Western Civilization
A Political, Social, and Cultural History

VOLUME II — SINCE 1660

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THIS volume covers the period from 1660 to the present. The political, social and cultural development of our modern bourgeois society is its major theme. Inasmuch as the new order has experienced since 1870 its greatest change that period has been given relatively more space than the early one. Because of this emphasis the book can be used not only in general courses covering Western civilization, but also in more restricted courses dealing with the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

A textbook of so general a nature can make no pretense of any high degree of originality. It is hoped, however, that a freshness of approach will be found in this volume. Nowhere else, it is believed, is the social phase of history so sharply and continuously stressed. Moreover, not to be found in similar histories, are such full treatments of the development of modern science, the economic background of World War II, the Global Struggle, and its aftermath.

Necessarily, some phases of the past have had to be slighted; in fact the author has felt it expedient to be brief in his treatment of the early modern period. A sincere effort has been made, however, to maintain a proper balance between mass and quality, between fact and meaning, and to avoid abstract generalizations. History is viewed as a process of evolution, as a drama of struggle and achievement, and as a play that does not fold. The events are carried to the present, and the treatment reflects, as far as possible, the most recent information that has come to light.

The author wishes to express his gratitude for the valuable suggestions given him in the preparation of this book by Professor Richard J. Hostetter (University of Arkansas), Mr. Walter Utt (Alameda, California) and Mrs. Amie H. Abbot (Berkeley, California).

Berkeley, California

Franklin C. Palm
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CHAPTER I

The Commercial Revolution
and the Expansion of
Europe

THREE threads of progress give us the approach to the modern
world: the expanding self-confidence of the individual; the rise
of the middle classes; and the evolution of the modern state. In some
ways they were interrelated. The individualism of the Renaissance
was fundamentally a cause of the growth of the bourgeoisie, and the
latter in turn assisted in the development of the modern nation. However,
it was not until the nineteenth century that the business classes
actually took over the state. Prior to that time, absolute monarchs
and their statesmen operated the government machinery, often using
the bourgeoisie to advance their dynastic interests. Nevertheless, one
can discover in a study of the Renaissance and the religious wars that
ushered in the modern age signs of the eventual triumph of the
genius of the individual in science, business, politics, and art—a
genius that was to have much to do with the making of our twen-
tieth century society.

Both these upheavals, however, were accompanied by a series of
profound economic changes that transformed the medieval pattern
of commerce, finance, and manufacturing into an economic system
recognizable as the immediate forebear of twentieth century capi-
talism. Practically all the essential elements of our present-day eco-
nomic system were formed in the matrix of the economic evolution
that took place over a three hundred-year period, roughly from 1450
to 1750. This series of changes marking the transition from the non-
profit, static economy of late medieval times to the dynamic, capital-
istic economy of the early modern period has become known as the
Commercial Revolution. The term “revolution,” of course, is mis-
leading insofar as the upheaval discussed below was not cataclysmic in its suddenness but rather an evolutionary process extending over centuries. There is no doubt, however, that one system of economic relationships was overturned and that another took its place, and the effects were as far-reaching as any sudden and violent revolution in the history of western Europe.

Early beginnings of the Commercial Revolution are obscure, for much of modern capitalism long bore the imprint of medieval practices insofar as industry was dominated by commerce. It was only when expanding manufacturing had developed to the point where it could put trade in a subordinate position that the Commercial Revolution came to an end. It is difficult, therefore, to place a precise date for this economic transition.

Causes of the Commercial Revolution also are not clear since it was a series of gradual changes. There are several specific impulses, however, that can be isolated and that appear to have had a direct causal relationship to the economic and financial innovations of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The introduction of coins of general circulation and the accumulation of surplus capital were of paramount importance. Crusades and treks of men like Marco Polo into the farther reaches of Asia stimulated a demand for new goods from the East. Italian commercial cities of Genoa and Venice burgeoned as monopolists of the Mediterranean trade and, farther to the north, towns like Augsburg and Nuremberg grew rich as a consequence of their positions on the land route to the Netherlands from northern Italy. The Hanseatic League, too, flourished by trading the products of the Baltic region for the spices, gems, brocades, and other commodities of the East. Because the new commerce within the various states provided more taxable wealth, the monarchs encouraged their enterprising subjects. To the men of the rising middle classes this combination of factors gave hopes of power and riches and, most important of all, some of the equipment for the expansion of business. No longer would they be content with the restrictive ideals of medieval economic life. Drastic changes in economic views and practices were inevitable.

The key to an understanding of the Commercial Revolution lies in the remarkable series of overseas discoveries and explorations that began in the fifteenth century. This expansion of Europe cannot be offered as the primary cause of the Commercial Revolution, for it was a concurrent aspect of the same course of economic evolution. Yet many features of the Commercial Revolution owed their development to the impetus given by the discovery of new sources of wealth.

Expansion and commercial development in the early modern pe-
period depended, to some extent, on certain important innovations in the art of navigation. The introduction of the mariner’s compass, the astrolabe, the quadrant, and improvements in charts, maps, and tables lent a security to sailing the seas theretofore unknown. Larger ships, such as the galleon, the caravel, and the carrack were developed; and, although unwieldy, they were heavily armed against privateers and pirates. The primary reason for the great period of discovery and exploration, however, was economic rather than technological. The Oriental trade had for some time been in the hands of the Italian cities, and the Spaniards and Portuguese desired to break this monopoly by finding a new route to the East. This ambition led to those epic voyages from the Iberian Peninsula that opened up a new world.

The first and immediate effect of the movement was to change the front of Europe from the Mediterranean, on which it had faced since antiquity, to the West, i.e., the Atlantic Ocean. Portugal, being the earliest European country to have colonies, was the first to profit by the change because she was the country that initiated exploration, in the time of and under the promotion of Prince Henry the Navigator (1394–1460). About the middle of the fifteenth century, Portugal had made colonies of Madeira and the Azores, and had explored the Gold Coast of Africa. A far greater colonial prospect was opened for Portugal when Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope in 1497 and set his helm for the “Gorgeous East.” When he landed at Calicut, the natives told him of Chinese traders who had been there eighty years earlier. This and subsequent revelations of Chinese commercial possibilities led the Portuguese to send an expedition to Canton in 1514. The Portuguese even effected an entrance into Japan. Their empire in the East extended from southwest Africa to the Malay Peninsula and the Molucca Islands. By 1550 Brazil, too, had become a lucrative Portuguese agricultural colony.

In the meantime, the Genoese mariner, Christopher Columbus, persuaded Queen Isabella of Castile to back him in his effort to reach the East Indies by sailing westward—a notion, incidentally, already widespread among geographers. Thirty-three days out of the Canaries, the intrepid voyager sighted what he thought to be Asia. The year 1492 was only a beginning for Spain. In 1520 Magellan, a Portuguese in Spanish pay, sailed past Tierra del Fuego and on to the Philippines to meet his death, but not without first claiming the Philippines in the name of Spain. The last of his little trio of ships, the Victoria, sailed to the southwest and three years after setting out from Spain reached its starting point, concluding the first circumnavigation of the globe.
After the settlement of the West India or Caribbean Islands, the Spanish Empire in America included Mexico, or New Spain, Peru, New Granada (now Colombia), and the present states on the isthmus and in Central America. Mexico was conquered by the hardy Cortez in 1519–1521; the penetration of Peru and Chile began in 1527, and Pizarro completed the conquest of the west coast of South America a few years later. Domination of the Pacific in the East Indies from the Philippines as a base might have been Spain's, but she failed to utilize her opportunity beyond discovering the New Hebrides and Solomon Islands. About 1600 a weakened Spain, warned by the incursions into her waters of men like Drake and Cavendish, English navigators, confined herself to preventing foreigners, as far as possible, from learning anything about an ocean where she hoped eventually to make great discoveries.

The first period of European colonization may be said to have terminated when Charles V of Spain abdicated in 1555, and his son Philip II succeeded him. In the next generation—we may take the year 1618 as terminating it—the history of colonization exhibits two important changes: the decline in the East of the Portuguese colonial empire and the entrance of the Dutch and the English into the colonial field.

The Portuguese Empire decayed because of the corruption that developed in its administration, supplemented by defects in its organization. Native princes attacked their establishments, and Malayan and Chinese pirates ravaged their shipping. The second cause was the subjugation of Portugal by Philip II of Spain in 1580. The kingdom remained a Spanish province until 1640. Brazil soon fell a victim to this change of government, for English and French freebooters ravaged the coast towns.

While Spain became master of both the East and the West Indies, in addition to America, the Dutch and the English appeared as formidable threats to her colonial empire. The Dutch were the first. It was natural for them to venture into the Atlantic and the Pacific, for they had been a maritime and commercial people in the North Sea and the Baltic for many years. Accordingly, when the Netherlands revolted against Spain, the Spanish colonies were marked for prey.

England in the time of Queen Elizabeth was the third nation to enter the colonial competition. In order to avoid hostility with Portugal and Spain, the English attempted with the aid of Czar Ivan the Terrible to establish a route across Russia from Archangel to the Caspian. When this failed, vain efforts were made between 1576–1610 to discover both a northwest and a northeast passage to the
Orient by Martin Frobisher, Sir John Davis, and Sir Humphrey Gilbert. Sir Francis Drake undertook his famous voyage around the world in 1577–1580; and the first English voyage to India around the Cape of Good Hope occurred in 1591.

A new and different form was given at this time both to colonial government and to commerce by the establishment of chartered companies. The East India Company, founded in 1600, is the earliest example of this form of organization for the purpose of promoting commerce and colonial enterprise, anticipating by a year a similar company of the Dutch. The trade of the East India Company during the earlier years of its existence was limited by the more firmly entrenched Dutch, especially in the Moluccas. More successful was the Turkish or Levant Company, which traded through Alexandria and Aleppo with Turkey and Persia. The beginning of England's sea power in the Mediterranean is to be found in the creation of this organization.

During this period the English also established their first settlements in North America. Chartered companies, such as the London Company, the Plymouth Company, and the Company of Massachusetts Bay, obtained a foothold on the North American continent during the reigns of James I and Charles I. In the ebb and flow of colonial history in the seventeenth century the fact of supreme importance to be observed is the steady and substantial growth of English colonies in North America. They participated in the Anglo-Dutch war of 1689–1697, which in America was called "King William's War," and in "Queen Anne's War," which was the American colonial phase of the War of the Spanish Succession, at the termination of which in 1713 by the Peace of Utrecht, France ceded Nova Scotia (Acadia), Newfoundland, and the Hudson's Bay Territory to England.

British East Indian trade and colonization also greatly prospered in this era. Bombay was acquired in 1668. When hostilities began between the Great Mogul and the Nabob of Bengal in 1690, the territory around Calcutta was bought from the latter and Fort William was erected. Moreover, a foothold was gained on Sumatra. Despite protests by English manufacturers against the East India Company's introduction of silk and cotton goods as a throat-cutting practice, the company received a renewal of its grant in 1698. The origins of Great Britain's Indian Empire are found in the operations of this great trading company.

In Holland, the Dutch East India Company enjoyed an undisputed monopoly of the Dutch trade between the Cape of Good Hope and the Straits of Magellan and the right of making settlements in India.
This powerful corporation was both a mercantile and a political organization, a stupendous corporate monopoly, with a few but stringent rules as, for example: prohibition of trade by any of its officials, promotion according to merit, prompt collection of debts, and prompt payment of bills. The expansion of the company was aided by the general hatred of the Portuguese in the East. Hindered from establishing settlements in India by the powerful Mogul Empire, the company developed its activities among the East India Islands, where Batavia in Java was established in 1621. By confining its activities to the Archipelago, it escaped the hostility of Hindu and Chinese powers.

Because James I had been too shortsighted to occupy the territory of the Cape of Good Hope, the Dutch East India Company took formal possession of it in 1652 and colonized the territory with a hardy stock of settlers. The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes drove hundreds of Huguenots to take advantage of the Dutch East India Company’s offer to transport them to the Cape, where they planted vineyards and intermarried with the Dutch population. By 1784 a French traveler was able to discover in all the Dutch settlements but one-old man who still remembered the French tongue of his forefathers.

In the first fifty years of the seventeenth century the growth of Holland’s colonial empire fills the eye; in the second fifty years it is that of England. In the former period the Dutch East India Company was at the height of its power, which radiated from Batavia to Ceylon, Borneo, Sumatra, and the Spice Islands, to China and Japan. Almost everywhere the Portuguese Empire was despoiled. Factories and trading posts were also spread along the east coast of India as far as Bengal. In Japan, because of the revolution there in 1639, the Dutch succeeded in driving out the Portuguese and, though under great restrictions, gained a foothold for themselves.

Because Spain could not close the eastern side of the Pacific, the Dutch, after they had ousted the Portuguese from the East Indies, moved on to explore the southwest Pacific. Tasman in 1642–1643 discovered what are now called Tasmania, New Zealand, and the Friendly Islands, and sailed completely around Australia. The Dutch East India Company managers at Amsterdam, however, considered that Tasman had failed because he had brought them no profits and no new markets; and so little did they encourage exploration for its own sake that New Holland (Australia) was long believed to be an archipelago. Like the Spanish and the Portuguese before them, the Dutch lost their opportunity.

The colonial success of the Dutch led them, after the renewal of
the war with Spain in 1621, to establish a West India Company. Its privileges comprised West Africa, almost the whole of the eastern and western coasts of South America, and the islands of the Pacific. Brazil was the chief object of attack, and all Pernambuco and some contiguous provinces were subjugated, although they were recovered later by Portugal in 1654. The Dutch also seized St. Eustatius, Curaçao, and lesser islets in the Caribbean, which became sources of tobacco and sugar.

France, too, attempted to build a formidable colonial empire during this period. Early in the sixteenth century, Cartier sailed up the St. Lawrence, thereby establishing a vague French title to eastern Canada. France made attempts to establish colonies in America at Port Royal, the present Annapolis, in Nova Scotia (1604), and at Quebec in 1608, which Champlain founded. The two last-mentioned settlements were to become important in the future. The fur trade and fisheries were more an object than was agriculture in these colonies. France also made efforts to establish colonies in the Caribbean in the time of Richelieu, and the islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique became sources of sugar and tobacco for the French after 1635. About the same time, French settlements were made at Cayenne (French Guiana) on the north coast of the South American continent and at Senegal on the African coast.

The ascendancy of France in the reign of Louis XIV brought a new factor into the history of colonization and changed the conditions. For the first time, France showed a serious interest in colonial enterprise. The French East India Company was established in 1664. Colonies that France essayed to establish were of three types: commercial, agricultural, and plantation. The great French minister Colbert inspired the movement that had its beginnings in the West Indies where French settlers earlier in the century had acquired a foothold in several islands. Development of the French colonies in the West Indies was committed to the chartered West India Company, but the company lasted only ten years because of the multitude of restrictions imposed upon it by a government with a passion for regulating everything. Sugar, cotton, tobacco, before the introduction of the coffee tree, were the chief products. The greatest French West India colony was that half of the great island of Santo Domingo. It had a picturesque origin, for when the English began to colonize in the Caribbean, the French permitted the buccaneers and pirates who infested the Spanish Main to settle on the western shore of Santo Domingo after 1664. By the end of the century, however, Santo Domingo had become a respectable French colony.

In Africa, French trade was in the hands of the chartered Senegal
Company and Guinea Company, while the French East India Company, chartered in 1664, attempted to build an empire between the Cape of Good Hope and the Far East. Madagascar was visited by the French in 1665, marking the first step in the long history of French domination over this island, which France still owns. In 1679 a factory was established at Pondicherry, a tiny bit of territory in India still in the possession of France. None of these chartered companies of France prospered, partly because of too much regulation from Paris, and partly because the mercantile system was at war with itself. The East India Company suffered most because, in order to promote domestic manufactures, the importation of Indian fabrics into France was prohibited. Acadia in Nova Scotia was an agricultural and fishery settlement belonging to France, and Canada was almost wholly engaged in peltry. After much strife with England, France eventually was left in possession of Acadia by the Peace of Breda (1667). But the French settlement at Plaisance in Newfoundland made the question of fisheries on the Grand Banks an acute one for many years to come. The tiny French settlements in the Mississippi Valley that La Salle established in the reign of Louis XIV acquired importance in the eighteenth century.

Even the small states of northern Europe endeavored to get into the game of founding colonies. The Danes made a settlement at Tranquebar in India. In 1638 a colony of Swedes settled on the Delaware River, but the Dutch, regarding this as an invasion of their territory, annexed New Sweden to New Netherlands in 1655. Frederick William, the Great Elector of Brandenburg, attempted to establish trading posts on the West African coast. The Dutch in Guinea and the French in Senegal both resented the Prussian intrusion into their "sphere of influence," if not their territory, and after a precarious history the Elector's posts fell into their hands in 1725. German dreams of colonial empire were not to be realized until late in the nineteenth century.

These voyages of discovery and the founding of colonial empires during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries had an incalculable effect on the economic life of Europe. Where once commerce had been confined to the Mediterranean trade, it now became a world enterprise. No longer was the Oriental trade monopolized by the Italian cities. Genoa, Pisa, and Venice began a sharp and rapid descent into desuetude and obscurity, whereas English, Dutch, Portuguese, and Spanish ports were thronged with ships and merchandise. The volume of commerce increased tremendously, and new articles of consumption multiplied. The diet of Europeans was extended to include tea, coffee, and cocoa, not to mention gin and rum. Sugar
came into use for flavoring, supplanting spices, which had become cheaper and were no longer enjoyed only by the very rich. Lemons and oranges, the humble potato, and the tomato arrived in Europe. Tobacco was introduced from the new world. Molasses, rum, quinine, cochineal dye from South America, ivory from Africa, all were now added to the growing list of overseas products. Silk and velvet were giving way to cotton and linen, which were now being brought into Europe in such quantities that they ceased to be articles of luxury.

Probably the most important economic result of the new imperialism was the great influx of gold and silver from America, more than trebling the world’s supply. This staggering increase in the supply of bullion was one of the most essential factors in the growth of a capitalistic economy. More money in circulation meant more persons anxious to put it to profitable use. This new form of wealth could be stored for future use as well. The medieval idea of trade as an equal exchange vanished when men began to consider gold and silver as mere symbols of commodities rather than as commodities themselves. Profits unlimited became the new and dynamic ideal. Capitalism, although not matured until the nineteenth century, was given its first great impetus during the Commercial Revolution.

Increase of precious metals gave rise to another feature of modern capitalism: banking. The medieval disapproval of usury had made the practice of banking something to be carried on by Moslems and Jews, and not until the Medici family of Florence and other great commercial houses of the Italian cities in the fourteenth century began to lend money as a business enterprise did banking for profit become a respectable pursuit. From Italy the banking business spread during the fifteenth century into southern Germany, France, and the Low Countries. The cause of this movement, of course, was the shifting of trade routes during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Mercantile and financial power passed first to southern Germany, where the Fuggers, Welsers, and Baumgartners of Augsburg prospered by lending money to emperors, kings, and dignitaries of the Church. The growth of these private financial empires was followed by the establishment of government financial agencies, such as the Bank of Sweden (1656), the Bank of Spain (1665), and, most influential of all, the Bank of England, founded in 1694.

Development of banking facilitated the rise of various types of aids to large-scale financial transactions. Promissory notes, drafts, checks, and bills of exchange were introduced. From Italy came the modern system of double-entry bookkeeping, which in turn necessitated various business auxiliaries, such as auditors, agents, and brokers.
The use of checks was of tremendous significance to the development of business, for henceforth there was no need to transfer physically huge amounts of cash. In turn, this use of checks greatly facilitated exchange because the credit resources of the banks could be expanded far beyond the actual cash on hand. Ultimately the settlement of large numbers of accounts with very little interchange of money was made possible by the establishment of a system of international clearance.

The Commercial Revolution also brought a significant change in the methods of production. New overseas markets demanded increased quantities of European manufactured goods, and it was natural for the governments to encourage the production of those manufactures to be exchanged for raw materials. The medieval guild system, wherein the workingmen labored in the home of a guild master, rapidly became defunct when the demand for speeded-up production made itself felt. Under the new domestic, or putting-out system, the workers carried on their labors in their own homes, with the merchant capitalist providing the original capital with which to establish the business and the necessary raw materials. Workers labored under a fixed contract at a rate agreed upon. Merchant representa-
tives made their rounds of the workers' homes, leaving more raw material and picking up the finished work. The putting-out system was thoroughly capitalistic in its functioning.

This system left much to be desired from the standpoint of both the workers and the merchant capitalists. At first it gave the worker more independence than he had had under the guilds, since working in his own home rendered close supervision difficult. However, the later development of the system saw the workers lose their independence to the entrepreneur when the latter began to supply his workers with both materials and tools. This later phase brought with it some of the worst evils of modern industrialism: woman and child labor, "sweating" of the workers, and low wages. From the entrepreneur's point of view the system made impossible a close regulation of wage earners' activities, of the quality of the product, and of production schedules. There was also opportunity for the workers to steal some of the raw material or to lower its quality by introducing substitutes. It was as a result of these many difficulties that large central shops ultimately appeared, where the agents of the merchant capitalists could maintain a close surveillance over the workers. All that was needed to transform these central shops into a full-fledged factory system was the introduction of industrial machinery, a feature of the Industrial Revolution. This putting-out system became the dominant feature of organization and control in the English textile industries until the advent of the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century. However, it failed to eliminate guilds on the Continent; France retained the latter in many of their aspects until after her Revolution, whereas in parts of central Europe the medieval method of production was not abandoned until well into the nineteenth century.

Another outstanding feature of the Commercial Revolution was the development of business organizations. With few exceptions, business in the ancient and medieval world was the affair of individuals or families. Business partnerships had been known in medieval Italy, and they did further the accumulation of capital for investment in business, but the unlimited liability of the partners and the dissolution of the partnership upon the death or withdrawal of one of the partners were obvious and serious defects of this form of organization. Expansion of business and commerce during the early modern period called for more adaptable forms, and it was to meet this need that the regulated company came into being. It amounted to a form of business association rather than of organization. Ordinarily the members of the regulated company formed their association for the purpose of co-operating to maintain a monopoly of
trade in some part of the world, with each of the members sharing in the expense of keeping up docks and warehouses and of maintaining the company’s monopoly. A classic example of this type of organization was the Merchant Adventurers, an English group engaged in foreign trade, particularly with the East. Of a later period, but also famous, were the Muscovy Company and the Levant Company.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the regulated companies were supplanted by joint-stock companies, which had the advantage of permanence, more centralized control, limited liability of each of the joint owners, and a much larger accumulation of capital through a wide distribution of shares. The early companies were chiefly commercial rather than industrial enterprises. The main shortcoming of the joint-stock company as compared to the modern corporation was that it was not a person before the law with the rights and privileges guaranteed to individuals. Despite this defect, which did not become serious until later, the joint-stock company was a highly influential factor in the trade with the East and the settlement and exploration of the new world. The British East India Company, for example, won a charter from the English government and until 1784 ruled India as if it were the company’s private property. Names of some of the other companies suggest the importance of these organizations to the settlement of the Western Hemisphere: the Hudson’s Bay Company, the Plymouth Company, and the London Company, the last of which was responsible for founding the Virginia colony.

Growth of trade and industry during the Commercial Revolution also made necessary more stable and uniform monetary systems. Precious metals as mediums of exchange never passed entirely out of use in western Europe, though coinage almost ceased for several centuries as the Roman Empire crumbled. It was not until the thirteenth century that coinage came into general use; and even then there was no uniformity in any country. Local nobles as well as kings issued coins; the types of currency were frequently modified, and the coins themselves were often debased. The tendency during the early modern period was for every important state to adopt a standard system of money for business within its borders. Queen Elizabeth began the construction of a uniform coinage in England, but it was not finished until late in the seventeenth century. The French did not arrive at a simple and convenient standard until the time of Napoleon.

As a means of meeting the shock of fortune involved in the opening of great new stores of wealth, the nations of Europe gradually adopted a new set of doctrines and practices known as mercantilism
in England and " Colbertism" in France. It was an economic policy that was as much a concomitant of the growth of strong national dynastic states as of the parallel growth of world commerce. The time had come for the new national governments to take a hand in the regulation of economic activities. The essential idea behind mercantilism was the domination of trade in the interest of the national state.

Self-sufficiency of the country was the aim of the mercantilists. The idea of state intervention to regulate industry and commerce was nothing new, and the medieval towns had practiced it for many decades, but the purpose had been one of economic self-defense. Mercantilism meant something more than this, for it amounted to commercial aggression against one's neighbors. Each nation's prosperity was supposed to depend upon a policy of increasing its exports and decreasing its imports, maintaining a monopoly of the trade of its colonies, and interfering by restrictive measures with the commerce of its neighbors when this commerce offered serious competition.

The fundamental assumptions behind the mercantilist policy were manifold, and most of them were erroneous; however, they were to be expected among those nations ambitious for political consolidation and territorial aggrandizement. These assumptions were: (1) That the accumulated stock of bullion is the index of the nation's wealth; (2) that outside of mining ore, trade is the best means of acquiring bullion in the shape of specie; (3) that in order to accumulate this specie, exports must exceed imports, i.e., a "favorable balance of trade"; (4) that colonies are valuable to furnish a market for exports; (5) that the colonies should not be permitted to manufacture anything that might compete with the industries of the mother country; (6) that colonies should send the mother country raw materials that are needed for manufactures; and finally (7) that colonies are therefore profitable commercial enterprises, and colonial trade is a monopoly of the mother country.

Mercantilism strove for supremacy in commercial competition as well as in economic independence. The methods of achieving this supremacy were protective tariffs, the artificial stimulation of industry by government subsidies and other privileges, the maintenance of high-quality standards for manufactured goods, and the securing of commercial treaties that would open markets on favorable terms for industrial products. Thus England, in the Methuen Treaty with Portugal in 1703, won a monopoly of the Portuguese market for her goods and assured herself a steady influx of gold from Brazilian mines.

Mercantilism often defeated its own ends. Governments sometimes
banned raw materials from abroad that were needed for certain industries at home. Only gradually was it realized that trade itself was broadly international and that, therefore, an unfavorable balance of trade with one country might be compensated for by a favorable balance with another. Moreover, the prohibition of imports from a country often led to that country’s unwillingness to buy the exports of the prohibiter. The discriminatory tariff practices involved in mercantilism sometimes produced actual war. Colbert’s high tariffs, for example, against English goods did much to embitter the relations of the two countries. Finally, economic paternalism by the government created a feeling of dependence that inevitably spelled a discouragement of enterprise and initiative.

It will be seen from the foregoing discussion that the Commercial Revolution, in its various aspects, was responsible for almost all the elements that constitute the capitalist regime. It brought about inflation and much social unrest in sixteenth century Europe; it changed the basis of commerce from a regional plane to a worldwide scale; it introduced the conception of business for profit; and it led to a new emphasis on the accumulation of wealth. Competition of the fiercest sort became the foundation of production and trade. It brought in its wake, too, an era of speculative frenzy, exemplified by the South Sea Bubble in England and the Mississippi Bubble in France of the early eighteenth century.¹ The Commercial Revolution also shoved the bourgeoisie into prominence as the dominant economic class in nearly every country in western Europe. It remained only for businessmen to supplement their economic power with political and social ascendancy, a development that was to come in the nineteenth century. Finally, and most important of all, the Commercial Revolution paved the way for another and more significant economic upheaval, the Industrial Revolution. The expanding commerce brought a large, new supply of available capital; it speeded the development of capitalism, credit, and credit institutions, and trained Europeans in their uses; and it greatly stimulated manufacturing industry and gradually weakened the old restrictive guild system. An industrial proletariat began to appear in the cities, now becoming splotted with unsightly workshops, the forebears of the modern factory system. The eighteenth century was to witness the advent, in England at least, of the great Industrial Revolution that was destined to transform completely the social and political as well as the economic complexion of western civilization in the century and a half following 1750. This upheaval helped to make possible the

¹ See p. 92-94.
rise of the genius of the individual in all phases of life. But before England could take the lead in the building of our modern society, she had to bring about important political, economic, and social changes. These were gained as a result of a civil war, a dictatorship, and a "bloodless" revolution.

OLD MERCERS' HALL WHERE THE BANK OF ENGLAND WAS FIRST ESTABLISHED
From The Book of History, by permission of The Grolier Society Inc., publishers

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CHAPTER II

Civil War, Dictatorship, and Revolution in England (1603–1688)

The death of Queen Elizabeth of England in 1603 marked the end of the powerful Tudor dynasty. These capable rulers had been satisfied with the practical exercise of royal authority. They did not define it, nor make sweeping claims. Both Elizabeth and Henry VIII took great pains to secure the consent of Parliament for their most autocratic acts. Thus they were very popular with the people, the latter believing that whatever their rulers did was right. Although Parliament was subservient to the will of the Tudors, at no time were the powers of this body eliminated. Therefore, when unpopular kings opposed the interests of the nation and the will of Parliament later on, that body was in a position to challenge their absolute power.

Antagonism between Parliament and king soon followed the accession to the throne in 1603 of James I, of the arrogant and shortsighted Stuart line. Son of Mary, Queen of Scots, and originally crowned James VI, King of Scotland, this first representative of a new dynasty was not a strong man, nor was he an admirable character. He seems to have inherited the weak characteristics of his father, but not the charm and intelligence of his mother. He was coarse in manner and speech. He posed as a man of profound erudition, and his vanity allowed him to think of himself as an English Solomon. These personal shortcomings, combined with his almost ludicrous insistence on the principle of the divine right of kings, made James I a weak beginning, indeed, for a dynasty that hoped to outshine the capable Tudors.
In England, as on the Continent, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, religious questions were overshadowed by political and constitutional ones. This is shown by the increase of Puritanism, which was doctrinally Calvinistic and politically in favor of reform of abuses. One of the first official acts of James I was the issuance of a proclamation enforcing the Act of Uniformity. In 1604, several new canons, enacted at the king's instance, bore so heavily on the Puritans that three hundred clergymen resigned their livings rather than conform. Still worse, the old recusancy laws of Elizabeth's time were revived. The effect of this drastic course was to draw into opposition almost all the various separatist sects: the Puritans, Presbyterians, Brownists, and others.

Meanwhile a political struggle had broken out between James I and Parliament, in which the nonconformists were aligned against the king. In 1598, James I had published a book entitled Basilicon Doron, or The Royal Gift, in which he advocated the old political theory of the divine right of kings to rule their subjects as they pleased. This doctrine especially enraged the Puritans, who were strongly represented in Parliament. In order to understand the nature and importance of this question, it is necessary to explain the form of government of England at this time. The central organ of administration was the privy council composed of the highest officials of the realm and some favorites of the king; neither its composition nor its powers were clearly defined. Appointed by the crown were the judges sitting in the three courts of law: (1) King's Bench for criminal cases; (2) Common Pleas for civil cases; and (3) Exchequer or Chamber of Accounts, which had to do with revenue and taxation cases only.

Parliament, the representative body of the nation, was formed of two houses: the House of Lords and the House of Commons. The lords were hereditary except for the bishops, but the king could create new peers and thus command a majority in the House of Lords if it was necessary. This body very naturally sustained the crown in most instances. The House of Commons was composed of representatives of the counties (knights of the shires) and burgesses, representing the cities and towns. Rights of this elective group consisted in the right to vote subsidies, to concur with the House of Lords in the making of laws, and to present petitions or remonstrances to the king. A statute was a law that had passed both houses of Parliament and been approved by the crown. The king was free to accept or reject a remonstrance. Parliamentary privileges were liberty of speech and freedom from imprisonment for speaking on any matters touching the business of Parliament, and the right to
impeach the king's ministers for maladministration or corruption in office. Parliament, however, could not convene of itself but had to be summoned by the crown, which also could dismiss it at will.

The king derived his revenue from crown lands or domains he held as suzerain and from tithes of the clergy. Since these incomes were vested and inherited rights of the crown, the king was not dependent upon Parliament for their collection. However, these revenues were not always sufficient for the needs of the crown, especially if the king was extravagant or inclined to indulge in an expensive and ambitious foreign policy. When necessary, then, the king applied to Parliament for a subsidy, such as, for example, an income tax on the annual value of lands or a property tax upon the actual value of goods. The custom of granting subsidies went back to the reign of Edward III when Parliament took advantage of this power to exact concessions from the crown and to curtail the royal prerogative.

James I was constantly in need of money. Wasting much more than his normal revenue, he convoked and dissolved Parliament according to whether he could or could not obtain subsidies from it. From 1603 to 1624 he summoned four Parliaments of varied duration. The debates in that body turned upon the Established Church, which the Puritans abhorred, as well as upon grants to the king. Catholic objections were stilled by the discredit brought upon the "Papists" by the discovery of the Gunpowder Plot (November 5, 1605) to blow up the houses of Parliament. When James I, in a speech from the throne, formulated his theory of the divine right of kings, the Parliament reminded the king that he erred in thinking that it had no privileges and no rights. Thereupon the king demanded a grant from the self-assertive Parliament, and when that body offered him considerably less on condition that he moderate his policy toward the Puritans, James I refused, dissolved Parliament, and resorted to arbitrary impositions. He initiated, moreover, the practice of selling baronetcies or hereditary knighthoods. For seven years the king racked along in this way, a policy that neither gave him the income he wanted nor alleviated the antagonism of Parliament. Led by the ardent Parliamentarians, Sir John Eliot and John Pym, the legislative body assumed the initiative. Making laws and voting taxes were not enough; Parliament wanted to become a "government-making organ." In Eliot's mind was born the idea of ministerial responsibility.

Evidently the time had come for an important change in the English constitution. But it was unfortunate that in this critical period the country was ruled by a king who was not of English birth, who
was hostile to English constitutional tradition and practice, was lacking in political understanding, and was unable to see both sides of the controversy. The situation was complicated by the fact that there was more than one issue at stake. The question of the Church also was involved. Was the Church to continue to be the state in its ecclesiastical and religious capacity? What was to be its government and doctrine? Was it to be Anglican or Puritan? How was it to be governed? By bishops or presbyters? Was its creed to be Lutheran or Calvinist? Or should the Elizabethan compromise continue to stand? Was the unity of state and Church to be preserved? Or was diversity of creed and worship and government to be admitted? Were all creeds and churches to be on an equality? Or was the state to identify itself with one particular creed and one particular form of government? And if so, which was it to be?

English Catholics hoped for toleration of their religion and, despite popular hatred of the "Papists" and the ill-advised Gunpowder Plot, their position was slowly improving. The essential fact, from the standpoint of the crown versus Parliament issue, was that the Catholics presented no political problem because their loyalty to their religion did not prevent them from being politically patriotic. The religious issue was wholly among the three Puritan parties: Conforming Puritans, Presbyterians, and Independents. All were Calvinists, but they disagreed on the form of Church government. The Presbyterians were politically the most radical and religiously the most intolerant sect; they demanded exclusive religious, ecclesiastical, and political ascendency. In short, they wanted the Church in England to be Calvinistic in faith, Presbyterian in form of government, and politically to control the government. James I regarded them as heretics and traitors. He felt that their refusal to submit to the authority of bishops appointed by him amounted to treason to the crown. The Presbyterians, however, came to hold sway in Scotland, whereas the Independents (i.e., Congregationalists) became the dominant political factor in England, for the latter group were the Parliamentary party bent on establishing ministerial responsibility and the ascendency of Parliament over the crown. Thus the difficulties of the future Charles I were clearly foreshadowed.

Meanwhile foreign politics intruded upon the scene. In 1613 the daughter of James I had married Frederick, Elector Palatine of the Rhine who, five years afterward, imprudently accepted the crown of Bohemia after that country rebelled against the emperor and thus precipitated the Thirty Years' War. Furthermore, in 1615, James I conceived the ambitious design of marrying his eldest son Charles to a Spanish princess, despite the fact that Spain was Catholic and that
powerful English merchants desired war with Spain for the purpose of completing the job begun under Elizabeth. Demonstrating a complete lack of diplomatic ability, the king asked for a subsidy for his exiled son-in-law, Frederick, but at the same time refused to aid the German Protestants for fear of offending Spain, and declared that the Parliament had no right to pronounce upon the conduct of foreign affairs. Immediately the members rejoined that they had the privilege of free speech. James’s answer was to dissolve the Parliament and to break off the Spanish match. In the last year of his life, James I made a treaty with France for the marriage of Prince Charles to Henrietta Maria, sister of Louis XIII, which was not consummated until after the king’s death.

Despite numerous mistakes, James I should receive credit for two constructive achievements. He established the ecclesiastical commission of scholars who made the King James translation of the Bible, and he planned the improvement of London. On the debit side, however, the reign of James I marked a sharp aggravation of the conflict between Parliament and crown over the fundamental question of whether sovereignty lay in the monarchy or in the Parliament as the representative body of the nation. The issue touched the form of government, the practice of administration, justice, taxation, and personal liberty. As a result of his insistence on divine right and the absolute power he already possessed together with his uncompromising attitude toward the Puritans, and his chronic need of additional revenue, James I contributed little to a solution of England’s ills. His son, Charles, was to reap the consequences of his father’s shortsighted policies as well as the fruit of his own tyranny.

Charles I succeeded his father in 1625 and faced all the problems that troubled his parent’s reign: taxation, finance, Church organization, foreign policy. These issues, in fact, grew more acute under Charles I. The new king was a more attractive personality but even haughtier and more uncompromising than his father and equally extravagant, except that he spent his money less on favorites and more upon art. Soon after his accession to the throne, he, like his father, began his long struggle with Parliament. Between 1625 and 1629, Charles I summoned and dismissed Parliament four times. His unwillingness to listen to parliamentary criticism of his government brought the dismissal of the first body; the second Parliament refused to grant money until Charles acceded to its demand that an unpopular minister be dismissed. The third Parliament of Charles I (1628) is dear to the memory of freeborn Englishmen for its passage of the Petition of Right, the chief article of which was that no
taxes could be levied without the consent of Parliament. Royal sanction was also won to a condemnation of billeting of soldiers on civilians, of arbitrary imprisonment, and of punishment by martial law. The Petition of Right, second only to the Magna Carta as a fundamental charter of English freedom, was assented to only grudgingly by Charles I, and in return for this concession Parliament complacently granted five subsidies to the king.

Nevertheless, the conflict continued. Charles now resorted to flagrantly irregular means of raising money. Parliamentary opposition to the financial tyranny and demands of the king led to stormy scenes as the fourth Parliament met in January, 1629. The leader of the opposition, Sir John Eliot, as well as several others, was clapped in the Tower. Two months later, agents of the king forcibly closed the doors at Westminster (where Parliament sat). Eleven years of even more arbitrary government began, during which Charles I failed to summon the representatives of the people.

Meanwhile Charles raised money by such means as forced loans, benevolences, illegal taxes, monopolies, and sales of titles. The notorious Court of Star Chamber, "whereby his Majesty's subjects have been oppressed by grievous fines, imprisonments, stigmatizings, mutilations, whippings, pillories, and gags, etc.," found much grist for its mill. Charles I's advisers in this time were hard men, like Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury, and Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. The ritualistic inclinations of the former enraged the Puritans, and the "thorough" policy of the latter angered almost all men except those of the court party.

Although Charles's fiscal exactions boosted the royal income from 540,000 pounds in 1624 to 618,000 pounds in 1635, there was still a deficit of 636,000 pounds. To bridge the gap between credit and debit, Charles I levied the notorious ship-money tax, a measure that was particularly obnoxious to the middle classes and served to consolidate bourgeois opposition to the monarchy. Under an ancient statute the English seaboard towns were compelled to pay a ship-tax to the crown in lieu of providing ships for the royal navy. The crown was empowered to collect this tax only in time of war. Charles I not only imposed this new ship-money tax in time of peace, but he also inflicted it on the entire kingdom. In the face of tremendous popular opposition, the case was argued at great length before the Court of the Exchequer, whose twelve judges, save two, sustained the crown. The ship-money case for the first time in English history raised the issue that, since the king was ruling without a Parliament, taxation without representation is tyranny, an issue to be later asserted by the American colonists in 1776. Three Englishmen who dared to with-
stand the king. John Hampden, Oliver Cromwell, and John Pym, were so discouraged that they were prevented from going to America only by a royal proclamation (April 30, 1687) imposing restrictions on emigration.

It was not the Puritans in Parliament, however, who provided the original impetus for the civil war that was looming immediately ahead, but the Calvinistic Scots, who were supremely outraged when Archbishop Laud attempted to impose a liturgy for the Scottish Church. The Scots, devoted to the Presbyterian system, hating episcopacy, liturgy, and ritual, set up a provisional government under a written instrument called the Covenant on February 27, 1638. These Covenanters prepared for war, seized fortresses, and garrisoned them with troops.

Yet events moved slowly. Neither the Puritans in England nor the Scots were disposed to wage open war against the king, and both hoped for a peaceful solution of the issues at stake. Charles's anger at the Covenanters was tempered by his lack of money to pay an army to take the field against them. Feigning a moderation that he did not feel, Charles I summoned Parliament after a lapse of eleven years (1640), but, when the old wrangle was resumed as to voting supplies before or after grievances were redressed, the Parliament was dissolved. From a clergy subservient to Laud, the king won a subsidy of 120,000 pounds, whereas other contributions, voluntary and forced, added 300,000 pounds more to the royal treasury. Strafford, in the midst of preparations for the invasion of Scotland, convinced Charles I that Parliament could still be bent to the royal pleasure. The famous Short Parliament convened on April 13, 1640, but it met the same fate as its predecessors when it refused the financial demands of the king. From Genoese bankers and the Pope came offers of money, but the former wanted the city of London to underwrite their proffered loan whereas the Holy Father suggested that Charles declare himself a Catholic in return for an advance.

While facing these problems, Charles I, in August, 1640, heard that the Scots had suddenly taken the initiative, crossed the Tyne on the 20th and taken Newcastle. What Englishmen had hesitated to do, that the Scots did—they revolted against the growing tyranny of the king, who fatuously believed that absolutism was firmly established in England, and that it could be extended to Scotland as well. As a result, Charles I was destined to lose his crown and his head, and England for eleven years was to be converted into a Puritan Commonwealth. For the fight of the Scottish Church against the successive Stuart kings was not merely a struggle for the faith most acceptable to the Scottish people, it was also the spirit of local independence
of men wishing to manage their own affairs without the interference of kings or court, against sovereigns who believed that bishops were the most trustworthy of government officials.

The canny Scots saw an opportunity to make a little “easy money.” Having occupied the northern counties, they demanded to be bought off, and, since the king could not push them back into Scotland by force, the only alternative was to summon Parliament to get the required indemnity. In calling the assembly, Charles signed his death warrant. The famous Long Parliament convened on November 3, 1640, and sat until 1660, through many vicissitudes and changes of fortune. The fact that the Scottish army could not be disbanded until paid, gave the Parliament the whip hand over the king. Thereupon, Parliament, “composed of reactionary country squires, discontented aristocrats, fanatics who dreaded innovations in religion, lawyers and antiquarian theorists,” proceeded to attack the royal policy on a wide front, determined to take the government of the country into its own hands. The day of reckoning had come.

One of the first acts of the Long Parliament was the impeachment of Strafford, the king’s most stalwart supporter. Strafford had become convinced that the hope of England rested in a strong monarchy and that he could best serve his country and his king by becoming the leader of that policy in the House of Lords, seeing that a compromise between king and Commons was for the time being impossible. Though grounds for Strafford’s impeachment were found in his alleged misgovernment of Ireland, the real source of the animus against him was that he harried the planters, who had settled in northern Ireland, because they were Presbyterians and, therefore, in his mind radicals. In the charges made against Strafford, Pym, whose hatred of the accused knew no bounds, invented the doctrine of “constructive” treason, in retort to Strafford’s question: “How can that be treason in the lump or mass which is not so in any of its parts?” The treason charge was not upheld, and the remorseless Pym devised a constitutional theory, the Bill of Attainder, for which Strafford had to be sent to the scaffold in order to prove it to be true. The ex-lord lieutenant of Ireland was followed on the scaffold by Archbishop Laud, who was executed on January 10, 1645.

On February 15, 1641, the Triennial Act was passed. This provided for the meeting of Parliament at least once in three years, and that both houses might not be prorogued or dissolved under fifty days from their first meeting without their own consent. The two courts of Star Chamber and High Commission were abolished, and both armies were disbanded after they had been paid. One of the

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most important documents ever declared by a legislature, the Grand Remonstrance, appeared when Charles I crossed swords once again with Parliament because that body refused him an army with which to suppress an Irish insurrection and stood firm against renewed royal demands concerning the question of episcopacy. On November 22, 1641, the Parliament replied with this document of 206 articles, in which a long series of unconstitutional acts of the government since the beginning of the reign was particularized. Practically, the Remonstrance was a vindication of the Parliament and an appeal to the country. Article 197 has been called "the protoplasm of constitutional evolution." A section reads:

That his Majesty be humbly petitioned by both Houses to employ such counsellors, ambassadors, and other ministers in managing his business at home and abroad as the Parliament may have cause to confide in, without which we cannot give his Majesty such supplies for support of his own estate.

It was the formulation of Sir John Eliot's principle of responsible ministers—a principle that did not finally triumph until 1688. Thus in the Grand Remonstrance of 1641, Pym had carried through that for which Eliot had died in prison in 1632.

The Grand Remonstrance was a declaration of war, and a full-fledged civil conflict now broke out between the king's supporters—called "Cavaliers"—and the parliamentary party, the small landowners, and businessmen, the majority of whom were Puritans and Presbyterians. Royalists now dubbed their opponents "Roundheads" because they cut their hair short in contempt for the current aristocratic custom of wearing curls. At first the king's party, with almost a monopoly on military experience, carried the field against the parliamentary forces, but in the long run the odds were against the Cavaliers. The wealth of England was primarily in its commerce and industry, and these sources of supply were in the hands of the king's enemies. To the latter, revenue with which to purchase arms and ammunition was always available, and an efficient army was being whipped into shape. Early in 1644, Scottish troops crossed the border to join forces with the Parliamentary armies (New Model Army). With Sir Thomas Fairfax in command of the Parliamentary infantry, and with the redoubtable Oliver Cromwell at the head of the cavalry, the Roundheads decisively defeated Charles I at Naseby (June 14, 1645). His losses irreparable, Charles and his commanders still managed to hold off the Scots and the Parliamentary armies for almost a year, but, when it became apparent that there was no stemming of the insurgent tide, the king threw himself on the mercy of the Scottish army rather than into the hands of Fairfax and Cromwell. The shrewd
Scots used the king as an instrument to compel Parliament to pay them the 400,000 pounds that had been promised them, and on January 30, 1647, handed him over to the Parliamentary commissioners empowered to receive him.

It was a critical moment, for during the course of the war jealousy and resentment had developed between the Parliament and the army. The former wanted the king to reign but not to govern and to deprive him of all real power. The army, on the other hand, was antimonarchical and wished to set up a democratic republic—which was realized in 1649 in the Commonwealth. In religion Parliament planned to impose uniformity of belief and of form. The army was for "moderate" tolerance, by which was meant exclusion of Catholics, Episcopalians, and any who did not believe in the Trinity. With such an alignment of forces, the Parliament was determined, in a pinch, to use the Scottish soldiery both to impose religious uniformity and to crush the army and the Independents.

Parliament was Presbyterian, but the army was Independent, an appellation that united in loose association many of various opinions but who agreed in their hatred of the Established Church, episcopacy, ritual, liturgy, and favored congregational government. Even Presbyterianism was too highly organized for them. When Parliament unsuccessfully attempted to disband the army and when the Independents kidnapped the Parliament's trump card—the king himself—Royalists, Presbyterians, and Scots combined against Cromwell's forces. The future Lord Protector smashed the Scots at Preston, and on December 6, 1648, sent Colonel Pride, with an army to expel the Presbyterian majority from the House of Commons. This is what is known as "Pride's Purge." The Independent minority of 53 members, which were all that the Commons now consisted of (derisively called the "Rump Parliament"), resolved itself into a special High Court of Justice, protected by the army, and tried and condemned the king. Though declaring that it was acting in the name of popular sovereignty, and that it was representative of "the people," the Rump obviously was nothing more than a military dictatorship. Since no legal precedent justified convicting Charles I of treason against the nation, the trial and execution of the king amounted to an act of revolution. "I reckon it," Carlyle has written, "perhaps the most daring action any body of men to be met with in history ever, with clear consciousness, deliberately set themselves to do." On January 30, 1649, Charles was beheaded in front of his palace at Whitehall, and a few months later the House of Lords was abolished. The first stage of the Great Rebellion was now completed.

Though the Rump Parliament was nominally the governing body
of England, Cromwell was the ruler in fact and governed through the army. The government was a military autocracy—or, as would be said today, it was a Fascist dictatorship. Cromwell’s New Model Army combined religion and soldiering with a zeal hardly surpassed by the Saracens. It was of Puritan composition (although many soldiers possessed few definite religious ideas), actuated by the fiercest fanaticism and held under the most rigorous discipline. Europe had never before seen such an army. The soldiers were paid more punctually; disorderly conduct, drunkenness, or profanity was severely punished. Prayers were said every day in camp and divine worship held on Sundays. It was a religious army, though not of a uniform belief. Cromwell recruited his men without distinction of sect. The captains were professional soldiers appointed by Cromwell, but the rest of the officers were elected by the men themselves.

The army found no lack of occupation, for Cromwell, whom one writer described as “the incarnation of Puritan passion, the instrument of English ambition,” was ever ready to turn to the arbitration of the sword in maintaining his oligarchic republic. When a rising in favor of Charles II took place in Ireland under the Marquis of Ormonde, Cromwell’s treatment of the Irish made Strafford’s former notorious policy of “thorough” coercion look mild indeed. Three whole counties were laid prostrate by the soldiers, who were forbidden to drink or use profanity; the people were killed or driven out; and the territories repopulated with immigrants from England whose descendants today constitute the six Protestant counties of Ulster. Despite the later conciliatory rule of Henry Cromwell, the dictator’s son, thousands of Irish fled the country to form Irish brigades at the service of foreign powers. Some managed to get to America. The Catholics in Ulster found themselves “transplanted” to Connaught. Conquered lands were partitioned among the new settlers, many of whom were soldiers who were thus paid in lieu of money.

In Scotland, Cromwell’s arms were no less successful than in Ireland. When Charles II, the son of Charles I, landed in Scotland in 1650 and was proclaimed king upon his promise to support the Covenant, Cromwell turned from battling the Irish to pound the Royalists into submission. Charles managed to escape in disguise to France, but his supporters were deported to the colonies or turned over to the Guinea merchants and sent to perish in the mines. Scotland, like Ireland, was treated like a conquered country. Estates were confiscated; heavy taxes imposed; forts erected and garrisoned; and English judges sat in the Scottish courts.

Pacification of Ireland and Scotland was completed in the nick of
time, for a naval war broke out in 1652 with the Dutch (1652–1654). Parliament, in 1651, had passed the Navigation Act, which forbade the importation of articles of trade except in English vessels. This practically destroyed the Dutch carrying and colonial trade with England and was a drastic method of protection of home industry—in this case shipbuilding—and promotion of employment. The English won four victories at sea, the Dutch fleet won one before peace was made.

Meanwhile political tension in the country became more acute. The army and the Rump were at odds, for the members of the latter body were determined to retain their seats even though a new Parliament seemed to be necessary. Cromwell, however, was afraid to risk an election in a country overwhelmingly monarchical in sentiment. The upshot of the bickering was that Cromwell, in 1653, once more paraded a detachment of troops into the Rump and ordered the members to disperse. A favorable Parliament was chosen by Cromwell's Council of State, but, when this hand-picked group found it could accomplish nothing, the members assigned their power to Cromwell and recommended that he make himself sole ruler.
When the written document signed by a majority of the House was put in his hands, Cromwell, having already made a gesture of declining the offer, consented to the proclamation of the Instrument of Government, according to which he was declared Lord Protector (December 16, 1653), to rule with the assistance of a Council of 21 and a triennial Parliament of 460 members. Less than two years later the Parliament was abolished, and Cromwell governed as a military despot with the aid of the army. England was divided into twelve military circuits, each under a major-general with a force of soldiery supported by a tax on royalist estates. It was a state under permanent martial law. Both the Instrument of Government and the Act declaring the people of England to be a commonwealth and free state were verbiage as far as the furtherance of English liberty was concerned.

Cromwell's foreign policy was in the interest of protecting and promoting English commerce abroad. His Navigation Act of 1651 founded the English merchant marine, and the navy that had decayed under James I and Charles I was re-established. Thereupon he offered a British alliance with Spain in return for freedom of trade in the West Indies, and when Spain refused he sent his sailors to the Caribbean to plunder the Spanish settlements. Meanwhile he forced Denmark to reopen the Sound between Denmark and Scandinavia; repeatedly sent warships to the Mediterranean to pursue the Barbary pirates; and acquired Dunkirk from France, thereby obtaining a door for entrance of English trade into the Continent, which freed it from the tolls and tariffs imposed in Antwerp. This was the last event in Cromwell's life. In September, 1658, the Protector died, while a storm raged over England; the superstitious said that it was raised by his terrific struggle with the devil to seize his soul, which he, like Faust in the legend, had sold to the devil for earthly power.

From a modern point of view, Cromwell's religious bigotry and its manifestations constitute the blackest mark against the man. The possession of religious ideas different from his own was intolerable in Cromwell's mind. Freedom of belief to Romanists or Scottish Presbyterians or English High Churchmen or Quakers was a concession he could never allow. Deportation into slavery or execution were common punishments for the offense of being a Catholic or a Scottish Presbyterian. The Puritan position, as he himself said, was the only real Christianity. It was the severity of his control of all forms of religious belief, except that of the Puritans, which gradually brought about a revulsion of feeling in almost all quarters. This feeling culminated in 1660 in the restoration of monarchy in
the person of Charles II. Many Puritans who had opposed the moral repressions (blue laws) imposed by Cromwell and had joined the Cavaliers now welcomed the re-establishment of the monarchy and the abolition of the religious dictatorship.

Puritanism is the political term, and Presbyterianism the ecclesiastical term, with which to describe the government of England from 1646 to 1660. The establishment of Presbyterianism involved the disestablishment of the Anglican Church, the dismissal of its ministers, and the seizure of its property. The Book of Common Prayer was suppressed. Cathedrals were used as military storehouses in many cases, and church bells were melted down for cannon. Marriage was made a civil, not a religious, institution. The observance of Christmas Day was discouraged. Dispossessed Anglican clergy, living in penury and obscurity, were replaced by men who for the most part had inadequate theological training. Thus the last years of the Protectorate went on toward the inevitable reaction. It would be difficult to make a stronger condemnation of Cromwell than did one of his biographers, Morley, when he wrote:

Wherever force was useless Cromwell failed. He attempted those things in which none but a valiant and great man could have succeeded. Without doubt, no man with more wickedness ever attempted anything or brought to pass what he desired more wickedly, more in the face and contempt of religion and moral honesty.

There is ground to think that Cromwell himself felt that the period of his rule was a passing phase, a salutary interval in English history between monarchies. But he had the deep conviction, in which he was justified, that future England would be better than it was in the reigns of James I and his son. The very excesses of the Restoration confirmed his judgment. The nature of the English government needed to be changed. The temper of the people required discipline, a rod of iron laid across their backs, and Puritanism was that rod. Attacked by all parties—Royalists, Presbyterians, Republicans, Levellers—Cromwell was a "conservative revolutionist" who might have governed constitutionally if it had been possible. But disruptive forces impelled him to establish his dictatorship. He was a partisan—what strong man is not brave in adhesion to his ideas?—and a sincere and earnest Puritan in religion. Cromwell was neither a saint nor a hypocrite. Hard, harsh, reserved, one to be feared or admired, he was loved by few. Historians have varied greatly in their estimate of Cromwell's stature as a statesman, but

1 A radical, political, economic, and social group which wanted to "level" everything and make a new heaven and a new earth.
on at least one score most are in agreement: he was the greatest cavalryman in British history and one of its ablest tacticians.

The Commonwealth government was the achievement of one man and could not long endure when he was gone. For nine months, from September, 1658, to May, 1659, after the death of Cromwell, his son Richard bore the title of Protector, but soon, becoming involved in a dispute with Parliament, he dissolved it. Whereupon the remnant of the Long Parliament (the "Rump") was restored by the army. Richard resigned and disappeared into oblivion. At this juncture a sturdier soldier took a hand. General Monk, who had been practically the ruler of Scotland under the Commonwealth government for seven years past, and who was heartily sick of the shilly-shally way things had been going in London, now marched on London and, with the aid of Fairfax and Lambert, frightened the Long Parliament into dissolving itself. Monk victoriously entered London on February 3, 1660, amid the huzzas of the populace, which had grown tired of Puritanism.

From Breda, across the Channel, Charles II issued on April 14 a declaration promising amnesty, liberty of religious belief, and settlement of confiscated estates. In London a recently elected Parliament accepted the Declaration of Breda, and in May proclaimed King Charles II. Sure of his welcome, Charles returned to London as an English king, limited by the constitution, as the Long Parliament had left it at the outbreak of the Civil War. Interestingly enough, the atrocities committed during the short reaction that followed, such as the drawing and quartering of some of the regicides and the transfer of the bodies of Cromwell and his lieutenants from Westminster Abbey to a resting place under the gibbet at Tyburn, were not done by the Royalists but in pursuance of an order of the Parliament. The assembly was then mainly composed of Presbyterians, Cromwell's former associates, and later enemies.

Charles II has come down in history as the "Merry Monarch." No prince ever stood less upon his dignity, perhaps because he had less dignity to stand upon, than Charles II. He was a calculating opportunist who always kept his policy fluid, and never let his ministers know all that was in his mind. His father having been executed by the Puritans, and he himself having been fed to repletion on long-winded Presbyterian sermons during his expedition to Scotland in 1651, Charles II possessed a hearty dislike of preachers and preaching. Mistresses and jaded courtiers made up his immediate circle.

But for all his gaiety and frivolity, his extravagance, his loose morals, and his lack of principles, Charles had learned much worldly wisdom during his wanderings and adventures in exile. He was a
shrewd psychologist. He understood that the English nation as a whole was strongly monarchical in political sentiment and deeply attached to the fundamental institutions of the country that had developed through the centuries. He tacitly admitted that his predecessors had grossly abused this great tradition, its ideas, and its practices. An immense change had been made by the Puritan Revolution in the position of the kingship, notwithstanding the eagerness with which Charles II was brought back. He perceived, too, that the English people were tired of the excesses of Puritanism, its petty regulation of society, its irritating interference with the intimate things of private life, its intolerance, and its austerity. It was natural in the circumstances that the Restoration was a social and moral reaction, but not a political reaction. In two respects, however, Charles II had reserved opinions that he discreetly did not express: one was to increase the royal prerogative as much as possible; the other, to establish Catholicism if given the opportunity. He was not able to accomplish these two purposes as he hoped, and it was because his brother, James II, boldly and openly tried to do so that the latter lost his throne.

Although religious dissension plagued the reign of Charles II, the Established Church remained a pillar of the throne. Magistrates and even town officials were compelled to take the sacrament according to the Church of England, and on August 24, 1662, the Act of Uniformity required all clergymen, university fellows, and school teachers to assent to everything in the Book of Common Prayer. Several years later the Conventicle Act was passed, which forbade more than five persons meeting together for religious worship except in a household or in accordance with the Established Church. When this proved not sufficiently effective, the Five Mile Act was promulgated, forbidding dissenting persons from coming within five miles of any incorporated town or place where they had once dwelt. In Scotland a royalist parliament was set up and the Covenant declared abolished. All through the reign of Charles II, persecution of the Covenanters, Covenanters, and Cameronians continued. The rugged faith of the Scottish people today is largely due to their courage in these times.

Charles II's politico-ecclesiastical policy grew bolder with the years. In 1672 the Declaration of Indulgence, although apparently favoring greater toleration of Dissenters, actually was intended to secure toleration of Catholics. It proved so unpopular that it was rescinded the next year. Finally, in 1673 the Test Act required every person holding office under the government to take the oath of allegiance and of supremacy and to accept the sacrament according to the Church of England. High Church Episcopalianism was becom-
ing as intolerant and tyrannical as Puritanism had been a few years before. But England simply would endure neither Popery nor political Catholicism. After the scare aroused by an alleged conspiracy to assassinate Charles II and establish the Church of Rome, a Papist Disabling Act was passed, excluding Catholics from Parliament. It was not repealed until 1828.

Although Charles II could resort to money extortions, he could not go too far in destroying other aspects of English tradition. As a result, interesting lineaments of later constitutional government were foreshadowed at this time. The chief state officials began to be looked upon as collectively responsible for the course of government. In 1679 a new Cabinet Council was instituted. This may be regarded as the anticipation of the cabinet government with ministerial responsibility that was established later on. In the same year the Habeas Corpus Act was also signed, one of the cornerstones of liberty of the individual, for it compelled prompt trial of an arrested person and protected him from again being imprisoned for the same offense. Party and Parliamentary government and the principle of ministerial responsibility all began to develop simultaneously during the period of the Restoration. These institutions were worth the price paid for them, for their creation was probably the greatest and most successful experiment in government in all history.

Charles II died on February 6, 1685, sincerely (or cynically?) professing the Catholic faith upon his deathbed. His illegitimate son, the Duke of Monmouth, immediately proclaimed himself "king" and led a scatterbrained insurrection to make himself king in fact. But the adventurer was quickly defeated and soon met his death in the Tower. Unfortunately, James II (1685-1688), the legitimate heir to the throne, was the weakest and the worst of the Stuarts—cruel, faithless, revengeful, and autocratic. It may have been courage, it certainly was folly, for him at once: to adopt a strong Catholic policy which he did in making official appointments, both civil and military; to endeavor to have the Test Act repealed; to institute a new Court of Ecclesiastical Commission before which several bishops were tried and acquitted; and to oppose the influx of exiled Huguenots into England. There was an inclination among the king's opponents, however, to tolerate his arbitrary rule so long as they could expect one of James's two Protestant daughters to succeed him. They realized that the alternative was civil war.

This attitude changed, however, when a son was born to James by his Catholic second wife. Then the opposition foresaw the possibility of an indefinite continuation of despotic and papist rule. To forestall such a consequence, a petition was secretly sent to Wil-
liam of Orange (husband of Mary, Protestant daughter of James II), begging him to come over and save England from "Tyranny and Catholicism." It was signed by "seven patriots," or "seven eminent persons." They were the Earl of Devonshire, the Earl of Shrewsbury, Compton, Bishop of London, Lord Lumley, Admiral Russell, and Henry Sidney, names almost as cherished in England's memory as those of the signers of the Declaration of Independence in ours. On November 5, 1688, William landed in England and entered London shortly before Christmas. James II fled to France, but his daughter, Anne, refused to follow him. The lucky resolution made her Queen of England in 1702 when William III died.

This so-called "Glorious Revolution" of 1688 was both political and institutional. It changed both the theory and the practice of the royal power. Hitherto the king had been above the nation. Now the nation was superior to the king, for it was the English nation, through Parliament, which called William and Mary to the throne. In October, 1689, the previous Petition of Right, with additions and amplifications, was passed as a statute, and became as permanent an ingredient of the constitution as the Magna Carta. Almost everything that had been contended for since the accession of James I was embodied in this statute, known to posterity as the Bill of Rights. After 1688, a ministry at odds with the Commons became impossible. Henceforth the ministry had to be chosen from the same party as the majority in the House of Commons, owing to the all-powerful right of the House of Commons to introduce and to pass money-bills, a privilege first claimed in the Bill of Rights. The most important clause was that which stipulated that levying taxes without grant of Parliament was illegal. From that day to the present, Parliament has had final control over the crown. The development of party and cabinet government and the principle of a responsible ministry were promoted by this Parliamentary control of taxes and money-grants, though according to most writers it was not until the reign of Queen Anne (1702–1714) that fully developed constitutional government was attained. Nevertheless a long-standing question of sovereignty had been solved; henceforth sovereignty rested in the hands of the Parliament. The idea of absolute monarchy was forever destroyed; and the English could well call it their "Glorious Revolution."

In addition to the advancement of political liberalism and popular government, the spread of religious toleration in this period was impressive. There is no doubt that at the beginning of the eighteenth century England was almost solidly Protestant; and, although the old laws against the Catholics still stood on the statute books, none of them was enforced except that of exclusion from civil office. Fur-
ther, the Dissenters were also discriminated against. Religious equality, however, was yet to come, for only Anglicans had full political rights. Despite these laws the cause of religious freedom had been considerably promoted, for the various religious groups were permitted to practice their faiths.

In short, although the Revolution of 1688 was bloodless and unheroic, it was of lasting benefit. In a sense it was, as Edmund Burke said when our own American Revolution was in process, "a revolution not made, but prevented." It saved England from that yoke of absolutism that was being imposed upon continental Europe; it gave more personal and religious liberty to the individual; and it enabled the business classes in co-operation with the land-owning aristocracy to govern England, to build an empire, and to create a prosperous bourgeois state. It also contributed much to the American and French revolutions by encouraging the French and the Americans to overthrow their arbitrary governments. And finally, it furnished the basis of the political theories of such eighteenth century intellectuals as Voltaire, Jefferson, and Paine.

![Merchant and Apprentice: Shopping in the Time of Charles I](image)

**Collateral Reading**

J. Morley, *Cromwell* (1900).
CHAPTER III

France, Spain, and the Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century

The Bettmann Archive

LOUIS XIV, KING OF FRANCE
Painting by Rigaud

THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV

The year 1661 was a turning point in European history. In that year Louis XIV had personally assumed the reins of government, and the reign of the Grand Monarque began. About the same time Puritan domination, which Cromwell had established in England after the execution of Charles I in 1649, collapsed. Charles II was recalled and the Restoration took place in England.

Louis XIV's personal rule was the culmination of the national development of France to which Henry IV, the first of the Bourbon kings, and Cardinal Richelieu had contributed so much. French ascendancy in Europe had become an irrefutable fact, for in her administration, her court, her armies and navies, and in her impressive mechanism of divine right monarchy, France was the pattern for all others. The monarchy that Richelieu had fashioned with such consummate skill now reached its peak of efficiency. Louis XIV, the man who is said to have equated his person with the state, was in many respects a personification of that excellence, yet he lacked the judgment to divine the limit of absolute monarchy. Though he had the wit—or good fortune—to choose ministers not only willing but able to further his purposes, he would rule alone, brooking no deterrent from his advisers. Under this kind of man France could be dazzling, but she could also wear herself out in the performance of the tasks set by her master.

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Louis XIV was at once king and premier. For fifty-four years no European ruler worked harder or kept longer at his desk than he. In theory his monarchy was absolute. In his person and inheritance and ancient tradition, Louis XIV incarnated the type of absolute monarch. The maxim attributed to him, "I am the State" (L'état, c'est moi), was true in practice, if not in law. Royal authority, he held, was not of human but of divine origin. God established kings, and kings were His lieutenants, whose only limitations were their own discretion and fear of God. In person, Louis XIV was of short stature, graceful carriage, gracious manners when pleased, menacing when offended, dignified always, and of majestic appearance on state occasions. He was a magnificent poseur, this actually little man with a pockmarked face, a great periwig, and red heels on his shoes to make him look taller. He was industrious, incapable of delegating responsibility, and jealous of his ministers, whom he treated like glorified bureau clerks.

The most important administrative office was that of comptroller-general or minister of the treasury and finance, next to whom was the secretary of war, as one might expect in view of the great series of wars that France waged in the reign of Louis XIV. There was no minister of foreign affairs, for the king was that himself. As a whole, the system of government was that which Richelieu had built, both in the organs of the central government and in provincial organization. The thirty-two intendants remained all-powerful in the provinces. In establishing a lieutenant general of police, however, the king made a salutary improvement. His first appointee, La Reynie, left Paris well policed, with paved streets, having 5000 street lamps, a sewerage, and a water system. Every activity in France, the post, the press, the theatre, commerce, trade, industry, was watched and regulated.

While Paris was the capital of France, actually Louis XIV's habitual place of residence was at Versailles, fourteen miles from Paris. During his first years of rule, the king, like his predecessors, had resided at St. Germain in summer, but conceived a dislike of the place. The site of Versailles was hardly beautiful, for it was a waterless plain, and the expense of bringing water to the palace and vast gardens was immense; even more expensive was the palace on which the king expended over one thousand million francs. No fewer than 36,000 men and 6000 horses are said to have been employed at one time in formation of the terraces, gardens, road making, and excavation for miniature lakes. After 1682 Versailles was the permanent place of royal residence.

The most characteristic creation of Louis XIV was etiquette. The
court, that is, the household of the king and all its civil and military attachés and visitors, became an institution. It included the separate households of the king, the queen, the dauphin or heir-apparent, the princes of the blood, so that it was not unlike the solar system, everything revolving around the king; a simile that accounts for the term Le roi soleil, or Sun King, which was attributed to Louis XIV. The court lost all its former military character. Instead of wearing military costume as previous kings had done, Louis XIV wore ruffled shirts with lace cuffs, silk breeches and stockings, and buckled shoes. He was fond of ribbons and laces. In brief, Louis XIV dressed as a rich bourgeois, not as a soldier. He wore a pompous wig, carried a cane, rode in a carriage instead of on horseback, and neither hunted nor fenced.

The dominant internal problem of France in the seventeenth century was the double one of taxation and finance. Richelieu and Mazarin were masters of the art of diplomacy but deplorably poor financiers. At the accession of Louis XIV in 1643 anticipations of the revenue included that for three years in advance, i.e., for 1646, and the old evil of selling titles of nobility was resorted to again, the sale being stimulated by cancellation of all previous patents of nobility acquired in the preceding thirty years. Under Mazarin the average current expenses of the government were 60 millions and the revenue was 48 millions. Of the latter, 23 millions were reserved for secret service, thus explaining why every plenipotentiary at the Peace of Westphalia was in the pay of the French.

Oldest of the taxes in France was the taille, or tallage, which went back to the feudal age and was tax upon real and personal property of the common people, but from which the nobles and clergy were exempt since they had levied this form of tax upon their serfs in the Middle Ages. Another tax—and the most unpopular—was the gabelle, a tax on salt, the manufacture of which was a government monopoly. The amount of salt to be purchased was strictly defined. Each consumer was compelled to purchase in proportion to the number in his family and could not sell to another any surplus quantity he might have. Much salt was illicitly made along the seacoast and smuggled to the inland provinces. Almost every history of Old France dwells with execration upon the injustice of the gabelle. Another heavy levy in France under the ancient regime was the transit tax imposed on commodities of interchange between provinces. It was as if interstate commerce in the United States were taxed, which is forbidden by our constitution.

The exemption of the French nobles from taxation was not, as generally supposed, quite universal. They were subject to the taille
for lands in their own occupation and to the capitation or poll tax, from which even the Dauphin was not exempt. Because the nobles in Old France had pecuniary privileges, titles of nobility became objects of speculation and purchase. To such an excess did this practice reach in the seventeenth century that it was calculated there were no fewer than four thousand offices conferring hereditary nobility, and all vendible. Then again, the crown sold “special appointments” to tradesmen, such as glove-maker, wig-maker, etc., to the king. The regulations governing apprenticeship were unjust and a severe limitation on industry.

When the personal government of Louis XIV began in 1661, the financial condition of France was desperate. One of his first acts was to appoint Colbert to be comptroller-general (1661–1683). Colbert was one of the earliest European statesmen to think in economic terms. The hard-working, parsimonious but capable minister began by recovering over 110 millions of stolen revenue when he prosecuted more than five hundred former officials for peculation. He liquidated part of the public debt and at the same time reduced the rate of interest on the remainder. He compelled the farmers-general to compete for the privilege of collecting taxes and accepted the bid that allowed the most to the government. By 1681 this form of revenue amounted to over 64,000,000 livres, as against slightly over half that amount twenty years earlier.

But these expedients were negative rather than positive remedies. A more constructive augmentation of revenue was necessary. Of the three sources of revenue, agriculture, commerce, industry, the first was of least interest to Colbert, and he believed that the stimulation of industry was more important than the promotion of commerce. He was particularly anxious to develop the cloth industry, and advocated protective tariffs upon all woven silk, wool, cotton, linen, and dyestuffs. The Flemish weavers who manufactured the world-renowned Gobelin tapestries were introduced into France by Louis XIV’s zealous comptroller-general. Italian silk workers and Venetian glass makers also were imported to help develop French luxury manufactures, a line in which France still excels. In sum, Colbert’s policy was to regularize existing industries and to introduce new ones subsidized by the government. In the matter of internal commerce Colbert abolished or reduced many of the medieval inter-provincial tolls, built roads, and constructed canals, notably the one which connected Toulouse with a Mediterranean port. But he was only partially successful in abating the evil of custom duties within France, and they were not wiped out until the Revolution of 1789 demolished the old regime.
As the two maritime nations, England and Holland, were France’s chief commercial competitors, a strong navy was required to enforce this mercantilistic policy. After Richelieu’s death in 1642, the French navy had rapidly decayed, and by the time Louis XIV assumed the reins of government there were no ships of the first and second classes, and the few that were left were in so decrepit a condition that they dared not put to sea. Of the ships that existed in 1661, only eight were fit for service in 1671. Colbert scrapped the whole antiquated fleet and created a new navy, repaired old shipyards, and built new ones. Between 1668 and 1681 he had 60,000 enrolled seamen distributed over the maritime provinces of France. At Brest, Rochefort, Dunkirk, Havre, and Toulon he erected arsenals. By 1692, France had 2500 naval officers and 97,000 sailors and marines.

Colbert's policies were at first successful. But about 1675, difficulties began to multiply and revolts broke out in some of the provinces because of new and heavy war taxes. Foreign and civil war, a famine in 1693, dearness of food, increased taxation, the exodus of the Huguenots after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685), weakened France. The increasing gap between revenues and expenditures was bridged by loans at prodigious rates of interest which, in turn, helped to ruin the country’s finances. It is no wonder that in 1715, Louis XIV’s reign ended in worse condition than it had begun. The government debt aggregated 1320 millions of livres.

Notwithstanding this serious and chronic financial condition, Louis XIV pursued his ambitious course, oppressing his people at home and increasingly antagonizing Europe by his external policy of conquest. Three subjects in particular need to be noticed. These were the Chambers of Réunion (1679–1684), the declaration of the liberties of the Gallican Church (1682), and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685).

Along the eastern frontier of France were some ragged edges, the most important of which were Alsace, Lorraine, Luxemburg, the bishoprics of Trèves, Saarbrück, and Zweibrücken, or Deuxponts. These areas Louis XIV wished to acquire in order to round out his frontier, though his ultimate ambition was to extend France to the Rhine, a realization of France’s long cherished doctrine of “natural frontiers”—the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. In dispute between France and Germany ever since the break-up of the Frankish Empire in the ninth century, these border areas were now desired by the French king, who saw his chance to take advantage of an anomalous political condition and absence of accurate legal definition. Four special courts, called Chambers of Réunion, were instituted at Metz, Breisach, Besançon, and Tourney; they were or-
ordered to investigate the mass of obscure, conflicting, or concurrent claims, and to decide what dependencies had at any time belonged to the territories and cities that had been ceded to France by the last four treaties of peace. The courts, of course, were a blind for outright annexation by France, for Louis XIV followed up each decision with military occupation. By 1683, France had gobbled up these territories; with the exception of Strasbourg, the territory of Alsace alone escaped annexation. The German states and the Holy Roman Empire were the chief victims of this procedure, but all Europe resented it, though reluctant to go to war to prevent it.

The Pope also became an enemy of Louis XIV and sympathized with Protestant Holland and England, the two chief adversaries of France. This enmity arose over the question of the "Gallican Church" and its liberties. Louis XIV had no special respect for Rome, an attitude in the tradition of Richelieu and Mazarin. He conceived that his duty to the Papacy consisted in maintaining the principles of Catholic dogma and worship, but that in every other capacity the king was the head of the Church in France. This meant that the king had the rights of making clerical appointments and of appropriating for his own use a portion of the revenues of the Church as a landed proprietor—and the Church, be it remembered, was the largest landowner in the realm. By 1673, the cost of Louis' wars led him to increase his impositions upon the French clergy, in spite of their protests that it was extortion. Inevitably other issues were drawn into the controversy, such as the proper relation of Church and state, and even the right of the Papacy to depose a king for misgovernment. In the end, Louis XIV won his controversy with Pope Innocent XI, one of the ablest of modern Popes. Later Europe witnessed the spectacle of a pope reproving the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes and morally supporting the Protestant coalition against France in the next war.

Perhaps the most calamitous event in the reign of Louis XIV was the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. It climaxed the king's internal policy and at the same time intensified foreign enmity to France. This royal act is evidence of the fact that, though the principle of religious toleration was admitted and enacted into law by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, in practice it was more honored in the breach than in the observance—in England, Holland, and elsewhere as well as in France. Influential factors in the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes were the Jesuits, Louvois, the powerful minister of war, Madame de Maintenon, the king's mistress, most of the high clergy, and the guilds, whose members resented the competition of Huguenot workers. The last factor needs a further word of explanation.
Colbert, in seeking to increase control of industry and commerce, revived Henry IV's policy of regulating the guilds. He had no patience with their efforts to restrict trade for fear of competition, nor with their exclusiveness, corruption, and fraud. His organization of new corporations and his encouragement of new industries, as well as his importation of Protestant tradesmen and craftsmen, antagonized the guilds, who would admit no Protestant to their organizations. The Huguenots, mostly of the bourgeois and artisan classes, prospered; they were thrifty, industrious, and, in general, honest and loyal. Colbert's fall in 1681 ruined the reforms he had introduced, assured the triumph of the guilds, and made the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes a certainty.

Louis XIV, too, was personally inclined against the Huguenots, for he, with his ideas of Divine Right and absolute authority, was unwilling to tolerate a section of nonconforming subjects. Convinced that Protestantism represented a menace to his authority and that religious unity should be as complete as political unity, and also encouraged by Maintenon, Louis XIV turned a deaf ear to the reasonable and courageous petitions of the Protestants to put a stop to Huguenot persecutions.

On October 18, 1685, the blow fell. The Protestant religion was forbidden, the church edifices were confiscated and destroyed, and Protestant schools were abolished. Worst of all were the terrible dragonnades, punitive military expeditions that harried with fire and sword the provinces in which the Huguenots were most numerous. Thousands of Huguenots were condemned to the galleys—a living death. Louis XIV must bear a heavy weight of blame for the Revocation, but his moral responsibility may be extenuated to some degree by reason of the conspiracy of silence around him, maintained by Louvois and many other high civil and military officials. The persecutions continued, however, to the end of Louis XIV's reign, and when the king died in 1715 there were Huguenots still chained to oars, despite the French promise given in the Treaty of Utrecht with Great Britain two years earlier to liberate all Huguenots who had been condemned to the galleys. France suffered as a result of the king's bigotry.

The moral and material injury done to France by the Revocation was incalculable. According to Vauban, Louis XIV's enlightened military engineer, over 100,000 Protestants had fled the country, taking with them sixty millions of wealth; the army lost 600 officers and 12,000 soldiers, and the fleet, 9000 sailors and marines. Even Vauban's figures were far below actuality; at the lowest estimate now given, France lost 400,000 inhabitants, among them scholars,
teachers, men of letters, artists, progressive merchants, skilled artisans, and craftsmen. To England, Holland, Brandenburg, and to the overseas colonies of the Dutch and the English, these hundreds of thousands carried away the intellectual, physical, and moral powers that France could ill afford to lose. Nor did the Revocation succeed in its original purpose, for Protestantism survived in France, and still exists.

From the internal history of France we must now turn to the larger stage of international relations and the dominating role played by the Sun King and his state. Louis XIV's exalted opinion of himself, his powerful armies and navies, the dynastic ideas of his time, all these added up to a policy of seeking to establish French influence in every part of Europe, to push the French frontier to the Rhine, and even to strive for universal dominion. *Le Grand Monarque* was determined that all Europe should bow before him or feel the force of his will.

Diplomacy and war—if we disallow Clausewitz' dictum—were the alternating instruments of pressure in Louis XIV's arsenal. Both were a matter of money to pay soldiers and to bribe the ministers of foreign states, practices which Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV reduced to a method. Every European sovereign had his ambassador at the principal foreign courts. The envoys were kept instructed by dispatches, the most important passages of which were ciphered. For the first time armies began to be uniformed and to have a regular armament. The more portable musket had supplanted the heavy and cumbersome arquebus or old-fashioned blunderbuss; the bayonet, essentially a sword-blade fixed to a gun barrel, had taken the place of the pike, providing two weapons in one. Marshal Vauban, the greatest military engineer of the seventeenth century, had helped advance the art of fortification. Louis XIV also had the services of the most brilliant field commanders of the age—Turenne, Condé, Luxembourg, Catinat, Vendôme, and Boufflers, against one or another of whom were pitted William of Orange, Prince Eugene of Savoy, and the Duke of Marlborough.

The beginning of the personal reign of Louis XIV in 1661 precipitated the first war of the new era, known as the War of Devolution (1667–1668), which arose over the question of the reversion of the Spanish Netherlands when Philip IV of Spain should die, as he did in 1665. On the ground that his wife, the daughter of the Spanish king, had a right to a Spanish inheritance—a sheer piece of effrontery from a legal point of view—Louis XIV demanded of his father-in-law the cession of a considerable portion of the Spanish Netherlands to France. When refused, Louis XIV prepared to take
by force what he could not get by diplomacy. In 1667 his armies invaded the Netherlands and Franche-Comté, easily crushing the resistance of the Spanish troops in his way. Whereupon Holland, realizing that the elimination of a buffer state between herself and France might prove not only bothersome but fatal to her very existence, hastily formed the Triple Alliance (January, 1668) with England and Sweden. The coalition induced Louis XIV to sign the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle a few months later, according to the terms of which France restored Franche-Comté to Spain—after dismantling the fortresses—but retained twelve fortified towns along the border of the Spanish Netherlands.

Louis XIV, nursing his animosity against the Dutch, whom he regarded as the soul of the coalition against him, bought England out of the Triple Alliance by concluding the secret Treaty of Dover (June 1, 1670) with Charles II. According to the terms of this agreement, the Stuart king became a French pensioner bound to assist Louis XIV in his designs against the Dutch with an army and a fleet, in return for which Charles looked to French support in establishing arbitrary government after the Stuart model of kingship. Thus to England the issue was one between constitutional and absolute monarchy.

By 1672, Louis XIV had also bribed the Swedes away from their Dutch alliance and formed a coalition with strategically situated German powers, thus politically isolating the Dutch Republic and apparently rendering her easy prey to French aggression. At this juncture, William of Orange, now a grown man of political astuteness, was made Captain and Admiral General of the Republic. Three weeks later England formally declared war upon Holland. The French declaration was delayed a few days longer, for Louis XIV was cleverly concealing his designs and his responsibility behind the perfidy of his puppet Charles II.

The Dutch forces were rapidly reduced to dire straits by the French army and the English navy, despite their inundation of three whole provinces by cutting the dikes, and a heroic but ineffective resistance. Ready now for peace at any price, the Dutch offered Louis XIV terms that would have given France the Rhine as part of her frontier as well as a handsome indemnity. Flushed with success and a prey to his own arrogance, Louis XIV spurned the Dutch terms and made demands that only served to steel his opponents to further resistance. A popular revolution in Holland made William of Orange the Stadtholder, and the Dutch cut more of their dikes and forced Louis XIV to withdraw. Dutch liberty once more was saved from foreign and Catholic oppression. Henceforth William of
Orange was ruler of the Dutch Republic and the master spirit of opposition to the French king.

Louis XIV, foiled of his prey in Holland, had determined to indemnify himself for his losses there by falling upon the Spanish possessions in Central Europe. The French easily conquered Franche-Comté, but the allies projected a triple invasion of France: in the south by Spain; from the north, William of Orange in command of Dutch and Spanish troops advanced up the Somme and forced the French to retreat; on the east, a German and Imperial force struck at France through Alsace. The peril of France was great, and it was made greater by the sudden defection of England. There, Charles II was forced by public opinion to co-operate overtly with the Dutch and, in order to cement the Anglo-Dutch alliance, Mary, Charles’s niece and the eldest daughter of the future James II, was given in marriage to William of Orange. The historical outcome of this union came in 1688 when the English Parliament expelled the Stuart dynasty and called William and Mary to the throne of England.

The grand designs of the coalition for a triple invasion of France collapsed and gave Louis XIV a breathing spell, during which he consolidated his Franche-Comté conquest and made minor advances into the Spanish Netherlands. By this time, however, Louis XIV had other and more immediate interests to look after, and needed peace for their execution. In 1678–1679, peace was made in a series of separate treaties inclusively called the Treaty of Nimwegen, by the terms of which all the territory that France had conquered was restored to Holland. France acquired Franche-Comté, and several towns on the fringe of the Spanish Netherlands, including Valenciennes, Ypres, Cambray, St. Omer, Maubeuge, and Condé. Spain suffered the most, for she was in no condition to prolong the war, and her late allies were unwilling to fight on her behalf when their contentions were satisfied.

Between the Treaty of Nimwegen in 1678–1679 and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, Louis XIV was at the height of his power and the shadow of France fell across Europe. Yet those years were the edge of the declivity. Louis XIV had angered nearly all Europe by his ambition and his arrogance, most of all by the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and in the succeeding years of his reign an outraged Europe was united against France to abridge her domination. Yet France at the end of the seventeenth century was the greatest state of the civilized world. The decay of Spain, the impotence of England under the Stuarts, the political disintegration of Germany, gave France the opportunity to become mighty. This is
EXTENSION OF THE FRONTIERS OF FRANCE (1648-1713)
what Richelieu and Mazarin and Louis XIV had perceived and boldly acted upon. French military power was greater than any Europe had known since the Roman Empire. France seemed to be in a position to dominate western Europe.

Louis XIV's highhanded aggressions against Germany—the Chambers of Réunion—had been followed by French seizure of the Palatinate. This new territorial aggression brought about the formation of the League of Augsburg in 1686 against France, to which the electors of Bavaria, Saxony, and Brandenburg, the duke of Savoy, and the kings of Sweden and Spain were parties. War hung in the balance. Louis XIV could see clearly that the impending Revolution of 1688 in England would bring about Anglo-Dutch adherence to the League against him. In anger at the opposition looming ahead, he frightfully devastated the Palatinate, demolishing cultural monuments and military objectives with equal fervor. This wanton act increased the anger abroad, already deeply stirred by the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes.

The Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the accession of William of Orange to the English throne brought England into alignment, not only with Holland but also with the Continent, against the French menace of political preponderance in Europe. So certain was Louis XIV that William would fail in his invasion of England that the French fleet made no effort to intercept the Dutchman's crossing of the Channel. It was a fatal error of judgment, for the imperatives of British foreign policy were twofold: to prevent the predominance of any one state on the Continent—the "balance of power"—and to insure against the Low Countries falling into the hands of a great military and naval empire. William III regarded the Whig and Tory parties merely as two different and rival instruments for the subjugation of France. He despised both of them, but was compelled to use them as best he could. In 1689 the Grand Alliance was formed by William III—the most formidable combination of powers against her that France had ever seen. The Austrian Emperor, the Great Elector of Brandenburg, the Dukes of Brunswick and Hesse, the Kings of Denmark and Spain—all united in opposition to Louis XIV's designs.

The war that now broke out, known as the War of the Grand Alliance, was waged on land and sea. Principal seat of the conflict was the Spanish Netherlands, that cockpit of Europe for so many centuries. Battles raged even in the New World where Count Frontenac, the governor-general, and Canadian Indians were arrayed against the English colonists and their Iroquois allies in what is known as "King William's War." The course of the conflict in Eu-
Europe was singularly devoid of brilliance on either side, but France, facing such a powerful set of opponents, was the first to feel exhaustion. In 1697, Louis XIV signed the Peace of Ryswick, according to the terms of which France, England, and Holland restored the conquests that each had made. But France was allowed to keep the conquests made from Spain, as well as Strasbourg, although compelled to renounce all other “réunions” to the Empire. Her claim to the Palatinate was annulled. What galled Louis XIV most were the requirements to recognize William III as King of England and Anne as his successor and to abandon French support of the Stuarts. For the first time in the Bourbon period France had been compelled to make a real sacrifice.

Louis XIV’s concessions and his willingness to make peace, however, were due to more than his weaker position against the allies. As usual, he had other schemes, the fruition of which required an interval of peace. His attention was on the question of the reversion of the Spanish monarchy and its vast colonial empire when the imbecilic, invalid, and childless king, Charles II, should die. The Spanish succession had been a subject of intrigue between Bourbons and Habsburgs for years, and each house had a candidate for the inheritance. When Charles II died in 1700, his will revealed that Louis XIV’s grandson, Philip of Anjou, had been designated as his heir. Louis XIV naturally accepted the proffered crown in the name of his grandson, and Europe prepared to resist what it considered to be a new aggression. The stakes were large, indeed, and the French monarch was determined to gain them.

The prize in prospect was less for Spain herself than for her colonies, which included Cuba and other West India islands, Florida, Mexico, Central America, and all South America except the two Guianas and Brazil. To these vast colonial possessions must be added the Philippines and the Canary Islands. In Europe, too, it must be remembered that Spain had the key to the English Channel in her hands in the Belgian provinces and Luxembourg, and a bunch of keys to the control of the Mediterranean in her possession of the Balearic Islands, Sardinia, Sicily, Naples, to say nothing of the Milanais, industrially and agriculturally of importance and strategically placed to control the major Alpine passes, either for commerce or war.

Both the interest of the maritime powers, England and Holland, in the destiny of the Spanish Empire and the stakes to be played for were enormous. For the first time in European history, transoceanic expansion, colonial imperialism, and sea power on a grand scale emerged as issues of transcendent importance, dwarfing even the con-
tinental issues. The prospect of French acquisition of the Spanish Netherlands disquieted England and Holland, and if France also acquired Naples and Sicily and the other islands in the Mediterranean, the sea would become French and be closed to English and Dutch shipping. Charles II's death, therefore, precipitated the first world war in history, for nothing less than a world war could settle the question of his inheritance. The War of the Spanish Succession began.

In England the Parliament was opposed to the conflict, and had it not been for several provocative measures by French forces, William III might have had difficulty in aligning the country behind his policy of stopping French aggression. Louis XIV was impolitic, however, and the last act of William III's life was the formation, with the Duke of Marlborough's aid, of the Grand Alliance in the summer of 1701. To have been able to create an effective European coalition against France out of so many heterogeneous elements was the historic achievement of William III, an achievement that wrecked Louis XIV's dream of world dominion. William's death in 1702 did not arrest the preparations, and the government of Queen Anne declared war.

Down to 1704, Louis XIV took the offensive; his ultimate objective was the capture of Vienna. Prince Eugene of Savoy, now an Austrian field-marshals and famous as the conqueror of the Turks, combined his forces with those of the Duke of Marlborough, that redoubtable English commander. This brilliant duet was too much for Louis XIV's armies, and at the battle of Blenheim (August 13, 1704) Marlborough and Eugene won a tremendous victory over the Franco-Bavarian forces. The outcome of the engagement saved Vienna from French capture, and western and southern Germany from French domination, for Louis XIV was compelled to withdraw all his forces behind the Rhine.

With Germany and Austria now out of the French danger zone, the seat of the war shifted to the Spanish Netherlands and to Italy, which were still in Louis XIV's hands. Marlborough wanted to make a quick and decisive thrust into France from the eastern frontier, but factional strife at home, Dutch jealousy, and Austrian lethargy made impossible this one opportunity to terminate the war swiftly. The direct and costly conquest of the Spanish Netherlands, where French armies lay entrenched behind fortified cities and a huge earthwork embankment running from the Meuse to the sea, became necessary. Fortunately for the enemies of France, Louis XIV played directly into Marlborough's hands by changing commanders and making a try for victory to redress the defeat at Blenheim. The
new French commander, Marshal Villeroi, incompetent and stupid, considered Marlborough as a "mediocre adventurer."

On a May morning in 1706, the plateau of Ramillies witnessed the spectacle of 60,000 Frenchmen, Bavarians, Spaniards, and Walloons being put to rout within the space of two hours by the equally numerous but better disciplined forces of Marlborough. Brussels, Antwerp, Ghent, Ostend, in fact nearly the whole Spanish Netherlands, fell into the hands of the coalition as a consequence of Marlborough's triumph. Hard upon this event, Eugene's victory at Turin drove the French out of Italy. On the defensive now, the French fell back to make a stand in their fortified barrier towns along the frontier between France and the Spanish Netherlands, but two subsequent defeats at Oudenarde (1708) and Malplaquet (1709) broke the back of French military resistance and added to the lustre of Marlborough and Prince Eugene.

In twelve years, England, Holland, and Austria had nearly annihilated the resources of France; the Austrian claimant to the Spanish throne, Archduke Charles, had twice entered Madrid; and Louis XIV had been compelled to consent to the expulsion of his grandson from Spain. It only remained for England to dictate the terms of peace that should determine the future settlement of Europe.

Then suddenly the situation changed, and the interests of all parties were altered. Emperor Joseph I died in April, 1711, leaving no children, and his brother, the Archduke Charles, who had been the coalition's candidate for the throne of Spain, became emperor. Immediately there loomed the possibility of a union of Spain and all her colonies with the hereditary Habsburg lands—Austria, Bohemia, Silesia, and Hungary, as well as Belgium and North Italy, which Austria had acquired during the war. Such an eventuality represented more of a danger to the balance of power than to the preponderance of France. The event reversed all the political relations and threw the game into the hands of Louis XIV, who, it was plain, would now realize his ambition to place his grandson on the Spanish throne. The absurdity of merely dynastic government had never before and has never since been more convincingly demonstrated.

England at once realized the circumstances and, having got the most out of the war, moved to make peace. As she held the trump cards the other allies were compelled to follow suit. She alone dictated the terms of the Peace of Utrecht (April 11, 1713). The provisions of the treaty offer a singular contrast to the terms of the original alliance. England got the lion's share of the spoil at Utrecht. France ceded to her Newfoundland, Nova Scotia (Acadia), and Hudson's Bay Territory. Spain yielded Gibraltar (captured by Britain in 1704).
and the island of Minorca with the important harbor of Port Mahon, by which English naval supremacy was established in the Mediterranean. In addition, the English won the Asiento, a contract giving English slave traders the exclusive right to supply the Spanish colonies with African slaves.

The Spanish Netherlands, instead of going to Holland, as might have been expected, passed to Austria, to the chagrin of the Dutch—but the port of Antwerp still was kept closed in the interest of the commerce of London and Amsterdam. Savoy for its part in the war was given Sicily as a kingdom. Prussia also, for an even smaller role in the conflict, was erected into a kingdom, and thus Catholic and Protestant kings were balanced. Spain was permitted to retain its appanages in Italy, except Milan and Naples, which passed to the emperor. As for Louis XIV, defeated in every quarter, he was successful in the scheme that had been the primary cause of the war; he saw his grandson, in spite of all, established on the throne of Spain and the possessor of Spanish America. It was stipulated, however, that the French and Spanish thrones should never be united. Most important, though, was the fact that the War of the Spanish Succession sharpened, if it did not create, the issues of England's relation to the Continent as well as the relation of England's colonies beyond the sea to the mother-country. Thus two alternative policies were envisaged: a continental policy, and a maritime, colonial, and American policy.

The Treaty of Utrecht was the last event of importance in the history of Louis XIV. In 1715 he died and the sun of the Bourbons had set; it was the end of an era. It was no less so in the history of England. Queen Anne succumbed in 1714, and the House of Hanover or Brunswick succeeded in the person of King George I. The Age of the Georges had begun, with new names, new circumstances, new policies. The peace settlement also marked the termination of a long struggle of the smaller states in Europe to save themselves from French preponderance, if not actual domination. At the same time it was a struggle of the Protestants of England, Holland, and Germany to avert from themselves the fate of the Huguenots in France. Finally, the seventeenth century had been the age of French ascendency over Europe. Now England's sea power, together with her financial and commercial interests, outmatched France's armies and resources. In the matters of commercial supremacy and colonial possessions England was without a rival. She had no more to fear even from the competition of Dutch commerce, for Holland had become a client. And as for her colonial rival, Spain, that country had lost its position as one of the great world powers.
THE DECLINE OF SPAIN (1598–1659)

In spite of the political deterioration and economic impoverishment that it had suffered under Philip II, the Spanish monarchy in the seventeenth century enjoyed a unique prestige. It dictated the style, manners, and fashions to every court in Europe. Spanish literature and art rivaled, if it did not surpass, that of England and France. This transformation of Spain, which had already begun under Philip II, was consummated under the reign of Philip III (1598–1621) and remained unchanged under those of his successors Philip IV (1621–1665) and Charles II (1665–1700), whose reigns are without interest.

The administrative system of Spain, created by Philip II, was simple in spite of its seeming complexity. Public business was not distributed among ministers but among various councils, each with secretaries, keeper of the seal, and other officials. Above these was a Grand Council of State. All these bodies operated very slowly; communications were always made in writing between them and the king, or between one council and another. Six months might elapse between moves. Indirect taxes were farmed, and direct taxes were voted by the Cortes, the national legislature. Local government was administered by judges, corregidors in cities, alcaldes in the country districts, under whom were the police. Spanish judges were under the royal authority that paid them and might depose them, and this was true also of other officials. They had no such independence as had French officials, who purchased their offices from the crown and often exploited them to their own advantage.

In theory the Spanish monarchy was absolute. But such intense centralization of authority threw an intolerable burden upon the king, so that the delays in enforcement of the law often worked injustice or harm because the ruler was unable to delegate responsibility. Even the heir to the throne was excluded from any participation in the administration so that each new sovereign came to the throne without any previous political experience. Accordingly, in practice the king's favorite minister was the actual ruler of the state. This, indeed, was a tradition, almost an article of Spanish ceremonial.

In religion the government remained as intolerant as it was in the reign of Philip II. The Moriscos, the name given to the converted Mohammedans—descendants of those Moors who had remained in Spain after the proscription of 1492, had accepted Christianity, and had been good Catholics for centuries—were expelled in 1609, as the Moors and Jews had been earlier. This act seriously impaired Spanish prosperity, for the Moriscos had preserved the agricultural and
industrial skill of their race, both of which rapidly declined after their expulsion. Old soldiers to whom their lands were allotted were unwilling to do manual labor, and the same may be said of the Spanish artisans who preferred lolling in the sun to work. Expulsion of the Moriscos, sales taxes, and internal tolls wrought the ruin of Spain's agriculture, industry, and commerce. Finally, brigandage within the country and the forays of the Barbary pirates upon the coasts climaxed Spain's distress. Population declined and entire villages were deserted. Internal revolts were frequent. Catalonia rebelled in 1639; Portugal, in 1640. Catalonia was not pacified until 1652 and then on condition that her ancient liberties should be preserved. Portugal won her independence under the Duke of Braganza, who founded the royal house anew. Later the Spanish rebellion spread to Naples and Sicily.

Decay was eating the heart of the Spanish nation. Yet it is not strictly accurate to ascribe Spain's decadence to intellectual and moral decline. The existence of such writers as Cervantes, author of Don Quixote, that immortal satire upon the absurdities of Spanish chivalry, of Gracian's Oraculo Manual (1653), a series of essays on life and conduct as suggestive and as penetrating almost as the Essays of Montaigne in France in the previous century, and of the painters Velasquez and Murillo, shows that there were still some creative forces in Spain.

The ultimate cause of Spain's decay was largely economic and financial. Fiscally the condition of the Spanish monarchy was one of almost chronic bankruptcy. No budget existed. When money was in hand, it was spent lavishly; this was especially true when the galleons arrived from Spanish America or the Cortes granted a subsidy. In the intervals the government lived on forced loans, which it might or might not repay. The only regular source of income was from indirect taxation—the alcavala or sales tax of one-tenth, taxes on consumption, monopolies, and internal tolls for transport of goods from one province to another. Almost the entire revenue was mortgaged in advance. Philip II, after thrice repudiating the public debt, had left a debt of one hundred million ducats.

Even more fatal to the nation's economic life was the flood of American treasure and the price revolution. The total import of gold and silver, principally the latter, from Mexico and South America between 1503 and 1660 was 447,820,932 pesos. Contrary to popular belief, little of this immense treasure fell into the hands of the

1 For full and convincing information on this subject, see Earl J. Hamilton, American Treasures and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501-1650 (Harvard University Press, 1934).
buccaneers of the Spanish Main or the gentlemen sea marauders like Drake and Raleigh. In only two years were significant portions of a treasure fleet seized by enemies: in 1628 the Dutch took the fleet returning from New Spain, and in 1656 the English prevented most of the specie on the Tierra Firme fleet from reaching the motherland. For the most part the flotillas, teeming with men and bristling with arms, sailed at regular intervals over usual courses, almost, if not absolutely, without regard to the operations of enemies.

The effect of this immense amount of precious metals steadily pouring into Spain was a price revolution of astonishing dimension. It was inflation with a vengeance. Money was "cheap" and prices were "dear." Ruinous taxation, depreciated currency, market manipulation, high labor costs, vagrancy, depopulation, luxury, enclosure of common pasturage, destruction of forests, all directly or indirectly proceeded from the influx. Of what benefit was the increased amount of money if prices rose excessively? At the opening of the seventeenth century the price level in Spain was 3.46, that of France 2.19, that of England 2.56, as compared with a hundred years earlier.

"Out of conflict with penury and the zeal for reform issued an endless succession of inflationary and deflationary measures that perturbed economic life and played a conspicuous part in the decline of Spain." A bad economic system, interference with and taxation of private treasure (sometimes amounting to confiscation), a decrease in the production of the mines, and a rise in the expense of mining were some of the other causes.

THE DUTCH REPUBLIC

One of the most important reasons for Spain's fall was the revolt of the Spanish Netherlands. Aided by England and France, the people in this region had resisted the power of Spain. The seven northern provinces of the Spanish monarchy in the Low Countries had denounced under the leadership of William of Orange the domination of Spain in 1579 and had united into a federation called the Union of Utrecht. This was the origin of the Dutch Republic or, to designate it more particularly, the Republic of the United Netherlands. The federation was very loose, owing to provincial tradition and separatist feeling, and, if a more perfect union had not been developed, political disaster probably would have ensued.¹

These seven provinces differed in physical features, in history, in economy, and to some degree in language. In the northeast, Over-Yssel and Groningen were marshy and poor; the Duchy of Gelder-

¹ The southern part of the Low Countries remained attached to the Spanish crown. It was called the Spanish Netherlands, and later became modern Belgium.
land was a poor country but ruled by a warlike nobility both poor and proud. The province of Utrecht was a former diocese, secularized by the Reformation. The other three provinces of the Union bordered on the sea. Friesland was peopled by a free and hardy peasantry used to wind and wave, and intensely democratic in spirit. Holland and Zeeland were the most important; both were commercial and industrial provinces, dominated by the bourgeois patricians of Amsterdam and other thriving cities.

Each province had its own local estates, or legislative body. Municipal organization varied according to the province, but in the large towns the burgher class was predominant. The capital of the confederation was The Hague—literally “the Hedge”—where the old palace of the counts of Holland was situated. Leading official of the county of Holland was the Grand Pensionary, who was appointed for five years by the popular assembly. Nominally the Pensionary was the chief executive of the province of Holland only, but owing to the preponderance of Holland in the confederation he had very great influence throughout the whole country. By 1593 the Estates General had become the ruling body of the republic. Each province had only one voice in the deliberations, that is to say, the deputies of each province voted en bloc. The Estates General directed foreign affairs and regulated matters common to the Union, but were careful not to trespass upon the “states’ rights” of the several provinces.

Chief executive of the united Dutch Republic was the Prince of Orange, who combined the authority of commander-in-chief of the army and fleet and the presidency of the state under the titles Captain and Admiral General Stadtholder, both of which functions became hereditary in the House of Orange. Although only seventeen years of age when his father, William the Silent, was assassinated, Maurice of Nassau was at once named Stadtholder on the motion of the then Grand Pensionary of Holland. It was to this ruler that the Dutch owed the liberation of the Netherlands from Spain. He was a great commander and civil engineer, whose dikes and canals and causeways and siege operations utterly discomfited the Spanish troops. Between 1591 and 1598 his campaigns were brilliant but gruelling. Despite his genius, however, the United Netherlands might have succumbed to Spain if it had not been for the intervention of Queen Elizabeth of England and Henry IV of France. Disappointing to the Dutch, Henry IV at first did not insist on Spanish recognition of Dutch independence when he concluded the Treaty of Vervins in 1598 with Philip II, a demand that might have driven Spain to exasperation and rendered Henry’s domestic difficulties insurmountable. Deserted by the French and facing an opponent worthy of his steel—the Arch-
duke Albert, son-in-law of Philip II—the young Prince of Orange fought the Spanish to exhaustion. His own country was devastated in the process. Henry IV finally intervened between the belligerents, and in 1609 a truce to last for twelve years was signed. In reality it was the recognition of Dutch independence in all save the theory of international law. With the coming of peace the United Netherlands rapidly recovered, and its prosperity soon astonished Europe.

Despite marked economic development, there was a considerable interval of political disunity in the Dutch Netherlands. In fact, the period from 1609 to 1650 was one of bitter party conflict. During the long war with Spain, this party antagonism had been latent, for the pressing interest was liberty and independence. But when these were secured the ancient factional hostility flared up. It was largely a struggle over the kind of government. The essential issue in the Dutch Republic was one of political theory and administrative practice. The first article of the Union of Utrecht in 1579 had attempted to delineate the nature of the relationship between the various provinces and the central government, but interpretation was so varied that differences arose as to states' rights and national sovereignty. Without reference to a supreme judicial body, such as our Supreme Court, or to civil war, the Dutch solved the problem of giving simultaneous and just expression to central and provincial rights. This party cleavage was exacerbated by other differences. The Orange party, sustained by the army, warlike so far as European affairs were concerned, was monarchical in spirit, orthodox Calvinist, intolerant in religion, and wanted to establish a state church. The opposition party, led by the Grand Pensionary, John of Olden-Barnemveldt, had republican objectives, and was composed of the wealthy bourgeoisie, merchants, and the professional class; they wished for peace for the sake of trade; were tolerant in religious policy (for there were still many Catholics in the Netherlands); were opposed to the establishment of a state church; and were jealous of the rights and liberties of the provinces and the towns.

The rivalry of the two parties broke into a flame of enmity over the difference in religious policy—an issue to which every other antagonism soon became attached on one side or the other. The point at issue was whether predestination was conditional or not, and soon the province of Holland, under Barneveldt, took up arms to settle the quarrel with the other six provinces, all of which were politically Orangist. Before civil war could break out, the rebellion was suppressed, Barneveldt put to death, the doctrine of conditional predestination condemned, and a state Church established (1619).

When Maurice died in 1625, he was a king in all save the title. His
half-brother and successor, Frederick Henry, was the son of William the Silent. He was easygoing though not weak. No one was opposed to him. He pleased everyone and antagonized none, so that during the twenty-two years of his rule he contributed to the popularity and permanence of the House of Orange. His outstanding achievement was the establishment of the Dutch navy, which later on (1655) not only defied but defeated the fleets of England in a war over commercial rivalry. It is significant of the abiding fighting spirit of the Dutch that they opposed to the last the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.

