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BUDDHIST PSYCHOLOGY

AN INQUIRY INTO THE ANALYSIS AND THEORY OF MIND IN PALI LITERATURE

BY

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EDITOR'S NOTE

One of the most marked signs of the times is the close attention that is being paid to psychological research, the results of which are being followed with the greatest interest by an intelligent public, and the continued advance of which promises to be one of the most hopeful activities of modern science. The observation, analysis, and classification of mental phenomena are being pursued with untiring energy, and the problems of mind attacked on all sides with refreshing vigour. In brief, the new science of psychology seems to promise at no distant date to become one of the most fruitful, if not the most fruitful, field of human tillage. But turn where we will to our manuals or special studies, we find no reference to the patient work of many centuries accomplished by the introspective genius of the
East. In this field none have laboured with greater industry and acumen than the Buddhist thinkers, whose whole philosophy and therewith also their religion rests on a psychological basis. Not only so; but some of their main contentions are very similar to the later views advanced by the dominant schools of modern research. The work of these profound analysts of the nature of mind should, therefore, by no means be neglected by modern psychologists and those who are interested in their instructive labours—and who that desires to know himself can fail to be so interested? It must, however, be admitted that there is some excuse for previous neglect owing to the lack of books designed to smooth the way for those unacquainted with Oriental studies. It is with the hope of making a start in this direction that the present valuable introduction has been secured from the pen of one who is acknowledged to be the most competent student of the subject in the West.
PREFACE

My book is an attempt, in the words of the ‘Quest Series’ programme, to envisage faithfully something true in the history of a very interesting current in human ideas. This ‘something true’ is the analysis and theory of mind in the movement and culture we understand by Early Buddhism, as well as in that of its direct descendant still thriving in Burma, Ceylon and Siam, called Theravāda, or the Doctrine of the Elders. This also is called Buddhism—some call it Hīna-Yāna, some Southern Buddhism.

As to the book’s quests and goals, two of the more proximate may suffice. While scholars are beginning to get at and decipher the long-buried treasure of Buddhist writings brought from Mid-Asia, the general reader is being told that the group of other descendants from Early Buddhism called
Mahā-Yānism, is not only evolved from the earlier doctrine, but is its completion and apotheosis. The reader cannot judge in this matter, unless he has an all-round knowledge of what the developed system started from. Such a knowledge is not always present in those who are fluent about the complete descendant. Hence he is placed in the position of one who learns of Neo-Platonism and not of Plato, of Aquinas and not of Aristotle. My book’s quest is to present summarily some of the thought contained in the mother-doctrine and her first-born child, much of which is still inaccessible to him.

The second object is to bring nearer the day when the historical treatment of psychology will find it impossible to pretend that the observation and analysis of mind began with the Pre-Socratics. Psychologists are, some of them, curiously unhistorical, even with regard to the European field with its high fence of ignorance and prejudice. Theories are sometimes put forward as new that have been anticipated in both Europe and Asia. I say ‘curiously,’ because the
history of ideas about the mind is both fascinating and suggestive. Would Professor Bergson say of his brother thinkers, too, especially of the more constructive among them (I dare to include himself), that the past of psychological thought also est là, continuellement, but that so intent is their forward gaze that they 'cannot and must not look back'? Yet how much more impressive might they not make the present for us if they would, if they felt compelled to look back a little more! Let us hope that monographs in psychological history may eventually succeed in making it unnecessary for drowning, or other catastrophes, to bring flooding in upon them the ignored past of ideas in Indian philosophy.

With so large an object in so small a book, it has been impossible to compare the line of descent I have chosen with other lines, even with that of the Mādhyamika school, in which Professor de la Vallée Poussin has revealed much interesting psychological matter. I have also to apologize for bringing in several terms in the original. This was as inevitable, for clearness and un-
ambiguity, as would be the use of corresponding Greek words in writing on Greek psychology. But we are more used to Greek words. Finally, if I have repeated statements made in previous writings, it was to avoid irritating the reader by too many references, as if suggesting that he might as well be reading not one book, but three or four.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

February 1914.
TO

SHWE ZAN AUNG

A TRIBUTE OF GRATITUDE AND
ESTEEM
BUDDHIST PSYCHOLOGY

CHAPTER I

HABITS OF THOUGHT

There are some to-day who say that enough is known of 'Buddhism,' by the portions of its literature translated into English and German, to enable any one to form correct judgments concerning the data and conclusions grouped under that term, without further acquaintance with that literature at second hand, let alone at first hand.

This is a fairly tenable view if by Buddhism be meant just a certain ethical reform movement, a gospel set on foot to save souls and roll back the murk of sin and superstition, a new creed with a revived moral code. But when we gain a wider perspective of Buddhism, and look more deeply into what is involved by the term, we may feel less confident. Buddhism really covers the thought and culture of a great part of India for some centuries, as well as that of Further
India (pace China and Japan), up till the present. And the reader of translations from its literature, be he superficial or thoughtful, is bound to come across strange things in the point of view, the values, the logic, which should make him realize that the Semitic and Hellenic stock on which his own religious and philosophic principles are grafted, does not coincide with that from which the traditional notions revealed in Buddhism have sprung.

Now if our knowledge of the notions at the heart of Greek and Roman culture and religion has recently been most notably deepened and clarified by research in a literature which has been long in our hands, how much may we not yet have to learn of the history of other human ideas, the literature expressing which is but partly accessible not only to readers of translations, but even to investigators of the original texts?

To write on the subject of this book with the authority of a master, would imply a familiarity, not only with certain works of the Buddhist canonical books, mostly as yet untranslated, but also with the elaborations in theory made by the great scholastics, none of which are translated, and but a few of which are yet printed. Hence this rough provisional sketch can but serve as a temporary makeshift, born of half-
knowledge, till in another decade of this century some writer, better equipped in every way, is able adequately to deal with it.

For even in the original cult and school of Buddhism, known as Hīna-Yāna, or better as Theravāda—the Doctrine of the Elders—maintained down to the present in Further India, it is true of its psychology, even more perhaps than of any other branch of learning, that we have here no body of knowledge evolved in a night to be clothed forthwith in a nutshell. It reveals a growth as does the psychology of Europe, which evolved from the *De Anima* of Aristotle to the *Méditations*, and the rest, of Cartesianism. Compared with the latter evolution, the psychology of the Theravāda is as a quiet river, flowing often unseen, compared to a stream torn by cataracts. There are in it no ruptures of an ecclesiasticism replacing 'paganism,' and so forth. It is probable—and it certainly pleases our pride to think so—that no quiet consistent internal growth can produce such notable results as have come from our own more cataclysmic struggles out of barbarism and superstition into relatively free and developed analysis of mind. However that may be, the historian of Buddhist psychology has a growth to discern and describe, from its earliest recorded expressions in the Suttanta, or books of Suttas, again in the analytical works known as Abhidhamma-
Pitaka, and other early surviving books, down to the discursive commentaries of the present era, the work of eminent scholastics. We shall hardly expect to find, in any of these classic works, that detached and specialized study of mental life as such, which under its modern name of psychology is a matter of yesterday among ourselves. From Aristotle to Hamilton and J. S. Mill, scientific analysis of mind has been discussed either incidentally in philosophic subject-matter, or as the leading subject, but with incursions into the field of metaphysic and ethics. These are also the methods we find in Buddhist inquiries into the nature and processes of mind. If we take up the mediæval classic compendium of philosophy and psychology, recently made accessible to English readers — Anuruddha’s Abhidhammattha-sangāha¹—we find, here a notable analysis of cognition sandwiched between metaphysical statements, and there an examination of states of consciousness complicated by ethical considerations.

Hence it will be necessary to dig out and excise our materials from their context. And in noting the results, the reader cannot be too careful to mark whether they are yielded by the older literary strata, or by earlier or later scholastic work discussing

¹ Translated as A Compendium of Philosophy (see Bibliography).
those older canonical scriptures. The materials are not yet ready for dealing properly with the scholastic psychology as a rounded-off body of doctrine. I am rather presenting the subject in approximately Buddhist fashion; the older matter as justifying, and illustrated by, the later expositions. And I am not seldom poaching in philosophical preserves.

Since, however, the Compendium, or digest just referred to, is the only text yet published giving a purview of Buddhist philosophy of life and mind, a glance at its point of departure may attune our own understanding to a difference in scale of contents and of values from that which is habitual to us. In true thought are no 'habits of thought,' writes Mr. Fielding-Hall, in his enthralling book The Passing of Empire. That is so ideally, but actually all thinking is only relatively true; for all thinking has been and is done by way of habits, that is, traditions, of thought. Vast is the fleeting show of the world, and brief the current of each span of life. We must economize in methods of thought, and this can only be done by following the beaten tracks of our own traditional methods, when we assimilate new perceptions to establish generalizations.

But there are beaten tracks other than ours, habits of thought not European, along which philosophizing was flowing before
we' began, and still flows. And our difficulties in understanding those philosophies lie less in learning the results, than in getting out of our own beaten groove into the 'habit of thought' along which those results were come at.

The Compendium starts with assuming four categories of ultimate notions: not the One and the Many, not the Real and the Ideal, but (1) chitta,¹ consciousness (mind, 'heart,' intelligence); (2) chetāsikā (literally, mental things, mentals); (3) rūpa (literally, shape, visible form, material quality); (4) nibbāna (nirvāṇa, or summum bonum). Roughly speaking, we may approximate these to our own ultimates: (1 and 2) mind or consciousness; (3) matter; (4) happiness, or the ideal. But it is, I repeat, a rough, an approximate fit only; our logic kicks against finding a co-ordination, as ultimates, of (1) consciousness, and (2) phases or factors of consciousness. Nor are we content to substitute for a purely spiritual, negatively expressed concept our own more comprehensive and more positively conceived terms for the summum bonum. We shall probably conclude that we here see a section of humanity beating out its way to truth along lines that are parallel to, or

¹ More strictly transliterated citta; but so spelt throughout to ensure correct pronunciation, as in our word chit. Both the t's should be pronounced: chi-ta.
even convergent with our own, but different—different in its point of departure, different in its intervening experiences, different in its 'habits of thought.'

But the fact that these categories start, not with abstract generalizations such as unity, plurality, reality, substance, but with consciousness and, so to speak, coefficients of consciousness, should certainly bring us to this conclusion, if to none other, namely, that such a view argues a very close attention bestowed on the nature and work of mind. The output of that attention it is my business presently to summarize. Two points, before we leave the Compendium to dig in the older books, may serve to bring out that difference of standpoint in this old Eastern, if mainly Aryan, view of things.

The next step in the manual brings us up against a vastness in extension assigned to chitta undreamt of by ourselves when we set out to analyze consciousness. Chitta, we read, is fourfold, according as it is experienced in one of the three loka's, or planes of life, or, fourthly, by one who, for the time being, is 'beyond-a-loka' (lōk'-uttārā) as to his thought. These three loka's include the whole universe of being, from creatures infra-human up to both the inferior celestial worlds and the superior—a purview greatly exceeding, if parallel to that of Aquinas, who confines himself to
discussion on the consciousness of ‘the angels’ only. He includes an analysis of the angelic nature to complete his scheme of *formae separatae*. Buddhism has always held that, by dint of sedulous practice in prescribed forms of contemplative exercise, mundane consciousness might be temporarily transformed into the consciousness experienced in either the less material, or the quite immaterial worlds. It has therefore both Aquinas’s reason and this too for its fourfold scheme of *chitta*.

Mr. Aung, as an ‘interpreter of... mediaeval Buddhism presented through modern Burmese glasses,’¹ figures *chitta* and *chetāsīka’s* as the shell and the contents of a sphere,² and shows, both hereby and by the context, that this tradition is content to envisage the two concepts as respectively a whole and its factors, or else as respectively a unity ‘and something more,’ ‘concomitant’ with that unity. And thus some among us will still be left chafing at the logic of four categories which should be three.

The rest of us will suspend our judgment and get on, bearing two things in mind as we do so. Firstly, that our traditional logic of whole and parts, genus and species, is a convenient Greek fiction, by which we artificially parcel off the flow or *continuum* of experience as if we were sorting seeds or

the like. It is a mental instrument which plays a relatively minor part in Indian thought. When the Aristotelian and his heirs divide the knowable into bundles, and sub-bundles, ranging the individual everywhere under the more general, the Buddhist thinker, especially in the philosophy of mind, saw everywhere confluences, conjunctures of conditions and tendencies, from which at a given *locus* (*ṭhāṇa, okāsa*) something individual came to pass. He stood for the emergence of the Particular; the Greek, for the revelation of the Universal.

But let this not be strained. Buddhist thought is very largely an inquiry into mind and its activities. Now in that field, as an eminent psychologist has observed,¹ "a difference in aspects is a difference in things." For the 'things' or subject-matter of psychology are the aspects under which things present themselves to mind. Hence we can find it natural enough for psychological philosophers to see, as psychologically, if not as logically, distinguishable categories: (1) the aspect of a sensitive, reacting, discriminating consciousness *happening* in living individuals; and (2) the aspect of an ever-varying confluence of co-efficient mental complexes, evoked along with the ever-recurring, bare happening of that consciousness.

¹ James Ward, *Ency. Brit.*, art. 'Psychology.'
Taking one further glance at the Compendium before we shut the book, we are again repelled by an analysis of consciousness as immoral and as moral, i.e. as bad and as good, ethically speaking. We have learnt, in modern text-books, that ethical considerations are to be kept severely apart from what is held to be scientific investigation of facts, mental or other, of things as they are or appear to be. Those considerations deal with the 'ought to be,' and why.

Here again we come upon a difference of 'habit of thought.' For the Buddhist, the ethical goodness or badness of a state of consciousness was a primary quality of that consciousness no less than, for us, extension and solidity are reckoned as primary qualities of external things, accessible to touch. 'There is nothing good but thinking makes it so' was never a Buddhist dictum. You act, speak, think, say, in a good way, whatever you or others may think about it. 'A good, moral, or meritorious act' means that a desirable result will follow such an act, sooner or later, inevitably. And an opposite sort of result will follow no less the opposite sort of act. The doing will entail suffering. These opposed qualities are integral parts of the content of mental activity, wrought up in its texture. They are, therefore, not out of place in an analysis of consciousness, and I doubt if even at this time of day a
Buddhist, writing on psychology, would judge that such considerations involved trespass outside his legitimate range.

With these remarks on some of the differences in the point of view between the Buddhist outlook and that of our own tradition, we pass on to survey some of the older judgments concerning mind and consciousness. We shall not fail to find many of these judgments on all fours with our own stock of conceptions. But the different avenues along which the Indian mind has travelled are always more or less patent. Hence the difficulty found by both readers and writers in looking at the things of life and mind with Buddhist eyes, and hence the many mistakes we commit.
CHAPTER II

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE NIKĀYAS

I. MIND IN TERM AND CONCEPT

Psychological material is never far to seek in Buddhist books, unless their subject-matter mainly precludes such a content. This is the case with the first of the canonical Piṭakas, the Vinaya, the subject of which is, for the most part, the organization and rules of the Sangha, or fraternity of men and women 'in orders.' In the following four collections of Suttas, or discourses, entitled the Nikāyas, which correspond in authority and sanctity to the Gospels and Epistles of the Christian Scriptures, there is more or less matter of psychological interest in each of the four; the third Nikāya, called Saṃyutta, contains on the whole the most. Five of its parts are ostensibly concerned with the mental and physical constituents of the individual, with sense (organ and object of sense), with feeling, and with purpose. In the fifth Nikāya—a miscellaneous group of books—the psychological matter is almost always incidential. Generally, the high
ethical or spiritual importance of grasping aright the nature of mind, or mental process, is affirmed. And in a Sutta of the second Nikāya, the founder of Buddhism is represented as betraying himself to an adherent, who had never before seen him, by a discourse largely on the nature of mind.¹

What were the reasons for this emphasis? Chiefly two: the one theoretical, the other ethical.²

(1) Apparently because consciousness or mind was judged to be the most striking, the most typical, the most conclusive instance of that perpetual movement, change, happening-and-ceasing in the nature of everything which was summed up chiefly in the word 'impermanent.'³ To body, when not regarded molecularly, a relative permanence might be assigned, whether it were a human body or an elephant's, a tree or a mountain. But mind was conceived from the outset as a series of transient, if connected, happenings. And each momentary happening comprised three phases: a genetic, a static and an evanishing phase. So that, as the type of the impermanent, mind was different even at each fraction of its momentary duration:

"Better were it, bhikkhus, that the uneducated many-folk should conceive this four-

¹ Cp. my Buddhism, pp. 67 f. ² See below, p. 36. ³ Anicca (pron. a-nitcha).
element-made body, rather than chitta, to be soul. And why? The body is seen to persist for a year, for two, three, four, five, ten or twenty years, for a generation . . . even for a hundred years, or even for longer, while that which is called consciousness, that is, mind, that is, intelligence, arises as one thing, ceases as another, both by night and by day.”

This view is not that of substantialist philosophy—that is to say, it does not envisage chitta as an entity, persisting as the same during life, and modified constantly by external stimuli and inherent change. It is that of a series of phenomena, flash-points, we might call them, of intelligence, cinema-films, thaumatrope-figures, welded into an apparent unity, such as is brought about by these inventions. And they are welded only thus far into a phenomenal genuine unity, in that each moment of consciousness is causally connected, so long as each series lasts, with its predecessor.

There are no passages in the Nikāyas expounding chitta in terms of momentary chittāni, or consciousnesses. But it was inevitable that later exegesis would so develop the theme. And so it has been developed, and so developed, it is taught even at the present day, as we shall see later. But the Suttas elsewhere confirm the citation given

\(^1\) Samyutta-Nikāya, vol. ii. p. 94.
above by another discourse, in which consciousness or mind is declared to be an intermittent manifestation, 'happening' only in reaction to a suitable stimulus, and ceasing when the stimulus was exhausted. As we might phrase it, mind in the individual organism was, in the absence of the requisite conditions for evoking it, only potential.

A bhikkhu, Sāti Fisher-son,\(^1\) gives out as the Buddha's own teaching that “it is mind (viññāna) which persists and is reborn after death unchanged.” He is summoned to repeat this before the Master. “Is it true, Sāti, that you said this?” “Yea, lord, so do I understand you to teach.” “What, Sāti, is this mind?” “That speaker, that feeler, lord, who experiences the result of good and evil deeds done here or there.”

“Now then, foolish man, whence got you such a doctrine as being teaching of mine? Have I not taught you by many methods that mind arises from a cause; and except from a cause, mind cannot come to be?”

The bhikkhus bear him out in this. He goes on:

“*And consciousness is designated only in accordance with the condition causing it: visual consciousness from the seeing eye and the seen object; auditory consciousness from the hearing ear and the sound; . . . thought*

\(^1\) Majjhima-N. i. 256 ff. (P.T.S. ed.).
from mind and mental object. Just as a fire
is different according to the kind of fuel. . . .
Do ye see, bhikkhus, that this is [something
that has] become? Do ye see that the becoming
is according to the stimulus [lit. food]? Do ye
see that if the stimulus ceases, then that which
has become ceases?"

These two passages contain the whole of the
Buddhist theory of mind or consciousness
in the germ:—intermittent series of psychic
throbs associated with a living organism
beating out their coming-to-know through
one brief span of life. The fact of those
conscious pulsations, the category of these
phenomena, conventionally expressed as a
unity, as chitta, is accepted, both early and
late, as an ultimate of experience, as an
irreducible datum, not to be defined in terms
of anything else.

There does not seem to have existed any
inquiry into the fact and process of electricity,
in early Indian thought, either for practical
or for academic purposes, through which, as
in our own philosophic evolution, the con-
cepts of the ultimates in nature, in mind,
might have been modified and developed.
Yet the Buddhist conception of conscious-
ness is, I venture to think, better understood
as a mental electrification of the organism,
than in terms of any other natural force
or other phenomenon. The philosophic in-
quirer, if European, is more likely to draw a comparison with Aristotle's principle of form or actualizing essence, which in the case of a living body 'informs' or 'entelechizes' matter, and without which that body has merely a 'potential' being. Consciousness, 'psyche' or chitta, is the entelechy of the body, a psychically innervating force. Danger of fallacious confusion may, however, arise in any parallel drawn between even the modified noumenon of Aristotelian 'form' with the phenomenal Buddhist chitta or viññāṇa. 'Potential' applies rather to future chittas than to the material basis of the body. And in its highest manifestation as psychē, Aristotle's 'form' becomes nous, the nous poiētikos which is held to be both perduring and immortal and 'from without,' 'alone divine.' None of these terms is ever applied to the Buddhist concept of mind.

Let us therefore abstain from such comparisons, and consider further the varying context in which the terms for that concept occur.

In the former citation from the Nikāyas, (pp. 13f.) the three terms 'consciouness, that is, mind, that is, intelligence,' are stated as mutually equivalent:

"cittam iti pi mano iti pi viññāṇam."

In commenting, centuries later, on this passage, Buddhaghosa, the greatest of the
scholastics, calls all three a name for the manāyātānā, or ‘sphere of cognition.’ Elsewhere the first two of the three terms are used as practically coincident, but this is the only passage known to me where all three are so represented. This is no small comfort to the inquirer, for in referring, in the most general terms, to the phenomenon of mind or consciousness, the Nikāyas show a certain predilection for one term or other of the three according to the aspect under which that phenomenon is being discussed. And, in our ignorance of the stock of current nomenclature of which the Nikāyas made use, this predilection appears as somewhat arbitrary. It is therefore, I repeat, a good thing to know that it does not really matter which of the three terms is used; the meaning is practically identical.

For instance, when kinds of irreducible data are classified under the category dhātu—usually translated ‘element’—we find the second and third terms of these three synonyms called dhātu, but never, I believe, the first of them (chitta). Earth, water, fire, air are grouped as ‘elements,’ in India as in Europe, and sometimes space is added, and sometimes consciousness (viññānadhātu). Now the philosophic exegesis of the Commentaries considers the first four elements

1 Dīgha-N. i. 213; Anguttara-N. i. 170 (pron. mā-nō, vin-yāna).
and consciousness not as substances, but rather as elemental irreducible data, as phenomenal, yet not unreal, as forces of momentary duration but infinitely recurring, and combining to form apparently persisting, apparently static 'things.' Thus earth stands for extended element, known by hardness (we should perhaps say 'solidity'), water stands for cohesive element, binding everything, fire stands for heat, air, for mobile element, while viññāṇa is the aware, or intelligent, element.

Again, to mano as prefixed to dhātu (and also to the dual compound, mano-viññāṇa-dhātu) is assigned a special function in consciousness, with which we can better deal later. Without these affixes mano may form the generic term for those functions; and it is also so used when its work is considered under the aspect of product, or karma, namely, in the phrase equivalent to our 'thought, word and deed.' The Commentators connect mano with mināti (mā), to measure. And it is more usual, when the intellectual functioning of consciousness is referred to, to employ mano; viññāṇa representing the field of sense, and sense-reaction, and chitta standing pre-eminently for the subjective, inward-looking aspect of consciousness, conveyed by our lapsed word 'inwyt.'

When, however, the doctrine bears upon
the psychology, or eschatology, of rebirth, with all the near-lurking notions of animistic transmigration, then the term for consciousness is usually viññāṇa, never mano. Chitta appears only in the post-Nikāyan phrases: rebirth-chitta and decease-chitta. It must be remembered that Buddhists did not invent their terms for mind, etc., nor divert their current usage as to form and context. They only sought to infuse these terms that they found, with diverted meaning, like old bottles filled with new wine. And we may safely conclude, from such discourses as that on Sāti’s error, and from others involving legendary diction, that viññāṇa was the current and standard expression for that factor of the organism, which was commonly supposed alone to survive bodily dissolution, and to transmigrate, as the ‘vehicle’ of the soul. An analogous case would be that of an English divine or journalist discussing this factor in terms of ‘mind,’ or ‘consciousness,’ so long as the activities of this life were his subject, but substituting ‘soul’ when adverting to death and to consciousness after death. While for ignorant folk, from early Buddhist days down to the Burmese peasant of to-day, viññāṇa (or its Burmese equivalent) is conceived as the manifestation of soul (attā), that is, of a ghostly semi-material mannikin.

Among the Māra or Satanic folklore,
which got wrought up into the more adult discussions of the Suttas, is the legend of Māra, the spirit of sensuous seduction, of the craving that involves dyings and rebirths, lurking around a death-bed, in the visible shape of murky ‘smokiness,’ looking for the escaping viññāṇa of the dying person. The legend is told twice in connection with the death of saintly bhikkhus, in whom viññāṇa was ceasing utterly to arise, because they had attained the end of life, earthly or celestial.\(^1\) It belongs to the edifying literature of the Sutta-Piṭaka, and would be as out of place in a Buddhist philosophical discussion as it would be to write, in an examination paper on electrical physics, of a thunderbolt falling upon anybody. It was the popular way there and elsewhere, then and more or less always, to speak of something flitting at death, perceptible perhaps only to vision not of men, at least of ordinary men. And the current term for the flitter, or flitting thing happening, in Kosala and Magadha, to be viññāṇa, Buddhist teaching, while seeking to correct the current notion, retained this word, when it might equally well have used chitta or mano.

Again, the genesis of intelligence in the human embryo is expressed by the use of viññāṇa:

\(^1\) Samyutta-N. i. 122 ; iii. 124.
"Were viññāṇa, Ānanda, not to descend into the mother's womb, would body and mind become constituted therein?" ¹

It is doubtless another case of folklore speech accepted by the Suttanta teaching that the usual verb for happening or coming to be—viz. uppaṭṭati, uppaṭti, arising or attaining—is here replaced by avakkanti, descent, a figure of speech more rare, though it is found in such phrases as 'descent of pain,' or 'of happiness.' ²

For Buddhists the dissolution of the factors of a living individual at death was complete: body 'broke up' and mind or the incorporeal ceased. But if, in the final flickerings of mind or viññāṇa, there was a coefficient of the desire to enjoy, involving a clinging to, or grasping after life wherewith to enjoy, then those dying pulsations, as cause or condition, produced their effect, not in the corpse, but in some embryo wakening elsewhere at that moment to life, it might be in the next house, it might be in some heaven, or purgatory.

"To him, bhikkhus, who lives intent on enjoyment in things that tend to en fetter us, there will be descent of viññāṇa . . . and where viññāṇa gains a footing, there is descent

¹ Dīgha-N. ii. 63 (Dialogues of the Buddha, ii. 60—'consciousness' had been a better rendering for viññāṇa).
² Saṃyutta-N. iii. 69.
of mental and bodily life... for this nutri-
ment, viññāna, is the cause of our taking birth, 
and coming again to be."1

In the term translated above 'mental and 
bodily life'—nāmarūpa, literally, name and 
visible or material object, or form—we have 
yet another word annexed by Buddhism from 
current and traditional usage. It appears 
in the Brāhmaṇas, in what are presumably 
the pre-Buddhistic Upanishads, and in the 
Atharva-Veda, as a dual designation for 
the perishable and the imperishable factors 
of the individual. The Buddhist scholastics 
derive nāma exegetically from a root meaning 
'to bend,' to emphasize the ductability of 
mind. But the ancient labelling of mind or 
soul by 'name' derives from a widespread 
feature of primitive culture, which sees, in 
the name, a status and a raison d'être for 
the individual over against the mystery and 
mencée of a mainly hostile universe.

In the works just named, nāma and rūpa 
are the two great manifestations—Word 
and Mind—of creative being or Brahman, 
as which 'It' descends into sky and 
earth.2 And as Sat, Being, it permeates 
seed, egg, foetus, and 'spreads asunder' 
mortal nāma's and rūpa's in space.3 In

1 Samyutta-N. ii. 13, 91, 101.
2 Saṭapāṭha-Brāhmaṇa, xi. 2, 3 (SBE xliiv. pp. 27 f.).
3 Chāndogya-Upanishad, vi. 3; 2, 3; viii. 14, 1.
one passage it is they that are real, or actual, covering the immortal breath within them; in another, nāma appears as the immortal, leaving rūpa at death for infinite worlds.¹

Buddhist thought—and herein it is, as ancient thought, so impressive—repudiated the Vedic and Vedāntist cosmology, although it suffered the borrowed word. It had no use for the faith and fantasy, which found satisfaction in perpetuating and elaborating primitive sagas about a world, for which a beginning and a creative agent were postulated. But there were the corporeal and incorporeal aspects of life to be accounted for, if not in their beginning, at least in their procedure and tendency. And this traditional term of nāmarūpa fitted them thus far, that it indicated the mental and bodily compound in the individual—a desideratum, this, in our own nomenclature.

