered to proceed to Indra to learn from him the science of healing. Indra instructed him in the subject, being learned in the three subjects of the (hetu) causes (of diseases), knowledge of the (liṅga) signs (of diseases) and the knowledge of medicines. Bharadvāja, having learnt this elaborate science in three divisions, repeated it to the sages in exactly the same manner in which he learnt it. After this it is said that Punarvasu taught Āyur-veda to his six disciples, Agnivesa, Bhela and others. Cakra-pāni, the commentator, says that Punarvasu was the disciple of Bharadvāja, and quotes as his authority a statement of Hārīta. But on this point Caraka himself is silent.

But one thing emerges from this half-mythical account of the origin of Āyur-veda, viz. that the Āyur-veda was occupied from the beginning with the investigation of the nature of causes (hetu) and reasons (liṅga) for legitimate inferences in connection with the enquiry into the causes of diseases and the apprehension of signs or indications of the same. In the Nidāna-sthāna of Caraka eight synonyms for reason (hetu) are given, viz. hetu, nimitta, āyatana, kārtṛ, kārana, pratyaya, samutthāna and nidāna. It is curious enough that the words pratyaya and āyatana are used, which are presumably Buddhistic. The word pratyaya, in the sense of cause, is hardly found in Indian philosophy, except in Buddhism. The use of so many terms to denote cause evidently suggests that before Caraka’s redaction there must have been an extensive literature which had used these words to denote cause. As a matter of fact, the word pratyaya is hardly ever used in the Caraka-saṃhitā to signify cause, though it is counted here as one of the synonyms of hetu, or cause. The natural implication of this is that the word pratyaya was used for hetu in some earlier literature, from which Caraka collected it; so with other words, such as samutthāna, āyatana, which are counted in the list as synonyms for hetu, but are not actually used in the body of the text. This may lead us to think that the discussion of hetu under

1 Ātreya Gautamaḥ saṃbhyaḥ. In this passage Ātreya may, however, be taken as a man separate from the wise Gautama.
various names is an old subject in Āyur-veda literature existing before Caraka, from which Caraka collected them.

We know that Āyur-veda was primarily concerned with three questions, viz. how diseases originated, how they were known, and what were their cures. It was in this connection that the principle of causality was first from a practical necessity applied in Āyur-veda. Thus, if it is known that a person has been exposed to sudden cold or has enjoyed a heavy feast, then, since it is known that cold leads to fever and over-feeding to indigestion, with the very first symptoms of uneasiness one may at once infer that the patient is likely to get fever or to have diarrhœa or acute indigestion. Or, if it is known that the patient has a strong diarrhœa, then it can similarly be inferred that he has eaten indigestible articles. Thus the two principal kinds of inference which were of practical use to the Āyur-veda physicians were inference of the occurrence of a disease from a knowledge of the presence of the causes of that disease, i.e. from cause to effect, and inference of the specific kinds of unhygienic irregularity from the specific kind of disease of the patient, i.e. from the effect to the cause. The other and third kind of inference is that of inference of disease from its early prognostications (pūrva-rūpa). Cakrapāni, in commenting on the possibility of inference of specific diseases from their early specific prognostications, compares it with inference of rain from an assemblage of dark clouds or of the future rise of the Kṛttika constellation from the rise of the constellation Rohini, which immediately precedes it. Both these are cases of inference of future occurrences of causation or coexistence. The prognostication may, however, be of the nature of an immediately and invariably associated antecedent which may drop altogether when the disease shows itself. Thus before a high fever the hair of the patient may stand erect; this standing erect of the hair in a specific manner is neither the cause nor is it coexistent with fever, since it may vanish when the fever has actually come. It is, however, so invariably associated with a specific kind of fever that the fever can be inferred from it. Again, when there is any doubt among a number of causes as to which may be the real cause of the disease, the physician has to employ the method of difference or

1 These two kinds of pūrva-rūpa are thus described by Cakrapāni in his commentary on Caraka-saṁhitā, 11. 1. 7: tāc ca pūrva-rūpaṁ devi-viśāhām eham bhāvi-cyādhy-avyakta-liṅgam...devītyam tu doṣa-dūṣya-samārchanā-janyam avyakta-liṅgād anyad eva yathā śoare bāla-pradaśā-roma-harṣādi.
the method of concomitant variation for its proper ascertainment. That similar things produce the same kind of effects and opposite things produce opposite results are two of the accepted postulates of the law of sāmānya and viśeṣa in the Caraka-saṁhitā\(^1\). Now, applying these two principles, it is held that in a case of doubt as to any kind of irregularity being the cause of any particular disease it has to be found out by experiment whether the application of the suspected cause (e.g. cold) increases the disease (e.g. fever); if it does, and if the application of its opposite (e.g. heat) decreases the disease, then cold is to be regarded as the cause of the disease. If the application of any particular kind of element increases an effect (a particular kind of disease) and the application of its opposite decreases it, then that particular element may be regarded as the cause of that effect. Caraka holds that the three methods, viz. the cause and effect relation (niḍāna), the method of invariable prognostication (pūreça-rūpa) and the method of concomitant variation (upasaṅya, which includes anupaṅya also) are to be employed either jointly or separately for the ascertainment of the nature of diseases which have already occurred or which are going to happen in the near future\(^2\). Caraka thus urges that the physician should examine carefully the causes of diseases by the application of all these methods, so that they may be ascertained from their visible effects. Caraka then goes on to give examples of a number of diseases and the causes or prognostications by which their nature can be ascertained. He then says that a disease which is at first only an effect of some other causes may act as a cause of other diseases and may thus be regarded both as an effect and as a cause. There is therefore no absolute difference between a cause and an effect, and that which is a cause may be an effect and that which is an effect may also in its turn be a cause. Sometimes a disease may behave as cause of another disease and then cease to exist itself, whereas again, one disease may exist side by side with another disease which it has produced and aggravate its effects. Then, again, a disease (cause) may produce a disease (effect), and that effect another effect. Thus one cause may produce one effect as well as many effects, and one effect may be due to one or to many causes, and

\(^1\) Caraka-saṁhitā, i. i. 44.

\(^2\) The other two methods of samprāpti and rūpa need not be discussed in this connection.
again many causes may jointly produce many effects. Thus, though fever, delirium, etc. may all be produced by dryness (rūkṣa), yet under certain circumstances fever alone may be produced by it. Again, fever may also be produced by the combination of a number of causes which under other circumstances may produce jointly a number of diseases. So one entity may be an invariable concomitant (linga) of one event or of many events, and there may also be a number of invariable concomitants of one event. Thus fever is the invariable concomitant of hygienic irregularities in general, and all fevers have heat as their invariable concomitant. From certain kinds of hygienic irregularities fever can be inferred; but these can also be associated with a number of other diseases.¹

Hence it is evident that the determination of the nature of causes and effects and the inference of facts or events of invariable concomitance were an indispensable necessity for the Āyur-veda physicians in connection with the diagnosis of diseases and the ascertainment of their causes and cures. It was for this reason that Caraka divided inference into three classes, from causes to effects, from effects to causes and from the association of other kinds of invariable concomitants. The Nyāya-sūtra of Akṣapāda contains expressions which seem to have been borrowed from Nāgārjuna’s Mādhyamika-kārikā and from the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra and the regulations of Buddhistic idealism, and hence it is generally believed to have been composed in the second or the third century A.D.² In this fundamental and earliest work of Nyāya philosophy inference (anumāna) is described as being of three kinds, viz. from cause to effect (pūrvavat), from effect to cause (sesavat), and inference from similarities (sāmānyato-drśta) not comprehended under the cause-effect relation. Now it is exactly these three forms of inference that are described in the Caraka-samhitā, and, so far as is known to the present writer, this is the earliest work which describes inference in such a systematic manner, and so it

¹ See Caraka-samhitā, II, 8, 22–27.

A commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Pramāṇa-vidhvaṃsana called Pramāṇa-vidhvaṃsana-sambhāṣita-ṭṛtiṇ reproduces Nāgārjuna’s definition of the categories, which are the same as the categories enumerated in the first sūtra of Akṣapāda’s Nyāya-sūtra. But, as Walleser points out in his Life of Nāgārjuna from Tibetan and Chinese Sources, it is impossible to fix Nāgārjuna’s date exactly. He may have lived at any time between the second and the fourth centuries A.D. So no fruitful result can be attained by considerations of this kind.
may naturally be regarded as the source from which Ākṣapāda drew his ideas. Now Caraka’s work may be regarded as a revision of Aṅgīvēśa’s work, based on Atri’s teachings, based on Bhāradvāja’s instructions. Aṅgīvēśa’s work is now lost, and it is not known what exactly were the contributions of Caraka in his revision of Aṅgīvēśa’s work; but, since we find no work of an earlier date, Hindu, Buddhist or Jaina, which treats of the logical subjects found in the Caraka-saṃhitā, and since these logical discussions seem to be inextricably connected with medical discussions of diagnosis of diseases and the ascertainment of their causes, it seems very natural to suppose that Caraka got his materials from Aṅgīvēśa, who probably got them from still earlier sources. Incidentally it may be mentioned that Jayanta, in his Nyāya-maṇḍjarti, discussing the question of the probable sources from which Ākṣapāda drew his materials, suggests that he probably elaborated his work from what he may have gathered from some other science (sāstrāntarābhhyāsāt); but it is difficult to say whether by sāstrāntara Jayanta meant Āyur-veda. The Nyāya-sūtra, however, expressly justifies the validity of the Vedas on the analogy of the validity of Āyur-veda, which is a part of the Vedas.\(^1\)

The similarity of the Nyāya-sūtra definition of inference to Caraka’s definition is also very evident; for while the former begins tat-pūrvakaṃ tri-vidham (where tat-pūrvakaṃ means pratyakṣa-pūrvakaṃ), the latter begins pratyakṣa-pūrvakaṃ tri-vidham tri-kālām. But, while Caraka knows only the three forms of inference, he has no names for these three types such as are supplied by Ākṣapāda, viz. pūrvavat (related to pūrva, the prior, or the cause), ṣevaṇat (related to ṣeva, the later, or the effect) and sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa (from observed similarity in the past, present and future, which is also emphasized by Caraka in the same manner). From the con-

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Jayanta enters into a long discussion in his Nyāya-maṇḍjarti, trying to prove that it was through his omniscience that Caraka could write his work and that he never discovered the science by inductive methods nor derived it from previous traditional sources.


Vātsyāyana, in his commentary on the Nyāya-sūtra, illustrates pūrvavat (from cause to effect) as the inference of rain from the rise of clouds, ṣevaṇat (from effect to cause) as the inference of rain in the uplands from the flooding of the river in the lower regions and sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa (from similar behaviour) as the inference of the motion of heavenly bodies from their changes of position in the sky at
siderations detailed in the preceding footnote it may well be assumed that Aksapāda's contribution to the definition of inference consists in his giving names to the types of floating inference described in Caraka-saṃhitā. It is not improbable that the Nyāya-sūtra derived its theory of five propositions, and in fact most of the other logical doctrines, from Caraka, as there are no earlier works to which these can be traced. Caraka's definition of perception as the knowledge different times. But he also gives another meaning of these three terms pūrṇavat, ṣeṣavat and sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa. He interprets pūrṇavat here as the inference of fire from smoke "on the analogy of past behaviour of co-presence," ṣeṣavat as the inference of the fact that sound is quality because it is neither substance nor action, by the method of residues (ṣeṣa), and sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa as the inference of the existence of soul from the existence of desire, which is a quality and as such requires a substance in which it would inhere. This is not an inference from similarity of behaviour, but from the similarity of one thing to another (e.g. that of desire to other qualities), to extend the associations of the latter (inference in a substance) to the former (desire), i.e. the inference that desire must also inhere in a substance.

In the case of the terms pūrṇavat and ṣeṣavat, as these two terms could be grammatically interpreted in two different ways (with matu suffix in the sense of possession and vati suffix in the sense of similarity of behaviour), and as the words pūrṇa and ṣeṣa may also be used in two different ways, Vatsyāyana interprets them in two different ways and tries to show that in both these senses they can be justified as modes of inference. It seems obvious that the names pūrṇavat, ṣeṣavat and sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa were given for the first time to the threefold inference described by Caraka, as this explains the difficulty felt by Vatsyāyana in giving a definite meaning to these terms, as they had no currency either in traditional or in the contemporaneous literature of Vatsyāyana. Udyotakara, in his commentary on Vatsyāyana, contributes entirely original views on the subject. He takes Aksapāda's sūtra, atha tat-pūrṇāhāṃ tīrṇaḥ anumāṇaḥ pūrṇavac cheṣavat sāmānyato-dṛṣṭaḥ ca, and splits it up into atha tat-pūrṇāhāṃ tīrṇaḥ anumāṇaḥ and pūrṇavac cheṣavat sāmānyato-dṛṣṭaḥ ca; by the first tīrṇaḥ he means inference from positive instances (anuvai), from negative instances (cāryāparāhārī) and from both together (avayu-vayāparāhārī). He gives two possible interpretations of the terms pūrṇavat, ṣeṣavat and sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa, one of which is that pūrṇavat means argument from cause to effect, ṣeṣavat that from effect to cause and sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa is the inference on the basis of relations other than causal. The Sāṃkhya-kārikā also mentions these kinds of inference. The Mādhara-vṛtti again interprets the threefold character of inferences (tīrṇaḥ anumāna) in two ways; it says, firstly, that tīrṇaḥ means that an inference has three propositions, and, secondly, that it is of three kinds, viz. pūrṇavat (from the effect, e.g. flooding of the river, to the inference of the cause, e.g. showers in the upper region), ṣeṣavat (from part to whole, e.g. tasting a drop of sea-water to be saline, one infers that the whole sea is saline), and sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa (inference from general association, e.g. by seeing flowering mangoes in one place one infers that mangoes may have flourished in other places as well). Curiously enough, the Mādhara-vṛtti gives another example of sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa which is very different from the examples of sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa hitherto considered. Thus it says that, when one says, "It is illuminated outside," another replies: "The moon must have risen."

1 For more or less fanciful reasons Mr Dhruva suggests that the terms pūrṇavat and ṣeṣavat were borrowed in the Nyāya-sūtra from the Mimāṃsā-sūtra and that this sūtra must therefore be very old (Proceedings and Transactions of the First Oriental Conference, Poona, 1922). This argument is invalid for more
that arises through the contact of the self, the senses, the mind and the objects seems very much like an earlier model for Aksapāda’s definition of perception, which adds three more qualifications to make the meaning more complex and precise. The idea that in the first instance perception is indeterminate (nir-vikalpa or a-vyapadesya) is a later development and can hardly be traced in Hindu philosophy earlier than the Nyāya-sūtra. The similarity of the various categories of vāda, jalpa, vitanda, chala, jāti, nigraha-sthāna, etc., as enumerated in Caraka, to those of the Nyāya-sūtra has been duly pointed out in a preceding section. The only difference between the two sets of enumeration and their elaboration is that Caraka’s treatment, being the earlier one, is less full and less complex than that of Aksapāda.

The fact that physicians in counsel earnestly discussed together, in order to arrive at right conclusions regarding both the theoretical causes of diseases and their cures and their actual practical discernment in individual cases, is abundantly clear from even a very superficial study of the Caraka-sanhitā. The entire work seems to be a collection of discussions of learned physicians with Atri as their chairman. Where differences of opinion are great, they are all noted, and Atri’s own opinion on them is given, and, where there was more or less unanimity, or where Atri himself lectured on specific problems, his own opinion alone is given. It is also related how a good and clever physician is to defeat his opponents in dispute, not only in a legitimate and scientific way, but also by sophist’s wrangling and unfair logical tricks. It was a practical necessity for these physicians to earn their bread in the face of strong competition, and it is easy to see how the logical tricks of chala, jāti and nigraha-sthāna developed into a regular art of debate, not always for the discovery of truth, but also for gaining the victory over opponents. We hear of debates, discussions or logical disputes in literature much earlier than the

than one reason. Firstly, granting that the Mīmāṃsā-sūtra is very old (which is doubtful), the fact that these two logical terms were borrowed from it does not show that it must be a very old work; for even a modern work may borrow its terminology from an older treatise. Secondly, the fact that these three terms were borrowed from early sources does not show that the theory of tri-vidha anumāna in the Nyāya-sūtra is either its own contribution or very old. Mr Dhrava’s arguments as to the Māthara-cṛtī being subsequent to Vatsyāyana’s commentary are also very weak and do not stand criticism.

1 indriyārtha-samikṣapotparam jhānam avyapadesyam avyabhicāri vyapasa-vālmākham pratyakṣam. Nyāya-sūtra, 1. 1. 4.

2 Caraka uses the word vihāla in 11. 1. 10. 4 in the sense of distinction (bheda) of superiority and inferiority (utkara-prakara-rūpa).
Caraka-saṃhitā; but nowhere was the acquirement of this art deemed so much a practical necessity for earning a living as among the medical men. And, since there is no mention of the development of this in any other earlier literature, it is reasonable to suppose that the art of debate and its other accessories developed from early times in the traditional medical schools, whence they are found collected in Caraka’s work. The origin of the logical art of debate in the schools of Āyur-veda is so natural, and the illustrations of the modes of dispute and the categories of the art of debate are so often taken from the medical field, that one has little reason to suspect that the logical portions of the Caraka-saṃhitā were collected by Caraka from non-medical literature and grafted into his work.

Āyur-veda Ethics.

The length of the period of a man’s lifetime in this iron age (kali-yuga) of ours is normally fixed at one hundred years. But sinful actions of great enormity may definitely reduce the normal length to any extent. Ordinary vicious actions, however, can reduce the length of life only if the proper physical causes of death, such as poisoning, diseases and the like, are present. If these physical causes can be warded off, then a man may continue to live until the normal length of his life, one hundred years, is reached, when the body-machine, being worn out by long work, gradually breaks down. Medicines may, however, in the case of those who are not cursed by the commission of sins of great enormity, prolong the normal length of life. It is here that Caraka and his followers differ from all other theories of karma that flourished on the soil of India. The theory is not accepted in any Indian system of thought except that of Caraka. In spite of the many differences that prevail amongst these theories, they may still be roughly divided into four classes. Thus there are, first, the pauruṣa-vādins, such as those who follow the Yoga-vāśīṣṭha school of thought and are idealists of the extreme type, thinking that all our experiences can be controlled by a determined effort of the will and that there is no bond of previous karma, destiny, or fatality which cannot be controlled or overcome by it. Human will is all-powerful, and by it we can produce any change of any kind in the development of our future well-being. There is, again, the view that God alone is responsible for all our actions, and that He makes those whom He wants to
raise perform good actions and those whom He wants to take the downward path commit sinful deeds. There is also the view that God rewards or praises us in accordance with our good or bad deeds, and that we alone are responsible for our actions and free to act as we choose. There is a further view, elaborately dealt with in Patañjali’s Yoga-sūtra, that our deeds determine the particular nature of our birth, the period of our lifetime and the nature of our enjoyments or sufferings. Ordinarily the fruits of the actions of a previous birth are reaped in the present birth, and the ripened fruits of the actions of the present birth determine the nature of the future birth, period of life and pleasurable or painful experiences, while the fruits of extremely good or bad actions are reaped in this life. In none of these theories do we find the sort of common-sense eclecticimsm that we find in Caraka. For here it is only the fruits of extremely bad actions that cannot be arrested by the normal efforts of good conduct. The fruits of all ordinary actions can be arrested by normal physical ways of well-balanced conduct, the administration of proper medicines and the like. This implies that our ordinary non-moral actions in the proper care of health, taking proper tonics, medicines and the like, can modify or arrest the ordinary course of the fruition of our karma. Thus, according to the effects of my ordinary karma I may have fallen ill; but, if I take due care, I may avoid such effects and may still be in good health. According to other theories the laws of karma are immutable. Only the fruits of unripe karma can be destroyed by true knowledge. The fruits of ripe karma have to be experienced in any case, even if true knowledge is attained. The peculiar features of Caraka’s theory consist in this, that he does not introduce this immutability of ripe karmas. The effects of all karmas, excepting those which are extremely strong, can be modified by an apparently non-moral course of conduct, involving the observance of the ordinary daily duties of life. Ordinarily the law of karma implies the theory of a moral government of the universe in accordance with the good or bad fruits of one’s own karma. We may be free to act as we choose; but our actions in this life, excepting those of great enormity, determine the experiences of our future lives, and so an action in this life cannot ordinarily be expected to ward off any of the evils of this life which one is predestined to undergo in accordance with the karma of a previous birth. Moreover, it is the moral or immoral aspects of an action that
determine the actual nature of their good or bad effects, success or failure. This implies a disbelief in our power of directly controlling our fortunes by our efforts. The theory of karma thus involves a belief in the mysterious existence and ripening of the sinful and virtuous elements of our actions, which alone in their course of maturity produce effects. If the theory that sins bring their punishment, and virtues produce their beneficial effects, of themselves, is accepted, its logical consequences would lead us to deny the possibility of mere physical actions modifying the fruition of these karmas. So the acceptance of the moral properties of actions leads to the denial of their direct physical consequences. If through my honest efforts I succeed in attaining a happy state, it is contended that my success is not due to my present efforts, but it was predestined, as a consequence of the good deeds of my previous birth, that I should be happy. For, if the fruition was due to my ordinary efforts, then the theory that all happy or unhappy experiences are due to the ripening of the karmas of the previous births falls to the ground. If, on the other hand, all success or failure is due to our proper or improper efforts, then the capacity of sins or virtues to produce misery or happiness may naturally be doubted, and the cases where even our best efforts are attended with failure are not explained. But, if our ordinary efforts cannot effect anything, and if the modes of our experiences, pleasures and sufferings, and the term of our life are already predestined, then none of our efforts are of any use in warding off the calamities of this life, and the purpose of the science of medicine is baffled. In common-sense ways of belief one refers to "fate" or "destiny" only when the best efforts fail, and one thinks that, unless there is an absolute fatality, properly directed efforts are bound to succeed. Caraka's theory seems to embody such a common-sense view. But the question arises how, if this is so, can the immutability of the law of karma be preserved? Caraka thinks that it is only the extremely good or bad deeds that have this immutable character. All other effects of ordinary actions can be modified or combated by our efforts. Virtue and vice are not vague and mysterious principles in Caraka, and the separation that appears elsewhere between the moral and the physical sides of an action is not found in his teaching.

He seems to regard the "good," or the all-round manifold

1 Caraka-samhita, iii. 3. 28–38.
utility (hîta) of an action, as its ultimate test. What a man has to
do before acting is carefully to judge and anticipate the utility of
his action, i.e. to judge whether it will be good for him or not;
if the effects are beneficial for him, he ought to do it, and, if they
are harmful, he ought not to do it\footnote{buddhîya samyag idaṁ mama hitam idam mamāhitam ity aveykayavekṣya kar-
maṇāṁ pratyetmanām samyak pratipādanena ity ahita-karma-parityāgena hita-
karmacaranaṁ ca. Cakrapāṇi on Caraka, t. 8. 17.}. Our ultimate standard of good
actions lies in seeking our own good, and to this end the proper
direction and guidance of our mind and senses are absolutely
necessary. Caraka applies here also his old principle of the golden
mean, and says that the proper means of keeping the mind in
the right path consists in avoiding too much thinking, in not
thinking of revolting subjects, and in keeping the mind active.
Thoughts and ideas are the objects of the mind, and one has to
avoid the atiyoga, mithyā-yoga and a-yoga of all thoughts, as just
described. "Self-good," or ātma-hîta, which is the end of all our
actions, is described as not only that which gives us pleasure and
supplies the material for our comfort, ease of mind and long life,
but also that which will be beneficial to us in our future life.
Right conduct (sad-vṛtta) leads to the health and well-being of
body and mind and secures sense-control (indriya-vijaya).

The three springs of action are our desire for self-preservation
(prāṇaisāna), our desire for the materials of comfort (dhanaisāna),
and our desire for a happy state of existence in the future life
(paralokaisāna). We seek our good not only in this life, but also
in the after-life, and these two kinds of self-good are summed
up in our threefold desire—for self-preservation, for the objects
that lead to happiness, and for a blessed after-life. Right con-
duct is not conduct in accordance with the injunctions of the
Vedas, or conduct which leads ultimately to the cessation of all
sorrows through cessation of all desires or through right know-
ledge and the extinction of false knowledge, but is that which
leads to the fulfilment of the three ultimate desires. The cause of
sins is not transgression of the injunctions of the scriptures, but
errors of right judgment or of right thinking (prajñāparādha).
First and foremost is our desire for life, i.e. for health and pro-
longation of life; for life is the precondition of all other good
things. Next to our desire for life is our desire for wealth and
the pursuit of such vocations of life as lead to it. The third is
the desire for a blessed after-life. In this connection Caraka introduces a discussion to prove the existence of a future state of existence. He says that a wise man should not entertain doubts regarding the existence of a future life, since such doubts might hinder the performance of right conduct. The mere fact that we cannot experience its existence with our senses is not a sufficient negative proof. For there are few things which can be directly experienced by the senses, and there are many which exist, but are never experienced by the senses. The very senses with which we experience other things cannot themselves be subject to sense-experience. Even sensible things cannot be perceived if they are too near or too distant, if they are covered, if the senses are weak or diseased, if the mind is otherwise engaged, if they are mixed up with similar things, if their light is overcome by stronger light, or if they are too small. It is therefore wrong to say that what is not perceived by the senses does not exist. If, again, it is argued that the foetus must derive its soul from the parents, then it may be pointed out that, if the soul of the foetus migrated from either of the parents, then, since the soul is without parts, it could not have migrated in parts, and such a total migration would mean that the parents would be left without any soul and would die. As the soul could not migrate from the parents to the child, so neither can the mind nor the intellect be said to have so migrated. Moreover, if all life must be derived from the migration of other souls, then how can insects come into being, as many do, without parent insects? Consciousness exists as a separate and beginningless entity, and it is not created by anyone else. If, however, the supreme soul be regarded as its cause, then in that sense it may be conceived as having been produced therefrom. The theory of the after-life consists according to Caraka principally in the view that the soul is existent and uncreated, and that it is associated with the foetus at a certain stage of its development in the womb. He also refers to the evidence of rebirth which we

1 yair eva tāvac indriyaḥ pratyakṣam upalabhyaṃ tāny eva santi cāpratyakṣaṃ-śāni. Caraka, I. 11. 7.
4 Of this point Cakrapāṇi gives a different interpretation in I. 11. 13.
have in the difference of the child from the parents; in the fact that, though other causes are more or less the same, two children differ in colour, voice, appearance, intelligence and luck; in the fact that some are servants, whereas others are their rich masters; in the fact that some are naturally in good health, while others are in bad, or are different in the length of life; from the fact that infants know how to cry, suck, smile or fear without any previous instruction or experience; that with the same kind of efforts two persons reap two different kinds of results; that some are naturally adepts in certain subjects and dull in others; and that there are at least some who remember their past lives; for from these facts the only hypothesis that can be made is that these differences are due to the *karma* of one’s past life, otherwise called *daiva*, and that the fruits of the good and bad deeds of this life will be reaped in another. It has also been pointed out in a previous section that a child does not owe his or her intellectual parts to the father or to the mother. These gifts belong to the soul of the child, and there is therefore no reason to suppose that the son of an intellectually deficient person will on that account be necessarily dull.

Caraka further urges that the truth of rebirth can be demonstrated by all possible proofs. He first refers to the verdict of the Vedas and of the opinions of philosophers, which are written for the good of the people and are in conformity with the views of the wise and the virtuous and not in opposition to the opinions of the Vedas. Such writings always recommend gifts, penances, sacrifices, truthfulness, non-injury to all living beings and sex-continence as leading to heavenly happiness and to liberation (*mokṣa*). The sages say that liberation, or the cessation of rebirth, is only for those who have completely purged off all mental and bodily defects. This implies that these sages accepted the theory of rebirth as true; and there have been other sages who also have distinctly announced the truth of rebirth. Apart from the testimony of the Vedas and of the sages, even perception (*pratyakṣa*) also proves the truth of rebirth. Thus it is seen that children are often very different from their parents, and even from the same parents the children born are often very different in colour, voice, frame of body, mental disposition, intelligence and luck, as described above. The natural inference to be based on these data directly experienced is that no one can avoid the effects of the
deeds he has performed, and that therefore what was performed in a past birth is indestructible and always follows a man in his present birth as his daiva, or karma, the fruits of which show in his present life. The deeds of the present birth will again accumulate fruits, which will be reaped in the next birth. From the present fruits of pleasurable or painful experiences their past seeds as past karma are inferred, and from the present deeds as seeds their future effects as pleasurable or painful experiences in another birth are also inferred. Apart from this inference other reasons also lead to the same condition. Thus the living foetus is produced by the combination of the six elements, to which connection with the self from the other world is indispensable; so also fruits can only be reaped when the actions have been performed and not if they are not performed—there cannot be shoots without seeds. It may be noted in this connection that in no other system of Indian thought has any attempt been made to prove the theory of rebirth as has here been done. A slight attempt was made in the Nyāya system to prove the theory on the ground that the crying, sucking and the natural fear of infants implies previous experience. But Caraka in a systematic manner takes up many more points and appeals to the different logical proofs that may be adduced. Again, we find the nature of the fruits of action (karma) discussed in the Vṛṣsa-bhāṣya on the Yoga-sūtra of Patañjali. It is said in the Yoga-sūtra, II. 13, that the karmas of past life determine the particular birth of the individual in a good or bad or poor or rich family and the length of life and pleasurable or painful experiences. But that physical differences of body, colour, voice, temperament, mental disposition and special intellectual features are also due to the deeds of the past life seems to be a wholly new idea. It is, however, interesting to note that, though Caraka attributes the divergence of intelligence to deeds of the past life, yet he does not attribute thereto the weakness or the strength of the moral will.

Caraka further refers to the collective evil effects of the misdeeds of people living in a particular locality, which may often lead to the outbreak of epidemics. Speaking of the outbreak of epidemic diseases, he says that they are due to the pollution of air and water, and to country and climatic revolutions. The pollution of air consists in its being unnatural for the season, dull and motionless, too violent, too dry, too cold, too warm, stormy, of the nature of whirlwind, too humid, dusty, smoky, impure or of
bad smell. The pollution of water consists in its being of unnatural colour, bad smell, bad taste, containing impurities (when devoid of its natural qualities), which are often avoided by water birds, and being unpleasant, and having its sources largely dried up. The pollution of a particular locality occurs when it is infested with lizards, wild animals, mosquitoes, flies, insects, mice, owls, predatory birds or jackals, or when it is full of wild creepers, grass, etc., or when there is a failure of crops, the air smoky, etc. The pollution of time consists in the happening of unnatural climatic conditions. The cause of these epidemic conditions is said to be the demerit (adharma) due to the evil deeds of past life, the commission of which is again due to bad deeds of previous life. When the chief persons of a country, city or locality transgress the righteous course and lead the people in an unrighteous manner, the people also in their conduct continue to grow vicious and sinful. And, as a result of the misdeeds of the people of the locality, the gods forsake that place, there is no proper rain, the air, water and the country as a whole become polluted and epidemics break out. Thus the misdeeds of a people can, according to Caraka, pollute the whole region and ultimately ruin it. When a country is ruined by civil war, then that also is due to the sins of the people, who are inflated with too much greed, anger, pride and ignorance. Thus epidemics are caused by the conjoint sins of the people of a particular region. But even at the time of the outbreak of such epidemics those who have not committed such bad actions as to deserve punishment may save themselves by taking proper medicines and by leading a virtuous life. Continuing to establish his theory that all climatic and other natural evils are due to the commission of sins or adharma, Caraka says that in ancient times people were virtuous, of strong and stout physique and extremely long-lived, and on account of their virtuous ways of living there were no climatic disturbances, no famines, no failure of crops, no drought and no pollutions leading to epidemics and diseases. But at the close of the satya-yuga, through over-eating some rich men became too fat, and hence they became easily tired, and hence became lazy, and on account of laziness they acquired the storing habit (saṅcaya), and, through that, the tendency to receive things from others (parīgraha), and, through that, greed (lobha). In the next, Tretā, age, from greed there arose malice, from malice lying, from lying desire, anger, conceit, antipathy, cruelty,
violence (abhīghāta), fear, sorrow and anxiety. Thus in the Tretā age dharma diminished by a quarter, and so the earthly production of harvest, etc. also diminished by a quarter, and the bodies of living beings lost their vitality accordingly; their length of life diminished, and diseases began to grow. So in the Dvāpara age there was a further diminution of the quantities of earthly productions and a further weakening of human constitution and shortening of the length of life.

It may be remembered that in Suśruta, III. 1, it is said that many persons of the medical school of thought had conceived this world to have come into being either through time (kāla), in the natural process by a blind destiny (niyati), or through a mere nature (svabhāva), accidental concourse of things (yadrechā), or through evolution (parināma) by the will of God; and they called each of these alternatives the prakṛti, or the origin of the world. But the notion of the Sāmkhya prakṛti holds within it all these concepts, and it is therefore more appropriate to admit one prakṛti as the evoking cause of the world. Gayi, in interpreting this, holds that prakṛti is to be regarded as the evoking material cause, whereas time, natural process, etc. are to be regarded as instrumental causes for the world-manifestation. According to Suśruta the selves (kṣetra-jñā) are not in the medical school regarded as all-pervasive (a-sarva-gata), as they are in the Sāmkhya system of thought. These selves, on account of their virtues or vices, transmigrate from one life to another as men or as different animals; for, though not all-pervasive, they are eternal and are not destroyed by death. The selves are not to be regarded as self-revealing, as in Sāmkhya or the Vedānta; but they can be inferred, as the substance or entity to which the feelings of pleasure and pain belong, and they are always endowed with consciousness, though they may not themselves be regarded as of the nature of pure consciousness. They are cetanāvantaḥ (endowed with con-

1 The primary use of prakṛti may have been due to the idea of an enquiry regarding the source and origin of the world. Prakṛti literally means “source” or “origin.” So the term was probably used in reference to other speculations regarding the origin of the world before it was technically applied as a Sāmkhya term. The ideas of svabhāva, kāla, etc. seem to have been combined to form the technical Sāmkhya concept of prakṛti, and two schools of Sāmkhya, the Kapila and the Patañjali schools, arose in connection with the dispute as to the starting of the evolution of prakṛti accidentally (yadrechā) or by the will of God. The idea of prakṛti was reached by combining all the alternative sources of world-manifestation that were current before, and so they are all conserved in the notion of prakṛti.
sciousness) and not cit-svarūpāḥ (of the nature of consciousness). They are extremely subtle or fine (parama-sūksma), and this epithet is explained by Daśaṇa as meaning that the selves are as small as atoms. But, being always endowed with consciousness, they can also through self-perception (pratyakṣa) be perceived as existing. The transmigration of these selves is regulated by the merit and demerit of their deeds. Daśaṇa says that through excessive sins they are born as animals, through an admixture of virtues and sins they are born as men, and through a preponderance of virtues they are born as gods. But according to Caraka not only is the nature of transmigration controlled by the good or bad deeds of a man, but even the productivity of nature, its purity or pollution; and the thousand and one things in which nature is helpful or harmful to men are determined by good and bad deeds (dharma and adharma). Dharma and adharma are therefore regarded as the most important factors in determining most of the human conditions of life and world-conditions of environment. Such a view is not opposed to the Sāṃkhya theory of world-creation; for there also it is held that the evolution of ātman is determined by the good or bad deeds of the selves; but, though implied, yet in no Sāṃkhya work is such a clear and specific determination of world-conditions and world-evolution through the merit and demerit of human beings to be found. Freedom of human will is almost wholly admitted by Caraka, and, where the fruits of previous actions are not of a confirmed character, they can be averted or improved by our efforts. Our efforts thus have on the one hand a cosmical or universal effect, as determining the conditions of the development of the material world, and on the other hand they determine the fate of the individual. The fruits of our actions determine our birth, our experiences and many intellectual gifts; but they do not determine the nature of our will or affect its strength of application in particular directions.

Springs of action in the Caraka-samhitā.

The chief feature of Caraka’s springs of action consists in the fact that he considers three primary desires as the motive causes of all our actions. These are, as has already been said, the desire for life, the desire for riches and the desire for future life. In this Caraka seems to have a view uniquely different from that of most
of the systems of philosophy, which refer to a number of emotions as the root causes prompting us to action. Thus the Vaiśeṣika regards attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain as the cause of all our actions. Pleasure is defined as being a sort of feeling which is approved and welcomed and towards which an attraction is naturally felt. Pleasures, therefore, when they arise, must always be felt, and there cannot be anything like unfelt pleasures. Apart from sensory pleasures, Śridhara in his Nyāya-kandali discusses the existence of other kinds of pleasure, due to the remembering of past things, or to calmness and contentedness of mind or self-knowledge. Pleasures are, however, regarded as the fruits of meritorious deeds (dharma) performed before. Pain, the reverse of pleasure, may be defined as an experience from which we are repelled and which is the result of past misdeeds. Desire, as the wish to have what is unattained (apraţta-praythana), may be either for the self (svārtha) or for others (parārtha). Such desires may be prompted by any of the following: longing for happiness in heaven or on earth (kāma), appetites (abhilāsa), longing for the continuance and recurrence of the enjoyment of pleasurable objects, compassion for others (karunā), disinclination to worldly enjoyment (vairagya), intention of deceiving others (upadha), subconscious motives (bhāva). Praśastapāda, however, distinguishes between desires for enjoyment and desires for work. But he does not include the positive Buddhist virtues of friendship (maitri) and a feeling of happiness in the happiness of others (mudita), and he is content with only the negative virtue of compassion (karunā). He also counts anger, malice, suppressed revengefulness (manyu), jealousy of the good qualities of others (akṣamā), and envy arising from a sense of one's inferiority (amarṣa). But, in spite of this elaborate classification, Praśastapāda makes in reality two broad divisions, namely, desires arising from attachment to pleasures, and those from aversion to pain. Pain is as much a positive feeling as pleasure and cannot be regarded as mere negation of pleasure. Though Praśastapāda knows that there is such a thing as desire for work, yet he does not give it any prominent consideration, and the net result of his classification of the springs of action is that he thinks that all desires are prompted by attachment to feelings of pleasure and antipathy to pain. Feelings, therefore, are to be regarded here as fundamentally determining all desires and through them all actions.

The Naiyāyikas think that attachment and antipathy can be
traced to a more fundamental root, viz. ignorance or delusion (moha). Thus Vātsyāyana, by tracing attachment or antipathy to ignorance, tends to intellectualize the psychological basis of Praśastapāda. For moha would mean want of knowledge, and, if attachment and antipathy be due to want of knowledge, then one can no longer say that feelings ultimately determine our actions, as it is the absence of right knowledge that is found to be ultimately the determinant of the rise of all feelings and emotions. Jayanta, however, in his Nyāya-mañjari, counts ignorance (moha), attachment (rāga) and antipathy (dveṣa) as being three parallel defects (doṣa) which prompt our efforts1. Under attachment he counts sex-inclination (kāma), disinclination to part with that which would not diminish by sharing with others (matsara), jealousy (sphā), inclination towards birth again and again (trṣṇā) and inclination towards taking forbidden things (lobha). Under dveṣa he counts emotional outbursts of anger with burning bodily conditions, envy (trṣyā), jealousy at the good qualities of others (astīyā), injuring others (droha) and concealed malice (manyu). Under ignorance he counts false knowledge (mithyā-jñāna), perplexity due to indecision (vicikitsā), sense of false superiority (mada) and mistakes of judgment (pramāda). But he adds that of the three defects, rāga, dveṣa and moha, moha is the worst, since the other two arise through it. For it is only the ignorant who are under the sway of attachment and antipathy. To the objection that in that case moha ought not to be counted as a defect in itself, but as the source of the other two defects, Jayanta replies that, though it is a source of the other two defects, it of itself also leads people to action and should therefore be counted as a defect in itself. It is no doubt true that all defects are due to false knowledge and are removed by right knowledge; yet it would be wrong to count the defects as being of only one kind of false knowledge (mithyā-jñāna); for the three defects are psychologically felt to have three distinctive characteristics. Jayanta, while admitting that the feelings of attachment or antipathy are due to ignorance, considers them to be psychologically so important as to be regarded as independent springs of action. Thus, while he was in nominal agreement with Vātsyāyana in regarding attachment and antipathy as being due to moha, he felt their independent

1 Teṣām doṣām tryo rāśayo bhavanti rāgo dveṣo moha iti. Nyāya-mañjari, p. 500.
psychological importance and counted them as parallel defects prompting our efforts.

Patañjali divides all our actions into two classes, vicious (kliṣṭa) and virtuous (akliṣṭa). The virtuous actions are prompted by our natural propensity towards emancipation, while the vicious ones are prompted by ignorance (avidyā), egoism (asmitā), attachment (rāga), antipathy (dveṣa) and the will to live (abhinivesa). The latter four, though of the nature of feeling, are yet regarded as being only manifestations of the growth and development of ignorance (avidyā). It is a characteristic peculiarity of the Sāṃkhya philosophy that thoughts and feelings are not regarded there as being intrinsically different; for the guṇas form the materials of both thoughts and feelings. What is thought in one aspect is feeling in another. It was on this account that false knowledge could be considered to have developed into the feelings of egoism, attachment and antipathy, and could be regarded as being of the same stuff as false knowledge. In the Nyāya psychology, thought and feelings being considered intrinsically different, a difficulty was felt in reconciling the fact that, while ignorance could be regarded as being the cause of the feelings of attachment and antipathy, the latter could not be regarded as being identical with ignorance (moha). Jayanta, therefore, while he traced rāga and dveṣa to moha, ontologically considered them as parallel factors determining our actions psychologically. In the Sāṃkhya-Yoga metaphysics this difficulty could be obviated; for that school did not consider feelings to be different from thoughts, since the thoughts are themselves made up of feeling-stuff; hence even false knowledge (avidyā) need not be regarded as being wholly an intellectual element, since it is itself the product of the feeling-stuff—the guṇas.

It is needless to refer in detail to the theories of the springs of action in other systems of Indian thought. From what has already been said it would appear that most systems of Indian Philosophy consider false knowledge to be at the root of all our worldly activities through the mediation of feelings of attachment, antipathy and self-love. There is an inherent pessimism in most systems of Indian thought, which consider that normally we are all under the evil influence of false knowledge and are all gliding on the downward path of sins and afflictions. They also consider that all attachments lead to bondage and slavery to passions, and thereby lead us away from the path of liberation. Actions are
judged as good or bad according as they lead to liberation or bondage; their efficacy is in securing the transcendental realization of the highest truth and the cessation of rebirth, or obscuration of the nature of reality and exposure to the miseries of rebirth.

But Caraka gives us a scheme of life in which he traces the springs of all our actions to the three fundamental motives or biological instincts of life-preservation, worldly desire of acquiring riches for enjoyment, and other worldly aspirations of self-realization. According to him these three fundamental desires sum up all springs of action. On this view will appears to be more fundamental than feeling or knowledge. Caraka does not seem to begin from the old and stereotyped idea that false knowledge is the starting-point of the world. His is a scheme of a well-balanced life which is guided by the harmonious play of these three fundamental desires and directed by perfect wisdom and unerring judgment. Evil and mischief creep in through errors of judgment, by which the harmony of these desires is broken. All kinds of misdeeds are traced, not to feelings of attachment or antipathy, but to errors of judgment or foolishness (prajñāparādha). This prajñāparādha may be compared to the moha or avidyā of the Nyāya and Yoga. But, while the Nyāya and Yoga seem to refer to this moha or avidyā as a fundamental defect inherent in our mental constitution and determining its activities as a formative element, Caraka’s prajñāparādha is not made to occupy any metaphysical status, but expresses itself only in the individual lapses of judgment.