Under the reign of William II (1647–1650) the old antagonism broke out again, but the situation was now different, for the stadholder was an energetic proponent of absolute power, a belief strengthened by his marriage with a daughter of Charles I of England. When the burgher Republicans strenuously opposed his drive to be recognized as a king, William II, with the army behind him, arrested the leaders of the Republican party, but his sudden death from smallpox left the Orange party without a leader, for his only son, William III, was born six days after his father’s demise. For the moment the party of the Estates was triumphant. This meant in fact the preponderance of Holland over all the other provinces, and it was the Grand Pensionary of Holland, John De Witt, who actually ruled the Netherlands for the next twenty-two years (1650–1672), a period culminating in the assassination of the Grand Pensionary and the triumph of the House of Orange in the person of William III.

Within two years of De Witt’s advent as ruler of the United Netherlands, a naval war broke out between England and Holland. Dutch sympathy for Charles II was partly responsible, but the chief cause of the conflict was Dutch resentment against the English Navigation Act (October 9, 1651), which forbade the importation of goods into England except in English vessels and was primarily aimed against the Dutch carrying trade. On the high seas the Dutch admirals, De Ruyter and Tromp, split honors with the English admiral, Blake, but in the end England’s superior naval power, the Anglo-Swedish alliance, the hostility of the Hanseatic cities toward Holland, and French neutrality spelled the defeat of the Dutch.

This external combination reacted adversely upon internal conditions in the Netherlands. Prices rose and hard times prevailed. Public opinion execrated John De Witt and looked toward the House of Orange for relief. Only the firm support of the Estates General kept De Witt in power. In April, 1654, peace was concluded with England. De Witt, threatened by disaffection and a possible civil war at home, made humiliating financial and commercial concessions to England, but he at least preserved his office and remained in
power. With the help of a staunch Republican burgher class and by skillfully utilizing sectional and class antagonisms, John De Witt once more deviously steered his way through rocks and shoals to political mastery.

Foreign affairs, however, again intruded on De Witt's attempts to restore commerce and rehabilitate finances. Open rupture with France impended. Mazarin, having failed to lure Cromwell into an alliance with France against Spain, was eager to see England continue to be embroiled with the Dutch. After an act of deliberate provocation, Mazarin spurned Dutch objections and demanded a "favored nation" commercial treaty for France, which the Dutch were unwilling to make.

The death of Cromwell on September 3, 1658, came in the nick of time to save the United Netherlands from the French threat. Liberated from English tyranny on the seas, the Dutch immediately invaded the Far East in defiance of the threats of the East India Company, and laid the foundations anew of the Dutch East India Company and the Netherlands' colonial empire in the East Indies. Furthermore, by a nicely timed alliance with the Great Elector of Brandenburg against Sweden and a loan to Denmark, John De Witt preserved Dutch shipping and commerce in the Baltic. By 1660 the Dutch were again prosperous and a power to be reckoned with politically.

Between 1660 and 1668, the power of John De Witt flourished, but opposition was beginning to appear. Encouraged by the Stuart Restoration in England, the Dutch Orangists clamored for the restoration of the stadtholderate in the person of William. When William reached eighteen years, an age deemed to make him eligible for the position, the power of John De Witt, however, was so firmly entrenched that William gave up his objective temporarily and feigned a republicanism that he did not feel in order to avoid conflict.

De Witt's foreign policy at the same time was a conciliatory one. Despite certain very concrete grievances against Mazarin's commercial policy, the Grand Pensionary concluded an alliance with the French in April, 1662, and the two powers were joined by England several months later. Nominally this alliance was a defensive one against Spain but, since Spain at this time was too decrepit to have been able to make any offensive move, the expression was sheer hypocrisy. Behind the word "defensive" lurked the secret intention of France and the Dutch Republic to partition the Spanish Netherlands between them, while England was to get her reward in the Caribbean at the expense of Spain. Even Portugal was drawn into this network.
English colonial ambition, however, was stronger than De Witt's willingness to compromise. When the Dutch and English trading companies on the coast of Africa entered into hostilities, the mother-countries were drawn in. From 1665 to 1667 the war raged; the stakes were nothing less than the Dutch colonial empire. Again English sea power was victorious, and at the Peace of Breda the Dutch Republic was compelled to recognize England's retention of the New Netherlands, i.e., the Dutch territory in North America from the Connecticut to the Delaware Rivers, including New Amsterdam and New Jersey. The name of New Amsterdam was changed to New York in honor of Charles II's brother, the Duke of York, later King James II. France received Acadia and the Dutch got Surinam.

At this moment John De Witt was at the height of his power. It is true that the Dutch had lost their colony in North America, but they had gained Surinam and retained their colony in Africa; moreover, the Orangists and the Republicans were in a state of equilibrium at home. The United Provinces seemed to hold the balance of power in western Europe, and their economic prosperity was enormous. Yet the Dutch were soon to bear the brunt of a combined Anglo-French assault on their commercial ascendancy, a blow that was to make them mere spectators at the eighteenth century struggle of France and England for the commercial and colonial supremacy of the world.

Despite their eventual inferior status, the Dutch did contribute much to Western civilization. In commerce and in industry they were among the pioneers of the early modern period. Dutch agriculture led in scientific progress; Dutch scientists and mathematicians were unequaled. In the sphere of maritime law the United Netherlands were supreme. In education, the University of Leyden was one of the leading centers of Protestant learning in Europe.

In art the Dutch painters produced some of the world's greatest masterpieces. Rubens of the Spanish Netherlands (Belgium) was perhaps the most celebrated painter in the first half of the seventeenth century. He was also a good businessman, "employing a number of student assistants and accepting numerous lucrative orders" from such influential and wealthy patrons as Henry IV of France and James I of England. His 2200 compositions indicate that his art was a profitable business. In the seventeenth century the Netherlands was the center of the school of "realistic" painting. Interested more in the "common men" than in the aristocrats, such artists as Jordaens, David Teniers, Frans Hals, and Rembrandt depicted the life of the middle classes and the peasants. As a result, their pictures of country fairs, urban carnivals, meetings of guildsmen, of corpu-
lent burgomasters, beautiful landscapes, and stern scenes from that fountain of "rugged individualism," the Old Testament, give us an excellent idea of Dutch burgher life in those golden days.

The greatest importance of the United Netherlands lay in the fact that it was the only place where complete intellectual freedom existed. Consequently, it became a prominent haven of refuge for thinkers of various nationalities who were oppressed at home. From Spain and Portugal came many exiled Jews; from Germany, Calvinists; from France, Huguenots; and from England, Puritans and Pilgrims. These persecuted people showed their appreciation of the freedom the Dutch offered by working indefatigably for the good, not only industrially of Holland, but intellectually of the whole world. Great thinkers were cradled in their foster home. Spinoza and Descartes, for example, found in Holland freedom to express ideas that in other countries would have been censored or suppressed.

French despotism and Dutch oligarchical republicanism thus well
illustrate the two types of government that accompanied the rise of the bourgeoisie in the seventeenth century. In both France and the Netherlands mercantilism was the accepted doctrine. In France, however, economic interests were in the final analysis subordinated to a state dominated by a narrow, ambitious king; in the Netherlands the interests of the state were subordinated to a shortsighted, selfish bourgeoisie. Therefore, in both countries economic prosperity was temporary. During the eighteenth century business leadership passed to England, where the middle classes were able to create a more workable politico-economic concept of the state.

**Collateral Reading**

C. Hugan, *Social France in the Seventeenth Century* (1911).
CHAPTER IV
Continental Imperialism in Northern, Central, and Eastern Europe: The Early Modern Phase

Frederick the Great
On the king's right side, the Crown Prince, later Frederick Wilhelm II.
From a copper engraving by Daniel Chodowiecki

The NORTHERN AND EASTERN STATES

The early modern period was as important for the history of the states of northern and eastern Europe as it was for those of central and western Europe, and equally complicated. In Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, Poland, and Russia, changes took place which conditioned their character and destiny for long years to come. The conflict among these states, which ringed the Baltic, was for possession of as many of the Baltic lands as possible, an ambition in which sea power and trade interests were important factors. But ethnic difference between the antagonists was very much greater than in the case of the great rivals in western Europe. The Poles and Russians were Slavs; the Letts in Lithuania or Livonia were of non-European origin; the Finns in Finland were of Ugro-Tartar descent; the Prussians, though originally of the same stock as the Letts, were heavily commixed with Germans and Slavs. All these peoples bordering the Baltic, the Danes and Swedes excepted, were far below the cultural condition of the western nations.

In the three Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Sweden, and Nor-
way, the Reformation had soon prevailed. Denmark and Norway were united into a single kingdom. The Swedish monarchy was established in 1523 by Gustavus Vasa (died 1560) and strengthened by the property confiscations connected with the Reformation.

Poland, which had been united with Lithuania in 1386, until 1572 was ruled by the Jagello kings, but whether Poland was an hereditary or an elective monarchy was not clear even to the Poles themselves. A Polish royal election was a sort of double auction of the crown, partly in public for the benefit of the state, partly in secret for the advantage of the nobles in the diet who voted according to self-interest. The nobles had reduced the people to a wretched condition of serfdom and were rich, proud, and ignorant. There were no commercial cities and hence no bourgeois class in the country. The kingdom was a great, sprawling, amorphous mass without natural boundaries, a weakness that accentuated its other weaknesses. When the Jagello House expired in 1572, Stephen Bathory of Transylvania, born a Hungarian, got possession of the throne for ten years and tried to expand Poland toward both the Black Sea and the Baltic. Bathory conquered Danzig and part of the East Baltic coast but died before he could reach the Black Sea. He was succeeded by three kings of the Swedish house of Vasa.

Prussia, originally conquered by the military crusading Order of the Teutonic Knights between 1220–1283, during which the natives were brutally subjugated and towns founded by German incomers, was secularized in 1525. In that year the Grandmaster of the Order, Albert of Brandenburg, turned Lutheran and converted the country into an hereditary duchy, which passed to the Margraves of Brandenburg by inheritance in 1618.

Russia, under the rule (1462–1505) of Ivan Vasilevitch III, Duke of Moscow, threw off the Mongol domination and, by conquering and annexing Novgorod and its territory, created a state which, bounded by the Don and the Dnieper, was already formidable because of its size and the ambition of its rulers. Ivan Vasilevitch IV (czar 1533–1584), known as "The Terrible," was the founder of Russian domination in Asia, and for the first time attracted the attention of western Europe to Russia. He is said to have proposed marriage to Queen Elizabeth. His son, Feodor, who died in 1598, was the last czar of the lineage of Rurik, who had founded the Duchy of Kiev in the ninth century, with which the formation of the Russian state began. Fifteen years of anarchy ensued until the dynasty of Romanov acquired the crown in 1613.

This period of the Moscow czarism, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, was one of the worst epochs in Russian history. The Tartar
yoke had only recently been cast off and its evil influence was still felt. At the same time there began the Byzantine influence, exercised through the Greek Church and the intermarriage of the czars with princesses of the Greek imperial house. The title of Caesar, corrupted into Czar, was adopted and the name for Constantinople was changed to Czargrad (Caesar-city, grad being the Russian word for city). Czars not only laid claim to, but in their ignorance asserted that they had inherited, the title and right of succession to the old Byzantine Empire after its destruction by the Turks in 1453.

Religiously and culturally Russia was hostile to the West. Kiev and the south of Russia were more cultured and enlightened than central Russia, the Moscow area, which was the political center of the country. Few there, except the clergy, could read and write. It is mentioned in a sixteenth-century document that out of 115 princes' and noblemen's sons only 47 could sign their names. The backwardness of learning in Russia at this time is illustrated by the fact that the study of astronomy and cosmography was prohibited and that the use of Arabic figures was unknown.

A change for the better started in the late sixteenth century and continued to improve in the century that followed. The necessity of adopting European civilization began to be perceived at Moscow, and Germans, Dutchmen, Englishmen, and Italians were invited by the czars in great numbers as physicians, architects, engineers, military officers, etc. In the seventeenth century many Englishmen and Scots were serving in the Russian army or employed at court. Gradually the more progressive element in Russian society became disgusted with the Asiatic stagnation, and the tendency to European civilization was only checked by the traditional prejudices of the czars.

Salutary change came with the accession of the Romanov dynasty in 1613, especially during the reign of Peter the Great (1682–1725). True, he did not create the new spirit, but he had the intelligence and the initiative to shake off traditional shackles and boldly to promote western European civilization. Peter was an intelligent, strong-willed, and brutal barbarian whose Tartarism was veneered with the influence of Western civilization. His determination was to Europeanize Asiatic Russia culturally and to make her a European power politically. He was determined to make landlocked Russia reach the sea—the Black Sea in the South, and the Baltic in the North. For this reason he conquered Azov from the Turks in 1696 and founded St. Petersburg (now Leningrad) in the swamps of the Neva in 1703, in order "to give Russia a window looking upon Europe." For the purpose of educating himself, he made a journey
through Germany to Holland, during the years 1697–1698, where for a time he worked in a shipyard in Zaandam (the cottage in which he dwelt is still preserved, and was given to the czar in 1890); afterwards he worked in Amsterdam and visited England. He returned to Russia with a great company of foreign artisans and craftsmen, artists, and military officers. Endless anecdotes are told of him at this time, one that when examining a particularly intricate instrument of torture, he wanted the working of it illustrated and was for putting one of his servants in the machine but fortunately was restrained from doing so by the shocked observers with him. His first act after returning home was to abolish the dangerous bodyguard of nobles, the Streltsi, which were replaced by an army organized on the European model. The reform was carried through by Gordon, a Scottish officer.

Meanwhile, in 1697, Charles XII had become King of Sweden. He was a boy of fifteen. The opportunity to despoil Sweden of her continental holdings seemed—to Russia, Poland, and Denmark—too great to be missed. In 1700 all three disclosed their designs. Denmark coveted Holstein-Gottorp; Poland and Russia both wanted Livonia. The young Charles XII thereupon astonished Europe. He showed himself to be a demon of war, though devoid of political judgment. Within five months Denmark was disposed of, and Charles XII hastened to Livonia to confront Peter the Great and Augustus II of Poland-Saxony. With an army of only 8000 men, the daring young king disposed of the Russians at Narva late in the year 1700 and shattered the Polish-Saxon army at Riga shortly thereafter.

It was then that Charles XII made a fatal error of judgment. The liberation of Livonia left him free to choose which of his enemies he would now attack—Russia or Poland? The fate of Sweden hung upon the choice, and Charles XII made the wrong turn in the road. Memory of the ancient animosity between Sweden and Poland—hatred, not prudence—impelled him to push the war with Poland, a choice that gave Peter the Great five precious years to establish his power. Poland collapsed before the Swedish whirlwind. To replace his defeated opponent, Charles XII put a Polish noble named Stanislaus Leszczyński upon the vacant throne. Then he committed another blunder. Instead of turning to attack Russia, he pushed on into Saxony in pursuit of the fugitive king. Once in military occupation of Saxony, the Swedish soldier-king now gave the first evidence of his madness, for he cherished the fantastic idea of being another Gustavus Adolphus and creating another League of Protestant Princes against Catholicism.

By this time Europe, in the grip of the War of the Spanish Suc-
cession, had begun to observe the "Meteor of the North." The Grand Alliance, built on a union of Catholic and Protestant princes, was in danger of falling to pieces, for the empire had been invaded through the back door. Louis XIV, however, welcomed the Swedish diversion. At this critical juncture, the Duke of Marlborough, whom Charles XII ardently admired, undertook a personal mission to the youthful Swedish monarch in order to divert his attention elsewhere. In 1707 the hero of Blenheim and Ramillies, during an interview with Charles XII in Saxony, smoothly convinced his ambitious listener that a far greater achievement than the dethronement of Augustus of Saxony would be the overthrow of the czar and the Swedish conquest of Russia.

The Swedish king swallowed the bait. Central and western Europe was soon rid of his tempestuous and erratic genius. He evacuated Saxony in September, 1707, and after a series of long and hunger-ridden marches, his troops invested Poltava. Peter the Great, now with five years of preparation behind him, attacked the exhausted Swedes, and before darkness blotted out the blood of battle that day, the fate of northern Europe and of Russia had been decided. This Russian victory marked the end of Swedish greatness. The Russian colossus had begun to stir.

Charles XII fled to Bender in Bessarabia, which was Turkish territory. Here he persuaded the sultan to declare war upon Russia, a task rendered less difficult by the sultan’s grievance against Peter the Great for the seizure of Azov. The czar and his army were soon trapped by the Turks in Moldavia but, thanks to the suggestion made by the czarina that he bribe the Turkish commander, Peter the Great was able to conclude the Peace of Pruth in 1711. Azov was handed back to the Turks, but the Russian army went off unmolested.

Undoubtedly this discomfiture was immediately responsible for Charles XII’s insanity. The Peace of Pruth was almost as great a defeat to Charles XII as was Poltava. He was practically held prisoner by the Turkish government until 1714, when he contrived an adventurous escape and a dramatic flight home through Hungary and Germany. In the meantime, his empire was being torn apart by Peter the Great, the Danes, the Poles, and Frederick William I of Brandenburg-Prussia. Despairing of making good his losses on the mainland, Charles XII, in a blind fury of resentment, attempted to redeem himself by attacking Norway. On December 11, 1718, he was mysteriously shot before Friedrichshall, perhaps by an assassin. The "Meteor of the North" was burned out and the strength of Sweden was exhausted. Russia was now indisputably the first north-
ern power whose dominion over the Baltic was incontestable since the foundation of St. Petersburg. In its attempts to expand eastward, however, Russia was not so successful. The Turkish Empire, backed by Western powers, stood in the way.

**The Ottoman Turks**

The empire of the Ottoman Turks reached its maximum power under the rule of Suleiman II (1520–1566), From the Euphrates to the Danube and from north of the Black Sea to the frontier of Morocco stretched the domain of the Turk. Yet the greatness of Turkey had been built on a foundation of sand. What strength it had was due to the ability of a few gifted and intelligent sultans, but there was neither political nor moral power to bolster the work of these rulers. When their strong sultans passed, the Turks revealed their weakness. Favorites of the palace ran the government; the provincial governors (pashas) were corrupt. Probably the most significant weakness of the Ottoman Empire was the fact that it was composed mostly of unwilling subjects, professing another faith, hating and fearing their rulers. Everywhere in the Empire the Turkish troops, still excellent warriors, held these peoples in subjection. If unmolested by outside powers, the Turks might have been able to hold their own for centuries, but at a time when growing nations were seeking what they considered their logical boundaries, Turkey, like Poland, could not hope to resist their encroachment. Turkey, after her repulse at the gates of Vienna in 1683, was on the defensive. The question of what was to become of Turkey arose to plague the diplomats of Europe. Thus the Eastern Question was born.

The decline of Turkey during the early modern period affected the fortunes of Europe’s leading states. Her first attack on their strategic outpost of defense, Vienna, came in 1529. While this foray into Europe was being made, Turkish sea power was clinching the dominion of the eastern Mediterranean, and the coasts of Italy and Spain were being harassed by a captain-general of the Turkish navy, one Hyrdin Barbarossa, or Red Beard. The capture of Buda-Pesth (Ofen) in 1540 left Vienna as the sole Christian bulwark in southeastern Europe.

Fortunately for Europe, the great spirit of Turkish conquest expired with the death of Suleiman II in 1566, when he was on his third campaign into Hungary. By 1572, Turkish sea power was destroyed at Lepanto, and by 1606 most of the fortresses had fallen into the hands of Austria, which thus by slow but sure stages gradually acquired full possession of Hungary once more. Happily, too, for Europe, Sultan Amurath IV (Sultan 1622–1640) during these
years was engaged in war with Persia, and he and his successor let the Balkans alone. In the ensuing years, however, Austrian tyranny in Hungary made adherents for the Turks there, and the upshot was another Turkish invasion of Austria in 1683. Vienna, under siege by the Mohammedan hordes, was saved through the heroism of John Sobieski, King of Poland. This repulse secured both Germany and Austria from further Turkish assault. In Hungary, however, the war continued, and it was not until 1686 that Buda-Pesth was recovered.

At the same time Venice, half-somnolent for decades, awakened and renewed her ancient struggle against the Turks. After the loss of Constantinople in 1261, she still ruled over the most important islands in the Aegean, but these possessions had been gradually lost to the Turks in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In 1694–1695 the Venetians made a determined effort to recover their Aegean holdings, but their navy was no match for the Turks, and after two sea fights they gave up their dream of a reconstructed Venetian empire in the eastern Mediterranean. It was the death-flurry of Venice. Henceforth she survived in a state of suspended animation until Napoleon destroyed the Venetian Republic in 1798.

For a brief spell, under Mustapha II, in 1695, Turkish vigor seemed to have revived. When, however, Prince Eugene became commander-in-chief of the Austrian armies, the war with the Turks was soon liquidated. By the Peace of Karlowitz (January, 1699), Austria acquired complete possession of Hungary and Transylvania, which were united; Venice received the Morea; and Peter the Great, who had his own war with the Turks, got Azov. Henceforth Turkey ceased to be the terror of Europe and especially of Austria and Hungary; Russia was destined to take her place.

Continental Imperialism in Central and Eastern Europe

The emergence of Russia as a partially modernized state and as a factor in the affairs of Europe was one of the significant developments of the eighteenth century. Peter the Great was largely responsible for this reorientation. As an indispensable prelude to his plan to bring his country closer culturally and territorially to Europe, he tried to reconstruct its economy and society on a Western basis. He also embarked on a program of expansion, to the west toward the Baltic, to the south toward the Black Sea with the Mediterranean beyond, and to the east toward the Pacific. One of his aims was the acquisition of a “window,” or all-year port, which would free Russia from a virtually land-locked imprisonment, by bringing her into closer touch commercially and culturally with the outside world.

1 See pp. 66–68, 126–127.
There were other motives that led the czar toward expansion. One, perhaps, was prestige. He, like most rulers of this period, was influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by the imperialism and glory of Louis XIV. Through the extension of Russian authority in the Balkans, the czar might eventually acquire Constantinople and succeed to the throne of the Byzantine Caesars. Also, by so doing, he would be enabled to emancipate the brother Slavs of southeastern Europe from Turkish overlordship. Furthermore, the Greek Orthodox Christians, co-religionists of the Russians, would be freed from the rule of the Moslem. In a way, the Near East, in view of the decline of Turkish power, seemed to afford the most convenient opportunity for Russian imperialism. Victory was illusive, however, for although Peter took the Black Sea port of Azov from the Turks in 1696, he lost it to them in 1711. His policy of expansion in the south was inconclusive and it remained for his successors to pursue his aims with greater effect.

While Peter was thus shifting his country’s center of gravity to the Near East, his emissaries were busily engaged in planting the Russian eagle on the shores of the Pacific and in establishing treaty relations with China. This eastward movement, motivated largely by the demands of the fur trade, was also influenced by the czar’s determination to reach the Pacific. Therefore, he commissioned Bering, a Danish navigator, to ascertain whether Asia was joined to America. In carrying out this project, Bering discovered Alaska and paved the way for Russian expansion in North America. Other Russian expeditions explored the coasts and waterways of the Far East from the Arctic region to the Japanese archipelago. Meanwhile, Peter even contemplated the conquest of the Trans-Caspian area and Persia for the purpose of establishing an approach to, and trade relations with, India.

Peter the Great’s death in 1725 interrupted both his reform program and his policies of expansion. A line of weak rulers and an internal struggle between the “liberals,” those who favored Peter’s plans, and their opponents, the conservatives, jeopardized the program of the great czar. After a period of disorder and uncertainty, there finally emerged another strong figure, in some respects a spiritual successor of Peter—Catherine the Great, Empress of Russia (1762–1796). The German-born wife of the insignificant Peter III was a woman of dominating personality, sensuous, autocratic, and able. She, after the murder of her husband, became the “Autocrat of all the Russias,” and proceeded to re-establish the prestige of the crown and to sponsor a program of internal reforms.1 It was in the

1 For Catherine’s internal reforms, see p. 127.
realm of foreign affairs, however, that Catherine was most successful. Proclaiming that “war against Turkey is my historic mission,” she encouraged an aggressive policy in the Near East. A Russian protectorate was established over Georgia, in the Caucasus mountains. Intermittent warfare was carried on against the Turks, but international complications in central Europe delayed a decisive success in the Near East until 1774.

Central Europe was thrown into turmoil as a result of the growing-pains of Prussia. The history of this state in the eighteenth century was influenced largely by two kings—the domineering Frederick William I (king 1713–1740) and his enlightened son, Frederick II (king 1740–1786). The former, academically ignorant but energetically able, helped to pave the way for his brilliant successor by building up a paternal despotism administered by an efficient bureaucracy. Also, he left a well-filled treasury, a strong standing army, and a tradition of militarism strengthened by his acquisition of Swedish Pomerania as a reward for intervention in the Great Northern War. Known as the “Barrack King,” Frederick William was filled with contempt for his son’s predilection for culture, in the form of music, literature, and French fashions. Numerous quarrels resulted from the king’s attempt to reform his heir. “You know very well,” he informed the youth in 1728, “that I cannot stand an effeminate fellow who has no manly tastes, who cannot ride or shoot (to his shame be it said!), is untidy about his person, and wears his hair curled like a fool instead of cutting it; and that I have condemned all these things a thousand times, and yet there is no sign of improvement.” Despite his father’s coercive discipline, which included uncongenial service in the army and even imprisonment, Frederick persisted in an intellectual and cultural preparation that enabled him to become one of the outstanding rulers of his day.

The reign of Frederick the Great was to be the most brilliant, perhaps, of all Prussian kings. Although retaining his intellectual and artistic interests, he combined a domestic program of reform with an aggressive foreign policy. It was in the latter sphere, however, that

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1 For Frederick’s internal reforms, see pp. 125–126.
he was to achieve his most signal successes. The first year of his reign presented him with an opportunity to strike under favorable conditions at Austria, the chief obstacle to Prussian hegemony in the

Germanies. From that power, he secured the rich province of Silesia, but he was forced to devote much of his attention during the balance of his reign to the preservation of this conquest.

Austria, despite occasional defeats and other vicissitudes, experienced something of a renascence in the eighteenth century. Charles VI, the Holy Roman emperor (1711–1740), endeavored simultaneously to consolidate his authority in Austria and to increase his prestige by adventurous foreign policies. As a result of the Treaty of Utrecht, Austria had obtained from Spain the Spanish Netherlands, Naples, Milan, and Sardinia. Later Charles agreed to grant Philip V recognition as king of Spain in exchange for the island of Sicily, which was to be taken from the Duke of Savoy who was to be given Sardinia and the title of king as compensation. These arrangements, so favorable to Austria, were displeasing to Philip's spouse, Eliza-
beth of Parma. She desired to provide her son Don Carlos with a desirable principality in Italy; therefore she was on the watch for a chance to upset these settlements respecting this country.

The War of the Polish Succession (1733-1736) presented that opportunity. This struggle rose out of the attempt of Louis XV of France to restore his father-in-law, Stanislaus Leszczynski, to the Polish throne. Inasmuch as Austria joined Russia in resisting a French solution to the Polish question, Spain hastened to tear up those parts of the Treaty of Utrecht which dealt with Italy. France, in need of friends, was virtually forced to acquiesce in the Spanish designs. Thus a war developed with Austria and Russia on one side, and France and Spain on the other. After several years of indecisive fighting and fruitless negotiations, a settlement was reached at Vienna. By the terms of this agreement, Austria consigned Sicily and Naples to Don Carlos who, in return, relinquished his claims on Parma and Tuscany. Thus the younger branch of the Bourbons was enthroned in the so-called Kingdom of the Two Sicilies where it remained until its expulsion by Garibaldi in 1860. The Polish throne, however, went to the Russian protégé, Augustus III, son of an earlier king. Stanislaus Leszczynski was forced to content himself with the patrimony of the Duke of Lorraine who took Tuscany by way of compensation.

As the reign of Charles VI drew to a close there seemed little to show for his exertions. His aggressive policies in Italy, in Poland, and at the expense of the Turks, against whom the Austrians had a hard time to hold their own, had borne little fruit. The emperor, who had no son, hoped to secure the succession of his daughter, Maria Theresa, to his Austrian domains, as well as to Bohemia and Hungary, by means of the Pragmatic Sanction. By this code he sought to ensure her inheritance legally. Approval of this arrangement was secured from neighboring powers, including Prussia, by persuasion and bribery. In addition, his daughter's marriage was arranged to Francis of Lorraine, who in 1745 was elected Holy Roman emperor.

Maria Theresa, Queen of Bohemia and Hungary and Archduchess of Austria (1740-1780), was fully qualified to be a contemporary and rival of Frederick the Great and Catherine the Great. Endowed with determination, energy, and common sense, if not originality, she undertook to preserve and to strengthen her hereditary claim. She was handicapped by the lack of national solidarity, ruling, in fact, over a miscellany of Germans, Czechs, Magyars, Slavs, and Italians. Nevertheless, when her dominions were attacked by most of the great powers of continental Europe, she succeeded in fusing her heterogeneous subject-peoples into a compact unit capable of repelling the invaders.
The war of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) was Europe's response to the dynastic problem in Vienna as land-hungry neighbors perceived an opportunity to despoil the young ruler. Spain wanted her Italian possessions; France coveted the Austrian Netherlands; the electors of Saxony and Bavaria, both related to Maria Theresa by marriage, claimed Moravia and Bohemia respectively. Frederick of Prussia, however, was her most dangerous adversary. Immediately after the death of Charles VI, he arranged understandings with France and Bavaria for the dismemberment of the Habsburg realm. Prussia was to receive Silesia; France was to secure compensation in the Austrian Netherlands; and the Elector of Bavaria was to be elevated to the throne of the Holy Roman Empire.

Frederick's seizure of Silesia in December, 1740, followed by decisive defeats of the Austrians, precipitated the conflict. French and Bavarian troops invaded Austria and Bohemia. Spain, still obsessed with expansion in Italy, attacked the Austrians there and thus merged the War of Jenkins' Ear with this greater struggle. Great Britain, on the other hand, preferring a continental balance of power, and already at war with Spain, became an ally of Austria. Saxony, Sardinia, and the Dutch Netherlands, joined the anti-Austrian coalition, but the first two-named were eventually persuaded by Austria to withdraw from the combat and the Dutch refused to do more than remain on the defensive. Maria Theresa, undaunted by the strength and number of her enemies, appealed to her Magyar subjects in Hungary who helped her to place new armies in the field. Resigning herself to the temporary loss of Silesia, she arranged a separate peace with Frederick by conceding him that province in 1745. This desertion of his allies by the Prussian king enabled the Austrians to more than hold their own with the remainder of their enemies. The conflict, characterized by hostilities carried on simultaneously in North America, in India, in the Netherlands, in Italy, in the Germanies, and on the seas, dragged on three more years. By 1748, however, both sides, temporarily worn out, were ready to discontinue hostilities.

Peace was restored in 1748 by the treaties of Aix-la-Chapelle. These provided for the return of all territorial conquests, with the exception of Silesia which was retained by Prussia. The powers consented to the Pragmatic Sanction and to the election of Maria Theresa's husband as Holy Roman emperor (which had taken place in 1745). Austria relinquished Parma and certain other Italian possessions to Spain, and made some minor cessions to Sardinia. The war had failed to solve the broader issues at stake, such as the question of

1 For a discussion of the colonial aspect of the War of the Austrian Succession and the peace which followed, see p. 96.
Austro-Prussian rivalry in the Germanies, the future of Italy, and the Anglo-French duel for colonial and commercial supremacy. In many respects the peace was as unsatisfactory as the war. It was, in fact, little more than a truce. Responsible statesmen, regarding it as such, prepared for the next war, which they expected to break out soon. Maria Theresa, unreconciled to her loss of Silesia, inaugurated a comprehensive program of reform designed to strengthen her realm for the impending struggle. Administrative control was centralized; tax reforms, designed to augment state revenue, were introduced; agriculture was encouraged; and the army was strengthened.

With the aid of her able diplomatist, Prince Kaunitz (1711–1794), Maria Theresa reconstructed Austria’s diplomatic bulwarks. Louis XV of France was approached through his mistress, Madame de Pompadour, and persuaded that his best interests lay in an alliance with Austria, a traditional enemy of the Bourbons, as a precaution against further expansion by Prussia. Elizabeth, the Russian czarina, personally antagonistic to Frederick and suspicious of his policies, also joined the anti-Prussian bloc. This Austro-Franco-Russian coalition, sometimes known as the ”Kaunitz alliance,” was a grave menace to Prussia’s security. Great Britain, however, ever hostile to France, and still devoted to the principle of a continental equilibrium, shifted sides and now supported Frederick. These reversals of policy, the Habsburg-Bourbon alliance, and the Anglo-Prussian entente, came to be designated as the Diplomatic Revolution.

Prussia took the initiative in precipitating the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763). Frederick, despite his limited resources as compared with the manpower and wealth of his enemies, assumed the offensive by seizing Saxony. The duration of the war was dominated by the attempts of his enemies to squeeze his kingdom into submission. He, however, at the head of a splendid army, enjoying the inner lines, and assisted by British financial subsidies, was able to stand off his enemies largely through his own military genius. Nevertheless, his cause looked hopeless when, despite brilliant victories and occasional defeats, his enemies pressed forward steadily from all directions. Berlin was taken by the Russians in 1759, and Hanover was saved from the French by the energies of his nephew, the Duke of Brunswick. He could maintain his armies in the field only by recruiting prisoners of war captured from the enemy. The desertion of the British, who had defeated the French in India and Canada and now discontinued the subsidies, was another crushing blow. Then his enemies were strengthened as a result of the Family Compact (1761), a defensive alliance of the three Bourbon kingdoms, France, Spain, and the two Sicilies. In 1762, Spain came into the war against Prussia.
Confronted by the prospects of overwhelming defeat, Frederick was saved by a fortuitous circumstance. In 1762, the Czarina Elizabeth, his bitter enemy, died, and was succeeded by Peter III, a madman, who was, however, a great admirer of the Prussian king's military prowess. The new czar deserted his allies and offered to support Prussia. By this time, most of the belligerents were hopelessly weary and agreed, therefore, to the treaty of Hubertusburg (1763). Reluctantly, Maria Theresa acknowledged again the title of Frederick to Silesia. Later, in the same year, Great Britain made peace with France and Spain by the Treaty of Paris.¹

Thereafter, the great continental powers, except for an insignificant dispute between Austria and Prussia over Bavaria (1777-1779), derisively known as the "Potato war," preserved peace among themselves until the international convulsions of the period of the French Revolution. During the generation after 1763, Poland and Turkey became the chief sacrificial offerings upon the altar of the continental imperialism of Russia, Austria, and Prussia. France, exhausted and embarrassed with domestic difficulties; Spain, weak and decadent, and Great Britain—preoccupied with economic and colonial problems—exerted comparatively little influence for the time being on the course of international events in eastern Europe.

Poland was the logical, if perhaps not legitimate, prey of more powerful neighbors. Her area, second only to that of Russia, consisted of a level plain, unshielded by natural frontiers. The population was predominantly Polish, but there were unassimilable minorities of Germans, Russians, Lithuanians, Ruthenians, and Jews. Religious dissension was common for the Poles were Roman Catholics, whereas the Germans were chiefly Lutheran, and the Russians were Orthodox. An antiquated social system and a backward economy lingered, in which a ruling aristocracy of 150,000 Poles controlled about fourteen million serfs. There was scarcely any middle class, and the country's extremely limited trade was conducted chiefly by Germans and Jews.

The political system of Poland was almost a standing invitation to foreign intervention. It was an aristocratic oligarchy, which found its chief expression in a diet that represented only the nobles. This body's authority was emasculated by the liberum veto, by which any member could block legislation or dissolve the chamber by a single adverse vote. Since unanimity was virtually unattainable, the diet lacked positive authority; on the other hand, it had vast negative power by virtue of the fact that the king was powerless to enact laws, impose taxes, or declare war, without its consent. The kingship was

¹ For information concerning this settlement, see pp. 96-97.
elective and was usually sold by the nobles to the highest bidder. A
candidate often found it necessary to diminish still further the au-
thority of the crown by granting additional privileges to the selfish
nobles. Frequently, the nobles chose a foreigner as their king, be-
cause his ignorance of Polish conditions would assure feeble rule or
because he was the candidate of a neighboring power that had gen-
erously distributed bribes among the electors. Monarchs so chosen
usually pursued policies beneficial to their sponsors rather than to
Poland; they were wedges for the transplantation of international
antagonisms into the heart of Poland.

Poland had long been a center of international intrigue. A roll-
call of her kings testified to this fact: "... a Frenchman, a Hun-
garian, three Swedes, one or two Gallophil Poles, two Saxon Kings
ominated by Austria, and finally the discarded lover of the Em-
press Catherine of Russia—such were the men upon whom during
the last two centuries of 'independence' the oligarchy conferred the
dubious honour of the Polish crown." ¹ Prior to the middle of the
eighteenth century, France, Austria, Sweden, and Saxony had found
Poland a fertile field for diplomatic interference. Prussia and Russia,
however, were more dangerous to Polish independence. The former
aimed at securing the Polish provinces on the lower Vistula, which
separated East Prussia from the balance of the country; Russia de-
sired to secure the bulk of Poland as a stepping-stone into the heart
of the continent. Austria, on the other hand, preferred an inde-
pendent Poland, under the rule of her protégé, the Elector of Saxony.

Until 1763 the powers co-operated in preserving a sort of inter-
national equilibrium in Poland. A crisis in that year revealed a lapse
in the policy. At that time Russia and Prussia, hoping to steal a
march on Austria, France, and other interested parties, combined
forces to place Catherine's protégé, Stanislaus Poniatowski, on the
throne, made vacant by the death of Augustus III. A number of
Polish nobles, invoking the help of Austria, Saxony, and France, or-
organized the Confederacy of Bar, and tried to kidnap the new king.
Then a Russian army, sent by Catherine, defeated the forces of the
Confederacy, captured Cracow, and threatened to solve the whole
Polish question unilaterally in favor of Russia. Whereupon, France,
disinclined toward open intervention, incited the Ottoman Empire
to war against Russia. Catherine's troops, however, expelled the
Turks from the Crimea and overran Moldavia and Wallachia.
By 1770, it appeared as though Turkey, like Poland, was going to be
dismembered at the behest of Catherine.

¹ Marriott, J. A. R., Historical Problems of the European Commonwealth,
p. 157.
Prussia and Austria did not want Russia to overturn the balance of power in eastern Europe at the expense of Poland and Turkey. Therefore Frederick revived an old project—the partition of Poland. He perceived that in a three-power division of this unfortunate country the conflicting interests of Russia, Prussia, and Austria could be harmonized. Bribe by generous slices of Poland, Russia, he believed, would abandon her plan to conquer the Ottoman Empire; Austria, if granted compensation, would consent to the Russian advances. As a reward for his services in maintaining the balance of power, Frederick proposed to take a share of Poland. In February, 1771, he wrote to his minister in St. Petersburg: "You will yourself feel that an acquisition of this sort could not give umbrage to anybody; that the Poles, the only people who have a right to complain, do not deserve to be humoured by either the Court of Russia or myself, considering the conduct they are pursuing."

Catherine, demanding the largest share, and Maria Theresa, asserting that she "had no desire for Polish territory and [that she] regarded Frederick's scheme as immoral," acquiesced in the design of the Prussian king. Thereupon, the monarchs, acting simultaneously in 1772, in accordance with the prior agreement among themselves, seized their shares of the booty. Russia secured the eastern part of Lithuania; Austria obtained Galicia (except Cracow); and Prussia annexed an area, excluding Danzig and Thorn, which linked her directly with East Prussia. Poland lost one-fifth of her population and one-fourth of her area. Neither France nor England saw fit to exercise a restraining influence on behalf of Poland.

The first partition of Poland did not check Catherine's drive against the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, the weaknesses of the latter, with its non-homogeneous population, its political decentralization, its linguistic and religious divisions, and its cultural decadence, were incentives for redoubled efforts on the part of the Russians. Turkish resistance was overcome and in 1774 the Porte was compelled to accept the Treaty of Küçük-Kainarji. By the terms of this settlement, Turkey ceded Azov to Russia; gave her valuable commercial rights in the Black Sea; recognized the virtual independence of the Crimea; and granted the czar protective rights over certain Christians living in Turkey. Nine years later Russia annexed the Crimea and established, rather portentously for the Turks, a naval base at Sebastopol.

Austria regarded this vast extension of Russian authority as inimical to her own welfare. Joseph II, Maria Theresa's son, became emperor and co-regent with his mother (1765–1790) and wanted to curb Russia and Prussia in order to re-establish the prestige of the
Habsburg empire. Catherine, desirous of avoiding war with Austria, made a proposal to Joseph for a joint Austro-Russian partition of the European portions of the Ottoman Empire. According to the terms of this agreement, Russia was to obtain the northern shore of the Black Sea as far west as Odessa, and Austria was to receive northern Serbia and Bosnia. Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bessarabia (regions which today constitute the bulk of Rumania) were to comprise an independent state, called Dacia, under Austrian protection. The balance of the Balkan peninsula was to become an independent Greek empire, with its capital at Constantinople, and with a Russian prince, under Russian protection, as its ruler. Joseph II, perceiving the advantages of a project that would enable him to get a share of Turkey and that would isolate Prussia, his chief enemy, accepted Catherine's proposal. The two sovereigns, leaving Frederick out in the cold, soon attacked Turkey.

Catherine and Joseph, however, were unable to carry out their plans. Prussia, disapproving their ambitious designs, encouraged Sweden, Russia's old rival, to declare war in 1788 upon the czarina's empire. Furthermore, Great Britain, arranging a triple alliance, consisting of Prussia, the Dutch, and herself, seemed on the point of attacking Russia. Still more damaging to the partition design was the defeat by the Turks of the Austrians, who were now driven back across the Danube. Joseph's premature death in 1790 ended the scheme, for his successor, Leopold II (1790–1792), abandoned the Russian alliance, made peace with the sultan, and re-established friendly relations with Prussia.

Russia, in view of the Austrian defection, of anti-Russian movements in Poland, and of the crisis in the West that was rising out of the French Revolution, determined to liquidate her war with Turkey. She consented, therefore, to the Treaty of Jassy (1792), by which the terms of Küchük-Kainarji were confirmed. A small slice of Turkish territory, between the Bug and the Dniester rivers, went to Russia. Thus Catherine, even though frustrated in her ambitious design, retained for Russia a favorable position in the Near East.

The Polish question still baffled the chancelleries of Europe. While the Russians were fighting the Turks, Prussia had endeavored to check their advance in Poland. To this end Prussia signed in 1790 a defensive alliance with Poland, which guaranteed the latter's integrity and political freedom. Encouraged thereby, the Poles introduced the short-lived constitution of 1791 that was designed to infuse new vitality into the decadent monarchy. The hereditary principle was substituted for the elective; representation in the diet was broadened; the *liberum veto* was abolished; towns were granted autonomy;
religious toleration was conceded, but Roman Catholicism remained the official faith; and the emancipation of the serfs was considered. Polish patriots were trying, desperately but belatedly, to preserve their country’s freedom by modernizing and thereby strengthening it.

Catherine opposed any scheme of reform that would tend to stabilize the Polish monarchy. She found it expedient, however, to simulate approval of the constitution so as to lull Prussian and Austrian suspicions as to her real motives. Actually, she wanted to absorb much of the remainder of Poland, but desired to see the hands of Austria and Prussia tied by commitments elsewhere. The outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789, leading to international complications which involved the interests of Austria and Prussia, caused those two powers to arrange a defensive and offensive alliance directed against France. She lent all of her efforts to embroil the two Germanic states in war with their revolutionary neighbor. “I rack my brain,” she said, “to push the courts of Vienna and Berlin to mix themselves up in the affairs of France. I want to engage them in those affairs so as to have my elbows free.”

War finally broke out in the West in the spring of 1792 between Austria and Prussia, on the one hand, and France, on the other. Catherine took advantage of this circumstance to rush an army into Poland, ostensibly to protect a certain group of nobles who claimed that the constitution of 1791 violated their liberties. Frederick William II, the nephew and successor of Frederick the Great on the Prussian throne (1786–1797), however, was more interested in Poland than he was in the French Revolution. Catherine decided, therefore, to extend him an invitation to co-operate in a second partition of Poland. He accepted promptly and coerced Austria into approval by threatening to leave her in the lurch in the war against France.

The second partition of Poland took place in January, 1793. Operating with the skill of a surgeon, Russia and Prussia sliced off handsome shares of Polish territory for themselves. The former secured all of the eastern provinces between the upper Dvina and the Dniester rivers, while the latter seized her northwestern areas, including Danzig and Thorn. Meeting for the last time, the Polish diet, its defending forces scattered by the invaders and surrounded by Russian troops, consented to the partition. But a fragment of Poland remained independent. The Poles, perceiving the imminence of their country’s complete suppression, rose in general revolt in 1794 under the leadership of Tadeusz Kosciusko (1746–1817). For a while the cause of the insurrectionists prospered as they inflicted defeats on both the Russians and the Prussians. The tide turned, however,
as Austria intervened; the Poles, beset on all sides by Austrians, Prussians, and Russians, were overwhelmed. By the successive treaties of 1795-1796, the dismemberment of Poland was completed. Austria acquired southern Masovia and western Galicia; Prussia received western Masovia, including Warsaw; and Russia annexed all of the rest.

Poland's fall had a marked influence on the European equilibrium. Russia, Prussia, and Austria, now found their frontiers contiguous with one another, since there was no longer a buffer state. In some

*Significance of the partitions of Poland*

![Peter the Great, Czar of Russia](The Bettmann Archive)

_Peter the Great, Czar of Russia_
After a painting by Kupetuki
respects, Poland had functioned as a shock-absorber when the central and eastern countries felt impelled to adjust their boundaries. Now, however, the three great empires were flush against one another; their rulers had to adjust their sights to an eastern frontier in which there was no longer a “no man’s land” in which to intrigue and maneuver. France, too, was conscious of a gap in the East where she was accustomed to a traditional ally in Poland. In some respects the Polish nation in subjection was a more vital factor in European life than it had been as an independent state, for it was a victim of an imperialistic nationalism which was to engulf the continent in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

**Collateral Reading**

A. N. Tolstoi, *Peter the Great* (1932).
The Old Regime and the Origins of a New Order

Significance of the eighteenth century

Superficially the culture of the eighteenth century seemed to mirror the absolute monarchy, the feudal social order, the established Church, and the intellectual dogma of the preceding age. Beneath its relatively placid surface, however, were to be found the economic and intellectual forces that eventually would encompass its disintegration. The Old Regime, an all-embracing term used to refer collectively to the whole stock and body of eighteenth century institutions, was the product of more than a thousand years of cultural evolution. With its balance, its ripeness, its mellowness, its traditionalism, and its sophistication, it presented a façade so imposing that most contemporaries accepted it as permanent and final. Processes of change, nevertheless, not fully perceived and scarcely appreciated at the time, were insidiously undermining its foundations. These changes, leading to a profound alteration of the economic and technological bases of society, resulted in political and social maladjustments which, foreshadowing the revolutionary disturbances at the end of the century, threatened to crumble the tradition-encrusted surface of the culture of the Old Regime. In a way, then, the eighteenth century resembled Janus, the two-faced god of the Romans, with one face turned toward the past whose institutions it mirrored, while the other, boldly presented to the future, revealed the faint glimmerings of the Modern Age.

Christian Europe had the Old Regime as its characteristic institutional expression. In the West, feudal society, the medieval church,
and divine-right monarchy, basic ingredients of this particular form of cultural design, originated, matured, and decayed, earlier than in the East, where they were still comparative newcomers in the eighteenth century. Thus, in countries like France and England, the Old Regime, already decadent, was experiencing a sort of Indian summer, whereas, in Russia it was just becoming well established. In other parts of the Continent appeared all sorts of variants between the two extremes. It was normal, therefore, that the violent revolution against the old society should have developed first in France, where the process of decay, due partly to old age, had proceeded furthest.

The social structure of the Old Regime was a heritage from the Middle Ages. It was premised on the belief in the fundamental inequality of man—an inequality held to be organic and biological, as well as social. This system, grouping men on the basis of birth into castes, arranged hierarchically, was regarded as a reflection of the will of God. Society was divided into two general classifications: the privileged and the unprivileged. The former category consisted of the clergy and the nobility, whereas the latter embraced all groups of commoners, such as the bourgeoisie, the artisan workers, the peasants, and the serfs. Each class had its own interests, responsibilities, ethics, and standards, which were, to a certain extent, reflected in the law. Aristocrats and commoners did not mingle on terms of equality, and there was little intermarriage between the two groups. “Social intercourse in the eighteenth century was largely restricted owing to barriers of rank and prejudice, in effect not unlike the actual physical barriers which cage all similar animals in a zoological garden and prevent them from mingling with other species, although they can clearly see and hear each other.”

Aristocratic society, as judged by the condition of its two highest estates, was on the decline after 1700. In the Middle Ages, the clergy, as the praying class and shepherds, who guided laymen along the path of God, enjoyed immense prestige. In a more secular age, however, such as the eighteenth century, much of their glamour had vanished. Renaissance learning, with its paganism and materialism, had largely discredited the medieval conception of the earthly existence as essentially a drama of salvation in which the clergy, not unnaturally, played a decisive role. The Protestant Revolt, with its revelations of intrigue, corruption, and immorality among the clergy, destroyed religious unity and also helped to dispel popular illusions concerning their piety and religious devotion. Meanwhile, the Commercial Revolution, with its impetus to capitalism and overseas expansion, tended to focus popular interest in objectives more material than
those upheld by the clergy. In short, the latter, whether Catholic or Protestant, found themselves more and more out of touch with realities and, consequently, less influential.

The clergy themselves were affected by the modified conditions. A gulf opened between the higher officials in the Church, who were themselves wealthy, worldly, materialistic, and often skeptical, and the lower clergy who generally remained simple, poor, and ignorant. The established Church, whether Catholic or Protestant, was weakened by this internal division that left its upper brackets linked with the aristocracy while its lower ranks, recruited from the commoners, found themselves identified with that element.

The power and prestige of the nobility were also on the wane. During the Middle Ages, this group, the fighting class, had acquired large estates and had secured from emperors and kings privileges and immunities which set them above the commoners. They justified their economic and social superiority by allowing the peasants and serfs to derive a living from their lands, by protecting them from invaders, by dispensing justice, and by preserving peace, order, and security, on their own estates. In exchange for these benefits, the nobles received dues and services from the commoners. By the eighteenth century, however, the feudal lord, reduced to a mere courtier or landlord in most parts of western Europe, had been superseded in the performance of these functions by the state. He continued, nevertheless, although giving little in return, to exact dues and feudal services from his peasants. Thus, he had degenerated into a mere parasite, who insisted on preserving the most objectionable phases of feudalism, such as privilege, social superiority, immunity from taxation and certain royal laws, and a monopoly (shared with the Church and the monarch) of the land. In addition, the nobility, representing but a small fraction of the population, nearly monopolized the higher positions in the Church, the state, the army, and the navy. In a highly caste-conscious age loyalty to one’s own class was generally much stronger than one’s feeling of patriotism or social responsibility. Therefore, the nobility was largely consecrated to the task of preserving itself and its privilege from an encroaching king and a rising bourgeoisie.

Ranking below the level of the nobility was an important class, socially inferior but numerically superior—the bourgeoisie. It consisted, for the most part, of merchants, bankers, owners of industries, lawyers, doctors, scholars, and other professional men, and constituted a sort of aristocracy of wealth and talent. In contrast to the nobles who generally resided at court or in their châteaux, the members of the bourgeoisie lived in cities and towns. In fact, the emer-
gence of this class rather paralleled the growth of cities and towns which resulted from the rebirth of trade and commerce in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The Commercial Revolution greatly accelerated the processes of business revival and urbanization and, by so doing, contributed still further to the rise of the bourgeoisie. By the eighteenth century, this class exerted great political power in Great Britain and the Dutch Netherlands, and wielded considerable influence in France and the Germanies. In southern and eastern Europe, however, it was much less significant and in some areas scarcely existed. In general, the number and strength of the bourgeoisie corresponded to the distribution of cities of commercial importance. Formerly significant mercantile centers, such as Venice, Genoa, Rome, and the seaport towns of Spain and the Germanies, had already been surpassed in the eighteenth century by London, Paris, and the Dutch cities.

Also congregated in urban centers were the artisan workers. Employed, for the most part by bourgeois capitalists, these laborers were the eighteenth century counterpart of the modern proletariat. They were required to work long hours, often under adverse conditions, for low wages. Their housing facilities were poor and they suffered from the high cost of living. As yet they had no labor organizations of their own and were at the mercy of their employers and of the bourgeois-controlled guilds that regulated business and working conditions. They resented their plight, but found themselves more or less helpless. Although the bourgeoisie themselves objected to the static nature and rigidity of the feudal social order that maintained them in a position of inferiority, they had no desire to see the artisan workers escape from their economic bondage.

The peasants, who constituted the great bulk of the population of Europe in the eighteenth century, were the base of the feudal social structure. They lived in sparsely furnished hovels, grouped in villages, amid meadows, plowlands, and woods. They had to work long hours to eke out a mere existence, as a large part of their produce went to pay dues to the lords, tithes to the clergy, and taxes to the state. Much of their social life centered around the village church; there they were baptized, educated to some extent, married, and, finally, buried. Their pleasures were few. Occasionally, aristocratic festivities in the near-by castle or manor-house of the lord broke the monotony for the peasant, but generally he was only an onlooker. Nevertheless, the peasant was better off in the eighteenth century than he had been before. Serfdom was on the decline as the trend toward capitalistic farming and urbanization made the institution inconvenient and unprofitable in western Europe. In England,
France, and the Dutch Netherlands, it was rapidly disappearing; in central and eastern Europe, however, economic backwardness was reflected in the general prevalence and persistence of serfdom.

Although the aristocratic nobility dominated society under the Old Regime, it had been shorn of much of its independent political power. The trend toward political absolutism and the widespread belief in the divine right of rulers had resulted in the concentration and consolidation of almost all authority in the hands of the monarch. Only in England, and to some extent in the Dutch Netherlands, of the more important nations, was the head of the state forced to share his power with the upper classes. In nearly every other country, an absolutism, patterned more or less after that of Louis XIV of France, was the rule.

These absolute monarchies were also economic despotisms. Their rulers, devoted to the principles of mercantilism, endeavored to control and to co-ordinate the economic life of their peoples in such a way as to increase the power of the state. They encouraged the fullest utilization of labor, even to the extent of using women and children, so as to increase to the maximum the productivity of agriculture and industry. Trade, both foreign and domestic, was regulated in the interests of the nation. Colonies were esteemed not only as sources of raw materials, particularly plantation products, but as markets for the surpluses created in the mother-country. Exports were to be increased as much as possible and imports curbed so as to create a "favorable balance of trade," viz., an excess of exports over imports. Then, they believed, precious metals would flow in and could be hoarded as a visible symbol of the state's wealth.

Despite certain crudities and fallacies underlying the mercantile theory, the commercial powers of Europe experienced a rise in prosperity. Between 1716 and 1788 the total export and import trade of the three chief mercantilist states, Great Britain, France, and the Dutch Netherlands, increased from about three hundred million dollars to almost a half billion. Trade with the British and French colonies nearly doubled. In France, alone, the supply of specie rose from seven hundred and thirty million livres in 1715 to about two and one fifth billions in 1784. State revenues, like national incomes, mounted tremendously. In central Europe the response to the stimulation of the new economics was not so impressive, and in eastern Europe it was scarcely apparent.

This remarkable expansion of commerce and finance could not help but affect the social institutions of the Old Regime. The mercantilist state was a powerful factor in weakening and, in some cases, destroying the localism of the feudal lords and the communes. Popu-
lation increased greatly and tended to concentrate in the towns. In fact, the movement of modern people from the country to the city was already under way in western Europe. This shift, accompanied by the conversion of thousands of peasants into town-dwelling workers, tended to dislocate eighteenth century society and to destroy its stabilization. New capital-labor and employer-employee relationships, tending to be less personal, were helping to destroy the older feudal relationships in the more advanced areas. Wealth, to some extent, diminished the barriers between the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy. It enabled many merchants and successful lawyers to pull themselves up by their boot-straps into the lower rungs of the noble class. Although they were regarded as upstarts by the socially elect, still they procured titles, privileges, and a certain amount of prestige. On the other hand, many nobles, by investing in stocks and, in some cases, by owning and managing business enterprises, disdained the obligations of their caste, noblesse oblige, and became to all practical purposes members of the bourgeoisie.

Despite the growing importance of commerce and finance, the development of capitalism prior to the nineteenth century was slow. Medieval customs and methods still prevailed in agriculture, industry, and transportation. Merchants were not yet sufficiently obsessed with the chief objective of capitalism—the amassing of great fortunes. Usually they were content to assure themselves of an income sufficient to permit them to retire, perhaps purchase an estate, and simulate the life of a country gentleman. In France and England, they were keen on the purchase of titles for themselves and their sons, and on the arrangement of favorable marriages for their daughters. Dutch burghers, on the other hand, were more addicted to investment in foreign bonds.

Eighteenth century political institutions were generally unfavorable to the growth of capitalism. It is true that governments in England, France, Russia, the Dutch Netherlands, and in some other countries, endeavored to encourage commerce and industry through regulations and subsidies. Nevertheless, their efforts were partly frustrated by the prevalence of wars, ill-advised policies on the part of rulers, high taxes, internal tariff barriers, and the inadequacy of police protection for private property. A spirit of religious intolerance resulted in the persecution of such groups as the Jews and the Huguenots, which might otherwise have contributed greatly to the building up of the new economy. Nascent capitalism had other difficulties to overcome in the eighteenth century. Deforestation had nearly exhausted the supply of one form of material essential for houses, wagons, tools, ships, and fuel. Attempts to overcome this
deficiency had led to the importation of lumber from Scandinavia, North America, and elsewhere. Recourse to substitutes, such as coal for fuel, and economy in the use of wood, helped to overcome a serious deficiency. In short, even in this early stage, capitalism was confronted with the problem of acquiring the essential raw materials.

A flair for speculation accompanied the birth-pangs of the new economy. Contemporaries, incapable of grasping the implications and mechanics of capitalistic enterprise, frequently fell victim to their own cupidity encouraged by a false optimism. Hence, there developed early in the eighteenth century what one writer has aptly termed an "Age of Bubbles." An enthusiasm for investment in stocks, affecting all classes, culminated in a brief period of inflation. Perhaps the best examples of this mania for speculation were the South Sea Bubble in England and the Mississippi Bubble in France. Even the Dutch, deserting their sober practices of the seventeenth century, went in for unsound speculation on such a scale, that, in 1794, the East India Company, their greatest financial and economic institution, crashed.

The South Sea Bubble was the outcome of the assumption by the South Sea Company, founded in 1711 and consisting of merchants, of the floating national debt. In exchange for this service, the government guaranteed the company annual payments and a monopoly of the trade with Hispanic America. Extravagant ideas regarding the wealth of this area, together with assurances that the King of Spain was going to admit the company into the lucrative trade therewith, enabled the sponsors to boom the stock. As a result, the shares rose, in a short time from $500 to $10,000. A short-lived period of inflation followed, as people of all classes, desirous of partaking of this prosperity, rushed to purchase stock. Concerning this fever of speculation, Jonathan Swift, in his Gulliver's Travels, wrote: "The people in the street walked fast, looked wild, their eyes fixed, and were generally in rags." All sorts of concerns, some legitimate and some spurious, were projected so as to exploit the fever for speculation. Stock was sold to establish companies "for making wigs and shoes, for making oil from sunflowers, for importing jackasses from Spain, for trading in human hair, for fatting hogs, and for a wheel for perpetual motion."

France, too, succumbed to the intoxication of false prosperity. John Law, a Scottish financier, with the blessings of the government, established a bank endowed with the authority to issue paper money. He also sponsored several speculative enterprises, the most notable of which was the Mississippi Company, founded in 1717. This concern, designed to exploit the resources of the Mississippi, ushered in a flurry of speculation as representatives of all classes—nobles, priests,
The Bursting of the South Sea Bubble: Scene in Change Alley during the Financial Boom.
shopkeepers, coachmen, and women—hastened to buy the soaring stock so as to sell later at a great profit. As in England, fortunes were made on paper, living costs mounted causing intense suffering among the poor, crime increased as many sought a short cut to wealth.

Such glittering prosperity could not endure. In France, a few far-sighted speculators, fearful of a crash, decided to get rid of their stocks. Soon a selling wave culminated in a panic. By 1720, many stocks were valueless; hitherto wealthy men found their fortunes to consist of worthless paper. The experience of the British investor was comparable. Late in the same year came the crash as the whole speculative edifice of the South Sea Company tumbled. Ruined investors of all classes, in both countries, denounced their governments, which conducted belated investigations. Public confidence in the new devices of capitalism was badly shaken.

Despite these debacles, the sinews of capitalism tended to grow. In both England and France there appeared statesmen, prominent among them, Robert Walpole (1676–1745), who, appreciating the importance of economic activity, supported its development as a way out of the depression. Extensive ship-building, commercial development, and further colonial expansion overseas were encouraged by them, as by the Dutch.

The three great mercantilist states, Great Britain, France, and the Dutch Netherlands, were, along with Spain and Portugal, the most important colonial powers. In the struggle for supremacy, however, Spain and Portugal, both decadent, and the Dutch Netherlands, experiencing internal difficulties, had been outstripped by the British and French. By the eighteenth century, the race for leadership had simmered down to a contest between the two latter. Even after the financial crisis of 1720 the French government endeavored to expand in North America and India. This process was hampered by the refusal of the king to allow Huguenots to settle in his colonies, by the subjection of the colonies to bureaucratic control, by the fact that the French were traders rather than settlers, and by the French neglect of naval power. Nevertheless, great colonial governors, like Bienville (1680–1768) in Louisiana and Dupleix (1697–1763) in India, succeeded in consolidating and expanding French authority and prestige in those areas. The British, distrusting French expansion, eventually came to the conclusion that their own security could only be achieved by the destruction of the French Empire.

A series of wars in the eighteenth century decided the issue of colonial supremacy in favor of Great Britain. In 1739 an Anglo-Spanish conflict, known as the War of Jenkins' Ear, broke out partly as a result of Spain's attempt to suppress British smuggling into her
ENGLISH, FRENCH AND SPANISH COLONIES IN NORTH AMERICA
1755 and 1763

- ENGLAND
- FRANCE
- SPAIN

UNKNOWN
colonies in South America and the West Indies. Pacificaly inclined, the English government was forced through public opinion, which was aroused by the mutilation by the Spaniards of an English freebooter and captain, to resort to armed measures. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, France, sensing a possible humiliation of her English rival, arranged with Spain a secret understanding, the Family Compact (both countries having Bourbon kings), whereby the two powers reciprocally guaranteed the possessions of one another. In addition, the French undertook to regain Gibraltar, Minorca, and Georgia for Spain.

The War of Jenkins' Ear soon merged with the great continental War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748). Great Britain, joining forces with Austria against France, Prussia, Spain, and other powers, concentrated on an effort to dismember the colonial empires of France and Spain. After seven years of relatively indecisive fighting, during which the conquest of Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island by the English colonists was offset by the French capture of Madras in India, the belligerents consented to make peace. In the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), Great Britain, France, and Spain agreed to the restoration of the status quo ante bellum by the return of all colonial conquests. Spain consented to the extension of the Asiento, a British share in the Spanish colonial trade, for a period of four more years; two years later, however, Great Britain relinquished it for a remuneration of £100,000.1

Within a few years, the outbreak of the Seven Years' War (1756–1768) ushered in the decisive chapter in the Anglo-French duel for colonial supremacy. Actually, hostilities between France and England, in the French and Indian War, had already commenced in the colonies as early as 1754. When the great continental conflict began, with Prussia arrayed against France, Austria and Russia, and later Spain, William Pitt (the Elder), prime minister of England, intervened on behalf of Prussia. Thus Pitt's decision was inspired not only by the traditional British policy of supporting the principle of the balance of power, but also by the determination to smash the French colonial empire.

The struggle was a deathblow to French aspirations for colonial supremacy. British victories in Canada, India, the West Indies, and at the expense of the Spanish colonies, decided the issue in the overseas theaters of war. Peace was arranged among Great Britain, France and Spain by the Treaty of Paris (1763). France was required to surrender to England the bulk of her possessions in India, together with

1 For a fuller account of this conflict and the Seven Years' War which followed, see pp. 76–78.
her holdings in North America east of the Mississippi River. In addition, she ceded New Orleans and the territory west of the river to her ally, Spain. The latter, however, was compelled to give Florida to Great Britain in exchange for the restoration of Havana and Manila, both captured by the British. Henceforth, England was the dominant colonial nation, since France was virtually eliminated and Spain, her only serious rival now, was scarcely a power of the second rank.

This duel for world empire cost the victor dearly. Great Britain had won the war but it remained to be seen whether she could win the peace. Huge debts, high living costs, and a sharp slump in foreign trade, created a depression that taxed national patience and hindered the growth of capitalism. British efforts to combat this economic recession, involving the resumption of mercantilistic practices, contributed largely to the civil war within the empire which threatened to wreck it.

Within little more than a decade of the victory over France, the British Empire was shaken by a formidable convulsion—the revolt of the Thirteen Colonies. British statesmen, in pursuit of a rather elusive recovery, resorted to mercantilistic orthodoxy. Regarding the colonies as existing purely for the benefit of the mother-country, they endeavored to exploit them by insisting that they should furnish essential raw materials not produced at home; that they should abstain from industrial enterprises which would compete with those of England; and that they should assume a share of the financial, military, and naval obligations of the royal government. American colonists, particularly the merchant classes, asserting that they were being taxed without being represented in Parliament, resented bitterly these regulations as well as the numerous irksome restrictions on their economic activities. "The fact that they were Englishmen made them peculiarly sensitive to dictation, and the habit of initiative which had been bred in the colonies by the circumstances of their origin, the self-reliance of the companies, and the degree of self-government conferred upon the settlers, accentuated this attitude." Disregarding conciliatory measures proposed belatedly by the British government, the Americans advanced rapidly into open revolt.

The American revolution, in a way, constituted a repudiation of the Old Regime. To a certain extent it was a demonstration of American nationality and republicanism as opposed to alien rule and the dynastic principle. Moreover, it revealed the incompatibility of the Englishman and the American whose experiences and environment differed far too widely to permit them to remain willingly under a single government, located in London. In the economic sphere, it reflected the revolt against the mercantilism and the pater-
nalism of the typical eighteenth century monarch. In fact, it was largely economic interests that caused all classes to support the merchants in their opposition to British interferences. Land speculators and settlers resented the royal Proclamation Line of 1763 that forbade settlement in the west. Southern landlords, deeply in debt to British merchants, feared the attempts of their creditors to levy taxes directly on their property. Small manufacturers, shopkeepers, artisans, craftsmen, and unemployed laborers, desirous of sweeping changes, generally favored a complete break with England. Resorting to demonstrations, boycotts, and violence, they literally forced the reluctant upper classes, particularly the wealthy merchants, who preferred a relaxation of the British economic restrictions to complete independence, to sanction the revolution. In short, aristocratic and wealthy elements were so alarmed at the possibility of an American victory with its prospects of the rise of the lower classes, that many of them retained their loyalty to the British.

Nevertheless, in 1775, the Second Continental Congress, representing the thirteen American colonies, met at Philadelphia. It declared war on England and then proceeded to raise armed forces which were placed under the command of George Washington as commander-in-chief. On July 4, 1776, the colonies issued their Declaration of Independence. Inspired by its liberal philosophy, the colonists, many of whom, however, were not in favor of complete separation, engaged in a long, desperate struggle for freedom. A hastily constituted foreign office endeavored to procure recognition and help from abroad. Finally, the colonists, aided by a recently won ally, France, which hankered for revenge on England, and assisted slightly by the Dutch and Spanish, emerged triumphant. By the Treaty of Versailles (1783), Great Britain was forced to acknowledge the independence of the United States of America and to return miscellaneous colonial possessions, acquired somewhat earlier, to France and Spain.

The success of the American revolution signified a victory for bourgeois individualism. Not only was the new-world version of the Old Regime swept away, but the middle classes co-operated to crush the spirit of radicalism among the lower elements. Eventually, they succeeded in framing a constitution that left the business, landowning, and legal classes in a position of predominance. Thus emerged the first typically bourgeois republic in the western hemisphere; its successful struggle was to have a profound influence in encouraging the revolt later on against the Old Regime in Europe.

In England there was a positive reaction to this revolution, a reaction which frustrated imperialism. Many leaders, disillusioned with mercantilism, denounced its principles. They repudiated the
idea that colonies should be exploited by the mother-country. Tucker of Gloucester, calling attention to England's superiority in capital and industrial development, claimed she need not fear competition from her colonies. Adam Smith, in his *Wealth of Nations* (1776), declared that mercantilism actually harmed the interest of the mother-country and advocated the *laissez-faire* theory, which forbade governmental interference in business. In short, among thinking men, the pendulum was visibly swinging away from the paternalism of the Old Regime toward the free trade of the next century.

Nevertheless, the British government refused to abandon its traditional imperialism and persevered in a policy of expansion in India and in the Pacific. In fact, England made her greatest gains in the former area in the latter half of the eighteenth century. There, the British East India Company, under the leadership of Robert Clive (1725–1774), had not only succeeded in overcoming the French, but its brilliant governor, by intrigue, by bribery, and by force, had brought many native sections under its political and economic sway. Clive's efficient work was continued by Warren Hastings (1732–1818) who, like his predecessors, co-operated with the Grand Mogul, a native sovereign who ruled over much of India. As a result, he obtained additional territories in Bengal and financial rewards for the company. Meanwhile, by the Regulating Act (1773) and the Government of India Act (1784), the authority of the company was curtailed as Parliament set up machinery both in Calcutta and in London, designed to curb the inefficiency and corruption of company rule. The new arrangements did not work out satisfactorily and more than a half century was to elapse before comprehensive reforms were introduced.

The British also expanded along the significant lines of world commerce, particularly the routes to India and in the Pacific. Between 1785 and 1795, they obtained a foothold, later to become the Straits Settlements, in the Malay Peninsula which guarded the sea-approaches to China and Japan. In 1795 they acquired Ceylon, and, shortly thereafter, Cape Town and other Dutch possessions in Africa were seized. These conquests enabled England to control the all-water route to India around Africa. During the latter part of the eighteenth century, Great Britain established an empire in the Pacific. British interest in Australia dated from Captain Cook's visit there in 1770; it was not until the nineteenth century, however, that the development of sheep-raising and the discovery of gold led to an influx of settlers in Australia and New Zealand. Until then, the Australian colonies were useful only as way stations for vessels and as settlements to which criminals might be deported.
British commercial and colonial expansion helped to pave the way for sweeping changes—the Agricultural, the Technological, and the Industrial Revolutions. Great Britain, by her unrestrained expansion of population and facilities for production in certain lines, threw her economy out of gear to such an extent that she was threatened with a shortage of food, clothes, and other necessities of life. There was a serious rise, therefore, in the prices of farm commodities. The landowners, chiefly aristocrats and retired businessmen, were quick to grasp the opportunity of catering to this emergency. They wished to increase the productivity of their estates, by abandoning the traditional methods of subsistence cultivation in favor of capitalistic or large-scale farming, and by the practice of more efficient and more scientific methods of agriculture.

Prior to the eighteenth century, agricultural methods had changed very little. For ages farmers had been accustomed to sowing seeds broadcast, a wasteful method, since many failed to grow and others remained too close together. Greater precision was made possible by the drill, an invention of an English farmer, Jethro Tull (1674-1741), which deposited the seeds in straight furrows at suitable intervals. Improvement of methods was also facilitated by the study of soils. Viscouni Townshend (1674-1738), a gentleman farmer, revealed the advantages of crop rotation as compared with the three-field system of the Middle Ages, which still prevailed. He increased his annual crops, and at the same time avoided impoverishment of the soil, by planting wheat, barley (or rye), clover (or beans), and turnips, in successive years. Another beneficial innovation was the use of artificial fertilizers. Manure had long been used to revive the fertility of exhausted land, but by this time scientists had succeeded in discovering other means of nurturing wasted and poor soils. These new methods, together with irrigation and drainage, improved crops and also made much hitherto waste land available for cultivation. Scientific advances made possible other improvements. Another English farmer, Robert Bakewell (1725–1795), for example, developed the technique of careful breeding of cattle for finer and heavier stock. The horseshoe and the threshing machine, and eventually the Bell reaper in 1826, helped to revolutionize agriculture to such an extent that the agrarian phases of the Old Regime became hopelessly outmoded.

The Agricultural Revolution transformed the landowning system in England. Prior to this rural upheaval, small farmers rented, owned, or cultivated strips of land located in various parts of the large estates. Most of them, employing antiquated tools and methods, allowed about a third or even more of their property to remain
idle. Landlords, desirous of engaging in capitalistic or large-scale farming for the production of surpluses which could be sold at high profits, wanted to gain possession of the unused lands. Between 1700 and 1839, therefore, they, aided by acts of Parliament, secured several million acres of these “commons” or waste lands. Thousands of farmers, too poor to purchase farm implements, buildings, seeds, and stock, sold their holdings and either became tenants or day laborers on the large estates, or went to the cities and colonies in quest of employment. The landlords, on the other hand, taking advantage of the new mechanical technique, farmed their estates at great profit to themselves. As a result of their increased productivity, Great Britain found herself virtually independent of foreign sources of supply until 1792.

A number of great inventions in the eighteenth century resulted in what has been designated as the Technological Revolution. They resulted from the transfer of scientific knowledge from the purely academic field to the utilitarian activities of man. Machines, capable of performing the labor more rapidly and more efficiently, were created; they could be operated, first, by steam and, later, by water-power. These machines, the fruit of applied science, transformed industry when they were utilized extensively therein, for they enabled the manufacturer to develop large-scale production that was the industrial counterpart of the system of capitalistic farming.

The Industrial Revolution, an outgrowth of its indispensable forebear, the Technological Revolution, was partly a response to the economic needs of the eighteenth century. Hitherto, manufacturing had been conducted on a very small scale. From the Middle Ages it was carried on under the guild system. The master gathered around him small groups of craftsmen, apprentices, and laborers, who cooperated in the making of goods. By the sixteenth century, however, a new form of production, the domestic or putting-out system, was supplanting the craft guilds in the textile industries of England. Under this new arrangement, emerged the capitalist, who, owning raw materials and sometimes tools, hired workmen for wages and secured handsome profits for himself by marketing the goods. In short, he interjected himself between craftsman and consumer, exploiting the former and profiting at the expense of the latter. European weavers, however, less enterprising than those of England, clung for many years to the older system of producing and marketing their own goods.

A revolution in industrial methods followed. From 1750 on, both the domestic system and the craft guilds began to crumble as a result of the alteration of the economic set-up which resulted from the
commercial, agrarian, and technological advances. The expansion of overseas trade led to the opening of new markets, the increase of profits, and an extensive demand for manufactured articles. Similarly the Agricultural Revolution facilitated the exploitation of new areas with greater returns to the capitalist. These changes made possible the maintenance of a larger population, with a correspondingly heavier demand for food, clothes, and implements. At the same time, a sharp rise in living standards was an additional impetus to the expansion of industry by the application of machine-power.

The significant economic transformation of the eighteenth century developed most conspicuously in England. There the Industrial Revolution, particularly, took root because that country was peculiarly fitted for leadership. A strong and orderly constitutional government had long fostered business interests. Commercial expansion had not only resulted in an influx of wealth, but also had developed the spirit of enterprise, the essential business institutions, and ambitious leaders. England’s powerful fleets protected her from invasion and assured her of naval supremacy, while an extensive merchant marine secured commercial hegemony of the world. She was blessed with tremendous supplies of coal, iron ore, and wool. Her well-established industries already had a thriving domestic market at their command. These factors were more pronounced in England than on the Continent and largely explain her economic pre-eminence.

The textile industry in England was the first to be reorganized as a result of the Technological Revolution. About 1738, John Kay invented the “fly shuttle,” which enabled the weavers to make cloth more rapidly than before. A generation later, in 1767, James Hargreaves, a weaver of Lancashire, created the spinning jenny, a device wherein the turning of a crank made several wheels revolve, which in turn caused eight threads to be spun out simultaneously. A few years later, substitutes for human power were found as Richard Arkwright, a businessman, applied water-power, and James Watt, steam power, to the machines already in use.

This process of mechanization revolutionized the whole textile industry. Production, in any given line, far outstripped that which had been possible when full reliance had to be based on human energy. Arkwright, called the “father of the factory system,” attained greater industrial efficiency by concentrating his goods and his workers in immense shops, known as factories. This concentration, in contrast to the custom of having goods made in private homes under the domestic system, permitted more centralized control, greater coordination, increased flexibility of management and production, and specialization on the part of the worker. With the application of
machinery and the factory system to industry, the Industrial Revolution had become a reality.

A profound transformation of Western society was in the making. True, commercial and financial expansion, the Agricultural, Technological, and Industrial Revolutions—all had changed the economy of the Old Regime very little in the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, the eventual extension of the use of machinery and new sources of power to the coal, iron, and other industries, the tendency toward mass production which meant lower prices and sometimes cheaper goods, the development of faster and more efficient methods of transportation and communication, and the raising of living standards, all contributed between 1750 and 1850 to the disintegration of the Old Regime. Although its anachronistic institutions appeared to be intact superficially, the implications of the new economic advances presaged a sweeping reorganization. Its social order, based on birth, tradition, and law, was already threatened by a new society whose wealth would be a major criterion of rank. Perhaps Napoleon perceived the social change that impended when he declared: "Aristocracy always exists. Destroy it in the nobility, it removes itself immediately to the rich and powerful houses of the middle classes. Destroy it in these, it survives and takes refuge with the leaders of the workshops and the people." Certainly, in its economic and intellectual aspects, the eighteenth century pointed to a new economic and social order, even if its political, social, and religious institutions still drew their inspiration from the past.
Collateral Reading


The Intellectual Revolution

It was in the early modern period that the principle of absolutism was firmly entrenched in Europe. Only in England was there a development that impinged on royal prerogatives. The Glorious Revolution may well be said to have been the first promise that the divine-right principle, exemplified so completely by the Stuarts in England and Louis XIV in France, was doomed to go down before a middle class slowly becoming conscious of its strength. Moreover, the economic advance effected by the Commercial Revolution, the individualism born of the Renaissance and Reformation, and the entirely new conception of the universe and man's relation to it, which a golden era of scientific achievement brought in its wake, were gathering force behind the bourgeoisie. It was during this early modern period that men's intellects were freed of the veneration for authority, superstition, and traditionalism that had grown up over the centuries and elicited unquestioning obedience to the dictates of divine-right kings. Absolutism had seen its golden age, and its foundation was slowly disintegrating under the attacks of progressive thinkers. But before discussing the revolutionary intellectual activity of this period and the scientific advances that stimulated it, we might profitably consider the arguments of those thinkers who sought to justify the political status quo, the men who provided the philosophical justification of their sovereigns' policies. The forces of reaction, as well as the believers in progress, had their share of support among highly influential philosophers of the day.

It should be noted at the outset that the spokesmen for absolutism were genuinely concerned over the maintenance of order at a time
when war, social and economic unrest, and civil strife were common phenomena in the everyday lives of men. When religious and dynastic wars were laying waste to Europe and everywhere people were heartily sick of turbulence, it is easily understood why absolutist political theories took hold in the minds of both rulers and ruled. Moreover, the rising middle classes, needing protection and stability in the interests of business enterprise, fell easily into supporting Caesarism—for the time being. Order was synonymous with the security of life, limb, and property, and the problem in general was how to find this necessary security. Despotism appeared to be the only practical answer. The twentieth century has provided too many examples of people surrendering their liberty for security for us to consider the phenomenon peculiar to the early modern period.

Jean Bodin (1530-1596), though not so enamored of unlimited princely power as some of his fellow political philosophers, was strongly convinced that no legislative body had the right to limit that power, that even tyranny did not justify rebellion. Revolution meant disorder; progress could be served only by stability. Bodin's theory of sovereignty, on which his fame rests, was the soul of simplicity and bluntness: "supreme power over citizens and subjects, unrestrained by laws." Theoretically, the ruler was to be restrained by his own conception of God's law; actually, Bodin's conclusion posed no barrier to inhuman tyranny, for in the sixteenth century there were almost as many views of Divine Law as there were rulers. The political philosopher's profound faith in the superior moral insight of princes was little justified by the realities of his time.

To Thomas Hobbes, the seventeenth century author of Leviathan, the state was an omnipotent monster in which all lesser associations were "mere worms," a view quite in keeping with the fact that Hobbes was writing during the Puritan regime and frankly yearned for a return to monarchy. By nature man is an unsocial animal, motivated only by selfishness, declared Hobbes. Out of a morass in which life for the individual was "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short," men emerged—again for the purpose of achieving selfish objectives—to enter into a "social contract" with their prince by which they surrendered all their rights. Thus empowered, the sovereign could guarantee security to his subjects. Since the people themselves had voluntarily surrendered their rights, they could not break the social contract even when their ruler oppressed them, nor need the sovereign consider God's or nature's law as a limitation of his authority. Although Hobbes' political philosophy failed in its immediate purpose of modifying the excesses of the Puritan Revolution, it had the effect of riveting attention on the need of an authoritarian
state, and lent an emphasis to the "social contract" theory, which Rousseau, in the next century, was to use in arriving at conclusions that seemed to be diametrically opposite to the idea of a monarchy.

Even while Hobbes was rationalizing Caesarism, and while absolutism was being bolstered by the rationale of its philosophical apologists, a ferment of intellectual activity was taking place that was destined to give form and substance to a myriad of political, economic, and social frustrations among the ambitious middle classes, if not the masses, of Europe. A new "metaphysics" was formulated by men like Sir Isaac Newton, John Locke, René Descartes, and Baruch Spinoza, which derived from the scientific achievements of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and foreshadowed the intellectually luminous eighteenth century, the "Age of Reason." The genesis of the entire Intellectual Revolution is to be found in the significant conclusions reached by the scientists of our early modern period. It has often been pointed out that the beginning of modern science has altered the course of history more profoundly than all the wars since time began.

The scientific advance of the sixteenth century that had the broadest implications for Western civilization in general was in the field of astronomy. Accepted throughout the Middle Ages was the Ptolemaic theory of a geocentric universe, an idea both in keeping with the teachings of the Bible and the evidence of the senses. In 1543, Nikolaus Copernicus, a studious and inquisitive Polish monk, was on his deathbed when a copy of a newly published book he had written was handed him. It was the dying man's *The Revolutions of the Heavenly Orbs*, the fruit of more than thirty years' observation of the planets. Copernicus' conclusions were revolutionary, for he stated that the moon revolves about the earth, while the planets, including the earth, revolved around the sun in circular orbits. The popular reaction to this heliocentric theory was enormous, and even such intellectual leaders of the time as Jean Bodin in France and Sir Francis Bacon in England rejected the idea outright, while religious men like Luther and Calvin derided it as the vaporings of a fool. Man's supreme position among created things was in question. Curiosity and opposition were lively, indeed.

In the generation after Copernicus, a Dane, Tycho Brahe (1546-1601), spent his life in making a series of accurate observations of astronomical phenomena in a vain attempt to effect a compromise between the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems. Though Brahe did not have the scientific imagination to interpret his data, nor the ability to discover the mathematical formulas behind them, his work made it possible for his most famous disciple, Johannes Kepler
(1571–1630), to prove that a planet moves in an ellipse with the sun at one focus, that it moves in its orbit more rapidly when near the sun and more slowly when farther away, and that a straight line joining the planet to the sun sweeps across equal areas in equal intervals of time. Kepler's third law of planetary motion, worked out amid the direst poverty and war, was that the square of the time of revolution (or year) of each planet is proportional to the cube of its mean distance from the sun. Henceforth, it was a simple feat to compute exactly the size of the orbits, their distance from the sun, and the velocity of planetary motion. One problem remained: Why do planets move and keep to their orbits?

It was Galileo Galilei (1564–1642), an Italian mathematician, who brought final proof to the Copernican hypothesis and gave it popularity throughout Europe. By fitting into a tube a convex lens at one end and a concave lens as an eyepiece, Galileo created the first astronomical telescope. When he turned his crude instrument toward the nocturnal heavens, he saw things that were intoxicating to his senses. The moon showed a pockmarked face; the Milky Way proved to be made up of clusters of stars; four little moons seemed to be revolving around Jupiter; Saturn was eerily ringed. Two years later, Galileo, now a pensioner of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, made the startling announcement that the sun, hitherto considered incorruptible, had spots on it. Besides, claimed the great scientist, it was turning on its axis.

The challenge of the Italian's now famous observations was too much for a Christian world that did not want to be told that man was a crawling insect on the surface of an infinitesimal speck among the heavenly bodies. Scriptural assurances of man's importance in the cosmic scheme seemed to be contradicted by the astronomer's evidence that infinite forces at play in the universe took little heed of man and his purposes. In 1616, Galileo, according to the minutes of the Inquisition's Holy Office, retracted the view that he and his persecutors lived in a heliocentric universe. A week later the Index of Prohibited Books carried the title of Copernicus' publication, *The Revolutions of the Heavenly Orbs*.

In 1632 the irrepressible Galileo brought out a book called *A Dialogue on the Two Principal Systems of the Universe*, in which he caused the character, Simplicio, the advocate of the Ptolemaic system, to appear as simple-minded as his name suggested, while the arguments of Salviati, the proponent of the Copernican system, were obviously convincing. This time the Inquisition forced the hapless astronomer, under threat of torture, to sign a recantation, and for the rest of his life he was kept under close ecclesiastical surveillance.
His name and his views, however, had become a byword throughout the Western world.

Sir Isaac Newton (1642–1727), the most illustrious physicist of the Intellectual Revolution, published in 1687 his famous law of universal gravitation—a law based in part on the work of Galileo—which provided a single unifying principle for the entire world of matter. The Copernican hypothesis was to be doubted no longer. In the scientific field Newton also analyzed light and greatly improved the telescope. His famous *Principia Philosophiae Naturalis Mathematica* made it clear that everything in the universe is governed by immutable laws discoverable by and comprehensible to the mind of man. Unlike Galileo, with whom he shares the honor of being the father of modern physics, Newton was honored in his lifetime by appointment to high public office and, in death, by burial in Westminster Abbey.

Two other outstanding figures in the field of physics were Wilhelm Leibnitz, a German, and Christian Huygens, a Hollander. To the former we are indebted for his suggestion that time and space are relative rather than absolute, and for his theory that light is transmitted from the sun to the earth through the medium of ether. Huygens' invention of the pendulum clock in the mid-seventeenth century made him a celebrity while still in his twenties. In the science of optics he improved the telescope, produced an almost perfect achromatic eyeglass, and was the first to develop the wave theory of light.

In the closely related field of mathematics, Holland also produced an important figure in the person of Stevinus (1548–1620), a commercial agent and adviser to the Prince of Orange. He developed the use of decimal fractions and urged on his sovereign the adoption of a decimal system of coinage, weights, and measures. His contemporary in Scotland, Napier, invented logarithms and introduced the use of the decimal point. Descartes, too, was important in mathematics, for he invented analytical geometry, suggested new mathematical methods for physicists, and stimulated scientific interest in the mathematical aspects of astronomy. The many talented Isaac Newton invented the infinitesimal calculus, developed much of the theory of equations, and established the binomial theorem.

The founder of modern chemistry was Robert Boyle (1627–1691), son of an Irish nobleman, who won distinction in 1660 by announcing his discovery that the volume of a gas varies inversely with the pressure. He did much to establish chemistry as a pure science, divorced from both alchemy and medicine. The idea of chemical "elements" was suggested by him, and he even came close to enunci-
ating a fully modern atomic theory. For almost a century after Boyle little progress in chemistry was made, partly because of a rather general misunderstanding of the phenomena of flame and combustion. The so-called "phlogiston" theory, asserted by a German physician in the early eighteenth century, held that "phlogiston" was the mysterious something that caused a flame to burn and consume fuel. In the latter half of the eighteenth century a rapid series of discoveries exploded the phlogiston theory and paved the way for the great achievements in chemistry during the nineteenth century. A Scot, one Joseph Black, discovered carbon dioxide about 1755; hydrogen, produced by treating iron, zinc, and other metals with sulphuric acid, was identified and described as "inflammable air" by Henry Cavendish in 1766; and in 1774 a Unitarian clergyman, Joseph Priestley, found a gas that was necessary to both combustion and the respiration of animals. A few years later, Priestley showed that his newly discovered gas, named oxygen by the French scientist, Lavoisier, produced water when combined with hydrogen, and air when combined with nitrogen.

Antoine Lavoisier (1743–1794), called by some "the Newton of chemistry," finally obliterated the phlogiston theory by proving that both combustion and respiration are simply forms of oxidation, differing only in the time required to complete the process. His most important achievement was the founding of quantitative analysis and the theory of the conservation of mass, i.e., that although matter may alter its state chemically, it does not change in amount. Revolutionary France did a poor service to science and humanity when in 1794 it guillotined Lavoisier, then only fifty-one years of age.

In biology several significant advances were made during the seventeenth century. Robert Hooke (1635–1703), a clergyman's son, was the first man to see and describe the cellular structure of plants, and a few years later Marcello Malpighi, a professor at the University of Bologna, demonstrated the sexuality of plants and the lung-like function of vegetable leaves. Anton van Leeuwenhoek, a Dutch manufacturer of microscopes, used his product to discover bacteria and protozoa, and wrote a treatise giving the first description of human spermatozoa. Another Dutchman, Jan Swammerdam, wrote in 1685 a General History of Insects and made basic observations in embryology by working with caterpillars and tadpoles. Existing botanical knowledge was classified by a Swede known as Linnaeus, the Latinized form of Linné (1707–1778). All natural objects were classified into three kingdoms: stone, animal, and vegetable; each kingdom was subdivided into classes, genera, and species. The system of biological nomenclature, by which every plant and animal is desig-
nated first by genus and second by species, was invented by this peripatetic and observant Swede.

But the most famous classifier of zoological data was the Frenchman Buffon (1707–1788). In his forty-four volume *Natural History of Animals*, Buffon, although himself unable to accept the full implications of the evolutionary theory, recognized a close kinship between man and the higher animals. He conceded that, were it not for the authority of the Scriptures to the contrary, the ape and the man might really have a common ancestry.

Progress in medicine and physiology during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was very slow for several reasons. The principal source of Greek and Roman medical information was the writings of Galen, the famous Greek physician who lived and died in Rome during the second century A.D. Galen’s full descriptions of Greek medical science and practice were all but forgotten during the Middle Ages, but when the Italian medical humanists of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries found his treatment of the structure and function of the human body so complete and consistent, the Greek’s authority became pre-eminent. Physicians were content to rely on the word of Galen. There were other impediments as well to medical and anatomical research. Doctors were inadequately prepared; surgery ranked as a trade along with cutting hair and shoeing horses; and, perhaps the most serious of all, there existed a tremendous popular prejudice against dissection of human bodies for anatomical study.

The first serious repudiation of the authority of Galen was made by a young anatomy professor at the University of Padua, Andreas Vesalius (1514–1564), in a treatise on *The Structure of the Human Body*, published in the same year that saw the publication of Copernicus’ masterpiece. The book, filled with fine illustrations of his subject, was the product of checking every statement of Galen by reference to the human cadavers Vesalius dissected in front of his students over a period of seven years. The pictures told the story of what his scalpel had laid bare, but the physicians and theologians of the time called the new anatomy both sacrilegious and false. The disgusted Vesalius broke off his research and became court physician to the Emperor Charles V, but he had pointed out the path of scientific investigation which others soon followed.

A student of Vesalius, one Fabricius, discovered the values in human veins, but it was William Harvey, an Englishman, who found that the blood actually circulates, out through the arteries and back through the veins, under the propulsion of the heart. Harvey’s definitive work, *The Movement of the Heart and Blood*, published in
1628, was a fatal blow to the authority of Galen, and established the author's own eternal fame, for the whole of modern physiology is based on the knowledge that the blood circulates. Harvey did not realize exactly how the terminal branches of the arteries were linked up with those of the veins, but this revelation was not long in coming. In 1661, Malpighi examined a frog's lung through a microscope and saw the blood passing from the arteries to the veins through the capillaries. Less than twenty years later, Leeuwenhoek, looking at the tail of a tadpole through a microscope, saw evidence that convinced him that arteries and veins are one and the same thing, differing only in that the former carried the blood from the heart while the veins brought it back.

Perhaps the most curious example of how medical men of the early modern period reacted against the authority of Galen was Theophrastus Bombastus Hohenheim (1493–1541), who published pompously written books under the name of Paracelsus (“Greater than Celsus”). The son of a Swiss country physician and hospital superintendent, the uncouth, loud-mouthed Hohenheim traveled from one university to another, learning just enough about medicine to convince him that Galen was considerably off the mark and to give point to his colleagues' charges that the self-styled Paracelsus was a quack. Notwithstanding his lack of genuine scholarship and inadequate training, Hohenheim discovered a number of valuable drugs, pointed out the close relationship between medicine and chemistry, and convinced many that medicine is to be regarded as an experimental science.

The phenomenal development of science in the early modern period not only widened men's knowledge about the physical universe and its living creatures; it also aroused inevitable speculation concerning what lay beyond or above the physical. or what has been called since the time of Aristotle, "metaphysics." This new philosophy marked a rather sharp break with theology, just as the new scientific findings were divorced from the traditional metaphysics of Christian revelation. Revolutionary development of natural science was itself responsible to a large degree for the new metaphysics, though the causal relationship should not be emphasized too strongly. The Renaissance, as we have seen, had brought a new emphasis to the individual, and encouraged him to do his own thinking; the Commercial Revolution and the expansion of Europe had created widened intellectual horizons, an almost unavoidable consequence of contact with distant lands and strange peoples. If the Protestant Reformation produced much religious bigotry, it also stimulated a spirit of criticism. The growth of this spirit of inquiry and the concomitant development of a secular view of life contributed a set of
attitudes toward existing social and political institutions that her-alded the overthrow of the old order. The firm establishment of these new views of society and the individual’s place in it constituted a true revolution in thought, a series of changes known collectively as the Intellectual Revolution.

This upheaval was essentially a revolt against authority, the au-thority of theology over men’s thinking that not even the Renais-sance and the Protestant Reformation had been able to dissipate entirely. And since the scientists were the first to throw off this yoke, it was natural that many of the precursors of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment were prominent as both scientists and philosophers. Several of these philosopher-scientists deserve more than passing men-tion.

A distinguished Englishman, Francis Bacon (1561–1626), was one of the first to insist on the inductive method as the indispensable ground of accurate knowledge. He was convinced that philosophy was held in chains by scholastic logic, and that the only way to break loose was to turn to the direct observation of nature, to the accumu-lation of facts about things and the discovery of the laws governing them. Induction was the key to truth; authority, tradition, and syllogistic logic were to be avoided like the plague. “Antiquity,” he wrote, “deserveth that reverence that man should make a stand thereupon and discover what is the best way; but when the discovery is well taken, then to make progression.” Yet many of Bacon’s own convictions were deeply rooted in the past, for he believed in astrology, divination, and witchcraft, and when Copernicus’ theory of a heliocentric universe was published, Bacon was not a good enough scientist to perceive its validity. Nevertheless, Bacon’s message that the new philosophy must be inductive, experimental, and utilitarian was important to the methodology of later metaphysicians.

The real founder of modern critical philosophy was the French-man René Descartes (1596–1650). This versatile genius easily demon-strated how much unverifiable assumption lay beneath the earlier scholastic philosophy. He began by rejecting authority, no matter how venerable or respected, and in this he was a real innovator, for previous philosophers had been unwilling to spurn both traditional opinion and the ordinary experience of mankind. Simple, self-evident truths were all he required, and from these he argued that one should reason to particular conclusions. One of these axioms Descartes embodied in his famous principle, “I think, therefore I am” (Cogito ergo sum), and he contended that this realization alone would enable man to deduce the existence of God, or that mind exists independent of matter. Pure deduction was the key to all
knowledge. Descartes is also important for his mechanistic interpretation of the universe. Not even the lowest forms of life, he asserted, were excluded from functioning as machines. Man is merely a higher kind of machine, but he is set off from the lower animals by his capacity of consciousness, which the latter do not possess, and therefore man has the power of reflective self-direction. It is obvious that Descartes' two doctrines of rationalism and mechanism represented the rejection of nearly all the theological bias of the past.

Descartes was not the only exponent of rationalism among the philosophers of the seventeenth century. Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), a brilliant Dutch Jew who came under the influence of Descartes' teachings, grew so critical of Hebrew dogmas that he was cast out from among his own people, but under the patronage of Jan De Witt, the Grand Pensionary of Holland, Spinoza elaborated his philosophy of pantheism. He came to the conclusion that God and nature are identical. This doctrine of the immanence of God—purely pantheistic in its conclusions—grew out of reason rather than faith, and was intended to express the scientific notion of nature's unity and the continuity of cause and effect. Worship of the order and harmony of nature was for Spinoza the perfect good which, when attained, would bring pure and lasting happiness to man. Realization that he is but an impotent particle in a wondrously arranged universe would instill a philosophical serenity in him who wearies himself in trying to change his fate. Spinoza's determinism, however, did not prevent him from advocating justice, toleration, and living by reason, and his own personal life represented a considerable attempt to set a noble pattern for others to follow.

Thomas Hobbes, whom we have mentioned previously in connection with the political theory of monarchical absolutism, was also an important seventeenth century rationalist. His contribution was a radical materialism. He rejected Descartes' idea that mind and matter are separate and distinct phenomena. The origin of all knowledge, according to Hobbes, is in sense perception, and his senses told him that everything, including God, is reducible to matter. Hand in hand with Hobbes' materialism went his mechanical explanation of man, whose actions are determined by inherited or acquired likes or dislikes. Freedom of will is impossible; man is a creature of habit.

The work of Sir Isaac Newton was of great importance to the development of the new philosophy. It has been suggested that his law of gravitation had been anticipated in part by Galileo's discovery of the laws governing falling bodies upon the earth, and by Kepler's principles of planetary motion. Newton extended the idea of these
unvarying physical laws to the entire universe, and when this application was made it followed that everything in nature is governed by universal laws, which can be formulated just as precisely as the principles of mathematics. The medieval idea that the universe is operated according to a benevolent purpose was gone, and in its place came the conviction that events followed upon one another with automatic precision, while man had only to adapt himself to this rhythm. There was room for God in Newton's philosophy, but He was not endowed with the power to regulate the paths of the stars or to interrupt the order of nature's workings. The appearance of Newton's *Principia* in 1687 marked the close of the single greatest century in the history of science, but it also opened the door to an era during which the philosophy of those scientific achievements was applied to human institutions as well.

It was left to John Locke (1632–1704) to bring man into the picture of a universe ordered on some rational plan, and to point out the effect of external phenomena upon his mind. He began by discarding the doctrine of innate ideas, contending that man is not born with any apprehension of universal truth. Beginning with a mind that is a blank tablet, the infant slowly learns to perceive the external world through its senses, and it is through the senses that the child acquires the simple ideas that are the foundation of knowledge. Since these simple ideas are insufficient bases for intelligent living, reason steps in to build them into a complex but usable body of general truth. Both the senses and the mind are necessary, declared Locke, for the one acquires the raw materials of knowledge while the other organizes and gives meaning to them. This combination of reason and experience as the sources of knowledge represented a distinct break from existing philosophical tradition, to say nothing of theological dogma.

Locke's empiricism and Newton's discovery that the universe is a great machine, governed by natural laws, and susceptible of interpretation by mathematical formulas, provided the basic ingredients of the intellectual movement of the eighteenth century known as the Enlightenment. The movement had its origin in England, but it quickly spread from there to the Continent, where it found its highest expression in France. As simply as the significant concepts of the Enlightenment can be stated, they appeared to be these: (1) reason is the only sure guide to wisdom; (2) science should replace theology and, therefore, it is to be assumed that the entire universe of mind and matter is governed by natural law; (3) man, in obedience to the dictates of reason and natural law, not only progresses, but will ultimately reach perfection; and (4) simplicity and naturalness in
the structure of society are best. Religion was the first to feel the impact of these ideas.

Pierre Bayle, the famous French Huguenot skeptic who fled to Holland shortly before the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, crusaded in his writings against religious intolerance and argued that religion was not the business of the state. Complete freedom for any type of religious thought was far better than trying to compel men to believe otherwise than their consciences dictated. If conversion of others is attempted, it should be by reason and urbane argument, not by forcible indoctrination. When criticism of his utterances grew threatening, the wily and sardonic Bayle openly espoused and glorified faith, but in such a way that it became repugnant to the minds of all intelligent men.

By the eighteenth century a repudiation of Christian theology by the scientifically minded intellectuals appeared inevitable. Differences between scientists and theologians in the Middle Ages were not serious, because of the prestige of the Church and because of its reliance on Greek science, which had not yet been superseded. From the time of the Renaissance on, however, the breach between science and theology widened, as scientists revealed more and more of the nature of the universe with which the teachings of the Church seemed to differ. In their outlook on life, intellectuals came to rely on experience, observation, experimentation, and logic; the Churches, Catholic and Protestant alike, preferred to adhere to their traditional beliefs and practices.

Many intellectuals soon found themselves in revolt—not necessarily against Christianity, but against the established Churches, both Protestant and Catholic, which, the new learning notwithstanding, still proclaimed their infallibility in matters of faith, morals, and knowledge. Most eighteenth century thinkers, permeated by rationalism, and full of enthusiasm for the work of the scientist, could no longer accept conventional ideas concerning the divinity of Christ, the fall of man, divine revelations and miracles, and the indispensability of the Church as a medium for the salvation of the soul. They had become so impressed by the natural laws which seemed to control the universe that they were convinced that there must also be natural laws regulating religious life, politics, and society. If the Church, the state, and other man-made institutions could be set aside, then, they believed, these natural laws could function to the universal betterment of mankind. Therefore, many learned men, in striving for a natural religion, i.e., one in accordance with the dictates of reason and natural law, embraced deism.

Deism developed earliest in England and spread from there to the...
continent. Traces of a natural religion could be depicted as early as the twelfth century; in Baron Herbert of Cherbury (1583–1648) there appeared a devotee of such a cult. It was not until the eighteenth century, however, that deism became an important factor in Europe, and then chiefly in France, since that country had become a fertile seed-bed for advanced ideas as a result of the development of scientific studies there. As deism spread it became more radical, causing many of its adherents to break with Christianity. Orthodox theologians denounced this tendency, but a militant defender of the new faith appeared in François Marie Arouet, better known as Voltaire (1694–1778). Attacking the established Church savagely for its intolerance and obscurantism, he upheld the deistic philosophy. On the other hand, a few skeptics, such as the Baron d’Holbach (1723–1789), a German residing in Paris, finding deism an unsatisfactory substitute for orthodox Christianity, denounced all religion and preached atheism.

Some intellectuals, nevertheless, refused to abandon Christianity. Instead, they organized societies for the purpose of harmonizing religion and science. In 1717 such a group, called the Grand Lodge, was organized in England; because its members adopted much of their ceremonial from the medieval guilds of master masons, they were called “Freemasons.” Its members were nonsectarian, but they had to accept the belief in God. Before the eighteenth century was over, there were affiliated lodges in Scotland, Canada, the United States, India, and most European countries.

There were other manifestations of interest in religious reform on the part of contemporaneous thinkers. One group, called Pietists, recommended a compromise in the religious-scientific controversy and urged Christians to stop quarreling over dogma and to pattern their lives after that of Christ. Two of its leaders were the Lutheran pastor, Philip Spener (1635–1705), and the Swedish professor, Emanuel Swedenborg (1688–1772), who, as advocates of religious toleration, inspired a number of sects. In England pietism was represented by George Fox, who founded the Quakers, and by John Wesley (1703–1791), who organized a Holy Club whose members were nicknamed “Methodists,” because of their methodical cultivation of piety and charity.

A tendency toward religious toleration was, perhaps, one of the significant contributions of the eighteenth century. The prevalence of new ideas led to broadmindedness and freer expression. Both Catholics and Protestants, condemning witchcraft, terminated the practice of trying, burning, and beheading witches. Some Christians even went so far as to denounce prevailing laws that oppressed the
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Jews. The Hebrew philosopher, Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786), asserting that Judaism was but one of several true faiths, urged Christians to appraise this religion on its own merits. In fact, a greater spirit of tolerance prevailed in the eighteenth century, because many of the certainties of the preceding age seemed to have faded away before the advance of the new learning.

One institution that helped to disseminate new ideas, in an age during which newspapers were comparatively rare, was the salon. Many aristocratic ladies, and frequently members of the bourgeoisie, continued a custom, originated during the Renaissance, of entertaining on certain days. The intelligentsia acquired the habit of congregating in their salons in order to exchange ideas and news. There were to be encountered the intellectuals, artistic folk, men of affairs, musicians, faddists, and all sorts of bizarre beings, who wished to give expression to their own ideas or to listen to those of others. In effect, the salon was a sort of intellectual clearinghouse.

Another factor that contributed to the cultural broadening of the eighteenth century was the Encyclopædia. This monumental work, under the editorship of Denis Diderot (1713–1784), was a collaborative effort, in which leading experts in each field of learning wrote the pertinent articles. Most of the famous intellectuals of the day were contributors. Thus, in a way, the Encyclopædia, which came out volume by volume, the first appearing in 1751, and the last in 1772, was a sort of epitome of eighteenth century learning. It was permeated with the spirit of the age; rationalism, natural laws, deism, and humanitarianism all helped to color a gigantic compilation of knowledge, which, because of widespread public interest therein, became an important agency for the diffusion of the new ideas, as well as an object of periodic government suppression.

A rebirth of conscience accompanied the spread of advanced thought. Humanitarians were aroused over the plight of the unfortunate elements of society, such as the poor, the orphans, the ill, the insane, the slaves, and the criminals. They endeavored to improve the status of these groups by calling the attention of their fellow men to social conditions. As a result, there was a widespread tendency on the part of wealthy patrons and philanthropists, members of the aristocracy and of the bourgeoisie, to establish and to endow places of refuge for the poor, asylums for orphans and the mentally ill, hospitals, and schools.

Friends of slaves and criminals were active on their behalf. An abolition movement devoted to the suppression of slavery developed. In England, William Wilberforce (1759–1833) formed an anti-slavery committee, and in France a “Society of Friends of the Blacks”
was established in 1788. Sponsors of penal reform appeared in Cesare Beccaria (1738–1794), the Italian criminologist, and Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), the English exponent of utilitarianism. Denouncing harsh criminal laws, the maltreatment of prisoners, and the use of torture, they urged humane legislation and an improvement of prison conditions. Some of these reformers, in fact, developed a cosmopolitan humanitarianism, which transcended barriers of race, creed, and political affiliation, and looked hopefully to a future of international peace.

To a considerable extent the Intellectual Revolution, like the Renaissance, was a bourgeois movement. Members of the business and professional classes became patrons of literary, scientific, and artistic figures, who represented the ideas and ideals of the middle classes. The bourgeoisie, with its wealth and increasing social importance, looked forward to a still greater growth in the future. Therefore, it could subscribe readily to the idea of progress which conceived of society as being in a state of flux. Furthermore, the middle classes, with their capitalistic outlook, tended to measure success in terms of profit and wealth. Thus they stressed the economic factor and advocated such reforms as would contribute to a fuller and wider prosperity. Eventually they came to favor such sweeping changes in the political, social, and economic structure as to signify virtually the disappearance of the Old Regime.