In welding together a number of terms and categories drawn in part, doubtless, from current use, the compilers of the early Buddhist records have no more reduced their formulas to a flawless consistency than had the compilers of the Upanishads, to name no other scriptures. Thus nāma is not only (when joined with rūpa) not made synonymous with chitta, viññāṇa or mano; it is defined either as feeling, perceiving,

¹ Brihadāraṇyaka-Upanishad, i. 4, 7 ; 6, 3 ; iii. 2, 12.
viññāṇa, and all complexes of thought, word and deed,¹ or, again, as the first two, and as volition, contact and attention.² The inconsistency is, however, more formal than real, since among those ‘complexes’ (whereof more presently), ‘volition’ and ‘contact’ are ranked foremost, ‘attention’ only coming into similar status in later psychology.³ In the formula of Causal Genesis, or law of causation applied to life, nāmarūpa is not defined in terms of viññāṇa, because the former term serves to denote the newly reborn or reconceived human unit, while viññāṇa figures as the conditioning process, one viññāṇa being causal in the dying unit, another viññāṇa being caused in the embryonic unit. There was therefore a distinction in time, hence a distinction is made in definition.

Viññāṇa does not produce nāmarūpa, but because there is a functioning of the former as one span of life ends, a resultant functioning of fresh viññāṇa associated with a new rūpa, starts a fresh nāmarūpa. So might a man, murdered as he called for help on the telephone, have set going elsewhere, by his last words, a whole series of actions. We may call this transmitting a message, but we know not the nature of the electric

¹ Vibhaṅga, 136 ff. ; Dhamma-sangaṭi, § 1309.
² Majjhima-N. i. 53 ; Saṁyutta-N. ii. 3 f.
³ Compendium, 94 f.
force released, though we can say something about the medium for its transmission. We reckon on the force without speculating about it. We accept the transmission of mental qualities from parent to offspring without understanding it, and biological mathematicians now try to measure it, as electricity is measured. Some of us are inclined to discern here and there an analogous force in thought-transference or telepathy, albeit we do not understand its nature, or detect a medium of transference. Buddhists are equally unenlightened as to the nature and medium of the re-birth-force, but for them its logic is irrefutable. And whereas the vast field of possible antecedents for any individual rebirth make scientific inquiry fairly bootless, the theory does not break its shins, as does our theory of heredity, against the anomalies arising in the transmission of mental faculties, the conditions of which are yet unsolved by science.

One more term for consciousness, in addition to these four,—chitta, mano, viññāna, nāma,—refers us to the aspect of mind known in our psychology as consciousness of self, or presentation of the self, or ego, Pali attā (Sansk. ātman). Joined to bhāva, state, attabhāva is a useful term for personality, individuality.

"I, sir, during the time I have had experience through this attabhāva, am not capable of
remembering what have been its characteristics and habits; how then should I remember former existences?"  

The word includes the entire living human compound in any one span of life. And its use was judged to be, if necessary, not always harmless. "The body and the mental constituents are here," runs Buddhaghosa's exegesis on another context, "termed attabhāva, after the usage of average folk who say: 'This is my self.'"  

Even without the affix, the word is used, though rarely, in the sense of personal appearance. Thus in the Questions of King Milinda: "But given mirror, light and face opposite, there would be [one's] self (attā)." Usually, however, in the older books perhaps invariably, it is only in the oblique cases that attā is employed in a parallel sense to our reflexive pronoun. It is only in the nominative case, speaking approximately, that it acquires psychological emphasis as the representative and re-representative concept of a subject of mental objects, of conscious presentations and representations—a concept harmless enough as a necessary economical fiction of thought and speech, but deemed a very jungle of error for the man in the street.

1 Majjhima-N. ii. 32.
2 Atthasālini, 308; see Buddhist Psychological Ethics, 175, n. 1.
3 Op. cit. (SBE xxxv.) i. 86.
Legitimately used in this form, it may function (a) like our term 'conscience,' i.e. moral consciousness—

"Does the self reproach thee not as to virtue?" ¹

"The self, O man, knows thee as truthful or as false." ²

"The self well tamed is man's true sacrificial fire." ³

(this meaning is also found in oblique cases⁴) —or (b) in the work of introspection generally:

"In so far as a bhikkhu knows the self (or himself, attānam) to this effect: 'thus far am I in faith, morals, learning, self-surrender, insight, ready speech,'—he is called knower of self (attaññū)." ⁵

The complement to this on the side of action is:

"a bhikkhu who without deceit or guile manifests the self (himself) as he really is." ⁶

An interesting feature in some of these attempts at self-expression, for which all languages seem to prove very inadequate

¹ Samyutta-N. iii. 120; iv. 47; Anguttara-N. iii. 255; 267 f.
² Anguttara-N. i. 149. ³ Samyutta-N. i. 169.
⁴ Anguttara-N. i. 53. ⁵ Ibid. iv. 114. ⁶ Ibid. iii. 65.
instruments, is the bifurcated or dual self. We see here, as in other literatures, the notion of one's self and another self dramatizing, so to speak, amongst the flow of individual subjective experience, and resolving the one self into plurality:

"These are the penalties of wrong-doing: the self upbraids self . . ."  

"Any virtuous layman established in the fourfold peace [of religious faith] can, if he will, confess himself to himself as assured of happy rebirth, and as having enlightenment as his final goal."  

"To whom is the self not dear? To evildoers, for . . . though they may say 'Dear to us is the self,' yet that which a man disliked would do to one disliked, that do they by the self to the self."  

"By self incite the self, examine self
By self, self-guarded thus, watchful of mind
And happy shalt thou live. For self of self
Is warded, unto self hath self recourse.
Therefore train well thyself, as 'twere a steed
Well bred by trainer for the market reared."  

This dual mental projection is at times expressed by chitta and the closely allied term cheto, as if we should speak of mind affecting will, or 'heart' influencing 'head':

1 Anguttara-N. i. 57.  
2 Ibid. iii. 211.  
3 Samyutta-N. i. 72.  
4 Dhammapada, verses 379 f.
“Ye should restrain, curb, subdue chitta by cheto. . . .” ¹

But this is a very rare variant, usually reserved for the cheto of one person discerning, 'reading,' as we say, the 'thought' (cheto, chitta) of another; whereof more presently.

That this mental fiction of self presented to self, as of a lower to a 'higher self,' as we say,—this quasi-personification of alternating phases in the mental continua, one set of judgments and values jostling on another,—was considered by the scholastics as mere phraseological method, is shown by the passing over of such expressions, in their painstaking exegeses, without comment.

The an-atta position in the Nikāyas cannot be properly judged by those who are acquainted only with the European conception of 'souls.' These pathetic creations—the little fluttering sprites on Greek vases, the melancholy shades in Vergil's, later, in Dante's, other-world, or -worlds, the errant, fallible, doubled self which we meet with in mediæval literature, the

"Animula vagula blandula
Pallidula rigida nudula"

of Hadrian—the Buddha might conceivably have classed as a sixth group in the organism. But whereas such notions are not

¹ Majjhima-N. i. 120, 242.
absent from the early literature of India, the anti-\textit{ātta} argument of Buddhism is mainly and consistently directed against the notion of a soul, which was not only a persistent, unchanging, blissful, transmigrating, superphenomenal being, but was also a being wherein the supreme Ātman or world-soul was immanent, one with it in essence, and, as a bodily or mental factor, issuing its fiat.' This theory, so prominent in the \textit{Upanishads}, is evidently alluded to in the second discourse ascribed to the Buddha:

\begin{quote}
\textit{The body} . . . [and so on for mental factors] . . . is not the \textit{Self}. If it were the \textit{Self}, the body would not be subject to disease, and we should be able to say: \textit{Let my body (or mind) be such and such a one, let my body not be such and such a one!} But since the body is not the \textit{Self}, therefore it is subject to disease, and we are not able to say: \textit{Let, etc.} Now of that which is perishable, liable to suffering, subject to change, is it possible so to regard it as to say: \textit{This is of Me; this am I, this is the \textit{Self} (soul) of me?}
\end{quote}

I venture to think that this argument would never have suggested itself to a

\footnote{For more discussion, but again very limited in scope, see my \textit{Buddhism}, 1912, chap. iii.}

\footnote{\textit{Vinaya Texts}, i. pp. 100 f.; the last part of the argument occurs frequently in the second, third and fourth \textit{Nikāyas}.}
European pluralist or phenomenalist. He would not associate omnipotence or bliss, as well as immortal continuity, with soul or ego. But however the entity was conceived, the main ground of its rejection in Buddhism was its supposed exemption from the universal laws of causation, ill and impermanence.

Whether that entity was called sāṭṭha (being), attā, jīva (living principle) or puggāla (person) did not matter:

"For these are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world. Of these he who has won truth makes use indeed, but is not led astray by them." ¹

And Buddhist doctrine never hesitates, as we have seen, to make use of customary phrases as a medium of exposition. The Suttas represent, for the most part, the effort of mature, cultured minds reaching out to guide immature, less cultured minds. The phrases and standpoints, useful for that purpose, cease to be used when the more academic method of set and general formulas called Abhidhamma is observed. When teaching is by way of that method, we no longer hear of a Self A discerning, judging, controlling self B, self C and so forth. All is then in terms of process, genesis, causation, series, and mental data, states or pheno-

¹ Dīgha-N. i. 263.
mena (dhamma). Now the atta, as popularly and as theologically conceived, was an entity distinct from phenomena, a self-existent something that 'perdured' while they arose and ceased, a unity temporarily associated with plurality, a micro-deity within distorting man's true perspective, in Buddhist doctrine of all illusions the most dangerous.

In poetical diction, on the other hand, the poet not infrequently apostrophizes his past subjective experience as a serial unity or continuum, chitta being in this case the term evidently current for such a device, to the exclusion of mano and vijnana. Similarly our own poets select 'heart' or 'soul' for their monologues, never 'mind' or other terms; witness Goethe:

"Herz, mein Herz! was soll das geben? . . .
Ich erkenne dich nicht mehr!"

"O heart gone gadding after things that please . . .
I call thee, heart, the breaker of my luck!
I call thee, heart, despoiler of my lot!"¹

"I will restrain thee, heart, as elephant
Is by the towngate's sallyport . . ."²

"'Tis thou, O heart, dost make us what we are . . ."³

¹ Theragathā, verses 213, 214 (cp. Psalms of the Brethren, p. 155).
² Ibid. verse 355.
³ Ibid. verse 1127; verses 1106-45 are a continuous monologue to the chitta.

3
This choice of *chitta* as the sensuous and impulsive consciousness contrasted with the more intellectual aspect of it, make the word 'heart' in such passages a fitting counterpart for *chitta*—heart, that is, in the popular diction of to-day. Three centuries ago only, as we know, the word could bear a more intellectual significance, seen in such Biblical phrases as: "Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts . . ." and: "Why reason ye in your hearts?" 'Heart' (*hādāyā*) also finds a place in Buddhist popular psychology, but in the sense of 'inmost,' 'inwardness,' and also of 'thorough.'

In this aspect of sensuous and impulsive ungoverned mentality, *chitta* is likened repeatedly to an ape, tricksy, restless and inconstant, inquisitive and greedy:

"Within the little five-doored hut an ape
Doth prowl, and round and round from door to door
He hies, rattling with blows again, again . . .
Halt, ape! run thou not forth! for thee
'Tis not herein as it was wont to be.
Reason doth hold thee captive. Never more
Shall roam far hence [in freedom as of yore]."

Dhammapāla, in his Commentary on the poem, refers to the *chitta*-ape of the Nikāya

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2 *Psalms of the Brethren*, verses 125 f. So Shakespeare: "More new-fangled than an ape, more giddy in my desires than a monkey" (*As You Like It*); or Nietzsche on Sterne: "His squirrel-soul sprang with insatiable unrest from branch to branch."
simile, albeit the emphasis there is on the transient coming and passing of mental pulsations:

"Just as an ape in the forest, roaming through the woodland, clutches a bough, lets go and clutches another, so is what is called chitta, that is, mind . . . ever changing as it arises and ceases."

"Unsteady is the heart as jiggling ape!" is another instance of a figure that became the type-symbol of chitta or viññāna in Buddhist pictorial art. So is the Šutta-Nipāta line:

"They grasp, they clutch, then loose their hold again,  
As monkey gripping bough, then letting go,"

where chitta is involved in concrete action; as it is again in the Samyutta version of what we know as the negro's Brer Rabbit and the Tar-Baby:

"In the Himālaya, king of the mountains, are pleasant glades where both monkeys and men may roam. There trappers lay pitch-snares in the monkey-tracks. . . . And if a monkey is foolish and greedy, he takes up the pitch in his paw and it sticks there. Seeking to free his paw with the other, it sticks to that.

1 Samyutta-N. ii. 95.  
2 Psalms of the Brethren, verse 111.  
3 Ibid. p. 112, n. 2.  
   Verse 791.
Seeking to free his paws with one foot . . .
with the other foot, it sticks to both. Seeking
to free both feet with his snout, it sticks to
that." ¹

The moral points to self-control and govern-
ance of sense-impressions and sense-desires.
Elsewhere we find mind not as truant, but
as guide and governor, under the Platonic
simile of charioteer:

"The body is a chariot light, mind is the charioteer, . . .

[where mano is the selected word, chitta
playing a subordinate part, more in the
sense of heart, as the loose, unattached
drapings]

With steeds of equal training, mind pursues the mastered
road . . .

Smiting with wisdom's whip the team that makes for
things of sense.

Herein, O king, thyself alone must be the charioteer." ²

(2) The belief in the ductability of mind
by proper and persistent training, or 'taming,'

¹ Samyutta-N. v. 148; a similar case of self-capture
occurs in the Jātakas or Birth-stories of the Sutta-
Piṭaka, and in Brazilian folklore (cp. A. Lang, The Brown
Fairy Book, pp. 336 f.).

² Jātaka, vi. p. 252. The rendering 'the soul is the
charioteer' is only justifiable if the verse was borrowed
by Buddhism. The Commentary explains as above. Cp.
the figure of the Self in the chariot, intellect (buddhi)
driving, with the reins (mano), the horses of sense along the
roads (objects of sense), in Kaṭha Upanishad, i. 3, 3 f.
as it was termed, was the other reason for the importance assigned to mental analysis in Buddhism. The proximate object of the higher or religious life is described as vināya, discipline, sañyāma, restraint, attānam dametī, sametī, taming, harmonizing one's self, and guarding the gates of sense.

"Once hard to tame, by taming now is tamed
Vira..."

is one of many such emphatic verses.¹ The conquest by man's wit and minor physique over not only the horse, with his swiftness and natural weapons, but also over the mass and might and mind of the elephant, lifted the process of taming to a more impressive status. The latter beast, trained and otherwise, plays a frequent part in ethical similes, and the great Teacher is often termed

"Tamer and driver of the hearts of men."²

Other peaceful conquests by man are brought into service:

"The conduit-makers lead the stream;
Fletchers coerce the arrow shaft;
The joiners mould the wooden plank;
The self: 'tis that the pious tame!"³

¹ Psalms of the Brethren, verses 8 ff. ; also Sisters, xxxii.
² Psalms of the Sisters, verses 216, 135; Brethren, verse
³ Iii.
⁴ Ibid. verse 19; Dhammapada, 80, 145.
The doctrine of self-mastery, with a varying co-efficient of asceticism, is common to all religions and practical philosophies worthy of being so named. Buddhism, as an intellectual or philosophical religion, combats the unruly faculties more with the mental analysis of the ‘Know thyself’ gnomon, than with the averted gaze of a faith appealing chiefly to emotion and will. Its ‘middle way’ between self-indulgence and asceticism is, in one Sutta, explicitly declared to be, not such an aversion of attention, but a system calling for the habit of breaking up the web of conscious experience, of classifying its factors, valuing them and mastering the issues in conduct.¹

¹ Majjhima-N. iii. 298 ; my Buddhism, 67.
CHAPTER III

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE NIKĀYAS—continued

II. CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD

Self-governance, as one of the two reasons for mental analysis in Buddhist culture, brings us up against the nature of that culture's inquiry into sense, and mental activity on occasion of sense. If we may judge by the space and the careful treatment allotted to it, the importance of the subject finds no parallel in the history of human ideas until we come to modern Europe. We find, it is true, no philosophical basis for it comparable to our theories of Sensationalism, Experientialism, or Rationalism. But we can see man conceived as a compound of instruments receptive and reacting; conceived, too, as standing Janus-faced, with the power of looking into one of two houses—the house of sense-impressions, or mundane experience, and the house of spiritual impressions, including what may be called supernormal experience.¹ Between these two vistas he

¹ Majjhima-N. i. 279.
had to shape a course of conduct as sane, and attended by aspirations as worthy, as those instruments, moulded by past karma, were able to form.

Those ‘instruments’ may be enumerated Buddhist-wise thus:

“She taught to me the Norm, wherein I learnt
The factors, organs, bases of this self—
Impermanent compound.”

What are these ‘factors, organs, bases’ according to ‘the Norm,’ or orthodox doctrine?

The Five Aggregates

‘Factors’ here stand for khandhā (Sansk. skandhāḥ), literally heap, body, or aggregate. These are the nāmarūpa, dealt with in the last chapter, but the division is now fivefold: four immaterial or incorporeal (ā-rūpīno) aggregates or groups, and one material aggregate.

Under this category we see a fuller effort made to take account, not so much of a dual, as of a still more composite nature in the so-called individual. We see also the refusal to recognize therein any unity except that which is conferred, for practical convenience, by the bond and label of the name—person, individual, creature, self and the like. The five may be translated: material qualities, feeling, sense-perception, complexes

1 Psalms of the Sisters, verses 69, 43; Brethren, 1255.
of consciousness or co-efficients, and, fifthly, consciousness itself, the viññāna of foregoing remarks. There is here no order in function or evolution. Buddhaghosa, in one dissertation on them,\(^1\) takes the last after the first, much as we should do, in order that the middle ones ‘shall be better understood.’ But in the Canon no reason for the order, which as stated is invariable, is ever given.

The division is as old as the inception of the Buddhist movement itself. It forms part (together with the doctrines of the ethical mean, or Middle Path, the Eightfold Path of supreme or ‘right’ practice, the Four Truths, and the vision and goal of saintship) of the first sermon or Sutta, ascribed to the Founder. And it is a cardinal doctrine of the Theravāda all the way. There is no evidence that any such fivefold category was current at the time, although each term was in use. That which is apparently peculiar to Buddhism is the grouping of them as a division exhaustive, not only of body and mind, but also of such terms as might serve to stand erroneously for the notion of a perduring hyper-phenomenal soul or self. Other classifications of the factors of individual being occur throughout the Canon,\(^2\) some twofold, some three, some fourfold,

\(^1\) Visuddhi-magga, ch. xiv.
\(^2\) Cp. my Buddhism, p. 72.
but not one is systemically maintained as is that of the khandha's.

The word itself occurs but once in an early Upanishad, meaning 'body' of doctrine (dharma-khandha),¹ and once again in a later Upanishad meaning 'mass' of smoke.² Nor does the word occur among the psychological terms of the Sāṅkhya aphorisms. This may point to a relatively deliberate choice of the word and of the division by the founders of Buddhism.

That a word so static in import should have been chosen in view of the dynamic tendency of the doctrine, and of the canonical exposition given of the khandhas, is somewhat curious. Buddhaghosa helps us out to some extent by pointing out that, whereas khandha signifies aggregate (rāsi), it also has a comprehensive and symbolic, lit. contracting, import. Thus, just as we say, when a man hews at a portion of a tree, he is cutting 'the tree,' so do we mean when we use such a comprehensive term as, say, viññānak-khandha.³ And perhaps no other term could so well have served to keep the plurality, the absence of essential unity in the individual, so forcibly to the fore as this clumsy-seeming word. The oldest interpretations of the five terms are, for that matter, of anything but static import. Let us consider these in the accepted order:

¹ Chāndogya-U. ii. ii. 3. ² Maitrāyana-U. 7, 11. ³ Āthasālinī, 141.
"Why, bhikkhus, do ye say rūpa? Because one is affected by (modified by, feels, ruppati):—affected by cold and heat, by hunger and thirst, by touch of gnat and mosquito, by wind, and sun and reptiles."¹

Rūpa, in its more special sense, is a visible shape, a coloured surface, the object of vision. More generally, it means those material qualities, both of, and external to, the individual, through movements and changes in which he becomes aware, receives impressions of sense. 'Ruppati,' which I have rendered 'affected by,' is, in Buddhaghosa's comment on this passage, paraphrased by disturbed (or excited), struck (or impressed), hurt, broken (or disintegrated),² the verbal form being deponent. We have no term that quite fits. 'Matter' suggests stuff, materials, irrespective of sentience-producing quality. 'Body' suggests framework, solidity, object of touch. 'Form,' often used for rūpa, is of much philosophical ambiguity, for so far from suggesting the mutability of rūpa, it stands, in Aristotelianism, for the "constant element as contrasted with the shifting shapes of matter."³ Hence no one term will suffice for constant duty. For rūpa, as an 'aggregate' or factor of a

¹ Samyutta-N. iii. 86 (Khandha-Samyutta, 79).
² Sāratthappahāsini.
³ Compendium, S. Z. Aung on 'Rūpa,' pp. 271 f.
living organism, material, or corporeal aggregate, or simply 'body' may prove near enough. And in any case, the text and commentary clearly attach no substantial significance to the literal meaning of khandha. 'Aggregate' refers only to a manifold, an accumulation, an indefinitely repeated class of phenomena, implied when any part of them is discussed. Instead of any static thing or things, there is here defined a type of process, an incessantly changing and modifiable flux, expressed in terms of sentience, or of what modern text-books might treat of under metasomaticism or metabolism.

With regard, next, to the second khandha:

"Why, bhikkhus, do ye say, vedanā? Because vedanā are felt (vediyanti). And what are felt? Both pleasant and painful and also neutral vedanā. Each is felt, therefore ye say feelings."

Vedanā has often been translated by sensation, partly perhaps because the stem, from \( \sqrt{\text{vid}} \), suggests the senses as sources of knowledge, partly owing to the position of vedanā in the series of terms constituting the formula of causation: "because of the sixfold sphere of sense, contact; because of contact, vedanā; because of vedanā, craving. . . ." But the hedonistic content of the term requires the word 'feeling,' a term with which, for that matter, our worried
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psychologists know that a deal of sense-import is mixed up. By Buddhists the third and the fifth aggregates are more closely associated with sensations than is *vedanā*. ‘Contact,’ ‘touch,’ produces both sensations and *vedanā*:

“Just as, bhikkhus, from the juxtaposition and friction of two sticks, warmth is generated, heat is born; and from the altering, the relinquishing of just those sticks, that corresponding warmth is allayed and ceases, even so does pleasant *vedanā* arise because of contact capable of producing it . . . and cease when the contact ceases.”

(The same applies to painful *vedanā*.)

But ‘contact,’ as a philosophical term, has the very general implication of proximate condition, either physical, or, in the case of *vedanā*, psychical.

Now feeling in this, its strictly hedonistic sense, cannot be expressed in more intimate terms. It means more essentially state of the subject, or subjective state, for our psychology, than any other phase of consciousness. The Buddhists discerned this too, not only in the reply describing *vedanā*, but also in the warning added in Buddha-ghosa’s comment, namely, that “there is no distinct entity or subject who feels”; “it is only feeling that feels or enjoys,” and

that "because of some object which is in causal relation to pleasant or other feeling." \(^1\) So consistently insistent is Buddhist philosophy in giving prominence to object over subject—to see in object the relating thing, and in the compound, labelled 'subject,' the thing related.\(^2\) "In philosophy," says our neo-Realism, "the mind must eliminate itself." \(^3\)

A point of interest to psychologists is the recognition of neutral feeling, with its doubly negative name: —not-painful-not-pleasant (adukkha-m-asukha) feeling—as a distinct phase. A positive content indicated by a negative term need appear no anomaly to us, for whom 'immortality,' 'independence' are accepted instances. Our psychology only doubts whether bare feeling can be said to arise in subjective experience, unless it be felt as pleasant or unpleasant. Between these two we are disposed to allow no more than a zero-point.

In one Sutta, a layman maintains the European preference for two phases only of feeling as the more authoritative doctrine.\(^4\) The Founder is referred to and replies, that feeling may be classed under two, three or more heads according to the special aspect of feeling discussed by the teacher. For

\(^1\) Sāratthappakkāsini.
\(^2\) Compendium, p. 2.
\(^3\) S. Alexander, Things and Knowledge.
\(^4\) Saṁyutta-N. iv. 223 f.
bare emotional sentience, the three phases are invariably given. The typical description of them, in the archaic analysis of the Nikāyas, runs as follows. The teacher is the eminent woman-teacher, Dhammadinnā, whose answers on this occasion are confirmed by the Buddha as being what he himself would have said. After stating the three phases, and qualifying each as being either bodily or mental, she is then asked:

"'What has pleasant feeling that is pleasant, what that is painful? What has painful feeling that is painful, what that is pleasant? What has neutral feeling that is pleasant, what that is unpleasant?' 'Pleasant feeling has stationariness as pleasant, change as unpleasant; painful feeling has stationariness as painful, change as pleasant. Neutral feeling has knowledge as pleasant, not-knowing as painful.'"  

After replying to an ethical question, she is asked:

"'What is comparable to pleasant, to painful, to neutral feeling?' 'Pleasant and painful feelings are mutually comparable. Neutral feeling is comparable with ignorance, as this is with knowledge.'"

1 Majjhima-N. i. 303.
2 Or as Buddhaghosa's less awkward prose paraphrases: "in neutral feeling a state of knowing is pleasant, a state of not knowing is painful."
BUDDHIST PSYCHOLOGY

It is not easy for us, with our logic of definition and division, based on Greek Substantialism, to acquit Buddhists here of confusing ‘bare feeling,’ ‘feeling proper,’ with intellectual concomitants. Personally, however, the longer I study their thought, the more reluctant I become to vote them illogical, even from our own logical standpoints. I am inclined instead to judge that they envisaged pleasurable feeling less comprehensively than we do, and that they may have seen in what Bain, for instance, called emotions of relativity, emotions with a preponderant intellectual coefficient, an irreducible base of simple or bare feeling not describable as ‘pleasant.’ Such feeling we might describe negatively as neutral, positively as intellectual excitement: the residual consciousness in the complex state called piti, interest or zest.¹

Fuller acquaintance with Buddhaghosa may reveal more light hereon. For all purposes of religious and moral edification, this third phase was of little use, as compared with the other two. In the Suttas it is chiefly of concrete consciousness predominantly ‘happy’ and ‘unhappy’ that we read. But the cultivation of neutral feeling was of considerable importance in the exercises for the attainment of that other-world consciousness, alluded to in the first chapter.

¹ See below, pp. 94, 97, 176, 187.
CONSCIOUSNESS

In this second aggregate too we can see that there is no question of static substance or state quickened or otherwise modified in, or by feeling, but only a plurality of moods. The 'heap' simply records the fact of a quantity of past experiences of similar emotional gushes.

We come to the third khandha:

"Why do ye say saññā? Because one perceives (sañjanāti). And what does one perceive? One perceives blue-or-green, and yellow and red and white."

This scant information with respect to such an everyday word doubtless sufficed for the hearers, but its simplicity is misleading for alien readers. Saññā is not limited to sense-perception, but includes perceiving of all kinds. Our own term 'perception' is similarly elastic. In editing the second book of the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka, I found a classification distinguishing between saññā as cognitive assimilation on occasion of sense, and saññā as cognitive assimilation of ideas by way of naming. The former is called perception of resistance, or opposition

1 Nīla; the word does duty for both, for the colour of sky, cloud, hills, trees, etc., Bud. Psy. Ethics, p. 62, n. 1; cp. Edridge Green, Colour-Blindness and Colour-Perception: "The tetra-chromatic regard blue as a greenish violet." India is the home of blue-green indigo.
2 Vibhanga, 1904, p. 6.
(pañigha-saññā). This, writes Buddhaghosa,¹ is perception on occasion of sight, hearing, etc., when consciousness is aware of the impact of impressions; of external things as different, we might say. The latter is called perception of the equivalent word, or name (adhibhāvanā-saññā), and is exercised by the sensus communis (mano), when e.g. "one is seated . . . and asks another who is thoughtful: 'What are you thinking of?' one perceives through his speech." Thus there are two stages in saññā-consciousness: (1) "contemplating sense-impressions"; (2) "ability to know what they are" by naming. An illustration is added, in the Commentary, of a bhikkhu contemplating a woman who sat spinning as he passed, and on his companion taxing him therewith, said it was because of her likeness to his sister.