Caraka, however, did not dare to come into conflict with the prevailing ethical and philosophical opinions of his time, and we find that in Śārīra, 1 he largely accepts the traditional views. He says there that it is the phenomenal self (bhūtātman or sanyogapurūsa) that feels pleasure and pain, and in connection with the duty of a physician to remove all physical sufferings produced by diseases he says that the ultimate healing of all pain consists in the permanent naiṣṭhikā (removal) of pain by the removal of grasping (upadhā)². He says there that grasping (upadhā) is itself sorrowful and the cause of all sorrows. All sorrows can be removed by the removal of all grasping tendencies. Just as a silk-worm draws out its cocoon thread to its own destruction, so does

¹ Cakrapāṇī interprets upadhā as desire (trṣṇā); but it seems to me that it would have been more correct to interpret it as the Buddhist upādāna, or grasping. Cakrapāṇī on Caraka, iv. 1. 93.
the miserable man of ignorance draw desires and longings from the objects of sense. He is wise indeed who considers all objects as fire and withdraws himself from them. With the cessation of all actions (anārāmbha) and dissociation from sense-objects there is no more fear of being afflicted with sorrows. Sorrows, again, are said to proceed from four causes, namely, the wrong notion of non-eternal things (e.g. sense-objects) as eternal (buddhi-vibhraṃśa), the want of the power of controlling the mind from undesirable courses (dṛṣṭi-vibhraṃśa), forgetfulness of the nature of right knowledge (smṛti-vibhraṃśa) and the adoption of unhygienic courses (asātmya-arthāgama). Prajñāparādha is defined here as a wrong action that is done through the confusion of intelligence and want of self-control and right knowledge (dhi-dṛṣṭi-smṛti-vibhraṣṭa), and this is supposed to rouse up all maladies and defects (sarva-doṣa-prakopana). Some of the offences that may be counted under prajñāparādha are as follows: to set things in motion, to try to stop moving objects, to let the proper time for doing things pass by, to begin an action in the wrong manner, not to behave in the accustomed manner, not to behave modestly and politely, to insult respected persons, to go about in wrong places or at wrong times, to take objects which are known to be harmful, not to abide by the proper course of conduct described in the Caraka-samhitā, 1.1.6; the passions of jealousy, vanity, fear, anger, greed, ignorance, egoism, errors, all actions prompted by these and whatever else that is prompted by ignorance (moha) and self-ostentation (rajas). Prajñāparādha is further defined as error of judgment (viṣama-vijñāna) and as wrong enterprise (viṣama-pravartanā), proceeding out of wrong knowledge or erroneous judgment. It will thus appear that it is wise to take prajñāparādha in the wider sense of error of judgment or misapplied intelligence, regarding it as the cause of all kinds of moral depravity, unhealthy and unhygienic habits and accidental injuries of all kinds. As Caraka admitted the existence of the self and of rebirth and regarded moral merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) as the causes of all human enjoyment and sufferings, and of the productivity or unproductivity of the ground, and the hygienic or unhygienic conditions of water, āir and the seasons, he had to include within prajñāparādha the causes that led to vices and sins. The causes of all sorrows are, firstly, wrong consideration of the non-eternal as eternal and of the injurious as good; secondly, want of self-control; and, thirdly, the defect of
memory (smṛti-bhrāṃśa), through which the right knowledge and right experience of the past cannot be brought into effect. Thus, though in a sense Caraka compromises with the traditional schools of philosophy in including philosophical ignorance or misconception within praṇāparādha, and though he thinks that philosophical ignorance produces sins, yet he takes praṇāparādha in the very wide sense of error of judgment, leading to all kinds of transgression of laws of health and laws of society and custom, risky adventures, and all other indiscreet and improper actions. Praṇāparādha, therefore, though it includes the philosophical moha of the traditional school of philosophy, is yet something very much more, and is to be taken in the wider sense of error of judgment. Caraka, no doubt, admits jealousy, vanity, anger, greed, ignorance (moha), etc., as producing improper action, but he admits many other causes as well. But the one supreme cause of all these subsidiary causes is praṇāparādha, or error of judgment, taken in its wide sense. It will not, therefore, be wrong to suppose that, according to Caraka, all proper actions are undertaken through the prompting of three fundamental desires, the desire for life, the desire for wealth and enjoyment, and the desire for spiritual good. And all improper actions are due to improper understanding, confusion of thought, and misdirected intelligence (praṇāparādha). The three fundamental desires, unassociated with any error of judgment or lack of understanding, may thus be regarded as the root cause of all proper actions. There is, therefore, nothing wrong in giving full play to the functioning of the three fundamental desires, so long as there is no misdirected understanding and confusion to turn them into the wrong path. Caraka does not seem to agree with other systems of philosophy in holding the feelings of attachment and antipathy to be the springs of all actions. Actions are prompted by the normal active tendencies of the three fundamental desires, and they become sinful when our energies are wrongly directed through lack of understanding. Though Caraka had to compromise with the acknowledged view of the systems of Indian Philosophy that the cessation of all sorrows can be only through the cessation of all actions, yet it seems clear that the course of conduct that he approves consists in the normal exercise of the three fundamental desires, free from the commission of any errors of judgment (praṇāparādha). Thus Caraka does not preach the idea of leaving off desires,
attachments, feelings and actions of all kinds, nor does he advocate the Gītā ideal of the performance of duties without attachment. His is the ideal of living one’s life in a manner that is most conducive to health, long life, and proper enjoyment. Our only care should be that we do not commit any mistake in eating, drinking and other actions of life which may directly or indirectly (through the production of sins) produce diseases and sufferings or jeopardize our life and enjoyment in any way. This unique character of Caraka’s ethical position is very clearly proved by the code of conduct, virtues and methods of leading a good life elaborated by Caraka. He no doubt shows a lip-sympathy with the ideal of giving up all actions (sannyāsa); but his real sympathies seem to be with the normal scheme of life, involving normal enjoyments and fruition of desires. A normal life, according to Caraka, ought also to be a virtuous life, as vices and sins are the sources of all sorrows, sufferings and diseases in this life and the next.

Good Life in Caraka.

It is well worth pointing out at the outset that “good life” in Caraka means not only an ethically virtuous life, but a life which is free from diseases, and which is so led that it attains its normal length. Moral life thus means a life that is free from the defect of praṇṇāparādha. It means wise and prudent life; for it is only the want of wisdom and prudence that is the cause of all physical, social, physiological, moral and spiritual mischiefs. To be a good man, it is not enough that one should practise the ethical virtues: a man should practise the physical, physiological and social virtues as well. He must try to live a healthy and long life, free from diseases and sufferings and free from reproaches of any kind. It is important to note that Caraka does not believe in the forced separation of the physical life from the mental and the moral. Physical diseases are to be cured by medicines, while mental diseases are to be cured by right and proper knowledge of things, self-control and self-concentration. The close interconnection between body and mind was well known from early times, and even the Mahā-bhārata (xii. 16) says that out of the body arise the mental diseases and out of the mind arise the bodily diseases. Caraka also thinks that a physician should try to cure not only the bodily diseases but also the mental diseases.
The Mahā-bhārata further says in the same chapter that there are three elements in the body, viz. heat, cold and air; when they are in a state of equipoise, the body is healthy, and when any one of them predominates, there is disease. The mind is constituted of sattva, rajas and tamas; when these are in a state of equipoise, the mind is in proper order, and when any one of them predominates, it becomes diseased. Caraka, however, thinks that it is only when rajas and tamas predominate that the mind gets diseased. But, whatever these differences may be, it is evident that, when Caraka speaks of life, he includes both mind and body, and it is the welfare of both that is the chief concern of the physician. Caraka’s prohibitions and injunctions are therefore based on this twofold good of body and mind that ought to be aimed at.

After speaking of the harmfulness of attempting to control some of the bodily excretory movements, he recommends the necessity of attempting to control certain other mental and bodily tendencies. Thus he forbids all persons to indulge rashly in their unthinking tendencies to commit mistakes of mind, speech and action. A man should also control his passion of greed, and his feelings of grief, fear, anger, vanity, shamelessness, envy, attachment and solicitude. He should not speak harshly or talk too much or use stinging words or lie or speak irrelevantly or untimely. He should not injure others by his body, indulge in unrestricted sex-gratifications, or steal. Injury to living beings (ḥimsā) is supposed to produce sins and thereby affects one’s longevity. Non-injury is thus described as being the best way of increasing life (ahimsā prāṇa-vardhanānāṃ). The man who follows the above right course of life is called virtuous, and he enjoys wealth, satisfies his desires, abides by the laws (dhārma) of a good life, and is happy. Along with the proper and well-controlled exercise of the moral functions Caraka advises people to take to well-controlled bodily exercises (veyāyāma). When moderately performed, they give lightness, power of doing work, steadiness (sthairya) and fortitude (duḥkha-sahiṣṇutā). Avoidance of unwise courses and non-commission of errors of judgment (tyāgaḥ prajñāparādhānām), sense-control, remembrance of past experiences (smṛti), due knowledge of one’s own powers, due regard to proper time and place and good conduct prevent the inrush of mental and bodily diseases; for it is these which are the essentials of a good life, and a wise man always does what is good for himself. Caraka further advises
that one should not keep company with those who are sinful in character, speech and mind, or with those who are quarrelsome, greedy, jealous, crooked, light-minded or fond of speaking ill of others or cruel or vicious, or with those who associate with one's enemies. But one should always associate with those who are wise, learned, aged, with men of character, firmness, self-concentration, ready experience, with those who know the nature of things and are full of equanimity, and those who direct us in the right path, are good to all beings, possess a settled character and are peaceful and self-contented. In these ways a man should try, on the one hand, to secure himself against the inrush of mental troubles which upset one's moral life and, on the other hand, properly to attend to his bodily welfare by taking the proper kind of food at the proper time and attending to other details of physical well-being.\(^2\)

The rules of good conduct (sad-vṛttā) are described in detail by Caraka as follows:\(^2\):

A man should respect gods, cows, Brāhmaṇas, preceptors (guru), elderly persons, saints and teachers (ācārya), hold auspicious amulets, bathe twice and clean all the pores of the body and feet and cut his hair, beard and nails three times in a fortnight. He should be well-dressed, should always oil his head, ears, nose and feet, comb his hair, scent himself and smoke (dhūma-pā). He should recognize others with a pleasant face, help others in difficulties, perform sacrifices, make gifts, talk delightfully, nicely and for the good of others, be self-controlled (vasyātman) and of a virtuous temperament. He should envy the cause of another's prosperity in the form of his good character and other causes of his personal efficiency (hetāv īrṣyu), but should not be jealous of the fruits of these in the form of a man's prosperity or wealth (phāle nṛṣyu). He should be of firm decision, fearless, susceptible to the feeling of shame, intelligent, energetic, skillful, of a forgiving nature, virtuous and a believer (āstika). He should use umbrellas, sticks, turbans and shoes, and should at the time of walking look four cubits of ground in front of him; he should avoid going to impure, unclean and dirty places; he should try to appease those who are angry, soothe the fears of those who have become afraid, help the poor, keep his promises, bear harsh words, be self-controlled, remove the causes of attachments and antipathy (rāga-dveṣa) and behave as the friend of all living beings. Again,

\(^1\) See Caraka-saṁhitā, i. 7.  
\(^2\) Ibid. i. 8.
one should not tell lies, or take that which belongs to others, should not commit adultery, or be jealous at other people's wealth, should not be given to creating enemies, should not commit sins, or do wrong even to a sinner, or speak about the defects or secrets of others; should not keep company with the sinful or with those who are the king's enemies or with madmen, the mean, wicked, outcast, or those who make abortions. One should not climb into bad vehicles, lie on hard beds, or beds without sheets or pillows, should not climb steep mountain sides or trees or bathe in fast flowing rivers with strong currents; one should not go about places where there are great fires raging, or laugh loudly or yawn or laugh without covering the face, or pick one's teeth. Again, one should not break the laws ordained by a large number of persons, or other laws in general; should not go about at night in improper places, or make friends with youngsters, old or greedy people, fools, sinners or eunuchs; one should not be fond of wines, gambling, prostitutes, divulge secrets, insult others, be proud or boastful or speak ill of old people, teachers, kings or assemblages of persons, or talk too much; one should not turn out relations, friends or those who know one's secrets. One should attend at the proper time to every action, should not undertake to do anything without properly examining it, or be too procrastinating, or be under the influence of anger and pleasure; one should not be very down-hearted in afflictions, or too elated in success, or too disappointed in failures; should practice sex-continence, try to be wise, make gifts, be friendly and compassionate to all and always contented. It is needless to continue to enumerate all the qualities, which would commonly be included within the requisites of a good life. In this Caraka seems to cut an absolutely new way, and in no other branch of Indian thought can we note such an assemblage of good qualities of all the different kinds necessary not only for a virtuous life, but for the healthy and successful life of a good citizen.

It has already been pointed out that error of judgment or delusion, in whichever sphere it may be exercised, is the root of all mischiefs and all troubles. And Caraka demonstrates this by enumerating in his schedule of good conduct proper behaviour in all the different concerns and spheres of life. To Caraka the conception of life is not as moral or immoral, but as good (hitā) and bad (ahitā). It is true, no doubt, that here and there stray statements are
found in the *Caraka-samhita* which regard the cessation of all sorrows as the ultimate end of life; but it is obvious that Caraka's main approach to the subject shows very clearly that, though moral virtues are always very highly appreciated, yet the non-moral virtues, such as the proper taking care of the well-being of one's own body and the observance of social rules and forms of etiquette or normal prudent behaviour, are regarded as being equally necessary for the maintenance of a good life. Transgressions and sins are the causes of mental worries, troubles and also of many mental and physical diseases, and one ought therefore to take proper care that they may not enter into one's life; and it is said that the diseases produced by strong sinful acts cannot be cured by the ordinary means of the application of medicines and the like, until with the proper period of their sufferings they subside of themselves. But sins and transgressions are not the only causes of our desires, accidents and other domestic, social and political troubles. It is through our imprudent behaviour and conduct, which are due to error of judgment (*prajnaparadha*), as our other sins and immoral acts are, that all our bodily and mental troubles happen to us. A good life, which is the ideal of every person, is a life of peace, contentment and happiness, free from desires and troubles of all kinds. It is a life of prudence and well-balanced judgment, where every action is done with due consideration to its future consequences and where all that may lead to troubles and difficulties is carefully avoided. It is only such a life that can claim to be good and can be regarded as ideal. A merely moral or virtuous life is not our ideal, which must be good in every respect. Any transgression, be it of the rules of hygiene, rules of polite society, rules of good citizenship, or any deviation from the path which prudence or good judgment would recommend to be wise, may disturb the peace of life. A scheme of good life thus means a wise life, and observance of morality is but one of the many ways in which wisdom can be shown.

*Āyur-veda*, or the Science of Life, deals primarily with the ways in which a life may be good (*hita*), bad (*ahita*), happy (*sukha*) or unhappy (*asukha*). A happy life is described as a life undisturbed by bodily and mental diseases, full of youth and proper strength, vitality, energy, power of launching new efforts, endowed with wisdom, knowledge and efficient sense-organs—a life which is full of all kinds of desirable enjoyments and in which the ventures that
are undertaken are all successful. The opposite of this is what may be called an unhappy life. The happy life thus represents a life so far as it is happy and enjoyable and so far as it satisfies us. The good life is the life as it is moulded and developed by our right conduct. In a way it is the good life that makes a happy life. They who seek a good life should desist from the sins of taking other people's possessions and be truthful and self-controlled. They should perform every action with proper observation, care and judgment, and should not be hasty or make mistakes by their carelessness; they should attend to the attainment of virtue, wealth and the enjoyments of life without giving undue emphasis to any of them; they should respect those who are revered, should be learned, wise and of a peaceful mind and control their tendencies to attachment, anger, jealousy and false pride; they should always make gifts; they should lead a life of rigour (tapas) and attain wisdom, self-knowledge or philosophy (adhyātma-vidhā), and behave in such a way that the interests of both the present life on earth and the life hereafter may be attended to with care and judgment, always remembering the lessons of past experience¹. It is now clear that the ideal of good life in Caraka is not the same as that of the different systems of philosophy which are technically called the Science of Liberation (mokṣa-sāstra). The fundamental idea of a good life is that a life should be so regulated that the body and mind may be free from diseases, that it should not run into unnecessary risks of danger through carelessness, that it should be virtuous, pure and moral; that it should be a prudent and wise life which abides by the laws of polite society and of good and loyal citizens, manifesting keen alertness in thought and execution and tending constantly to its own good—good for all interests of life, body, mind and spirit.

Āyur-veda Literature.

The systematic development of Indian medicine proceeded primarily on two principal lines, viz. one that of Suśruta and the other that of Caraka. It is said in Suśruta's great work, Suśruta-saṃhitā, that Brahmā originally composed the Āyur-veda in one hundred verses, divided into one thousand chapters, even before he had created human beings, and that later on, having regard to the shortness of human life and the poverty of the human intellect,
he divided it into the eight parts, Śalya, Śālākya, etc., alluded to in a previous section. But this seems to be largely mythical. It is further said in the same connection in the Suśruta-saṃhitā, 1. 1 that the sages Aupadhenava, Vaitarana, Aurabhra, Pauśkalāvata, Karavirya, Gopurarakṣita, Suśruta and others approached Dhanvantari or Divodāsa, king of Kāśi, for medical instruction. Suśruta’s work is therefore called a work of the Dhanvantari school. Though it was revised at a later date by Nāgārjuna, yet Suśruta himself is an old writer. A study of the Jātakas shows that the great physician Ātreya, a teacher of Jivaka, lived in Taxila shortly before Buddha\(^1\). It has been said in a preceding section that in the enumeration of bones Suśruta shows a knowledge of Ātreya’s system of osteology. Hoernle has further shown in sections 42, 56, 60 and 61 of his “Osteology,” that the Satapatha-Bṛāhmaṇa, which is at least as old as the sixth century B.C., shows an acquaintance with Suśruta’s views concerning the counting of bones. But, since Ātreya could not have lived earlier than the sixth century B.C., and since the Satapatha-Bṛāhmaṇa of about the sixth century B.C. shows an acquaintance with Suśruta’s views, Hoernle conjectures that Suśruta must have been contemporary with Ātreya’s pupil, Agnivesa\(^2\). But, admitting Hoernle’s main contentions to be true, it may be pointed out that by the term veda-vādinaḥ in Suśruta-saṃhitā, III. 5. 18 Suśruta may have referred to authorities earlier than Ātreya, from whom Ātreya also may have drawn his materials. On this view, then, the lower limit of Suśruta’s death is fixed as the sixth or seventh century B.C., this being the date of the Satapatha-Bṛāhmaṇa, while practically nothing can be said about the upper limit.

But it is almost certain that the work which now passes by the name of Suśruta-saṃhitā is not identically the same work that was composed by this elder Suśruta (vyādha Suśruta). Dālana, who lived probably in the eleventh or the twelfth century, says in his Nibandha-samgraha that Nāgārjuna was the reviser of the Suśruta-saṃhitā\(^3\); and the Suśruta-saṃhitā itself contains a supplementary part after the Kalpa-sthāna, called the Uttara-tantra (later work). In the edition of Suśruta by P. Muralidhar, of Pūrṇaknagar, there is a verse at the beginning, which says that that which was

\(^1\) Rockhill’s Life of Buddha, pp. 65 and 96.
\(^3\) Pratisamkṣartāpita Nāgārjuna eva. Dālana’s Nibandha-samgraha, 1. 1. 1.
so well taught for the good of the people by the great sage Dhanvantari to the good pupil Suśruta became famous all over the world as Suśruta-saṃhitā, and is regarded as the best and the chief of the threefold Ayur-veda literature, and that it was strung together in the form of a book by no other person than Nāgārjuna. Cakrapāṇi also in his Bhānumati refers to a reviser (pratisaṃskartṛ); but he does not mention his name. Gayadhāsa’s pañjikā on Suśruta, Suśruta-candrikā or Nyāya-candrikā, has an observation on the eighth verse of the third chapter of the Nidāna-sthāna, in which he gives a different reading by Nāgārjuna, which is the same as the present reading of Suśruta in the corresponding passage. Again, Bhaṭṭa Narahari in his Tiṭpani on the Astāṅga-ḥṛdaya-saṃhitā, called Vāgbhaṭa-ḥkaṇḍana-mandaṇa, in discussing mūḍha-garbha-nidāna, annotates on the reading vasti-dvārā vipannāyāḥ, which Vāgbhaṭa changes in borrowing from Suśruta’s vastimāra-vipannāyāḥ (11.8.14), and says that vasti-dvārā is the reading of Nāgārjuna. That Nāgārjuna had the habit of making supplements to his revisions of works is further testified by the fact that a work called Yogaśataka, attributed to Nāgārjuna, had also a supplementary chapter, called Uttara-tantra, in addition to its other chapters, Kāya-cikitsā, Śālākya-tantra, Salya-tantra, Viṣṇu-tantra, Bhūtavidyā, Kaumāra-tantra, Rasāyana-tantra and Vājikarana-tantra. This makes it abundantly clear that what passes as the Suśruta-saṃhitā was either entirely strung together from the traditional teachings of Suśruta or entirely revised and enlarged by Nāgārjuna on the basis of a nuclear work of Suśruta which was available to Nāgārjuna. But was Nāgārjuna the only person who revised the Suśruta-saṃhitā? Dalhana’s statement that it was Nāgārjuna who was the reviser of the work (pratisaṃskartāpi Nāgārjuna eva) is attested by the verse of the Muralidhara edition (Nāgārjunenaiva grathitā); but the use of the emphatic word eva in both suggests that there may have been other editions or revisions of Suśruta by other writers as well. The hopelessly muddled condition of the readings,

1 Upadīṣṭā tu yā samyag Dhanvantari-mahārīṣiṇā
   Suśrutāya suṣīgyāya lokānant hita-vānchayā
   sarvatra bhuri viśhyātā nāmnā Suśruta-saṃhitā
   Ayur-vedat-raytmadhya svetāh mānyā tathottamā
   sā ca Nāgārjunenaiva grathitā grantha-rāpatat.

2 Nāgārjunas tu paṭhati: śārkarā sikatā meho bhasmākhyo 'imāri-vaikertam iti.
In the Nirṛtya-Sāgara edition of 1915 this is 11.3.13, whereas in Jīvānanda’s edition it is 11.3.8. See also Dr Cordier’s Récentes Découvertes de MSS. Médicaux Sanscrits dans l’Inde, p. 13.

3 ata eva Nāgārjunair vasti-dvāra iti paṭhyate.
chapter-divisions and textual arrangements in the chapters in different editions of the *Sūrūta-saṃhitā* is such that there can be no doubt that from time to time many hands were in operation on this great work. Nor it is proper to think that the work of revising *Sūrūta* was limited to a pre-Cakrapāṇi period. It is possible to point out at least one case in which it can be almost definitely proved that a new addition was made to the *Sūrūta-saṃhitā* after Cakrapāṇi, or the text of *Sūrūta* known to Dalhāṇa was not known to Cakrapāṇi. Thus, in dealing with the use of catheters and the processes of introducing medicine through the anus (*vasti-kriya*) in iv. 38, the texts of the *Sūrūta-saṃhitā* commented on by Dalhāṇa reveal many interesting details which are untouched in the chapter on *Vasti* in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* (*Uttara-vasti, Siddhi, sthāna, xii*). This chapter of the *Caraka-saṃhitā* was an addition by Dṛḍhabala, who flourished in Kāśmīra or the Punjab, probably in the eighth or the ninth century. When Cakrapāṇi wrote his commentary in the eleventh century, he did not make any reference to the materials found in the *Sūrūta-saṃhitā*, nor did he introduce them into his own medical compendium, which passes by the name of Cakradatta. Cakrapāṇi knew his *Sūrūta-saṃhitā* well, as he had commented on it himself, and it is extremely unlikely that, if he had found any interesting particulars concerning *vasti-kriya* in his text, he should not have utilized them in his commentary or in his own medical work. The inference, therefore, is almost irresistible that many interesting particulars regarding *vasti-kriya*, absent in the texts of the *Sūrūta-saṃhitā* in the ninth and eleventh centuries, were introduced into it in the twelfth century. It is difficult, however, to guess which Nāgārjuna was the reviser or editor of the *Sūrūta-saṃhitā*; it is very unlikely that he was the famous Nāgārjuna of the *Mādhyaika-kārikā*, the great teacher of Śūnyavāda; for the accounts of the life of this Nāgārjuna, as known from Chinese and Tibetan sources, nowhere suggest that he revised or edited the *Sūrūta-saṃhitā*. Alberuni speaks of a Nāgārjuna who was born in Dihaka, near Somanātha (Gujarat), about one hundred years before himself, i.e. about the middle of the ninth century, and who had written an excellent work on alchemy, containing the substance of the whole literature of the subject, which by Alberuni’s time had become very rare. It is not improbable that this Nāgārjuna was the author of the *Kakṣapuṭa-tantra*, which is
avowedly written with materials collected from the alchemical works of various religious communities and which deals with the eightfold miraculous acquirements (āṣṭa-siddhi). But Vṛnda in his Siddha-yoga refers to a formula by Nāgārjuna which was said to have been written on a pillar in Pāṭaliputra1. This formula is reproduced by Cakrapāṇi Datta, Vaṅgasena and by Nityanātha Siddha in his Rasa-ratnākara. But since Vṛnda, the earliest of these writers, flourished about the eighth or the ninth century, and since his formula was taken from an inscription, it is not improbable that this Nāgārjuna flourished a few centuries before him.

Of the commentaries on the Suṣruta-samhitā the most important now current is Dalhana’s Nibandha-samgraha. Dalhana quotes Cakrapāṇi, of A.D. 1060, and is himself quoted by Hemādri, of A.D. 1260. He therefore flourished between the eleventh and the thirteenth centuries. It has been pointed out that sufficient textual changes in the Suṣruta-samhitā had occurred between Cakrapāṇi and Dalhana’s time to have taken at least about one hundred years. I am therefore inclined to think that Dalhana lived late in the twelfth, or early in the thirteenth, century at the court of King Sahapaḷa Deva. Cakrapāṇi had also written a commentary on the Suṣruta-samhitā, called Bhānumati, the first book of which has been published by Kaviraj Gangaprasad Sen. Dr Cordier notes that there is a complete manuscript of this at Benares. Niścala Kara and Śrīkaṇṭha Datta sometimes quote from Cakrapāṇi’s commentary on the Suṣruta-samhitā. Dalhana’s commentary is called Nibandha-samgraha, which means that the book is collected from a number of commentaries, and he himself says in a colophon at the end of the Uttara-tantra that the physicians Dalhana, son of Bharata, had written the work after consulting many other commentaries2. At the beginning of his Nibandha-samgraha he refers to Jaiyyaṭa, Gayadāsa, Bhāskara’s pāñjikā, Śrīmādhava and Brahmādeva. In his work he further mentions Caraka, Harita, Jatukarṇa, Kāṣyapa, Kṛṣṇāyana, Bhadraśaunaka, Nāgārjuna, the two Vāgbhaṭas, Videha, Harīscandra, Bhoja, Kārttika Kuṇḍa and others. Hariścandra was a commentator on the Caraka-samhitā. It is curious, however, that, though Dalhana refers to Bhāskara and Śrīmādhava

1 Nāgārjunena likhitā stambhe Pāṭaliputrake, V. 149.
2 Nibandhan bhuhu etṣya vaidyāḥ Śrībhāratatmājanṛ uttara-sthānam aśāro tumā pūṣpaṭaṃ Dalhaṇo bhīṣaj. Concluding verse of Dalhana’s commentary on Suṣruta’s Uttara-tantra, chap.66.
at the beginning of his commentary, he does not refer to them in the body of it. Hoernle, however, is disposed to identify Bhāskara and Kārttika Kuṇḍa as one person. Vijayarākṣita and Śrīkāntṭha Datta, commentators on Mādhava’s Nidāna, refer to Kārttika Kuṇḍa in connection with their allusions to the Suṣruta-samhitā, but not to Bhāskara. A Patna inscription (E.I.I. 340, 345) says that King Bhoja had given the title of Vidyāpati to Bhāskara Bhātta. Hoernle thinks that this Bhāskara was the same as Bhāskara Bhāṭṭa. Hoernle also suggests that Vṛṇḍa Mādhava was the same as Śrīmādhava referred to by Dālhaṇa. Mādhava in his Siddha-yoga often modifies Suṣruta’s statements. It may be that these modifications passed as Mādhava’s Tippaṇa. Since Gayādāsa and Cakrapāṇi both refer to Bhoja and do not refer to one another, it may be that Gayādāsa was a contemporary of Cakrapāṇi. Hoernle thinks that the Brahmadeva referred to by Dālhaṇa was Śrībrahma, the father of Maheśvara, who wrote his Sāhasāṅka-carita in a.d. 1111. Maheśvara refers to Hariścandra as an early ancestor of his. It is not improbable that this Hariścandra was a commentator on Caraka. The poet Maheśvara was himself also a Kaviṛāja, and Herāmba Sena’s Gūḍha-bodhaka-samgraha was largely based on Maheśvara’s work. Jejjaṭa’s commentary passed by the name of Brhal-laghu-paṇjikā; Gayādāsa’s commentary was called the Suṣruta-candrikā or Nyāya-candrikā and Śrīmādhava or Mādhava-Kara’s Tippaṇa was called Śloka-vārttika. Gayādāsa mentions the names of Bhoja, Suranandi and Svāmīdāsa. Gayādāsa’s paṇjikā has been discovered only up to the Nidāna-sthāna, containing 3000 granthas. Among other commentators of Suṣruta we hear the names of Gomin, Āśādhavarman, Jinadāsa, Naradanta, Gadādhara, Bāṣpacandra, Soma, Govardhana and Praśanandhaṇa.

It may not be out of place here to mention the fact that the Sāmkhya philosophy summed up in the Śātra-sthāna of Suṣruta is decidedly the Sāmkhya philosophy of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, which, as I have elsewhere pointed out, is later than the Sāmkhya philosophy so elaborately treated in the Caraka-samhitā. This fact also suggests that the revision of Suṣruta was executed after the composition of Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s work (about a.d. 200), which agrees with the view expressed above that the revision of Suṣruta was the work of Nāgārjuna, who flourished about the fourth or the fifth century a.d. But it is extremely improbable that the elaborate medical doctrines

1 History of Indian Philosophy, vol. 1, pp. 313–322.
of an author who lived at so early a date as the sixth century B.C.
could have remained in a dispersed condition until seven, eight
or nine hundred years later. It is therefore very probable that
the main basis of Suśruta's work existed in a codified and well-
arranged form from very early times. The work of the editor or
reviser seems to have consisted in introducing supplements, such
as the Uttara-tantra, and other chapters on relevant occasions. It
does not seem impossible that close critical and comparative
study of a number of published texts of the Suśruta-samhitā
and of unpublished manuscripts may enable a future student to
separate the original from the supplementary parts. The task,
however, is rendered difficult by the fact that additions to the
Suśruta-samhitā were probably not limited to one period, as has
already been pointed out above.

It is well known that Atri's medical teachings, as collected by
Agnivesa in his Agnivesa-tantra, which existed at least as late as
Cakrapāṇi, form the basis of a revised work by Caraka, who is
said to have flourished during the time of Kaniśka, passing by
the name of Caraka-samhitā. It is now also well known that
Caraka did not complete his task, but left it half-finished at a
point in the Cikitsā-sthāna, seventeen chapters of which, together
with the books called Siddhi-sthāna and Kalpa-sthāna, were added
by Kapilabala's son, Dṛḍhabala, of the city of Pañcanada, about the
ninth century A.D. The statement that Dṛḍhabala supplemented
the work in the above way is found in the current texts of the Caraka-
samhitā. Niścalā Kara in his Ratna-prabhā describes him as author
of the Caraka-pariśiṣṭa, and Cakrapāṇi, Vijayarākṣita and Aruṇa-
datta (A.D. 1240), whenever they have occasion to quote passages
from his supplementary parts, all refer to Dṛḍhabala as the author.
The city of Pañcanada was identified as the Punjab by Dr U. C. Dutt
in his Materia Medica, which identification was accepted by Dr
Cordier and referred to a supposed modern Panjpur, north of Attock
in the Punjab. There are several Pañcanadas in different parts of
India, and one of them is mentioned in the fifty-ninth chapter of
the Kāśi-khaṇḍa; Gaṅgādharā in his commentary identifies this
with Benares, assigning no reason for such identification. Hoernle,
however, thinks that this Pañcanada is the modern village of

1 On Caraka's being the court-physician of Kaniśka see S. Levi, Notes sur
les Indo-Scythes, in Journal Asiatique, pp. 444 sqq.
2 Caraka-samhitā, vi. 30 and Siddhi-sthāna, vii. 8.
Pantznor ("five channels" in Kashmir) and holds that Dr̥dhabala was an inhabitant of this place. There are many passages in Caraka which the commentators believe to be additions of the Kāśmīra recension (Kāśmīra-pāṭha). Mādhava quotes a number of verses from the third chapter of the sixth section, on fevers, which verses are given with the omission of about twenty-four lines. Vijayarakṣīta, in his commentary on Mādhava's Nidāna, says that these lines belong to the Kāśmīra recension. Existing manuscripts vary very much with regard to these lines; for, while some have the lines, in others they are not found. In the same chapter there are other passages which are expressly noted by Cakrapāṇidatta as belonging to Kāśmīra recensions, and are not commented upon by him. There are also other examples. Hoernle points out that Jīvānanda's edition of 1877 gives the Kāśmīra version, while his edition of 1896, as well as the editions of Gaṅgādhara, the two Sens and Abinas, have Caraka's original version. Mādhava never quotes readings belonging to the Kāśmīra recension. Hoernle puts together four points, viz. that Caraka's work was revised and completed by Dr̥dhabala, that there existed a Kāśmīra recension of the Caraka-saṃhīta, that Dr̥dhabala calls himself a native of Paṇcanaḍa city, and that there existed a holy place of that name in Kāśmīra; and he argues that the so-called Kāśmīra recension represents the revision of the Caraka-saṃhīta by Dr̥dhabala. Judging from the fact that Mādhava takes no notice of the readings of the Kāśmīra recension, he argues that the latter did not exist in Mādhava's time and that therefore Mādhava's date must be anterior to that of Dr̥dhabala.

But which portions were added to the Caraka-saṃhīta by Dr̥dhabala? The obvious assumption is that he added the last seventeen chapters of the sixth book (Cikitsā) and the seventh and eighth books. But such an assumption cannot hold good, since there is a great divergence in the counting of the number of the chapters in different manuscripts. Thus, while Jīvānanda's text marks Arśas, Atisāra, Visarpa, Madātyaya and Dvīraṇīya as the ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth chapters of Cikitsā and therefore belonging to the original Caraka, Gaṅgādhara's text

asmin sapṭādaśādhyā kalpāḥ siddhāya eva ca
nādāyante gmiveśasya tantre Carakasaṃskṛtye
tān etān Kāśīlabalaḥ iṣṭaṃ Dr̥dhabalo 'harot
tantraśyāṣya mahārthasya pūraṇārthaṃ yathāyatham.

VI. 30. 274.
calls the ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth chapters Unmāda, Apasmāra, Kṣatakṣīna, Śvayathu and Udara. The seventeen chapters attributed to Dr̥habala have consequently different titles in the Gaṅgādhara and Jīvānanda editions. Hoernle has discussed very critically these textual problems and achieved notable results in attributing chapters to Caraka or Dr̥habala. But it is needless for us to enter into these discussions.

Mahāmahopādhyāya Kaviraj Gaṇanath Sen, merely on the strength of the fact that the Rāja-tarāṅgiṇī is silent on the matter, disputes the traditional Chinese statement that Caraka was the court-physician of Kaṇiṣka. There is no ground to believe as gospel truth a tradition, which cannot be traced to any earlier authority than Bhoja (eleventh century), that Patañjali was the author of a medical work, and that therefore Patañjali and Caraka could be identified. His comparisons of some passages from Caraka (iv. 1) with some sūtras of Patañjali are hardly relevant and he finally has to rest for support of this identification on the evidence of Rāmabhadrā Dīkṣita, a man of the seventeenth or the eighteenth century, who holds that Patañjali had written a work on medicine. He should have known that there were more Patañjalis than one, and that the alchemist and medical Patañjali was an entirely different person from Patañjali, the grammarian.

The most important commentary now completely available to us is the Ayur-veda-dīpikā, or Caraka-tātparya-tikā, of Cakrapāṇidatta. Another important commentary is the Caraka-pañjikā by Śvāmikumāra. He was a Buddhist in faith, and he refers to the commentator Hariścandra. The Caraka-tattva-pradīpikā was written in later times by Śivadāsasena, who also wrote the Tattvācandrikā, a commentary on Cakradatta. We hear also of other commentaries on Caraka by Bāspacandra or Vāpyacandra, Iśānadeva, Iśvarasena, Vakulakara, Jinadāsa, Munidāsa, Govardhana, Sandhyākara, Jaya nandī and the Caraka-candrikā of Gayādāsa.

Among other ancient treatises we may mention the Kāśyapa-samhitā, discovered in Kaṭhmāṇḍū, a medical dialogue between Kāśyapa, the teacher and Bhārgava, the student. It is interesting to note that it has some verses (MS., pp. 105–110) which are identical with part of the fifth chapter of the first book of Caraka. There is another important manuscript, called Bhāradvāja-

1 J.R.A.S., 1908 and 1909.
2 Pratyakṣa-sārīram, introduction.
samhitā, which contains within it a small work called Bhesaja-kalpa, a commentary by Veṅkaṭeśa. Agniveśa’s original work, the Agniveśa-samhitā, which was the basis of Caraka’s revision, was available at least up to the time of Cakrapāṇi; Vijayarākṣita and Śrīkāṇṭhadatta also quote from it. Jatukarna’s work also existed till the time of the same writers, as they occasionally quote from Jatukarna-samhitā. The Parāśara-samhitā and Kṣārapāṇi-samhitā were also available down to Śrīkāṇṭhadatta’s, or even down to Śivadāsa’s, time. The Hārita-samhitā (different from the printed and more modern text) was also available from the time of Cakrapāṇi and Vijayarākṣita, as is evident from the quotations from it in their works. Bhela’s work, called Bhela-samhitā, has already been published by the University of Calcutta. It may be remembered that Agniveśa, Bhela, Jatukarna, Parāśara, Hārita and Kṣārapāṇi were all fellow-students in medicine, reading with the same teacher, Ātreya-Punarvasu; Agniveśa, being the most intelligent of them all, wrote his work first, but Bhela and his other fellow-students also wrote independent treatises, which were read before the assembly of medical scholars and approved by them. Another work of the same school, called Kharanada-samhitā, and also a Viśvāmitra-samhitā, both of which are not now available, are utilized by Cakrapāṇi and other writers in their commentaries. The name samhitā, however, is no guarantee of the antiquity of these texts, for the junior Vagbhaṭa’s work is also called Āśṭāṅga-hṛdaya-samhitā. We have further a manuscript called Vararuci-samhitā, by Vararuci, and a Siddha-sāra-samhitā by Ravigupta, son of Durgāgupta, which are of comparatively recent date. The Brahma-vaivarta-purāṇa refers to a number of early medical works, such as the Cikitsā-tattva-vijnāna of Dhanvantari, Cikitsā-darśana of Divodāsa, Cikitsā-kaumudi of Kāśirāja, Cikitsā-sāra-tantra and Bhrama-ghna of Āśvinī, Vaidyaka-sarvasva of Nakula, Vyādhi-sindhu-vimardana of Sahadeva, Jñānārṇava of Yama, Jivādana of Cyavana, Vaidya-sandeha-bhanjana of Janaka, Sarva-sāra of Candrasuta, Tantra-sāra of Jābala, Vedāṅga-sāra of Jājali, Nidāna of Paila, Sarva-dhara of Karaṭha and Dvaidha-nirṇaya-tantra of

1 See Dr Cordier’s Récentes Découvertes de MSS. Médicaux Sanscrits dans l’Inde (1898–1902).
2 See Cakrapāṇi’s commentary on Caraka-samhitā, II. 2, also Śrīkāṇṭha on the Siddha-yoga, jvaraśākhāra.
3 Cakrapāṇi’s commentary, II. 2 and II. 5, also Śrīkāṇṭha on the Nidāna (Kṣudra-ropa).
Agastya\textsuperscript{1}. But nothing is known of these works, and it is difficult to say if they actually existed.

It is well known that there were two Vāgbhaṭas (sometimes spelt Vāhaṭa). The earlier Vāgbhaṭa knew Caraka and Suśruta. It is conjectured by Hoernle and others that the statement of I-tsing (A.D. 675–685), that the eight arts formerly existed in eight books, and that a man had lately epitomized them and made them into one bundle, and that all physicians in the five parts of India practised according to that book, alludes to the Aṣṭāṅga-saṃgraha of Vāgbhaṭa the elder. In that case Vāgbhaṭa I must have flourished either late in the sixth century or early in the seventh century; for I-tsing speaks of him as having epitomized the work “lately,” and on the other hand time must be allowed for the circulation of such a work in the five parts of India. A comparison of Suśruta and Vāgbhaṭa I shows that the study of anatomy had almost ceased to exist in the latter’s time. It is very probable that Vāgbhaṭa was a Buddhist. The Aṣṭāṅga-saṃgraha has a commentary by Indu; but before Indu there had been other commentators, whose bad expositions were refuted by him\textsuperscript{2}.

Mādhava, Drḍhabala and Vāgbhaṭa II all knew Vāgbhaṭa I. Mādhava mentions him by name and occasionally quotes from him both in the Siddha-yoga and in the Nidāna, and so also does Drḍhabala\textsuperscript{3}. Hoernle has shown that Drḍhabala’s 96 diseases of the eye are based on Vāgbhaṭa’s 94. Vāgbhaṭa II towards the end of the Uttarā-sthāna of his Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya-saṃhitā definitely expresses his debt to Vāgbhaṭa I. But they must all have flourished before Cakrapāni, who often refers to Drḍhabala and Vāgbhaṭa II. If, as Hoernle has shown, Mādhava was anterior to Drḍhabala, he also must necessarily have flourished before Cakrapāni. Hoernle’s argument that Mādhava flourished before Drḍhabala rests upon the fact that Suśruta counts 76 kinds of eye-diseases, while Vāgbhaṭa I has 94. Drḍhabala accepts Vāgbhaṭa I’s 94 eye-diseases with the addition of two more, added by Mādhava, making his list come to 96. Mādhava had accepted Suśruta’s 76 eye-diseases and

\textsuperscript{1} It is curious to notice that the Brahma-vaivarta-purāṇa makes Dhanvantari, Kaśirāja and Dvodāsa different persons, which is contrary to Suśruta’s statement noted above.

\textsuperscript{2} Duravyākhyā-vīpa-sūtasya Vāhaṭaryāśmad-uktayah santu saṃvitti-dāyinyas sad-āgama-parisṛktrā. Indu’s commentary, i. 1.

\textsuperscript{3} Siddha-yoga, i. 27, Aṣṭāṅga-saṃgraha, ii. 1, Nidāna, ii. 22 and 23, Saṃgraha, i. 266, Caraka-saṃhitā (Jīvānanda, 1896), Cikitsita-sthāna, xvii. 31, Saṃgraha, ii. 26. Again, Cikitsita-sthāna, xvi. 53, etc., Saṃgraha, ii. 27, etc.