Eighteenth century economists became protagonists of bourgeois individualism. They denounced mercantilism, claiming that its theories concerning wealth, prosperity, a favorable balance of trade, and monopoly were fallacious. Famines, they claimed, had frequently resulted from official restrictions on the sale of grain; they asserted that the mere possession of precious metals was no guarantee of prosperity; and they demanded the termination of the whole mercantile system, with its regulations and its restraints on trade and industry.

A new school arose which championed the idea of economic liberty, in which the individual would be left free to work out his own economic salvation. In France, there emerged a group of economists, led by François Quesnay (1694–1774), who came to be known as Physiocrats. One of its characteristic spokesmen, Vincent de Gournay (1712–1759), developed the laissez-faire doctrine that the government should keep its hands off economic life. He held that agriculture, rather than commerce or industry, was the chief source of wealth, and that it would prosper more if all feudal and governmental restraints were removed. Turgot (1727–1781), an enlightened bureaucrat, urged that the laissez-faire idea he applied to commerce and industry as well. In envisioning an economic milieu com-
pletely free of all official interference, he wrote: "Every seller, it being his chief interest to merit preference over his competitor, will sell in general the best goods at the lowest prices at which he can make a profit in order to attract customers. The merchant or manufacturer who cheats will be quickly discredited and lose customers without interference of government." Like most of the Physiocrats, Turgot was a monarchist; he believed, however, that the property-owning classes should be made politically articulate through a system of assemblies to which they should send delegates.

Adam Smith (1723–1790), the Scottish economist, came closest to being the ideal bourgeois philosopher of the eighteenth century. In his *Wealth of Nations* (1776), he claimed that the real strength of a state consisted in the prosperity of its citizens. Therefore, he asserted the right of the individual to hold private property and to acquire further wealth. Like the Physiocrats, he opposed feudal and mercantilistic regulations and championed the *laissez-faire* theory, claiming that each individual knew best how to enrich himself and, thereby, the whole community. Consequently, he demanded complete economic liberty, insisting that the preservation of this freedom and the safeguarding of private property were among the primary obligations of the state. Thus, Smith's philosophy, accepted wholeheartedly by most of the bourgeoisie, was based on the right to have and to hold.

In the field of political theory, the French intellectuals were active supporters of bourgeois ideals. Montesquieu (1689–1755), a lively admirer of Locke and British institutions, expounded new conceptions of the theory of the state and pointed out the shortcomings of privileged aristocracy, the folly of religious intolerance, and the corruption of the court. His *Persian Letters*, a biting satire on French society, escaped official condemnation only because it appeared during the Regency, when a good laugh was at a high premium. His famous *Spirit of the Laws*, published in 1748, stands as Montesquieu's most serious and thought-provoking book. He did not attempt to arrive at a science of government by pure deduction, but based his arguments on a study of political systems as they were supposed to have operated in the past. From a combination of study and travel he came to the conclusion that the government that might be suitable for one people might not be so for another, since laws, customs, and institutions are produced by geographical conditions, particularly climate. Despotism, he claimed, is best suited to countries of great extent; limited monarchy to those of medium size; and republicanism was appropriate only to small countries. France he put in the middle category.
Although he labored under a serious misapprehension concerning the separation of powers in the British constitution, Montesquieu's most famous principle was highly influential in the development of bourgeois democracy. Liberty, he declared, was impossible so long as any two or more of the three fundamental and natural divisions of governmental authority, the legislative, the judicial, and the executive, were united in the same hands. It is interesting to note that Montesquieu's system of checks and balances was not intended to facilitate democracy, but rather to prevent a dictatorship of the majority. Hostility toward despotism, in other words, did not necessarily imply a sympathy for the democratic principle as it is thought of today.

No writer of the eighteenth century, save Rousseau, equaled Voltaire in the expression of bourgeois ideals. He, like Montesquieu, was an admirer of British political institutions. He constantly advocated law, order, and the sanctity of private property. Although he favored equality, he realized that it was an ultimate goal rather than an immediate objective. A sincere monarchist, he, however, never hesitated to attack royal tyranny. In his opinion, both the state and the Church should be deprived of all powers that impeded the rise of a bourgeois society. The chief function of the government, he believed, was to maintain the sanctity of property. As an anticlerical, he contended that the Church should be subordinate to the state in temporal matters. In short, Voltaire, himself a successful businessman, was a firm exponent of a bourgeois state. Possessing a sincere belief in benevolent despotism, Voltaire at no time subscribed to radical views. He did not espouse the idea, advanced in England by John Locke, that the people, as the ultimate source of government, had the right of revolution against constituted authority. Nor was he impressed by the idea of a limited monarchy, advocated by Montesquieu. Avoiding extremes, Voltaire relied on reason as the certain guide to progress and enlightenment.

Rousseau, perhaps more than Voltaire, was the harbinger of bourgeois democracy. He favored the overthrow of the decadent, monarchical state, with all its trappings, and urged the establishment of a natural society based upon the so-called instincts of man. Members of the bourgeoisie, and even aristocrats, were so intrigued by his advocacy of a simple life, undefiled by the corrupting influences of civilization, that they sponsored a "back-to-nature" movement. In itself this tendency was interesting rather than important, but it revealed a widespread desire to escape from the oversophistication of eighteenth century society. More significant for the bourgeoisie was the doctrine of popular sovereignty which Rousseau presented in a
political brochure entitled the *Social Contract* (1761). Therein he endeavored to annihilate the ideology of the Old Regime and to recall to people their alleged right of revolution. Despite his apparent radicalism, many of the bourgeoisie endorsed his doctrines, because

they conceived of themselves as the leaders in the impending regeneration of society.

Actually, Rousseau was more of a romanticist than a rationalist. Confronted with realities, he usually recommended moderation and patience. For example, although recognizing the injustice of serfdom in Poland, he felt that no solution for the problem was immediately available. Again, contrary to his expressed radicalism, when he drafted a model constitution for Corsica, he revealed himself a moderate rather than an extremist. In fact, there are scholars who claim that Rousseau was actually an exponent of the will of the people expressed through a strong state and a benevolent dictator. Despite this opportunism, he was inspired by the vision of a utopia. Unlike Voltaire, who favored the wealthy bourgeoisie, Rousseau cherished the interests of the lesser businessmen and the lower classes. He en-
visaged an ideal society, in which there would be extremes of neither wealth nor poverty.

It is rather difficult to assess Rousseau's influence. He was denounced by pious Christians, by adherents of the Old Regime, by plutocrats, and even by rationalists such as Voltaire, who distrusted his radicalism and his extravagances. On the other hand, he was very much admired by Hume, the historian, by Kant, the German philosopher, by Thomas Paine, the English rationalist, and by countless thousands of the middle and lower classes. Rousseau's influence achieved its zenith during the French Revolution, when it was reflected in the pursuit of liberty, equality, and fraternity and in the establishment of a strong government.

By the end of the eighteenth century, scientists, intellectuals, and theorists had created the ideology indispensable for a revolt against the Old Regime. Extreme individualism, however, was a two-edged weapon. Its potentialities could be exploited at this time by the middle classes for the purpose of wrecking the prestige and the institutions of the old society. On the other hand, individualism, if taken up by the lower classes, as it was in the nineteenth century, might operate to the disadvantage of a class which desired merely to substitute itself as a privileged caste in place of the old aristocracy. In the eighteenth century, however, the bourgeoisie were too keen on shattering the hegemony of the nobility to be unduly concerned about the aspiration of the masses. In fact, most of their outstanding intellectuals—Voltaire, for example—accepted the idea that reforms could come only from above.

Reforms from Above: The Enlightened Despots

As champions of individual liberty the Physiocrats and other critics of the old order opposed all tyrannical methods of government; at the same time most of them favored a particular kind of central authority which they called benevolent (or enlightened) despotism. In their opinion a despot should be the servant of his people, exercising his power solely for their benefit, and identifying their welfare with his own. He should, wrote the famous Physiocrat, Dupont de Nemours, "... promulgate by positive ordinances the natural and essential laws of the social order." In advocating benevolent despotism, these philosophers visualized the creation of an ideal state. Its political and social organization was to be orderly, harmonious, and permanent. The inhabitants thereof were to be well educated, were to enjoy equality of opportunity, and were to be completely freed of ancient habits and prejudices.

Eighteenth century despots, however, were fundamentally mer-
cantilists. Their dominant motive was to create strong and prosperous states, especially through the exclusive policy of increasing exports and decreasing imports. Inasmuch as the problem of foreign trade was far less important in the Germanic states, the mercantilist philosophy of governmental intervention in those countries turned more towards domestic problems. Social improvements under the auspices of the state gave a humanitarian cast to German mercantilism which has been called cameralism.

These ideas influenced most monarchs. Contemporary rulers subordinated everything within the control of the state to the problem of national existence. They attempted to create strong and prosperous countries by strengthening their personal rule, by increasing military power, and by handing down beneficial reforms. Most enlightened despots, in their efforts to diffuse prosperity, endeavored to abolish the restrictions that hampered the bourgeoisie and the peasantry. They tried to unify their legal systems, to abolish judicial abuses, to weaken the temporal power of the Church, to encourage industrial, commercial, and agricultural development, to emancipate the serfs, and to promote the training and education of the people.

Frederick the Great of Prussia was a characteristic benevolent despot. Maintaining that the king was the first servant of the state, he devoted considerable energy to the internal problems of administration. Every department of government came under his scrutiny. But Frederick's achievements in the field of internal reform were limited. From the beginning of his reign he opposed serfdom, denouncing it as "revolting to mankind," and abolishing it on his estates. Nevertheless, he was unwilling to arouse the opposition of the powerful Junkers (landlords) by depriving them of their serfs. Dependent upon the support of the property-owning classes, he refused to antagonize them by the introduction of sweeping social and class reforms.

The Prussian ruler, however, wanted to improve the economic and religious structure of his kingdom. By careful economies in the management of the state, he was able to devote part of the revenue to agricultural and industrial developments. For example, he succeeded in building a system of drainage canals which reclaimed for cultivation thousands of acres of waste land. Frederick encouraged the expansion of old industries, subsidized new ones, and by his visits to various parts of the country, he infused into business as well as into local government much of his own energy and love of order. Like Voltaire and other skeptics, he felt contempt for religious intolerance. He maintained that his subjects should be allowed to worship God freely in any way they chose. Tolerating the Catholic minority in his kingdom, Frederick also permitted religious sects, expelled
from other countries, to establish homes and to flourish in Prussia. Catholics, as well as Protestants, were admitted to his service. "My aim," he said, "is to show the adherents of the different churches that they are all fellow-citizens."

Legal reforms as well as religious toleration strengthened Prussia. Before Frederick became king a subject found it very difficult to obtain justice in disputes because of the legal system which was cumbersome, contradictory, and in many respects unreasonable. Determined to establish a unified system, Frederick began the formulation of a new code. Although he died before it was completed, it was promulgated by his successor. In a way, this code was a sort of Magna Carta of benevolent despotism. It asserted that the government existed to promote the welfare of the people; it granted personal liberty to a man in so far as he did not harm anyone else; and it even declared that the state must care for the poor and the unemployed. At the same time, it sanctioned the established order—serfdom, the absolute king, and the privileged classes. It also gave the ruler the right to suppress freedom of press and speech. Frederick's code, in short, is a picture of the eighteenth century benevolent despot and, as we shall see later, the twentieth century dictator. It proclaimed the "leader's desire" to reform all things and to help everybody; at the same time it refused to recognize the right of the subject to express opinions in regard to what should be done.

In Russia, as well as in Prussia, certain rulers had already tried to introduce reforms. Peter the Great, a slightly primitive type of enlightened despot, had attempted to Europeanize his country. To this end, he tried not only to draw Russia closer to Europe by obtaining for her a seacoast on the Baltic, but also to introduce into that country Western customs and culture. He reorganized his military forces, provided them with adequate equipment, and started the building of a navy. Although he followed no fixed plan, Peter attempted to create an efficient government. He divided Russia into administrative divisions to facilitate the collection of taxes; he curbed the rights and privileges of the nobles; and he overhauled the official machinery. For the medieval duma, consisting of nobles, he substituted an advisory council, consisting of a few persons, not all of noble birth, chosen by himself, and created the Holy Synod as an advisory council to himself in running the affairs of the Church.

Influenced by mercantilist doctrines, Peter tried to increase the wealth of the country by encouraging industrial and commercial expansion. He also attempted to bring about social reforms. Following his whims, he endeavored to Europeanize the Russians by requiring them to shave off their beards, to dance in the Western style, and to
curtail their long trailing robes. Unfortunately the heavy cost of his wars, the deep-rooted opposition of the Russian people to alien customs, and Peter's personal limitations prevented him from achieving complete success. In fact, he did little more than create a veneer of Westernism which was apparent chiefly among the upper classes.

Catherine II was the second Russian ruler who sponsored an extensive reform movement. During her reign she displayed keen interest in progressive ideas and in the works of the intellectuals. She subscribed to the *Encyclopaedia*; invited its editors, Diderot and d'Alembert, to visit her; and corresponded with Voltaire, to whom she explained her numerous plans for reform. Imbibing something of the skepticism of the philosophers, she confiscated much religious property, and devoted part of the wealth so acquired to endowing schools and hospitals. Moved by the ideas of Montesquieu and Beccaria, the Empress called an assembly in Moscow (1766), which represented every nationality and class in her vast empire. At this meeting she suggested the establishment of an enlightened legal code. This proposal declared that "the nation is not made for the ruler but the ruler for the nation"; it gave the individual the right to do anything that was not forbidden by law; and it condemned intolerance and such cruelties as torture. War with Turkey, however, prompted Catherine to dismiss the assembly and to abandon her reform program. At one time she favored the emancipation of the serfs, but the vested interests of the great landowners were so menaced that she gave up the scheme. Instead, she strengthened the institution of serfdom by making it illegal for the serfs to complain of the harshness of their masters. Despite her genuine sympathy for the poor and the oppressed, practical considerations prevented her from carrying her reforms beyond the blueprint stage.

Joseph II of Austria was more radical than his contemporaries, Frederick II and Catherine the Great. Early in life he came under the influence of the writings of the philosophers. Himself a cynic and a skeptic, and full of contempt for all things that seemed to him irrational, he developed a special interest in the question of Church and state. This problem attracted considerable attention in the eighteenth century. In 1763, a German scholar, under the assumed name of Justinus Febronius, published a book attacking the power of the Pope. Accepting the Gallican idea, set forth in the Declaration of Gallican Liberties (1682), that the Pope "had been granted authority from God only in spiritual matters . . . and not in temporal affairs," Febronius expressed the belief that the Church "had, it is true, made the Pope its head in spiritual matters, but he remained subordinate to a general council."
Influenced by these ideas Joseph determined to bring the Church in the Habsburg domains under his control and to introduce radical religious reforms. Numerous monasteries were abolished and their wealth devoted to charity and education; bishops were appointed without consulting the Pope; marriage was made a civil contract; and toleration was accorded other sects. Pope Pius VI, bitterly condemning these acts, journeyed to Vienna in order to remonstrate with the emperor. But Joseph saw to it that he and the Holy Father did not meet.

Possessing the courage of his convictions, Joseph II also tried to unify administratively his heterogeneous territories. Old political divisions were abolished; local privileges were abrogated; and an attempt was made to place Germans, Magyars, Italians, Poles, Bohemians, and Belgians, and other groups living in the empire, under a uniform system in which Joseph’s own officials enjoyed the control. Few rulers worked more conscientiously for the welfare of their people than he did. Interested in social reform, he emancipated the serfs in Bohemia, Moravia, Galicia, and Hungary, and reduced their services in other parts of his empire. To improve economic conditions, Joseph taxed the nobles and the clergy, introduced a uniform legal system, and stimulated industry by means of a protective tariff. In the field of education Joseph II entertained enlightened but dogmatic views. He planned to bring the universities, intermediate and primary schools, into a single system and to administer them as a department of government. Teachers, thus converted into government officials, were expected to furnish a plentiful supply of civil servants.

Powerful opposition thwarted the bulk of the reforms introduced by this modern ruler. Some important measures were enacted, but Joseph II was unable to bring about the sweeping transformation of society which he contemplated. "The work piles up daily," he wrote his brother Leopold in 1772, "and nothing is done. I labor unceasingly all morning, and until five and six in the afternoon, with fifteen minutes out while I eat a solitary lunch, but there is no result. The petty objections, the intrigues, of which I have been so long the victim, hinder and delay me, and with the delay everything is going to the devil."

In 1790, Joseph II died, a bitterly disappointed man. The privileged classes, the clergy and the nobility, with the aid of the subject nationalities who opposed political centralization, had succeeded in preventing him from establishing an orderly, efficient, and modern state. Conscious of his failure, the unfortunate ruler, shortly before his death, selected as his epitaph: "Here lies Joseph II, who was unfortunate in everything he undertook."
A number of lesser despots attempted to carry out similar reforms. As Grand Duke of Tuscany, Leopold II, successor of Joseph II to the Austrian throne, introduced some modern changes. Influenced by physiocratic ideas, he brought about the construction of roads, the draining of marshes, the introduction of new crops, and the abolition of restrictions on commerce, industry, and agriculture. Tuscany, as a result of these measures, became one of the most prosperous states in Italy. A sincere humanitarian, Leopold was influenced by Beccaria's opposition to cruel and unusual punishment, such as branding, mutilation, breaking on the wheel, and drawing and quartering. By his famous penal code he prohibited the use of torture and abolished the death penalty, save in cases of parricide or lèse-majesté. It was indeed unfortunate that this able man died two years after he became Holy Roman emperor (1792). His son and heir, the phlegmatic Francis II, not only opposed further reforms, but pursued a conservative policy that made Austria the most reactionary of the great powers.

Like other enlightened despots, Charles III, King of Spain (1759-1788), tried to modernize his country. As King of Naples and Sicily (1738-1759) he had attempted to reduce the power of the Church and to better conditions. Influenced by the stories of his benevolence, the Spanish people, when he became king in 1759, anticipated a golden age. But his appearance must have disappointed them. Short, dark, round shouldered, toothless and shabbily dressed, he probably looked more like a broken-down clerk than a king. But Charles soon proved that he was a true champion of progress. A typical despot, who believed in handing reforms down to his people, he ignored the national assembly, or Cortes. At the same time he tried to encourage industry by means of protection, agriculture by the establishment of agricultural colleges, and commerce by the founding of trade schools, by the relaxation of mercantilistic regulations, and by the construction of highways, bridges, and canals. Interested in education, he secularized the schools, and modernized the curriculum in several universities through the introduction of such studies as science and philosophy. He also attempted to crush the temporal power of the Church by limiting and taxing the wealth of that institution, by abolishing the Inquisition, and—following the example set by Portugal and France—by expelling the Jesuits (1767).

Portugal, as well as Spain, enjoyed a brief period of benevolent despotism. Under the direction of a very able statesman, the Marquis of Pombal, who was virtually a dictator from 1755 to 1777, that country was subjected to sweeping reforms. The budget was balanced; the legal system unified; education, improved; the army, reorganized;
and commerce with the Portuguese colonies was stimulated. Opposition, especially on the part of the Jesuits who were financially interested in the colonial trade, was disregarded. Determined to free Portugal from foreign influences and at the same time to create a prosperous nation, Pombal did not hesitate to inflict severe punishment upon the recalcitrants. In 1759, Joseph I, king of Portugal, inspired by Pombal, banished the Jesuit order from all the dominions of the Portuguese crown.

During the eighteenth century benevolent despots flourished in various other parts of Europe. In the tiny German state of Baden, Charles Frederick attained greater success as an enlightened despot than did many of his more illustrious contemporaries. Gustavus III, King of Sweden (1771–1792), was another intelligent ruler who was actuated by reforming zeal. While he was trying to modernize Sweden, a court physician, Struensee, was introducing reforms in the Danish state. As chief councilor of the king and queen, he reorganized the governmental administration, balanced the budget, and modernized the judicial system. State officials and other officeholders, who lost their jobs when he cut governmental expenditures opposed his program. By 1772 they were powerful enough to bring about his imprisonment and death. As a result his reforms, such as religious toleration, free trade, free labor, and legal changes, were not carried out. The institution of a system of hospitals and the establishment of a program of public hygiene probably constitute his outstanding achievements.

Most of these benevolent despots failed in their attempts to hand down reforms to their subjects. Under the sway of the philosophers they had decided that it was politically inexpedient not to oppose social and economic progress. All of them appreciated the advantage to the state of economic enterprises, and adopted policies designed to help the small farmer and the middle classes. But, despite these traces of social idealism, these rulers refused to limit their own personal authority through the granting of political reforms. Moreover, they were unable to obtain the support of the vested interests, the clergy, and the nobility, who were determined to retain their huge estates and their valuable privileges. Actually, the Old Regime, which the enlightened despots sought to preserve in a modified form, could not be co-ordinated with the aims and ideals of the Age of Reason. The old and the new ways of thinking were mutually incompatible.

In one country, Great Britain, the government did relinquish political power to the business and landed classes. The kings of England in the seventeenth century, as we have seen, were forced to accept the transfer of leadership from the executive to the legislative
branch of government. After the so-called Glorious Revolution of 1688, the initiative in foreign as well as in domestic affairs was left, for the most part, to royal ministers. These, with rare exceptions, had the support of Parliament, which represented the wealthy landowning and mercantile classes. When the ministers lost this backing, they usually resigned.

During the reign (1714–1727) of the first Hanoverian king, George I, the cabinet secured an independent position which enabled it to initiate policy and to chart the course of the ship of state. George I had little interest in British problems, and was handicapped by his inability to speak English. Therefore he did not attend the meetings of his ministers, preferring to leave to them the formulation of policy. This freedom from royal predominance in the cabinet, except for a spasmodic interference by George III, remained the rule henceforth.

The development of the party system in England enabled the commercial groups to dominate the cabinet. In the eighteenth century two political parties struggled for the approval of the electorate—the Tories, supported by the aristocratic elements, and the Whigs, who represented some of the landed and most of the mercantile classes. It was through control of the latter party that the commercial interests of England were able to influence British policy in such a way as to insure their country’s economic pre-eminence.

While those who benefited by the commercial-colonial expansion
of England were dominating the policies of their country, the busi-
ess classes of France, lacking political power, were unable to advance
their interests. Louis XVI, their king (1774–1792), was willing to
assume the role of an enlightened despot and to introduce policies
designed to create a strong and prosperous state. But he did not pos-
sess the will-power requisite for a definite stand on important issues.
Consequently, when the state finances in France approached bank-
ruptcy, and a satisfactory solution of this problem demanded a gen-
eral overhauling of the feudal system, the king was incapable of
furnishing the necessary leadership. This failure, as we shall see,
cost the king his head and the feudal aristocracy their privileges.

**Collateral Reading**


Sir W. C. Dampier-Whetham, *A History of Science and its Relations with
Philosophy and Religion* (1932).

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CHAPTER VII

The French Revolution

MODERATE PHASE

IN order to understand the French Revolution it is necessary to examine the conditions and institutions out of which it grew. The government of France toward the end of the eighteenth century was essentially the same as that which had been fashioned by Henry IV, Richelieu, and Louis XIV in the century preceding. Nobles and clergy retained a large part of their feudal privileges. The various parlements (law courts), especially the parlement of Paris, watched jealously over old customary rights. In such provinces as Artois, Brittany, Burgundy, Languedoc, and Flanders, the estates, still possessing some power, continued to assemble. Officially, the executive, administrative, and legislative functions of the government were vested in the hands of the king. He appointed officials and judges, levied taxes, and directed the expenditure of the government money. He was head of the army and navy and had complete control of foreign affairs. Actually, much of his authority was delegated to officials who ruled in his name.

The king, especially if he were a weakling like Louis XVI, was little more than the titular head of a bureaucratic system over which he had little control. Inasmuch as the vast work of governing France could not be handled by one man, the direction of affairs was in the hands of officials chosen by the king from the nobility and the middle classes. They functioned in various councils and elsewhere, and constituted the bureaucracy that governed the realm. Officials, responsible to the central government, controlled local as well as general
matters. Delegates of royal authority, the thirty-two intendants, represented the king in the thirty-four gouvernements, or administrative divisions into which France was divided, and actually governed the kingdom. Justice was administered in a number of courts. A system of ecclesiastical tribunals dealt out Church law; miscellaneous feudal courts handled civil and criminal disputes. For the most part, important legal matters, however, had long before come under the jurisdiction of the royal courts—the highest of which were the parlements.

Governmental income was derived largely from two kinds of taxes—direct and indirect. Direct taxes were those paid as such on particular articles. The chief of these, and the most important revenue producer, was the taille, or property tax levied on non-noble lands and individuals. In view of the exemptions of the clergy and the nobles, this was imposed upon the unprivileged groups. Then there was a poll tax, to which the commoners and some nobles were liable. A tax called vingtième, originally a twentieth but now approximately eleven per cent of the subjects income, was also collected. In addition, there were the indirect taxes, which were paid on commodities and included in the price. The most important of these was the gabelle, or salt tax; but there were a number of others.

Despite the marked increase of taxes during the eighteenth century the amount remained within the capacity of the French people to bear. In fact, much more was paid during the generation that followed 1789. But the exemption of the wealthy groups forced the government to increase the taxes of those who had less ability to pay. As a result, these people, especially the unprivileged middle classes, found the cost of government burdensome and hateful. At the same time, the government, as a result of wasteful policies and irresponsibility, could not obtain enough revenue and was threatened with bankruptcy. Constantly pressed for money, it resorted to such desperate expedients as lessening the value of coins, and borrowing at ruinous rates. In 1788 revenues were being anticipated even into the second year.

There were men in France capable of solving the financial problem. Turgot, Louis XVI's financial minister from 1774 to 1776, had planned to do so by effecting economies, by taxing the privileged groups, and by sponsoring an individualism in business calculated to restore prosperity and to increase the revenues. But the privileged elements, whose interests were jeopardized, opposed his program. Through the queen, Marie Antoinette, certain nobles persuaded Louis to discharge Turgot. Following his dismissal, another minister, Necker, tried, during the years 1776–1781 to balance the budget by
a policy of economy; when he published a report, however, which revealed the deplorable state of governmental finance and the extravagance of the court, he too was dismissed. His successor, Calonne, at first attempted to revive prosperity by a lavish spending of government money. His methods simply destroyed what little credit the monarchy still retained. In 1787, the Assembly of the Notables, composed of distinguished nobles and ecclesiastics, was called for the purpose of dealing with the fiscal problem, but it failed of positive achievement. This inability to solve the financial matter had convinced many people that reform in France could not come from above—that it must come from below.

Unfortunately, at this critical time the monarchy lacked leadership. Louis XVI was an honest, amiable, well-intentioned man, but he suffered from an inferiority complex that paralyzed his will power. His consort, Marie Antoinette, daughter of Maria Theresa, was an obstinate, pleasure-seeking spendthrift, who helped to waste the financial resources of France. Frenchmen disliked her because she was a foreigner. Neither one of them was calculated to inspire great confidence among those who felt that reform was imperative. Inefficient administration also weakened the government in France. Most of the officials, who were not chosen on the basis of ability, were hostile or indifferent to reforms. Governmental inefficiency, the result of privilege, maladministration, and overlapping of the powers of miscellaneous officials, made absolutism doubly irritating. Despite its weaknesses the government might have maintained control by the use of the army. But the king’s military forces could not be relied upon to put down even local riots. Like the civilian population, the soldiers were infected by subversive propaganda, freemasonry, and reform sentiment. The Swiss mercenaries were actually the most reliable troops in the king’s army.

The spread of discontent among the French people, especially the bourgeoisie, greatly weakened the government. By 1784, elements of all classes were influenced by Montesquieu’s exaltation of the British limited monarchy, by Voltaire’s bitter attacks upon the Church, and by the intellectuals’ worship of reason and natural law. An increasing number of middle-class men, accepting the laissez-faire doctrine, favored the abolition of all restrictions on commerce, industry, and agriculture. They also embraced Rousseau’s conception of society as based on a social contract between ruler and ruled. His contention that man possessed natural rights, such as freedom, equality, property, and the pursuit of happiness reconciled many to the necessity of immediate change.

Despite inefficient government, economic conditions prior to 1789
were on the upgrade. French peasants were much better off than were their brothers in Central Europe; foreign trade had doubled between 1750 and 1789; old guild and handicraft organizations were disintegrating (their numerous regulations receiving little consideration from a growing number of independent merchants and artisans); and improvements in industry and in agriculture promised prosperity for the country as a whole. These favorable signs, however, merely threw into bolder relief the political incompetency and the social decadence of the Old Regime.

It was the financial problem that finally opened the way for revolution. Facing a real crisis in 1787, Louis XVI decided to oppose the forces of privilege for a moment by favoring the enactment of a land tax on all classes without distinction. The Parlement of Paris, determined to embarrass the king, refused to register the royal edict, declaring that “the nation alone in an Estates General assembled can consent to a perpetual impost.” Thereupon, the king, displaying unusual resolution, ordered parlement into exile. But other judicial bodies also denounced the tax as illegal and insisted upon the re-establishment of the Parisian court. The latter, recalled by the government, continued to demand that the Estates General be summoned. Thus the king had permitted the Parlement of Paris to assume the role of champion of the masses in a struggle with arrogant despotism. Unwilling to put through tax reforms, but at the same time hopeful of staving off a financial crisis by getting new loans to meet current expenses, the king finally consented to the calling of the Estates General within five years. This concession did not satisfy parlement. It demanded an immediate convocation and was supported in its contention by the provincial parlements. With the treasury practically empty, Louis XVI, on July 5, 1788, issued a summons for an Estates General.

The Estates General was an assemblage, consisting of delegates selected by the three orders of the realm—the clergy, the nobility, and the commoners. It was called only in grave emergencies and had not met since 1614. In fact, no one, not even the government, knew precisely what its authority, organization, functions, or procedure were to be. Elections were held in every section of the country, and electors for each order selected the delegates, who represented, therefore, a specific class. The nobles and clergy were each allowed three hundred representatives, and the Third Estate, six hundred. Each group was to sit as a separate body; if they voted by order, the privileged classes would have a two-to-one advantage, but if they voted by head, the commoners, able to count on the support of the lower clergy and the liberal nobles, would have control of the political
balance. Memoranda called *cahiers*, generally prepared by the electors, were brought to Versailles by the delegates. These contained lists of grievances and of suggested reforms, of which the most universal were the curtailments of privilege, tax relief, and constitutional government.

A great majority of the delegates representing the Third Estate, of whom over half were lawyers, favored extensive reforms. They planned to draw up a constitution wherein the rights of all would be defined and maintained by law, and to establish an assembly which would meet in national emergencies and would oppose all violations of the proposed charter of liberties. They did not intend to overturn the monarchy or to deprive the nobility and the clergy of all their privileges; they only wanted to insure political, legal, and financial equality among all property owners. In short, these members of the Third Estate were determined to convert the Estates General into a national assembly, and to carry out such physiocratic reforms as the abolition of fiscal privileges and economic restrictions. By these changes they hoped to increase prosperity, swell revenues, and balance the national budget.

The assembling of the Estates General afforded Louis XVI an opportunity of leading it on the path of reform. But the ever-vacillating king, lacking a definite plan, and at the mercy of the influences surrounding him, was unable to fulfill this role. Actually, he found it impossible to lead or to intimidate the Third Estate. Instead, the mantle of authority, slipping from the royal shoulders, was seized by the Third Estate, which thereby assumed the initiative in the task of regenerating France.

Prior to the meeting of the Estates General on May 5, 1789, the monarchy seemed disposed to grant such significant reforms as a constitutional government and a responsible ministry. Louis XVI had paved the way for these changes when, before the assembly met, he doubled the membership of the Third Estate. But it was soon apparent that this concession would not count for much unless the three groups—the clergy, the nobility, and the Third Estate—could meet together rather than in separate bodies. Only then would the Third Estate enjoy the full advantage of their double representation. But the government soon proved to that body that Louis intended to consider in the Estates General the matter of finances only. Ignoring the bourgeois program for political and legal reforms, and the demands of the Third Estate that the various estates be consolidated into one assembly, the king refused to adopt a policy of bourgeois reform and defended the cause of feudal privilege.

Despite the opposition of the king and the aristocracy, the Third

Estate tried earnestly, during the first few months that the Estates General was in session, to win over the privileged orders to the plan of a single house in which each delegate should have one vote. Finally, the Third Estate announced early in June that it would constitute itself a national assembly, and the other orders were invited to unite with it for that purpose. Thereupon a great number of the lower clergy and many liberal nobles came over, because their sympathies lay with the commoners rather than with the privileged orders.

On June 17 the Third Estate boldly proclaimed itself the National Assembly of France. Then, fearing dissolution by the king, it decreed that the people should pay no taxes from the day they were prorogued. Three days later, excluded from their meeting place by the king, who thus planned to curb their reforming zeal, they adjourned to a nearby tennis court. There they took the famous oath whereby they agreed never to separate until they had given France a constitution. Such spirit dissipated the half-hearted opposition of the king. Unwilling to assume the responsibility for a violent upheaval, he and the privileged classes, on June 27, finally gave way; henceforth the Estates General sat as one house, the National Assembly. By thus transforming the Third Estate into the National Assembly, the members of that group had seized the initiative and paved the way for their virtual capture of the government.

The struggle over representation in the National Assembly was really the first stage in the Revolution. After the union of the three estates, dissatisfaction developed inside and outside this body. There was lodged in all groups of delegates a feeling of bitterness, tempered, however, by a widespread conviction that a golden age of reform was at hand. Inspired by the court, the king, planning to suppress the Assembly, ordered the concentration of foreign mercenaries near Versailles and Paris. On July 11, Necker, and other colleagues favorable to reform, were suddenly dismissed. Meanwhile unrest had developed in the city and country districts of France. Aroused by the lurid tales about the king and the nobility, peasants attacked and destroyed buildings, manorial records, and other evidences of feudal authority. Stimulated by a street orator, Camille Desmoulins, a group of Paris rioters on July 14 seized an old fortress, the Bastille, rarely used as a prison. Its capture was hailed by the Assembly, by reformers, and by the masses, as an event of tremendous importance; it was interpreted as a blow for freedom against despotism, and as the symbol of the dawn of a new era.

During the next few months a great wave of unrest swept the country. It soon manifested itself in outbreaks of spontaneous revolt, in
organized uprisings and also in a marked increase of opposition to authority—seigneurial, ecclesiastical, judicial, municipal, and royal. In various parts of France, bishops, nobles, local officials, judges, intendants, tax collectors, and even businessmen and peasants who did not approve of the Revolution, were attacked and ill-treated. Manors, government buildings, granaries, religious houses, and crops were destroyed; nobles fled from these regions and even from France; officials went into hiding; courts of justice ceased to sit; and taxes could not be collected. Panic stricken as a result of these riots, which brought about not only the abolition of orderly government but also the destruction of private property, the middle classes and other groups of owners took immediate action. In Paris, as in the various
towns and villages of the rest of France, popularly controlled governments (called communes) and National Guards (civil militia) were established to protect and preserve law and order. They were of local origin; i.e., they were not organized and supported by the crown. It would seem that they were created primarily to stop the destruction of bourgeois property by the mob; at the same time, they were prepared to defend the Revolution against the king.

These disorders attracted the attention of the representatives in the National Assembly as well as of the middle classes in cities and towns. On the night of August 4, irresponsible, excitable, and frightened delegates forced the Assembly to declare for the abolition of feudal dues in principle. Decree after decree was passed, amounting to thirty in all, abolishing serfdom, feudal payments, church tithes, internal tariffs, guilds, and certain clerical, aristocratic, and municipal privileges until, when adjournment came at eight o'clock in the morning, the injustices of the old order had been theoretically overthrown and a new society, wherein men were equal before the law, had been inaugurated. In reality the bourgeois Assembly did not abolish the Old Regime completely. The aristocrats still retained their social privileges and were to be compensated for the loss of personal services. Many conservative businessmen and enlightened noblemen, through a bourgeois-aristocratic alliance, planned to bring about the establishment of a limited constitutional monarchy, resembling that of England.

In August of 1789 the representatives of the Third Estate pushed through the National Assembly the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. In this document it was proclaimed that "men are born free and with equal rights... The end of all political associations is the conservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression. The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation."

While the Assembly was engaged in the creation of a new political and administrative order, riots continued to break out in various parts of the nation. In October, the unrest in Paris resulted in the famous march of the Parisian mob (consisting, for the most part, of men wearing women's clothes) to Versailles. The timely arrival of Lafayette and the National Guard at the capital averted an attack upon the palace, but the next day, the royal family and the National Assembly were forced to return with the mob to Paris. Henceforth both king and legislature remained in that city under the control of Revolutionary elements. Despite this interruption, the National Assembly managed to formulate the Constitution of 1791 (dated from
the year of its official promulgation). The men largely responsible for this document were the bourgeois exponents of a decentralized government, such as Lafayette. Opposing the attempts of Mirabeau and other advocates of a strong central authority, they succeeded in drawing up a constitution which created a weak monarchy, controlled by property owners. In the new government the king was to be little more than a figurehead, and real authority was vested in a single legislative body elected by those who paid taxes. Thus the petty bourgeoisie, the peasants, and the urban workers were excluded from a voice in the government which was placed under the control of the wealthy middle classes. Property franchise and the system of indirect elections insured bourgeois control of the legislative body.

Local as well as central government was radically changed by the Constitution of 1791. The old provinces, the intendants, and the parlements were abolished, being replaced by eighty-three departments, each of which was subdivided into districts, cantons, and communes, each with elected governing bodies. Local authorities everywhere were dominated by the Revolutionary communes which had sprung up in all parts of France. Each commune under bourgeois control was a little republic in itself. It selected its officers, controlled its own militia, collected taxes, and exercised the other powers of a modern city government. Also, courts and judges, elected by the people, replaced the parlements and brought the judiciary under popular control. In short, the local, as well as the central government, was placed largely in the hands of the bourgeoisie.

While formulating a constitution the National Assembly also tried to solve the financial problem. With the removal of fiscal immunities it was felt that the national budget would be balanced. Liquidation of the national debt, however, was a difficult problem, for it required the obtaining of a tremendous amount of money on short notice. Unsuccessful in its attempts to raise sufficient money by taxing the hitherto privileged classes and by imposing new levies, the National Assembly determined to confiscate the property of the church. In a series of decrees in 1789–1790, the government took steps which provided that all ecclesiastical property should be transferred to the nation. Inasmuch as the sale of these extensive holdings might cause a disastrous depreciation of the market, the government decided to issue assignats, which were a form of mortgage bond based on the value of the property. At first these assignats carried interest, but later this interest was abolished. As bullion was nearly driven out of circulation, the assignats circulated throughout the country like national paper currency. Unable to resist the temptation to inflation, the government proceeded to pay its bills during the next seven years
by successive issues of assignats. With each issue the security behind the assignats, namely, the church property, became relatively less. Therefore, the value of the currency deteriorated. Consequently, an inflationary boom resulted which completely dislocated the economic life of the nation.

Confiscation of religious property by the state produced another problem. Having deprived the Church of its wealth, the government was forced to provide for the support of the clergy and the expenses of worship. The National Assembly was willing to take over this financial burden if the Church was brought under the control of the state. Therefore, it issued, in the summer of 1790, the Civil Constitution of the Clergy which made the Catholic Church in France virtually a department of the state. It required that the clergy, bishops, and priests be elected by their diocese and parishes, abolished the old ecclesiastical divisions, and stated that henceforth the clergy were to be paid by the government. This Civil Constitution served to fan still further the flames of unrest in France. The Pope, suspicious of the ideas expressed in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and resentful of the seizure of ecclesiastical property in France, refused to sanction the constitution and prohibited the clergy from taking the required oath of allegiance. Thereupon many ecclesiastics failed to take the oath; thousands of peasants, loyal to the church, became hostile to the Revolutionary government; the king, and many noblemen, too, opposed this act. In short, this religious policy alienated a large part of the nation from the National Assembly and from the Revolution.

During the year 1791 internal and external difficulties facing the Revolutionary government increased rapidly. In certain parts of France the people openly advocated the establishment of a confederation of small autonomous states. With the rapid rise of prices and the marked slowing down of industry and commerce, wage earners in the cities, especially Paris, became discontented; unrest, affecting the army, resulted in mutinies; and the privileged classes in foreign nations, resenting the attacks upon the nobility and the treatment of the French king, became increasingly hostile toward the Revolutionary government.

Encouraged by this foreign interest in French affairs, Louis XVI decided, in 1791, to leave France. Then, with the help of foreign rulers and the émigrés (nobles who had fled abroad), he planned to return to France and overthrow the Revolutionary regime. Recognized and arrested in the little village of Varennes, however, the king and his family were brought back to Paris. The Assembly, rather than run the risk of a reactionary or radical uprising, announced that the king had been kidnapped and forced to flee against his will. It
ignored the charges, brought by extremists, that he was guilty of treason. A group of men, members of a club in Paris known as the Cordeliers, nevertheless refused to accept this explanation. Maintaining that the king was a traitor, they advocated his dethronement and the establishment of a republic.

Amidst this general unrest, the National Assembly, before finishing deliberations, passed laws designed to prevent the "disruptive influence" of organized economic groups. In June of 1791, it abolished the guilds in the name of bourgeois liberty; and then, as an exponent of free enterprise, it passed the Le chapelier law of June 14, forbidding combinations of employees and employers and declaring strikes illegal. This law revealed the capitalistic influence in the Assembly and created a self-conscious workers' group hostile to the bourgeoisie as well as to the monarchists. In September of 1791 the Assembly finally declared a general amnesty, passed a self-denying ordinance which stated that its members should not be eligible to a seat in the new Legislative Assembly, and dissolved itself in favor of the new government. On September 14, 1791, the king halfheartedly took the oath to the constitution, and the work of bourgeois statesmanship, the limited monarchy, was born.

Unfortunately the founders of the new order had made some serious mistakes. In passing the self-denying ordinance, they insured the election to the new Legislative Assembly of men who had little experience in the art of governing. In establishing a unicameral legislature, and in separating the legislative and executive powers of government—giving the preponderance of authority to the assembly—the framers of the constitution created a system wherein growing antagonism between the Legislative Assembly and the crown was inevitable. Moreover, in decentralizing the administration, the National Assembly jeopardized the enforcement of the decrees of the central government. Mirabeau, the leading opponent of this decentralized monarchy, saw what was coming, for shortly before his death on April 2, 1791, he said: "I carry with me the ruin of the monarchy. After my death factions will dispute about its fragments."

**RADICAL PHASE**

With the dissolution of the National Assembly, the French Revolution entered upon a new phase and into the control of a different group of men. The upper bourgeoisie, largely responsible for the creation of a new order within the framework of the monarchy, soon found themselves maneuvered into the position of conservatives. Opposed to their rule was a petty-bourgeois, proletarian alliance, supported by the Paris mob, which were determined to scrap
the rule of the wealthy bourgeoisie who had merely substituted themselves as the privileged group in place of the old aristocracy. The Revolution had moved to the Left, and those, like the propertied classes who refused to do likewise, now appeared to be reactionary backsliders. This opposition to the bourgeois monarchy was to a large extent the result of economic distress. The National Assembly had ignored the welfare of the masses. Bent upon establishing bourgeois political supremacy and finding a solution of the financial question, it had not concerned itself with such problems as the high cost of living (accentuated later on by inflation), unemployment, and the distribution of land among the peasants. Instead, it had permitted the rich bourgeoisie in the towns and cities of France, through their control of the communes and the national guards, to preserve their political and economic hegemony.

By 1791, the masses, especially in Paris, were becoming increasingly restless and self-assertive. Workers, without jobs, and peasants who had flocked to the capital for food and employment, the petty bourgeoisie (small artisans, merchants, and some professional men, especially lawyers) who were victims of economic instability due partly to the Revolution, and, finally, the riffraff of any city, all became more and more hostile toward the bourgeois regime and welcomed an opportunity to destroy this system of privilege. Revolutionary clubs, stimulated by popular unrest, were also responsible for the decline of the limited monarchy. Most famous of these was the Jacobin Society. Originally an informal group of Breton deputies at the Estates General in Versailles, it had, in October, 1789, moved to Paris with the National Assembly, where it established itself in a Jacobin monastery and came to be called the Jacobin Club. Prior to the inauguration of the Legislative Assembly in 1791, the society began to increase its membership. By September of that year over 406 affiliated groups were organized in the provinces of France. This efficient centralized society with its hundreds of daughter chapters, its headquarters at Paris, its own press, its propagandists, and its itinerant agents, soon became the most powerful organization in France. Before its overthrow in 1794 it was the actual ruling force of the nation.

During the period of the National Assembly the Jacobin Club became an important agency for the molding of public opinion. At that time it favored the drawing up of the Constitution of 1791 which set up the limited monarchy. After this government was created the majority of Jacobins, together with other kindred groups, took on a radical hue. Comprising petty bourgeoisie for the most part, the Jacobins remained bourgeois in their outlook in that they never
ceased to support the principle of private property. On the other hand, they tended to become proletarian, especially in their political program, advocating the overthrow of a monarchy dominated by the propertied classes. Their proletarianism, however, was partly a means to an end. Determined to rule France, they later favored the distribution of food to the hungry and the creation of work for the unemployed. These aims were in part inspired by a desire to win the support of the Paris Commune, whose strength lay in the mob.

Other important clubs also came into existence. Opposed to the republicans, who by 1791 had gained control of the Jacobin Societies, defenders of the Constitution and of the king organized the Feuillant Club (July, 1791). This organization, however, was so bitterly attacked by the enemies of the government that it was dissolved in 1792. A moderate republican club, as well as the Feuillant organization, incurred the opposition of the "radical" Jacobins. In 1791 a group of young lawyers of the Legislative Assembly, who came originally from the province of Gironde, organized informally. They proposed the establishment of an aristocratic, decentralized government, in which each commune should be autonomous of the central authority. Most radical of the Revolutionary organizations was the famous Cordelier Club. Unlike the Jacobin Society it was limited to Paris; it exerted influence especially with the working classes. This organization was led by a lawyer, named Georges Jacques Danton (1759–1794), an able, astute, and ruthless opportunist. Under his direction it became a hotbed of radicalism and sought to impose its will upon moderate elements and upon the representatives of the nation.

A counter-Revolutionary movement, i.e., one which aimed to undo the work of the Revolutionists (largely inspired by hostility to the religious policy of the government, by social dissatisfaction, and by the economic depression), contributed to the overthrow of the monarchy. Plots of the émigrés to bring about foreign intervention in the Revolution and to stir up royalists and religious revolts in France, and the attempted flight of the royal family—all tended to increase the opposition to the king, who was generally accused of being disloyal to the Revolution.

France's declaration of war on Austria in April, 1792, followed a little later by hostilities against Prussia, actually precipitated the crisis which brought about the dethronement of Louis XVI. It inflamed the people, gave a nationalistic impetus to the Revolution, exposed treason and apathy, and carried the radicals to power. "We have need of great treasons," said Brissot, a Girondin, "for there is still poison in the heart of France which needs a powerful explosion
to expel it." Nearly all sections of public opinion in France favored a war. The king and the courtiers believed that it would revive the loyalty of the country to the king and place military power in their hands; wealthy bourgeoisie thought it would remove the rowdy elements and restore law and order; and the petty middle classes were of the opinion that it would lead to the overthrow of the monarchy. Only a small group of Jacobins, including the famous Revolutionary leaders, Maximilien Robespierre (1758–1794) and Jean Paul Marat (1744–1793), opposed the declaration of war, claiming that it would harm the lower classes and destroy the Revolution.

Austrian opposition to the French Revolution helped to bring about the conflict. During the early phase of the Revolution this ancient foe—Fatherland of the "treacherous" Marie Antoinette—had defended the rights of the German princes in Alsace, which had been disregarded by the French when they tried to abolish feudalism in that region. The Holy Roman emperor, Leopold II, had not only afforded protection to the émigrés who were plotting the ruin of the Revolution but also had displayed sympathy for the plight of his sister and brother-in-law in France. In addition, he and the King of Prussia had warned the French in the famous Declaration of Pillnitz (August 27, 1791) to restore Louis XVI to his former position. This declaration, however, was merely a threat. Although opposed to the Revolution, Leopold, in view of the Polish and eastern situation, mentioned above, had no desire to entangle Austria in a foreign war by leading a crusade against the Revolution.

The declaration offered the Revolutionaries, especially the Girondins who wanted to give liberty to the world outside and also to expose the treachery of the king, an opportunity to bring about the struggle. During the winter of 1791–1792 they had influenced the Legislative Assembly to pass laws directed against the nonjuring priests and the émigrés. On March 1, 1792, Leopold's death resulted in the accession of the more bellicose Francis II as emperor (1792–1835). Meanwhile, adopting every means to create war fever, the Girondins finally were able to overthrow the moderate (Feuillant) ministry of the king, and to place their own leaders, Roland, Dumouriez, and others, in office. On April 20, 1792, they persuaded the Assembly, by an overwhelming majority, to declare war against Austria. Prussia, hostile to the Revolution and allied with Austria, declared war on France a little later.

The conflict soon expanded into a European struggle which lasted more than twenty years. On the one side there were the Austro-Prussian armies, under the command of the Duke of Brunswick, who

1 See pp. 79–84.
threatened the people of France with dire punishment, in his manifesto, if they did not restore the old order of things; beside him were the French émigrés, of whom more than twenty thousand were assembled in the Rhineland alone—an angry class, who set all their hopes on the victory of the German armies. On the other side, there were the Revolutionary armies, and beside them were many German liberals, who, hating despotism and inspired by Girondist idealism, preferred a French victory. Aware of this following, the government admitted many Germans to French citizenship, as a counter thrust to the Duke's manifesto.

During the first five months of the war, the Revolutionary armies made very little progress. Invading the Austrian Netherlands they were soon defeated and had to retreat. Demoralized, many Revolutionary soldiers fled, after having taken the precaution of murdering their officers. Meanwhile the Austrian and Prussian armies invaded France, announcing that all who dared to defend themselves would be treated as rebels. Capturing Longwy and Verdun, with the aid of French royalists in these towns, they, by September, 1792, were a fortnight’s ride from Paris.

Threatened by enemies within and without, certain Revolutionary leaders had already decided to get rid of the king. The Jacobins, denouncing the Girondins for their inefficient leadership, organized a popular demonstration against the monarch, the object of which was to force him to sign certain decrees. On June 20, workers and many petty bourgeoisie, bearing with them Revolutionary petitions, visited the Legislative Assembly and then called upon the king. After they had forced the panicky ruler to put on a red cap of liberty and to drink with them, the mob dispersed. Conservative middle-class men, as well as aristocrats, condemned this whole affair and urged that the leaders of the mob be punished. Lafayette now offered to use the National Guard to protect the monarchy; but the king and queen, distrusting him, refused his protection.

On August 10, 1792, an insurrection brought about the fall of the limited monarchy. This uprising was the work of the Revolutionary Commune of Paris, a Jacobin-controlled government that had been organized after the overthrow of its less radical predecessor. The plans for this attack on the Tuileries had been very carefully made. At the sound of a bell the mob marched toward the palace, where the royal family was residing. Meanwhile, the king and his family took refuge with the Assembly, leaving the palace to be sacked, and their defenders, the Swiss Guard, to be massacred by the mob. The Assembly thereupon suspended the king from his office, handed the royal family over to the Revolutionary Commune of Paris, appointed
an executive committee to carry on the government, dissolved itself, and arranged for the election of a constitutional convention to reorganize the government. On September 20th the Convention met and quickly voted for a republic. Throughout Paris the people cried: "The monarchy is dead, long live the republic."

After the dethronement of the king, the Revolutionary Commune of Paris, representative of the lower classes and of Jacobinism, became a powerful factor in the government of France. It, and not the Legislative Assembly, was the real ruler of the country in the interim between the coup d'état of August 10 and the meeting of the Convention on September 20. Even under the Convention it continued to be an important factor, until the overthrow of Robespierre in July, 1794, initiated a swing away from the Left and toward the Right.

The man of the hour was Danton, the shrewd leader of the Cordelier Club. One of the chief organizers of the insurrection of August 10, he was for the next year and a half the incarnation of French patriotism in its struggle against invaders and the counter-Revolutionists. Prior to the assembling of the Convention, he, as Minister of Justice, permitted a "treason" hunt of aristocrats, monarchists, and other disloyal persons. Professed exponent of violence, he condoned the famous September Massacres, a purge, organized by the Jacobins, in which the inmates of the prisons, irrespective of the reasons for their incarceration, were murdered. Elected to the Convention, Danton resigned the Ministry of Justice and played thenceforth an important role in the debates of that body. His patriotic appeals to the masses, and his incessant praise of Paris as the natural center of a free France, helped to establish his great popularity.

French military success undoubtedly stimulated patriotism. On September 20, 1792, the Prussian troops were checked at the battle of Valmy, and the invaders were forced to withdraw from France. The Revolutionary armies then assumed the offensive and helped to "liberate" the oppressed peoples of neighboring states. Savoy, Nice, the Rhine towns—Spires, Worms, Mainz, and Frankfurt—were occupied; and the Austrians were virtually expelled from the Austrian Netherlands which was placed under the authority and protection of the Convention. Inspired by these victories, the French Revolutionaries now prepared to aid all peoples who wished to replace despotic rulers by governments which would grant to their citizens liberty, fraternity, and equality. At the same time, these crusaders, as practical and patriotic Frenchmen, determined to extend the frontier of France to the "natural boundaries" by the annexation of all territory between France and the Rhine River. While engaged in this imperialistic venture, the republican government, afraid of a monarchi-
cal restoration, and desirous of defying conservatives both at home and abroad, guillotined Louis XVI on January 21, 1793.

All of the great powers, including England, now realized that Revolutionary France threatened not only the political and social order in Europe, but also the Balance of Power. In the Germanies, many rulers prepared to fight the Revolutionary ideas. Political writing and Revolutionary literature, as well as freemasonry (also suspect), were interdicted, and in Treves, the Elector demanded the restoration of the Jesuits as a counterweight against the Revolutionary tendencies. Great Britain and the Dutch Netherlands had a practical reason for engaging in a war with their neighbor. Interested in maintaining the suppression of Belgian trade by keeping the Scheldt river closed, they resented very much its opening by the French in 1792. They realized that this change constituted a serious threat to their commerce. Consequently, these countries joined hands with other enemies of the Revolution and of French imperialism. In 1793, a great coalition was formed, comprising Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Holland, Sardinia, Spain, Portugal, the Papacy, and a number of Italian states. Thus France found herself at war with the major part of Europe.

Despite Revolutionary enthusiasm France at first was unable to achieve military success. Led by General Dumouriez, a French army tried to invade Holland but was checked by the enemy. Later, after being defeated by the Austrians at Neerwinden, Dumouriez betrayed the republic and agreed to help the enemy restore the French monarchy. Meanwhile the Austrians recovered the Netherlands; the English took Toulon and besieged Dunkirk; the Spaniards crossed the Pyrenees Mountains; and the Prussians and Austrians drove the French out of the Rhineland region. By the fall of 1793, France, torn by civil wars, faced an invasion by foreign armies. Two developments, however, saved the republic at this time: First, the delay of her enemies who refused to advance because of jealousies and rivalries (especially over Poland), and because of the belief that France would destroy herself by her own excesses if left alone; and second; the establishment by the Jacobins of an efficient organization.

Backed by the masses, the Jacobins determined to overthrow the Girondins and to obtain complete control of the government. Largely responsible for the declaration of the war, the Girondins had proved themselves incapable of carrying it to a successful conclusion. They were idealists rather than men of action. Advocates of political decentralization and economic individualism, they tried to conduct the war with an army which selected its officers and removed them when it so desired.
It was soon apparent to Danton, Robespierre, and other Jacobin leaders, that the military defeats, mutinies, and internal opposition to the government were largely the result of Girondist weakness. France and her Revolution, these men of action believed, could only be saved by the re-establishment of discipline and authority in the form of a dictatorship. They were not parliamentarians but dictators, emphasizing the importance of the state, the desirability of imperialist expansion, and the necessity of helping the lower classes by the complete abolition of feudalism and the introduction of bourgeois social reforms. The Jacobins, favoring state control over the economic, political, and social activities of its citizens, supported the subordination of all political divisions to Paris. "Paris has made the Revolution, and when it shall perish there will no longer be a Revolution," said Danton. "Let Paris be reduced to her 83rd share of influence," was the retort of a Girondin.

During the winter of 1792 and the spring of 1793 the quarrel between the Jacobins and the Girondins became more acute. Each group accused the other of dictatorial ambitions. Meanwhile the political power of the Girondins was being steadily undermined. Girondist loyalty to the Revolution was greatly weakened by military disasters, by the desertion of General Dumouriez, and by their lukewarm support of the death sentence imposed upon Louis XVI. Marat, Danton, and Robespierre all opposed a Girondin constitution prepared by the Convention which provided for a decentralized republic. Instead, they demanded the creation of a powerful government capable of defeating the enemy and of consolidating the Revolution.

By April, 1793 a strong government had evolved. New organizations had been created with plenary powers, such as the Committee of General Security, responsible for the internal police and the preservation of order, the Revolutionary Tribunal, a criminal court charged with the duty of wiping out treason, and the Committee of Public Safety, an emergency executive. The latter group, which originally consisted of twenty-five members but was later reduced in numbers, became the chief governing body of Revolutionary France. Given vast executive powers by the Convention, it proceeded to maintain law and order in France, to continue the Revolution, and to push the war against the enemy states. Under orders from this committee were the famous "deputies on mission," committees of two members of the Convention chosen to go to every department and to every army in the field. They were empowered to enforce loyalty, as they interpreted it, wherever they went, and had the authority to depose and punish local, civil and military officials. Fur-
ther, by the Law of Suspects, Revolutionary committees were able to arrest and to send anyone accused of treason before the Revolutionary Tribunal. In short, the Jacobins, by 1793, through these octopus-like arrangements, had established the machinery of the Reign of Terror.

This dictatorship was created in order to end civil war, to defeat the foreign invaders, and to preserve the political and social changes brought about by the Revolution. It was an emergency regime, arising out of a desperation which forced the government to make the people put their liberties in storage and forget the principles of the Revolution in order that they might triumph in the end.

Prior to the establishment of this strong government, the Jacobins in the Convention attempted to check internal unrest by legislation designed to help the peasants, the workers, and the bourgeoisie. In 1793 the confiscated property of émigrés was divided into small holdings and offered for sale (most of it, however, was purchased by speculators); the plan to compensate noblemen for the loss of feudal rights was abandoned; a maximum price was placed on certain foodstuffs in order to combat the high cost of living (this policy was abandoned later on because it was so harmful to the peasants); a minimum wage law was enacted for a time; and the tax burden of all but the plutocrats was reduced.

Meanwhile, the Jacobins, by means of the Terror, proceeded to eliminate their internal foes. Having ousted the Girondins from power—virtually all of them had been guillotined or forced into exile—Danton and his Jacobin colleagues took over the task of suppressing internal revolts and of defeating the foreign enemies. In 1793 there was an uprising of the Catholic peasants in the Vendée. This civil war, largely an outgrowth of provincialism and royalist sentiment, rose out of the opposition to the military levy decree of February. About the same time there was a revolt of the cities in the south and west, where Girondist sympathies were still strong, against the rule of Paris. By December, 1793, the Paris government had pressed the civil war with great brutality, but the Vendean revolt remained a problem for many years.

During the same year the Jacobin leadership changed the fortunes of war. Under the direction of superb military organizers, Carnot and Prieur, fourteen Revolutionary armies were raised on a conscript basis, were equipped with munitions and new weapons, and were placed under the command of trained officers. Carrying out well-planned campaigns, these forces defeated the enemy and assumed the offensive. By July, 1794, the Austrian Netherlands was again in French hands; by the following January Holland was conquered; and
in the spring of 1795 the French troops were advancing on the Spanish and Italian frontiers. As a result of these defeats the first coalition broke up. Prussia, afraid of being left out of the third Partition of Poland, accepted terms of peace at Basle (April, 1795). Spain did likewise and became an ally of France. A republic was established in the Dutch Netherlands, under French auspices, which also made peace with France. Determined to defeat France and to curb thereby the Revolution, Austria, Great Britain, and Sardinia continued the struggle.

While the strong government was restoring law and order and was carrying out a successful war, it also was endeavoring to regenerate France. The task was not an easy one. On the one hand, certain moderate leaders, such as Danton, urged that the Revolution, in view of the defeat of the foreign enemies and of the reorganization of France, had gone far enough. On the other hand, a group of extremists, petty bourgeois and proletarian followers of Hébert for the most part, believed that the Revolution should go on. They claimed that the government should confiscate all wealth and distribute it among the poor so as to bind that portion of the population to the Revolution. Opposed to these moderates and radicals was a third faction. Led by Robespierre, this group was determined to continue the war and to establish a bourgeois republic which would intervene directly in the interests of the lower classes.

By April, 1794, Robespierre had succeeded in removing his two great rivals, Danton and Hébert (via the guillotine), and had obtained control of the Revolutionary government. Backed by his brother, Couthon, Saint-Just, and other satellites, he, as virtual dictator of the Committee of Public Safety, tried to create his version of a perfect state. He forced the Convention to pass the famous Ventôse decrees which sequestered all property of the émigrés with a view to permitting these lands to be distributed among the families of soldiers. But this was a war measure. It merely proposed to give some means of support to a definite class for the duration of the struggle. Robespierre, a firm advocate of law, order, and private property, constantly opposed attempts of the radicals to pass laws designed to confiscate and to redistribute wealth.

Robespierre was a leftist dictator, but not an extremist. By 1794 he was an imperialist, favoring the continuation of war in order to strengthen the Revolutionary cause by the acquisition for France of foreign territories. He desired to see the establishment of a mercantilist republic, wherein, due to an equable diffusion of prosperity, there would be extremes neither of wealth nor of poverty. Moved by the unrest which usually exists in an era of inflation, high prices,
unemployment, business depression, and war, he tried to restore a system of state regulation. Freedom of trade and industry was abolished; and commerce, industry, and the sale and distribution of goods were put under the direct control of the state, which inspected, appropriated, and regulated all the essential activities. In addition, the merchant marine was confiscated, imports and exports were placed under a license-system, and maximum prices were fixed—at about one-third of those prevailing in 1790—for all the common articles of everyday use. Furthermore Robespierre introduced a form of industrial conscription which paralleled the military measures. Thereby the whole population, regardless of sex, was placed at the disposal of the nation and could be called upon to serve in any occupation.

Besides introducing these war measures, Robespierre tried to recast the state in a fresh mold. As an idealist, devoted to the doctrines of Rousseau, he planned the creation of a virtuous nation. It was to consist of people who developed their minds as well as their bodies, who lived moral as well as useful lives. Frugality, stoicism, and equality were sought after by the dictator, who, through them, hoped to achieve a slightly puritanical utopia.

The program of this apostle of virtue included some practical measures. He favored the establishment of a uniform legal code; urged the creation of a public school system which would produce intelligent and patriotic citizens; and even contemplated the enactment of social legislation, such as old-age pensions. To some extent, he was the forerunner of the twentieth century dictator.

But while Robespierre talked about need of civic virtue and planned the fairer distribution of wealth, he failed to carry out any well-defined program of social reform. As a result, people began to criticize his rule, especially when the great victory of Fleurus on June 26, 1794, seemed to prove beyond a doubt that the Terror was no longer needed. Opposition, however, caused Robespierre to overreach himself. To stiffen the Reign of Terror, he passed a law that admitted any sort of evidence in trials, and the question of guilt was left to the discretion of the jurors. By a special provision of this act, everyone, even a member of the Convention, could be brought before the Revolutionary Tribunal. With the Terror dangling over their heads, many individuals whose conduct was anything but pure, concluded they had better get rid of this so-called Incorruptible.

People of France were growing tired of the Robespierre-inspired Committee of Public Safety, of the factional struggles, of price controls, and of the campaign of ruthless terrorism. From the summer of 1793 to July, 1794, more than twelve thousand people—monarch-
ists, priests, profiteers, unsuccessful generals, fallen factionaries, lukewarm Revolutionaries, and others—had been put to death. In the opinion of many citizens, the justification for the continuation of this Revolutionary terroristic government had ceased with the passing of the dangers of invasion and civil wars. Tired of terror, of virtue, and of war, and desirous of enjoying the benefits of the Revolution, one faction was determined to sidetrack Robespierre. Aware of a movement against him, he made the tactical mistake of absenting himself for several weeks from meetings of the Committee of Public Safety. During this time his opponents perfected a plot, the maturatation of which led to the fall and imprisonment of Robespierre. An attempt of the Paris Commune to effect his escape having been frustrated, he was outlawed by the Convention, and finally guillotined on July 28, 1794.

After the dictator’s death the Thermidorian reaction set in as the Revolutionary pendulum began to swing back toward the Right. The enemies of Jacobinism, such as the Girondins and the wealthy bourgeoisie, gained control of the Convention. Determined to destroy the entire Jacobin system, the Convention proceeded to reorganize the Paris Commune, the Revolutionary Tribunal, and the Committee of Public Safety so as to abolish the machinery of the dictatorship. Meanwhile the enemies of Jacobinism instituted a White Terror. Armed groups of young men, called Jeunesse dorée, assaulted Jacobins and destroyed all evidences of the radical regime. In the fall of 1794, the Jacobin Club itself was closed. While this reaction was taking place, the Convention encouraged speculation in food and other necessities of life by abolishing price controls and encouraging inflation. At the same time they endeavored to take the government out of business by creating a plutocratic state—the First French Republic.

The new government, established in 1795, set out to achieve the following aims: the maintenance of economic liberty, law and order, the preservation of private property, and the termination of the war. It consisted of an executive Directory of five members, and a two-chambered legislature—consisting of a Council of Five Hundred (whose members, selected on a property qualification, were to be at least thirty years of age), and a Council of Ancients (whose members were to be at least forty years old and whose chief function was to suspend, when desirable, the decisions of the Five Hundred). Two-thirds of the representatives of both were to be selected from the membership of the Convention.

The government (1795–1799) tried to pursue a middle-of-the-road policy, and, as a result, was an anathema both to conservatives and to
radicals. It promptly suppressed all hostile movements, both royalist and proletarian. For example, François Babeuf, an advocate of complete community of property, was executed in 1797 for conspiring to put his ideas of equality into practice; his subversive organization, The Society of Equals, was completely eradicated. Innumerable other conspiracies were crushed with equal vigor. Attempts were made by this government to conciliate the various opposition groups—clergy, nobles, petty bourgeoisie, workers, and poor peasants—by introducing some reforms, but on the whole they were ineffectual.

France remained exhausted and demoralized. The treasury was empty, and, save for wartime profiteers and speculators who thrive on the misfortunes of their fellow men, the people were poor. Most of the gold had left the country; assignats were practically valueless; and the feeble attempts on the part of the government to improve conditions by establishing a new currency and by creating a new Law of the Maximum, designed to maintain wages and prices at a certain level, only served to increase the general insecurity and to disorganize commerce, industry, and agriculture. Production was almost at a standstill; work shops were closed; widespread unemployment and famine were greatly increased by enemy blockades. There was a complete breakdown of law and order, as bands of vagrants and robbers wandered through the land.

Unrest lay throughout France. Royalist and Jacobin riots occurred in various parts of the country and indicated the existence of widespread opposition to the government. The wealthy bourgeoisie and

THE SACKING OF THE ROYAL PALACE ON AUGUST 10, 1792.
peasants who had gained land as a result of the Revolution, alone supported the corrupt Directory. Thus the stage was set for another political upheaval. Discontented, exhausted, and discouraged, the French people by 1799 were willing to turn from the leadership of mediocre politicians to that of any man capable of restoring peace, order, security, and the Revolutionary reforms. Such a leader appeared in Napoleon, "the man of destiny."

**COLLATERAL READING**

CHAPTER VIII

The Napoleonic Empire

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Napoleon Bonaparte

Napoleon Bonaparte: A Modern Caesar

IF France emerges from all this, she will be obedient as any lamb," remarked Catherine II of Russia in 1794, "but what she needs is a man of superior intellect, skillful, courageous above all his contemporaries and perhaps even his century. Has that man been born into the world?" Her question was answered five years later when a young officer in the French army, Napoleon Bonaparte, became First Consul of France.

This obscure Italian was born August 15, 1769, on the island of Corsica, which had, just before his birth, in 1768 passed from the possession of Genoa into that of France. He was educated in French military schools, where he displayed marked ability in the study of military tactics and mathematics. On completing his military training, this poor and unknown young man was made a second lieutenant and assigned to a French army stationed in the south. Under ordinary circumstances Napoleon probably would have remained an unimportant officer under the Old Regime, but the Revolution threw open the gate of promotion to young men of talent. Vacancies in the military staff, due to the desertion of aristocratic officers, and the distinction gained by Napoleon in the recapture of Toulon from the British (1793) enabled him to become a brigadier-general of artillery in December of that year. A brilliant opportunist, Napoleon then played politics (after the fashion of most Revolutionary generals). Identifying his interests with the Robespierre faction, he made every effort to obtain an active command in the field. Robes-
pierre's overthrow prevented him from reaching this end and temporarily deprived him of his position in the army. Too valuable an officer to lose, he suffered nothing worse than an eight-day imprisonment.

Determined to carve out a career for himself, regardless of obstacles, Bonaparte refused to accept an unimportant assignment in the army of the west; instead he decided to seek advancement in Paris, the center of political intrigue. For this insubordination he faced the possibility of expulsion from the army. He redeemed his prospects, however, in 1795, by defending the bourgeois Convention against the mob of Paris, led by the radicals. Thereby he won the confidence of the influential politician, Barras, who became his patron temporarily. Two years later, Bonaparte received his reward for his defense of the Convention; in 1796, at the age of twenty-seven, he was appointed by the Directory to command the Army of Italy which faced the Austrians and the Sardinians.

By this time the Directory had decided to launch an aggressive war against the remaining enemies of France—England, Austria, and Sardinia. England still refused to make peace while the Austrian Netherlands remained in French hands; nor would Austria listen to peace proposals while France retained her possessions and certain other territories in the Germanies and in Italy. Realizing that England could not be attacked, the Directory assailed Austria by sending the main army over the Rhine through south German lands, while a minor force was merely to keep the Austrians engaged in Italy. Bonaparte was placed in charge of this latter command. He now proceeded to make the most of it.

Much to the surprise of the Directory, the little Corsican turned the Italian front into the main theater of the war. After winning ascendency over his own officers and soldiers, he struck with lightning rapidity. Between April, 1796, and April, 1797, he won eighteen victories, subduing the Italian troops, forcing the Austrians out of Italy, and compelling the Habsburg emperor to accept peace terms whereby France took Nice and Savoy from Sardinia, the Ionian Islands from Venice, and Lombardy from Austria. Desirous of creating friendly buffer states in northern Italy, Napoleon formed Lombardy and several central provinces into a federation known as the Cisalpine Republic. He even invaded the Papal States and forced the Holy Father to permit the union of part of his northern holdings with the newly established state. Nominally representative institutions were permitted in the Cisalpine Republic, but actual control remained in his own hands. He also overthrew the existing government in Genoa and created another pseudo-democratic state, the Ligurian Republic,
likewise under French control. This satellite republic gave France control of the coastal route to Italy.

By the Treaty of Campo Formio (1797), Austria was not only forced to cede to France rights in Italy but also the Austrian Netherlands and territory on the left bank of the Rhine. The emperor, in fact, had to undertake to bring about a meeting of the imperial diet to effect these changes. In return for these concessions, Napoleon seized Venetia and handed part of it over to Austria, though that republic had preserved a friendly neutrality. Napoleon, by thus recasting the state system of Italy, ignored the traditional and historic pattern of Italian politics and gave the peninsula a never-to-be-forgotten impetus toward national unification.

Napoleon not only conquered Italy; he plundered her. He deprived the Italians of their money and robbed them of their art treasures. His agents ransacked various art galleries and selected pictures which Napoleon demanded as prizes of war. Paintings, sculpture, and other _objets d'art_, as well as prisoners and money, were sent to France, where they were paraded through the streets—a visible symbol of Bonaparte's achievements. After this display, the much publicized leader himself returned to Paris. There he was the cynosure of all eyes, the object of tremendous curiosity. Realizing that the masses preferred heroes who were remote to those who had become commonplace, he cleverly kept in the background, affected simplicity of dress and demeanor, and thereby won praises for his modesty. Actually, he had no intention of emulating the example of Cincinnatus in returning to his plow, for he had determined already "to keep his glory warm." But it was difficult for him to adopt a plan of action. He realized that he was too young to enter the government and was yet unprepared to overthrow it. He could only bide his time until something turned up.

The Egyptian project afforded the idle hero the needed opportunity. This campaign, an attempt to strike at England through her route to India, was welcomed by Bonaparte as another chance to acquire glory, and by the Directory as a convenient means of getting rid of a too popular general. Great Britain was the only member of the First Coalition still at war with France in 1798. The British Channel barred the way to a French invasion of England. Moreover, there were not enough British soldiers in Europe for Napoleon to inflict upon them a decisive defeat. The Egyptian adventure was a rather indirect method of hitting at England by threatening her colonial interests in the Orient. Nevertheless, the commander's instructions were sufficiently vague so as to leave scope for spectacular achievements such as the conquest of Constantinople or of India.
To the great relief of the Directory, Napoleon, in May, 1798, set sail for Egypt. Accompanied by a large army and a brilliant staff of scientists, he intended to conquer, explore, and develop the East in the style of Alexander the Great. “This little Europe has not enough to offer,” he remarked one day to a friend. “The Orient is the place to go to. All great reputations have been made there.” “I do not know what would have happened to me,” he said later, “if I had not had the happy idea of going to Egypt.” Wildly imaginative and yet intensely practical, this “child of the Mediterranean” was bent upon an achievement which would astound the world.

In October, 1799, Napoleon, accompanied by a few companions, returned to France, leaving his army behind in Egypt. For over a year he had endeavored to carry out his plan, but as a military campaign, despite victories at the Pyramids and Aboukir Bay, it failed to achieve decisive results. Facing Russian, Turkish, Egyptian, and British opposition Napoleon soon appreciated the futility of the whole enterprise. His failure, however, was largely due to the destruction of his fleet by the British Admiral Nelson at the battle of the Nile. This naval defeat undermined any prospects of a decisive blow at the British Empire. But it was the European, not the Egyptian, situation that influenced Napoleon to hasten back to France. Receiving word that this country was in a condition of external peril and internal chaos, he decided that the opportunity he had been looking for had presented itself—“the pear (France) was ripe enough to pick.”

By 1799, the stage was set for the rise of a dictator. French aggressions in Holland, Switzerland, and Italy had resulted in the formation of another European alliance against her, this time consisting of Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Naples, Portugal, and Turkey. Assuming the offensive, the coalition had expelled the French from all Italy, save Genoa and Switzerland, and an Anglo-Russian expedition had landed in Holland. The little republics created by the French in Italy had all disappeared. Actually, the tide of battle had turned in favor of the French before Napoleon’s return but the French people were still alarmed at the advance of their enemies. At home, the corrupt Directory faced social and economic chaos as a result of its inability to meet such problems as inflation. Religious and aristocratic unrest, as well as the social discontent of the masses, resulted in governmental crises in Paris and uprisings in Brittany, in La Vendée, and in other parts of France.

Taking advantage of this widespread opposition to the Directory and of the public fear of invasion, Napoleon, within a period of three weeks, played the decisive role in the coup d’état of Brumaire
(November, 1799) which resulted in the overthrow of the Directors and the establishment of a new form of government, called the Consulate (1799–1804). The new constitution, drawn up largely by the Abbé Sieyès, Revolutionary intriguer, provided for a government consisting of an executive authority of three Consuls, a Council of State, a Senate whose members were appointed for life by the First Consul, a Tribunate selected by the Senate, and a Chamber of 300 nominated by the Senate out of representatives elected by the departments. Appointed First Consul, Napoleon easily transformed himself into a dictator. Through control of the executive, the command of the army, and the power of appointment both of central and local officials he was soon able to concentrate all real authority in his hands. Meanwhile, the people in a plebiscite approved of the new constitution, believing that it signified the establishment of an efficient government.

"We have finished with the romance of the Revolution: it is time to begin its history," said Napoleon, upon becoming First Consul. Many French people received this announcement with enthusiasm. They were tired of Revolutionary theories and yearned for peace, order, and prosperity. To a few, especially some of the bourgeoisie, however, the rise of this "man on horseback" simply meant the continuation of war and the return of tyranny; actually there was no organized group between Napoleon and the masses capable of opposing him.

Desirous of universal support, Bonaparte restored peace at home and abroad. In order to suppress internal unrest he established a centralized administrative system. Prefects and sub-prefects, appointed by him, took over local government, restored discipline, and established law and order throughout the realm. Before the end of 1799 Napoleon proclaimed a general amnesty and invited the émigrés and the non-juring priests to return to France. In 1800 he undertook to terminate the war. Taking advantage of international rivalries which had begun to destroy the unity of the coalition, Napoleon assumed the offensive. Following the French victories of Marengo (in Italy) and Hohenlinden (in Germany) against the Austrians, he induced Russia to withdraw from the war and forced Austria to accept the peace of Lunéville (1801). By this settlement France again strengthened her position in the Italian peninsula and in the Rhineland. In the following year Great Britain, who had been at war with France since 1793, concluded the Peace of Amiens with that country. Thereby England acquiesced in the territorial status quo in Europe and returned some of the French colonies which she had conquered. The argument was largely the work of the trading classes
in England who believed that peace between their country and France would enable them to dispose of the surplus goods which they had been unable to sell during the war. Neither of the late belligerents regarded this peace as more than a temporary truce.

Having suspended the European struggle, Napoleon assumed the role of a civil administrator. Adopting a modest and conciliatory attitude—ostentatiously putting away his general's uniform in order to don civilian clothes—he pledged to the people (especially the business classes) order without reaction at home, financial stability, encouragement of agriculture, trade, and industry (by protection), and the attainment by all men, regardless of class, of political, social, and economic positions befitting their talents. Throwing his boundless energy into the task of fulfilling these promises, Napoleon overhauled the internal economy of France. An efficient system of tax collecting was established, and the assessments were fixed for a definite period at moderate rates so as to gain public confidence and thus to secure prompt payment. For the purpose of strengthening government credit by stabilizing the price of national bonds, a sinking fund was set up. A great part of the public debt was refunded; a regular budget was created; and state officials were held responsible for public funds. Financial aid to businessmen as well as to the government was enlarged through the establishment of the Bank of France (1800). To check speculation and to prevent frauds, the stock exchange was regulated. Financial stability was also promoted by Napoleon's opposition to the issuance of new government bonds and his insistence upon a "pay as you go" policy. Of special importance to the businessmen were the tax laws introduced by Napoleon. These measures were designed to lighten the taxes on capital and real estate by shifting a large part of the burden on to indirect taxes, such as those upon luxuries like tobacco and liquors. All of these measures had a rejuvenating effect upon the condition of the country. As trade began to revive and public credit to function, the reckless profiteering invited by depreciated currency was brought to an end.

Napoleon tried to bring about economic recovery in many ways. New industries were encouraged; old business enterprises were given aid; industrial and chemical experiments were fostered; and industrial expositions were held. In his attempts to restore prosperity he planned the creation of a chamber of commerce and the introduction of ordinances regulating industrial and agrarian affairs. Schools designed to teach workers to use machinery were opened; exhibitions with rewards for excellence in workmanship were held; and the system of communications was improved by the construction of numerous roads and canals. Napoleon also endeavored to stimulate the
economic development of France by the creation of tariffs, by the regulation of imports and exports, and by the attempt to create a colonial empire equal to that of Great Britain. Indeed, if Napoleon could have avoided war, France might have experienced an era of great economic prosperity, for in 1801 the much-needed Belgian coal fields were inside her frontiers.

While engaged in these undertakings Napoleon also promulgated a new system of graded law courts with appointed officials for both civil and criminal justice. But his greatest achievement in the legal field was the codification of the law, which, before the Revolution, had been a mass of overlapping, confused, and contradictory regulations. In these codes Napoleon did much to strengthen the position of the middle classes. The sanctity of property was emphasized; labor unions were outlawed, because they constituted a state within a state; and equality of opportunity was stressed. Government and military positions were open to men of talent, regardless of social or economic distinction. Nevertheless, Napoleon ignored the principle that every profession was open to all men. He permitted the middle classes to form organizations, although he frowned on the unionization of wage earners.

Napoleon's program even included the fields of education, art, and literature. A four-graded educational system was established, ranging from primary schools to an imperial university which was founded in 1808. He subscribed to the liberal idea that educational facilities should be offered by the state to those who possessed ability. He held that education and nationalism were closely allied; for, in private as well as in public schools, he demanded the teaching of patriotism to all students. Art, music, and literature were encouraged by the state; but artistic expressions were rather pompous and official, for the government was suspicious of originality and excessive freedom.

Religious problems, also, were dealt with by this able dictator. After careful negotiations with the Pope, Napoleon arranged the Concordat of 1801, restoring the French Church to communion with His Holiness and re-establishing Catholicism in France. The earlier confiscation of Church property was sanctioned by the Pope and in return the clergy were to be paid salaries by the French government. Higher church dignitaries, however, were to be appointed by Napoleon, subject to rejection by the Pope only on the grounds of heresy.

1 His general codes, dealing with criminal, civil, and commercial matters, still remain the basis of French law. Imposed by France upon all states which she brought under her influence, these enlightened codes were introduced into Italy and the Germanies.
and immorality. Liberty of worship was allowed to non-Catholic sects, but Lutherans, Calvinists, and Jews, like Catholics, were brought under state control.

Well satisfied with these achievements, the French people, with few exceptions, hailed Napoleon as a great benefactor. He had brought peace and order to the country; and prosperity, as a result of his program, seemed likely to follow. Influenced by these considerations, they permitted him to revise the government in the direction of further centralization. In 1802 his term as First Consul, originally for ten years, was extended to life, and he was granted the privilege of naming his successor. Two years later the Consulate, still ostensibly Republican, was abolished and an hereditary empire took its place. The Council of State was supplanted by a Privy Council; and the Tribunate was divided into five sections, its debates being held in secret, and its members being selected by Napoleon. An elaborate imperial court was created, consisting of a hierarchy of officials—Grand dignitaries: Grand officers, Princes, and ministers—as formal as that of the Bourbons. Theoretically, members of all classes who had achieved distinction, especially in the service of the state, were eligible, but old social distinctions and values began to reassert themselves.

In his attempt to expand the economic resources of France, Napoleon passed laws designed to protect French industry and keep English goods out of the country. From the beginning of his administration he had conceived of a French colonial empire which should equal or surpass that of Great Britain. He attempted to re-establish French authority in the West Indies; compelled the Dutch to cede part of the Guiana to France; and forced Spain to cede to him Louisiana (though he sold it to the United States almost immediately). He tried to expand French influence in the Orient by arranging an alliance with the sultan of Turkey and the shah of Persia and by planning the restoration of French power in India. He also sent an expedition, partly scientific, partly political, to Australia. At the basis of these imperialist policies was his fundamental objective of expanding French commerce, industry, and agriculture, so as to make France, rather than England, the workshop of the world.

These plans were interrupted by the outbreak of war between France and England in May, 1803. By that time Britain had become suspicious of Napoleon's continental, colonial, and economic aggressions. At the beginning of the struggle Napoleon planned to invade England. A powerful army was stationed on the channel coast, and a fleet of flat-bottomed boats was concentrated to carry it across. An elaborate naval plan was devised whereby the British fleet
CEREMONY OF THE CORONATION OF NAPOLEON AND JOSEPHINE
was to be maneuvered out of the way while the troops were crossing the channel. This naval campaign, however, ended disastrously for France. In July, 1805, Sir Robert Calder defeated a French fleet under Admiral Villeneuve near Cape Finisterre, and in October, Admiral Nelson destroyed the combined French and Spanish fleets off Cape Trafalgar. Prior to this last defeat, however, Napoleon had already decided to abandon the invasion of England in favor of a vigorous prosecution of the war against England's partners in the Third Coalition. These naval defeats were a decisive factor in the struggle which followed. During the next decade Great Britain, in control of the seas, and with the backing of her international bankers, was able to protect her empire, feed her people, subsidize her allies, survive the attempt of Napoleon to strangle her economically by the Continental system, and finally to play an important role in the military campaign which destroyed Napoleon's power forever.

Great Britain and her allies had to fight for ten long years before they were able to reach this objective. Between 1805 and 1807 the so-called Third Coalition, consisting of Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Naples, and Sweden, was decisively defeated and destroyed by Napoleon. Austria was the first victim. Leaving Marshal Massena in charge of the army on the Italian front, Napoleon struck across the Germanies, forced an Austrian army to surrender at Ulm (October, 1805), and in November occupied the Habsburg capital, Vienna. In December, he defeated at Austerlitz the combined Austro-Russian armies. After this reverse, Francis II had to submit to the Treaty of Pressburg. By the terms of this settlement, the Austrian ruler surrendered a portion of his lands in Swabia and the Tyrol to Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden, and also ceded Dalmatia and Venetia to the newly established kingdom of Italy, of which Napoleon had made himself king.

The reconstruction of the Germanies and the abolition of the Holy Roman Empire now followed. Continuing the policy which he had initiated after the Treaty of Lunéville (1801), Napoleon consolidated many ecclesiastical and small secular states. A number of south German and Rhenish states, including Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg, were formed into a Confederation of the Rhine under French protection and pledged to an alliance with France. Then, upon the demand of France, Emperor Francis renounced his title of Holy Roman Emperor (August 6, 1806), thus clearing the way for the establishment of a new European empire under Napoleon.

Suspicious of this large-scale intervention of France in German affairs, Prussia abandoned her neutrality and took the field against Napoleon. Unfortunately her action was poorly timed. Russia, after
her defeat at Austerlitz, was too demoralized to furnish immediate aid, and, therefore, Prussia had to meet Napoleon singlehanded. Her speedy destruction followed. In October, 1806, two Prussian armies were defeated on the same day at Jena and Auerstädt. These reverses were followed by the complete collapse of Prussia. Her armies surrendered; her fortresses fell; and her capital opened its gates to the French. Determined to punish Prussia severely, Napoleon deprived that country of over half her territory and population, including most of the Polish provinces obtained in the Partitions. These provinces were formed by the French conquerer into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, a version of the Polish buffer state. At the same time he levied a ruinous financial tribute upon Prussia.

Not waiting to complete his deliberate humiliation of these Prussians, Napoleon marched toward Russia. After a rather futile winter campaign in Poland he defeated the Russians at the battle of Friedland (1807), and thereby influenced Alexander I, the czar (1801-1825), into accepting peace negotiations. In June, 1807, the two emperors met on a raft in the middle of the river Niemen and discussed peace terms which were later incorporated into the Treaty of Tilsit. Europe was divided into two spheres of influence, with Napoleon presiding over the west and Alexander the east. As a result of their conferences, Prussia's western provinces and certain small German states were combined into the kingdom of Westphalia for Napoleon's brother, Jerome. Alexander was given to understand that he might take Finland, which he coveted, from Sweden; attractive pickings from the vast Turkish Empire were also dangled, but somewhat vaguely, before him. Both rulers decided that Great Britain should be asked to make peace and to give up her maritime claims. If she refused to do so, the two emperors agreed to make war against her and to force Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal to close their ports to her goods. Great Britain, anticipating these maneuvers, retained access to the Baltic by forcing Denmark to surrender her navy. Thus, still in control of the seas, these active islanders or "enemies of the world," as they were called by Napoleon, were definitely in a position to continue the war.

After Tilsit, Napoleon returned to France as virtual master of Europe. He had destroyed another coalition and had forced all the great powers, save Great Britain, to accept peace terms; he had completely reorganized the map of the continent; and by 1812 he had created a French Empire which extended to the Rhine and included Belgium, Holland, and the North Sea coast as far as the Danish frontier in the north, and to the south, Savoy, Piedmont, Genoa, Parma, Tuscany, and the Italian coast as far as Rome, which was
called the second city of the Empire. The balance of Italy, except for Naples, was united to France by the dynastic bond of a joint ruler, Napoleon himself. There were also a number of dependencies distributed among clients and members of the Bonaparte family, such as the Kingdom of Westphalia, with Jerome Bonaparte as king, the Confederation of the Rhine with Napoleon as protector, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, with a subservient Saxon ruler as its head, the Kingdom of Naples, with Napoleon’s brother-in-law, General Joachim Murat, as its chief, and after 1808 the Kingdom of Spain, with Joseph Bonaparte as its ruler. Most of the remaining European monarchs were under Napoleon’s control. French troops occupied Prussia and thus kept the Hohenzollern dynasty under surveillance; Alexander I of Russia was an ally; Pope Pius VII was a prisoner on French soil; and the Austrian Emperor after 1810 was dynastically connected by a marriage. Only Great Britain and a few minor states were not under Napoleon’s control. Since the time of Charlemagne no ruler in Europe had created as powerful an Empire as had Napoleon. He had completely demolished the eighteenth century balance of power and had substituted a federative system of kings; and he had established French hegemony over Europe through the creation of a super-state.

Despite its grandeur, this Napoleonic structure possessed vital weaknesses. Its size made it too unwieldy for one man to rule and its very strength and power aroused antagonisms which jeopardized its stability. After 1807, Napoleon faced constantly the nationalist opposition of the countries he had conquered. A regeneration movement in Prussia was especially significant. Aroused by the disastrous battle of Jena and the losses suffered at Tilsit, Prussian statesmen, such as Baron von Stein and Prince Hardenburg, concluded that the only hope for national recovery lay in a drastic social and intellectual revolution in Prussia. Desirous of bringing this about, they abolished serfdom in 1807, introduced educational and moral reforms, including the establishment of the University of Berlin and the Gymnasie (or high school), and encouraged the formation of such patriotic societies as the Tugendbund, which promoted morality and public spirit, accompanied by a love of fatherland and a hatred of French domination. Under the direction of the military genius, Scharnhorst, the Prussian army was modernized. To circumvent Napoleon’s decree that Prussia should maintain an army of no more than 42,000, Scharnhorst hit upon the ingenious device of having men serve with

1 In 1810 Napoleon divorced Josephine, who had borne him no children, and married Marie Louise of Austria who later presented him with an heir, called the King of Rome.
the colors only a brief time. Then they would pass into the reserve and others would be put rapidly through the same training. By this method, he succeeded in creating an army of 150,000 men, while ostensibly adhering to the limit imposed by the French.

The inability of Napoleon to destroy his great rival, Great Britain, however, was the fundamental reason for his overthrow. After the abandonment of the plan to invade England in 1805, Napoleon tried to defeat that country through an attack upon her commerce. To do this he announced his famous Continental System in the Berlin and Milan Decrees of 1806 and 1807. By these he excluded British-borne goods from a large part of Europe. Every state, as it came under his direct or indirect control, was forced to join this blockade. Eventually it became necessary to conquer the entire continent, so as to cut off England completely from trade with Europe, and thus ruin her financially.

In control of the seas, England immediately took retaliatory measures. France and her allies soon found themselves in a state of blockade. Both sides suffered heavily: Napoleon’s policy greatly injured British commerce, but at the same time the British blockade, which deprived Europe of world trade, inflicted tremendous economic hardships upon all peoples under French control. The consequent breakdown of commerce and industry, and the marked scarcity of goods in Europe, aroused great resentment among all classes, even in France. Despite this antagonism, Napoleon refused to abandon the blockade. Resolved to defeat England, once and for all, he refused to drop this economic war.

In the end the Continental Blockade not only failed, but proved to be a boomerang. Smuggling increased to huge dimensions; licenses weakened the blockade; there were places of leakage in Portugal and along the Baltic coast where British goods came in. Political alliances, also, were strained by this policy. Russia found it increasingly difficult to maintain her close relations with France. The Russian aristocrats from the first opposed this alliance with a radical country which had destroyed feudalism and had proclaimed the equality of man. Moreover, the Continental System had practically ruined Russia’s important trade with Great Britain. At first Czar Alexander tried to carry out the terms of the alliance concluded at Tilsit, but Napoleon’s opposition to Russia’s desire to obtain Constantinople, and Alexander’s belief that Napoleon planned to make the Grand Duchy of Warsaw another Kingdom of Poland, finally caused the czar in 1812 to break with France.

Prior to the outbreak of the struggle between Russia and France, Napoleon had encountered powerful opposition to his system in
other parts of Europe. In 1807 he inaugurated his famous Peninsular War. Determined to make a satellite state of Portugal and to force that country to adhere to the Continental System, he first arranged with Spain for its conquest and partition. In July, 1808, he put his brother Joseph on the Spanish throne and planned, through the reduction of the Church and the feudal regime, to unite the people of Spain in policy and revolutionary principles with France. But this co-ordinating program aroused little enthusiasm in Spain. Regarding Napoleon as an alien conqueror, who, like the Moors, intended to subjugate their country, the Spanish people united in common opposition to this intruder. Already, in June, 1808, they had defeated an isolated French force at Baylen. Napoleon for the first time encountered the formidable opposition of people, not kings. For over six years Spanish and Portuguese forces, aided most of the time by British troops under General Wellesley (later the Duke of Wellington), engaged in a continuous struggle against Napoleon's armies. Distracted by other problems, Napoleon was unable to subjugate completely these determined Iberians. After 1808, the Peninsular War, like a running sore, gradually sapped Napoleon’s military strength.

In the spring of 1809 the declaration of war against France by Austria for the fourth time, forced Napoleon to give up his attempt to participate personally in the conquest of Spain. Leaving that country he led another army into central Europe. This time the Austrian forces, well organized, ably led by the Archduke Charles (brother of the Emperor), and imbued with the spirit of national consciousness, put up a surprisingly stubborn opposition to Napoleon. By July, however, the French again emerged victorious—this time at Wagram. After this battle Austria again made peace with Napoleon. By the Treaty of Schönbrunn she ceded Galicia—part of it to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and part of it to Russia. She was also forced to hand over Trieste, Carniola, and part of Carinthia and Croatia to France. Austria was thus reduced to the rank of a lesser power, almost entirely shut off from the sea.

Although in 1810 and 1811 Napoleon seemed at the zenith of his power, his empire was already tottering. Following the outbreak of war between Russia and France in 1812 events moved to bring about Napoleon’s downfall in a swiftly culminating succession. The stupendous invasion of Russia, in which the Russians balked Napoleon by avoiding battle until his forces were near Moscow, and the disastrous retreat from that city which destroyed the Grand Army, shook Napoleon’s prestige to its foundations, and started a renewal of intrigues at home and hostile negotiations abroad. For a while Napo-
leon's enemies hesitated to begin another war against him. But the Prussians, seeing the remnants of the Grand Army pass through their country, realized that Napoleon's wings were clipped. Prussia, there-

fore, entered into a secret alliance with Russia, and when the king perceived the determination of the Prussian people to liberate their country from the shackles of Napoleon, he consented to declare war against France. Meanwhile, Great Britain, Russia, and Sweden had organized the Sixth Coalition to which Prussia and eventually Aus-
ria (in August, 1813) were added for the purpose of liberating Euro-

te from the French.

By now the odds were beginning to turn against Napoleon. Lack-
ing capable generals and experienced soldiers to replace those he had
lost, he was unable to carry the war into the enemy's territory and

defeat them quickly in a series of crushing battles. He tried to do
so, invading the Germanies with characteristic speed. But a series of
victories was nullified by his defeat in the three-day battle of Leip-
zig (October, 1813); and with this reverse the entire Napoleonic
system began to tumble down. Enemies and traitors now appeared
everywhere; the Continental System collapsed; and tributary states
prepared to discard French control. Despite these discouraging de-
velopments Napoleon refused to listen to peace terms and engaged
in a brilliant but futile campaign in northern France in the early
part of 1814. His efforts were of no avail, however, and after the fall
of Paris, Napoleon abdicated on April 6, 1814. About two weeks
later he departed for exile in the little island of Elba, and Louis
XVIII, a brother of the guillotined Louis XVI, returned to France as
king with the blessings of the allies.

In March, 1815, while the representatives of the victorious powers
were arranging peace terms in Vienna, Napoleon escaped from Elba,
landed in France, and regained his throne. Entering Paris, vacated
just a short while before by Louis XVIII, Napoleon re-established
the empire. Thereupon, the allied powers, proclaiming him an out-
law, despatched new armies for the purpose of accomplishing his
overthrow a second time.

Napoleon, hastily liberalizing his empire in an effort to secure
wider support, prepared to resist the enemy. At the head of an army
he left Paris (June 12) to take the field against the forces of the
allied powers. After defeating Blücher's Prussians in two indecisive
battles, the last of the Napoleonic armies was completely destroyed
by British and Prussian forces under Generals Wellington and
Blücher at the Battle of Waterloo on June 18. Four days later he
again abdicated and gave himself up to the British government.
This time the British exiled him to St. Helena, an isolated island
lying in the South Atlantic, below the equator. There he spent the
remaining six years of his life in recalling his past triumphs and in
the preparation of his memoirs.

With the overthrow of Napoleon, wars which for twenty-three
years had distracted Europe came to an end. As a result of this long
struggle, millions of lives had been sacrificed; treasures beyond com-
prehension had been wasted; and the progress of mankind had been
impeded. A huge debt was bequeathed to the future generations
which had to be paid out of their resources and savings. But vast as were these evils, the compensations were not entirely inadequate. The energy and patience, begotten in the long years of trial, enabled men to achieve, in the long period of peace which followed, tremendous advances in the nonmilitary phases of life. After Napoleon's downfall, assaults upon despotisms and vested interests persisted as millions of people reasserted their claims to liberty, fraternity, and equality. And, temporarily, at least, so strong a repugnance to war developed that representatives of the leading nations revealed a willingness to settle differences by means other than war.

During the period which bears his name, Napoleon exerted an influence upon human affairs which is almost without parallel in history. Few men inflicted upon his fellow creatures miseries so appalling. At the same time, never before did a man's hand scatter seeds destined to produce a harvest of political changes so beneficial. Assuming, as he did, the control of a people who had flung aside their antiquated institutions, he was forced not only to heed the changes brought about by the Revolution but to introduce new ideas and ideals to the peoples whom he conquered. He robbed Italy, but at the same time aroused her from a sleep of centuries and led her toward the road of national unity. He, by destroying the innumerable small states which comprised the Holy Roman Empire and by cruelly humiliating the Prussians, inspired among the Germans that ideal of unity which enabled them to create, some decades later, the German Empire. He was the dreaded apostle of fraternity and equality—but not liberty. In short, by the institutions which he created, by the doctrines which he was obliged to profess, by the very violence of which he was guilty, he communicated to the human mind an impulse which it could not disregard. And even when he became utterly despotic—when he laid intolerable burdens upon the people, when he squandered their lives, when he trampled on the freedom of nations—even then his influence encouraged the development of national rights. For the hatred which his dictatorship invoked, and the vast combination of forces which it rendered necessary, united among themselves the various peoples whom he conquered—and taught them to know their own strength.

**Peace Settlements**

After the downfall of Napoleon the representatives of the victorious powers faced a most difficult problem—the reconstruction of Europe. This task was undertaken by them at the famous Congress of Vienna (September, 1814–June, 1815). Beyond question this was one of the most imposing diplomatic gatherings in the history of
Europe. Never before had there been such an assemblage of celebrities. There were emperors, kings, generals, lesser princes, diplomats from practically every European power except Turkey; there were representatives of the great European banking houses too—men who by their financial support had helped to bring about Napoleon's overthrow; and there were a great number of adventurers. Inasmuch as the representatives of the four great countries, Metternich of Austria, Alexander I of Russia, Castlereagh of Great Britain, and Humboldt of Prussia, agreed to decide all important questions among themselves, the delegates of the smaller powers played unimportant roles in the peace negotiations. Talleyrand, the French representative, at first was ignored by the allies. Later, antagonisms among the victorious powers enabled him to advance the interests of France.

The main work of the Congress was the restoration of "the good old days" and the distribution of the territories that France had been forced to relinquish. Ardent defenders of the Old Regime, most of the diplomats decided to check once and for all the spread of such radical and subversive ideas as constitutionalism, nationalism, democracy, and equality. They realized that the past two decades had left their heritage of influences and counter-influences: reflected in such unsettling forces as democracy, nationalism, militarism, and a deep-seated fear of revolution and of war. They also knew that the years immediately following would be marked by a strong desire on the part of the people everywhere for peace and political stabilization. Therefore the chief significance of the generation after 1815 lies in the attempt of the leading statesmen and rulers of Europe to give expression and form to this demand for peace and stability through the division of territorial spoils and the restoration—so far as possible—of the Old Regime.

In their attempt to carry out these aims, the diplomats were aided by an intellectual reaction. Able writers, as we shall see later, exalted the old order and maintained that the radicalism of the Revolution and the caesarism of Napoleon were responsible for the destruction, the bloodshed, and the chaos of the past twenty-five years. The general desire for peace also helped the diplomats. By 1815 people, thoroughly war-weary, had lost interest in the revolutionary crusade to attain an earthly utopia; instead, they craved immediate security. Conservative statesmen, aware of this yearning for peace, maintained that the solution of Europe's problem lay in a return to the conditions and the institutions of the Old Regime. Therefore they accepted the principle of legitimacy as the guiding light of the congress.

1 See pp. 187-188; 307-308.
Count Metternich (1773–1859), the Austrian chancellor, was the outstanding exponent of restoration. Determined to set up another equilibrium, this guiding spirit at Vienna decided to bring about a redistribution of territory, involving the re-establishment of the balance of power, the revival of the Old Regime, and the aggrandizement of his own state. Shortly after Napoleon's abdication Metternich and the other representatives of the allied powers in the first Treaty of Paris (1814) had recognized the re-establishment of the Bourbon monarchy in France, had limited her boundaries to those which she had in 1792, and had permitted her to create a constitutional government. The allies had made no attempt to restore the Old Regime in that country, nor had they tried to destroy the revolutionary reforms. After Waterloo the allies, as a punishment for allowing Napoleon to return, deprived France of Savoy, reduced her frontiers to those of 1790, and levied an indemnity upon her. Pending the fulfillment of the peace terms, an allied army of occupation was to be stationed in France.

At the Congress of Vienna the diplomats strove, while safeguarding the principles of autocracy and legitimacy, to reconcile the demands of individual countries with the interests of the European equilibrium. In the Germanies, for example, they attempted to satisfy the desire of the various states to retain their sovereignty and at the same time re-establish the ascendency of Austria in that region through the creation of the Germanic Confederation. This new political organization, consisting of the thirty-nine states into which Germany was now divided, possessed a diet composed of delegates representing the ruler of each realm, with the emperor of Austria as president. The Confederation decentralized middle Europe and thus was an important factor in the re-establishment of the equilibrium. It also restored the prestige of Austria in Central Europe. Assuming the influential position, formerly held by France, she, as president of the Confederation, prepared to oppose the expansionist policies of Prussia and Russia and, led by Metternich, to become the champion of the status quo as created at Vienna.

Austria's close ally at Vienna, Great Britain, was more concerned with the restoration of the continental balance of power than with the suppression of liberalism. Determined to prevent France from again dominating the continent, she insisted that the defeated power be surrounded by buffer states. To her satisfaction, the allies hindered French ambitions in the Rhineland by granting territory in this region to Prussia. They also merged the Austrian Netherlands and Holland to form the kingdom of the Netherlands under the House of Orange. Thus was established a strong obstacle to a French
advance in the north. In compensation for the loss of the Austrian Netherlands, Austria gained possession of Lombardy and Venetia. Her influence in Italy also was strengthened by the re-establishment of legitimate dynasties in the central states. Napoleon's second Empress, Marie Louise, became Duchess of Parma; the Papal States were restored to their former size; and the Bourbons were returned to the kingdom of the Two Sicilies and to Spain. A confederation was also re-established in Switzerland and its independence was guaranteed by the powers. England, the persistent enemy of Napoleon, the builder of repeated coalitions, and the pay-mistress of the allies for many years, was satisfied. France had been surrounded by buffer states and the political equilibrium of Europe had been restored.

Political stability in Europe was achieved by granting territorial rewards to practically all of the victorious powers. Russia retained certain minor territories which she had taken from Turkey in the war prior to 1812. She also obtained Finland and received a considerably larger share of Poland. Distrust of the allied powers, who resented her aggrandizement, forced Russia to form Poland into a separate constitutional kingdom linked only by a personal union with the Russian state. As a reward for her part in the overthrow of Napoleon, Prussia took over western Pomerania (the remnant of Sweden's Germanic Empire), half of Saxony (which thereby paid the price of having supported Napoleon in 1813), and the important Rhine area of Westphalia. Sweden, also one of the victorious allies, demanded and obtained Norway from Denmark in compensation for the cession of Finland to Russia. The Norwegians refused to recognize the legality of this transaction, drew up a constitution, and elected a king. Bernadotte, the Swedish monarch, however, overcame their opposition by inducing the Norwegians to accept him as their monarch on condition that they should have their own government and constitution. This personal union of Norway and Sweden lasted until 1905 when Norway became an independent kingdom.

Chiefly responsible for Napoleon's overthrow, Great Britain received the greatest rewards. Very wisely she selected strategic territories which would enlarge her empire and at the same time would insure her commercial and maritime supremacy. Heligoland in the North Sea, Malta and the Ionian Islands in the Mediterranean, Cape Colony in South Africa, Ceylon in the east, and miscellaneous islands in the West Indies, including Trinidad, now became parts of the British Empire. Henceforth Great Britain, with her sea power unchallenged and with her industries at home untouched by invasions was, after a short period of postwar depression, able to take advantage of peace by reviving and expanding her commerce and
industry. In short, the Napoleonic wars helped to make Great Britain the foremost industrial, capitalistic, and imperialistic state of the world.

Associated with the allied attempts to attain peace and political stabilization were two historic experiments—the Holy Alliance proposed by Alexander I of Russia, and the Quadruple Alliance formulated by Metternich of Austria and Castlereagh of Great Britain. For a number of years the impressionable czar had revolved in his plastic mind a scheme by which the peace of Europe could be preserved. During the war he had outlined a project for the arbitration of international disputes by a third power, but at Vienna he presented a solution which represented not only his own peculiar form of idealism, but also that of his spiritual advisor, the pietistic Baroness Krüdener. As formulated, this so-called Holy Alliance simply introduced the concept of a moral compact among Christian rulers. The monarchs of Europe were asked to declare solemnly “in the name of the most Holy and Indissoluble Trinity” that they would take “the sublime truth of holy religion” for their guidance, “that they would act towards each other as Christian brothers, and towards their subjects as fathers of families.” This scheme could scarcely be called an alliance, for it had no machinery to enforce its will; in fact, it was little more than the expression of a pious ideal.

All European rulers, except the non-Christian sultan, were asked to join the alliance; they all accepted the invitation save the Pope and the Regent of England who was prevented from doing so by Parliament. Alexander thought of inviting the President of the United States to sign it, but general opposition in Europe probably prevented the discouraged idealist from carrying out this plan. European rulers refused to take the scheme seriously. It was politically useless, not necessarily because of its religious character, but because it was unrealistic and could not be harmonized with the aims and methods of practical diplomacy. Castlereagh called it “a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense,” Metternich “a loud-sounding nothing”—“words.” The Regent of England sent a private letter to Alexander expressing his general sympathy with his intention.