We may conclude, then, that in this third or perception-aggregate, we have the content of any consciousness, or chitta, in so far as there is awareness with recognition, this being expressed by naming.

As to the fourth aggregate:

"Why, bhikkhus, do ye say sankhāra's? Because they compose what is compound (sankhātam). And what is the compound that they compose? They compose material

¹ Sammohavinodani, Commentary on the Vibhanga. An English edition is in preparation.
quality (rūpaṃ) as compound to make (lit. in order to) 'rūpa'; they compose feeling as compound to make 'feeling'; percepts, to make 'percept'; complexes to make 'complexes'; consciousness to make 'consciousness.'"

"Just as one cooks rice-gruel to make rice-gruel," continues the Commentator, "or a cake to make a cake, so is this being brought together by antecedent conditions and wrought up into a [mental] compound termed rūpa. . . . By 'composing' is meant 'striving along, kneading together, effecting.' Together with the mental production of rūpa are compounded the feeling and other states associated with it. The essential mark of a sankhāra is 'being work of mind.'" 2

The fourth khandha, then, is the complementary factor to the more passive, receptive phase of consciousness. In the somewhat later elaborations of doctrine in the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka, this constructive aspect is reserved for the first-named of the 52 elements of consciousness comprised under sankhāra's, namely, chetānā. 3 In that term

1 The Sinhalese printed edition of the Commentary reads rūpaṭhāya, and so for the other terms.
2 Chetayita, literally, 'being mind-ed.'
3 In its more passive sense of component things, rather than compounding function, sankhāra has a much wider implication, even that of 'things in general,' 'this transient world,' and the like. I may refer readers to S. Z. Aung's analysis of the term in our Compendium of
Buddhists discern what we mean by volition. The other 51 factors are rather coefficients in any conscious state, than pre-eminently active or constructive functionings. To this manifold of factors we shall have occasion to return.

Lastly:

"Why, bhikkhus, do ye say viññāṇa? It is conscious (vijānāti), therefore it is called viññāṇa, consciousness. Of what is it conscious? Of tastes: sour, bitter, acrid, sweet, alkaline, non-alkaline, saline, non-saline."

Here it will be said: if this and the third, or perception-khandha, are merely awareness of difference in sensations, what is there to choose between them? If we turn to one of the psycho-ethical discussions of the Majjhima-Nikāya to help us out, we shall find apparently the same conclusion arrived at. The questioner is Koṭṭhīta, called the Great, and Sāriputta, chief of the disciples, and although no class of students attending either is mentioned, the dialogue must have been compiled, or actually delivered for the benefit of brethren less proficient than the

Philosophy, pp. 273 ff., and to R. O. Franke’s Appendix in his selected translations from the Digha-Nikāya (1913). I much regret that the Compendium was not in Dr. Franke’s hands when he wrote this Appendix. It could have had no juster or more appreciative critic. His own rendering of this difficult term is ‘Hervorbringungen,’ ‘pro-

ducts.’
eminent Mahā-Koṭṭhīta. The questions turn on the nature of viññāṇa and other aggregates. The first is here said to be consciousness of what is pleasant, painful, and neither. A little later, feeling is declared to be concerned with the same, and perception, with sensations such as colour. Koṭṭhīta then goes on:

“‘And that, brother, which is feeling, that which is perception, and that which is viññāṇa, are these mental states conjoined, or disconnected? Are you able to disentangle them and point out different modes of action for them?’ ‘The three, brother, are conjoined, not disconnected, nor are we able to disentangle them and point out for them different modes of action. For what one feels, brother, one perceives; what one perceives, of that one is conscious.’”

The essential homogeneousness of chitta or chitta’s would seem to be here upheld, as a corrective against attaching too much weight to analytic distinctions. Viññāṇa, we are assured on good Buddhist authority, is of more general import than any one phase of consciousness. It there includes and involves the other three mental aggregates just as our own psychologies allow only a logical distinction for purposes of analysis between two or more main phases of con-

¹ Majjhima-N., i. 292 f.
sciousness. To see further separateness would be, wrote Buddhagahosa,¹ "as if one drew water at the delta where the five rivers enter the sea saying: 'This is Ganges water; this is Jumna water.' All these mental states are one with respect to their object." "Sensations of sight," he adds, "illustrate perception here, because form and appearance show its action most clearly; sensations of taste are cited for consciousness as best showing its awareness of specific distinction [in general]."

*Viññāna*, in fact, being, it would seem, a term of such general import, may stand for any 'awareness' of mind, no matter how general or how abstract the content.

It must still remain for us a logical anomaly to see the more general aspect *co-ordinated* with the more special aspects, as one among four aggregates, instead of the second, third and fourth being reduced to subdivisions of the fifth. Some day we shall witness a Thera of Ceylon or Burma, master of both his own and our traditions, doing justice to the subject. Meanwhile we may do well to hang up our judgment on two memoranda: (1) the absence in the Buddhist tradition of any cogent logic of division by way of genus and species; (2) the presence of an emphatic negation of any substantial unity in *viññāna* or

¹ Commentary on *Majjhima-N.*, Sutta 43.
chitta or mano. Safety was felt to lie only in classifying mind as not one, subdivided, but as several. Nāmarūpa was far more convenient as a starting-point, but it was a dangerous old bottle for new wine, for it dated, as we have seen, from animistic or atmanistic compilations. "Why," wrote Buddhaghosa, "did the Exalted One say there were five aggregates, no less and no more? Because these not only sum up all classes of conditioned things, but they afford no foothold for soul and the animistic, moreover they include all other classifications." ¹ No 'wrong view' finds, in the Nikāyas, correction so emphatic, so uncompromising as this: that "viññāna is an identical something, continuous, persisting." ²

Hence the primary reason for the khandha-division was practical—the reader may call it religious, philosophical, ethical, as he pleases—and not scientific. Herein it resembled Plato's threefold pysche—sentient, passionate, rational—put forward to inculcate the governance of the first and second by the third. Aristotle's threefold scheme was more scientific, giving us "an evolutionary concept of increasing connotation." ³ But Aristotle was elaborating a tradition which started

² Majjhima-N. i. 256; quite literally, 'runs on, flows on, not-other.'
³ G. Croom Robertson, Elements of Philosophy, p. 221.
from unity, and held it 'most unreasonable' to consider the psyche as a plurality.¹ The founders of Buddhism, ascribing to that unity in 'self,' to which consciousness usually, and language (when not metaphorical) always testifies, only the validity of popular, conventional usage, started from plurality. They saw in the person a plurality held together by a name, and by an economy of mental procedure. Their philosophy is synthetic, starting from many. When it analyses, it reveals, not fractions, but a number of co-ordinated ultimates. For it, ultimate truth lies in inverting conventional truth, or as we might say, common sense. The latter sees truth in a consistent use of names for things-as-perceived, holding that these are things-as-they-really-are (yathā-bhūtam). But the task of philosophy lay in ‘penetrating’ through these fictions of the ‘world’s’ beliefs and these myths of language. It must not take surface-usage as in the least trustworthy. The attitude is of course common to all philosophizing worthy of the name. But in Buddhism it was applied in a more thoroughgoing degree than almost anywhere else in ancient thought. By 'him who sees,' the 'one,' to which consciousness seemed to testify, is considered as a myth carried over from the name, and valid only in popular thought.

¹ De Anima, ch. iv.
Theory of Sense

The next word in our verse is 'organs': āyātānā. This word, meaning simply place or sphere for meeting, or of origin, or ground of happening,¹ is used to cover both organ of sense and sense-object. The 'meeting' is that effected, on occasion of sensation, between organ and object. What this meeting of man's cognitive apparatus with the external world consisted in, was, as we know, variously conceived. But no serious effort to inquire into, and formulate, the natural procedure in that meeting appears in any Indian literature judged to be pre-Buddhistic, or contemporary with the Nikāyas.² Vedāntic inquiries in this direction are late, probably incited by Buddhist pioneering effort.

Nothing, however, were further from truth than to affirm that the late Vedism, or the early Vedāntism of the oldest Upanishads took no account of sense in their philosophy. When our historians of psychology have realized that to limit their origins to Hellenistic thought is to present inexcusably mutilated work, we shall find our facts more accessible.

¹ Threefold meaning assigned by Buddhaghosa, Commentary on Dīgha-Nikāya, 2, 124.
² It is perhaps significant that the words Sinn (sense) and Empfindung (sensation) do not even occur in Deussen's index to his work on the Upanishads, or to those of vols. i. and ii. of his History of (Indian) Philosophy.
The crabbed confines of a little manual prevent due justice being dealt to the many interesting glimpses of sense-theories in the eight Upanishads generally reckoned oldest. But a few words on them are necessary to show both how much and how little the advance in theory by Buddhism had to aid it.

Summarized, these glimpses show much psychological insight, fitfully and unsystematically presented, often with a poetic Platonism. All are more or less subservient to the main atmanistic theory.

(1) How little that theory, as compared with Buddhist pluralism, was calculated to encourage serious independent inquiry, appears in such phrases as: "Let no man try to find out what sights, sounds, smells, tastes are. Let him know the seer . . . the hearer," etc. Again: "When seeing, He (Brahman) is called 'eye,'" and so forth; "He is eye of the eye, ear of the ear," etc. He, or It, used these instruments, but was distinct in essence, separable. When they slept, he unsleeping went whither he listed, 'golden person, bird-alone.' Accordingly the listeners did not 'try' very much. Nevertheless, they saw vividly some things of significance for psychology.

1 According to Regnaud these are Brihadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, Kaushitaki, Aitareyya, Taittiriya, Isa, Kena, Kaṭha.

2 Brīh. iv. 3, 12.
(2) With a view concentrated more on theoretic synthesis than on the facts of experience, they now included, now excluded, the three relatively animal senses of smell, taste and touch. Sometimes only one is excluded; *e.g.* the indwelling Ātman or Brahman ‘pulls,’ or ‘rules’ eye, ear, tongue (not tasting, but speaking), and skin, but not the nose.¹ So, too, these four only are called ‘graspers,’ and the respective objects, ‘overgraspers,’ for “eye is seized by visible objects, ear by sound,” etc.—a notion equally applicable to the senses of smell and taste.

(3) One result of this aesthetic eclecticism is that the significance of touch in our knowledge of the external world is not discerned. Thus it is of the eye, and not of touch, that we read: “The essence (sap) of the material, the mortal, the solid [Deussen: *Stehendes*, *sthitan*], the definite [Deussen: *Seiende*, *sat*] is the eye, for it is the essence of *sat* (being).”² In one Upanishad action and hands replace touch and sensitive surfaces.³

(4) But the tendency to centralization in the person went along with a theory of the co-ordination of sensations into the unity of percepts, by the action of a *sensus communis* or sense-mind (*prajñā*). Thus: “Some say,

¹ *Bṛih. iii. 7, 17 f.*  
² *Ibid. ii. 3, 4.*  
³ The *Kaushitaki.*
that the vital forces (*prāna's*) go into one becoming, since no one could at the same time make known a name, see ... hear ... think with *manas* ... whereas the vital forces, by going into one becoming, bring all these one after another into consciousness, ... and then all function together with each one, sight, hearing," etc.\(^1\) And it is in the heart that these vital forces, which include the senses\(^2\) become one. The heart is thus the *sensorium commune*.

(5) We do not find the Buddhist common name for the peripheral organs of sense, as door or gate, but only 'openings' (*susayah*) into the heart, *viz.* eye and ear, speech, mind and air.\(^3\)

(6) In the heart too reside all rūpa's, "for we know colours by the heart," while the sun, or the sun-god, abides in the eye.\(^4\) Here we seem to get a fleeting glimpse—no more—of a parallel to the Common and Special Sensibles of Aristotle's theory of sense, developed in modern psychology by Locke as primary and secondary qualities. Deussen translates rūpa's by forms, but the context, let alone the Buddhist *tradition*, requires us to see in the object of sight strictly colours, as Max Müller renders it.

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\(^1\) *Kaush.* iii. 2.

\(^2\) *Chānd.* iii. 12, 3 f. and *n.* 1; viii. 3, 3.

\(^3\) *Ibid.* iii. 13, 1 f. The word 'door,' *dvāra*, is very near, however; see *ibid.* iii. 13, 6.

\(^4\) *Bṛih.* iii. 9, 20.
We shall now be the better able to judge wherein Buddhist psychology may be considered to have made any advance on these striking, and often mythically, or at least figuratively, conceived theories of the nature of sense. Confining ourselves, as in the foregoing chapter, to the earliest documents, and taking counsel on them from the Commentaries, we will take the six matters numbered above in order.

(1) We have already seen, we know, that to what extent the obsession of the Subject, omnipresent yet indwelling, may have checked inquiry into contact with Object, Buddhism had shaken off the cause of such a check. So thoroughgoing was the doctrine, in refusing to emphasize, or even recognize, any self-agency that might be misconceived, when the law of causation was being discussed, that queries in terms of a personal agent were deemed unfitting.

"There are four foods, bhikkhus, for maintaining creatures that have come to be, or for conducing to their coming to be. What are the four? Material food, gross or subtle; secondly, contact; thirdly, mental provision; fourthly, viññāṇa. These are the four."

The Commentator explains that in cases 2 and 3 the interlocutor might easily understand something ancillary to the food itself, as when (2) birds feed their young, causing
contact, and as when (3) a turtle lays her eggs not in the water but on the sand above its reach. But the new viññāṇa that becomes potential in the new embryo, as the result of a last conditioning, viññāṇa in a dying person, was not so easy to bring under the notion of food—food for a complete new nāmarūpa.

"Thereupon the venerable Moliya Phaggūna said to the Exalted One: 'Who is it, lord, that feeds on the food viññāṇa?' 'Tis no fit question,' said the Exalted One. 'I do not use the term "feeds." If I did, your question were a fit one. But since I do not, if one were to ask: "For what is viññāṇa a food?" this were a fit question; and this the fit reply: Viññāṇa-food is the condition for bringing about rebirth in the future.¹ When that is come to birth there is the sphere of sense and of the condition of sensations, namely, contact."

"'But who is it, lord, that comes into contact?'

"'Tis no fit question,' said the Exalted One. 'I do not say: he comes into contact. . . . If one were to ask: "Because of what condition is there contact?" this were a fit question, and this the fit reply: Conditioned by the sphere of sense [arises] contact; conditioned by contact [arises] feeling."

¹ Cp. p. 20.
"But who is it, lord, that feels?"
"'Tis no fit question . . ." [and so on, for yet two more unfit queries: who desires? who grasps?]

(2) Whether the concentration on Object, and not on Subject, was the cause or not, Buddhist analyses consistently deal with the five senses, and with each of them. The priority invariably yielded to Sight and Hearing may be a legacy from older doctrines. But whatever is stated about the nature and functions of sense, is shown as valid for each of the senses. So faithfully is this uncompromising consistency carried out, that the application of statements to each sense, taken severally, is effected at a considerable cost of literary effect and of readers' patience.²

The most general (as well as the earliest) formula of sense-consciousness, given half a dozen times in the Majjhima and Samyutta-Nikāyas, is as follows:

"Because of sight [lit. eye] and visible matter (rūpa) arises visual consciousness (chakkhu-viññāna); the collision of the two is contact. (Conditioned by contact [arises] feeling; what one feels, one perceives; what

¹ Samyutta-N. ii. 13.
² An idiomatic phrase of popular usage: 'things seen heard, imagined, apprehended,' or 'things seen, heard, touched, imagined,' occurs, but not where sense-cognition is discussed. It survives in part; see Compendium, p. 37.
one perceives, one thinks about; what one thinks about, one is obsessed withal; hence obsessions concerning past, future and present objects cognized through sight beset and infest a man.) Because of hearing . . . of smell, &c.”

The formula ceases at the first bracket. The context is given to illustrate the application. Here is another application, taken from the 207 short Suttas on the sphere of sense:

“Viññāṇa comes to pass, bhikkhus, because of a dual [thing]. What is that dual [thing]? Because of sight and because of visible object arises visual consciousness. Sight is transient, changing; its state is ‘becoming-other-ness.’ Visible objects are just the same. So this dual thing is both mobile and passing away. . . . Visual consciousness, sprung from a condition, from a relation which is transient, changing, having ‘becoming-other-ness,’ is itself no less so. Now this kind of consciousness, happening because of a transient condition, whence shall it become perduring? Visual contact—as the collision, coincidence, encounter of these three phenomena is called—is transient, changing, having ‘becoming-other-ness.’ Arisen because of a transient condition, whence shall it become perduring? Come into contact

1 Majjhima-N. i. 111 f.
2 Samyutta-N. iv. 67 f.
one feels, is aware, perceives; hence these states also are mobile and passing away, transient, changing, having ‘becoming-other-ness.’"

This protracted formula is repeated for each sense.

As to the psycho-physical nature of this contact, no attempt is made throughout the canonical books to analyse it. Nearly or quite a decade of centuries was needed for so academical, so scientifically disinterested an advance as this. But we can imagine that, for a country, whose archaic analyses could locate colours (or visible objects more concretely conceived) ‘in the heart,’ the seat of mind, it was no difficult matter so to transcend the bare touch-notion in contact as to feel no need for either a material medium, or for the outleaping eidôla-emanations of old Greek thought.¹

Whatever was actually held to take place in all contact, we find no underlying hypothesis of an illusory world, or of a creating intelligence within. The association of māyā, the cosmic ‘illusion’ of other and later Indian thought, is absent from the whole of Theravāda Buddhism. Its ultimate data were phenomenal, and yet they were very real. They were not dependent upon a constructing percipient mind. The manifestation of

¹ Even Aristotle only makes some sort of medium for sight a necessary condition (De Anima, II. vii.).
sensations in experience depended, in part, on the external elements being brought into suitable focus with organs made of similar elements, within us. Without, there was the ever-mobile, ever-changing world compounded of countless syntheses of the four elements: the extended, the cohering, the calorific, the mobile, with or without the residual element of life. Within, were mobile and changing syntheses of all these elements. To effect contact of sense between the without and the within, a threefold conjuncture was needed. After discoursing on the four elements as external and internal, each of them taken separately, Sāriputta, the leading teacher after the Buddha, is represented as saying:

"If (1) the action of the eye is not cut off, but (2) external visible objects do not come into focus,¹ and (3) a correlation according is not set up, there is not to that extent the manifestation of a corresponding degree of viññāna. [The same results from conditions 1 and 2 only being given.] But if the action of the eye is not cut off, if external visible objects come into focus, and if a correlation according is set up, then the corresponding degree of consciousness is manifested."

This is repeated, as is usual, for the other senses in turn. The widespread theory of

'like being known only by like’ was considered to be implicit in these, the mother-doctrines. The elements were either (a) belonging to the self or internal, or (b) external.¹ Later it is referred to as an ancient doctrine.² But speculation concerning nature or mind is not a Buddhist characteristic. We find the more positive statements that variety in contact is due to difference in organ or in object. And from difference in contact, difference arises in feeling, perception, volition, etc.³

The picturesque metaphor of ‘grasper’ and ‘over-grasper’ for sense-organ and object I do not find in the Nikāyas. There are other metaphors,⁴ most of which are for ethical, or for what we might call evangelical exhortation. But in two or three there are points of philosophical interest. In the Sutta called ‘The Snake,’ of the Sense-sphere Samyutta,⁵ a man (‘Everyman’) is represented as fleeing for his life from four great snakes (the four elements), five assassins (the five aggregates or khandhas), with Love-of-pleasure in their midst with drawn sword. He hastens into a village, which he finds empty and about to be destroyed by bandits. Rushing away he comes to the

¹ Majjhima-N. i. 421 f.
² Aṭṭhasāliṇī, 313; Bud. Psy. Eth. lx.
³ Samyutta-N. ii. 140 f.
⁴ Bud. Psy. Ethics, p. 175, n. 4.
⁵ iv. 172 f.
perils of the sea, to cross which he has to make a raft, and scull himself over with hands and feet. Here the empty village is identified with the six organs of sense, wherein no 'headman,' no 'I,' nor 'Mine' is found. In this connexion it is well to remember that the very ancient superstitions concerning 'the man that is seen in the eye' became, in the older Upanishads, a symbol of the indwelling agent, whether conceived as divine or human: "that is the Ātman . . . the immortal . . . Brahman." Again the village-sacking bandits are the six kinds of 'external' objects of sense, for each organ of sense is hit (haññati, smitten, hurt, slain) by objects that are attractive or the reverse.

(3) It was only natural that the uncompromising, unflinching way in which Buddhism, from the outset, faced the whole question of sense-cognition, and its moral effect on man should eventually lead to interesting developments, such as the nature of touch and things tangible (phoṭṭhabba), and the relation of touch to sight. But this is developed in post-Nikāyan literature (pp. 143, 186).

(4) The theory of a co-ordinating factor in sense, or sensus communis, is adopted in both early and scholastic Buddhism. The five special senses had mutually distinct provinces:

1 Atthasālinī, 309; and Saratthāppahāsinī on this Sutta.
2 Chānd. iv. 15, 1; viii. 7, 4; Brah. iii. 7, 18.
"These five senses, brother, have different fields, different ranges; they do not share each other's field and range. Of them thus mutually independent, mano is their resort, and mano partakes of, enjoys, the field and range of them all." 

Buddhaghosa's comments on this theory of mind as an organ of reference are mainly figurative, but of interest. As to the word rendered by resort (paṭisarāṇa), this he illustrates elsewhere on this wise:—Disciples sometimes invite the Master's teaching by saying: "Things (or phenomena) have the Exalted One as their root, their guide, their resort. Well for us if he reveal the meaning of this that he has just declared. . . ." 

Hereon the Commentary's parable: "Things of all four planes [of being], coming into the focus of his omniscience, are said to resort to the Exalted One, they make him their resort, they go down, they go down together. . . . Thus contact comes to his discernment asking: 'What is my name?' 'Thou art contact in the sense of searching.' . . ." 

The four mental aggregates ask in turn, "'each receiving a name according to its nature.'"

In commenting on the Majjhima passage, where 'mind' is the 'resort,' he first dis-

1 Majjhima-N. i. 295; Saṃyutta-N. v. 218.
2 Anguttara-N. i. 199, and elsewhere. Paṭi-sarāṇa is literally 're-going.'
tistinguishes between the work of mano as 'five-door cognition' (i.e. on occasion of sensations) and as 'mind-door' (or representative) cognition. Then he proceeds: "Visual consciousness is mere seeing visible object; and so for the other senses. There is here no scope for the three radical states of appetite, ill-will and bewilderment. These affect cognition proper (mano, or jāvānā)." He then illustrates by a king enjoying a large revenue accumulating from numberless little taxes levied from a village of five families. Finally, in commenting on the dry, non-ethical formulas of the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka concerning mano,¹ he states that whereas the door-objects—sight, sound, etc., impressions—are variables that pass by, mano, having its 'base' in the heart, is a constant which has the sole function of receiving them. "The mark of mano is the cognizing, the becoming aware of sense-objects immediately after the visual, or other sense-consciousness." Thus, through mano, we get a simulated unity and simultaneity of impressions, which are really single and successive, if exceedingly and most delicately swift.

This location of intellectual functioning in the heart as its basis or 'site' (vatthu) has been carried over by Buddhaghosa and his contemporaries from pre-Buddhistic tradi-

¹ Bud. Psy. Ethics, lxxviii. 129 n. 1; Atthasālinī, 263 f.
tion. Nevertheless the psycho-physical association is not made in the canonical books. And modern Buddhists, jealous for the omniscience of their great Founder, maintain that this silence is not accidental; in other words, the Buddha judged that to assign another, e.g. a cerebral, basis for mind would not 'go down' with his age. Be that as it may, the evasion of the word 'heart' is quite marked. After enumerating the bases of the five senses, the Paṭṭhāna goes on: "That material thing on the basis of which apprehension and comprehension take place. . . ." \(^1\) 'Heart,' in the Canon, comes into purely poetical idiom, as among ourselves to-day, e.g. 'peace of heart,' 'tribulation of heart,' \(^2\) 'appealing to the heart,' \(^3\) and 'heart of the Norm,' \(^4\) or doctrine.

(5) Similarly, the expression doors (dvāra), or gates of sense, which became a technical term in the scholastic psychology of cognition, is in the older books but a picturesque simile. The only formula in which it there occurs is in that of sense-control called 'guardedness as to the doors of sense.' But that the figure was ready, even in the earlier days, to fall into rank as a scientific term, and may even then have been often so used, appears from

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\(^1\) Pointed out by S. Z. Aung; *Compendium*, pp. 277 f.
\(^2\) *Samyutta-N. i*. 126, 212; *Anguttara-N. v*. 46.
\(^3\) *Dīgha-N. iii*. 173.
\(^4\) *Vibhanga*, 401.
a parable in the Nikāyas of a ‘six-gated fortified city’ through the gates whereof come messengers, bringing a true message. The moral is that there are more ways than one of apprehending the gospel. And the six gates are explained to be the six organs of sense, ‘mindfulness’ being the doorkeeper.¹

(6) The properties of things, whether primary or secondary or otherwise, were much discussed in mediæval Buddhist philosophy. The English reader can discern this in the numerous quotations given by S. Z. Aung in his notes to the Compendium. But the Nikāyas had an ethical philosophy, theoretical and practical, to put forward. And no inquiry was wrought up into the Suttas save such as was judged necessary or auxiliary to the attainment of ‘right views’ in such a philosophy, and to the application of them to practice.

The honesty and candour of the Suttas, in dealing with the fact of knowledge as got by way of five peripheral ‘doors’ and one inward ‘door’ of sense, and with conduct as impressed and incited and swayed by sense, are due to a conviction of the immense importance of understanding this fact of life, and all that the fact involved for the mind and conduct. Cognition through sense was a process of natural causation. Through

¹ Sāmyutta-N. iv. 194.
sense arose feeling; through feeling, action. Hence the importance of treating the subject without eclecticism, without æstheticism, from the standpoint of natural law, for a practical purpose. This was, in ultimate terms, the elimination of the ills that arose through sense-cognition, and through the actions to which mankind was thereby impelled.
CHAPTER IV

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE NIKĀYAS—continued

III. FEELING

The last-named feature is the reason why, in the lengthy collection of Suttas devoted to the 'Sixfold Sphere of Sense,'¹ we get so open and steady a contemplation of the psychology of sense, and so limited a range of psychological result. We are told that the six senses give man his world, his everything—that they are the world, everything.

"I will teach you SABBĀM [the all, everything]. . . . What is that? Eye and visible object, ear and sound, nose," and so on to mano and its 'objects.'²

"I will teach you the arising and the passing away of the world. . . . What are they? Because of eye and visible form arises visual consciousness, the encounter of the three is contact . . ., thence feeling, thence craving, from the extinction of which comes

¹ Samyutta-N. iv. 1 ff., 'Saḷāyatana.'
² Ibid. 15-27.
extinction of grasping and the extinction of this whole mass of ill." ¹

"That by which one becomes cognizant of the world, and has conceits about the world, that is called, in the Ariyan discipline, the world . . . namely, by cognizance through sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, mano." ²

"I say, that the end of the world is not to be learnt, to be seen, to be got to, by going to the end of the world, nor by not getting there is an end to be made of ill.³ . . . 'Tis even in this fathom-long carcase, percipient, intelligent, that I declare to be the genesis of the world, the ceasing of the world and the way going to the cessation of the world." ⁴

We should err if we read any Idealism into the last quotation; it is anticipated by a context coinciding mainly with the foregoing quotation, which is again closely connected with those before it. The elements of ultimate reality, I do not say existed, but were constantly becoming and passing away, in the macrocosm as in the subjective microcosm. But that microcosm apprehended them by way of its sense-doors. They presented the 'world' to the individual by representing it.

"Where there is eye and visible objects,

¹ Samyutta-N. iv. 87; cp. 52.
² Ibid. 95.
³ Ibid. 93.
⁴ Ibid. i. 62; Anguttara-N. ii. 48.
visual consciousness and the things that may be learnt through visual consciousness, there is the world, or the notion of world. Where there is ear," etc.¹

Those sense-doors were presenting it to him night and day from birth till death, and, by the all-powerful lever of feeling, were pushing him this way and that, as mighty Gangā was ever bearing down bubbles of foam and driftwood.² And nothing that sense-cognition could show was able to end Sorrow and Pain finally and altogether.