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added two of his own. The second point in Hoernle’s argument is that Mādhava in his quotations from Caraka always omits the passages marked by Vijayarākṣita as Kāśmīra readings, which Hoernle identifies with the revision work of Dr̥habalā. These arguments of Hoernle appear very inconclusive; for, if the so-called Kāśmīra recension can be identified with Dr̥habalā’s revision, both Dr̥habalā’s Kāśmīra nativity and his posteriority to Mādhava can be proved; but this proposition has not been proved. On the other hand, Cakrapāṇi alludes to a Dr̥habalā sāṃskāra side by side with a Kāśmīra reading, and this seems to indicate that the two are not the same. The suggestion of Mādhava’s anteriority on the ground that he counts 78 eye-diseases is rather far-fetched. Mādhava’s date, therefore, cannot be definitely settled. Hoernle is probably correct in holding that Dr̥habalā is anterior to Vāgbhaṭa. However, the relative anteriority or posteriority of these three writers does not actually matter very much; for they lived at more or less short intervals from one another and their dates may roughly be assigned to a period between the eighth and tenth centuries A.D.

Vāgbhaṭa II’s Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya-saṁhitā has at least five commentaries, viz. by Arunādatta (Sarvāṅga-sundari), Āśādhara, Candracandana (Padārtha-candrikā), Rāmanātha and Hemāḍri (Āyur-veda-rasāyana). Of these Arunādatta probably lived in A.D. 1220. Mādhava’s Rūg-viniścaya, a compendium of pathology, is one of the most popular works of Indian Medicine. It has at least seven commentaries, viz. by Vijayarākṣita (Madhu-kośa), Vaidyavēcaspati (Āṭaṅka-dīpana), Rāmanātha Vaidya, Bhavānīsahāya, Nāgaṇātha (Nidāna-pradīpa), Ganeśa Bhisaj and the commentary known as Siddhānta-candrikā or Vivaraṇa-siddhānta-candrikā, by Narasimha Kavirāja. Vijayarākṣita’s commentary, however,

1 Hoernle thinks that the total number of 76 eye-diseases ordinarily found in the printed editions of Mādhava’s Nidāna is not correct, as they do not actually tally with the descriptions of the different eye-diseases given by Mādhava and do not include pāksma-kopa and pāksma-sātā varieties. Hoernle’s “Osteology,” p. 13.
2 Cakra’s commentary, i. 7. 46–50.
4 Narasimha Kavirāja was the son of Nīlakaṇṭha Bhaṭṭa and the pupil of Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa. He seems to have written another medical work, called Madhu-matt. His Vivaraṇa-siddhānta-candrikā, though based on Vijaya’s Madhu-kośa, is an excellent commentary and contains much that is both instructive and new. The only manuscript available is probably the one that belongs to the family library of the author of the present work, who is preparing an edition of it for publication.
closes with the 33rd chapter, and the rest of the work was accomplished by Śrīkaṇṭhadatta, a pupil of Vijayarākṣita. Vṛnda (who may be the same as Mādhava) wrote a Siddha-yoga, a book of medical formulas, well known among medical writers.

In connection with this brief account of Indian medical works the Nava-mītaka, and the other mutilated medical treatises which have been discovered in Central Asia and which go by the name of “Bower manuscript,” cannot be omitted. This manuscript is written on birch leaves in Gupta characters and is probably as old as the fifth century A.D. It is a Buddhist work, containing many medical formulas taken from Caraka, Suśruta and other unknown writers. It will, however, be understood that an elaborate discussion of chronology or an exhaustive account of Indian medical works would be out of place in a work like the present. The Āyur-veda literature, and particularly that part which deals with medical formulas and recipes, medical lexicons and the like, is vast. Aufrecht’s catalogue contains the names of about 1500 manuscript texts, most of which have not yet been published, and there are many other manuscripts not mentioned in Aufrecht’s catalogue. Among the books now much in use may be mentioned the works of Śāṅgadhara, of the fourteenth century, Śivadāsa’s commentary on Cakrapāṇi, of the fifteenth century, and the Bhāva-prakāśa of Bhāvamiśra, of the sixteenth. Vaṅgasena’s work is also fairly common. Among anatomical texts Bhoja’s work and Bhāskara Bhāṭṭa’s Śārtra-padmīni deserve mention. The Aupadhenava-tantra, Pauśkalāvata-tantra, Vaitarana-tantra and Bhoja-tantra are alluded to by Ďalhaṇa. The Bhāluki-tantra and Kapila-tantra are mentioned by Cakrapāṇi in his Bhānumati commentary. So much for the anatomical treatises. Videha-tantra, Nimi-tantra, Kāṅkāyana-tantra, Sātyaki-tantra, Karāla-tantra and Kṛṣṇātreyā-tantra on eye-diseases are alluded to in Śrīkaṇṭha’s commentary on Mādhava’s Nidāna. The Saunaka-tantra on eye-diseases is named in the commentaries of Cakrapāṇi and Ďalhaṇa. The Jīvaka-tantra, Parvataka-tantra and Bandhaka-tantra are alluded to by Ďalhaṇa as works on midwifery. The Hiranyākṣya-tantra on the same subject is named by Śrīkaṇṭha, whereas the Kā iyapa-saṃhitā and Ālambāyana-saṃhitā are cited by Śrīkaṇṭha on toxicology. The Uṣanas-saṃhitā, Sanaka-saṃhitā, Lātyāyana-saṃhitā are also mentioned as works on toxicology.

Among some of the other important Tantras may be mentioned
Nāgārjuna’s Yoga-śataka, containing the eight regular divisions of Indian Medicine, and Nāgārjuna’s Jīva-sūtra and Bheṣaja-kalpa, all of which were translated into Tibetan. Three works on the Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya, called Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya-nāma-vaidūryaka-bhāṣya, Padārtha-candrikā-prabhāsa-nāma, Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya-vṛtti and Vaidyakāśṭāṅga-hṛdaya-vṛttī bheṣaja-nāma-sūci, were also translated into Tibetan.

The Āyur-veda-sūtra is a work by Yogānandana-thā, published with a commentary by the same author in the Mysore University Sanskrit series in 1922, with an introduction by Dr Shama Sastry. It is rightly pointed out in the introduction that this is a very modern work, written after the Bhāva-prakāśa, probably in the sixteenth century. It contains sixteen chapters and is an attempt to connect Āyur-veda with Patañjali’s Yoga system. It endeavours to show how different kinds of food increase the sātteva, rajas and tamas qualities and how yoga practices, fasting and the like, influence the conditions of the body. Its contribution, whether as a work of Āyur-veda or as a work of philosophy, is rather slight. It shows a tendency to connect Yoga with Āyur-veda, while the Vira-simhāvalokita is a work which tries to connect astrology with the same.
CHAPTER XIV

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE BHAGAVAD-GĪṬĀ

The Gīṭā Literature.

The Gīṭā is regarded by almost all sections of the Hindus as one of the most sacred religious works, and a large number of commentaries have been written on it by the adherents of different schools of thought, each of which explained the Gīṭā in its own favour. Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya is probably the earliest commentary now available; but from references and discussions found therein there seems to be little doubt that there were previous commentaries which he wished to refute.

Śaṅkara in his interpretation of the Gīṭā seeks principally to emphasize the dogma that right knowledge can never be combined with Vedic duties or the duties recommended by the legal scriptures. If through ignorance, or through attachment, a man continues to perform the Vedic duties, and if, as a result of sacrifices, gifts and tapas (religious austerities), his mind becomes pure and he acquires the right knowledge regarding the nature of the ultimate reality—that the passive Brahman is the all—and then, when all reasons for the performance of actions have ceased for him, still continues to perform the prescribed duties just like common men and to encourage others to behave in a similar manner, then such actions are inconsistent with right knowledge. When a man performs actions without desire or motive, they cannot be considered as karma at all. He alone may be said to be performing karma, or duties, who has any interest in them. But the wise man, who has no interest in his karma, cannot be said to be performing karma in the proper sense of the term, though to all outward appearances he may be acting exactly like an ordinary man. Therefore the main thesis of the Gīṭā, according to Śaṅkara, is that liberation can come only through right knowledge and not through knowledge combined with the performance of duties. Śaṅkara maintains that all duties hold good for us only in the stage of ignorance and not in the stage of wisdom. When once the right knowledge of identity with Brahman dawns and ignorance ceases, all notions of duality, which are presupposed by
the performance of actions and responsibility for them, cease. In interpreting *Gītā*, III. 1, Śaṅkara criticizes the opinions of some previous commentators, who held that obligatory duties cannot be given up even when true wisdom is attained. In reply he alludes to legal scriptures (*smṛti-sāstra*), and asserts that the mere non-performance of any duties, however obligatory, cannot lead to evil results, since non-performance is a mere negation and of mere negation no positive results can come out. The evil effects of the non-performance of obligatory duties can happen only to those who have not given up all their actions (*a-saṃnyāsi-viṣayatvāt pratyavāya-prāpteh*). But those who have attained true wisdom and have consequently given up all their actions transcend the sphere of duties and of the obligatory injunctions of the Vedas, and the legal scriptures cannot affect them at all. The performance of duties cannot by itself lead to liberation; but it leads gradually to the attainment of purity of mind (*sattvā-sūdhi*) and through this helps the dawning of the right knowledge, with which all duties cease. In a very lengthy discussion on the interpretation of *Gītā*, xviii. 67, Śaṅkara tries to prove that all duties presuppose the multiplicity of the world of appearance, which is due to ignorance or nescience, and therefore the sage who has attained the right knowledge of Brahman, the only reality, has no duties to perform. Final liberation is thus produced, not by true knowledge along with the performance of duties, but by true knowledge alone. The wise man has no duties of any kind. Śaṅkara’s interpretation of the *Gītā* presupposes that the *Gītā* holds the same philosophical doctrine that he does. His method of interpretation is based not so much on a comparison of textual passages, as simply on the strength of the reasonableness of the exposition of a view which can be consistently held according to his Vedānta philosophy, and which he ascribes to the *Gītā*. The view taken in the present exposition of the *Gītā* philosophy is diametrically opposite to that of Śaṅkara. It has been repeatedly pointed out that the *Gītā* asserts that even the wise man should perform his allotted duties, though he may have nothing to gain by the performance of such duties. Even God Himself as Kṛṣṇa, though He had no unsatisfied cravings, passions or desires of any kind,

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performed. His self-imposed duties in order to set an example to all and to illustrate the fact that even the wise man should perform his prescribed duties.

Ānandajñāna wrote a commentary on Śaṅkara’s Bhagavad-gitā-bhāṣya, called Bhagavad-gitā-bhāṣya-vivaraṇa, and Rāmānanda wrote another commentary on that of Śaṅkara, called Bhagavad-gitā-bhāṣya-vyākhya. He is also said to have written another work on the Gitā, called Gitāsaya. After Śaṅkara there seems to have been some pause. We have two commentaries, one in prose and one in verse, by two persons of the same name, Yāmunācārya. The Yāmunācārya who was the author of a prose commentary is certainly, though a viśistādevaita-vādin, not the celebrated Yāmuna, the teacher of Rāmānuja. His commentary, which has been published by the Sudarśana Press, Conjeeveram, is very simple, consisting mainly of a mere paraphrase of the Gitā verses. He thinks that the first six chapters of the Gitā deal with the nature of true knowledge of God as a means to devotion, the second six with the nature of God as attainable by devotion and adoration, and the third six repeat the same subjects for a further clearing up of the problems involved.

Yāmuna, the great teacher of Rāmānuja, who is said to have been born in A.D. 906, summarized the subject-matter of the Gitā in a few verses called Gitārtha-saṅgṛaha, on which Nigamānta Mahādesika wrote a commentary known as Gitārtha-saṅgṛaha-rakṣā. This also was commented on by Varavara Muni, of the fourteenth century, in a commentary called Gitārtha-saṅgṛaha-dīpikā, published by the Sudarśana Press, Conjeeveram. Another commentary, called Bhagavad-gitārtha-saṅgṛaha-tīkā, by Pratyakṣādevayathācārya, is mentioned by Aufrecht. Yāmuna says that the object of the Gitā is to establish the fact that Nārāyana is the highest Brahman, attained only by devotion (bhakti), which is achieved through caste duties (sva-dharma), right knowledge and disinclination to worldly pleasures (vairāgya). It is said that the first six chapters of the Gitā describe the process of attaining self-knowledge by self-concentration (yoga) through knowledge and action along with self-subordination to God, the performance of all actions for God and detachment from all other things. Nigamānta Mahādesika notes that karma may lead to self-realization either indirectly, through the production of knowledge, or directly by itself.

1 Gitā, III. 22.
From the seventh to the twelfth chapters the processes of the attainment of devotion (bhakti-yoga) by knowledge and by actions are described, and it is held that the true nature of God can be realized only by such devotion. From the thirteenth to the eighteenth chapters, the nature of pradhāna, of puruṣa, of the manifested world and of the supreme lord are described and distinguished along with the nature of action, of knowledge and of devotion. Yāmuna then goes on to describe the contents of the chapters of the Gitā one by one. Thus he says that in the second chapter the nature of the saint of imperturbable wisdom (sthita-dhi) is described. Such right knowledge can be achieved only by a knowledge of the self as immortal and the habit of performing one’s duties in an unattached manner. In the third chapter it is said that a man should perform his duties for the preservation of the social order (loka-rakṣā) without attachment, leaving the fruits of all his actions to God, and considering at the same time that the guṇas are the real agents of actions and that it is wrong to pride oneself upon their performance. The fourth chapter describes the nature of God, how one should learn to look upon actions as implying no action (on account of unattachment), the different kinds of duties and the glory of knowledge. The fifth describes the advantages and the diverse modes of the path of duties and also the nature of the state of realization of Brahman. The sixth describes the nature of yoga practice, four kinds of yoginis, the methods of yoga, the nature of yoga realization and the ultimate superiority of yoga as communion with God. The seventh describes the reality of God, how His nature is often veiled from us by prakṛti or the guṇas, how one should seek protection from God, the nature of the different kinds of devotees, and the superiority of the truly enlightened person. The eighth describes the lordly power of God and the reality of His nature as the unchanged and the unchangeable; it also describes the duties of those who seek protection in God and the nature of the true wisdom. The ninth describes the glory of God and His superiority even when He incarnates Himself as man, and the nature of devotional communion. The tenth describes the infinite number of God’s noble qualities and the dependence of all things on Him, for initiating and increasing devotion. The eleventh describes how the true nature of God can be perceived, and demonstrates that it is only through devotion that God can be known or attained. The twelfth
describes the superiority of devotion, methods of attaining devotion, and different kinds of devotion; it is also held that God is highly pleased by the devotion of His devotees. The thirteenth describes the nature of the body, the purification of the self for self-realization, the cause of bondage and right discrimination. The fourteenth describes how the nature of an action is determined by the ties of guṇa, how the guṇas may be made to cease from influencing us, and how God alone is the root of all the ways of the self’s future destiny. The fifteenth describes how the supreme lord is different from the pure selves, as well as from selves in association with non-selves, on account of his all-pervasiveness and his nature as upholder and lord. The sixteenth describes the division of beings into godly and demoniac and also the privileged position of the scriptures as the authority for laying the solid foundation of knowledge of the true nature of our duties. The seventeenth distinguishes unscriptural things from scriptural. The eighteenth describes how God alone should be regarded as the ultimate agent of all actions, and states the necessity of purity and the nature of the effects of one’s deeds. According to Yāmuna karma-yoga, or the path of duties, consists of religious austerities, pilgrimage, gifts and sacrifices; jñāna-yoga, or the path of knowledge, consists of self-control and purity of mind; bhakti-yoga, or the path of devotion, consists in the meditation of God, inspired by an excess of joy in the communion with the divine. All these three paths mutually lead to one another. All three are essentially of the nature of the worship of God, and, whether regarded as obligatory or occasional, are helpful for discovering the true nature of one’s self. When by self-realization ignorance is wholly removed, and when a man attains superior devotion to God, he is received into God.

Rāmānuja, the celebrated Vaiṣṇava teacher and interpreter of the Brahma-sūtra, who is said to have been born in A.D. 1017, wrote a commentary on the Gitā on viśiṣṭādvaita lines, viz. monism qualified as theism. Veṅkaṭānātha, called also Vedāntacārya, wrote a sub-commentary thereon, called Tātparya-candrika. Rāmānuja generally followed the lines of interpretation suggested in the brief summary by his teacher Yāmuna. On the question of the imperativeness of caste duties Rāmānuja says that the Gitā holds that the duties allotted to each caste must be performed, since the scriptures are the commands of God and no one can transgress His orders; so the duties prescribed by the scriptures as obligatory
are compulsory for all. The duties have, therefore, to be performed without desire for their fruits and purely because they are the injunctions of the scriptures (ekā-strærthataya ānuṣṭheyam). It is only when duties performed simply to please God, and as adoration of Him, have destroyed all impurities of the mind, and when the senses have become controlled, that a man becomes fit for the path of wisdom. A man can never at any stage of his progress forsake the duty of worshipping God, and it is only through such adoration of God that the sins accumulating in him from beginningless time are gradually washed away and he can become pure and fit for the path of knowledge. In interpreting III. 8 Rāmānuja says that the path of duties (karma-yoga) is superior to the path of knowledge (jñāna-yoga). The path of duties naturally leads to self-knowledge; so self-knowledge is also included within its scope. The path of knowledge alone cannot lead us anywhere; for without work even the body cannot be made to live. Even those who adhere to the path of knowledge must perform the obligatory and occasional (nitya-naimittika) duties, and it is through the development of this course that one can attain self-realization by duty alone. The path of duties is to be followed until self-realization (ātmāvalokana) and, through it, emancipation are obtained. But the chief duty of a man is to be attached to God with supreme devotion.

Madhvācārya, or Ānandatīrtha, who lived in the first three-quarters of the thirteenth century, wrote a commentary on the Bhagavad-gitā, called Gītā-bhāṣya, commented on by Jayatīrtha in his Prameya-dipikā, and also a separate monograph interpreting the main purport of the Gītā, called Bhagavad-gitā-tātparya-nirnaya, commented on by Jayatīrtha in his Nyāya-dipikā. His main emphasis was on the fact that God is different from everything else, and that the only way of attaining our highest goal is through devotion (bhakti) as love and attachment (sneha). In the course of his interpretation he also introduced long discussions in refutation of the monistic theory of Śaṅkara. Since everything is dominated by the will of Hari the Lord, no one ought to feel any attachment to mundane things. Duties are to be performed by all. Krṣṇabhaṭṭa Vidyādhīrāja, the sixth disciple from

Madhva, who lived in the first quarter of the fourteenth century, wrote a commentary on the Gitā, called Gitā-ṭhā. Rāghavendra Svāmin, who lived in the seventeenth century and was a pupil of Sudhindra Yati, wrote three works on the Gitā, called Gitā-vṛtti, Gitārtha-samgraha and Gitārtha-vivaraṇa. Commentaries were also written by VallabhaŚārya, Vijñānabhikṣu, Keśava Bhaṭṭa of the Nimbārka school (called Gitā-tatteva-prakāśika), Ānjyaneya (called Hanumad-bhāṣya), Kalyāṇa Bhaṭṭa (called Rasika-raṇjita), Jagaddhara (called Bhagavad-gitā-pradīpa), Jayarāma (called Gitā-sārārtha-samgraha), Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa (called Gitā-bhūṣaṇa-bhāṣya), Madhusūdana (called Gūḍhārtha-dīpikā), Brahmānanda Gīrī, Mathurānātha (called Bhagavad-gitā-prakāśa), Dattātreya (called Prabodha-candrikā), Rāmakṛṣṇa, Mukundadāsa, Rāmakṛṣṇa, Viśvesvara, Saṅkarāṇanda, Śivadayālu Śrīdharasvāmin (called Subodhīnti), Sadānanda Vyāsa (called Bhāva-prakāśa), Sūryapandita (Paramārtha-prapā), Nīlakṛṣṇa (called Bhāva-dīpikā), and also from the Śaiva point of view by Rājānaka and Rāmakaṇṭha (called Sarvato-bhadra). Many other works were also written on the general purport of the Gitā, such as Bhagavad-gitārtha-samgraha by Abhinavagupta and Nṛsiṃha Śhakkura, Bhagavad-gitārtha-sāra by Gokulacandra, Bhagavad-gitā-lakṣābharana by Vādirāja, Bhagavad-gitā-sāra by Kaivalyaśīndra Sarasvatī, Bhagavad-gitā-sāra-samgraha by Narahari and Bhagavad-gitā-hetu-nirṇaya by Viṭṭhala Dīkṣita. Most of these commentaries are written either from the point of view of Saṅkara’s bhāṣya, repeating the same ideas in other language, or from the Vaiśnava point of view, approving of the hold of normal duties of men in all stages of life and sometimes differing only in the conception of God and His relation with men. These can claim but little originality either of argument or of opinions, and so may well be left out of detailed consideration for our present purposes.

**Gitā and Yoga.**

Whoever may have written the Gitā, it seems very probable that he was not acquainted with the technical sense of yoga as the cessation of mental states (citta-vṛtti-niruddha), as used by Patañjali in his Yoga-sūtra, i. 1. I have elsewhere shown that there are three roots, yujir yoge and yuj samādhau, i.e. the root yujir, to join, and the root yuj in the sense of cessation of mental states or one-
pointedness, and *yuj samyamane*, i.e. *yuj* in the sense of controlling. In the *Gītā* the word *yoga* appears to have been used in many senses, which may seem to be unconnected with one another; yet it may not be quite impossible to discover relations among them. The primary sense of the word *yoga* in the *Gītā* is derived from the root *yuji r yoge* or *yuj*, to join, with which is connected in a negative way the root *yuj* in the sense of controlling or restricting anything to that to which it is joined. Joining, as it means contact with something, also implies disjunction from some other thing. When a particular type of mental outlook or scheme of action is recommended, we find the word *buddhi-yoga* used, which simply means that one has intimately to associate oneself with a particular type of wisdom or mental outlook. Similarly, when the word *karma-yoga* is used, it simply means that one has to associate oneself with the obrigatoriness of the performance of duties. Again, the word *yoga* is used in the sense of fixing one’s mind either on the self (*ātman*) or on God. It is clear that in all these varying senses the dominant sense is that of “joining.” But such a joining implies also a disjunction, and the fundamental and indispensable disjunction implied is dissociation from all desires for pleasures and fruits of action (*phala-tyāga*). For this reason cases are not rare where *yoga* is used to mean cessation of desires for the fruits of action. Thus, in the *Gītā*, vi. 2, it is said, “What is called cessation (of desires for the fruits of action) is what you should know, O Pāṇḍava, as Yoga: without renouncing one’s desires (*na hy asaṁnyasta-saṁkalpa*) one cannot be a yogin.” The reason why this negative concept of cessation of desires should be regarded as *yoga* is that without such a renunciation of desires no higher kind of union is possible. But even such a dissociation from the fruits of desires (which in a way also means *sāmyamana*, or self-control) is to be supplemented by the performance of duties at the preliminary stages; and it is only in the higher stages, when one is fixed in *yoga* (*yogārūḍha*), that meditative peace (*śama*) can be recommended. Unless and until one succeeds in conquering all attachments to sense-objects and actions and in giving up all desires for fruits of actions, one cannot be fixed in *yoga*. It is by our attempts at the performance of our duties, trying all the time

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to keep the mind clear from motives of pleasure and enjoyment, that we gradually succeed in elevating it to a plane at which it would be natural to it to desist from all motives of self-interest, pleasure and enjoyment. It is at this stage that a man can be called fixed in *yoga* or *yogārūḍha*. This naturally involves a conflict between the higher self and the lower, or rather between the real self and the false; for, while the lower self always inclines to pathological and prudential motives, to motives of self-interest and pleasure, it has yet within it the higher ideal, which is to raise it up. Man is both a friend and a foe to himself; if he follows the path of his natural inclinations and the temptations of sense-enjoyment, he takes the downward path of evil, and is an enemy to his own higher interests; whereas it is his clear duty to raise himself up, to strive that he may not sink down but may elevate himself to a plane of detachment from all sense-pleasures. The duality involved in this conception of a friend and a foe, of conqueror and conquered, of an uplifting power and a gravitating spirit, naturally involves a distinction between a higher self (*paramātman*) and a lower self (*ātman*). It is only when this higher self conquers the lower that a self is a friend to itself. In a man who has failed to conquer his own passions and self-attachments the self is its own enemy. The implication, however, is that the lower self, though it gravitates towards evil, has yet inherent in it the power of self-elevation. This power of self-elevation is not something extraneous, but abides in the self, and the *Gītā* is emphatic in its command, "Thou shouldst raise thyself and not allow thyself to sink down; for the self is its own friend and its foe as well."

It is only when the self thus conquers its lower tendencies and rises to a higher plane that it comes into touch with the higher self (*paramātman*). The higher self always remains as an ideal of elevation. The *yoga* activity of the self thus consists, on the one hand, in the efforts by which the *yogin* dissociates himself from the sense-attachments towards which he was naturally gravitating, and on the other hand, in the efforts by which he tries to elevate himself and to come into touch with the higher self. At the first stage a man performs his duties in accordance with the injunctions of the *śāstras*; then he performs his duties and tries to dissociate himself from all motives of self-interest and

1 vi. 5.
enjoyment, and at the next stage he succeeds in conquering these lower motives and is in touch with the higher self. Even at this stage he may still continue to perform his duties, merely for the sake of duty, or he may devote himself to meditative concentration and union with the higher self or with God. Thus the Gitā says that the person who has conquered himself and is at peace with himself is in touch with paramātman. Such a person is a true philosopher; for he not only knows the truths, but is happy in the inner realization and direct intuitive apperception of such truths; he is unshakable in himself; having conquered his senses, he attaches the same value to gold and to stones; he is the same to friends and to enemies, to the virtuous as to the sinful; he is in union (with paramātman) and is called a yogin. The fact that the word yogin is derived here from the root yuj, to join, is evident from a number of passages where the verb yuj is used in this connection.

The Gitā advises a yogin who thus wants to unite himself with paramātman, or God, in a meditative union, to lead a lonely life, controlling his mind and body, desiring nothing and accepting nothing. The yogin should seat himself on level ground, in a clean place, and, being firm on his threefold seat composed of kūśa grass, a leopard skin and soft linen, he should control his thoughts, senses and movements, make his mind one-pointed in God (tatra), gather himself up in union, and thus purify himself. The yogin should eat neither too much nor too little, should neither sleep too much, nor dispense with sleep. He should thus

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1. Yuksa ity ucyate yogi sama-loṣṭāsma-hāṅcanaḥ, vi. 8. Saṅkara, however, splits it up into two independent sentences, as follows: ya śṛdrī yuṣṭaḥ saṁāhitā iti sa ucyate kathyate; sa yogi sama-loṣṭāsma-hāṅcanaḥ. Śrīdhara, again, takes a quite different view and thinks it to be a definition of the yogārūḍha state and believes yuksa to mean yogārūḍha, which in my opinion is unjustifiable. My interpretation is simpler and more direct than either of these and can be justified by a reference to the context in vi. 7 and vi. 10.

2. Yogi yuṣṭaḥ satatam ātmānam rahasya sthitah. Ibid. vi. 10.
   Upaniṣadāne yuṣṭāy uṣṭaḥ yogam ātmā-viśuddhaye. vi. 12.
   Yuksa ātma mat-parah. vi. 14.
   Yujān evam sadātmānam yogi niyata-mānasah. vi. 15, etc.

3. Ekāt kṣeta-cittātmā nirātār aparigrahaḥ. vi. 10. The word ātmā in yata-cittātmā is used in the sense of body (deha), according to Saṅkara, Śrīdhara and others.

4. Both Saṅkara and Śrīdhara make tatra an adjective to āsane. Such an adjective to āsane would not only be superfluous, but would also leave ekagram without an object. The verb yuṣṭyāt, literally meaning “should link up,” is interpreted by Śrīdhara as “should practise,” apparently without any justification (vi. 12).
lead the middle course of life and avoid extremes. This avoidance of extremes is very unlike the process of yoga advised by Patañjali. Patañjali’s course of yoga formulates a method by which the yogin can gradually habituate himself to a condition of life in which he can ultimately dispense with food and drink altogether and desist from all movements of body and mind. The object of a yogin in making his mind one-pointed is ultimately to destroy the mind. According to Patañjali the advancement of a yogin has but one object before it, viz. the cessation of all movements of mind (citta-vṛtti-nirodha). Since this absolute cessation cannot be effected without stopping all movements of the body, desires and passions are to be uprooted, not only because they would make the mind fly to different objects, but also because they would necessitate movements of the body, which would again disturb the mind. The yogin therefore has to practise a twofold control of movements of body and mind. He has to habituate himself to dispensing with the necessity of food and drink, to make himself used to all kinds of privations and climatic inconveniences of heat and cold and ultimately to prepare himself for the stoppage of all kinds of bodily movements. But, since this cannot be successfully done so long as one inhales and exhales, he has to practise prāṇāyāma for absolute breath-control, and not for hours or days, but for months and years. Moral elevation is regarded as indispensable in yoga only because without absolute and perfect cessation of all desires and passions the movements of the body and mind could not be absolutely stopped. The yogin, however, has not only to cut off all new causes of disturbance leading to movements of body and mind, but also to practise one-pointedness of mind on subtler and subtler objects, so that as a result thereof the sub-conscious forces of the mind can also be destroyed. Thus, on the one hand, the mind should be made to starve by taking care that no new sense-data and no new percepts, concepts, thoughts, ideas or emotions be presented to it, and, on the other hand, steps are to be taken to make the mind one-pointed, by which all that it had apprehended before, which formed the great storehouse of the sub-conscious, is destroyed. The mind, thus pumped out on both sides, becomes absolutely empty and is destroyed. The ideal of Patañjali’s Yoga is absolute extremism, consisting in absolute stoppage of all functions of body and mind.

The Gītā, on the other hand, prescribes the golden middle course
of moderate food, drink, sleep, movements of the body and activity in general. The object of the yogin in the Gitā is not the absolute destruction of mind, but to bring the mind or the ordinary self into communion with the higher self or God. To the yogin who practises meditation the Gitā advises steadiness of posture; thus it says that the yogin should hold his body, head and shoulders straight, and, being unmoved and fixed in his posture, should avoid looking to either side and fix his eyes on the tip of his nose. The Gitā is, of course, aware of the process of breath-control and prānāyāma; but, curiously enough, it does not speak of it in its sixth chapter on dhyāna-yoga, where almost the whole chapter is devoted to yoga practice and the conduct of yogins. In the fifth chapter, v. 27, it is said that all sense-movements and control of life-movements (prāṇa-karmāṇi) are like oblations to the fire of self-control. In the two obscure verses of the same chapter, v. 29 and 30, it is said that there are some who offer an oblation of prāṇa to apāna and of apāna to prāṇa and thus, stopping the movement of inhalation and exhalation (prāṇāpāṇa-gati ruddhvā), perform the prānāyāma, while there are others who, taking a low diet, offer an oblation of prāṇa to prāṇa. Such actions on the part of these people are described as being different kinds of sacrifices, or yajña, and the people who perform them are called yajña-vidāḥ (those who know the science of sacrifice), and not yogin. It is difficult to understand the exact meaning of offering an oblation of prāṇa to prāṇa or of prāṇa to apāna and of calling this sacrifice. The interpretations of Śāṅkara, Śrīdhara and others give us but little help in this matter. They do not tell us why it should be called a yajña or how an oblation of prāṇa to prāṇa can be made, and they do not even try to give a synonym for juhecati (offer oblation) used in this connection. It seems to me, however, that there is probably a reference to the mystical substitution-meditations (pratikopāsanā) which were used as substitutes for sacrifices and are referred to in the Upaniṣads. Thus in the Maitri Upaniṣad, vi. 9, we find that Brahman is to be meditated upon as the ego, and in this connection, oblations of the five vāyus to fire with such mantras as prāṇāya svāhā, apāṇāya svāhā, etc. are recommended. It is easy to imagine that, in a later process of development, for the actual offering of oblations to fire was substituted a certain process of breath-control, which still retained the old phraseology of the offering of oblations in a sacrifice. If this interpretation is
accepted, it will indicate how processes of breath-control became
in many cases associated with substitution-meditations of the
Vedic type\(^1\). The development of processes of breath-control
in connection with substitution-meditations does not seem to
be unnatural at all, and, as a matter of fact, the practice of
prāṇāyāma in connection with such substitution-meditations is
definitely indicated in the Maitri Upaniṣad, vi. 18. The movement
of inhalation and exhalation was known to be the cause of all
body-heat, including the heat of digestive processes, and Kṛṣṇa is
supposed to say in the Gītā, xv. 14, "As fire I remain in the body
of living beings and in association with prāṇa and apāṇa I digest
four kinds of food and drink." The author of the Gītā, however,
seems to have been well aware that the prāṇa and apāṇa breaths
passing through the nose could be properly balanced (samau), or
that the prāṇa vāyu could be concentrated between the two eye-
brows or in the head (mūrdhni)\(^2\). It is difficult to say what is
exactly meant by taking the prāṇa in the head or between the
eyebrows. There seems to have been a belief in the Atharva-śiras
Upaniṣad and also in the Atharva-śikhā Upaniṣad that the prāṇa
could be driven upwards, or that such prāṇa, being in the head,
could protect it\(^3\). Manu also speaks of the prāṇas of young
men rushing upwards when old men approached them. But,
whatever may be meant, it is certain that neither the balancing
of prāṇa and apāṇa nor the concentrating of prāṇa in the
head or between the eyebrows is a phrase of Patañjali, the Yoga
writer.

In describing the course of a yogin in the sixth chapter the
Gītā advises that the yogin should lead the austere life of a Brahma-
cārin, withdraw his mind from all mundane interests and think
only of God, dedicate all his actions to Him and try to live in
communion with Him (yukta āsita). This gives to his soul peace,
through which he loses his individuality in God and abides in Him

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\(^2\) prāṇāpāṇau samau kṛtvā nāsāhhyantara-cārīnau, v. 27. The phrase samau
kṛtvā is left unexplained here by Śaṅkara. Śrīdhara explains it as "having sus-
pended the movement of prāṇa and apāṇa"—prāṇāpāṇo uṛddhvaśdo-gati-
nirrodhena samau kṛtvā kumbhaham kṛtvā. It is difficult, however, to say what is
exactly meant by concentrating the prāṇa vāyu between the two eyebrows,
bhrumor madhye prāṇam uśkṣita samyak (viii. 10). Neither Śaṅkara nor Śrīdhara
gives us any assistance here. In mūrdhny uḍāhityaṁ tam prāṇam uḍhitino yoga-
dhāranām (viii. 12) mūrdhni is paraphrased by Śrīdhara as bhrumor madhye, or
"between the eyebrows."

\(^3\) Atharva-śiras, 4 and 6 and Atharva-śikhā, i.
in the bliss of self-effacement. A yogin can be said to be in union (with God) when he concentrates his mind on his own higher self and is absolutely unattached to all desires. By his efforts towards such a union (yoga-sevayā) he restrains his mind from all other objects and, perceiving his self in himself, remains in peace and contentment. At this higher state the yogin enjoys absolute bliss (sukham ātyantikam), transcending all sense-pleasures by his pure reason, and, being thus fixed in God, he is never shaken away from Him. Such a yogin forsakes all his desires and controls all his senses by his mind, and, whenever the mind itself seeks to fly away to different objects, he tries to control it and fix it on his own self. Patiently holding his mind fixed in his self, he tries to desist from all kinds of thought and gradually habituates himself to shaking off attachments to sense-attractions. At this stage of union the yogin feels that he has attained his highest, and thus even the greatest mundane sorrows cannot affect him in the least. Yoga is thus sometimes defined as the negation of the possibility of all association with sorrows. One can attain such a state only by persistent and self-confident efforts and without being depressed by preliminary failures. When a yogin attains this union with himself or with God, he is like the motionless flame of a lamp in a still place, undisturbed by all attractions and unruffled by all passions. The yogin who attains this highest state of union with himself or with God is said to be in touch with Brahman or to attain Brahmahood, and it is emphatically asserted that he is filled with ecstatic joy. Being in

1 śanītīm nirvāṇa-paramān mat-saṃsthām adhigacchati, vi. 15. The Gītā uses the words śanīti and nirvāṇa to indicate the bliss of the person who abides in God. Both these words, and particularly the word nirvāṇa, have a definite significance in Buddhism. But the Gītā seems to be quite unacquainted with the Buddhistic sense of the word. I have therefore ventured to translate the word nirvāṇa as “bliss of self-effacement.” The word is primarily used in the sense of “extinguishing a light,” and this directly leads to the Buddhistic sense of the absolute destruction of the skandhas. But the word nirvāṇa is also used from very early times in the sense of “relief from sufferings” and “satisfaction.” Thus the Mahā-bhārata, with which the Gītā is traditionally associated, uses it in this sense in III. 10438:

sa pātvā ātālaṁ toyaṁ pipāśartto mahā-patīḥ;
nirvāṇam agamad dhīmān svaukaḥ cābhavat tadā.

Again, in the Mahā-bhārata, xii. 7150 and 13014, nirvāṇa is described as being highest bliss (paramāṁ sukham), and it is also associated with śanīti, or peace, as it is in the above passage—śanītiṃ nirvāṇa-paramān. In Mahā-bhārata, vi. 1079, and in another place it is called a “state of the highest Brahman” (paramāṁ brahma—ibid. xii. 13239).

2 taṁ vidyād duśkha-saṁyoga-viyoṣam yoga-saṁjñiṣṭam, vi. 23.

3 Yathā dipō nivāta-stho nhāgate sopamā śṛdhā, vi. 19.
union with God, he perceives himself in all things, and all things in himself; for, being in union with God, he in one way identifies himself with God, and perceives God in all things and all things in God. Yet it is no mere abstract pantheism that is indicated here; for such a view is directly in opposition to the main tenets of the Gitā, so often repeated in diverse contexts. It is a mystical state, in which, on the one hand, the yogin finds himself identified with God and in communion with Him, and, on the other hand, does not cease to have relations with the beings of the world, to whom he gives the same consideration as to himself. He does not prefer his own happiness to the happiness of others, nor does he consider his own misery and suffering as greater or more important or more worthy of prevention than those of others. Being in communion with God, he still regards Him as the master whom he adores, as the supreme Lord who pervades all things and holds them in Himself. By his communion with God the yogin transcends his lower and smaller self and discovers his greater self in God, not only as the supreme ideal of his highest efforts, but also as the highest of all realities. As soon as the yogin can detach himself from his lower self of passions and desires, he uplifts himself to a higher universe, where the distinction of meum and teum, mine and thine, ceases and the interest of the individual loses its personal limitations and becomes enlarged and universalized and identified with the interests of all living beings. Looked at from this point of view, yoga is sometimes defined in the Gitā as the outlook of equality (samātva).

In the Gitā the word yoga has not attained any definite technical sense, as it did in Patañjali’s Yoga-sūtra, and, in consequence, there is not one definition of yoga, but many. Thus yoga is used in the sense of karma-yoga, or the duty of performance of actions, in v. 1, and it is distinguished from the sāmkhya path, or the path of knowledge, in ii. 39. The word karma-yoga is mentioned in iii. 3 as the path of the yogins, and it is referred to in iii. 7, v. 2 and XIII. 24. The word buddhi-yoga is also used at least three times, in ii. 49, x. 10 and XVIII. 57, and the bhakti-yoga also is used at least once, in XIV. 26. The one meaning of yoga that suits all these different contexts seems to be “association.” It has already been said that this primary meaning of the word is the central idea of yoga in the Gitā. One of the main teachings of

\[ \text{samātvaṃ yoga ucyate, it. 48.} \]
the Gitā is that duties should be performed, and it is this obligatoriness of the performance of duties that in the Gitā is understood by karma-yoga. But, if such duties are performed from motives of self-interest or gain or pleasure, the performance could not lead to any higher end. It is advised, therefore, that they should be performed without any motive of gain or pleasure. So the proper way in which a man should perform his duties, and at the same time keep himself clean and untarnished by the good and bad results, the pleasures and sorrows, the praise and blame proceeding out of his own deeds, is to make himself detached from all desires for the fruits of actions. To keep oneself detached from the desires for the fruits of actions is therefore the real art (kauśāla) of performing one's duties; for it is only in this way that a man can make himself fit for the higher union with God or his own higher self. Here, then, we have a definition of yoga as the art of performing one's duties (yogah karmasu kauśalam—II. 50). The art of performing one's duties, e.g. the art of keeping oneself unattached, cannot however be called yoga on its own account; it is probably so-called only because it is the indispensable step towards the attainment of the real yoga, or union with God. It is clear, therefore, that the word yoga has a gradual evolution to a higher and higher meaning, based no doubt on the primary root-meaning of "association."

It is important to note in this connection that the process of prānāyāma, regarded as indispensible in Patañjali's Yoga, is not considered so necessary either for karma-yoga, buddhi-yoga, or for the higher kind of yoga, e.g. communion with God. It has already been mentioned that the reference to prānāyāma is found only in connection with some kinds of substitution-meditations which have nothing to do with the main concept of yoga in the Gitā. The expression samādhi is used thrice in the noun form in the Gitā, in II. 44, 53 and 54, and three times in the verb form, in VI. 7, XII. 9 and XVII. 11; but the verb forms are not used in the technical sense of Patañjali, but in the simple root-meaning of sam + ā + v dhā, "to give" or "to place" (arpaṇa or sthāpana). In two cases (II. 44 and 53) where the word samādhi is used as a noun it has been interpreted by both Śaṅkara and Śrīdhara as meaning the object in which the mind is placed or to which it is directed for communion, viz. God. The author of the Gitā is well aware of

1 In II. 44, however, Śaṅkara considers this object of mind to be antahkaraṇa.
the moral conflict in man and thinks that it is only by our efforts
to come into touch with our higher self that the littleness of
passions and desires for fruits of actions and the preference of
our smaller self-interests can be transcended. For, once man is
in touch with his highest, he is in touch with God. He has then
a broader and higher vision of man and his place in nature, and
so he identifies himself with God and finds that he has no special
interest of his own to serve. The low and the high, the sinful
and the virtuous, are the same in his eyes; he perceives God
in all things and all things in God, and it is this state of com-
munion that is the real yoga of the Gitā; and it is because in this
state all inequalities of race, creed, position, virtue and vice, high
and low vanish, that this superior realization of universal equality
is also called yoga. Not only is this union with God called yoga,
but God Himself is called Yogeśvara, or the Lord of communion.
As a result of this union, the yogin enjoys supreme bliss and
ecstatic joy, and is free from the least touch of sorrow or pain;
and this absolute freedom from pain or the state of bliss, being
itself a result of yoga, is also called yoga. From the above survey
it is clear that the yoga of the Gitā is quite different from the
yoga of Patañjali, and it does not seem at all probable that the
Gitā was aware of Patañjali's yoga or the technical terms used by
him.

The treatment of yoga in the Gitā is also entirely different from
its treatment in almost all the Upaniṣads. The Katha Upaniṣad
speaks of sense-control as being yoga; but sense-control in the
Gitā is only a preliminary to yoga and not itself yoga. Most of
the yoga processes described in the other Upaniṣads either speak
of yoga with six accessories (śad-āṅga yoga) or of yoga with eight
accessories (aṣṭāṅga-yoga), more or less after the manner of
Patañjali. They introduce elaborate details not only of breath-
control or prāṇāyāma, but also of the nervous system of the body,
idā, pīṅgalā and susumnā, the nerve plexus, mūlādhāra and other
similar objects, after the manner of the later works on the Śaṭ-
or buddhi. But Śridhara considers this object to be God, and in II. 53 Śaṅkara
and Śridhara are unanimous that the object, or the support of the union or
communion of the mind, is God.