During this discussion of Alexander’s plan, the allied statesmen, especially Metternich and Castlereagh, accepted the czar’s idea of concerted action on the part of the European powers and advanced a practical scheme, called the Concert of Europe. The plan provided for the maintenance of the newly established European equilibrium through the co-operation of the four great monarchical powers, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain. These four states constituted themselves the guardians of European stability against military ag-
gressions and of legitimate governments against revolution. This Quadruple Alliance was formed to maintain for a period of twenty years the territorial setup and to exclude the Bonaparte dynasty from Europe. Further, it was decided that meetings be held "at fixed periods either under the immediate auspices of the sovereigns or through their representatives... devoted to the grand interests they have in common, and to the discussion of measures which shall be judged to be most salutary to the repose and prosperity of the nations, and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe." It was to be an alliance designed to maintain the established order.

Dominated by Metternich, the Concert of Europe was unable to check the irresistible forces of change, especially the modern conception of nationalism. After the overthrow of Napoleon the various peoples who had been conquered and humiliated by him became more and more conscious that each nationality had its own language, traditions, and interests which distinguished it from other peoples. Patriots in the Germanies, Italy, and Greece, for example, recalled the glorious histories of their forefathers, and also, in the case of the Germanies, especially, they remembered the liberal promises of their rulers made during the struggle against Napoleon. Gradually there developed a feeling that a people should possess a government suited to its customs and needs and should be governed by its own ruler. Accepting the principle of national self-determination, these exponents of nationalism insisted that no people should be dominated by another, nor should its territories be divided up and transferred to other states without regard to the wishes of the inhabitants. Influenced by these ideas, Germans, Italians, Greeks, Belgians, and other peoples demanded, and most of them obtained, eventually, unity and independence.

The Quadruple Alliance tried to prevent the spread of liberalism and nationalism (at least, on the part of subject peoples). To achieve this aim the members of the Quadruple Alliance held four meetings—at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, at Troppau in 1820, at Laibach in 1821, and at Verona in 1822. At these gatherings the conservatives, led by Metternich, urged the suppression by the Alliance of all liberal movements. Great Britain, represented at first by Castlereagh and later by the liberal Canning, refused to intervene in the internal affairs of other states. These statesmen were especially interested in the nationalist revolutions which were taking place in South America at that time. They knew very well that the overthrow of Spanish control with its monopolistic system by the insurrectionists would advance British commercial interests in that region. Therefore they insisted that the only aims of the Quadruple Alliance were the main-
tenance of the territorial status quo in Europe and the exclusion of the Bonapartes from the throne of France for a period of at least twenty years.

Despite the hostility of Great Britain to intervention in Hispanic America, Metternich determined to preserve the status quo in Europe. At the Aix-la-Chapelle Conference (1818) he favored not only the rehabilitation of France, but also her inclusion in the Concert of Europe. He realized that Paris was still the center of revolutionary unrest and believed that these radical tendencies could be curbed if France became a member of the conservative league. Moreover, he was of the opinion that unless France joined the Concert, she might seek a separate alliance with another great state, perhaps Russia. After some discussion the representatives of the other three powers agreed to enter into a Quintuple Alliance which would include France. The latter power paid up its war indemnity and the allied army of occupation was withdrawn.

In general, the meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle was a success. The Big Four, for example, intervened in a quarrel over the succession to the throne of Baden and backed Bavaria in its opposition to the claims of the Elector of Hesse to the title. They also reprimanded Bernadotte, King of Sweden, for ignoring the treaty rights of Norway and Sweden. The big powers, however, failed to co-operate on all international matters. Great Britain, for example, refused to sanction an attempt on the part of the Quadruple Alliance to intervene in the revolts of the Spanish colonies in South America and thereby restore them to the mother country. Castlereagh and Metternich also opposed a plan to end piracy in the Mediterranean by joint action on the part of the big powers. Neither statesman wanted Russian war vessels on the Mediterranean Sea, and therefore no action against these sea bandits was taken, although the pirates became so powerful that Austria was forced to place her sea-borne commerce under the protection of the Ottoman Empire. In retaliation, Prussia and Russia, who favored intervention both in South America and in the Mediterranean, opposed England's proposal to police the seas against sea-raiders. Despite Metternich's claim that there never was "a prettier little Congress," rifts, small, but well defined, were apparent at Aix-la-Chapelle.

A revolution which broke out in Spain in 1820 helped to widen the breach between the great powers. In an attempt to establish a constitutional government Spanish liberals forced King Ferdinand to adopt the democratic constitution drawn up in 1812. Alexander I of Russia, who, by that time, was the leading opponent of all revolutionary movements, was astounded when he received word of this
development in Spain. Believing that no monarch in Europe would be safe if this subversive influence spread, he thereupon asked all sovereigns to send their royal Spanish brother aid in the form of an army. In opposing this suggestion, Castlereagh maintained that this Spanish trouble—in fact, all domestic strife—was outside the sphere of the Quadruple Alliance. "It was never intended," he declared, "as a Union for the government of the world, or for the superintendence of the internal affairs of other states." Great Britain in joining the Alliance agreed only to prevent the restoration of the Napoleonic dynasty and to maintain the settlements of Vienna for twenty years. Moreover, England, as a constitutional monarchy with a revolutionary history of its own, could not participate in any plan to put down revolutions in other countries. Fearing the possibility of Russian military demonstration in Spain, Metternich backed Castlereagh in his opposition to Russian intervention on the Iberian Peninsula.

The spread of the revolutionary movement, however, forced Metternich to favor Alexander's plan to call another Congress. In Portugal, Naples, and Piedmont, liberals and patriots overthrew existing governments and set up constitutions. These revolts, especially the Italian disturbances, jeopardized Austria's position. Aware of this danger, the representatives of the big powers assembled at the Congress of Troppau (1820). Despite Anglo-French opposition, Metternich, Alexander, and the Prussian representatives had the Congress issue a statement of policy. Known as the Troppau Protocol it announced that "States which have undergone a change of government due to revolution, the results of which threaten other states, ipso facto cease to be members of the European alliance . . . If, owing to such alteration, immediate danger threatens other states, the powers bind themselves, by peaceful means, or if need be by arms, to bring back the guilty State into the bosom of the Great Alliance." Disregarding the opposition, Metternich and Alexander succeeded in having the Congress adjourned to Laibach. Meanwhile, Austria proceeded to carry out the will of the Troppau Congress by suppressing the revolutions in Naples and Piedmont.

In 1822, European developments brought about another Congress at Verona, the last meeting in which Great Britain participated. Before it convened, the death of Castlereagh, a revolt of the Greeks against Turkish overlordship, and the threat of French intervention in Spain changed the entire complexion of the assemblage. Canning, called a "Malevolent meteor" by Metternich, had no faith in international co-operation, and believed that England could benefit more from isolationism in foreign affairs than through co-operation. Despite British objections, however, the revolutions in Spain and
Greece threatened to provoke interventions on the part of the Concert of Europe.

When the Greeks rose against the Turks, Alexander, despite his professions of conservatism, found his sympathies engaged on the side of the insurrectionists. Having special historic interests in the Ottoman Empire he insisted that he be allowed to intervene in Greece as Austria had in Italy. He called the attention of the entire world to the fact that he was the protector of the Greek Christians—his co-religionists—and asked his diplomatic colleagues to give him their moral support in a crusade to emancipate the Greeks. But neither Canning nor Metternich seemed to favor Russian intervention in the Balkans. They apparently questioned the purity of Alexander’s intentions and even intimated that his policy had as its main objective the aggrandizement of Russia in the Near East. Preferring to maintain the status quo there, Metternich, by adroit diplomacy, put off the discussion of the Greek question, and thereby delayed Russian intervention.

The Austrian statesman could not block consideration of the Spanish trouble. By 1822 the revolutionary situation in that country had become so menacing that France decided to intervene. Therefore she asked the powers at Verona to approve her plan to re-establish law and order in Spain. This request precipitated a crisis in the Congress. Canning refused absolutely to be a party to such action, and Wellington, the British plenipotentiary, withdrew from the meeting. The representatives of the other powers, however, reluctantly granted France the right to intervene. In 1823 she suppressed the Spanish revolution and re-established the Old Regime.

Restored to his throne (1814–1833), Ferdinand VII of Spain asked Metternich to call a congress to settle once and for all the revolutionary movement in South America. In making this request the Spanish monarch had the complete support of France who opposed the expansion of British interests in Hispanic America. But Great Britain refused to send representatives to this proposed meeting. Therefore the other nations, lacking sufficient naval forces to crush the revolutionary movement in the new world, decided not to act.

Ferdinand’s attempt to bring about foreign intervention in South America led to one important act—the enunciation of the famous Monroe Doctrine. In this declaration, based on a message to Congress of President Monroe, the United States proclaimed the separation of European and American interests, declaring that, while she would refrain from interfering in the affairs of Europe, no continental power would be permitted to interfere in the affairs of the American continent, or to appropriate colonies there. In short, the Mon-
roe Doctrine, issued with the blessing of Canning, was the diplomatic means whereby the strongest power in the New World informed the great states of Europe that they must not extend their dictatorship to North and South America. This proclamation of nonintervention differed in form but not in spirit from the protests of Castlereagh and Canning. It outlined the foreign policy which the United States was to pursue henceforth, and it was followed by formal recognition of the independence of the Spanish colonies by the United States and by Great Britain.

Despite the breach in the solidarity of the Concert of Europe over the Hispanic-American situation, Alexander I in 1824 called another congress to consider the Near-Eastern problem. Great Britain refused to send a representative to this meeting, but the delegates of the other four powers met in St. Petersburg in 1825. After several months of discussion this assembly was adjourned without having come to any important decisions. Thereafter Metternich’s international system rapidly collapsed. In 1827, England, France, and Russia created a Triple Alliance to handle the Turkish question; in 1830 the Concert failed to act when the French and Belgian revolutions succeeded; and, in 1834, France and Great Britain, deserting the cause of conservatism, arranged alliances with the constitutional parties in Spain and Portugal. In short, Metternich’s attempt at five-power co-operation had given way to an international individualism, described by Canning as: “Every nation for itself, and God for us all.”

La gloire de Napoléon n'est pas égalee—elle ne sera jamais effacée.
The drawing is from a rebus of 1840.

Collateral Reading

F. B. Artz, Reaction and Revolution, 1814–1832 (1934).
G. Bruun, Europe and the French Imperium (1938).
CHAPTER IX

Conservatism, Liberalism, and Radicalism, 1815–1848

AFTER Napoleon, Europe experienced a general economic depression. During the many years of war, industry, commerce, and in some places agriculture had been practically destroyed. Thousands of people were without jobs and food, while governments, facing tremendous debts, seemed powerless to aid them or to find solutions for the ills which beset them.

In France the situation after 1815 was especially critical. She was practically defenseless; her soil was occupied by her enemies; her man power had been sadly depleted; her trade was practically destroyed, and the demands of her conquerors had emptied the treasury. To meet this situation the government, disregarding the fact that her bonds were selling at 57, floated a new loan. But poor harvests and food prices so high that people could scarcely afford to live precipitated a crisis in 1816. To stave off famine the government was forced to regulate the price of wheat.

Great Britain, conqueror of France, also encountered economic difficulties. During the war she had enjoyed a period of prosperity. Prices of agricultural products and manufactured goods increased, and owners of farms and factories were able to pay good wages to workers who managed to avoid military service. After the war those engaged in the spinning and weaving industries, especially, suffered severe cuts in wages and frequently lost their jobs. Not only the collapse of the war market, but also the substitution of the power-loom for the hand-loom weaver contributed to this decline. Other lines of industrial and commercial activity suffered correspondingly, and soon there were thousands of unemployed whose prospects of being
rehired were very slight. Social unrest was the natural result of this depression. Hungry weavers begged Parliament to intervene in their behalf or to send them to Canada. Thousands of them urged that the power-loom be abolished by law, and, failing in their attempts to bring about this legislation, they tried to destroy the machines which, they said, "were devouring the bread of their children." At the same time they asked Parliament to establish a legal minimum wage scale, adequate for the maintenance of a family. "Unfortunately," wrote a contemporary, "it was beyond human power to grant their prayer. A better weaver than they had arisen. The hand-loom had to be put away among the rubbish of the past, and the poor workman had to endure a life of ever deepening want till he died."

Profits as well as wages collapsed after Napoleon. During the war rents had more than doubled and the high prices of foodstuffs and manufactured goods had enabled many farmers and industrialists to accumulate fortunes. Determined to maintain prosperity for the great landowners at least, lawmakers—representatives of the landed gentry for the most part—decided to keep up the prices of foodstuffs, especially grain. They realized that a drop in the cost of living would have provided cheap food for the masses, but they also knew that it would bring about a decline in profits for the landowners. To avoid this calamity a new corn law was passed in 1815. It provided that no foreign grain was to be imported until wheat in the home market had reached, for a period of six months, the prohibitive price of 80 shillings per quarter. Thus the domestic market was preserved as a virtual monopoly for the capitalistic, farming aristocrats.

High taxes delayed economic recovery in Great Britain as well as in France. During the Napoleonic Wars England devoted a tremendous amount of money to the support of her soldiers, her sailors, and her allies. Between 1793 and 1815, for example, she furnished the allies over sixty-eight million pounds. When the war came to an end these debts had to be paid by the British people. To collect sufficient money for this purpose and yet not impair governmental credit, Parliament levied taxes on tobacco, malt, paper, and salt. These and other taxes bore most heavily on the working classes—the poor weaver, for example, paid nearly half of his income to the government in direct or indirect taxation. In commenting on this high cost of wars and government Sidney Smith, a contemporary, wrote:

The school boy whips his taxed top; the beardless youth manages his taxed horse with a taxed bridle on a taxed road, and the dying Englishman, pouring his medicine which has paid seven percent into a spoon which has paid fifteen percent, flings himself upon his chintz bed which
has paid twenty-two percent, and expires in the arms of an apothecary, who has paid a license of one hundred pounds for the privilege of putting him to death. His whole property is then immediately taxed from two to ten percent. Large fees are demanded for burying him in the chancel; his virtues are handed down to posterity on taxed marble; and he is then gathered to his Father—to be taxed no more.

Reactionaries took advantage of the social discontent, stimulated by the depression, to assume the role of defenders of law and order and to advance their interests thereby. Determined to prevent another revolution, conservative statesmen, privileged nobles and clerics, wealthy businessmen, country gentlemen, and reactionary intellectuals—all opposed liberal tendencies. Under their guidance governments ordered the police to spy upon persons suspected of being engaged in the promotion of subversive ideas or acts. People were cautioned against making ill-considered remarks. Parents were to keep their children, teachers their pupils, and employers their workmen, off the streets. To keep the peace was to be the citizens’ first duty. In Great Britain, for example, conservative leaders tried to stifle discontent by passing the famous Six Acts (1819), forbidding military exercises without permission, curtailing freedom of assembly, and establishing a stamp tax on pamphlets, similar to that imposed on newspapers. In the Germanies, Metternich, the same year, forced the Diet of the Germanic Confederation to enact the famous Carlsbad Decrees regulating the press, intimidating university professors and students, and curbing public opinion.

A wave of romantic reaction gave the exponents of the Old Regime a moral basis for their repressive policies. This romanticism (which developed into the transcendental Idealism of the German philosophers) rejected the emphasis of the seventeenth and eighteenth century rationalists upon reason which they declared was anarchic. Instead, the romanticists asserted that faith was binding and constructive. Recognizing the importance of the individual, they maintained that human nature was the product of man’s instincts and feelings; and that his instructive and emotional life served to dominate and paint for him both his view of the world and his conception of human life. In other words, the poet or the saint was a truer guide on the pathway of life and thought than the scientist. Religion and morality were not sciences but matters of the heart. The romanticists developed an organic conception of society, believing that individuals were chiefly significant insofar as they were parts of the whole. They thought of society as co-operative, in which each class had its own interests and responsibilities. Influenced by these concepts, the romanticists favored the repudiation of eighteenth century
atheism, free thinking, and politico-economic individualism, and the re-establishment of the supremacy of God, and an idealized feudalism.¹

Like their intellectual defenders, the privileged classes in Europe were, on the whole, less liberal than they had been before the French Revolution. Churchmen, aristocrats, and monarchs joined in sharing the first fruits of Waterloo and trying to hold them. An ancient title again became the surest guarantee of preferment at court, in the army and navy, and in the Church. Oblivious to the fact that they were living in a changing world, the privileged classes still clung to the social patterns of the Middle Ages. Devout advocates of tradition, they tended to rely upon the aid of the Church in their opposition to revolutionary transformation. In France, bishops and priests of the Roman Catholic Church, reacting to the attacks of intellectuals and of revolutionary leaders on their spiritual and temporal powers, supported the nobility. Maintaining that unrestrained freedom would result in an atheistic world, they opposed civil marriages, divorces, public schools, and other modern tendencies. In Great Britain, Protestants also defended tradition and authority. Episcopalian, Methodists, and other denominations worked consciously or unconsciously for law and order. “None of us,” stated the Statute of the Wesleyan Body, “shall either in writing or in speech speak lightly or irreverently of the government.” Without authority and faith society could not endure, believed the Pietists of Germany. Even the upper bourgeoisie—merchants and bankers—feared political and social extremes. They disliked the economic and social restrictions of despotism, but at the same time they were alarmed at the potentialities of unrestricted license. Like the aristocrats, they ignored the rights of the lower classes, and favored a government of, and by, and for, the propertied classes.

Conservatives, however, were unable to extinguish the fire of liberalism. After 1815, persons of liberal inclinations still persisted in preaching the gospel of constitutionalism, republicanism, social equality, and freedom for suppressed nationalities. In England and France such champions of change were making the greatest advances. Challenging the supremacy of the landowning and commercial classes, a new social group within the bourgeoisie, the manufacturers, became articulate. These captains of industry demanded the establishment in England, and later on, in France, of a political and social order which would make success dependent on economic proficiency rather than upon social or religious position. Self-made men, who had emerged from poverty and obscurity as a result of the Industrial

¹ For discussion of Romanticism in literature, see pp. 307–308.
Revolution, became devout exponents of the laissez-faire doctrines of Adam Smith and the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham. Believing money to be the chief criterion of success, these individualists subscribed to Bentham's idea, expressed in his *Principles of Morals and Legislation* and *Universal and Perpetual Peace*, that all institutions which stood in the way of individual economic advancement should be abolished. Antiquated laws, autocracy, aristocracy, theocracy—these and other obstacles to bourgeois progress, they insisted, must give way to more useful and efficient institutions which would promote the greatest good for the greatest number. An ideal state, they believed, should be ruled by the taxpayers, and should maintain law and order, the sanctity of property, and defend its citizens against alien attacks. It should not, as it had in the past, regulate the economic activities of its citizens. In short, each person should work out his own economic salvation; the duty of government was merely to protect life and property at a minimum of cost.

These exponents of the bourgeois state were firm advocates of constitutional government. In their opinion a constitution was a device which would establish and protect their ideals. It was the supreme law, to which all secular rulers were subordinate, and its existence was a guarantee of the assertedly inalienable rights of the individual, such as life, liberty, and private property. In short, the purpose of a constitution was to define and to describe the legal rights of the citizen and the structure and operation of the government which was to secure his enjoyment of these rights. But it need not establish democratic government. Instead it might better create a representative government in which the bourgeoisie could protect their economic interests through the ballot. Thus freedom, in the economic sphere although not necessarily in politics, was the watchword of liberals in the nineteenth century. Individual liberty, said Henri Benjamin Constant (1767–1830) in his work *The Spirit of Conquest and Usurpation*, was a fundamental of human society, for it determined morality and economic progress, and it alone made for human advancement. In his advocacy of liberty, Constant, however, did not champion political democracy. "Wealth and its twin brother leisure," he said, "alone render a man capable of exercising political rights."

Bourgeois emphasis upon freedom was also a vital factor in the development of nationalism. It is true that the idea of self-determination in Italy, the Germanies, and in the Balkans originally was not of bourgeois origin. People of all classes in these and other lands, in order to justify their right to national independence, were inspired by the romanticism of their day which emphasized the unifying cultural aspects of their glorious past. But, gradually, in the nineteenth
century, nationalism, like individualism, became a bourgeois ideal. Both were incompatible with the co-operative beliefs of the Middle Ages and of modern socialism. Thus, the bourgeoisie, convinced that economic individualism was the secret of success, soon saw in nationalism a means by which they as Frenchmen, Englishmen, or Germans might advance their personal interests and perhaps acquire wealth—under the guise of patriotism.

During the nineteenth century nationalism became an important check on internationalism as well as on unfettered individualism. There arose a growing emphasis upon the supremacy in all matters of the national state. Miscellaneous types of internationalists, such as ultramontanists, socialists, and communists, and disciples of complete individualism, such as anarchists, came to be regarded as enemies of the existing order and of patriotism. Partly responsible for this practical loyalty were the captains of industry. With the overthrow of the old order and its replacement by a new one, those in power, the wealthy bourgeoisie, exploited patriotism as a means whereby they could check any group which threatened their rule or their economic power. Nationalism, welding together people of all classes, seemed the most inspiring doctrine of all and one of the valuable assets of the new regime; to the bourgeoisie it was an insurance policy—a safeguard which would absolutely protect them against the attacks of their enemies. To the early nineteenth century exponents of nationalism, the romanticists, however, it was more than an inspiring doctrine or an insurance policy; it was a religion. These intense patriots insisted that nationalism was the greatest influence in life. Epitomizing all that was moral, it was something that a man should be ready to die for—yes, and to kill for also.

Between 1815 and 1848 nationalist and democratic movements resulted in disorders and revolutions in all parts of Europe and the New World. Varying in intensity and in direction, according to local conditions, the agitations achieved different degrees of success. Prior to 1848 little headway was made by the forces of liberalism in Russia, Austria, and Prussia, but in Great Britain, France, Belgium, Greece, and in the various Hispanic-American countries, a considerable measure of success was attained. Despite numerous failures, the revolts during the period were of tremendous importance; they created the foundation upon which was to be built the modern capitalist-bourgeois state.

Curiously enough the backward, agrarian states of Serbia and Greece were the first to achieve nationalist success. Led by a brave but rather primitive pig-dealer, Kara George, the Serbs, in 1804, inaugurated a struggle to overthrow Turkish control. It was not until
1830, however, that they were able to gain autonomy. Stimulated by the uprising of the Serbs, the Greeks in 1821 launched their rebellion. Admirers of antique culture, liberals, and Christians throughout the world, sympathized with the Greeks in their attempt to regain their freedom and restore the glorious past. Lord Byron, and numerous other Europeans, for example, participated personally in the revolution. Desirous of destroying the Ottoman Empire and acquiring Constantinople, Russia decided upon direct intervention on behalf of these Hellenic co-religionists. But Austria ruled over millions of Slavs, and Great Britain and France feared Slav dominance in the Balkans; therefore, the two Western states agreed to co-operate with the czar in forcing mediation on the Turks. When the sultan demurred, however, the combined fleets of the three Christian powers in 1827 destroyed a Turko-Egyptian fleet at the battle of Navarino. Apologizing for this "unfortunate incident," Great Britain withdrew her forces and left Russia a free hand. Declaring war upon Turkey in 1828 Russia defeated the forces of the sultan and enabled the Greeks by the Peace of Adrianople (1829) to secure their independence. Thereupon the Kingdom of Greece was founded under the joint guarantee of Great Britain, France, and Russia.

Although Russia aided the Greeks in their struggle for freedom, she was more orthodox when it came to liberal revolts at home. In 1825 a group of young military officers launched the Decembrist Revolt for the purpose of establishing a constitutional government. Their uprising was promptly squelched by the czar. Five years later the Poles, perhaps encouraged by the revolution of 1830 in France, started a fight for independence. Nicholas I, the reactionary czar (1825–1855), who had ignored Alexander's constitution which permitted autonomy to the Poles, acted quickly and put down the revolution. The leaders were punished; the constitution was annulled; and all vestiges of autonomy were swept away.

The Belgians in 1830 also engaged in a nationalist uprising. For a time this struggle between Catholic, industrial Belgium, and Protestant and commercial Holland threatened to bring about international complications. France favored the dissolution of the buffer state created at Vienna, and even planned a union between the French and Belgian peoples. Great Britain also decided not to oppose the national aspirations of the Belgians, but, at the same time, determined to prevent a Franco-Belgian union. After some Anglo-French wrangling, which nearly led to armed hostilities, the independence of Belgium was recognized (1831) under the rule of Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg Gotha, uncle of England's Queen Victoria. Holland,

1 See p. 235.
backed by Russia, withheld her acceptance. In 1839 general recognition, however, was accorded to the new Belgian kingdom when, in order to forestall future wars over this strategically-located country, the great powers of Europe, guaranteed her neutrality. It was this treaty that was violated by Germany in 1914 and was described by her chancellor as a "scrap of paper."

Liberal and nationalist movements developed in other small nations of Europe. In Sweden and Denmark attempts were made to establish constitutions; in Norway a nationalist group urged separation from Sweden; in Switzerland Catholic-Protestant antagonism, and rivalries between cantons inhabited by people who spoke French, German, and Italian, resulted (1847) in a civil war and the establishment of a unified government. A constitution, creating a federal republic, with cantonal democracy, was adopted.

In the Mediterranean countries (Spain, Portugal, and Italy) and in the Germanies, the revolutionary movements were unsuccessful. The issues of Spain and Portugal were curiously parallel. Both states were involved in dynastic and constitutional struggles and in the process of losing their large colonial empires. King Ferdinand VII of Spain tried, after his return in 1814, to extinguish all traces of liberalism implanted in Spain during the Napoleonic occupation. Adopting a reactionary policy he restored the Inquisition, returned the wealth taken from the monasteries, persecuted all liberals, and ignored the constitution of 1812 which he had accepted upon his return. Saved by French intervention in 1823 when the constitutionalists threatened to bring about his overthrow, he instituted a reign of terror which lasted until his death in 1833. The constitutional question then became entangled with the dynastic struggle. For seven years Don Carlos, the late king's brother, who had the support of the absolutists and the clericals, fought the followers of Donna Isabella, the young daughter of Ferdinand, who favored the constitutional program. This struggle, however, came to a close in 1840 when Isabella II, with Franco-British support, defeated the Carlists. Her victory did not lead to the establishment of a liberal regime. On the contrary, her rule was a miserable record of confusion, intrigue, and scandal, which dragged on until 1868 when she was expelled as a result of a revolution.

Dynastic struggles also occurred in Portugal. After the revolution of 1820 its King, John VI, who had retired to the Portuguese colony of Brazil upon the French invasion of 1807, returned to Portugal. Thereupon his son, Dom Pedro, became Emperor of Brazil, which declared itself independent of the mother country. Desirous of retaining a dynastic interest in the throne of Portugal, Dom Pedro,
upon the death of his father in 1826, announced that his seven-year-old daughter, Donna Maria de la Gloria, was a candidate for the throne of Portugal. But an uncle of the young lady, Dom Miguel, disputed her claims. Backed by the absolutists and clerics he therefore engaged in a short struggle with the constitutionalists, who supported Donna Maria. With French and British aid Dom Pedro in 1834 finally succeeded in establishing his daughter on the throne. Her reign, like that of her Spanish counterpart, was repressive and turbulent. Portugal’s transition from medievalism to modernism, hindered by poverty and by acute social and economic distresses, presented an unsavory spectacle.

Constitutional and national movements failed in Italy. After Napoleon’s downfall, reactionaries restored the Old Regime. Split into numerous political divisions that unfortunate country therefore became the prey of selfish despotism, helpless divisionalism, and alien (Austrian) influence. In certain parts of that peninsula the Napoleonic code was retained, but clericalism, feudalism, and autocracy again prevailed for the most part. Despite their war on revolutionary ideology, reactionaries were never able to eradicate the impulse toward national unity and democracy. Secret societies flourished in all parts of Italy, agitating in behalf of liberalism and nationalism. Of these organizations the Carbonari was the most famous. Its origin is obscure and is frequently connected with Freemasonry. Appearing in southern Italy and Sicily just before Napoleon’s fall, it advocated certain liberal changes. Soon it spread throughout Europe. Everywhere it consisted of groups of twenty, with a certain ritual based on the charcoal-burner’s trade. Revolutions and uprisings in Naples (1820), in Piedmont (1821), and in other parts of Italy were aided by the Carbonari. But the disorders were quickly suppressed by Austrian troops.

Three leaders helped to change the situation in the peninsula. In 1831 Mazzini, a young idealist from Genoa, organized the Young Italy Society. Visualizing the unification of his country, the creation of an Italian republic, and the maintenance of European peace by a federation of republics, this eloquent prophet made the cause of a liberal and a united Italy into a popular, well-organized movement, both at home and abroad. The Young Italy Society, with its direct appeal to the young people and to idealists, soon supplanted the Carbonari as the most significant revolutionary agency. Another leader, Charles Albert of Sardinia, also came from the north. Succeeding to the throne of Sardinia in 1831, he gradually adopted the cause of moderate reform then being preached by the Italian intellectual, Gioberti. There was already a large following of patriots, rather than
of revolutionaries. They desired educational and economic improvements, but nursed the hope of a federal union, under the presidency of the Pope. This proposal at first gained support from the third great leader of this period, Pope Pius IX, who ascended the Papacy in 1846. This liberal Pope gave impetus to reform in Italy. Upon his elevation Pius IX freed political prisoners, released Jews from the Ghetto at Rome, opened certain posts in the Papal States to laymen, admitted political newspapers, and advocated economic improvements. The outburst of papal liberalism astounded the reactionaries throughout Europe. Denouncing Pius for his liberalism, Metternich overawed the pontiff by sending troops into Ferrara. A wave of indignation and Austrophobe sentiment swept Italy which enabled Charles Albert to emerge by 1848 as the liberal leader of the nationalist movement in Italy.

By 1848 Metternich faced revolutionary opposition in central Europe as well as in Italy. Between 1815 and 1848 political decentralization and Austrian domination prevailed in the Germanies even more than in Italy. As stated before, thirty-nine states were bound together in a loose Germanic Confederation. The same inequality among the various states persisted as in the days of the Holy Roman Empire. Austria, the president of the confederation, and Prussia, the vice-president, were powers of international rank. Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, Württemberg, Baden and others were middle-sized states which, jealous of one another, wielded comparatively little influence. A number of states were attached to foreign powers—Hanover, being an appendage of the English crown until 1837; Holstein, belonging to the King of Denmark; and Luxemburg, being ruled by the King of the Netherlands. Other tiny states, relics of feudalism, were insignificant.

There was no central government capable of overcoming these divisions and of establishing national unity. The confederation, as set up at Vienna, restricted the sovereignty of the members to only a slight degree: in the event of war against the confederation, each state bound itself not to make an alliance with the enemy. It possessed neither executive organization, nor federal armaments. There was the Diet of Frankfurt, which represented the governments of the various states, but it had no power to enforce its decisions, requiring a two-thirds majority in important matters and a unanimous vote in questions involving fundamental laws, organic institutions, individual rights, and religious affairs.

This lack of unity in the Germanies enabled Austria under the guidance of Metternich to dominate the Confederation. Determined to preserve the federal principles in Central Europe and the mo-
archical ideal in each state, he strenuously opposed the introduction of liberal ideas. The willingness of Frederick William of Prussia and lesser princes to grant political concessions—even constitutions to their subjects—encountered the Austrian chancellor’s opposition. Taking advantage of a student demonstration at the Wartburg in Weimar (1817), on the anniversary of the beginning of the German Protestant Revolt and of the Battle of Leipzig, and of the assassination of a conservative agent of Russia, Kotzebue, in 1819, Metternich was able to force acceptance throughout Germany of the repressive Carlsbad Decrees. Under the political reaction which ensued liberalism was able to make but little headway in the Germanies. A few minor disturbances—a burlesque revolution in Baden, small uprisings in Hesse, Hanover, Brunswick, and Saxony, and some student demonstrations in Hanover—slightly ruffled the apparent calm which lasted in Germany until 1848.¹

Beneath the surface, however, the desire for unity expressed itself in a German nationalism which gained support from all classes. Intellectuals—philosophers, scientists, composers, artists, students, and merchants in the various German states—revealed their zeal by writing stimulating books, by making significant discoveries, and by composing distinguished music. In their writings Kant, Fichte (1762–1814) and Herder glorified the German people, and Heine (1797–1856) urged the establishment of democracy and unity. In their music Beethoven (1770–1827) and Richard Wagner (1813–1883) reflected the aspirations of individuals and the collective want of the community. Actually, this German Renaissance, sung by poets and musicians, advocated by teachers, and propagated by student societies, was highly tinged with romanticism. It looked back with longing to the great traditions of medieval Germany, and with angry passion, mingled with pride, to the War of Liberation in 1813. “What is the German Fatherland?” cried Arndt, a famous German intellectual. “Where every Frenchman is called an enemy and every German is called a friend.”²

In the early nineteenth century, German nationalism, filled with romantic mysticism and anti-French passion, was vague and confused as to any practical program of German unity. A rather active group of patriots tended to favor the idea of a Great Germany which should include Austria; another advocated a Little Germany which would exclude the Habsburg Empire and accept the leadership of Prussia. A number of German states, including Bavaria, urged a scheme for uniting Germany under three heads—Austria, Prussia, and Bavaria.

¹See pp. 201–205.
The Austrian Empire was a real obstacle; if it were included, with its large groups of non-German subjects, then the Fatherland would be too diluted; if it were excluded, then the Germans of Upper Austria and the Tyrol would be lost to their nation. It was this same difficulty which prevented Austria from taking the leading role in the nationalist movement. Aware of this situation and determined to maintain Habsburg rule over German and non-German peoples, Metternich tried to nullify all plans for German unity. But he represented a lost cause.

Austria's opposition to nationalism enabled her great rival, Prussia, to become the logical leader in the move to create a German state. During the Napoleonic Wars her armies, thanks to the regeneration of Prussia conducted after Jena by Stein, Scharnhorst, and other leaders, played an important role in destroying the French empire. Her military success also enabled her diplomats at Vienna to secure for Prussia valuable territorial and other profits, rewards which helped her to lay the foundation of a strong modern state. After Napoleon's overthrow Prussia strengthened her position in central Europe by creating the Zollverein, an economic customs agreement which tended to promote union in north Germany. Prior to 1818 most German states had tariff frontiers which greatly hindered their economic development. Wishing to promote prosperity, Prussia negotiated, between 1819 and 1842, tariff agreements with her neighboring states. These agreements by abolishing numerous customs duties not only reduced the price of manufactured goods to consumers, but also stimulated the expansion of commerce and industry, thus contributing to the prosperity of the business classes. Impressed by the success of this policy other states entered into the Zollverein; in 1848 it included practically all of them, except Austria. By keeping her rival out of this economic league, Prussia played the leading part in the economic unification of Germany, and, by so doing, established herself as the logical leader in the movement for political unity.

While the Germans were trying to attain national solidarity, the French were attempting to achieve political stability. Louis XVIII (1814–1824) handed down to his subjects a charter which vaguely recognized social equality and preserved most of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic reforms. He also accepted a Parliament consisting of a Chamber of Peers and an elective Chamber of Deputies. Limited suffrage and a ministry not responsible to the assembly enabled the king and the propertied classes to control the state. This attempt to establish a government which was essentially an absolutism, with a mere gesture toward the sovereign nation, proved unsatisfactory to a
great majority of the French people. Reactionaries demanded the complete restoration of the Old Regime, while liberals urged concessions in the direction of constitutional democracy.

Louis XVIII, old, indolent, and unimaginative, wanted to maintain the status quo. He found it difficult, however, to control the liberal impulses which appeared among the people and in the Chamber of Deputies, and impossible to tame the nobles, the émigrés, the clergy, and even his own ministers, who, devoted to absolutism and feudalism, were staunch ultra-royalists. Aroused by reactionary enthusiasm, these die-hards launched a White Terror in southern France, assailing and frequently murdering republicans and Bonapartists. In the Chamber of Deputies, an ultra-royalist majority, elected in 1815, passed laws in violation of the charter and demanded the punishment of Napoleon’s generals. Despite this reactionary outburst, the king, in his attempt to maintain a moderate policy, reduced the size of the army, abolished conscription, and adhered to the charter. The assassination of the Duc de Berri, heir to the throne, in 1820, however, put the ultra-royalists in power. Laws were now passed which interfered with individual liberty, repealed the divorce act, and conferred a double vote upon the wealthy classes. Taking advantage of this reactionary wave, the clerical party increased its hold over national education and asserted its claims for the restoration of ecclesiastical lands. This attempt to re-establish the Old Regime aroused the bitter opposition of the masses. Peasants and bourgeoisie began to fear the loss of the lands secured during the Revolution. Businessmen predicted economic catastrophe as a result of the heavy taxes, governmental corruption, and the restoration of feudal regulations and restrictions. Secret societies, agitating for revolution, appeared in various parts of France. An increasingly large group of men were convinced that a constitutional monarchy alone could preserve the nation from disaster.

Ignoring this revival of liberalism, Charles X, who succeeded his brother, Louis XVIII, in 1824, dedicated his life to the restoration of “the good old days.” Idol of the ultra-royalists, this old man, who boasted that he and Lafayette had not changed since 1789, prepared to advance the cause of his nobles and clerics. Bishops were given greater powers and an attempt was made to bind more closely the throne and the altar. “There is no such thing as political experience,” wrote Wellington. “With the warning of James II before him, Charles X is setting up government by priests, through priests, and for priests.” Sacrilege again became a crime punishable by death; censorship of the press was instituted; the re-establishment of primogeniture was proposed; and a huge financial indemnity was granted.
to the émigrés for the losses which they had suffered during the Revolution.

In 1830 a revolution in Paris swept Charles X from the throne. In his attempt to suppress the opposition, the king had appointed as his chief minister in 1829, Prince de Polignac, an ultra-clerical and royalist reactionary. Public opinion, already critical of Charles's ultra-royalism, was antagonized by his choice of minister. Everywhere the monarch was being criticized. Exasperated, he retaliated against his detractors by issuing the four famous ordinances of July 25, 1830, suspending liberty of press, dissolving the chamber, altering the franchise, and summoning a new parliament. This provoked a revolution. Demanding at first the establishment of a republic, but later, as a result of Lafayette's influence, a limited bourgeois monarchy, the masses of Paris attacked the royal troops and built barricades in the streets of the city. Continuously weeping, the last Bourbon King of France wisely decided to abdicate, going as an exile to London, where he is said to have registered in a hotel as Mr. Smith. A provisional government was now set up, and Louis Philippe, of the House of Orleans, related to the royal family, was asked by a French banker to ascend the throne. Accepting this invitation with a show of reluctance, Louis Philippe now became the first "Citizen-King of the French." The Revolution of 1830 thus brought to an end in France the divine-right monarchy. Henceforth the people, especially the wealthy businessmen, were to have a voice in the government.

After 1815 the Old Regime declined in Great Britain as well as in France. The land-owning aristocrats dominated the government through the Tory party. But the Technological and Industrial Revolutions, as we have seen, brought into existence a powerful group of middle-class men—the manufacturers. They soon opposed the Tory government, which they believed catered only to the interests of the landowners, and joined the small farmers, businessmen, and the wage earners in a concerted move to dethrone the landed gentry. To reach this objective they determined to destroy the political monopoly enjoyed by conservative members of the Church of England. In 1828 the disabilities from which Protestant Dissenters suffered were removed by the abolition of the requirement that all officeholders should take the sacrament according to the rites of the Church of England and should make a declaration against the doctrine of transubstantiation. In the following year Parliament, after a long and bitter controversy, passed the Catholic Emancipation Act, which permitted Catholics to sit henceforth in either house of Parliament and to hold, with few exceptions, municipal and national offices. Having

1 See pp. 100-104; 188-189.
granted political rights to these religious groups who, for the most part, opposed the landowners, the liberals, led by Lord John Russell, introduced a Reform Bill in the House of Commons. It aimed to bring about a redistribution of seats on a more equitable plan, and a withdrawal of the rights of representation from depopulated boroughs in favor of the large towns and cities. The passage of this Reform Bill, as we shall see, marked the decline, in 1832, of aristocratic rule, but it did not signify the establishment of a democracy. Small farmers, petty businessmen, and wage earners who had favored the bill were still denied the ballot. Like their brothers in France they merely had exchanged one set of masters, the landowning aristocrats, for another, the wealthy bourgeoisie. Democracy was still around the corner in England as it was in most parts of the continent.

**The Revolutions of 1848**

In 1848 a large part of Europe was in a restless, disturbed, and expectant state. Men were wearied of the old order and were demanding democratic reforms, social equality, a more popular system of education, separation of church and state, and national independence. As in England and America, and in France before 1789, the Old Regime was gradually disintegrating in Europe, and the revolutions of 1848 served to hasten this process.

With the beginning of that year, risings broke out in Italy as well as in other parts of Europe. By March, 1848, constitutional governments had been established in all the leading Italian states, save those under Austrian control. Then came the news that a revolution in Vienna had forced Metternich to flee. Immediately a strong anti-Austrian feeling swept Italy which led to a series of revolts against Austrian control. In Milan the citizens succeeded in driving out the imperial troops. Venice did likewise and proclaimed a republic. The Austrian rulers of Modena and Parma fled, and Habsburg authority seemed to have collapsed. There was a widespread demand for a war of liberation to expel the Austrians and to unite Italy under any Italian prince deemed worthy to assume the sacred task. Some favored a federation under the presidency of Pope Pius IX, but the establishment of Italian unity under the rule of the Nationalist king, Charles Albert of Sardinia, appeared more feasible. Insisting that there could be but one leader in this emergency, the young Count Cavour, editor of the *Risorgimento*, a liberal newspaper, recommended Charles Albert. "The supreme hour of the Sardinian monarchy has sounded. There is only one path open to the government, the nation, the King,—immediate war."

\[1\] See pp. 273-274.
On March 23, Charles Albert proclaimed war on Austria. Leopold of Tuscany joined him; and the Pope and Ferdinand of Naples promised to send troops. Before the struggle got under way, however, the national movement was undermined through the withdrawal of papal and Bourbon support as a result of Austrian protests. Sole remaining hope of the nationalists, Charles Albert was a patriotic prince, but a poor statesman and an incompetent soldier. Disregarding certain defections within the ranks and stimulated by the enthusiasm of his immediate followers, the foolish king rushed headlong against the Austrians. In July, he was defeated at the battle of Custozza. Thereupon he was forced to sign a capitulation, leaving Lombardy to the Austrians. Sardinia's defeat did not bring the war of liberation to an end; it precipitated the popular phase of the struggle. "The War of the Princes is finished," said the Mazzinian and republican element, "that of the peoples is begun." Meanwhile a republic was proclaimed in Venice; the temporal power of the Papacy was overthrown; and republics were set up in Rome and Tuscany.

Pius IX repented his alliance with liberalism. Suspecting Charles Albert of secretly planning the establishment of a centralized monarchy instead of a confederation, the Pope dissociated himself from the cause and commanded his subjects to detach themselves from an ideal which no longer enjoyed the esteem of God. Then he turned against the liberal movement, claiming that it was hostile to the moral and spiritual, as well as the temporal, prerogatives of the Church. Disregarding the opposition of the Pope, Charles Albert and other Italian rulers denounced the Austro-Sardinian armistice and renewed the war. Again the Italians were defeated, this time at Novara (1849), and the Sardinian ruler, rather than submit to a humiliating peace, abdicated. Victor Emmanuel II, his son, now had to arrange a settlement with Austria.

Charles's abdication marked the failure, at least for the time being, of the democratic and nationalist movement throughout Italy. Reactionary Bourbon rule was re-established in southern Italy and Sicily; and Rome, after a brilliant defense conducted by Garibaldi, was taken over by French troops sent by Louis Napoleon as a gesture to the Catholic Church in France and in order to uphold French prestige in Italy. In August, 1849, Venice was conquered by Austrian soldiers. Thus the forces of reaction triumphed, as one by one all the little Italian republics were extinguished. In most of Italy darkness seemed again to have fallen upon the cause of liberals and nationalists. Only in Sardinia, where Victor Emmanuel II refused to abandon the constitution which his father had created, did the light of liberalism still gleam.
The revolutions of 1848 in Central Europe resembled those of Italy in traversing a cycle of promising success, war, defeat, and extinction. At first these uprisings in Austria, Schleswig-Holstein, Prussia, Hanover, Württemberg, Bavaria, Baden, and in the smaller states, were generally successful. Constitutions were established; liberal ministries were created; and freedom of speech and press was promised. "Kings shook hands with the leaders of revolutions, their soldiers fraternized everywhere with the mob; professors appeared as prime ministers; and students, artisans, and shopkeepers sat as deputies in newly summoned popular legislatures."

Plans to emancipate the serfs (already freed in Prussia in 1807), to extend toleration to the Jews, and to create equality of opportunity, presaged the establishment in Central Europe of bourgeois-capitalist regimes.

Temporarily, Prussia took the lead in this liberal movement. Its king, Frederick William IV, who ascended the throne in 1840, was regarded by many as a national leader. He seemed to justify this reputation when, in 1847, he called for the first time a United Prussian Diet and declared his intention of settling the German question. Informed of these unseemly gestures, Metternich and Czar Nicholas I were shocked, believing that their good neighbor had deserted the cause of law and order—the Old Regime. But they soon discovered that Frederick William had no intention of granting his subjects real political power, for he dismissed the diet before any constitutional changes could be enacted. Nevertheless, the mere convocation of that body had greatly encouraged the liberals, who now proceeded to agitate throughout Germany for reform.

In 1848 the revolution broke upon a German people seething with excitement and unrest. Frederick William IV of Prussia, yielding to the liberal and nationalist demands, summoned the diet to discuss the constitution, and assumed the role of leader in Germany of the national movement. Wearing a black, red, and gold sash, the colors of the Holy Roman Empire, he headed a procession through the streets of Berlin. "I have today," he declared, "assumed the German colors, and have placed my people under the revered banner of the German Empire. Prussia's interests shall henceforth be those of Germany."

While the Prussian king was planning the unification of Germany, an important attempt to rebuild a united Germany was being made in the federal capital. Meeting in Frankfurt (May, 1848), a national parliament, consisting of leading liberal thinkers and reformers of the Germanies, discuss the creation of a new constitution for a united nation. Ignoring the princes, the president, at the beginning of the

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1 Grant and Temperley, Europe, 1789-1914, p. 225.
sessions, declared, "We derive our authority for this purpose from the sovereignty of the nation. Germany desires to be a single state ruled by the will of its peoples with the co-operation of all its members." Numerous obstacles, however, confronted the delegates in their attempts to reconstruct Germany. Especially difficult were such problems as the rivalry of Austria and Prussia, the antagonisms between the northern and southern states, and the choice as to a monarchy or a republic. After prolonged and faintly academic discussions, a constitution, providing for a unified nation with an emperor to be selected from among the ruling princes of the Germanies, was finally completed in March, 1849. In April the assembly, deciding to exclude Austria for not being entirely Germanic, and thus to create a little Germany rather than a big Germany, offered the imperial crown to Frederick William IV of Prussia.

The Prussian king by this time had lost much of his interest in the reform movement. Referring to his liberal behavior of the previous March, he commented, "In those days, we all crawled upon our stomachs." Apparently he now preferred to stand upon his reactionary feet. Influenced by the suppression of the revolutionary movements in the Austrian domains, he already had dismissed his liberal advisers, dissolved the Prussian Diet, and re-established royal autocracy. Therefore, when the offer came from Frankfurt, Frederick William, realizing that his desertion of the reactionary cause would bring upon him the bitter opposition of his Habsburg neighbor and other lesser princes, declined the invitation because of its parliamentary and revolutionary basis.

Frederick William's refusal was followed by the disintegration of the Frankfurt Assembly. Plans to create a liberal and a united Germany were modified and then abandoned as the members began to return to their homes. The last remnant of the meeting was dispersed by Austrian troopers. Despite its failure, the assembly achieved one important objective—it had revealed the widespread desire, if not the method, of achieving national unity. Bismarck, architect of the German Empire, as we shall see, was partly indebted to this body for its sound conclusion that unification could not be achieved by the co-operation of Austria and Prussia, but only through the leadership of a single state. In short, the very failure of the Frankfurt Assembly proved that as long as the conflicting interests of Prussia and Austria were balanced in central Europe, a German nation could not be established.

After the dissolution of the assembly both Prussia and Austria tried to introduce certain federal reforms. In 1848 Prussia proposed the

1 See pp. 226-228.
establishment of a new league of northern German states, but this plan was rejected by Austria, who had the support of Russia in her determination to maintain the status quo. Unwilling to risk a war with these powerful neighbors, the Prussian ruler was forced to abandon his plan, and, at the famous interview, or the so-called "humiliation" of Olmütz (1850), to recognize the continued supremacy of the Germanic Confederation. In return the Austrian emperor gave up certain proposals which would have increased his personal power in the Germanies. In 1850, the kingdom of Prussia was not yet prepared to wage a major war in order to dominate central Europe. But this failure did not check the rise of Prussia. It is true that the influence of Frederick William waned after he turned down the offer of the Frankfurt Assembly. Nevertheless, Prussia with her large population and large area, remained the leader of the north German states, largely because of the prosperity which had followed her establishment of the Zollverein. The customs union had introduced a period of great economic development in the Germanies. Profiting, therefore, by this union and also conscious of the inability of the liberals to achieve German political unity, the middle classes supported the autocratic empire created by Bismarck and gained through the construction of a powerful economic state.

Until the nationalist movements in Central Europe and Italy came under the direction of two able leaders, Bismarck and Cavour respectively, Austria remained the pivot upon which their fate turned. In the Austrian Empire, inhabited by twelve different nationalities, the force of national self-determination, instead of being constructive and unifying, as in Germany and Italy, was disruptive and centrifugal. Fully aware of the situation, the emperor and his advisers for forty years had maintained the status quo in order to prevent the spread of revolutionary ideas and to neutralize nationalistic currents. They attempted to do so through censorship of the press and speech and by other repressive measures. The government tried to counteract patriotic movements by a policy of "divide and rule," sending Germans to Hungary, Magyars to Italy, Italians to Galicia, and Poles to Austria. By thus playing off one group against another, the Habsburgs kept them all in a well-tempered state of discontent and prevented them from presenting a united opposition to the Viennese authorities.

Until 1848, Metternich was able, despite occasional difficulties, to check the spread of liberalism. But Austria, a house divided within itself, suffered from antiquated methods of agriculture, constitutional repression, and administrative stagnation. In the early thirties unrest developed in all parts of the empire. Germans, Magyars, and Slavs
voiced constitutional, social, economic, and national grievances. Mounting opposition to the aging Metternich, and the accession of the eccentric Ferdinand I in 1835, hampered the government in its resolve to preserve the status quo. Dissatisfaction became widespread, especially among the subject peoples, the oppressed peasantry, and the bourgeoisie. This unrest finally culminated in revolutionary outbreaks throughout the Habsburg dominions. In 1846, the Galician peasants rose in rebellion. The revolutionary infection soon spread to the Germans, the Czechs, the Magyars, the South Slavs, and the Italians who lived in other parts of the empire. For several months it seemed as if the proud Habsburg state was to fall to pieces. In March, 1848, riots occurred in Vienna; Metternich fled; and the harmless Ferdinand, a few months later, left Vienna. In control of the city, groups of students and bourgeoisie forced the government to promise the people a constitution and an elective assembly. At the same time, concessions were granted to the Czechs, Magyars, and the Galicians; and the Croatian autonomous movement was confirmed in the appointment of its leader Jelačić as Ban.

These liberal concessions were soon annulled by the reactionary government. Encouraged by successes in Italy, it decided to abandon its policy of reform and to stamp out internal discontent. Several developments aided the defenders of Habsburg imperialism in carrying out this program. In the first place, the strong loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty, which existed in many parts of the empire, was strengthened by the emperor’s flight. Increasing sympathy for the emperor was aroused and exploited by repeated imperial proclamations and appeals. Secondly, national jealousies between the Magyars and Slavs in Hungary, and the Czechs and Germans in Bohemia prevented united action and cooperation on the part of the various groups of revolutionaries. Slavs were of the opinion that the Germans in Austria and the Magyars in Hungary were trying to substitute themselves for the Habsburgs as the ruling element, and that the national rights of other peoples would be ignored. Poles, Czechs, Croats, and other South Slavs were determined to oppose such developments.

Taking advantage of these national rivalries the Habsburg government played off one movement against the other and quelled all of them thereby. In June, the rivalries between the Czechs and Germans in Prague enabled the Austrian general, Windischgrätz, to recapture the city and to put down the Bohemian revolution. In October, he was able to recapture Vienna which was then turned over to the reactionaries. In Hungary, however, the situation was not so favorable. Having proclaimed their complete separation from Aus-
tria, the Magyars had set up an independent republic under Kos-
suth and Déak and were prepared to defend it by force of arms. By
1849, the Habsburg government received military support from the
Croats and other South Slavs, who opposed Magyar dominance, and
from Nicholas I of Russia, who was alarmed at this revolutionary
movement in the house of his Habsburg neighbor. Slav, Russian,
and Austrian troops were now directed against the Magyar republic,
and in a short time its short-lived independence was revoked.

Having suppressed all of the revolutionary movements the re-
anctionary elements in Austria created a dictatorship. Ferdinand I,
who had promised reforms, abdicated, so as to avoid carrying them
out, and an eighteen-year-old youth, Francis Joseph, succeeded him
on the throne. Under the new emperor, a strong government headed
by Prince Schwartzzenberg annulled the liberal concessions and re-
established the status quo. One measure, the abolition of feudal
services and the emancipation of the serfs, remained as the chief
visible achievement of the uprisings. The Habsburg dynasty con-
tinued to rule by the will of God, and not by the consent of the mis-
cellaneous peoples who constituted this polyglot state.

The triumph of reactionary forces in central Europe was followed
by a period of internal peace. During that time domestic enterprise,
especially in the Zollverein, and even in Austria, was directed toward
economic development. Commerce expanded; prices of agricultural
products increased; and money began to flow into the Germanies.
All classes participated in this advancement; but of these it was the
bourgeoisie who experienced the fullest measure of growth. They
had already played an important role in the political and economic
regeneration of central Europe in the first half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. By 1850 they had sufficient technical knowledge and cultural
experience to make Germany one of the most advanced areas in
Europe. It was at this time that the foundations of a capitalistic
regime were well established. Credit banks were founded; joint stock
companies enabled people to purchase shares in business concerns;
and, between 1853–1857, railways, connecting the leading cities and
the outlying districts, were built, mining and weaving became thriving
industries, dyes were perfected, machinery was improved, and
scientific processes of agricultural cultivation were adopted. Thus,
before the German Empire was created by Bismarck, the middle
classes were laying the economic foundations of that powerful state.

By 1850 the cause of bourgeois liberalism had achieved marked vic-
tories in both Europe and the New World. In the Old World nearly
every country, save Russia, was affected by the revolutionary tenen-
cies of the 1840's. The King of Denmark, in 1849, set up a moderate
constitution which created an assembly based on propertied suffrage. In the Netherlands the liberal movement forced King William II to grant his people a constitution which extended the suffrage for the lower house of the States General. In Belgium the electorate was also increased. In the Balkans and in Hispanic America similar revolutionary movements enabled the people to secure varying degrees of political rights.

Perhaps the greatest advance in bourgeois liberalism took place in France between 1830 and 1848. Practically commanded by the rich bankers to become their king, Louis Philippe, in 1830, adopted the title of King of the French—not King of France—a clever distinction by which he implied that the people had conferred sovereignty upon him. During the reign of this bourgeois monarch, France experienced the growing pains of the Industrial Revolution. Factories were built; machinery was introduced; and railway construction was promoted. Accompanying this economic development there was a marked concentration of population in the cities. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the population of Paris and Lyons about doubled, and that of Marseilles increased over seventy-five per cent. With this concentration accelerated by a mounting birth rate, living conditions among the wage earners deteriorated rapidly. The slow mechanization of industry, however, increased the demand for unskilled labor. Consequently, in the textile industry, for example, there were jobs for men, women, and children, provided that they were willing to work long hours for low pay. Eventually the increase of machinery and of labor supply resulted in the development of unemployment and increased crime. "There are," wrote the French Socialist, Louis Blanc, "even according to official statistics, more than one million persons in France who literally have not enough to eat, and one person in nine belongs to the 'suffering' classes. In Paris, 63,000 persons are living a life of crime or of dire poverty." Between 1823 and 1847, labor tried to better its conditions through the formation of unions which were illegal, by means of the strike, and by the enactment of legislation beneficial to the workers. The plight of the farmer was little better than that of the wage earner. Only a part of the land confiscated by the government during the Revolution had been transferred to the peasant. Most of it went into the hands of wealthy bourgeoisie. Consequently, the small farmer—the peasant—remained poor and backward.

Despite these bad social conditions the July Monarchy (named for the month of its inception) lasted for eighteen years. That it endured for so long was due not to lack of hostility but to the fact that the opposition was so disunited that the government alone could secure
The French Parliament in Session
From a lithograph by Honoré Daumier
a slight parliamentary majority. At no time did the king have the solid support of any important group, save the wealthy elements. Staunch Catholics and Legitimatists (supporters of the Bourbon claims) hated this ruler who based his reign on the Revolutionary changes which had destroyed the sacred union of throne, altar, and feudal society. They favored the strict repression by the government of all democratic and liberal tendencies and the resumption of close diplomatic relations with the reactionary powers. On the other hand, the republicans and other extreme liberals opposed the conservatism of the monarchy. They demanded the establishment of universal manhood suffrage and favored a foreign policy designed to encourage liberal and nationalistic movements abroad. Inasmuch as their opposition in Parliament proved ineffectual, they waged a press war against the government and its policies.

A third group—the Bonapartists—was hostile to the existing regime, as well as to the republicans and ultra-reactionary monarchists. Influenced by the legend which had grown up around the dead emperor’s memory and stimulated into fervor by the return of his remains to Paris in 1840, they maintained that a military dictatorship alone could save France from internal disorders and foreign humiliation.

The rise of a radical movement—socialism—as we shall see, did much to strengthen the Bonapartist cause. Socialism in France represented the demands of the working classes who felt that they had not received adequate benefits from the French and Industrial Revolutions. In their opinion, the peasants had obtained lands; the bourgeoisie, through their control of the state, were enjoying commercial and manufacturing advantages which were the government’s chief title to success; but the wage earners possessed neither political power nor profit. Looking upon the bourgeoisie as well as the nobility as their enemy, these new radicals expressed their discontent in strikes and in occasional affiliations with the republicans.

Gradually these industrial workers formulated their own philosophy and program. Influenced by the writings of the Utopians, Saint-Simon and Fourier; the Socialist, Louis Blanc; and the Anarchist, Proudhon, they were ambitious to reshape the political and social order in such a way as to bring about a redistribution of the obligations and benefits of society on a more equitable basis. In 1839 the aims of this program were outlined by the great French Socialist leader, Louis Blanc, in his famous essay The Organization of Labor. In this manifesto he stated that every man should have the right to work, and that it was the duty of the state to furnish employment for all. The state, representing society, was expected to provide, at
public expense, workshops under the direction of the workers themselves, who were to share in the profits. The socialist party in 1848 definitely accepted Louis Blanc's idea that there should be no more "exploitation of man by man."

"TRULY I DON'T KNOW HOW THEY WERE AT AUSTRIELTZ, BUT THEY COULD HARDLY HAVE BEEN BETTER."

So reflects a vain bourgeois citizen, dressed in the bright uniform of the national guards, as he preens himself in self-admiration before a mirror. The cartoon is by Honoré Daumier (1808-1897), a famous French Caricaturist.

Certain intellectuals, especially sentimental and emotional romanticists, like the socialists disliked Louis Philippe. These nationalists were especially critical of the monarch's foreign policy. Successive failures in his attempts to extend French influence in Belgium (1831) and in Egypt (1840) were regarded by patriots as national humiliations. At the same time they resented his internal policy,
which consisted chiefly in catering to the wealthy elements and their interests. Despite these criticisms Louis Philippe simulated the role of a democratic king. He sent his boys to the public schools, shaved himself, walked unaccompanied on the streets, wore civilian clothes, and shook hands with his fellow citizens. These gestures pleased some of the petty bourgeoisie, while his program of peace and industrial prosperity satisfied the wealthy classes. But Louis Philippe himself did not intend to remain a democratic ruler. Firm advocate of autocracy, embellished by an aristocracy of wealth rather than of birth, he resolved to re-establish the power of the crown and to revive a personal despotism.

Numerous disturbances during the first ten years of Louis Philippe’s reign probably forced the king to create a strong government. Republican plots, especially in Paris in 1832 and 1834, industrial strikes in Lyons, in Grenoble, Marseilles, and in other southern towns, a royalist rebellion in 1832, Bonapartist conspiracies, and numerous attempts on the king’s life, certainly did not encourage Louis Philippe to democratize the monarchy. Determined to maintain law and order he resorted to a policy of open repression. In 1840 the ministry of Thiers was dismissed and a strong government under the guidance of Guizot (1787–1874), a staunch defender of plutocracy, was created.

By 1847 all factions—Legitimatists, Bonapartists, republicans, and socialists—were demanding political reforms. Reform banquets were held in many towns to arouse public opinion. In order to check these subversive eating jousts the government, on February 22, 1848, prohibited a great banquet which was to be held in Paris. This action precipitated a crisis. A mob, thoroughly aroused, insisted upon the resignation of Louis Philippe’s apostle of individualism, Guizot. On the following day the minister was dismissed. Thereupon the republicans and socialists demanded the abdication of Louis Philippe and the establishment of a republic. Troops, summoned by the government to quell this uprising, refused to attack the mob. Realizing that the game was up, Louis Philippe abdicated in favor of his grandson, the Count of Paris. But the republicans and socialists, although differing as to ultimate aims, by now were determined to set up a republic. Ignoring the claims of Louis Philippe’s heir, they created a provisional government which proclaimed a republic and arranged for the calling of a National Convention. As a rhyme in *Punch* (March 18, 1848) put it:

“Louis Philippe
Has lost his sheep
And never again will find them
The people of France
Have made an advance
And left their king behind them."

Having agreed only upon the establishment of a republic, the republicans and socialists in the provisional regime immediately quarreled over economic policies. The republicans from the beginning opposed the socialist plan to introduce Louis Blanc's scheme of national workshops. But the increase of unemployment and of unrest among the masses forced them to accept some sort of compromise. Elections of the promised National Convention were postponed in order to give the socialists time to educate the people, while the red flag of the Ministry of Progress, with Blanc as its chairman, was permitted to fly over the Luxemborg. In their attempt to placate the proletariat the republicans also opened the ranks of the National Guard to all classes and set up a few workshops. By May, 1848, over 100,000 unemployed men (in Paris alone), under the direction of bosses who were opposed to socialism, were earning a couple of francs a day by performing useless tasks.

While the workshops were being organized, the socialists and republicans engaged in a bitter political campaign to gain control of the convention. Contrary to the fears of the republicans, the election resulted in a return of a majority for them. Assured of the support of the National Guard, and realizing that the workers constituted potential revolutionary storm troops, the republicans in the assembly passed a resolution, in June, closing the national workshops and ordering the workmen to leave Paris. This order precipitated a revolution. Troops were called to put down this uprising and to destroy the socialist movement; barricades were erected by the radicals in the narrow streets; and bloody encounters took place in various parts of the city. But in this struggle the socialist cause was doomed. Not only their enemies, the bourgeoisie of Paris, but also their antagonists in the country—the peasants and wealthy landowners—flocked to the capital, determined to stamp out socialism. Instructing full authority to General Cavaignac, a republican, the army suppressed the revolt. On June 26, the Convention was again in control of Paris and the "Red Terror" disappeared, not to raise its head until the disorders of 1870–1871.

Having crushed the socialist revolution, the Convention drew up a constitution which provided for the establishment of a republican government with an elective president and legislature, each to be chosen for four years. In December, 1848, occurred a spectacular presidential campaign. In this election there were four candidates: Lamartine, the Catholic representative, Ledru-Rollin, the socialist,
General Cavaignac, the republican, and Louis Napoleon, the nephew of the great emperor.

For years ambitious Napoleon had dedicated his life to the task of re-establishing the Bonaparte dynasty in France. Prior to 1848 several futile attempts to do so had resulted in arrests, imprisonment, and continued exile, but the revolution of that year afforded him a good opportunity. Returning to France in September he had been elected delegate to the Convention. Preaching the gospel of equality, prosperity, and nationalism, and promising peace, order, security, and glory, he popularized his candidacy for the presidency. In December the elections were held and Louis Napoleon was elected president, receiving over three times as many votes as the next candidate, General Cavaignac. Thousands of sentimental Frenchmen, hearkening to the siren call of nationalism and captivated by the romantic association with the great Napoleon, voted for the "dark horse." He alone, they believed, would give everyone a square deal.

THE FLIGHT OF METTERNICH FROM VIENNA IN 1848.
From a contemporary caricature

COLLATERAL READING


¹ For good general accounts of Europe since 1815, consult:
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J. E. Gillespie, Europe in Perspective: 1815 to the Present (1942).
W. P. Hall and W. S. Davis, The Course of Europe since Waterloo (1941).
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J. F. Scott, and A. Baltzly, *Readings in European History since 1814, Chaps. II-V* (1930).
CHAPTER X

The Second French Empire and the Unification of Italy and Germany

THE BETTMANN ARCHIVE

NAPOLeON III, EMPEROR OF FRANCE

DESPITE the treaties of Vienna, a Bonaparte had managed to become head of France, and one, too, who seemed disposed to continue the Napoleonic tradition. As president of the second French Republic, he had sworn to remain faithful to the democratic ideal. "My duty is clear," he said. "I will fulfil it as a man of honor. I shall regard as enemies of the country all those that endeavor to change by illegal means that which France has established." Three years later, after a coup d'état, resembling in many ways that of 1799 which made his uncle First Consul, Louis Napoleon assumed the office of Prince-President for ten years. In the following year (1852) he re-established the empire. Suddenly the powers of Europe awoke to the fact that a Bonaparte had become dictator, that the man whose name they had hitherto associated with comic-opera conspiracies and futile exploits occupied the throne of Napoleon.

England and the Northern Courts (Prussia, Russia, and Austria) had approved of Louis Napoleon's rise to power in the presidential election of 1848. They believed that his presidency meant the restoration of law and order, economic recovery, and the elimination of the socialist menace. But when he made himself emperor, he aroused the bitter opposition of the Northern Courts, who claimed that he intended to change the settlements of Vienna and who refused to accept him into the ranks of European royalty. On the promise not to change the balance of power, Louis Napoleon obtained England's recognition of the Second Empire. With Albion's approval of his assumption of the royal purple, he was able to overcome the opposition of the Northern Courts. Later on he rewarded
the British business classes for their support by lowering the tariff on English goods.

Louis Napoleon frequently justified his dictatorship by claiming that it rested on the sovereignty of the people. No Legislative Assembly, he said, had the right to limit his actions: the people alone, by a plebiscite, could reject or approve his policies. Thus, as emperor, he still regarded himself as the delegated agent of the people, a sort of democratic Caesar, in whom was vested a mandate to govern by the sovereign nation. This belief in popular sovereignty, revealed from time to time in plebiscites and elections, enabled Louis Napoleon to create and to maintain his autocratic government. Unable, as president, to win the support of the Legitimatists and the Orleanists who despised all Bonapartes, and the wealthy bourgeois Republicans who distrusted him, Louis Napoleon turned, in 1851, to the masses for support. Many workers still remembered that, long before the election of 1848, Louis Napoleon had written an essay, *The Extinction of Pauperism*, in which he had drawn a sympathetic picture of the oppressed working classes and had outlined a solution for the problem of unemployment. Therefore, they regarded him as their friend and willingly backed him. After the successful *coup d'état* of December, 1851, he accused the Legislative Assembly of trying to deprive the people of the ballot and held a plebiscite requesting their approval of his action. In this election the masses, favoring universal male suffrage, voted as he wished, lengthening Louis Napoleon's term as president from four to ten years and giving him authority to remodel the constitution.

As Prince-President, Louis Napoleon determined to transform the republic into an empire. He now turned to the middle classes for support. An ardent defender of law and order, private property, and the sanctity of the home, he urged all law-abiding citizens in Great Britain, Switzerland, Belgium, as well as in France, to follow his lead in a crusade against socialism in order to protect these things. Thoroughly aroused by this propaganda, a great part of the property classes in France lost faith in the republic and accepted Louis Napoleon's contention that an empire meant peace, law, order, prosperity, and glory. On November 21–22, 1852, another plebiscite gave the French people an opportunity to vote on the question of reestablishing the empire and of proclaiming Louis Napoleon its emperor under the title of Napoleon III. In the election 7,824,129 Frenchmen voted "yes," 253,149 voted "no." On December 2, 1852, upon a proposal of the Senate, Napoleon III was proclaimed Emperor of the French, and the Second Empire was established.

For the next eighteen years France was governed by a man who
was to attract widespread attention during this period and to pro-
voke very conflicting judgments. Professing at all times a firm belief
in the sovereign will of the people, he, as their leader, concentrated
both legislative and executive powers in his hands, manipulated elec-
tions in such a way as to favor imperial interests, regulated limited
freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and placed education strictly
under the supervision of the government and of the Church.

Despite these reactionary measures Napoleon III insisted that he
was a modern leader. It was his task as a dictator, he felt, to raise the
power and wealth of the state by adhering to a capitalist-utopian
program. France, he said, by leading in the social-reform movement,
would continue the work of Napoleon I and emancipate the op-
pressed peoples of Europe. It was also his duty, as a servant of the
people, to promote the material prosperity of all classes in France by
personal encouragement, actions, and beneficial achievements. Al-
ways courting the support of the masses, he promised to reduce the
cost of living, furnish employment for all, and to enact insurance laws
for the benefit of the wage earners. He permitted the workers to form
co-operative societies for collective buying and selling, to organize
unions, and to strike. Business enterprise was freed from govern-
mental regulations. Ardent exponent of the laissez-faire doctrine, he
nevertheless promised to encourage the organization of commercial
companies, to subsidize a merchant marine, and to promote general
prosperity by a system of public works. Trade was to be stimulated
by imperialist expansion. Through the extension of French control
in Algeria, the annexation of Cochin-China and Annam in 1858,
the erection of a protectorate in Cambodia, and the acquisition of
special privileges in Syria, Louis Napoleon planned to give business-
men an opportunity to increase their profits and missionaries a
chance to make converts.

Napoleon III believed that the French people would gladly sac-
crifice political liberty for an autocratic government which would
guarantee to them order, security, and prosperity. Therefore he
sought, with marked success, to promote the economic development
of the country. "We have immense districts of virgin soil to clear,
roads to open, harbors to dig, rivers to render navigable, canals to
finish, our network of railways to complete." Also he encouraged the
expansion of agriculture, commerce, and industry, the construction
of canals, railways, roads, and houses, and the promotion of social
welfare by giving the masses increased legal, medical, financial, and
educational opportunities. Attempting to abolish unemployment,
the emperor introduced a system of public works designed to make
France comfortable and beautiful, and at the same time to furnish
jobs for those who could not be absorbed by private industry. As a result of this public-works policy, Paris was rebuilt into a modern city, with wide streets, beautiful public buildings such as the opera house, and with remarkable educational and artistic facilities. Napoleon III’s endeavor to promote the general welfare only increased, perversely enough, the opposition to his regime. The large business interests disliked his low tariff policy which enabled England to flood French markets with her goods, and they bitterly opposed his public-works program which resulted in high taxes and favored the wage earners. Small businessmen and wage earners resented both his autocratic methods and his economic measures. They demanded the restoration of political liberty, the lowering of taxes, and the reduction of the cost of living. The mass of the peasants alone supported him throughout most of his reign.

Louis Napoleon’s foreign policy also was of so diverse a character that there were always some Frenchmen who considered themselves injured by it. In spite of the fact that he claimed that the empire meant peace, Napoleon III involved his country in a series of futile wars. In 1854, as the defender of Christianity, he joined with Great Britain, Sardinia, and Turkey in the Crimean War against Russia. The Slavic empire was defeated, but it cost France the lives of 75,000 soldiers and some $400,000,000. About the only reward Napoleon III obtained for his country was the honor of having the peace conference held in Paris. In 1859 the Emperor very foolishly entered into a war with Austria on behalf of the Italians, and then suddenly and prematurely withdrew, thus incurring the enmity of his ally. Several years later he engaged in his most ridiculous adventure—the conquest of Mexico. This invasion was an attempt to establish in Mexico a French-sponsored empire which should keep in check the United States, uphold the monarchical principle, and at the same time secure economic advantages for France. The prospective throne of this protégé empire was offered to and accepted by the Archduke Maximilian, brother of the Austrian Emperor, Francis Joseph. Inasmuch as the whole enterprise was a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States, on the conclusion of the American Civil War, ordered Napoleon to withdraw his forces, on pain of war. He complied with this request, but Maximilian, who insisted on continuing the futile enterprise, was captured and shot by Mexican rebels in 1867.

This Mexican fiasco greatly weakened the position of Louis Napoleon. French capitalists were angered at the useless expense of this undertaking; Catholics were disappointed at its failure; and workingmen were incensed at the loss of life and high taxes. The enter-
prise left friends and foes alike filled with profound suspicion as to his motives. "For he would destroy the effects of a genuine altruism either by sudden abandonment of a half-hearted pursuit of the goal, or still more by a tendency to 'present a little bill,' to demand a little reward, a *pourboire* for France." Although he was a professed exponent of nationalism, on several vital occasions he opposed it in Germany and in Italy.

It is true that during the first part of his reign the Emperor's numerous activities, his grand promises, and his illustrious name enhanced his international reputation. His prestige was so high that Bismarck, about 1860, observed ironically: "The world places to his account everything that happens, and if it rains in Central Asia at an unseasonable moment, chooses to attribute it to the malevolent machinations of the Emperor." But the 'sixties were marked by the steady decline of Napoleon's reputation. His failures to intervene in the Polish revolution of 1863, in the Danish-Germanic war over the provinces of Schleswig-Holstein, and in the Seven Weeks' War between Austria and Prussia (1866) had belied his pretensions to being the arbiter of Europe. This abstinence undermined his international prestige. The Mexican disaster of 1867 seemed to be the final blow.

Aroused by the bitter criticism of his policies, Napoleon III tried to win the support of the masses by liberalizing the empire. In the 'sixties he increased the power of the legislative body; in 1861 the budget was voted and discussed in sections in the assembly; and in 1867 the imperial address was abandoned and deputies were given the right to question ministers who might be delegated by the emperor to take part in the discussions of the Assembly. Lastly, in 1869 the legislature was given the power to initiate laws; ministers were made responsible to the chamber; and a parliamentary monarchy of the British type was established. Upon the acceptance by the people of this new constitutional reform in another plebiscite, the emperor declared: "More than ever, we may face the future without fear." The people, however, confronted by high taxes and conscious of an inglorious foreign policy, were not so optimistic. Despite Napoleon's liberal reforms, they continued to denounce his regime. Whereas the greatest writers of the time, Thiers, Louis Blanc, George Sand, and Victor Hugo had been criticizing the emperor from their various places of exile, now the press took advantage of the abolition of restrictions to carry on the attacks at home.

The final blunder, which resulted in the overthrow of Napoleon III, rose out of his German policy. Apparently blind to Prussia's military power and to Bismarck's plan to unify Germany, the French emperor adopted a policy of neutrality during the Austro-Prussian
War of 1866. Much to his surprise, Prussia, by winning a short but decisive victory over Austria, was able to create a North German Confederation with her Hohenzollern ruler as its head. The emperor now realized that France faced a powerful rival across the Rhine. Anticipating a war with this aggressive neighbor, Louis Napoleon ordered the reorganization of the French army and searched for allies in the coming struggle. But Russia, resentful of the hostility of France in the Crimean War; Austria, of Napoleon’s aid to Sardinia in 1859; Italy, of his desertion of 1859; Great Britain, of the Emperor’s desire to absorb Belgium; and the United States, of his violation of the Monroe Doctrine—all refused to support him. Unable to obtain allies, Napoleon III attempted at this time to forestall a crisis until conditions should be favorable to him. Developments apparently beyond his control finally led to a war between France and Prussia. 

Lacking capable leaders and an efficient army, the French were quickly and easily defeated. On September 2, 1870, Napoleon III surrendered himself and 80,000 men at Sedan. The Second Empire, hitherto upheld by military force, now crumbled to the ground.

Despite his weaknesses and numerous mistakes, Napoleon III, during his twenty odd years of rule, did display a certain kind of ability. Possessing an unusual imagination, he saw the possibilities of the Suez and Panama canals, and favored their construction. Louis Napoleon also had a sincere respect for the principle of nationalism, and a sense of international responsibility which unfortunately was marred by a flair for meddling in other people’s affairs. Believing, sincerely, that he represented the will of the people as expressed in numerous plebiscites, the emperor came out in favor of congresses to settle international disputes. Unfortunately his confusion of principle and practice, his mixture of idealism and profit-seeking brought neither the success of realistic diplomacy, nor the compensation of political altruism. In the end, his policies led to isolation and to defeat.

Strangely enough, the overthrow of Napoleon III, the professed champion of suppressed nationalities, coincided with the triumph of nationalism in Italy and in Germany. Largely responsible for the unification of Italy was Count Cavour (1810–1861), a realistic exponent of bourgeois capitalism and Italian nationalism. Born in Piedmont, Cavour imbibed the liberal ideas of his age; he became a staunch advocate of the constitutional form of government and a bitter foe of absolutism, clericalism, and socialism. The British mon-

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1 See pp. 228–229.
archy was his ideal—a king with powers limited by a constitution, and a legislature representing the people and their economic interests. In his newspaper, *Il Risorgimento*, he urged the modernization of Piedmont through the establishment of agricultural organizations, mechanics' institutes, industrial societies, and banks, as aids to capitalists and laborers. Becoming prime minister of Sardinia in 1851, Cavour prepared the way for the unification of Italy. With remarkable foresight he saw the problems that had to be solved in order to unify that country. To do this he decided to modernize Piedmont, to obtain the co-operation of all Italian states, and to expel Austria from Italy by means of foreign aid. "Piedmont," he remarked, "gathering to itself all the living forces of Italy, will soon be in a position to lead our mother country to the higher destinies to which she is called." But he admitted that Italy was incapable of freeing herself of foreign domination; she must obtain outside help in her crusade to gain national unity.

With the aid of the bourgeoisie and the liberal king, Cavour set out to modernize Piedmont. A parliamentary government was established; monasteries were dissolved; a modern financial system was installed; currency, agriculture, and industry were encouraged; and the army, arsenals, and fortresses were improved. Without these efficient reforms which fitted Piedmont for effective leadership, the union of Italy probably would have been deferred indefinitely. Having prepared Piedmont for her important role, he set out to win the support of all Italian states and leaders. Garibaldi, Mazzini, and other patriots were won to the cause of unity and constitutional government. Businessmen, intellectuals, and anti-clericals everywhere promised their aid. Miscellaneous secret organizations, particularly the Young Italy Society, helped to enlist popular support for Cavour's program in the various town and country districts.

Cavour possessed not only a keen appreciation of the obstacles in the way of Italian unity but also a knowledge of the practical means by which they might be overcome. Realizing, for example, that Italy alone could not drive out the Austrians, he resolved to obtain the help of a foreign state by making the grievances of Italy an international question. For that reason he sponsored an active propaganda of the Italian cause throughout western Europe. He also brought about the participation of Sardinia in the Crimean War on the Anglo-French side. Over 15,000 troops were sent to fight with the allied forces in this struggle to check the advance of the Russians in the Near East. At the peace congress which followed the allied victory, Cavour, despite Austrian opposition, received a place in the session and obtained thereby the opportunity of attracting European
attention to the Italian cause. As a result of Cavour's clever presentation of the Italian case, Lord Clarendon, the British representative, was frankly sympathetic; Napoleon III was impressed. The Italian question had become a matter of international concern.

Napoleon III possessed sincere sympathies for repressed nations. Like his famous uncle he favored the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy and the establishment of an independent, but weak, Italian confederation in the north. At first, however, he seemed unwilling to assume an active role in the move to unite Italy. He knew that such an action would bring upon him the hostility of the Catholics who feared the abolition of the temporal powers of the Pope as a result of Italian unity. Despite this opposition Napoleon III in 1858 finally decided to help the Italians expel the Austrians. This decision was partly the result of an unsuccessful attempt on his life by a Mazzinian fanatic, named Orsini. Displaying remarkable magnanimity, Louis Napoleon derived from the incident its true lesson. He decided that Orsini stated the truth when from his prison he begged the emperor to take up the Italian cause. "So long as Italy is not independent, the tranquility of Europe, no less than of your Majesty, is a mere chimera... Deliver my country and the blessings of twenty-five million citizens will follow you in posterity." At a meeting held in July, 1858, Cavour and the Emperor arrived at an agreement. Louis Napoleon was to help drive the Austrians out of Italy, but with the understanding that a centralized Italian state should not be created. The north was to be combined into a single kingdom, that of Sardinia under Victor Emmanuel II, but the rest of the peninsula—consisting of the central duchies, the Papal States, and the kingdom of the Two Sicilies—was to be united in a confederation under the Pope. Thus the Italians were to be freed of Austrian dominance, but divisionalism was to be perpetuated. In return for her aid, France, according to the agreement, was to receive Nice and Savoy. Further, it was arranged that a member of the Napoléonic family was to marry Victor Emmanuel's daughter. As a final condition Louis Napoleon stipulated that Austria must be made to appear the aggressor in the anticipated war.

On January 1, 1859, the French Emperor informed the Austrian ambassador that he deplored the unfriendly relations between France and Austria. A few days later Victor Emmanuel, in an address before the Sardinian Parliament, proclaimed: "We are not insensible to the cry of pain which arises to us from many parts of Italy." Following this speech the government printer of France published a pamphlet setting forth the doctrine of nationality and pointedly suggesting its application to Germany as well as to Italy. Then, sud-
denly Austria, who had hitherto ignored every provocation, sent an ultimatum to Sardinia, ordering that nation to disarm within three days. Cavour quickly rejected this demand; thereupon Austrian troops, in April, 1859, invaded Piedmont, and, on the following day, France declared war on Austria. "The die is cast," cried Cavour, "and

![Map of Europe 1859](image)

A Contemporary Sketch Illustrating the Condition of Europe in 1859

we have made history." "The next Parliament," he told the people of Piedmont, "will be that of the kingdom of Italy."

In about two months the French and Sardinian forces expelled the Austrians from Lombardy and seemed on the point of driving them out of Italy. At this juncture, Napoleon III decided to withdraw from the war. He had engaged in the struggle to win the Austrian provinces for Piedmont and to set up an Italian Confederation under his patronage, but he had no intention of erecting on the flank of France a vigorous and powerful Italian state. Another reason for this unusual move was the possibility that Prussia might enter the war on the side of Austria and attack from across the Rhine. Therefore, hastily and without the knowledge of Cavour, the emperor arranged
the armistice of Villafranca with Austria on July 8th. By the terms of this settlement, which were later embodied in the Peace of Zurich, Nice and Savoy were assigned to France; Lombardy was to be ceded to Victor Emmanuel; and Venetia was to be retained by Austria. The rulers of Modena, Parma, and Tuscany were to be restored to their respective countries, and the Pope was to be urged to adopt certain reforms. This settlement, falling far short of complete unity, aroused deep resentment in Italy. Cavour, in a fit of passion, begged Victor Emmanuel to reject the peace and, when the latter refused, resigned. "Nothing can come out of this peace," he mourned, "I will turn conspirator and revolutionary, but this treaty shall not be carried out."

Cavour soon discovered that his plans for Italian unity had not been entirely ruined. In central Italy the people refused to restore their rulers and voted for annexation with Sardinia. Encouraged by this action, Cavour returned to office (1860) and succeeded in negotiating an arrangement with Louis Napoleon whereby the people in the small states in central Italy signified their desire of joining Piedmont, and the inhabitants of Savoy and Nice cast ballots (with commendable but slightly suspicious unanimity) for annexation to France. By April, 1860, Victor Emmanuel was king of all northern and central Italy save Venetia and the Papal States.

The next advance in the direction of Italian unity was led by one of Italy's greatest patriots—Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807–1882). In 1860, he saw an opportunity to promote Italian union under the House of Savoy. Opposed to the cruel and inefficient rule of their Bourbon king, the people of Sicily begged Garibaldi to lead them in an uprising. He decided to do so. Cavour also was asked to back the movement, but, realizing that his encouragement of a revolution in a neighboring state might be interpreted by the great powers as a breach of international law, he adopted a policy of strict neutrality. Nevertheless, he allowed Garibaldi to raise and equip in Genoa an expeditionary force of two thousand Red Shirts and ordered the Sardinian fleet to keep between Garibaldi's ships and its potential foe, the Neapolitan fleet.

On May 10, Garibaldi and his followers, wearing their famous red woolen shirts which he had given them, landed at Marsala, Sicily. Within a fortnight they had defeated a Neapolitan army and had established their leader as dictator of Sicily. Encouraged by this success, Garibaldi now decided to cross to the mainland and help the people of Naples get rid of the Bourbon king. Both Victor Emmanuel and Napoleon III, fearing international complications, opposed this project. The Italian ruler ordered Garibaldi not to pass the Straits of Messina, and Napoleon III proposed that the Straits
should be occupied by an Anglo-French squadron so as to confine Garibaldi to Sicily. England, however, definitely friendly to the Italian cause, refused to concur in the French plan. Despite the diplomatic commotion he was arousing, Garibaldi invaded southern Italy, overthrew the Bourbon regime, and proclaimed himself dictator of that region. His amazing victories were received with mingled feelings by the patriots of northern Italy. Although he welcomed the overthrow of the Bourbon kingdom, Cavour feared that the extension of Garibaldi's sphere of activity to Rome might precipitate the intervention of Austria and France. Then the entire cause of Italian unity would be endangered. Further, Cavour suspected Garibaldi of republican leanings and therefore distrusted the patriot's profession of loyalty to Victor Emmanuel. Claiming that "Italy must be saved from foreigners, evil principles, and madmen," the Italian statesman finally decided to act. To forestall Garibaldi's conquest of Rome, Victor Emmanuel ordered his troops to invade the Papal States. Having done this, Victor Emmanuel, at the head of his troops, advanced toward Naples. Garibaldi met the king and, instead of opposing the royal will, ordered his troops to join the king's army, thus enabling the Sardinian ruler to complete the conquest of the Bourbon kingdom. On November 9, Victor Emmanuel's sovereignty was formally extended over Naples and Sicily. In the following February, a national parliament, representing over 22,000,000 people, met at Turin and proclaimed Victor Emmanuel King of Italy "by grace of
UNIFICATION OF ITALY 1859-1919

The map shows the process of the unification of Italy with the Kingdom of Sardinia and the Kingdom of Italy. The colored sections indicate different regions and dates of unification.
God and the will of the people." Four months later (June 6, 1861), Cavour, having lived long enough to witness the completion of the major part of his program for Italian unity, died of exhaustion.

Five years after the death of this able statesman, another step in the unification of Italy was taken. Joining forces with Prussia in a war upon Austria, the Italians, though defeated in their own theater of hostilities, were able to profit as a result of the great Prussian victory at Sadowa. According to the peace terms exacted from Austria by Prussia's great statesman, Bismarck, the people of Venetia were allowed to hold a popular election to determine whether or not they wanted to join Italy. This plebiscite resulted in a tremendous vote in favor of union with Italy, and thereupon the province was added to the territory ruled by Victor Emmanuel.

The last step in the unification of Italy—prior to the outbreak of World War I—was taken in 1870. At this time a conflict between France and the German states resulted in the withdrawal by Louis Napoleon of the troops which he had stationed in Rome in order to protect the sovereignty of the Pope. Immediately the soldiers of Victor Emmanuel occupied the Eternal City and the Roman citizens voted for union with the Italian monarchy. Despite threats of excommunication against the invaders and fervent appeals for help from true Catholics, the Pope was deprived of the temporal power which he had exercised for over a thousand years. Victor Emmanuel and his parliament now moved to Rome, which henceforth became the capital of the Italian constitutional monarchy. In an attempt to mollify the Pope, the Italian Parliament passed a number of laws guaranteeing to His Holiness the honors and immunities of a secular ruler, the possession of the Vatican and Lateran palaces, a large income, and authority and freedom in the government of the Church. But Pius IX, bitterly opposed to the anticlerical policy of the Italian government, refused to accept this settlement. Predicting the downfall of the Italian kingdom he withdrew to the Vatican in a voluntary imprisonment from which neither he nor his successors emerged for nearly sixty years.

While Pope Pius was prophesying the inevitable doom of Italian unity, Otto von Bismarck was opening a new era in the history of both Prussia and the Germanies. This reactionary Junker, who had distinguished himself as a bitter anti-democrat at the Frankfurt Diet between 1851 and 1858, and who had gained valuable experience as a diplomat at the Russian and French courts, received his great opportunity to serve his beloved Prussia in 1862. At that time King William I (1861-1888) of Prussia was engaged in a bitter struggle with his Landtag. Desirous of advancing the influence of Prussia in
German affairs, he had urged the reorganization and strengthening of the Prussian army. A powerful liberal and antimilitary group in the Landtag, however, refused to grant the increase of expenditure necessary to carry out the military program; instead, these politicians, more interested in liberal reforms, asked the king to reduce military service, to establish trial by jury, to reconstruct the upper house, to promote secular education, and to establish ministerial responsibility. These requests were rejected by the angry king. Dominating the situation, he quickly dissolved parliament, forced his ministers to resign, and raised new regiments without parliamentary sanction.

Confronted by an angry parliament, the desperate king in 1862 adopted the suggestion of his Minister of War, General von Roon, that he make Bismarck his Minister President and give the latter full power to represent the royal cause. Accepting the appointment, Bismarck said: "I will perish with the king rather than forsake Your Majesty in the contest with parliamentary government." Bismarck soon proved that he was the ideal man for the job. Thoroughly Prussian, he was devoted to the cause of divine-right absolutism which he considered not only just but indispensable for Prussia. As a result of ten years of diplomatic experience he had reached the conclusion that Austria was the chief obstacle to German union and that only by excluding her could a united state be established. Therefore, in accepting his new appointment he set out not only to combat parliamentary government, but also to make Prussia the leader in a move to unify Germany. "Germany," he said, "is not looking to Prussia's liberalism but to her power. . . . Prussia must keep its forces together, its boundaries are not those of a sound state. The great questions of the day will not be decided by speeches and majority resolutions (that was the blunder of 1848 and 1849) but by blood and iron." In the bitter constitutional struggle which ensued, the Prussian liberals fought with greater ardor than ever before. But they were engaged in a futile battle. Disregarding their opposition, Bismarck raised taxes without a budget and muzzled the press. He was absolutely confident that constructive achievements in the future would justify his autocratic policies. "We give Herr Bismarck one year," said a member of the opposition in 1863. Actually, the Prussian statesman retained his post for nearly three decades.

While Bismarck was re-establishing royal supremacy in Prussia, he was also developing his scheme to bring about German union under Prussian leadership. In 1863 he induced the reluctant King William I of Prussia to refuse an invitation of the Austrian emperor to attend a Congress of German princes to discuss a proposal for Ger-
man reconstruction. Thus Bismarck kept Prussia out of a possible entanglement which might have placed that state in a political strait jacket. To placate Russia, he refused to back the Poles in their revolt against the overlordship of the czar. Despite bitter liberal opposition he signed a military convention with the St. Petersburg government, in which he promised to prevent Polish insurrectionary activities in Prussia. By supporting Russia in the Polish affair, Bismarck obtained the friendship of that country—a friendship which enabled him to count on the neutrality of the czar when he engaged in wars later on with Austria and France.

Assured of Russian benevolence and in possession of the best trained army in the world, Bismarck, by 1864, was ready to take the first step in his plan to attain German unity. It so happened that a series of events gave him his much coveted opportunity. In 1863, Christian IX, King of Denmark, influenced by ardent nationalists, proclaimed a constitution which provided for the annexation of Schleswig, a province adjacent to Denmark which was inhabited by Germans as well as by Danes. Prior to this action Schleswig and another province, Holstein (a region in which the German element predominated), had been imperfectly attached to the Danish crown. In the late forties the reigning king of Denmark, Frederick VII, had issued a constitution for all his dominions, including the two duchies. Immediately the German elements in these regions engaged in a revolt, claiming that the king was trying to "Danise" them. This crisis was settled by the Great Powers in a congress at London (1852). Opposed to Prussian attempts to obtain independence for the duchies, the other European states succeeded in reaching a settlement whereby the status quo was to be preserved.

In March, 1863, Frederick VII, however, disrupted this agreement when he announced the incorporation of the duchies with the Danish kingdom. Christian IX, who succeeded him, confirmed the actions of his predecessor, and another crisis arose. Frederick, Duke of Augustenburg, an unsuccessful rival to the Danish throne, now placed himself at the head of an anti-Danish group in the duchies. The Germanic Diet also intervened in behalf of the provinces. Encouraged by this support, Schleswig-Holstein thereupon declared their independence under Frederick of Augustenberg. At this point Bismarck entered into the situation. He opposed both the incorporation of the two provinces by Denmark and their admission as independent states into the German Confederation. Contemplating their annexation by Prussia he persuaded Austria to champion the cause of the duchies and to agree to a joint intervention and settlement of the problem. Austria joined Prussia, and an ultimatum was
sent to Copenhagen demanding that Denmark renounce the incorporation of Schleswig without delay. Christian IX refused to yield, and the German forces in 1864 invaded Holstein. After a three months' campaign in which Denmark was overrun, peace was signed. According to the terms of this settlement Denmark surrendered the provinces to Prussia and Austria and promised to recognize any disposition that they might make of them.

Trouble now arose over the division of the spoils. At first it was agreed that Austria administer Holstein, and Prussia control Schleswig. But Bismarck was unwilling to maintain this arrangement. Accusing Austria of favoring the formation of a single state out of the two duchies, he rushed an army into Holstein, thus violating the agreement which gave the region to Austria. Meanwhile the Diet of the German Confederation voted to uphold Austria's claims to Holstein. Thereupon Prussia promptly withdrew from the Confederation and Austria immediately demanded the mobilization of the Confederation's military forces. On June 18, 1866, Prussia found herself at war with Austria and other German states.

Bismarck was prepared for this contest. He had arranged an alliance with Italy whereby Venetia was to be handed over to her in the event of the defeat of Austria. Louis Napoleon at a meeting with Bismarck at Biarritz (1865) had intimated that in the event of a war between Austria and Prussia, France would remain neutral. Finally, Russia could be counted upon to be friendly to her conservative neighbor, Prussia. On the other hand, Austria, reaping the bitter fruit of incompetent diplomacy, found herself with no allies, save some of the lesser German states.

The Seven Weeks' War resulted in a quick, inexpensive, and complete triumph for Prussia. Superior training, modern equipment such as the needle gun (a new type of breech-loading rifle), the telegraph, and the railroad, together with the able generalship of von Moltke, enabled the Prussian army to crush the Austrian forces in the battle of Sadowa (July 3, 1866). This battle, despite Italian defeats, decided the war. Fearing possible foreign intervention and also the danger of a growing cholera epidemic, Bismarck insisted on peace. Despite the opposition of the Prussian King and his generals, he also demanded a lenient settlement—one which would not mortally wound Austria and would, on the other hand, pave the way for a reconciliation later on. By the Treaty of Prague (August 23, 1866), Austria paid a very small indemnity, ceded her rights in Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia, acquiesced in the dissolution of the German Confederation, withdrew from German affairs, and agreed to permit Prussia to organize another confederation north of the river Main.
In addition to these concessions, Austria, by the Treaty of Vienna (October 3, 1866) permitted Venetia to join Italy. These settlements constituted one of the master strokes in Bismarckian diplomacy. The commanding position, which Austria had held under Metternich in Central Europe, now passed to Prussia.

After Sadowa, Austria, despite deep humiliation and ardent determination to regain her position of supremacy in the Germanies, was forced to postpone foreign designs and to concentrate upon internal affairs. With the suppression of the revolutionary movements of 1848 the Habsburg government had endeavored to maintain the status quo by a dictatorship. But this policy proved a failure and, after the disastrous wars of 1859 and 1866, was abandoned. Thenceforth, the government tried to introduce liberal reforms and to conciliate the numerous discontented groups. It soon discovered, however, that it could not satisfy the various elements. There were the German-speaking liberals who advocated a single parliamentary constitution for the whole empire; there was a federalist group which favored a federation and autonomy—i.e., autonomy for all the nationalities of the empire, combined with a central government; and finally, there was the dualist group which desired complete equality between Austria and Hungary without consideration of the rights of other nationalists. The leader of this faction in Hungary was Francis Déak who now opposed the plan of Kossuth, the ex-president of the Magyar republic, to achieve complete independence for Hungary.

Despite these differences, the Habsburg government attempted to strengthen its position at home by revising the constitution of the Austrian dominions. Realizing that the Magyars were too powerful to be ignored, a reorganization of the empire was arranged by Count Beust, of Austria, and Déak. According to the terms of the Ausgleich or “compromise” which they arranged, Austria and Hungary were to have their own rulers, their own governments and administrations. They were to be united dynastically—the Habsburg emperor of Austria was to be ipso facto King of Hungary; and three common ministries (for foreign affairs, finances, and the army) were to unite the two states. Further, the budget of the joint ministries and matters in dispute were to be agreed upon by two delegations selected by the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments.

This Austro-Hungarian alliance led to an important change in the foreign policy of the Habsburgs. Expelled from Germany, the Austrian dynasty turned eventually to the Balkans for compensation. An expansion of interests there, especially the assumption of military control over Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878, largely inhabited by Slavs,

1 See p. 225.
only served to increase the unrest among the various Slavic groups in the Dual Monarchy. "Take care of your barbarians, and we will take care of ours," said the Austrian minister, Beust, to the Magyar leader, Count Andrassy. But the "barbarians" (the Slavs) could not be suppressed so easily. Encouraged by their brother Slavs in the Balkans and in Russia, they persisted in their agitations for autonomy and independence.

While the Austrians and Magyars were trying to maintain their ascendancy in the Dual Monarchy, the Prussians were endeavoring to dominate the newly formed North German Confederation. Established in 1867 by Bismarck, this German Bund possessed a federal government in which no attempt was made to introduce constitutional equality among the twenty-two member states. The King of Prussia was made hereditary president with power to select the federal chancellor. A legislature comprised two houses: the Federal Council (Bundesrat), representing the sovereign princes of the various states and dominated by the large Prussian delegation and thus by the Prussian King, and the Reichstag, little more than a debating society, elected by universal manhood suffrage. Actually, this new constitution extended the Prussian system of government over most of North Germany.

Bismarck realized in 1867 that until he incorporated the southern states—Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and the two Hesse Duchies—in his union, German unity would remain incomplete. At the request of Napoleon III he had acquiesced in their independence, but at the same time he had concluded military and economic conventions with them whereby they agreed to give Prussia military support in the event of war, and to enter the Zollverein. The inclusion of these states in the German union, however, was Bismarck's chief aim. A Franco-German crisis in 1870 provided the solution. German unity was to be completed as a result of a war between the German states and their bitter enemy, France. But it was difficult for either side to stir up hostility. When war appeared imminent, Bismarck succeeded in arousing unfriendly sentiment throughout Germany, especially in the southern states, by publishing proposals of Napoleon III to acquire Luxemburg, Belgium, and Rhineland territory. Determined to oppose the expansion of the North German Confederation, Louis Napoleon helped to accentuate anti-German feeling in France. Newspaper editors, politicians, and educators on both sides succeeded in greatly stimulating militant patriotism among the people. Meanwhile, France searched vainly for allies; and Prussia, confident that the leading nations would be neutral, welcomed a crisis which would lead to war.
A slight improvement in relations between France and Prussia came to an end in 1870 when the question of a candidate for the Spanish throne became serious. After various refusals by minor European princes, the position, vacated by Queen Isabella, was offered to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, of the Catholic branch of the Hohenzollern family. France, hearing of this offer, became angry and regarded it as an attempt to disturb the balance of power. Thereupon, the King of Prussia, rather than have war, influenced, indirectly, young Leopold to reject the Spanish throne. But this refusal did not satisfy the Spanish-born Empress Eugénie and the French war party. They insisted that William I should agree not to permit a Hohenzollern to occupy the throne of Spain. In July, 1870, Benedetti, the French ambassador, presented this unreasonable demand to William I, who replied frankly that he could not bind his successors by such a promise. From Ems the Prussian ruler then sent Bismarck a calm report of the incident. Intent upon a war the German chancellor revised and shortened the telegram in such a way as to make it appear to the Germans that Benedetti had insulted William I, and to the French that the Prussian monarch had insulted the representative of France. He then released the distorted Ems dispatch to the press. Its publication produced the desired war fever—everybody was insulted. "To Berlin! To Berlin!" cried the French mobs in Paris. "To Paris! To Paris!" shouted the Germans in Berlin. Mobilization started in both countries. In Prussia, military leaders assured the king that their forces were prepared. In France, the French Minister of War told the emperor that the army was ready "down to the last button on the last garter of the last soldier."

The war soon demonstrated the efficiency of the German military forces. Quickly invading France, they defeated the imperial troops at Metz and elsewhere, and at Sedan captured Napoleon III and a French army. The French soldiers, badly organized, poorly led, and inadequately prepared, were forced to surrender or to retreat. Patriotic levies, raised by republican leaders, carried on the struggle, but they were incapable of turning the tide of war. Paris, after a brave defense, was captured, and, on January 28, 1871, an armistice was signed. In the Treaty of Frankfurt, which was concluded by the Provisional Assembly of France on May 10, 1871, Germany exacted from her enemy a war indemnity of over $1,000,000,000. Northern France was to be occupied by German troops until the indemnity was paid. Furthermore, Alsace and part of Lorraine were to be ceded by France to Germany. At first Bismarck opposed the annexation of Lorraine, saying, "I do not like the idea of having so many Frenchmen in our house against their will"; but the military authorities, for strategic
reasons, insisted upon the acquisition of this region. Bismarck, against his better judgment, capitulated. Thus, although Germany won military glory, unity (for the southern German states had by this time joined the North German Confederation), money, and territory, she incurred the undying hatred of the humiliated and resourceful French people.

A CARTOON OF NAPOLEON III, FROM "PUNCH." 1865
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PARALLELING the rise of Germany was the emergence of the Near-Eastern question as an important factor in European politics. This question was in essence the problem arising out of the political and territorial decline of the Ottoman Empire. It was a serious matter in the eighteenth century and was a source of irritation and international trouble right down to the outbreak of World War I. In the early nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire comprised people who spoke various languages, who practiced diverse religions, and who possessed miscellaneous national ideals and customs. Asiatic Turkey was inhabited chiefly by Moslems (Turks, Arabs, and Kurds), by Christians, and by Jews. In European Turkey, however, the majority of the people were Slavic in language and Christian by faith. These Slavs, split into various national groups, were under the control of a Turkish minority. The sultan was in theory if not in practice the absolute head of the Ottoman Empire. He was also the religious leader of the Moslems. His simple but effective government consisted of a grand vizier (prime minister), a religious adviser, and provincial governors appointed by the central government, and other minor officials. A uniform and systematized administration, however, was lacking in the Ottoman Empire. Local affairs among the non-Moslems were administered by the religious heads of each unit. Government positions, save the most exalted, were open to all, regardless of class or of nationality.

Unfortunately the Turks were not interested in the art of government. In their opinion it existed merely to collect taxes and to enforce obedience of all subjects. Not being especially concerned with these
duties, they permitted inefficient sultans, disloyal administrative officials, and corrupt tax collectors, mostly Greeks, to run the government. Ruling as privileged conquerors, collecting taxes, and refusing to assimilate the peoples, this Turkish administration, from the sultan to the lowest official, resembled a cancer, which, by the opening of the nineteenth century, the Balkan nationalities were determined to eradicate.

In 1821 the Greeks rebelled, and after many years of bitter war gained their independence (1829). The Serbians also engaged in a revolution.Recalling their glorious past, they rose in 1804, and, under the enthusiastic leadership of Kara George, a swineherd, expelled the Turks. This revolt subsided in 1813, but two years later the Serbs, led by Miloš Obrenović, who had assassinated Kara George, engaged in another uprising. Aided by the Russians, the Serbs finally achieved their chief ambition in 1830—autonomy and a national Church. Thus after many years of war and intrigue, Serbia became a principality, tributary to the sultan but nevertheless self-governing, with a princely house ruling by right of heredity—the house of Obrenović.

Nationalist unrest also affected the Rumanians and the Bulgarians. Fired by French ideals and their Latin heritage, and helped by Napoleon III, the Rumanians in the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia were able to unite these Danubian Principalities under a young patriot, Cuza, who in 1861 became Alexander, Prince of the united Principalities. The Bulgarians, too, influenced by these developments among their neighbors, finally resolved to be free. Inasmuch as Bulgaria was close to Constantinople, it was more difficult for the people of that region to obtain independence. In 1856 the Bulgarians were permitted the official use of their language, and in 1870 they secured for themselves a national Church with freedom from the Patriarch who lived in Constantinople. In the uprising which occurred later, however, the sultan treated them so ruthlessly that Russia intervened. The war which ensued between Turkey and Russia, as will be shown, made Bulgarian independence a matter of international concern.

Revolts against the sultan’s authority were not limited to the Balkan nationalities. Uprisings of ambitious vassals, notably that of Mehmet Ali, pasha of Egypt, threatened the existence of the Turkish government. Mehmet Ali, an Albanian tobacco dealer who could neither read nor write, had made himself practically an independent ruler in Egypt. He was a very ambitious man who wanted to westernize and to enlarge his holdings. Given the island of Crete as a reward for his support of the sultan in the Greek insurrection, he
demanded control of Syria. Upon the sultan’s refusal the pasha sent troops into this region (1832). Immediately the sultan appealed to the foreign powers for aid; but Russia alone seemed willing to support his cause. The Russian intervention in this revolt alarmed other European powers—especially Great Britain and France. Primarily interested in the Belgian question at that time they wanted to avoid complications in the Near East. Therefore they put pressure upon Turkey to cede Syria to Mehemet Ali. In 1833 the sultan agreed to hand over this region, and Adana, to his Egyptian vassal. He also signed the Treaty of Unkiah Skelessi with Russia. According to the terms of this agreement Russia secured privileges which placed Turkey under a kind of Russian military protectorate. Russian warships were granted free passage through the Straits and the sultan promised to close this important water highway to foreign ships at Russian dictation. This settlement greatly disturbed the European powers, for it signified Russian hegemony in the Near East.