So we hear more often about how sense affected than about what it told.³ I have attributed this emphasis to the aesthetic vivacity of the ancient Northern Hindus, as betrayed by their literature.⁴ There is also this negative condition, under which Buddhist doctrine was put forward and organized: the absence of any advance in natural science.

Modern psychology has made its most marked forward strides during periods of scientific advance and excitement. And the strides were usually made by men of scientific, especially medical, training. Hartley, e.g., was a physician; Tetens, a physicist and mathematician; Priestley was a chemist; Cabanis was a professor of medicine; Locke was a

¹ Samyutta-N. iv. 39.
² Ibid. iii. 140; iv. 179.
³ Buddhism, 'The Norm,' p. 65.
⁴ Ency. Religion and Ethics, 'Asceticism (Buddhist).'

student of natural science and a physician; Weber, Fechner, Spencer are other notable instances. Such thinkers were more interested in the mechanism of sense as so many avenues of knowledge, and as a department of the science of the living organism. Their interest was intellectual. The 'dynamics' of consciousness were relatively uninteresting until the influence of Schopenhauer had leavened thought.

To revert to older days, it is clear from Aristotle’s works that a considerable activity in biological inquiry was being carried on at the time, and that not only by Aristotle himself, 'master of those that know.' He too evinces a relatively mild interest in the dynamics of feeling and will. He delivered lectures on Ethics, but it is not a little instructive to compare his somewhat pedagogic treatment of Pleasure with the immense ground-wave importance attached to pain and pleasure, sorrow and happiness, in Buddhist psychological ethics. He writes six and a half sections, out of a total of ten, in the Nicomachean Ethics, before resuming thus: "The consideration of pleasure and pain... is one of the subjects we are bound to discuss, for we said that moral virtue and vice have to do with pleasures and pains, and most people say that happiness implies pleasure." In the *De Anima* and the *De Sensu*, his chief interest is in biological and intellectual conclusions.
But in the Buddhist canonical books, amid all the allusions to contemporary activities, there is no indication of any activity in scientific research going on, with the exception of astrology and medicine,\(^1\) and of medicine rather practised as an art than as being advanced by systematic investigation and experiment.

The art of the physician and the surgeon figures frequently both in narrative, in sanitary regulation (e.g. in the Vinaya books), and in parable. The Founder himself is called the Great Healer, the World’s Physician.\(^2\) The most central of all Buddhist ethical doctrines— the Four Ariyan Truths—is formulated on the plan of a medical diagnosis: namely, the nature of a malady, its cause, its cessation, its curative régime. And we may not be greatly wrong if we judge that, however we regard the grasp of universal causation by the mind of the Sākyamuni,\(^3\) it was due to (1) the absence of a contemporary body of science, and (2) the presence of a developed medical tradition, that the doctrine of causation took the, to us, peculiar form and standpoint that it did.

Thus: anything due to an assignable cause was terminable if you could stop the

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\(^1\) Possibly also of mathematics; but there is no positive evidence.


\(^3\) See this more fully treated in ch. iv. of my *Buddhism*. 
working of the cause. But you could stop it, because nothing became a cause arbitrarily, or supernaturally. Now, for the doctor, and for the patient and the patient’s own folk, the ‘anything,’ the One Thing, is Dukkha, Ill (the word means everything that is the contrary of Sukha—happiness, pleasure). And all or any dukkha can be made to cease, if (1) it be rightly diagnosed, (2) its cause or the conditions of its genesis and persistence be ascertained, (3) the nature of the state contrary to it be realized, (4) the ‘cure’ consistently carried out.

The medical inspiration, or at least, standpoint, was pointed out several years ago by Dr. Kern: \(^1\) “It is not difficult to see that these four Satyas are nothing else but the four cardinal articles of Indian medical science, applied to the spiritual healing of mankind, exactly as in the Yoga doctrine. E.g. in Yogasūtra ii. 15, Commentary: ‘Just as the doctor’s code is fourfold: illness, cause of illness, health, medicine, so too is this code fourfold, to wit: samsāra,\(^2\) its cause, emancipation (mōksha), ‘the way thereto.’ ” The learned writer, however, in this valuable aperçu, specializes unnecessarily, and moreover leaves us to draw a mistaken inference. I have heard a physician pointing out the analogy between the Four Truths

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\(^1\) \textit{Indian Buddhism}, Strassburg, 1896, pp. 46 f. \textit{Satya} = truth. \hfill \(^2\) \textit{Samsāra} = endless living and dying.
and his own British medical code, from simply hearing them stated as Buddhist religious doctrine, without allusion being made to his own profession. Talking of physicians tempts me to quote from the letter of a notable British Buddhist as bearing on this point: "The operation and hospital-experience was indeed a very formidable affair—so terribly impressive in its insistence on the Dukkha-Truths, that I marvel . . . after that experience, that the realization of the truth of them is not more common, at least among those who have to do with hospitals. Perhaps indeed this most impressive object-lesson is responsible for the large proportion of medical men among those Occidentals who are . . . deeply interested in Buddhism."

Moreover, to quote the late Commentary on the Yoga-sūtras as an authority for the statement that Indian medical procedure had suggested a fundamental doctrine of Buddhism, is much as if one were to say that J. S. Mill's inclusion of the syllogism in his Formal Logic proves it to have been in existence when Aristotle was teaching. There were 'cardinal articles' of medical clinic, not only in India, but in all countries before either the Yoga-sūtras (let alone the Commentary) or other records, more certainly pre-Buddhistic, were compiled.

Here, however, I am concerned only to
suggest that an advance in the systematic study of mind is especially liable to be influenced by, and to mould itself upon, that body of more or less systematic physical knowledge, which bulks most impressively in the more thoughtful part of the society of that time and place. For the subject-matter of mental science is, as we know, not accessible to strictly collective observation; introspection is of the individual, and in the individual no two instances of a phenomenon can be shown as absolutely coincident. Hence it is largely, I do not say only, when some onward stride in physical science draws the rest of human knowledge in its wake, that the laws of mind are freshly investigated, as something that must also be brought into the line of march.

Where there is no such advance in psychical investigation, some system of dogmatic metaphysic is probably holding the cultured imagination of the age captive, through the spell of some myth of the Word. When the mind breaks free and looks deeper, there will naturally be a recourse, for its fresh concepts, to more positive ideas as guides and supports.

Now in the healing lore and craft of the day—the only one, I repeat, that comes prominently to the front in episode and in details of rules in the Vinaya—the revolt of thought embodied in the Buddhist move-
ment found its noblest inspiration. The word dukkha covers all that is meant by 'not well'—ills and pains of body, ills and misery of mind, in a word, dis-ease. Its presence is the doctor's casus belli and raison d'être; its cause and extinction is his quest. For its absence there may be several positive expressions. And yet there is nothing else in life so mortally positive as dukkha. And it is easy, alas! for many to conceive its mere absence as sufficient for happiness. Nibbāna itself, a quasi-negative term, was at times employed as = health,\(^1\) as well as happiness. And the Founder, in one of his more emphatic utterances about his mission, expressed that as one of healing:

"Both then and now just this do I reveal:
—dukkha and the extinction of dukkha."\(^2\)

The physical healer finds the causes of dis-ease in the mutual interaction of man and his environment. Buddhism too found therein the causes of all that made for unhappiness. Sense-impressions were the avenues whereby came satisfactions (pasādā) fraught with peril. Consciousness, with its three main roots or conditions—greed or appetite, enmity, delusion—pushing it, reacted on its impressions as feeling, desire for, grasping after, all that tended to the

\(^1\) Majjhima-N. i. 509; Sutta-Nipāta, verse 749.
\(^2\) Majjhima-N. i. 140; Saṃyutta-N. iv. 384.
expansion and conceit of this Me and Mine. And as it behoved the physician to keep in view all possible sources of any disease, neglecting none, so was Buddhism searching and exhaustive in its treatment of the avenues of sense, ignoring none of the five that conveyed, nor the sixth that co-ordinated and revived what the former brought.

The great intermediary between the (relatively) passive reactions to the manifold stimulus of sense and the following more or less deliberate reactions, Buddhism discerned, correctly enough, in Feeling. This might be pleasant, painful, or neither. And it did not follow that where feeling was pleasant (sukha), the symptoms of disease (dukkha) were absent. For the sukha born of sense was the most efficient handmaiden of dukkha, if dukkha be broadly understood as both physical and moral ill, and all that this does, or may involve of mental suffering and moral deterioration.

As Ledi Sadaw, the eminent Thera (Senior in the Order) writes: ¹ “We must distinguish between dukkha of the category (or, in Buddhist idiom, of the essential mark) of something unpleasant experienced (by way of sense), physical or psychical, and the dukkha we use in the triad: impermanence (aniccha), ill, and non-soul (an-atta). By this dukkha

we mean a state of peril and danger, without peace, security or blessing."

This, in other words, is the distinction a physician, or at least a patient, might draw between sensations of pain and disease. The presence, the growth, the decline of the pain is not always accompanied by the presence or increase or cessation of the disease. And this distinction we have to draw throughout the whole of Buddhist literature dealing with sense, with feeling, and the effects of feeling. Else we find ourselves landed in much inconsistency of expression, as I shall show.

That feeling is the inevitable response to awareness of new stimulus is affirmed up and down the Nikâyas, notably in Samyutta-N. on the sphere of sense (vol. iv. 1 ff.), e.g.:

"Where there are hands, there taking and setting down appears; where there are feet, there coming and going appears; where there are limbs, there folding and stretching appears; where there is stomach, there hunger and thirst appears. Just so, bhikkhus, where there is sight (or eye), or hearing . . . there arise subjective pleasure and pain, conditioned by sense-stimulus (lit. contact, samphassa)." ¹

The contrary is then stated, both of the analogies and the analogues: "... Where there is not sight, etc., neither pleasure

¹ Samyutta-N. iv. 171.
nor pain, conditioned by sense-stimulus, arises."

This quotation is conclusive enough to represent all other passages stating the concomitance of sensations and feeling, understood as our psychology of sense understands pleasure and pain, or at least pleasure and unpleasure.¹ That the senses convey pleasure as well as its opposite, is not only allowed and affirmed by doctrinal teaching, but the pleasure is also recognized as very genuine and good by the most eminent of the teachers. The Founder affirmed at times that none lived more at ease (sukham seti) than himself, however much he had forsworn most of the so-called good things of life.² His chief apostles forgather with him one fine evening in the Gosinga Wood, delighting in the ‘divine perfumes’ of the dewy moonlit scene, where the tall sāl-trees stand clad in golden bloom.³ Temperance was prescribed for maintaining the physical comfort (phāsuvihāra) of health.⁴

But when the disciple is bidden to look upon sukha as, or quā dukkha, then we know that the wider concept is to be understood after the quā. And this is no

¹ I owe this term, borrowed from German science, to my university colleague, Mr. T. H. Pear.
² Anguttara-N. i. 136 f. ; Samyutta-N. iv. 127.
³ Majjhima-N. i. 212 f. ; Samyutta-N. iv. 104, and passim.
less the case when things unpleasant to the 'average sensual man' are valued by a different scale and held to constitute higher pleasure:

“Things seen and heard, tastes, odours, what we touch, Perceive, all, everything desirable, Pleasant and sweet, while one can say 'It is,' These are deemed Sukha by both gods and men, And where these cease to be, they hold it woe.

“What other men call Sukha, that the saints Call Dukkha; what the rest so name, That do the Ariyans know as happiness. Behold a norm that’s hard to apprehend! Hereby are baffled they that are not wise.”¹

If we would not be baffled, it is with this wider implication that we must read those passages wherein each sense is declared to be dukkha, and not productive of either this or its contrary. If, using Ledi Sadaw’s definition, we read into such passages as "seeing . . . is sorrow . . ." the wider sense of dukkha, thus:

“The eye, brother, is a faculty of peril and danger, bringing, as such, no peace, security or blessing; it is to understand this that the holy life under the Exalted One is lived. . . .”²

and so on for the other senses, why, then we may not be unwilling to admit even for laymen the truth in this ‘monkish’ statement.

¹ Sutta-Nipāta, verse 759 f.; cp. Saṃyutta-N. iv. 127.
² Ibid. iv. 51, 140.
CHAPTER V

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE NIKĀYAS—continued

IV. IDEATION

The systematic analysis of mind in the Nikāyas is pursued no further than the recipient and co-ordinating work of mano as sensus communis. Sequences in consciousness are occasionally pursued further, but without overmuch terminological consistency, and irregularly. Here are a few instances:

"Because of some tendency there arises perception, opinion, thinking, volition, wish, aspiration. And according as the tendency is low, mediocre or lofty, so will all these be." ¹

The process of conversion in religion is described as one of "hearing, attending, remembering, comparing, discerning, desire, zeal, pondering, endeavour." ²

"Thinking results in desire, through desire objects are divided into what we like and

¹ Samyutta-N. ii. 153; see Commentary.
² Majjhima-N. i. 480; ii. 173.
what we dislike, hence envy and selfishness, hence quarrelling and fighting.”

“Conditioned by contact arises feeling; what one feels, one perceives; what one perceives, one thinks about; what one thinks about, one is obsessed withal.”

These samples reveal the persistent effort, in the Suttas, to carry on the method, systematically observed in treating of sense, of setting forth mind and character as orderly, causal process. The method is emphatically Buddhist. The most notable example of it is the important formula of natural causation, as exemplified in the process of life being bound up with dukkha. In the mental process, the resolution of afferent or receptive consciousness into efferent or discharging consciousness is clearly affirmed. Sense and feeling stirred by sense are converted into motor presentations; as desire, etc. But we meet with no closer analysis of intellectual process, of what has, in our own psychology, been called representative and re-representative cognition, or ideation. In the last sample, we only hear that ‘what we perceive,’ i.e. notice (the saññā-khandha), we ‘think about’ (vitakketi).

1 Dīgha-N. ii. 278 f. (condensed). 2 Majjhima-N. i., iii. 3 Not of course solely Buddhist. But it is interesting to compare, with the above, cognate passages in the older Upanishads:—Chāndogya, vii. 2–26; Taaittiriya, ii. 3–5; Kaṭha, i. 3, 10, etc.
The latter term, with its substantive *vitakka* (from the root *tark*) is the most usual expression in the Suttas for the looser, popular meaning of thinking and thought: turning the mind on to a subject, mentation, adapting the attention. Without the prefix (*vi*), it is a term for argument or dialectic (*takka*).\(^1\) It is used rather for restless and discursive intellection, and not for the *vol plané* of intuitive sweep of mind.

Another term, *vichāra*, used only in association with *vitakka*, is a complementary expression to this, indicating persistence in discursive thinking, the onset of which is indicated by *vitakka*.

A still more general term for intellection, without explicit reference to sense, is *chinteti*, *chintā*, but it is seldom met with in the older books.\(^2\)

Another word, much used for the adapted attention, is *manasikāra*, literally mind-making, work-in-mind.

Next, there are two words connoting representative cognition, in form much like our re-flect, re-consider — *pacchavekkhāti*, *paṭisaṅchikkhāti*. Both have the prefix of re-version and repetition, and both stems belong to the vocabulary of vision. The former, as with us, is also used for optical reflection.

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\(^1\) *Dialogues*, i. 29, 34 f.

\(^2\) *Samyutta-N*. v. 447; occurs not seldom in the *Jātaka* tales.
The Buddha thus admonishes his son Rāhula who is graduating in saintship:

"'What is the use of a mirror?' 'To reflect, lord.' 'Even so must we reflect, and reflect in all our work of body, speech or thought, namely, This that I would do, will it be harmful to myself, or others.' . . ." 

Closely allied to these terms are other two, less easy to render by exact equivalents: sāti and sampajañña, mindfulness and discernment. The former term, with its compounds, anusāti, used for reiterated recollection, and paṭissāti, which throws emphasis on vivid reinstatement, are the Pāli equivalents for 'memory' and its synonyms. But sāti, an important term in Buddhist ethical training, is not wholly covered by memory, and is, on the whole, best rendered by mindfulness, inasmuch as it denotes rather the requisite condition for efficient remembrance, or thought of any kind, namely, lucidity and alertness of consciousness. It is a quality rather than a specific direction of consciousness; it expresses that heedful, 'thoughtful' awareness, which is the opposite of mental distractedness, and the essential preliminary to deliberate concentration of mind. But for

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1 Majjhima-N. i. 415.
2 Anguttara-N. iii. 284; v. 329; i. 30.
3 Sutta-Nipāta, verse 283; Atthasālīni, 147.
all that, sāti and memory are closely allied.¹ Sampajañña is more or less coincident with sāti, and is usually employed in the Nikāyas as a twin word. It means literally ‘sustained cognizing,’ ‘deliberateness,’ ‘self-awareness.’

"How is the bhikkhu mindful and self-aware? . . . He effects self-awareness in his going and his coming and all his avocations, in his speech and in his silence.” ²

The latter term is often rendered by 'self-possessed'; this expresses well the 'having one's self well in hand' of the Buddhist ideal. But our word is rather the condition, the requisite mental attitude in order to that moral victory. This is expressed in another of those mental causal sequences, from which I have quoted above:

"... What is the nutriment (condition) of self-control? Sati-sampajañña.

"What is the nutriment (condition) of sati-sampajañña? Thoroughgoing attention," etc. etc.³

And 'self-possessed' does not make explicit the intellectual emphasis of sampajañña, as is done by Neumann's rendering of the twin phrase: 'klaren Sinnes und einsichtig,'

¹ The reader of Pali may compare sati, in Digha-N. i. 180 and Majjhima-N. iii. 89, with anussati, anussarati in Anguttara-N. iii. 284 and v. 329.
² Digha-N. i. 70.
³ Anguttara-N. v. 115.
of lucid mind and discerning.' We might use 'self-conscious,' were this term and its substantive not somewhat debased in our moral and social currency. Moreover there is, in the Buddhist word, no explicit reference to 'self.' When in the Abhidhamma books of incipient scholasticism sampajañña came to be defined, it was ranked as a synonym among that galaxy of intellectual nomenclature, often repeated, in which consciousness, when engaged at its highest intellectual functioning, is described. But in so far as the word conveys an intellectual emphasis specifically its own, it is that of conscious or deliberate intellecction. Thus sampająña-musā is 'consciously speaking untruth.'

In another brace of intellective terms, each of which is, in Abhidhamma, defined as equivalent to sampajañña:—vichāyā and vimamsa—the emphasis is rather on the volitional coefficient, involved in discursive, inquiring effort of thought. Chintā also, and its verb, may take this more specific sense.

"There are four unthinkable, that may not be thought about [i.e. speculated about], involving for the thinker insanity and trouble.

1 Majjhima-N. i. 414; so sampajañña-samāpatti, deliberate abandonment of consciousness (in trance), Dīgha-N. i. 184.
2 Ibid. iii. 106; cp. Atthasālinī, 147, with Milinda, 298.
3 Dīgha-N. ii. 222; Vibhanga, 222.
These are speculations concerning the range of Buddhahship, speculations concerning the range of him [i.e. of his intuitive powers] who is in meditative ecstasy, speculation concerning the working of [the law of] karma, and speculations about the world."

The last kind of ‘speculation’ (loka-chintā) is by the Commentator defined to be on who made the world, or living beings, or the plant world, etc. The more usual word for speculation, conceived as a product rather than a process of thinking, is diṭṭhi, from drś, to see, and more allied etymologically therefore to our ‘speculation.’

Coming to terms for cognition merging into preponderating volition, we have chetānā, sañchetanā and sankappa. The first two, while connected etymologically with chintā, chitta, have come to mean purposive or volitional consciousness.

“\textit{I say that chetānā is action; thinking, one acts by deed, word, or thought.}”\textsuperscript{1}

“\textit{Its meaning,” wrote Buddhaghosa, “is co-ordinating; its essential property is effort, endeavour.”} And it is put in apposition with terms of wishing and aspiration.\textsuperscript{2}

\textit{Sankappa} (like \textit{vitakka} above) emphasizes the mind being set on to some object. Mind as a planning, devising, designing, concocting,

\textsuperscript{1} Anguttara-N. iii. 415. \textsuperscript{2} Samyutta-N. ii. 99.
is a favourite notion in Buddhist psychology, as we saw under the fourth aggregate generally. It is the co-operative bustle of a beehive, in harmony with the pluralistic attitude.

Where there is a coefficient of pleasurable feeling, the intellectual interest, zest or excitement constitutes a state of mind termed *piti*, about which more later. As an expansive, enthusiastic, but ethically desirable state, it is the complement to the self-restraint and calm held no less desirable.

Finally, there are all the names for the deeper or wider work of mind, when not busied with the details of ordinary reactions to sense. *Nāna* and *pañña*,¹ as knowledge or understanding, may face both ways, concerned either with sense or with higher things, but usually the latter. The second term is often likened to illumination, irradiation. Work of higher intellection is expressed in terms meaning penetration, insight, intuition, rather than by concepts of discursive thought, such as judgment, or ratiocination; reason—the 'reason' of Scottish psychology—ranks above reason-ing. And in the words *jhāna*, contemplation, and *samādhi*, rapt concentration, are contained the expression of that self-training in selective, intensive work of mind in which the Indian sought, by changing the usual conditions and procedure in cognition, to

¹ Pronounce *nyāna*, *panyā*. 
induce consciousness of a higher or different power.

Here, however, the special end served by the analysis of sense is no longer present, and consequently there is no systematic classification. We may say the same for the complex states of emotion and desire or passion. In the latter field we find only two mutually opposed groups of three: the three radical instincts of appetite (with its developments: greed, lust, passion); aversion (with its developments: anger, hate, malevolence, etc.); and delusion or dulness (equivalent to ignorance, confused consciousness). Three opposite instincts are reckoned as equally radical to these, but as they determine the conduct of the minority only of mankind, we hear much less of them, and they are, significantly enough, given in a negative form—\textit{a-lōbha}, \textit{a-dōsa}, \textit{a-mōha}.

In this second group, however, \textit{adōsa} appears under its positive name as \textit{mettā}, that is, friendship, fraternal affection or love (\textit{caritas}, \textit{agapē}). And with it are prescribed, for systematic meditation, the other altruistic emotions of pity, or sympathy with suffering, and \textit{mūdātā}, or sympathy with happiness.

I know of no other groups to rank beside the systematic and easily systematized

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1 Disinterestedness, amity, intelligence. \textit{Anguttara-N. i. 134 f. A\textit{mōha} is synonymous with \textit{paññā.}}

2 \textit{Ibid. 183.}
scheme of sense-consciousness, dealt with in a previous chapter. The reader will, I trust, not chafe at meeting these Buddhist concepts in their original dress. It seemed the least ambiguous way of showing what they really sought to convey.

In the succeeding centuries, however, when for a time the mental culture of India became largely Buddhist, the analysis and classification of states and processes of consciousness became extended and more explicit, as we shall see. In the venerable records under consideration, we must glean and infer here and there, to ascertain where-in the more complex, evolved, or 'higher' work of consciousness was held to consist. The following characteristics of mental activity, so reckoned, may carry us some way towards a correct synthesis.

1. *The complexity of any given chitta and its resolution.*—This is markedly recognized in the opening book¹ of that somewhat later collection in the Canon known as the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka, in which the Nikāyas are frequently quoted as authoritative sources. But there is an interesting anticipation of the analytic procedure, followed in the first half of that work, in the *Majjhima-Nikāya.*² The Sutta

² Vol. iii. p. 25. This was only published when my translation was practically finished; hence I have not referred to it there.
is termed *Anūpādā-Sutta* or Series-Discourse, and contains an appreciation of the gifts and character of Sāriputta by the Master. Among these, his power of introspective analysis is referred to as “insight into the sequence of mental presentations”; and it is thus illustrated:

“For instance, bhikkhus, Sāriputta, aloof from sensuous desires, aloof from bad ideas, enters into and abides in First Jhāna, wherein attention is applied and sustained, which is born of solitude and filled with zest and pleasurable feeling. And the presentations in that First Jhāna, to wit, thinking applied and sustained (vitakka, vichāra), and zest and pleasurable feeling (pīti, sukha) and singleness of object (chitt’ekaggatā), and contact, feeling, perception, volition, consciousness (chitta), desire (chanda), choice, effort, mindfulness, indifference, adaptation of attention (manasikāra)—these are for him serially determined; these, as they arise, are for him things understood, and as they are present and as they depart, are for him things understood. He discerns: ‘Verily these presentations that were not, have become; having become, they again depart.’ And he with regard to them abides neither drawn to, nor averse from them, independent, not captivated, but free, detached, his mind placing no barriers.”
This sound psychological attitude is attributed to the apostle equally in all other grades of Jhāna-exercises, the contents of consciousness varying, and discerned as varying, by one or more elements in the complex, from grade to grade. And the fact that in the exercise of this introspective intuition Sāríputta’s fine intellect was distinguished, shows the extent to which Buddhist mental science recognized that work of intellection. Our manuals call it self-consciousness, internal perception, or the conscious relation of presentations to self-presentation: the realizing that ‘this percept is mine,’ ‘I think this notion.’ For the Buddhist this is the way in which the testimony of ignorant, untrained consciousness exercises introspection. But for the trained consciousness all introspection is retrospection—a fact recognized by our own psychology, though perhaps not by it sufficiently exploited to explain the apparent duality of subject and presentations. Thus each momentary present chitta, in introspection, is a complex of a present fact and past facts wrought up into it, both momentary. Hence Sāríputta ‘retrospected,’ but with no such reference to self. And that he had got beyond this illusive consciousness of a King Ego, holding a levée of presentations, was a source of great satisfaction to him.
“Now Ānanda saw Sāriputta coming afar off, and . . . he said to him: ‘Serene and pure and radiant is your look, brother Sāriputta! In what mood has Sāriputta been to-day?’ ‘I have been alone, in Jhāna, brother, and to me came never the thought: I am attaining it! I have got it! I have emerged from it!’” 1

For, in the Master’s words:

“. . . It is by holding up the idea of no-self with regard to all things without limit, that ye can say, ‘I shall well discern cause and the arising of things through conditions.’” 2

To revert: any chitta or group of chitta’s—the Dhamma-Sangani uses only the singular—was held to involve a number of factors, a complex content, divisible into the other three mental khandha’s or aggregates. And the trained intellect, if naturally acute, was able to divide and describe its immediately past complex as if it were a present, external collection of material objects. I say ‘trained intellect,’ not only with reference to the power of sustaining this analytic process in the detached, disinterested frame of mind praised in Sāriputta, not only to the absence of self-reference, but also to the fact that the process of internal perception implies a

1 Samyutta-N. iii. 235 f.
2 Anguttara-N. iii. 444.
stock of classified concepts concerning states of consciousness, to which the introspector, in analysing, refers each phase or factor. Hence under this first feature in higher intellection must be reckoned: (1) an existing scheme of mental analysis reinstatable at will; and (2) the work of internal perception itself, consciousness referring consciousness not to a subject, but to partly or symbolically reinstated concepts, reinstated, that is, by way of the common name only: “this is desire, this is choice,” etc. In a passage of the Poṭṭhapāda Suttanta we find internal perception distinguished by the name of ŋāṇa. To Poṭṭhapāda’s inquiry this reply is given:

“First arises the conscious state (saññā), after that ŋāṇa (that is, insight concerning it). The springing up of the latter is dependent on the springing up of the former. Thus he intuits: ‘It is from this cause that ŋāṇa has arisen in me.’”

2. Intellect as a relating particulars to general concepts.—This is what we have seen commended in Sāriputta. But I have now in mind certain large generalizations or abstract ideas, certain very general attributes which the trained mind, in Buddhism, had to discern in particulars. Prominent among these were the three universals:

1 Dīgha-N. i. 185.
impermanence, ill, absence of self or soul (a-niccha, dukkha, an-atta). Under these, everything constituting the external world and the constituents of personal being were to be subsumed, or, in Buddhist idiom, everything was to be contemplated quâ these three: aniccha-to, etc. To be capable of this threefold insight as a habitual attitude of mind was the supreme intellectual criterion, the hall-mark of sound judgment.