1 paśya me yogam aśīvaram, ix, 5, etām vibhūtiṁ yogam ca, x, 7. In the
above two passages the word yoga seems to have a different meaning, as it is
used there in the sense of miraculous powers; but even there the commentators
Śaṅkara and Śridhara take it to mean “association” (yuḥti) and interpret
aśīvaram yogam as “association of miraculous powers.”
Thus the Amṛta-nāda enumerates after the manner of Patañjali the six accessories of yoga as restraint (pratyāhāra), concentration (dhyāna), breath-control (prānyāma), fixation (dharāna), reasoning (tarka) and meditative absorption (samādhi), and describes the final object of yoga as ultimate loneliness of the self (kaivalya). The Amṛta-bindu believes in an all-pervading Brahman as the only reality, and thinks that, since mind is the cause of all bondage and liberation, the best course for a yogin to adopt is to deprive the mind of all its objects and thus to stop the activity of the mind, and thereby to destroy it, and bring about Brahma- hood. Brahman is described here as being absolutely indeterminate, uninferable, infinite and beginningless. The Kṣurika merely describes prānyāma, dhyāna, dharāna and samādhi in association with the nerves, susūmṇa, pīngalā, etc. and the nerve plexuses. The Tejo-bindu is a Vedāntic Upaniṣad of the ultramonistic type, and what it calls yoga is only the way of realizing the nature of Brahman as one and as pure consciousness and the falsity of everything else. It speaks of this yoga as being of fifteen accessories (paṁca-dāsāṅga yoga). These are yama (sense-control through the knowledge that all is Brahman), niyama (repetition of the same kinds of thoughts and the avoidance of dissimilar ones), tyāga (giving up of the world-appearance through the realization of Brahman), silence, a solitary place, the proper posture, steadiness of mind, making the body straight and erect, perceiving the world as Brahman (dhyā-sthiti), cessation of all states and breath-control (prāna-samyamana), perceiving all objects of the mind as Brahman (pratyāhāra), fixing the mind always on Brahman (dharāna), self-meditation and the realization of oneself as Brahman. This is, however, a scheme of yoga quite different from that of Patañjali, as well as from that of the Gītā. The Triśikha- brāhmaṇa speaks of a yoga with eight accessories (aṣṭāṅga-yoga), where the eight accessories, though the same in name as the eight accessories of Patañjali, are in reality different therefrom. Thus yama here means want of attachment (vairāgya), niyama means attachment to the ultimate reality (anuraktiḥ pare tattve), āsana means indifference to all things, prāna-samyamana means the realization of the falsity of the world, pratyāhāra means the inwardsness of the mind, dharāna means the motionlessness of the mind, dhyāna means thinking of oneself as pure consciousness, and samādhi means forgetfulness of dhyānas. Yet it again includes
within its yama and niyama almost all the virtues referred to by Patañjali. It also speaks of a number of postures after the hatha-yoga fashion, and of the movement of prāṇa in the nerve plexuses, the ways of purifying the nerves and the processes of breath-control. The object of yoga is here also the destruction of mind and the attainment of kaivalya. The Darśana gives an aśṭāṅga-yoga with yama, niyama, āsana, prāṇyāma, pratyāhāra, dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi more or less after the fashion of Patañjali, with a supplementary treatment of nerves (nāḍī) and the movement of the prāṇa and other vāyus in them. The final object of yoga here is the attainment of Brahmahood and the comprehension of the world as māyā and unreal. The Dhyāna-bindu describes the self as the essential link of all things, like the fragrance in flowers or the thread in a garland or the oil in sesamum. It describes a saḍ-aṅga yoga with āsana, prāṇa-samroda, pratyāhāra, dhāraṇā, dhyāna and samādhi. It also describes the four cakras or nerve plexuses, and speaks of the awakening of the serpent power (kundalini) and the practice of the mudrās. It speaks further of the balancing or unifying of prāṇa and apāṇa as leading to yoga. The object of this yoga is the attainment of the transcendent state of liberation or the realization of the paramātman. It is useless to refer to other Upaniṣads; for what has already been said will be enough to show clearly that the idea of Yoga in the Gītā is entirely different from that in the Yoga Upaniṣads, most of which are of comparatively late date and are presumably linked up with traditions different from that of the Gītā.

Sāṃkhya and Yoga in the Gītā.

In the Gītā Sāṃkhya and Yoga are sometimes distinguished from each other as two different paths, and sometimes they are identified. But though the Gītā is generally based on the doctrines of the guṇas, prakṛti and its derivatives, yet the word sāṃkhya is used here in the sense of the path of knowledge or of philosophic wisdom. Thus in the Gītā, 11. 39, the path of knowledge is distinguished from that of performance of duties. Lord Kṛṣṇa says there that he has just described the wisdom of Sāṃkhya and he is going to describe the wisdom of Yoga. This

1 Tadā prāṇāpāṇaiyor aikyaṁ kṛtvā; see Dhyāna-bindu, 93–5 (Adyar Library edition, 1920). This seems to be similar to prāṇāpāṇai samāi kṛtvā of the Gītā.
seems to give us a clue to what is meant by Śāmkhya wisdom. This wisdom, however, seems to be nothing more than elaboration of the doctrine of the immortality of soul and the associated doctrine of rebirth, and also the doctrine that, howsoever the body might be affected and suffer changes of birth, growth and destruction, the self is absolutely unaffected by all these changes; the self cannot be cut or burned; it is eternal, all-pervasive, unchangeable, indescribable and unthinkable. In another passage of the Gītā, xiii. 25, it is said that there are others who perceive the self in accordance with śāmkhya-yoga; and Śaṅkara explains this passage to mean that śāmkhya-yoga means the realization of the self as being absolutely different from the three guṇas, sattva, rajas and tamas. If this is Śāmkhya, the meaning of the word yoga in this passage (anye śāmkhyena yogena) is not explained. Śaṅkara does not expound the meaning of the word yoga, but explains the word śāmkhya and says that this śāmkhya is yoga, which seems to be an evasion. Śrīdhara follows Śaṅkara’s interpretation of śāmkhya, but finds it difficult to swallow his identification of śāmkhya with yoga, and he interprets yoga here as the yoga (of Patañjali) with eight accessories, but does not explain how this aṣṭāṅga-yoga can be identified with śāmkhya. It is, no doubt, true that in the immediately preceding verse it is said that, howsoever a man may behave, if he knows the proper nature of puruṣa and of the prakṛti and the guṇas, he is never born again; but there is no reason to suppose that the phrase śāmkhyena yogena refers to the wisdom recommended in the preceding verse; for this verse summarizes different paths of self-realization and says that there are some who perceive the self in the self through the self, by meditation, others by śāmkhya-yoga and others by karma-yoga. In another passage it is said that the Śāmkhyas follow the path of knowledge (jñāna-yoga), while the Yogins follow the path of duties (Gītā, iii. 3). If the word yoga means “association,” as it does in various contexts, then śāmkhya and śāmkhya-yoga would mean more or less the same thing; for śāmkhya-yoga would only mean association with śāmkhya, and the phrase śāmkhyena yogena might mean either association with śāmkhya or the union of śāmkhya. It has already been said that, following the indications of the Gītā, ii. 39, śāmkhya should mean the realization of the true nature of the self as immortal, all-pervasive, unchangeable and infinite. It has also been pointed out that it is such a true realization of the
self, with its corresponding moral elevation, that leads to the true communion of the self with the higher self or God. Thus this meaning of sāṃkhya on the one hand distinguishes the path of sāṃkhya from the path of yoga as a path of performance of duties, and at the same time identifies the path of sāṃkhya with the path of yoga as communion with God. Thus we find that the Gītā, v. 4, 5, says that “fools only think Sāṃkhya and Yoga to be different, not so wise men,” since, accepting either of them, one attains the fruit of them both. The goal reached by the followers of Sāṃkhya is also reached by the Yogins; he who perceives Sāṃkhya and Yoga to be the same perceives them in the right perspective. In these passages sāṃkhya and yoga seem from the context to refer respectively to karma-sannyāsa and karma-yoga. Sāṃkhya here can only in a secondary way mean the renunciation of the fruits of one’s actions (karma-sannyāsa). The person who realizes the true nature of his self, and knows that the self is unchangeable and infinite, cannot feel himself attached to the fruits of his actions and cannot be affected by ordinary mundane desires and cravings. As in the case of the different uses of the word yoga, so here also the word sāṃkhya, which primarily means “true knowledge,” is also used to mean “renunciation”; and since karma-yoga means the performance of one’s duties in a spirit of renunciation, sāṃkhya and yoga mean practically the same thing and are therefore identified here; and they are both regarded as leading to the same results. This would be so, even if yoga were used to denote “communion”; for the idea of performance of one’s duties has almost always communion with God as its indispensable correlate. Thus in the two passages immediately following the identification of sāṃkhya and yoga we find the Gītā (v. 6, 7) saying that without karma-yoga it is hard to renounce karma; and the person who takes the path of karma-yoga speedily attains Brahma. The person who thus through karma-yoga comes into union (with Brahma) is pure in spirit and self-controlled, and, having identified himself with the universal spirit in all beings, he is not affected by his deeds.

One thing that emerges from the above discussion is that there is no proof that the word sāṃkhya in the Gītā means the discernment of the difference of prakṛti and the guṇas from puruṣa, as Śaṅkara in one place suggests (Gītā, xiii. 25), or that it refers to the cosmology and ontology of prakṛti, the guṇas and their
evolutes of the traditional Kapila-Sāṃkhya. The philosophy of the guṇas and the doctrine of puruṣa were, no doubt, known to the Gitā; but nowhere is this philosophy called sāṃkhya. Sāṃkhya in the Gitā means true knowledge (tattva-jñāna) or self-knowledge (ātma-bodha). Śāṅkara, commenting on the Gitā, xviii. 13, interprets sāṃkhya to mean vedānta, though in verse xiii. 25 he interprets the word as meaning the discernment of the difference between the guṇas and the puruṣa, which would decidedly identify the sāṃkhya of the Gitā with the Kapila-Sāṃkhya.

The Mahā-bhārata also refers to sāṃkhya and yoga in several places. But in almost all places sāṃkhya means either the traditional school of Kapila-Sāṃkhya or some other school of Sāṃkhya, more or less similar to it: yoga also most often refers either to the yoga of Patañjali or some earlier forms of it. In one place are found passages identifying sāṃkhya and yoga, which agree almost word for word with similar passages of the Gitā1. But it does not seem that the sāṃkhya or the yoga referred to in the Mahā-bhārata has anything to do with the idea of Sāṃkhya or yoga in the Gitā. As has already been pointed out, the yoga in the Gitā means the dedication to God and renunciation of the fruits of one’s karma and being in communion with Him as the supreme Lord pervading the universe. The chapter of the Mahā-bhārata just referred to speaks of turning back the senses into the manas and of turning the manas into ahaṃkāra and ahaṃkāra into buddhi and buddhi into prakṛti, thus finishing with prakṛti and its evolutes and meditating upon pure puruṣa. It is clear that this system of yoga is definitely associated with the Kapila school of Sāṃkhya. In the Mahā-bhārata, xiii. 306, the predominant feature of yoga is said to be dhyāna, and the latter is said to consist of concentration of mind (ekāgratā ca manasaḥ) and breath-control (prāṇāyāma). It is said that the yogin should stop the functions of his senses by his mind, and the movement of his mind by his reason (buddhi), and in this stage he is said to be linked up (yukta) and is like a motionless flame in a still place2. This passage naturally reminds one of the description of dhyāna-yoga in the Gitā, vi. 11–13, 16–19 and 25, 26; but the fundamental idea of yoga,

2 Cf. the Gitā, vi. 19, yathā dīpo nivāta-sthaḥ, etc.
as the dedication of the fruits of actions to God and communion with Him, is absent here.

It is needless to point out here that the yoga of the Gītā is in no way connected with the yoga of Buddhism. In Buddhism the sage first practises āśā, or sense-control and mind-control, and thus prepares himself for a course of stabilization or fixation of the mind (sāmādhāna, upadhāraṇa, patīṭṭhā). This samādhi means the concentration of the mind on right endeavours and of its states upon one particular object (ekārammana), so that they may completely cease to shift and change (sammā ca avikkhappamānā). The sage has first to train his mind to view with disgust the appetitive desires for food and drink and their ultimate loathsome transformations as various nauseating bodily elements. When a man habituates himself to emphasizing the disgusting associations of food and drink, he ceases to have any attachment to them and simply takes them as an unavoidable evil, only awaiting the day when the final dissolution of all sorrows will come. Secondly, the sage has to habituate his mind to the idea that all his members are made up of the four elements, earth, water, fire and wind, like the carcass of a cow at the butcher’s shop. Thirdly, he has to habituate his mind to thinking again and again (anussati) about the virtues or greatness of the Buddha, the Sangha, the gods and the law of the Buddha, about the good effects of āśā and the making of gifts (cāgānussati), about the nature of death (maranañussati) and about the deep nature and qualities of the final extinction of all phenomena (upasamānussati). He has also to pass through various purificatory processes. He has to go to the cremation grounds and notice the diverse horrifying changes of human carcasses and think how nauseating, loathsome, unsightly and impure they are; from this he will turn his mind to living human bodies and convince himself that they, being in essence the same as dead carcasses, are as loathsome as the latter. He should think of the anatomical parts and constituents of the body as well as of their processes, and this will help him to enter into the first jhāna, or meditation, by leading his mind away from his body. As an aid to concentration the sage should sit in a quiet place and fix his mind on the inhaling (passāsa) and the exhaling (assāsa) of his breath, so that, instead of breathing in a more or less unconscious manner, he may be aware whether he is breathing quickly or slowly; he ought to mark this definitely by counting numbers, so that by
fixing his mind on the numbers counted he may realize the whole process of inhalation and exhalation in all stages of its course. Next to this we come to brahma-vihāra, the fourfold meditation of mettā (universal friendship), karunā (universal pity), muditā (happiness in the prosperity and happiness of all) andupekkhā (indifference to any kind of preferment of oneself, one’s friend, enemy or a third party). In order to habituate himself to meditation on universal friendship, a man should start with thinking how he would himself like to root out all misery and become happy, how he would himself like to avoid death and live cheerfully, and then pass over to the idea that other beings would also have the same desires. He should thus habituate himself to thinking that his friends, his enemies and all those with whom he is not connected might all live and become happy. He should fix himself to such an extent in this meditation that he should not find any difference between the happiness or safety of himself and that of others. Coming to jhānas, we find that the objects of concentration may be earth, water, fire, wind, colours, etc. In the first stage of concentration on an object there is comprehension of the name and form of the object; at the next stage the relational movement ceases, and the mind penetrates into the object without any quivering. In the next two stages there is a buoyant exaltation and a steady inward bliss, and, as a result of the one-pointedness which is the culminating effect of the progressive meditation, there is the final release of the mind (ceto-vimuttī)—the Nibbāna.

It is easy to see that, though Patañjali’s yoga is under a deep debt of obligation to this Buddhist yoga, the yoga of the Gita is unacquainted therewith. The pessimism which fills the Buddhist yoga is seen to affect not only the outlook of Patañjali’s yoga, but also most of the later Hindu modes of thought, in the form of the advisability of reflecting on the repulsive sides of things (pratipakṣa-bhāvanā) which are seemingly attractive1. The ideas of universal friendship, etc. were also taken over by Patañjali and later on passed into Hindu works. The methods of concentration on various ordinary objects also seem to be quite unlike what we find in the Gita. The Gita is devoid of any tinge of pessimism such as we find in the Buddhist yoga. It does not anywhere recommend the habit of brooding over the repulsive

1 See Nyāya-maṇḍari, Vairāgya-lataka, Sānti-lataka.
aspects of all things, so as to fill our minds with a feeling of disgust for all worldly things. It does not rise to the ideal of regarding all beings as friends or to that of universal compassion. Its sole aim is to teach the way of reaching the state of equanimity, in which the saint has no preferences, likes and dislikes—where the difference between the sinner and the virtuous, the self and the not-self has vanished. The idea of yoga as self-surrendering union with God and self-surrendering performance of one’s duties is the special feature which is absent in Buddhism. This self-surrender in God, however, occurs in Patañjali’s yoga, but it is hardly in keeping with the technical meaning of the word yoga, as the suspension of all mental states. The idea appears only once in Patañjali’s sūtras, and the entire method of yoga practices, as described in the later chapters, seems to take no notice of it. It seems highly probable, therefore, that in Patañjali’s sūtras the idea was borrowed from the Gitā, where this self-surrender to God and union with Him is defined as yoga and is the central idea which the Gitā is not tired of repeating again and again.

We have thus completely failed to trace the idea of the Gitā to any of the different sources where the subject of yoga is dealt with, such as the Yoga Upaniṣads, Patañjali’s Yoga-sūtras, Buddhist Yoga, or the Mahā-bhārata. It is only in the Pañca-rātra works that the Gitā meaning of yoga as self-surrender to God is found. Thus Ahirodbudhyā-saṁhitā describes yoga as the worship of the heart (ḥṛdayārādhana), the offering of an oblation (haviḥ) of oneself to God or self-surrender to God (bhagavate ātma-samarpanam), and yoga is defined as the linking up (saṁyoga) of the lower self (jīvatman) with the higher self (paramātman). It seems, therefore, safe to suggest that the idea of yoga in the Gitā has the same traditional source as in the Pañca-rātra works.

Sāmkhya Philosophy in the Gitā.

It has been said before that there is no proof that the word sāmkhya in the Gitā means the traditional Sāmkhya philosophy; yet the old philosophy of prakṛti and puruṣa forms the basis of the philosophy of the Gitā. This philosophy may be summarized as follows:

1 The Ahirodbudhyā-saṁhitā, of course, introduces many observations about the nerves (nāḍī) and the vāyu, which probably became associated with the Pañca-rātra tradition in later times.
Prakṛti is called mahad brahma (the great Brahma or the great multiplier as procreatress) in the Gītā, xiv. 3. It is said there that this prakṛti is described as being like the female part, which God charges with His energy for the creation of the universe. Wherever any living beings may be born, the great Brahman or prakṛti is to be considered as the female part and God as the father and fertiliser. Three types of qualities are supposed to be produced from prakṛti (guṇāḥ prakṛti-sambhavāḥ)2. These are sattva, rajas and tamas, which bind the immortal self in its corporeal body. Of these, sattva, on account of its purity, is illuminating and untroubling (anāmâyam, which Śrīdhara explains as nirupadra\(v\)am or sāntam), and consequently, on account of these two qualities, binds the self with the attachment for knowledge (jñāna-saṅgena) and the attachment for pleasure (sukha-saṅgena). It is said that there are no living beings on earth, or gods in the heavens, who are not pervaded by the three guṇas produced from the prakṛti3. Since the guṇas are produced from the prakṛti through the fertilization of God’s energy in prakṛti, they may be said to be produced by God, though God always transcends them. The quality of sattva, as has been said above, associates the self with the attachments for pleasure and knowledge. The quality of rajas moves to action and arises from desire and attachment (trṣṇā-saṅga-saṁuddhavacām), through which it binds the self with egoistic attachments for action. The quality of tamas overcomes the illumination of knowledge and leads to many errors. Tamas, being a product of ignorance, blinds all living beings and binds them down with carelessness, idleness and sleep. These three qualities predominate differently at different times. Thus, sometimes the quality of sattva predominates over rajas and tamas, and such a time is characterized by the rise of knowledge in the mind through all the different sense-gates; when rajas dominates sattva and tamas, the mind is characterized by greed, efforts and endeavours for different kinds of action and the rise of passions, emotions and desires; when tamas predominates over sattva and rajas, there is ignorance, lethargy, errors, delusions and false beliefs.

The different categories are auyakta, or the undifferentiated

1 mama yonir mahad brahma tasmin garbhāṃ dudhāmy aham. xiv. 3. I have interpreted mahad brahma as prakṛti, following Śrīdhara and other commentators. Sāṅkara surreptitiously introduces the word māyā between mama and yonir and changes the whole meaning.
2 Gītā, xiv. 5.
3 Ibid. xviii. 40.
prakṛti, buddhi (intellect), ahamkāra (egohood), manas (mind-organ) and the ten senses, cognitive and conative. Manas is higher and subtler than the senses, and buddhi is higher than the manas, and there is that (probably self) which transcends buddhi. Manas is regarded as the superintendent of the different senses; it dominates them and through them enjoys the sense-objects. The relation between the buddhi and ahamkāra is nowhere definitely stated. In addition to these, there is the category of the five elements (mahābhūta)\(^1\). It is difficult to say whether these categories were regarded in the Gitā as being the products of prakṛti or as separately existing categories. It is curious that they are nowhere mentioned in the Gitā as being products of prakṛti, which they are in Śāṅkhya, but on the other hand, the five elements, manas, ahamkāra and buddhi are regarded as being the eightfold nature (prakṛti) of God\(^2\). It is also said that God has two different kinds of nature, a lower and a higher; the eightfold nature just referred to represents the lower nature of God, whereas His higher nature consists of the collective universe of life and spirit\(^3\). The guṇas are noticed in relation to prakṛti in III. 5, 27, 29, XIII. 21, XIV. 5, XVIII. 40, and in all these places the guṇas are described as being produced from prakṛti, though the categories are never said to be produced from prakṛti. In the Gitā, IX. 10, however, it is said that prakṛti produces all that is moving and all that is static through the superintendence of God. The word prakṛti is used in at least two different senses, as a primary and ultimate category and as a nature of God’s being. It is quite possible that the primary meaning of prakṛti in the Gitā is God’s nature; the other meaning of prakṛti, as an ultimate principle from which the guṇas are produced, is simply the hypostatization of God’s nature. The whole group consisting of pleasure, pain, aversion, volition, consciousness, the eleven senses, the mind-organ, the five elements, egohood, intellect (buddhi), the undifferentiated (avyakta, meaning prakṛti existing, probably, as the sub-conscious mind) power of holding the senses and the power of holding together the diverse mental functions (saṃghāta) with their modifications and changes, is called kṣetra. In another place the body alone is called kṣetra\(^4\). It seems, therefore, that the word kṣetra signifies in its broader sense not only the body, but also the entire mental plane, involving

\(^1\) Gitā, III. 42, XIII. 6 and 7, XV. 9.
\(^2\) Ibid. VII. 5.
\(^3\) Ibid. VII. 4.
\(^4\) Ibid. XIII. 2.
the diverse mental functions, powers, capabilities, and also the undifferentiated sub-conscious element. In this connection it may be pointed out that kṣetra is a term which is specially reserved to denote the complex of body and mind, exclusive of the living principle of the self, which is called kṣetra-jīna, or the knower of the kṣetra, or kṣetrin, the possessor of the kṣetra or the body-mind complex. It is said that, just as the sun illuminates this whole world, so does the kṣetrin illuminate the whole kṣetra¹.

It will be remembered that it is said in the Gitā that God has two different natures, one the complex whole of the five elements, ahamkāra, buddhi, etc., and the other the collective whole of life and spirit (jīva-bhūta). It will also be remembered that, by the fertilization of God’s power in prakṛti, the guṇas, or the characteristic qualities, which pervade all that is living, come into being. The guṇas, therefore, as diverse dynamic tendencies or characteristic qualities, pervade the entire psychosis-complex of ahamkāra, buddhi, the senses, consciousness, etc., which represents the mental side of the kṣetra. Kṣetra-jīna, or the kṣetrin, is in all probability the same as puruṣa, an all-pervading principle as subtle as ākāśa (space), which, though it is omnipresent, remains untouched by any of the qualities of the body, in which it manifests itself. It is difficult to say what, according to the Gitā, prakṛti is in itself, before the fertilization of God’s energy. It does not seem that prakṛti can be regarded as being identical with God. It appears more to be like an ultimate principle coexistent with God and intimately connected with Him. There is, however, no passage in the Gitā by which the lower prakṛti of God, consisting of the categories, etc., can be identified with prakṛti; for prakṛti is always associated with the guṇas and their production. Again, it is nowhere said in the Gitā that the categories ahamkāra, senses, etc., are in any way the products of the guṇas; the word guṇa seems to imply only the enjoyable, emotional and moral or immoral qualities. It is these guṇas which move us to all kinds of action, produce attachments and desires, make us enjoy or suffer, and associate us with virtues and vices. Prakṛti is regarded as the mother-source from which all the knowable, enjoyable, and dynamic qualities of experience, referred to as being generated by the successive preponderance of the guṇas, are produced. The categories of the psychosis and the five elements, which form the

¹ Gitā, xiii. 34.
mental ground, do not, therefore, seem to be products of the guṇas or the prakṛti. They seem to constitute a group by themselves, which is referred to as being a lower nature of God, side by side with His higher nature as life and spirit. Kṣetra is a complex of both the guṇa elements of experience and the complex categories of body and mind. There seem, therefore, to be three different principles, the aparā prakṛti (the lower nature), parā prakṛti or puruṣa, and prakṛti. Prakṛti produces the guṇas, which constitute experience-stuff; the aparā prakṛti holds within itself the material world of the five elements and their modifications as our bodies, the senses and the mind-categories. It seems very probable, therefore, that a later development of Sāmkhya combined these two prakṛtis as one, and held that the guṇas produced not only the stuff of our experience, but also all the mind-categories, the senses, etc., and the five gross elements and their modifications. The guṇas, therefore, are not the products of prakṛti, but they themselves constitute prakṛti, when in a state of equilibrium. In the Gītā prakṛti can only produce the guṇas through the fertilizing energy of God; they do not constitute the prakṛti, when in a state of equilibrium. It is hard to realize the connection between the aparā prakṛti and the prakṛti and the guṇas. The connection, however, can be imagined to take place through the medium of God, who is the fertilizer and upholder of them both. There seems to be but one puruṣa, as the all-pervading fundamental life-principle which animates all bodies and enjoys and suffers by its association with its experiences, remaining at the same time unaffected and untouched by the effects of the guṇas. This naturally presumes that there is also a higher and a lower puruṣa, of which the former is always unattached to and unaffected by the guṇas, whereas the lower puruṣa, which is different in different bodies, is always associated with the prakṛti and its guṇas and is continually affected by their operations. Thus it is said that the puruṣa, being in prakṛti, enjoys the guṇas of prakṛti and this is the cause of its rebirth in good or bad bodies1. There is also in this body the higher puruṣa (puruṣah parah), which is also called paramātman, being the passive perceiver, thinker, upholder, enjoyer and the great lord2. The word puruṣa is used in the Gītā in four distinct senses, firstly, in the

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1 Gītā, xiii. 21.
2 upadraṣṭānumantā ca bhartā bhoktā mahēśvarah
   paramātmeti cāpy ukto dehe 'smin puruṣah parah. Ibid. xiii. 23.
sense of puruṣottama, or God\(^1\); secondly, in the sense of a person\(^2\); and the Gitā distinctly speaks of the two other puruṣas as ksara (changeable) and akṣara (unchangeable). The ksara is all living beings, whereas the aksara is changeless. It is this higher self (uttamaḥ puruṣaḥ), different from the other puruṣa and called also paramātman, that pervades the three worlds and upholds them as their deathless God\(^3\). God, however, transcends both the ksara puruṣa and the aksara puruṣa and is therefore called puruṣottama\(^4\).

Both prakṛti and the paramātman puruṣa are beginningless. The paramātman puruṣa, being changeless and beyond the sphere of the guṇas, is neither the agent of anything nor affected by the guṇas, though it resides in the body. Prakṛti is regarded as the ground through which all causes, effects, and their agents are determined. It is the fundamental principle of all dynamic operations, motivations and actions, whereas puruṣa is regarded as the principle which makes all experiences of joys and sorrows possible\(^5\). The paramātman puruṣa, therefore, though all-pervasive, yet exists in each individual, being untouched by its experiences of joy, sorrow and attachment, as its higher self. It is only the lower self that goes through the experiences and is always under the influence of the guṇas. Any attempts that may be made to rise above the sphere of the guṇas, above attachments and desires, above pleasures and pains, mean the subordination of the lower self to the pure and deathless higher self. Every attempt in this direction implies a temporary communion (yoga) with the higher self. It has already been pointed out that the Gitā recognizes a conflict between the higher and the lower selves and advises us to raise the lower self by the higher self. In all our moral efforts there is always an upward and a downward pull by the higher puruṣa on the one side, and the guṇas on the other; yet the higher puruṣa does not itself make the pulls. The energy of the downward pull is derived from the guṇas and exerted by the lower self. In all these efforts the higher self stands as the unperturbed ideal of equanimity, steadiness, unchangeableness in good or evil, joys or sorrows. The presence of this superior self is sometimes intuited by self-meditation, sometimes through philosophic knowledge, and sometimes by our moral

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\(^1\) sanātanas tvam puruṣo mato me. Gitā, xi. 18.
\(^2\) tvam ādi-devaḥ puruṣaḥ puraṇaḥ. Ibid. xi. 38.
\(^3\) For puruṣottama see ibid. viii. 1, x. 15, xi. 3, xv. 18 and xv. 19.
\(^4\) Ibid. xi. 15, ii. 21, ii. 60, iii. 4, etc.
\(^5\) Ibid. xv. 16 and 17.
efforts to perform our duties without attachment and without desires. Each moral effort to perform our allotted duties without attachment means also a temporary communion (yoga) with the higher self or with God. A true philosophic knowledge, by which all actions are known to be due to the operations of the prakṛti and its guṇas and which realizes the unattached nature of the true self, the philosophic analysis of action and the relation between God, the higher self, the lower self, and the prakṛti, and any devotional realization of the nature of God and dedication of all action to Him, and the experience of the supreme bliss of living in communion with Him, mean a communion with the higher self or God, and are therefore yoga.

It is easy to notice here the beginnings of a system of thought which in the hands of other thinkers might well be developed into the traditional school of Sāṃkhya philosophy. It has already been pointed out that the two prakṛtis naturally suggested the idea of unifying them into the one prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya. The higher and the lower puruṣas, where the latter enjoys and suffers, while the former remains unchanged and unperturbed amidst all the experiences of joy and sorrow on the part of the latter, naturally remind one of the Upaniṣadic simile of the two birds in the same tree, of whom the one eats tasteful fruits while the other remains contented without them. The Gītā does not seem to explain clearly the nature of the exact relation between the higher puruṣa and the lower puruṣa. It does not definitely state whether the lower puruṣa is one or many, or describe its exact ontological states. It is easy to see how any attempt that would aim at harmonizing these two apparently loosely-connected puruṣas into one self-consistent and intelligible concept might naturally end in the theory of infinite, pure, all-pervasive puruṣas and make the lower puruṣa the product of a false and illusory mutual reflection of prakṛti and puruṣa. The Gītā uses the word māyā in three passages (vii. 14 and 15, xviii. 61); but it seems to be used there in the sense of an inscrutable power or ignorance, and not in that of illusory or magical creation. The idea that the world or any of the mental or spiritual categories could be merely an illusory appearance seems never to have been

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1. dhyaṇenātmani paśyanti hecid ātmānaṁ ātmanā anye sāṃkhya-yogena karma-yogena cāpāre. Gītā, xiv. 25.

2. Muṇḍaka, iii. 1. 1 and Śvetāṣṭarata, 4. 6.
contemplated in the Gītā. It is not, therefore, conceivable that the lower, or the kṣara, puruṣa might be mere illusory creation, accepted as a necessary postulate to explain the facts of our undeniable daily experience. But it is difficult to say how this kṣetra-jīna puruṣa can have a separate existence from the para puruṣa (which is absolutely free from the guṇas), as enjoying the guṇas of prakṛti, unless the former be somehow regarded as the result of the functioning of the latter. Such a view would naturally support a theory that would regard the lower puruṣa as being only the para puruṣa as imaged or reflected in the guṇas. The para puruṣa, existing by itself, free from the influence of the guṇas, is in its purity. But even without losing its unattached character and its lonely purity it may somehow be imaged in the guṇas and play the part of the phenomenal self, the jīva or the lower puruṣa, enjoying the guṇas of prakṛti and having the superior puruṣa as its ultimate ground. It cannot be denied that the Gītā theory of puruṣa is much looser than the later Sāṁkhya theory; but it has the advantage of being more elastic, as it serves better to explain the contact of the lower puruṣa with the higher and thereby charges the former with the spirit of a higher ideal.

The qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas were regarded as the universal characteristics of all kinds of mental tendencies, and all actions were held to be prompted by specific kinds of sattva, rajas or tamas. Mental tendencies were also designated accordingly as sattvika, rājas or tāmasa. Thus religious inclinations (śraddhā) are also described as being of a threefold nature. Those who are of sattvika nature worship the gods, those who are of rājas nature worship the yakṣas and the rakṣas and those who are of tāmasa nature worship ghosts and demons. Those who, prompted by vanity, desires and attachments, perform violent ascetic penances unauthorized by the scriptures and thereby starve and trouble their body and spirit, are really demoniac in their temperament. Again, sattvika sacrifices are those performed solely out of reverence for the scriptural injunctions and from a pure sense of duty, without any desire or motive for any other kind of worldly or heavenly good. Again, rājas sacrifices are those which are performed for the realization of some benefits or good results or for the satisfaction of some vanity or pride. Tāmasa sacrifices are those which are performed without proper faith, with improper ceremonials, transgressing Vedic injunctions. Again, tapas also is described as
being threefold, as of body (śārira), of speech (vāṇmaya) and of mind (māṇasa). Adoration of gods, Brahmns, teachers and wise men, sincerity and purity, sex-continence and non-injury are known as physical or bodily tapas. To speak in a manner that would be truthful, attractive, and conducive to good and would not be harmful in any way, and to study in the regular and proper way are regarded as the tapas of speech (vāṇ-maya tapas). Mental (māṇasa) tapas consists of sincerity of mind, friendliness of spirit, thoughtfulness and mental control, self-control and purity of mind. The above threefold tapas performed without any attachment for a reward is called sātteika tapas. But tapas performed out of vanity, or for the sake of higher position, respectability in society, or appreciation from people, is called rājasa—such a tapas can lead only to unsteady and transient results. Again, the tapas which is performed for the destruction of others by ignorant self-mortification is called tāmasa tapas. Gifts, again, are called sātteika when they are made to proper persons (holy Brahmns) on auspicious occasions, and in holy places, merely out of sense of duty. Gifts are called rājasa when they are made as a return for the good done to the performer, for gaining future rewards, or made unwillingly. Again, gifts are called tāmasa when they are made slightly, to improper persons, in unholy places, and in ordinary places. Those who desire liberation perform sacrifices and tapas and make gifts without aiming at the attainment of any mundane or heavenly benefits. Knowledge also is regarded as sātteika, rājasa and tāmasa. Sātteika wisdom consists in looking for unity and diversity and in realizing one unchangeable reality in the apparent diversity of living beings. Rājasa knowledge consists in the scientific apprehension of things or living beings as diverse in kind, character and number. Tāmasa knowledge consists in narrow and untrue beliefs which are satisfied to consider a little thing as the whole and entire truth through sheer dogmatism, and unreasonable delusion or attachment. An action is called sātteika when it is performed without any desire for a reward, without attachment and without aversion. It is called rājasa when it is performed with elaborate endeavours and efforts, out of pride and vanity, for the satisfaction of one’s desires. It is called tāmasa when it is undertaken out of ignorance and without proper judgment of one’s own capacities, and when it leads to waste of energy, harm and injury. An agent (kartrty) is called sātteika when he is free from attachment
and vanity and absolutely unruflled in success and failure, persevering and energetic. Again, an agent is called rājas a if he acts out of motives of self-interest, is impure, is filled with sorrow or joy in failure or success, and injures others. An agent is called tāmasa if he is careless, haughty, thoughtless, deceptive, arrogant, idle, procrastinating and melancholic. Understanding (buddhi) is said to be sāttvika when it grasps how a man has to set himself in the path of virtue, how to refrain from vice, what ought and what ought not to be done, of what one has to be afraid and how to be fearless, what is bondage, and what is liberation. Rājasa understanding is that by which one wrongly grasps the nature of virtue and vice, and of right and wrong conduct. Tāmasa understanding is that which takes vice as virtue and out of ignorance perceives all things wrongly. That mental hold (dhṛti) is called sāttvika which by unfailing communion holds together the sense-functions and biomotor and mind activities. That happiness which in the beginning appears to be painful, but which is in the end as sweet as nectar, and which is the direct result of gaiety of mind, is called sāttvika sukha. The happiness arising out of sense-object contact, which in the beginning is as attractive as nectar, but in the end is as painful as poison, is rājasa. That happiness which arises out of sleep, idleness and errors, and blinds one in the beginning and in the end, is called tāmasa. So also the food which increases life, facilitates mind-function, increases powers of enjoyment, makes one healthy and strong, and is sweet, resistible and delightful is liked by the sāttvika people. That food is liked by rājasa people which is hot, sour, salt, dry and causes pain and brings on diseases. The food which is impure, tasteless, old and rotten is liked by tāmasa people. All this goes to show that the guṇas, sattva, rajas and tamas, are determinants of the tendencies of, or rather the stuff of, the moral and immoral, pleasurable and painful planes or characteristics of our experience. Sattva represents the moral and supermoral planes, rajas the ordinary mixed and normal plane, and tamas the inferior and immoral characteristics of our experience.

Avyakta and Brahman.

The word avyakta is primarily used in the Gītā in the sense of “the unmanifested.” Etymologically the word consists of two parts, the negative particle a meaning “negation,” and vyakta meaning “manifested,” “differentiated” or “revealed.” In this
sense the word is used as an adjective. There is another use of the word in the neuter gender (avyaktam), in the sense of a category. As an illustration of the first sense, one may refer to the Gitā, II. 25 or VIII. 21. Thus in II. 25 the self is described as the unmanifested; unthinkable and unchangeable. In the Upaniṣads, however, it is very unusual to characterize the self as avyakta or unmanifested; for the self there is pure consciousness and self-manifested. In all later Vedāntic works the self is described as anubhūti-svabhāva, or as being always immediately intuited. But in the Gitā the most prominent characteristic of the self is that it is changeless and deathless; next to this, it is unmanifested and unthinkable. But it does not seem that the Gitā describes the self as pure consciousness. Not only does it characterize the self as avyakta or unmanifested, but it does not seem anywhere to refer to it as a self-conscious principle. The word cetanā, which probably means consciousness, is described in the Gitā as being a part of the changeable kṣetra, and not the kṣetra-jñā. It may naturally be asked how, if the self was not a conscious principle, could it be described as kṣetra-jñā (that which knows the kṣetra)? But it may well be replied that the self here is called kṣetra-jñā only in relation to its kṣetra, and the implication would be that the self becomes a conscious principle not by virtue of its own inherent principle of consciousness, but by virtue of the principle of consciousness reflected or offered to it by the complex entity of the kṣetra. The kṣetra contains within it the conscious principle known as cetanā, and it is by virtue of its association with the self that the self appears as kṣetra-jñā or the knower.

It may not be out of place here to mention that the term kṣetra is never found in the Upaniṣads in the technical sense in which it is used in the Gitā. The term kṣetra-jñā, however, appears in Śvetāsvatara, vi. 16 and Maitrāyaṇa, II. 5 in the sense of puruṣa, as in the Gitā. The term kṣetra, however, as used in the Gitā, has more or less the same sense that it has in Caraka’s account of Sāṁkhya in the Caraka-saṁhitā, III. 1. 61–63. In Caraka, however, avyakta is excluded from the complex constituent kṣetra, though in the Gitā it is included within the constituents of kṣetra. Caraka again considers avyakta (by which term he means both the Sāṁkhya prakṛti and the puruṣa) as kṣetra-jñā, whereas the Gitā takes only the puruṣa as kṣetra-jñā. The puruṣa of the Gitā is further

1 Gitā, xiii. 7.
characterized as the life-principle (*jīva-bhūta, vii. 5 and xv. 7) by which the whole world is upheld. The Gītā does not, however, describe in what particular way the life-principle upholds the world. In Caraka’s account also the ātman is referred to as the life-principle, and it is held there that it is the principle which holds together the buddhi, the senses, the mind and the objects—it is also the principle for which good, bad, pleasure, pain, bondage, liberation, and in fact the whole world-process happens. In the Caraka-saṃhitā puruṣa is regarded as cetanā-dhātu, or the upholder of consciousness; yet it is not regarded as conscious by itself. Consciousness only comes to it as a result of the joint operation of manas, the senses, the objects, etc. In the Gītā puruṣa is not regarded as the cetanā-dhātu, but cetanā or consciousness is regarded as being a constituent of the kṣetra over which the puruṣa presides. Thus knowledge can accrue to puruṣa as kṣetra-jña, only in association with its kṣetra. It may well be supposed that puruṣa as kṣetra-jña and as a life-principle upholds the constituents of the kṣetra, and it is probable that the puruṣa’s position as a cognizer or knower depends upon this intimate association between itself and the kṣetra.

Another relevant point is suggested along with the considerations of the nature of the puruṣa as the cognizer, namely, the consideration of the nature of puruṣa as an agent (kārtya). It will be pointed out in another section that the fruition of actions is rendered possible by the combined operations of adhisthāna, kartr, kāraṇa, caṣṭā and daiva, and this doctrine has been regarded as being a Śaṅkhya doctrine, though it has been interpreted by Śāṅkara as being a Vedāntic view. But both Śaṅkhya and the Vedānta theories are explicitly of the sat-kārya-vāda type. According to the sat-kārya-vāda of the traditional Śaṅkhya philosophy the fruition of actions is the natural result of a course of unfolding evolution, consisting in the actualization of what was already potentially present. On the Vedāntic sat-kārya-vāda view all operations are but mere appearances, and the cause alone is true. Neither of these doctrines would seem to approve of a theory of causation which would imply that anything could be the result of the joint operation of a number of factors. That which is not cannot be produced by the joint operation of a collocation of causes. It may be remembered, however, that the Gītā explicitly formulates the basic principle of sat-kārya-vāda, that what exists cannot be destroyed and that what does not exist cannot come into being.
This principle was applied for proving the deathless character of the self. It is bound to strike anyone as very surprising that the Gītā should accept the sat-kārya-vāda doctrine in establishing the immortality of the self and should assume the a-sat-kārya-vāda doctrine regarding the production of action. It is curious, however, to note that a similar view regarding the production of action is to be found in Caraka's account of Sāmkhya, where it is said that all actions are produced as a result of a collocation of causes—that actions are the results of the collocation of other entities with the agent (karyā)\(^1\).

The word avyakta is also used in the sense of "unknowability" or "disappearance" in the Gītā, ii. 28, where it is said that the beginnings of all beings are invisible and unknown; it is only in the middle that they are known, and in death also they disappear and become unknown. But the word avyakta in the neuter gender means a category which is a part of God Himself and from which all the manifested manifold world has come into being. This avyakta is also referred to as a prakṛti or nature of God, which, under His superintendence, produces the moving and the unmoved—the entire universe\(^2\). But God Himself is sometimes referred to as being avyakta (probably because He cannot be grasped by any of our senses), as an existence superior to the avyakta, which is described as a part of His nature, and as a category from which all things have come into being\(^3\). This avyakta which is identical with God is also called akṣara, or the immortal, and is regarded as the last resort of all beings who attain their highest and most perfect realization. Thus there is a superior avyakta, which represents the highest essence of God, and an inferior avyakta, from which the world is produced. Side by side with these two avyaktas there is also the prakṛti, which is sometimes described as a coexistent principle and as the māyā or the blinding power of God, from which the guṇas are produced.