Six years later (1839) the sultan and Mehemet Ali again engaged in a war. Backed by Louis Philippe of France who had ambitions in the Near East, the pasha resisted the attempt of the Turkish ruler to regain Syria. Again Turkey faced the possibility of a disastrous war and further cession of territory to Mehemet Ali. At this critical moment, England’s foreign minister, Lord Palmerston, championed the sultan’s cause. Determined to check the advance of Egyptian, French, and Russian interests in the Near East, he sent a British fleet to Alexandria as a warning to Mehemet Ali, and meanwhile got Austria, Prussia, and Russia to agree to the Convention of London, whereby Mehemet Ali was to be recognized as the hereditary pasha of Egypt with the right to retain the Pashalik of Acre and control of southern Syria for life. Should he fail to relinquish his other conquests within ten days his authority was to be restricted to Egypt alone. Mehemet Ali and the French government were both infuriated by Palmerston’s high-handed methods, and Paris threatened war. This menace did not perturb the British, for they knew that the July Monarchy, beset by internal troubles, could not afford to risk a military struggle. Therefore, Great Britain, in collaboration with the other important powers, resorted to military and naval measures to coerce Mehemet Ali into accepting the proposed terms. After suffering several defeats, the pasha gave way in 1841 and agreed to an arrangement which left Egypt autonomous but still under Turkish suzerainty. Meanwhile, Turkey was also saved from dismemberment by Russia; for the latter power consented to the annulment of the Treaty of Unkiah Skelessi, which was replaced by the Straits Convention (1841), closing the Straits to the warships of all countries. Thus Turkey, escaping from
the Egyptians and the Russians, passed under the collective tutelage 
of the great powers.

Following the settlement of the Egyptian question, Czar Nicholas I 
proposed that Great Britain and Russia partition the Ottoman 
Empire. "Turkey is in a critical state," he said, "the country seems to be 
falling to pieces. We have on our hands a sick man—a very sick man. 
It will be, I tell you frankly, a great misfortune, one of these days, 
should he slip away from us before all necessary arrangements have 
been made." Although she was inclined to favor the idea of partition, 
England, regarding Russian aggression as more menacing to India 
than to Turkey, turned down the czar's proposals. Moreover, Eng-
land still professed to believe what Palmerston had emphatically 
expressed in 1837: "All we hear about the decay of the Turkish Empire, 
and its being a dead body and a sapless trunk and so forth, is pure 
and unadulterated nonsense... If we can procure ten years of 
peace under joint protection of the five Powers, and if those years 
are profitably employed in reorganizing the internal system of the 
Empire, there is no reason whatever why Turkey should not become 
a respectable power again."

England was unable to procure ten years of peace or to rehabilitate 
Turkey. In March, 1853, the whole question was raised to a more 
serious plane by Russia's demand that the sultan acknowledge the 
czar's claim, based on the treaties of Kuchuk-Kainardji and Adrian-
ople, to protectorship over the Greek Christians of the Ottoman 
Empire. Great Britain opposed Russia's request to protect the Greek 
Christians, fearing that it would give that country a definite foothold 
in the Ottoman Empire. Her ambassador, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, 
a Turkophile like Palmerston, persuaded the sultan to grant certain 
concessions to Russia in the matter of holy places, but to reject the 
proposal to establish a protectorate. Thereupon Russian forces oc-
cupied the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, not as an act of 
war, but as a material guarantee for the acceptance of Russia's just 
demands. The Great Powers were now forced either to intervene or 
to acquiesce in the situation. England, France, Prussia, and Austria 
held a conference at Vienna and sent a note to Russia and Turkey, 
suggesting the adherence by both powers to the letter and spirit of 
the treaties of Kuchuk-Kainardji and Adrianople, with respect to the 
protection of the Christians. Both sides rejected the note. Then the 
sultan, encouraged by the British ambassador, asked Russia to re-
nounce her right to establish a protectorate. Russia refused to do so. 
In October, 1853, Turkey declared war, and her troops advanced 
against the Russians on the Danube.

Turkey's not altogether disinterested friends now rushed to her Crimean War
aid. In Great Britain, Lord Aberdeen, the prime minister, heeded the demands of the imperialists, who feared for the safety of India, and the liberals who, sympathizing with the oppressed Poles, regarded Russia as an outworn autocracy which was trying to hold the continent in subjection. England declared war on Russia. Napoleon III also entered the conflict in 1854 on the side of the Turks. He did so with the hope of winning prestige for himself and France, by avenging the defeat of his illustrious uncle in 1812, and by appearing as the protector of Christians and as the champion of the people in their struggle against autocracy. A year later, Cavour, seizing an opportunity to put the Italian problem before the powers of Europe, enrolled Sardinia on the side of the Turks. Austria and Prussia remained neutral. Prussia was rather friendly to Russia, but Austria, in spite of Russia's aid in 1849, saw a chance to extract concessions from both sides as the price of her neutrality or, if the situation warranted, to intervene. She delayed too long, however, and the war ended before she could enter the struggle.

The Crimean War—one of the most useless of conflicts—passed through two stages. In the first, the allies drove the Russians out of the principalities and took the offensive in the Crimea. The second stage of the war was dominated by the allied siege of Sebastopol and the Russian efforts to relieve it. For about a year the fort held out, but in September, 1855, it was compelled to surrender. Financially exhausted and burdened by the sheer technical difficulties of transport through a country which as yet had no railways, Russia finally consented to negotiate a settlement. In March, 1856, peace was secured at Paris.

By the Treaty of Paris, Russia was forced to give up that part of Bessarabia that she had obtained in 1812, thus moving her frontier away from the mouth of the Danube. She also was required to relinquish her protectorate over the Danubian provinces and to recognize the predominance of Turkey in these regions. The Black Sea was to be neutralized; it was to be open to the merchant ships of all nations, but closed to all ships of war, and no naval or military establishments were to be allowed upon its shores. Finally, the Ottoman Empire was placed under a collective guarantee of the great powers, and the Sublime Porte was accepted for the first time in the European comity of nations. In return for this recognition the sultan vaguely announced generous intentions toward his subjects regardless of religion or race. Unable to profit by the aid that he had been granted, the sultan failed to carry out his promises.

Within Russia, the Crimean War opened up a new era of reform and reorganization. Prior to this struggle her rulers had virtually ig-
nored such modern changes as the abolition of serfdom, constitutionalism, and the mechanization of agriculture, commerce, industry, and transportation. Alexander I, ruling from 1801 to 1825, at first exhibited liberal tendencies but later became a reactionary ruler. His successor, Nicholas I, throughout his reign (1825–1855) was devoted to the principles of extreme conservatism. As an ardent Slavophile he had encouraged nationalism in culture and other forms. He also had had the laws codified, had introduced currency and financial reforms, and had even contemplated the emancipation of the serfs. Nevertheless, he had always opposed any attempt to weaken his authority, refusing to permit any movement toward constitutionalism, Polish independence, and freedom of press. But the Crimean War, during which Nicholas I had died, discredited his policy and demonstrated that even as a military autocracy the czardom could not justify itself. This dismal failure had exposed the entire administrative system to criticism.

Influenced by this situation Alexander II, the new czar (1855–1881), determined to modernize Russia. Nicholas’s restrictions on the press, the universities, and on European travel were removed. Political concessions then were granted the Poles; exiles were welcomed home; and measures designed to stimulate industry, commerce, transportation, and the development of natural resources were introduced. Finally the tsar tackled the problem of serfdom, which seemed to be the fundamental evil obstructing progress in every field of Russian endeavor.

For centuries the mass of the Russian peasants had been serfs, either on the royal estates or on the land of private landowners or institutions. Most of those who worked for the crown were subjected to forced labor, heavy taxes, and various restrictions, but they did possess limited political rights. Living in mirs, or village communities, they enjoyed a certain amount of self-government by virtue of elected councils and village elders. Those who belonged to private owners, however, possessed no political privileges. They also lived in mirs but, being denied the autonomy of those serfs on the crown lands, they were completely under the control of the landlords who could demand any service from them, sell them, transport them, hand them over to the army, or put them into factories. Prior to the Crimean War the peasants had engaged in numerous revolts to throw off their shackles and gain freedom, but these uprisings were crushed. The loss of the war, however, was a severe shock to the prestige of the established order. Revealing serfdom as an institution which, through its social degradation and economic stagnation threatened the ruination of Russia, the Crimean debacle convinced many Rus-
sians—conservatives as well as liberals—that a country with so antiquated an economy could not cope with modern powers. Therefore they tended to favor the emancipation of the serfs.

Although Alexander II was not an enthusiastic liberal, he perceived the inefficiency of the Russian social order in the Crimean War and realized that important changes were indispensable. Rather than risk a revolution which might force him to submit to unwelcome reforms demanded by his subjects, he sponsored them himself. The abolition of serfdom began in 1859, but in 1861, backed somewhat reluctantly by his nobles, he published the Edict of Emancipation, which freed about twenty-three million serfs. Most of the domestic servants, having received their independence, went to the cities and obtained jobs in the rapidly expanding industries. But the majority of the peasants were farmers, and, unless given land, would remain a propertyless, homeless class. To avoid this situation, the government gave the peasants allotments of land (varying in size and quality with the district) for which they were to pay the state in annual installments spread over a period of forty-nine years. The state, in turn, reimbursed the lords for the loss of the property, generally by means of government bonds. Unfortunately, the free peasant did not become a private landowner; instead, he was forced by the government to hand over his property to the community, or mir. The village was responsible for the taxes, the annual redemption payments to the government, certain administrative and police duties, and the allotment of land among the peasants. Thus the peasant merely exchanged the landlordism of the nobility for that of the state.

Without question the Edict of Emancipation was a great legislative act. Millions of men and women were thereby transformed from serfs into citizens. Subsequent acts carried the liberation program still further until, by 1866, serfdom had been completely eradicated. This solution of a vast economic and social problem was, however, open to criticism. Most aristocrats, deprived of serfs and of much land, lacking initiative, special training, and capital, failed to adjust themselves to new conditions. Many became bankrupt, while others, unable to live on their lands, were forced to sell their remaining property to the peasants. The results of the emancipation were disastrous to the peasants as well as to the nobles. Land assigned to the moujik was generally the poorest property and too small to provide for the normal growth of families; hence there developed congestion and increasing poverty. Redemption payments and other taxes were also unusually high. The peasants suffered, moreover, from the communal system of cultivation and administration. Since the mir was responsible for the payment of all taxes, it restricted the movements
of its peasants, refusing to allow them to leave without a guarantee that they would bear their share. At intervals, the land in the mir was redistributed to each peasant head of a household in the villages. This meant that, as population increased, the units of the land given to each peasant decreased in size. Thus their farms became progressively smaller and it became increasingly difficult for the peasant to make a living.

Production also was cut down by the lack of private ownership. The wasteful medieval strip system still prevailed in Russia; harvests were poor; famines occurred frequently; and taxes ate up the surplus of produce. Further, as the price of wheat fell in the world markets, profits decreased correspondingly, and the paradoxical situation developed of a starving country with growing grain exports. At the same time, there arose in Russia a group of peasants who acquired lands of their own outside of the mir. These wealthy peasants, called kulaks, contributed to the general unrest by constituting a superior class within the peasants. Thus, the Russian government, in emancipating the serfs, helped to bring about a vast economic revolution, the effects and defects of which were bound to influence the whole subsequent history of that country.

The emancipation of the serfs led to important political as well as social changes. With the abolition of serfdom, the judicial authority exercised locally by the nobility over their serfs disappeared. By the Zemstvo Decree of 1864, European Russia was divided into 360 districts grouped in provinces. Delegates elected by the landowners, the peasant communities, and certain elements of the urban population constituted a district Zemstvo assembly. They in turn chose a permanent governing body and sent representatives to the provincial Zemstvo, which elected its own governing board. Both assemblies had charge of such ordinary duties of local government as sanitation, primary education, poor relief, prevention of famine, maintenance of roads and bridges, and the collection of taxes for local needs. In 1870 a certain amount of self-government was granted by the czar to towns. Municipal councils, elected by taxpayers, were created, but these bodies were under the close supervision of the central authorities.

Judicial and military reforms were made necessary as a result of the administrative reorganization. In 1864 an edict proclaimed the separation of judicial and administrative functions, the abolition of secret hearings, and the end of class privileges. It announced the establishment of laws equally just to all, of irremovable judges, of trial by jury, and of equality before the law. Public prosecutors and justices of the peace for local affairs were appointed. Thus Russia was
given a judicial system which compared favorably with those of other European countries. The army was reorganized by the government. In 1874 universal military service was established by the Army Reform Bill of that year. A quota of youths for military service was drawn by lot, and the terms of service were to be six years with the active army, nine with the reserve, and five with the militia. Russia seemed destined to become a modern state.

Prior to the introduction of this military bill, certain events had caused Alexander II to abandon some of his reforms and to develop reactionary tendencies. The Polish insurrection in 1863, for example, influenced him to give up his plan to satisfy the Poles by granting them autonomy within the Russian Empire. The difficulties and dissatisfaction which followed his social reforms disillusioned the liberal czar. But it was the development of Marxist and anarchist activities that caused him to abandon his reform program and adopt reactionary policies.

Alexander II and his successors, Alexander III (czar, 1881-1894) and Nicholas II (czar, 1894-1917), were unable to extinguish the revolutionary movements. In the third quarter of the nineteenth century, radicals, called Nihilists, denounced the whole reform program as inadequate and ineffectual. Destructive, individualistic, and materialistic, they urged the complete overthrow of the Old Regime—czeardom, church, the social and economic order and family life. In place of this conglomerate society, with its divers traditions, they favored the establishment of a new utopia, fashioned in accordance with the laws of science. Inspired by these eighteenth-century ideas, many Nihilists, as teachers, doctors, nurses, workers, and agitators, visited the peasants and tried to teach them the doctrine of revolution. Unable to understand the significance of this instruction most of the peasants were not won over by this propaganda. In the late seventies numerous Nihilists, influenced by the anarchistic teachings of the exiled nobleman, Bakunin, resorted to a policy of terrorism. They decided not only to abolish the Old Regime by force, but also to prevent the establishment of bourgeois capitalism and to proceed directly into communism. Thus Russian radicalism in its early phase, based on the commune, the mir, rather than on the factory, was revolutionary rather than evolutionary.

During the closing years of his reign Alexander II made an attempt to suppress terrorists. Censorship of speech, the press, and universities was tightened; reforms were abandoned or mutilated by decrees; and agitators were exiled to Siberia. Aroused by these reactionary measures the revolutionaries resorted to increasing terrorism. This situation became so critical that the czar in 1880 adopted a policy of con-
ciliation and planned the introduction of a limited representative government. Unfortunately, on the very day the czar decided to accept this political reform (March 13, 1881), he became himself the victim of the terrorists. The assassination discredited liberalism and greatly strengthened the Slavophil movement with its emphasis upon loyalty to the czar, the Russian Church, and native culture. Pobiedonostsev, a close friend of the new czar, Alexander III, and a brilliant defender of reaction, as Procurator of the Holy Synod (1880-1905), became the dominating influence in the government. A bitter opponent of freedom of thought and of popular government, he urged every Russian patriot to defend Holy Russia from the deforming and corroding influence of Western culture. Repression, purification, and Russification seemed to be the order of the day. The authority of the Zemstva was reduced; freedom of the press and universities was abolished; Nihilists and other radicals were exiled; and martial law was established. To insure purity of thought and action, all non-Russian groups were to be Russified and most nonorthodox religious organizations were to be exterminated. Jews were to be the special object of supervision. They were to be restricted to certain towns, forbidden to engage in agriculture or to hold property outside of a definite area, partly debarred from education, and liable to salutary punishments (called Pogroms) if they were disobedient. As a result of this oppression thousands of Jews emigrated to America between 1880 and 1900; those who remained lived like cattle, herded in the congested ghettos of Russian cities.

Despite its reactionary policies, the government was forced to introduce measures designed to improve social conditions. It tried to help the peasants by diminishing their redemption payments, by abolishing the poll tax imposed on them, and by establishing land banks to facilitate their purchases of lands. It co-operated with private individuals attempting to provide relief during the great famine of 1891-1892. It also attempted to improve conditions in the factories. During the eighties, thousands of peasants, unable to make a living on farms, obtained jobs in factories, where they were subjected to merciless exploitation. Aroused by this terrible situation the government introduced rather feeble laws designed to reduce hours of labor, to improve working conditions, and to regulate the work of women and children. On the other hand, it outraged the workers by refusing to allow them to form unions and to strike in order to better their lot.

Besides helping the wage earners, the government tried to aid the bourgeoisie. To stimulate industrial developments, the able statesman, Count Witte, created stringent protective tariffs. This, com-
bined with currency reforms, the establishment of a gold standard, and other measures for the protection of capital, enabled him to lure foreign investors into the country. With the capital which they provided, railroads were built, industry was expanded, machinery was purchased, and new factories were established. As a result of these economic measures, foreign trade increased, transportation expanded, national credit improved, and the coal and iron industries experienced a period of remarkable growth. Superficially, Russia seemed on the verge of a spectacular industrial revolution.

Internal inefficiency and the unrest of the people, however, retarded this economic transformation. Following the death of Alexander III in 1894, his successor, Nicholas II, determined to extinguish all opposition to his rule, announcing that he intended to preserve the principles of authority "as firmly and unwaveringly as my late father of imperishable memory." War was declared on all groups which in any way questioned his supremacy. Radicalism was to be stamped out by a White Terror. By this time Russian bourgeois liberals and proletarian radicals possessed definite political and social objectives and were being formed into rather efficient organizations. Political groups, such as the Cadets, aimed to bring about constitutional reforms; while, at the same time, a growing number of wage earners and intellectuals urged the complete overthrow of the Old Regime, the elimination of capitalistic society, and the establishment of a new order—the socialist state. Largely responsible for the rapid growth of this radical movement was the czar's stubborn opposition to political reforms. In most European countries the governments had permitted the middle classes to attain some political power, in order to gain their support in the creation of prosperous states. In Russia, however, no extensive constitutional reforms were promulgated. Guided by Pobiedonostsev, the czar was intent upon maintaining his absolute rule.

Strong hostility to this reactionary policy appeared in the Zemstva. Designed to deal with local problems, these bodies, representing the views of bourgeois intellectuals of various professions, developed, nevertheless, a profound interest in national affairs. Resenting the illogicality of an active and successful self-rule existing side by side with a decadent, autocratic, central government, they vigorously urged the creation of a constitution and the establishment of a ministerial parliamentary system. Thereupon the reactionary elements in the government tried to weaken the Zemstva by depriving them of considerable local power. Disregarding these measures the Zemstva became even more critical of the government. In 1903, bourgeois liberals backed by representatives of all classes formed the "Union
of Liberation” which later served as a nucleus of the Constitutional Democratic Party (popularly known as the “Cadets”).

Movements for economic and agrarian reforms accompanied these constitutional agitations. Wage earners, influenced by the socialist ideas of Karl Marx and by the revolutionary methods of the terrorists, began to organize. More violent and more uncompromising than were their brother radicals in western Europe, these Russian proletarians established the Social Democratic Workmen’s Party in 1884. They advocated not only the overthrow of the Old Regime, but also the reorganization of society on the basis of the dominance of the workers. Although these radicals agreed upon these objectives, they soon disagreed as to the way by which the new socialist state was to be attained. A moderate group, called the Mensheviks (minority men) favored peaceful methods and co-operation for the time being with the capitalistic opponents of czardom. The extremist group, the Bolsheviks (majority men), urged the immediate overthrow of the government and opposed co-operation with the bourgeoisie. Advocating violent measures, the peasants also formed an organization called Social Revolutionists. With its slogan, “all land to the peasant,” it found enthusiastic support among the land-hungry farmers who hoped to acquire additional holdings. Knowing very little about socialism, these peasants favored the overthrow of the Old Regime and the establishment of a great national commonwealth of self-governing communes. They seemed hostile to both the bourgeoisie and the socialist type of state.

In 1904–1905 internal unrest culminated in a revolution. This uprising was precipitated by the Russo-Japanese War which had discredited the czarist government by revealing its corruption and incompetence. Representative leaders of the Zemstva and bourgeois groups urged the calling of a national assembly and the enactment of political and social concessions. A band of dissatisfied workers marched to the Winter Palace of the czar to ask for reforms. Instead, they were fired upon by government troops, earning for that day, January 22, 1905, the name Bloody Sunday. Following this massacre, uprisings, industrial and agrarian in character, broke out in certain districts in Russia. Intense violence characterized these outbreaks. Nobles’ houses were destroyed; government officials were killed; and an attempt was made on the life of the czar. Throughout the year an incipient revolution threatened to destroy the government. By the Octobrist Manifesto the czar assured his people of the establishment of a more liberal regime. The return of the troops from the Russo-Japanese War and a timely loan from France, however, enabled him to restore his authority.
Panicky as a result of the rapid spread of the revolutionary movement, Nicholas II finally decided to introduce certain reforms, including a National Assembly or Duma. This concession did not satisfy the revolutionists. Informed by the czar’s “Fundamental Law” that supreme power was still vested in his hands and that he was only prepared to share part of his authority with the Duma, the liberal elements continued to agitate for a responsible ministry, for universal suffrage, and for freedom of speech, of conscience, of public meeting, and of the press. They also urged the establishment of compulsory free education, the introduction of financial reforms, and the redistribution of landed property. Instead of accepting these proposed changes, the czar proceeded to limit the power of the Duma and to suppress his critics. At the same time, his government, maintaining that it favored the introduction of social reforms, passed a number of measures to benefit the peasants. Redemption payments were cancelled; and steps were taken to abolish the mir system. Thus the government planned to destroy the whole collectivist system of land holding and to create private ownership of property. In order to help the peasants obtain land, financial advances were made to them by the state. Moreover, a system of public works was established to facilitate the development of agriculture. Some enclosure of land, limited intensive cultivation, introduction of machinery—all of these developments presaged the beginnings of an agricultural revolution in Russia.

But the government refused to grant important political reforms. In 1906 reactionary ministers persuaded the weak Nicholas II to dissolve the first Duma. Nearly half of the delegates, thereupon, met at Viborg in Finland and issued a manifesto requesting the people not to pay taxes until another Duma was called. Facing a revolution, the czar appointed a very able bureaucrat, Stolypin, as premier. This practical leader advised the czar to call a second Duma, which would be chosen in such a way as to represent the conservative landed gentry. Unable to control the elections, however, which resulted in a too liberal assembly, Stolypin got Nicholas to dissolve it and to revise the electoral law so as to insure the selection of reactionaries. In 1907 the third Duma was summoned. Controlled by the government, it passed a number of administrative reforms, but it made no attempt to curb the autocratic authority of the czar. In 1912 a fourth Duma assembled. Although it, too, represented the conservative classes, this body was sometimes very critical of the government. Additional reforms, demanded by representatives of the peasants and the proletariat, however, were ignored both by the czar and by the Duma. Becoming disgusted with the government the socialists promoted strikes
in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Riga, and Baku. In the summer of 1914, as the strikes were threatening to become more numerous, the outbreak of World War I interrupted both radical and reactionary agitation. All groups—reactionaries, Cadets, Social Revolutionists, and Mensheviks—rushed to the defense of Russia and of their brother Slavs in Serbia. Out of this struggle many hoped would rise a democratic empire, one which would liberate all Slavs, dominate the Straits, and expel the Turks from Europe.

Russia was drawn into the war largely as a result of her Near-Eastern ambitions. After the Crimean War she had paid little attention to the Ottoman problem, concentrating on expansion in Central Asia and in the Far East. Great Britain and France, therefore, dominated Near-Eastern affairs. In the 'seventies, however, a revolt against Turkish oppression by certain Christian peoples in the Balkans led to the renewal of Russian activities there. This uprising was the result of Turkey’s failure to carry out her earlier promises of reform. After the Crimean War, corruption, extravagance, and cruel oppression continued to characterize Ottoman rule, especially in the Balkans. Aroused by these conditions, encouraged by Pan-Slav propaganda, and suffering from famine as a result of crop failure, the people of Herzegovina, a province bordering Montenegro, revolted (July, 1875). Immediately the revolution spread to the neighboring province of Bosnia, where a Turkish army was defeated.

The great powers of Europe now realized that these uprisings, together with Turkey’s default on her foreign loans and the persistence of palace intrigues, might lead to the complete collapse of the Ottoman Empire and to the predominance of Russia in the Near East. To avoid the latter contingency they urged the sultan to carry out certain reforms. But the Slav rebels refused this time to accept the Turkish promises, unless supported by guarantees from the European states. Attempting to eradicate Ottoman rule, the Bulgarians, Serbians, and Montenegrins now joined in a war against the Porte (1876).

In the struggle which followed, atrocities were committed by both sides. Over a hundred Turkish officials were murdered by Bulgarians, and the Turkish troops killed thousands of Christians in the rebellious provinces. Deeply moved by the wholesale slaughter of Bulgars, Gladstone of England urged that the Turks be thrown out of Europe “bag and baggage.” Disraeli, his political opponent, opposed this solution of the Balkan problem. He feared Russian expansion in the Near East, realizing that this country, Britain’s most dangerous rival, once in control of Constantinople, would be in a position to challenge

British interests in the Orient. As Prime Minister, he assumed the role of apologist for the Turks and succeeded in keeping England from intervening against them in the Balkan crisis.

Russia refused to adopt a "hands off" policy. She knew that the Slavs in the Ottoman Empire expected her support and determined not to disappoint them. On April 14, 1877, the czar declared war upon Turkey and sent troops into the Balkans. In about six months the Russian soldiers were threatening to capture Constantinople; Turkey was entirely at the mercy of her foes. To avoid the loss of his capital, Sultan Abdul Hamid II in March, 1878, reluctantly agreed to a settlement with Russia—the Treaty of San Stefano. By this peace Montenegro and Serbia were enlarged and their independence recognized; Bosnia and Herzegovina were placed under the joint guarantee of Russia and Austria; reforms were granted the Armenians; Russia was given Batum and Ardahan in Asia and part of the Dobrudja (which she proposed to trade to Rumania for southern Bessarabia); Rumania's independence was recognized; and a very large Bulgaria under Russian auspices was created—an autonomous tributary principality, with a Christian government and a national militia.

Russia's triumph in the Near East caused general dissatisfaction elsewhere. Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania opposed the enlargement of Bulgaria. Rumania claimed that Russia had not rewarded her satisfactorily for her aid; Austria-Hungary said that Russia had violated the terms on which the Dual Monarchy had promised neutrality. Disraeli maintained that Russia ultimately intended to destroy the Ottoman Empire, to dominate the Balkans, and to overturn the balance of power in the Near East. Austria and Great Britain insisted that the treaty be submitted to a European congress for revision inasmuch as it changed the status quo in the Near East without the consent of those powers signatory to the treaty of Paris in 1856. Russia, of course, protested, but when Bismarck, in order to obtain an alliance with the Dual Monarchy, decided to back that country in its determination to hold a conference, Russia was forced to consent to this meeting.

At the Congress of Berlin (1878), largely dominated by Disraeli of England, Andrassy of Austria, and Bismarck of Germany, the Treaty of San Stefano was revised and Russia was robbed of many of the fruits of her victory. According to the terms of the new settlement, Russia received southern Bessarabia from Rumania, and the Asiatic Province which she occupied, and she got part of the Dobrudja in exchange for Bessarabia. Bosnia and Herzegovina were handed over to Austria for political occupation. She was also given

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1 See p. 279.
the Sanjak of Novi Bazar between Serbia and Montenegro for military purposes only. Bulgaria was reduced to about one-third the area established by the Treaty of San Stefano; moreover, she remained under the suzerainty of Turkey. Of the rest, Eastern Rumelia was restored to Turkey, but was given autonomy; Macedonia, with its two-and-a-half millions of mixed population, was returned to Turkey. Montenegro and Serbia were recognized as independent states, but the territories they had been granted by the other treaty were reduced. Greece demanded possession of Crete, Thessaly, Epirus, and part of Macedonia, but failed to get them. England was confirmed in her possession of the island of Cyprus, which she had already acquired from Turkey.

Having re-established the balance of power in the Balkans, the great states, save Russia, were satisfied. "There is again a Turkey in Europe," said Disraeli. But these arrangements could not check the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Patriotic movements in Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece, Serbia, and Macedonia, threatened to precipitate new wars which might result in the complete expulsion of the Turks from Europe. The Congress of Berlin merely served to sharpen the rivalries over the Near East. By separating Eastern Rumelia from the independent Bulgarian state, the congress intensified the unrest in that part of the Balkans. In 1885 the people of Rumelia finally declared for union with Bulgaria. Certain European states thereupon protested this violation of the settlement, but Anglo-Austrian hostility to Russian policy prevented drastic interference by any of the powers. Eventually, Bulgaria's strong man, Stambulov, however, managed to free his country from Turkish dominance.

Revolutionary agitation occurred in the Asiatic as well as in the European parts of Turkey. In 1894–1895 an Armenian revolt was harshly suppressed by the sultan's troops. After this affair, the center of trouble shifted to Greece. That country was finding it difficult to establish an orderly government. For twenty-nine years the people had submitted to the inefficient rule of King Otto of Bavaria. In 1863, having driven this useless ruler from the throne, they offered it to a Danish prince, who became King George of the Hellenes, ruling until 1913. Meanwhile the Greeks demanded the inclusion of Thessaly, Epirus, Macedonia, the Ionian Islands, and Crete in their dominions. Although Greece lacked the support of the European Powers, except England, she was able to acquire a small section of Epirus and the major part of Thessaly, thanks to British aid in 1881. Greece was especially interested in the fortunes of the people of Crete. From 1830 the Cretans had tried numerous times to throw off Turkish control and unite with Greece. Finally, in 1897, this island-state, led
by Venezelos, proclaimed its union with Greece and obtained the support of that country. But the Turkish armies, reorganized by the Germans, overwhelmingly defeated the Greeks, and, after a few weeks of fighting, the conflict ended. Greece was forced to pay a heavy war indemnity and to return a part of Thessaly to Turkey.

While the sultan was facing continual trouble and disturbances in various parts of his empire, a close friendship was formed with Germany. For nearly a century Great Britain had acted the role of a big brother toward the Turks, but after the Congress of Berlin Anglo-Turkish relations had become strained. Bismarck, who wished to maintain peace in the Balkans, favored a rapprochement between Germany and Turkey. It was not until after his fall in 1890, however, that a warm and personal relationship was established. By that time William II of Germany had decided to advance German economic interests in the Near East and at the same time to support the Balkan ambitions of his ally, Austria-Hungary. Accordingly, he embarked on a Turkophile policy, visiting Abdul Hamid II in 1889 and in 1898, and making, on his second sojourn, a formal pilgrimage to the Holy Land, where he announced that the sultan and the three hundred million Mohammedans who reverenced him as caliph might rest assured that the German emperor was their friend.

After this trip a German-controlled company was organized to build a railway from Berlin to Bagdad. Prior to this grant, German officers were reorganizing the Turkish armies, and German bankers and traders were extending their economic influence to all parts of the empire. The Bagdad Railway was a logical outgrowth of these activities and paved the way for further German penetration of the Turkish Empire. This, and other lines controlled by Germany, it was felt, would place at the feet of the kaiser’s subjects, wealth, trade, and power. Moreover, when the time came for a final liquidation of Turkey, Germany would be in a position to receive her share.

Although Germany’s Near-Eastern program brought tremendous profits, it created numerous problems. Imperialistic interests in Great Britain, in France, and in other European powers, considered themselves threatened by this German thrust. Moreover, the Teutonic advance encouraged Austro-Hungarian ambitions in the Balkans. The people there—especially the Serbs—in turn feared the aspirations of their Habsburg neighbor. Russia also disapproved of this Austro-German thrust to the East. She disliked the railway from Berlin to the Orient because it threatened her grain trade with serious competition and promised a regeneration of the Ottoman Empire which she did not favor. Moreover, Russia still hoped to obtain control of the Mediterranean so that she could have an outlet for the
exportation of the great grain crops which were raised in the Dnieper and Volga river valleys. Accordingly, to block the extension of the railway, Russia, in 1900, arranged an agreement with Turkey, which practically made Armenia a Russian sphere of influence. This interfered with the projected Berlin-to-Bagdad line since it was to take a northerly and less difficult route across Armenia. By 1907, Russia had again shifted the emphasis of her policy of expansion in Asia—from the Far East back to the Near East. Her defeat in the war against Japan, the growing fear that the Teutonic states were going to emerge the victors in the international competition for control of the Near East, and the rapprochement with England, all contributed to this change. Henceforth, Russia concentrated on the Dardanelles.

The Bettmann Archive

Abdul Hamid II, Sultan of Turkey

Collateral Reading

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CHAPTER XII

Prewar Europe,
1870–1914

France, Germany, Italy, and the Lesser Powers, 1870–1914

The victory of the German states over France in 1871 marked the beginning of a new era. It moved the political and diplomatic center of gravity of Europe from Paris to Berlin. An age which had derived its inspiration from France gave way to one which looked to Germany for leadership in military, economic, political, and social matters. This change was epitomized by Lord Morley when he wrote: "Europe has lost a mistress but gained a master."

In France the immediate result of the German invasion and triumph was a revolt. Even before the peace terms had been signed the people in the Commune of Paris engaged in an uprising which lasted about two months. Various dissatisfied groups participated in this rebellion. Stung by the humiliating peace terms—the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, and the heavy indemnity—and afraid of a monarchical government, Jacobin republicans advocated a dictatorship of the people as a prelude to the expulsion of the Germans and the restoration of the republic. These radicals were backed by socialists who planned the establishment of a socialist state and by anarchists who demanded the overthrow of the central government and the erection of communes throughout France. In short, the uprising was a demonstration of opposition to Germanism, royalism, and capitalism.

The request of the government that the guns be removed from Paris precipitated the struggle. Seizing them, the revolutionaries ran up the Red Flag of 1848 and urged their comrades in all the cities of
France to do likewise. Determined to eliminate the conservative peasants from political control, these city radicals planned the establishment of a federation of republics for France resembling in certain particulars the present political setup of Soviet Russia. Unlike the Russian Bolsheviks, they failed to win over the military forces, Troops of the Provisional Government, on the other hand, besieged Paris while the Germans watched. For two months the insurgents held out, but after the food supply was exhausted they were forced to surrender. Frightful revenge was now taken by the bourgeois-peasant forces of law and order. Over 15,000 men were butchered by soldiers, and over 15,000 were arrested and either sentenced to death or exiled to a living hell in the French colonies. Such was the vengeance of the possessing classes upon the dispossessed, of the old revolution upon the new, of the provinces upon Paris.

After the restoration of law and order, Thiers, chief of the executive (later President of the Republic), tackled the problem of national recovery. Backed by the patriotic and thrifty French people he raised sufficient money to pay the huge indemnity demanded by Germany within two and one-half years. As a result of this feat, German troops were withdrawn from France. Thus France was relieved of the burden which Bismarck hoped would prevent her recovery for at least a generation. Encouraged by this achievement the government attempted to reorganize the army. Compulsory military service was introduced; fortresses were built; railways, roads, and bridges were constructed; and industrial, commercial, and agricultural prosperity were revived. By 1875 this unusual power of recuperation—largely the result of a satisfactory balance between agriculture and industry, as well as financial stability—enabled France to resume her position as one of the great powers.

The establishment of the Third French Republic was another important step in the program of recovery. Despite the fact that France was ostensibly a republic from the autumn of 1870 on, the National Assembly was overwhelmingly monarchical in sentiment. The monarchists, however, were divided among themselves into three factions. One group, the Orleanists, favored the claim of the Count of Paris, grandson of Louis Philippe; another, the Legitimists, backed the Bourbon candidate, Henry V (more commonly called the Count of Chambord), an ardent advocate of clerical, royalist, and feudal traditions; the third, the Bonapartists, agitated for the return of a member of that dynasty. Since the three factions could not agree on a common candidate, they had put Thiers into the president’s chair as a stopgap. He, however, showed signs of becoming a republican. “There is only one throne,” he cried, “and three
people cannot sit upon it at the same time." Thereupon the monarchists forced him out of his post and elected in his place the well-known royalist, Marshal MacMahon, President of the Provisional Assembly. Ardent conservatives now tried to arrange a settlement between the monarchist factions, whereby the Count of Chambord was to ascend the throne with the Count of Paris as heir-apparent. But the unwillingness of the Count of Chambord to accept the tricolor flag, after all other issues had been decided, destroyed the compromise and prevented the re-establishment of the monarchy.

A majority of the Assembly reluctantly decided to stabilize the quasi-republic pending a solution of the monarchical question. Accordingly, they passed in 1875 three "Organic Laws" which, together with subsequent legislation of an organic nature, comprised the new constitution. No attempt was made to draw up another declaration of the "Rights of Man." These original laws and four important amendments simply created the framework of the republican government. Its central structure consisted of a President, elected for seven years by the two houses. Possessing little power, he presided but did not govern. The real executive branch consisted of a Premier and Cabinet dependent upon a dominant party, or bloc of parties, in the Chamber of Deputies. There was a Legislature of two houses: a Senate, with three hundred members elected by an indirect method for nine years; and a Chamber of Deputies, comprising nearly six hundred deputies elected for terms of four years on the basis of popular suffrage. The consent of the Senate was necessary for the dissolution of the Legislature by the President. That body also served as a check upon the Chamber of Deputies. A centralized administration fostered continuity of national policy, despite the instability of the executive officer, the premier. Local government was subordinated to the authority of the central government. France consisted of départements, ruled by prefects appointed by and representing the central officers.

This highly centralized republican government endured in the face of monarchical opposition, domestic scandals, and radical challenges, largely because it catered to the interests of the two great property-owning classes—the bourgeoisie and the peasantry. Not only did it encourage industrial and commercial expansion by improved communications, imperialistic development, protection, and low taxes, but it also helped the peasants by encouraging the growing of silk, flax, hemp, and other commodities, and by establishing loan banks, insurance companies, and agricultural schools. It enabled sons and daughters of the common people to develop their abilities through the establishment of a public-school system (1881–1886).
Control of education was taken from the Church and placed in the hands of political authorities. In this manner the educational system became a center of bourgeois idealism and of patriotism to the existing regime. As a result of these enlightened policies France, by 1914, was one of the most prosperous nations in Europe. Her wealth, including stocks and securities of foreign governments and industries, was more equally distributed than that of any other great power. Her property-owning classes, the backbone of the country, enjoying apparent security, save for the constant fear of a war with Germany, had become, for the most part, loyal to the republic.

Although successful in bringing about rapid recovery and marked prosperity in France, the republic encountered bitter hostility. In the late seventies the royalists engaged in an unsuccessful revolt which was followed by the resignation of Marshal MacMahon. In the eighties, an adventurer, General Boulanger, backed by monarchists, clericals, and other chauvinists, severely criticized and frequently embarrassed the republic and advocated the establishment of a dictatorial government. He failed to strike when the iron was hot, was forced to flee, committed suicide, and his movement collapsed.

Scandals, involving governmental officials, temporarily discredited the republic. The notorious Dreyfus case, however, created a real crisis for the republic. In 1894, Captain Alfred Dreyfus, an Alsatian Jew attached to the Ministry of War, was arrested, convicted on a charge of treason, and sentenced for life to Devil's Island. Several years later investigations of a Colonel Picquart, chief of the Military Intelligence Staff, tended to substantiate the unfortunate officer's protestations of innocence and a retrial was demanded. High military officers tried to hush up the case, believing that the honor of the army would be blackened if the verdict of the court-martial was proved unjust. They therefore removed Colonel Picquart from his position and appointed a less inquisitive man in his place. In January, 1898, Emile Zola, the famous novelist, reopened the case when he published a letter in which he frankly stated that the judges of the court-martial were unjust and dishonest. Monarchists and clericals bitterly resisted this move. They denounced Jews, republicans, and socialists as criminals, claiming that those who believed in the innocence of Dreyfus were enemies of law and order, property, Church, and country. They accused them of being allies of such forces of evil as a syndicate of Jews, Freemasons, Protestants, England and the Triple Alliance, socialists, anarchists, enemies of the Faith, enemies of the flag, and enemies of society. In the midst of party passions, aroused as they had not been in France since the Commune, Dreyfus was given a retrial before a group of high army offi-
cers, who had been his accusers five years before. Attempting not to allow a thorough probe of the affair, the judges deliberately barred certain vital testimony and finally, by a vote of five to two, declared him guilty with extenuating circumstances. The court then sentenced Dreyfus to ten years' imprisonment, and thus the honor of the army had been maintained. President Loubet immediately pardoned Dreyfus, and he was released, broken in health. In 1906 friends of the unfortunate man finally succeeded in having the verdict of the court-martial quashed by the Court of Cassation. Dreyfus was declared vindicated, restored to his rank in the army, and the case was closed.

This affair, however, revived the quarrel between Church and state. Influenced by the clerical opposition to Dreyfus, the bourgeois republicans and the socialist groups demanded the abrogation of the Concordat of 1801 and the separation of Church and state. As a result of their agitations the Association Law of 1901 was passed which dissolved unauthorized religious orders, barred them from teaching, and confiscated their property. In 1904 another act forbade teaching by religious groups. Diplomatic relations between France and the Papacy were suspended, and in 1905 the French Republic annulled the Concordat and disestablished the Roman Catholic Church in France. By this separation law, members of all creeds were placed on an equal footing and were authorized to form associations of laymen for public worship. The state was released of payment of salaries to the clergy (with a few exceptions) and churches were handed over to lay associations to be used during the life of those organizations. The Pope and many influential Catholics opposed this act, especially that part which allowed laymen to participate (by means of the associations) in the control of Church affairs. After a two-year controversy a compromise was arranged by the tactful statesmen, Briand. A new law gave the clergy the right to manage their own affairs and to make arrangements with the local mayors for the use of the churches in worship. These laws were significant because they separated Church and state and insured governmental control in secular matters. Henceforth the Church was a private institution, confining its attention officially to the spiritual realm.

Social as well as religious difficulties faced the Third French Republic. As in other industrial states, the government had to deal with the problem of increasing unrest among the wage earners. To meet this situation, trade unions were legalized in 1884. In addition, in 1892 a law was enacted regulating the employment of women and children, providing for a maximum ten-hour working day, and establishing provision for the health and safety of persons in the
factories. In addition, a workmen's compensation act (requiring employers to compensate workers for injuries received during service) was passed in 1898; and in 1911 a plan of old-age insurance was adopted. This social legislation failed to check the advance of radicalism. Opposed for the most part to Louis Blanc's program of control of the republic by workers, the establishment of national workshops, and the creation thereby of a socialist state, many French radicals of the early twentieth century turned to syndicalism, a form of trade unionism applied to revolutionary purposes. Aiming at the overthrow of private enterprises by the strike and the control thereby of production by syndicates (organized groups of workers), these proletarians accepted the socialist objectives, but adopted the violent methods—direct economic action and industrial wrecking—outlined by Proudhon and Blanqui. During the years 1906–1910 this radical movement, spreading rapidly in French industrial centers, caused a number of serious proletarian uprisings. In 1910, the movement culminated in a great railway strike—a strike which many believed was but the beginning of a revolution. This "revolt," however, was suppressed by the Radical Socialist Premier, Briand, who disapproved of violence. Calling up military reserves he forced the workers as soldiers to run the trains, and by so doing he broke the strike.

While the French people were establishing a bourgeois republic, Bismarck, as chancellor, strove to create a prosperous, powerful, and efficient German empire. To achieve these aims he had preserved autocracy in Prussia and extended it to the whole Reich. Retaining the constitution of the North German Confederation, he had created a federal organization based upon the hegemony of Prussia among the states and the dominance of monarchical principles. The hereditary Prussian King was ipso facto Kaiser or German Emperor, but sovereignty was vested in the Bundesrat. This body represented the various German states by quota, Prussia possessing 17 of the 61 votes. It had not only considerable executive and judicial power, but it also possessed a dominant voice in legislative affairs. Inasmuch as the Prussian delegation was the largest group in the Bundesrat, the kaiser as Prussian King was able to control that body. Thus, the Federal Council (the Bundesrat) was a sort of constitution camouflage for Prussia's government of the empire. Theoretically, the Bundesrat was entirely in the hands of the reigning princes; practically, it was under the control of the Hohenzollerns.

In the administration of the internal affairs of the empire the kaiser was not dominant. His executive power was slight, as there were only a few federal officials to appoint, and he lacked veto power over bills passed by Parliament. Possessing greater authority in for-
eign affairs, he could declare war and peace, arrange alliances and
treaties, and appoint and receive ambassadors. He was also com-
mander-in-chief of the army and navy and selected the chancellor,
who in turn chose the other members of the cabinet. This imperial
chancellor presided in the *Bundesrat*, but voted and spoke only as

![The Reichstag in Berlin](image)

*a Prussian representative. Except in foreign, military, and naval
affairs, the empire depended on the administrative officers of the
separate states. The empire retained the bicameral system of the
North German Confederation. In addition to the *Bundesrat* there
was a *Reichstag* or National House, whose members were elected for
terms of five years by the population of the whole empire by man-
hood suffrage. This body possessed only a limited veto power and
was relatively insignificant. In 1877 a supreme Federal Judicial
Court was created, possessing original jurisdiction in instances of
treason and appellate jurisdiction in other cases.

Bismarck was the first chancellor of this newly created federal state.
For the next twenty years, until his fall in 1890, he devoted himself
to the establishment of a powerful, prosperous, and unified German
Empire. He bitterly opposed ultramontanism, provincialism, dem-
cracy, and socialism, considering them enemies of progress. Sin-
cere exponent of benevolent despotism, he planned the strengthening of imperial unity not only by force but also by the excellence of his administrative organization and by the economic and intellectual advantages he offered the German people. Thus, by making the empire prosperous and efficient he hoped to win over all elements, including even the three and a half million Poles of the north and east, the 150,000 Danes of North Schleswig, and the nearly two million French subjects in Alsace-Lorraine.

In his opposition to certain organizations which, in his opinion, threatened German unity, Bismarck at first resorted to extreme measures. Shortly after the Franco-German war, for example, he became involved in a bitter quarrel with the Roman Catholic Church. Regarding that institution as a state within a state, he determined to bring it under the control of the government. In May, 1872, he had an imperial law enacted expelling the Jesuits from Germany and prohibiting priests from expressing political ideas in their pulpits. A year later the Prussian Diet passed the so-called May Laws, requiring compulsory civil marriage, ordering all candidates for the priesthood to be Germans (educated in a German university), forbidding ecclesiastical punishments, suppressing the Catholic Bureau in the Department of Education, and withdrawing the inspection of schools from the clergy. In 1875 a crisis arose when Bismarck ordered all religious orders abolished. Backed by liberals, atheists, scientists, and a group of "old Catholics" (opponents of the doctrine of Papal Infallibility of 1870), Bismarck declared that he would "never go to Canossa." The church naturally opposed the chancellor's anti-Catholic legislation. For five years this battle (Kulturkampf) between the Church and state continued. During this period the Catholic or "Center" party in the Reichstag was in open revolt, constantly embarrassing the chancellor by refusing to support his program. Suddenly Bismarck called for an armistice. Realizing that he might have to resort to force in the struggle, and facing a radical internal movement, he entered into negotiations with the Pope. Leo XIII hastened to accept Bismarck's overtures of peace. During the next nine years nearly all anti-Catholic laws were annulled, and a series of arrangements established co-operation between the Pope and the kaiser, especially in the matter of Church appointments. In return, the chancellor secured the support of the Catholic Center party, a real force in German politics.

Backed by his new ally Bismarck now declared war on the socialists. At first he adopted a policy of repression. A series of acts prohibited all associations, meetings, and publications which aimed at the destruction of the existing order of society and government. To
deal with any emergencies which might arise the police were granted extensive powers. By these measures socialist gatherings were made illegal and their funds confiscated. This attempt to eradicate the "Red International" failed; socialist unrest only increased and became more radical because it was driven underground. Numerous secret organizations, some with headquarters in Switzerland, now replaced the outlawed trade unions. Bismarck next attacked the enemy on another front. Displaying an extraordinary grasp of the situation he concluded that the growth of unrest was the result of economic conditions which must be changed. Social discontent, he decided, was connected with an agricultural and industrial depression which in the 'seventies succeeded a short era of speculation (facilitated by the indemnity received from France). Believing that this recession was also the result of German free-trade policy, he adopted the doctrine of economic nationalism, as outlined by such able economists as Schmoller (1838–1917), List (1789–1846), and Wagner (1835–1917). In 1879 he therefore established a high tariff on agricultural and industrial products.

To create a prosperous Germany, Bismarck also favored the development of professional and technical education. The graduate school which had appeared first in Germany in the early nineteenth century, was expanded, especially in the field of technical training. In the German gymnasiums a program was developed corresponding to that of the American high school and college. Natural science, history, sociology and other "modern" subjects were taught. In short, while English colleges were suspicious of so-called practical trends in education, German schools were taking the lead in the development of the modern system of higher education with its emphasis upon vocational and professional training.

At the same time the German chancellor adopted the ideas of the nationalist economists that the state served as the equalizer of conflicts and that a powerful, unified, and prosperous country could best be attained by the establishment of friendly relationships among the different social classes, the reduction of injustice, an approach to a more equitable distribution of wealth, and social legislation, promoting progress and the moral elevation of the lower and middle classes. Having helped the bourgeoisie and the farmers by a protective tariff, Bismarck decided to aid the wage earners by means of social legislation. Therefore he embarked on a program of state socialism by having laws enacted in 1883, 1884, and 1887, designed to insure workmen against sickness, accidents, and old age. In 1911 these laws were unified into a comprehensive scheme of social legis-

1 See p. 303.
lation which, before World War I, became a model for similar reforms in Great Britain, France, and other European countries.

Despite his remarkable success in the unification and development of the German Empire, the chancellor in 1890 was practically forced out of office. In 1888 Bismarck’s friend and master, the old Emperor William I, died, and the long partnership between ruler and minister came to an end. Kaiser William was succeeded by his son, Emperor Frederick, a liberal, who reigned for ninety-nine days. Although he was unsympathetic toward the chancellor’s policies, he retained him in power in view of the imminence of his own death. But when his son, William II, became emperor (1888–1918), Germany entered upon a new era. For two years Bismarck managed to remain in office, but in 1890 he was dropped, and a young, inexperienced man took over the ship of state.

When he became kaiser, William II was twenty-eight years of age, ambitious, aggressive, and alive to modern tendencies. He possessed an active and vivid imagination, but was reckless, restless, neurotic, and immature, having little political acumen or appreciation of the importance of public opinion. Militaristic, meddlesome, and domineering, but well intentioned, he believed that he had one great purpose on earth—to carry out the divine mission of the Hohenzollerns. Imbued with this idea, he found it difficult to tolerate the authority of the old chancellor. Whereas Bismarck ruled in silence, William II laid German aspirations before the world in pompous and boastful speeches. These utterances, revealing a lack of emotional poise and dignity, alarmed Europe and irritated many Germans. Disregarding growing criticism, William proclaimed “system, efficiency, and discipline” as his chief watchwords, and sponsored a sort of moral crusade to spread Deutsche Kultur throughout the world.

The kaiser’s crusading propensities were chiefly inspired by Germany’s remarkable economic expansion. During his reign the empire enjoyed a phenomenal commercial, industrial, and agricultural revolution. An excellent geographical position and the possession of essential resources had greatly facilitated this development. In the center of Europe, Germany was a natural distributor of foreign goods on the continent. Thanks to the coal in the Ruhr and Saar Basin and the iron in Lorraine and Silesia, she, by 1914, had surpassed Great Britain in the manufacture of iron and steel, and had taken third place, excelled only by the United States and England, in the production of coal. In shipping she was second only to her British rival; whereas in the manufacture of electrical and chemical industries, Germany took the lead. In textile manufactures, however, she lagged
behind Great Britain. Scientific methods were not limited to industry. In agriculture, farmers were able to increase production through the use of fertilizers and farm machinery. The enlarged output of sugar beets and potatoes was especially noteworthy.

Like Bismarck, William II worked hand-in-glove with merchants, industrialists, and landowners in their attempts to extend their mar-

kets abroad and to monopolize those at home. Bismarck at first tended to oppose the acquisition of colonies, regarding them as extravagances. Before his fall he did consent to imperial expansion. But he insisted that German colonization must have the sanction of Great Britain, mistress of the seas. William II, however, adopted a more aggressive policy. Won over to the cause of colonial expansion by the great banking and industrial interests of Germany, he aroused jealousy and fear on all sides by his boastful remarks. Disregarding British opposition, he became an ardent advocate of a powerful German navy. "I will never rest," said the Kaiser in 1897, "until I have raised my navy to the same standard as that of the army." "The times are past," said one of his ministers, "when the German left the earth to one of his neighbors, the sea to another, and reserved the sky for himself." German penetration in the Near East, her naval ambitions, and her so-called Weltpolitik policy, as we shall see, finally forced competitors to settle their colonial rivalries and to unite in opposition to this seeming menace.
During the reign of William II there was social progress as well as economic and naval expansion. Bismarck's social legislation was extended; efficient city governments were established; and local improvements, such as sanitation, water facilities, parks, schools, and hospitals, and municipal ownership of public utilities were fostered. These advances, tempered with obedience, efficiency, and discipline, undoubtedly contributed to German success in improving the standards of living, in virtually eliminating slums in cities, and in achieving national power and prosperity.

Encouraged by these triumphs, champions of autocracy appeared in the realm of literature as well as in politics. Treitschke (1834-1896), the German historian, asserted that “the state towered above the individuals who composed it and realized ideals far beyond individual happiness”; Delbrück (1848-1929), in his works earnestly defended the despotism of William II. “The vacillations of democracy,” he said, “weaken any government”; and Bülow, the imperial chancellor from 1900 to 1909, in his Imperial Germany, also defended autocracy by claiming that “the lack of frontiers and the presence of enemies on three sides made a centralized government necessary.” Autocracy's greatest champion, however, was that strange apostle of the idea of a superman and a superstate, Nietzsche (1844-1900). Emphasizing in his works, Thus Spake Zarathustra and Beyond Good and Evil, the “will to power,” he denounced democracy and socialism as the “cult of numbers” and the “religion of equality,” and glorified the ruling classes, “whose very power was indicative of their superiority and of their right to rule.”

Prior to 1914 an increasing number of non-Germans, bourgeois liberals, and socialists, opposed this philosophy of despotism. The French inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, the Poles in eastern Germany, and the Danes in Schleswig—all resisted the governmental policy of Germanization, which aimed to eradicate the customs, institutions, and languages of these minorities. The Center Party, chiefly Bavarian and Catholic, favored moderate social reforms but opposed extreme political centralization as well as socialism. To the left of the Centrists, the National Liberals, representing big business, favored imperialism, opposed socialism, and urged liberal political and social reforms. Further to the Left, the Progressives, representing the lesser bourgeoisie, advocated a ministerial-parliamentary system, personal liberty, and a shift of the tax burden to the wealthy through heavy taxes on incomes and inheritances. On the extreme Left were the Social Democrats, the party of the wage earners. Although socialism was their goal, they opposed violence and were willing to co-operate with the bourgeoisie in order to obtain immediate reforms.
During the reign of William II the voting strength of the Social Democratic party increased from one and a half to four and a half million votes. At the outbreak of World War I, it had one hundred and ten seats in the Reichstag with one-third of the voting population of Germany enrolled in its ranks. Save for petty persecutions the organization of this party was allowed to develop without interference by the state authorities. After the repeal of Bismarck's anti-socialist laws, Social Democratic associations and newspapers were established in all parts of Germany.

Prior to the outbreak of World War I, the radical movement was spreading rapidly in Italy as well as in Germany. This development was largely the result of disorganization, intrigue, poverty, and discontent which prevailed in that country. Attempts had been made to obliterste these evils; but the inability of the government to solve certain basic problems which confronted Italy after her unification helps to explain its unsatisfactory political and social condition in 1914. Following its unification, Italy became a constitutional monarchy with an elected chamber of deputies, an appointed senate, and a premier. At first the franchise was extremely limited, but it was broadened especially in the decade prior to the outbreak of the World War when liberal elements came into power.

One of the most difficult problems facing Italy after 1870 was that of the Papacy. After the loss of Rome to Italy, Pope Pius IX refused to accept the financial settlement and freedom, offered by the Italian government in the Law of Papal Guarantee, and the loss of his temporal power. From his self-imposed imprisonment he hurled furious criticisms against the government and asked the faithful not to vote in the elections to Parliament. Disregarding his ire the government passed anti-clerical legislation, confiscating Church property, suppressing theological faculties in the universities and spiritual directors in the schools, making compulsory civil marriages, and dispensing with required religious oaths and instruction in the elementary schools. These measures aroused bitter hatred and led to violent demonstrations. But with the rise of socialism, the crown and altar began to drift together. In 1905, Pope Pius X allowed Catholics to participate in the elections in order to check the advance of socialism. Nevertheless, as we shall see, it was not until 1929 that a reconciliation between the Italian government and the Pope occurred.¹

More disturbing and more difficult to solve were the various regional, political, and economic problems. There was hostility between the constitutional and economically progressive north on the

¹ See p. 423.
one hand, and the autocratic, backward south on the other. Moreover
the various provinces of Italy found it difficult to give up the local
independence they had enjoyed in return for national security. In
addition to these rivalries the government was weakened by the
presence of numerous organizations of bandits and secret societies,
the Mafia and Camorra, in southern Italy, and by struggles between
monarchs, republicans, and socialists. These political differences
made it very difficult for the government to create an efficient ad-
ministration and to introduce the necessary economic and social
reforms. Despite these difficulties the monarchy tried to solve all
significant economic, social, and financial problems. It endeavored
to establish industries in a country that lacked coal and iron; it en-
couraged agrarian development in a state where considerable land
was not fertile and where most of the good soil was concentrated in
the hands of a few wealthy families; and it worked earnestly to
stamp out illiteracy and to create a strong army and navy. All these
governmental activities required the expenditure of large sums of
money which the monarchy tried to obtain by means of taxes—fre-
quently so high that the propertied classes faced extinction.

Although it was handicapped by the inheritance of a big debt and
lack of money, the Italian government improved conditions con-
siderably. A national financial system was set up; large armaments on
land and sea were created; railways were constructed; harbors were
built; a merchant marine was established; and industry and agri-
culture were promoted. Special efforts were made to increase the
acreage of vineyards, but governmental efforts to stimulate agricul-
tural production were relatively ineffectual. In industry, the govern-
ment attempted to increase production by establishing in 1878 a
moderate tariff, and in 1887 a full protective system. In 1877 com-
pulsory education was introduced and slight progress was made in
the establishment of public schools. Social legislation in behalf of
the working classes was passed. Benefit societies, peoples' banks, and
other aids to the masses were created.

In the field of politics the liberal monarchists faced mounting
radical opposition. Before the opening of the twentieth century, a
vigorous socialist-syndicalist drive began to develop in Italy, as in
other countries. In 1898, numerous labor uprisings took place,
especially in southern Italy, and from time to time certain Italian
radicals, influenced by Russian anarchism and terrorism, indulged
in bomb-throwing tactics. The revolutionary movement finally cul-
mminated in the assassination of King Humbert (1900). This tragedy,
the work of an anarchist, was a symptom of the general unrest in
Italy. Heavy taxation, the danger of national bankruptcy, corruption,
and political intrigue, local and regional disputes, and general poverty, especially in southern Italy, all created a feeling of dissatisfaction throughout the country which resulted not only in the rapid increase of radicalism, but also in a rising tide of emigration. From 1876 to 1905 the number of emigrants rose tremendously, reaching a maximum in 1905 of 726,000.

Upon the accession to the throne of Victor Emmanuel III slight economic and political improvement occurred. Foreign trade increased; agriculture seemed to be on the upgrade; foreign capital was made available for internal improvements; and poverty was reduced by money sent home by emigrants. Leading political groups, including the Catholics, now seemed reconciled to the maintenance of a liberal monarchy. Universal manhood suffrage was established; legislative and administrative reforms were introduced; and education was improved. In 1897, defenders of the government were greatly encouraged when the state's revenues exceeded expenditures and for the first time showed a surplus.

In foreign affairs, Italy, prior to 1914, seemed to have achieved great-power status. Checked in her attempt to conquer Abyssinia (1896), she nevertheless retained footholds in Africa—namely Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland acquired in the 'eighties, and Tripoli secured in 1911 as a result of a war with Turkey. Improved relations with the Papacy, participation in the Triple Alliance, and a secret agreement with France, as will be shown, all marked the rise of Italian influence in the field of diplomacy. Demands for the acquisition of parts of "unredeemed" Italy still in the possession of Austria also indicated a growing national sentiment—a sentiment which was to play an important part in Italian diplomacy before the war.

Despite the moderate success of the monarchy in internal and foreign affairs, it still faced in 1914 a number of serious problems. Socialism continued to grow and strikes, often resulting in acts of sabotage, were frequent in various industrial centers, such as Milan, Rome, Naples, Venice, Genoa, and Florence. In 1914, the various labor troubles culminated in an attempt to hold a general strike which collapsed forty-eight hours after it started. Natural phenomena, such as the eruption of Mount Vesuvius and other volcanoes, and terrible earthquakes also contributed to the feeling of insecurity in Italy. Prior to 1914 many people felt that the liberal monarchy, with its numerous political parties and its weak premiers—ineffective because of their dependence on groups of political factions—was incapable of solving Italy's significant problems.

See pp. 336, 354.
Bourgeois liberalism made slight headway in two other Mediterranean countries—Spain and Portugal. During the nineteenth century, democratic movements in those countries generally degenerated into factional struggles. In 1873, Spain did have a republic which lasted nearly two years. But the Bourbon monarchy was restored in the person of Alphonso XII. Facing general unrest, his successor, Alphonso XIII, managed to retain his power by means of a clever political tool, called rotativism. According to this scheme, the two leading political parties—liberal and conservative—rotated in office by managing elections. Despite this unusual political device, Spain at the turn of the century was headed toward revolution. Defeated in the Spanish-American War of 1898, she was deprived of most of the remnants of her once great empire. Now the government, defender of the privileged and selfish aristocrats and clerics, faced a rising republican and socialist opposition. Pressed by these radicals, it was forced to sanction some educational and economic reforms. Social legislation was also introduced; and the Church was stripped of a small part of its wealth and its temporal power.

Similar changes occurred in Portugal. As a result of dynastic and factional strife which shattered the institution of monarchy morally and physically, Portugal eventually became a republic (1910). In spite of this change, she was often ruled by brutal dictators. A radical movement, however, forced the government to introduce certain reforms. The Church was deprived of many privileges, and educational facilities were extended. Although numerous Portuguese liberals opposed militarism and favored further social transformation, they were unable to bring about drastic political and social changes.
During the last half of the nineteenth century, the small nations of Europe, such as Denmark, Holland, Belgium, the Scandinavian states, and Switzerland, generally followed along the same patterns of progress as the Great Powers. Most of them discarded the restraints and restrictions of the Old Regime and adopted capitalistic practices. Of these countries, Belgium experienced a pronounced political development and economic expansion. After the revolution of 1830, in which the Belgians obtained their independence, they established a moderately liberal constitutional monarchy, leaving political power in the hands of the aristocracy and the wealthy bourgeoisie. Belgium then experienced an era of real prosperity. Free from the restraining influence of the Dutch traders, that country became one of the great industrial nations of Europe. Its favorable location and its natural resources were the means to this end. Situated on the North Sea, Belgium was able, by the construction of canals and railways, to connect the entire region with the great sea port of Antwerp and to exploit her extensive coal beds. As a result she was the one country in Europe which kept pace industrially with Great Britain in the first half of the nineteenth century.

Liberalism affected the Dutch as well as the Belgians. In 1848 King William II, ruling from 1840 to 1849, accepted a new fundamental law, in which the king was checked by a parliament of two houses. A federal government was established in the Netherlands similar to that of the United States and Switzerland. Additional reforms, such as the extension of suffrage, came rather slowly. In fact, William III, who ruled from 1849 to 1890, was influenced only by a small bourgeois oligarchy. Suffrage was slightly extended, however, during the reign of Queen Wilhelmina (1898–1948), but universal suffrage, demanded by liberals and socialists, had not been granted by 1914. Despite large territorial losses, the Netherlands remained in the nineteenth century a land of hardworking, thrifty people. Although a small continental state, she still retained in 1914 many important colonies, including Java, Sumatra, part of Borneo, and Celebes in Asia, and Dutch Guiana. These possessions, together with a large merchant marine and agricultural surplus, enabled the Dutch to maintain a reasonable prosperity.

Like the Dutch, the people of Switzerland established a federal government in the nineteenth century. A new constitution, promulgated in 1848, permitted the cantons to retain their local authority, but recognized the supremacy of the central, or federal government. National legislative and executive powers were vested in an Assembly of two houses and an Executive Committee of seven, which was

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elected by the Federal Assembly. One of the seven, the President of the Council, was the presiding officer. Thus, a body of people, speaking French, German, and Italian, believing in either the Protestant or the Catholic faith, submerged their linguistic and religious antagonisms, and established one of the most advanced democracies of the nineteenth century. During this period Switzerland enjoyed pronounced economic prosperity. It became a tourist playground, a home for refugees, and it experienced industrial as well as agrarian development.

Although no longer politically significant after the seventeenth century the three Scandinavian nations in northern Europe—Denmark, Sweden, and Norway—played an important role in the development of Western civilization. The peoples of these states were very much alike, speaking similar languages, professing for the most part the Lutheran faith, and promoting similar economic interests, primarily agriculture, commerce, and fishing. In all these countries liberalism made headway during the nineteenth century. In Denmark, economic developments influenced the autocratic monarch, Christian IX, to grant democratic concessions. The small Danish farmers, having improved their economic positions by intensive dairy farming and by co-operative societies, finally forced the king to accept the parliamentary form of government. In Sweden, however, the conservative landowners, the junkers, backed the government in its opposition to liberalism. In 1863 the growing middle classes finally succeeded in bringing about the establishment of a modern parliament of two houses. High property qualifications enabled the landowners to dominate this government until 1909. At that time universal suffrage was established; Sweden joined the ranks of the European democracies, and the bourgeoisie and the proletariat now prepared to co-operate in promoting the prosperity of that country by the inauguration of a very interesting program of social and economic reform.¹

Norway also experienced liberal changes. Handed over to Sweden by the powers at Vienna, the Norwegians, mainly small farmers, fearless fishermen and sailors, with a few industrious merchants, bitterly opposed this union with their conservative neighbor. This opposition led first to autonomy, but finally culminated in the peaceful separation of the two Scandinavian states in 1905. In 1898 the Norwegians had satisfied their deep desire for liberty by forcing their parliament (Storting) to grant universal manhood suffrage. Eventually, however, sweeping reforms, such as women’s suffrage, helped to make Norway one of the most democratic of modern countries.

¹ See pp. 459-460.
Great Britain before the War

Like most of the continental countries, Great Britain still retained in 1815 many of the institutions of the Old Regime. It possessed an hereditary House of Lords, a highly restricted suffrage, an established church, and a social system based on caste. It was dominated by the conservative elements. The Tory landowners refused to break with the past, preferring to govern England as had their forefathers in bygone days. They were as patriotic, energetic, and kind as any other men in England. But they lacked the vision and the objectivity necessary to handle the problem of social reconstruction confronting the newly-born industrial England of the nineteenth century; they were unfitted both by economic position and by intellectual training for a duty of such magnitude.

As we have seen, captains of industry by 1815 were beginning to force their way into the upper strata of society. Their rise was due to the Industrial Revolution which brought about a shift in the economic balance of power from the landowners to the bourgeoisie. The greatest happiness of the greatest number—of middle-class people—now became the accepted aim of the ambitious businessman. To attain this end the Tory government of the landowners had to be obliterated and a bourgeois regime, with its self-conscious virtues and its constructive energy, substituted. Like their Calvinist forefathers, these frugal followers of the utilitarian, Bentham, frowned upon aristocratic elegance and leisure and emphasized, instead, simplicity and hard work. It was their firm belief that the scientific principles of eighteenth-century thinkers would help businessmen solve all earthly problems, and they had little patience with lazy aristocrats.

These points-of-view rose out of the intense economic struggle which the Industrial Revolution had created. Men who were engaged in this strife realized that the world was inhabited by millions of selfish human beings, that life was a struggle for existence, and that only the fit survived. Believing that this contest was a good thing in itself, they welcomed the works of the so-called classical economists who extolled individualism. They especially applauded the economist, Ricardo, when he criticized the landowner for receiving an unearned increment on the rent of his land and suggested that he be taxed thereupon. The business classes also gladly adopted the thesis advanced by Ricardo, Malthus, and Mill—that the accumulation of capital for the purpose of facilitating the mechanization of industry and the promotion of general prosperity was permissible and, in fact, indispensable. Many of them accepted the Malthusian theory

1 See pp. 188-189; 198-199.
that natural phenomena, such as war, disease, and famine, alone would solve the problem of overpopulation. Therefore, they felt that the state should persist in a laissez-faire attitude, leaving individuals to their economic fate. Mill avowedly opposed the exploitation of the masses, and Malthus, while he felt its inevitability, was full of pity for the working man.

Idealists, such as the utopian, Robert Owen (1771–1858), refused to accept selfish individualism, especially the idea that social reforms would encourage vagrancy and discourage thrift. Even from the ranks of the bourgeoisie there was now and then heard an admission that all was not well in England, that poverty and other social ills had increased; but blame for anything wrong was placed by the bourgeoisie on the shoulders of the landowners who, by means of the Corn Laws, which excluded foodstuffs from England, ruled selfishly in their own interests. Intelligent observers, however, realized that exploitation of the workers by the industrialists also was responsible for this poverty.

Taking advantage of this discontent and determined to destroy the political and economic power of the landowners, businessmen, reformers, and wage earners advocated social and political changes. Newspapers, such as the London Times, devoted much space to the discussion of reforms; street orators did an unusual amount of talking; and everywhere people recited with delight such verses as:

"Only to think to have lords over-running the nation,

As plenty as frogs in a Dutch inundation."

Exploiting bourgeois and proletarian agitation for reform, the Whigs were able to secure the passage by Parliament of the Reform Bill of 1832. Prior to the enactment of this legislation, the country had not been redistricted for election of members to the House of Commons since the reign of Charles II (1664). During this period the economic revolutions had brought about a shift of population from country to city. Despite this change, the depopulated rural districts continued to elect representatives to the House of Commons, while such thriving cities as Manchester, Leeds, and Birmingham had no representatives in Parliament. The Reform Bill deprived the landowners of their political monopoly by completely redistricting the country. Fifty-six districts containing less than two thousand inhabitants were wiped out. Thirty-two districts with a population of less than 4000 lost one member each in the House of Commons. More populous sections were granted seats lost by the less densely inhabited regions. As a result of this change, London's representa-

\[1\] See p. 199.
tion, for example, rose from six to twenty-two members. The Reform Bill also extended the suffrage to the middle-class farmers and the shopkeepers. By granting the ballot to these groups, the number of voters, especially in the city districts (the boroughs) was considerably increased, but the laborers and the poorer members of the middle classes still lacked the ballot. Out of six million adult males, less than one million had the right to vote. By this extension of suffrage the number of voters was increased from three per cent to five per cent of the whole population. There was a realignment of the party system as the Whigs, swelled by voters from the bourgeoisie, began to call themselves Liberals, and the Tories, who, fearing rapid changes, dropped some of their old traditions and designated themselves as Conservatives.

Disappointed in the Reform Bill of 1832 and the Municipal Government Act of 1835, which placed city governments in the hands of the bourgeois voters, the working classes petitioned Parliament for reforms. They presented to the government "The Peoples' Charter" in which they urged that body to give every adult the right to vote, to establish the secret ballot, to abolish property qualifications for membership in the House of Commons, and to pay members of that body. Demanding social reforms, the Chartists declared that the nation as a whole could not remain indifferent to the intolerable misery of the wage earners. They denounced a regime in which a man possessed the right to hire women and children to work in factories at starvation wages. Political control, they declared, must be taken from the wealthy classes and given to the masses before true social justice could be achieved.

True to form, the ruling classes in 1848 rejected the demands of the Chartists and suppressed the agitators. Many selfish industrialists opposed all attempts to find a solution for unemployment, poverty, the waste and decay of child labor, and the employment of women in factories. As production expanded and profits increased, the poverty of the lower classes grew worse. Even the propertied elements suffered as a result of financial crashes and speculative orgies. Nevertheless, they insisted that the government should remain aloof from private business and concern itself only with preserving peace; everyone was to look out for his own welfare.

Despite this emphasis upon a laissez-faire policy, Parliament was forced by liberal elements and by circumstances to pass social legislation beneficial to the lower classes. In 1802 and 1819 laws were enacted which limited child labor. In 1833 an anti-slavery bill obliterated slavery throughout the empire; and in 1833 a Factory Act further limited employment of children and empowered a govern-
ment commission to enter factories and to see that laws were obeyed. The poor law was changed in such a way as to encourage the paupers to work and thus to decrease the public burden. Relief was not wholly abolished, but workhouses were built and assistance was limited to inmates of these establishments. Meanwhile, the wage earners, adopting a new plan of campaign, withdrew from the Chartist organization and reconciled themselves to the industrial system. Forming trade unions they attempted to better social conditions by arranging separate agreements with their employers, by appealing to Parliament for protection, and by abstaining from political entanglements. By 1850, labor, through collective bargaining rather than violence, seemed to be in a position to gain many of its demands.

In its attitude toward economic and social problems the government adhered to a laissez-faire policy. There were times when action was imperative, but the authorities usually preferred to temporize rather than to undertake the solution of economic problems. In a way this policy of noninterference in business on the part of the state aided the wage earners. The middle classes, for example, in forcing the government to abolish the Corn Laws, helped the workers as well as themselves. Since 1815 most landowners had been able to maintain their large incomes by means of this legislation which kept up the price of grains. By the 'Forties, the industrialists, however, abolished these laws. Ardent exponents of the free-trade movement which had begun in the eighteenth century, they claimed that the tariff on grain increased the profits of the landlords at the expense of the business classes and the wage earners. Besides, they held that England must import most of her food so as to balance industrial exports. These men, with Manchester as their headquarters, were led by Richard Cobden, an idealistic cotton merchant; John Bright, a Quaker; and Sir Robert Peel, a moderate Tory. By 1845 the movement had grown so rapidly that the Corn Laws were doomed. A crop failure, particularly in Ireland, enabled Peel, Prime Minister in 1846, to repeal the Corn Laws. Free trade was established between 1852 and 1867, and Great Britain, with her great head start in the field of industrial, commercial, and financial expansion, was in a position to become the leading industrial state.

Free trade was only one aspect of the bourgeois plan to achieve real individualism and prosperity in England by removing all kinds of restrictions. Before the mid-century a series of bills had abolished various religious handicaps. In 1828 Dissenters were given the right to hold office; in 1829 Catholics were admitted to Parliament; later, minor religious discriminations against Jews and atheists were removed; and in 1869 the Anglican Church in Catholic Ireland was
disestablished. Despite these social and religious reforms, physical and moral decay among the English people, as a result of the terrible social and economic conditions which accompanied industrialization, forced the working men to organize in order to obtain better social conditions and higher wages. In 1834 the Grand National Consolidated Trades Union was created. Favoring an eight-hour day, with the use of strikes to gain its aims, this organization was important because it signalized the rise of the modern unions, which played a significant role in the political, social, and economic development of the bourgeois state.

While the workers were trying to earn a living the middle classes were enjoying prosperity. The Technological and Industrial Revolutions, which were making Great Britain an economic beehive, enabled them to grow in numbers, in wealth, and in power. No longer did the landowners and their dependents constitute the bulk of the population; in a hundred thriving cities many businessmen were of more consequence than the great landlords of the shires. They accumulated large fortunes in industry, trade, and investment. They influenced every cranny of British cultural and intellectual life. In short, they enabled Mid-Victorian England to become the arbiter of Western civilization. Queen Victoria, during her reign from 1837 to 1901, became a symbol of this hegemony.

At a time when the wealthy middle classes were achieving political supremacy as well as financial prosperity, the masses were seeking equal rights and social reforms. Between 1832 and 1867 bourgeois reformers and working men demanded the extension of the suffrage. In 1866 the Liberal leader, Gladstone, sponsored a reform bill which was defeated because of its seeming radicalism. In the following year, the Conservatives passed the Reform Bill of 1867. Actually, this act, fathered by Disraeli, was more radical than that of the Liberals. It provided for a wider extension of the franchise and a partial redistribution of seats that brought greater political power in the House of Commons to the industrial and commercial centers. This, and similar legislation in 1868 for Ireland and Scotland, gave the ballot to the upper class of laborers and all tenant farmers. It doubled the number of voters in England and marked an important step in the political rise of the working classes. Subsequent political reforms resulted in the triumph of democracy in England. In 1872 the secret ballot at Parliamentary elections was introduced; in 1884, under the liberal rule of Gladstone, farm laborers were granted the right to vote; and in 1885 a Parliamentary Reform Act increased the representatives of the large cities to the House of Commons.

As a result of this legislation the House of Commons became a
PARLIAMENT BUILDING, BIG BEN, AND WESTMINSTER BRIDGE, LONDON, ENGLAND
representative body. Its members were elected by all classes. Voters expressed their views by means of organized parties. The Liberals favored individual liberty, free trade, separation of Church and state, home rule for Ireland, and improved social conditions for working men. The Conservatives, differing in degree rather than in kind, erected a whole network of last ditches beyond which they would not go. At all times they emphasized the bulwarks of the existing order—the monarchy, the church, and the constitution—and stood forth as the defender of law, order, property, and the empire. Nevertheless, they were willing to sponsor a certain degree of social reform, provided it was not carried to extremes.

Outstanding advocate of liberalism was William Ewart Gladstone (1809–1898). As Prime Minister in the 'sixties and 'seventies he favored the removal of all restrictions which stood in the way of the individual. In the 'sixties he passed a series of budgets by which he placed the burden of taxation upon all classes by the imposition of income, inheritance, and liquor taxes. He also swept away the import duties on many articles. Interested in Ireland, he tried to better conditions there by introducing bills designed to help the peasants gain security of tenure and ownership of the land. In 1870, Parliament enacted the first Irish Land Act. This bill provided, in case of the tenant's eviction, compensation for him for any permanent improvement to the land which he may have made. It also set up a fund to enable the tenant to buy property. In 1879, Parnell, Irish leader in Parliament, formed the Irish Land League which demanded extensive reforms. Gladstone, in 1881, passed a law through Parliament which provided for the establishment by a special court of fair rent, for fixity of tenure, and for free sale of lease rights by the tenant. Although the Land Act was an important reform it did not provide a final settlement, inasmuch as the landlords still owned their property. Despite the opposition of English aristocrats who had large estates in Ireland, Gladstone also planned to grant Home Rule to the Irish. Joined by a group of Liberals who opposed this bill, the Conservatives, however, as we shall see, managed to defeat Gladstone on this issue in 1886, 1893, and 1895.

Opposition to Gladstone's Irish policies, together with an economic depression which began in the 'seventies, contributed to the fall of this Liberal leader and the rise of his able Conservative opponent, Benjamin Disraeli (1804–1881). By 1873 the export of steel rails and other goods to Europe had experienced a drastic decline. As a result, prices fell, industries slowed down, and unemployment increased. At the same time a steady rise in the amount of food-

1 See p. 282.
stuffs imported from Russia and the Americas, and a fall in the cost of living caused a decline in British agricultural products. Farmers were unable to raise grain at a profit and either lost their lands or became truck-growers. Aroused by this situation the voters turned their backs on the Liberals and elected a Conservative government.

Believing that imperialism alone could solve England's economic problems, the new Prime Minister, Disraeli, strengthened the British Empire by acquiring for Great Britain a strong interest in the Suez Canal (1875) and by helping to check the Russian advance in the Balkans at the Congress of Berlin (1878). At the same time, he strongly favored the development of markets in India, in order to improve industrial conditions in England. To popularize this program he had Queen Victoria proclaimed Empress of India in 1877. Upon his death in 1881, Disraeli left behind him a powerful Conservative party, favoring a protective tariff and a vigorous foreign and imperialist policy. In power between 1895 and 1905, the Conservatives crushed the Boer States in South Africa and, by 1902, had gained possession of valuable diamond and gold mines and agricultural lands. Enthusiastic Conservatives now visualized the end of the depression, believing that the importation of precious metals and the development of imperial markets would increase price levels and restore prosperity in England.

Adopting a policy of noninterference in domestic affairs, the Conservatives therefore awaited the return to normal conditions. The demands of the Irish for Home Rule were ignored, although the government did pass bills designed to quiet the Irish by permitting land reforms. A County Councils Act (1888), establishing popularly elected councils in the rural districts, was also enacted. But in general the government pursued a "hands off" policy, ignoring the problem of increasing unemployment and poverty. Meanwhile British industry failed to recover. The erection of protective tariffs in Germany, France, the United States, and elsewhere, excluded her goods from these markets; but her own markets, unprotected, because of the free-trade doctrines, were open to the cheap products manufactured in other industrial states. Revival of shipping competition through the rise of large merchant marines in France, Germany, and Austria contributed to a decline in shipping and shipbuilding.

Economic conditions encouraged the unionization of British workers. In 1871 and 1875, the government was forced to recognize the legality of unions, of strikes, and of collective bargaining. In 1889, unsatisfactory working conditions resulted in the outbreak of several strikes. In the midst of a general controversy over the future of labor, Keir Hardie, a Scottish miner and socialist, led the workers in 1893
in organizing the Independent Labor Party, the object of which was
to obtain collective ownership of all the means of production, dis-
tribution, and exchange. This party was too radical for the rank and
file of British workmen; therefore, in 1899, the Trade-Union Con-
gress paved the way for the founding of the organization, which, in
1906, adopted the name of Labor Party. In the election of 1906 the
Labor Party won twenty-nine seats in the House of Commons as com-
pared with seven for the Independent Laborites. The new Labor
Party, although not radical, looked with favor upon such socialistic
policies as nationalization of mines, railways, and canals, free educa-
tion, and old-age pensions.

Influenced by this manifestation of proletarian unrest, the govern-
ment deserted temporarily its laissez-faire policy. In 1902, a year
after the death of Queen Victoria and the accession to the throne of
Edward VII, Parliament unified the factory laws into a single code
which was extended to remedy some of the worst evils of the indus-
trial situation. Hours of labor, especially for women and children in
mines, were regulated, and sanitary conditions of factories were
carefully supervised. In 1905 a Liberal government took office, and
in the following year a mine code was passed, definitely forbidding
the employment of women and children and regulating conditions
in the mines. A workingman's compensation act was also enacted, af-
fecting industrial and agricultural laborers, clerks, servants, and
sailors. Employers were compelled to compensate their workers for
injuries and diseases incurred during employment. By adopting this
legislation Parliament definitely abandoned the principle that the
wage earner had to take care of himself. The laborer was a part of
the industrial system and, like the machinery, had to be repaired by
the employer. Several years later (1908) the government continued
this new social policy by passing old-age pension acts, and, in 1909, a
minimum wage law was enacted which applied chiefly to the un-
skilled trades. In 1912 minimum wage legislation was extended to
the coal industry.

Believing that capitalism was doomed unless the government did
something to help the worker, David Lloyd George (1863–1945), a
clever Welsh attorney and a member of the Liberal Cabinet, became
Britain's leading exponent of social democracy. He knew that the
tendency of population to increase, the substitution of machinery for
man power, and the periodical depressions were creating an increas-
ingly dangerous problem of unemployment. Therefore he deter-
mined to avoid future trouble by enacting a National Insurance Act
(1911) which would force employers, employees, and the government
to create a fund which should support those temporarily out of em-
ployment and those unable to work as a result of injuries received on
duty. Despite vigorous opposition on the part of the Conservatives,
this significant piece of legislation was passed. Thus workers were
given a feeling of security which they had long desired. To the radical
working men and socialists, however, this bill was merely one step in
the right direction. Nationalization of certain key industries, and
high income taxes, as a prerequisite for a socialist state, they declared,
should follow.

In addition to proposing social reforms, Lloyd George favored the
education of the masses. Under Gladstone the famous Forster Act
(1870) introduced the first elementary schools, but they were far out-
numbered by private institutions that enjoyed state aid. Between
1876 and 1899 education was made free and compulsory for children
under twelve; in 1902 a bill was passed which transferred control of
the state schools from local authorities to the county or borough coun-
cil; private institutions were to receive government support; the two
systems (private and public schools) were co-ordinated in relation to
school population; and both were held to the same standard of work.
The act aroused the disapproval of those who believed in secular
education. Led by Lloyd George they introduced a bill in 1906 which
recognized only state schools as a part of a national educational sys-
tem, but this bill was vetoed by the House of Lords.

Chief opponents of Lloyd George’s reform program were the Con-
servatives, representing the wealthy industrial and landowning classes.
They were especially bitter in their opposition to Lloyd George’s
famous Budget Bill of 1909, whereby the resourceful Welshman
planned to force the “haves” to pay in the form of new land and
income taxes, for the cost of the new social-security legislation. At-
tempting to protect their interest, the wealthy classes insisted that this
bill would ruin England and pave the way for socialism, and so they
got the House of Lords to reject it. Lloyd George and his Liberal fol-
lowers now accused the Lords of violating the constitution by usurp-
ing the House of Commons’ right to enact all money legislation. Fol-
lowing a general election, he, backed by the Irish nationalists and the
Laborites, pushed the budget through Parliament (1909). Two years
later he also had the House of Commons pass a Parliament Act
which definitely deprived the House of Lords of power over financial
matters, gave it the right merely to delay other legislation, and re-
duced the maximum life of Parliament from seven to five years.

Having deprived the aristocrats of their political authority, the
Liberal government next attacked the exploitation of their tenants
and laborers. In 1913–1914 agricultural legislation was passed estab-
lishing a minimum wage law for agricultural workers, creating a
scheme of rural housing, granting the tenant full compensation for all improvements made by him, regulating leases of farms, and encouraging small holdings or the leasing of farms by local and county councils. A land commission also was to be established to supervise the relations of landlord and tenant and to promote the development of agriculture. Only a part of this comprehensive rural program was put into operation.

Another important problem—Home Rule for Ireland—seemed about to be solved by the Liberal government when the outbreak of World War I postponed further progress in this matter. Agitation for Home Rule—the establishment of an Irish Parliament—began almost immediately after the passage of the Act of Union in 1800 which abolished that body and gave the Irish one hundred seats in the British House of Commons. The famous leader, O'Connell, soon after his admission to Parliament in 1829, began to agitate for the repeal of the act of 1800. By 1886, eighty-five Irish Home Rule members were sent to Parliament. Impressed by this movement Gladstone took up the Home Rule question. In 1886 the first bill was introduced and rejected. A split now occurred within the Liberal Party, the conservative wing forming a Liberal Unionist group. Despite this opposition, Gladstone's second bill passed the Commons in 1893, but was vetoed by the House of Lords. In 1912 the third Home Rule Bill was introduced by Prime Minister Asquith. This bill provided for the establishment of an Irish Parliament composed of a Senate appointed by the government and a lower house elected by the people. Matters of general importance, such as military and naval forces, peace and war, diplomacy and commerce, however, were to be handled by the British Parliament, in which Ireland was to have a representation of forty-two members who were to vote only on imperial questions. This bill passed the Commons, but the Lords vetoed it. Two years later the Commons enacted it over the House of Lords' veto.

While Parliament was discussing the act, opposition to this solution of the Irish problem had developed among the people of North Ireland (Ulster). The Ulsterites had very little in common with the native Irish. They were Protestants and industrialists for the most part, and the other Irish were predominantly Roman Catholics and farmers. Preferring to remain subjects of the King of England, the Ulsterites were preparing to resist the application of a bill which would leave them in a union with the Irish nationalists, when the outbreak of World War I brought about a temporary lull in the Anglo-Irish dispute.

World War I also resulted in an armistice between capital and labor. Upon the eve of that struggle, the spread of labor unrest, a
commercial and industrial decline, and an increasing opposition to British control in various parts of the empire seemed to presage the decay of Great Britain. Prior to 1914 the government had tried to check the outbreak of numerous destructive strikes by having the House of Lords as a supreme court declare picketing illegal and holding unions responsible for damages (the Taff Vale Decision). Influenced by the rise of the Labor Party, both Conservatives and Liberals voted to nullify the Taff Vale Decision by passing the Trades Disputes Act which legalized peaceful picketing and made unions not responsible for alleged illegal actions of their members in trade disputes. Meanwhile, the Labor Party, led by J. Ramsay MacDonald, urged nationalization of certain key industries and the enactment of a steeply graduated income tax as the first steps in the solution of all labor troubles by the establishment of a socialist state.

Despite the attempts of the Liberals under Lloyd George to ameliorate social conditions, the strike situation between 1911 and 1914 grew steadily worse. Seamen, firemen, railway employees, and miners instituted strikes which threatened to upset the economic life of the kingdom. Even agricultural workers formed unions and demanded higher wages and better living conditions. By 1914 the tendency on the part of craft unions to combine into large industrial organizations, composed of all workers of a particular industry, threatened to create a state within a state. In fact, the National Union of Railwaymen, the Transport Workers' Federation, and the Miners' Federation formed a triple alliance which seemed powerful enough to paralyze by a strike the entire economic life of the country.

In addition to the spread of labor unrest Great Britain faced a gradual commercial and industrial decline. By 1914 Germany and the United States were powerful and successful competitors. With great coal and iron reserves, Germany was able to manufacture goods at lower costs, to undersell British products in the markets of the world, and to deprive Great Britain of the shipping monopoly she had long enjoyed. A decline in her coal industry added to England's economic troubles. Moreover, she possessed old machinery and therefore was unable to compete with the up-to-date American and German mechanical devices. In an attempt to restore prosperity, an aggressive group of British Conservatives, led by Joseph Chamberlain, urged tariff protection for British goods and the creation of an economic imperial Zollverein (customs union comparable to that formed by Prussia among the German states) which should include all possessions within the British Empire. But this union failed to materialize, as it did not at first find favor with many conservative-minded people or in the great commonwealths of the empire. The common-
wealths were afraid that it would bring about the subordination of colonial industries to those of Great Britain.

These social and economic problems were not peculiar to Great Britain. Prior to 1914 industrial progress in France, Germany, the United States, and other countries had stimulated stiff international competition for markets, raw materials, and investments. To protect domestic interests these states had passed tariffs. But practically all of them experienced financial crises and depressions accompanied by a fall in prices, a decline in consumption of manufactured goods, and an increase in unemployment, poverty, crime, and radicalism—characteristics of our modern industrial society.

![Queen Victoria and Disraeli](image)

*Queen Victoria and Disraeli*
*After a drawing in Alan Bott's This Was England*

**Collateral Reading**


*Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. XI, Chaps. VIII, XX, XXIII, XXIV; Vol. XII, Chaps. III, V, VI, VII, X-XI.


A. Maurois, *Disraeli* (1927).
L. Strachey, *Queen Victoria* (1921).
POLITICAL, economic, and social changes in the nineteenth century resulted in the establishment of the modern democratic state. Politically, this type of organization could be defined as one in which the citizens ruled indirectly through periodically elected deputies or representatives. By this popular sovereignty, the people controlled, in theory at least, all phases of public policy. The framework of the democratic state was erected during the revolutionary era of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. During that period, as we have seen, the constitutional and representative systems of government similar to that of England, were established in many European states. These political innovations marked the rise of the businessmen—especially in industrial countries. Once in control of the governments, they were able to deprive the nobles and ecclesiastics of their special political, economic, and social privileges. The lower classes—wage earners and tenants—however, still had to endure such evils as low wages, irregularity of employment and tenantship, and bad working conditions. They therefore desired the ballot in order to end injustices and to promote their own prosperity. The result was the gradual establishment, in many European states during the late nineteenth century, of universal suffrage and majority rule—political aspects of the modern democratic state.

This political development was accompanied by significant economic and social changes. During the nineteenth century, the Technological and Industrial Revolutions greatly transformed industry and agriculture. Originating in England in the eighteenth century,

1 See Chaps. VII-IX.
these economic upheavals spread to Belgium, France, Germany, Austria, and even to Russia in the following century. Wherever they went they largely eliminated the fear of famine by vastly increasing the variety and quantity of foodstuffs. They also tremendously enlarged the wealth of these countries through the augmented productive capacity of the nation and the exploitation of mineral resources such as iron, coal, and petroleum.

Parallel to this increase in productive capacity came an improvement in transportation facilities. Canals were built, and macadam roads, railways, and steamboats were used to improve means of intercourse. At the same time the concentration and growth of population was notable, especially in the centers of industry—the cities. Rapid transportation broke down the isolation which characterized the older agrarian society. In short, the modern state, as a result of these changes, rested on a new mobility and experienced an expansion of foodstuffs, goods, capital, and population.

The so-called Second Industrial Revolution was largely responsible for these changes. Whereas the first revolution was confined largely to the invention of machinery which increased the output in the textile and certain other industries, the second revolution, which, roughly speaking, occurred after 1870, marked the creation of inventions which tremendously expanded the supply of metals, of coal, and of oil. At the same time it greatly improved transportation and communication. In 1856, the Bessemer process was discovered, whereby steel was produced from iron. By the invention of the famous Siemens process in 1861, and through the introduction of the Gilchrist-Thomas method in 1876, various impurities were removed from the iron ore, and a better steel was produced. In addition to these improvements, scientists created a number of alloys, substances which could withstand chemical action and tremendous physical shocks and strains, such as stainless steels, developed after 1912. A new product, aluminum, was made available through the discovery of a refining process by a young student at Oberlin College, Charles Martin Hall (1863–1914).

These rapid advances in the production of minerals, however, would not have been possible without an adequate supply of fuel for their smelting. Thanks to the development of coal mining this need was satisfied. The invention of the steam shovel, the application of electricity to machinery (resulting in the invention of a pick-machine driven by electricity which did the work of twelve miners), and the development of various coal cutting machines—these and other inventions assured a tremendous increase in the output of coal. Moreover, with the invention of the internal combustion engine, in 1859,
and the Diesel engine, in 1892, petroleum became an important fuel. Its greatest value has been to furnish power for automobiles, airplanes, railroad trains, and ships. Finally, the development of miscellaneous forms of electrical power generation, particularly hydroelectric generation after 1910, gave such states as France, the Scandinavian countries, and Italy—countries that lacked coal—an opportunity to harness their numerous waterfalls and thus obtain power through the electric energy of the motor. During the postwar period tremendous hydroelectric projects were completed in Italy, Russia, the United States, and many other countries.

Parallel with revolutionary advances in the production of metals and fuel occurred remarkable progress in the invention of automatic machinery in the textile and knitting industries. These, in turn, tremendously increased the output of wool, cotton, linen, and silk. Furthermore, in the last part of the nineteenth century a process for the production of a fiber of a silken texture, called rayon, was discovered. In addition to the production of silk, the nineteenth century witnessed a revolution in the dye industry and the introduction of many new products of great value today, such as rubber. As a result of these and other inventions, benefits were conferred upon people of all classes. They were better fed, housed, and clothed than they had ever been before. Materials for building were obtained from mines, forests, and quarries; labor-saving devices and improved engineering enabled men to use these materials in construction of skyscrapers, public buildings, warehouses, depots, docks, and long bridges.

The creation of an abundant water supply in towns by means of dams, water pipes, and other devices did much to promote the general health of people. Baths were no longer a luxury and many of the diseases rising out of polluted water were eradicated. Because of improved mining and transportation it was possible to develop better heating facilities. To a large extent coal stoves replaced or supplemented fireplaces; systems of heating (hot water and hot air) were introduced. As a result people were able to live in comfort in their houses during the winter and to enjoy a plentiful supply of warm water. New kinds of illumination added greatly to domestic comfort. Torches, candles, and lamps were largely replaced by gas and electric lights. In many places powerful arc lights in city streets made it possible to prolong the activities or amusements of day into the night, thus making man's life relatively longer and more productive than theretofore.

Enormous advances were made in the diffusion of news and ideas. Prior to the nineteenth century newspapers were few in number (most news from abroad was many weeks old) and limited in subject
matter. During the nineteenth century cheap paper, rapid transportation, and mechanical inventions tremendously increased the size and importance of newspapers. In 1814 the London Times set up a printing press run by steam, and it was soon possible to do printing at a rapid rate of speed. Books, magazines, and newspapers gradually became numerous and cheap. The invention of the telegraph and the laying of submarine cables, around the middle of the nineteenth century, enabled papers to secure and to print accounts of events that had occurred but a few minutes before publication. With the turn of the nineteenth century, other inventions, such as the wireless telegraphy, the telephone, and the radio enabled men to keep informed of events in a way never dreamed of before.

In the spread of information photography also played an important role. Prior to its invention, only the wealthy could afford paintings, portraits, or pictures on their walls. Beginning with Daguerre, who invented photography in the form of the daguerreotype in 1839, the art was perfected and cheapened until, by the twentieth century, pictures were taken and developed rapidly and at relatively slight cost. Further improvements in photography greatly enhanced its importance. Not only did it become possible to photograph colors, light, and shade, but also, thanks to the discovery of the X-ray of light, by Roentgen, a German scientist, one could penetrate through spaces in opaque objects and take pictures of the other side or the interior of the object.

About the close of the century the invention of cinematography by Edison enabled one to take pictures of an object in motion, which, when shown afterward in rapid succession, produced the "moving picture." Cinemas or movies were soon improved and spread over the world, furnishing entertainment and information for literally millions of people. The invention of the phonograph, by which sounds could be recorded and reproduced, brought good music into many homes. When combined with the motion picture, it resulted in the modern "talkie," one of the most influential amusements and educational agencies of the twentieth century. Just as important, perhaps, is the radio. Bringing educational and musical programs to millions, it is today one of the greatest avenues of communication.

By 1900 the modern state rested on a new social as well as a new economic basis. During the nineteenth century feudal society disappeared in advanced countries. Industrial and financial chieftains, instead of nobles and ecclesiastics, practically controlled the economic life of the people. Men and machines both had become their puppets. Machinery and credit had enabled them to replace the old aristocracy as masters of the modern state. The system which the captains of in-
Industry dominated was truly capitalistic. Each industrialist tried to outsell the others by means of superior methods of production. But the more efficient an industry became through substitution of mechanical labor, the more people were thrown out of jobs and the less people seemed to be able to consume the increasing supply of goods. To sell at all under these conditions the industrialists had to lower costs of manufacturing by means of more efficient and more expensive machinery, by mass production, and by absorption of rival concerns. Hence, there was, by the close of the nineteenth century, a tendency on the part of industries to grow and merge into large unified trusts, controlled by a few industrialists and captains of finance.

Although this development appeared in most industrial countries of Europe, it was in Germany that it achieved its fullest expression. There it became a characteristic feature of the autocratic state. Bismarck hated economic individualism and soon set himself against it. Influenced perhaps by the Hohenzollern policy of benevolent despotism, by Hegel’s emphasis upon the state, and by conceptions of state socialism expressed in the works of such German economists as List, Wagner, and Schmoller, he insisted that all classes would benefit if they would co-operate in the task of building a powerful, unified, and prosperous state. To accomplish this—even before the industries and factories of Germany were earning great profits—he inaugurated social legislation designed to give security to the wage earners. At the same time he fattened industry, agriculture, and commerce by protection against competition, by financial subsidies, and by favorable legislation.¹

Despite her late economic development, Germany in 1914 controlled a substantial portion of world trade. Not handicapped as were the British by a conservatism which refused to discard time-worn machinery or to depart from traditional business methods, the Germans moved rapidly in both agriculture and industry from the small-scale standards of medieval society to the large-scale organization of modern times. Accustomed to tendencies toward consolidation, the German people offered no opposition to the rise of trusts. Hence, by 1914 a large part of German economic life, especially in the chemical, coal, iron, and steel industries, was organized into consolidations, called cartels. These were powerful associations of firms in which members maintained their separate existence and individuality but agreed to co-operate with one another in the control of output, prices, and markets. This form of syndicate was advantageous in that it eliminated waste, economized effort, and checked cutthroat competition. On the other hand, it resulted in the concentration of financial

¹ See p. 262.
and economic power in the hands of a few big industrialists and bankers, who, by controlling prices, credit facilities, and production, took advantage of the helplessness of the masses of people. Nevertheless, cartels were spreading rapidly in all fields of production by 1914. The government co-operated with these associations in their attempt

to extend their markets abroad and to monopolize those at home. By 1914 German businessmen, as a result of this remarkable industrial growth, were in a position to challenge the supremacy of the landowning aristocrats, the Junkers. These German manufacturers and capitalists in 1912 opposed the high tariffs on foodstuffs, which enriched the Junkers and increased the cost of living. Determined to abolish high tariffs, reduce taxes, and lower the cost of living, the business groups appealed to the wage earners for support. In the elections of 1912, the German landowners, as a consequence of the workers' acceptance of the capitalists' program, were badly defeated.

In England the first great combine, organized in the early 'nineties, was the Brünner-Monod Salt Union, which comprised about sixty-four competing firms. At the turn of the century the Coats' Sewing-Cotton organization had been created with a capital of 10,000,000
pounds and a virtual monopoly throughout England. Imitations of the German cartels and the American trusts arose in England as the movement in favor of Big Business gained headway. Shipping rings, whereby steamship companies arranged monopolistic agreements in which they divided up the trade routes and paid rebates to merchants who patronized their lines, came into existence. British industrialists were engaged in an earnest attempt to regain their former supremacy when World War I interrupted for a while the international economic competition.

In the United States the late nineteenth century marked the rise of great corporations—associations of many capitalists, large and small, for the purpose of doing business on a big scale. A corporation was usually governed by a board of directors which was chosen by the stockholders who were entitled to as many votes as they had shares of stock. With a view to the abolition of competition, many of these corporations formed combinations, called trusts. These monopolistic organizations, at first dominated by a few industrial leaders, were either vertical trusts (complete and self-contained units of all the successive stages of manufacture from the production of the raw material to the final distribution of the finished product), or horizontal trusts (combines of various firms producing similar products). Inasmuch as these trusts tended to use their monopoly to regulate the prices of certain commodities, they encountered the opposition of the government. Aroused especially by the price-controlling methods of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, the United States Congress virtually outlawed trusts in 1890 by the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. To evade this law, holding companies were formed which were corporations that owned controlling stock issues in other corporations, and were, therefore, the legal substitute for trusts. By a system of pyramiding, minority control was established on a large scale. Management was practically separated from ownership, and a few absentee holders of stock controlled a great number of large combines.

In the twentieth century, investment bankers became the actual rulers of these holding companies. These men used their control not only to increase profits of the concern for greater productivity and better service, but also to earn large and immediate rewards through speculative manipulations in the stock market. During the postwar period, especially, great banking combinations got control of manufacturing, mining, transportation, utilities, and insurance companies.

1A rebate was a portion of the freight charges which the company returned to the shipper. Thus, the former, ostensibly conforming to the established rates, was, in reality, cutting his for his clients in order to retain their patronage,
not only in the United States, but also in other parts of the world. At first banks performed a very important function in the economic life of the nation. They furnished industrial concerns credit for the purchase of raw materials and the payment of wages. In their scramble for high profits, they extended their activities. Certain institutions, called investment banks, gained control of the holding companies and often proceeded to water stocks (issue more stock than the capital value of the enterprise), to force corporations into bankruptcy after looting them, and to use the resources of the companies for speculative purposes in the stock markets.

These financial manipulations did much to discredit the stock exchanges as well as the banks. Originally, the stock market had been established to facilitate the collection of a large amount of capital for profitable investments. As we have seen, their very existence tended to encourage foolish speculation and wild booms such as the South Sea Bubble and the John Law venture. In the early speculative orgies, the gambling was on the future earning power of the stocks. By the twentieth century, speculation also was based on the fluctuation of the market value of the stocks, frequently artificially raised or lowered through bidding pools and manipulation. In fact, the stock market in the United States was by 1929 largely a gambling institution, wherein thousands of people were engaged in speculative orgies. In October of that year the stock market crashed and a depression followed. After the debacle, the American government attempted to force the stock market, as well as the banks, to perform their normal functions—the purchase and sale of securities for investment and the furnishing of credit for legitimate economic expansion.

The small businessmen in capitalistic society frequently played an important role in the move to curb the power, not only of banks but also of trusts, by their opposition to the over-centralization of business, especially in the 'eighties and the 'nineties. To be sure, many admitted that Big Business had benefited society by introducing technical improvements, labor-saving devices, efficient management, and, often, lower prices. They could see, moreover, that mass production had frequently brought luxuries within the reach of men with moderate incomes. Nevertheless, they believed that these benefits were insignificant in comparison to the great evil which it brought in its wake—a new economic servitude—inflicted upon society by Big Business. This new servitude for the little businessmen was the result of economic strangulation brought about by the mechanization of

1 The first stock exchanges were established in London (1698); Paris (1724); and New York City (1817).
2 See pp. 92-94.
industry and the rise of Big Business. Numerous small concerns, catering to the needs of the local community, unable to compete against these large enterprises because of their limitations in capital and credit and their lack of preferential treatment by business rivals, were forced to sell out. The economic structure was thrown out of gear as thousands of small shopkeepers went out of business. They were pushed into the ranks of the propertyless, the jobless, or the wage-earning classes.

Although the little businessmen organized in all of the industrial countries of Europe, they made the most constructive attempts to stave off extinction in Belgium. In the 'nineties numerous associations were created for the study and defense of their interests, and in 1899 a bureau was subsidized by the Belgian government for the express purpose of promoting economic and professional associations among small businessmen and industrialists. In the next nine years, four great congresses of these businessmen, meeting in Antwerp, Liége, Ghent, and Nemours, respectively, scrutinized the scientific and economic aspects involved in the stabilization of the bourgeois order. Royal decrees and national investigation followed, all with the object of destroying the monopoly of Big Business. Handicapping the efforts, in general, of the middle classes to better their conditions was the fact that they were not able at first to win the support of the workers. Prior to 1914 many small businessmen opposed organized labor as well as Big Business. Facing two enemies, the middle classes were unable to concentrate upon either foe. Meanwhile, both Big Business and Labor grew at the expense of the petty bourgeoisie.

This new industrial setup tended to make the economic life of the plutocrat and proletariat, as well as the small businessman, more insecure. It is true that working conditions were gradually improved; that an undreamed leisure was bestowed upon man; and, that, thanks to the development of medical science, he could expect "to enjoy" a greater length of life. At the same time, businessmen were always conscious of the possibility that some new invention or discovery would force them to reorganize or even abandon their enterprises; and workers constantly faced the spectre of unemployment, especially during the period of depression which invariably followed an interval of prosperity under the new industrial system.

In a way the tendency toward economic consolidation was helpful to the wage earners in meeting the problem of unemployment. It enabled them to organize by bringing them together in large concerns and making them first craft-conscious and then class-conscious. In practically every country where there were important industries, the workers organized unions in order to better their economic and
social positions. Soon, these labor units decided to consolidate in order to control governmental policy. In France a National Federation of Syndicates, representing most of the national and regional unions of the country, was formed in 1895 for the purpose of creating a socialist state, consisting of co-ordinated industrial units. The syndicalists aimed at the destruction of capitalistic society through the use of revolutionary tactics, namely, the strike, direct action, and sabotage. In Great Britain the political trend was more obvious. An Independent Labor Party was organized (1893) and representatives were elected to Parliament. Even in Germany, despite the opposition of the autocratic government, workingmen’s unions were created which attempted to enter politics by either endorsing or supporting candidates and certain policies. Wherever unions existed strikes usually occurred. These industrial upheavals, like the unions, increased in numbers and in size. Unable to solve the growing problem of unemployment which seemed to be the inevitable result of the rapid mechanization of industry, practically every industrial country in Europe faced the problem of labor unrest.