To see all things as stamped with the 'mark' (lakkhāna): 'this is transient,' etc., was not to be understood in the somewhat flabby and non-committing sense in which average folk will allow: 'Tout lasse, tout passe, tout casse,' or 'man is born to sorrow,' and then 'pass by on the other side.' Nor was the third judgment—'nothing has any soul or substrate' (which is a development of the first)—to be made from a half-way stage. By this I mean, made from the platform of a knowledge which has merely outgrown the concepts both of primitive animism, and of mediæval interpretations of Platonic realism and Aristotelian 'quiddity.' This threefold insight amounted to the three universal propositions: (1) that nothing in life and the world as known is really persistent save the fact of change; (2) that everything in life is, for the living sentient being, "a state of peril and danger, without lasting peace, security or blessing"; (3) that
there is nothing in or of the living being exempt from the two foregoing judgments. That being so:

"Is it fitting to regard that which is impermanent, liable to suffering, having change as its nature, as ... the self, the soul of me?" ¹

If it is imagined that this is affirmed of a perishable body and mind only, in other words, of the five aggregates, it should be noted that the early Buddhists found the current notions of ātman, soul or self, inextricably identifiable, or bound up with those constituents of the living being, which they at least covered by their khandha-category:

"All recluses and brahmmins—all teachers, namely, of religion—who consider the ātman as allocated in a variety of ways, consider that it is allocated in one or other of the five aggregates ... namely, that viññāṇa is the soul, that the soul has viññāṇa, that viññāṇa is in the soul, that the soul is in viññāṇa." ²

and so for the other khandhas. But

"the learned Ariyan disciple, who discerns them that are Ariyans, and is trained and expert in Ariyan doctrine, ... he under-

¹ Samyutta-N. iii. 104, and passim.
² Ibid. iii. 46, and passim
stands that body and mind are impermanent, are liable to suffering, are without soul.”  

Another such standpoint of the trained mind was

“clearly to see by right reason even as it really is this law of causation and these matters of life arising as [mutually] conditioned.”

(More of this in our next chapter.)

An interesting phase of this higher work of intellect is seen in the contemplative exercises called Brahmavihāra’s, or as we might say, Sublime Occupations. A rather later term was “the four Appamaññā’s or Infinites.” This is where the intellect with a strong coefficient of emotion is turned from a particular to an ever-wider degree of generality. The coefficient emotions prescribed were, as stated above, love (caritas), pity, sympathetic joy, lastly indifference or equanimity, which was to replace this threefold succession, presumably as a bracing corrective to any excess of sentiment. The Nikāyan formula runs as follows:

“Come ye, bhikkhus, expelling the five Hindrances [sensuous desire, ill-will, stolidity-and-torpor, excitement-and-worry, perplexity, nescience] and attenuating the heart’s defile-

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1 Samyutta-N. iii. 57.
2 Ibid. ii. 26.
3 Majjhima-N. i. 369 f. See above, p. 95.
4 Vibhanga, 272 f.
ments by insight, abide ye in the suffusing of one region of earth with a consciousness accompanied by love; thence the second region, thence the third, the fourth. And thus aloft, below, across, the entire world and all that are therein do ye continue to suffuse with a loving consciousness abounding, lofty, infinite, without anger or ill-will.”

This is repeated for each of the other three coefficients. The exercises, according to the testimony of the Nikāyas, were not originally, or at least not exclusively, Buddhist. They were judged indispensable to the training of religious aspirants, and were known to pious laymen and held to be conducive to rebirth in the Brahma heaven. By earnest Buddhists they were practised as helps to that emancipation of heart and mind from all ‘hindrances’ and fetters adverse to spiritual perfection.

3. Intellect as a work of eliminating, precluding, selecting.—This inverse work of adjusted attention was considered no less important a branch of Buddhist mental culture. It is explicitly recognized in the Nikāyas, and was systematically practised in what was collectively known as samādhi, or concentrative meditation, or also as adhichitta, or higher consciousness. Here

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1 Samyutta-N. v. 115 f.  
2 Ibid.  
4 Anguttara-N. i. 236 f.
again emancipation, the freedom of self-mastery, was the platform to be won, ‘object, pith and goal,’ as it was, of the higher life.\(^1\) Samādhi is sometimes made to include the exercises just described.\(^2\) And it is clear that to develop a concept in generality, in abstractness, the elimination of the concrete, of the particular, must proceed pari passu.

But the emphasis in samādhi is that of concentration, of an intensive attention, which can only be got by throwing overboard, into the sea of things disregarded and negligible, everything that is irrelevant and distracting to the single apex of thought (chīt’ ek-aggatā), which is the equivalent term to samādhi.\(^3\) Not only were objects of thought, presentations, percepts, etc., to be ejected, but the attitude, mood, movement of consciousness were to be regulated and modified deliberately. A dialogue between the Buddha and one of his leading disciples, Anuruddha, eminent for ‘celestial vision,’ a sort of ‘second sight,’ reveals this in some detail:

"‘Have you three, Anuruddha, leading this life, zealous, ardent and strenuous, experienced supernormal states, extraordinary Ariyan knowledge and insight, happiness?’

\(^1\) Majjhima-N. i. 197; cp. Anguttara-N. ii. 26.
\(^2\) Samyutta-N. iv. 350 ff.
\(^3\) Ibiid. v. 21, 198, 225, 268; cp. Dhamma-sangāni (Bud. Psy. Ethics), §§ 11, 15.
"We have perceived, lord, both an aura\(^1\) and a vision of forms. But lately these have all vanished and we do not attain to the after-image."

"But this is what you three must attain to. I too, indeed, before I became wholly enlightened and Buddha, perceived both aura and vision of forms. And then in my case too they vanished. So I pondered over the cause of this and discerned that concentration had left me, and hence the vision. Also that my concentration had been dispersed through access of doubt, then by want of attention, then by sloth and torpor, then by dread, then by elation, then by slackness, then by trying too much, then by sluggishness of effort, then by longing, then by awareness of differences. And to me continuing zealous, ardent and strenuous, came perception of aura and vision of forms. But they soon vanished again, because I contemplated the forms too closely. . . . Then I beheld the aura, but not the forms . . . then the forms, not the aura . . . then I beheld the one as immense, the others as small, and inversely. Finally, I judged that my shortcomings in concentration were varieties of vitiated consciousness, and that, these being all got rid of, I would practise three-fold concentration, to wit, applying attention and sustaining it, sustaining attention without applying it afresh, and concentration without"

\(^1\) Obhāsa, luminance.
attention in either way. And I concentrated with rapture, and without it, with delight, and with indifference. And then in me, with concentration so practised, lo! there arose the knowledge and the insight that my emancipation was sure, that this was my last life, that now there was no more rebecoming." ¹

The more usual process of systematic elimination of factors in consciousness was that known as the Four Jhānas. Jhāna (Sanskrit, Dhyāna), or ecstatic musing, was a practice of unknown antiquity, akin to what is generally termed Yoga. It is nowhere claimed in the Nikāyas as devised by, or peculiar to the founders of Buddhism. But no branch of mental culture appears oftener in the Suttas than this, or is more frequently prescribed for all serious study. I wrote several years ago,² that the psychology of Jhāna would one day come to evoke considerable interest. I believe that the 'day' is much nearer now, and further, that to what extent Jhāna is still practised in Buddhist monasticism, and to what extent proficients in it become accessible to inquiry, the medical psychology of to-day

¹ Majjhima-N. iii. 157 f. I have considerably condensed the text. 'Practised' is literally 'made-to-become,' developed. Cp. Compendium, 65 f.
² Bud. Psy. Ethics; lxxxviii.
will find interesting material. But I have nothing to add to the little outline there given of the process by which the Jhāna state was apparently brought about. That process was of the kind known, I believe, to hypnotism as auto-suggestion. There was no question of a subject placing a consciousness rendered as passive as possible at the disposal of another strongly volitional consciousness, as in what used to be called mesmerism. The jhāyin did not include a cataleptic condition in his programme save as an ultimate stage, not belonging to the so-called Four Jhānas, but to a four- or fivefold sequel of ‘Arūpa-Jhānas,’ only attempted by experts, and as a final test or step to complete self-mastery and sanctification (to call in a Christian term). On the contrary, he was intensely conscious, but in prescribed, artificially induced ways. These, taken collectively, consisted in artificially intensifying that natural mental process, whereby the mind concentrates itself wholly, at the expense of general, many-sided alertness and awareness.

There was first intense attention by way of ‘an exclusive sensation’—I believe it was Condillae who so defined attention.

1 I have unfortunately not seen a brochure on the subject by Surgeon-Major E. Rost (Rangoon).
2 *Majjhima-N. iii. 28; Anguttara-N. iv. 456.
3 On the ‘absence of mind’ attained in Jhāna, see *Dialogues*, ii. 141 f.
This was to be entered on after securing physical conditions as far as possible free from discomfort and disturbance, and with elimination of every kind of activity of body and of mind, save that of reacting to the bare sensation. After a time that reaction would practically cease, the wearied sense giving out. Change, indispensable to consciousness, has been eliminated, for the self-hypnotizer must not vary his source of sensations. Meanwhile the sensuous source, mark, or symbol is replaced by a representation of it, the percept by a corresponding image. So much is reckoned as preliminary or preparatory process. The image then becomes conceptualized or de-individualized and it is then, apparently, that a 'subjective sensation' of luminance or 'aura' is alleged to become felt,¹ and the subject experiences the supernormal consciousness of Jhāna proper, with or without its flashes of ecstasy.²

The Nikāyas nowhere describe the preliminary process in detail, and the very terms for the stages of it (such as pari-kamma, upachāra, etc.), belong to later books. But the list of material devices or kasīna's—artifices I have called them—for inducing Jhāna by prolonged gazing, occur in these older books. They are

² Compendium, 55.
stated as ten in number; those usually quoted being a portion of earth, a flame, or a colour. The psychological interest of the process lies in the gradual elimination of certain factors of consciousness. The formulas run invariably thus:

"When, aloof from sensuous ideas, aloof from evil ideas, he enters into and abides in First Jhāna, wherein attention is applied and sustained (sa-vitakka, sa-vichāra), which is born of solitude and filled with zest and pleasant emotion; when next, from the subsiding of attention applied and sustained, he enters into and abides in Second Jhāna, which is inward tranquillizing of the mind, self-contained and uplifted from the working of attention, is born of concentration, full of zest and pleasurable emotion; when next, through the quenching of zest, he abides with equal mind, mindful and discerning, experiencing in the body that pleasure whereof the Ariyans declare: 'Happy doth he abide with even, lucid mind, and so enters into and abides in Third Jhāna'; when next, by putting away both pleasant and painful emotion, by the dying out of the joy and misery he used to know, he enters into and abides in Fourth Jhāna, that utterly pure lucidity and indifference of mind, wherein is neither happi-

1 Anguttara-N. i. 201; v. 46; Majjhima-N. ii. 14; Dīgha-N. iii. 268.
ness nor unhappiness—this is the training of the higher consciousness." ¹

Here we have a gradual composure and collectedness of consciousness gradually brought about by the deliberate elimination of: (1) the restless, discursive work of intellect, seeking likenesses and differences, establishing relations, forming conclusions; (2) the expansive suffusion of zest, keen interest, creative joy; (3) all hedonistic consciousness.

The residual content of consciousness is, in the formula, admitted to be (a) a sort of sublimated or clarified sati, an intensified inward vision or intuition, such as a god or spirit might conceivably be capable of; (b) indifference or equanimity, also godlike. This would be that neutral point of feeling, discussed in a former chapter, inclining from its equilibrium to pain at ignorance, and to pleasure at knowledge. And though pleasure is eliminated, the Jhāna-practice is spoken of collectively as belonging to happiness.² "Attainment in Jhāna," writes Mr. S. Z. Aung, "is a very important psychological moment, marking an epoch in his mental experience for the person who suc-

¹ Anguttara-N. i. 235, cf. 53; Dīgha-N. iii. 222, and passim in the Nikāyas. The last clause is peculiar to the first reference.
² Dīgha-N. iii. 78; Anguttara-N. ii. 36, 87, passim.
ceeds in commanding it. He has for the first time in his life tasted something unlike anything he has ever experienced before. The feeling is simply indescribable. He feels an entirely changed person, purged from the Hindrances. He is living a new, higher life, the life of a god of the heavens called Rūpa [or Vision], experiencing the consciousness believed to be habitual there.”

I place on record these testimonies, ancient and modern, much as another might write of the alleged rapture enjoyed through the best European music, who himself was incapable of experiencing it. The contents of this sublimated Jhāna-consciousness, though severely pruned, do not appear to have been entirely, if at all, unearthly. It was usual for a disciple to ask his master for a theme, perhaps only a pregnant word or two, on which he might practise solitary meditation. And in the Vibhanga, the second book of Abhidhamma, the Jhāna-formula appears again and again with some such word inserted after each stage of Jhāna: e.g. love, or emptiness (viz. of soul); or again it might be one of the exercises in will, included in what came to be called the 37 factors of enlightenment.\(^3\) Such a co-

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\(^1\) It is conceived that in the heavens least remote from our sphere of being, sense is limited to vision and sound.

\(^2\) Compendium, p. 57.

\(^3\) Ibid. 179 f.; Dialogues of the Buddha, ii. 129.
efficient in the abnormal ‘clearness of mind’—a clarity to which mystics ancient and modern have testified—was not necessarily a matter for discursive or toiling intellection. Jhāna-consciousness, after the first stage, was beyond all that. It would continue to hold the notion in a species of penetrative contemplation, or intuitive beholding and comprehension. Thereafter, when normal consciousness recurred, it would be more strongly permeated than before with that notion, from the effect of this injection at high pressure.

A feature in the Jhāna-practice of the Nikāyas—I am not competent to assert as much either for modern Buddhism or Vedāntist Yoga—is the frequent and systematic recourse to it. It was for the brethren and sisters of the Order, what to all religious Christians, especially to those engaged in a religious calling, is the sacrament of the Eucharist—a function the psychology of which is curiously ignored in James’s *Varieties*. I have seen letters revealing some slight resemblance to Jhāna-consciousness at a first, or other communion.

1 Tennyson’s testimony, supplied by Tyndall: “By God Almighty! There is no delusion in the matter! It is no nebulous ecstasy, but a state of transcendent wonder, associated with absolute clearness of mind.” Cp. the poem, ‘Two Voices’; W. James’s *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 384 ff.

2 See *op. cit.*
And there is a similar careful preparation of the 'heart' previous to communicating, as in the self-purging of the 'hindrances,' of the sensuous and immoral dispositions obligatory on a sincere disciple. No less, also, than communion was Jhāna practised, and with mystic, if not moral, success by those who were morally unworthy, though mystically predisposed. Jhāna was not end, but means, and not the only or indispensable means. But where the supernormal fits and flashes of other mystics are, by recorded testimony, fitful and rare, and not systematically led up to, Jhāna-consciousness would seem to have been habitually and voluntarily induced, if perhaps with varying degrees of success (samāpatti). There was of course this deep cleavage between it and the eucharistic consciousness, that the self was banished, and no sense of union with the divine One, or any One, aimed at or felt. Herein too the Buddhist differs from the Vedāntist, who sought to realize identity with Ātman, that is, the identity of the World-soul and his own self or ātman—'Tat tvam asī' (That art thou). Alone the jhāyin sat, but he did not 'flee alone to the Alone,' exactly as did Plotinus.

And so far as such mystic sense of union implies passivity, Jhāna-consciousness is not on all-fours with most mysticism. To allude again to James's analysis; it has the essen-
tial noëtic quality too strongly to permit of passivity as a constant. Intellect and volition, for Buddhist thought, are hardly distinguishable, and the jhāyin seems to be always master of himself and self-possessed, even in ecstasy, even to the deliberate falling into and emerging (as by a spiritual alarum-clock) from trance. There is a synergy about his Jhāna, combined with an absence of any reference whatever to a merging or melting into something greater, that for many may reveal defect, but which is certainly a most interesting and significant difference.

Of James's other two qualities of mystic consciousness—transiency and ineffability—the former is markedly true concerning the momentary ecstasy of attainment or appanā, as also concerning the realization of great spiritual elevation generally. Touching the 'Fruit' of each 'Path' of spiritual progress appears to have been a momentary (khanika) flash of insight. As to the latter, ineffability, it is also true that we find no attempts by brethren who were expert at Jhāna, e.g. Anuruddha, Revata the Doubter, or Subhūti of the 'love-jhāna,' to enter in detail into their abnormal experiences. The first-named Thera comes nearest:

1 See above: chitta, cheto, chintā, chetanā.
2 Psalms of the Brethren, cclvi., iii., i.
“In fivefold concentrated ecstasy (samādhi)
My heart goes up in peace and unity.
Serene composure have I made my own;
My vision as a god’s is clarified.
I know the destinies of other lives:
Whence beings come and whither they do go;
Life here below, or other-where of life—
Steadfast and rapt, in fivefold Jhāna sunk.”

But although this celestial perspective is a staple article in saintly experience as recorded by the Nikāyas, and has a formula of its own, no seer ever gives it local habitation or actuality for mundane perception. Language is everywhere too much the creature and product of our fivefold world of sense, with a varying coefficient of motor consciousness, to be of much use in describing consciousness that has apparently got beyond the range of sense and local movement. Even in non-spatial perception of melody, we have to borrow from our sense of gravitational resistance overcome, and to speak of rising and falling. Possibly, moreover, the symbols of communication, of description, become still harder to find for minds, whose articulate medium is not made rich and wieldy through familiarity with written words. Supernormal vision itself, on the other hand, might conceivably be stronger, freer, more accessible, in the absence of a bookish memory. But this point, though it may be relevant,

1 Psalms of the Brethren, verses 916 f.
I do not press. Many spheres of being, varying in remoteness, otherness, inaccessibility to his own earthly span of life, were very present to the Buddhist imagination. And denizens of the remoter, quasi-immaterial Brahma-spheres are represented as having to materialize in order to become perceptible to celestials less remote, let alone to human beings (Dialogues, ii. 244).

These remoter spheres were collectively called A-rūpaloka, or Arūpāvachārā, world or sphere of the invisible or formless. Here there was life without instruments of sense or corporeality. And to attain, while yet on earth, to any conception (perception was impossible) amounting to experience of a sphere, which was not spatial in a literal sense, there were four stages of Arūpa-jhāna, showing also an interesting, if very vague psychology. Elimination was now, not of factors of consciousness,—the clarity and the equanimity remain,—but of all consciousness of detail or of limitations, thus:

(1) “A bhikkhu, by passing beyond the consciousness of form, by putting an end to the sense of resistance, by paying no heed to the idea of distinctions, at the thought: ‘Space is infinite!’ attains to and abides in the conceptual sphere of space as infinite. For him his previous consciousness of things visible passes away, and there arises in him then the blissful
consciousness, subtle yet actual, of an infinite sensation of space.

(2) "Again, a bhikkhu, having wholly transcended the sensation of infinite space, at the thought: 'Infinite is consciousness!' attains to and abides in the conceptual sphere of consciousness as infinite. For him the previous consciousness, subtle yet actual, of a conceptual sphere of space as infinite passes away. And he then becomes conscious only of a concept, subtle yet actual, of consciousness as infinite.

(3) "Again, having wholly transcended the conceptual sphere of consciousness as infinite, at the thought: 'There is nothing!' he attains to and abides in the conceptual sphere of nothingness. For him the previous consciousness, subtle yet actual, of a conceptual sphere of consciousness as infinite passes away. And he then becomes conscious only of a concept, subtle yet actual, of infinite nothingness.\(^1\)

(4) "... Having wholly transcended the sphere of nothingness, he attains to and abides in the sphere of neither-percipient-nor-non-percipient.\(^2\)

After this either the subject emerged

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\(^1\) Here the mediæval explanation is that the preceding stage of consciousness was discerned as, in reality, 'nothing'—an unsatisfactory exegesis, as it stands.

\(^2\) Cp. Dialogues, i. 249 f. with ii. 118 f. passim in the Four Nikāyas. The second reference gives similar samādhi exercises.
from Jhāna, or proceeded to fall into trance, perception and feeling ceasing.

On the fourth phase of quasi-unconsciousness, Buddhaghosa remarks: "[One might say] neither consciousness, nor etc. etc., as well as 'neither percipience, etc.,' so subtle and delicately faint is the consciousness."¹ We seem, in fact, to have come upon another limiting or zero-point, as was the case in 'neutral feeling.'

These curious and vague fetches of imagination may appeal in no way to modern readers, nevertheless they are serially, and in succession to the other four Jhānas, pronounced by the Buddha to be each a yet more exquisite happiness than its predecessor. This attribution is even made with regard to the final trance, the Teacher remarking, in reply to sceptics, that if no happiness could be affirmed of such a state, his statement was not made with respect to merely pleasant feeling, but with respect to any occasion whence happiness may be obtained.² Happiness is here evidently taken in the larger moral or spiritual sense, complementary to that wider sense in which, as we saw, dukkha might be used. If happiness was involved as a result of practising self-hypnotism and trance, happiness was, so far, associated with, and predicable of, that practice.

¹ Sumangala-Vilāsini, ii. ² Saṁyutta-N. iv, 227 f.
CHAPTER VI

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE NIKĀYAS—continued

IV. IDEATION—continued

4. Growth of intellect a vision of objects under the causal relation.—There is a wealth of terms in Pali and Sanskrit for knowledge under the aspects both of process and of product, for which it is hard to find a corresponding abundance of, at least, English equivalents. We too have words from the metaphors of sight, access, grasp and piercing, and indeed have better exploited 'light.' But Buddhist philosophy has not only commandeered the acts of waking (budh) and turning-towards (ā-vaj, adverting), but has nearly a dozen words built on the proper 'know'-stems alone (jan, vid). And the question for the student of Buddhist psychology arises: how far does the greater richness of Buddhist intellectual nomenclature correspond to a greater manifold in modes of knowing or of knowledge?

There are even, in that psychology, terms for cognitive states which have a time co-
efficient, implicative of either confident expectation or assured attainment. These are, respectively: ‘consciousness - that - I shall-know-the-unknown’ (anaññāta-ñ-ñassā-mūtindriya) and ‘consciousness of gnosis’ (aññindriya).¹ (The affix ‘indriya,’ here rendered by ‘consciousness,’ is literally power or faculty or ability, used in that general way in which we employ the word ‘sense,’ but with a more dynamic import.) They are technical terms of spiritual experience. The former describes the mind of the convert, or, to revert to technical terms, of one who has reached the stream (sōt-āpanna). The latter term describes this mind as, ‘going from strength to strength,’ he attains each successive degree in the way to saintship. Final fruition involves a third technical term: aaññātāvindriya, the consciousness of him who has gnosis, who has come to know.

More usually the consciousness of deepening power of intellection and, to speak in spatial terms, of a widening perspective, is expressed by the help of one of two adverbs: yonīso and yathābhūtam. These have, both of them, the secondary meaning of ‘thoroughly’ and ‘genuinely.’ But in their literal sense they mean respectively ‘from the source, or matrix,’ and ‘as [it has] become.’ We approximate to this

¹ Dīgha-N. iii. 219; Saṃyutta-N. v. 204; Bud. Psy. Ethics, pp. 86, 97.
intensive force of import in the word ‘radical,’
and in the expression, made classical by
Matthew Arnold, “seeing things as in them-
soles they really are.” This cumbersome
phrase cannot match the latter of the two
Pali terms either in conciseness, or in genetic
emphasis. But Arnold was not to blame
for a weak spot in his native tongue, nor
for the unfortunate conditions, whatever
they were, which resulted in our dropping
the strong term weorōan, and cheapening
its weak substitute ‘to become.’ The
makers and the heirs of modern French and
modern German were more fortunate, or
sounder in their thinking than we, when
they preserved this most precious instru-
ment of philosophic insight, the power of
which was felt by Hegel, and is now being
exploited by Prof. Bergson.

The full causative force of the two terms
was doubtless lost, for Buddhists, by con-
ventional usage. And yet I write the last
phrase hesitatingly, for whereas they claim
nothing novel in the use of them, it is not
without significance that neither term is
pre-Buddhistic in the sense lent them in
the Nikāyas. Nor are they a feature in
Vedāntist or in Jain literature.\(^1\) As ex-
pressions qualifying a certain depth and

\(^1\) Yathābhūtām appears at least once in the Mahābhārata
(iii. 12070), which as a complete compilation is much
later than the Nikāyas.
direction of intellectual consciousness they are emphatically Buddhist. And since for Buddhism to know thoroughly was to know under the causal relation,—was to know by way of judgments relating effect with cause,—the adoption of just these two qualifying phrases for such intellection as was deemed admirable, is full of interest.

Work-in-mind (mānāsikāra) which was not yoniso led to muddled results.¹ Coupled with ‘the voice of another’ it became the joint agent in arousing greed, hate and error.² But yoniso-manasikāra was essential to the prevention or suppression of the ‘hindrances’ of sensual desire, malevolence, sloth, distraction and doubt,³ and to the inducing of the loftier spiritual qualities.⁴ It was the hall-mark of religious ‘distinction,’⁵ and, when coupled with endeavour which was also yoniso, resulted in the winning of ‘emancipation.’⁶ From yoniso-manasikāra, as the root, springs joy, thence zest, thence composure, thence happiness, thence concentration; concentrated, we see and know things as they have become (yathā-bhūtam); thus seeing and knowing, distaste arises, thence passionlessness, thence freedom.⁷ Yathābhūtam is constantly used to

¹ Samyutta-N. i. 203. ² Anguttara-N. i. 87.
³ Samyutta-N. v. 85, 102; Anguttara-N. i. 5, 13.
⁴ Ibiā. i. 14. ⁵ Di̓gha-N. iii. 273.
⁶ Samyutta-N. i. 105. ⁷ Di̓gha-N. iii. 288.
qualify verbs of cognition corresponding to the nouns given on the preceding page; and there is no doctrine or view of importance which is not declared to be thoroughly understood when it is 'known and seen,' discerned, comprehended, and so forth, 'as it really has become, by right insight.'

And that there was from the outset a conscious association between this phrase, as merely conveying emphasis, and the belief in Universal Becoming—a belief which finds formulation under the doctrines of Impermanence, Non-soul and Causal Genesis—appears clearly in the important 'Great Sutta of the Destruction of Craving.' Here the Buddha is represented as rehearsing, in an emphatic and detailed catechism, the doctrine that mind (viññāna) has become (bhūtam) through assignable conditions (in other words, that consciousness arises at any moment from a cause), and having come to be is liable to cease. And 'he who by right insight discerns this as it has become,' or 'really,' can entertain no doubts as to whether mind is or is not perduring, immortal, and so forth.

That Buddhism was so seriously insistent on true or higher cognition being the apperception of things in a causal perspective, is due not to a genuinely scientific stand-

1 Cp. the references in Saññyutta-N. vi. 81, 82 (Index).
2 Majjhima-N. i. 260; cp. Saññyutta-N. ii. 48.
point, but to its pragmatic earnestness. Its central theme was release from ill or dukkha through a right understanding of dukkha. It diagnosed in order to cure.

"How does one discern as-it-has-really-come-to-be both the genesis and the passing away of all dukkha-phenomena?"  

It may be judged that in this section we have strayed from psychological territory in discussing, not what Buddhists thought about 'knowing,' but what they thought about 'knowing well.' Rightly or wrongly, however, the inclusion has been done deliberately—sampajāna.

5. Intuition, insight, supernormal consciousness.—The chief intellectual result in the concentrative exercises discussed above was a superlative clarity of mind, untroubled by either discursive intellection or hedonistic affection. Apart from any context, this might be read as a prescription for a rest-cure for overwrought minds, or as the pursuit of the ends known to philosophy as Quietism, Apatheia, Ataraxia. But the Jhāna-process, as met with in the longer Suttas, is usually found to lead up to no static poise of intellectual vacuity, but to a number of states, either serial, or alternative, of what may be called abnormal synergy—a term I follow Henry Maudsley in borrowing from

1 Samyutta-N. iv. 188; Anguttara-N. i. 173 f.
medicine—so clearly is the state of consciousness said to be induced by voluntary intellection or will:

"With consciousness\(^1\) thus concentrated [in Fourth Jhāna], made pure, translucent, cleared, void of defilement, made supple, wieldy, firm, imperturbable, he applies and bends-over the mind\(^2\) to knowledge and vision."

The possible alternative or serial states that might then be induced are described under eight heads, six of them being intuitive, and two being, if I may so say, kinetic:

1. Discernment of the interrelation between body and mind\(^3\) clearly revealed, as when the purity of a fine gem is being properly seen owing to its being threaded on a string.

2. Supernormal hearing of sounds, voices, both human and celestial, the distant becoming near.

3. Discernment of another person’s consciousness.

4. Reminiscence of former lives: "He recalls several previous sojournings, namely, one or more rebirths . . . in such a place such was my name . . . family . . . term of life . . . as if a man were to travel and, on

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\(^1\) *Dialogues*, i. 86 f.  
\(^2\) *Vijñāna*. The simile, of course, illustrates not the interrelation, but the discernment.
coming home, should know where he had been and what he had done.”