The word "Brahman" is used in at least two or three different senses. Thus in one sense it means prakṛti, from which the guṇas are produced. In another sense it is used as an essential nature of God. In another sense it means the Vedas. Thus in the Gītā,

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1 Caraka-saṃhitā, iv. 1. 54.
2 Gītā, ix. 10, māyādhikṣeṣa prakṛtiḥ sūyate sacarācaram.
3 Ibid. viii. 20 and viii. 21; also ix. 4, where it is said, "All the world is pervaded over by me in my form as avyakta; all things and all living beings are in me, but I am not exhausted in them."
III. 15, it is said that the sacrificial duties are derived from Brahman (Vedas). Brahman is derived from the eternal; therefore the omnipresent Brahman is always established in the sacrifices\(^1\). The idea here is that, since the Vedas have sprung from the eternal Brahman, its eternal and omnipresent character is transmitted to the sacrifices also. The word "omnipresent" (saeva-gata) is probably used in reference to the sacrifices on account of the diverse and manifold ways in which the sacrifices are supposed to benefit those who perform them. In the Gītā, iv. 32, also the word "Brahman" in Brahmano mukhe is used to denote the Vedas. But in iv. 24 and 25, where it is said that all sacrifices are to be made with the Brahman as the object and that the sacrificial materials, sacrificial fire, etc. are to be looked upon as being Brahman, the word "Brahman" is in all probability used in the sense of God\(^2\). In v. 6, 10, 19 also the word "Brahman" is used in the sense of God or Īśvara; and in most of the other cases the word is used in the sense of God. But according to the Gītā the personal God as Īśvara is the supreme principle, and Brahman, in the sense of a qualityless, undifferentiated ultimate principle as taught in the Upaniṣads, is a principle which, though great in itself and representing the ultimate essence of God, is nevertheless upheld by the personal God or Īśvara. Thus, though in VIII. 3 and X. 12 Brahman is referred to as the differenceless ultimate principle, yet in XIV. 27 it is said that God is the support of even this ultimate principle, Brahman. In many places we also hear of the attainment of Brahmahood (brahma-bhūta, v. 24, VI. 27, XVIII. 54, or brahma-bhūya, XIV. 26), and also of the attainment of the ultimate bliss of Brahman (Brahma-nirvāṇa, II. 72, v. 24, 25, 26). The word brahma-bhūta does not in the Gītā mean the differenceless merging into oneness, as in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara. It is wrong to think that the term "Brahman" is always used in the same sense in which Śaṅkara used it. The word "Brahman" is used in the sense of an ultimate differenceless principle in the Upaniṣads, and the Upaniṣads were apprized by all systems of Hindu thought as the repository of all sacred knowledge. Most systems regarded the attainment of a changeless eternal state as the final goal of realization. As an illustration, I may refer to the account of

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\(^1\) Gītā, iii. 15.

\(^2\) Śrīdhara, in interpreting this verse (iv. 24), explains it by saying, tad evam paramesvaro rādhanā-lakṣaṇam kārma jñāna-hetuteṇa bandhakatvābhāvād akarmaiva.
Sāmkhya given by Caraka, in which it is said that, when a man gives up all attachment and mental and physical actions, all feelings and knowledge ultimately and absolutely cease. At this stage he is reduced to Brahmahood (brahma-bhūta), and the self is no longer manifested. It is a stage which is beyond all existence and which has no connotation, characteristic or mark¹. This state is almost like a state of annihilation, and yet it is described as a state of Brahmahood. The word “Brahman” was appropriated from the Upaniṣads and was used to denote an ultimate superior state of realization, the exact nature of which differed with the different systems. In the Gītā also we find the word “Brahman” signifying a high state of self-realization in which, through a complete detachment from all passions, a man is self-contented within himself and his mind is in a perfect state of equilibrium. In the Gītā, v. 19, Brahman is defined as the faultless state of equilibrium (nirdoṣam hi samam brahma), and in all the verses of that context the sage who is in a state of equanimity and equilibrium through detachment and passionlessness is said to be by virtue thereof in Brahman; for Brahman means a state of equanimity. In the Gītā, xiii. 13, Brahman is described as the ultimate object of knowledge, which is beginningless, and cannot be said to be either existent or non-existent (na sat tan nāsad ucyate). It is said that this Brahman has His hands and feet, eyes, head, mouth and ears everywhere in the world, and that He envelopes all. He is without senses, but He illuminates all sense-qualities; Himself unattached and the upholder of all, beyond the guṇas, He is also the enjoyer of the guṇas. He is both inside and outside of all living beings, of all that is moving and that is unmoved. He is both near and far, but unknowable on account of His subtle nature. Being one in many, yet appearing as many, the upholder of all living beings, the devourer and overpowerer of all, He is the light of all light, beyond all darkness, He is both knowledge and the object of knowledge, residing in the heart of all. It is easy to see that the whole concept of Brahman, as herein stated, is directly borrowed from the Upaniṣads. Towards the end of this chapter it is said that he who perceives the many living beings as being in one, and realizes everything as an emanation or elaboration from that, becomes Brahman. But in the next chapter Kṛṣṇa as God says,

¹ nihṣytaḥ sarva-bhāveḥhyād cihnam yasya na vidyate. 

Caraka-saṃhitā, iv. 1. 153.
"I am the upholder of the immortal and imperishable Brahman of absolute bliss and of the eternal dharma." In the Gitā, xiv. 26, it is said that "he who worships me unflinchingly through devotion, transcends all guṇas and becomes Brahman." It has just been remarked that the Gitā recognizes two different kinds of avyakta. It is the lower avyakta nature of God which has manifested itself as the universe; but there is a higher avyakta, which is beyond it as the eternal and unchangeable basis of all. It seems very probable, therefore, that Brahman is identical with this higher avyakta. But, though this higher avyakta is regarded as the highest essence of God, yet, together with the lower avyakta and the selves, it is upheld in the super-personality of God.

The question whether the Gitā is a Sāṁkhya or a Vedānta work, or originally a Sāṁkhya work which was later on revised, changed, or enlarged from a Vedānta point of view, need not be elaborately discussed here. For, if the interpretation of the Gitā, as given herein, be accepted, then it will be evident that the Gitā is neither a Sāṁkhya work nor a Vedānta work. It has been pointed out that the word sāṁkhya, in the Gitā, does not mean the traditional Sāṁkhya philosophy, as found in Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s Kārikā. But there are, no doubt, here the scattered elements of an older philosophy, from which not only the Sāṁkhya of Īśvarakṛṣṇa or the Saṭṭhi-tantra (of which Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s work was a summary) developed, but even its earlier version, as found in Caraka’s account, could be considered to have developed. There is no doubt that the Gitā’s account of Sāṁkhya differs materially from the Sāṁkhya of the Saṭṭhi-tantra or of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, from the Sāṁkhya of Caraka, from the Sāṁkhya of Pañcaśikha in the Mahā-bhārata and from the Sāṁkhya of Patañjali and the Vyāsa-bhāṣya. Ordinarily the Sāṁkhya of Patañjali is described as a theistic Sāṁkhya (seśvara-sāṁkhya); but the Īsvara of Patañjali is but loosely attached to the system of Sāṁkhya thought as expounded in Yoga. The Īsvara there appears only as a supernormal, perfect being, who by his permanent will removes the barriers in the path of the evolution of prakṛti in accordance with the law of karma. He thus merely helps the fulfilment of the teleology of the blind prakṛti. But in the Gitā both the puruṣas and the root of the cosmic nature are but parts of God, the super-person (puruṣottama). The prakṛti, from which the guṇas which have only subjectivistic characteristics are derived, is described as the māyā power of God, or like a
consort to Him, who, being fertilized by His energies, produces the guṇas. The difference of the philosophy of the Gītā from the various schools of Sāṃkhya is very evident. Instead of the one prakṛti of Sāṃkhya we have here the three prakṛtis of God. The guṇas here are subjectivistic or psychical, and not cosmical. It is because the Gītā admits a prakṛti which produces the subjectivistic guṇas by which the puruṣas are bound with ties of attachment to their experiences, that such a prakṛti could fitly be described as guṇamaya māyā (māyā consisting of guṇas). The puruṣas, again, though they are many, are on the whole but emanations from a specific prakṛti (divine nature) of God. The puruṣas are not stated in the Gītā to be of the nature of pure intelligence, as in the Śaṅkhya; but the cognizing element of consciousness (cetanā) is derived from another prakṛti of God, which is associated with the puruṣa. It has also been pointed out that the Gītā admits the sat-kārya-vāda doctrine with reference to immortality of the self, but not with reference to the fruition of actions or the rise of consciousness. The Śaṅkhya category of tan-mātra is missing in the Gītā, and the general teleology of the prakṛti of the Śaṅkhya is replaced by the super-person of God, who by his will gives a unity and a purpose to all the different elements that are upheld within Him. Both the Śaṅkhya of Kapila and that of Patañjali aim at securing, either through knowledge or through Yoga practices, the final loneliness of the translucent puruṣas. The Gītā, however, is anxious to secure the saintly equanimity and a perfect, unperturbed nature by the practice of detachment of the mind from passions and desires. When such a saintly eqauanimity and self-contentedness is achieved, the sage is said to be in a state of liberation from the bondage of guṇa-attachments, or to be in a state of Brahmahood in God. The philosophy of the Gītā thus differs materially from the traditional Śaṅkhya philosophy on almost every point. On some minor points (e.g. the absence of tan-mātras, the nature of the production of knowledge and action, etc.) the Gītā philosophy has some similarities with the account of the Śaṅkhya given in the Caraka-samhitā, iv. 1, as already described in the first volume of this work.

The question whether the Gītā was written under a Vedāntic influence cannot be answered, unless one understands what is exactly meant by this Vedāntic influence; if by Vedāntic influence

1 A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. ii, 1922, pp. 213-222.
one means the influence of the Upaniṣads, then the Gītā must plainly be admitted to have borrowed very freely from the Upaniṣads, which from the earliest times had been revered for their wisdom. If, however, by Vedāntic influence one means the philosophy of Vedānta as taught by Śaṅkara and his followers, then it must be said that the Gītā philosophy is largely different therefrom. It has already been pointed out that, though Brahman is often described in Upaniṣadic language as the highest essence of God, it is in reality a part of the super-personality of God. The Gītā, moreover, does not assert anywhere that Brahman is the only reality and all else that appears is false and unreal. The word māyā is, no doubt, used in the Gītā in three passages; but its meaning is not what Śaṅkara ascribes to it in his famous interpretation of Vedāntic thought. Thus in the Gītā, vii. 14, māyā is described as being of the nature of guṇas, and it is said that he who clings to God escapes the grip of the māyā or of the guṇas. In the Gītā, vii. 15, the word māyā is also probably used in the same sense, since it is said that it is ignorant and sinful men who, through demoniac ideas, lose their right wisdom under the influence of māyā and do not cling to God. In all probability, here also māyā means the influence of rajas and tamas; for it has been repeatedly said in the Gītā that demoniac tendencies are generated under the preponderating influence of rajas and tamas. In the Gītā, xviii. 61, it is said that God resides in the heart of all living beings and moves them by māyā, like dolls on a machine. It has been pointed out that the psychical tendencies and moral or immoral propensities which move all men to action are produced under the influence of the guṇas, and that God is the ultimate generator of the guṇas from the prakṛti. The māyā, therefore, may well be taken here to mean guṇas, as in the Gītā, vii. 14. Śrīdhara takes it to mean the power of God. The guṇas are, no doubt, in a remote sense, powers of God. But Śaṅkara’s paraphrasing of it as deception (chadmanā) is quite inappropriate. Thus it is evident that the Gītā does not know the view that the world may be regarded as a manifestation of māyā or illusion. It has also been pointed out that the word “Brahman” is used in the Gītā in the sense of the Vedas, of faultless equanimity, of supreme essence and of prakṛti, which shows that it had no such crystallized technical sense as in the philosophy of Śaṅkara. The word had in the Gītā all the looseness of Upaniṣadic
usage. In the *Gitā* the word *avidyā*, so famous in Śaṅkara’s philosophy of the Vedānta, is nowhere used. The word *ajñāna* is used several times (v. 15, 16; x. 11; xiii. 11; xiv. 8, 16, 17; xvi. 4); but it has no special technical sense in any of these passages. It has the sense of “ignorance” or “misconception,” which is produced by *tamas* (*ajñānaṃ tamasah phalam*, xiv. 16) and which in its turn produces *tamas* (*tamas te ajñāna-jan ivaiddhi*, xiv. 8).

Conception of Sacrificial Duties in the *Gitā*.

The Vedic view of the obligatoriness of certain kinds of sacrifices or substitution-meditations permeated almost all forms of Hindu thought, excepting the Vedānta philosophy as interpreted by Śaṅkara. The conception of the obligatoriness of duties finds its best expression in the analysis of *vidhi* in the Mīmāṃsā philosophy. *Vidhi* means the injunctions of the Vedas, such as, “Thou should’st perform such and such sacrifices”; sometimes these are conditional, such as, “Those who wish to attain Heaven should perform such and such sacrifices”; sometimes they are unconditional, such as, “Thou should’st say the three prayers.” The force of this *vidhi*, or injunction, is differently interpreted in the different schools of Mīmāṃsā. Kumārila, the celebrated commentator, in interpreting Jaimini’s definition of *dharma*, or virtue, as a desirable end (*artha*) or good which is enjoined by the Vedic commands (*codanā-lakṣano ’rtho dharmah*, Mīmāṃsā-sūtra, 1. 1), says that it is the performance of the Vedic injunctions, sacrifices, etc. (*yāgādhiḥ*) that should be called our duty. The definition of virtue, then, involves the notion that only such a desired end (on account of the pain associated with it not exceeding the associated pleasure) as is enjoined by Vedic commands is called *dharma*. The sacrifices enjoined by the Vedas are called *dharma*, because these would in future produce pleasurable experiences. So one’s abstention from actions prohibited by Vedic commands is also called *dharma*, as by this means one can avoid the undesirable effects and sufferings of punishments as a result of transgressing those commands. Such sacrifices, however, are ultimately regarded as *artha*, or desired ends, because they produce pleasurable experiences. The imperative of Vedic commands is supposed to operate in a twofold manner, firstly, as initiating a volitional tendency in obedience to the verbal command (*śābdī bhāvanā*), and, secondly, in releasing
the will to the actual performance of the act enjoined by the command (ārthī bhāvanā). The propulsion of verbal commands is not like any physical propulsion; such a propulsion only arises as a result of one’s comprehension of the fact that the performance of the acts enjoined will lead to beneficial results, and it naturally moves one to perform those acts out of self-interest\(^1\). So of the twofold propulsion (bhāvanā) implied in a Vedic imperative the propulsion to act, as communicated by the verbal command, is called sābdī bhāvanā; and this is followed by the actual efforts of the person for the performance of the act\(^2\). The prescriptive of the command (vidhi) is comprehended directly from the imperative suffix (lin) of the verb, even before the meaning of the verb is realized. If this is so, it is contended that the imperative, as it is communicated by the command, is a pure contentless form of command. This contention is admitted by the Bhaṭṭa school, which thinks that, though in the first stage we have communication of the contentless pure form of the imperative, yet at the successive stages the contentless form of duty is naturally supplemented by a more direct reference to the concrete context, as denoted by the verb with which the suffix is associated. So the process of the propulsion of bhāvanā, though it starts at the first instance with the communication of a pure contentless form, passes, by reason of its own necessity and the incapacity of a contentless form of duty to stand by itself, gradually through more and more concrete stages to the actual comprehension of the duty implied by the concrete meaning of the associated verb\(^3\). So the communication of the contentless duty and its association with the concrete verbal meaning are not two different meanings, but are

\(^1\) adṛṣṭe tu viṣaye īreyah-sūdhānādhigamaḥ śabdaika-nibandhana iti tad-adhi-

\(^2\) gamopāyaḥ śabda eva pravartakah; ata eva śabdo ’pi na svartāpamāvṛteṇa prav-

\(^3\) vartako vāy-vādi-tulyatva-prasāṅgāt;...arthaprattim upajanaṇayāḥ śabdasya prav-

\(^1\) vartakatvaṁ. Nyāya-maṅjarī, p. 342. The Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1895.

\(^2\) Līṁ-ādeḥ śabdasya na pratti-janaṇa-mātṛte vyāpārah kintu puruṣa-pravṛttvāc

\(^3\) api; sa ca yam līṁ-ādi-vyāpārah śabda-bhāvanā-nāmadheya vidhiḥ ity ucyate sa eva

\(^1\) ca pravartakah...yo bhavanā-kiṛtya-kārtī-vaishvamā pravajaka-vyāpārah puruṣa-stho

\(^2\) yatrac bhavanā-kiṛtyaḥ kartā scargasādikarmatāṁ āpayate so ’rtha-bhāvanā-sabd-

\(^3\) da ucyate. Ibid. p. 343.

\(^1\) Yady api amśair asamprastāṁ vidhiḥ sūtyaiḥ bhaṅjām

\(^2\) tathāpya ataikato nāsa eva tan-mātṛte paryavasyati

\(^3\) anuṣṭheṣe hi viṣaye vidhiḥ punamām pravartakāṁ

\(^1\) amśa-trayena ca caupānām nānuiśthhati bhāvanām

\(^2\) tasmat prakṛtaṁ-rūpā ’pi vidhiḥ ātavat prattikṣate

\(^3\) yāvad yogayatveṣu āpannā bhāvanā nyānapākiṣṭe. Ibid. p. 344.
rather the prolongation of one process of communication, just as cooking includes all the different associated acts of putting the pan on the fire, lighting the fire, and the like. These two bhāvanās, therefore, mean nothing more than the reasoning of the will and its translation into definite channels of activity, as the performance of the sacrifice, etc., and vidhi here means simply the prompting or the propulsion (vyāpārah preraṇā-rūpah); and it is such prompting that initiates in the performer the will, which is later on translated into concrete action.

Another Mīmāṃsā view objects to this theory of dual bhāvanā and asserts that the suffix lin involves the notion of an order to work (prerana), as if the relation of the Vedas to us were one of master and servant, and that the Vedic vidhi as expressed in the lin suffix conveys the command (praiṣya-praiṣayoh sambandhah). The vidhi goads us to work, and, being goaded by it, we turn to work. It does not physically compel us to act; but the feeling we have from it that we must be ordered to act constitutes the driving power. The knowledge of vidhi thus drives us to our Vedic duties. When a man hears the command, he feels that he has been commanded and then he sets to work. This setting to work is quite a different operation from the relation of the command and the commanded, and comes after it. The essence of a Vedic sentence is this command or niyoga. A man who has formerly tasted the benefits of certain things or the pleasures they produced naturally intends to have them again; here also there is a peculiar mental experience of eagerness, desire or intention (ākūta), which goads him on to obey the Vedic commands. This akūta is a purely subjective experience and cannot, therefore, be experienced by others, though one can always infer its existence from the very fact that, unless it were felt in the mind, no one would feel himself goaded to work. Niyoga, or a prompting to work (prerana), is the sense of all vidhis, and this rouses in us the intention of working in accordance with the command. The actual performance of an action is a mere counterpart of the intention (ākūta), that is subjectively felt as roused by the niyoga or the


2 Ayam api bhauṭika-eyāpāra-hetur ātmākūta-vīśeṣo na pramāṇāntara-vedyO bhavati na ca na vedyate tat-saṁvedane satī cestā yadvam praman pramanād evagamO 'numāntyate. Ibid. p. 348.
driving power of the *vidhi*. This view differs from the view of Kumārila in this, that it does not suppose that the propulsion of the Vedic command takes effect in a twofold *bhāvanā*, through the whole process of the conception and the materialization of the action in accordance with the Vedic commands. The force of the command is exhausted in prompting us to action and arousing in us the inward resolution (*ākūta*) to obey the command. The actual performance of the action comes as a natural consequence (*arthā*). The force of the *vidhi* has a field of application only when our ordinary inclinations do not naturally lead us to the performance of action. *Vidhi*, therefore, operates merely as a law of command which has to be obeyed for the sake of the law alone, and it is this psychological factor of inward resolution to obey the law that leads to the performance of action.

Maṇḍana, in his *Vidhi-viveka*, discusses the diverse views on the significance of *vidhi*. He interprets *vidhi* as a specific kind of prompting (*prāvartanā*). He distinguishes the inner volitional intention of attaining an end and its translation into active effort leading to muscular movements of the body. *Prāvartanā* here means the inner volitional direction of the mind towards the performance of the action, as well as actual nervous changes which are associated with it\(^1\). The command of the Vedas naturally brings with it a sense of duty or of “oughtness” (*kartaṇyaṭā*), and it is this sense of *kartaṇyaṭā* that impels people to action without any reference to the advantages and benefits that may be reaped by such actions. The psychological state associated with such a feeling of “oughtness” is said to be of the nature of instincts (*pratibhā*). It is through an instinctive stimulus to work, proceeding from the sense of “oughtness,” that the action is performed.

The Nyāya doctrine differs from the above view of *vidhi* as a categorically imperative order and holds that the prompting of the Vedic commands derives its force from our desire for the attainment of the benefits that we might reap if we acted in accordance with them. So the ultimate motive of the action is the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain, and it is only with a view to attaining the desired ends that one is prompted to follow the Vedic

\(^1\) *Bhāva-dharma eva kaścit samhitā-sūdhanānuguno vyāpāra-padaśārah; tad yathā ātmāno buddhy-ādi-janana-pravṛttasya manah-sanyoga eva’yaṁ bhāva-dharmaṁ tadvad atrāpi spandasya tad-ītaro vā bhāva-dharmaṁ pravṛtti-janana-mukti-lasya vyāpāra-tīṣaṁ prāvartanā. Vācaspati’s *Nyāya-kanitā* on *Vidhi-viveka*, pp. 243, 244.*
commands and perform the sacrifices. In this view, therefore, the prompting, or preranā, has not in it that self-evident call of the pure imperative or the rousing of the volitional tendency through the influence of the imperative; the prompting felt is due only to the rise of desires for the end.

Most of the above interpretations of vidhi are of much later date than the Gītā. No systematic discussion of the nature of vidhi which can be regarded as contemporaneous with or prior to the date of the Gītā is now available. But even these latter-day explanations are useful in understanding the significance of the force of the notion of the imperative in the Gītā. It is clear from the above discussion that the notion of the imperative of vidhi cannot be called moral in our sense of the term, as has been done in a recent work on Hindu Ethics. For the imperative of vidhi is limited to the injunctions of the Vedas, which are by no means coextensive with our general notion of morality. According to the Mīmāṃsā schools just described virtue (dharma) consists in obedience to Vedic injunctions. Whatever may be enjoined by the Vedas is to be considered as virtue, whatever is prohibited by the Vedas is evil and sin, and all other things which are neither enjoined by the Vedas nor prohibited by them are neutral, i.e. neither virtuous nor vicious. The term dharma is therefore limited to actions enjoined by the Vedas, even though such actions may in some cases be associated with evil consequences leading to punishments due to the transgression of some other Vedic commands. The categorical imperative here implied is scriptural and therefore wholly external. The virtuous character of actions does not depend on their intrinsic nature, but on the external qualification of being enjoined by the Vedas.

1 S. K. Maitra’s Hindu Ethics, written under Dr Seal’s close personal supervision and guidance.
2 Kumārila holds that even those sacrifices which are performed for the killing of one’s enemies are right, because they are also enjoined by the Vedas. Prabhākara, however, contends that, since these are performed only out of the natural evil propensities of men, their performance cannot be regarded as being due to a sense of duty associated with obedience to the injunctions of the Vedas. Kumārila thus contends that, though the Śyena sacrifice is attended with evil consequences, yet, since the performer is only concerned with his duty in connection with the Vedic commands, he is not concerned with the evil consequences; and it is on account of one’s obedience to the Vedic injunctions that it is called right, though the injury to living beings that it may involve will bring about its punishment all the same. Sāṁkhya and some Nyāya writers, however, would condemn the Śyena sacrifice on account of the injury to living beings that it involves.
Whatever is not enjoined in the Vedas or not prohibited in them is simply neutral. It is clear, therefore, that the term dharma can be translated as "virtue" only in a technical sense, and the words "moral" and "immoral" in our sense have nothing to do with the concept of dharma or adharma.

The Gītā distinguishes between two kinds of motives for the performance of sacrifices. The first motive is that of greed and self-interest, and the second is a sense of duty. The Gītā is aware of that kind of motive for the performance which corresponds to the Nyāya interpretation of Vedic vidhis and also to the general Mīmāṃsā interpretation of vidhi as engendering a sense of duty. Thus it denounces those fools who follow the Vedic doctrines and do not believe in anything else; they are full of desires and eager to attain Heaven, they take to those actions which lead to rebirth and the enjoyment of mundane pleasures. People who are thus filled with greed and desires, and perform sacrifices for the attainment of earthly goods, move in an inferior plane and are not qualified for the higher scheme of life of devotion to God with right resolution. The Vedas are said to be under the influence of mundane hankerings and desires, and it is through passions and antipathies, through desires and aversions, that people perform the Vedic sacrifices and think that there is nothing greater than these. One should therefore transcend the sphere of Vedic sacrifices performed out of motives of self-interest. But the Gītā is not against the performance of Vedic sacrifices, if inspired by a sheer regard for the duty of performing sacrifices. Anyone who looks to his own personal gain and advantages in performing the sacrifices, and is only eager to attain his pleasurable ends, is an inferior type of man; the sacrifices should therefore be performed without any personal attachment, out of regard for the sacred duty of the performance. Prajāpati created sacrifices along with the creation of men and said, "The sacrifices will be for your good—you should help the gods by your sacrifices, and the gods will in their

1 Vyavasāyātmikā buddhiḥ samādhau na vidhiyate. Gītā, II. 44. The word samādhau is explained by Śrīdhara as follows: samādhāḥ cittaḥ kāryaṁ, paramesvarāḥ bhimukhate āh āh vāv; tasmin niśceyātmikā buddhiḥ tu na vidhiyate. Samādhiḥ is thus used here to mean one-pointedness of mind to God. But Śaṅkara gives a very curious interpretation of the word samādhiḥ, as meaning mind (antaḥkaraṇa or buddhi), which is hardly justifiable. Thus he says, samādhiye 'śmin purusopabhogāyā sarvam iti samādhih antaḥkaraṇam buddhiḥ. The word vyavasāyātmikā is interpreted by commentators on II. 41 and II. 44 as meaning niśceyātmikā (involving correct decision through proper pramanās or proof). I prefer, however, to take the word to mean "right resolution."
turn help you to grow and prosper. He who lives for himself without offering oblations to the gods and supporting them thereby is misappropriating the share that belongs to the gods.”

This view of the Gītā is different from that of the later Mīmāṃsā, which probably had a much earlier tradition. Thus Kumārila held that the final justification of Vedic sacrifices or of dharma was that it satisfied our needs and produced happiness—it was artha. The sacrifices were, no doubt, performed out of regard for the law of Vedic commands; but that represented only the psychological side of the question. The external ground for the performance of Vedic sacrifices was that it produced happiness for the performer and satisfied his desires by securing for him the objects of desire. It was in dependence on such a view that the Nyāya sought to settle the motive of all Vedic sacrifices. The Naiyāyikas believed that the Vedic observances not only secured for us all desired objects, but that this was also the motive for which the sacrifices were performed. The Gītā was well aware of this view, which it denounces. The Gītā admitted that the sacrifices produced the good of the world, but its whole outlook was different; for the Gītā looked upon the sacrifices as being bonds of union between gods and men. The sacrifices improved the mutual good-will, and it was by the sacrifices that the gods were helped, and they in their turn helped men, and so both men and the gods prospered. Through sacrifices there was rain, and by rain the food-grains grew and men lived on the food-grains. So the sacrifices were looked upon as being sources not so much of individual good as of public good. He who looks to the sacrifices as leading to the satisfaction of his selfish interests is surely an inferior person. But those who do not perform the sacrifices are equally wicked. The Vedas have sprung forth from the deathless eternal, and sacrifices spring from the Vedas, and it is thus that the deathless, all-pervading Brahman is established in the sacrifices¹. The implied belief of the Gītā was that the prosperity of the people depended on the fertility of the soil, and that this again depended upon the falling of rains, and that the rains depended on the grace of gods, and that the gods could live prosperously only if the sacrifices were performed; the sacrifices were derived from the Vedas, the Vedas from the all-pervading Brahman, and the Brahman again forms the main content of the

¹ Gītā, III. 15.
Vedas. Thus there was a complete cycle from Brahman to sacrifices, from sacrifices to the good of the gods and from the good of the gods to the good and prosperity of the people. Everyone is bound to continue the process of this cycle, and he who breaks it is a sinful and selfish man, who is not worth the life he leads¹. Thus the ideal of the Gītā is to be distinguished from the ideal of the Mīmāṃsā in this, that, while the latter aimed at individual good, the former aimed at common good, and, while the latter conceived the Vedic commands to be the motives of their action, the former valued the ideal of performing the sacrifices in obedience to the law of continuing the process of the cycle of sacrifices, by which the world of gods and of men was maintained in its proper state of prosperity. When a man works for the sacrifices, such works cannot bind him to their fruits; it is only when works are performed from motives of self-interest that they can bind people to their good and bad fruits².

The word dharma in the Gītā does not mean what Jaimini understood by the term, viz. a desirable end or good enjoined by the sacrifices (cudanā-laksanā 'ṛtho dharmah). The word seems to be used in the Gītā primarily in the sense of an unalterable customary order of class-duties or caste-duties and the general approved course of conduct for the people, and also in the sense of prescribed schemes of conduct. This meaning of dharma as “old customary order” is probably the oldest meaning of the word, as it is also found in the Atharva-Veda, 18. 3. 1 (dharamam purāṇam anupālayanti)³. Macdonell, in referring to Maitrāyaṇa, IV. 1. 9, Kāṭhaka, xxxi. 7 and Taittiriya, III. 2. 8. 11, points out that bodily defects (bad nails and discoloured teeth) and marrying a younger daughter while her elder sister is unmarried are coupled with murder, though not treated as equal to it, and that there is no distinction in principle between real crimes and what are now regarded as fanciful bodily defects or infringements of merely conventional practices. In the Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa, xiv. 4. 2. 26, also we find dharma for a Kṣatriya⁴ is illustrated as being the characteristic duties of a Kṣatriya. The central meaning of the word dharma in the Gītā is therefore the oldest Vedic meaning of the word, which is

¹ Gītā, III. 16.
² Ibid. III. 9.
³ dharma, dharmast are the regular words, the latter in the Rg-veda and both later, for “law” or “custom.” See Macdonell’s Vedic Index, p. 390.
⁴ tād etat kṣattrasya kṣattravaḥ yad dharmah tasmād dharmat paraṁ nāsti. Dr Albrecht Weber’s edition, Leipzig, 1924.
a much earlier meaning than the latter-day technical meaning of the word as it is found in Mīmāṃsā. Dharma does not in the Gītā mean sacrifices (yajña) or external advantages, as it does in Mīmāṃsā, but the order of conventional practices involving specific caste-divisions and caste-duties. Accordingly, the performance of sacrifices is dharma for those whose allotted duties are sacrifices. Adultery is in the Vedas a vice, as being transgression of dharma, and this is also referred to as such (dharma naṣṭe, 1. 39) in the Gītā. In the Gītā, II. 7, Arjuna is said to be puzzled and confused regarding his duty as a Kṣatriya and the sinful course of injuring the lives of his relations (dharma-saṃmūḍha-cetāḥ). The confusion of dharma and adharma is also referred to in xviii. 31 and 32. In the Gītā, IV. 7 and 8, the word dharma is used in the sense of the established order of things and conventionally accepted customs and practices. In II. 40 the way of performing one's duties without regard to pleasures or sorrows is described as a particular and specific kind of dharma (asya dharmasya), distinguished from dharma in general.

The yajña (sacrifice) is said to be of various kinds, e.g. that in which oblations are offered to the gods is called daiva-yajña; this is distinguished from brahma-yajña, in which one dedicates oneself to Brahman, where Brahman is the offerer, offering and the fire of oblations, and in which, by dedicating oneself to Brahman, one is lost in Brahman. Then sense-control, again, is described as a kind of yajña, and it is said that in the fire of the senses the sense-objects are offered as libations and the senses themselves are offered as libations in the fire of sense-control; all the sense-functions and vital functions are also offered as libations in the fire of sense-control lighted up by reason. Five kinds of sacrifices (yajña) are distinguished, viz. the yajña with actual materials of libation, called dravya-yajña, the yajña of asceticism or self-control, called tapo-yajña, the yajña of union or communion, called yoga-yajña, the yajña of scriptural studies, called svādhyāya-yajña, and the yajña of knowledge or wisdom, called jñāna-yajña. It is easy to see that the extension of the application of the term yajña from the actual material sacrifice to other widely divergent methods of self-advancement is a natural result of the extension of the concept of sacrifice to whatever tended towards self-advancement. The term yajña had high and holy associations, and the

1 Gītā, iv. 24 and 25. 2 Ibid. iv. 26–28; see also 29 and 30.
newly discovered systems of religious endeavours and endeavours for self-advancement came to be regarded as but a new kind of yajña, just as the substitution-meditations (prattkopāsanā) were also regarded as being but new forms of yajña. Thus, while thought advanced and newer modes of self-realization began to develop, the older term of yajña came to be extended to these new types of religious discipline on account of the high veneration in which the older institution was held.

But, whatever may be the different senses in which the term yajña is used in the Gitā, the word dharma has not here the technical sense of the Mīmāṃsā. The Gitā recommends the performance of sacrifices to the Brahmins and fighting to the Kṣatatriyas, and thus aims at continuity of conventional practices which it regards as dharma. But at the same time it denounces the performance of actions from desire, or passions or any kind of selfish interest. A man should regard his customary duties as his dharma and should perform them without any idea of the fulfilment of any of his own desires. When a man performs karma from a sense of disinterested duty, his karma is no longer a bondage to him. The Gitā does not, on the one hand, follow the old karma-ideal, that one should perform sacrifices in order to secure earthly and heavenly advantages, nor does it follow, on the other hand, the ideal of the Vedānta or of other systems of philosophy that require us to abandon our desires and control our passions with a view to cleansing the mind entirely of impurities, so as to transcend the sphere of duties and realize the wisdom of the oneness of the spirit. The Gitā holds that a man should attain the true wisdom, purge his mind of all its desires, but at the same time perform his customary duties and be faithful to his own dharma. There should be no impelling force other than regard and reverence for his own inner law of duty with reference to his own dharma of conventional and customary practices or the duties prescribed by the śāstra.

Sense-control in the Gitā.

The uncontrollability of the senses was realized in the Katha Upaniṣad, where the senses are compared with horses. The Gitā says that, when the mind is led on by fleeting sense-attributions, the man loses all his wisdom, just as a boat swings to and fro in deep waters in a strong gale. Even in the case of the wise
man, in spite of his efforts to keep himself steady, the troubled senses might lead the mind astray. By continually brooding over sense-objects one becomes attached to them; out of such attachments there arise desires, out of desires there arises anger, out of anger blindness of passions, through such blindness there is lapse of memory, by such lapse of memory a man’s intelligence is destroyed, and as a result of that he himself is destroyed. Man is naturally inclined towards the path of evil, and in spite of his efforts to restrain himself he tends towards the downward path. Each particular sense has its own specific attachments and antipathies, and attachment (rāga) and antipathy are the two enemies. The Gītā again and again proclaims the evil effects of desires and attachments (kāma), anger (krodha) and greed (lobha) as the three gates of Hell, being that which veils wisdom as smoke veils fire, as impurities sully a mirror or as the foetus is covered by the womb. Arjuna is made to refer to Kṛṣṇa the difficulty of controlling the senses. Thus he says, “My mind, O Kṛṣṇa, is violent, troubled and changeful; it is as difficult to control it as it is to control the winds.” True yoga can never be attained unless and until the senses are controlled.

The Pāli work Dhamma-pada is also filled with similar ideas regarding the control of attachments and anger. Thus it says, “He has abused me, beaten me, worsted me, robbed me—those who dwell not upon such thoughts are freed from hate. Never does hatred cease by hating, but hatred ceases by love; this is the ancient law....As the wind brings down a weak tree, so Māra overwhelms him who lives looking for pleasures, has his senses uncontrolled, or is immoderate in his food, slothful and effeminate. ...As rain breaks through an ill-thatched house, so passion will break through an undisciplined mind.” Again, speaking of mind, it says, “As an arrow-maker levels his arrow, so a wise man levels his trembling, unsteady mind, which it is difficult to guard and hold back....Let the wise man guard his mind, incomprehensible, subtle, capricious though it is. Blessed is the guarded mind.” Again, “Not nakedness, nor matted hair, not dirt, nor fasting, not lying on earth, nor ashes, nor ascetic postures, none of these things purify a man who is not free from desires.” Again, “From

1 Gītā, II. 60, 62, 63. 2 Ibid. III. 34, 37–39; XVI. 21. 3 VI. 34.
4 Dhamma-pada (Poona, 1923), I. 4, 5, 7, 15. 5 Ibid. III. 6, 38.
6 Ibid. X. 141.
attachment (piyato) comes grief, from attachment comes fear; he who is free from attachment knows neither grief nor fear. From affection (pemato) come grief and fear. He who is free from affection knows neither grief nor fear. From lust (rati) come grief and fear. He who is free from affection knows neither grief nor fear. From lust (kāma) come grief and fear. He who is free from lust knows neither grief nor fear. From desire (tanha) come grief and fear. He who is free from desire knows neither grief nor fear."

It is clear from the above that both the Gītā and the Dhamma-pada praise sense-control and consider desires, attachments, anger and grief as great enemies. But the treatment of the Gītā differs from that of the Dhamma-pada in this, that, while in the Dhamma-pada there is a course of separate lessons or moral instructions on diverse subjects, the Gītā deals with sense-control as a means to the attainment of peace, contentment and desirelessness, which enables a man to dedicate all his actions to God and follow the conventional courses of duties without looking for anything in them for himself. The Gītā knows that the senses, mind and intellect are the seats of all attachments and antipathies, and that it is through the senses and the mind that these can stupefy a man and make his knowledge blind. All the sense-affections of cold and heat, pleasure and sorrow, are mere changes of our sensibility, are mere touches of feeling which are transitory and should therefore be quietly borne. It is only by controlling the senses that the demon of desire, which distorts all ordinary and philosophic knowledge, can be destroyed. But it is very hard to stifle this demon of desire, which always appears in new forms. It is only when a man can realize within himself the great being which transcends our intellect that he can control his lower self with his higher self and uproot his desires. The self is its own friend as well as its own foe, and one should always try to uplift oneself and not allow oneself to sink down. The chief aim of all sense-control is to make a man's thoughts steady, so that he can link himself up in communion with God.

The senses in the Gītā are regarded as drawing the mind along with them. The senses are continually changing and fleeting, and they make the mind also changeful and fleeting; and, as a result of

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1 Dhamma-pada, xvi. 212-216.
2 Gītā, i. 40.
3 Ibid. ii. 14.
4 Ibid. ii. 61; iii. 41, 43; vi. 5, 6.
that, the mind, like a boat at sea before a strong wind, is driven
to and fro, and steadiness of thought and wisdom (prajñā) are
destroyed. The word prajñā is used in the Gitā in the sense of
thought or wisdom or mental inclinations in general. It is used
in a more or less similar sense in the Brhad-āranyaka Upaniṣad,
iv. 4. 21, and in a somewhat different sense in the Māṇḍūkya
Upaniṣad, 7. But the sense in which Patañjali uses the word is
totally different from that in which it is used in the Gitā or the
Upaniṣads. Patañjali uses the word in the technical sense of a
specific type of mystical cognition arising out of the steady fixing
of the mind on an object, and speaks of seven stages of such prajñā
corresponding to the stages of yoga ascension. Prajñā in the Gitā
means, as has just been said, thought or mental inclination. It does
not mean jñāna, or ordinary cognition, or vijñāna as higher wisdom;
it means knowledge in its volitional aspect. It is not the kriyākhya-
jñāna, as moral discipline of yama, niyama, etc., of the Pañca-rātra
work Jayākhya-saṃhitā. It means an intellectual outlook, as in-
tegrally connected with, and determining, the mental bent or
inclination. When the mind follows the mad dance of the senses
after their objects, the intellectual background of the mind deter-
moving its direction, the prajñā is also upset. Unless the prajñā
is fixed, the mind cannot proceed undisturbed in its prescribed
fixed course. So the central object of controlling the senses is the
securing of the steadiness of this prajñā (vaśe hi yasyendriyāni
tasya prajñā pratiṣṭhitā—11. 57). Prajñā and dhi are two words
which seem to be in the Gitā synonymous, and they both mean
mental inclination. This mental inclination probably involves both
an intellectual outlook, and a corresponding volitional tendency.
Sense-control makes this prajñā steady, and the Gitā abounds in
praise of the sthita-prajñā and sthita-dhi, i.e. of one who has
mental inclination or thoughts fixed and steady. Sense-attach-
ments are formed by continual association with sense-objects, and
attachment begets desire, desire begets anger, and so on. Thus all
the vices spring from sense-attachments. And the person who
indulges in sense-gratifications is rushed along by the passions.
So, just as a tortoise collects within itself all its limbs, so the
person who restrains his senses from the sense-objects has his
mind steady and fixed. The direct result of sense-control is thus
steadiness of will, and of mental inclinations or mind (prajñā).

1 11. 54-56.
The person who has his *prajñā* fixed is not troubled in sorrows and is not eager to gain pleasures, he has no attachment, no fear and no anger. He is indifferent in prosperity and in adversity and neither desires anything nor shuns anything. He alone can obtain peace who, like the sea receiving all the rivers in it, absorbs all his desires within himself; not so the man who is always busy in satisfying his desires. The man who has given up all his desires and is unattached to anything is not bound to anything, has no vanity and attains true peace. When a man can purge his mind of attachments and antipathies and can take to sense-objects after purifying his senses and keeping them in full control, he attains contentment (*prasāda*). When such contentment is attained, all sorrows vanish and his mind becomes fixed (*buddhiḥ paryavati-ştate*). Thus sense-control, on the one hand, makes the mind unruffled, fixed, at peace with itself and filled with contentment, and on the other hand, by making the mind steady and fixed, it makes communion with God possible. Sense-control is the indispensable precondition of communion with God; when once this has been attained, it is possible to link oneself with God by continued efforts. Thus sense-control, by producing steadiness of the will and thought, results in contentment and peace on the one hand, and on the other makes the mind fit for entering into communion with God.

One thing that strikes us in reading the *Gītā* is that the object of sense-control in the *Gītā* is not the attainment of a state of emancipated oneness or the absolute cessation of all mental processes, but the more intelligible and common-sense ideal of the attainment of steadiness of mind, contentment and the power of entering into touch with God. This view of the object of self-control is therefore entirely different from that praised in the philosophic systems of Patañjali and others. The *Gītā* wants us to control our senses and mind and to approach sense-objects with such a controlled mind and senses, because it is by this means alone that we can perform our duties with a peaceful and contented mind and turn to God with a clean and unruffled heart. The main emphasis of this sense-control is not on the mere external control of volitional activities and the control of motor propensities

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1. *Gītā*, II. 56.
3. *Ibid.* II. 65; see also II. 58, 64, 68, 70, 71.
in accordance with the direction of passions and appetites, but on the inner control of the mind behind these active senses. When a person controls only his physical activities, and yet continues to brood over the attractions of sense, he is in reality false in his conduct (mithyācāra). Real self-control does not mean only the cessation of the external operations of the senses, but also the control of the mind. Not only should a man cease from committing actions out of greed and desire for sense-gratification, but his mind should be absolutely clean, absolutely clear of all impurities of sense-desires. Mere suspension of physical action without a corresponding control of mind and cessation from harbouring passions and desires is a vicious course\(^1\).

The Ethics of the Gītā and the Buddhist Ethics.