Reformers had long favored changes in behalf of labor. Ardent exponents of a real democratic state, a group of reformers—called utopians—advanced plans whereby labor and capital would cooperate in an attempt to achieve a perfect economic order. Of these, the fantastic Frenchman, Saint-Simon (1760–1825), was pre-eminent. Unwilling to discard the capitalistic system, he proposed that the “great minds,” the financiers, industrial leaders, and scientists, should, by inventions, scientific discoveries, and industrial improvements, participate in a planned movement to eliminate poverty. “All social institutions,” he wrote, “should have as their aim the physical and moral improvements of the most numerous and poorest class.” Charles Fourier (1772–1837), another Frenchman, suggested a scheme by which, instead of a central government handling the great business enterprises—a difficult task—France should be split into small groups of families, called Phalanges, each of which should contain eighteen hundred members, owning in common the buildings and all the implements for the production of the necessities of life. The total product of their work was to be divided so as to give capital four-twelfths, labor five-twelfths, and talent or management three-twelfths. Visualizing a confederation of Phalanges, with the capital at Constantinople, Fourier eventually had followers as far west as the United States.

Great Britain had a brilliant utopian in the wealthy liberal manufacturer, Robert Owen (1771–1858). Disturbed by the prevalence of poverty, he hoped to regenerate mankind by the formation of co-
operative groups which should own and use for their benefit all the necessary means of production. As manager of a large cotton mill of which he later became the chief proprietor, he paid good wages, bettered working conditions, and transformed the living quarters into a model town. To the surprise of fellow industrialists, Owen's factory, despite additional expenditures, earned dividends as large as before. The co-operative movement which rose out of the ideas and activities of the utopian socialists, especially Owen, manifested itself during the last half of the nineteenth century in various forms. Producers' co-operatives were established, especially in agriculture. Over all Europe, co-operative buying and selling agencies enabled the farmers to get better prices for their commodities and also to avoid unreasonable charges on things they purchased. In Great Britain and other countries consumers organized co-operative stores and wholesale houses. Usually the goods in these concerns were sold at the market price, and the profits of the enterprises were given back to the members—the consumers—in the form of dividends. Co-operative banks, loan associations, and similar institutions were also formed. Prior to 1914 the co-operative movement developed in practically every country. Local associations were first created, but later, national organizations were established. In 1895 an Industrial Co-operative Alliance was erected. Wherever these organizations were founded they played an important role in lessening the evils of capitalistic enterprise and speculation.

While the utopians and other advocates of the co-operative movement were trying to solve economic and social problems within the framework of the capitalistic state, another reformer, Karl Marx (1818-1883), urged the abolition of capitalism and the establishment of a socialistic state. During his youth this apostle of socialism saw his fellow Germans trying to unify and liberalize their country. He also witnessed the Industrial Revolution penetrating the Rhineland, and the consequent enrichment of a few and the impoverishment of the masses. Conscious of the injustices which resulted, Marx decided to devote his life to the task of revealing social inequalities and of emancipating the workingman. As a student Marx had come under the influence of the German philosopher, Hegel. Accepting the latter's idea "that each period is characterized by the predominance of a 'world people,' who are possessed of a universal idea which must be given to mankind," Marx explained that the cause of change was to be found in material circumstances—climate, soil, inventions, the economic struggle of classes, and other forces of man and Nature. Upon the fall of the bourgeoisie, he believed the workingmen were certain to become "the world people."
The history of all hitherto existing society, he wrote, in collaboration with Friedrich Engels, in their *Communist Manifesto*, was the history of class struggles:

Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstruction of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes . . . . in every historical epoch, the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and the social organization necessarily following from it, form the basis upon which is built up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of that epoch.

In his writings, especially *Das Kapital* (completed by Engels), Marx also asserted that the capitalist class was destined to become the dominant group and that it would seize the control of the agencies of production and distribution, and finally of the government. He further declared that the concentration of wealth under capitalism would in time place all property in the hands of a very few, but ultimately the exploited class would revolt against this tyranny and would overthrow the established order. Marx denounced the capitalist as an idle drone, since he drew dividends by virtue of being a stockholder. He predicted that in time, the capitalist, as useless as a feudal lord in the eighteenth century, would be destroyed and the whole system of capitalism swept away.

Marx claimed that labor was the source of all value. Therefore, whoever contributed to the welfare of mankind should have his share in the output, be he composer, engineer, farmer, street cleaner, teacher, or artist. As long as men received dividends from investments in machines, however, the workers would not get their rightful share. Consequently, he believed that the state should own and control all the agencies of production and distribution. Private ownership would then be restricted to items such as food, clothing, furniture, pictures, and books. Everyone should have an equal opportunity to enjoy the available necessities and luxuries. Thus oppression and poverty would disappear. Instead of a small minority of the population living at the expense of the rest, all groups would be brought to a single level. All should be rewarded or should suffer alike. True equality, real democracy, and human welfare, he said, could only be attained if the workers united. Already living in poverty, they had nothing to lose but their chains. Therefore they needed to organize so that the time might come when all men would work and no one would be permitted to enrich himself at the expense of his neighbor. Marx as-
sumed that thereafter men would be able to live in harmony and brotherly love.

In his early works Marx merely suggested widespread social reform by legislative action—not by violent revolution. But later, as a result of his study of the Paris Commune, he wrote a treatise in which he advocated that the dictatorship of the proletariat be attained, if necessary, by violent methods. Applying his economic interpretation of history, he contended that just as the great French Revolution had shattered the bulwark of feudalism and paved the way for the rise of the bourgeoisie who consolidated their gains by the revolutions of 1830 and 1848 in France, so the Commune of Paris (1871) marked the beginning of the proletarian revolt against the bourgeois order. Marx then set forth the belief that a minority, creating a strong government, had to rule during the transition from capitalism to socialism. Thus, a dictatorship of the proletariat was an essential prelude to the establishment of true socialism.

Undoubtedly one of the keenest critics of bourgeois society, Marx contended that ideas of all kinds were determined chiefly by the economic position of the people who held them. Each class of persons whose interests were similar, he declared, constituted within itself an intellectual cosmos, with a politics, a metaphysics, and an art of its own. He believed that the romanticism, the idealism, and the revolts of the early nineteenth century were largely bourgeois movements; i.e., they were manifestations of the determination of the bourgeoisie to annihilate the last vestiges of feudalism. He also claimed that capitalism was responsible for the large-scale exploitation of the working classes. Machinery and credit had enabled the bourgeoisie to supplant the feudal lords as the masters of the state. That capitalism would destroy itself was the recurrent note in his writing.

Another form of radicalism—anarchism—challenged the premises of capitalism. Like socialism, it was engendered by the Industrial Revolution and arose out of more or less systematized theories on the part of middle-class reformers as to how poverty and its attendant ills could be exterminated. But it differed from socialism in that it would abolish entirely all government and give complete freedom to the individual. Anarchism had as its nurturers two able advocates: the Frenchman, Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865), and the Russian, Michael Bakunin (1814–1876). Proudhon’s ideas were an outgrowth of the conditions brought about in France as a result of the Industrial Revolution, and of the hostility of the proletariat to the middle-class regime of Louis Philippe. Losing faith in all governments, Proudhon wrote Qu’est-ce que la propriété? (What is prop-
ert?), answering his rhetorical question with "La propriété, c'est la vol."
(Property is theft.) Strangely enough, however, he did not favor public ownership of private property. Every man, he stated, should have an equal right to use property as his personal possession. Every man should enjoy the full benefit of his labor. Authority in any form was anathema. Self-determination, or self-government, was the best basis for an orderly society. Like Rousseau, Proudhon believed that if men could get rid of "man-made laws" and live together, not limited by supreme authority but only by voluntary yet legally binding force of contract, a perfect social order would be attained; for man, inherently just, would fulfill his obligations. Wrong doing would disappear and complete individualism would make the world a veritable paradise.

Bakunin outlined a more militant form of anarchism. Living in autocratic Russia and exiled to Siberia because of his ideas, he disregarded the past and also became a staunch advocate of terrorism.

The future social order must, from top to bottom, be made only by free association and federation of workers, in association first, then in communes, in districts, in nations, and finally, in a great international and universal federation.

These were essentially the ideas of Proudhon. To them Bakunin added the concept of revolution, or of violence, as the inevitable method by which the old order would be destroyed and the new established.

Another French radical, Louis Auguste Blanqui (1805–1881), seemed to have adopted Bakunin's ideas. Like many Jacobins of the French Revolution, Blanqui urged a policy of extreme governmental centralization which was to be made possible by the dictatorship of the proletariat. Not only was a violent revolution necessary, but also it was to be achieved under the guidance of an intelligent faction which was proletarian at heart. Regarding the evils of bourgeois society as irrational, he decided that utopia was possible only if private property was abolished. His program, attacking religion as well as capitalism, embraced revolution, atheism, and communism.

Such radical views were but a part of the evidence testifying to the great intellectual change which occurred in the nineteenth century. This mental transformation rose partly out of the formulation of the evolutionary doctrine—the idea "that things had evolved out of other things by slow changes through long processes of time." Although this belief was expressed by certain Greek philosophers it was not placed on a scientific basis until the nineteenth century. In 1830–1833, the able scientist, Sir Charles Lyell, in his Principles of Geology
definitely formulated the principle that the present appearance of the earth was the result of a steady and constant operation of geological forces. This thesis was developed by Charles Darwin in his momentous volume, *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection* (1859), and his famous work, *Descent of Man* (1871). In these volumes he brought out the idea that Life is governed by unchanging law and orderly development and that Nature has selected those species for survival which are best adapted to their environment, or those which have been best able to maintain themselves in the struggle for existence.\(^1\)

About fifty years later the doctrine of relativity completely altered the general ideas with respect to the universe. Prior to the advancement of this concept, time and space had been considered as the absolute standards for the judging and measuring of things. According to the theory of relativity, as enunciated by the famous scientist, Einstein, in 1905, velocities were variable with respect to the different circumstances under which they were operative. Consequently, in a universe in which standards were not set but were, on the other hand, variable, there was no Absolute Truth; but only truth relative to the matter or person concerned. This theory therefore revised the concepts of geometrical properties of space and time and established a connection between the geometry of the world and the distribution of matter in it.

The existence of Absolute Truth was questioned by philosophers as well as by scientists. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries intellectuals thought deeply and profoundly over the problem of truth. In the nineteenth century, students of psychology—a study of the human mind, its qualities and functions—considered this problem. As a result of their investigations many of them decided that personalities and human minds were so variable, and knowledge and opinions held by them were so different, that it was futile and also unscientific to set up beliefs which would be absolutely true for them all.

Religious scholars bitterly opposed this attack upon Absolute Truth, maintaining that their faith was based upon revealed truths which had been delivered by Christ to the Apostles. At first they resented very much the evolutionary doctrine that human beings had gradually been evolved from lower species in a process that required over 100,000,000 years, believing that the basis of their faith was being shaken. Later a compromise was arranged between religion and science whereby certain Christians managed to fit the evolutionary doctrine into their scheme of things. According to the Cath-

\(^1\) See p. 329.
olic Church, the Darwinian theory of time could explain only the evolution of man's material body, not the creation and life of immortal spirits. This spiritual side of humanity belonged to the realm of faith and religion as unquestionably as the material side belonged to the province of natural science. Some of the Protestants, called Fundamentalists, however, refused to accept the theory of evolution.

The church opposed attacks upon its temporal as well as its spiritual power. Determined to resist any attempt to limit the rights of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope Pius IX (1846–1878) attacked modernism in his famous *Quanta Cura* (1864). In this religious ultimatum he reasserted the supremacy of the church in matters of faith and morals; he denounced secular and public education, civil marriages, free thinking, and other bourgeois beliefs and modern trends. Also, he frankly opposed republicanism and nationalism, considering them disintegrating movements hostile to the interests of the Church. Attempting to strengthen his papal authority, which these forces seemed to threaten, Pope Pius called a meeting of the General Council at the Vatican (1869–1870). This assemblage of nearly 800 churchmen ratified the dogma of papal infallibility that "declared it to be divinely revealed that whatever the pope spoke as pope, with respect to the affairs of the church, he spoke without liability to error." Despite this stand, the Holy Father was unable to stem the tide of nationalism, even in Italy, and lost his temporal power in Rome (1870), and remained confined thenceforth to the Vatican.

This hostility between the church and the modern state finally subsided. Between 1878 and 1914, the successors of Pius IX accepted, or at least tolerated, democracy, constitutionalism, nationalism, and lay education, while the bourgeois government, in return, aided the Church in its missionary activities. This *entente* did not mean that all issues between Church and state were settled. In fact, the antagonism subsided largely because the representatives of both camps, by the close of the nineteenth century, faced a common enemy—"the Reds." To suppress these socialists, anarchists, and communists, the Catholics organized political parties and labor unions—Center and Catholic Action groups—in European countries, especially in France, Germany, and Belgium. These organizations set themselves ardently to improve the existing capitalistic order by forming associations of young workingmen for religious as well as economic improvement and by organizing Catholic political parties to bring about moderate social reforms. In 1891, Pope Leo XIII gave this Catholic "social" movement a charter when he issued his famous encyclical, *Rerum
Novarum. Directed against Marxist socialism, this document "defended private property, emphasized the importance of the family, protested against the exalting of the state," and condemned the doctrine of economic determinism.

From the first, Protestants accepted the modern state. Individualists in the matter of salvation, they did not find it difficult to accept constitutional and democratic reforms hinging about the laissez-faire doctrine. Certain sects, as, for example, the Methodists, whose membership included a large representation of working people, did favor social and economic reforms, but within the framework of the established order.

Prior to World War I the Greek Orthodox faith of the East was little affected by bourgeois liberalism. This organization of autonomous Churches, which counted among its adherents a great majority of the Russians, the Greeks, and the Balkan Slavs, was deeply influenced by the Russian Church (the Russian branch which was controlled by the czar through the Holy Synod). Subservient to the czar, the same rituals, ceremonies, and customs had existed for centuries, little troubled by revolts from within and little touched by influences from without. The great Russian Revolution of 1917, however, marked the sudden overthrow of this powerful organization in secular activities in Russia. As in France during the Revolution, the Christian Church went down with the old order. Ecclesiastical lands and property were confiscated, and some of the priests and higher clergy murdered or exiled. In Spain a similar upheaval occurred in 1931.¹

Largely as a result of this bourgeois emphasis upon secularism, a great pedagogical revolution occurred. This upheaval was anticipated by Rousseau, who, in his writings, especially Émile (1762), favored more emphasis upon self-expression in students. This idea was developed by Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746–1827), Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841), and Friedrich Wilhelm Froebel (1782–1852). Of these, Froebel contributed the most important educational concepts. Accepting Rousseau’s thesis he claimed that the development of the personality was of more importance than the mere accumulation of information. Influenced by this belief he founded the kindergarten, in which he emphasized the value of play in the education of the young child.

During the nineteenth century important changes were made in the curriculum of educational instruction. Heeding the views of Herbert Spencer, Thomas Huxley, and others, educators accepted the various branches of science as fundamental studies. A liberal

¹ See pp. 479–480.
education was recognized as important in so far as it prepared one
to earn a livelihood.

Prussia led in the development of education in the early nine-
teenth century. In that country, the absolute ruler encouraged the
establishment of normal schools and also the creation of primary
schools. Thus was developed a system of education which became
distinguished by its emphasis upon thoroughness and coherence.
The nineteenth century was also the Golden Age of the German
universities. At that time they had developed a conception of aca-
demic freedom which was offered to professors and students alike.
For the student it meant a greater emphasis upon individual free-
dom in his selection and method of study. For the professor it sig-
nified more freedom in expression and greater security of tenure,
enabling him thereby to devote more time to his special field of
research. As a result of this emphasis upon education, the German
universities took the lead in the development of post-graduate and
professional work. In these institutions the lecture method continued
to be widely used; special seminar courses were introduced in which
the emphasis was placed upon research and original investigation;
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, which had nothing to do with
philosophy in the accepted sense, was introduced. This new stress
upon education helps to explain the remarkable expansion of the
public-school system elsewhere in the nineteenth century. Influenced
by German achievements, there appeared in the United States the
first national system of public schools. Later most of the European
states adopted the German and American progressive trends in the
establishment of national systems of public education.

At first, most Christian sects, fearing the loss of their moral leader-
ship, opposed the spread of secular education. They also disapproved
of the development of the theater, the opera, and the cinema, feeling
that these forms of entertainment would deprive the church of its
cultural supremacy. Unable to check them, Catholics and Protestants
both established organizations designed to strengthen their moral
and cultural influence. Protestants, for example, tried to restrict
secular activities on Sunday, and Catholics endeavored to improve
the moral tone of motion pictures. Many churches also attempted to
regain their social and cultural leadership by holding dances, lec-
tures, and motion pictures in their social centers.

Secularization of social life as well as of education contributed to
the emancipation of women. During the nineteenth century co-
education was established in most bourgeois countries. Systems of
education had been improved; illiteracy and a more tolerant po-

\footnote{See also p. 262.}
sition before the law was extended to peoples regardless of religion or sex. Men now began to realize that women had played an important role in the development of civilization. Influenced by this point of view, they were reconciled, despite occasional difficulties, to seeing women assume a larger share in the economic and educational life. Having made limited gains in the economic and intellectual spheres, women began to agitate for political equality. Prior to the twentieth century only New Zealand (1893) and some of the Australian colonies enacted woman suffrage. The early years of the twentieth century, however, witnessed the triumph of feminism. By 1914, Norway and Finland granted suffrage to women. In some of the American states and in the United Kingdom and in the more advanced parts of the British Empire, women gained political and legal rights before the close of the war. After the world conflict, the feminist movement spread rapidly. Germany, Russia, and the new countries of Central Europe granted women the right to vote.

The growing secularism in life, especially after World War I, led to a revolt against certain moral and cultural traditions. Determined to seek self-expression, to defy many of the more traditional conventions, the postwar generation frequently discarded the older outlook upon sex and dress. Many of the admirers of the new spirit of youth advocated nudism, claiming that such naturalness was conducive to both the health of the human body and the esthetic enjoyment of it as a work of beauty in nature. To its critics, however, the movement was a symptom of a degenerating age.

Prior to World War I many people began to find fault with the outstanding contribution of the late modern era: the capitalistic state. They admitted that in its economic, political, and psychological aspects, this organization showed itself to be the most efficient and the most powerful state established thus far. At the same time they condemned its competitive and aggressive characteristics, claiming that these developments tended to increase hostility, fear, and suspicions between countries.

Enlargements of military forces did testify to the mutual hatreds and rivalries of the prewar nations. Military conscription in the form of universal obligation to service, subject to selection by lot (introduced during the French Revolution, 1793, and extended and systematized by Napoleon I and the Prussians after the battle of Jena, 1806), had led to an overhauling of the military systems of Europe. In this movement the Germans, as a result of their military efficiency demonstrated in the wars of 1866 and 1870, took the lead. Aroused by her defeat in 1870, France then became Germany's chief competitor. This military competition was not limited to Germany and
France. Before 1914 practically every European nation engaged in an armament race. With the exception of Great Britain, who was dependent upon her navy rather than upon her army, all the great powers, and many of the small ones, adopted universal military service. They maintained giant peacetime armies, backed by millions of reserves, equipped with modern weapons, and ready to respond to the call for mobilization at any moment.

Naval, as well as military, rivalries developed before the war. Germany, in order to protect her shipping and her colonies, built a powerful navy. Determined to maintain the two-power standard—a navy equal to the next two largest combined—Great Britain, suspicious of German naval expansion, increased her strength. New boats were built, especially the all-powerful dreadnoughts, which, from 1906, were considered the most important types of ships. Occasionally “naval holidays” were proposed by leaders on both sides, but Great Britain, insisting on a fifty per cent superiority over the German navy, refused to trade her supremacy on the sea for an alliance with Germany. As a result, the competition continued. Meanwhile, other nations, particularly the United States, France, and Japan, constructed powerful fleets. In short, there was a marked increase in military and naval rivalry between 1900 and 1914, which reached its zenith just before the outbreak of World War I.

More important than the armament race was the economic competition which involved the leading states of Europe prior to 1914. This struggle in the economic sphere was the result of the developing opportunities of power and wealth offered by the Mechanical and Industrial Revolutions. During the early nineteenth century, as we have seen, a general opposition to governmental intervention in the economic activities of its people. In fact, there seemed to be a definite tendency to promote individualism in business by doing away with all restrictions and regulations which fettered personal enterprise. France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, the Swiss cantons, Norway, and Sweden, and the German and Italian states, followed Great Britain’s example, and abolished internal tariff barriers. British, French, and Dutch colonies were thrown open to the trade of all countries, and shipping restrictions were eliminated. Beginning with the Anglo-French Treaty of 1860, numerous trade agreements were arranged whereby tariffs were reduced on most-favored-nation terms, since most economists generally believed that free trade was bound to result in prosperity and peace.

After 1870 there came a change. Industrial as well as political leaders soon began to advocate state intervention in international eco-

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The age of free trade

Economic Nationalism

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4 See pp. 188–189.
economic affairs, while maintaining nonintervention in domestic matters. Aware of the strength of the modern state, exponents of Big Business now desired to use it in order to stifle the importation of competitive goods and to gain markets and raw materials abroad. They succeeded in having national tariff systems introduced so as to protect "infant industries" and to insure for the wage earners "a full dinner pail." Inspired by these and other bourgeois arguments, the governments of France, Germany, and Russia, between 1870 and 1900, returned to the protective system. In 1902, for example, the German tariff on British goods was twenty-five per cent compared with a French tariff of thirty-four per cent and a Russian tariff of one hundred and thirty-one per cent. Italy, the United States—in fact, all the great powers save Great Britain—revived this phase of mercantilism. As in the early modern period, this resumption of mercantilistic practices resulted in bitter international disputes, colonial rivalries, and in increasing diplomatic intrigue. These developments caused many people by 1914 to fear a devastating world war which might demolish the existing state system and all that it implied. This conflict, as we shall see, finally occurred, and while the capitalistic order was not destroyed as a result of the struggle, it was gravely weakened and considerably changed.

**LITERATURE AND ART**

The late modern period was a golden age in literature and art. In literature the works of this era equaled if not surpassed those of the Renaissance. Never before had there been so much good writing; never before was there such great popular interest in literary production; and never before were so many books made accessible to the great mass of people through the printing of cheap editions and the establishment of great libraries. Literary artists of distinction appeared in practically every country. Great Britain experienced a golden age (the Victorian period) as vital as any literary era in her history. In France, the classical epoch of Louis XIV was followed by the age of romanticism and realism, superior in many respects to its literary predecessor. In the Germanies the works of the Revolutionary period marked the beginning of a literary movement that was European in its scope. In Russia, in the Scandinavian countries, in Spain, and in other states, important books appeared. Most of these were stimulated by the clash of Revolutionary ideas, by the progress of science, and by the economic and social movements of their day. Thus they reflected an ardent optimism—so characteristic of the Century of Hope.

All kinds of writing—prose, poetry, drama, criticism, and his-
torical composition—were ably done by talented men of letters, but prose, particularly prose of interest to the layman, was emphasized more than poetry or the drama. It was through the medium of the novel that the great writers of the nineteenth century expressed most of their political and social ideas. But, at the same time, they produced many brilliant critical and descriptive essays.

The literary lights of the early nineteenth century carried on the struggle between classicism and romanticism which had begun in the second half of the eighteenth century. At that time Burns, Wordsworth, and Coleridge in England; Herder, Goethe, and Schiller in the Germanies, had broken away from the restraints of the artificial and stereotyped classical school and had given free reign to their imagination and passion. Not identified with any particular social or political philosophy, the romanticists, however, did follow certain consistent literary theses in their method and style. Their thoughts were generally obtained from the inward world of personal feeling; their literary forms were individualistic creations, quite independent of classical influence; and their beliefs often "implied a return to an attitude of wonder towards the world." Many were inclined toward mysticism, and, as a result, the views of these romanticists were linked historically with the traditions of the Middle Ages. At the same time, in exalting the common people as brought out in medieval legends, folksongs, and sagas, other romanticists, especially the Germans, Schlegel and Novalis, became ardent nationalists, actually visualizing the re-establishment thereby of the perfect civilization, which (according to them) had existed in the medieval period.

The outstanding forerunner of romanticism was probably the eighteenth century Frenchman, Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). By placing final authority on the powers of intuition, he gave each man personal sovereignty in matters of thought. There are those who believe that a combination of such temperamental traits led to the French Revolution.

Certainly the emotional excesses of this cataclysm produced a reaction among many of the romanticists themselves. Turning conservative, men like Fichte, Hegel, and Kant rejected democracy and individualism in favor of a monarchical state. They considered the stability of the old authoritative society necessary as a check on arbitrary actions outside the law. In literature, Sir Walter Scott (1771–1832) expressed the opposition of conservative romanticists to change. Opposed to utilitarianism he idealized the Middle Ages and encouraged the conservatives in their attempt to resurrect the past. In France there were romanticists in the early nineteenth century...
who considered the French Revolution a gigantic mistake of history. Bonald (1754–1840), and de Maistre (1754–1821), very able literary reactionists, attacked not only the Revolution but also the enlightenment of the eighteenth century.

Many romanticists, on the other hand, upheld the principles of the French Revolution. In the Germanies, Heinrich Heine (1797–1856), the outstanding literary light of that time, embraced these concepts and expressed in his writings the sincere desire to help build a united-democratic Germany. In Great Britain, Thomas Babington Macaulay (1800–1859) was one of the leading defenders of the new bourgeois individualism. In his essays he expounded the middle-class beliefs of the Victorian Era as expressed in the famous trinity—Liberty, Utility, and Progress. Frankly materialistic, he maintained that the practical progress of mankind alone counted—all else was unimportant. There were also romanticists in Mid-Victorian England who tended to exalt the cause of liberalism: Shelley (1792–1822), as an ardent reformer, worked for Catholic emancipation; Byron (1788–1824) lost his life in the Greek wars for independence; Mrs. Browning (1806–1861), in her sentimental poem, The Cry of the Children, helped to bring about factory reform; while Thackeray and George Eliot described wealth as sordid and tended to make it hateful.

Outstanding humanitarian was Charles Dickens (1812–1870). In his works dealing with the oppressed in English life, he pictured the horrors of the poor houses, the ridiculous methods in vogue in the schools, the endless delays and lack of justice in the courts, and the terrible sufferings of the unfortunates in prison for debt. His novels became the Bible of contemporary social reformers. Most bitter were the humanitarian romanticists in their criticisms of social injustices brought about by the Technological and Industrial Revolutions. While they accepted these great upheavals as a logical phase in the economic development of the nation, they protested against the failure of society to deal properly and adequately with the new conditions. Certain romanticists, however, could see no good in these revolutions. Carlyle viewed them as monstrous things, entirely materialistic, and claimed that they would crush the spiritual instincts of the British people. The great devotee of art, Ruskin, felt that revolutions were responsible for much of the ugliness in life. In France the prolific Honoré de Balzac (1799–1850) was perhaps the most brilliant of a number of writers who considered the bourgeois as a deadly blight on all true refinement and beauty. In his novels he describes a panorama of the vices and weaknesses, the stupidity and foibles of the middle classes in the forties. Such liberal
thinkers as Victor Hugo, Alexandre Dumas, and George Sand also attacked the injustices of the new order. Later Émile Zola (1840–1902) continued the trend of the social novel with his powerful portrayals of life. Even in backward Russia able literary surgeons studied the human heart and described both the noble and base impulses of men and women. Gogol (1809–1852), in his famous work, *Dead Souls*, gives a clear understanding of Russian serfdom and its abuses. Turgenev (1818–1883) in his writings also describes social conditions in Russia, basing his famous masterpiece, *Fathers and Sons*, on the development of the Nihilist movement.

These Russian writers were in a way forerunners of another school in literature which appeared after 1870—the realist. Influenced by the emphasis upon facts, rather than upon reason or emotion, these literary “radicals” tried in their works to reveal things as they actually exist. One of the most famous of these realists was Gustave Flaubert (1821–1880). In his *Madame Bovary* he reveals the utter mediocrity of small-town life and shows that average qualities are in reality merely bourgeois virtues. Surpassing Flaubert as a satirist was another eminent Frenchman, Anatole France (1844–1924), who possessed many of Voltaire’s skeptical traits. His best work is *Penguin Island*, a social satire in which institutions and classes are indicted rather than individuals.

Realist writers attacked various phases of modern existence. In Germany, Thomas Mann (1875–) in his famous work, *Buddenbrooks*, reconstructed the life of a rich merchant family. In a remarkable word picture he brings out the pride and the emphasis upon wealth of the bourgeoisie in nineteenth century Germany. Russia’s greatest realist was Count Leo Tolstoi (1828–1910). In such novels as *The Kreutzer Sonata*, *Resurrection*, and *War and Peace*, he revealed many of the cruelest inhumanities of man against man. His *War and Peace* is a masterful analysis of the effects of the Napoleonic invasion of 1812 upon all people. It is, moreover, a brilliant essay on the evils of war in general. Most radical of all the realistic Russian writers was Maxim Gorky (1868–1937). In his famous novel, *Foma Gordeyev*, he frankly sees no good in the upper classes whom he stigmatized as exploiters of the people. Discursive and increasingly revolutionary in his writings, Gorky was an active Russian communist until his death. He was considered to be the outstanding literary apologist for the Bolshevik program.

In certain respects the writings of the English realists were more pessimistic than those of their Russian contemporaries. Men like George Gissing (1857–1903) and John Masefield (1875–) lost faith in their age and resigned themselves to hopelessness. Less pes-
simistic was the outlook of the two famous English socialist writers, Bernard Shaw (1856— ), and H. G. Wells (1866–1946). Determined to shock society's dearest prejudices, to defy conventions, and to challenge the whole order, Shaw praised much of the work of the communists in Russia and favored the establishment of a socialist society in England through evolutionary and educational means. While following a similar trend of thought, Wells devoted many pages to the justification of science as a blessing rather than a curse to mankind. Both of these men, however, opposed violent revolution in Great Britain.

Prior to the outbreak of World War I the drama became an important vehicle of literary expression. One of the greatest dramatists was the Norwegian genius, Henrik Ibsen (1828–1906). An implacable foe of bourgeois society, Ibsen's dramas attempted to present the social problems which confronted the average people. In his Enemy of the People and The Pillars of Society, he satirized the middle classes and their conception of democracy; in The Doll's House, he called for the emancipation of women; and in Ghosts, he showed the results of syphilis as a social disease. In none of these dramas, however, did he offer any solution to these problems; he merely presented the facts to the public. Another revolutionary, more radical even than Ibsen, was his contemporary, the Swedish writer, August Strindberg (1849–1912). In his Upper and Lower Classes distinct socialist views are preached.

Foremost of the German realist dramatists was Gerhart Hauptmann (1862— ). In his early work, Before Dawn, and in his most famous one, The Weavers, he pictured the middle classes face to face with the problem of the rising proletariat: the employers stormed, threatened to use force, pled before justice, prayed to Heaven for protection of their wealth, called the leaders of the workers demagogues, tried to split the ranks of the proletariat, but refused to ease the lot of their workers.

In spite of the economic backwardness of Russia some of the best drama of the century was produced by Russian dramatists. Gogol masterfully portrayed the corrupt Russian bureaucracy, especially the grasping provincial governors, in The Inspector. Anton Chekhov (1860–1904) was, probably, the outstanding dramatist of the century. Works like Uncle Vanya and The Cherry Tree brilliantly described the changes in the Russian social order and the growing sense of decay and futility on the part of the landed class.

Great Britain could claim few outstanding playwrights during the Victorian Age. At the turn of the century, however—notably with the advent of Bernard Shaw—English drama came into its own.
Outstanding dramatists in Britain included Shaw, Sir James Barrie, John Galsworthy, and Somerset Maugham. Maugham handled the dilettante interests of the English middle class in sparkling fashion. Barrie was fantastical and sentimental, with one of the keenest senses of humor that the recent period has developed. More important are John Galsworthy and Bernard Shaw. Galsworthy is regarded by certain critics as a greater master painter of social drama than Shaw. Essentially, Galsworthy is a portrait artist, not attempting to solve or analyze but merely to describe. Shaw is of a different sort. A keener analyst, a more biting critic, he has created a new form of drama based upon discussion and without the characteristic plot arrangement as the central theme. Thus his *Man and Superman* is a discussion of eugenics and socialism and *Mrs. Warren's Profession* deals with prostitution and economic exploitation. Many consider Shaw as one of the really great figures in recent English literature. Certainly he is a unique personality.

Art and music, as well as literature, experienced a marked development in the late modern period. The Italians, the French, the Scandinavian peoples, and the Slavs all made valuable contributions in the field of music, but, in the nineteenth century at least, the Germans were the leaders in this form of art. Prior to that time such musicians as Bach and Mozart had made Germany the musical center of the world as a result of their stately classical compositions with their emphasis upon melody. The outstanding representative of the revolutionary school of modern music was Ludwig van Beethoven (1770–1827). One of the greatest musical geniuses of all time, his work involved new conceptions and new techniques. He broke with the classical idea of music as the acme of poise, of grace, and of sheer perfection. Because of his rebellion he is often called the man who "freed" music. Beethoven's conception of music was romantic. He believed in the triumph of inner feeling and rejected the conventionality of classicism. In his own words, art was the "communication of the divine, a higher revelation than all wisdom and all philosophy," and music was "more emotion than tone-painting."

At the same time Franz Schubert (1797–1828) was quietly writing songs which have never been surpassed for their sheer simplicity of beauty. Among the most famous of these is his *Der Erlkönig*. He also performed remarkable work in the composition of symphonies,

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2 Interpretations of Beethoven's position in music differ. According to H. Leichtentritt, "neither Haydn nor Beethoven can be called real romanticists, though romantic ideas sometimes penetrate into the solid, clear structure of their classical form." Moreover, the *Pastoral Symphony* is an example of tone painting in program music. See H. Leichtentritt, *Music, History, and Ideas*, p. 202.
and his *Unfinished Symphony* is noted for its beautiful interweaving of melody.

One of the foremost contributions of the revolution in music was the modern symphony orchestra. This orchestral development paralleled the mass production activities in the economic sphere during the nineteenth century. Whereas the leading composers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—Mozart, Haydn, and Bach—had to compose for piano (the harpsichord) or organ, and had also to limit their activities in the wind instruments to simple passages, the development of mechanical perfection of the brass and wood winds in the nineteenth century offered innumerable opportunities for the exploitation of more intricate musical scores. Alongside of this perfection in mechanical exactness came the development of the orchestra. The orchestra is truly a modern product. Lacking the necessary instruments the small string and ensemble groups with which the musicians Bach and Vivaldi worked can hardly be called orchestras. It was only in the nineteenth century that artists like Boehm and Albert perfected instruments, especially the wood winds and the brasses, to such an extent that they could be incorporated into a workable group in conjunction with the violin family. These three major divisions, then, formed the nucleus of the modern orchestra, the development of which was aided by the increased technical perfection of the instruments.

This orchestral evolution increased the importance of the orchestra in the opera. Hitherto its role had been essentially subordinate, providing mere accompaniment to the voice. Weber (1786–1826), often called the father of modern orchestration, increased the instrumental elements and made the orchestral unit play a leading part in the action at times. Wagner of Germany (1813–1883) and Verdi (1813–1901) of Italy, however, were the two leading composers of opera wherein the orchestra played an important role.

These musicians were also the outstanding interpreters of nationalism in music. Wagner has to this day remained the symbol of German unity and expression. His *Meistersinger* is primarily a glorification of German civilization, a hymn celebrating its triumphs in the fields of art and science. Verdi also expressed desire for Italian unity in his compositions and the phrase "Viva Verdi" was the rallying cry of the Italian people during the critical years of unification. The importance of the German masters during the nineteenth century caused many people to underestimate musical contributions of composers in other lands. It is only recently that they have begun to recognize the importance of the French school. Hector Berlioz
(1803–1869), for example, has been vastly underrated. His masterful work in the field of orchestration and rhythmical device in the percussion stands as a living monument to his genius.

Toward the close of the nineteenth century the Russian musicians came into their own. Heirs of a geographic and ethnographic Asiatic tradition, they wrote music that showed the influence of the orient on Russian life and culture. Perhaps the greatest musical genius that Russia has produced was Peter Tchaikowsky (1840–1893). His compositions were among the most brilliant and individualistic of that time. Their boldness, passionate melancholy, and varied contrasts, all seem to convey to the listener an appreciation of the unrest of the Russian people prior to the revolution.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, there occurred a revolt against this emotional, sentimental, and passionate type of music. While fundamentally romantic, this new school emphasized impressionism. The leading exponent of this type was Claude Debussy (1862–1918). He attempted to emphasize the tonal impression which he received from the outward forms of nature. Striving to portray in his music the realities of life, he introduced such novelties as the whole-tone scale, creating thereby harmonies which to the ordinary listener at first seemed to be ugly discords. Other disciples of the modern musical trend, such as R. Strauss, Scriabin and Stravinsky tried to create new musical effects. At the same time many exponents of the more conservative romantic and nationalist school, such as the Norwegian composer, Grieg, and the Finnish genius, Sibelius, were producing their monumental works.

Painting, sculpture, and architecture also were vitalized during the late modern period. In these fields, as in literature and music, the seeds of romanticism sprouted forth. Artists broke with the past in their belief that the spiritual world was granted to the artistic mind through the medium of imagination. Each painter became, thereby, an artistic Protestant—one who was able to interpret for himself, and not to build upon precedent. France and Spain were the centers of this romanticism at the turn of the century. Outstanding representative of this school was Jacques David (1748–1825). Despised by his contemporaries during the rule of Louis XVI, it was not until the French Revolution that he became the triumphant figure in the world of art. Probably the most violent romanticist of the period was Eugene Delacroix (1799–1863). Sprung from revolutionary parents, this man was the implacable foe of realism. "A realistic poetry," he said, "could one conceive of that monstrosity, is a contradiction in terms." Though somewhat antedating romanticism, Francisco Goya (1746–1828) belonged to the same school. Probably
the greatest painter Spain has produced since Velasquez, he was a deadly enemy of the Church and of war. In his series of etchings called *The Disasters of War* there is a brilliant characterization of the stupidity, cruelty, and sadistic fury of militarism.

John Constable (1776–1837) was the leading English romantic painter. A great landscape artist, he was impressed, not by perfection and order in nature, but by its irregularity and variety of movement and color. Influenced by the work of Constable, a definite school grew up in France around 1830 whose members were chiefly interested in landscape painting. Centering about the little city of Barbizon, they began to be known as the Barbizonists. This group is particularly famous because of one man—Camille Corot (1796–1875). His pictures are noted for their excellence of composition, perfection of balance, casual simplicity, indescribable charm, and freedom from strain and artificiality. Famous also in the romantic school was J. Millet (1814–1875), who interpreted the eternal struggle of the French peasant with the soil.

Toward the middle of the nineteenth century, the realists challenged the supremacy of the romanticists in the world of painting. They attempted to describe nature as it is seen by the eye, unmodified by abstract ideas or poetic sentiment. The French artist, Gustave Courbet (1819–1877), can well be remembered as the man who demonstrated the truth that it is not so much what the subject matter is as how it is painted. Henri Daumier (1808–1879) developed, especially through the use of political lithograph work, one of the most concentrated and dramatic styles in French art. His cartoons throw much light on the France of his day.

About 1865 the impressionistic school began to develop. This group tried in their works to reproduce an even closer approximation to the physical processes of seeing. Edouard Manet (1818–1883) created a sensation by his nude figures. Another member of this school, Claude Monet (1840–1926), did fine work in his analysis of light and color. Having very little moralistic bias, Monet’s pictures show the effects of a pantheist and naturalist seeking to discover beauties in nature. Impressionism in art had many defects, and Paul Cézanne (1889–1906) turned to the correction of them. His efforts established another artistic school which has been called post-impressionism. In Cézanne’s own words their object was “to make of Impressionism something as solid and durable as the old masters themselves.” In attempting this he arrived at a more elliptical and abstract method of painting. Probably as famous as Cézanne was the Dutch painter Vincent Van Gogh (1853–1890). During his short and passionate life, this half mad, mystical, and very religious
preacher to the poor succeeded in evolving a most distinctive style which is characterized by an unusual color effect. Influenced by the ideas of Cézanne, contemporary painters were dominated by a passion for novel construction. Artists like Georges Braque (1881–) and Pablo Picasso (1881–) for many years painted pic-
tures with no subject matter. Their works consist primarily of geometrical forms with fine relationships and excellent color. Such social movements as communism and socialism have also affected art. Two Mexican artists have revived the technique of mural painting. Diego Rivera and José Orozco have declared art to be the language of the people and their work is concerned with social and economic themes—the history of labor, the machine, and the worker.

A nineteenth century general revolt in art evidenced itself also in sculpture. Classic and rococo styles of the Ancien Régime were abandoned in favor of works which showed the influence of neo-classicism and romanticism. The first true romantic sculptor was probably
Jean Baptiste Carpeaux (1827–1875) who seems to have translated the style of the painter Ruben’s into stone. The culmination of this type of art is found in the work of Auguste Rodin (1840–1917). At no time, not even in the Middle Ages, was French sculpture so completely dominant as during the period of Rodin. By means of successive hollows and projections, he was able to bestow reality upon his work, and by the skillful use of light and shade he created a sense (somewhat akin to that of the Impressionists in painting) of reality to his figures.

Starting from the belief that mathematics is the basis of all good art, Cubism has also entered the field of sculpture. Its aim has been to portray what is considered to be the most sublime character of its subjects by emphasizing the mathematical relationships found in them. Constantin Brancusi (1879–) is one of the chief exponents of this school.

Architecture was also profoundly affected by the romantic movement in the early half of the nineteenth century. A Gothic revival took place in England where, between 1840 and 1860, the Houses of Parliament were built according to that style. Toward the middle of the century, however, Eclecticism became the vogue. Having as their only criteria the freedom to choose freely from all historical styles, the exponents of the movement built such houses as the Bibliothèque Sainte-Geneviève in Paris. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries architecture was deeply influenced by the theory of functionalism. Use of iron and steel in buildings helped this theory along, since it had as its basis the belief in the use of architecture for utilitarian ends. The modern skyscraper is the best representative of this type. For the first time, the world evolved a
kind of architecture without the suggestion of an historical style. Formal beauty is attained through the observation of functional requirements, and geometrical motives are usually employed to enhance the mechanical exactness of the buildings.

**Collateral Reading**

F. C. Palm, *The Middle Classes: Then and Now, Chaps. XX, XXI*.
CHAPTER XIV

The Age of Science

The Bettmann Archive

CHARLES R. DARWIN

SCIENCE as well as industry entered upon its Golden Age in the nineteenth century, although significant discoveries were made in earlier times. The Greeks were on the verge of an industrial and steam age, and the Egyptians and Arabs all had moments of scientific insight, but they did not appreciate the value of experimental proof, and, primarily because of the hiatus between knowing and doing, they stopped short of the practical application of their scientific theories. The people of the later Middle Ages, according to Professor Strong, experienced an era of scientific development that was interrupted by the humanistic revolt of the fifteenth century. During this era, stimulated by the intellectual atmosphere of the Arabian universities, much effort was expended on the study of science, but it was largely motivated by mystic ideals that were incapable of accomplishment. The alchemists sought a philosopher's stone with magic powers of creating life or of converting common metals into gold, and they failed in their quest because they did not focus their attention on building a solid roadway to such distant peaks.

Nevertheless, the basis of modern science was laid in these past ages, quite incidentally and almost unnoticed. It was not until the seventeenth or eighteenth century, however, that a few amateur philosophers—Sir Isaac Newton, Antoine Lavoisier, Joseph Priestley, and others—attacked such problems as the nature of gravitation and of combustion and thus were able to prepare the way for the outstanding achievements of the period after Napoleon.

1 The author is indebted to Dr. Gerald Wundt, Professor Seville Chapman, and Mr. Ben Rust for valuable assistance in the preparation of this chapter.

2 Strong, E. W., Procedures and Metaphysics, pp. 118-120.

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This unfolding of science, particularly in the fields of astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, medicine, and bacteriology, constitutes one of the most notable developments of the nineteenth century. So brilliant were its achievements in the harnessing of natural forces, and so optimistic were people as the result of its great advances, that science won for the period between Napoleon and World War I, quite rightly, a most appropriate title—The Century of Hope. Whereas the earlier scientific movements stopped short of fluorescence, this last movement, on the contrary, seemed in the nineteenth century to have just begun to tap the sources of man's conquest of nature. Amid the political and economic uncertainty of the postwar period, the march of science continued; great discoveries were made; and the life of mankind was considerably altered. Influenced by these developments, there are those who believe today that men of science by their discoveries and by their emphasis on accuracy and conciseness alone can solve the economic and social problems confronting this twentieth century world.

Astronomy, the science of the celestial bodies and thus of the external universe, is the father of all the other sciences. The stars are a vivid challenge to human imagination and their investigation requires, first, precise observation, and second, ample mathematics. Thus it was a problem in astronomy that led Isaac Newton to the development of the calculus. His Law of Gravitation not only established the solar system and permanently discarded all geocentric concepts of the universe but also brought out the importance of mathematics as an essential tool of all the sciences. Repeatedly it has been astronomy that has demanded progress in mathematics, and this in turn has permitted the advance of all other sciences. Not all progress in astronomy, however, was based on mathematics. Nineteenth century astronomy profited as much from a knowledge of the composition and temperature of the stars as from their mathematical motions. Fundamental to this phase of investigation was the perfection of the spectroscope of Kirchoff and Bunsen at Heidelberg and the consequent method of spectro-analysis which permitted the identification of all the chemical elements, both in the laboratory and in distant stars. The analysis of the light from these stars soon established the fact that they are all composed of the same elements that are found on the earth and that therefore the material composition of the universe is essentially the same throughout.

Spectroscopy was the first development in the larger field of astrophysics and the latter has proved so revealing that the spectroscope rivals the telescope in importance for astronomical researches. Thus it has been possible to measure not only the temperature of stars and
nebulae, but also their size, density, distance, and velocity of motion and of rotation. Slight shifts in the position of well-known lines in the spectrum of certain elements indicate that the source of light is not stationary but is moving. A shift toward the red end of the spectrum indicates that it is approaching us. This principle, set forth originally by the scientist, Christian Doppler (1803–1853), has established not only the motion of the so-called fixed stars but has in very recent years also led to the conviction that entire galaxies are in motion. If so, they are apparently all receding from us so that the universe seems to be expanding.

The motions of the stars indicate that our sun is one of many millions that comprise a disc-shaped cluster—our galaxy. This entire mass rotates about a relatively fixed center, one rotation requiring about 250,000,000 years. Since the earth is at least two billion years old it has, during its lifetime, accompanied the sun through eight revolutions about the galactic center. The diameter of this galaxy is some 100,000 light-years. Much more remote, and measurable in distances of a million to almost a billion light-years, are other galaxies, uncounted but many millions in number, whose distance cannot be accurately measured. It is in this very remote region that most present problems of astronomy lie. Because the light from these remote galaxies is so excessively faint the major hope of further discoveries with regard to the external universe lies in more powerful telescopes such as the two-hundred-inch instrument of the California Institute of Technology.

During the nineteenth century, however, the advances in physics and chemistry were far more vital and practical than the challenging developments in astronomy. At the time of Napoleon almost nothing was known about magnetism and electricity and relatively little about light or heat. Indeed, at the beginning of this period the fundamental concept of energy was just becoming established. The work of Benjamin Thompson, Count Rumford (1753–1814), during the French Revolution, and later of James Joule (1818–1889), had proved by accurate measurements that energy cannot be destroyed, but, in all its various manifestations, is merely converted from one form to another. The equivalence of mechanical energy, i.e., the energy of motion, and of heat, is absolutely necessary to modern engineering and to the understanding of all processes that involve work (the use of energy).

Inasmuch as the mathematical development of thermodynamics was a necessary step for the understanding and improvement of the operation of steam engines, this science is the very cornerstone of the machine age. Its Second Law is as universal and compelling as the
conservation of energy itself, for it establishes the concept of potential, or intensity of energy, and defines the conditions under which energy will flow from one place or body to another, i.e., from a body of higher temperature, pressure, or voltage, to one of lower potential. The elimination of the ancient concept of "caloric," the material or tangible substance of heat, was thus complete and heat energy was established as the energy of molecules in motion. Rapid motion corresponds to higher temperatures and a cessation of such molecular motion or vibration occurs at the "absolute zero" of the temperature scale.

A similar change took place early in the century as regards the concept of light. Sir Isaac Newton (1642–1727) had advanced the idea that light is composed of tiny particles, or corpuscles, but in the nineteenth century, Young in England, Fraunhofer in Germany, and Fresnel in France, proved that light is a wave phenomenon. In order to account for the waves, the proposal of Huygens, that all space—even between the atoms of matter—is filled with a perfectly elastic medium called "the ether," was adopted although no other use for or evidence of this universal intangible and weightless substance has ever been found. Thus light waves are supposedly ether waves. As a result of the researches of Maxwell, Hertz, and others, however, light actually was found to be a form of electromagnetic vibration. These men showed that there were electromagnetic waves other than those to which the eye is sensitive. Waves longer and shorter than visible light were revealed. Indeed the human eye can detect only a single octave in the enormous range of wave-lengths of these ether vibrations. The wave-length of red light is about twice that of violet light, but the wave-length of an X-ray is one-thousandth, and gamma rays from radium are still shorter. On the other hand, the waves used in wireless telegraphy and radio broadcasting today are from a million to a billion times as long as those of visible light. To detect these ether waves, both longer and shorter than visible light, it is necessary to use devices such as the ionization chamber, the photographic plate, the photoelectric cell, and the thermopile. Maxwell's theory of electromagnetic waves, although purely mathematical, permitted the discovery of the nonvisible radiations and thus made possible the utilization of X-rays, discovered in 1895, the commercial development of wireless telegraphy, in 1896, and the understanding of radium and radioactivity, first revealed in 1896.

Industrially and socially, however, the practical mastery of electricity itself was of even greater importance. The invention of the electric battery preceded the nineteenth century, but the flow of electricity through wires was not seriously studied until the time of
Oersted, in Denmark, Ampère, in France, and Ohm, in Germany, during the early years of the nineteenth century. On the basis of their work, Michael Faraday (1791–1867) discovered electromagnetic induction in 1831. Faraday possessed a rare combination of logical thought, technical skill, and imaginative power. He pursued his researches at the Royal Institution in London for forty years and not only clarified the relation between electricity and magnetism, but also prepared the way for all subsequent electrical dynamos, alternators, and transformers so that it became possible to generate large amounts of electrical energy by the exercise of such mechanical power as water and steam. In the hands of more practical men such as Edison and Steinmetz in the United States, electrical engineering became competent, and gigantic industries were built upon it. Its basic contribution to society was twofold. First it permitted the simple and inexpensive conversion of electric current into mechanical power by means of the electric motor. Even more important was the fact that it facilitated the free distribution of energy in limitless quantities to any desired point by the mere installation of a conducting wire. The importance of this transportation and distribution of power can hardly be overemphasized as a determinant of the conditions of industry and of modern life.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the science of physics seemed to have reached maturity and it was generally believed that its future would produce only further refinements, but no major revolutions. Nothing in all the history of science has been more ironic than the complete revolution at the beginning of the twentieth century which ended this serenity. The discovery of radium and X-rays in the late 1890's was followed by such major developments that classical physics seems relatively unimportant. Merely to list the radical advances is to reveal a whole new universe. In 1911, Robert A. Millikan at the University of Chicago isolated the electron, the atom of electricity, and at once gave the previous empirical knowledge of electricity a scientific validity. Electron collisions became the obvious explanation for the generation of extremely short ether waves, i.e., X-rays, and the relation between electron velocities and X-ray wave-lengths followed at once and inevitably led to the improvement of X-ray tubes and their successful utilization in industry and medical practice. Even more important were the relations developed between the electron and atoms at high temperatures, for the emission of electrons from hot wires became the basis of detectors and amplifying tubes which are essential to radio broadcasting.

More important, however, was the recognition that electrons are essential constituents of all matter. This fact led to the greatest for-
ward step of modern physics, Rutherford's proposal that the atom is not the "hard, massy particle" described by Sir Isaac Newton, but is a miniature solar system with all its actual "matter" concentrated in a central nucleus which occupies only a millionth of a billionth of its volume, and with electrons moving in orbits about it, like planets about the sun. This theory of atomic structure, developed by Bohr and others, has not only accounted for the spectra of the elements and for the amazing radiations of radium, but it also has actually made obvious the differences between the behavior of the various chemical elements. Chemical properties of elements and compounds can now be referred directly to the electron arrangements in their atoms and molecules.

During the past fifteen years research on the atom has been devoted primarily to the study of the nucleus itself, for powerful instruments are available, such as the cyclotron of E. L. Lawrence at the University of California, which can shatter the nucleus and thus convert one element into another—the ancient goal of the alchemists.

Progress was first made in various related fields. In 1933 artificial radioactivity was discovered by the French scientist, Irene Curie. As a result of her research, further investigation proved that the radium particles used for bombarding the nucleus were not the only ones that could split it. In 1939, Professor Enrico Fermi, of the University of Chicago discovered that the neutron as a bombarding projectile, shot through a protecting substance, such as paraffin, was more effective. Meanwhile, two German scientists, Meitner and Hahn, described what happened when the neutron split the atom—namely, "the energy which binds it together is released." According to Einstein, this energy was incredibly great; and to prove this, scientists concentrated on splitting the uranium atom, the most powerful of all. Pure uranium was isolated, and two chemical elements were created from it—neptunium and plutonium. The latter was of tremendous importance in the development of atomic power. In fact, it was used in the two bombs dropped on Japan—bombs that demonstrated the terrific energy that science had made possible for man in his desire to build or to destroy.

Exploration of the minute, and the penetration into the nature of matter are balanced by the outward reach of modern astronomy. Actually they go so far beyond the normal human experience that the classical laws, even those of geometry, do not apply. Indeed, the facts in both regions would be quite incomprehensible without another great advance in mathematics. It was in 1905 that Albert Einstein first published his theory of relativity. This accomplished the final step in the progression begun by Copernicus and Galileo,
DESTRUCTION.
(Upper) Fire bombs on Tokyo. (Lower) An atom bomb on Hiroshima.
for it abolished all naïve ideas that man’s outlook is cosmic and absolute, and demonstrated that our concepts of time, space, motion, and velocity can be only tentative, and valid within our limited experience. On a universal scale all standards of measurement are relative to each other and can be relied upon only when relative motion is definitely known. Therefore the difficulty of making reliable measurements of velocity on swiftly moving stars or planets is insuperable as there can be no absolute standard of reference. Einstein’s mathematical formulas for converting measurements on one moving system to those on another moving with a different velocity, however, might have seemed wholly speculative had they not found striking confirmation in such matters as the bending of a light ray as it passes a star or the displacement of lines in the spectrum of an element. Consequently both in the vast reaches of astronomy and in the minuteness of the atom the concept of relativity has restored order where classical mathematics failed completely.

Similarly the concept of energy introduced by Max Planck in 1900, and commonly known as the quantum theory, assumes that energy is not continuous, but exists in discreet amounts or quanta. This idea was at first incomprehensible, but it has clarified many diverse phenomena in the field of radiation and of heat. It has not yet reached maturity, but together with relativity and the nuclear atom it forms a possible basis for the understanding of the universe in terms of a single fundamental concept. As a result of these three ideas it is possible to consider electrons as having the properties of waves; it is commonly assumed that matter and energy can be converted one into the other; and it is a definite possibility that the twentieth century will see a full development of the matter-and-energy relation so that either can be converted into the other at will, and—a very remote contingency—for the useful purposes of industry and perhaps of humanity.

The study of matter itself, the science of chemistry, is very old. The Greeks had theories and the alchemists had much factual information. No real understanding was possible, however, until the question of the ultimate structure of matter was settled, and this came in the nineteenth century. In 1808, John Dalton (1766–1844) proposed a very specific and detailed atomic theory in which he assumed that matter can be subdivided down to an ultimate particle—the atom—beyond which subdivision cannot proceed without the destruction of matter itself. This concept was not new; but, in expounding it, Dalton assigned definite weights to the atoms of different elements and assumed that two or more atoms of two or more elements combine to form molecules, thus forming the fundamental unit of chemi-
cal compounds. These conclusions gave a definite interpretation of chemical reactions and an explanation for the fact that reactions do take place between very definite quantities of materials. Thus one gram of hydrogen reacts with eight grams of oxygen to produce water and any amount of either above those figures is left over, untouched. The elaboration of this theory during the succeeding century convinced chemists that matter “acts as if” it were composed of atoms and that all substances consist of molecules which in turn are built up from atoms of different elements. At the beginning of the twentieth century the atomic theory was probably the best established and the most useful of all scientific theories and yet its basic assumption had not been actually proved.

This proof waited upon progress in physics. It was the study of radium and, in particular, of its disintegration into alpha rays and a series of other elements that furnished the actual proof of the atomic theory. Experiments of great precision made in the Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge determined the actual mass of single atoms ejected in a radium explosion, and it was the development of the mass spectrograph by Aston that made it possible to photograph and measure the mass of any atom whatever. It was in the years just preceding and during World War I that final conclusive evidence became available to prove that the atom is the ultimate and chemically indivisible particle of an element, and that it has an attractive force toward other atoms which leads it to combine in definite patterns into molecules of chemical compounds. Ninety-two different varieties of atoms—ninety-two different elements—were thus established. Indeed it was subsequently found that nearly all the elements have several types of atoms, as, for instance, isotopes, wholly alike in behavior but slightly different in mass.

The study and mastery of chemical reactions did not, however, wait for the atomic formula to progress from a theory to a fact. Most of the ninety-two chemical elements had been definitely recognized by the early nineteenth century and in 1869 Mendeleeff (1834–1907) arranged them in the order of increasing weight of their atoms, and thus revealed a striking periodic relationship. The sixteenth element in this order, for instance, resembles the eighth very closely. There was a gradual change from metallic to nonmetallic properties in each octave, from a tendency to form alkalies to a tendency to form acids, from one end of the scale to the opposite, in almost every chemical property and then a repetition of this swing—so that the elements could be arranged in periods and thus fall into eight major families. This “periodic system” of the elements provided extraordinary insight into chemical relationships and at once permitted the produc-
tion of many new chemical compounds. At the same time it furnished a profound challenge to explain changes in relationships within the atom. But this again had to await the nuclear concept of Rutherford and Bohr.

This nuclear atom at once explained the periodic system on the basis that the mass of the atom is confined to the nucleus, whereas its surface is composed of planetary electrons. The difference between one atom and another is twofold. In going from one to the next in order of atomic weight, the mass of the nucleus increases, but the number of electrons in the external regions also increases—for the units that are added to the nucleus are positively charged and require a balance of negative electrons to make a stable atom. The chemical behavior of the atom, however, depends partly on the number, but primarily on the arrangement of the electrons at the surface. If the outermost orbit contains only a single electron this is easily detached in the process of chemical combination, a fact which gives the atom metallic properties. Two electrons in the outer orbit give the atom metallic characteristics which are less intense but, at the same time, allow the atom to attach two other atoms instead of one. The series progresses until, with seven electrons in the outer orbit, there is little or no tendency to release electrons and, instead, there is a tendency to take electrons from other atoms. Then its behavior is thus the reverse of metallic, or, nonmetallic. Most chemical reactions between atoms involve the combination of atoms in such a manner that the metallic atom surrenders electrons to the nonmetallic, forming a stable orbit of eight electrons which constitute the bond that holds the molecule together. Thus again twentieth century physics has given a wholly competent explanation for the long established facts of chemistry.

While this theory was being developed there was also a steady building up of knowledge concerning many thousands of chemical compounds. Acids, alkalis, and salts were easily recognized by their chemical behavior. All acids have certain properties in common, but are distinguished by their own characteristic element, i.e., sulfur or phosphorus or chlorine. The compounds of one element, carbon, fitted but vaguely into these general classes and yet were so multiform as to constitute a separate science—organic chemistry. This name was derived from the fact that prior to 1828 these compounds were widely available in nature, but were produced entirely by plants and animals and could not be made from carbon itself or from any mineral substance. The classical experiment of Liebig and Woehler in that year produced the organic compound, urea, from purely inorganic sources. It was at first difficult to realize that plant and animal sub-
stance was also chemical and could be altered and built in the laboratory as well as in nature.

Within the next few decades the major classes of organic compounds were recognized; their chemical behavior was correctly attributed to certain groupings of atoms within the molecule; and the characteristic reactions and formulas were set up for alcohols, acids, ethers, aldehydes, phenols, etc. In the twentieth century this knowledge of the structure of molecules and the chemical and physical behavior depending upon it led to a veritable synthetic age so that synthetic silk, rubber, leather, glass bristles, resins, and plastics are now huge items of commerce. Indeed synthetic perfumes, flavors, medicinals, and even vitamins and hormones, i.e., materials of powerful psychological and physiological effect, are widely and confidently used. There is perhaps no limit to the possibility, not of duplicating nature, but of improving on natural materials. As a result man has in recent years become less dependent on all sorts of special raw materials produced by animals and plants and is more and more relying upon the great basic natural substances of coal, petroleum, natural gas, and wood for an infinite variety of special organic products. In short, chemistry and physics have achieved a profound insight into the nature of matter and of energy and have passed far beyond the merely descriptive phase that they had reached in the days of Napoleon.

The science of biology is not so fortunate and cannot as yet give a profound and satisfying definition of life. Nevertheless it, too, is more than descriptive today. During the nineteenth century biology was "natural science" and devoted most of its attention to the exploration of the incredible diversity in the forms of life and in relating plant and animal species to each other. The first great generalization in this field, the theory of evolution, was put forth by Charles Darwin (1809–1882) in The Origin of Species, published in 1859. This ordering of the forms of life and the unfolding of the great drama in the development of higher animals through eras measured in millions of years was again a profound shock to the human race and incompatible with ancient traditions and doctrines. The furious quarrel that ensued set science apart from those who most cherished human precepts. Even now, when the facts of evolution are more firmly established, the scars of conflict are still evident in the supposed antipathy of cold analytical science to deep human and spiritual values.

Thus the science of life has repeatedly encountered obstacles because its conclusions, unlike those of chemistry and physics, touched mankind to the quick. Nevertheless, anthropology has now sketched
the evolution of man through a million years and has convincingly shown his development from a more primitive ape-like type. Physiology has applied the principles of chemistry and physics not only to the circulation of the blood but to such processes as digestion, metabolism, and cell growth. Perhaps the most important development of physical chemistry has been its success in explaining the innumerable chemical reactions which take place in the animal body and are necessary to the processes of life.

Among these the most striking are probably the reactions controlled by minute quantities of chemicals, such as enzymes, vitamins, and hormones which govern not only the normal processes of the body, but determine the disposition and reactions of the mind. Recently the most poignant challenge came from the recent isolation of definite chemical compounds that exert a profound control over body processes, i.e., the sex hormones. They control behavior and personality in an uncanny manner, due to the catalytic effect of certain groupings of atoms in molecules, and can be manufactured in the laboratory from quite innocuous ordinary chemicals. It is apparent that this chemical influence and alteration of human behavior and personality will furnish the next great battleground for science.

Perhaps the most significant chapter in the life sciences is that of heredity and genetics. This originated in the purely descriptive work of the Austrian monk, Gregor Mendel (1822–1884), whose careful work on the breeding of sweet peas established the broad principles of the inheritance of specific traits in offspring of different parents and led to the concept of "dominant" and of "recessive" traits. His empirical principles were seized upon by plant and animal breeders for the production of many new and valuable types. As in the case of the atomic theory, many years elapsed before the actual unit of inheritance that is responsible for physical traits could be determined. In the twentieth century T. H. Morgan of New York and his collaborators succeeded in attributing the traits of individuals to the genes within the chromosome of the nucleus of the cell. The redistribution of these chromosomes in the process of reproduction and in mitosis of the reproductive cells provided a definite physical, and even mechanical, basis for the principles of Mendel. These units of genetics play much the same role that is played by quanta in energy and by atoms in matter.

Advances in biology are of such intimate consequence to the human race that they are swiftly applied not only in the plant and animal industries, but also in medicine. Indeed, the need for knowledge in the medical sciences has always been so pressing that they have provided a primary incentive for research. An excellent example is
The work of Pasteur (1822–1895), a chemist, who revealed the nature of infectious diseases by discovering a whole new world of living things. By his skillful use of the microscope and of the laboratory methods of chemistry he discovered bacteria and other micro-organisms and, although not a physician, was able to effect astonishing cures in diseases such as anthrax and hydrophobia. He established bacteriology and, through the work of Koch (1843–1910) and many others, the conquest of bacterial fevers is now almost complete. Such scourges as malaria, yellow fever, smallpox, diphtheria, and typhus have been brought under control by the rigorous application of the principles related to bacteriology.

The history of medicine is in itself a vast subject both in the mass of its detail and in its significance to humanity. It includes many subjects that were inconceivable a century ago, such as embryology, cytology, anesthesia, modern surgery, immunology, and others that cannot be mentioned here.

This survey would not be complete, however, without some reference to the study of the functioning of the human mind. To a large extent the science of psychology still awaits upon better understanding of the chemistry and physics of the brain and of the nervous system. Yet many clarifying concepts have been introduced by such men as Pavlov and Freud, and the numerous social applications of their principles have made psychology one of the most active fields of present-day science. Psychiatry and psychoanalysis promise to develop fundamental units of behavior and mental action which may in time become analogous to the atom, the quantum, and the gene.

Thus it is evident that the content of science today is almost wholly different from that of Napoleon's days. Knowledge gained during the past century far outweighs that of all previous time. The application of this knowledge has produced tremendous social consequences, including an enormous increase in the population of the earth, an extension of life expectancy to some sixty-five years, the existence of great cities, an expansion in transportation and communication which has effectively reduced the size of the earth, and an incredible increase in the average wealth, comfort, and leisure of the human being. Indeed, the amazing success of science in solving the problems of our environment has produced a reliance upon intelligence, fact-finding, and logic which is perhaps the outstanding characteristic of the present age. On all sides there is insistent demand that the problems of economics and of social living—and even the pervasive problems in the spiritual realm—be solved by the same methods.

There are men and women who question the ability of science to solve earthly problems. They maintain that, in making possible the
invention of the atomic bomb, science has unleashed a terrible weapon that will destroy rather than build. On the other hand, there are those optimists who claim that the terrific energy released through the splitting of the atom will ultimately contribute to the health and the comfort of mankind. In fact, they say that we are on the verge of a stage in the industrial revolution far more dramatic and revolutionary than any of its earlier phases.

The Brineman Archive

Albert Einstein: During a Lecture in Mathematics

Collateral Reading

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CHAPTER XV

Imperialism and the Road to War

The Bettmann Archive
Cecil Rhodes, Empire Builder.

THE NEW IMPERIALISM

While scientists were extending our knowledge of this world, soldiers, clerics, and businessmen were conquering it. This so-called new imperialism, which started about 1870, was essentially an outgrowth of the capitalistic and industrial systems, just as the old imperialism of the early modern period resulted largely from national-mercantilistic policies. The growth of large-scale business, with giant output and enormous profits, led to a vast increase of capital that encouraged a further growth and expansion of business enterprises. Out of the changed economic order arose a new nobility—the industrial and financial barons. During the nineteenth century these men, especially in England, taking political control from the landed aristocracy, paved the way for the subordination of the state to business interests.

But this development of capitalism threatened its very existence. Unrestricted competition forced individual industries to expand, to lower costs by adopting labor-saving devices, to discharge at times large numbers of wage-earners, and thereby to decrease the number of consumers able to purchase their goods. This capitalistic society found itself in a very embarrassing situation, there being more goods to sell but relatively fewer people to buy them, and also more monetary capital but fewer productive enterprises in which to invest. The domestic market being cluttered with a surplus of goods, capitalists, to avoid devastating depressions, were forced to seek foreign markets which would absorb not only the excess production, but also the idle capital which had been accumulated. Moved by these considerations, and encouraged by the development of rapid transportation and com-
munication, groups of capitalists induced their governments to establish protective tariffs and to encourage imperialist expansion. Thus mercantilism, called neo-mercantilism or economic nationalism today, was revived. Economic self-sufficiency now became the great objective—an end to be reached by colonial expansion, tariffs, state aid, and methods of discrimination which controlled the markets, raw materials, and economic opportunities in the interests of the nationals.

Although the material benefits of imperialistic ventures were enjoyed by the few—wealthy merchants, industrialists, capitalists, certain missionaries, and high military and naval officers—the general public supported territorial expansion. National pride led the masses to urge the acquisition of strategic naval bases, colonial markets, and the control of raw materials. Many of them subscribed to Kipling’s concept of the “white man’s burden,” and looked upon imperialism as a crusade to give the world the benefits of a superior civilization. Pious Christians—both Catholic and Protestant—also viewed imperialism as primarily a means whereby the true faith could be carried to the heathen. Frequently the precursors of the movement, the Christian missionaries, aroused a popular interest in these heathen lands and by their activities demonstrated to eager and often unscrupulous traders and capitalists the unexploited economic potentialities of these backward countries.

In this struggle for empire which became intensified in the 1870’s, Great Britain had a distinct advantage. Prior to that time all the great colonial empires had declined save that of Great Britain. True, she had lost the Thirteen Colonies in 1783, but she had soon replaced them by taking possession of Australia and New Zealand, by expanding her interests in India, and by obtaining, as a result of Napoleon’s downfall, the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, Guiana, Trinidad, Malta, and other possessions. Then, while the European states were trying to solve internal problems, England developed her empire and evolved new methods of control, such as self-government for certain colonies, as, for example, Canada, in 1840. By 1870, Great Britain possessed the largest empire of all time, an empire that included about one-fourth of the globe and that provided havens for emigrants and sources of tremendous wealth.

Two other nations, Russia and the United States, by 1870 had established great empires, although in these instances it was national expansion rather than economic imperialism. Russia had expanded in Asia until her dominions reached the Pacific. In North America the United States extended her frontier until it reached from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans. Thus, by 1870, three countries ruled
over the major part of the world. No wonder that certain European states felt dwarfed and oppressed.

Impelled by the need for markets, raw materials, investment-opportunities, and havens for emigrants, these countries after 1870 joined the contest to obtain the unoccupied portions of the earth. France and Belgium, and, belatedly, Germany and Italy, entered the field, determined to win at least a place in this important contest. Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands, conscious of prizes won in the earlier cycle of modern imperialism, participated in the game. Great Britain, Russia, and the United States, seasoned veterans, continued to compete, and they soon became the favorites in the race. Austria, alone, of the great powers abstained from overseas colonialism.

The scenes of this great imperialistic struggle lay in Africa, in Asia, and in the Pacific. The United States, through the famous Monroe Doctrine, forbade further colonization in the Americas. But the prizes offered in the other continents seemed to satisfy the participants. During the course of the contest, the intense rivalry threatened to precipitate a general war. Fortunately, the diplomats were able to avoid such a catastrophe until the World War of 1914. Within forty years, the greater parts of available territories in Africa, Asia, and Oceania had been parcelled out as rewards among the powers.

Widespread interest in this international contest and the importance of the prizes awarded would seem to justify a description of the event. Businessmen, statesmen, soldiers, sailors, explorers, and missionaries—all were involved in it. It was characterized by private exploration, public enterprise, conquest, and international agreements. Winner of the first prize was Great Britain. She acquired tremendous new territories in Africa that gave her a continuous influence from the Cape of Good Hope to Cairo, broken only by German East Africa, which came under her imperial control after World War I. She also was awarded important possessions in Asia, in Oceania, and in Malaya.

Egypt and the Boer states in South Africa were Great Britain's outstanding African winnings. In the contest to gain Egypt, Great Britain, however, encountered the keen competition of France. The latter country had long been interested in North Africa. She had created a post near the mouth of the Senegal River in 1626, and during the reign of Louis XIV, she had acquired Gorée (1677), annexed Madagascar, and founded settlements on the Ivory Coast. She also had established headquarters for slave traffic near the mouth of the Senegal River. During the early nineteenth century she had increased her possessions in that continent, beginning the occupation of Algeria in 1830 and bringing that country into subjection by
1847, despite brave resistance led by the native chieftain, Abd-el-Kader. Native uprisings and border raids by the semi-nomadic Moslem Berbers of the Sahara, Tunis, and Morocco forced the French to extend their control beyond the boundaries of Algeria. Gradually they began to penetrate the Sahara and press eastward toward Tunis. This defensive expansion resulted in the annexation of Tunis (1881)—long considered by the Italians as a logical field for colonization—and in the acquisition of Morocco, despite the opposition of Germany (1905–1911).

While France was establishing an empire in Northwest Africa, Great Britain challenged that country’s plan to acquire Egypt. This ancient land was strategically located near the main highways of trade connecting Europe with Asia. It was under the rule of a clever Albanian adventurer, Mehemet Ali (1769–1849), who had secured virtual independence from his nominal sovereign, the Sultan of Turkey. Yet his successors were less capable. Wasting huge sums of money on lavish entertainments, vast projects, futile conquests, one, Ismail, by name, obtained loans from French and British bankers at high rates of interest and, by the 1870’s this spendthrift found himself near bankruptcy. Unable to borrow more money, Ismail in 1875 was forced to sell his interest in the Suez Canal. This waterway had been built with European capital, under the direction of a French engineer, Ferdinand de Lesseps, and was opened in 1869. France, crippled by the costly war with Prussia (1870–1871), could not purchase Ismail’s stock. Disraeli, Prime Minister of Great Britain, thereupon borrowed the money from the Rothschilds and purchased the shares for his country. Financial troubles within Egypt soon forced both France and Great Britain to intervene and to take over control of its finances in order to protect British and French creditors. This dual control, however, broke down in 1883 because France had failed to join Great Britain in an attempt in the preceding year to put down a nationalist rebellion. Thereupon, England suppressed the uprising and extended her influence over Egypt. Moved by a threat of a Turkish attack upon the Suez Canal in 1914, Great Britain finally established a protectorate over Egypt which lasted until 1922, when Egypt was granted limited independence.

Following the withdrawal of France from active participation in Egyptian affairs (1883), Great Britain and France engaged in a struggle for control of the Nile basin and the Red Sea, south of Egypt. Hoping to establish a transcontinental empire, France now attempted to extend her control across Africa from Tunis to her colony of Somaliland on the Red Sea (secured in 1862 by Napoleon

3 See pp. 235–236.
III. Great Britain opposed this French advance, realizing that British ascendancy in the region south of Egypt was necessary in order to protect her water-highway to India and to carry out her project of a Cape-to-Cairo railway. A crisis between the two nations arose in 1898 when a French expedition under Captain Marchand faced a superior British force under Lord Kitchener. The French foreign minister, Delcassé, decided to avert a war at this time and gave way. Thus, England, left supreme in the Sudan, was in a position to dominate the whole of the upper Nile Valley. As we shall see, the rivalry between France and Great Britain was liquidated later when all conflicting interests were compromised and the famous Entente Cordiale of 1904 was arranged.

While the British and the French were quarreling over control of North Africa, the Italians were trying to set up an empire on the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Establishing their supremacy in Eritrea (1882) and Somaliland (1889), they then attempted to conquer the ancient kingdom of Ethiopia. Native opposition, aided by the French, checked the advance of the invaders, who suffered a humiliating defeat at Adowa in 1896. This repulse resulted in the temporary neglect of Italian imperialism. In 1906, the French and the British determined to dominate North Africa, entered with Italy into a tripartite agreement that defined the economic interests of these countries in Ethiopia and guaranteed the integrity and independence of that state. Five years later Italy revived her policy of imperial expansion. Having arranged a friendly understanding with France, Russia, and Great Britain concerning her designs on Tripoli, she took advantage of local uprisings in that land to impose a war on its owner, Turkey, and thereby to seize not only Tripoli in northern Africa, but also the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean Sea (1911–1912).

Whereas Great Britain, France, and Italy were the chief rivals in the race to acquire control of North Africa, the contest for the central part of that continent was characterized by keen competition among a number of other powers. Prior to the start of the race in 1880, the British, French, and Portuguese had established footholds along the west coast, but the hinterland had remained neglected. Representatives of all nations interested in this region met at Brussels in 1876 and formed the “International Association for the Exploration and Civilization of Africa.” King Leopold II of Belgium (1865–1909) was especially concerned with this humanitarian project. He had heard of the populous districts of the Congo, with their valuable natural resources, particularly gold, diamonds, copper, wild rubber, ivory, palm products, and tropical woods. Determined not only to
give the natives the questionable benefits of civilization, but also to get possession of these important material things, he and his associates established a "Committee for the Study of the Upper Congo." This body sent the famous explorer, Stanley, in 1879, to negotiate treaties with the natives, build roads, and establish trading centers. Overcoming with difficulty the rivalry of the Portuguese and the French, Leopold in 1884 was recognized by all powers as head of the Congo Free State. In personal control of one of the most fertile regions in Africa, covering over a million square miles, Leopold proceeded to exploit his empire. He pretended that his interest in the Congo was primarily humanitarian; but certain Englishmen, in 1903 and 1904, proved to the world that Leopold, in order to obtain huge profits, was treating the natives brutally. Public indignation became so great that Leopold was forced, in 1908, to hand over the Congo Free State to Belgium in return for a handsome indemnity. Reforms were introduced by the Belgian government in its administration of the Congo Free State, and slowly the evils of European imperialism were removed.

Influenced by the reports of the fabulous economic resources to be found in the Congo Basin, a number of great powers entered the contest in this region. They met at Berlin in 1884–1885, and at that meeting they declared solemnly that they would maintain free trade in the Congo, would abolish slavery and the slave trade, would establish effective occupation—not a paper declaration—and would treat the natives as "children of God." Having thus drawn up the rules of the game, they quickly partitioned the west coast of Africa, disregarding some of the pious promises set forth in the Berlin Conference. France obtained a vast area above the Free State, most of the Senegal and Niger river basins, the greater part of the Sahara and western Sudan, and reoccupied the island of Madagascar to which she had an old claim. Great Britain increased her holdings on the Guinea coast and enlarged her colony of Nigeria, especially in the region between the Niger River and Lake Chad. Germany acquired the Cameroons and Togoland. Disputes between the French, the British, and the Germans were settled by compromise arrangements.

Great Britain, Germany, and Portugal partitioned the west coast below the Congo. Portugal got the large colony of Angola; Germany obtained a barren area between Angola and British Cape Colony, which was called German West Africa. Before England would recognize Germany's conquest, she obtained Germany's recognition of her claim to the strategic Walvis Bay, on the coast of the German colony. By 1914 the entire west coast of Africa, with the exception of Liberia, a protégé of the United States which was ostensibly independent, had
succumbed to European rule. The east coast was also partitioned. Portugal revived her claim to Mozambique; Great Britain extended her empire to include Uganda; and Germany and Great Britain divided the sultanate of Zanzibar (1890), establishing colonies known respectively as German and British East Africa.

In South Africa British imperialism was triumphant. In 1815, Great Britain annexed the Dutch colonies in Cape Town. Resenting alien rule, the Boers, or Dutch, moved to the north, founding the independent republic of Natal (1838), the Orange Free State (1836), and the Transvaal (1838). Natal was soon taken over by the British, but the other two provinces retained their independence until 1877. At that time Disraeli annexed the Transvaal, but in 1881 Gladstone recognized the independence of the two Boer republics again. During the next two decades imperialist sentiment in Great Britain forced the British government to further the cause of expansion in Africa. Under the direction of Cecil Rhodes, the diamond magnate and empire builder, a British protectorate was established in 1885 in Bechuanaland, to the north of Cape Colony. Later Rhodes extended British control to Lake Tanganyika, over the region which came to be known as Rhodesia.

In 1899–1902, Great Britain took possession of the Boer countries of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. Discovery of valuable gold mines in those lands and the influx of British citizens to these Boer states led to trouble between the Uitlanders (foreigners) and the Boers. Influenced by the appeals of the Uitlanders for help, Great Britain finally decided to intervene. In the war that followed, the British encountered great difficulty in crushing the Boer states. Directed by able leaders, the Dutch fought a successful guerrilla warfare against the British, who were forced to put over half a million men in the field. It was only after three years of bitter struggle that the Boers agreed to peace terms. By 1902 British arms were victorious and the whole of South Africa was brought under the sway of imperial England. Having protected its subjects in their desire to participate in the economic exploitation of the Boer republics, the British liberal government in 1910 set up a self-governing federation in South Africa. A federal union of the Transvaal, Orange Free State, Natal, and Cape Colony was created in which liberal home rule and constitutional government were established.

Thus, by 1914 Europe dominated all Africa, with the exception of Liberia and Abyssinia. Of the competing powers, Great Britain and France had won first and second prize respectively. Belgium and Portugal had obtained valuable awards, but Germany and Italy, despite their resources and great-power status, were unable to secure
colonies in Africa commensurate with their dignity and prestige. They both remained land-hungry.

European powers competed against one another in Asia as well as in Africa. In the early modern period the Portuguese, Spaniards, Dutch, French, and English established trading posts and obtained holdings in various parts of this continent. But Russia acquired the largest empire in that center of European rivalry.

One of the most remarkable movements of modern times was the expansion of Russia from the small duchy of Muscovy to a great empire of about 8,650,000 square miles and a population of 170,000,000. In Asia this expansion occurred in three regions: northern Asia—through Siberia to the Pacific Ocean, Alaska, and California; the heart of Asia—through Turkestan to China, Afghanistan, and India; and the Caucasus—through Georgia and Daghestan to Persia. The outstanding motives for this increase of territory were the desire of an agrarian nation for more land, the ambition for increased trade connections with the great commercial centers of the Orient, the extension of the fur trade, the acquisition of ice-free ports, and the establishment of defensible frontiers on the east and the southeast against the wild nomadic tribes of the steppes of central Asia. Moreover, the Russians had a civilizing mission to perform. They wanted to bring order and civilization to Asia and to convert the natives to Greek Christianity.

The success of Russian expansion was due partly to a favorable geographic location, Russia being the only great European state whose borders touch the continent of Asia. Her autocratic government was a factor which favored expansion because of its centralization, and because it was the type of government which was understood by and appealed to the numerous tribes of Asiatics in Siberia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Also, the Russians were experienced in the use of bribery, intrigue, and force when necessary. Finally, imperial officials studied the languages and customs of the East, and in establishing Russian supremacy, gained the support of the conquered peoples by simply asking them to recognize the czar, to pay an annual tribute, and to stop pillaging. Drastic political and social reforms were not usually imposed upon the natives.

In the earlier attempts to obtain holdings in Asia, European nations (save Russia) only touched the fringes of that great continent. Great Oriental states like China were practically ignored. They continued to pursue their own courses and policies until the great wave of nineteenth-century imperialism engulfed them.

The rapid industrial transformation of western Europe brought about the exploitation of the economic resources of Asia. Faced with
expansion or destruction, the various capitalistic countries struggled for control of different parts of that continent. By 1914 they had largely destroyed the seclusion of its ancient peoples and had brought the greater part of them under European political or economic control.

In Asia the Chinese Empire, because of its tremendous population, great natural resources, and political disorganization, was the most promising field for the European contest. Actually, the unpopular Manchu dynasty (1644–1912) controlled only the central portions of that empire. The outlying regions, such as Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, and Sinkiang, were sparsely settled frontier districts which possessed virtual independence.

For many centuries China was the home of the predominant civilization of the Far East. Other peoples, such as those who lived in Siam, Burma, and Indo-China, imitated it, and were practically vassals of China. Considering her customs and traditions ideal and eternal, China resented all foreign intrusions or innovations. Having established her political and cultural hegemony in the Far East, a satiated China could well afford to favor the doctrine of anti-imperialism and to adopt a policy of "splendid isolation." In ancient times and in the early modern period, China, however, had permitted trade connections to exist with some of the foreign powers. The first Western trading station in China was established by the Portuguese at Macao in 1557, and later, the British, the Dutch, and the Russians established commercial relations. Constant quarrels between the various rival traders led to change of policy on the part of Chinese authorities. In the eighteenth century foreign religious activities were suppressed, aliens were barred from China, and overseas trade was limited to the port of Canton. This isolation lasted until 1839. At that time, Great Britain, backing its East India Company's determination to export opium to China, despite the opposition of that government, declared war on the "Flowery Kingdom." Within three years the Chinese were defeated and forced to accept a treaty whereby five treaty ports were opened to foreign trade, the island of Hong Kong, near Canton, was ceded to Great Britain, and an indemnity of twenty-one million dollars was to be paid. Subject to certain restrictions, the opium trade was permitted to continue.

Encouraged by Great Britain's advance in China, other powers—France, Prussia, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United States—demanded and obtained similar rights. These concessions were extended in 1860, following an attack upon China by Great Britain and France, to avenge the sinking of a British vessel by pirates and the death of a French missionary. According to the terms of the set-
tlement which followed the war, six additional ports were opened; foreign ministers were to reside at Peking, the imperial capital; protection of missionaries was promised; foreigners were allowed to carry on commercial operations along the Yangtze River; Great Britain obtained a territorial concession on the mainland near Hong Kong; and a large indemnity was levied upon China. Taking advantage of these concessions, the Western powers now promoted their economic interests and at the same time undermined the political independence of China. Legations were established by the leading foreign states. Special treaties enabled them to fix the Chinese tariff, while, by the privileges of extraterritoriality, China was forced to exempt foreigners from the jurisdiction of her courts.

A protest against the concessions to foreigners—the Taiping Rebellion (1853–1864)—was suppressed by the Chinese government, aided by European forces. Following this uprising, the powers advanced their economic interest by engaging in a partial partition of China. Russia in 1860 annexed the coast south of the Amur River, to the northeast of China proper; France in 1863 took over Cambodia, and in 1885 annexed Annam and Tongking; Great Britain completed her absorption of Burma in 1886; and Japan, as a result of her war with China (1894–1895), secured recognition of the independence of Korea, cession of the island of Formosa and the Liaotung Peninsula, and an indemnity and certain commercial rights. Opposition on the part of Germany, France, and Russia forced Japan to relinquish her claim to the Liaotung Peninsula. Later, Russia gained control of this strategic region through a lease for twenty-five years of Port Arthur and neighboring harbors. France, not to be outdone, strengthened her influence in south China through the acquisition of Kwangchow; Great Britain obtained in 1898 the port of Wei-hai-wei, across the Yellow Sea from Port Arthur; and Germany received from China special concessions in the Shantung Peninsula. In possession of strategic holdings on the Chinese coast, the European powers proceeded to carve China into spheres of influence. In the north, Russia got concessions in Outer Mongolia, Manchuria, and the Liaotung Peninsula; the Germans developed their interests in Shantung; the British made plans to dominate the whole Yangtze River valley; and the French determined to exploit the three southern provinces which adjoined French Indo-China.

This attempt to partition China aroused deep concern in the United States. While the European nations were advancing in China, the United States had become a Pacific power as a result of the Spanish-American War, which enabled her to acquire the Philippines and other islands. She had failed, however, to establish a foothold on
the Chinese coast, a circumstance which hampered American economic interest in China. Attempting to obtain equal rights for American businessmen, Secretary of State John Hay in 1899 announced his famous Open Door policy in which he asked the various European powers not to discriminate against other nationals in their spheres of influence. This idea was accepted in 1900 by France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia, and Japan, in principle, and by Italy, unreservedly, as she had no special interest in China.

While the Western powers were introducing their civilization into the Celestial Empire, the Chinese experienced profound political changes. Despising these aliens, conservative factions wished to expel the foreigner and his hated innovations. A party of reformers, however, recognizing the might of the Westerners, desired to imitate them to the extent of modernizing the government and of adopting certain phases of Western civilization. At first, the reform party obtained the support of the young emperor, Kiangsu, and an attempt was made to introduce educational reforms, railways, and other features of Western life. A palace revolution, however, enabled the anti-Western party to imprison the emperor, to restore the old dowager empress, Tzu-Hsi, and to inaugurate a policy of opposition to Western civilization and foreign control. A strong anti-foreign movement, led by a secret society known as the Boxers, developed between 1898–1900. This movement culminated in a Chinese attack upon the legations at Peking and their subsequent relief by an international army. After the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, the Western powers levied a huge indemnity upon China and secured further concessions and privileges from the dowager empress.

Unable to check the advance of the white men by force, the Chinese government now decided to adopt Western reforms. The weak monarchy, however, was able to make little headway. As a result, in 1912 the ancient government was terminated, and a republic, under the able Chinese leader, Yuan Shih-k'ai, was announced. An attempt was made to create a liberal republican government. Inspired by the American-educated Dr. Sun-Yat-sen, a constitution was drawn up and a republic created. But the disconcerting effects of foreign penetration and exploitation, the disturbances resulting from the spread of liberalism and Western ideas in China, and the cultural differences between northern and southern China led to further disintegration of the great state. From relative stability China passed to the horrors, uncertainties, and turmoil of civil strife from which she had not emerged with the coming of the War in 1914.

In complete contrast to the disintegration of China was the rise of the powerful Japanese Empire. For many centuries this island king-
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dom had existed in a state of almost complete seclusion. During this period a feudal system developed. A mayor of the palace, called a Shogun, took over the functions of the emperor, and the nobles and warriors exerted real authority. In 1853–1854, an American squadron, under the command of Commodore Perry, visited Japan and forced that country to grant trading privileges and to open ports to the United States. Other nations got the Shogun to give similar concessions to them. These actions terminated Japan’s long period of isolation. At first, the Japanese resented this interference. Opposing the introduction of Western ideas and practices, these Orientals tried to expel the foreigners. Meeting failure, they finally decided to adopt Western civilization.

Within a period of about twenty years Japan was partially modernized. In 1867 the Shogun relinquished his authority to the Emperor, who was re-established as the supreme head of the state. Foreign legations, alien traders, and travelers were welcomed; telegraphs and railways were constructed; and Western commercial and industrial methods were introduced. A complete social transformation accompanied this industrial revolution. Feudalism was abolished in 1871; a national school system was established; and in 1889 a constitution was promulgated. This constitution gave the emperor considerable executive and veto power, and created a legislative branch, consisting of an aristocratic House of Peers, and a House of Representatives with rather limited powers and selected on the basis of a restricted suffrage. In addition to this important governmental change, the judicial and legal systems were Westernized, and in 1871 universal military service was introduced and the construction of a navy was initiated.

By the 1890’s Japan, a rapidly growing industrial country, became conscious of the need for territorial expansion both as a solution of the problems of surplus population, raw materials, and markets, and as a defensive measure to resist possible Russian encroachments. She therefore engaged in a war with China (1894–1895). As stated elsewhere,¹ she defeated her neighbor easily, and obtained control of the island of Formosa, but she was not permitted by Germany, France, and Russia to retain her extensive conquest on the mainland. Resentful of this interference, she watched with mingled fear and anger the partition of China by the great powers of Europe. Especially did she oppose the advance of Russia in Manchuria. Bent upon keeping the Russians out of Korea, she entered into an alliance with Great Britain (1902), in which each agreed to maintain benevolent neutrality if the other should be involved in a war.

¹ See p. 341.
with a third state. By the terms of this agreement the two nations also promised to maintain the independence of China and Korea and to carry out the terms of their alliance for a period of five years.

Despite this alliance, the Russians occupied Korea, Japan now tried to arrange a satisfactory understanding with Russia by negotiations, but, failing, she in 1904 determined upon war. Disregarding the formality of a declaration of war, she invaded Manchuria, winning the battle of Mukden and virtually crushing the Russian military power in the Far East. She then attacked Port Arthur and captured that great Russian stronghold after a long siege. The destruction of the Russian Baltic fleet, on May 27, 1905, destroyed the czar’s naval power. Facing unrest at home and subjected to diplomatic pressure from the neutral powers, the Russian government reluctantly agreed to a peace meeting at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. With President Theodore Roosevelt acting as mediator, the two powers finally accepted the following terms: recognition by Russia of the pre-eminence of Japan in Korea; cession by Russia of one half of the island of Sakhalin to Japan; evacuation of Manchuria by the troops of both powers; transfer to Japan of the Russian lease of Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula; surrender by Russia to Japan of the southern section of the railway between Port Arthur and Harbin; and the grant to the Japanese of fishing rights along the shores of the Bering Sea. After this treaty was signed, Japan took steps to establish a protectorate over Korea. In view of its unwillingness to accept this overlordship, the Korean government was overthrown in 1910 by the Japanese, who then annexed the country. By a treaty arranged in 1915 the Emperor of Korea formally handed over his country to Japan, and henceforth it was governed as an integral part of the Japanese Empire.

A Japanese penetration of southern Manchuria followed the war against Russia. Some Japanese settled there; much capital was invested in Manchuria; and the foundation of a great Japanese empire in Asia was established. Thus, by 1914 Japan had created an empire for herself, comprising a long chain of islands from Formosa to the Kuriles, as well as Korea and a sphere of influence in southern Manchuria. This empire she was able to enlarge during World War I, for, as an ally of Great Britain (by virtue of the renewals of the alliance in 1905 and 1911), she seized the German concession in Shantung and the German islands in the Pacific north of the equator. This put Japan in a position to threaten the sovereignty of China and to guard the sea approaches to her prospective victim.

India, like China, was an empire in itself, with a population of over three hundred millions. In ancient times it had enjoyed a high
civilization, but numerous alien invasions had contributed to its cultural and political decline. Split into religious groups, particularly Hindus and Moslems, weakened by a rigid caste system, and politically disrupted with the fall of the Mogul Empire in the eighteenth century, India by the nineteenth century could offer little opposition to British imperialism. Great Britain, therefore, was able to obtain virtual control of that vast peninsula.

Prior to the nineteenth century, the British East India Company had functioned as a state in a few districts on the coast. Inefficiency and corruption of company rule, however, forced the government, by the Regulating Act of 1773, to appoint a council of four members to pass on the acts of the governor-general, representative of the Company. In 1784 Parliament extended its authority by passing the Government of India Act, which established at London a board of control for the supervision of Indian affairs with a cabinet member at its head. It also arranged for the selection of the governor-general in India by the Company, but provided for his recall by the government. Rapid British expansion in India, following the decline of the Mogul Empire, resulted in the introduction into India of many forms of Western civilization. Steamships were used, harbors improved, telegraphs and roads built, railways planned, a postal system set up, schools established, and agricultural reforms introduced. Aroused by the discovery of valuable mineral deposits, such as coal and iron, British investors poured large amounts of money into organizations designed to exploit the region.

Most of the natives resented this advance of the Westerners. In 1857–1859 hatred of foreign attempts to change certain religious beliefs and customs, together with opposition to Western exploitation of India, led to the Sepoy Rebellion. The immediate cause of this uprising was the demand that the Moslems and Hindus who had been forced into British military service use cartridges greased with tallow from the cow (a holy beast among the Hindus). This practice offended the religious susceptibilities of the Hindus, and they therefore initiated the uprisings. The revolt soon spread into the Ganges provinces and Central India, receiving the support of native rulers as well as the masses. At first, the revolution, led by the Mogul, was successful. Many British civilians and troops were killed, and in many provinces native rule was restored. Military reinforcements, however, finally enabled the British government to suppress the uprisings, to punish the mutineers severely, and to exile the Mogul.

This rebellion forced the British government to introduce further reforms in India. In 1858 the rule of the East India Company was abolished. By the Better Government of India Act, the Empire was
converted into a crown colony, with supreme control vested in the Secretary of State for India, a cabinet member, and a small council in London. A viceroy, selected by the cabinet, represented the government in India. He was aided by executive and legislative councils, and by provincial administrations under governors, assisted by nominated councils or chief commissioners who dispensed with councils. Over three-fifths of India came under this system of British rule. In addition there were more than six hundred native states not under British administration whose dynasts were dependent on British protection and supervision.

Introduction of Western civilization into India only tended to increase the nationalist opposition to British control. A movement to attain native representation in the government was fostered by the educated peoples of India. Willing to grant this reform, provided that they could retain control of the government, the British in 1907 permitted two Indians to be appointed on the Council of the Secretary of State, and one on the Executive Council of the Viceroy. In 1909 another act made provision for the election of twenty-five of the sixty-eight members of the Viceroy's Legislative Assembly. But these concessions did not satisfy the natives. Claiming that they were not represented adequately, an extreme nationalist group demanded independence or, at least, autonomy. Security of British economic interests in India prevented the government from granting these demands. As a result a bitter struggle began, its bitterness enhanced by the fact that the natives now frankly demanded freedom from alien economic as well as political oppression. Conspiracies, assassinations, and riots disturbed the land. Inability of the Hindus and the Moslems to co-operate, however, weakened the cause of the nationalists and enabled the British government to maintain its control.

Meanwhile, India experienced marked material development. Railways, canals, roads, and modern communications tended to make India an economic unit. Vast fortunes were accumulated, chiefly by the British, through the production and export of coffee, tea, rice, wheat, opium, jute, cotton, gold, ivory, trinkets, and fine fabrics. Tremendous quantities of British manufactured goods, especially cotton and iron goods, were imported into India. Small wonder the British, enjoying almost a monopoly of India's foreign trade, discouraged the development of competitive industries (textiles, for example) there.

The British justified their exploitation of India by citing the great benefits conferred upon that land by English rule. Codification of laws, introduction of educational facilities, abolition of infanticide
and the suicide of widows, diminution of famines, wars, and internal uprisings, and the introduction of sanitary improvements—all were brought about by the British. Despite those benefits, the natives of India prior to the outbreak of World War I were keenly aware of the fact that, as yet, they had not been permitted self-government.

British supremacy in India faced external as well as internal opposition. East of India, the French, as we have seen, took possession of Cochin-China. Following a war with China, France in 1883 forced that country to agree to the establishment of a French protectorate over holdings in Annam and Tongking. In 1898 France secured a sphere of influence in south China, including the port of Kwangchow. Periodically, the British became alarmed. Fearing a French occupation of Siam and a French march toward Burma and India, they attempted to stop this threat by taking possession in stages, as the result of wars in 1826, 1852, and 1886, of the buffer state, Burma. Thenceforth, they did everything in their power to prevent the conquest of Siam by France. Until 1904 the two European powers were frequently on the verge of war over this region. But in 1904 they reached a settlement, as a phase of the general Anglo-French colonial understanding, whereby Siam was to be recognized by both powers as an independent buffer state.

Russia, as well as France, threatened British dominance in India. Throughout the nineteenth century she engaged in a policy of expansion that carried her ever closer to India. Turkestan was brought under her control, extending the Russian Empire to the frontiers of Afghanistan, a mountainous state located north of India. Great Britain now decided to check this Russian advance. The barren state of Baluchistan was seized by the British in 1883, and the great mountains in Afghanistan which constituted India's northwestern frontier were placed under British control. Meanwhile, Russia continued to threaten India on three sides: Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. Between 1891 and 1900 she built the great Trans-Siberian Railroad and extended another line from the Caspian Sea to the western wall of the Chinese Empire. Thereupon Russian and British capitalists and diplomats soon engaged in a lusty battle for control of the economic resources of Persia and Tibet; Russian and Japanese statesmen at the same time argued over Russian expansion in the Far East. As we have seen, the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 signified the creation of a united front by these states directed against Russian expansion. This alliance was followed by a war between Japan and Russia and the advance of the Bear in the Far East was definitely

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1 See p. 341.
2 See pp. 343-344.
checked. Forced to give up her plans to acquire Korea, as a result of her defeat by Japan (1904-1905), Russia concentrated upon her policy of expansion in Persia, desirous of participating in the exploitation of that country's valuable resources, especially oil, and to establish a rail-highway between the Persian gulf and European Russia. At this critical moment, when an Anglo-Russian war over Persia seemed imminent, the projected construction of the Berlin-to-Bagdad railway by Germany forced Russia and Great Britain to settle their imperialist rivalries. Determined to prevent Germany from securing the shortest and quickest route to the Orient, they, encouraged by their joint friend, France, liquidated their rival interests. By a treaty, agreed upon in 1907, they divided Persia into three zones. The northern part of the country was handed over to Russia; the southeastern portion, especially rich in oil, was given to Great Britain; and the intervening strip was left in the hands of the Shah of Persia. Great Britain also made Russia recognize the independence of Afghanistan and the neutrality of Tibet. The Russian threat to India from the direction of Persia and Afghanistan was allayed.

The Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 did not solve Persia's troubles. Until 1914 that unfortunate country was ruled by a clique of unpatriotic politicians who served the interests of the partitioning powers. Aroused by this situation, the Persians themselves organized a nationalist movement, which had as its objectives the re-establishment of law and order within the country, the abolition of foreign control, and the return of Persia's economic resources to the Persians. Prior to 1914 the Persians remained very much under the thumb of English and Russian imperialists.

While the European powers were struggling for control of Asia, they also engaged in a contest for possession of the myriads of islands in the Pacific. In this race Great Britain again won the first prize. Already in possession of Australia and New Zealand, she, during the nineteenth century, established five colonies in Australia, one on the island of Tasmania, and further settlements in New Zealand. The Australian colonies were combined into a federal union in 1900 and were granted a constitution and a parliamentary government. In 1907, New Zealand was also given dominion status in the British Empire. In both Australia and New Zealand, Western civilization made marked progress. In New Zealand, especially, the introduction of modern culture resulted in the enactment of progressive political and social legislation. Factory laws were passed, a labor department was created, a system of old-age pensions was introduced, and the government embarked on a policy of state socialism, taking over railways, telegraphs, telephones, insurance companies, and certain coal
mines. In addition to these important dominions Great Britain also acquired numerous small islands in the Pacific. The Fiji group was annexed in 1874, and in 1886 England acquired the southeastern part of New Guinea, Germany the northeastern, and the Netherlands the western half.

In the contest for islands in Oceania, the Dutch won second prize. Already in control of the East Indies, they, in the late nineteenth century, developed these possessions. Subsequent humane reforms, leading to social and economic progress, made them the most valuable of colonial possessions. Germany, France, Japan, and the United States also won awards. In the late nineteenth century Germany obtained the Marshall Islands in addition to a part of New Guinea, and the Caroline, Palau, and Ladrone groups of islands, except Guam. In 1899, upon the partition of the Samoan group, its two larger islands went to Germany; but the one containing the important harbor of Pago Pago went to the American nation. French acquisitions in the Pacific were not as extensive as those of Germany. New Caledonia was annexed in 1853, and Tahiti and other small islands in the Pacific were also obtained during the nineteenth century. Like France, Japan annexed groups of small islands, extending from Russian Siberia to Sakhalin, and from southern Japan to a point not far from the Philippines.

The United States, however, was more successful than Japan in this race in Oceania. In 1867 she strengthened her position in the north Pacific by her purchase of Alaska from Russia; in 1898 she acquired the Philippines and Guam, as a result of the Spanish-American War; and by an agreement in 1899 with Germany and Great Britain, she got the most important of the Samoan Islands. Meanwhile, she had obtained a number of small islands, and in 1898 had annexed Hawaii. Possession of these lands made the United States one of the most important Pacific powers.

While the United States was extending her interests in the Pacific she was also developing her influence in the Americas. Taking advantage of the backwardness of the various Hispanic states, after their separation from Spain, she engaged in an economic penetration of these countries. Fearful that the European states would seize these regions, the United States had enunciated the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. But the European nations disregarded this doctrine and entered into the economic development of Latin America, even attempting to annex certain regions. In the 1860's France, for example, tried to set up an empire in Mexico. Later, in 1895, Great Britain, as a result of a dispute with Venezuela over a boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana, threatened to settle the matter by war.
At this time the United States intervened and requested Great Britain to submit the matter to arbitration. In making this demand, the American Secretary of State, Olney, declared that the United States was practically sovereign on this continent, "and its fiat law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." Great Britain eventually consented to arbitration. In 1902–1903, European creditor states, after blockading Venezuela for not paying her debts, submitted their dispute to American arbitration.

After the war with Spain the United States expanded its economic interests in the Caribbean. Gaining possession of Cuba and Puerto Rico (ceded to the United States by Spain), it made the former a protectorate and annexed the latter. Meanwhile, by conquest, lease, purchase, and intervention, the United States soon dominated the Caribbean area. Protection of American interests in this area was associated with attempts to take over the Isthmus of Panama. In 1878 a French company had obtained a concession from Colombia to dig a waterway connecting the Pacific and the Atlantic. Later this project was dropped and the United States purchased the French rights. Colombia, however, refused to lease the strip of land necessary for the construction of the canal. Whereupon President Theodore Roosevelt took advantage of a revolution in Colombia, in 1903, to obtain the independence of Panama. The new republic, grateful for American aid, granted the United States a perpetual lease on a ten-mile strip across the Isthmus. Work on this important project was begun at once, and in 1914 it was opened to traffic.

The rise of the two great non-European powers, the United States and Japan, exerted a tremendous influence upon world politics. Henceforth European states could not settle arbitrarily the affairs of Latin America and the Orient; they had to take into consideration the ideas of these two powerful nations, knowing that they were well organized by 1900 and were in a position to contest on even terms for the valuable economic prizes said to exist in those backward regions of the world.

**The Road to War**

After the victory of 1871, Germany was not interested in colonial expansion. She was more concerned with internal problems and wanted peace above everything else, so as to be able to solve them. Bismarck, however, was aware of the fact that an armed conflict might break out at any time. He knew that Germany's harsh treatment of France had won for the empire the deep hatred of a humiliated people, and realized that Germany could not count on the friendship of a single European power. Therefore his entire diplo-
matic policy was designed to prevent antagonisms from developing into war, to destroy potential combinations against Germany, to attach the various countries to his empire rather than to France—and thus, by a series of alliances and counteralliances, to preserve the German Empire.

At first the chancellor was able to establish friendly relations with Austria and Russia. The well-known Three Emperors’ League was created, but it was an informal understanding between the three rulers whereby they agreed to maintain the status quo as established in 1871, to work for a solution of the Near Eastern problem, and to oppose international socialism and other revolutionary doctrines which threatened the monarchical system. In certain respects the Three Emperors’ League resembled the Quadruple Alliance. Although there was no definite agreement, there was merely an understanding that the three conservative states would co-operate in checking the spread of all subversive political, social, and economic doctrines. Thus, by aligning the reactionary nations against advanced ideas which emanated from republican France, Bismarck endeavored to build up and consolidate suspicion and distrust of that country.

In his attempt to isolate France, Bismarck tried to bring Great Britain into the conservative League. He emphasized, in his diplomatic negotiations with England, the danger of international socialism, and insisted that Great Britain—the leading exponent of the bourgeois-capitalistic system—join in this crusade to stop socialism and save civilization. Enthusiastic exponent of “splendid isolation,” Great Britain refused to join the conservative powers in their attempt to maintain the status quo. Like Canning, who opposed Metternich’s plan to check the spread of nationalism and democracy, Gladstone—the “Little Englander”—and Disraeli—the imperialist—realizing that this war on radicalism was in reality directed against France, did not propose to drag England into European troubles so that Germany could overturn the balance of power.

In 1875 occurred a famous war scare, occasioned by the widespread but probably fallacious belief that Bismarck planned a preventive war against France. The republic’s remarkable economic recovery after 1871, her payment of the indemnity levied by Germany, her rearmament program, and her imperialistic activity in Egypt (the Suez Canal), alarmed the jingoistic element in Germany. In France it was believed that Bismarck proposed to launch a second war against that country in order to crush it once and for all. The French appealed to London and St. Petersburg. British diplomats, committed to the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, did not
favor any further weakening of France. Joining Russia, Great Britain let it be known that she and her Slav ally would oppose any attack upon the French state. Thereupon the war fever quickly subsided, and France, grateful to England for her aid, accepted that country as her partner in the ownership of the Suez Canal.