(5) Supernormal vision, or discernment of the destinies of beings deceasing and being reborn, “far ing according to their deeds . . . just as a man from a balcony might watch persons entering or leaving the house, walking along the streets, seated at the cross-roads; and would know whither each was bound.”

(6) Discernment and conscious extirpation of the influence of sense-desires, desire for rebirth, and of the mental obfuscation of ignorance. (These are likened to intoxicating drugs, or āsāvā’s, and a fourth, speculative opinion, came to be added generally.) “As if from the bank of a mountain tarn of water, clear, translucent, serene, one were to look down and discern the shells, the fishes and the pebbly bottom.”

(7) Evoking or creating a phantom body (literally, ‘made of mind’), the double of one’s own body.

(8) Supernormal locomotion, or movements in which gravitation and opacity ceased to obstruct.

The last two are the usual phenomena of what, in Buddhist literature, is termed iddhi, a word meaning to stir, set in movement, and secondarily, to do so successfully, to have wrought. The second mode came to be called ‘iddhi by fixation of resolve’
(adhiṭṭhānā-iddhi). No further record is here practicable of what these older texts say concerning them. It is only to be added that there was no belief in a ‘soul’ leaving the body temporarily, as the jhāyin sat ‘rapt’ in trance, or nearly so. We nowhere read of a comatose body, whose mental factors were arguing with angels, or elsewhere active. But it seemed to be claimed for the saint of old, that he had trained himself to such efferent power of synergy, that he could convert the momentary successions called chitta into body, or vice versa.

Not even Buddhaghosa’s account of iddhi and its induction is adequate to give us outsiders much insight into its working, or its psychology. Supernormal consciousness in genius or any other mode can only be testified to by the person so gifted, and must always elude self-analysis. Self-consciousness is necessarily at zero. The entire vitality, mental and bodily, is engaged in the making, the poiēsis, whether it be the synthesis of a new induction, the sympathy of aesthetic creation, or the synergy of supernormally adjusted action. The ‘what’ of experience is recollected, but not the ‘how.’ This holds for all the other six in the series.

With regard to reminiscence (4), cases of which, it has been claimed, occur, without jhāna, now and then in the East of to-day, among children, such an achievement may
be as consistently upheld by a pious Buddhist, as by any one who combined acceptance of it with belief in an immortal ego or soul. This may be made clearer in my concluding chapter. But with regard to the achievement of it by the adult consciousness of the Arahant or one nearly so, and only in Jhāna, Prof. Bergson’s discussions on memory are strikingly suggestive.¹ Given our ‘whole past ever about us’ in the unknown spaceless working of mind in time, on which we cannot look back as we might, because life forces the forward view in us; given too the ‘racial attention’ to life grown weak, the desires and prospects in it interesting us no more, whether by impending death, or from the deliberate renunciation of all they offer now and hereafter, as life—can we not see that, in the light of this flooding in of the past for one who is ending life, and who is also convinced that his past includes infinitely many lives, his remembrance of that past becomes a lengthened vista? Such was the Arahant’s (abnormal) lack of personal forward view on life; and who can say that his retrospect was not also abnormal?

Of these eight attainments in insight and will, numbers 2–6 and 8 came to be known as the six super-knowledges (abhiññā). And on the whole body of them, the name of

¹ Cp. e.g. his recent address: Proceedings, Psychical Research Society, 1913.
vijjā (Sanskrit, vidyā), or more usually paññā, was conferred,¹ more properly paññā- kkhandha, or body of intellectual (attainment). Paññā-vision, again, was of a wider or higher implication than the special supernormal 'vision':

"The eye of flesh, the eye divine,  
And eye of insight, best of all."²

And a fourth variety is sometimes mentioned: eye of truth, or insight into the nature of things.³

Nevertheless so protean and flexible is the term paññā, that it is used not only for intuitive knowledge, but for any exercise of intelligence, if only that intelligence is being intelligently exercised. The synonyms by which it is defined in the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka embrace nearly every aspect of cognition, from research and analysis to insight.⁴ As a mental complex it is classed with the sankhāra aggregate; as a cognitive process it is thus compared with the more general term viññāṇa:

"'What is it to have paññā?' 'To discern (pajānāti) the method of the Four Truths.' 'What is viññāṇa?' 'Being conscious, for instance, of pleasure or pain or

¹ Dialogues, i. 124, 236; cp. 62, n. 1.  
² Iti-vuttākā, § 61 (Fifth Nikāya). 'Eye divine' was the usual name for supernormal vision (3).  
³ Dialogues, i. 95.  
⁴ Bud. Psy. Ethics, § 16.
neutral feeling.' "Are the two mutually involved or separate? And is it possible, considering them apart, to declare that they are different?" "That is not possible; they are mutually involved. What one discerns, of that one is aware; of what one is aware, it is this that one discerns.' "What distinguishes them then?" "Pañña is to be developed; viññāna is to be understood.'"

Feeling and perception are also stated to be bound up with, and not different from, viññāna or consciousness. Then:

"What is cognizable by representative consciousness (manoviññāna) when it is detached from the five senses and attains entire clarity (i.e. in the fourth stage of Jhāna)?"

The answer gives three of the four ulterior Jhānas enumerated above, pp. 117 f.

"And by what does one discern (pajānāti) cognizable idea? By the eye of pañña. But what is [here] the meaning of pañña? Pañña means higher knowledge (abhīñña), complete knowledge (pari-ñña), elimination (pahāna)." ¹

"All are modes of knowing," comments Buddhaghosa, only the prefix differs. He then, by a simile which he much fancied,²

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¹ Majjhima-N. i. 292 f.: dialogue, already quoted between Mahā-koṭṭhita and Sāriputta. See above, p. 52.
² Used in three of his works.
compares sañña, viññāna, paññā to the different reaction provoked, at sight of the precious metals, in a child, a citizen, and a metallurgical expert. The first sees in them coloured objects; the second sees also in them tokens representing utilities to be got; the third is also able to judge as to their origin and their fashioner. Thus viññāna includes the work of perception and also general notions. But paññā includes both these, and also "by an uplift of energy attains to a revelation of the Way."

A Commentator was bound to be exegetical. But the concluding clause is a deeply interesting comment on the statement above: 'paññā is to be developed.' The verb—bhāvetabbā—is literally 'must made be to become.' It is constantly used in connexion with the meditative self-training of the Buddhist student. With it may be compared similar terms—anubrūheti, vaddheti, develop, make to grow—used in connexion with mental culture.

"For it is through conditions, through a cause, that ideas arise and pass away. And by training certain ideas arise, others pass away." ¹

Such is the refrain in another dialogue already quoted.

¹ Dialogues, i. 247 f.
In their arising is involved creative, constructive effort. And this is intuition or insight, that effort of "intellectual sympathy by which the mind can place itself within the mobile reality" of things.\(^1\) \textit{Paññā} was not simply exercise of thought on matters of general knowledge and practice, nor was it dialectic, nor desultory reverie. It was intelligence diverted by—or rather as—concentrated volition, from lower practical issues till, as a fusion of sympathy, synthesis, synergy, it 'made to become' that spiritual vision which had not been before.

We must now abandon this incomplete survey of the extent to which the books, reckoned oldest in the Buddhist culture, analyse the nature of mental procedure. If we have found something, there is much we have not found—for instance, the image and the conditions of its reinstatement, an analysis of the emotions, instinct as compared with volition. We have now to see what later texts have done to make good any of these archaic silences.

\(^1\) Bergson, \textit{Introduction to Metaphysics}. The relatively specialized function assigned by Buddhaghosa to \textit{Viññāna}, as compared with \textit{Saññā}, and as compared with the very general conception of it in modern Buddhist theory (cp. pp. 8, 18, 54), forms the subject of an inquiry among Burmese teachers now being prosecuted, in response to my questions, by Mr. S. Z. Aung.
CHAPTER VII

PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE
ABHIDHAMMA-PIṬAKA

We have left scanty space for such a discussion. It must, however, be remembered that to analyse, or detach from their contingent occasions, the doctrines expressed in the Suttas is largely the work of this section of the Canon; hence we have been forestalling much of what had else awaited us. As to the rest, I propose to bring out a few points revealing work done on those doctrines as it was carried on in the School, and not by way of addressing the congregation, or conversing with the individual inquirer. Work so done is the subject-matter and method of the Suttas.

The keynote to the contents of this Piṭaka is both the summarizing, and also the working-in of the details of the doctrines committed to the Order in the Sutta-teaching. This is what we might have expected to find under the given circumstances. The day of the master-minds of the founders was too recent for their utterances to be considered objectively, much less critically, whence might
have sprung development of theory. And that day had witnessed such a breaking away from current theory—from diṭṭhi, which was so largely coincident with atta-diṭṭhi, or attavāda, or sakkāya-diṭṭhi, all names for the same sort of metaphysic—that we cannot wonder if constructive imagination was held tightly down to working out the legacy, whereof the Abhidhammika teachers were the first heirs.

The one exception to this sterility in development of theory is the ‘system of relations,’ the analysis, that is to say, of all the types of relations observable between phenomena. The immensely detailed analysis of these twenty-four relations, or doctrine of events as conditioned, occupies the last ‘great’ book called Paṭṭhāna, and lies outside our subject. But even that exposition lacks concise theoretic discussion.

In the developed psychological detail, the following features are of interest:

1. **Development of introspective analysis.**—In the first book of the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka we come immediately upon a great development in statement, of the type of mental analysis in the Anupāda Sutta noticed above. Human consciousness has been schematized as experiencing now one, now

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1 *i.e.* theory of self or soul, doctrine or school of ditto, theory of individuality.
2 But see pp. 194 ff.
3 See pp. 96 ff.
another, of a certain number of *types* of contents.¹ These are divided under three heads, *viz.*: eight types or classes of good consciousness (*chitta*), and twelve of bad consciousness characterizing human beings, and supposed also to characterize, more or less, beings infra-human, and all *devas*, or angels, exclusive of (a) the remoter, more ethereal Brahma- or Rūpa-world, and (b) the entirely immaterial A-rūpa world. Thirdly, types of morally indeterminate consciousness. Here consciousness is analysed, not as causing-result, but as itself caused-result, namely, of bygone acts in this, or previous lives. As in most of these seven books, the method of exposition is catechetical throughout. And the absence, for all the questioning, of any attempt to set forth more than formulas and definitions, seems to betray how largely such a work must have been merely a mnemonic guide, and a book of reference for term and set phrase, in the hands of the exponent giving his oral lessons. The component *dhamma*’s, or mental phenomena, into which any one of these psychoses or concrete momentary *chitta*’s is resolved, have increased more than fivefold above those named in the above-quoted Sutta. The probable reason is that in any given person each *type* of conscious unit may, at a given moment, show some only of the com-

ponents. The door is left open, for that matter, for yet other components to be distinguished and added to the typical list, as particular and not typical features.

"Now these, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced dhamma’s there are on that occasion—these are good (or bad) dhamma’s."

And the Commentator, elaborating yet more, specifies nine such complementary components, e.g. of the first ‘good thought.’ One of these, thus relegated to a relatively contingent place, is manasikāra, ‘work of mind,’ rendered above ‘adapted attention.’ This ‘work-of-mind,’ writes Buddhaghosha, is synonymous either with the ‘adverting’ of each sense, or with the adverting of the ensuing mano, or it is to be conceived, with respect to object, as the confronting and linking mind with object, as a driver harnessing horse and chariot (Atthasālinī, 138). Later developments brought this factor to the front.1 The distinction between a moment of consciousness, where attention is or is not previously prepared or adjusted, is, in these types, otherwise taken into account. Every alternate type or class, namely, is declared to be motivated. This does not imply that the types lacking this feature are spontaneous, due to chance. All consciousness was conditioned. It only

1 See below, p. 176, and Bud. Psy. Ethics, 34, n. 1.
implies that the preceding consciousness had adverted already to the object in question. The Commentary gives, as illustrations, the prompting of what we call first and second thoughts, and prompting by another. This emphasis on attention is repeated in the discussion on sense, and lends for us a noteworthy modernity to this ancient analysis.

I have already commented on the intrusion of such a practical category as 'good' and 'bad' in matter so peculiarly psychological as that of introspective analysis. The Pali words are as wide in practical scope as our 'good' and 'bad.' Goodness applied to mind connotes wholesomeness, virtue, causing welfare, skill, writes the Commentator; of these the fourth meaning does not apply, the other three do. The terms therefore are ethically used. But both ethics and psychology are for the Buddhist but phases, logical distinctions in that one and central doctrine of the Norm, or, as we should say, cosmodicy, which constitutes for him philosophy and religion indissolubly united. To be and do good was to put thought and action into line with eternal, universal law, under which certain types of chitta would inevitably be followed, later if not sooner, by certain consciously felt results in self and in others. 'Self,' as reaping, would be the resultant, not the identical, self who sowed.
Practically, in these curious old analyses, ‘good’ is used only in the sense of ‘felicific,’ or causing welfare.\(^1\) The caused welfare, or resulting pleasant consciousness, wherever and whenever experienced, is reckoned as undetermined or neutral; it is not itself reckoned as being ‘good,’ or felicific in its turn, but is called undetermined, indeterminate, unmanifested, \textit{a-vyākātā}.\(^2\) Of such states neither good nor bad, writes the Commentator, is declared. This developed theory of consciousness, judged to be neutral with respect to result, and distinguished only as effect of past consciousness, I have not found in the Nikāyas.

2. Development of psychological definition. —This feature is the most valuable contribution made by the Abhidhammikas to the psychology of Buddhism. Of their three compilations dealing largely, or even wholly, with definitions, a great part of the contents consists of inquiries into the nature of a number of mental complexes. The definitions may not be satisfying to our own logical tradition. They consist very largely of enumerations of synonymous or partly synonymous terms of, as it were, overlapping circles. But they reveal to us much useful information concerning the term described,

\(^{1}\text{Cp. }\textit{Bud. Psy. Ethics, lxxxii. f.}\)
\(^{2}\text{So in Ceylon tradition, Burma and Siam write }\textit{abyākāta}.\)
the terms describing, and the terms which we may have expected to find, but find not. And they show the Sokratic earnestness with which these early Schoolmen strove to clarify their concepts, so as to guard their doctrines from the heretical innovations, to which ambiguity in terms would yield cheap foothold.

As instances of the light thrown for us by this mass of conscientious cataloguing, we may note a few purely psychological definitions:

(i.) "Which are the phenomena that are (a) of the self, (b) external?
"Ans. (a) The spheres (fields) of the five senses and of mano (sensus communis, etc.); (b) the spheres of the five kinds of sense-objects and of mental objects (dhammā)." ¹

"In what respect is this or that khandha (a) of the self, (b) external?
"Ans. (a) That khandha which, for these or those beings, is of the self, is self-referable, one's own, referable to the person. . . . (b) That khandha which for these or those other beings, other persons, is of the self, is self-referable, their own, referable to the person." ²

We have here the field of object including not only all that is directly presented to

¹ Bud. Psy. Ethics, § 1207 f.
² Ibid. § 1044 f.; Vibhanga, pp. 2 f. The former work has dhammā for khandha. On khandha, i.e. personal factor mental or bodily, see above, pp. 40 f.
‘my’ experience considered as the subject, but also all that is subjective for others. It would have been convenient to render (a) and (b) in the questions by subjective and objective. The pairs of terms, however, are not exactly parallel. Bāhira, bahiddhā, mean just ‘external.’ But the other term (a) is ampler than ‘subjective,’ including all the elements, abstractly conceived—extended, cohesive, etc.\(^1\)—that enter into the composition of the individual. ‘Subjective’ often fits well, especially in the more academic developments of Abhidhamma, but for the Buddhist, as with us, ‘self is a fairly fluid term.’\(^2\) There was, for this philosophy, no academic dualism to accentuate and rationalize the popular antithesis, used in the Suttas, of body and mind. There was only on the one hand the fleeting mobile compounds that made up what it was convenient to call ‘me,’ ‘myself,’ ‘this individual,’ and, on the other hand, all compounds that were ‘other,’ external to that self. This was the only ‘subjective-objective’ distinction that was, and, I believe, has ever been, recognized.

(ii.) "What on that occasion is the power (or faculty) of mindfulness (sati’ndriya)?"

\(^1\) *Bud. Psy. Ethics*, § 597 f.; *cp. Majjhima-N.* i. 185 f., 421 f.

\(^2\) *Cp. W. James, Prin. Psy.* i. 292 f.
"Ans. The mindfulness which on that occasion is recollecting, calling back to mind; the mindfulness which is remembering, bearing in mind, the opposite of superficiality and of obliviousness . . . this is the power of mindfulness that there then is."  

This term has been discussed above. I have added the Abhidhamma definition to make clear the comprehensiveness of its meaning. That, etymologically, is memory, or remembering; practically, it is clear thinking on past or present.

"Opposite of superficiality" is literally "state-of-not-floating,"—"like pumpkins and empty pots on the surface of water" is the comment—"but sinking on to the object of thought," and again "non-floating and apprehension (upagaṇhānā) are its essential marks." In it, consciousness reminds itself of what it has (its past being wrought up with its present), like a treasurer detailing his revenue to a king. Past, present, future, the threefold time-distinction, is constantly cited, but the problem of forgetfulness and reinstatement, and the conditions of reinstatement, usually alluded to among ourselves as association of ideas, are still not raised as matters calling for definition.

1 Bud. Psy. Ethics, § 14. Sati derives from s[m]arati, 'to remember.'
(iii.) It is more in the Abhidhamma elaboration of sense-analysis that distinctions of time are brought forward. This analysis reveals an increase in precision of statement rather than in theory, or added matter of observation. But it remains the fullest experiential statement of sense-consciousness which ancient literature has given us. It occurs in the first book, and is included under the inquiry into material qualities in general or rūpa.¹ The four elemental material qualities are ‘underived,’ no upādā, or irreducible; the sense-organs, and all sense-objects, except those of touch, are derived, that is, from the underived elementals. Hence the ancient Hellenic theory that ‘like is known by like’ may be considered as latent in this arrangement,² although it is only in Buddhaghosa that I have found it made explicit: “Where there is difference of kind there is no stimulus. The Ancients say that sensory stimulus is of similar kinds, not of different kinds.”³

Each of the five special senses, and then the mano, co-ordinator of sense, is set out in a fourfold formula, carefully worded and voluble as compared with the jejune statement of organ, object plus contact, of the

¹ Translated in Bud. Psy. Ethics, pp. 172 ff.
² Empedokles, Plato, Plotinus, who accepted it, were all influenced, through Pythagorism or otherwise, by Eastern thought.
³ Atthasālinī, 313, cp. above, p. 67.
Nikāyas. Summarized, the formula takes account of (a) the sense, invisible (the fleshy organ is not included) and reacting, (b) the object invisible also (as presentation) and impinging, and (c) the contact. Further,

(1) the fact of possible sensation;
(2) the actual impact of object;
(3) the actual impact of sense;
(4) the resultant actual impression and possible results in the four incorporeal aggregates.

The severance of (2) and (3) is explained by the Commentary as indicating (2) involuntary sensation, e.g. an unexpected seeing of lightning, and (3) voluntary seeing, 'looking,' for example, or 'listening'—adjusted movement of attention of "one who by his own wish, seeking to look at some object, concentrates his vision."

And in all four statements, there is the detailed time-reference—'has seen, sees, will or may see,' 'has impinged, impinges, will or may impinge.' Sense is emphatically stated—as an experience in time no less than in space. With sense 'purged,' everything becomes in a way 'present' to consciousness, 'bending over the present moment.'

(iv.) "What is that material quality which is not derived? (a) The sphere of the tangible; (b) the cohesive element. What is (a)? The ex-
tended, calorific and mobile elements; the hard, the soft, the smooth, the rough, pleasant contact, painful contact, the heavy, the light. . . . What is (b)? The watery or clinging element [āpo], the binding quality in [things] material."

I have alluded already (pp. 18 f.) to this philosophic abstraction of cohesiveness, etc., as superseding in Buddhist culture the more primitive category of the four (or more) elements. The salient feature in the cohesive element is fluidity, adds the Commentary. It is exempted from the tangible, inasmuch as that which is felt, in a concrete liquid, is the other three elements, not the cohesion of them. We feel its resistance, its heat or cold, its movement. And these three we apprehend through the most fundamental of our senses, namely, touch. The other sense-organs and objects are, relatively speaking, as cotton balls striking other cotton balls on the elemental anvils. But touch is as a hammer smiting through its cotton to the anvils (Comy.).

(v.) "Now on that occasion (i.e. at the genesis of the first type of good consciousness) there are the four (mental) ‘aggregates.’ . . . What on that occasion is the sankhāra-kkhandha (group of complexes)? Contact, volition,

\footnote{Bud. Psy. Ethics, §§ 647, 652; the renderings are slightly altered from those judged best fourteen years ago. Cp. Compendium, 232.}
initial and sustained application, zest, concentrating; the five moral powers—faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, insight--; vital power, rightness of views, intention, endeavour, mindfulness, concentration; the forces of faith...insight (as above); the forces of modesty and discretion, disinterestedness, amity, understanding; no-covetousness, no-malice; composure, buoyancy, pliancy, fitness, proficiency, rectitude of consciousness and its properties, mindfulness and intelligence, calm and insight, grasp and balance—these, or whatever other incorporeal causally induced phenomena there are on that occasion, exclusive of the aggregates of feeling, perception, and of consciousness—these are the aggregate of sankhāra's.\(^1\)

The contents of this fourth aggregate are re-stated with the explication of each of the other types of good and of bad consciousness, the items varying according to the typical nature of the psychosis analysed. The next type, for example, lacking the intelligent or intellectual character of the first type, all the constituents implying understanding, insight, etc., are omitted, and so on.

This is a notable elaboration in what Croom Robertson used to call 'bodying out a thought,' as compared with the simple description of this particular 'group' in the

\(^1\) *Bud. Psy. Ethics*, § 62.
Nikāyas. And it is intended to express, not what is present in consciousness at every flicker of the type evoked, but the field of choice, the range and potentiality, in the conscious activity ranked under the given type. These typical good and bad types of consciousness that are being analysed, are each and all said to be caused on occasion of a mental object, either a sense-impression, or a revived impression. And the contents of the mental complexes of an Ariya-sāvaka—a saintly student—would differ greatly from that of the average layman whom he taught, when some external object evoked in each the same type of consciousness.

Viewed in this way, the analyses are not so overdone as at first sight they seem to be. They are all in keeping with one of the chief tasks of the Abhidhamma compilers: the jealous guarding of the doctrines of the Suttas, in their oral preservation and transmission, from errors arising through vagueness and ambiguity of language. And thus it is that they have left us a mass of exponential detail with no exposition of theory. The doctrine (Dhamma) had been declared, learnt and handed on in set verbal forms. In Abhi-dhamma the teacher, conversant with the Dhamma, and teaching it in his turn, possessed, in the definitions of these seven supplementary books, a
thesaurus of reference helping to clarify his knowledge and his expositions.

A curious feature in these seven Abhidhamma-books is the beginning of the distinction: chitta and chetasika’s, which was finally to supersede in psychological analysis the more cumbersome khandha-division.

"Which are the mental phenomena that are (a) of mind (chitta)? . . . (b) that are mental properties (chetasikā)?"^1

The first are stated to be the five kinds of sense-awareness (viññāna), the mano-element, and representative cognition. The latter comprise the aggregates of feeling, perception and sankhāra’s. Chetasikā and chitta have swallowed the five aggregates between them. In probably the latest Abhidhamma-book, Kathā-vatthu, we find a list of mental phenomena, greatly abbreviated by an ‘etc.’ in the middle, but evidently covering the three above-named aggregates, and called chetasika’s. These were to be regarded as the coexistent accompaniments—whether all or some of them is not yet stated—of chitta.

3. Generalizing in matter and in form.—To a great extent, the doctrines as we have them in the oldest books were very largely enunciated ad hominem, as replies to particu-

^1 Budd. Psy. Ethics, p. 318; Dhātukathā, pp. 38 f. On the term in the Nikāyas, see Compendium, 239, n. 1.
lar inquirers, bringing particular needs to be satisfied, and special defects to be put right. Many also, it is true, were spoken ad parisam, i.e. to the parisā, or company of disciples. This was a variable quantity, as the many years and tours of the Founder’s long life of mission work went on, and was so far different from the little nucleus named in the Christian gospels that it might, on any occasion, consist of a very mixed group of intelligences, from the novice, or the ‘untamed’ or untamable bhikkhu, up to men of intellect and extraordinary gifts like Sāriputta, and like Moggallāna and Kassāpa, both termed Mahā or Great. Such chosen followers were often touring, each with his own band of learners.

The Abhidhammikas set themselves to eliminate from the doctrines, thus adapted to individuals and small groups, all that was contingent in narrative; the episode eliciting the pronouncement, the comparative method of conveying its meaning, the parable and the simile, that appealed to this or that hearer. The bare judgment, or predication, was thus registered, and its terms defined. The result is not attractive reading, but the purpose was doubtless served. Taken altogether we have, in Abhidhamma, not a well-constructed philosophical system, but all the materials for one. “The Dhamma,” wrote the learned Ledi Sadaw in his essay on
Abhidhamma, "is taught in two ways: in formulas suitable for memorizing ... and in instruction imparted directly and specifically to individuals. By the former method the matter is analysed either in outline or in detail, without regard as to whether perplexities may arise or not. . . . Now the great field of Abhidhamma instruction is one of formulas, . . . wherein one must keep in view, not only those who are listening on any one occasion, but the general course of the doctrine according to the meaning and the letter. Thus will the teaching make for increase of analytical knowledge in those Ariyan students who have learned the doctrines, and for the acquisition, some future day, of analytical knowledge by ordinary folk." ¹

But this elimination of what was contingent matter does not exhaust Abhidhamma generalizing. Had this negative work been all, we might have had the not-to-be-regretted result of a Piṭaka shorn of some of its length. By the logic of consistency or symmetry, the Abhidhammikas judged it right to apply their doctrinal formulas, psychological and otherwise, not only to normal humanity, but also to supernormal humans like the arahants, and to those companies of celestial beings on different planes of life, to which

¹ Yāmāha, ii. (P.T.S.), pp. 222, 229; translated in JPTS, 1914, pp. 116, 124.
normal humans were, as religious beings, habitually aspiring.

We find the inquiry into normal human consciousness exacting enough, and consign the study of the abnormal and pathological mind to quasi-physiological treatises, and that of superhuman consciousness to theologians. We are adding the study of the infra-human animal mind to the by-products of our psychology, but only since yesterday. If we profess to include in that psychology an inquiry into all manifestations of consciousness, we have become, in this last respect, more catholic in outlook than the Buddhists. Their 'satta' is practically co-extensive with our 'creature' or 'being.' And for them there is even less of any logical dividing-line between creatures, human, sub- and super-human, than our own tradition and prejudice reveal. Yet they, with a creed of pity and tenderness for all beings, have not extended their intellectual curiosity to the mental processes of those that were, as they held, temporarily undergoing an unhappy phase of life's unending pulsations. The wealth of sympathetic insight into animal life shown in the Jātaka tales, the belief that rebirth as animal was a fate very likely awaiting the foolish person you were addressing, if not yourself—

"Those who leave this world and are reborn
as human beings are few, but those who . . . are reborn in purgatory, among beasts, among the shades, are many”

make this omission somewhat strange. We only read that rebirth as an animal was considered as the result of a more or less immoral previous life while a human being, and as a life only less full of ill than the doom of purgatory. So greatly, no doubt, was the apparent joyousness of much animal life overshadowed, for the sensitive and intellectual Indian, by the mercilessness of nature and of man on the one hand, and by the incapacity of the animal for attaining spiritual development, on the other.

“There are these five realms of life (lit. goings), Sāriputta: purgatory, the animal kingdom (lit. matrix), the shade plane, man-kind, the devas. And I understand (pajānāmi) purgatory, and the way that leads thereto, and the career through which, if practised, one is reborn after death to the dread doom of the Waste, the Downfall of the constant round. And I understand the animal kingdom, and the way that leads thereto, and the career, because of which one is reborn after death therein.”