The subject of sense-control naturally reminds one of Buddhism. In the Vedic religion performance of sacrifices was considered as the primary duty. Virtue and vice consisted in obedience or disobedience to Vedic injunctions. It has been pointed out that these injunctions implied a sort of categorical imperative and communicated a sense of vidhi as law, a command which must be obeyed. But this law was no inner law of the spirit within, but a mere external law, which ought not to be confused with morality in the modern sense of the term. Its sphere was almost wholly ritualistic, and, though it occasionally included such commands as “One should not injure anyone” (mā himsyāt), yet in certain sacrifices which were aimed at injuring one’s enemies operations which would lead to such results would have the imperative of a Vedic command, though the injury to human beings would be attended with its necessary punishment. Again, though in later Sāmkhya commentaries and compendiums it is said that all kinds of injuries to living beings bring their punish-ment, yet it is doubtful if the Vedic injunction “Thou shouldst not injure” really applied to all living beings, as there would be but few sacrifices where animals were not killed. The Upaniṣads, however, start an absolutely new line by the substitution of meditations and self-knowledge for sacrificial actions. In the

\(^1\) Cf. Dhamma-pada, 1. 2. All phenomena have mind as their precursor, are dependent upon mind and are made up of mind. If a man speaks or acts with a pure mind, happiness accompanies him, just as a shadow follows a man incessantly.
primary stage of Upanişadic thoughts a conviction was growing that instead of the sacrificial performances one could go through a set form of meditations, identifying in thought certain objects with certain other objects (e.g. the dawn as the horse of horse-sacrifice) or even with symbolic syllables, OM and the like. In the more developed stage of UpanIŞadic culture a new conviction arose in the search after the highest and the ultimate truth, and the knowledge of Brahman as the highest essence in man and nature is put forward as the greatest wisdom and the final realization of truth and reality, than which nothing higher could be conceived. There are but few moral precepts in the Upanişads, and the whole subject of moral conflict and moral efforts is almost silently dropped or passes unemphasized. In the Taittirīya Upanişad, i. 11, the teacher is supposed to give a course of moral instruction to his pupil after teaching him the Vedas—Tell the truth, be virtuous, do not give up the study of the Vedas; after presenting the teacher with the stipulated honorarium (at the conclusion of his studies) the pupil should (marry and) continue the line of his family. He should not deviate from truth or from virtue (dharma) or from good. He should not cease doing good to others, from study and teaching. He should be respectful to his parents and teachers and perform such actions as are unimpeachable. He should follow only good conduct and not bad. He should make gifts with faith (traddhā), not with indifference, with dignity, from a sense of shame, through fear and through knowledge. If there should be any doubt regarding his course of duty or conduct, then he should proceed to act in the way in which the wisest Brahmans behaved. But few Upanişads give such moral precepts, and there is very little in the Upanişads in the way of describing a course of moral behaviour or of emphasizing the fact that man can attain his best only by trying to become great through moral efforts. The Upanişads occupy themselves almost wholly with mystic meditations and with the philosophic wisdom of self-knowledge. Yet the ideas of self-control, peace and cessation of desires, endurance and concentration are referred to in Bhadāranyaka, iv. 4. 23, as a necessary condition for the realization of the self within us.1 In Katha, vi. 11, the control of the senses (indriya-dhāraṇa) is referred to as yoga, and in Mundaka, iii. 2. 2,

1 śānto dānta uparatas titikṣuh samāhito bhūtvātmany eva ātmānām pañyati.
Bṛh. iv. 4. 23.
it is said that he who consciously desires the objects of desire is again and again born through desires; but even in this world all desires vanish for him who is self-realized in himself and is self-satisfied. The idea that the path of wisdom is different from the path of desires was also known, and it was felt that he who sought wisdom (vidyābhispa) was not drawn by many desires.

The point to be discussed in this connection is whether the central idea of the Gitā, namely, sense-control and more particularly the control of desires and attachments, is derived from the Upaniṣads or from Buddhism. It has been pointed out that the Upaniṣads do not emphasize the subject of moral conflict and moral endeavours so much as the nature of truth and reality as Brahma, the ultimate essence of man and the manifold appearance of the world. Yet the idea of the necessity of sense-control and the control of desires, the settling of the mind in peace and contentment, is the necessary precondition for fitness for Vedic knowledge. Thus Śaṅkara, the celebrated commentator on the Upaniṣads, in commenting on Brahma-sūtra, i. 1. 1, says that a man is fit for an enquiry after Brahma only when he knows how to distinguish what is permanent from what is transitory (nityāṇitya-vastu-viveka), and when he has no attachment to the enjoyment of the fruits of his actions either as mundane pleasures or as heavenly joys (ihāmutra-phala-bhoga-virūga). The necessary qualifications which entitle a man to make such an enquiry are disinclination of the mind for worldly joys (śama), possession of proper control and command over the mind, by which it may be turned to philosophy (dama), power of endurance (viṣaya-titikṣā), cessation of all kinds of duties (uparati), and faith in the philosophical conception of truth and reality (tattva-śraddhā). It may be supposed, therefore, that the Upaniṣads presuppose a high degree of moral development in the way of self-control and disinclination to worldly and heavenly joys. Detachment from sense-affections is one of the most dominant ideas of the Gitā, and the idea of Mundaka, III. 2. 2, referred to above, is re-echoed in the Gitā, ii. 70, where it is said that, just as the waters are absorbed in the calm sea (though poured in continually by the rivers), so the person in whom all desires are absorbed attains peace, and

1 kāmān yāḥ kāmaryate manyamānasya kāmabhir jāyate tatra tatra paryāptakāmasya kṛtātmaks tu ihaiva sarve pravṛtyantāt kāmāḥ. Mundaka, III. 2. 2.
2 Kaṭha, II. 4.
not the man who indulges in desires. The Gîtā, of course, again and again emphasizes the necessity of uprooting attachments to pleasures and antipathy to pains and of controlling desires (kāma); but, though the Upaniṣads do not emphasize this idea so frequently, yet the idea is there, and it seems very probable that the Gîtā drew it from the Upaniṣads. Hindu tradition also refers to the Upaniṣads as the source of the Gîtā. Thus the Gîtā-māhātmya describes the Upaniṣads as the cows from which Kṛṣṇa, the cowherd boy, drew the Gîtā as milk

But the similarity of Buddhist ethical ideas to those of the Gîtā is also immense, and, had it not been for the fact that ideas which may be regarded as peculiarly Buddhistic are almost entirely absent from the Gîtā, it might well have been contended that the Gîtā derived its ideas of controlling desires and uprooting attachment from Buddhism. Tachibana collects a long list of Buddhist vices as follows:

aṅganaṁ, impurity, lust, Sn. 517.
ahāṅkāro, selfishness, egoism, A. i. 132; M. iii. 18, 32.
mamaṅkaro, desire, A. i. 132; M. iii. 18, 32.
mamāyītam, selfishness, S. N. 466.
mamattam, grasping, egoism, S. N. 872, 951.
apēkha, desire, longing, affection, S. N. 38; Dh. 345.
tīcchā, wish, desire, covetousness.
ejā, desire, lust, greed, craving, S. N. 751; It. 92.
āsā, desire, longing, S. N. 634, 794, 864; Dh. 397.
pipāsā, thirst.
esā, esanā, wish, desire, thirst, Dh. 335.
ākāṅkhā, desire, longing, Tha. 20.
kiticānam, attachment, S. N. 949; Dh. 200.
ganṭho, bond, tie, S. N. 798; Dh. 211.
ādāna-ganṭho, the tied knot of attachment, S. N. 794.
giddhi, greed, desire, Sn. 328; M. i. 360, 362.
gedho, greed, desire, Sn. 65, 152.
gahanām, entanglement, Dh. 394.
gāho, seizing, attachment.
jalīna, snare, desire, lust, Dh. 180; A. ii. 211.
pariggha, attachment, Mahānīd. 57.
chando, wish, desire, intention, S. N. 171, 203, etc.
jaṭā, desire, lust, S. N. 1. 13; V. M. 1.
jigīmśanatā, covetousness, desire for, Vībhanga, 353.
jīgīmśanatā, covetousness, V. M. 1. 23.
tanha, tasinā, lust, unsatisfied desire, passion.

1 Sarvopaniṣado gāvo dogdhā gopāla-mandanaḥ.
2 The Ethics of Buddhism, by S. Tachibana, p. 73.
upādānam, clinging, attachment, Dh. II. 58, III. 230.
pañāṭha, wish, aspiration, Sn. 801.
pīhā, desire, envy, Tha. 1218.
peṇam, affection, love, A. III. 249.
bándha, thong, bondage, attachment, Sn. 623; Dh. 344.
bändhanam, bond, fetter, attachment, Sn. 522, 532; Dh. 345.
nibándha, binding, attachment, S. II. 17.
vinibándhanam, bondage, desire, Sn. 16.
ānumbándho, bondage, affection, desire, M. III. 170; Jt. 91.
upanibándho, fastening, attachment, V. M. I. 235.
paribándho, Com. on Thi. p. 242.
rāgo, human passion, evil, desire, lust, passim.
sārāgo, sārajanā, sārajjitattham, affection, passion, Mahānīd. 242.
raṭṭi, lust, attachment, Dh. 27.
manoratho, desire, wish (?).
ruci, desire, inclination, Sn. 781.
abhilāso, desire, longing, wish, Com. on Peta-vattu, 154.
lalasā, ardent desire (?).
ālayo, longing, desire, lust, Sn. 535, 635; Dh. 411.
labhō, covetousness, desire, cupidity, Sn. 367; Dh. 248.
labhānam, greed, Tha. 343.
labhānā, lōbhitattam, do (?).
vanam, desire, lust, Sn. 1131; Dh. 284, 344.
vanatho, love, lust, Dh. 283, 284.
nīvesanam, clinging to, attachment, Sn. 470, 801.
sanpūпо, fetter, bond, attachment, Sn. 473, 791; Dh. 397.
āsattī, attachment, hanging on, clinging, Sn. 777; Vin. II. 156;
S. I. 212.
visattikkā, poison, desire, Sn. 333; Dh. 180.
saṁthāvaṁ, friendship, attachment, Sn. 207, 245; Dh. 27.
uussado, desire (?), Sn. 515, 783, 785.
sneho, sineho, affection, lust, desire, Sn. 209, 943; Dh. 285.
āsayo, abode, intention, inclination, V. H. I. 140.
anusayo, inclination, desire, A. I. 132; Sn. 14, 369, 545.
sībbāni, desire (?), Sn. 1040.
kodho, anger, wrath, Sn. I. 245, 362, 868, 928; Dh. 221-3; It. 4, 12, 109.
kopo, anger, ill-will, ill-temper, Sn. 6.
āghāta, anger, ill-will, hatred, malice, D. I. 3, 31; S. I. 179.
patiṭho, wrath, hatred, Sum. 116.
doso, anger, hatred, passim.
vīddeso, enmity, hatred (?).
dhūmo, anger (?), Sn. 460.
upanāno, enmity, Sn. 116.
vīyāpādo, wish to injure, hatred, fury, Sum. 211; It. 111.
anabhīraddhi, anger, wrath, rage, D. I. 3.
veram, wrath, anger, hatred, sin, Sn. 150; Dh. 3-5, 201.
virodho, opposition, enmity (?).
roso, anger (?).
rosanam, anger (?).
vīrāroṣanam, anger, Sn. 148.
aṇīṇānam, ignorance, It. 62.
mohona, fainting, ignorance, folly, passim.
mohanam, ignorance, S.N. 399, 772.
avijjā, ignorance, error, passion.

It is interesting to note that three vices, covetousness, hatred and ignorance, and covetousness particularly, appear under different names and their extirpation is again and again emphasized in diverse ways. These three, ignorance, covetousness and hatred or antipathy, are the roots of all evils. There are, of course, simpler commandments, such as not to take life, not to steal, not to commit adultery, not to tell a lie, and not to take intoxicating drinks, and of these stealing gold, drinking liquors, dishonouring one’s teacher’s bed, and killing a Brahmin are also prohibited in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, v. 10. 9–10. But, while the Chāndogya only prohibits killing Brahmans, the Buddha prohibited taking the life of any living being. But all these vices, and others opposed to the āṭṭhaṅgāsīla and dasa-kusala-kamma, are included within covetousness, ignorance and hatred. The Gītā bases its ethics mainly on the necessity of getting rid of attachment and desires from which proceeds greed and frustration of which produces anger. But, while in Buddhism ignorance (avīḍya) is considered as the source of all evil, the Gītā does not even mention the word. In the twelvefold chain of causality in Buddhism it is held that out of ignorance (avijjā) come the conceptions (saṅkhāra), out of the conceptions consciousness (viññāna), out of consciousness mind and body (nāma-rūpa), out of mind and body come the six fields of contact (āyatana), out of the six fields of contact comes sense-contact, out of sense-contact comes feeling, out of feeling come desires (tanha), out of desires comes the holding fast to things (upādāna), out of the holding fast to things comes existence (bhava), out of existence comes birth (jāti), and from birth come old age, decay and death. If ignorance, or avijjā, is stopped,

1 There is another list of eightfold prohibitions called āṭṭhaṅgāstīla; these are not to take life, not to take what is not given, to abstain from sex-relations, to abstain from falsehood, from drinking liquors, from eating at forbidden times, from dancing and music and from beautifying one’s body by perfumes, garlands, etc. There is also another list called dasa-kusala-kamma, such as not to take life, not to take what is not given, not to commit adultery, not to tell a lie, not to slander, not to abuse or talk foolishly, not to be covetous, malicious and sceptical.
then the whole cycle stops. But, though in this causal cycle ignorance and desires are far apart, yet psychologically desires proceed immediately from ignorance, and a frustration of desires produces anger, hatred, etc. In the Gitā the start is taken directly from attachment and desires (kāma). The Buddhist word ṭṛṣṇā (tanhā) is seldom mentioned in the Gitā; whereas the Upaniṣadic word kāma takes its place as signifying desires. The Gitā is not a philosophical work which endeavours to search deeply into the causes of attachments, nor does it seek to give any practical course of advice as to how one should get rid of attachment. The Vedānta system of thought, as interpreted by Śaṅkara, traces the origin of the world with all its evils to ignorance or nescience (avidyā), as an indefinable principle; the Yoga traces all our phenomenal experience to five afflictions, ignorance, attachment, antipathy, egoism and self-love, and the last four to the first, which is the fountain-head of all evil afflictions. In the Gitā there is no such attempt to trace attachment, etc. to some other higher principle. The word ajñāna (ignorance) is used in the Gitā about six or eight times in the sense of ignorance; but this “ignorance” does not mean any metaphysical principle or the ultimate starting-point of a causal chain, and is used simply in the sense of false knowledge or ignorance, as opposed to true knowledge of things as they are. Thus in one place it is said that true knowledge of things is obscured by ignorance, and that this is the cause of all delusion. Again, it is said that to those who by true knowledge (of God) destroy their own ignorance (ajñāna) true knowledge reveals the highest reality (tat param), like the sun. In another place jñāna and ajñāna are both defined. Jñāna is defined as unvacillating and abiding self-knowledge and true knowledge by which truth and reality are apprehended, and all that is different from this is called ajñāna. Ajñāna is stated elsewhere to be the result of tamas, and in two other places tamas is said to be the product of ajñāna. In another place it is said that people are blinded by ignorance (ajñāna), thinking, “I am rich, I am an aristocrat, who else is there like me? I shall perform sacrifices make gifts and enjoy.” In another place ignorance is said to

1 ajñānenāctum jñānāṃ tena muhyanti jantavah. v. 15.
2 jñānena tu tad-ajñānāṃ yeṣam nāhitam atmanaḥ. v. 16.
4 Ibid. xiv. 16, 17; x. 11; xiv. 8.
5 Ibid. v. 16.
produce doubts (sāmśaya), and the Gītā lecture of Kṛṣṇa is supposed to dispel the delusion of Arjuna, produced by ignorance\(^1\). This shows that, though the word ajñāna is used in a variety of contexts, either as ordinary ignorance or ignorance of true and absolute philosophic knowledge, it is never referred to as being the source of attachment or desires. This need not be interpreted to mean that the Gītā was opposed to the view that attachments and desires were produced from ignorance; but it seems at least to imply that the Gītā was not interested to trace the origin of attachments and desires and was satisfied to take their existence for granted and urged the necessity of their extirpation for peace and equanimity of mind. Buddhist Hinayāna ethics and practical discipline are constituted of moral discipline (śīla), concentration (samādhi) and wisdom (paññā). The śīla consisted in the performance of good conduct (carītta) and desisting (vārītta) from certain other kinds of prohibited action. Śīla means those particular volitions and mental states, etc. by which a man who desists from committing sinful actions maintains himself on the right path. Śīla thus means (1) right volition (cetanā), (2) the associated mental states (cetasika), (3) mental control (saṃvara), and (4) the actual non-transgression (in body and speech) of the course of conduct already in the mind by way of the preceding three silas, called avitikkama. Saṃvara is spoken of as being of five kinds, viz. (1) pāṭimokkha-saṃvara (the control which saves him who abides by it), (2) sati-saṃvara (the control of mindfulness), (3) nāna-saṃvara (the control of knowledge), (4) khanti-saṃvara (the control of patience) and (5) viriya-saṃvara (the control of active restraint). Pāṭimokkha-saṃvara means all self-control in general. Sati-saṃvara means the mindfulness by which one can bring in the right and good associations, when using one's cognitive senses. Even when looking at any tempting object, a man will, by virtue of his mindfulness (satti), control himself from being tempted by not thinking of its tempting side and by thinking on such aspects of it as may lead in the right direction. Khanti-saṃvara is that by which one can remain unperturbed in heat and cold. By the proper adherence to śīla all our bodily, mental and vocal activities (kamma) are duly systematized, organized and stabilized (samādhānam, upadhāranam, patiṭṭhā). The practice of śīla is for the practice of jhāna (meditation). As a preparatory measure thereto, a man must train himself

\(^1\) Gītā, iv. 42; xviii. 72.
continually to view with disgust the appetitive desires for eating and drinking (āhāre paṭikūla-saṇnā) by emphasizing in the mind the various troubles that are associated with seeking food and drink and their ultimate loathsome transformations as various nauseating bodily elements. He must habituate his mind to the idea that all the parts of our body are made up of the four elements, viz. ksiti (earth), āp (water), etc. He should also think of the good effects of śīla, the making of gifts, of the nature of death and of the deep nature and qualities of the final extinction of all phenomena, and should practise brahma-vihāra, as the fourfold meditation of universal friendship, universal pity, happiness in the prosperity and happiness of all, and indifference to any kind of preferment for himself, his friend, his enemy or a third party.¹

The Gītā does not enter into any of these disciplinary measures. It does not make a programme of universal altruism or hold that one should live only for others, as is done in Mahāyāna ethics, or of the virtues of patience, energy for all that is good (vīrya as kuśalotsāha), meditation and true knowledge of the essencelessness of all things. The person who takes the vow of saintly life takes the vow of living for the good of others, for which he should be prepared to sacrifice all that is good for him. His vow does not limit him to doing good to his co-religionists or to any particular sects, but applies to all human beings, irrespective of caste, creed or race, and not only to human beings, but to all living beings. Mahāyāna ethical works like the Bodhi-caryāvatāra-paṇjikā or Śikṣā-samuccaya do not deal merely with doctrines or theories, but largely with practical instructions for becoming a Buddhist saint. They treat of the practical difficulties in the path of a saint's career and give practical advice regarding the way in which he may avoid temptations, keep himself in the straight path of duty, and gradually elevate himself to higher and higher states.

The Gītā is neither a practical guide-book of moral efforts nor a philosophical treatise discussing the origin of immoral tendencies and tracing them to certain metaphysical principles as their sources; but, starting from the ordinary frailties of attachment and desires, it tries to show how one can lead a normal life of duties and responsibilities and yet be in peace and contentment in a state of equanimity and in communion with God. The Gītā

¹ See A History of Indian Philosophy, by S. N. Dās Gupta, vol. I, p. 103.
has its setting in the great battle of the Mahā-bhārata. Kṛṣṇa is represented as being an incarnation of God, and he is also the charioteer of his friend and relation, Arjuna, the great Pāṇḍava hero. The Pāṇḍava hero was a Kṣattriya by birth, and he had come to the great battle-field of Kurukṣetra to fight his cousin and opponent King Duryodhana, who had assembled great warriors, all of whom were relations of Arjuna, leading mighty armies. In the first chapter of the Gitā a description is given of the two armies which faced each other in the holy field (dharma-kṣetra) of Kurukṣetra. In the second chapter Arjuna is represented as feeling dejected at the idea of having to fight with his relations and of eventually killing them. He says that it was better to beg from door to door than to kill his respected relations. Kṛṣṇa strongly objects to this attitude of Arjuna and says that the soul is immortal and it is impossible to kill anyone. But, apart from this metaphysical point of view, even from the ordinary point of view a Kṣattriya ought to fight, because it is his duty to do so, and there is nothing nobler for a Kṣattriya than to fight. The fundamental idea of the Gitā is that a man should always follow his own caste-duties, which are his own proper duties, or seva-dharma. Even if his own proper duties are of an inferior type, it is much better for him to cleave to them than to turn to other people’s duties which he could well perform. It is even better to die cleaving to one’s caste-duties, than to turn to the duties fixed for other people, which only do him harm.

The caste-duties of Brahmins, Kṣattriyas, Vaiśyas and Śūdras are fixed in accordance with their natural qualities. Thus sense-control, control over mind, power of endurance, purity, patience, sincerity, knowledge of worldly things and philosophic wisdom are the natural qualities of a Brahmin. Heroism, bravery, patience, skill, not to fly from battle, making of gifts and lordliness are the natural duties of a Kṣattriya. Agriculture, tending of cattle and trade are the natural duties of a Śūdra. A man can attain his highest only by performing the specific duties of his own caste. God pervades this world, and it is He who moves all beings to work. A man can best realize himself by adoring God and by the performance of his own specific caste-duties. No sin can come to a man who performs his own caste-duties. Even if one’s caste-duties were sinful or wrong, it would not be wrong.
for a man to perform them; for, as there is smoke in every fire, so there is some wrong thing or other in all our actions. Arjuna is thus urged to follow his caste-duty as a Kṣattriya and to fight his enemies in the battle-field. If he killed his enemies, then he would be the master of the kingdom; if he himself was killed, then, since he had performed the duties of a Kṣattriya, he would go to Heaven. If he did not engage himself in that fight, which was his duty, he would not only lose his reputation, but would also transgress his own dharma.

Such an instruction naturally evokes the objection that war necessarily implies injury to living beings; but in reply to such an objection Kṛṣṇa says that the proper way of performing actions is to dissociate one’s mind from attachment; when one can perform an action with a mind free from attachment, greed and selfishness, from a pure sense of duty, the evil effects of such action cannot affect the performer. The evil effects of any action can affect the performer when in performing an action he has a motive of his own to fulfil. But, if he does not seek anything for himself, if he is not overjoyed in pleasures, or miserable in pains, his works cannot affect him. A man should therefore surrender all his desires for selfish ends and dedicate all his actions to God and be in communion with Him, and yet continue to perform the normal duties of his caste and situation of life. So long as we have our bodies, the necessity of our own nature will drive us to work. So it is impossible for us to give up all work. To give up work can be significant only if it means the giving up of all desires for the fruits of such actions. If the fruits of actions are given up, then the actions can no longer bind us to them. That brings us in return peace and contentment, and the saint who has thus attained a perfect equanimity of mind is firm and unshaken in his true wisdom, and nothing can sway him to and fro. One may seek to attain this state either by philosophic wisdom or by devotion to God, and it is the latter path which is easier. God, by His grace, helps the devotee to purge his mind of all impurities, and so by His grace a man can dissociate his mind from all motives of greed and selfishness and be in communion with Him; he can thus perform his duties, as fixed for him by his caste or his custom, without looking forward to any reward or gain.

The Gītā ideal of conduct differs from the sacrificial ideal of

1 Gītā, xviii. 44-48.
conduct in this, that sacrifices are not to be performed for any ulterior end of heavenly bliss or any other mundane benefits, but merely from a sense of duty, because sacrifices are enjoined in the scriptures to be performed by Brahmans; and they must therefore be performed from a pure sense of duty. The Gitā ideal of ethics differs from that preached in the systems of philosophy like the Vedānta or the Yoga of Patañjali in this, that, while the aim of these systems was to transcend the sphere of actions and duties, to rise to a stage in which one could give up all one’s activities, mental or physical, the ideal of the Gitā was decidedly an ideal of work. The Gitā, as has already been pointed out, does not advocate a course of extremism in anything. However elevated a man may be, he must perform his normal caste-duties and duties of customary morality. The Gitā is absolutely devoid of the note of pessimism which is associated with early Buddhism. The śīla, samādhi and pañña of Buddhism have, no doubt, in the Gitā their counterparts in the training of a man to disinclination for joys and attachments, to concentration on God and the firm and steady fixation of will and intelligence; but the significance of these in the Gitā is entirely different from that which they have in Buddhism. The Gitā does not expound a course of approved conduct and prohibitions, since, so far as these are concerned, one’s actions are to be guided by the code of caste-duties or duties of customary morality. What is required of a man is that he should cleanse his mind from the impurities of attachment, desires and cravings. The samādhi of the Gitā is not a mere concentration of the mind on some object, but communion with God, and the wisdom, or prajñā, of the Gitā is no realization of any philosophic truth, but a fixed and unperturbed state of the mind, where the will and intellect remain unshaken in one’s course of duty, clear of all consequences and free from all attachments, and in a state of equanimity which cannot be shaken or disturbed by pleasures or sorrows.

It may naturally be asked in this connection, what is the general standpoint of Hindu Ethics? The Hindu social system is based on a system of fourfold division of castes. The Gitā says that God Himself created the fourfold division of castes into Brahmans, Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas and Śūdras, a division based on characteristic

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1 Śaṅkara, of course, is in entire disagreement with this interpretation of the Gitā, as will be discussed in a later section.
qualities and specific duties. Over and above this caste division and its corresponding privileges, duties and responsibilities, there is also a division of the stages of life into that of Brahma-cārin—student, grha-stha—householder, vāna-prastha—retired in a forest, and bhikṣu—mendicant, and each of these had its own prescribed duties. The duties of Hindu ethical life consisted primarily of the prescribed caste-duties and the specific duties of the different stages of life, and this is known as varṇāśrama-dharma. Over and above this there were also certain duties which were common to all, called the sādhāraṇa-dharmas. Thus Manu mentions steadiness (dhairya), forgiveness (kṣamā), self-control (dama), non-stealing (cauryābhāva), purity (śauca), sense-control (indriya-nigraha), wisdom (dhi), learning (vidyā), truthfulness (satya) and control of anger (akrodha) as examples of sādhāraṇa-dharma. Prāṣastapāda mentions faith in religious duties (dharma-śraddhā), non-injury (ahimsā), doing good to living beings (bhūta-hitatva), truthfulness (satya-vacana), non-stealing (asteya), sex-continence (brahma-caryā), sincerity of mind (anupadā), control of anger (krodha-varjana), cleanliness and ablutions (abhiṣecana), taking of pure food (suci-dravya-sevana), devotion to Vedic gods (viṣiṣṭa-devatā-bhakti), and watchfulness in avoiding transgressions (apramāda). The caste-duties must be distinguished from these common duties. Thus sacrifices, study and gifts are common to all the three higher castes, Brahmans, Kṣattriyas and Vaiśyas. The specific duties of a Brahmin are acceptance of gifts, teaching, sacrifices and so forth; the specific duties of a Kṣattriya are protection of the people, punishing the wicked, not to retreat from battles and other specific tasks; the duties of a Vaiśya are buying, selling, agriculture, breeding and rearing of cattle, and the specific duties of a Vaiśya. The duties of a Śūdra are to serve the three higher castes.

Regarding the relation between varṇa-dharma and sādhāraṇa-dharma, a modern writer says that “the sādhāraṇa-dharmas constitute the foundation of the varṇāśrama-dharmas, the limits within which the latter are to be observed and obeyed. For

1 The Gītā, however, counts self-control (jīma), control over the mind (dama), purity (śauca), forgiving nature (kṣanti), sincerity (ārjava), knowledge (jñāna), wisdom (vijñāna) and faith (āstikya) as the natural qualities of Brahmans. The duties of Kṣattriyas are heroism (jaurya), smartness (tejas), power of endurance (dṛṣṭi), skill (dākṣyā), not to fly in battle (yuddhe cápy apalāyana), making of gifts (dāna) and power of controlling others (śākara-bhāva). The natural duties of Vaiśyas are agriculture, rearing of cows and trade. Gītā, XVIII. 42–44.
example, the Brahmin in performing religious sacrifice must not appropriate another's property, non-appropriation being one of the common and universal duties. In this way he serves his own community as well as subserves (though in a negative way) the common good of the community—and so, in an indirect way, serves the common good of humanity. Thus the individual of a specific community who observes the duties of his class does not serve his own community merely, but also and in the same process all other communities according to their deserts and needs, and in this way the whole of humanity itself. This, it will be seen, is also the view of Plato, whose virtue of justice is the common good which is to be realized by each class through its specific duties; but this is to be distinguished from the common good which constitutes the object of the sādhāraṇa-dharmas of the Hindu classification. The end in these common and universal duties is not the common well-being, which is being correctly realized in specific communities, but the common good as the precondition and foundation of the latter; it is not the good which is common-in-the-individual, but common-as-the-prius-of-the-individual. Hence the sādhāraṇa duties are obligatory equally for all individuals, irrespective of their social position or individual capacity. The statement that the common good (sādhāraṇa-dharma) could be regarded as the precondition of the specific caste-duties implies that, if the latter came into conflict with the former, then the former should prevail. This is, however, inexact; for there is hardly any instance where, in case of a conflict, the sādhāraṇa-dharma, or the common duties, had a greater force. Thus, for example, non-injury to living beings was a common duty; but sacrifices implied the killing of animals, and it was the clear duty of the Brahmins to perform sacrifices. War implied the taking of an immense number of human lives; but it was the duty of a Kṣatriya not to turn away from a battle-field, and in pursuance of his obligatory duty as a Kṣatriya he had to fight. Turning to traditional accounts, we find in the Rāmāyana that Śambūka was a Śūdra saint (muni) who was performing ascetic penances in a forest. This was a transgression of caste-duties; for a Śūdra could not perform tapas, which only the higher caste people were allowed to undertake, and hence the performance of tapas by the Śūdra saint Śambūka was regarded

1 Ethics of the Hindus, by Ś. K. Maitra under Dr Seal’s close personal supervision and guidance, pp. 34.
as _adharma_ (vice); and, as a result of this _adharma_, there was a calamity in the kingdom of Rāma in the form of the death of an infant son of a Brahmin. King Rāma went out in his chariot and beheaded Śambūka for transgressing his caste-duties. Instances could be multiplied to show that, when there was a conflict between the caste-duties and the common duties, it was the former that had the greater force. The common duties had their force only when they were not in conflict with the caste-duties. The _Gītā_ is itself an example of how the caste-duties had preference over common duties. In spite of the fact that Arjuna was extremely unwilling to take the lives of his near and dear kinsmen in the battle of Kurukṣetra Kṛṣṇa tried his best to dissuade him from his disinclination to fight and pointed out to him that it was his clear duty, as a Kṣatriya, to fight. It seems therefore very proper to hold that the common duties had only a general application, and that the specific caste-duties superseded them, whenever the two were in conflict.

The _Gītā_ does not raise the problem of common duties, as its synthesis of _nieṛtti_ (cessation from work) and _praṇṛtti_ (tending to work) makes it unnecessary to introduce the advocacy of the common duties; for its instruction to take to work with a mind completely detached from all feelings and motives of self-seeking, pleasure-seeking and self-interest elevates its scheme of work to a higher sphere, which would not be in need of the practice of any select scheme of virtues.

The theory of the _Gītā_ that, if actions are performed with an unattached mind, then their defects cannot touch the performer, distinctly implies that the goodness or badness of an action does not depend upon the external effects of the action, but upon the inner motive of action. If there is no motive of pleasure or self-gain, then the action performed cannot bind the performer; for it is only the bond of desires and self-love that really makes an action one's own and makes one reap its good or bad fruits. Morality from this point of view becomes wholly subjective, and the special feature of the _Gītā_ is that it tends to make all actions non-moral by cutting away the bonds that connect an action with its performer. In such circumstances the more logical course would be that of Śaṅkara, who would hold a man who is free from desires and attachment to be above morality, above duties and above responsibilities. The _Gītā_, however, would not advocate
the objective *nivṛtti*, or cessation of work; its whole aim is to effect subjective *nivṛtti*, or detachment from desires. It would not allow anyone to desist from his prescribed objective duties; but, whatever might be the nature of these duties, since they were performed without any motive of gain, pleasure or self-interest, they would be absolutely without fruit for the performer, who, in his perfect equanimity of mind, would transcend all his actions and their effects. If Arjuna fought and killed hundreds of his kinsmen out of a sense of his caste-duty, then, howsoever harmful his actions might be, they would not affect him. Yudhiṣṭhirā, however, contemplated an expiation of the sin of killing his kinsmen by repentance, gifts, asceticism, pilgrimage, etc., which shows the other view, which was prevalent in the *Mahā-bhārata* period, that, when the performance of caste-duties led to such an injury to human lives, the sinful effects of such actions could be expiated by such means¹. Yudhiṣṭhirā maintained that of asceticism (*tapas*), the giving up of all duties (*tyāga*), and the final knowledge of the ultimate truth (*avadhi*), the second is better than the first and the third is better than the second. He therefore thought that the best course was to take to an ascetic life and give up all duties and responsibilities, whereas Arjuna held that the best course for a king would be to take upon himself the normal responsibilities of a kingly life and at the same time remain unattached to the pleasures of such a life². Regarding also the practice of the virtues of non-injury, etc., Arjuna maintains that it is wrong to carry these virtues to extremes. Howsoever a man may live, whether as an ascetic or as a forester, it is impossible for him to practise non-injury to all living beings in any extreme degree. Even in the water that one drinks and the fruits that one eats, even in breathing and winking many fine and invisible insects are killed. So the virtue of non-injury, or, for the matter of that, all kinds of virtue, can be practised only in moderation, and their injunctions always imply that they can be practised only within the bounds of a commonsense view of things. Non-injury may

¹ *Mahā-bhārata*, xiii. 7. 36 and 37.
² Thus Arjuna says:

\[ \text{akaktah sahtavad gacchan nihsango mukta-bandhaah samah iatrav ca mitre ca sa vai mukto mahiptate;} \]

To which Yudhiṣṭhirā replies:

\[ \text{tapas tyagao 'cadhir iti niiceyas tv esa dhistatam parasparaṃ jyita esam yesam naishreyast matiḥ.} \]

be good; but there are cases where non-injury would mean doing injury. If a tiger enters into a cattle-shed, not to kill the tiger would amount to killing the cows. So all religious injunctions are made from the point of view of a practical and well-ordered maintenance of society and must therefore be obeyed with an eye to the results that may follow in their practical application. Our principal object is to maintain properly the process of the social order and the well-being of the people۱. It seems clear, then, that, when the Gitā urges again and again that there is no meaning in giving up our normal duties, vocation and place in life and its responsibilities, and that what is expected of us is that we should make our minds unattached, it refers to the view which Yudhiṣṭhira expresses, that we must give up all our works. The Gitā therefore repeatedly urges that tyāga does not mean the giving up of all works, but the mental giving up of the fruits of all actions.

Though the practice of detachment of mind from all desires and motives of pleasure and enjoyment would necessarily involve the removal of all vices and a natural elevation of the mind to all that is high and noble, yet the Gitā sometimes denounces certain types of conduct in very strong terms. Thus, in the sixteenth chapter, it is said that people who hold a false philosophy and think that the world is false and, without any basis, deny the existence of God and hold that there is no other deeper cause of the origin of life than mere sex-attraction and sex-union, destroy themselves by their foolishness and indulgence in all kinds of cruel deeds, and would by their mischievous actions turn the world to the path of ruin. In their insatiable desires, filled with pride, vanity and ignorance, they take to wrong and impure courses of action. They argue too much and think that there is nothing greater than this world that we live in, and, thinking so, they indulge in all kinds of pleasures and enjoyments. Tied with bonds of desire, urged by passions and anger, they accumulate money in a wrongful manner for the gratification of their sense-desires, “I have got this to-day,” they think, “and enjoy myself; I have so much hoarded money and I shall have more later on”; “that enemy has been killed by me, I shall kill other enemies also, I am

۱ Loka-yāträrtham ēvedaṁ dharma-pravacanaṁ ķatam
ahimā sādhu himseti īreyān dharma-parigrahaṁ
nātyantam guṇavat kimcin na cápy atyanta-nirgunaṁ
ubhayām sarva-kāryeṣu dṛṣyate sādhu asādhu va.

Mādhyā-nātā, vi. 15. 49 and 50.
a lord, I enjoy myself, I am successful, powerful and happy, I am rich, I have a noble lineage, there is no one like me, I perform sacrifices, make gifts and enjoy.” They get distracted by various kinds of ideas and desires and, surrounded by nets of ignorance and delusion and full of attachment for sense-gratifications, they naturally fall into hell. Proud, arrogant and filled with the vanity of wealth, they perform improperly the so-called sacrifices, as a demonstration of their pomp and pride. In their egoism, power, pride, desires and anger they always ignore God, both in themselves and in others. The main vices that one should try to get rid of are thus egoism, too many desires, greed, anger, pride and vanity, and of these desire and anger are again and again mentioned as being like the gates of hell.

Among the principal virtues called the divine equipment (dāivī sampat) the Gītā counts fearlessness (abhaya), purity of heart (sattva-saṃsuddhi), knowledge of things and proper action in accordance with it, giving, control of mind, sacrifice, study, tapas, sincerity (ārjava), non-injury (ahimsā), truthfulness (satya), control of anger (akrodha), renunciation (tyāga), peacefulness of mind (śānti), not to backbite (apaśīma), kindness to the suffering (bhūteṣu dayā), not to be greedy (aḻolupatva), tenderness (mārdava), a feeling of shame before people in general when a wrong action is done (hṛt), steadiness (acapala), energy (te’as), a forgiving spirit (kaśānti), patience (dhr̥ti), purity (sauca), not to think ill of others (aḍroha), and not to be vain. It is these virtues which liberate our spirits, whereas vanity, pride, conceit, anger, cruelty and ignorance are vices which bind and enslave us. The man who loves God should not hurt any living beings, should be friendly and sympathetic towards them, and should yet be unattached to all things, should have no egoism, be the same in sorrows and pleasures and full of forgivingness for all. He should be firm, self-controlled and always contented. He should be pure, unattached, the same to all, should not take to actions from any personal motives, and he has nothing to fear. He is the same to friends and enemies, in appreciation and denunciation; he is the same in heat and cold, pleasure and pain; he is the same in praise and blame, homeless and always satisfied with anything and everything; he is always unperturbed and absolutely unattached to all things. If one carefully goes through

1 Gītā, xvi. 8–18.
2 Ibid. xvi. 1–5.
3 Ibid. xvi. 21.
4 Ibid. xii. 13–19; see also ibid. xiii. 8–11.
the above list of virtues, it appears that the virtues are pre-
eminently of a negative character—one should not be angry, hurt-
ful to others, egoistic, proud or vain, should not do anything with
selfish motives, should not be ruffled by pleasure and pain, heat
and cold and should be absolutely unattached. Of the few positive
virtues, sincerity and purity of heart, a forgiving spirit, tenderness,
friendliness, kindness, alertness and sympathy seem to be most
prominent. The terms maitra (friendliness) and karunā (com-
passion) might naturally suggest the Buddhist virtues so named,
since they do not occur in the Upaniṣads. But in the Gītā also they
are mentioned only once, and the general context of the passage
shows that no special emphasis is put on these two virtues. They
do not imply any special kind of meditation of universal friendship
or universal piety or the active performance of friendly and sympa-
thetic deeds for the good of humanity or for the good of living
beings in general. They seem to imply simply the positive friendly
state of the mind that must accompany all successful practice of
non-injury to fellow-beings. The Gītā does not advocate the active
performance of friendliness, but encourages a friendly spirit as a
means of discouraging the tendency to do harm to others. The
life that is most admired in the Gītā is a life of unattachedness,
a life of peace, contentment and perfect equanimity and unper-
turbedness in joys and sorrows. The vices that are denounced are
generally those that proceed from attachment and desires, such as
egoism, pride, vanity, anger, greediness, etc. There is another class
of virtues which are often praised, namely those which imply
purity, sincerity and alertness of mind and straightforwardness of conduct.
The negative virtue of sense-control, with its positive counterpart,
the acquirement of the power of directing one’s mind in a right
direction, forms the bed-rock of the entire superstructure of the
Gītā code of moral and virtuous conduct.

The virtue of sameness (samatva), however, seems to be the
great ideal which the Gītā is never tired of emphasizing again and
again. This sameness can be attained in three different stages:
subjective sameness, or equanimity of mind, or the sameness in
joys and sorrows, praise and blame and in all situations of life;
objective sameness, as regarding all people, good, bad or in-
different, a friend or an enemy, with equal eyes and in the same

1 The term maitra occurs only once in the Muktikopaniṣat, II. 34, and the
Muktika is in all probability one of the later Upaniṣads.
impartial spirit; and the final stage of the achievement of this equanimity is the self-realized state when one is absolutely unperturbed by all worldly things—a state of transcendence called gunātīta. Thus in the Gītā, II. 15, it is said that he whom sense-affections and physical troubles cannot affect in any way, who is unperturbable and the same in joys and sorrows, attains immortality. In II. 38 Kṛṣṇa asks Arjuna to think of joys and sorrows, gain and loss, victory and defeat as being the same, and to engage himself in the fight with such a mind; for, if he did so, no sin would touch him. In II. 47 Kṛṣṇa says to Arjuna that his business is only to perform his duties and not to look for the effects of his deeds; it is wrong to look for the fruits of deeds or to desist from performing one’s duties. In II. 48 this sameness in joys and sorrows is described as yoga, and it is again urged that one should be unperturbed whether in success or in failure. The same idea is repeated in II. 55, 56 and 57, where it is said that a true saint should not be damped in sorrow or elated in joy, and that he should not be attached to anything and should take happiness or misery indifferently, without particularly welcoming the former or regretting the latter. Such a man is absolutely limited to his own self and is self-satisfied. He is not interested in achieving anything or in not achieving anything; there is no personal object for him to attain in the world. To such a man gold and stones, desirables and undesirables, praise and blame, appreciation and denunciation, friends and foes are all alike. Such a man makes no distinction whether between a friend and foe, or between a sinner and a virtuous man. Such a man knows that pleasures and pains are welcomed and hated by all and, thinking so, he desires the good of all and looks upon all as he would upon himself—on a learned Brahmin of an elevated character, on a cow, an elephant, a dog or a candāla; and the wise behave in the same way. He sees God in all beings and knows the indestructible and the immortal in all that is destructible. He who knows that all beings are pervaded by all, and thus regards them all with an equal eye, does not hurt his own spiritual nature and thus attains his highest. As the culmination of this development, there is the state in which a man transcends all the corporeal and mundane characteristics of the threefold guṇas, and, being freed from birth, death, old age and

1 Gītā, III. 17, 18.
2 Ibid. XIV. 24, 25.
3 Ibid. VI. 9.
4 Ibid. VI. 31; also v. 18.
5 Ibid. XIII. 28.
sorrow, attains immortality. He knows that the worldly qualities of things, the *guna*ś, are extraneous to his own spiritual nature, and by such thoughts he transcends the sphere of all worldly qualities and attains Brahmahood\(^1\).