Two years later another crisis threatened to bring about a general European war. In 1875 massacres of Christians by the Turks in the Balkans led to Russian protests and finally to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. Again Bismarck feared that his Three Emperors' League would be disrupted by this Balkan crisis. Austria, he realized, would bitterly oppose Russian supremacy in this region, and a war between these powers might involve the leading nations of Europe. Therefore, at the Congress of Berlin, called to consider the Near-Eastern Question, Bismarck assumed the role of the "honest broker," and permitted Austria and Great Britain to revise the treaty of San Stefano (1877) in such a way as to check Russian aspirations in the Balkans. Thus isolated, Russia sullenly accepted the Berlin settlement. She now withdrew from the Three Emperors' League, claiming that the Congress of Berlin was a European coalition led by Bismarck against Russia.

Perturbed about Russia's hostile attitude toward Germany, Bismarck decided to strengthen Austro-German relations. In 1879 a defensive alliance between Austria and Germany was concluded against Russia. Its terms provided that, should either Austria or Germany be attacked by Russia, they were bound to lend each other aid and not to conclude peace save by joint agreement; should one of them be attacked by another power, the ally would observe an attitude of benevolent neutrality; if the attacking power, moreover, were supported by Russia, the obligation of armed help would arise, and the war would be waged jointly until the conclusion of peace.

Realizing that he had by the Dual Alliance involved Germany indirectly in the Austro-Russian rivalry in the Balkans, Bismarck attempted to regain Russia's friendship and to check thereby the growing hostility between Austria and Russia over the Near East. In 1881 he succeeded in re-establishing the Three Emperors' League, whereby its members agreed to remain neutral should any one of them be attacked by an outside power. Thus Germany was assured of Russian neutrality in the event of being assailed by France. Furthermore, Russia and Austria, by consenting to co-operate in the solution of any problems arising out of the Near East, decreased the danger of a general war. This alliance endured only a few years. An intensification of Austro-Russian hostility, as a result of intrigues in Bulgaria and Serbia, culminated in a protracted crisis. Bismarck's
THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN, 1878: BISMARCK WELCOMING THE DEPUTIES.
Painting by Anton von Werner
moderating influence succeeded in averting war, but the League collapsed in 1887 when Russia again withdrew. To prevent a conflict in the Balkans, and also a possible alliance between Russia and France, Bismarck initiated negotiations with Russia—negotiations which resulted in the Reinsurance Treaty of 1887. By its terms Russia and Germany promised to remain neutral if either should become involved in a war with a third power. This clause was not applicable, however, in the event of a German attack upon France or a Russian assault upon Austria.

Prior to the consummation of this agreement with Russia, Germany entered into an alliance with Italy. Bitterly opposed to the French occupation of Tunis in 1881, and worried lest some Catholic power intervene in the Roman question, the Italians had turned to Berlin for support. But Bismarck, although he welcomed the opportunity to strengthen the opposition to French revanche, refused to agree to an alliance which should exclude Austria-Hungary. Italy accepted his terms. She realized that in Austria were millions of Italians who should be emancipated, but at the same time she felt that the French menace in the Mediterranean was of more immediate concern. In 1882, therefore, the Triple Alliance was formed, in which Germany and Austria agreed to aid Italy if she were attacked by France, and Italy promised to help Germany if the latter were assailed by France. If any one member were menaced by two or more powers, the other two would likewise support their ally. Each state, however, was to remain benevolently neutral if a member were attacked by any other power.

Bismarck's diplomacy had as its chief objective the maintenance of the status quo and the avoidance of war. A complicated system of juggling and manipulation by means of insurance and counter-insurance agreements, it prevented an international crisis, isolated France, and kept the peace. At the same time it had certain significant weaknesses. Russia, for example, because of her aspirations in the Near East, could never be brought close to Austria. Bismarck knew that the rivalry between Russia and Austria-Hungary over the Balkans was a constant menace to peace and he frankly stated that his chief concern was to prevent the outbreak of a war between the two powers over some issue in that region. He admitted that, if a struggle occurred, his entire diplomatic structure would collapse. Germany would then be forced to choose between Russia and Austria-Hungary.

The Iron Chancellor also failed to reach a close understanding with Great Britain. He encouraged the consummation of the First Mediterranean Agreement of 1887, in which Great Britain, Italy,
and Austria agreed to preserve the existing territorial situation in the Mediterranean and Black Sea areas. He also favored the Second Mediterranean Agreement of that year whereby Great Britain, Austria, Italy, and Spain decided to oppose any disturbance in the Near East and to defend the neutrality of Turkey. But he refused to bring Germany into these agreements, knowing very well that such an act on his part would arouse bitter antagonism in Russia. Moreover, he was of the opinion that Anglo-Russian rivalries in Asia and Anglo-French hostility in Africa and Asia would prevent England from joining any group hostile to Germany. Nevertheless, in leaving Great Britain unattached to any definite alliance and, at the same time, in creating a diplomatic set-up whereby war could not be localized but was a matter of European concern, Bismarck built up a system which was almost certain to involve England.

Bismarck's diplomacy had several other weaknesses. In the first place, France, although temporarily isolated, was a constant menace to German security. Nursing a bitter hatred and fear she engaged in a definite program of rearmament. Also, the Triple Alliance had a number of marked flaws. The Italians, for example, desirous of freeing their fellow-countrymen who lived in Austro-Hungarian territory, could not enter sincerely into an alliance which included their ancient enemy—Austria-Hungary. In fact, this Triple Alliance obligated Germany not only to support Austria-Hungary in the event of a war over the Balkans, but forced her also to help the Habsburgs sustain their anachronistic empire by opposing the desires of the Slavs and the Italians for autonomy and freedom. Despite these weaknesses Bismarck's system of alliances worked under his guidance. His successors, however, were less adroit in diplomatic finesse and only succeeded in arousing a hostile coalition of powers against Germany.

Following the resignation of Bismarck in 1890, German foreign policy passed into the hands of the young, ambitious, and inexperienced Kaiser William II. The new emperor left the direction of affairs largely in the hands of his advisers in the foreign office, especially in those of the neurotic Baron von Holstein. At one time an ardent advocate of Bismarck's policies, Holstein later opposed them vigorously. He occupied a key position in the foreign office and wielded decisive influence upon German diplomacy. He was largely responsible for the disagreement between William II and Bismarck over relations with Russia, which contributed to the latter's resignation. Staunch exponent of the Austro-German alliance, he, supported by certain military officers, succeeded in convincing the kaiser that Germany had to choose between the Reinsurance Treaty with
Russia and the alliance with Austria. Conflicting interests in the Balkans, he maintained, were bound to lead to a war between Austria and Russia, and it was Germany's duty to support her ally. William II finally accepted this point of view; thereupon Bismarck resigned, and the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, upon its expiration in 1890, was dropped.

Economic changes in Germany helped to explain this new diplomatic policy. Under the old chancellor the empire had become powerful, united, and prosperous through internal economic expansion and the maintenance of peace. Interested primarily in the building of a powerful Germany, Bismarck favored a continental policy and at first opposed colonial expansion. Industrial development, however, was accompanied by the rise of an imperialistic group in the empire which demanded the acquisition of colonies in order to obtain markets, raw materials, and opportunities for investment. Bismarck was finally forced to heed the ideas of this group. Admitting the necessity of a moderate policy of colonial expansion, he had Germany participate at the Conference of Powers in Berlin (1884-1885) and by so doing obtained recognition by the great states, especially Great Britain, of Germany's right to expand. "If Germany is to become a colonizing power," said Gladstone of England in the House of Commons, "all I say is 'God speed her.' She becomes our ally and partner in the execution of the great purpose of Providence, for the advantage of mankind."

When William II ascended the throne the rapid economic development of Germany seemed to require an aggressive imperialistic policy. Inspired by this new concept of world power, the young kaiser encouraged German economic expansion in the Near East. Following a visit to Constantinople in 1889 he succeeded in negotiating a favorable commercial treaty with Turkey (1890). German capitalists, traders, and artisans now entered the Ottoman Empire, and prepared to exploit its resources. Abdul Hamid II, Sultan of Turkey, welcomed this economic penetration. Facing internal revolts and the threat of foreign intervention, suspicious of the other great powers of Europe, and willing to trust Germany (the one nation that had not tried to rob his state nor had joined in any protest against Turkish atrocities in the past), Abdul Hamid encouraged close economic relations with that country. He was especially generous in the railway concessions he granted the Germans. Believing that a railroad would be a means of unifying and consolidating his empire, the shrewd sultan gave Germany leave to build the "Berlin to Bagdad" Railway through the Asiatic parts of his empire, also giving them mining rights within a twenty-kilometer zone on each side of
the railway. By 1902 a German controlled line had been constructed across the Balkans, and was ready to be extended to the Persian Gulf and to the Red Sea. To the Germans this project constituted a significant step in the establishment of a huge economic empire which would include the Near East. Rich in oil, cotton, and agricultural products, this region offered Germany the things she needed. Moreover, the development of a rich market for German manufacture would be created through the exploitation of the Turkish Empire.

While he was engaged in this program of imperial expansion, William II also began the construction of a powerful navy. This policy, together with his imperialism, aroused the hostility of jealous competitors. Alliances and ententes directed against German expansion were formed. Following the dropping of the Reinsurance Treaty by Germany, Russia and France, both increasingly suspicious of the Triple Alliance, drew close together and finally entered into a Dual Alliance (1891–1894). Technically this agreement was not an alliance, inasmuch as it was not approved by the French Chamber of Deputies as provided by law. Actually, however, it was the equivalent of one. Ostensibly defensive in purpose, it provided that “if France is attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall employ all her available forces to attack Germany. If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France shall employ all her available forces to fight Germany.”

The announcement of this Dual Alliance aroused considerable alarm in Germany and in England. Bismarck’s fear of an alliance between Germany’s two neighbors had been realized at last. Her hegemony in Europe was ended, for in its place there existed henceforth an equilibrium of power, maintained by two groups, the Triple Alliance and the Dual Alliance. This Russo-French combination was as distasteful to Great Britain as it was to Germany. In the 1890’s, England still clung to her isolationist policies, but there had been occasions when the two powers seemed to be drawing together. In 1890, for example, Great Britain ceded Heligoland to Germany, much desired by that country since the construction of the Kiel Canal. In return England secured a partition of Zanzibar and, thus, a peaceful solution of what threatened to become a serious controversy. At no time, however, was Germany able to draw Great Britain into the Triple Alliance or to obtain a definite pledge of military support. Great Britain, despite the fact that her interests in North Africa and Asia were threatened by France and Russia, refused to join the Triplice. She realized that German economic penetration in the Near East was just as much a menace to her interests as were the policies of France and Russia. She did go so far as to suggest
in 1895 that Germany and Great Britain partition the Turkish Empire. But Germany, suspicious of British motives, and, planning to exploit that region herself, refused to accept this proposal. There were later attempts to bring about an Anglo-German alliance, but it always seemed as though the two countries were never able to attain a full accord.

In the late 1890's a number of events caused Great Britain to abandon her traditional policy of isolation and to seek friends. The fear of the Russian advance in the Far East, the clash with France over the occupation of Fashoda by French troops, the outbreak of the Boer War, and especially the belief that the Dual and Triple Alliances might combine against England—all these developments influenced Great Britain into adopting a new course. At first England tried to enter into closer relations with Russia and Germany. Unable to interest Russia in a plan to divide Turkey and China into spheres of influence, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, offered to arrange an alliance with Germany. But the German foreign office, fearing that such an agreement might involve the Fatherland in Anglo-French antagonisms in Africa, refused to permit such a settlement with England. Colonial disputes, involving German and British claims in Africa and China, however, were amicably settled.

Unable to secure an ally in Europe, Great Britain finally found a friend in the Far East—Japan. Quick to see that the Russian acquisition of Port Arthur challenged both British and Japanese interests in the Far East, Japan desired an alliance with Great Britain. Accordingly, negotiations were instituted, and in 1902 the two countries concluded an alliance in which each was to support the other if it were attacked by two or more states, and each was to remain neutral if the other was attacked by one power. Assured of British support in the event that Russia was backed by another country, Japan now decided to stop the advance of the "bear that walked like a man." This objective she achieved in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

While Japan was indulging in her war with Russia, her ally, Great Britain, was winning a friend in Europe. By 1902 a number of French diplomats, especially the foreign minister, Delcassé (1852-1928), had concluded that France could not establish a great colonial empire and at the same time regain her predominance in Europe without British support. They also believed that the Franco-Russian and the Anglo-Japanese commitments might involve England and France in war. Such a contingency would not only thwart French aims but would enable Germany to exact important concessions from
both sides. A close friendship between France and Great Britain seemed imperative. Fear of Germany also influenced Great Britain to enter into some kind of an agreement with France. By that time the development of Germany's naval program, constituting a serious challenge to Great Britain's sea supremacy, menaced her security. In fact, the opening of the Kiel Canal in 1895, and the German navy bills of 1898 and 1900 which sanctioned the construction of a fleet larger than that of either Russia or France, caused England to look upon Germany as her most dangerous rival. Aided by her Francophile king, Edward VII, Great Britain succeeded in arranging a settlement with France, whereby all colonial troubles were liquidated. This *Entente Cordiale*, as it came to be called, provided that France recognize the British position in Egypt, and that Britain support the predominance of France in Morocco. In a supplementary treaty, Spain underwrote this Moroccan agreement. England and France also settled conflicting interests over Newfoundland, western Africa, and New Hebrides, Siam, and Madagascar; but the Egyptian-Moroccan agreement was the most vital part of the *Entente*. Appended to the general settlement were secret articles, not published until 1911, which provided for the eventual liquidation of Morocco and Egypt by the two powers.

The *Entente Cordiale* brought about a diplomatic revolution. Though at first without military and naval obligations (later the French and British army and navy authorities made arrangements for disposition of their forces in the event of a war with Germany) it signified European hostility to Germany's advance in the Near East. It also marked a widening rift between Great Britain and Germany and the abandonment of British isolation. The agreement increased France's self-confidence and caused her to pursue a more aggressive policy. It also forced Italy to reconsider her position in the Triple Alliance. By 1900, after a secret exchange of letters with France, she agreed to sanction the aspirations of France in Morocco provided the latter recognize her ambitions in Tripoli. In 1902 she signed a secret agreement with France which stipulated that Italy was to remain neutral if France were attacked by another power or if France declared war as a result of direct provocation. France made a reciprocal pledge. The consummation of the *Entente Cordiale* in 1904 strengthened Italian opposition to the Central Powers. Determined to regain "unredeemed Italy" from Austria-Hungary, and also to obtain control of the strategic Adriatic, Italy remained a member of the Triple Alliance in name only.

The desire of the *Entente Cordiale* to check German expansion was revealed in the Moroccan crisis of 1905–1906. For a long time
France had wanted to gain control of Morocco, which adjoined her colony of Algeria. Encouraged by the settlement with Great Britain, she, in 1904, began to interfere in the internal affairs of Morocco with the view of strengthening her political foothold there. This activity on the part of France aroused Germany. Possessing economic interests in Morocco she maintained that France was violating international treaties and German rights, declared that the Moroccan question was of international concern, and asked that a conference be called to consider the problem.

Aware of the intense opposition to Germany's Moroccan policy, William II tried, in desperation, to strengthen the position of his country by merging the Triple Alliance and the Franco-Russian Alliance. Meeting Nicholas II in July, 1905, at Björkö, in northern waters, he actually influenced the weak czar to sign a treaty, by which Germany and Russia agreed to aid one another in the event of an attack by a third European power. For a moment the ghost of Bismarck's Three Emperors' League hovered above the horizon, then disappeared again—forever. Knowing very well that Franco-German antagonism over Morocco and Russo-German rivalry in the Near East would prevent the carrying out of such an alliance, the foreign offices of both Germany and Russia rejected this personal pledge of their sovereigns.

Influenced by this Björkö idyll, Great Britain in 1908 renewed her alliance with Japan and supported France at the International Congress of Algeciras (1906), called to deal with the Moroccan situation. Germany, isolated except for Austrian backing, was forced to withdraw some of her demands, to permit France actually to strengthen her position in Morocco, and to be satisfied by a mere formula recognizing the independence of that region. Thus, while the crisis resulted in a compromise, not satisfactory to Germany or France, it did demonstrate the strength of the Anglo-French entente.

Prior to 1905, German diplomacy was based on the assumptions that an alliance between Russia and Germany was possible and that one between Russia and Great Britain was improbable. Checked by Japan in the Far East, Russia, in 1907, however, welcomed England's aid in arranging a settlement with her Oriental foe and also favored negotiations designed to end the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia. The German penetration of the Near East also influenced Russia in her attempt to bring about a settlement with Great Britain. Determined to revive her aggressive policies in that field of international rivalry, she decided to negotiate her disputes with Great Britain, believing that then Russia and England as friends would oppose Austro-German ambitions in the Near East. Accordingly, negotiations were
opened in 1907 and a treaty was signed embodying surprising concessions on both sides. The significance of this understanding lay in the fact that it united two erstwhile foes in common hostility toward Germany.

Thus, by 1907, what twenty years before would have been considered impossible, was achieved. Great Britain, France, Russia and Japan had settled their rivalries and had created a loosely constructed coalition capable of challenging the hegemony of the Triple Alliance. Attempting to maintain her position in the Far East as well as the Near East, Germany tried desperately to bring the United States into her network of alliances. Difficulties between Japan and the United States over immigration in 1906–1907 were a cue for William II to emphasize his idea of the "yellow peril" and to suggest that Germany and the United States unite in opposition to Japan and her friends. President Theodore Roosevelt, however, refused to enter into such an alliance. Instead, he welcomed in 1908 the famous Root-Takahira Agreement, in which the United States and Japan recognized their respective interests in the Far East and promised to respect and preserve the independence and territorial integrity of China. Thenceforth the United States identified its interests, especially in the Pacific, with those of Japan and the Triple Entente.

By 1908, Germany believed that she and her ally, Austria-Hungary, were menaced on all sides by a deliberate policy of encirclement. Disaster faced the Triple Alliance unless the military and diplomatic pincers, manipulated by France and Russia, could be broken. But where could the Central Powers apply the pressure? In the Balkans? From 1908 to 1914 the Near East was the checkerboard of European diplomacy. Here the revolution of the Young Turks in 1908 marked the beginning of a series of crises which finally culminated in the world catastrophe. At first the European states had welcomed this

\(^1\) See p. 348.
uprising, believing that it would lead to the modernizing of Turkey and the elimination of national and religious troubles. But the Young Turks, once they had overthrown the old sultan Abdul Hamid II and placed his brother Mohammed V on the throne, embarked on an aggressive movement for reform and Ottomanization, which involved an attempt to compel everyone to conform to a uniform national pattern. Establishing a regime more oppressive to national and religious groups than ever before, the new Turkish government continued Abdul Hamid’s foreign policy, opposing all Western powers, save Germany.

The Young Turk revolution, however, enabled certain states to advance their interests. Bulgaria took advantage of the uprising to repudiate Turkish suzerainty and to declare herself fully independent. Austria also used the revolution to strengthen her position in the Balkans. Bosnia-Herzegovina, which Austria, acting as a mandatory of the Congress of Berlin, had occupied since 1878, was annexed. This action produced an international crisis. Involved in a bargain with Austria, whereby Russia was to get the Straits opened and Austria was to annex the provinces, Russia opposed the sudden annexation of these provinces. Unable to obtain the permission of the European states to open the Straits, she naturally determined to prevent Austria from reaching her objective. At this critical moment Germany came to the support of her ally, Austria; and Russia, as well as France and Great Britain, was forced to accept Austria’s occupation of the provinces, or go to war. This crisis, however, served to widen the breach between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance. It clearly indicated that the bitter Austro-Russian struggle over the Balkans might ultimately involve the two groups in combat.

A violent Austro-Serbian feud helped to precipitate World War I. As far back as 1903, Serbia had been the center of Pan-Slav agitation, fostered by Russia and directed towards the emancipation of the Slavs in the Dual Monarchy. The Bosnian crisis intensified this antagonism, for while it strengthened Austria’s prestige in the Balkans, it cut Serbia off from access to the sea in that direction, increased the Slavic population of the Dual Monarchy, intensified their nationalistic feelings, and caused the Serbs (economically dependent on Austria) to fear loss of political independence.

While the Austrians and Serbs were singing hymns of hate, the next crisis occurred in Morocco. In 1911 the German warship, Panther, arrived at Agadir, a Moroccan port on the Atlantic, ostensibly to protect German economic interests, but actually to warn France not to take possession of Morocco without giving Germany the French Congo. Great Britain, fearing that Germany’s bullying of France
to extort the whole of the French Congo would force France into war, backed her friend firmly and forced Germany to arrange a settlement with Paris. According to the terms of this agreement, France gave to Germany a piece of the French Congo and a promise that the open door policy would be maintained in Morocco. In return, Germany permitted France to establish a protectorate over Morocco. Following the Agadir crisis, Italy took advantage of the unpopularity of the Young Turks in Europe, dispatched an ultimatum to Constantinople, and sent troops to Tripoli. Unwilling to accept the loss of this part of her empire, Turkey opposed this aggression. The Italo-Turkish War which followed lasted until 1912, when the First Balkan War forced the sultan to submit to a peace that deprived him of Tripoli.

The Balkan crisis rose out of the desire of the Slavic states to obtain Turkish territory and their expressed determination to bring about better conditions for the Christians in Turkish Macedonia. Casting aside their numerous quarrels, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria formed a League and ordered the Turks to introduce certain reforms. When the sultan refused to carry out these demands, the League declared war and within three months had completely defeated the sultan’s forces, driving them out of all European territory save Constantinople and adjacent areas. The European powers, Great Britain and Germany, realizing that the intervention of Russia or Austria on either side would lead to a general war, intervened and obtained an armistice (December 1912). A peace conference was held in London. At this meeting Turkey refused to accept a proposed settlement that included cession of her territory to the Balkan states. Foolishly, she reopened the war, and her troops were soon pushed back to Constantinople. Facing the loss of that important city, the Turks finally submitted to the Peace of London (1913) in which they were deprived of everything except their capital and its immediate surroundings.

Trouble again developed when the Balkan League tried to divide the loot. Serbia became very angry because the other Balkan powers, under the influence of Italy and Austria, set up Albania as an independent state. Serbia had planned for a long time to obtain part of Albania and to give the rest of the land to Montenegro. But Austria and Italy did not propose to see Serbia become an important Balkan and Adriatic power. Therefore they forced both Germany and Great Britain to oppose this Serbian aspiration in the interest of peace.

Meanwhile, difficulties over the disposition of Macedonia led to the Second Balkan War of 1913. Bulgaria, who had obtained the
greater part of the spoils, was suddenly attacked by her recent allies, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, as well as Turkey. Taking advantage of this opportunity to obtain certain territories from Bulgaria, Romania also joined in the conflict. Surrounded on all sides, Bulgaria could offer little opposition and was forced to submit to revised peace terms that deprived her of half of what she had gained after the First Balkan War. The great powers, however, were relieved when the struggle was brought to a close. They realized that its continuation might have led to the participation in it of a member of the Triple Alliance or the Triple Entente. This in turn might have forced both groups into a world war. Austria, on the other hand, was dissatisfied. Determined to punish Serbia, she tried unsuccessfully in the summer of 1913 to make her allies countenance an attack on that country.

Unfortunately, the Second Balkan War left most of the Balkan States discontented. Much to her dissatisfaction, Turkey was restricted in Europe to Constantinople and vicinity, Rumania, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia—all received parts of the territories obtained from Turkey and Bulgaria, but none of these states was satisfied. Serbia and Greece, the countries that acquired the largest territorial rewards, were the most unhappy. Greece, for example, increased her population by two millions and her territory by fifteen thousand square miles, in addition to gaining Crete and other Aegean Islands, and Macedonia (including Salonika); nevertheless, she wanted more territory inhabited by Greeks. Serbia also benefited greatly, increasing her population one and a half millions and her area by fifteen thousand square miles. But, again she failed to gain one of her chief objectives—access to the sea. Disappointed, she held Austria largely responsible for her failure.

Increasing enmity on Serbia’s part soon expressed itself in intrigue and agitation among the Austrian Slavs. Aroused by this reaction, Austria decided that, in order to preserve the independence of the Dual Monarchy, this subversive propaganda must be checked. Germany also was interested in the Balkan situation. She realized that the enlargement of Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece had changed the balance of power in the Balkans to the disadvantage of the Central Powers, who were now cut off from direct contact with Germany’s protégé, Turkey. On the other hand, Russia was strengthened through the aggrandizement of Serbia and Montenegro. Germany had always tried to prevent Austria from precipitating a general European war over the Near East by restraining Vienna from pushing matters too far. By 1914, however, as the Triple Alliance weakened and Germany felt she was becoming isolated, Austrian
support seemed essential to Berlin. Aware of her alliance-value, the Dual Monarchy tended to become more aggressive in her Balkan policies. Germany, down to her last ally among the great powers, could no longer say "Watch your step!"

![Image: The Serbian Cock, Backed by the Russian Bear, Defying the Austrian Eagle. After a cartoon from "Mr. Punch's History of England"

As the antagonism between Austrian imperialism and Serbian nationalism became increasingly apparent, statesmen on both sides feared that war was inevitable.

On June 28, 1914, occurred the tragedy which actually precipitated it. On that day Francis Ferdinand of Austria, heir to the Habsburg throne, and his wife were murdered by a young Bosnian in Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital. Austria, with the consent of Germany, decided to stamp out this Pan-Slav intrigue once and for all by giving Serbija, whom she held responsible for the crime, a severe punishment. Following an investigation of Serbia's responsibility—an investigation which suggested but did not prove that Serbian authorities knew about the plot weeks before its execution—Austria sent a harsh ultimatum to Serbia (July 23, 1914). The demands presented therein were more severe than was generally expected. They included: (1) the official condemnation by the Serbian government of all anti-Austrian propagandist activities by its citizens; (2) the suppression of all publications and societies which fostered hatred of the Dual Monarchy; (3) the elimination of anti-Austrian teachers and books from the schools; (4) the dismissal of governmental officials implicated in anti-Austrian activities; (5) the arrest of two Serbs, named in the ultimatum, who were allegedly involved in the murder conspiracy; and (6) the acceptance by Serbia of Austrian
collaboration in the investigation of the crime and in the carrying out of the above program within her borders. Serbia was given forty-eight hours in which to adopt, in its entirety, the Vienna ultimatum.

Although Serbia accepted most of the demands, Austria stated that the reply was unsatisfactory and, in spite of William II’s moderating counsels, declared war on Serbia (July 28). On the preceding day Russia, with the support of France, announced her intention of backing Serbia. Believing that the Central Powers were determined at all costs to crush Serbia (which for selfish reasons Russia could not permit), the czar, on July 29, issued the order (revived after a short cancellation on the 30th) for general mobilization. This action was immediately interpreted by Europe as meaning almost certain war. Aware of this fact, both Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign minister, and Bethmann-Hollweg, the German chancellor, tried to localize the conflict. They made all sorts of proposals designed to avert war, but they were unable to compel Austria and Russia to submit the vital issues to arbitration.

Germany, meanwhile, realizing that a war with Russia meant a European conflict, demanded that Czar Nicholas II stop mobilization within a period of twelve hours. Receiving no answer by 7 P.M., Germany on August 1 declared war upon Russia. Then, turning to France, she asked for a statement of intentions. “France will consult her own interests,” was the reply. A declaration of war by Germany upon France followed on August 3. Immediately, Germany proceeded to carry out her famous Schlieffen Military Plan which had been prepared against such a situation. On August 4 German soldiers swept across neutral Belgium and Luxemburg in an attempt to crush France before Russia was ready to fight.

Germany had also communicated with Great Britain, promising to preserve the territorial integrity of the Netherlands, Belgium, and France, in return for British neutrality. But Great Britain, influenced by her obligations to France, made the violation of Belgian neutrality an issue of war. Therefore, upon the German invasion of Belgium, Great Britain declared war against Germany. Within the first few days of August, hostilities had become European in scope. On August 6 the Dual Monarchy declared war on Russia. Montenegro joined Serbia against Austria on the following day and, on August 9, both Serbia and Montenegro broke relations with Germany. During the next three days France and Great Britain declared war on Austria.

At last the accumulation of inflammatory material over a period of fifty years had plunged Europe into a devastating conflagration. But this war was not the result of a deliberate conspiracy; it was the
outcome of a complex of disturbing factors. Military and naval rivalries, Russia’s drive on the Straits, Austria’s aggressive Balkan policy, Germany’s bullying diplomacy, the idea of revanche in France, irredentism everywhere, but especially among the Slavs and the Italians, and trade rivalry—all predisposed European nations toward war and made it increasingly difficult for the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente to maintain the diplomatic equilibrium. In short, industrialism, militarism, nationalism, imperialism, and entangling alliances had created a problem, which, in the opinion of many people, could be solved only by armed conflict. No diplomat, ruler, or citizen seemed to be able to direct these forces in such a way as to maintain peace. Fearing a war, which many of them regarded as inevitable, they simply tried to guard the interests of their respective countries. The conflict was not premeditated, but it was made possible by peoples and by diplomats, who, rather than relinquish a single advantage for their countries, permitted the world to drift toward the abyss.

![Map of the Near-Eastern Problem in 1914](image_url)

*The Near-Eastern Problem in 1914.*

*From a cartoon in Punch*

**Collateral Reading**


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CHAPTER XVI

War and Peace
1914–1920

THE FIRST WORLD WAR, 1914–1918

In extent, nature, scope, and technique, World War I exceeded all the then known historical experience and human calculation. Five great European states and their colonies were engaged in the struggle by the end of the first week of August. Before its conclusion, it had involved all the great powers and most of the minor countries—it had, in truth, become a world war.

Japan entered the conflict on the Allied side in August, 1914, mainly to advance her influence in China through the elimination of one of her competitors, Germany. For the most part, she limited her military and naval activities to the Far East, taking possession of the German concession in Shantung, China, and in 1915 trying to force China to accept the notorious Twenty-one Demands, which would have converted that country into a Japanese protectorate.\(^1\) In October, 1914, Turkey, under German political, military, and economic influence, joined the Central Powers in a war against her traditional foe, Russia. In 1915, Italy, after weighing the territorial bids by both sides, accepted the Allied promises of lands around the Adriatic, of financial help, of economic and territorial concessions in Asiatic Turkey and in North Africa, and joined the Allies. In the same year, Bulgaria, assured of territory in Macedonia, which lay chiefly in Serbia, cast her fortunes with the Central Powers. In 1916, Rumania, upon Allied pledges of territories and military aid,

\(^1\) See p. 493.
decided to support their side; and, in the following year, the United States, Portugal, Greece, China, and a number of Hispanic-American countries, entered into the war against the Central Powers. Many of the belligerents took little part in the actual fighting. Nevertheless, their support was of economic, strategic, diplomatic, and moral value in overcoming the Central Powers and their two allies, Bulgaria and Turkey.

As in extent, so in nature, scope, and technique the war differed from other struggles. For the first time the entire political, economic, and intellectual resources of the highly organized modern state were regimented and devoted to the cause of destruction. Scientific knowledge, educational facilities, state power (especially military conscription), national credit, and the fruits of agriculture, industry, and commerce, all were dedicated to one end—victory. Because of this tremendous concentration of effort and resources, the war itself was revolutionized. New methods, such as highly elaborated trench warfare, the use of gas, wireless telegraphy, and other products of science, were developed; new weapons—machine guns, tanks, submarines, and airplanes—were invented or improved, and a new sphere of fighting—the struggle in the air—was introduced. Before the conclusion of the war all the fighting nations were fused into a compact, mobilized whole, straining every nerve, using every science and art, summoning all powers of ingenuity, and enduring cruel military discipline to achieve one end—triumph over the enemy.

At first the military and naval leaders on both sides found it very difficult to cope with the new conditions that rose out of this revolutionized war. Firm believers in the idea expressed by the Prussian military writer, Karl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), that victory would come to the side possessing superior man-power, they tended to neglect scientific progress and technical invention and to minimize the value of weapon power. Conservative generals often failed to appreciate the fact that improvements in the mechanical phase of warfare were bound to strengthen the defensive rather than the offensive, and that these inventions would make the struggle a dead-lock of trench warfare, rather than a war of movement. Yet experience was soon to show that two machine guns in defense were often capable of paralyzing the attacking power of a thousand men, driving them to take refuge in trenches; and, as the machine guns became more plentiful, together with barbed wire and entrenchments, the paralysis would become more severe. Actually, the two groups of belligerents resembled two automobiles whose bumpers have become interlocked as the result of a head-on collision.
A great majority of the military authorities were not only unable to appreciate the significance of the new mechanical warfare, but they were also unable to control the tremendous forces at their disposal. In their desire to swell their ranks, they had forgotten the warning of the able eighteenth century commander, Marshal Saxe of France, that great numbers only serve to perplex and embarrass. Even with the aid of railways and broad highways it was difficult to handle armies of millions, keep them supplied, and prevent them from clogging the arteries of movement. The hope of an overwhelming victory, in the grand manner of Napoleon, was stultified by the very mass of these armies. Nevertheless, the use of innovations did not eliminate the importance of man-power as a vital determining factor. Instruments of destruction, improved and more numerous, made the number of men required for military service greater than ever before; and those who could not serve in the armies were needed for the production of war materials and food supplies. Universal service, which mobilized men for the trenches, was extended to include the conscription of man-power in the factories that produced goods necessary for carrying on the war. Women, as well as men, played an important role in the struggle. As nurses, as Red Cross workers, as substitutes for men in industry, commerce, and even agriculture, and as knitters of socks and sweaters, they played an important part in the war.

At the beginning of the struggle generals as well as civilians thought that it would not last longer than six months. German military experts, expecting a swift and glorious victory, adopted the famous Schlieffen Plan whereby German troops would invade and conquer France and then turn to the east and put Russia out of the struggle. In order to defeat France before Russia had mobilized her troops the plan called for a rapid invasion across the level, neutral states of Luxemburg and Belgium, rather than over the Franco-German frontier where the French were protected by strong fortresses and the Vosges mountains. This plan offered the Germans the opportunity to envelop completely and to conquer the French forces by a wide encircling movement of eight German armies, with Metz as the pivot. Failing to grasp the significance of this strategy, the Allied military authorities planned to delay the German advance into France while the Russians mobilized and swept full strength into Austria and Germany. At the same time, the French intended to invade Alsace-Lorraine and, by so doing, liberate their compatriots and secure control of the industrial areas along the Rhine, and then outflank the German armies as they marched through Belgium and northern France.
Unexpected resistance in Belgium delayed the German advance and enabled the French armies and a small British expeditionary force to avoid being caught by the enemy’s advancing scythe. Failing to break the German lines guarding Alsace-Lorraine, the French force quickly gave way, and for a time it looked as though they might retreat to southern France, leaving Paris to the tender mercies of the Germans. Meanwhile, the kaiser’s armies, disregarding the important channel ports which might have been seized at this time, advanced toward Paris. But when they were within the vicinity of that city, insufficient troops and the necessity of re-establishing the alignment of the invading armies, forced the German army, under General von Kluck on the extreme right of the huge line, to sweep around east of Paris. General Gallieni, military governor of Paris, recognized at once the full significance of this move of the Germans. Determined to strike the exposed right of the German line, he finally persuaded Joffre, the French commander-in-chief, to stop the retreat, order the Allies to attack, and allow Gallieni to strike the German army passing Paris “behind its right shoulder blade.” On September 6 occurred the “right about turn,” and the first battle of the Marne had begun.

Gallieni’s stroke temporarily unhinged the German right wing. Meanwhile, in the center of the lines, the forces of the German crown prince, trying to break past the strongly fortified Verdun pivot, were stopped by the fierce fire of the French artillery. With his center and right wing held up, and with his forces beyond his control, the mediocre German commander-in-chief, von Moltke, from his distant headquarters in Luxemburg, ordered the retreat that signified an Allied victory in the first Battle of the Marne. Despite bitter protests, the German army-group commanders at the front obeyed this order and retreated to a strong position on the river Aisne. By so doing they gave up their plan to put France out of the war in six weeks by their enveloping movement. Instead, they now tried to seize the important channel ports. Antwerp and Ghent were occupied, but the French and British, in the famous battle of Ypres, prevented the Germans from obtaining possession of such important ports as Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne. Thus the Germans had failed to carry out their plan to win the war with a smashing victory in France. After the short campaign, the struggle in the West ceased to be a war of movement and maneuver. Both sides settled down to trench warfare extending some 600 miles from the channel to the Alps. There they remained; neither side was able to achieve a “break through” until the closing weeks of the war.

In the East as well as in the West plans of the Central Powers were frustrated. Completing a surprisingly rapid mobilization, Russia
poured her armies into East Prussia and Galicia. For a short time
the advance of the Slav forces into Germany and Austria seemed
irresistible. But the inability of the Russian armies to co-operate
enabled the German forces in Prussia to attack one Russian army
and practically destroy it in the famous Battle of Tannenberg
(August 26–31, 1914). In Galicia, however, the Russians were more
successful, capturing fortresses and pushing the Austrians into the
Carpathian mountains. By the fall of 1914 a Russian conquest of
the Dual Monarchy seemed inevitable, but winter prevented con-
cclusive hostilities. To a certain extent the conflict in the East be-
came stabilized, yet it never completely lost its character as a war of
movement, as it did in the West.

With the failure of both sides to achieve decisive results on either
of the two main fronts, the conflict turned into a gigantic war of
attrition to determine which side could outlast the other. At first
neither the Germans nor the French had shown much interest in
the potentialities of sea power. Intent upon a quick, complete vic-
tory on land the German command practically ignored the British
fleet that had quietly gone to its bases above the North Sea even
before the outbreak of Anglo-German hostilities. But by the spring
of 1915 the Germans realized that British naval superiority, enabling
her to dominate the seas, to strip Germany of colonies, and to sweep
German commerce from the ocean, constituted a formidable obstacle
to German success. Facing economic pressure as a result of an Allied
blockade, the Germans by 1915 were forced to study the ways and
means whereby a counter-pressure could be introduced. Afraid to
send their main fleet, which was bottled up in the Kiel canal, against
the British, the Germans resorted to the submarine as a means of
overcoming British surface superiority and of blockading British
ports.

In February, 1915, Germany instituted a submarine campaign
against British shipping. Inasmuch as the nature of the submarines
would not permit the Germans to visit, search, and take prisoners
from enemy boats, Berlin announced the establishment of a war zone
around Great Britain in which enemy vessels would be sunk. In re-
taliation, Great Britain declared that she would search all ships sus-
pected of carrying goods to Germany. These declarations led to diffi-
culties with neutrals, especially the United States. America protested
vigorously the right of the English and the Germans to search or
destroy her vessels. Tension between Great Britain and the United
States, however, was eased as a result of the sinking of the British
liner Lusitania on May 7, 1915, by a German submarine. The drown-
ing of more than a hundred Americans, as a result of German naval
policy, was resented by the United States much more than the seizure of vessels and goods by the British patrols.

While Great Britain was trying to starve Germany by naval and economic pressure, British and French troops were engaged in a series of futile attempts to break through the German lines on the Western Front. But the strongly intrenched Germans, with machine guns and reserves, were able to keep their line intact. In September and October of 1915, the French sacrificed nearly 200,000 men in fruitless assaults against the German defenses in Champagne and Artois.

Meanwhile the Allies felt constrained to engage in serious operations in the Near-Eastern theater of war. Turkey's entry into the conflict on the side of the Central Powers in 1914 had bolted the Black Sea back-gate, by which Russia's potential millions of men might have been furnished with adequate munitions. Aware of Russia's precarious situation and afraid of Turkish designs against Egypt and the Suez Canal, Great Britain, by December, 1914, decided to act. A landing of troops near Alexandretta, where the solitary railway linked Turkey with the Arabian part of her empire, was considered. Meanwhile, the famous Englishman, Lawrence, aroused the national aspirations of the Arabs and, after 1915, brought them into the war against the Turks.

While Lawrence and the Arabs were making it uncomfortable for the Turks in Arabia, the French and British went to the aid of Russia. By so doing they planned to bring supplies to their faltering ally, to prevent Bulgaria from joining the Central Powers, and to establish a strong battle front in the Balkans. To reach these objectives the Allies decided to send a fleet through the Straits and capture Constantinople. On February 19, British and French warships having destroyed the forts at the entrance of the Dardanelles entered the narrows. A month later the combined naval forces, after silencing the land forts, were ready to move up the Straits. While engaged in this phase of the campaign several Allied warships were sunk or badly damaged. Fear of the unknown now caused Admiral de Robeck to abandon the attack, which, according to certain naval authorities, might have led to complete success if the fleet had continued to advance.

The Allies refused to renounce their plans to force the Straits despite the hostility of the Allied commanders-in-chief who disliked seeing any soldiers diverted from the Western Front. Resorting to a land attack with an army of inexperienced Australian, New Zealand, Indian, and French colonial troops, they tried from April, 1915, until the following January, to capture the narrow Gallipoli Peninsula
which commanded the western side of the Straits. But the Turks, under the direction of the able German General Liman von Sanders, and a brilliant Turkish leader, Mustapha Kemal, strengthened their fortifications and were able to check the Allied attacks. So, after losing over 50,000 men in futile attempts to scale the heights and capture Gallipoli, the Allies withdrew their troops and moved them to Salonika in Greek territory, where a battle front was established.

Even though it failed, the Gallipoli campaign indirectly enabled the Allies to strengthen their position on the Western Front by influencing the Germans to concentrate their efforts in the East and in the Balkans. Fearing the possible collapse of Austria as a result of Russian and Serbian pressure, von Falkenhayn determined to stand on the defensive on the Western Front and, in the East, to push the Russians back to a safe distance and to liquidate the Serbian menace. On May 2, 1915, the Central Powers launched an attack on the Eastern Front. Fifteen hundred heavy guns, firing thousands of shells, completely destroyed sections of the enemy's trenches. Deficient in reserves and guns, the Russians were unable to match the fresh shock troops of the Austro-German forces and had to retreat. Within three months Galicia had been reconquered and the Russians had been squeezed out of Poland.

With the Russians expelled from these territories, von Falkenhayn decided to "steam roller" Serbia and thus to remove another menace to the Dual Monarchy. Aided by Bulgaria, who, on September 6 had accepted the German promises of rich territorial rewards and had joined the side of the Central Powers, von Mackensen forced the Serbian army out of Serbia. That country now came under the rule of the enemy, and the remnants of the Serbian army were transferred to the Allied front at Salonika, there to become a part of the Allied army of about 500,000 men. Inasmuch as this huge force remained inactive during the greater part of the war it was derisively called by the Germans "their largest internment camp."

Italy's declaration of war on her ancient foe, Austria (May, 1915), was partly responsible for Germany's decision to conquer Serbia. Militarily, however, Italy's intervention did not greatly affect the situation, for her army, poorly drilled and inadequately equipped, was incapable of overcoming the Austrians, in view of the mountainous nature of the terrain. Because of this geographical advantage, Austria was able, in 1915, to hold the line without drawing more than a few divisions from the Russian front. Numerous attempts were made by the Italians in 1915 and 1916 to push across the Isonzo river and capture Trieste, but by August, 1917, the Italians, having suf-
ftered over a half million casualties, and having fought over eleven "Battles of Isonzo," were still in the vicinity of the river.

On the Mesopotamian, as on most other, fronts in 1915, the Allies were not very successful. Even before Turkey entered the war a small Indian force had been sent to safeguard the oil fields in that region. Later, under the lead of General Townshend, a British division was pushed up the Tigris river in order to menace Bagdad. Moving forward to Kut-el-'Amara, far from his base on the Persian Gulf, Townshend was finally defeated by the Turks at that place and forced to surrender on April 29, 1916.

Meanwhile, von Falkenhayn had already decided to seek a definitive victory in the West by delivering a knockout blow to France. In fact, with Russia practically out of the struggle, with Serbia crushed, and with the Turks holding their own, the Germans in the fall of 1915 were of the opinion that a tremendous assault upon Verdun, chosen as the point of attack for sentimental as well as strategic reasons, would destroy France as a factor in the conflict. Such a success would silence criticism at home and would probably force Great Britain to accept terms of peace.

During the winter of 1915–1916 a tremendous concentration of men and artillery was completed in the powerfully fortified sector opposite the city of Verdun. Unaware of these preparations, Great Britain took over a larger section of the Allied line in anticipation of a projected Anglo-French offensive further north. Dissatisfied with the system of voluntary enlistments, the British adopted in January, 1916, a system of conscription. By the spring, the British, under their new commander, Sir Douglas Haig, were confident of administering a crushing defeat to the enemy. This plan was rudely disrupted when the German offensive struck Verdun with the fury of a cyclone. In February, 1916, the battle was opened by a short, terrific German bombardment on a front of fifteen miles. This furious attack obliterated the French lines and converted the terrain into a wilderness of shell craters. Then the German infantry, protected by a barrage, made a limited advance. This continued for a month. About the end of March, however, von Falkenhayn felt that the French reserves had been destroyed. He therefore determined to capture Verdun by the use of sheer man-power. Resorting to frontal attacks, the Germans found themselves suffering severe losses. Although German troops were able to capture several forts and to penetrate within four miles of the city, they were not powerful enough to continue the advance. By June 30 the Germans lost the initiative and the tide of battle turned. The French recovered much of the territory lost earlier, and thus neutralized the German advance. On the following
day British troops opened up a terrific attack on the Somme, and the German army, now on the defensive, forced to shift its reserves, could no longer concentrate on Verdun.¹

In the battle of the Somme, which lasted from July to November of 1916, the British discovered that the German defense had not been appreciably weakened by their failure at Verdun. Aided by French troops and by tanks (which were used for the first time), they finally captured the plateau, held by the Germans, but at a tremendous cost of life. By fall the heavy rains made the battlefield impassable, so that the struggle came to an end with both sides weakened but with both lines unbroken.

While the Germans and the Allies were engaged in these titanic engagements, an important naval fight took place in the North Sea. Having abandoned the use of the submarine against merchant vessels, the German naval leaders reverted to their original plan of weakening the British forces in order to give the German fleet a reasonable chance of victory in the event of a major battle. With this idea in mind, a German scouting force, functioning as a decoy, tried to lure a British squadron out into the North Sea. Meanwhile, the main German battle fleet lay in wait, prepared to pounce upon the unsuspecting enemy. The British also elected to maneuver in the North Sea, and Beatty, in charge of the battle-cruiser squadron, proceeded to join Jellicoe with the grand fleet at a rendezvous off the coast of Norway. Beatty fell in with the German scouts, and then their main fleet. When he realized the situation, he decoyed the German forces into the fangs of the high seas fleet on May 31, 1916. The Germans did not dare to fight it out at this time. After a running fight off Jutland, they escaped during the night and returned to Kiel. In the short engagement which did occur the British fleet was severely battered, but the Germans, in leaving the British in control of the seas, forfeited any claims even to a moral victory.

Influenced by their military and naval failures, responsible German leaders in 1916 realized that a complete victory was impossible. They were encouraged by their conquest of Rumania, who had entered the war on the Allied side in August, 1916, and by their control of the valuable economic resources of the Near East; nevertheless, they felt that they probably had made their maximum gains. Therefore they desired to discuss terms of peace while the war map was still favorable to the Central Powers. With this plan in mind, the Germans in December, 1916, transmitted, via President Wilson of the United States, a note to the governments of their enemies.

¹ More than 315,000 Frenchmen and 281,000 Germans were killed in the battle of Verdun.
Therein, they proposed peace negotiations and intimated that they had no desire to destroy their foes, but that if the Allies refused to accept this offer, the struggle would continue with Germany and her allies "solemly disclaiming any responsibility before mankind and history."

In an official reply to the note, the Allies (December 30, 1916) maintained that Germany had failed to state the terms of peace and had sent this vague offer only as a war maneuver in order to undermine public opinion in Allied countries and to stiffen it in the Central Powers. Claiming that the enemy was worn out as a result of economic pressure and heavy losses, the Allied generals denounced their proposal as empty and insincere. Upon receipt of this reply the Central Powers informed the neutral governments that they had made a sincere attempt to end the war and that the Allies, in refusing to take this road, must assume responsibility for the prolongation of the struggle. Meanwhile, Germany's celebrated pair of generals, von Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who had supplanted von Falkenhayn, were making plans to secure a decisive victory. They decided to revert to unrestricted submarine warfare in order to starve England into submission. At the same time, they contemplated an eventual offensive to shatter the Western Front, which was to be preceded, however, by the complete liquidation of the Eastern Front.

On January 31, 1917, the German government announced that on the following day all vessels, neutral or belligerent, within certain zones adjoining Great Britain, France, and Italy, and in the eastern Mediterranean, would be sunk by submarines. Germany realized that this desperate policy would probably bring the United States into the war, but she believed that the Allies would be crushed before this western power could be of much material assistance to the already war-weary Allies.

Germany's decision to resort to the use of the submarine precipitated the intervention of the United States in the war. By January, 1917, a great majority of Americans sympathized with the Allied cause. From the beginning of the struggle both sides had endeavored to influence public opinion in all neutral countries, but especially in the United States. In 1914 the contesting governments had tried, through publications, called Blue Books, Red Books, and Orange Books, to justify their participation in the war before their peoples and their neighbors. Propagandists, representing the interests of each belligerent power, used printing presses, photographs, postcards, motion pictures, schools, and churches to impress upon their compatriots and upon the neutrals the nobility of their country's
war aims and the perversity and barbarism of the enemy. Both sides endeavored especially to influence public opinion in the United States. Germany by 1916 was doing everything in her power to keep the United States out of the war, while Allied propagandists strove desperately to bring that country into the struggle on their side. Control by the Allies of the various means of communication—the cables, for example,—enabled them to surpass the Germans in this unscrupulous business.

Despite the propaganda President Wilson and the American people maintained a policy of neutrality during the first two and a half years of the war. At the same time the president endeavored to find a basis of peace upon which the warring peoples could agree. His efforts in this direction, however, were futile. The Allies, insisting that they were fighting a battle which was defensive and just, resented Wilson’s attempt to intervene and even accused him of pro-Germanism. The Central Powers, equally convinced that right was on their side, scorned all peace proposals, at least until the fall of 1916. Aroused by the opposition to his peace endeavors, President Wilson tended to regard the belligerents as “naughty school boys.” He resented keenly their refusal to accept his offer of mediation and determined to do everything in his power to keep the United States from being involved in the conflict. Re-elected president in November, 1916, on the claim that he had kept America out of the war, Wilson, as late as January, 1917, still hoped, at least officially, that his country would never participate in this terrible struggle.

The announcement of the German submarine campaign, a few weeks later, and the outbreak of the Russian revolution in March, 1917, forced the President’s hand. By that time both Wilson and the American public realized that German provocations left the United States with no recourse save war. Finally conquering his hesitations, Wilson, during the first week of April, recommended that his country declare war, and on April 6, 1917, the United States entered the struggle against Germany. The United States was not prepared to play an important part in the military phase of the conflict. Until 1918, therefore, her help was largely limited to the moral and economic spheres.

Actually, the United States had been furnishing the Allies financial help long before she entered the war. From the beginning of the struggle she sold munitions and other goods to them. Unable to pay cash for their purchases the Allies in 1915 floated a huge loan in the United States. Many influential Americans, including Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, opposed this loan, claiming that it might involve the United States in the conflict. Despite this
opposition, international banking houses succeeded in disposing of the bonds to American citizens. By 1917 the situation, however, had become so critical that American financiers found it difficult to sell Allied bonds in the United States. Conscious of this situation, bankers, industrialists, and certain others were inclined toward American intervention in the war in order to assure an Allied victory. The press immediately inaugurated a bitter campaign against Germany—a campaign which did much to reconcile the American public to war.

While the United States was preparing to assist the Allies, Russia, overtaken by revolution, withdrew from the struggle. Corrupt, inefficient, and short-sighted, the czarist government was unable to defeat the highly industrialized and well-organized German Empire. In March, 1917, Russian soldiers and civilians, aroused by repeated defeats, governmental inefficiency, the breakdown of transportation, and scarcity of food, revolted. Whereupon there was established a provisional government, with first a liberal nobleman, Prince Lvov, and later a Menshevik leader, Kerensky, as chief executive. The new government tried to continue the war, but the exhaustion of Russia, morally and physically, and the demands of the peasants and workers for lands and peace led to the overthrow of this moderately socialist government and the withdrawal of Russia from the war. The Bolshevik government, which came into power in the fall of 1917, opened negotiations with the Central Powers, and on March 3, 1918, signed a peace treaty at Brest-Litovsk. By this settlement Russia surrendered to the Central Powers the Ukraine, Poland, Courland, Lithuania, Estonia, Livonia, Finland, and the Åland Islands. The districts of Ardahan, Kars, and Batum were conceded to Turkey. In addition, Russia had to pay an indemnity and furnish her late enemies with certain raw materials.

The withdrawal of autocratic Russia from the struggle enabled the Allies to liberalize the expression of their war aims. They therefore permitted President Wilson, as their spokesman, to announce that the object of the conflict was to emancipate oppressed peoples, to preserve democracy, and to abolish war. On January 8, 1918, the means of achieving these objectives were defined by President Wilson in his Fourteen Points. Briefly, they were: (1) abolition of secret diplomacy; (2) freedom of the seas; (3) removal of economic barriers; (4) reduction of armaments; (5) adjustment of colonial claims in the interest of the people concerned; (6) help to Russia in the rehabilitation of her national life; (7) restoration of Belgium; (8) evacuation of France and the return of Alsace-Lorraine to that country; (9) readjustment of Italy's frontiers; (10) autonomy for subject nationalities in the Dual Monarchy; (11) restoration of the
Balkan states; (12) self-government for subject peoples in the Ottoman Empire and freedom of the Dardanelles for all ships; (13) an independent Poland with access to the sea; and (14) a League of Nations. But the Allies accepted these terms only in part. Thoroughly incompatible with Wilson's Fourteen Points were the secret treaties among the Allies which provided for the partition of the German colonies in Africa; French occupation of the left bank of the Rhine; Russia's annexation of Constantinople; cessions of lands not predominantly Italian to Italy; division of Germany's holdings in the Far East; and virtual political and economic partition of Turkey.

Although distrustful of Wilson's lack of realism, the Allies welcomed his plan to put the United States on a war footing. Given dictatorial powers by Congress, the President conscripted men, built boats, and organized industry, transportation, and agriculture for the prosecution of the war. Over twenty-one billion dollars were raised by the sale of Liberty bonds to carry on the struggle. The navy was given the task of guarding ocean lines so that troops and supplies could be transported to the battle front.

Thanks to British and American sea power the German submarine campaign by the fall of 1917 had proved to be a failure. Using weapons of offense against the submarine, such as the mine, the depth charge, and the airplane; and by agencies of the defense, such as the convoy system, the barrage, and the camouflaged ship, the Allies were able to cut shipping losses, which, in the spring, had soared to appalling heights.

By the spring of 1918 large American forces under General Pershing were in France, ready for action; the submarine policy of Germany, terribly injurious at first, was breaking down; and Germany, desperate as a result of these developments, had decided to stake all her hopes on a final drive on the Western Front. Certain tendencies in 1917, however, encouraged the Germans in their expectation of victory. During that year the Allies had failed to dent the German front. In the summer war weariness developed in every country, but particularly in Great Britain, France, and Italy, while Germany, thanks to the withdrawal of Russia, was able to move the bulk of her forces from the Eastern to the Western Front. These developments, together with the breach made by German soldiers in the Italian lines at Caporetto and the consequent invasion of northern Italy by the Austrians in the fall of 1917, strengthened the German military authorities in their determination to make one last bid for victory. General Ludendorff, Germany's outstanding military strategist, was largely responsible for the military preparations and plans.
which resulted in this last gigantic assault. Over a half million men
and many guns were transferred from East to West, and a scheme of
attack was decided upon whereby the artillery was to constitute a
vast battering ram, to be accompanied by a novel attack, called in-
filtration, whereby the German troops would sift into the Allied
lines and undermine them. After considerable discussion, the mili-
tary leaders determined to advance first on the St. Quentin sector,
the point where the French and British forces joined. The tendency
on the part of the French to cover Paris, and the British to concen-
trate in front of their bases, the channel ports, made this sector
especially vulnerable.

On March 21, 1918, the Germans inaugurated this attack. The
British left, greatly outnumbered, was forced back and lost con-
tact with the French. Military mistakes on the part of the German
commanders, delay due to pillage, and the late but effective aid of
the French enabled the British finally to check the German attack.
Although the Teutons had advanced nearly thirty-five miles and had
badly dented the Allied lines, inflicting tremendous casualties, they
failed to gain their main objective—the unhinging of the Allied
front. Aroused by this lack of co-operation on the part of the British
and the French forces, the Allied leaders, Lloyd George, Clemenceau,
Pétain, Foch, Haig, Pershing, and others, met in April, 1918, and,
in an attempt to create unity, appointed Foch commander-in-chief
of the Allied armies. In April and May the Germans made two more
drives to break through the Allied lines, but again the French and
American troops stopped them.

By July, 1918, the tide of battle had turned. Checked in an at-
tempt to defeat the Italians (June 17), broken in spirit, confronted
by grave economic problems and nationalist unrest, the Dual Mon-
archy practically withdrew from the war. Meanwhile, the Germans
made a final desperate attempt to enlarge the Château-Thierry
salient. American, Italian, and French troops stopped their advance
and prevented them from capturing Reims and breaking the line.
Now the initiative changed hands. With thousands of American
troops being sent into the battle front (there were more than a mil-
ion American soldiers in the field before the war came to an end)
the Allies wiped out the Château-Thierry and Amiens salients,
crossed the Somme, and forced a general German retreat. Luden-
dorff, realizing that he lacked sufficient reserves to win the war, ad-
vised a settlement by peace negotiations.

In September the cause of the Central Powers started to crumble.
On September 30, Bulgaria signed an armistice with the Allies,
giving the latter the right to cross her territory in order to attack
Turkey or invade the Dual Monarchy. Turkey now realized that she could not oppose this European invasion. Deprived of Jerusalem, Damascus, Beirut, and Aleppo as a result of British and Arab advances in Asia Minor, and fearing the loss of Mosul, the oil region of Mesopotamia, and of Adrianople in Thrace, the Turks withdrew from the war (October 30, 1918). Austria-Hungary next decided to sue for peace. Deserted by her Balkan allies, confronted by internal unrest, and facing an invasion via the Balkans, she capitulated, signing an armistice on November 3, 1918.

Germany could not continue the war alone. Her armies, depleted of their reserves, lacking adequate food and equipment, and, more important, upset in their morale, could not stem the tide of Allied attacks, which were launched along the entire Western Front from the channel to the Vosges Mountains. By November the Germans realized that they would have to capitulate. The collapse of the Dual Monarchy and the fact that the Allied armies could now cross this country to attack Germany from the south, made the continuation of the war impracticable. Further, mutinies in the navy, the establishment of a republic in Bavaria, and the flight of the kaiser to Holland—all symptoms of an impending revolution in Germany—compelled Berlin to sue for an armistice. A temporary government under the liberal Prince Max was forced to give way to a socialist ministry under Friedrich Ebert. On November 5, 1918, this government was offered an armistice by Marshal Foch. It provided for the evacuation of Belgium, France and Luxemburg by German forces within two weeks and the withdrawal of German soldiers from all territory west of the Rhine within a month. The terms of the armistice also stated that the Allies were to occupy the west bank of the Rhine and the chief crossings; Germany was to renounce all
THE HABSBURG EM Emperors OF THE HOlY ROMAN EMPIRE (1619-1806) AND AUSTRIA (1806-1918)

FERDINAND II (1619-1657)

Maximilian = Maria Anna Elector of Bavaria

FERDINAND III (1637-1657)

Ferdinand

LEOPOLD I (1658-1705)

Maximilian II

JOSEPH I (1705-1711)

Charles Albert

CHARLES VII (1742-1745) = Maria Amelia

MARIA THERESA (1740-1780) = FRANCIS I (1745-1765)

of Lorraine-Tuscany

JOSEPH II (1765-1790)

LEOPOLD II (1790-1792)

FRANCIS II (1797-1835)

Emperor of Austria after 1806

FERDINAND (1835-1848) = Sophia of Bavaria

FRANCIS JOSEPH (1848-1916)

Maximilian = Charlotte of Belgium

Charles Louis

Emperor of Mexico (1864-1867)

Rudolf
d. 1889

Countess Sophie Chotek = Francis Ferdinand

Otto

CHARLES (1914-1918)

Bourbon-
Parma

Otto

Pretender

Present

War and Peace 1914-1920
THE HOHENZOLLERN KINGS OF PRUSSIA (1701-1918)  
AND EMPERORS OF GERMANY (1871-1918)

FREDERICK I (1701-1713) = Sophia Charlotte of Hanover

FREDERICK WILLIAM I (1715-1740) = Sophie Dorothea

FREDERICK II (1740-1786) = Augustus William

FREDERICK WILLIAM II (1786-1797)

FREDERICK WILLIAM III (1797-1840) = Louise of Mecklenburg-Strelitz

FREDERICK WILLIAM IV (1840-1861)

WILLIAM I (1861-1888)  
German emperor after 1871

FREDERICK III (1888) = Victoria of Great Britain

WILLIAM II (1888-1918)
treaties with Russia; she was to surrender to the Allies, submarines, warships, 5000 locomotives, 5000 motor lorries, and 150,000 railway cars; and finally, she was to permit the continuance of the Allied economic blockade. Unable to prolong the struggle, the German government accepted these severe terms, and at 11 A.M. November 11, 1918, firing ceased for the first time in four years. The war was over.

The signing of the armistice ushered in a demoralized stage in European history as the powers endeavored to wipe out the losses, contracted as a result of this four-year slaughter. Most of the bills, however, could not be paid. Life and health could not be restored to the ten million soldiers who were killed on the field of battle, and to the millions more whose lives were shortened or ruined as a result of the war. Nor could pensions and bonuses make up for the sufferings of the millions of wounded soldiers, orphans, and widows. Most of the economic costs of the war could not be paid. Of the $337,846,000,000, which Professor Bogart estimated in 1919 was the total cost of the war, the natural resources which went into the production of munitions and machines of war were completely wasted. But these expenses were only a part of the real costs of the war. Writing in 1919, this able economist brought out this point very well when he stated,

The figures ... are incomprehensible and appalling, yet even those do not take into account the effect of the war on life, human vitality, economic well-being, ethics, morality or other phases of human relationships and activities which have been disorganized and injured. It is evident from the present disturbances in Europe that the real costs cannot be measured by direct money outlays of the belligerents in the five years of its duration, but that the very breakdown of modern economic life might be the price exacted.

**Peace Settlements, 1919–1920**

When the Germans surrendered by accepting the armistice, it was evident that an era in the history of Western civilization had come to an end, and that the leaders of the victorious powers must assemble and prepare the way for the new order. This new order was to ensure an enduring peace—a peace which, according to President Wilson, was "to be planted upon the tested foundation of political liberty." Never before had the masses of people of the world entertained such great hopes as when their diplomatic representatives gathered at Paris to make the world "safe for democracy."

The American president was the great champion of the idealists in 1919. People believed that he had the good of mankind at heart, and after the war they were confident that he would in some way
bring about the great reforms of which he had spoken with such bewitching eloquence. Few realized, however, the serious obstacles that stood in the way of his idealistic program. The consummation of Wilson's aims required the solution of problems that had baffled mankind for ages. Moreover, the peace program of the American president, vaguely expressed and indefinite as to specific settlements, neglected the special desires and practical needs of the victorious states. The interests of the Allies, as expressed in the secret treaties and elsewhere, were bound to clash with the higher aims set forth in the Fourteen Points. Apparently not impressed by his idealism, the principal Allied leaders, in view of the passions of war which were still at a crest among them and the people they represented, determined to arrive at a settlement designed to secure a lasting peace through the advancement of their interests and the drastic punishment of the foe.

Leading statesmen at the Congress of Paris, which met on January 18, 1919, were President Wilson of the United States, Georges Clemenceau of France, David Lloyd George of Great Britain, and Vittorio Orlando of Italy. Unlike the independent diplomats, Metternich and Castlereagh, at Vienna, these statesmen had to account for their actions to populaces that were over-nationalized, self-conscious, and press-ridden. Obsessed by hate of Germany, millions of Allied peoples demanded a crushing punishment for her and a peace of vengeance. Under the circumstances it was difficult for diplomats to achieve an everlasting, a harsh, and at the same time a compromise peace that would be fair to all parties. Three forces explain to some extent why they adopted some degree of moderation in their treatment of Germany: namely, the conflict of interests between Great Britain and France, the desire to conciliate the United States, and the fear of Bolshevist Russia. Despite the bitter anti-German feeling in Great Britain, Lloyd George opposed Clemenceau's desire to ruin completely his Teuton neighbor. The British premier knew that his country's interests lay in an economic recovery of Germany rather than in her destruction as an important state. Both Lloyd George and Clemenceau realized that their countries needed financial aid from the United States for reconstruction, and that they must not alienate their American associate. Moreover, they hoped to obtain easy terms of settlement, if not cancellation of the war debts due the United States. Therefore they felt it desirable to make certain concessions to Wilson's idealistic program. Fear of the spread of communism also caused these statesmen to adopt a moderate policy. They believed that Bolshevism was accepted only when the alternative was despair, and they therefore rejected many ex-
treme proposals which might have caused Germany to embrace the radical movement emanating from Russia.

Although these four men dominated the Peace Conference, about seventy representatives from all the belligerent states, save the defeated powers, were there. In addition, a host of experts, secretaries, reporters, motion-picture men, professors, and representatives of various causes were in Paris during the conference. Delegates representing insurgent elements within the defeated countries were especially active. Representatives of the Poles, the Czechs, the Yugoslavs, the Baltic peoples, the Arabs, the Irish, and the Jewish advocates of a Zionist home in Palestine—all fought vigorously at the conference in behalf of their respective causes. To prevent the meeting from degenerating into a meaningless babel in which "these delegates would talk themselves and the world to death," the representatives of the great powers took control into their own hands. All important matters were assigned to a Council of Ten, consisting of the two chief delegations respectively of France, Great Britain, the United States, Italy, and Japan.

Before the conference met President Wilson realized that he might have difficulty in attaining a just and moderate peace in accordance with his famous Fourteen Points. Although his associates from other countries maintained occasionally that their real objective was the establishment of a new world order of democracy, peace, and security; in reality they planned to advance the interests of their respective countries. Individually, and sometimes collectively, they insisted that Germany must be punished, that Great Britain must continue to rule the seas, that Italy must dominate the Adriatic Sea, that France must obtain Alsace-Lorraine and perhaps the left bank of the Rhine, and that Japan must replace Germany in Shantung. Agreements concerning some of these aspirations had been incorporated in secret treaties arranged during the war. When Wilson, insisting on covenants openly arrived at, claimed that he was not aware of the secret agreements, diplomats and men of the world were frankly skeptical. As a matter of fact, he had heard of them and was in a position to get full information on them before he came to Paris.

Leader of the opposition to Wilsonian idealism was Georges Clemenceau, France's famous war minister. He was interested chiefly in the establishment of French security and in the destruction of Germany as a great power. Openly hostile to the Fourteen Points, he had declared: "The American president has fourteen commandments, while God himself had only ten." Nevertheless, he was not nearly as stubborn in his determination to advance the interests of France as
were General Foch and the French president and ardent nationalist, Raymond Poincaré. Frequently Clemenceau did have to make concessions, which he justified by saying, "What can a man do when he is sitting between Jesus Christ (Wilson) and Napoleon Bonaparte (Lloyd George)?"

Lloyd George, like the French statesmen, played an important role in sabotaging Wilson’s program. Thoroughly loyal to the British Empire, he labored at the conference to acquire for his country the German colonies in Africa and in the Pacific, the rich oil regions in Arabia and Mesopotamia, a protectorate over Egypt, and supremacy in Persia. Although he opposed the ruination of Germany through excessive cession of territory to France, he welcomed the destruction of Germany as Great Britain’s naval and commercial rival. A practical idealist, he only disapproved of that part of Wilson’s program that threatened to hinder British interests. Consequently, in the discussions in which the three decided the fate of the world, he usually occupied a position midway between Clemenceau, the arch nationalist, and Wilson, the doctrinaire internationalist.

Primarily interested in a just and lasting peace rather than in immediate objectives, the American from the beginning of the conference insisted that his fourteenth point—that providing for the League of Nations—take precedence over everything else. He feared that he might be forced to accept certain Allied demands which would be unjust to the Central Powers; but he felt that these would be rectified later by the League of Nations. In short, conceiving of the League as a sort of trellis upon which international good-will might climb, he believed that present deviations from the Fourteen Points might be necessary, but that in the future the League would correct any injustices. Clemenceau and, to a lesser degree, Lloyd George, although hostile to the League of Nations and highly impatient at the delay required for drafting its Covenant, permitted Wilson to make his fourteenth point the first order of business. After nearly a month of discussion, the Covenant of the League was finally accepted on April 28. Somewhat earlier the President had sailed for America in order to perform his official duties and also to assure himself of American backing of the League.

Before Wilson left Paris, Clemenceau and Lloyd George had jockeyed him out of his key position in the conference. They did so because they were convinced of his inability to direct its policies. High frigid aloofness, his way of treating his collaborators with what a journalist called the “glacial geniality of a headmaster” receiving his assistants on the first day of a new term, his ignorance of the
realities of the European situation, his slowness of mind and contempt of compromise, made it unlikely that anything would ever be settled while he was in command of the situation. Both Lloyd George and Clemenceau, believing that a speedy settlement was imperative, were desirous of realizing the practical aims of their respective countries. The outbreak of twenty-three little wars in various parts of the world, the spread of influenza everywhere, the existence of famine in Russia, Germany, Austria, and Hungary (largely the result of the Allied blockade to keep out food supplies), and the growing menace of the communist movement spreading from Russia into Hungary and into Germany—all these developments threatened to result in a general political and social upheaval in Europe, an upheaval which might deprive the victors of the spoils of war.

To avoid such a contingency and to expedite a settlement, the French and British premiers reduced the Council of Ten to the Council of Four: Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando. Thus, when President Wilson returned to Paris he was confronted by three heads of powerful states, tied by secret treaties which partitioned enemy territories among them. It is true that Lloyd George backed Wilson in his opposition to Clemenceau's plan to crush the Teutons completely. But the clever and unscrupulous French statesman, nicknamed the "Tiger," knowing that the American Congress would not support a League unless a clause was inserted into the Covenant ratifying the Monroe Doctrine, had actually forced Wilson to acquiesce in a severe humiliation of Germany as the price of French approval. The American president was prepared to make almost any concessions and sacrifices rather than jeopardize the League project.

Before the final peace settlements were agreed upon, Orlando of Italy precipitated a crisis which nearly broke up the conference. Demanding greater concessions around the Adriatic than those promised during the war by the Allies, he encountered unexpectedly stiff opposition from Wilson. The immediate crisis centered around the city of Fiume, the cession of which was requested by Italian diplomats. This demand was opposed by Wilson, who maintained that Fiume, the hinterland of which was Slavic, should not be included in an Italian state. As Wilson showed no sign of relenting on this issue, Orlando left the congress in anger and returned to Rome (April, 1919). Two weeks later, fearing that his absence might cause Italian interests to suffer, he returned to Paris. The peace conference, unable to adjust the conflicting claims over Fiume, adjourned without settling the matter. In September, 1919, Gabriele d'Annunzio, the Italian nationalist poet-aviator, and a group of followers precipi-
tated another crisis by seizing the city. A solution of the Dalmatian problem was left to Italy and Yugoslavia to work out by direct negotiations. At first, the Rome government, refusing to approve the illegal seizure, signed a treaty with Yugoslavia whereby the independence of the free state of Fiume was recognized. In 1924 Mussolini, however, repudiating this arrangement, obtained possession of the city for Italy. By a treaty with Yugoslavia the city proper was given to Italy, and Port Baros and a fifty-year lease on one of the three basins of Fiume harbor were granted to Yugoslavia.

Finally, the German peace terms were agreed upon. On May 7, 1919, the treaty was handed to the German delegates, who were brought before their victors in the Trianon Palace like prisoners in the dock. When the German representative had finished speaking, the white-bound book containing the four hundred odd clauses of the Treaty of Versailles was handed to them and the meeting came to an end. At last the Germans learned officially the terms of peace. By this treaty Germany was to lose one-eighth of her land and one-tenth of her European subjects. Alsace-Lorraine was to be surrendered to France without a plebiscite; three small districts were to be ceded to Belgium; Memel, a Baltic port, which eventually became an independent unit within Lithuania, was handed over to an Allied commission; areas taken from Poland were returned to Poland, thus re-establishing the corridor of alien territory which was closed by the first and second partitions of Poland in the eighteenth century; Danzig, the important seaport in the corridor, was declared a free port and placed under an Allied commission; and, finally, the Saar Valley, a German coal-mining district with a population of about 500,000 Germans, was placed under an international commission for fifteen years. It was to be exploited for the benefit of France in compensation for the destruction by the retreating Germans of her own coal mines. In 1935, as a result of a plebiscite held in this region, the citizens voted to return to Germany. Following a financial settlement whereby Germany, according to the original agreement, repurchased from France the actual mines, the Saar again became an integral part of the German Reich.

In addition to these territorial cessions Germany was forced to permit plebiscites in upper Silesia and in parts of Prussia and Schleswig. As a result of these elections, North Schleswig was returned to Denmark. In Upper Silesia and part of East Prussia, however, the majority of the people declared themselves for Germany. Nevertheless, there were large blocks of Polish inhabitants in these districts. Therefore they were partitioned, Poland receiving the portions which contained the most valuable economic resources. Germany refused
to recognize the validity of this transaction consummated finally by the League of Nations. Assenting to the loss of Alsace-Lorraine on her western border, she never became reconciled to the cessions of territory to Poland.

Germany also suffered colonial losses. All of her colonies and overseas possessions were ceded to the League of Nations, which distributed them in the form of mandates to Great Britain, France, Belgium, and the three British dominions of New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa. They were to be administered by those powers until such of them as were thought to be competent could become independent. The other colonies were to remain indefinitely under the trusteeship of the mandatory states. All German possessions and concessions in China, Siam, Liberia, Morocco, Egypt, and Turkey were transferred to the victorious Allies. In central Africa the native peoples were entrusted to Great Britain, France, and Belgium; South West Africa and German holdings in the Pacific were distributed among Great Britain, the Union of South Africa, New Zealand, Australia, and Japan. In all cases, however, the welfare of the native populations was to be the chief consideration, and the League remained the guardian of their interests and was to supervise the mandatory powers.

Germany was deprived of a large part of her economic resources, her merchant marine, and even control of her navigable rivers. In addition, the Allies assessed her an unspecified sum—called reparations—to be paid the Allies for the damage done to the civilian populations of the victorious countries. By May, 1921, she was required to hand over about five billion dollars on account; the total amount to be paid ultimately, however, was not specified but was left to a reparation committee of the Allies which was to be independent of the League of Nations. The Committee was empowered to accept goods as well as gold from Germany. Machinery, livestock, tools, equipment, and natural products were consequently to be turned over to the Allies as part payments. Should Germany fail to meet these obligations, the Reparation Committee could offer recommendations as to the proper course to be taken. Moreover, as a guarantee for the execution of these terms, the German territory to the west of the Rhine, together with the bridgeheads, were to be occupied by Allied and associated troops for a period of fifteen years; also, she was ordered to reduce her army to 100,000 men and to abolish conscription and the high-seas fleet was to be surrendered to Great Britain. Actually it had been scuttled by orders of the German admiral a few days before. In signing she would admit her sole guilt for the war by accepting the following article in the treaty: "The Allied and Associate
governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her Allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allies and Associate governments and their nationals have been subject as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her Allies." Dismayed by the severity of the treaty, facing revolution at home, and unable to offer military resistance to the Allies, Germany signed, under protest, on June 28, 1919, the fifth anniversary of the Sarajevo assassination which had been the signal for the war. This ceremony, which marked the fall of the German Empire, was held in the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles where Bismarck in 1871 had proclaimed the founding of the German Empire.

The peace treaties with Austria and Hungary represented attempts to carry out the Wilsonian principle of self-determination for subject peoples. At the conclusion of the war the Dual Monarchy, a multinational state, had fallen apart into its component sectors. The settlement of Paris legalized the arrangements, which, for the most part, had already come about. Austria, according to the Treaty of Saint-Germain (September, 1919), ceded the Trentino and upper Adige, Trieste, and surrounding territories to Italy; Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Dalmatian coast and islands to Yugoslavia—the new composite Slav state on her southern border; Bohemia, Moravia, and most of Austrian Silesia to Czechoslovakia—a newly formed state on her northern frontier; Galicia to Poland; and Bukovina to Rumania. As a result of these territorial cessions Austria was cut down from a proud monarchy of 116,000 square miles with about thirty million people, to a poverty-stricken republic of 32,000 square miles and six million people, two million of whom lived in Vienna. Included in these territorial transfers were four million Germans who were handed over to Czechoslovakia and Italy. Like Germany, Austria was disarmed and forced to pay reparations. Her army was reduced to 30,000 men; she was not permitted to possess air forces; and she was forced to accept drastic limitations on munitions and armaments. The economic provisions of the treaty were similar to those of Versailles. She also was required not to practice economic discrimination against Allied nationals.

Hungary also suffered great losses. By the Treaty of Trianon (June, 1920) she was reduced from a territory of over 126,000 square miles, inhabited by twenty-one million people to a small land of 36,000 square miles, inhabited by eight million people. Transylvania and the Banat were surrendered to Rumania; Croatia to Yugoslavia, and the Slovak provinces to Czechoslovakia. A reparations bill of two hundred million crowns was presented to Hungary by the Allies, and her army was reduced to 35,000 men.
Bulgaria and Turkey, too, were severely punished for their participation in the war. By the Treaty of Neuilly (November, 1919) Bulgaria was forced by the Allies to cede all of her coast lands to Greece and some valuable strategical territory to Yugoslavia. She, like the other defeated states, was expected to pay heavy reparations, to reduce her army to 20,000 men, and to abolish conscription. The Treaty of Sèvres, including the Tripartite Agreement (August, 1920), which closed the war between Turkey and the Allies, partitioned the Ottoman Empire politically and economically. In 1920 the Allies saw an opportunity to exploit the rich empire of the sultan. Therefore they dictated a treaty which deprived Turkey of all her European possessions (Constantinople and the Straits and all but a remnant of her Asiatic territories in Anatolia). In addition to these territorial gains, the victorious European powers were given valuable financial and political rights in what was left of Turkey, and she was required to pay old debts and war costs. Although the sultan accepted these harsh terms, loyal Turks in Anatolia refused to consent to political disintegration and economic bondage. A nationalist party, with a very able military man—Kemal Pasha—as its leader, came into existence. Taking advantage of serious divisions between the Allies, he repelled a Greek invasion of Asia Minor, and, in 1923, forced the Allies to agree to a revision of the peace treaty. According to the terms of the new settlement—the Treaty of Lausanne—Turkey regained Constantinople and part of Thrace, including Adrianople; and all of Asia Minor (Anatolia) and Armenia. Turkey’s military and naval forces suffered no restrictions; she was released from reparation payments; and the capitulations were abandoned. Her empire was not regained, however. Syria remained in the hands of France, and Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Egypt in those of Great Britain.

Having weakened their late opponents, the Allies sponsored a line of buffer states ranging from Finland in the North to Yugoslavia in the South, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. These states, established on the basis of the principle of national self-determination, served as a barrier to the spread of Bolshevism from Russia into the defeated countries. Also, as beneficiaries of the Peace of Paris, they, like France and England, would be inclined to favor the territorial status quo, as of 1919.

In addition to these settlements with the five defeated powers, minorities’ treaties were prepared by the Allies. By these agreements the various national and religious minorities in the Balkans and the newly created states were protected. They were guaranteed public and private worship, civil and political liberty, and the use of their own languages and schools. Greece, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Czech-
slovakia, and Poland were required to sign these agreements. All disputes involving minorities were to be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice, and the League stood as the guarantor of their freedom from persecution.

Although President Wilson played an important part in the preparation of the peace settlements, the Senate of the United States failed to ratify them. Certain features of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the acquisition of the German concessions on the Shantung Peninsula by Japan were especially objectionable to the United States. Wilson, however, stubbornly refused to accept any changes in the Covenant, maintaining that it should be accepted by the United States without reservations. Refusing to do so, Congress declared the war terminated on July 2, 1921 and signed a special treaty with Germany. In the settlement the American government accepted most of the changes made at Paris, but refused to include the League of Nations Covenant, and those clauses dealing with the territorial changes in Europe, the transfer of German concessions in the Far East, and labor clauses. Similar settlements were arranged with Austria and Hungary, but not with Bulgaria and Turkey, as the United States had never formally been at war with those nations.

The Allies soon discovered that these peace settlements were not lasting contributions to peace and stability. In their attempts to cripple the power of Germany by depriving her of her colonies, by reducing her territorial limits, and by ruining her economically, they prepared the way for the eventual rise of a Nazi Germany, powerful enough to threaten the new status quo. Nor did the Allies solve completely or satisfactorily the problem of nationality. They dismantled Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, in order to emancipate the Slavs, Arabs, and other peoples; but in so doing they left millions of Germans, Magyars, Bulgarians, and Turks under alien rule. Thenceforth these groups constituted dissatisfied minorities. Liberal views were only partially applied. The defeated powers were disarmed in practice, but the victorious and neutral states adopted disarmament only in principle. Attempts were made to improve international labor conditions, but no concerted effort was initiated to restore economic relations through the abolition of tariff barriers.

In their desire to reach certain national objectives, the Allies found it difficult to co-operate in a sincere attempt to create a political and social order satisfactory to all powers. France concentrated upon the political and economic destruction of her historic rival, Germany. Italy was interested chiefly in her desire to gain control of the Adriatic and thus dominate the trade gateway into the Balkans. Great Britain, having obtained important oil lands in the Near East and some
German colonies in Africa and Oceania, favored a partial recovery of Germany and Soviet Russia in order to recover her trade with them. Despite the drastic peace terms (perhaps not as severe, however, as those which a victorious Germany might have imposed upon a defeated enemy), the Allies were as fearful of a German recovery in 1919 as the Allies in 1815 were of a Napoleonic restoration.

Allied statesmen made no constructive attempt to bring about an economic rehabilitation of Central Europe. Instead, they levied heavy reparations on their starving, prostrate, disintegrated foes. As a result, a few years after these financial judgments were imposed, the Allies were forced to lend money to Austria and Hungary in order to prevent their complete collapse. Germany, on the other hand, tried half-heartedly to meet the financial exactions of the Allies. She made certain initial payments on a reparations bill, which, in 1921, was assessed at $33,000,000,000 (this amount was reduced by one third in 1922), but by 1923 she claimed that she was unable to meet certain heavy payments. Determined to carry out the terms of the reparations agreement, Poincaré, premier of France, in 1923 had French troops occupy the industrial heart of Germany, the Ruhr. The Germans in that district adopted a policy of passive resistance, refusing to work for the French or to consider the French plan to detach the Rhineland from Germany. Both Germany and France suffered as a result of this invasion and the economic impasse which followed. In Germany, passive resistance, in view of the resultant industrial stagnation and the cost of supporting the people in the Ruhr, helped to bring about the complete collapse of the mark.¹ The French franc also declined in 1923–1924 as a result of this invasion, falling from about 7½ cents to a little less than 5 cents. Financial difficulties in both countries, rising out of this economic conflict in the Ruhr, finally led to the development of a more conciliatory attitude in Paris and Berlin.

In November, 1923, the Allies decided to attempt a definitive and satisfactory settlement of the reparation question. Two committees were selected to solve the problem. One, with an American banker, Charles G. Dawes, as chairman, was to study the means of balancing the German budget and of stabilizing the currency; the other, under the direction of an English financier, Reginald McKenna, was to consider methods for the return of German capital which had left the country, in order to avoid a chaotic economic situation there and to escape heavy taxation. As a result of their investigations the committees adopted a solution, called the Dawes Plan, which was accepted by the Allies in 1924. According to this scheme the annual payments

¹ See pp. 430-431.
from Germany were reduced, subject to fluctuations in the future in accordance with an index of prosperity. A special bank, under joint Allied-German control, was created to regulate German currency. To put this plan into operation a loan of $200,000,000 was to be floated in the foreign market.

Inasmuch as the Dawes Plan condemned Germany to pay virtually her whole economic surplus every year to her conquerors, it did not last. By 1928 the Allies, realizing that the Germans could not conform to the schedule set up in 1924, consented to arrange a new settlement. A committee under the chairmanship of Owen D. Young, an American business executive, was appointed to investigate the situation. As a result of its investigations the Young Plan was evolved. In this plan the total reparation figure was set at $18,032,500,000, with specified payments extending over a period of fifty-nine years. This new schedule of payments went into effect November 1, 1929, and remained in operation a little less than two years. By 1931 the world depression, resulting in bank failures and financial chaos everywhere, made it impossible for Germany to negotiate further loans, and to meet reparation payments.

Perhaps one should not be too critical in his estimate of the peace treaties. Certainly it has always been in the logic of history and of human nature that defeated powers have usually paid some price to the victors. It might have been more wise in the long run if the Allies had limited their demands to the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine, some territorial rectifications for Italy, and miscellaneous other minor adjustments. But it was too much to expect that nations which had gone through a terrible ordeal such as World War I would display such generosity. Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando reflected the wishes of democratic states which found it virtually impossible to view the problem of securing a just and lasting peace dispassionately and objectively. Nor could the people of the United States understand all the vital issues. American opinion was inclined to become too indignant over the parts of the peace settlements of which it did not approve, and too enthusiastic over the sections which pleased it.

Collectively, the peace settlements presented a curious composite of idealism and practical politics—a sort of blend of diplomatic utopia and Realpolitik. In the first place, they defined national self-determination as a guiding principle of the European-state system and did take important steps toward the reshaping of Europe on that basis. The diplomats at Paris did make serious errors, but the more idealistic of them felt that the League of Nations would eventually bring about the necessary readjustments. In the second place, the settlements did endeavor to promote the cause of peace through the
creation of the League. Long before World War I started, at the Hague Conference of 1899, a Court of Arbitration had been established with the purpose of offering nations an opportunity to settle their disputes without resort to war. But it was not until the League had been established that co-operative machinery became a real force in international affairs.

This League of Nations, largely the work of President Wilson, became the object of much controversy. Its supporters regarded it as the instrument which would end all war; its enemies considered it as a device of the armed victorious states, especially France, whereby they guarded their spoils by maintaining the status quo. From the first the Covenant of the League encountered criticism. In the United States apprehension was felt lest it restrict American foreign policy, especially with regard to the Monroe Doctrine. As stated before, the United States refused to sanction the League, signing a separate peace with Germany largely on that account. In Japan the League was never popular. Unsuccessful in their attempts to include in the Covenant a statement of “the principle of the equality of nations and the just treatment of their nationals,” the Japanese entered the League with marked lack of enthusiasm. Despite a certain amount of hostility, over fifty nations joined the organization. They pledged themselves to promote international co-operation and peace by the acceptance of obligations to abstain from war against members of the League of Nations.

The Covenant was the constitution of that international body. Subject to amendment by the Council and the Assembly, it laid down general principles for the solution of any problem which might arise. The regular machinery for the operation of the League consisted of three organs: an Assembly, a Council, and a Secretariat. The Assembly, representing all states and meeting annually in Geneva, was the legislative body of the League. A Council, representing the great powers, especially, and meeting four times a year, was the executive of the League. Finally, there was a permanent Secretariat in residence all of the year at Geneva. It consisted of experts who gathered and made available information of all types.

In addition to these organizations there was the Permanent Court of International Justice. Its function was to arbitrate international disputes. Side by side with these various organizations which composed the League, but not officially a part of it, was the International Labor Organization, containing worker’s and employer’s delegates from all nations represented in the League. Its function was to improve labor conditions and to serve as an international clearing house for such matters.

After the treaties were signed the League was soon involved in a
great variety of matters rising out of the peace settlements. It undertook the supervision, in conjunction with the mandatory powers, of the German colonies and Turkish territories which had been transferred from the defeated powers to the Allies. By virtue of the Minorities’ treaties, discussed heretofore, it also tried to protect national, linguistic, and religious minorities found in Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Greece. But the League did not restrict its activities to political affairs, or problems rising out of the peace treaties. It was also concerned with such matters as the codification of international law, preparations for disarmament conferences, economic affairs, health, social, and humanitarian enterprises, and the promotion of internationalism in the intellectual field.

The most important activity of the League was in the realm of international arbitration and conciliation. But it lacked the prestige and authority to enforce its decisions, partly due to the fact that such important nations as the United States, Germany, and Russia were not charter members. Therefore it was defied successfully by great powers a number of times. It could order an economic boycott of an offending state, or it could recommend the use of military forces or other sanctions against the wayward country, but it could not compel enforcement of these decrees. Without armed troops at its disposal, it lacked executive power, and thus it was unable to settle the controversies that later on were to precipitate a second world war.

1 See pp. 397-398.
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CHAPTER XVII

Between Two Wars:
Proletarian and National
Dictatorships

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DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT: POSTWAR RUSSIA

WORLD WAR I tested rigidly the internal political and social cohesion of nearly every participating nation. Most countries retained at least the framework of their long-established institutions, but several, particularly Russia and the Fascist powers, as a result of acute problems which arose during or after the war, adopted radical innovations.

In Russia the changes were most drastic. At the outbreak of the war that great empire was in a state of unrest. But despite economic and political discontent, the Russian people rallied to the support of "Holy Russia." It was hoped by many that a democratic empire would emerge from the war, which would liberate the Slavs and dominate the Straits. Military failures, economic difficulties, and corruption in the government, however, soon revived the revolutionary movement in more virulent form. In 1915 serious defeats, heavy losses of men in battles (four million Russians were estimated to have been killed between 1914 and 1917), and an appalling shortage of ammunition discouraged both soldiers and citizens. Meanwhile, the dislocation of agriculture, the emergence of industrial problems, and the collapse of the transportation system put a terrible strain on the Russian people. Despite a tremendous demand for food, peasants were unable to transport and sell their crops. Military conscription deprived them of much-needed workers. As a result they were forced in 1914 to decrease their sowing areas. Industrial problems promoted unrest among the proletarians. In order to increase the meager supply
of munitions for the armies, industrial leaders forced their employees
to work long hours in unsanitary factories for low wages. These con-
ditions, together with high prices, encouraged strikes and riots. Out
of this unrest rose a bitter antagonism on the part of the workers
toward the autocratic government which consistently supported the
oppressive factory owners.

In addition to this agrarian and proletarian unrest, there developed
a pronounced opposition on the part of all patriotic Russians to the
corruption and the incompetency of the czarist government. It was
generally believed that the country was full of traitors holding impor-
tant political positions. Many corrupt bureaucrats were appointed
by Czar Nicholas II, who disregarded the suggestion that he select
patriotic and liberal Russians—men who had the confidence of the
people. As a result, numerous aristocrats became convinced that the
czar was incapable of governing during this critical period.

Nicholas II ignored the development of this opposition. Interested
in family life and indifferent to state affairs, he relied on the advice
of his foolish and superstitious wife who, in turn, was under the in-
fluence of a dissolute but cunning Siberian monk, Rasputin. The
latter used his all-powerful influence to have responsible officials and
commanders dismissed and saw to it that they were replaced by his
own creatures. He literally captured the imperial family and the
government. Those who opposed him were crushed. By 1916 patri-
otic Russians of all classes realized that Rasputin was one of the most
dangerous men in the empire. But his assassination in December,
1916, by certain aristocrats failed to improve political conditions in
Russia. The czar refused to make concessions to the Duma and ap-
pointed a madman, Protopopov, a protégé of Rasputin, as his Min-
ister of the Interior. Thus, there was no improvement in the imperial
administration. Corruption, inefficiency, and treason continued to
flourish in a government that was no longer able to command the
support of the nation.

The disintegration of the army and navy in the early months of
1917 precipitated the revolution. Defeats, poor leadership, and in-
sufficient food had destroyed the morale of the soldiers and had
caus ed them to accept revolutionary propaganda. Insubordination
was frequent, and the excessive brutality of the officers merely in-
creased the discontent. By January 1, 1917, over 1,200,000 men had
deserted the Russian armies. Most of the remaining troops were re-
less and ripe for revolt. On March 8, 1917, disorderly masses demand-
ing food appeared on the streets of Petrograd. Looting and rioting
occurred. Fraternization began between the crowds and the soldiers
of the garrison. The seriousness of the situation dawned upon gov-
ernment officials when a company of soldiers of the garrison refused to fire upon the rioters. Asked by the czar to dissolve, the fourth Duma ignored his request and, instead, created a provisional committee which it invested with vast powers to restore law and order. Meanwhile the insurrectionists had formed a Petrograd Soviet, a revolutionary council of soldiers and workers. This body, after some hesitation, decided to co-operate with the Duma in establishing a national provisional government. In the meantime, the czar, returning from the front and deserted by his troops, abdicated in favor of his brother, the Grand Duke Michael. A few days later the grand duke wisely surrendered all claims to authority. Thereafter, supreme power was vested in a provisional government until a constitutional assembly could be elected to prepare the way for a new order.

This provisional government consisted chiefly of bourgeois representatives under the leadership of Prince Lvov, a liberal noble. Advocate of middle-class reforms, it planned to establish in Russia constitutional government and an individualistic social order. At the same time, it intended to continue the war against the Central Powers. Serious problems soon brought about the collapse of this provisional regime. To re-establish political and economic stability in chaotic Russia and, at the same time, to continue the war were almost impossible. Incapable of handling the situation, Prince Lvov in July, 1917, resigned as prime minister and was succeeded by Kerensky, a theatrical poseur. Although he favored the establishment of a socialist state, he was willing to co-operate with the bourgeoisie in a program to create a constitutional government and to fight the war to a victorious conclusion.

Opposition on the part of both extreme conservatives and radicals, especially the Bolsheviks, prevented Kerensky from carrying out his program. After the March revolt the exponents of communism became more and more active in Russia. The leader of this Bolshevikist movement was Lenin, a revolutionary exile who had returned to Russia when the provisional government had promised to pardon all political offenders. This uncompromising radical immediately denounced the bourgeois government and began to propagandize the masses with his doctrines. In contrast to the orthodox Marxist Mensheviks who favored the interpolation of a bourgeois democracy between semi-feudal Russia and a Socialist regime, Lenin and his Bolshevik followers desired to dispense with the capitalistic state and to proceed directly to the creation of a Communist order. While attempting to continue the war, to preserve private property, and to establish a legal constitutional government, the provisional assembly was constantly embarrassed by the growing influence of the Bolshe-
viks. Soviets of workers and soldiers, especially the one in Petrograd, succumbing to Lenin’s propaganda, demanded the withdrawal of Russia from the war, the division of land among the peasants, the control of factories by the workers, and the distribution of food. Aided by a number of ardent radicals, especially one, Leon Trotsky, another revolutionary exile who had returned to Russia in 1917, Lenin soon succeeded in winning over large numbers of dissatisfied workers, soldiers, sailors, peasants, the unemployed, and political extremists by making reckless promises of peace, bread, and land. These discontented elements, for the most part, were not especially interested in the theories underlying communism, but they did want better conditions. Therefore they welcomed Lenin’s promise to rescue the propertyless man from the bourgeois dictatorship through a program involving the confiscation of private property, the nationalization of industry, and a world-wide attack on capitalism.

The Bolsheviks, a minority political group, came to power largely because of the lack of unity among the various monarchists, bourgeois, and moderate elements. Taking advantage of this circumstance and the growing economic unrest, the communists, by means of efficient organization and able leadership, gained control of the soviet organizations, representing the soldiers, sailors, peasants, and workers. Prior to this time the Mensheviks had been the dominant group in the town soviets, but, as economic conditions grew worse and the demand for peace increased, the Bolshevik element in these councils exerted an increasing influence. Under the direction of the able administrator, Trotsky, the Bolsheviks in September and October gained control of the Petrograd Soviet and prepared for the anticipated revolution.
In November these restless elements were able to bring about the overthrow of the provisional government and to establish a Bolshevist dictatorship. The final defeats of the Russian troops on the Eastern Front had prepared the way for this coup d'état. Taking advantage of this setback, the Bolsheviks, claiming that Kerensky had betrayed the socialist cause, that he was ignoring the welfare of the masses, and that he was carrying out the capitalistic and imperialistic desires of the Russian bourgeoisie, demanded the overthrow of his government. An unsuccessful attempt on the part of conservatives—monarchists and bourgeois aristocrats—under General Kornilov to capture the city of Petrograd helped to bring matters to a head. In November the Bolsheviks seized control of Petrograd and forced the provisional government into flight. Lenin, who had been driven into hiding by the Kerensky government, made a dramatic appearance before the meeting of the Congress of Soviets and secured the support of that body. A Soviet of the Peoples Commissars, of which Lenin was the chairman and Trotsky the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, was established. By January, 1918, the Bolsheviks, still a minority, finally had control of the government of Russia.

Once in power, the Bolsheviks destroyed all opposition and inaugurated a Communist regime. Aristocrats, military leaders, and the middle classes lost their property, their positions, and their citizenship. The upper classes and the bourgeoisie became the victims of a vengeful proletarian class. Thousands were killed, exiled to Siberia, or forced to flee Russia. Most of those who remained, without property or positions, lived in poverty and obscurity. A few possessed of technical skill and willing to conform to the new order were given positions as bank employees, engineers, and technicians, but the former upper and middle classes ceased to exist as such in Russia, and as a result of this revolution, the royal family was practically wiped out. Under arrest near Petrograd since March, 1917, they were later sent to Siberia and were shot.

The Bolshevist government now proceeded to fulfill its promises of land, national self-determination, and peace to the Russian people. Land was transferred from the great proprietors to the peasants; the right of self-determination on the part of such provinces as Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Ukraine, the Siberian Confederation, and the Transcaucasian Federal Republic was conceded by Lenin. Definite recognition, however, was frequently denied these states unless they were dominated by the local Bolshevist elements.

In December, 1917, peace negotiations were opened with the Central Powers. At the meeting of the German and Russian representatives, the former insisted on the cession by Russia of the Baltic prov-
inces and Poland. Refusing to accept these terms, Trotsky told the Germans that Russia was withdrawing from the war, but that she would not sign the peace treaty. The German armies immediately resumed their advance and forced Trotsky and his colleagues to submit. On March 3, 1918, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was concluded between Russia and Germany. By the terms of this settlement Russia gave the Central Powers the right to determine the future status of Poland, Courland, and Lithuania. She also promised to evacuate Finland, the Åland Islands, Estonia, Livonia, and the Ukraine; to recognize a treaty between the Central Powers and the Ukraine; to cede Batum, Kars, and Ardahan to Turkey; and to terminate Bolshevist propaganda in territories of the Central Powers or those included in the treaty. In August, 1918, Russia was forced to sign supplementary agreements with Germany granting that country favorable commercial relations and an indemnity. In return for these harsh terms, which isolated Russia from western Europe, that country received peace.

Taking advantage of this boon, the Bolsheviks were able to combat the various counter-revolutionary movements that had sprung up in Russia during 1918-1919. White armies and leaders had set up independent and rival governments in the neighborhood of Archangel and Murmansk, in the Baltic provinces, and in remote Siberia. By 1919 these military reactionaries were aided by the Allies, who were vexed by the withdrawal of Russia from the war, by Russia’s repudiation of the enormous debt she owed the Allies (especially France), by the Bolshevist denunciation of Allied imperialism, by the Bolshevist opposition to world capitalism, and by the fear that Germany would secure access to Russian resources. Therefore, Allied troops occupied certain ports and established an effective blockade of Bolshevist Russia. But the Bolsheviks were not discouraged. Two instruments—the Cheka, a police and spy organization created for the purpose of terrifying opponents of the new regime, and the Red Army—were established. The army was reorganized by Trotsky, who infused into it a crusader’s zeal. With the aid of the Cheka, the Bolshevist army instigated a reign of terror characterized by thousands of arrests, imprisonments, exiles, and executions. Supported by the peasants, who feared that a White victory would result in the return of their newly acquired lands to the great proprietors, the Red Army was able to defeat the reactionary movements. With the expulsion from the Crimea of the last White troops under General Wrangel (November, 1920) the counter-revolution as a military movement was suppressed.

While White armies, aided by the Allies, were trying to overthrow
the Bolsheviks, the latter were attempting to establish a new political and social order. In July, 1918, the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets drafted the constitution which created the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (R.S.F.S.R.). Henceforth the government rested on the dictatorship of the workers, the peasants, the soldiers, and the sailors. All classes possessing privileges, such as the old landowners, czarist bureaucrats, and the bourgeoisie, were debarred from suffrage and were deprived of property and positions. Land was given to the people; banks were nationalized; much of the old taxation was abolished; labor was established on a different footing; and free and universal education for workers and poor peasants was to be provided. Urban and rural soviets now obtained control of local governments and sent deputies to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. Since they were the strongholds of communism, the urban districts were given greater political representation than the rural units in the all-powerful central organization.

The All-Russian Congress of Soviets was the body in which supreme authority in the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic was theoretically vested. Originally, it was to be convoked semiannually, but, actually, it met only once a year after 1921. An All-Russian Central Executive Committee, elected by the Congress, exercised real executive and legislative authority. It met four times yearly, convoked the All-Russian Congress, appointed a cabinet (the Council of Commissars), and performed the executive functions of the state. Whenever the All-Russian Executive Committee was not in session, a body called the Praesidium carried on its work.

This political structure applied only to Russia proper. Following the suppression of the White regimes, the Bolsheviks succeeded in regaining all the territory which comprised the old Russian Empire with the exception of Poland, Bessarabia, and the Baltic Provinces. In 1922 the various independent governments which had been set up in these territories established political structures identical with that of the R.S.F.S.R. and joined Soviet Russia in a Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (U.S.S.R.). The U.S.S.R. adopted governmental machinery which paralleled that of the R.S.F.S.R. It consisted of a Union Congress of Soviets, a Union Central Executive Committee, and a Union Council of Commissars; and, save for local government, it exercised a virtual monopoly of power. It had jurisdiction over foreign affairs, commerce, labor legislation, education, public health, and the armed forces of the Union.

Supreme in the Soviet governmental system was the Communist Party. This organization consisted of some 38,000 local groups called cells. Every year the latter sent representatives to a party congress
which in turn selected a Central Executive Committee for the party. This all-powerful administrative body chose a political bureau of nine members who determined government policies and actually ruled Russia. Consisting of about a million members (about 21/2 million in 1936), the Communist Party became the only legal party in Russia. Through a well-disciplined organization it controlled the machinery of government, education, the press, speech, and the drama. Boys and girls were formed into Communist youth societies and taught Marxian concepts. A very efficient police organization, the G.P.U., replacing the Cheka in 1922, obliterated all counter-revolutionary movements by a systematic repression. Moreover, the Russian Communists gained virtual control of the international radical society called the Comintern.

Until his death in 1924, Lenin dominated the Communist Party. Possessing tremendous will and determination, remarkable executive ability, and unquestionable integrity, he was convinced that bourgeois-capitalism was largely responsible for the existing economic evils, such as imperialistic wars, unemployment, and the exploitation of wage-earners by the employers. Once capitalism could be destroyed, he said, the workers of the world would live at peace with one another and would co-operate in creating a planned economy wherein all would work for the benefit of society as a whole. To attain this new social order in Russia, Lenin and his followers attempted to make all means of production, distribution, and exchange in Russia part of a system which would guarantee to every man the essentials of life and the principles of justice. He tried to achieve these aims by nationalizing the land, forests, natural resources, all means of production, transportation, trade, banking, and insurance. Profits were to be completely abolished. Men were to work according to their abilities and share according to their needs. A classless society would thus supplant the bourgeoise system of landlords, capitalists, and wage-earners.

But the Bolshevist attempt to nationalize Russia's industrial and agrarian life precipitated a terrible economic depression. This was the result of the war, of revolution, of internal disorganization, of a strict Allied blockade, and of a lack of machinery, of capital with which to purchase goods abroad, of skilled labor, and of technical and managerial leadership. Workers soon discovered that they could not run the factories without the aid of managers, technicians, and capital. By June, 1918, industrial conditions were so bad that the government had to place industry under state control.\footnote{As opposed to the alternative of self-governing workshops.} Forming a Supreme Economic Council, it tried to supply the workers with...
needed raw materials, food, and technical leadership. Despite these measures, production fell off alarmingly.

Agriculture, as well as industry, collapsed. The agrarian depression began during the war, but was accentuated by the Bolshevist attempt to nationalize the land. Peasants, who were at heart capitalists, opposed the government's policy of nationalization and refused to surrender surplus products to the state. Unable to give the farmers clothing, machinery, and other desired goods in return for their foodstuffs, the government tried to confiscate their grain. The peasants thereupon instituted a policy of passive resistance, raising only enough grain for themselves and causing thereby a steady decline in the harvests of 1919, 1920, and 1921. In 1921 there was a severe drought followed by a terrible famine. Both farmers and city workers by now were discouraged, and in many places revolts occurred.

As a result of this situation, Lenin, quickly realizing that Russia was not ready for a Communist society, was forced to abandon pure communism and to institute a New Economic Policy (N.E.P.), a partial return to capitalism. A fixed tax was substituted for the grain levy; small traders and businessmen were permitted to establish small stores and factories and to compete with state-owned stores, consumer's co-operatives, and industries; under certain restrictions a money economy was established and concessions of foreign capitalists were guaranteed against nationalization. Russia's economic life became thenceforth a mixture of capitalism, state socialism, and communism.

The results of the N.E.P. were on the whole gratifying. Peasants who were able to work, to earn profits, and to retain their lands became less hostile to the government. Successful farmers, called Kulaks, and constituting not more than 3 per cent of the population, enlarged their holdings and increased their profits. But the Soviet authorities, distrustful of these petty capitalists, imposed heavy taxes on them in 1928 and greatly reduced their influence. After that date the Russian government practically exterminated the Kulaks.

Less than three years after the introduction of the N.E.P. Lenin died (1924). His successor was not the eloquent and brilliant Trotsky but the phlegmatic Stalin. The former was a better organizer and fomenter of revolution than he was a politician. Therefore, it was on Stalin, the Georgian, that the mantle of the great dictator fell. Shrewd, quiet, ruthless, he had held many positions under Lenin, who had regarded him as an efficient, but not a brilliant, man. Despite his intellectual limitations, Stalin was clever enough to oppose Trotsky's attempts to sponsor world revolution. In 1926–1927 an open revolt instigated by Trotsky and another leader, Zinoviev, against Stalin's program and authority in the political bureau of the
government furnished Stalin with an opportunity of exiling them and executing many of his enemies.

After Trotsky's overthrow, Stalin adopted many of his rival's policies. Abandoning in 1928 the N.E.P., the new dictator curtailed private commerce, opposed the Kulaks, extended collectivization of the peasants, and introduced the famous Five-Year Plan. The last-named project was designed to promote Russia's industrial growth so that after five years she could supply her domestic needs and acquire a surplus for export. This plan, which was inaugurated in 1928, was designed to increase enormously the output of coal, iron ore, steel, petroleum, electric power, and grains. Agricultural machinery, automobiles, and other manufactured products were to be produced in great factories. It also aimed at a cultural transformation of Russian life through the development of railways and highways, the improvement of housing conditions, the creation of technical schools, the reduction of illiteracy, and the encouragement of music, literature, and art in all villages. But it was only a partial success. Production of oil, agricultural machinery, autos, tractors, sugar, coal, and peat was tremendously increased; progress in electrification, railway construction, the iron, steel, and textile industries, and the building of great dams and giant industrial plants exceeded expectations; and, owing to agricultural improvements, the increase of grain production was sufficient to enable Russia to dump her surpluses on the world market by 1931. Collectivization of the farms and of domestic trade, also, progressed. By 1933 less than 40 per cent of the cultivation was on noncollective farms and but 5 per cent of the retail trade was in private hands.