1 Anguttara-N. i. 37.
2 Awareness of this in bird life is a pleasant detail in the Theras’ poems; cp. Psalms of the Brethren, pp. 27, 153, 364, 379.
3 Majjhima-N. i. 73.
The three remaining realms of life are declared to be understood by the Buddha no less, and so, he adds, is Nibbāna. But the Nikāyas contain no detailed revelation of that understanding so far as the first three realms are concerned. Concerning, however, the realm of devas—and this includes everything that we conceive as god, angel or guardian spirit, but not disembodied soul—the Abhidhammakas so generalize their psychological predications as to take the deva-consciousness sometimes into account. They considered that all men, except the arahants, were aspiring, well or badly, to be reborn as devas of some kind, to a larger, longer, serener life. There was no difference of kind, no presence or absence of soul, much less specific variety of soul, to distinguish deva from either man or animal. All were creatures, conditioned, compound persons, adapted to this mode of life or that.

Now it seemed to the compilers of the Abhidhamma books, either a legitimate exercise of curiosity, or a useful exercise in deduction—perhaps both—to state how much of the five-aggregate composition might go to make up rebirth in this or that deva-realm. For instance:

1 The Buddhist devas are like pious, intelligent human beings, now consulting or worshipping a superman, now admonishing a human fool.
"Where material qualities (rūpa-kkhandha) are reborn, is feeling there reborn? Ans. In the sphere of unconscious being the rūpa-kkhandha is reborn, but not feeling. In the realm of the five aggregates, both material qualities and feeling are reborn. But where feeling is reborn, are material qualities there reborn? Ans. In the invisible [or formless] world, feeling is reborn, but not material qualities."  

I have referred, in the book quoted, to the mass of catechism dealing with such matters as possibly an exercise in deduction, because it is fairly evident that when once the current doctrines, about the nature of life in other spheres than that of this world, were formularized, or at least definitely conceived, it could be deduced how far the personal compound inhabiting this earth would require modifying, in order to fit into this or that other sphere. The statements are not imparted as revelations, but as the explication of what ought to be, in the mind of an orthodox graduate, the conception of each class of beings, and of each plane of rebirth, in which he had been taught to believe. Hence, again, the statements are not drawn up as speculations. The founders of the doctrines 'understood' these spheres, because—so it was believed—they had 'seen,'

1 Yamākā, i. 19.
beholding by the ‘celestial eye,’ the pageant of the rebirth and decease of the successive lives of an indefinite number of being. Like theôroi at the Olympic Games—no mere spectators, but, in the fuller sense of that term, sacred deputies—they were accepted as representatives to other men of godlike powers, believed to be not superhuman, but supernormal only.

Note to p. 152, n. 2.—Mention might here have been made of a Buddha-discourse (Majjh.-N. iii. 169), in which he speaks of the miseries of rebirth as an animal: "And I might talk on in many ways, so hard is it adequately to state the ills of the animal world!"
CHAPTER VIII

PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MILINDA

The Questions of King Milinda,¹ in its psychological discussions, affords us interesting glimpses of development in theory midway between the Nikāyas and the Commentaries of the fifth century. No one as yet has sifted the contents of the only other Theravāda works, reckoned as authoritative, which have survived from the centuries when Buddhism was contending with, and becoming infected by, heretics in India, and was becoming thoroughly established in Ceylon—I refer to the Netti, ‘Leading’ or ‘Guidance,’² and Peṭakopadesa. In the Milinda we have the advantage of a fairly astute lay mind, bringing its problems and dilemmas to the orthodoxly trained mind of a genial and accomplished senior bhikkhu. The latter is apt, when pressed, to declare exceptions to a rule or law as practically proving, not testing it. But for the most

¹ See Bibliography.
² Edited by E. Hardy, P.T.S., 1902.
part his replies are very illuminating, and reveal here and there developments in theory and exposition, to which the later scholastics show their indebtedness. Briefly summing up those that bear on our subject, we may notice the following:

The dialogue branches into a great variety of subjects, religious, ethical, monastic, philosophical, but it is occupied for some fifty pages (in the translation) with purely psychological matter, and for some fifty more with psycho-philosophical matter as to ‘soul.’

One statement, not without interest here, is the measuring what we should call growth in holiness, graduation in saintship, in terms of increasing ability in intellection, or play of intellect.¹ The problem is how to reconcile the orthodox belief in the omniscience of the Buddha with the necessity of his having to consider (or reflect, ā-vajjāna, lit. ad-vert) before cognizing anything he wished. In reply, seven types of chitta’s are described, forming a scale in mental culture (bhāvitattam chittassa) from the least trained up to the supremely trained or Buddha mind, i.e. of the supreme type of Buddhas, known from this time onward as sabb’aññu, omni-scient, who gave themselves to enlighten and help mankind. In each grade, the mind is described as being brought quickly and easily into

¹ Questions of King Milinda, i. 154 f.
play about a greater range of subjects, remaining stiff and sluggish in action about a diminishing range of subjects.

'Culture,' here, is the term 'make-to-be,' 'cause-to-become,' associated above with developed intelligence (paññā). Perhaps 'development' or 'evolution' is at least as fit a rendering. And the supreme type of mind is declared to be so 'evolved,' that its thorough knowledge concerning everything knowable is, at any given moment, and with respect to a given subject, either actual, or potential with a potentiality swiftly transformable into actuality. The scheme is interesting as showing both the importance of intelligence or intellect in the Buddhist scheme of religious values, and also the oneness in kind between all human intellect, even up to the intellect of those who were ranked above the gods.

Concepts of mental functioning are discussed much after the earlier fashion of the Nikāyas, and usually during the repudiation, by the sage, of the animistic position. Just as the latest of the books in the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka opens its reasoned refutations of heresies with a much-detailed argument against the existence of any individual entity, so does Nāgasena, answering to his name as his first reply to the king, declare 'himself' to be but a mere convenient label for a number of parts and
aggregates. "For there exists no permanent entity." ¹

It is of historical interest that he here uses the opening phrase of the book just referred to and its term for entity or soul: not attā, but puggala. In fact, throughout his dissertations, terms other than attā are used: puggala, jīva (life, vital spirit),² vedāgu, sentient agent.³ Jīva, in the Sāṅkhya school, is the empirical soul, the intermediary, so to speak, between the organism and the absolute or noumenal soul. And it would almost appear as if attā had, at least for a time, come to signify merely the personal appearance or visible self.⁴

The mental processes discussed are chiefly those to which attention was given in connection with the Nikāyas. But there are points of added interest.

The sage has replied that "if he die with natural desires still at work in him, he will be reborn, but if not, no." Milinda asks if through reasoned thinking one "is not reborn." Nāgasena: "Both by reasoned thinking, sire, by insight and by other good qualities." "But are not reasoned thinking and insight just the same?" "No, sire, they are different. Sheep and goats, oxen,

¹ Kathā-vatthu, i. 2 (P.T.S. ed.); Questions, i. 40.
² Ibid. 48, 86, 132.
³ Ibid. 86.
⁴ See above, p. 27; in the translation attā is translated by 'image.'
buffaloes, camels, asses are capable of reasoned thinking, but not of insight.” ¹ Reasoned thinking and insight are then described by the respective essential features of mental grasp and elimination or severance, just as a reaper grasps with one hand and prescinds with the sickle.

‘Reasoned thinking’ and ‘insight’ are yoni-so-manasikāra and paññā, discussed above (pp. 123, 130). We should have possibly named dogs, elephants, monkeys, for the beasts named above. But clearly, not the most intelligent animals are meant; merely ‘animals’ in general. Now, in the Nikāyas, the ability and habit of yoni-so-manasikāra is the basis of all higher spiritual training. The English for it is not easy to find. Mr. Gooneratne has ‘wise contemplation,’ ² which in the Milinda context were a misfit. The term may possibly have depreciated a little during the centuries. If not, the crediting of animals with it lends point to the anomaly, pointed out above, with regard to inquiry into the mind of animals. ³ The association of paññā with ‘elimination’ dates from the Nikāyas, as we saw. It is, at the same time, exegetical, and not exhaustive of the import of the word. “Illumination,” says the sage, a little later, “is also its mark. . . .

¹ Questions, i. 50.
² Translation of Anguttara-N. parts i.–iii., Galle, 1913.
³ P. 151.
It causes the splendour of wisdom to shine, it reveals the Ariyan truths . . . as a lamp brought into a dark house.”¹ Again, like the wind, it has no abiding-place.²

Concerning the eight attainments called (p. 129 f.) paññā-kkhandha, or body of applied insight, the Questions refer to those known as super-knowledges (abhiññā’s), and frequent allusion is made to supernormal will (adhitṭhānā-iddhi), both as mere magic,³ and again, as a power wielded by the saint,⁴ and only limited should the still mightier result of past karma interfere with it.⁵ In one passage the power is likened to that of the synergy of an athletic action:⁶

“‘Yes, sire, there are persons who can go with this four-element-made body to Uttārakuru or to Brahma-world; or to any other part of this world.’ ‘But how can they?’ ‘Do you admit, sire, having ever jumped three or six feet of ground?’ ‘Yes, sir, I do; I can jump twelve feet.’ ‘But how?’ ‘I cause this idea (chitta) to arise: ‘there will I alight!’ With the genesis of the idea my body becomes buoyant to me.’ ‘Just so, sire, does a bhikkhu, who has iddhi and mastery over chitta, lifting up the body in consciousness, travel through the air by way of chitta.’

¹ Questions, i. 61. ² Ibid. i. 120. ³ Ibid. ii. 94. ⁴ Ibid. ii. 231, 234, 259. ⁵ Ibid. i. 261 f. ⁶ Ibid. i. 130.
Again, when Milinda is puzzled how a bhikkhu, who has will and mastery over mind, can vanish, and reappear in the Brahma-world, which is supposed to be distant a four-months’ journey of a falling body from the earth, “as soon as a strong man could stretch forth and bend in again his arm,” he is asked to think of anything he ever did at his birthplace (Alasanda—Alexandria, in Baktria), two hundred leagues away. He does so. “So easily, sire, have you travelled so far?” ¹ comments the sage, likening will-locomotion to thought.

Reverting to the insight-faculty itself, the following distinctions are less encumbered by exegetical metaphor:

“These three: consciousness (viññāṇa), insight (paññā), and the soul (jīva) in a creature—are they different in meaning as well as in the letter, or do they mean the same, differing only in the letter?” “Awareness, sire, is the mark of consciousness, and discernment, of insight; there does not exist a soul in beings.” ²

This is a close approximation to the question discussed above from the Nikāyas.³ And the eighteenth-century translator of the Questions into Singhalese amplifies the passage with a borrowed and condensed version of Buddhaghosa’s comment and

¹ Questions, i. 126. ² Ibid. i. 136. ³ See pp. 130f.
parable, to which I have referred. *Paññā* (Sk. prajñā), be it noted, was identified, by the older Upanishads, as none other, ultimately considered, than the Ātman itself: 'base and guiding principle of all that is.' Modified as jīva, the attā was shorn of its pantheistic import, and was more akin to the individual soul familiar to our own tradition. But, to pursue this psycho-philosophical question a little farther, the soul, as jīva, or vedagu (knower), was still conceived as a will-entity or agent, who, were he immanent, would, in order to know, not need to act through the intermediacy of the different channels of coming-to-know, to wit, the five senses and the *sensus communis* or co-ordinating, internal mano.

"What is this, sire, the 'soul' (vedagu)?"

"The life [-principle] (jīva) within, which sees through the eye, hears through the ear . . . and cognizes phenomena through mind, just as we, sitting here in the palace, can look out of any window we wish, east, west, north or south." . . . "If this jīva acts as you say, choosing its window as it likes, can it not then see through any one of the five senses, or so hear, so taste, etc.?" ¹

And later:

"But if, sir, there be no such thing as a soul, what is it then which sees objects with

¹ *Questions*, i. 86.
the eye, hears sounds with the ear, . . . or perceives objects with the mind?"

The Elder said: "If the soul does all this, then [it would not need the specialized apparatus of each sense] it would see, hear, etc., more clearly if the sense-organ were removed; but it is not the case that we see, hear, etc., better if the eye-aperture, etc., has the organ removed; hence there is no agent in sensation independent of the specific functioning of each sense." ¹

This argument, with its analogy of choice of window in contemplating the external world, is much on all-fours with that, in the Nikāyas,² of the attā exercising arbitrary will as one or other of the aggregates, so as to modify the personal present fate and

"remould it nearer to the heart's desire."

The form of animistic philosophy, against which it is a protest, may well have been the jīva theory of the Śāṅkhya-Sūtras. This was but a convenient fiction or schema, by which the else inconceivable action of the noumenal soul, called pūrūsha (an equivalent of puggala), ātman, or kevālā (absolute), upon body, sense and mano might be expressed in words. Thus the purusha was indifferent, impassive, separate; the senses acted mechanically. But sensation became conscious life when jīva glowed in it, like

¹ Questions, i. 133. ² See above, p. 31.
fire in hot iron, or as a red blossom in a crystal, the *purusha* losing nothing thereby.¹

The really important point that arises out of this, at first sight, somewhat futile argument of Nāgasena, is his immediately following enunciation of natural law in mental procedure, wherein lay the main support of his case. He first emphasizes the fact (briefly stated in the Nikāyas) of the orderliness in sense:—we cannot taste with the stomach, or the external skin; each channel of sense has its own procedure. The king is then made to ask whether a sense-impression always has *mano*-consciousness (co-ordination of sense) as its concomitant. “Yes.” “Which happens first?” “First the sensation, then *mano* functions.” The king asks whether sensation induces this perceiving by an injunction, or whether perception bids sense to supervene. The reply is, there is no such intercourse; the sequence happens through (1) ‘inclination’ or natural tendency, (2) existing structure, (3) habitual process, (4) practice. These conditions are severally illustrated by similes: (1) by rain-water running away according to natural *slope*;

(2) by the one means of egress and ingress used in a walled city; (3) by the usual order observed by the waggons of a caravanserai—first waggon, second waggon, etc.; (4) by the arts of writing, arithmetic and valuation, skill succeeding clumsiness through association set up by practice.

It was this *cosmos*, without and within, evident if not to be accounted for, that Buddhism accepted, as a saner, better-based view of things than that of the antinomy of an entity or soul, associated with the organism and yet not of it, and therefore, as the Kaiser Sigismund said of himself, *super grammaticam*, that is, *super* that organism’s *grammaticam*.

Further discussions on mental process yield some more definitions. The other concomitants of the happening of a *mano*-consciousness, beside the ‘contact’ on occasion of sense (between sense and its object), are stated to be feeling, perception, volition, onset of and sustained attention. These amount practically to the four immaterial aggregates, and are to be understood as the contents of a state or process of consciousness on occasion of sense. ‘Contact’ is illustrated by two rams butting, two cymbals clashing.¹ But, as we shall see, the *wherewithal* in the collision does not seem to have been conceived as matter in the case of

¹ *Questions*, i. 92 f.
sight and hearing. 'Feeling' is well described as 'the being experienced and the being enjoyed.' The character of 'perception' is cognizing—becoming aware, e.g. of visible objects, that is, of colours (Buddhist psychology still assigning only colour to bare visual impression). Thus a king's steward, visiting his treasure-house, perceives the variously coloured treasures. 'Recognizing' is a possible rendering, but in the term (saññā) the corresponding prefix is lacking.

'Volition' receives a definition of some interest. In the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka it is described by mere derivatives, throwing for us no light on its connotation. This is not far amiss if the term mean bare volition, or conation, since we have here an, or shall I say the, irreducible element of mind. Now the function or mark of volition, in these Questions,¹ is declared to be twofold: (1) deponent, and (2) causative; to wit, (1) thinking (or being caused to think), and (2) concocting or devising (to give effect to the thought). "As a man might prepare, concoct a poison and drinking it, give it also to others to drink." This dual idea was maintained up to Buddhaghosa's time. By him it is likened to the working and making to work of a peasant-farmer, and of a master-craftsman. And he applies the orthodox fourfold definition of

¹ Questions, p. 94.
his time to the term (chetanā), showing it to imply ‘being made to think,’ ‘effort,’ ‘fixing,’ ‘arranging.’ It would therefore seem to be the motor element in consciousness with the further implication of direction or purpose, and may thus be better rendered by volition than by conation. The latter, as bare reaching out, or activity put forth, is referred to an indriya—i.e. a power or faculty analogous to the sense-powers, and called víriya. It is thus described in the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka:

“The mental inception of energy . . . the striving and onward effort, exertion and endeavour, zeal and ardour, vigour and fortitude, state of unflagging effort, of sustained desire, of unflinching endurance, the solid grip of the burden.”

All this, on the other hand, suggests rather an aspect of the whole consciousness and character (habitual potential consciousness) at any given moment. In such terms as chetanā, the effort is being made to dissever, in a psychosis, all the nuances that go to make up the complex of consciousness.

The twin terms initial and sustained mental application recur. In the Ques-

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1 Visuddhi-Magga, ch. x.
3 Above, p. 89.
tions, they are likened to (a) a carpenter fixing a shaped plank into a joint, and (b) the reverberations of the (a) blows dealt in shaping a metal pot: (a) is the applied attention, (b) repeated pulsations of attention thus directed.

This analysis of consciousness ends with a reflection on the difficulty of “fixing all those mental phenomena involved in a single impression, on occasion of sense, telling that such is contact, such feeling, etc.,” as if a man in the Bay of Bengal were to taste the water and say in which river the drops had originally come down—a metaphor quoted, as we saw, by Buddhaghosa. The factors were distinguishable, but not experienced as isolated, no more than the many flavours enjoyed in the sauce blended by Milinda’s chef.

The term sati, or mindfulness, is twice discussed; the second occasion suggests a later development, almost identifying the word with mindfulness of the past, or memory, and offering the earliest approach to a theory of association of ideas existing in Indian literature. Stating that sati arises both through inward perception and external signs, the sage is asked: “In how many ways

1 Questions, i. 133.
2 Ibid. i. 97. It became nevertheless orthodox doctrine to hold, that no two chitta’s of sense-reaction could arise at the same moment. There was swift succession and apparent simultaneity. Ledi Sadaw, JPTS, 1914, 149.
does *sati* spring up?" ¹ Seventeen ways are enumerated, but they fall properly into the two above-named groups, with the exception of two. These two amount to a statement of our own 'association by way of similarity and of contrast,' and apply of course to subjective experience in general, whether presentative or representative. "Sati arises," we read, "... from similarity ... or difference of appearance ... as on seeing one *like* her we call to mind the mother ... ," or remember that such a colour, sound, etc., is *different* from that of a certain thing. The other 'modes by which mindfulness arises' are carelessly strung together, and only deserve mention because, so far as I know, there is no other inquiry of the same date to place beside the list. Briefly, then, recollection by purely representative effort is said to be effected by direct intellection (*abhiñāna*), by discursive volition, by the 'making-to-become' of trained intuition in 'super-knowledge,' *i.e.* in remembering one's own former lives, and, lastly, by ordinary revival of past experience as compared with present thoughts. This is more especially effected when that experience was of a striking nature, causing deep emotion. Milinda would recollect easily his coronation, Nāgasena his conversion; both would easily recall a pleasant or a painful episode. Ex-

¹ *Questions*, i. 121–23.
ternal suggestions of a visible or audible nature are also enumerated. The subject is then dropped.

Not less psychologically interesting is the exposition of a theory of dreams. The physical conditions of dreaming are stated to be: firstly, the constant condition of 'monkey sleep,' that is, of a state between waking and deep sleep; secondly, the variable antecedents of morbid health, biliousness for instance. The other kind of antecedent, through which alone the dream has any relation to impending occurrences, is deva-influence or deva-induction. The meaning or object of this 'celestial' (dibba) intervention is accepted as current lore without criticism. As telepathic procedure, where the agency was of a physically more ethereal, or mentally less canalized composition than the recipient's mind, the occurrence would not seem supernatural to an Indian. It is added that the dreamer would not read the sign; he would relate, and an expert would interpret—a 'wrong means of livelihood and low art,' according to the ancient teaching of the Founder.

In deep sleep the consciousness (chitta) is stated to have 'gone into,' that is, become one with the bhavanga, or flow of organic life, and 'does not go on,' 'does not recognize or discern what is pleasant or unpleasant.

1 Questions, ii. 157.  
2 Dialogues, i. 17.
For consciousness, in this merely potential state, not being a continuum,\(^1\) or persisting being, is practically non-existent. To what, if any, extent the life-flow moments include moments of what we now term subconscious mental life, I have yet to learn.

\(^1\)See *Questions*, ii. 159, \(n\). 2. Through Mr. S. Z. Aung's work on the *Compendium of Philosophy*, we are now in a better position to translate this passage.
CHAPTER IX

SOME MEDIAEVAL DEVELOPMENTS

Scanty space remains to discuss, even in outline, the additions and modifications made in mediæval and modern Theravāda psychology. Nor is the time for such discussion yet fully arrived. Of the two chief fields awaiting further research—the works of Buddhaghosa and those of Anuruddha and his commentators—only a small fraction is yet edited in Roman letter, and only one work, the digest called A Compendium of Philosophy, dating from probably the twelfth century, is yet translated. The date of Buddhaghosa is eight centuries earlier. These two groups of literature, the one supplementing the other, represent the dominant influence in Theravāda philosophical (including psychological) thought up to the present day. S. Z. Aung writes that the modern Burmese view, excepting certain independent critiques made by Ledi Sadaw, is one with the teaching of Buddhaghosa and Sumangala¹ (author of the most authoritative commentary on the Compendium).

¹ Compendium, 284.
Thus much can at any rate be said merely by reading the titles in these groups: the original zest with which philosophic and religious thought occupied itself with psychological analysis has never faltered. The human being, with or without the variations deducible in celestial being, has remained, according to Theravāda Buddhism, the proper study of mankind.

Another notable writer, two of whose works are extant, is about to become accessible to Europe, as far as publication in our own script makes him so. This is Buddhādatta, a contemporary of the more famous Buddhaghosa. The Rev. A. P. Buddhādatta of Ceylon has prepared an edition of his notable namesake's Abhidhamma vatāra, an 'introduction' to philosophy. In one respect, at least, he represents, perhaps better than Buddhaghosa, the earlier type of the classification with which we started in our first chapter.

Thus whereas Buddhaghosa expounds his psychology in terms of the five-aggregate division, Buddhādatta opens his scheme with the fourfold division of the Compendium—viz. mind, mental properties, material quality, Nibbāna.1 He writes in metrical Pali, stopping at times to supply his own

1 I do not say that we do not meet with this division in, and its acceptance by, Buddhaghosa. My point refers only to emphasis.
prose commentary: "Chitta, that is, being aware of what is within one's range . . . minding everything inclusively; one's own life-continuum." And later: "Chetasika's, that is, conjoined with chitta, or becomings-in-chitta (citte bhavā). These also, like chitta, form the subject to object, as such forming a single class. As resultants or non-resultants in consciousness, they are divisible into two classes. As productive of good or bad result or neither (literally: as good, bad or indeterminate) they form three classes. As belonging to consciousness concerned with mundane experience, with rebirth in worlds of sublimated matter, with rebirth in immaterial worlds, and with subjects whence all rebirth-concerns are rejected, they form four classes."

He then enumerates all the 'mental properties' to be distinguished in analysing that first type of a good and happy thought or chitta on occasion of sense, detailed in the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka, and discussed in an earlier chapter (pp. 186, 145). He also introduces the important distinction, not brought out in the old original analysis, of some mental properties being constants (nāyātā) and some contingent or occasional. "These five: pity, sympathy-with-joy, aversion from evil in act, speech and life, are inconstant; they arise sometimes [in such a type of consciousness]."

This distinction is clearly worked out in the
Compendium. We cannot yet compare Buddhadatta and Buddhaghosa. But the later Compendium shows clearly that, at all events, for psychological analysis, the 'five-groups' system has fallen into the background, and consciousness is resolved into chitta and its coefficients of chetasika's, some of which are constant coefficients, and some of which are, in any given moment of consciousness, present, some not.

This, in the Compendium of Philosophy, is much better worked out than in the older writer. We there see that, in such a given moment, mental analysis declares to be distinguishable factors, or nuances, seven constant coefficients, the Pali for 'constant' being 'all-consciousness-common-to.' These are contact, feeling, perceiving, volitional intellection, individualization, [the accompanying awareness of] psychic life, attention. Without these there can be no supraliminal consciousness. Besides these there may or may not be distinguishable six occasional coefficients, the Pali for 'occasional' being, in Buddhadatta, not-fixed, not certain (a-niyāta), in the Compendium, 'scattered' (pákiññaka), distributed. These are initial and sustained application,¹ deciding, effort, zest, desire-to-do, or intention.

These thirteen, the later work adds, are all neutral, morally speaking; they combine

¹ See above, p. 89,
with other factors of consciousness which are distinguishably good or bad 'implicates' of chitta.

Such then is the evolution of this dual category. First, chitta only; with the stray mention of chetasika, singular in number, in one Nikāya. Then a group word only—chitta-chetasika dhamma's, in the books of the (later) third Piṭaka. Then the second term, now plural, appears as a list in the latest book of that Piṭaka. Then the two terms described as separate philosophical categories in the fifth century, with fuller treatment, finally, of the latter category, in the twelfth-century manual. And in that manual the five aggregates are enumerated but once, in a philosophical, not a psychological section, just to paraphrase the ancient term nāmarūpa (mind-and-body),¹ before they are again and finally let go.

That a positive, if a very slow, evolution in psychological specialization is here to be seen, seems fairly clear. It may not be admitted in centres of Abhidhamma learning. I am not sure that the habit of regarding matters historically, so new as yet in our own world of science, is cultivated there. The theory of chitta and its properties or coefficient chetasika's, in this or that group of conscious syntheses, is pursued in the Compendium with a good deal of very arid

¹ Compendium, p. 198, cp. 213 ; cp. above, p. 23.
and to us also sterile numerical summarizing—an aftermath, I am tempted to think, of the so long preponderant booklessness in Indian culture. More instructive, and revealing a more notable development in analysis is the doctrine of function (kiccha) and of process (vīthi, pavatti). And here whereas the Compendium reveals advance in summarization, it is in Buddhaghosa and Buddhadhatta that, at present, we detect the original sources of its evolution.

In discussing the fifth aggregate—viññāṇa, or consciousness in its typical sense of coming-to-know, cognition,—Buddhaghosa enumerates fourteen modes (ākārā) in which there is viññāṇa-process,¹—viz. at re-conception, in subconsciousness (sleep, etc., bhavanga), in ad-verted attention (ā-vajjana), the five modes of special sense-impressions, recipience [of the same], investigation, determination, complete apprehension, and registration, and finally, at death. “At the end of registration, procedure is once more bhavanga (unconscious or subconscious). Then when bhavanga is again cut across, the course of consciousness having again acquired [the necessary] antecedents, adverting recurs, and so on, there being repetition of this procedure by way of the natural law (niyāmā) of consciousness, until the bhavanga perishes. In each new life (bhava, literally

¹ Visuddhi-Magga, ch. xiv.
becoming), the lapsing of the last subcon-
scious chitta is called decease (chūti, falling).
... But from decease [comes] again con-
ception, and from conception again bhavanga
—such is the procedure in the unarrested
consciousness-continuum of beings faring
on through eternity. But who so attains
Arahantship, to him when consciousness
has ended, renewed birth and death have
also ceased.”

The eleven modes of the cognitive pro-
cess are briefly described previous to this
passage. But they have not the appearance
of being stated for the first time. No
explanation of them as process is judged
necessary. And since Buddhadatta, in the
fourth chapter of the work referred to, also
names these fourteen modes of chitta,
it is probably right to conclude that they
both were but handing on an analytical
formula, which had evolved between their
own time and that of the final closing of
the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka.

But the exposition of the cognitive process
is more clearly and concisely stated in the
later Compendium. However swiftly an act
of sense-perception may be performed, it
was held that, in every such act, seventeen
moments or flashes (the metaphor is mine)
of consciousness took place, each moment
being considered to involve the three time-

1 Visuddhi-Magga, ch. xiv. 2 Above, p 174.
phases of all ‘becoming,’ namely a nascent, static and dissolving phase. “Hence,” we read, “the process [of sense-cognition] is thus: When, say, a visible object, after one chitta-moment (1) has passed, enters the avenue [or focus] of sight, the life-continuum (bhavanga) vibrating twice (2) (3), its stream is interrupted, then the adverting moment rises and ceases (4). Immediately after there arise and cease, in order, the visual impression (viññāna), aware of just that visible object (5), recipient consciousness (6), investigating consciousness (7), determining or assigning consciousness (8), then seven flashes of full perception,” or apperception (jāvāna) (9–15); finally, if the percept is sufficiently vivid, two moments of retention or registering consciousness (16, 17). This phase etymologically is very differently named: tad-ārammana, or that-object—that and not another. “After that comes subsidence into the life-continuum.”