Apart from the caste-duties and other deeds that are to be performed without any attachment, the *Gītā* speaks again and again of sacrifices, *tapas* and gifts, as duties which cannot be ignored at any stage of our spiritual development. It is well worth pointing out that the *Gītā* blames the performance of sacrifices either for the attainment of selfish ends or for making a display of pomp or pride. The sacrifices are to be performed from a sense of duty and of public good, since it is only by the help of the sacrifices that the gods may be expected to bring down heavy showers, through which crops may grow in plenty. Physical *tapas* is described as the adoration of gods, Brahmins, teachers and wise men, as purity, sincerity, sex-continence and non-injury; *tapas* in speech is described as truthful and unoffending speech, which is both sweet to hear and for the good of all, and also study; mental *tapas* is described as serenity of mind (*manah-prasāda*), happy temper (*saunyatva*), thoughtfulness (*mauna*), self-control (*ātma-vinigraha*) and sincerity of mind; and the higher kind of *tapas* is to be performed without any idea of gain or the fulfilment of any ulterior end\(^2\). Gifts are to be made to good Brahmins in a holy place and at an auspicious time, merely from a sense of duty. This idea that gifts are properly made only when they are made to good Brahmans at a holy time or place is very much more limited and restricted than the Mahāyāna idea of making gifts for the good of all, without the slightest restriction of any kind. Thus it is said in the *Śikṣā-samuccaya* that a Bodhisattva need not be afraid among tigers and other wild animals in a wild forest, since the Bodhisattva has given his all for the good of all beings. He has therefore to think that, if the wild animals should eat him, this would only mean the giving his body to them, which would be the fulfilment of his virtue of universal charity. The Bodhisattvas take the vow of giving away their all in universal charity\(^3\).

Thus the fundamental teaching of the *Gītā* is to follow caste-duties without any motive of self-interest or the gratification of sense-desires. The other general duties of sacrifices, *tapas* and

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2. *Ibid. xvi. 11-17.*
gifts are also to be practised by all and may hence be regarded in some sense as being equivalent to the sādhāraṇa-dharmas of the Vaiśeṣika and Smṛti literature. But, if caste-duties or customary duties come into conflict with the special duties of non-injury (ahimsā), then the caste-duties are to be followed in preference. It does not seem that any of the other special duties or virtues which are enjoined can come into conflict with the general caste-duties; for most of these are for the inner moral development, with which probably no caste-duties can come into conflict. But, though there is no express mandate of the Gītā on the point, yet it may be presumed that, should a Śūdra think of performing sacrifices, tapas or gifts or the study of the Vedas, this would most certainly be opposed by the Gītā, as it would be against the prescribed caste-duties. So, though non-injury is one of the special virtues enjoined by the Gītā, yet, when a Kṣatriya kills his enemies in open and free fight, that fight is itself to be regarded as virtuous (dharmya) and there is for the Kṣatriya no sin in the killing of his enemies. If a person dedicates all his actions to Brahmā and performs his duties without attachment, then sinfulness in his actions cannot cleave to him, just as water cannot cleave to the leaves of a lotus plant1. On the one hand the Gītā keeps clear of the ethics of the absolutist and metaphysical systems by urging the necessity of the performance of caste and customary duties, and yet enjoins the cultivation of the great virtues of renunciation, purity, sincerity, non-injury, self-control, sense-control and want of attachment as much as the absolutist systems would desire to do; on the other hand, it does not adopt any of the extreme and rigorous forms of self-discipline, as the Yoga does, or the practice of the virtues on an unlimited and universalist scale, as the Buddhists did. It follows the middle course, strongly emphasizing the necessity of self-control, sense-control and detachment from all selfish ends and desires along with the performance of the normal duties. This detachment from sense-pleasures is to be attained either through wisdom or, preferably, through devotion to God.

1 Gītā, v. 10.
Analysis of Action.

The consideration of the *Gītā* ethics naturally brings in the problem of the analysis of the nature of action, volition and agent. The principal analysis of volition in Hindu Philosophy is to be found in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works. Praśastapāda divides animal activities into two classes, firstly, those that are of a reflex nature and originate automatically from life-functions (*jīvāna-pūrvaka*) and subserve useful ends (*kām api artha-kriyām*) for the organism, and, secondly, those conscious and voluntary actions that proceed out of desire or aversion, for the attainment of desirable ends and the avoidance of undesirable ones. Prabhākara holds that volitional actions depend on several factors, firstly, a general notion that something has to be done (*kāryatā-jñāna*), which Gaṅgabhaṭṭa in his *Bhātta-cintāmani* explains as meaning not merely a general notion that a particular work can be done by the agent, but also the specific notion that an action must be done by him—a sense which can proceed only from a belief that the action would be useful to him and would not be sufficiently harmful to him to dissuade him from it. Secondly, there must be the belief that the agent has the power or capacity of performing the action (*kṛti-sādhya-jñāna*). This belief of *kṛti-sādhya-jñāna* leads to desire (*cikārsā*). The Prabhākaras do not introduce here the important factor that an action can be desired only if it is conducive to the good of the agent. Instead of this element they suppose that actions are desired when the agent identifies himself with the action as one to be accomplished by him—an action is desired only as a kind of self-realization. The Nyāya, however, thinks that the fact that an action is conducive to good and not productive of serious mischief is an essential condition of its performance.

The *Gītā* seems to hold that everywhere actions are always being performed by the *guna* or characteristic qualities of *prakṛti*, the primal matter. It is through ignorance and false pride that one thinks himself to be the agent. In another place it is said that for the occurrence of an action there are five causes, viz. the body, the agent, the various sense-organs, the various life-functions and biomotor activities, and the unknown objective causal elements or the all-controlling power of God (*daiva*). All actions

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1. *Gītā*, iii. 27; xiii. 29.
being due to the combined operation of these five elements, it would be wrong to think the self or the agent to be the only performer of actions. Thus it is said that, this being so, he who thinks the self alone to be the agent of actions, this wicked-minded person through his misapplied intelligence does not see things properly. Whatever actions are performed, right or wrong, whether in body, speech or mind, have these five factors as their causes. The philosophy that underlies the ethical position of the Gitā consists in the fact that, in reality, actions are made to happen primarily through the movement of the characteristic qualities of prakṛti, and secondarily, through the collocation of the five factors mentioned, among which the self is but one factor only. It is, therefore, sheer egoism to think that one can, at his own sweet will, undertake a work or cease from doing works. For the prakṛti, or primal matter, through its later evolutes, the collocation of causes, would of itself move us to act, and even in spite of the opposition of our will we are led to perform the very action which we did not want to perform. So Kṛṣṇa says to Arjuna that the egoism through which you would say that you would not fight is mere false vanity, since the prakṛti is bound to lead you to action. A man is bound by the active tendencies or actions which necessarily follow directly from his own nature, and there is no escape. He has to work in spite of the opposition of his will. Prakṛti, or the collocation of the five factors, moves us to work. That being so, no one can renounce all actions. If renouncing actions is an impossibility, and if one is bound to act, it is but proper that one should perform one’s normal duties. There are no duties and no actions which are absolutely faultless, absolutely above all criticism; so the proper way in which a man should purify his actions is by purging his mind of all imperfections and impurities of desires and attachment. But a question may arise how, if all actions follow necessarily as the product of the five-fold collocation, a person can determine his actions? The general implication of the Gitā seems to be that, though the action follows necessarily as the product of the fivefold collocation, yet the self can give a direction to these actions; if a man wishes to dissociate himself from all attachments and desires by dedicating the fruits of all his actions to God and clings to God with such a purpose, God helps him to attain his noble aim.

1 Gitā, xviii. 16.
2 Ibid. xviii. 15.
3 Ibid. xviii. 59.
Eschatology.

The Gītā is probably the earliest document where a definite statement is made regarding the imperishable nature of existent things and the impossibility of that which is non-existent coming into being. It says that what is non-existent cannot come into being, and that what exists cannot cease to be. In modern times we hear of the principle of the conservation of energy and also of the principle of the conservation of mass. The principle of the conservation of energy is distinctly referred to in the Vyāsa-bhāṣya on Patanjali-sūtra, iv. 3, but the idea of the conservation of mass does not seem to have been mentioned definitely anywhere. Both the Vedāntist and the Sāṃkhyaist seem to base their philosophies on an ontological principle known as sat-kārya-vāda, which holds that the effect is already existent in the cause. The Vedānta holds that the effect as such is a mere appearance and has no true existence; the cause alone is truly existent. The Sāṃkhya, on the other hand, holds that the effect is but a modification of the causal substance, and, as such, is not non-existent, but has no existence separate from the cause; the effect may therefore be said to exist in the cause before the starting of the causal operation (kārana-cvāpāra). Both these systems strongly object to the Buddhist and Nyāya view that the effect came into being out of non-existence, a doctrine known as a-sat-kārya-vāda. Both the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta tried to prove their theses, but neither of them seems to have realized that their doctrines are based upon an a priori proposition which is the basic principle underlying the principle of the conservation of energy and the conservation of mass, but which is difficult to be proved by reference to a posteriori illustration. Thus, the Sāṃkhya says that the effect exists in the cause, since, had it not been so, there would be no reason why certain kinds of effects, e.g. oil, can be produced only from certain kinds of causes, e.g. sesamum. That certain kinds of effects are produced only from certain kinds of causes does not really prove the doctrine of sat-kārya-vāda, but only implies it; for the doctrine of sat-kārya-vāda rests on an a priori principle such as that formulated in the Gītā—that what exists cannot perish, and that what does not exist cannot come into being. The Gītā does not try to prove this proposition, but takes it as a self-evident principle which no one could

nāsato vidyate bhūvo nabhavo vidyate satāḥ. Gītā, ii. 16.
challenge. It does not, however, think of applying this principle, which underlies the ontological position of the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta, in a general way. It seems to apply the principle only to the nature of self (ātman). Thus it says, “O Arjuna, that principle by which everything is pervaded is to be regarded as deathless; no one can destroy this imperishable one. The bodies that perish belong to the deathless eternal and unknowable self; therefore thou shouldst fight. He who thinks the self to be destructible, and he who thinks it to be the destroyer, do not know that it can neither destroy nor be destroyed. It is neither born nor does it die, nor, being once what it is, would it ever be again.... Weapons cannot cut it, fire cannot burn it, water cannot dissolve it and air cannot dry it.” The immortality of self preached in the Gītā seems to have been directly borrowed from the Upaniṣads, and the passages that describe it seem to breathe the spirit of the Upaniṣads not only in idea, but also in the modes and expressions. The ontological principle that what exists cannot die and that what is not cannot come into being does not seem to have been formulated in the Upaniṣads. Its formulation in the Gītā in support of the principle of immortality seems, therefore, to be a distinct advance on the Upaniṣadic philosophy in this direction.

The first argument urged by Kṛṣṇa to persuade Arjuna to fight was that the self was immortal and that it was the body only that could be injured or killed, and that therefore Arjuna need not feel troubled because he was going to kill his kinsmen in the battle of Kurukṣetra. Upon the death of one body the self only changed to another, in which it was reborn, just as a man changed his old clothes for new ones. The body is always changing, and even in youth, middle age and old age, does not remain the same. The change at death is also a change of body, and so there is no intrinsic difference between the changes of the body at different stages of life and the ultimate change that is effected at death, when the old body is forsaken by the spirit and a new body is accepted. Our bodies are always changing, and, though the different stages in this growth in childhood, youth and old age represent comparatively small degrees of change, yet these ought to prepare our minds to realize the fact that death is also a similar change of body only and cannot, therefore, affect the unperturbed nature of the self, which, in spite of all changes of body at successive
births and rebirths, remains unchanged in itself. When one is born one must die, and when one dies one must be reborn. Birth necessarily implies death, and death necessarily implies rebirth. There is no escape from this continually revolving cycle of birth and death. From Brahmā down to all living creatures there is a continuous rotation of birth, death and rebirth. In reply to Arjuna’s questions as to what becomes of the man who, after proceeding a long way on the path of yoga, is somehow through his failings dislodged from it and dies, Krṣṇa replies that no good work can be lost and a man who has been once on the path of right cannot suffer; so, when a man who was proceeding on the path of yoga is snatched away by the hand of death, he is born again in a family of pure and prosperous people or in a family of wise yogins; and in this new birth he is associated with his achievements in his last birth and begins anew his onward course of advancement, and the old practice of the previous birth carries him onward, without any effort on his part, in his new line of progress. By his continual efforts through many lives and the cumulative effects of the right endeavours of each life the yogin attains his final realization. Ordinarily the life of a man in each new birth depends upon the desires and ideas that he fixes upon at the time of his death. But those that think of God, the oldest instructor, the seer, the smallest of the small, the upholder of all, shining like the sun beyond all darkness, and fix their life-forces between their eyebrows, and control all the gates of their senses and their mind in their hearts, ultimately attain their highest realization in God. From the great Lord, the great unmanifested and incomprehensible Lord, proceeds the unmanifested (avyākta), from which come out all manifested things (avyaktayath sarvaḥ), and in time again return to it and again evolve out of it. Thus there are two forms of the unmanifested (avyākta), the unmanifested out of which all the manifested things come, and the unmanifested which is the nature of the eternal Lord from whom the former come. The ideas of deva-yāna and pitṛ-yāna, daksināyana and uttarāyana, the black and the white courses as mentioned in the Upaniṣads, are also referred to in the Gītā. Those who go through smoke in the new-moon fortnight and the later six months (when the sun is on the south of the equator), and thus take the black course, return again; but those who take the white course of fire

1 Gītā, viii. 16–23.
in the full-moon fortnight and the former six months (when the sun is on the north of the equator) do not return again. No very significant meaning can be made out of these doctrines. They seem to be but the perpetuation of the traditional faiths regarding the future courses of the dead, as referred to in the Chandogya Upanisad. The Gita, again, speaking of others, says that those who follow the sacrificial duties of the Vedas enjoy heavenly pleasures in heaven, and, when their merits are exhausted by the enjoyments of the good fruits of their actions, they come back to earth. Those who follow the path of desires and take to religious duties for the attainment of pleasures must always go to heaven and come back again—they cannot escape this cycle of going and coming. Again, in the Gita, xvi. 19, Krsna says, "I make cruel vicious persons again and again take birth as ferocious animals."

The above summary of the eschatological views of the Gita shows that it collects together the various traditionally accepted views regarding life after death without trying to harmonize them properly. Firstly, it may be noted that the Gita believes in the doctrine of karma. Thus in xv. 2 and in iv. 9 it is said that the world has grown on the basis of karma, and the Gita believes that it is the bondage of karma that binds us to this world. The bondage of karma is due to the existence of attachment, passions and desires. But what does the bondage of karma lead to? The reply to such a question, as given by the Gita, is that it leads to rebirth. When one performs actions in accordance with the Vedic injunctions for the attainment of beneficial fruits, desire for such fruits and attachment to these desirable fruits is the bondage of karma, which naturally leads to rebirth. The proposition definitely pronounced in the Gita, that birth necessarily means death and death necessarily means birth, reminds us of the first part of the twelvefold causal chain of the Buddha—"What being, is there death? Birth being, there is death." It has already been noticed that the attitude of the Gita towards Vedic performances is merely one of toleration and not one of encouragement. These are actions which are prompted by desires and, like all other actions similarly prompted, they entail with them the bonds of karma; and, as soon as the happy effects produced by the merits of these actions are enjoyed and lived through, the performers of these actions come down from heaven to the earth and

1 Gita, viii. 24-26.
are reborn and have to pass through the old ordeal of life. The idea that, there being birth, there is death, and that, if there is death there is also rebirth, is the same in the Gîtâ as in Buddhism; but the Gîtâ form seems to be very much earlier than the Buddhistic form; for the Buddhistic form relates birth and death through a number of other causal links intimately connected together in an interdependent cycle, of which the Gîtâ seems to be entirely ignorant. The Gîtâ does not speak of any causal chain, such as could be conceived to be borrowed from Buddhism. It, of course, knows that attachment is the root of all vice; but it is only by implication that we can know that attachment leads to the bondage of karma and the bondage of karma to rebirth. The main purpose of the Gîtâ is not to find out how one can tear asunder the bonds of karma and stop rebirth, but to prescribe the true rule of the performance of one’s duties. It speaks sometimes, no doubt, about cutting asunder the bonds of karma and attaining one’s highest; but instruction as regards the attainment of liberation or a description of the evils of this worldly life does not form any part of the content of the Gîtâ. The Gîtâ has no pessimistic tendency. It speaks of the necessary connection of birth and death not in order to show that life is sorrowful and not worth living, but to show that there is no cause of regret in such universal happenings as birth and death. The principal ideas are, no doubt, those of attachment, karma, birth, death and rebirth; but the idea of Buddhism is more complex and more systematized, and is therefore probably a later development at a time when the Gîtâ discussions on the subject were known. The Buddhist doctrine that there is no self and no individual anywhere is just the opposite of the Gîtâ doctrine of the immortality of the self.

But the Gîtâ speaks not only of rebirth, but also of the two courses, the path of smoke and the path of light, which are referred to in the Chândogya Upaniṣad. The only difference between the Upaniṣad account and that of the Gîtâ is that there are more details in the Upaniṣad than in the Gîtâ. But the ideas of deva-yāna and pitr-yāna do not seem to fit in quite consistently with the idea of rebirth on earth. The Gîtâ, however, combines the idea of rebirth on earth with the deva-yāna-pitr-yāna idea and also with the idea of ascent to heaven as an effect of the merits

1 Chândogya Upaniṣad, v. 18.
accruing from sacrificial performances. Thus the Gitā combines the different trains of ideas just as it finds them traditionally accepted, without trying to harmonize them properly. It does not attempt to discuss the point regarding the power of karma in determining the nature of rebirths, enjoyments and sufferings. From some passages (iv. 9 or vi. 40–45) it might appear that the bonds of karma produced their effects independently by their own powers, and that the arrangement of the world is due to the effect of karma. But there are other passages (xvi. 19) which indicate that karma does not produce its effects by itself, but that God rewards or punishes good and bad deeds by arranging good and bad births associated with joys and sorrows. In the Gitā, v. 15, it is said that the idea of sins and virtues is due to ignorance, whereas, if we judge rightly, God does not take cognizance either of vices or of virtues. Here again there are two contradictory views of karma: one view in which karma is regarded as the cause which brings about all inequalities in life, and another view which does not attribute any value to good or bad actions. The only way in which the two views can be reconciled in accordance with the spirit of the Gitā is by holding that the Gitā does not believe in the objective truth of virtue or vice (punya or pāpa). There is nothing good or bad in the actions themselves. It is only ignorance and foolishness that regards them as good or bad; it is only our desires and attachments which make the actions produce their bad effects with reference to us, and which render them sinful for us. Since the actions themselves are neither good nor bad, the performance of even apparently sinful actions, such as the killing of one's kinsmen on the battle-field, cannot be regarded as sinful, if they are done from a sense of duty; but the same actions would be regarded as sinful, if they were performed through attachments or desires. Looked at from this point of view, the idea of morality in the Gitā is essentially of a subjective character. But though morality, virtue and vice, can be regarded from this point of view as subjective, it is not wholly subjective. For morality does not depend upon mere subjective conscience or the subjective notions of good and bad. The caste-duties and other duties of customary morality are definitely fixed, and no one should transgress them. The subjectivity of virtue and vice consists in the fact that they depend entirely on our good or bad actions. If actions are performed from a sense of obedience to scriptural commands, caste-
duties or duties of customary morality, then such actions, in spite of their bad consequences, would not be regarded as bad.

Apart from these courses of rebirth and ascent to heaven, the last and best and ultimate course is described as being liberation, which transcends all that can be achieved by all kinds of merits attained by sacrifices, gifts or tapas. He who attains this highest achievement lives in God and is never born again. The highest realization thus consists in being one with God, by which one escapes all sorrows. In the Gītā liberation (mokṣa) means liberation from old age and death. This liberation can be attained by true philosophic knowledge of the nature of kṣetra, or the mind-body whole, and the kṣetra-jñā, the perceiving selves, or the nature of what is truly spiritual and what is non-spiritual, and by clinging to God as one’s nearest and dearest. This liberation from old age and death also means liberation from the ties of karma associated with us through the bonds of attachment, desires, etc. It does not come of itself, as the natural result of philosophic knowledge or of devotion to God; but God, as the liberator, grants it to the wise and to those who cling to Him through devotion. But whether it be achieved as the result of philosophic knowledge or as the result of devotion to God, the moral elevation, consisting of dissociation from attachment and the right performance of duties in an unattached manner, is indispensable.

God and Man.

The earliest and most recondite treatment regarding the nature and existence of God and His relation to man is to be found in the Gītā. The starting-point of the Gītā theism may be traced as far back as the Puruṣa-sūkta, where it is said that the one quarter of the puruṣa has spread out as the cosmic universe and its living beings, while its other three-quarters are in the immortal heavens. This passage is repeated in Chāndogya, III. 12. 6 and in Maitrāyaṇī, vi. 4, where it is said that the three-quarter Brahman sits root upward above (ūrdhva-mūlaṃ tripād Brahma). This idea, in a slightly modified form, appears in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, vi. 1, where it is said that this universe is the eternal Aśvattha

1 Gītā, viii. 28; ix. 4.  
2 Ibid. vii. 29; xiii. 34.  
3 Ibid. xviii. 66.

 śraddhaṃ śraddhā śraddhāmā 
tripād arsūmṛtam ruci. Puruṣa-sūkta.
tree which has its root high up and its branches downwards (urdhva-mūlo 'vāk-sākhaḥ). The Gītā borrows this idea and says, "This is called the eternal Aśvattha (pipul tree) with its roots high up and branches downwards, the leaves of which are the Vedas; and he who knows this, he knows the Vedas" (xv. 1). Again it is said, "Its branches spread high and low, its leaves of sense-objects are nourished by the guṇas, its roots are spread downwards, tied with the knots of karma, the human world" (xv. 2); and in the next verse, it is said, "In this world its true nature is not perceived; its beginning, its end, and the nature of its subsistence, remain unknown; it is only by cutting this firmly rooted Aśvattha tree with the strong axe of unattachment (asaṅga-sāstreṇa) that one has to seek that state from which, when once achieved, no one returns." It is clear from the above three passages that the Gītā has elaborated here the simile of the Aśvattha tree of the Katha Upaniṣad. The Gītā accepts this simile of God, but elaborates it by supposing that these branches have further leaves and other roots, which take their sap from the ground of human beings, to which they are attached by the knots of karma. This means a duplication of the Aśvattha tree, the main and the subsidiary. The subsidiary one is an overgrowth, which has proceeded out of the main one and has to be cut into pieces before one can reach that. The principal idea underlying this simile throws a flood of light on the Gītā conception of God, which is an elaboration of the idea of the Puruṣa-sūkta passage already referred to. God is not only immanent, but transcendent as well. The immanent part, which forms the cosmic universe, is no illusion or māyā: it is an emanation, a development, from God. The good and the evil, the moral and the immoral of this world, are all from Him and in Him. The stuff of this world and its manifestations have their basis, an essence, in Him, and are upheld by Him. The transcendent part, which may be said to be the root high up, and the basis of all that has grown in this lower world, is itself the differenceless reality—the Brahman. But, though the Brahman is again and again referred to as the highest abode and the ultimate realization, the absolute essence, yet God in His super-personality transcends even Brahman, in the sense that Brahman, however great it may be, is only a constitutive essence in the complex personality of God. The cosmic universe, the guṇas, the puruṣas, the mind-structure composed of buddhi, ahamkāra, etc., and the Brahman,
are all constituents of God, having their separate functions and mental relations; but God in His super-personality transcends them all and upholds them all. There is, however, one important point in which the *Gītā* differs from the Upaniṣads—this is, its introduction of the idea that God takes birth on earth as man. Thus in the *Gītā*, iv. 6 and iv. 7, it is said that "whenever there is a disturbance of dharma and the rise of adharma, I create myself; though I am unborn, of immortal self and the lord of all beings, yet by virtue of my own nature (prakṛti) I take birth through my own māyā (blinding power of the guṇas)." This doctrine of the incarnation of God, though not dealt with in any of the purely speculative systems, yet forms the corner-stone of most systems of religious philosophy and religion, and the *Gītā* is probably the earliest work available to us in which this doctrine is found. The effect of its introduction and of the dialogue form of the *Gītā*, in which the man-god Kṛṣṇa instructs Arjuna in the philosophy of life and conduct, is that the instruction regarding the personality of God becomes concrete and living. As will be evident in the course of this section, the *Gītā* is not a treatise of systematic philosophy, but a practical course of introduction to life and conduct, conveyed by God Himself in the form of Kṛṣṇa to His devotee, Arjuna. In the *Gītā* abstract philosophy melts down to an insight into the nature of practical life and conduct, as discussed with all the intimacy of the personal relation between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna, which suggests a similar personal relation between God and man. For the God in the *Gītā* is not a God of abstract philosophy or theology, but a God who could be a man and be capable of all personal relations.

The all-pervasive nature of God and the fact that He is the essence and upholder of all things in the world is again and again in various ways emphasized in the *Gītā*. Thus Kṛṣṇa says, "There is nothing greater than I, all things are held in me, like pearls in the thread of a pearl garland; I am the liquidity in water, the light of the sun and the moon, manhood (pauruṣa) in man; good smell in earth, the heat of the sun, intelligence in the intelligent, heroism in the heroes, strength in the strong, and I am also the desires which do not transgress the path of virtue." Again, it is said that "in my unmanifested (avyakta) form I pervade the whole world; all beings exist completely in me, but

1 *Gītā*, vii. 7-12.
I am not exhausted in them; yet so do I transcend them that none of the beings exist in me—I am the upholder of all beings, I do not exist in them and yet I am their procreator." In both these passages the riddle of God's relation with man, by which He exists in us and yet does not exist in us and is not limited by us, is explained by the fact of the threefold nature of God; there is a part of Him which has been manifested as inanimate nature and also as the animate world of living beings. It is with reference to this all-pervasive nature of God that it is said that "as the air in the sky pervades the whole world, so are all beings in 'me' (God). At the end of each cycle (kalpa) all beings enter into my nature (prakṛti yānti māmikām), and again at the beginning of a cycle I create them. I create again and again through my nature (prakṛti); the totality of all living beings is helplessly dependent on prakṛti." The three prakṛtis have already been referred to in the previous sections—prakṛti of God as cosmic matter, prakṛti as the nature of God from which all life and spirit have emanated, and prakṛti as māyā, or the power of God from which the three guṇas have emanated. It is with reference to the operation of these prakṛtis that the cosmic world and the world of life and spirit may be said to be existent in God. But there is the other form of God, as the transcendent Brahma, and, so far as this form is concerned, God transcends the sphere of the universe of matter and life. But in another aspect of God, in His totality and super-personality, He remains unexhausted in all, and the creator and upholder of all, though it is out of a part of Him that the world has come into being. The aspect of God's identity with, and the aspect of His transcendence and nature as the father, mother and supporter of the universe, are not separated in the Gitā, and both the aspects are described often in one and the same passage. Thus it is said, "I am the father, mother, upholder and grandfather of this world, and I am the sacred syllable OM, the three Vedas, Rk, Sāman and Yajus; I am the sacrifice, the oblations and the fire, and yet I am the master and the enjoyer of all sacrifices. I am the final destiny, upholder, matter, the passive illuminator, the rest, support, friend, the origin, the final dissolution, the place, the receptacle and the immortal seed. I produce heat and shower, I destroy and create, I am both death and the deathless, the good and the bad." With reference to His transcendent part it is

1 Gitā, ix. 3–5.  
2 Ibid. ix. 6–8.  
3 Ibid. ix. 16–19, 24.
said, "The sun, the moon and fire do not illuminate it—it is my final abode, from which, when once achieved, no one returns." And again, immediately after, it is said, "It is my part that forms the eternal soul-principle (jīva-bhūta) in the living, which attracts the five senses and the manas which lie buried in prakṛti, and which takes the body and goes out of it with the six senses, just as air takes out fragrance from the flowers." And then God is said to be the controlling agent of all operations in this world. Thus it is said, "By my energy I uphold the world and all living beings and fill all crops with their specific juices; as fire in the bodies of living beings, and aided by the biomotor prāṇa functions, I digest the four kinds of food; I am the light in the sun, the moon and fire." Again it is said, "I reside in the hearts of all; knowledge, forgetfulness and memory all come from me; I alone am to be known by the Vedas; I alone know the Vedas, and I alone am the author of the Vedānta." From these examples it is evident that the Gītā does not know that pantheism and deism and theism cannot well be jumbled up into one as a consistent philosophic creed. And it does not attempt to answer any objections that may be made against the combination of such opposite views. The Gītā not only asserts that all is God, but it also again and again repeats that God transcends all and is simultaneously transcendent and immanent in the world. The answer apparently implied in the Gītā to all objections to the apparently different views of the nature of God is that transcendentalism, immanentalism and pantheism lose their distinctive and opposite characters in the melting whole of the super-personality of God. Sometimes in the same passage, and sometimes in passages of the same context, the Gītā talks in a pantheistic, a transcendent or a theistic vein, and this seems to imply that there is no contradiction in the different aspects of God as preserver and controller of the world, as the substance of the world, life and soul, and as the transcendent substratum underlying them all. In order to emphasize the fact that all that exists and all that is worthy of existence or all that has a superlative existence in good or bad are God's manifestation, the Gītā is never tired of repeating that whatever is highest, best or even worst in things is God or

1 Gītā, xv. 6.
2 Ibid. xv. 7 and 8. It is curious that here the word Īśvara is used as an epithet of jīva.
3 Ibid. xv. 8, 12, 13, 14, 15.
God's manifestation. Thus it is said, "I am the gambling of dice in all deceptive operations, I am victory in all endeavours, heroism of the heroes and the moral qualities (satteva) of all moral men (satteva-vatāṁ)"; and after enumerating a number of such instances Kṛṣṇa says that, wherever there are special gifts or powers or excellence of any kind, they are to be regarded as the special manifestation of God. The idea that God holds within Himself the entire manifold universe is graphically emphasized in a fabulous form, when Kṛṣṇa gives Arjuna the divine eye of wisdom and Arjuna sees Kṛṣṇa in his resplendent divine form, shining as thousands of suns burning together, with thousands of eyes, faces and ornaments, pervading the heavens and the earth, with neither beginning nor end, as the great cosmic person into whose mouths all the great heroes of Kurukṣetra field had entered, like rivers into the ocean. Kṛṣṇa, after showing Arjuna his universal form, says, "I am time (kāla), the great destroyer of the world, and I am engaged in collecting the harvest of human lives, and all that will die in this great battle of Kurukṣetra have already been killed by me; you will be merely an instrument in this great destruction of the mighty battle of Kurukṣetra. So you can fight, destroy your enemies, attain fame and enjoy the sovereignty without any compunction that you have destroyed the lives of your kinsmen."

The main purport of the Gītā view of God seems to be that ultimately there is no responsibility for good or evil and that good and evil, high and low, great and small have all emerged from God and are upheld in Him. When a man understands the nature and reality of his own self and its agency, and his relation with God, both in his transcendent and cosmic nature, and the universe around him and the guṇas of attachment, etc., which bind him to his worldly desires, he is said to have the true knowledge. There is no opposition between the path of this true knowledge (jñāna-yoga) and the path of duties; for true knowledge supports and is supported by right performance of duties. The path of knowledge is praised in the Gītā in several passages. Thus it is said, that just as fire burns up the wood, so does knowledge reduce all actions to ashes. There is nothing so pure as knowledge. He who has true faith is attached to God, and he who has controlled his senses, attains knowledge, and having attained it, secures peace. He who
is foolish, an unbeliever, and full of doubts, is destroyed. He who is always doubting has neither this world, nor the other, nor does he enjoy any happiness. Even the worst sinner can hope to cross the sea of sins in the boat of knowledge. In the *Gītā*, iv. 42, Kṛṣṇa says to Arjuna, "Therefore, having destroyed the ignorance of your heart by the sword of knowledge, and having cut asunder all doubts, raise yourself up." But what is this knowledge? In the *Gītā*, iv. 36, in the same context, this knowledge is defined to be that view of things by which all beings are perceived in this self or God. The true knowledge of God destroys all *karma* in the sense that he who has perceived and realized the true nature of all things in God cannot be attached to his passions and desires as an ignorant man would be. In another passage, already referred to, it is said that the roots of the worldly Aśvattha tree are to be cut by the sword of unattachment. The confusion into which Arjuna falls in the *Gītā*, III. 1 and 2, regarding the relative excellence of the path of *karma* and the path of knowledge is wholly unfounded. Kṛṣṇa points out in the *Gītā*, III. 3, that there are two paths, the path of knowledge and the path of duties (*jñāna-yoga* and *karma-yoga*). The confusion had arisen from the fact that Kṛṣṇa had described the immortality of soul and the undesirability of Vedic actions done with a motive, and had also asked Arjuna to fight and yet remain unattached and perform his duty for the sake of duty. The purpose of the *Gītā* was to bring about a reconciliation between these two paths, and to show that the path of knowledge leads to the path of duties by liberating it from the bonds of attachment; for all attachment is due to ignorance, and ignorance is removed by true knowledge. But the true knowledge of God may be of a twofold nature. One may attain a knowledge of God in His transcendence as Brahman, and attain the philosophic wisdom of the foundation of all things in Brahman as the ultimate substance and source of all manifestation and appearance. There is another way of clinging to God as a super-person, in a personal relation of intimacy, friendship and dependence. The *Gītā* admits that both these ways may lead us to the attainment of our highest realization. But it is the latter which the *Gītā* prefers and considers easier. Thus the *Gītā* says (xii. 3–5) that those who adore the indefinable, unchangeable, omnipresent, unthinkable, and the unmanifested, controlling all their senses, with equal eyes for all

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1 *Gītā*, iv. 37–43.
and engaged in the good of all, by this course attain Him. Those who fix their mind on the unmanifested (avyakta) find this course very hard. But those who dedicate all their actions to God and, clinging to Him as their only support, are devoted to Him in constant communion, them He saves soon from the sea of death and rebirth

The most important point in which the Gītā differs from the Upaniṣads is that the Gītā very strongly emphasizes the fact that the best course for attaining our highest realization is to dedicate all our actions to God, to cling to Him as our nearest and dearest, and always to be in communion with Him. The Gītā draws many of its ideas from the Upaniṣads and looks to them with respect. It accepts the idea of Brahman as a part of the essence of God, and agrees that those who fix their mind on Brahman as their ideal also attain the high ideal of realizing God. But this is only a compromise; for the Gītā emphasizes the necessity of a personal relation with God, whom we can love and adore. The beginning of our association with God must be made by dedicating the fruits of all our actions to God, by being a friend of all and sympathetic to all, by being self-controlled, the same in sorrow or happiness, self-contented, and in a state of perfect equanimity and equilibrium. It is through such a moral elevation that a man becomes apt in steadying his mind on God and ultimately in fixing his mind on God. In the Gītā Kṛṣṇa as God asks Arjuna to give up all ceremonials or religious courses and to cling to God as the only protector, and He promises that because of that God will liberate him. Again, it is said that it is by devotion that a man knows what God is in reality and, thus knowing Him truly as He is, enters into Him. It is by seeking entire protection in God that one can attain his eternal state.

But, though in order to attain the height at which it is possible to fix one’s mind on God, one should first acquire the preliminary qualification of detaching oneself from the bonds of passions and desires, yet it is sometimes possible to reverse the situation. The Gītā thus holds that those whose minds and souls are full of God’s love, who delight in constantly talking and thinking of God and always adore God with love, are dear to Him, and God, through His great mercy and kindness, grants them the proper wisdom and destroys the darkness of their ignorance by the light of knowledge.

1 Gītā, xii. 6, 7. 2 Ibid. xviii. 66. 3 Ibid. xviii. 55, 62. 4 Ibid. x. 9–11.
In the *Gītā*, xviii. 57–58, Kṛṣṇa as God asks Arjuna to leave all fruits of actions to God and to fill his mind with God, and He assures him that He will then, by His divine grace, save him from all sorrows, troubles or difficulties. Again, in ix. 30–32 it is said that, even if a man is extremely wicked, if he adores God devotedly, he becomes a saint; for he has adopted the right course, and he soon becomes religious and attains eternal peace of mind. Even sinners, women, Vaiśyas and Śūdras who cling to God for support, are emancipated. Kṛṣṇa as God assures Arjuna that a devotee (*bhakta*) of God can never be lost1. If a man clings to God, no matter whether he has understood Him rightly or not, no matter whether he has taken the right course of approaching Him or not, God accepts him in whichever way he clings to Him. No one can be lost. In whichever way one may be seeking God, one is always in God’s path2. If a man, prompted by diverse desires, takes to wrong gods, then even unto those gods God grants him true devotion, with which he follows his worship of those gods, and, even through such worship, grants him his desires3. God is the Lord of all and the friend of all beings. It is only great-souled men who with complete constancy of mind worship God, and with firm devotion repeat the name of God, and, being always in communion with Him, adore Him with devotion. God is easily accessible to those who always think of God with inalienable attachment4. In another passage (vii. 16, 17) it is said that there are four classes of people who adore God: those who are enquiring, those who are in trouble, those who wish to attain some desired things, and those who are wise. Of these the wise (*jñānīn*), who are always in communion with Him and who are devoted to Him alone, are superior; the wise are dear to Him and He is dear to them. In this passage it has been suggested that true wisdom consists in the habit of living in communion with God and in being in constant devotion to God. The path of *bhakti*, or devotion, is thus praised in the *Gītā* as being the best. For the *Gītā* holds that, even if a man cannot proceed in the normal path of self-elevation and detach himself from passions and desires and establish himself in equanimity, he may still, simply by clinging to God and by firm devotion to Him, bring himself within the sphere of His grace, and by grace alone acquire true wisdom and

1 *Gītā*, ix. 30–32.
achieve that moral elevation, with little or no struggle, which is attained with so much difficulty by others. The path of bhakti is thus introduced in the Gitā, for the first time, as an independent path side by side with the path of wisdom and knowledge of the Upanisads and with the path of austere self-discipline. Moral elevation, self-control, etc. are indeed regarded as an indispensable preliminary to any kind of true self-realization. But the advantage of the path of devotion (bhakti) consists in this, that, while some seekers have to work hard on the path of self-control and austere self-discipline, either by constant practice or by the aid of philosophic wisdom, the devotee makes an easy ascent to a high elevation—not because he is more energetic and better equipped than his fellow-workers in other paths, but because he has resigned himself completely to God; and God, being pleased with his devotees who cling fast to Him and know nothing else, grants them wisdom and raises them up through higher and higher stages of self-elevation, self-realization and bliss. Arjuna treated Krṣṇa, the incarnation of God on earth, as his friend, and Krṣṇa in the rôle of God exhorted him to depend entirely on Him and assured him that He would liberate him—He was asking him to give up everything else and cling to Him as his only support. The Gitā lays down for the first time the corner-stone of the teachings of the Bhāgavata-purāṇa and of the later systems of Vaiṣṇava thought, which elaborated the theory of bhakti and described it as the principal method of self-elevation and self-realization.

Another important feature of the Gitā doctrine of devotion consists in the fact that, as, on the one hand, God is contemplated by His devotees in the intimate personal relation of a father, teacher, master and friend, with a full consciousness of His divinity and His nature as the substratum and the upholder of the entire animate and inanimate cosmic universe, so, on the other hand, the transcendent personality of God is realized not only as the culmination of spiritual greatness and the ultimate reconciliation of all relative differences, of high and low, good and bad, but as the great deity, with a physical, adordable form, whom the devotee can worship not only mentally and spiritually, but also externally, with holy offerings of flowers and leaves. The transcendent God is not only immanent in the universe, but also present before the devotee in the form of a great deity resplendent with brightness, or in the personal form of the man-god Krṣṇa, in whom
God incarnated Himself. The Gītā combines together different conceptions of God without feeling the necessity of reconciling the oppositions or contradictions involved in them. It does not seem to be aware of the philosophical difficulty of combining the concept of God as the unmanifested, differenceless entity with the notion of Him as the super-person Who incarnates Himself on earth in the human form and behaves in the human manner. It is not aware of the difficulty that, if all good and evil should have emanated from God, and if there be ultimately no moral responsibility, and if everything in the world should have the same place in God, there is no reason why God should trouble to incarnate Himself as man, when there is a disturbance of the Vedic dharma. If God is impartial to all, and if He is absolutely unperturbed, why should He favour the man who clings to Him, and why, for his sake, overrule the world-order of events and in his favour suspend the law of karma? It is only by constant endeavours and practice that one can cut asunder the bonds of karma. Why should it be made so easy for even a wicked man who clings to God to release himself from the bonds of attachment and karma, without any effort on his part? Again, the Gītā does not attempt to reconcile the disparate parts which constitute the complex super-personality of God. How are the unmanifested or avyakta part as Brahman, the avyakta part as the cosmic substratum of the universe, the prakṛti part as the producer of the guṇas, and the prakṛti part as the jivas or individual selves, to be combined and melted together to form a complex personality? If the unmanifested nature is the ultimate abode (param dhāma) of God, how can God as a person, who cannot be regarded as a manifestation of this ultimate reality, be considered to be transcendent? How can there be a relation between God as a person and His diverse nature as the cosmic universe, jīva and the guṇas? In a system like that of Śaṅkara Brahman and Ṣvāra, one and the many could be combined together in one scheme, by holding Brahman as real and Ṣvāra and the many as unreal and illusory, produced by reflection of Brahman in the māyā, the principle of illusoriness. But, howsoever Śaṅkara might interpret the Gītā, it does not seem that it considered Ṣvāra or the world as in the least degree illusory. In the Upaniṣads also the notion of Ṣvāra and the notion of Brahman are sometimes found side by side. As regards God as Ṣvāra, the Gītā not only does not think Him to be
illusory, but considers him the highest truth and reality. Thus there is no way of escaping from any of the categories of reality—the two avyakta, prakriti, jiva and the super-personality of Isvara comprehending and transcending them all. The concepts of Brahman, jiva, the unmanifested category from which the world proceeds, and the gunas are all found in the Upanishads in passages which are probably mostly unrelated. But the Gitā seems to take them all together, and to consider them as constituents of Isvara, which are also upheld by Him in His superior form, in which He transcends and controls them all. In the Upanishads the doctrine of bhakti can hardly be found, though here and there faint traces of it may be perceived. If the Upanishads ever speak of Isvara, it is only to show His great majesty, power and glory, as the controller and upholder of all. But the Gitā is steeped in the mystic consciousness of an intimate personal relation with God, not only as the majestic super-person, but as a friend who incarnates Himself for the good of man and shares his joys and sorrows with him, and to whom a man could cling for support in troubles and difficulties and even appeal for earthly goods. He is the great teacher, with whom one can associate oneself for acquisition of wisdom and the light of knowledge. But He could be more than all this. He could be the dearest of the dear and the nearest of the near, and could be felt as being so intimate, that a man could live simply for the joy of his love for Him; he could cling to Him as the one dear friend, his highest goal, and leave everything else for Him; he could consider, in his deep love for Him, all his other religious duties and works of life as being relatively unimportant; he could thus constantly talk of Him, think of Him, and live in Him. This is the path of bhakti or devotion, and the Gitā assures us that, whatever may be the hindrances and whatever may be the difficulties, the bhakta (devotee) of God cannot be lost. It is from the point of view of this mystic consciousness that the Gitā seems to reconcile the apparently philosophically irreconcilable elements. The Gitā was probably written at a time when philosophical views had not definitely crystallized into hard-and-fast systems of thought, and when the distinguishing philosophical niceties, scholarly disputations, the dictates of argument, had not come into fashion. The Gitā, therefore, is not to be looked upon as a properly schemed system of philosophy, but as a manual of right conduct and right perspective of things in the light of a mystical approach to God in self-resignation, devotion, friendship and humility.
Viṣṇu, Vāsudeva and Kṛṣṇa.

Viṣṇu, Bhagavat, Nārāyaṇa, Hari and Kṛṣṇa are often used in a large section of Indian religious literature as synonymous names of the supreme lord. Of these Viṣṇu is an important god of the Rg-Veda, who is one of the ādityas and who makes three strides in the sky, probably as he manifests himself in the eastern horizon, as he rises to the zenith and as he sets in the west. He is also represented in the Rg-Veda as a great fighter and an ally of Indra. It is further said that he has two earthly steps and another higher step which is known only to himself. But in the Rg-Veda Viṣṇu is certainly inferior to Indra, with whom he was often associated, as is evident from such names as Indrā-viṣṇu (R.V. iv. 55. 4; vii. 99. 5; viii. 10. 2, etc.). According to later tradition Viṣṇu was the youngest, the twelfth of the ādityas, though he was superior to them all in good qualities. His three steps in the Rg-Vedic allusion have been explained in the Nirukta as referring to the three stages of the sun’s progress in the morning, at midday and at evening. One of the names of Viṣṇu in the Rg-Veda is Śīpivīṣṭa, which Durgācārya explains as “surrounded with the early rays” (śipi-sampīñair bāla-raśmībhīr āvīṣṭa). Again, the sage praises Viṣṇu in the Rg-Veda in the following terms: “I, a master of hymns and knowing the sacred customs, to-day praise that name of thine, Śīpivīṣṭa. I, who am weak, glorify thee, who art mighty and dwellest beyond this world.” All this shows that Viṣṇu was regarded as the sun, or endowed with the qualities of the sun. The fact that Viṣṇu was regarded as dwelling beyond this world is probably one of the earliest signs of his gradually increasing superiority. For the next stage one must turn to the Satapatha-brāhmaṇa. In 1. 2. 4 of that work it is said that the demons (asura) and the gods were vying with one another; the gods were falling behind, and the demons were trying to distribute the world among themselves; the gods followed them, making Viṣṇu the sacrifice as their leader (te yajñam eva Viṣṇum puraskṛtyeyuh), and desired their own shares; the demons felt jealous and said that they could give only so much ground as would

3 Rg-Veda, vii. 100. 5, translated by Dr. L. Srup, quoted in Nirukta, v. 8.
be occupied by Viṣṇu when he lay down, Viṣṇu being a dwarf (vāmāna ha Viṣṇur āṣa). The gods felt dissatisfied at this, and they approached him with various mantras and in consequence attained the whole world. Again, in xiv. 1 of the same work, Kurukṣetra is referred to as being the place of the sacrificial performances of the gods, and it is said there that in industry, rigorism (tapas), faith, etc. Viṣṇu was the best of all gods and was regarded as being superior to them all (tasmād āḥur Viṣṇur devānāṁ śreṣṭhah), and was himself the sacrifice. Again, in Taิตtītya-samaḥhitā, i. 7. 5. 4, in Vājasaneyi-samaḥhitā, i. 30; ii. 6. 8; v. 21, in Atharva-Veda, v. 26. 7; viii. 5. 10, etc., Viṣṇu is referred to as the chief of the gods (Viṣṇu-mukhā devā). Again, Viṣṇu as sacrifice attained unlimited fame. Once he was resting his head on the end of his bow; and, when some ants, perceiving that, said, “How should we be rewarded, if we could gnaw the strings of the bow,” the gods said that they would then be rewarded with food; and so the ants gnawed away the strings, and, as the two ends of the bow sprang apart, Viṣṇu’s head was torn from his body and became the sun1. This story not only shows the connection of Viṣṇu with the sun, but also suggests that the later story of Kṛṣṇa’s being shot with an arrow by an archer originated from the legend of Viṣṇu’s being killed by the flying ends of his bow. The place of Viṣṇu (Viṣṇu-pada) means the zenith, as the highest place of the sun, and it is probable that the idea of the zenith being the place of Viṣṇu led also to the idea that Viṣṇu had a superior place transcending everything, which was, however, clearly perceived by the wise. Thus, at the beginning of the daily prayer-hymns of the Brahmans, known as sandhyā, it is said that the wise see always that superior place of Viṣṇu, like an open eye in the sky2. The word vaiṣṇava is used in the literal sense of “belonging to Viṣṇu” in the Vājasaneyi-samaḥhitā, v. 21, 23, 25, Taィtītya-samaḥhitā, v. 6. 9. 2. 3, Aitareya-brāhmaṇa, III. 38, Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa, i. 1. 4. 9; III. 5. 3. 2, etc.; but the use of the word in the sense of a sect of religion is not to be found anywhere in the earlier literature. Even the Gītā does not use the word, and it is not found in any of the earlier Upaniṣads; it can be traced only in the later parts of the Mahā-bhārata.

1 Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa, xiv. 1.
2 tod Viṣṇoḥ paramaḥ padaṁ saḍā paśyanti tūrayah divaḥ ca suṣṇār atatam. Acaṇaṇa-mantra of the daily sandhyā prayer-hymn.
Again, it is well known that the supreme man, or puruṣa, is praised in very high terms in the man-hymn (Puruṣa-sūkta) of the Rg-Veda, x. 90, where it is said that puruṣa is all that we see, what is past and what is future, and that everything has come out of him; the gods performed sacrifice with him with the oblations of the seasons, and out of this sacrifice puruṣa was first born, and then the gods and all living beings; the various castes were born out of him; the sky, the heavens and the earth have all come out of him; he is the creator and upholder of all; it is by knowing him that one attains immortality; there is no other way of salvation. It is curious that there should be a word nārāyaṇa, similar in meaning (etymologically nara + phak, born in the race or lineage of man) to puruṣa, which was also used to mean the supreme being and identified with puruṣa and Viṣṇu. In Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa, xiv. 3. 4., puruṣa is identified with nārāyaṇa (purusām ha nārāyaṇam Prajāpatir uvacca). Again, in Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa, xiii. 6. 1, the idea of the puruṣa-sūkta is further extended, and the puruṣa nārāyaṇa is said to have performed the paṇca-rātra sacrifice (paṇcarātraṃ ya- jña-kratrum) and thereby transcended everything and become everything. This paṇca-rātra sacrifice involves the (spiritual) sacrifice of puruṣa (puruṣa-medho yajña-kratur bhavati, xiii. 6. 7). The five kinds of sacrifice, five kinds of animals, the year with the five kinds of seasons, the five kinds of indwelling entities (paṇca-vidham adhyātmam) can all be attained by the paṇca-rātra sacrifices. The sacrifice was continued for five days, and the Vedic habit of figurative thinking associated each of the days of the sacrifice with various kinds of desirable things, so that the five-day sacrifice was considered to lead to many things which are fivefold in their nature. The reference to the five kinds of indwelling entities soon produced the paṇca-rātra doctrine of the manifestation of God in various modes as the external deity of worship (arcā), inner controller (antar-yāmin), as various manifestations of His lordly power (vibhava), as successive deity-forms in intimate association as vyūha and as the highest God (para). This idea is also found in the later Pānca-rātra scriptures, such as Ahirbudhnya-saṃhitā (1. 1) and the like, where God is described as having his highest form along with the vyūha forms. Puruṣa is thus identified with nārāyaṇa, who, by sacrifice of puruṣa (puruṣa-medha), became all this world. The etymological definition of nārāyaṇa as "one who has descended from man (nara)," as heṣeṣin suggested in accordance
with Pāṇini, iv. 1. 99, is not, however, accepted everywhere. Thus Manu, i. 10, derives nārāyaṇa from nāra, meaning “water,” and ayana, meaning “abode,” and nāra (water), again, is explained as “that which has descended from nara,” or supreme man. The Mahā-bhārata, iii. 12,952 and 15,819 and xii. 13,168, accepts Manu’s derivation; but in v. 2568 it says that the supreme God is called nārāyaṇa because he is also the refuge of men. The Taittiriya-Āranyaka, x. 1. 6, identifies nārāyaṇa with Vāsudeva and Viṣṇu. It may be suggested in this connection that even the Upaniṣad doctrine of the self as the supreme reality is probably a development of this type of ideas which regarded man as supreme God. The word puruṣa is very frequently used in the Upaniṣads in the sense of man, as well as in that of the highest being or supreme reality. In the Mahā-bhārata nara and nārāyaṇa are referred to as being the forms of the supreme lord. Thus it is said, “The four-faced Brahmā, capable of being understood only with the aid of the niruktas, joined his hands and, addressing Rudra, said, “Let good happen to the three worlds. Throw down thy weapons, O lord of the universe, from desire of benefiting the universe. That which is indestructible, immutable, supreme, the origin of the universe, uniform and the supreme actor, that which transcends all pairs of opposites and is inactive, has, choosing to be displayed, been pleased to assume this one blessed form (for, though double, the two represent but one and the same form). This nara and nārāyaṇa (the displayed forms of supreme Brahma) have taken birth in the race of dharma. The foremost of all deities, these two are observers of the highest vows and ended with the severest penances. Through some reason best known to Him I myself have sprung from the attribute of His Grace Eternal, as thou hast; for, though thou hast ever existed since all the pure creations, thou too hast sprung from His Wrath. With myself then, these deities and all the great Rṣis, do thou adore this displayed form of Brahma and let there be peace unto all

1 āpo nārā iti proktā āpo vai nara-sūnavaḥ tā yad arṣyayamāṃ pūrvaṃ tena nārāyaṇam smṛtaḥ. Manu, i. 10.
Water is called nāra; water is produced from man, and, since he rested in water in the beginning, he is called nārāyaṇa. Kullūka, in explaining this, says that nara, or man, here means the supreme self, or Brahmā.
the worlds without any delay. In the succeeding chapter (i.e. Mahā-bhārata, Śānti-parva, 343) nara and nārāyana are described as being two foremost of sages (ṛṣi) and two ancient deities engaged in the practice of penances, observing high vows and depending upon their own selves and transcending the very sun in energy.

The word bhagavat in the sense of blissful and happy is a very old one and is used in the Rg-Veda, i. 164. 40; vii. 41. 4; x. 60. 12 and in the Atharva-Veda, ii. 10. 2; v. 31. 11, etc. But in the Mahā-bhārata and other such early literature it came to denote Viṣṇu or Vāsudeva, and the word bhāgavata denoted the religious sect which regarded Viṣṇu as Nārāyaṇa or Vāsudeva as their supreme god. The Pali canonical work Niddesa refers to various superstitious religious sects, among which it mentions the followers of Vāsudeva, Baladeva, Puṇṇabhadda, Mañibhadda, Aggi, Nāga, Suparṇa, Yakkha, Asura, Gandhabba, Mahārāja, Canda, Suriya, Inda, Brahmall, dog, crow, cow, etc. It is easy to understand why a Buddhist work should regard the worship of Vāsudeva as being of a very low type; but at any rate it proves that the worship of Vāsudeva was prevalent during the period when the Niddesa was codified. Again, in commenting upon Pāṇini, iv. 3. 98 (Vāsudevārjunāḥhyām vun), Patañjali points out that the word Vāsudeva here does not denote the Vāsudeva who was the son of Vasudeva of the Kṣattriya race of Vṛṣṇis, since, had it been so, the suffix vunū, which is absolutely equivalent to vun, could well be by Pāṇini, iv. 3. 99 (gotra-kṣattriyākhyebhyo bahulam vunū), by which vunū is suffixed to names of Kṣattriya race. Patañjali thus holds that the word Vāsudeva is in this rule not used to refer to any Kṣattriya race, but is a name of the Lord (saṃjñaśa tatra bhāgavataḥ). If Patañjali's interpretation is to be trusted, for which there is every reason, Vāsudeva as God is to be distinguished from the Kṣattriya Vāsudeva, the son of Vasudeva of the race of Vṛṣṇis. It was well established in Pāṇini's time that Vāsudeva was God, and that His followers were called Vāsudevaka, for the formation of which word by the vun suffix Pāṇini had to make the rule (iv. 3. 98). Again, the Ghoṣunḍī inscription in Rajputana, which is written in Brāhmi, an early form of about 200–150 B.C., contains a reference to the building of a wall round the temple of Vāsudeva and Saṃkarsaṇa. In the Besnagar inscription of about 100 B.C.

Heliodorus, son of Diya, describes himself as a great devotee of Bhagavat (parama-bhāgavata), who had erected a pillar bearing an image of Garuḍa. In the Nānāghāṭ inscription of 100 B.C. Vāsudeva and Saṃkarṣaṇa appear together as deities to whom adorations are addressed along with other gods. If the testimony of Patañjali is accepted, the religious sect of Vāsudevas existed before Pāṇini. It is generally believed that Patañjali lived in 150 B.C., since in course of interpreting a grammatical rule which allowed the use of the past tense in reference to famous contemporary events not witnessed by the speaker he illustrates it by using a past tense in referring to the Greek invasion of the city of Sāketa (arunad Yavanah Sāketam); as this event took place in 150 B.C., it is regarded as a famous contemporary event not witnessed by Patañjali. Patañjali was the second commentator of Pāṇini, the first being Kātyāyana. Sir R. G. Bhandarkar points out that Patañjali notices variant readings in Kātyāyana’s Vārttikas, as found in the texts used by the schools of Bhāradvājīyas, Saunāgas and others, some of which might be considered as emendations of the Vārttikas, though Patañjali’s introduction of them by the verb paṭhanti, “they read,” is an indication that he regarded them as different readings¹. From this Sir R. G. Bhandarkar argues that between Kātyāyana and Patañjali a considerable time must have elapsed, which alone can explain the existence of the variant readings of Kātyāyana’s text in Patañjali’s time. He therefore agrees with the popular tradition in regarding Pāṇini as a contemporary of the Nandas, who preceded the Mauryas. Kātyāyana thus flourished in the first half of the 5th century B.C. But, as both Goldstücker and Sir R.G. Bhandarkar have pointed out, the Vārttika of Kātyāyana notices many grammatical forms which are not noticed by Pāṇini, and this, considering the great accuracy of Pāṇini as a grammarian, naturally leads to the supposition that those forms did not exist in his time. Goldstücker gives a list of words admitted into Pāṇini’s sūtras which had gone out of use by Kātyāyana’s time, and he also shows that some words which probably did not exist in Pāṇini’s time had come to be used later and are referred to by Kātyāyana. All this implies that Pāṇini must have flourished at least two or three hundred years before Kātyāyana. The reference to the Vāsudeva sect in Pāṇini’s sūtras naturally suggests its existence before his time. The allusions

to Vāsudeva in the inscriptions referred to above can be regarded as corroborative evidence pointing to the early existence of the Vāsudeva sect, who worshipped Vāsudeva or Bhagavat as the supreme Lord.

Turning to literary references to Vāsudeva and Kṛṣṇa, we find the story of Vāsudeva, who is also called by his family name Kanha and Keśava (probably on account of his bunch of hair), in the Ghaṭa-jātaka. The story agrees in some important details with the usual accounts of Kṛṣṇa, though there are some new deviations. A reference to the Vṛṣṇi race of Kṣatriyas is found in Pāṇini, iv. 1. 114 (ṛṣy-andhaka-vṛṣṇi-kurubhyaś ca). The word is formed by an unādi suffix, and it literally means “powerful” or “a great leader.” It also means “heretic” (pāṣaṇḍa) and one who is passionately angry (canda). It is further used to denote the Yādava race, and Kṛṣṇa is often addressed as Vārṣṇeya, and in the Gītā, x. 37, Kṛṣṇa says, “Of the Vṛṣṇis I am Vāsudeva.” The Vṛṣṇis are referred to in Kauṭilya’s Artha-sāstra, where the group of Vṛṣṇis (vṛṣṇi-saṅgha) is said to have attacked Dvaipāyana. The Ghaṭa-jātaka also has the story of the curse of Kanha Dvai-pāyana as the cause of the destruction of the Vṛṣṇis. But the Mahā-bhārata (xvi. 1) holds that the curse was pronounced by Viśvāmitra, Kanva and Nārada upon Śamba, the son of Kṛṣṇa. Two Vāsudevas are mentioned in the Mahā-bhārata: Vāsudeva, the king of the Pauṇḍras, and Vāsudeva or Kṛṣṇa, the brother of Saṃkar-śaṇa, and both of them are mentioned as being present in the great assemblage of kings at the house of King Drupada for the marriage of Draupadi; it is the latter Vāsudeva who is regarded as God. It is very probable that Vāsudeva originally was a name of the sun and thus became associated with Viṣṇu, who with his three steps traversed the heavens; and a similarity of Kṛṣṇa or Vāsudeva to the sun is actually suggested in the Mahā-bhārata, xii. 341. 41, where Narāyaṇa says, “Being like the sun, I cover the whole world with my rays, and I am also the sustainer of all beings and am hence called Vāsudeva.”

Again, the word Sātvata also is used as a synonym of Vāsudeva or Bhāgavata. The word Sātvata in the plural form is a name of a tribe of the Yādavas, and in the Mahā-bhārata, vii. 7662, the phrase Satvatāṁ varaḥ is used to denote Sātyaki, a member of the Yādava race, though this appellation is applied to Kṛṣṇa in a

1 Yūthena vṛṣnir ejati, Rg-Veda, i. 10. 2.
large number of places in the *Mahā-bhārata*. In the later *Bhāga-
vata-purāṇa* (ix. 9. 50) it is said that the Sātvatas worship Brahman
as Bhagavān and as Vāsudeva. In the *Mahā-bhārata*, vi. 66. 41,
Śaṅkarāṇa is said to have introduced the sātvata rites in wor-
shipping Vāsudeva. If Sātvata was the name of a race, it is easy to
imagine that the persons may have had special rites in worshipping
Vāsudeva. YāmunaŚārya, the great teacher of Rāmānuja in the
tenth century A.D., says that those who adore God (*bhagavat*), the
supreme person, with purity (*sattva*), are called *bhāgavata* and
*sātvata*.

Yāmuna strongly urges that Sātvatas are Brāhmaṇas by
caste, but are attached to Bhagavat as the supreme lord. Yāmuna,
however, seems to urge this in strong opposition to the current
view that Sātvatas were a low-caste people, who had not the ini-
tiation with the holy thread and were an outcast people originated
from the Vaiśyas. The Sātvatas are said to be the fifth low-caste people,
who worship in the temples of Viṣṇu by the orders of the king,
and are also called Bhāgavatas. The Sātvatas and Bhāgavatas
are those who make their living by worshipping images and are
hence low and disreputable. Yāmuna urges that this popular view
about the Bhāgavatas and the Sātvatas is all incorrect; for, though
there are many Sātvatas who make a living by worshipping images,
not all Sātvatas and Bhāgavatas do so; and there are many among
them who worship Bhagavat, as the supreme person, solely by
personal devotion and attachment.

From Patañjali’s remarks in commenting on Pāṇini, iv. 3. 98,
it is seen that he believed in the existence of two Vāsudevas,
one a leader of the Vṛṣṇi race and the other God as Bhagavat. It
has already been pointed out that the name Vāsudeva occurs
also in the *Ghata-jātaka*. It may therefore be argued that the
name Vāsudeva was an old name, and the evidence of the passage
of the *Nīdesa*, as well as that of Patañjali, shows that it was a
name of God or Bhagavat. The later explanation of Vāsudeva
as “the son of Vasudeva” may therefore be regarded as an

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1 *Mahā-bhārata*, v. 2581, 3041, 3334, 3360, 4370; ix. 2532, 3502; x. 726;
xii. 1502, 1614, 7533.

2 Thus Manu (x. 23) says:

\[
\text{vaiśyāt tu jāyate vrātyāt sudhamācārya eva ca kārṇaś ca viśvamā ca maitrār sātvat eva ca.}
\text{pañcamah sātvato nāma Viṣṇor āyatanām hi saḥ}
\text{pujayed aśrayā rājānām sa tu bhāgavataḥ smṛtaḥ.}
\]

*Yāmuna’s Āgama-prāṇīya*, p. 7. 6.

unauthorized surmise. It is very probable that Vāsudeva was worshipped by the race of Yādavas as a tribal hero according to their own tribal rites and that he was believed to be an incarnation of Viṣṇu, who was in his turn associated with the sun. Megasthenes, in his account of India as he saw it, speaks of the Soursenoi—an Indian nation in whose land are two great cities, Methora and Kleisobora, through which flows the navigable river Jobares—as worshipping Heracles. "Methora" in all probability means Mathura and "Jobares" Jumna. It is probable that Heracles is Hari, which again is a name of Vāsudeva. Again in the Mahā-bhārata, vi. 65, Bhīṣma says that he was told by the ancient sages that formerly the great supreme person appeared before the assembly of gods and sages, and Brahmā began to adore Him with folded hands. This great Being, who is there adored as Vāsudeva, had first created out of Himself Saṃkarṣaṇa, and then Pradyumna, and from Pradyumna Aniruddha, and it was from Aniruddha that Brahmā was created. This great Being, Vāsudeva, incarnated Himself as the two sages, Nara and Nārāyaṇa. He Himself says in the Mahā-bhārata, vi. 66, that "as Vāsudeva I should be adored by all and no one should ignore me in my human body"; in both these chapters Kṛṣṇa and Vāsudeva are identical, and in the Gītā Kṛṣṇa says that "of the Vṛṣṇis I am Vāsudeva." It has also been pointed out that Vāsudeva belonged to the Kanhāyana gotra. As Sir R. G. Bhandarkar says, "It is very probable that the identification of Kṛṣṇa with Vāsudeva was due to the similarity of the gotra name with the name of Kṛṣṇa." From the frequent allusions to Vāsudeva in Patañjali's commentary and in the Mahā-bhārata, where he is referred to as the supreme person, it is very reasonable to suppose that the word is a proper noun, as the name of a person worshipped as God, and not a mere patronymic name indicating an origin from a father Vasudeva. Kṛṣṇa, Janārdana, Keśava, Hari, etc. are not Vṛṣṇi names, but were used as personal appellations of Vāsudeva. Patañjali in his commentary on Pāṇini, iv. 3. 98, notes that Vāsudeva, as the name of a Kṣattriya king of the race of Vṛṣṇis, is to be distinguished from Vāsudeva as the name of God. This God, worshipped by the Sātvatas according to their family rites, probably came to be identified with a Vṛṣṇi king Vāsudeva, and some of the personal characteristics of this king became also personal

1 Sir R. G. Bhandarkar's Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism, pp. 11–12.
characteristics of the god Vasudeva. The word Kṛṣṇa occurs several times in the older literature. Thus Kṛṣṇa appears as a Vedic ṛṣi, as the composer of Rg-Veda, viii. 74. In the Mahā-bhārata Anukramani Kṛṣṇa is said to have descended from Aṅgiras. Kṛṣṇa appears in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (iii. 17) as the son of Devakī, as in the Ghaṭa-jātaka. It is therefore probable that Vasudeva came to be identified with Kṛṣṇa, the son of Devakī. The older conception of Kṛṣṇa's being a rtvij is found in the Mahā-bhārata, and Bhīṣma in the Sabhā-parva speaks of him as being a rtvij and well-versed in the accessory literature of the Vedas (vedāṅga). It is very probable, as Dr Ray Chaudhury points out, that Kṛṣṇa, the son of Devakī, was the same as Vasudeva, the founder of the Bhāgavata system; for he is referred to in the Ghaṭa-jātaka as being Kanhāyana, or Kanha, which is the same as Kṛṣṇa, and as Devakī-putra, and in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, iii. 17. 6, also he is referred to as being Devakī-putra. In the Ghaṭa-jātaka Kṛṣṇa is spoken of as being a warrior, whereas in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad he is a pupil of Ghora Aṅgiras, who taught him a symbolic sacrifice, in which penances (tapas), gifts (dāna), sincerity (ārjava), non-injury (ahimsā) and truthfulness (satya-vacana) may be regarded as sacrificial fees (dakṣina). The Mahā-bhārata, ii. 317, describes Kṛṣṇa both as a sage who performed long courses of asceticism in Gandhamādana, Puṣkara and Badari, and as a great warrior. He is also described in the Mahā-bhārata as Vasudeva, Devakī-putra and as the chief of the Sātvatas, and his divinity is everywhere acknowledged there. But it is not possible to assert definitely that Vasudeva, Kṛṣṇa the warrior and Kṛṣṇa the sage were not three different persons, who in the Mahā-bhārata were unified and identified, though it is quite probable that all the different strands of legends refer to one identical person.

If the three Kṛṣṇas refer to one individual Kṛṣṇa, he must have lived long before Buddha, as he is alluded to in the Chāndogya, and his guru Ghora Aṅgiras is also alluded to in the Kauśitaki-brāhmaṇa, xxx. 6 and the Kāṭhaka-samhitā, i. 1, which are pre-Buddhistic works. Jaina tradition refers to Kṛṣṇa as being anterior to Pārśvanātha (817 B.C.), and on this evidence Dr Ray Chaudhury thinks that he must have lived long before the closing years of the ninth century B.C. ¹

¹ Early History of the Vaiṣṇava Sect, p. 39.
Bhāgavata and the Bhagavad-gītā.

The Mahā-bhārata (xii. 348) associates the Bhagavad-gītā with the doctrines of the Ekānti-Vaiṣṇavas. It is said there that the God Hari (bhagavān Hari) always blesses those that are devoted to God without any idea of gain (ekāntin) and accepts their adorations, offered in accordance with proper rites (vidhī-prayukta)\(^1\). This ekānta religion (ekānta-dharma) is dear to Nārāyaṇa, and those who adhere to it attain to Hari, as Nilakaṇṭha, the commentator on the Mahā-bhārata, points out, without passing through the three stages of Aniruddha, Pradyumna and Saṃkarṣaṇa. The ekāntin faith leads to much higher goals than the paths of those that know the Vedas and lead the lives of ascetics. The principles of this ekāntin faith were enunciated by the Bhagavat himself in the battle of the Pāṇḍavas and the Kūrus, when Arjuna felt disinclined to fight. This faith can be traced originally to the Śāma-veda. It is said that, when Nārāyaṇa created Brahmā, he gave him this sātvata faith, and from that time forth, as the Mahā-bhārata states, there has been a host of persons who were instructed in this faith and followed it. It was at a much later stage briefly described in the Hari-gītā\(^2\). This faith is very obscure and very difficult to be practised, and its chief feature is cessation from all kinds of injury. In some places it is said to recognize one vyūha: in other places two, and in others three, vyūhas are mentioned. Hari, however, is the final and absolute reality; he is both the agent, the action and the cause, as well as the absolute beyond action (akarita). There are, however, but few ekāntins in the world: had the world been filled with ekāntins, who never injured anyone, were always engaged in doing good to others and attained self-know-

\(^1\) Ekāntino nīḥāma-bhaktāḥ, Nilakaṇṭha’s commentary on the Mahā-bhārata, xii. 348. 3.

\(^2\) kathito hari-gītāvam samāsā-vidhi-kalpitāḥ, Hari-gītā. 53. The traditional teaching of the Gītā doctrines is represented as ancient in the Gītā itself (iv. 1–3), where it is said that Bhagavān declared it to Vivasvān, and he related it to Manu, and Manu to Ikṣvāku, and so on, until after a long time it was lost; it was again revived by Kṛṣṇa in the form of the Bhagavad-gītā. In the Mahā-bhārata, xii. 348, it is said that Sanatkumāra learned this doctrine from Nārāyaṇa, from him Prajāpati, from him Raibhya and from him Kuṇsi. It was then lost. Then again Brahmā learned it from Nārāyaṇa, and from him the Barhiṣada sages learned it, and from them Jyeṣṭha. Then again it was lost; then again Brahmā learned it from Nārāyaṇa, and from him Dakṣa learned it, and from him Vivasvān, and from Vivasvān Manu, and from Manu Ikṣvāku. Thus the tradition of the Bhagavad-gītā, as given in the poem itself, tallies with the Mahā-bhārata account.
ledge, then the golden age, kṛta yuga, would have come again. This ekānta religion is a faith parallel to that of the Śaṃkhya-yoga, and the devotee who follows it attains Nārāyaṇa as his ultimate state of liberation. From this description in the Mahā-bhārata it seems that the doctrine of the Gitā was believed to be the ekāntin doctrine originally taught by Nārāyaṇa to Brahmā, Nārada and others long before the recital of the Gitā by Krṣṇa in the Mahā-bhārata battle. It is further known that it had at least four or five different schools or variant forms, viz. eka-vyūha, dvi-vyūha, tri-vyūha, catur-vyūha and ekānta, and that it was known as the Sātvata religion.

Yāmunācārya in his Āgama-prāmānya tries to combat a number of views in which the Bhāgavatas were regarded as being inferior to Brahmins, not being allowed to sit and dine with them. The Sātvatas, again, are counted by Manu as a low-caste people, born from outcast Vaiśyas and not entitled to the holy thread. The Sātvatas were, of course, regarded as the same as Bhāgavatas, and their chief duties consisted in worshipping for their living in Viṣṇu temples by the order of the king. They also repaired or constructed temples and images for their living, and were therefore regarded as outcasts. That the Bhāgavatas did in later times worship images and build images and temples is also evident from the fact that most of the available Paśca-rātra works are full of details about image-building and image-worship. The Gitā (I. 26) also speaks of adoration with water, flowers and leaves, which undoubtedly refers to image-worship. Saṁkarṣaṇa, as the brother or companion of Krṣṇa, is mentioned in Patañjali’s Mahā-bhāṣya (I. 2. 24) in a verse quoted by him, and in I. 2. 34 he seems to quote another passage, in which it is related that different kinds of musical instruments were played in the temple of Dhana-pati, Rāma and Keśava, meaning Balarāma, Saṁkarṣaṇa and Krṣṇa.

As Yāmuna points out, the opponents of the Bhāgavata school urge that, since the ordinary Brahminic initiation is not deemed

1 vaśiṣṭ that jñāya vrātyāt dhāvanvācārya eva ca kāraṇai ca vijnāma ca maitraḥ saṁvata eva ca. Āgama-prāmānya, p. 8.
2 paścamah sātvato nāma Viṣṇor ayatanāṁ hi sa pūjaved aṁśhaya rājānam sa tu bhāgavataḥ smṛtaḥ. Ibid.
3 Saṁkarṣaṇa-devītīyasya balaṁ Krṣṇasya ardhatam. Mahā-bhāṣya, I. 2. 27.
4 mṛdaṅga-saṅkha-panavaḥ prthah nadanti saṁsādri pricāde dhana-patīrāme keśavāṇām. Ibid. I. 2. 34.
a sufficient qualification for undertaking the worship of Viṣṇu, and since special and peculiar forms of initiation and ceremonial performances are necessary, it is clear that the Bhāgavata forms of worship are not Vedic in their origin. The fourteen Hindu sciences, viz. the six vedāṅgas on Vedic pronunciation (śikṣā), ritual (kalpa), grammar (vyākaranā), metre (chandas), astronomy (jyotiṣa), lexicography (nirukta), the four Vedas, Mīmāṃsā, argumentative works or philosophy (nyāya-vistara), the mythologies (purāṇa) and rules of conduct (dharma-śāstra), do not refer to the Pañca-rātra scriptures as being counted in their number. So the Bhāgavata or the Pañca-rātra scriptures are of non-Vedic origin. But Yāmuna contends that, since Nārāyaṇa is the supreme god, the Bhāgavata literature, which deals with his worship, must be regarded as having the same sources as the Vedas; the Bhāgavatas also have the same kind of outer dress as the Brahmins and the same kinds of lineage. He further contends that, though sātvata means an outcast, yet sātvata is a different word from sātvata, which means a devotee of Viṣṇu. Moreover, not all Bhāgavatas take to professional priestly duties and the worshipping of images for their livelihood; for there are many who worship the images through pure devotion. It is very easy to see that the above defence of the Bhāgavatas, as put forward by one of their best advocates, Yāmunācārya, is very tame and tends to suggest very strongly that the Bhāgavata sect was non-Vedic in its origin and that image-worship, image-making, image-repairing and temple-building had their origin in that particular sect. Yet throughout the entire scriptures of the Pañca-rātra school there is the universal and uncontested tradition that it is based on the Vedas. But its difference from the Vedic path is well known. Yāmuna himself refers to a passage (Āgama-prāmāṇya, p. 51) where it is said that Śaṅḍilya, not being able to find his desired end (puruṣārtha) in all the four Vedas, produced this scripture. The Gitā itself often describes the selfish aims of sacrifices, and Keśa urges Arjuna to rise above the level of the Vedas. It seems, therefore, that the real connection of the Pañca-rātra literature is to be found in the fact that it originated from Vāsudeva or Viṣṇu, who is the supreme God from whom the Vedas themselves were produced. Thus the Isvara-samhitā (1. 24–26) explains the matter, and states that the Bhāgavata literature is the great root of the Veda tree, and the Vedas themselves are but trunks of it, and the followers of Yoga are but its branches. Its
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main purpose is to propound the superiority of Vāsudeva, who is the root of the universe and identical with the Vedas.

The affinity of this school of thought to the Upaniṣad school becomes apparent when it is considered that Vāsudeva was regarded in this system as the highest Brahman. The three other vyūhas were but subordinate manifestations of him, after the analogy of prejñā, virāt, viśva and tajjasa in monistic Vedānta. Patañjali's Mahā-bhāṣya does not seem to know of the four vyūhas, as it mentions only Vāsudeva and Saṁkarśana; and the Gītā knows only Vāsudeva. It seems, therefore, that the vyūha doctrine did not exist at the time of the Gītā and that it evolved gradually in later times. It is seen from a passage of the Mahābhārata, already referred to, that there were different variations of the doctrine and that some accepted one vyūha, others two, others three and others four. It is very improbable that, if the vyūha doctrine was known at the time of the Gītā, it should not have been mentioned therein. For the Gītā was in all probability the earliest work of the ekāntin school of the Bhāgavatas. It is also interesting in this connection to note that the name Nārāyaṇa is never mentioned in the Gītā, and Vāsudeva is only identified with Viṣṇu, the chief of the ādityas. Thus Sir R. G. Bhandarkar says, "It will be seen that the date of the Bhagavad-gītā, which contains

1 mahato veda-tyākṣasya mūla-bhūto mahān ayaṃ
    skandha-bhūtā ṛg-adyāś te śākhā-bhūtā ca yogīnaḥ
    jagan-mūlahya vedāya Vāsudevasya mukhyātā
    pratipāda-katā saddhā mūla-vedākhyātā deviṣāḥ.

2 yasmāt samyak param brahma Vāsudevakhyam avyayam
    asmād avāpyate śāstra jñāna-pūrvaṇa harsaṃaṇaḥ.
    Pañcarāgama, as quoted in Rāmānujabhāṣya, 11. 2. 42.

The Chāndogya Upaniṣad (vii. 1. 2) refers also to the study of ekāyana, as in the passage vāko-vākyam ekāyanaḥ; ekāyana is also described as being itself a Veda in Śrīprāna-saṃhitā, 11. 38, 39:
    vedam ekāyanaṃ nāma vedānām śirasā sthitam
    tad-arthaḥ pañca-rātras mokṣa-dām tat-kriyāvatām
    yasmin eko mokṣa-mārga vede proktaḥ samātaḥ
    mad-ārdhāna-rūpeṇa tasmād ekāyanaṃ bhavet.

See also the article "The Pañca-rātras or Bhāgavata-sāstra," by Govindācārya Svāmin, J.R.A.S. 1911.

This faith is also called ekāyana, or the path of the One, as is seen from the following passage from the Tīvara-saṃhitā, 1. 18:
    mokṣāyanyā saṃpanṭhā etad-avya na vidyate
    tasmād ekāyanaḥ nāma pravadanti maniṣīṇaḥ.
no mention of the vyūhas or personified forms, is much earlier
than those of the inscriptions, the Nīdesa and Patañjali, i.e. it was
composed not later than the beginning of the fourth century before
the Christian era; how much earlier it is difficult to say. At the
time when the Gītā was conceived and composed the identification
of Vāsudeva with Nārāyaṇa had not yet taken place, nor had the
fact of his being an incarnation of Viṣṇu come to be acknowledged,
as appears from the work itself....Viṣṇu is alluded to as the chief of
the Ādityas and not as the supreme being, and Vāsudeva was Viṣṇu
in this sense, as mentioned in chapter x, because the best thing of
a group or class is represented to be his vibhūti or special mani-
festation.

The date of the Gītā has been the subject of long discussions
among scholars, and it is inconvenient for our present purposes
to enter into an elaborate controversy. One of the most extreme
views on the subject is that of Dr Lorinser, who holds that it
was composed after Buddha, and several centuries after the com-
 mencement of the Christian era, under the influence of the New
Testament. Mr Telang in the introduction to his translation of
the Bhagavad-gītā points out—as has been shown above—that
the Bhagavad-gītā does not know anything that is peculiarly
Buddhistic. Attempt has also been made to prove that the Gītā
not only does not know anything Buddhistic, but that it also
knows neither the accepted Sāṃkhya philosophy nor the Yoga of
Patañjali’s Yoga-sūtra. This, together with some other secondary
considerations noted above, such as the non-identification of Vāsu-
deva with Nārāyaṇa and the non-appearance of the vyūha doctrine,
seems to be a very strong reason for holding the Gītā to be in
its general structure pre-Buddhistic. The looseness of its com-
position, however, always made it easy to interpolate occasional
verses. Since there is no other consideration which might lead us
to think that the Gītā was written after the Brahma-sūtras, the
verse Brahma-sūtra-padaś caiva hetumadbhir vinīcitaś has to be
either treated as an interpolation or interpreted differently. Śaṅkara
also thought that the Brahma-sūtra referred to the Gītā as an old
sacred writing (sūtra), and this tallies with our other considerations
regarding the antiquity of the Gītā. The view of Dr Lorinser,
that the Bhagavad-gītā must have borrowed at least some of its
materials from Christianity, has been pretty successfully refuted by

1 Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism, p. 13.
Mr Telang in the introduction to his translation, and it therefore need not be here again combated. Dr Ray Chaudhury also has discussed the problem of the relation of Bhāgavatism to Christianity, and in the discussion nothing has come out which can definitely make it seem probable that the Bhāgavata cult was indebted to Christianity at any stage of its development; the possibility of the Gītā being indebted to Christianity may be held to be a mere fancy. It is not necessary here to enter into any long discussion in refuting Garbe's view that the Gītā was originally a work on Śāmkhya lines (written in the first half of the second century B.C.), which was revised on Vedāntic lines and brought to its present form in the second century A.D.; for I suppose it has been amply proved that, in the light of the uncontradicted tradition of the Mahā-bhārata and the Paṇca-rātra literature, the Gītā is to be regarded as a work of the Bhāgavata school, and an internal analysis of the work also shows that the Gītā is neither an ordinary Śāmkhya nor a Vedānta work, but represents some older system wherein the views of an earlier school of Śāmkhya are mixed up with Vedāntic ideas different from the Vedānta as interpreted by Śaṅkara. The arbitrary and dogmatic assertion of Garbe, that he could clearly separate the original part of the Gītā from the later additions, need not, to my mind, be taken seriously. The antiquity of the Bhāgavata religion is, as pointed out by Tilak, acknowledged by Senart (The Indian Interpreter, October 1909 and January 1910) and Bühler (Indian Antiquary, 1894), and the latter says, "The ancient Bhāgavata, Sātvata or Paṇca-rātra sect, devoted to the worship of Nārāyaṇa and his deified teacher Kṛṣṇa Devakī-putra, dates from a period long anterior to the rise of the Jainas in the eighth century B.C." And assuredly the Gītā is the earliest available literature of this school. As regards external evidence, it may be pointed out that the Gītā is alluded to not only by Kālidāsa and Bāṇa, but also by Bhāsa in his play Karna-bhāra.

1 Tilak quotes this passage on page 574 of his Bhagavad-gītā-rahasya (Bengali translation of his Marathi work) as follows:

hato 'pi labhate svargaṁ jītov tu labhate yathā
ubhe bahumate loke nāsti nispalatā rāṣe,

which repeats the first two lines of the Gītā, 11. 37.
and the Bodhāyana-Pitr-medha-sūtra, at the beginning of the third prāsaṇa, quotes another passage of the Gītā. Incidentally it may also be mentioned that the style of the Gītā is very archaic; it is itself called an Upaniṣad, and there are many passages in it which are found in the Iṣa (Iṣa, 5, cf. the Bhagavad-gītā, XIII, 15 and vi. 29), Munḍaka (Munḍ. II. 1. 2, cf. the Gītā, XIII, 15), Kāthaka (II. 15, II. 18 and 19 and II. 7, cf. the Gītā, VIII, 11; II. 20 and 29) and other Upaniṣads. We are thus led to assign to the Gītā a very early date, and, since there is no definite evidence to show that it was post-Buddhistic, and since also the Gītā does not contain the slightest reference to anything Buddhist, I venture to suggest that it is pre-Buddhistic, however unfashionable such a view may appear. An examination of the Gītā from the point of view of language also shows that it is archaic and largely un-Pāṇinean. Thus from the root yudh we have yudhya (VIII, 7) for yudhyasva; yat, which is ātmane-pada in Pāṇinean Sanskrit, is used in parasmai-pada also, as in vi. 36, VII, 3, IX. 14 and XV. 11; ram is also used in parasmai-pada in x. 9. The roots kāṅkṣ, vraj, viś and iṅg are used in Pāṇinean Sanskrit in parasmai-pada, but in the Gītā they are all used in ātmane-pada as well—kāṅkṣ in i. 31, vraj in II. 54, viś in XXIII. 55 and iṅg in VI. 19 and XIV. 23. Again, the verb ud-vij, which is generally used in ātmane-pada, is used in parasmai-pada in v. 20; nivasiṣyasi is used in XII. 8 for nivatsyas, mā sucaḥ for mā soctḥ in XVI. 5; and the usage of prasaviṣyadveam in III. 10 is quite ungrammatical. So yamāḥ samyamatāṁ in x. 29 should be yamāḥ samyacchatāṁ, he sakheti in XI. 41 is an instance of wrong sandhi, priyāyārhasi in XI. 44 is used for priyāyāḥ arhasi, senānīnām in X. 24 is used for senānyān. These linguistic irregularities, though they may not themselves be regarded as determining anything definitely, may yet be regarded

1 Bodhāyana-Grhya-leṣa-sūtra:
   tad aha bhagavān,
   patram puram phalaṁ toyam yo me bhaktya prayacchati
   tad aham bhaktya-upaḥram aśīṁi prayatātmanāḥ.

Also Bodhāyana-Pitr-medha-sūtra: yatasya vai manuṣyasya dhrvam maraṇam
   iti vijāntyāt tasmāj jāte na prahṛṣyaṁ mṛte ca na viśīdeta.

Compare the Gītā, jātasya hi dhrvve mṛtyuḥ, etc.

N.B. These references are all taken from Tilak’s Bhagavad-gītā-rahasya pp. 574, etc.

2 For enumeration of more errors of this character see Mr V. K. Rajwade’s article in the Bhandarkar commemoration volume, from which these have been collected.
as contributory evidence in favour of the high antiquity of the Gītā. The Gītā may have been a work of the Bhāgavata school written long before the composition of the Mahā-bhārata, and may have been written on the basis of the Bhārata legend, on which the Mahā-bhārata was based. It is not improbable that the Gītā, which summarized the older teachings of the Bhāgavata school, was incorporated into the Mahā-bhārata, during one of its revisions, by reason of the sacredness that it had attained at the time.
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1 The words are arranged in the order of the English alphabet. Sanskrit and Pāli technical terms and words are in small italics; names of books are in italics with a capital. English words and other names are in Roman with a capital. Letters with diacritical marks come after ordinary ones.
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