The later commentaries illustrate this multiple, if momentary, psychosis by the following simile: A man in deep sleep with covered head beneath a mango tree (stream of unconscious life or bhavanga). A wind stirs the branches (preceding chitta 1 and vibrating bhavanga, 2, 3). This causes a mango to fall by him (arrest or disruption of unconscious life). The man is waked by the

1 Compendium, 126.
falling fruit (adverting, 4). He uncovers his head (sense-impression of fruit, 5), picks up the fruit (receiving, 6), inspects it (investigating, 7), determines what it is (determining, 8), eats it (full perception, 9–15), swallows the last morsels (registering, 16, 17), re-covers his head and sleeps again (subsidence into bhavanga). ('After-taste' had perhaps been more apt for 16, 17.)

Such is the type of procedure where the impression is vivid. With fainter impressions, inception may take longer, or there may be no process of registering, whence comes retention and reproduction. There may even be no moments of full cognition, or, in the faintest stimuli conceivable, no sense-impression, but mere momentary bhavanga-chalāna, i.e. organic 'vibration.'

This is certainly, in its meticulous analysis, its so to speak microscopical introspection, a considerable elaboration of the simple Sutta statement, quoted in a former chapter, of mano as the resort of, and the indulger in, all the impressions of the special senses. Nevertheless, the validity of that statement is piously upheld by Buddhaghosa, when he is discoursing on mano. This is in his Commentary on the first Abhidhamma-Piṭaka book, a work containing better psychological matter than the more normative treatment of the Visuddhi-Magga.

1 P. 69.
The work of mano is there explained in reference to that passage.

Quoting it, he goes on: "Those objects which are the field and range of the five senses are also enjoyed by mano. . . . Each object (colour, sound, etc.) enters the focus [of consciousness] by two doors or gates. The object of sight, for instance, when it becomes the condition of bhavanga-vibration, by striking on the visual organ, at that instant comes into the focus of the mano-door. Just as a bird coming through the air and alighting on a tree, at the same moment shakes a bough and casts its shadow on the earth, even so is the simultaneity of sense-stimulus and mano-access." Then follow adverting of mano and the rest of the process. But in work of mano-door only, there is no sense-impact. This is when, on a later occasion and being no matter where, we recall some previous sense-experience—"the sight of the beautifully decorated shrine, the pleasant voice of the preacher, the odour of votive wreaths, the meal enjoyed with colleagues. Or we may, when lying on a hard bed, recall a soft, easy couch enjoyed at such a time. Thus to the adverting mano the tangible object seems to enter the door of touch, and to make the pleasant contact present. But there is no such impact at the time." ¹

¹ Atthasālinī, 73; Bud. Psy. Ethics, 2, n. 3.
Later on, the mano-element (‘element’ as being ‘empty of substance’ or ‘entity’) is described as “following the sense-impression, as having the essential mark of cognizing sights, sounds, etc., the property of receiving the same, the resulting phenomenon of truth (literally: thusness), and as its proximate antecedent, the vanishing of the sense-impression. . . .” ¹ Its physical basis is the heart, and although the door-objects, which are not similarly bound, pass on, this is the locus, this has the function of receiving them. The investigating moment and the rest come under that developed activity of mano termed ‘element of mano-consciousness,’ and correspond more or less to what our textbooks call representative cognition, much of which is always implicit, if perhaps latent, in an act of sense-perception. And where the work of mind is not largely automatic, and swiftly determined and apperceived, as on most occasions of sense, but is dealing with unfamiliar and problematical assimilation, we may presume that Buddhaghosa would admit that chitta-moments, predominantly of investigating, determining, etc., might be indefinitely multiplied. Unfortunately he has left us no work devoted entirely and systematically to mental analysis. And if there be any such

¹ Atthasālīna, 263. Note the orthodox scholastic mode of definition,
later work by another hand, it is not yet accessible.

A complete exposition of this Commentary, however, would reveal much more incidental psychological matter of interest. For instance, it does not pause to point to anything problematical in the phenomenon of contact on occasion of sense, either in the physical necessity, except in touch, of a medium, or in the apparent anomaly of rūpa in contact with that which is a-rūpa (matter with mind). And it makes no dogmatic statement concerning this. Nevertheless remarks are let drop guarding the psychological position. Thus: “Eye impinges on visible object (rūpa) only means eye receiving the mental object (ā-rammaṇa).”

Again, when he alludes to the Milinda similes for contact—the rams butting and cymbals clashing—Buddhaghosa justifies the use of ‘impact’ as between consciousness and mental object only in the sense of attaining, achieving (sampatti).

And, generally speaking, the cause of feeling lies in the nature of consciousness itself, “just as the heat of melting lac is in its own tissue though ascribed to burning coal without.”

There is a great deal more sagacious psychological comment scattered thickly up and down this Commentary, and to some extent the following Commentary on the

\[1\] Atthasālīni, 309. \[2\] Ibid. 108 f.
Vibhanga, or second book of the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka.¹ Some day, in a separate monograph, the psychology of Buddhaghosa will take its lawful place in the history of psychology. It is as yet premature to attempt a digest of the contribution made by him. A good deal of this cumbers the pages of the older work translated in my so-called Buddhist Psychological Ethics, but imperfectly and incompletely presented. I will only quote two more remarks given there, to show, by these alone, how unworthy of a truly catholic perspective it will be, to take account of Aristotle’s psychology and not of Buddhaghosa’s when made accessible.

The ‘work translated’ just mentioned (Dhamma-sangāṇī) has replied to its query: “What is included under visible object?” by stating, first, colours, then forms of magnitude. On these the Commentary remarks: “Here, inasmuch as we are able to tell ‘long,’ ‘short,’ etc., by touch, while we cannot so discern ‘blue,’ etc., therefore long, short, and so on are not to be taken as visual objects without explanation. It is only by customary usage that we can speak of anything as visible object which appears as long or short, great or small, etc. etc., when so placed as to compare with some-

¹ Printed as yet only in Burmese characters, this work is now being prepared for publication in Roman letter by the Pali Text Society.
thing else.”¹ This may not bring us up to modern psychology, but it is a farther step towards Berkeley's rather one-sided view, that whenever we are seeing, we are really, in mind, touching, than is Aristotle's mere hint: "There is a movement which is perceptible both by touch and sight."²

Once more, in commenting on the question: "What is included under the organ of touch?" he writes:

"The organ of touch (literally, the material organic compound, or body, kāya) is diffused over the whole bodily form just as moisture pervades an entire cotton rag. With the exception of this quality of unspecialized organ, the sense ranks with the others. To the objection that, if the sensitive surface be so general, it would convey confused impressions, the reply is that, without this extensity, we should not get all the touch-differentiations that we do get. In an ultimate sense the organ of touch is both everywhere and not everywhere. Not everywhere to the extent of being in things as seen or as tasted, etc. We cannot segregate sensations as we can grains of sand: hence qualities appear to, but do not really, coalesce in the object."³

Leaving the field of sense-cognition, another noteworthy contribution by Buddha-

¹ Atthasālinī, 317. ² De Anima, II. vi. ³ Atthasālinī, 311.
ghosa is his recording what was probably the current development of the meaning of the term I have rendered as 'zest' (pīṭī). This word in the canonical books is usually associated with either sūkha, pleasant, happy feeling, or pamōjja, joy, gladness, and it was very generally rendered by 'joy.' Mr. Aung has strongly maintained that it is not so much an emotional as an intellectual quality, and, at least at its lowest power, stands for 'interest.' Thus the 'interest' of pursuit as compared with the sukha of realization is, by Buddhaghosa, likened to the thirsty heated traveller's quest compared with his reaching water, shade and rest.

But if pīṭī be not emotional, it is unmistakably emotion. 'Emotional' is, has to be, used as the adjective of feeling. And pīṭī is classed, not with feeling (vedanā-kkhandha), but among the coefficients of consciousness called sankhāra's or chetasika's. It is not simply pleasurable feeling (sukha). But neither is emotion to be so defined. Emotion is feeling accompanying an idea, the being 'moved' with a coefficient of representative consciousness. The canonical description of pīṭī allies it with terms of gladness, mirth and enthusiasm.¹ Buddhaghosa gives, as its essential features, the being pleased, expansion, and elation.² He also gives us the five grades of pīṭī: the thrill

of eagerness, the momentary flash, the flood of enthusiasm, as waves breaking over us, ecstasy or transport, and rapture. And all the instances given refer to an idea or group of ideas as the proximate cause. Hence whereas no one word need suffice, 'joy' as the more exultant, uplifted form of interest or zest is by no means always a mistranslation. And as the Commentary on the Psalms of the Sisters and Brethren renders by pītisukha their emotion on reviewing their own struggles to the goal, so do I judge that Buddhaghosa, and even my excellent collaborator, would use pīti in translating Prof. Bergson's fine passage on the intellectual joy of creative effort and attainment. Once we get at the psychologically composite backbone of pīti: "intellectual excitement over an object felt as desirable,"¹ we may render the word by whichever of the above-named terms—none of which, not even 'joy,' is bare feeling—the particular context seems to demand.

This mood of intellectual commotion, ranging from interest, eagerness, or zest up to rapture, is too important in all religious psychology for us to dismiss the Buddhist discussion of it for yet a few moments longer. The emotion, writes the Commentator, reaches maturity and climax in composure and serenity of mind. But the prior working of it

¹ Discussed in my Buddhism (1912), p. 231.
is a sort of mental intoxication. We may pass over his metaphors of the first three and the last: the 'goose-flesh' thrill, the lightning flash, the boiling surge on the shore, the expansion of a blown bladder.\(^1\) It is on \(piti\) as elation, or transport or ecstasy, that he enlarges. And here he quits our Western and Greek-trained sobriety, and takes the elation\(^2\) and transport physically as well as mentally, representing those possessed of this rapture "caught up to the third heaven," as St. Paul might say, "whether in the body or out of the body I cannot tell—God knoweth," or as he himself says, "making the body elated, so as to accomplish a measure of leaping into the air." He then tells two anecdotes from his abundant store: how an Elder M. dwelling at N. contemplating the full moon at a shrine, and thinking how at the Great Shrine all the faithful must just then be reverencing the Buddha, dwelt on the idea of Him, and in a throbbing (ubbega) ecstasy, like the chords of a lyre, rose in the air and stood again in the courtyard of the Great Shrine. Thus too the daughter of well-to-do folk at Y., near the minster Z., left at home while they went to church, stands at her door looking in the bright moonlight up towards the hill-shrine 'shining like a heap

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\(^1\) Visuddhi-Magga, ch. iv.

\(^2\) Udagya=ud-ag-ya (up-top-ness).
of pearls,’ and longing to hear ‘the sweet Dhamma-discourse.’ Thereupon throbbing ecstasy arises and she too leaps into the air, arriving in the congregation before her parents. They question her and are amazed that she should have come as only arahants were wont to travel.

Pīti therefore at this degree of intensity was held to have produced, in the past at least, a similar supernormal result to the power of supernormal will, without apparently any express preparation or exertion of will.

Buddhaghosa gives his cases in much the same tone of habitual, unsurprised faith that an orthodox Christian would use in alluding to miracles. But I have not yet found him attesting his own experience of such results, nor that of his contemporaries. And his chapter on Iddhi in the Visuddhi-Magga, to which he here and there refers his readers, is to me clearly not that of one who spoke from first-hand experience. When this chapter appears in its long-delayed English dress, the reader will be able to judge to what extent the Jhāna exercises, prescribed for making the mind (chitta) ‘concentrated, purified, pliant and fit,’ seem calculated to induce the extraordinary power of will which, in the iddhi-adept, were reckoned able to convert mind into body,

1 Adhiṭṭhānā-iddhi, see pp. 127 f.
or body into mind, as if the repudiated Atman itself were immanent in either.

The work of Buddhaghosa cannot, let it be once more said, be justly appraised in these fragmentary remarks, typical of the very unfinished state of our 'excavations.' His intellect, clogged as it is by all that usually handicaps the scholastic mind, dominates the development of his own tradition: unsound philology, unsoundness as to historical evidence, the losing, in detailed work, all conspectus of the whole, whether that whole be the movement of thought in his day, or the movement, from its inception, of the tradition he represented. His diction, moreover, becomes at times involved and ambiguous. He was no longer writing for a culture with no literature. But there is a world of difference between his commentatorial phraseology and the limpid periods of Milinda's delightful monitor.

We know, however, enough to be doubtful as to the probability of coming upon any attempt to theorize on the problem of representative cognition, or of the association of ideas. Apparently he resembled in this respect European philosophers prior to Hume and Hartley—for Spinoza's statements \(^1\) carry us no further than Buddhaghosa's as psychological theory, though they are better summaries. Until, in fact, the

\(^1\) *Ethics*, ii. xvii, xviii.
neurological inquiries of Cartesianism were set on foot, no strong impetus arose to make the apparent parallelism between the physically associated and the mentally associated a matter for philosophy to theorize about. But the problem of the functions of the pineal gland and the deductions therefrom set the savants thinking anew. "I wonder," wrote Spinoza, "that one who had so often taken to task the Scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through occult qualities, could maintain a hypothesis, beside which occult qualities are commonplace! What does he understand, I ask, by the union of the mind and the body?" 1

Now Buddhist psychology postulated a seat, literally, site (vatthu), for each of the ways in which the organism was, as Prof. Bergson might say, canalized for access to external impressions, or rather for the access of those external conditions, in consequence of which chitta or consciousness was called up. These were the five special sense-peripheries, and, in the older books, "that material thing on the basis of which apprehension and comprehension take place," 2 a thing which, in all the (much later) commentaries, is explained to be the heart (hādāyā-vatthu). The brain is not even mentioned until the Milinda, 3 and though the

1 *Ethics*, v. Preface. He is referring to Descartes.
2 *Compendium*, 278.
3 *Questions*, i. 42.
etymological parallel of nerves (nahāru) is always included, in the enumeration of the thirty-two main constituents of the body, it is apparently in the sense of 'sinews.' There was therefore no physiological induction concerning the 'canalization' of sensory disturbance. Hence any corresponding theory of 'latent mental modifications,' based on a theory of neural tracks and so forth, is no more to be expected in Buddhist than in European mediæval psychology. And so far as I have seen, Buddhaghosa is content to push no further the adumbrations of theory we met with in the Milinda, but simply to give the facts, the results of representative cognition, without feeling called upon to frame any new theory to suit the 'non-entity-non-soul' axiom of his tradition which he loses no opportunity of upholding.¹

To judge, however, by S. Z. Aung's able presentment, in his introductory essay to the Compendium of Philosophy, the later mediæval and modern psychological literature of Burma and Ceylon has not only evolved a detailed theory of reproductive mental procedure, but claims to have evolved it from the so-called Method of Relations, formulated with interminable detail in the last book of the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka called Paṭṭhāna. We have as yet no access to the

¹ Bud. Psy. Ethics, xxxvi f.
original documents containing these later developments to which Mr. Aung owes his philosophical training. But I imagine that it will have been the contact with Western thought and criticism, and not his authorities, who prompted him to propound and to reply to the query: "How is memory possible, if the subject be not the same for any two consecutive moments in life?" ¹

There is a prospect, I am glad to say, of a fuller disquisition on Buddhist philosophy of mind, on the lines of Mr. Aung’s essay, by his teacher, Ledi Sadaw, coming our way. I have put in a plea that special attention may be given to the philosophy of relations (pacchāyā), and its application to mental processes.² Here is not the place to discuss it, and the question itself given above is philosophical, and not psychological. We are not, however, out for psychology pure and simple, and shall do well to pause a moment over the subject on which we may get more light in the near future.

Pacchaya is not exactly our relation. It is nearer to that kind of relation which we call causal. Thus, in the Commentary on the Book of Relations Buddhaghosa writes: "Pacchaya here means because-of-that-makes-

¹ Compendium, 42.
² Paṭṭhāna, part II., was edited by myself in 1906 ; part I. and the Commentary I am now preparing for press.
“to-go.” (This is the mediæval ‘buried-city’ etymology common to Europe and Asia.) “That is to say, it is concerned with what is not-opposed.” (More ‘buried-city.’) “For the phenomenon (A) which stands or happens in non-opposition to another phenomenon (B) is said to be the pacchaya of the latter.” We now become more positive again: “Pacchaya has the essential mark of rendering service (literally working-up-to, upakāraka). A is B’s pacchaya in so far as it renders service to B’s existing or becoming. Pacchaya, condition, reason-why, source, coming-to-be, origin (pabhāva), etc., are one in meaning, different in verbal form.” Judging by this passage, therefore, the twenty-four kinds of pacchaya distinguished in the Book of Relations are twenty-four ways in which the happening of A affects the happening of B; or conversely, in which the happening of B is as it is because of the happening of A.

When this definition is applied to the correlation of one mental moment (chītta) with another, we get a much less empty abstract conception than that of two terms just ‘standing in relation one to the other.’ We come to realize that in a continuum of momentary chītta’s we have not just a number of isolated, mutually independent units, simulating by their speed a unity of substance, just as a red-hot point whirled round
in the dark simulates an unbroken circle.¹ We have a number of units simulating unity, but they are such that each one is what it is because of the ‘service-rendering’ of those that have preceded it. Thus according to the Book of Relations, and the echo of it in the Compendium,² B chitta, related to A chitta as (1) immediately succeeding, (2) present while A is absent, (3) present with A in abeyance, that is, telling upon it, is, in consequence, so and not otherwise. Or again when A and B are in the pacchaya of association (sampayutta), A has rendered such service to B that it is wrought up into B, and hence in B our past appears as present. (In the latter case reference is not made to mutually contiguous chitta’s).

This influence, or service-rendering, or conditioning of one momentary phenomenon (whether mental or otherwise) came to be termed satti (Sansk. śakti), that is ability, vis, influence, force, chiefly, it would seem, through the teaching of Ariyavamsa, a notable and noble-natured Burmese teacher of the fifteenth century.³ And I mention the theory as showing that the Buddhist theory of non-soul, or of no abiding entity— which-has-chitta’s, has not caused the sub-

² Page 193, §9.
³ Cp. Mrs. Bode’s Pali Literature of Burma, 41. I owe the information to S. Z. Aung’s kind reply to my question as to the earliest mention of pacchaya-satti.
stitution, in place of such a doctrine, of disconnected momentary monads, each one being a *tabula rasa* of anything that had gone before.

All this is insufficient to explain the 'reinstatement' of any given section of the past at any given moment, in other words, why chitta's *AB* . . . *call up* certain former chitta's *XY* . . . whether we add, with Locke, why *C* is the consciousness that 'we did have' *XY* . . . once, or whether we do not. But that is a matter that the hypothesis of a perduring entity does not explain either. Theories of association may state that, for instance, a man, passing some object one day and making a remark, may recollect, when passing a year later, what he said, and continue the conversation, and call it association by contiguity and similarity. But the *form* of persistence, the actual mechanism of reinstatement, that has gone on 'in' the mental continuum, the theory can no more describe than the electrician can say how wire or ether is molecularly affected during transmission of electric force. We cannot describe mental experience, which is 'much more vast than cerebral life,' ¹ in terms of space, nor can we broaden into detail in terms of time.

Hence the sublimated animism of a

¹ Prof. Bergson, 'Presidential Address,' S.P.R., translated by Dr. Wildon Carr.
'psychic continuum' is really no better off as to an intelligible description of memory than is the Buddhist non-animism. If the former seem at first sight to help us out, it is because we have been surreptitiously conceiving mind in spatial dimensions, either as a storehouse,¹ and modified substance, or else as a long, long lane down which come pilgrims from the past. Such at least is, I think, the vaguely floating image of the remembering mind held, if not by psychologists, at least by the general reader. If we strip off these quasi-visible vestments of mind, and think of it only in terms of its processes experienced as results, then the upspringing of potential chitta's, not empty and mutually disconnected, but each fraught with the informing satti of this or that among former chitta-continua, brings all our past right up to and about our present at least as much as does a real, and not a simulated unity in the continuum.

In putting down the Compendium, we note that, in the last part, which is concerned with that mental training, or 'making to become,' so as to realize, for those who were ripening for it, the final goal of life, the word paññā has gone, and vipassanā, dis-cernment, insight, has replaced it. The twin terms, 'calm and insight,' date from the oldest books, but they come, as twin terms,

¹ A botte à souvenirs, Prof. Bergson would say.
to the very front rank only in mediæval works. Each now comprises a khandha or group of exercises. ‘Calm’ (sam’āthā) includes all that Buddhaghosa classed under samādhi (concentration) and the older books partly under training (sikkhā) of chitta, partly under paññā. Under ‘calm’ is now included ‘supernormal intellection,’ or a-bhiññā.\(^1\) Of its six modes the last—the spiritual ‘destruction of the āsava’s or vicious instincts’—is suppressed, and the other five are very briefly dismissed. ‘Insight’ comprises the intellectual realization of certain truths.

In spite of the ample statement given to one of them, to iddhi, in Mr. Aung’s interesting introduction, I see in these altered proportions an evolution of thought. Sixteen hundred years, perhaps, had elapsed since the wonderful age that produced the Founder and his Arahants, and over a thousand, since the earliest records were committed to writing. Even Buddhaghosa could only refer to the marvels achieved by saints of old, while it would seem that for Anuruddha’s still later age, the sight and sound of things ineffable, and the godlike will that could say of Brahma-heaven “Be thou near to me!”\(^2\) were become as things that were very far away.

\(^1\) Compendium, p. 209, and above, pp. 126–130.
\(^2\) Visuddhi-Magga. “Iddhividhā’
Let me bring to a close these fragmentary inquiries into the age-long career of Theravāda thought by linking those into the chitta and the pañīṇā of the oldest books with the latest utterances from Burma. In the Thera Ledi Sadaw of Mandalay are combined, fortunately for us, a desire to give of his best to those in Europe who have ears to hear, and a culture that is quite untouched by anything that Europe might have to give him of its own thought. His diction, so far as I know it, seems to me ageless; his similes might all be in the Nikāyas, or in Buddhaghosa; his ideas belong to a machine-less world. Such a product must, even in Burmese monasteries, be soon a thing of the past. Fortunately his works, written in Pali, are numerous, and are in print. In them (I do not say in them only) we may learn something of modern Theravāda, undistorted by filtration through minds born and trained in European tradition. Such ‘distortion’ may eventually bring about an evolution in Theravāda greater than any it has experienced—an evolution that will eventually react mightily on our own philosophic standpoints—and be ultimately acknowledged by Buddhists themselves as the cause of a great renascence. For the present we need to record this uncontaminated, unleavened heritage, deriving without break, from the Burmo-Singhalese
Council of A.D. 1165, not to mention the cult of the preceding centuries.

"Chitta (consciousness), mano (mind), mānasa (intelligence), viṃḍīṇa (awareness)," writes Ledi Sadaw, "all are really one in meaning: they are various modes of coming to know.\(^1\) \ldots We know, whether our knowing be of blue as such or not as such, or whether it be of the real, as real or as otherwise, or whether it be what we desire or do not desire. Now knowing is threefold: there is knowing as being aware of, knowing as perceiving, knowing as understanding. Perceiving is a clearer knowing than awareness, and is also knowing without forgetting over a lapse of time. Understanding (pajāṇaṇa) is knowing adequately by way of class and species. It is knowing completely all about any [given] knowable thing. For even in any one such thing there is much to be known, viz. as to its nature, conditions, correlations, effects, the evil, the good of it, its impermanence, the ill connected with it. And pajāṇana, paṇṇā, is to have an exhaustive knowledge of all this, as it is said: ‘The limit of knowledge is the knowable, the knowable is the limit of knowledge.’ Paṇṇā in its fullest sense is omniscience. \ldots Yet even for the learner, whenever through coming to know he conquers natural failings, his knowing has become

\(^1\) So Buddhaghosa.
paññā. . . . And whenever ordinary folk by coming to know dispel what is harmful, induce what is good, their knowledge too is paññā." ¹

The writer refers to passages in the canonical scriptures illustrating each kind of knowledge. A little further on he launches into a disquisition, varied by dialectic, on chitta as "the especial basis, the peculiar soil of the error of Permanence," and on the doctrine of chitta as a phenomenon "which uprises and ceases from one moment to another." From the standpoint of popular thought and diction, it is correct to speak of mind, person, soul, as being or persisting, or passing hence, when from the standpoint of ultimate or philosophical truth nothing of the kind is so. We will not go into that here. But we can pick up the thread again for a moment, where his discussion is psychological.

"Knowledge (ñāna),² do you say, is the criterion of truth? But that knowledge is twofold: inferential or intuitive.³ When ordinary folk are investigating abstruse, subtle, deep matters, they know by way of inference. But with proper mental training, by developing paññā, they may attain intuition in such matters. By intuition,

¹ Yamaka, ii., Appendix, p. 264 (P.T.S. ed.).
² Ibid. 274. This to the objector.
³ Paṭiveḍha, lit. penetrating.
they discard the concepts 'person,' 'entity,' 'self or soul,' 'living thing' (jīva), and know things as of purely phenomenal nature, under the concept of element (dhātu). Now mind, mental coefficients, matter, Nibbāna,¹ are just such abstruse, subtle, deep matters, to be truly understood only as inferential knowing becomes, through persistent training, transformed into intuitive knowing.”

Here we see intuition considered as one aspect of that paññā, which is thorough knowing.

It may be noticed that Dr. Ledi makes no reference to Buddhaghosa’s frequently repeated simile of the child, the citizen, and the gold-expert (above, pp. 131 f.), when distinguishing between the three modes of coming-to-know. Mr. Aung tells me that it is given in Sumangala’s still more popular commentary. He himself disapproves of consciousness (viññāna) being graded with perception and paññā, which belong to the philosophically different category of mental coefficients (chetasika’s).

Here the reader of the Nikāyas and Buddhaghosa will note that the ancient five-group distinction is passed over. Ledi Sadaw, however, in commenting on that classification, has illustrated, by a new and ingenious parable, the functions of the five

¹ The fourfold category of Buddhadatta and the Compendium. See above, pp. 174, 176.
'groups,' in vindication of the adequacy of this ancient category to take into account all human activities in such spheres as are governed by natural desire (tan̄hā-visayesu ṭhānesu): 1

"It may be asked: Why did the Exalted Buddha, when classifying conditioned experience under the concept of aggregates (khandhā), make the number five? We reply: By these five groups of phenomena our acts, regarded as felicific, on occasions where natural desires have play, find accomplishment. This the following parable may illustrate: A wealthy man, seeking wealth, builds a ship, and equips it with a crew of fifty-two sailors. By transport of passengers he amasses money. Of the crew one is expert in all works relating to the ship, and has these carried out; and one is acquainted with the ports to be visited and the routes thither, and he from a commanding position 2 directs the steering. The owner, maintaining boat and crew, receives and enjoys the ensuing wealth.

"Now by the sea we may understand the way of life ever renewed (samsāra); by the ship-owner, a person pursuing natural and worldly desires. By the ship we may understand the material aggregate (rūpa-

1 I have very slightly condensed the following.
2 I felt that 'the bridge' was too modern for this 'ageless' prose!
kkhandha); by the wealth it brings in, the aggregate of feeling; by the former officer, the aggregate of perception; by the crew carrying out his orders, the mental properties labelled as sankhāra-aggregate; and by the latter officer, who directs the ship's course, the viññāna-aggregate.

"'Feeling' covers all our enjoying, partaking of. 'Perception' includes our conversation with, our intelligence of, our competence respecting all experience in the range of things human, divine, or infra-human. That which we call sankhāra's covers all that we do by thought, word, or deed according to what we have perceived. And viññāna, or the aggregate of consciousnesses or cognitions, is all those sense-impressions, sense-cognitions, which act as heralds and guides wherever we happen to be, pointing out, as it were, in our daily activities, and saying: 'this is here, that is there!' Thus it is that the five aggregates cover all that is wrought within the range of natural and worldly desires."

Hence, in this our little inquiry over some twenty-three centuries or more, we are still, in these words of last year, well within sight of our starting-point. In them we see that, with a considerable evolution in introspective and analytical and critical power, there has been and still is an unbroken current of consistently upheld Theravāda tradition,
and that, even for a writer credited with so much independent and progressive judgment as Ledi Sadaw, the word ascribed in the Piṭakas to the Buddha, adored and omni-
scient, delivering his first sermon, in the Deer Wood near Benares, has not yet passed away, nay, has not, since that auspicious day, lost aught of its pregnant and far-seeing wisdom and power.
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**TRANSLATIONS OF LATER WORKS**


The mediæval texts referred to, but not translated, are given in the footnotes.
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