Nevertheless, complete success was not realized. Production costs were too high, and the desired increase of productivity of labor was not achieved. Moreover, scarcity of technicians and skilled labor, lack of effective discipline in the factories, backwardness of transportation facilities, inadequacy of food supplies, and the lack of liquid capital destroyed the balance of the scheme. To finance this program Russia was compelled to adopt a pay-as-you-go policy, exporting enough food and textiles to pay for the machinery and other essentials she obtained from foreign lands. This circumstance caused the execution of the plan to be an almost intolerable burden to millions of people who, in order to help the government purchase machinery, were forced to go without food. Despite these handicaps, by 1933 the coun-

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1 That is, the combining of small farms into large units which could be cultivated as units under the unified management and direction of state officials. This method was expected to achieve greater efficiency and increased productivity. See pp. 414-415.
try seemed to have made considerable progress in the direction of large-scale industrialism.

In 1933, Stalin inaugurated a second Five-Year Plan. Claiming success for the first, he announced that the new one "would change the country from one with the technique of the Middle Ages to one of contemporary technique"; would greatly expand transportation facilities; would improve agricultural methods; and would increase tremendously the output of manufactured goods, war materials, and foodstuffs. Thenceforth, he claimed, the common people of Russia would be brought into a position to enjoy the highest standard of living in the world. Japanese conquests in northern China and the rise of Hitler in Germany, however, forced Stalin to modify his policy. During the first two years of the second Plan there was a marked increase in national income and in the output of consumption goods. By 1935, however, the aggressive attitude on the part of these powerful anti-communist states made it necessary for Stalin to devote a considerable part of Russia's socialized wealth to the task of strengthening her national defenses. Meanwhile, the rapid improvement in the standard of living did not materialize. Prices of foodstuffs and of clothing remained beyond the reach of the worker. This improvement, however, the government still insisted, would occur.

Many Soviet wage earners were less optimistic. They saw developing in Russia a new class system whereby the governmental officials (generally members of the Communist Party), and the specialists, such as scientists, engineers, and technicians, enjoyed higher standards of living than the proletarians and the peasants. Believing that the government was rapidly adopting the garments of capitalism, they fought, for example, the movement inaugurated by a Russian worker, named Stakhanov, for improving industrial output by a greater division of labor and more effective planning. But their opposition to the government was about as futile as that of the private farmers, the Kulaks.

Desirous of eliminating these wealthy farmers completely, Stalin and the Communist Party in 1928 came out in favor of the collectivization of all agriculture. State farms, each consisting of from 100,000 to 200,000 acres run by a government-appointed director who hired labor at fixed wages, were maintained, but the collective farm became the most popular and most productive unit. Under the latter system the peasants pooled their land, machinery, draft-animals, and seed, while they retained the private ownership of their homes, personal possessions, gardens, and a certain number of chickens, cows, and other livestock. With the government they shared in the income of the collective farm. Owing to co-operation in working, buying,
and selling, these collectives, encouraged by the state, expanded their production of agricultural goods and, at the same time, increased the incomes of the peasants. As a result of this efficient system of mass production, the Kulaks, unable to compete, and persecuted by the authorities, were practically destroyed. Later the few that remained were forcibly "liquidated" by expulsion from their lands.

By 1936 Stalin, believing that the social and economic transformation was proceeding satisfactorily toward a classless society, had promulgated a new constitution. Therein, Stalin and his colleagues stated that a socialist system of economy existed in Russia, a system largely based upon ownership of property and of the means of production by the state or by co-operative groups. With this economic set-up, the government, however, recognized as legal the existence of the small private economy of individual peasants and handicraftsmen based on individual labor and excluding the exploitation of the labor of others. In other words, the Soviet Union by 1936 permitted its citizens to own savings, homes, and household and personal objects, and to inherit private property. This departure from pure communism was further revealed by the declaration that in the U.S.S.R. "socialism was being realized: 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his work.'" Apparently the earlier Communist doctrine that each should work according to his ability and receive according to his needs had been abandoned.

In addition to its statements of Soviet Russia's economic creed, the
constitution changed the organization of the government in such a way as to give more popular control of the political machinery. Every citizen at least eighteen years of age was given the right to elect and be elected irrespective of nationality, creed, educational background, residential qualifications, social origins, property status, and past activities. The secret ballot was adopted and the earlier system of indirect representation was abolished in favor of the direct election to the Council of the Union and the Council of the Nationalities in all political units. This confidence in the people on the part of the government seemed justified. In the elections held in 1937, Stalin and other leaders were unanimously returned to office.

The Bolshevik revolution resulted in drastic social as well as political and economic changes in Russia. Education was taken over by the government and devoted to the task of destroying illiteracy and converting the people, especially the younger generation, to Communist principles. By the end of the First Five-Year Plan (1933), illiteracy, except among the older generation, was practically eliminated and the people seemed to have been effectively communized. Thereupon the work in the public schools was changed so as to include more factual information and less political and social philosophy. Books and newspapers were plentiful and cheap in price. With the development of foreign opposition to Russia, the principle of nationalism intruded itself into the Communist utopia. The doctrine of patriotism came to be emphasized in the schools, and the great rulers of Russia, such as Peter the Great and Catherine II, were extolled in books and in motion pictures.

Deprived of its control over education and of its property, the Greek Orthodox Church suffered a tremendous blow at the hands of the Bolsheviks. For centuries an integral part of the Old Regime, it was completely eliminated. Atheism became practically a state dogma, and all other religions were regarded as manifestations of capitalism. Although the government finally abandoned its policy of religious oppression and announced one of toleration toward all faiths, in no way did it regard the Church as an essential element in Communist social activity.

Family life was greatly modified as a result of the Communist opposition to religion and private property. Communist society, rather than family life, was emphasized by the Bolsheviks. Influenced by this idea, women were encouraged to obtain positions, and their responsibilities in the home were lightened by state nurses, community kitchens, and modern apartments. At first, marriage and divorce were made easy. Later, the government tightened the divorce laws and, like the bourgeois state, placed more emphasis upon the home.
In his attempt to westernize communism, Stalin changed his policies with regard to the intellectuals. At first, they were frowned upon in Communist Russia. Many, by pledging their loyalty to the new order, managed to save their lives or to escape exile. But they were forced to occupy low social positions and were distrusted by most Communists. After 1931, however, Stalin, as a part of his endeavor to make communism more realistic in practice, greatly improved the lot of the intellectuals. Teachers, engineers, and technical experts obtained wage increases and their children were no longer denied privileges granted to other children. Eventually the intellectuals occupied a high position in the Communist class hierarchy. Stalin favored not only the scientific intellectuals, but the artistic leaders as well. Under his patronage, artists, according to the Communists, tried to evolve a cultural life that would be of real value to world civilization. Russian music was revived, and motion pictures, literature, the drama, and history were used not only to interpret the revolutionary past, but also to extol certain Russian rulers.

In foreign affairs Russia regained her position as a great power. For a number of years after the revolution she was virtually ostracized. Irate because of Russia's repudiation of foreign debts, afraid of Communist propaganda, and hopeful of a White victory in Russia, European powers refused to recognize her. Until 1921 only the four Baltic countries—Lithuania, Latvia, Finland, and Estonia—had official diplomatic relations with the Soviet Republic. In that year, Great Britain, to expand her trade, entered into a provisional commercial treaty with Russia. Similar agreements were made about the same time with Germany, Austria, Italy, and Norway. A year later Russian delegates took part in the international conference concerning intergovernmental debts which met at Genoa. The meeting was a failure, but Russia came away with a treaty of amity with Germany.

Russia soon secured recognition and made commercial treaties with practically every major country save the United States; she also signed nonaggression pacts with Turkey, Germany, Afghanistan, Lithuania, Persia, Finland, Estonia, Poland, France, and Italy. In 1933 the clever Russian diplomat, Maxim Litvinov, achieved the crowning victory in his plan to restore friendly relations with all leading powers, when he got the outstanding apostle of capitalism, the United States, to recognize Soviet Russia. The rise of Hitler in Germany (1933) had accelerated Russia's rapprochement with the Western powers. With the enthusiastic support of France, Russia in 1934 became a member of the League of Nations, occupying a permanent seat in the Council. Meanwhile Hitler's flamboyant threats, his desire to conquer rich Russian territory in the Ukraine (as out-
lined in Mein Kampf), and his definite determination to overturn the League of Nations, had borne fruit. In 1935, Russia and France entered into a mutual assistance pact, in case of aggression by a third power, which had as one of its chief objectives the maintenance of the status quo.

While France was bringing Russia into the Allied camp, a "have-not" nation, Japan, moved toward Nazi Germany. Determined to dominate China to the exclusion of Western Powers, Japan joined Hitler in the war on communism in general and Communist China in particular.

Facing an enemy in the East as well as the West, Stalin adopted a very realistic internal and foreign policy. Conforming to the methods characteristic of dictators, he decided to eliminate all malcontents—those who accepted Trotsky's thesis that Stalin had betrayed the revolution, those who were critical of the government because industrial production in many branches had failed to increase at the rate predicted, and those who, by sabotage and intrigue with Russia's enemies—Germany and Japan—were trying to check this economic development. As a result of these purges, many important governmental officials, communist leaders, and high-ranking officers in the army were imprisoned or executed.

Engaged in this attempt to remove all disloyal persons, Stalin at the same time inaugurated a policy of greater preparedness. Because of this policy, the Russian navy, army, and air services were strengthened. Compulsory military service was adopted; the pay of soldiers increased; and graded ranks were re-established among the officers. In order to infuse the soldiers and sailors with the proper form of patriotism, instruction was given them in Communist ideas. This indoctrination, the government hoped, would cause them to look upon war as a crusade to end war, to abolish the profit system, and to enable men elsewhere to share the alleged benefits of communism. Skeptical of the feasibility of a world revolution against capitalism, Stalin seemed content to preserve communism in Russia. He asserted that if he could carry out Lenin's plans in his country, whereby a people could be made prosperous and happy through the abolition of the profit system, the introduction of a planned economy, and the attainment of real social equality, the rest of the world would imitate Russia voluntarily.

**THE RISE OF NATIONALIST DICTATORS: POST-WAR ITALY AND GERMANY**

As the result of a bitter resentment against the terms of the peace treaties and an intense fear of communism, nationalist dictators ap-
peared in Italy, Germany, and elsewhere. These strong men, especially Mussolini and Hitler, seemed at first to be the defenders of capitalism—the economic status quo. They inaugurated great programs of political and economic reform, but at the same time they permitted property to remain in private hands and the profit system to continue. Gradually their attitude toward capitalism changed. Constantly forced to expand and to intensify their policies of regulating and of regimenting the life of the people, they introduced into their countries regimes which in certain respects were more characteristic of Russian communism than of bourgeois capitalism.

The first of the important postwar dictators was Benito Mussolini (1883–1945), founder of Italian Fascism. An ardent Socialist before World War I he, as editor of Avanti, a Socialist newspaper, violently advocated Italian neutrality and favored a social revolution. Suddenly, he changed his beliefs, and became an enthusiastic patriot, urging Italian intervention in the war. Repudiated by the Socialists, he entered the Italian army as a private. In the spring of 1917 he was wounded and exempted from further military service. Thereupon, as owner and editor of a daily paper, Il Popolo d’Italia, he used his journalistic talent to sustain the Italian morale during the dreary months of war. After the armistice Mussolini organized a group of one hundred and fifty men known as the fascisti. Consisting chiefly of ex-
service men, nationalists, and former socialists, this organization adopted the fasces of the Roman lictors—signifying royal authority over life and limb—and prepared to check the spread of communism, to promote national unity, and to make Italy a great world power. Dynamic and ruthless, Mussolini possessed the qualities of character which enabled him to carry out this program. He understood people and knew how to appeal to their emotions.

Like its leader, Fascism was essentially a response to a particular set of circumstances. Though it had developed a certain quasi-philosophical flavor, unlike Bolshevism it was not at first based on any well-defined theory of the social order. It was the answer to disunion and disorganization in Italy and was in a sense a counter-challenge of communism. Postwar depression, economic discontent, political vacillation, had brought Italy immediately to the verge of a Communist revolution. In this emergency Mussolini, the former Socialist and by this time the leader of a capitalist counter-movement, put himself at the head of thousands of Fascist volunteers who marched on Rome (1922) and established a dictatorship.

It was as a nationalist that Mussolini made his strongest appeal to the Italian people. The nation, according to his Fascist ideology, was not merely the sum total of living individuals, nor the instrument of parties for their own ends, "but an organism comprising the unlimited series of generations of which individuals are merely transient elements; it is the synthesis of all the material and non-material values of the race." Claiming that the individual could not advance unless he moved shoulder to shoulder with others, he announced his determination to substitute obedience for liberty. Italy, and thereby every Italian, could achieve real greatness only through the repudiation of democratic rule and the establishment of Fascist dictatorship composed of the enlightened few who would serve in the name of all the classes and individuals who collectively constituted the nation.

Having adopted this Fascist concept of the state, Mussolini eliminated all "disloyal" groups and individuals who opposed his will. Armed with guns, cudgels, and castor oil, his followers, wearing black shirts, attacked communists, socialists, members of trade unions, Freemasons, and other enemies of the Fascist program. A strict censorship of the press, of speech, of assembly, and of education was established. All organizations, societies, groups, and individuals who opposed these policies were ruthlessly crushed. Meanwhile the world was given to understand that the Fascists were engaged primarily in the task of removing from Italy the threat of communism. The government, unstable, weak, and inefficient, offered slight opposition
to the Fascist domination. Unsatisfactory peace terms, tremendous debts, currency inflation, an unbalanced budget, internal disorders, and imperialist failures had discredited the parliamentary system of government in Italy. By 1922 thousands of landowners, employers, professional men and small businessmen and intelligentsia, had joined the Fascist Party believing that it would restore law and order, purify the state, destroy radicalism, and strengthen the nation.

Backed by these influential elements of society, Mussolini received from the Italian parliament virtual dictatorial powers (1922). Then he reorganized the government. Administrative offices and parliament were brought completely under his control (1922–1924) and municipal governments were abolished by governmental acts (1925–1926). Officials, called Podestas, appointed by the central authorities at Rome, took charge of all cities and towns, save the "Eternal City," which was already under the rule of a governor appointed by the state. Meanwhile Mussolini freed himself from dependence upon parliament and made himself responsible to the figure-head king whose authority was purely nominal. Control of the military, naval, and air forces was placed in the dictator's hands.

In order that his supremacy be insured, Mussolini fashioned his Fascist Party into a highly centralized and hierarchical organization with nearly two million members. It was really a state within a state. At its top was the Fascist Grand Council, presided over by Mussolini, Il Duce (the Leader). Inasmuch as he could appoint the members of this Council, Mussolini controlled the majority. Thus he was able to initiate, co-ordinate, and direct all party activities. In short, as head of the Italian government and as leader of the Fascist Party, Mussolini united the policies of government and party, and thereby dominated the state. Various organizations and officials in the Fascist Party carried out Mussolini's will. There was a National Directorate, wielding executive power (in addition to the National Council that exercised political and administrative control). There was also a General Secretariat and a secretary-general of the Fascisti. In the various provinces there were secretaries, councils, and directorates, similar to the national bodies. Both national and provincial secretaries were practically appointed by Mussolini. At the base of this centralized organization were ten thousand local fasci, called cells. Their secretaries were appointed by the provincial secretaries. Desirous of winning over the youth, Mussolini created a number of

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1 The electoral reform bill of 1923 helped to make the state more totalitarian by conceding a two-thirds majority in the Chamber of Deputies to the political party under this system, inevitably the Fascists, which got the largest number of votes.
auxiliary organizations for boys ranging from eight to twenty-one years, the Balilla, the Avanguardia, and the Giovani Fascisti, and, for girls, the Piccole Italiane and the Giovane Italiane. In a sense the Fascist militia became a national guard. Its officers were recruited from the national army; its members took the oath of allegiance to the king and received half-pay while on duty. Subject to call, this militia was used primarily to maintain law and order after Mussolini’s accession to power.

Caesarism was extended to the economic as well as to the political sphere of Italian activity. Determined to preserve the capitalistic system, Mussolini proposed a plan of co-operation between capital and labor. Both industrialists and workers were to be encouraged by the state. Their organizations, called syndicates, were to be recognized and collective bargaining was to be permitted under official auspices. Strikes, however, were abolished. Disputes had to be taken to the government’s labor court from which there was no appeal. In 1926, Mussolini decided to regiment both employers and employees by creating in Italy six (later reduced to four) national confederations of employers, seven (later reduced to four) of employees, and later on one of the intellectuals under the direct control of the state. Il Duce thus brought economic problems, especially the matter of
wages, hours of labor, and working conditions under his supervision. In 1928 he linked this syndicalist system more closely with the Fascist Party by granting to the syndicates of employers and employees the right to submit candidates for the Chamber of Deputies. By the electoral law of 1928, Mussolini abolished democratic suffrage. Four hundred candidates were carefully selected by Mussolini's Fascist Grand Council and then the voters were asked to accept or reject the lot as a whole. Actually, therefore, the deputies were appointed by the Grand Council whose choices were merely ratified by the people.

In 1934 Mussolini definitely completed his plan to create a corporate state when he announced that the legislative power of the Chamber of Deputies would eventually be transferred to the National Assembly of Corporations. This latter organization was composed of the representatives of employers, employees, and technicians in the twenty-two divisions of Italy's productive life. Theoretically each corporation of employees and employers managed its own affairs; it was charged with the task of lowering costs of production, and maintaining fair wages, profits, and prices; also its representatives in the National Assembly of Corporations could suggest and vote upon governmental legislation. Actually, all decisions of Corporations and of the National Assembly were subject to the review of the Grand Council and of Il Duce. According to Mussolini this corporative system would bring about the complete collaboration of all classes for the welfare of the state. In defending this plan Il Duce asserted that the people wanted, not liberty, but railways, houses, bridges, roads, light, and other economic improvements which would result in a higher standard of living. The Fascist state, in adopting this vast scheme of economic reform, planned to realize this popular desire.

In 1929, Mussolini strengthened his cause by a settlement with the Pope. In the Lateran Treaty he healed the long quarrel with the Church by giving the Pope sovereign rights, diplomatic honors, and a financial indemnity. By this act he made it possible for the Italians to be both Fascist and Catholic.

In its attempt to refashion the agrarian, industrial, and cultural life of Italy, the government encountered grave obstacles. Lack of capital perhaps was the most important difficulty. By drastic economies Mussolini was able to reduce the national deficit, but at no time did he possess sufficient funds to subsidize adequately this economic program. The government also faced the problems of overpopulation and lack of certain essential natural resources, such as coal, iron ore, and oil. Under these conditions the fascist economic program seemed destined to fail.

Conscious of these problems and deficiencies Mussolini decided to
solve them through the revival of imperialism. He realized, however, that before Italy could obtain markets, raw materials, and outlets for her surplus population, she must be strong enough to impose her will upon resentful rivals. Therefore he begged all Italian mothers to assist in the patriotic duty of increasing the already dense population. At the same time he devoted his energies to the task of developing Italy's available resources. Announcing loudly his determination to make his country eventually self-sustaining, to eliminate unemployment, to augment Italy's productive capacity, and to increase greatly her military and naval power, Mussolini first plunged into his so-called "Battle of Agriculture." By fostering improvements in irrigation and fertilization of the soil, by subsidizing large grain growers, and by bestowing medals of distinction on successful farmers, he greatly stimulated agricultural production, especially of wheat.

Despite the tremendous financial cost of this economic program, Mussolini also tried to improve conditions in the fields of industry and transportation, and by so doing to eliminate unemployment. He inaugurated a vast project of public works, of reforestation, of marsh drainage, of railway and highway improvements, of shipbuilding, and of hydroelectric development. Large sums of government money were devoted to the production of rayon and silk, to the expansion of the merchant marine, and to the building of a powerful army and navy.

Prior to 1931, Mussolini achieved considerable success in his attempt to promote agriculture and industry, and at the same time to balance the budget. In fact Italy, in 1929–1930, had a budget surplus of several million liras. After 1931 the budget was badly out of balance. The national debt increased tremendously and there was some unemployment. Many critics of the corporate state maintained that the Italian masses would not continue to endure the lowering of their living standards. Good patriots, they had thus far submitted to Mussolini's leadership in this campaign to build a bigger and a better Italy. They did not question *Il Duce*'s patriotism. Moreover, they admitted that in many ways he had contributed to their welfare. By means of unemployment and industrial insurance he had given them a degree of economic security. In his war upon disease and slums he had promoted their health and comfort. Through his generous support of education he had taught many of them to read and write. They even accepted his plan of creating a totalitarian state by directing their hours of relaxation through the promotion of music, drama, and other cultural pursuits. But this loyalty was bound in time to demand a substantial reward. "Could Mussolini then be able to hand
over to his people the gift he wanted above everything else to give them—the loot of empire?"

Il Duce’s foreign policy had been chiefly concerned with the carrying out of Italy’s imperial ambitions. “The tendency toward imperialism,” declared Mussolini, “is one of the elementary trends of human nature, an expression of the will to power. . . . So long as man lives, he is an imperialist, when he is dead, for him imperialism is over.”

Another time he said, “Italy has need of expansion, and expand she will, despite the selfish embargo placed on her ambitions by the older colonizing Powers of the Peace Conference.” Determined to obtain for Italy a real place in the sun, he first turned to the East. By the Treaty of Lausanne between Turkey and the Allies (1923) Italian ownership of the Dodecanese Islands was recognized. In the following year, Italy by a treaty with Yugoslavia obtained control of the important Adriatic city of Fiume. Then, to strengthen his position in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean regions, Mussolini between 1924 and 1930 arranged conciliation and arbitration agreements with Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Spain, and Austria. Albania, despite the opposition of Yugoslavia and France, was made an Italian protectorate (1926–1927). In 1939, Mussolini annexed the little state, making it a part of the Italian Empire.

Despite these manifestations of imperialism, Mussolini maintained that his numerous conciliation and arbitration treaties, his adherence to the Locarno and Paris agreements, and his willingness to participate in a disarmament movement, proved that his policies were pacific. To give further evidence of his honorable intentions Il Duce
in 1933 expressed a desire to co-operate with France who opposed his designs in the Adriatic and his demands for naval parity. He also proposed that Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy sign a Four Power Pact whereby they agreed to maintain a policy of peaceful co-operation for ten years. Inasmuch as his scheme envisaged a revision of the peace treaties and the rearming of the defeated powers it did not win the enthusiastic support of France. But when the scheme was changed so as to provide that any revision of the peace treaties and existing boundaries must be in accordance with the League Covenant, France accepted the plan. In July, 1933, the pact was signed by the representatives of the four great powers. The acceptance of the agreement was a diplomatic victory for its sponsor, Mussolini. Germany was grateful because of his stand in favor of a revision of the peace treaties; and France, realizing that she now had a powerful neighbor across the Rhine (Germany), expressed a vague sympathy for Italy's imperialistic aspirations in North Africa.

Attempting to take advantage of this diplomatic success, and convinced that British isolationism and French fear of Germany would nullify their opposition, Mussolini, a year later (1934), decided to inaugurate an aggressive imperialist policy in Ethiopia. By means of this adventure Mussolini hoped to eliminate the social discontent which existed in Italy as a result of high prices, low wages, and unemployment. Moved by patriotic fervor the Italian people, he believed, would forget about their domestic troubles and support him in his attempt to avenge the defeat of the Italian forces at Adowa in 1896, and to re-establish a Mediterranean empire providing raw materials and opportunities for investment and colonization. Accordingly he sent his legions into the ancient land of the King of Kings under the pretext of settling Italo-Ethiopian border disorders. In making war on this semi-civilized country, Mussolini disregarded an agreement arranged in 1906 by Great Britain, France, and Italy (in which they recognized Ethiopia's independence), the membership of the latter in the League of Nations, and a treaty of friendship between Italy and Ethiopia in which they agreed to submit their controversies to arbitration (1928). On the other hand, Mussolini justified his intervention by claiming that the Allies had recognized Italian rights in Ethiopia during the war, but had inaugurated policies of economic expansion in Ethiopia despite their promise to the contrary. Therefore Italy's aggression was thought of by the Italians as being defensive.

Encouraged by Great Britain and France, Ethiopia appealed to the League to stop Italian intervention, but to no avail. Mussolini, refusing to recognize the League's right to interfere, conquered a large
part of this country. Meanwhile the League, unable to obtain the complete co-operation of Great Britain and France, offered ineffective opposition to Italy's conquest of Ethiopia. Inasmuch as this Italian adventure threatened the imperialist interests of England—the Suez Canal, for example—more than those of France, the British

lion did resort to all methods short of war to check the Italian advance. After devoting much time to futile discussion, the League, in response to British demands, finally decided to resort to a financial and economic boycott of Italy (November, 1935). Although this boycott hampered Fascist efficiency, it did not check the advance of the Italian forces in Africa. After seven months of warfare, the main objective of the Italian campaign was reached. Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, was occupied (May 5, 1936), the emperor of the country, Haile Selassie, was in flight, and Ethiopia was formally declared part of the Italian colonial empire. Thus, except for Liberia, the last independent African state had lost its independence.

As a result of this conquest, Mussolini strengthened his popularity in Italy and the League of Nations lost much of its prestige in the world. For a time the League continued the economic sanctions against Italy, stubbornly maintaining that this country had gone to war in disregard of her League obligations. On July 15, 1936, however, that body finally suspended these sanctions. Italy, it appeared,
had defeated the League. Disregarding this capitulation, many states, especially Great Britain, refused to recognize Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia. Thereupon, Mussolini, determined to strengthen his position in the Mediterranean, extended de jure recognition to the insurgent government in Spain which had been set up by General Franco at Burgos (November, 1936). As a counter challenge to the anti-Fascist help for the loyalist cause in Spain from many foreign countries (especially Russia), he permitted Italian “volunteers,” airplanes, and submarines to go to the insurgent cause. Nazi Germany also decided to back the nationalist movement.

After World War I, Germany, like Italy, faced an economic collapse and revolutionary chaos. In November, 1918, as the military defeat of Germany was becoming apparent, revolution broke out in various parts of the country. It began in the High Seas fleet which had spent the last two years of the war cooped up and inactive in the Kiel Canal. Alarmed by these revolts and by the increase of popular opposition, all the kings and princes, including the kaiser, abdicated or fled. Within a week there was not a monarch left in Germany. The catastrophe had not only overthrown the reigning dynasties, but had paralyzed temporarily the reactionary and conservative elements of society. Only the Social Democratic Party, numerically the largest in Germany, was prepared to assume the role of leadership at this critical time. It accepted this task and created the German Republic.

Although the Social Democrats advocated the establishment of a socialist state in theory, the majority of them favored in practice the creation of a liberal bourgeois republic. Representing the moderate trade unions, rather than the rank and file of German workers, they opposed vigorously the attempts of the Communists to establish a proletarian state. In 1918–1919, a successful Communist revolution seemed possible. The old ruling groups, rendered helpless by the national collapse, stood by while independent socialists and other extremists (called “Spartacists”), led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, placed firearms in the hands of the proletariat, raised red flags in numerous cities, and organized soviet government by workers, soldiers, and peasants' deputies. But the radical uprising was suppressed, and Liebknecht and Luxemburg were assassinated. Thus the Social Democrats, in restoring law and order, saved Germany for the industrialists and the junks, and by so doing prepared the way unintentionally for the rise of Hitler.

1 For discussion of international aspects of the Spanish Civil War see pp. 481-484.

2 They took their name from Spartacus, leader of a slave revolt in ancient Rome.
After the suppression of radicalism the provisional government, dominated by the Social Democrats, scheduled an election on the basis of universal suffrage of a National Assembly that was to draw up a constitution for the new German Republic. By this time the bourgeoisie had recovered courage. Consequently they were able in the elections to obtain control of the National Assembly. In addition to large delegations of socialist and of bourgeois parties there were also in this assembly smaller groups representing the monarchy, the industrialists, and the Catholics.

These delegates, meeting at Weimar, shrine of German liberalism, on February 6, 1919, drew up and adopted the German Republican Constitution. The Weimar Constitution established a framework of government on the basis of the classic principle of liberalism. It created a democratic government which consisted of a bicameral parliament, a president, a cabinet, and an advisory national economic council. It also contained a bill of rights, which guaranteed freedom of speech, press, and assembly, but which imposed limitations on personal and property rights in the interest of social welfare. On February 11 the moderate Socialist leader, Ebert, as head of the provisional government, signed the document. The National Assembly then moved to Berlin and acted as a Reichstag until the new government was formally established (June 6, 1920). Meanwhile various attempts on the part of reactionaries as well as radicals to overturn the new republic were suppressed. A plan, apparently supported by French officials, to detach the Rhineland from Germany and set up an independent state also failed dismally. By 1924 these disintegrating movements seemed to have been driven underground and the unity of the Republic appeared secure.

The establishment of this democracy delivered the German bourgeoisie from the menace of communism. Even with the ballot in the hands of the proletariat, the property owners could and did manage to retain a large share of political control. This power, secured directly through the ballot and indirectly through the acceptance of many middle-class views by the moderate elements in the Social Democratic Party, safeguarded the rights of property and prevented the socialization of commerce and industry. Certain obstacles, however, stood in the way of the Republic. From the first a large group of German patriots of all classes identified the greatness of Germany with the Hohenzollern Empire and tended in their thinking to link democracy with defeat and revolution. This latent hostility to the Republic might have been overcome if Germany could have experienced in the early postwar period an era of prosperity and national recovery. But such a revival was made unlikely largely because
of the failure to tax adequately the wealthy industrialists, the extravagant waste of money on public works, and the harsh treatment accorded Germany by the victorious Allies. Not only was Germany humiliated by the military and economic provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, but also she had to suffer diplomatic slights from her late enemies. These conditions undermined the feeble prestige of the Republic, especially during the years prior to the Locarno Pacts (1925).

Despite these obstacles the democratic government tried to restore Germany. Reactionary and radical uprisings were crushed, and an attempt was made to re-establish commerce and industry. But the cabinet, a coalition of Socialists, Democrats, and Centrists, was unable to guide the country to a real recovery. Germany simply could not meet the reparation payments to the Allies and at the same time re-establish normal economic conditions. Most of her markets, especially in France and the United States, were practically destroyed by the erection of tariff barriers. This loss of foreign markets and the poverty of the domestic markets so reduced economic activity in Germany that reparations had to be paid out of the capital of the country.

The Republic also had to deal with a perplexing problem of currency. Inflation began during World War I when the imperial government, unwilling to resort to heavy taxation to pay the cost of the struggle, proceeded to inflate its currency. Confronted by the problems of unemployment, need of food and raw materials, and the necessity of making reparation payments, the postwar government, now under the control of Wilhelm Cuno and other representatives of Big Business, decided to inflate the currency still further rather than to tax business heavily. The result of this policy was the steady depreciation of the mark. In 1921 the mark, which before the war had been worth twenty-five cents, had declined to sixty to the dollar. Continued deficits in the national budget which resulted from this depreciation led to further inflation. By November, 1922, a dollar would purchase over seven thousand marks. In 1923, Germany was in a dilemma. Unable to meet the heavy reparation payments demanded by the Allied Commission, the Germans were forced to submit to the occupation of their great industrial region, the Ruhr, by French and Belgian troops. The policy of passive resistance, to which the government resorted, completely disorganized the financial and economic structure of the Republic. The mark immediately started to tumble down the toboggan slide. Quoted at 14,000 to a dollar when the Ruhr occupation began, in the spring of 1923 it declined from 160,000 to 1,100,000 to the dollar during July,
and by the end of the year stood at 4,000,000,000,000 to the dollar.

Collapse of the mark completely dislocated German economic and social life. Savings, pensions, and insurance were destroyed; and mortgages, bonds, and notes were paid off with worthless currency, thus transferring wealth from the creditor to the debtor class. Inability of wages to keep pace with the sinking mark resulted in a decline in the standard of living. All incentive to thrift was destroyed. The chief aim of most Germans was to transfer currency into tangibles. This, in turn, produced an artificial industrial boom. Undoubtedly the most disastrous consequence of the currency debacle was the destruction of a great part of the prosperous bourgeois class. These unfortunate people, with fixed incomes derived from interest, rents; and even such flexible sources as fees, salaries, and profits, found it very difficult to keep up with the rapid and continuous rise in prices. Savings lost practically all of their values; pensioners and rentiers starved; families, formerly well situated, had to eat plain foods and discharge their servants. In fact, thousands of men, women, and children were forced to depend upon charity for their existence. Many middle-class persons found themselves pushed into the ranks of the proletariat. Industrial and financial tycoons, farmers, and workers, on the other hand, were not hit so hard. During the war Big Business had made great profits. In the period of postwar inflation, plutocrats were able to use this wealth to improve their positions by getting rid of bonded debts and expanding their properties or acquiring additional holdings at bargain prices, or hoard it in foreign banks. Many small businessmen and farmers also managed to survive inflation by holding on to their stores and farms. Even the wage earner was paid enough to insure a bare living.

During this critical period, Stresemann, an industrialist and head of the upper bourgeois People's Party which favored the monarchical form of government, assumed an important role in the German cabinet. As chancellor, in 1922, he put down reactionary and radical opposition, aiming his heaviest blows at the left which he regarded as the most dangerous foe of the bourgeois republic. As foreign minister (1923–1929), he tried to bring Germany out of her economic and diplomatic isolation. He strengthened the friendly relations with Soviet Russia which had been established by the Treaty of Rapallo (1922); he helped to obtain the acceptance of the Dawes Plan by the Reichstag; 1 and in 1925, in co-operation with Briand the great statesman of France, he succeeded in bringing about the adoption of the Locarno Treaties whereby Germany accepted the new frontiers in

1 Agreed upon in the spring of 1924, the Plan lowered the annual payments of German reparations. See pp. 399–400.
the west and agreed to submit to arbitration disputes over the eastern frontier. According to the terms of the settlement, Great Britain and Italy promised to support either France or Germany against aggression from the other. Impressed by Stresemann's friendly policy, the former Allies in 1926 admitted Germany into the League of Nations and thereby recognized her as an equal.

Between 1924 and 1929 Germany experienced a superficial recovery. Under the direction of the business interests the extensive loans from foreign bankers were devoted to the creation of vertical trusts, to the development of mass production, to the promotion of industrial efficiency, and to the establishment of pensions and unemployment doles. Commercial expansion also was facilitated through treaties concluded with all of the important powers. This economic development was accompanied by a resurgence of patriotism. Following the death of Ebert in 1925, the first president of the German Republic, the monarchists and other reactionaries persuaded the German war hero, Field Marshal von Hindenburg, to run for this office. Patriots rallied to his support and, as a result, the left-wingers were defeated as a monarchist was elected president of the Republic. But contrary to fears abroad that Hindenburg's election presaged a reactionary development, he took the oath to the constitution and, for nine years, served as the ostensible head of the government.

In 1929, Germany's rapid economic revival was halted and her democratic government faced an uncertain future. The beginning of a world depression made it impossible for Germany to continue floating the foreign loans which had facilitated her recovery; high tariff walls, raised by other countries, prevented further extension of her commerce; and a rapid fall in wages and agricultural prices brought about a decline of purchasing power in the domestic market. By 1929 a reduction in industrial activity resulted in a steady rise in unemployment. Despite the lightening of the reparation burden by the Young Plan, economic conditions grew steadily worse. In 1930–1931 the situation in Germany became so bad that the former Allies first declared a moratorium for one year of reparation payments and intergovernmental debts, and later (1932) consented to an almost complete cancelation of reparation payments.

By this time, however, the German Republic was virtually doomed. Industry continued to decline; unemployment to expand; wages to fall; and taxes to rise. In 1932 nine-tenths of the German people were barely existing on low wages or salaries; and society was being proletarianized. Discontent spread to all classes. Communists, Socialists, and workers' unions were suspicious of one another. Industrialists,
bankers, and great landowners (Junkers) bitterly denounced the republican government, claiming that it was protecting the workers by providing pensions, doles, apartment houses, and other luxuries at the expense of the property owners. The little businessmen, on the other hand, maintained that the government was aiding Big Business in its attempt to gain complete control of industry. Unable to check the advance of monopoly rule and yet unwilling to join the proletariat, the bourgeoisie faced extinction.

Fear of communism, on the part of reactionaries, conservatives, and erstwhile liberals and moderates, finally paved the way for the downfall of the German Republic. By 1932 certain German Aryans were developing real hostility to the Jewish people who, though comprising one per cent of the entire population, were said to control many of the large banks, the great industries, the big department stores, and the professions. But the rapid spread of communism among the workers and even the petty bourgeoisie created the real panic among the propertied classes. As taxes mounted, they tended to accept the ideas expressed by the Nazis (National Socialists) that the Jews and the Marxists were the suspicious characters in Germany's political woodpile. According to the Nazis, these radicals and aliens were intent merely upon their own selfish gains and, in time, were determined to take over the country. All classes—businessmen, farmers, and workers—would suffer should these subversive groups achieve this aim.

As nationalist discontent and hatred of alien groups increased, certain little businessmen began to cluster around a leader who had newly risen from their midst. This messiah—Adolf Hitler—was born in Austria (1889) and was the son of a humble customs inspector of the Dual Monarchy. As a mere youth he had gone to Vienna to study architecture but had not been very successful. Shortly before the outbreak of World War I, Hitler, having developed a strong hatred of Marxist socialism and semiticism, left this "racial Babylon" of Vienna and went to Munich where he obtained a job as a house painter. During the war, which he welcomed fervently, he served in the German army as a private and later as a sergeant, winning the Iron Cross for bravery in combat. After the struggle he organized a National Socialist German Workers' Party and, in 1920, announced a program of twenty-five points, similar in many respects to the platform of Italian Fascism.

In 1923, Hitler, Ludendorff, and others engaged in an attempt at Munich to overthrow the existing regime. Invading a beer hall on

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Rise of Hitler

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1 Aryan is really a linguistic term, but it is used in Germany to imply racial purity, i.e., descent from Aryan ancestry.
November 9, 1923, the Austrian orator announced his determination to "clear out the Jewish-Marxist pigsty in Berlin." Police dispersed the parade of the Nationalist Socialists, as they now called themselves, the next day, and Hitler was given a light jail sentence. During his prison term of only a few months he wrote part of his volume of memoirs, entitled Mein Kampf (My Fight). After his release, Hitler organized his followers, adopting the swastika as his emblem, and creating a semi-military force of more than a half-million "brown shirts," or shock troops. This preliminary work soon bore fruit. In 1929–1930, the depression hit Germany, and Hitler with a well-organized group of followers and a program that appealed to all classes became a new savior for millions of people.

Hitler possessed many of the personal qualities essential for a dictator. Der Führer (The Leader), as he came to be called, combined the talents of a demagogue with those of a statesman. "He is," wrote Henri Lichtenberger in his The Third Reich, "a popular orator of the first order.... He has also the undeniable gifts of seduction; he knows how to tame men and allure women. He is a man of iron will and tireless activity. And he possesses also the flair of the born politician, that intuition which permits him to sense the confused aspirations of the crowd, to discern how the wind is blowing, and to divine what should be and could be done at each particular moment. Hitler's appeal to the masses is further enhanced by the fact that he is 'a man of the people.'"

Keenly cognizant of the many conflicting elements and tendencies which existed in Germany, Hitler won the masses over to the Nazi cause. He did this by offering the discontented Germans a militant and nationalistic program which was opposed alike to communism and democracy and was designed to re-establish internal order and prosperity and to regain external prestige for Germany. This platform appealed to most discontented groups. Industrialists and landowners were won over by his condemnation of socialism and communism; the middle classes were attracted by his opposition to Big Business, as represented by large department and chain stores, and by his intense patriotism; and the proletarians were converted by his denunciation of Jewish capitalism and his promises of social and economic reforms. Patriotic Germans of all parties accepted with enthusiasm Hitler's promise (found in Mein Kampf), to free Germany from the shackles of the Treaty of Versailles. They visualized the restoration of Germany's international prestige through the repudiation of the thesis of German war guilt, the refusal to make further reparation payments, a drastic revision of the Polish corridor and other adjustments on the eastern frontier, the return of the
German colonies, the long-desired Anschluss with Austria, and the right of all Germans to unite and to arm.

Unable to reach these objectives, and on the verge of a revolution as a result of the depression, the Republic gradually sank into oblivion. In March, 1930, Heinrich Brüning, the Centrist leader, became head of a new cabinet. During the next two years he tried to maintain the republican form of government. But, with the proletariat unenthusiastic over his program, with the middle classes accepting Hitler's leadership, and with the aristocratic and plutocratic classes flirting with reaction and with the Nazi Party, Brüning and his colleagues saw the Republic's supports crumble one after another.

In the elections of April 24, 1932, to the Diet, the Nazi group became the dominant organization in Prussia and the second largest party in Bavaria. Although Brüning retained considerable support in the Reichstag, President Hindenburg (recently re-elected) was forced by reactionary intrigue to dismiss Brüning and to place the government in the hands of a group of reactionary nationalists first under von Papen and then under von Schleicher. Centrists, Nazis, and Junkers now engaged in a struggle for power. Meanwhile, a split within the ranks of the ruling clique enabled Hitler to enter the government. Determined to overthrow his rival, von Schleicher, who had displaced him as chancellor in December, 1932, von Papen, an unscrupulous intriguer, arranged a deal with Hitler, whereby certain great bankers and steel magnates (Fritz Thyssen, Hugenberg, and others) would support a Nazi-nationalist government with Hitler as chancellor, von Papen as vice-chancellor, and Hugenberg as Minister of Agriculture and Commerce. Thus with a majority of the cabinet non-Nazi, it was assumed that Hitler would be easily managed by his feudal colleagues. Hitler accepted the post of chancellor, and on January 30, 1933, was in a position to launch his drive for supreme power.

As chancellor, Hitler made himself the undisputed dictator—Der Führer—of Germany. Backed by the little businessmen and peasants, he liquidated the Socialists, the Communists, and the trade unions by dissolving and outlawing their party organizations, and by punishing their leaders. On March 12, the black-red-gold republican flag was discarded, and the black-white-red flag of the empire and the swastika banner of the Nazis were substituted. In 1935, the latter became the official flag of the Third Reich. With the support of Hugenberg's Nationalists, the Nazis in March, 1933, forced the Reichstag to pass an Enabling Act which gave the cabinet dictatorial authority, thus driving the last nail into the coffin of the Republic. Having taken over supreme power in the cabinet Hitler proceeded to put
down all opposition. In June, he suppressed the Social Democratic Party. Meanwhile, with the aid of Goebbels, his Minister of Propaganda, and Goering, the Prussian Premier, Hitler overpowered the Nationalist parties and placed a majority of Nazis in the cabinet. In July he signed a concordat with the Pope and dissolved the Center and Bavarian Parties, announcing that the Nazi organization was the only legal political group in Germany. Thus Hitler within a few months had established a dictatorship.

Property owners contributed to this Nazi triumph. Many Germans of the small bourgeois classes, having lost confidence in the Republic, supported the National Socialists. Junkers, industrialists, and bankers threw the resources of the National Federation of German Employers Association, the National Federation of German Industry, the National Chamber of Commerce, and the Herren Klub behind Hitler's program. They favored especially his plan to suppress radicalism and to discipline the workingman. In order to carry out this nationalist-capitalist revolution, Hitler destroyed all opposition. Freedom of speech, assembly, and the press vanished; Jews were persecuted and discriminated against in the professions and in business; republican clubs were dissolved; and thousands of enemies of the Nazi state were confined in concentration camps, i.e., places where anti-Nazis were concentrated and kept under guard.
In the spring of 1934, however, dissension developed within the Nazi ranks. A number of leaders from the left wing of the party wanted Hitler to suppress the industrialists and the Junkers as he had the Marxists and liberals. Instead, Hitler announced that the revolution was over and that he would crush any attempt to overthrow the present order. Despite this warning certain leaders of the Storm Troopers' opposed Hitler's will. As a result Der Führer flew to Munich and ordered Röhm, Heines, and others killed. In Berlin, Goering arrested and shot other enemies of Hitler. Squads of Storm Troopers and the Gestapo (secret police) participated in the purge.

While he was liquidating all opposition to and in the Nazi Party, Hitler created a totalitarian state. Leadership was made a principle of political and social organization. According to Herr Goering, "Authority goes from top to bottom, but Responsibility always from bottom to top. . . . Der Führer carries the final responsibility as he carries it before his God and his people . . . His will is law." Regents, representing Der Führer's will, were appointed in each of the component states, save Prussia where Hitler assumed the position of regent. Upon the death of President Hindenburg, 1934, a further step in the direction of totalitarianism was taken when the Reich cabinet decided to unite in Hitler the offices of president and chancellor. Meanwhile all popular government, state and local, was abolished, and sovereign rights of the states were transferred to the central government. The Reich was thus transformed from a federal into a centralized and unified state.

Having established his political supremacy Hitler nationalized and co-ordinated the economic and cultural life of Germany. Labor was deprived of its right to organize unions, to bargain collectively, to picket, and to strike. Employers' associations were also abolished. In the place of these groups was formed a German Labor Front, comprising both employers and employees. In order to control this organization Hitler divided the Reich into thirteen districts and appointed in each one a Trustee of Labor board. This board had the right to fix wages, to settle labor disputes, and to dismiss followers and leaders. Its decisions could be appealed to State Honor Courts, but such action was rare. Agriculture as well as industry was co-ordinated. At first the government helped some of the peasants by placing them on lands formerly possessed by Junkers and by granting them credit. To keep the peasant farms from being split into small holdings, the government also created hereditary peasant farms. Inasmuch as these estates could not be mortgaged, the owners found it difficult to borrow the money necessary for their operation. Steadily, the new

1 Members of the official Nazi Party militia.
regime brought agriculture more and more under state control. The objective of this policy was to raise the standard of living and to increase the production of foodstuffs so as to make Germany practically a self-sufficing nation. To this end, the government not only aided the farmer in the reclamation of waste land, but supervised practically every phase of agricultural life. As a result of this policy agricultural production, according to Nazi statistics, rose from 8.7 milliard reichsmarks in 1932 to 12 milliard reichsmarks in 1937.

German cultural and moral life was also co-ordinated. As head of the Ministry of Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment, Dr. Joseph Goebbels regimented public opinion. All types of expression—newspapers, theaters, motion pictures, music, and the arts—were controlled by this ministry with the purpose of fusing German emotional, moral, and intellectual life into a uniform spiritual mold. Education was overhauled by the Ministry of Education with the purpose of producing youths who would be strong, obedient, and loyal soldiers of the Third Reich. Service of six months in the labor camps and several years in the military were required of all young boys. Labor camps, at first not compulsory, were established for Nazi girls. In these camps they were trained to become mothers and workers in the home. Judges were directed to emphasize the security of the Nazi regime rather than the rights of the individual.

Hitler attempted to regiment the Church as well as the state. Under the direction of Goering the Protestant churches were to be organized along totalitarian lines in accordance with Nazi principles. The Church Synod was to be controlled by the German Christians—those subscribing to a German Nazi church. Certain extremists proposed that the Holy Bible at this time be purged of everything un-German. Thus the new Christian Church would be able to exalt pagan virility and hardihood, rather than piety and humility. Powerful Protestant opposition, however, confronted the Nazis in their attempt to regiment the Church. And while Hitler succeeded in bringing that institution under his control, many Churchmen consistently refused to subscribe to the neo-paganism of the Nazis. Catholics also fought Hitler's attempt to subordiate the Church to the state. In 1933 he tried to arrange a settlement with the Pope, negotiating a concordat whereby the Vatican relinquished the right of Catholic organizations in Germany to engage in political activities. Hitler, in return, promised not to interfere with Catholic educational, cultural, and youth organizations as long as they did not meddle in politics. But the terms of this settlement were not observed. Determined to obtain complete control of German youth, he denounced the Catholic youth movement, charging its leaders with
illegal association with Communists. Meanwhile the Church criticized severely Hitler’s racial ideology and his sterilization laws whereby physical and mental misfits were to be sterilized. In 1937 another crisis between Church and state arose when Hitler, accusing the Catholic teachers of immorality, determined to abolish certain Catholic schools in Bavaria.

In his attempt to re-establish unity, Der Führer embarked on a crusade to bring about racial purification. Jews and other non-Germanic elements that endangered, as he claimed, the purity of the “Aryan” race were ruthlessly suppressed. In September, 1935, the Nazi Reichstag met at Nuremberg in conjunction with the “Congress of Freedom” of the Nazi Party. Here the swastika flag was made the sole official banner of the Reich; new laws deprived all Jews of citizenship; and marriages between Jews and Christians were forbidden. As a result of this policy, over 100,000 Jews fled; hundreds committed suicide; and virtually all Jews suffered personal humiliations, impoverishment, and political oppression.

Disregarding a certain amount of hostility to his political, economic, religious, and racial policies, Hitler insisted that his National Socialist program had but one aim—the creation of a great Germany. “Fundamentally,” he said, “our National Socialist program replaces the liberalistic conception of the individual and the Marxist conception of humanity at large by the conception of a nation bound by breeding to a common soil. . . . It is the grandest and thereby the most sacred task of man to preserve his kind as devised by God and propagated by breeding.” With pride he called attention to the fact that “countless sons of workmen and peasants are today in leading positions in the Nazi state,” and claimed that the Nazi program “looks towards the whole people and never towards a single class. The purpose of the National Socialist revolution is not to deprive a privileged class of its rights for all future, but to raise a class without rights to equality.” In advocating this Hitler claimed that he was carrying out the will of the people as expressed by its party—the Nazis.

While professing to know little about economic theory, Hitler, from the beginning of his rule in 1933, introduced drastic economic changes. In outlining his program he definitely described such phrases as “economic freedom” and “rugged individualism” as of no importance. Instead, he declared that it was the duty of the state to direct the available working power for the purposes of a useful production. “The community of the nation does not live by the fictitious value of money,” he said, “but by the real production which in its turn only gives value to money. This production is the real cover of currency, and not a bank or safe full of gold!” In a speech before the
German Reichstag (February, 1938) Hitler proclaimed the success of his economic policies particularly the Four-Year Plan announced in 1936. After calling attention to his "powerful peace-time army" he stated that under National Socialism agriculture, industry, and commerce had experienced remarkable expansion. He proudly asserted that this economic advance had been made without foreign assistance and was due solely to the nation's own efforts under its own leadership. He claimed that only through production and expansion—not higher wages and shorter hours—could the German standard of living be raised and again stated that Germany's future rested solely in the "orbit of her wisdom and energy," not in "salvation in the form of any kind of aid from outside, whether of a political, economic, or financial nature."

Hitler actually did not believe in a complete self-enclosed economic system. Wherever possible, he invaded the markets of the world. His economic diplomacy, unlike England's, was conducted on a bilateral quid pro quo basis with goods exchanged for goods (the barter system). Money was still useful; but to Germany as well as Italy, it was ultimately less necessary than military might to seize raw materials. Thus Hitler devoted a large part of his capital, his man power, and his raw materials to a rearmament program. As a result, this increased production and trade did not benefit the masses, inasmuch as they were forced to go without necessities in order to support military preparations. They also had to submit to long hours of labor and to heavy taxation without receiving the compensation of higher wages.

On the other hand, the great industrialists in Germany at first prospered as a result of this economic expansion. Their incomes were increased and no special taxes were levied upon them. Thus they alone were able to enjoy higher incomes and a higher standard of living as a result of Hitler's system of economic planning. Constantly fearing the development of unrest among the masses, Hitler, like Mussolini, was forced to introduce policies designed to curb not only the profits and the power of Big Business, but also to stimulate German patriotism. He was obliged to identify himself with the most extravagant expectations of nationalistic fanaticism as a means of sustaining popular enthusiasm. Thus it was in the field of diplomacy that Hitler was able to win his most notable victories and to gain from the Germans their most ardent support.

After the Treaty of Versailles Germany followed a well-defined policy of passive resistance to the financial terms of the peace settlements. Hitler, unlike his predecessors, however, was determined not only to oppose reparation payments, but also to achieve equality in
the rights of armament, to recover the lost provinces and colonies, and to restore Germany's international prestige. In attempting to reach these ends, he abandoned the earlier policy of conciliation and bargaining and resorted to one of repudiation, defiance, and force.

In 1933, he began his policy of repudiation by withdrawing from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations. Two years later he obtained the endorsement of the people of the Saar when they voted to return to Germany. He also added to his popularity by subjecting the city of Danzig to Nazi control in defiance of the League. But he won his greatest diplomatic victory that year when he repudiated the disarmament clauses of the peace treaty and announced that Germany intended to establish universal military conscription so as to rebuild her powerful army. Great Britain, France, and Italy protested through the League of Nations, but Hitler secured a tacit acceptance of Great Britain to certain aspects of Ger-
man rearmament by signing a treaty with that country whereby Germany agreed to build a fleet only 35 per cent as large as that of the British. On July 1, 1935, he went a step further in repudiating the Versailles Treaty by re-establishing the German General Military Staff. But in 1936 he achieved his most important diplomatic victory. Professing to be angry as a result of the creation of another Dual Alliance between Russia and France, he occupied the Rhineland region which had been demilitarized by the Treaty of Versailles. France and Belgium at once sent vigorous protest to Hitler, but, lacking the enthusiastic support of Italy and Great Britain who were quarreling at that time over Ethiopia, they failed to act.

By 1938, Hitler seemed determined not only to change completely the verdict of Versailles, but also to carry out certain foreign policies that were largely the result of his Nazi ideology and of the economic needs of Germany. These ambitions he revealed in his famous book, Mein Kampf. In that work he proclaimed his intention of building a “Great” Germany through the annexation of Austria, the annihilation of French hegemony in Europe, the abolition of communism as a threat to Europe, and the national, territorial, and economic expansion of Germany to the East—the Baltic states, the Ukraine, and the Balkans. “If I had the Ural mountains, Siberia, and the Ukraine,” he shouted in one of his fanatical speeches, “Germany, under National Socialist leadership, would swim in plenty.” In 1938, he decided that the time had come for him to carry out his plan. He started for Austria!

**Collateral Reading**

B. King, *Fascism* (1931).
R. P. Stearns, *Pageant of Europe*, chaps. XXXVII, XXXVIII.
CHAPTER XVIII

Between Two Wars: France, Britain, and the Lesser States

FRANCE was largely responsible for the turns which the political and diplomatic development of central and eastern Europe took after World War I. Maneuvering to obtain security for herself, she helped wreck most of Wilson’s Fourteen Points, handicapped Germany by saddling her with reparations and by invading the Ruhr, and built up a series of alliances which were vaguely suggestive of those created by Bismarck. In establishing her diplomatic hegemony in Europe, France felt that she was preserving something of real value to the world—her civilization. Chief heir to a political and social order in which there was harmony between man and his surroundings and a just balance between Greek and Roman culture, between Humanistic intellectual inquiry and Catholic faith, between deep family loyalty and staunch individualism, and between agriculture, commerce, and industry, she believed that God and mankind expected her at least to maintain intact the territory which had served as the cradle of her culture.

No people were more patriotic than the 42,000,000 Frenchmen. However they might bicker over political and economic matters, they knew no right, left, and center when the fundamental interests of their beloved nation were menaced. They loved wholeheartedly the 213,000 square miles of black loam and green fields, of snow-peaked mountains and semi-tropical beaches that constituted France. Though she possessed an overseas empire twenty-two times her own

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size, France proper was not quite as large as the states of New Mexico and Arizona. Geographically, the country was a crossroads of the great trade-routes from Great Britain to the Mediterranean, and from the Western world to the heart of Europe. This strategic location helped her to become powerful and prosperous, but it also bound up her fate inextricably with that of neighboring nations.

A traveler journeying through France on the eve of World War I would have seen not only exquisite palaces and cathedrals, but also a land as intensively cultivated as a private vegetable garden, with 41 per cent of its area devoted to crops. Six of every ten Frenchmen lived in little communities of fewer than two thousand people. While mass production was mechanizing Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, France remained essentially a land of individuals, of small landowners, and of small bourgeois shopkeepers. It had some enormous industries, but they were not so characteristic of the country as were its flourishing little enterprises. It was the world's principal source of hand-made luxury goods, the chief wine-producing country, the fashion and art capital of the world.

During the war, France, like most of the belligerent powers, was under a virtual dictatorship—a dictatorship that tremendously changed the make-up of the nation. Industries were merged and mechanized. Little businesses still existed and agriculture went on much as before, but control of mines, iron and steel works, utilities, insurance companies, railroads, and brokerage houses was concentrated by a mesh of interlocking directorates in about two hundred corporations. The economic life of the country was dominated by the Bank of France, a private institution controlled by 200 stockholders. While French finance was monopolized by the Bank, French politics were directed generally by the middle classes. These people were the weather vanes of France. When times were good they voted for the party in power. When there was unrest in the land, the shopkeeper and the small farmer turned a little radical—not very radical, because no French party is so red as its name—but radical enough to swing the political center of gravity in the Chamber of Deputies to the Left. The bourgeois Frenchman—so the axiom goes—"wore his heart on the Left but his pocketbook on the Right."

During World War I party strife was dropped and France was ruled by a bloc known as the Union Sacré. In 1919, however, the union split into two large coalitions—the National Bloc, made up of conservatives and moderates, and the Left Bloc, consisting of Radical Socialists and other Leftist groups. The extremists, royalist on the Right, and some Socialists and Communists on the Left, remained outside the two blocs. After the elections of November, 1919, the
National Bloc controlled the French government. Dominated by Big Business, this coalition, unable to get Great Britain and the United States to guarantee French immunity from another German invasion, created one of the most powerful military forces in Europe. While engaged in the military as well as in the economic reconstruction of France, the conservative government created the French system of alliances with Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. This diplomatic brotherhood was designed to maintain the status quo in Europe through treaty enforcement and to isolate Bolshevik Russia. Even the League of Nations, under the influence of French policies, became a staunch defender of the French system of alliances.

Outstanding exponents of France's economic as well as political hegemony were her great industrialists. They wanted to obtain control of the iron and potash of Lorraine and the coke and coal of the Saar and the Ruhr. Frustrated in their attempt to gain the Ruhr and the Rhineland by the Treaty of Versailles, they determined to achieve their ambitions by pulling political wires. The National Bloc favored the interests of the Schneider-Creusot firm and other powerful industrial organizations and, under the able leadership of Raymond Poincaré, did everything in its power to aid Big Business. Influential in the government from 1919 to 1924, Poincaré backed French financiers in their plans to exploit the economic resources of central and southeastern Europe. French banks were established in the Little Entente states of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, as well as in Poland, Austria, and Hungary; loans were offered Poland and Yugoslavia for the purchase of munitions and other supplies; and in 1923, as stated before, French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr.

But Poincaré and the wealthy elements he represented overreached themselves. The masses, who, of course, were expected to pay the heavy cost of these undertakings became nervous and restless, especially when the franc experienced a rapid decline. Consisting of small, independent industrialists, rentiers, peasant proprietors, and civil servants, they forced Poincaré to resign and elected a moderate and conciliatory government headed by the Radical Socialist, Herriot. He inaugurated a milder policy toward Germany, recognized the Russian government, and promoted the cause of peace by trying to make the League of Nations an effective instrument for the prevention of future wars. As a result of this policy, France withdrew her troops from the Ruhr, accepted the Dawes Plan, and signed the Locarno Pacts.

1 See pp. 399, 430-431.
2 See pp. 399-432.
The main domestic problem confronting the Left Bloc—financial stability—was difficult to solve. During the war, the French government, instead of taxing its people, had borrowed money at home, from Great Britain, and from the United States. After the struggle the government was forced to abandon this financial policy. Meanwhile, the public debt was tremendously increased as a result of the costs of the postwar reconstruction of devastated areas in France and the occupation of the Ruhr. The National Bloc, through miscellaneous types of loans and tax increases, tried unsuccessfully to solve the financial problem. Then the Left Bloc came into power; but it preferred inflation to tax increases and jeopardized the franc, which now had fallen to slightly over two cents. Thereupon the people forced this Left Bloc out of office in 1926, again entrusting their future to Poincaré and a National Union ministry. In office, Poincaré vigorously tackled the financial question. Determined not to deprive Big Business of its hard-earned surplus, he placed the real burden of taxes on the thrifty middle classes. Income taxes were raised; indirect taxes were greatly expanded; salaries in the civil service were reduced. By these measures Poincaré balanced the budget and stabilized the franc at around four cents (as compared with about twenty cents before the war). By devaluing the franc, he deprived all owners of bonds—the middle classes and peasants for the most part—of four-fifths of their income and capital, and at the same time he relieved the government of four-fifths of its capital charges. Grateful indeed were the industrialists. Aided by cheap money, they were able to undersell their competitors in the markets of the world and to expand their enterprises at home and abroad.

Until 1931, France seemed to be the soundest state in Europe. She was able at least to feed and to employ her numerically stationary population, to increase her gold reserve, and to expand production. In foreign affairs she also exerted tremendous influence. Having concluded alliances with Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, she arranged treaties with Rumania and Yugoslavia, and contemplated, in the late 1920's, the formation of a United States of Europe within the framework of the League of Nations. It was hoped that the Locarno Pacts which virtually froze the diplomatic scene in western Europe as it was in 1925, and the Pact of Paris which outlawed war in 1929, would constitute the nucleus of an international system absolutely committed to the status quo.

The French people, however, were unable to bear the costs of this ambitious project. In its determination to enlarge the army, to strengthen the frontier fortifications (for example, the great Maginot Line facing Germany), to occupy the Ruhr, and to furnish vast loans
to the allies of France for military purposes, the French government dissipated its resources. Currency inflation, accentuated as a result of these expenditures, reduced the standard of living and prepared the way for French involvement in the world depression. Especially severe were the hardships suffered by the small property owners and professional men. Many, unable to carry on their enterprises or to live on incomes derived from their professions, were forced into the ranks of the proletariat. Facing complete extinction and economic enslavement, a great number of Frenchmen enlisted under the banners of fascism and communism. Most of them, however, remained loyal to the bourgeois republic, supporting the moderate parties in their attempt to avert revolution by timely reforms.

Despite the demoralizing effects of the depression, the French endeavored to weather the storm without resorting to violent measures. Through the government, they tried to save themselves by isolating France from the less prosperous parts of the world. Higher tariffs and a system of quotas were designed to protect French industries and agriculture by keeping the products of other nations out of the country. Attempting to retain the support of the peasant, the government placed French agriculture in a very strong position by giving the farmer a highly protected home market. The working classes, in whom lay the potential danger of revolution, were also helped through a program of state assistance to domestic industry and through governmental aid in the form of additional social legislation.

This situation could not endure indefinitely. France soon discovered that she could not cut herself off from the outside world; she was bound to be influenced by conditions elsewhere. As the economic situation grew worse, the protective defenses started to crack. Confronted by the problem of high taxes and unemployment, the peasants and urban workers, and members of the bourgeoisie, began to manifest dissatisfaction, despite the efforts that the Chamber of Deputies had made to retain their support. A period of legislative demoralization now followed (1932–1934). Unwilling to accept the demand of the conservative parties, representing Big Business, that the budget be balanced by a reduction in the cost of government, a majority of the ministries—Radical Socialists, Socialists, and Communists—let expenditures increase and permitted the budget to remain unbalanced. In a vain attempt to obtain decisive action, cabinets were overthrown with unusual rapidity.

By 1934 some Frenchmen predicted a complete financial collapse and prepared to face revolution. The Stavisky scandal, involving high French officials, brought matters to a head. Claiming that Stavisky, who had robbed the people of millions of francs
through the sale of worthless bonds, was aided by government officials, people demanded a parliamentary investigation. The refusal of the Radical Socialist leader, Chautemps, to order such an investigation increased the opposition to the government. An explosion of popular discontent, known as "the Stavisky riots," followed. Though it is fairly well established that the Stavisky riots began as a Royalist and Fascist demonstration, many young Communists joined in the fighting, in the belief that the revolution had come. Nearly all of the 102 Parisian newspapers also attacked the Radical Socialist, Daladier—then serving his first premiership—with a ferocity unparalleled even in the abusive French press. Though he had a vote of confidence in the Chamber, Daladier gave way to the attacks and resigned. Seventy-year-old Gaston Doumergue, ex-president of France, was brought from his flower garden to head a national union government, which had a strongly Rightist flavor.

Doumergue tried to balance the budget by reducing governmental expenses. Despite this economy, prices continued to rise; the currency threatened to become more and more unstable; the national debt actually absorbed about half of the national income. Disregarding these problems for the time being, the aged premier tried to strengthen his position by constituent reforms, realizing that so long as he was dependent on various political groups he could not carry out a constructive economic policy. This proposed political reorganization brought about his downfall. Accused of dictatorial ambitions, he resigned in November, 1934. A young representative of Big Business, Flandin, became head of a new Right government. Promising a policy of action, he soon discovered that he could do little unless he was granted additional political power. Parliament, however, refused to give him the authority and, accordingly, he resigned.

On June 7, 1935, Pierre Laval, another bourgeois leader, was appointed premier. Granted parliamentary permission to reduce governmental expenses he lowered salaries of public officials, pensions, and interest on governmental securities. In an attempt to end the depression he also increased the income tax, established a tax on munitions, arbitrarily reducing the cost of living. Despite these measures economic recovery did not occur. Fear of a further devaluation of the franc to restore industry and trade now caused many Frenchmen, especially investors, to lose faith in the government. Fascist leaders, agitating for the overthrow of parliamentary government, maneuvered for the support of these dissatisfied elements, promising prosperity and security once the government were taken out of the hands of the corrupt republicans and the unpatriotic radicals.

Certain men realized that these Stavisky riots, social discontent,
and fascism were direct threats to constitutional, democratic government. One of them was Léon Blum, an able Socialist leader, an intellectual, and a Jew; another was Léon Jouhaux, head of five million strongly organized factory workers. Six days after the Stavisky riots Jouhaux had called out one million workers in a brief, orderly, general strike as a gesture of labor unity. Meanwhile Blum worked to unite all elements which had reason to hate fascism—the Communist Party under Maurice Thorez at the extreme Left; the Radical Socialist party of the bourgeois center, and the Socialists, and the Federation of Labor. Thus was formed the Popular Front. This group, in the elections of May, 1936, succeeded in winning a thumping victory. The Socialists, with 146 seats, became the largest party in the Chamber, and France acquired a Socialist premier—Blum.

The new government concentrated upon the solution of internal problems. A wave of strikes was settled when Blum got the employers to accept the workers’ demands for shorter hours, vacations, and higher pay. Then he turned on the Fascists, suppressing the Croix de Feu organization which was led by Colonel de la Rocque. In an attempt to revive industry and commerce so that the employers could pay higher wages, Blum in the fall of 1936 devalued the franc about 30 per cent. At the same time pay cuts of government employees were restored; the allowances given soldiers increased; the coal industry reorganized; relief was provided for farmers and small businessmen who needed credit; the public-works program was expanded; and, finally, the Bank of France was reorganized so as to deprive the 200 stockholders of direct power.

These governmental measures did not solve the internal problems confronting the Popular Front government. In 1937 there was social unrest in France. Workers struck as a result of trouble over the application of the forty-hour week; Communists and Fascists engaged in riots; industry and commerce, despite the devaluation of the franc, failed to improve. Toward the close of his first year as premier, Blum was forced out of office when Parliament refused to grant his request for additional authority to deal with the financial problem. A new Popular Front ministry with the Radical Socialist, Chautemps, as premier, took over the reins of government. The Chautemps government tried earnestly to maintain domestic calm. Social legislation, such as the forty-hour week law, was modified, with the purpose of abolishing all changes which inflicted unnecessary hardships on the employers. In the spring of 1938, Chautemps, despite his moderate policies, was forced to resign over the usual questions of social and financial legislation. He was succeeded by Blum, who, after remaining in office about a month, was overthrown for the second time when
he tried to solve the financial problem by announcing a capital-tax plan. Many Frenchmen of the middle classes were perfectly willing to vote the Socialist ticket because they felt that, in so doing, they were showing themselves to be advanced thinkers. But when they discovered that the Socialist premier (probably too weak to tax Big Business) planned to tax the capital value of their little houses and gardens, they decided that this was not the kind of socialism they had voted for.

Following the overthrow of Blum, the Radical Socialist leader, Daladier, established a moderate ministry and took over a nation beset with strikes, weak currency, a treasury spending thirty million more a week than it was taking in, Arab revolts in the North African colonies, and the menace of fascism in Spain. It was a nation haunted by the specters of revolution and dictatorship and by the fear of war. French Fascists lacked an effective leader but had powerful financial backing; many workers were on strike, determined to fight rather than submit to further lowering of their living standards.

To meet these critical problems Daladier needed precisely the emergency powers denied previous premiers. He got them. Both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies decided to adjourn and let him govern French finances for three months by decree. Practically a dictator, Daladier tried to end the strikes and obtain the support of most Frenchmen by announcing that the first aim of his regime would be to make France secure, and the second would be to strengthen French democracy.

In his attempt to reinforce the position of France in foreign affairs, Daladier faced some very difficult obstacles. Prior to 1933, France, as stated before, was the dominant nation in Europe. But with the rise of Hitler came the relative decline of France. Gradually, Berlin, not Paris, became the center of European politics. French allies in central Europe—Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia—swung toward Germany. And Czechoslovakia, although still loyal to her ally, was, from the military point of view, more of a liability than an asset. The alliance with Soviet Russia, a constant irritant in French politics, also was of questionable value. Instead of Germany, it was now France which seemed to be all but encircled. To the east, the Rome-Berlin axis of unfriendly dictators had become a reality. To the northeast, Belgium had renounced her French alliance in favor of strict neutrality. To the south, General Franco, the Spanish Fascist leader, seemed to be winning a war with Italian and German help. Only to the north had France an ally—Great Britain. Determined to retain this friendship, Daladier willingly strengthened the alliance between the two countries by entering into an agreement with Great
Britain whereby in the event of a war the military and naval roles to be played by each state were to be co-ordinated. At the same time he approved of the Anglo-Italian Mediterranean Pact and in the Czechoslovakian crisis prepared to follow England's lead.¹

After the war, Great Britain, like France, faced critical internal problems. Unemployment was far worse than it had been before 1914; England had changed from a creditor to a debtor state; taxes were mounting; and industry and commerce were on the decline.

¹ For additional treatment of French foreign policy see pp. 466-470, 481-484.
For a few years Great Britain did make a temporary recovery. Encouraged by this economic revival, Lloyd George and his coalition government restored British currency to the gold standard, balanced the budget, and refunded the enormous debt to the United States. By 1921 the boom had collapsed, largely because of the lack of foreign markets and the serious competition of the United States, Japan, and Germany. As industry and trade declined, a general business depression set in. Many wage earners, professional men, and small businessmen lost their livelihoods. By 1921 there were more than two million unemployed in England. To take care of these unfortunate people a system of doles (small financial payments made to the unemployed by the state) was inaugurated. This relief measure enabled those out of work to exist, but it increased the tax burden of the propertied classes. In attempting to eliminate the depression, Lloyd George struggled to revive trade. An agreement with Russia was signed in 1921 which provided for the resumption of commerce. Parliament, about the same time, introduced a limited tariff system designed to protect British key industries and workmen from cheap foreign goods.

Determined to re-establish domestic harmony in the British Isles, Lloyd George in 1920 tried to settle the Irish Question. He opposed complete independence, but he was willing to grant the Irish Home Rule with the understanding that Protestant Ulster should not be forced to join the Catholic South. After considerable debate, Parliament finally passed a bill that gave both Catholic Ireland and Ulster Home Rule. Each was to be represented in Parliament and to have independent legislatures. Certain powers and imperial matters were to be handled by the British government. Opposed to this settlement, the Sinn Feiners in South Ireland forced the British Parliament in 1921 to grant dominion status to a Catholic Ireland. Even before this settlement De Valera, leader of the Irish Republican element, engaged in a long struggle to gain complete independence for Ireland. In 1937 the Catholic Irish agitated in behalf of a new constitution in which the whole of Ireland, including Ulster, was declared to be a sovereign independent democratic state, to be known by its old name, Eire. Meanwhile, a trade war with Great Britain, the outgrowth of a land-annuity dispute, continued with disastrous effect on the Free State's economic system. In 1938 this economic trouble between Ireland and England was settled as a result of negotiations between the two governments. The people of Ulster, however, refused to accept De Valera's plea that they "let all former differences now disappear in the common name of 'Irishman.'"
Opposition to the Irish Free State paved the way for the overthrow of Lloyd George's coalition government in 1922. Severe in their criticisms of the Irish settlement and also of the premier's treaty with Russia, the Conservatives finally withdrew their support from the coalition, compelling Lloyd George to resign. In the elections which followed the Conservatives won a clear-cut victory. Under the leadership of Stanley Baldwin, the new prime minister, the government tried to revive England's declining trade and industries by a protective tariff. This economic experiment was acceptable to a part of the electorate, but to the majority, which was not ready to abandon free trade, it was anathema. Consequently, in the elections of 1923 the Conservatives were defeated. The Labor Party, with the support of the Liberals, now came into power, with Ramsay MacDonald as the first Labor prime minister in British history.

The new ruler of Great Britain decided to follow a moderate domestic policy. Except for his recognition of Soviet Russia, he did nothing to disturb the business classes. Certain taxes and war duties were reduced, and the dole for the unemployed was continued. Government subsidies were given to home-builders. But no attempt was made to introduce far-reaching reforms which could be construed as a prelude to socialism. "Our Labor Government," said MacDonald at the time, "has never had the least inclination to try short cuts to the millennium." In foreign affairs the Labor prime minister played his most important role. He helped to prepare the way for the adoption of the Dawes Plan and encouraged the League of Nations in its quest of disarmament and security. To promote friendly relations and to increase trade, he extended de jure recognition to Soviet Russia (1924). But this friendliness toward Soviet Red Russia, together with the insignificance of his domestic policy, aroused the opposition of the electorate. In the election which followed, Stanley Baldwin's Conservative government was restored to power.

For five years (1924–1929) Baldwin, with the support of British business groups, governed Great Britain. During this time he sought by various means to bring about an economic recovery. Partial protection was established; the pension system was extended; and local taxes were reduced to help basic industries. But the government had its difficulties, notably with the mining industry, which had been crippled by the falling off of coal exports. In 1925 a strike of the coal miners, who rejected wage cuts, followed in 1926 by a general strike of other workers, was suppressed with the aid of civilian volunteers. Acts then were passed by Parliament making a general strike illegal and limiting in other ways the power of the unions. In 1927 a plan to strengthen the Conservative House of Lords was given up as a
result of strong opposition on the part of the Liberals and the Laborites.

Despite these attempts to aid commerce and industry, the economic situation in England did not improve. Unemployment increased, competition in world markets brought about a steady decline in Great Britain’s commerce, and her industry, saddled with out-of-date machinery and still organized along old-fashioned lines, seemed incapable of underselling foreign competitors. Aroused by the failure of the Conservatives to solve England’s economic troubles, some of the Liberals, under Lloyd George, urged the adoption by the government of a program of public works. The Laborites under MacDonald, on the other hand, insisted that to conquer the depression, the coal, transport, and power industries must be nationalized. They also advocated social reforms designed to eliminate unemployment by changing the economic and social life of the nation. In foreign affairs both Liberals and Laborites favored free trade, the resumption of relations with Russia, and the evacuation of the German Rhineland by Allied troops.

In the elections which followed in 1929, the Labor Party was victorious, and Ramsay MacDonald again became prime minister. Opposed by the Conservatives and the Liberals, the Labor government was unable to pass socialistic legislation. Instead, it tried to improve the international situation by re-establishing relations with Soviet Russia and by encouraging the cause of disarmament. By the summer of 1931, Ramsay MacDonald was confronted by the world depression. Even more than in the early postwar period, the British people, and particularly the middle classes, felt the effects of a sharp decline in economic activity. As unemployment increased, more and more families became dependent upon charity. Thus the burden on the state became excessive and the drain on finances heavy. Increased governmental expenditures meant new taxes, and these fell with special severity on the unfortunate small-business and professional men, who held a large share of the taxable wealth. The result was growing opposition to the government.

Realizing that Great Britain in 1931 was facing a national crisis, the three political parties established a Coalition cabinet with MacDonald as prime minister. For accepting the leadership of a government which was actually dominated by the Conservatives, MacDonald was read out of the Labor Party. In the parliamentary elections held in the same year, the Coalition ministry secured a vote of confidence as the Conservatives won by a landslide. Determined to bring about recovery within the capitalistic system, the new government inaugurated a program of retrenchment designed to lower the tax
burden on the propertied classes. Salaries and the dole were reduced; payments on the war debt owed the United States were postponed indefinitely; expenditures on education and other social services were cut; and the incomes of the middle classes and workers were thereby diminished. At the same time the government tried to bring about a general business recovery. To do this, foreign import trade was stimulated by the abolition of the gold standard. Furthermore, a protective policy was adopted. At the Ottawa Economic Conference (1932) preferential tariffs were arranged among Great Britain and the Dominions. By thus making the empire into a sort of Zollverein, foreign trade was decreased and British industry and commerce prospered accordingly.

Great Britain's new economic policy was, on the whole, satisfactory. Part of the burden of taxation was lifted; the actual cost of living was reduced; and cheapened money enabled many bourgeois householders to pay off their debts and at least hold their heads above water. By 1934–1935 many conservative Englishmen believed that prosperity had at last returned. But the average citizen was not especially optimistic about the situation. The moderate improvement of business and the slight reduction of unemployment which took place between 1932 and 1935 did not prove to him that Great Britain was on the road to recovery. As evidence of the prevailing uncertainty were the activities by the Liberal statesman, Lloyd George, and the Fascist leader, Sir Oswald Mosley. Claiming that the Coalition government was actually retarding industry, Lloyd George advocated, again, public works and other governmental expenditure as a means of helping the workers. Mosley, on the other hand, demanded the creation of a
National Industrial Council and the improvement of the home market. By 1936 his movement developed an anti-Semitic and anti-Communist tendency. As a result, street fights occurred between the advocates of fascism and their avowed enemies.

Despite the unrest, the government remained in the hands of the Conservatives. In 1935, MacDonald voluntarily retired as prime minister and Stanley Baldwin became head of a Tory government. In the following year King George V died and was succeeded by the popular Prince of Wales, who assumed the title, Edward VIII. A few months later the new ruler became involved in a dispute with his ministers, especially Stanley Baldwin, as a result of his determination to marry an American woman, Mrs. Wallis Warfield Simpson. Unable to secure the approval of his government, Edward, in December, 1936, abdicated voluntarily, and his brother, the Duke of York, now became king as George VI.

Although this matter was attracting the attention of the British people, business conditions, despite many strikes, high taxes, and stiff prices, seemed to be on the upgrade. Unemployment fell, and the budget of 1936–1937 showed a surplus as had several of its immediate predecessors. In an effort to revise one of England's greatest but most depressed industries, the government in 1937 proposed to purchase the coal-mining royalties of over four thousand owners, greatest of whom were the Church of England and several wealthy nobles. With the retirement of Baldwin in 1937 and the accession of another Conservative leader, Neville Chamberlain, as prime minister, complications in the field of foreign affairs threatened to delay or even frustrate Great Britain's economic recovery.

These international troubles became especially serious when Italy in 1935 began to conquer the ancient empire of Ethiopia. About the same time the expansion of Japan in North China, a process which had begun in 1931, together with the announced determination of Hitler to revise the peace treaties, forced the British government to act. Announcing a Five Year Armament Plan as a counter challenge to these well-prepared "have-not" powers, Great Britain decided in 1937 to spend some 300,000,000 pounds a year for the next five years on rearmament.

By 1939, Germany, Italy, and Japan were actually menacing British interests in the Balkans, in the Mediterranean, and in the Far East. Meanwhile Chamberlain, who was in power at that time, preferred not to risk a war. He tried desperately to satisfy these countries through a policy of conciliatory bargaining. Ardent exponent of the status quo, he feared that another world slaughter would destroy capitalism and ruin England.
THE LESSER STATES OF EUROPE

After World War I the small as well as the large capitalistic nations of Europe faced the problems of communism, monopoly-capitalism, and depression. Most of the lesser powers of northern Europe met these difficulties without resorting to drastic changes in their democratic systems; whereas, in Central Europe, in the Balkans, and in the Mediterranean area, a great majority of the states were forced to resort to dictatorial forms of government.

In the states of northern Europe—Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland—the people maintained, and in certain cases extended, the democratic institutions they had before the war. The Scandinavian countries were especially successful in their attempts to establish economic as well as political reforms. Desirous of aiding the small peasants, who were rapidly losing their property because they were unable to compete with large-scale farming, the governments introduced the tract method of intensive agriculture and furnished financial aid to the small landowner. So successful were these measures that by 1933, 94 per cent of the farmers in Denmark owned their own land and few possessed holdings of more than 250 acres.

In postwar Sweden the development of controlled capitalism under democratic institutions was particularly noteworthy. In order to help the small businessman by checking the growth of Big Business the government intervened in industry on his behalf. By 1929 the state's investments in Swedish industry amounted to over $600,000,000. The government operated over one-third of the mines of the country; it managed the telegraph and telephone lines; and it owned over 34 per cent of the electric power. With the extensive profits derived not only from these investments but also from its control of the liquor, tobacco, and match trades, the Swedish monarchy was able to pay part of the costs of government and thereby reduce taxes considerably. In addition to this governmental participation in business there developed in Sweden very significant co-operative movements. In 1930, co-operatives owned and operated at least 10 per cent of Swedish industry; consumers' co-operatives also flourished; and through these organizations the people were able to break the power of three great trusts—the margarine, flour-milling, and electric-bulb combines. Social reforms in Sweden, and in the other Scandinavian countries, too, helped to raise the standard of living. Laws limited the employment of women and children, established an eight-hour working day, created a commission to arbitrate strikes, and set up a social insurance system which covered unemployment, accident, sickness, in-
validity, and old age. Largely as a result of these economic policies, these northern countries were able to withstand the shock of the world depression far better than any of the other European states.

In central Europe, the Austrian people attempted to function under a federal republic consisting of two houses, a president, a ministry, universal suffrage, and proportional representation. Their new government, however, was unable to solve the difficult economic and financial problems with which it was confronted. Ruling over a small land-locked country it tried desperately to restore economic order and financial stability. But cut off from markets, raw materials, and foodstuffs, surrounded by hostile neighbors, and obliged to pay reparations and at the same time to support thousands of unemployed persons, it was forced to resort to inflation and soon found itself on the verge of bankruptcy. Fearing that a social revolution might follow, the Allies, through the League of Nations, went to Austria’s assistance. Financial aid was furnished and an economic collapse was thereby averted. But prosperity did not return to Austria; nor did social discontent disappear. Influenced by this unrest many Austrians, disregarding the firm refusal of the Allies to permit union with Germany in 1931, organized a strong Nazi Party which agitated for Anschluss. Opposed to this group arose a Fascist organization, the Heimwehr, which received its backing from Italy. Committed to the independence of Austria, the eventual restoration of the Habsburg dynasty, and the maintenance of an all-powerful Catholic Church, was a third organization—the Christian Socialist Party, led by Engelbert Dollfuss, premier in 1932–1934. Bitterly condemned by all of these groups was the radical Social Democratic party, which, in control of Vienna, had made that city a center of socialistic experimentation. Rents were forced down by law; municipal apartment houses for workmen were built; the municipality obtained control of bus, trolley, and subway lines, and of the water and lighting systems; and the city government even established a municipal brewery, bakery, ice shop, and crematorium. Tax money also was devoted to the building of public swimming pools and playgrounds.

These socialistic policies were bitterly opposed by the conservative peasants, by the wealthy taxpayers, by the conservative Catholic Church, and by the Rightist parties. Determined to stamp out this dangerous attack upon private property, Premier Dollfuss permitted the Fascist Heimwehr, under the reactionary young aristocrat, Prince von Starhemberg, to attack the socialists. Taking over the city hall in Vienna, Starhemberg turned his machine guns and light artillery first on the Viennese municipal buildings, especially the Karl Marx Hof (the largest apartment house in the world). After about four days of
sanguinary fighting the Socialists were forced to capitulate (February 15, 1934). The Social Democratic Party in Austria came to an end, and many of its embittered members became Nazis. Following this victory, Dollfuss established a dictatorship in Austria. Already he had created a “Fatherland Front,” an organization which, ostensibly nonpartisan, was actually dominated by the Christian Socialists. In April, 1934, he proclaimed the creation of an Austrian corporative state, and forced the parliament to approve a new national constitution and then go out of existence.

Meanwhile the activities of the German and Austrian Nazis became more and more menacing. Acts of sabotage continued through the spring and summer of 1934 and finally culminated in the Nazi putsch of July 25. Entering the chancellery, wearing Heimwehr uniforms, a group of Nazis took possession of this government building, and in the struggle Dollfuss was killed. The uprising was put down by the Heimwehr, the loyal army, and the police. Prince Starhemberg, who had been visiting in Italy, returned to Vienna and became acting chancellor. His friend, Mussolini, rushed thousands of troops to the border, determined to prevent a Nazi conquest of Austria. On July 28 Kurt Schuschnigg, another Christian Socialist leader, became chancellor. An ardent advocate of monarchy and clericalism, he suppressed Nazi activities; deprived the pro-Italian Starhemberg of his political power; disbanded the Heimwehr organization; and established friendly relations with Germany and Italy.

The evolution of the Nazi-Fascist plan to fight communism and to bring about a revision of the peace treaties led to an Austro-Italian rift. In April, 1937, Chancellor Schuschnigg received a very cool reception when he came to Venice on a diplomatic visit. The explanation for this indifferent treatment by Italy was announced indirectly by Mussolini when he declared, later on, that he was not especially interested in the problem of Austrian independence. Despite this change of attitude, Mussolini permitted his representatives to meet with those of Hungary and Austria in January, 1938, at Budapest. At this gathering the delegates agreed to recognize the Franco regime in Spain and to oppose the spread of communism. Meanwhile, Schuschnigg favored the restoration of the Habsburg monarchy, although he admitted that this political objective was not attainable immediately.

Bent upon suppressing this monarchist movement, Hitler, in February, 1938, had a conference with Schuschnigg and concluded an agreement with him. Its full terms were not at first known, but it was followed by a reorganization of the Austrian cabinet to include four pro-Nazi ministers. Although no responsible Nazi German had ever said that the Berchtesgaden pact guaranteed Austrian independ-
ence, Schuschnigg, in a speech before Parliament, claimed that it
did so. In Berlin the Austrian chancellor’s action was promptly
termed a betrayal. With Nazi howls rising about him, and upon the
advice of certain clerical, monarchist, and foreign interests, Schuschnigg
resolved in March to clarify the issue by announcing a plebiscite
in which Austrians were to vote on the question: “Are you in favor
of an independent Austria?” Nazi newspapers immediately claimed
that the plebiscite would be controlled by Schuschnigg, and German
troops began mobilizing at Munich. Within a day about 65,000
soldiers were on the march toward Austria.

Meanwhile, Schuschnigg received two ultimatums from Berlin.
Both threatened German armed invasion of Austria unless he can-
celled the plebiscite and resigned; the second required that the
Austrian cabinet should become two-thirds Nazi. By the time this
second ultimatum had arrived, German troops were reported to be
already over the border. Fearful of bloodshed, Schuschnigg ordered
that there should be no resistance to the German advance. He
radioed his resignation to the Austrian people, saying: “I bow to
force . . . I say good-bye with the wish that God will protect Austria.”
This resignation was the cue for Minister of Interior Arthur Seyss-
Inquart, an ardent Nazi, to succeed Schuschnigg and to wire Berlin
that the German army was needed to avert the threat of civil war in
Austria. German troops thereupon completed a virtually bloodless
conquest of the little republic. Five days after Schuschnigg had re-
signed Hitler entered Vienna, where he had once worked as a day
laborer. A million Viennese crowded the curbs to watch him pass,
preceded by forty light tanks and followed by three police cars and
a long procession of military automobiles. Thousands cheered him
wildly during two short speeches. Most of Austria’s 6,750,000 citizens
seemed to have gone Nazi. At least they accepted Seyss-Inquart’s de-
cree that the independent state of Austria no longer existed, and
Hitler’s boast that this greater Germany was the wish of the German
people. “Any attempt to part this people will be in vain! Sieg Heil!
(Hail victory!)”

The Anschluss

While most Austrians were preparing to assume the role of Ger-
man citizens, certain leaders of the Fatherland Party, and the Jews,
were trying to escape from the country. Unable to leave, many com-
mitted suicide or submitted to arrest. Meanwhile, Hitler announced
that a plebiscite was to be held on April 10, in which Germans and
Austrians were to vote on the question of the Anschluss. In the elec-
tion 99 per cent of the people cast their ballots in favor of the merger.
With the Treaty of Versailles already torn into tatters, the addition
of Austria made continental Germany a larger country than before
World War I. Further, the coup made the frontiers of Italy and Germany contiguous and permitted greater solidarity in the Rome-Berlin axis. Germany's acquisition of Austria also afforded her the following advantages: (1) It established border contact with Yugoslavia and Hungary, both rich in raw materials, and opened up the Danube River as a German highway for Rumanian oil; (2) it enabled Germany to encircle half of Czechoslovakia, giving the Reich the upper hand over that country.

Czechoslovakia was a country rich in resources, containing fertile soil, valuable forests, prosperous industries—textile, chemical, metallurgical—and large coal and mineral wealth. It also possessed a heterogeneous collection of nationalities. In the western highlands of the state—the frontier between Czechoslovakia and Germany—lay the Sudeten area, inhabited by over two and a half million German-speaking peoples. Below these mountains were the Bohemian plains occupied by the Czechs and Moravians. In the mountains to the east were Slovaks, and beyond them, Ruthenians. Along the Polish and Hungarian frontiers of Czechoslovakia were Polish and Magyar minorities, while scattered throughout the state were small groups of Germans, Jews, Rumanians, and Ruthenians.

Declaring for union with the Czechs (who for centuries had opposed the Habsburg rule), the Slovaks joined the latter in the creation of a Provisional National Assembly at Prague. On November 14, 1918, this body, with the support of the Allies, proclaimed the establishment of a republic. On February 29, 1920, it adopted a new constitution providing for a parliamentary government, consisting of two popularly elected houses, a president, and a ministry responsible to the chamber. In May of that year Masaryk—Czechoslovakia's leading intellectual and statesman—was elected president, with Eduard Beneš, a brilliant diplomat, serving as minister of foreign affairs.

Under the guidance of these realistic statesmen, Czechoslovakia gained strength despite many problems. The lack of ethnic unity was an especially difficult one to solve. With a population of about 14 millions living in an area of a little over 54,000 square miles, the Czechoslovakian government faced the hostility of nearly one-third of her population, consisting of Ruthenians, Poles, Jews, Magyars, and Germans. Despite the Minorities' Treaty which the Allies forced Czechoslovakia to sign, guaranteeing the various groups national, religious, and educational rights, friction developed. The large German minority was especially restless. In order to satisfy these groups President Masaryk endeavored to grant some measure of local autonomy to the various elements. These tendencies towards federalism caused the minority problem to abate for the time being. Neverthe-
less, economic and cultural differences prevented a complete union of the various national groups.

Despite this internal difficulty, Czechoslovakia became a prosperous and influential postwar state. Possessing over 80 per cent of the industrial resources of the Austrian Empire, she was in a position to supply her agrarian neighbors, Russia and Hungary, with an abundance of manufactured goods. At the same time, she was able to attain self-sufficiency in agriculture through the development of her valuable farmlands in Slovakia. To encourage production of foodstuffs the government passed reform bills designed to distribute two million acres of land (formerly in the possession of a few secular and religious landowners) among more than 500,000 peasants.

The government achieved distinction in its handling of external as well as internal affairs. Under the direction of its able foreign minister, Beneš, Czechoslovakia after the war became the pivotal link between France and the Little Entente states, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. In 1920–1921, these nations entered into a Little Entente, designed to maintain the status quo in central Europe. Three years later (1924) a Franco-Czech agreement made this entente an integral part of the French plan to establish a sanitary cordon of powers (including Poland) between Bolshevik Russia on the one hand, and Germany and the other defeated countries, on the other.

Economic difficulties and Italo-German opposition to French hegemony in the early 1930’s checked France’s attempt to enlarge her influence. To avoid a general economic collapse and widespread bankruptcy, representatives of Belgium, Estonia, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Rumania held a conference. At this meeting France proposed that a Danubian customs union be created in order to overcome tariffs, political barriers, and other obstacles to trade. She further stated that the rural states should be granted preferential tariffs by their neighbors, and an international loan be floated. Italy and Germany immediately objected to this scheme, realizing that it would greatly strengthen the influence of France in central Europe and in the Balkans. Nevertheless, in September, 1932, the plan, with certain modifications, was adopted; but a close political and economic agreement under the supervision of France was not achieved. In the following year fear of an Italo-Hungarian alliance prompted the members of the Little Entente to create a political and economic bloc. As a counter-challenge, Italy in 1934 signed protocols with Austria and Hungary which provided for economic co-operation between those three nations.

During the next three years both Germany and Italy strove to
strengthen their positions in central Europe. Austria seemed to be the center of their activity. Encouraged by the formation of an Austrian Nazi Party, Hitler, as stated before, seemingly determined to carry out the *Anschluss*. Mussolini at that time seemed to favor an independent, but Italian-dominated, Austria. By the spring of 1937 the strengthening of Italo-German relations created a situation wherein the independence of Czechoslovakia was menaced. Determined to do everything in their power to force the small states of central Europe and the Balkans into the Fascist-Nazi orbit, Italy and Germany carried out a plan that they had inaugurated in 1934, namely, of destroying the French system of alliances, resting on Belgium, Poland, and the Little Entente. In doing this they forced both France and Czechoslovakia to establish an alignment with Russia.

The isolation of Czechoslovakia was one aim of Germany and Italy in central Europe. To reach this objective, Poland was encouraged by them to pursue an independent policy. Also, Yugoslavia and Romania were asked to free themselves from their bonds with Prague. A crisis arose in March, 1937, when Italy and Yugoslavia signed an accord which, although it was technically compatible with Belgrade's obligations as a member of the Little Entente, foreshadowed her detachment from the French bloc. In an attempt to save the Little Entente, Beneš of Czechoslovakia visited Belgrade and tried to get Yugoslavia and, later, Rumania to enter into a mutual assistance pact. Pro-Fascist elements in both countries, however, prevented him from achieving these ends. Consequently, Czechoslovakia found herself in an increasingly precarious position amid the web of German and Italian intrigue spun around her. Dependent more and more on her rather uncertain alliances with France and Russia, beset by a growing Nazi movement among her German minority, and no longer able to count on the support of her former allies, Rumania and Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia by 1938 faced a very uncertain future. The prospect became even more uncertain when Hitler in the spring of that year occupied Austria and then demanded that all Germans in Czechoslovakia be granted their "just rights."

Under Czechoslovakia the Germans in the Sudeten region had enjoyed considerable self-rule, but, economically, they had not prospered. Their factories had felt the blight of depression; many Sudetens, purchasing German marks in preference to Czech currency, had been wiped out by the terrible German inflation of 1923; and Germany's policy of importing as little as possible had practically ruined the industries of Sudetenland. Consequently, when a Nazi movement, led by Konrad Henlein, a physical training instructor, began

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3 See p. 448.
to enroll the Germans of Czechoslovakia, its slogan of "bread and work for all Germans" sounded well to the thousands of unemployed men. By the summer of 1938, a well-organized group of Germans was demanding that Czechoslovakia grant it extensive political rights.

Realizing that a controversy between the Sudeten Germans and the Czech government might cause an internal explosion which could conceivably resolve itself into a world war between the Fascist and the Democratic powers, Great Britain, in July, 1938, sent a representative, Viscount Walter Runciman, to Prague. He was to act as mediator between Czechoslovakian officials and the Sudeten German Party which demanded self-government for the Germans in Czechoslovakia. In the middle of August Runciman's task was made very difficult when Hitler began the mobilization of 1,300,000 soldiers for summer maneuvers. British officials were certain that this was an effort to coerce Czechoslovakia into accepting Sudeten demands. Thereafter, London repeatedly warned Berlin that a Czech-Sudeten German war might involve the world. At the same time, in order to remove the cause for such a catastrophe, the British and French governments put pressure on Czech officials, urging them to make wide concessions to the Sudeten Germans.

Intent upon preventing a compromise solution of the Sudeten problem, Adolf Hitler, at Munich on September 12, delivered an inflammatory speech which was the signal for German uprisings throughout Sudetenland. Konrad Henlein, the "little Führer," now declared that Germans in Czechoslovakia wanted to become a part of Germany. Thereupon negotiations between the Germans and the Czechs ceased. "Responsibility for the final break," wrote Lord Runciman, "must, in my opinion, rest on Henlein ... and ... supporters inside and outside the country who were urging extreme unconstitutional action."

Three days after Hitler's speech, Prime Minister Chamberlain, in order to forestall a German invasion of Czechoslovakia, flew to Germany and personally visited Der Führer at Berchtesgaden. At this meeting the British premier was told quite bluntly by Hitler that Sudeten Czechoslovakia must be handed over to Germany. Flying back to London, Chamberlain was advised by Lord Runciman that turning Sudetenland over to Germany seemed to be the only solution. Consequently, an Anglo-French plan for the transfer of Czech territory to Germany was quickly prepared. Having gained the reluctant acceptance by Czechoslovakia of this plan, Chamberlain met Hitler again at Godesburg, a resort town on the Rhine. To the surprise of the British prime minister, Der Führer brushed aside the Anglo-French plan. In its place, he presented another, demanding
the cession of certain Sudeten territory to Germany by October 1, 1938, and plebiscites in other districts to determine whether they should remain Czech or become German. These territories, drawn on a map by Hitler's own hand, reached far into Czechoslovakia. Upon his return to England, Chamberlain sent the Godesburg demands to

The Tense Meeting in Berchtesgaden on September 24, 1938

Neville Chamberlain, British Prime Minister, and Reichsführer Adolf Hitler discuss the fate of Czechoslovakia. At right of picture are Joachim von Ribbentrop, German foreign minister, and Sir Neville Henderson, British ambassador to Berlin.

the Czechoslovakian government. These terms were indignantly rejected by that republic, whereupon Great Britain and France committed themselves to aid Czechoslovakia in the event of a German invasion. A world war seemed inevitable.

While practically every important nation in Europe mobilized its armed forces, peace moves continued. Cabling the rulers of many nations, Franklin D. Roosevelt, the American president, spared no effort to impress Hitler with the fact that the world wanted negotiations to continue. Chamberlain sent two messages to Mussolini, asking him to persuade Hitler to call a meeting of the great European powers. Following a telephone conversation with Mussolini, Der Führer announced that a conference would be convened in Munich, Germany. "It was as if the finger of God had drawn a rainbow across
the sky!" exclaimed former Prime Minister Baldwin when he heard how, at the last terrifying moment, Europe had been spared the ravages of war. In Great Britain, in France, in Italy, and in Germany, humble men and women wept tears of thankfulness. With Czechoslovakian territory about to be surrendered, General Syrovy, war hero and premier of that unfortunate country, interpreted the sentiments of his people when he declared pathetically: "We have been abandoned."

Meanwhile, three men—Chamberlain of Great Britain, Mussolini of Italy, and Daladier of France—sat down at Munich to reason with Hitler. From the beginning all were convinced that Sudetenland should be given to Germany. Sole basis of difference, according to Chamberlain, was the manner in which the territory was to be handed over. This problem was cleared up in less than nine hours of discussion. Starting on October 1, 1938, German troops were to institute a token occupation of parts of territories which were more than 50 per cent German in population. Within ten days an international commission was to decide the boundaries of territories to be occupied unconditionally by German troops. By the last of November the commission was to determine when and where plebiscites should be held. Final boundaries were to be guaranteed jointly by Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany. Seizing an opportune moment, the day after the agreement had been reached, Chamberlain endeavored to improve Anglo-German relations. He called upon Hitler and signed a statement with him which declared the two men to be agreed: (1) that Anglo-German relations were "of first importance"; (2) that the Munich Pact was "symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again"; and (3) that Anglo-German discussions should continue in order to remove all sources of friction between the two countries.

While most of Europe wildly cheered the news from Munich, Czechoslovakia lay humbled by these harsh terms. By the middle of October, Germany, with the consent of the commission, had taken over practically all of the lands demanded by Hitler at Godesburg; President Beneš of Czechoslovakia had resigned; the new government had virtually agreed to come under the Nazi orbit. Thus, having gained control of this old Bohemian state, Hitler decided that further plebiscites were unnecessary. Germany, without a cent of payment, had been able to occupy the powerful Czech military defenses along the frontier, to gain possession of vital segments of cross-country roads and railways, to take over most of the coal which had provided Czechoslovakia with fuel, and to gain at least half of her textile industry (fifth largest in the world). Expecting a Nazi terror
in Sudetenland, over 75,000 Czechs, Jews, and anti-Nazi Germans fled to Prague. Nor was this loss of territory to Germany all the price Czechoslovakia had to pay. While the German forces were entering Sudetenland, the Czech government allowed the Polish troops to occupy 300 square miles of Czech Silesia, rich in coal and peopled by 100,000 Poles. Later, negotiations were instituted with Hungary, which asked for Czech territories containing over 700,000 Magyars.

Unable to reach an agreement, the two nations finally accepted the mediation of Germany and Italy. On November 2, 1938, the latter powers announced a settlement of the Czech-Hungarian minority problem in which the territories inhabited by the Magyars were to be ceded to Hungary.

So vast were the issues broached by the dismembering of Czechoslovakia by the Munich agreement that no man could say with firm assurance whether history would record it as a great step toward peace or toward a world war. According to Hitler, the Sudetenland was the "last territorial demand I will make in Europe." Nevertheless, six months later, in March, 1939, Hitler completed the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia by establishing protectorates over Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia, and by permitting Hungary to take the Carpatho-Ukraine area at the most easterly tip of the former republic. But in gaining control of this territory Der Führer put himself in a position
to penetrate the Ukraine and the Balkans. In fact, Bismarck, in the nineteenth century, probably provided the real motive of Hitler’s coup when he said “whoever is master of Bohemia is master of Europe.”

The so-called “betrayal” of the Munich agreement enraged Great Britain and France and strained still further their relations with Germany. Chamberlain now unspARINGLY condemned these acts of aggression in central Europe, which he said had shattered confidence. Abandoning his program of appeasement, he went back to the policy of collective security, involving political action combined with military preparedness. Hitler’s move to create a greater Germany also alarmed a number of European rulers, including Regent Horthy of Hungary.

In many ways the postwar history of Hungary had paralleled that of her former associate, Austria. Like the latter, Hungary after the war found herself reduced to the position of a minor power, a small landlocked agrarian country, confronted by unfriendly states and inhabited by a backward and proud aristocracy and by poor and illiterate groups of workers and peasants. Despite these handicaps, the people in 1918 proclaimed a republic and established a provisional government. But the continuation of the Allied blockade and the demobilization of the Magyar armies led to unemployment and famine. Out of this economic distress arose a Communist Party. This organization, under the leadership of Béla Kun, overthrew the provisional government and established a Soviet state. A red terror directed against the upper classes now followed. This radical regime was soon overthrown by a counter-movement, and a Rumanian army invaded Hungary (1919). For three months the Rumanian soldiers, disregarding the opposition of the League of Nations, ransacked the country, carrying away millions of dollars’ worth of machinery, railway equipment, and other property. A few days after these freebooters had left the country, a Magyar White army, led by Admiral Horthy, entered Budapest and assumed control of the state. A White Terror, directed against the Communists and the Jews, ensued.

After law and order had been restored, Horthy promulgated a monarchical constitution and established a dictatorship with himself as regent. Encouraged by this political upheaval, Charles I (IV of Hungary), head of the Habsburg dynasty, tried to regain the throne of Hungary. The opposition of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, however, forced Horthy to expel Charles and to continue his dictatorship.

Although Horthy was regent of Hungary, the real ruler of the country from 1921 to 1931, was Premier Stephen Bethlen. Representing the wealthy landowning classes, this able statesman first suc-
ceeded in obtaining Hungary's admission into the League of Nations (1922). He was then able to obtain financial aid for Hungary and by 1926 to balance the budget. But economic recovery was very slow in that country. Wealth—mostly in the form of land—was concentrated in the hands of a few aristocrats; and, although steps were taken to improve the position of the peasant by dividing the large estates, the masses, as a whole, remained landless and poor. Almost as important as the economic difficulties was the problem of "unredeemed" Hungary. After the war the Allies transferred land inhabited by thousands of Magyars to neighboring powers, especially Rumania. Awaiting the day of revenge, the proud Magyars were delighted when Mussolini, about 1930, frankly proposed a revision of the Treaty of Trianon in Hungary's behalf. Hungary and Italy now agreed upon a pact of friendship. But in 1931 Hungary, again on the verge of bankruptcy, was forced to beg the Allies for financial help. France, in return for this aid, made Hungary promise to renounce further revisionist agitation. At the same time, the Magyar state did not renounce its close friendship with Italy. Under the leadership of Julius Gömbös, who was premier from 1932 to 1936, Hungary cultivated a close friendship with Germany as well as Italy and continued to advocate peaceful treaty revisions. After the Anschluss of Austria and Germany, the new premier, Kálmán Daránji, representing the wealthy landowners and the bureaucracy, together with Regent Horthy, opposed the attempts of a small Nazi group in Hungary to agitate for union with Germany. The premier was supported in this policy by the chief opposition group, the Independent Agrarian or Small Farmers' Party, who favored a restoration of the Habsburgs as the safest antidote to Nazism. By August, 1938, Horthy apparently experienced a change of heart. Visiting Germany at that time, he assured the Reich of Hungary's friendship, and, in return, received Germany's promise that Hungary's independence and freedom of action would be completely vouchsafed. In short, Hungary agreed to co-ordinate her interests and policies with those of Hitler, who was determined to dominate the Danubian area. Hungary thereupon identified herself with the Rome-Berlin axis.

Poland, as well as Hungary, had good reason to fear the spread of Nazism. In possession of part of Upper Silesia, an important German industrial center, and of a large part of West Prussia (the Polish corridor) she seemed destined to be a bitter enemy of her powerful neighbor. Aware of this situation, Poland, after the war, became a member of the French system of alliances designed to maintain the status quo in central Europe. Disputes with Russia and Lithuania over boundary limits also caused her to seek security through alli-
ances as well as through the development of powerful armaments.

Internal difficulties forced Poland to convert her postwar republic into a dictatorship. In 1921 a democratic government was created, consisting of two houses, a president, a cabinet, and providing for universal suffrage, with a voting age of twenty-one for the lower house, the Seymour, and thirty for the upper house, the Senate, and with proportional representation. This government managed to function about five years. In May, 1926, however, Poland's strong man, Marshal Pilsudski, publicly denouncing the government for its weakness and corruption, forced the premier and president to resign, and installed his friend and supporter, Professor Ignace Moszicki, as president. Later, Pilsudski deprived the Seymour of its legislative functions and had the president appoint him as premier. From 1926 until his death (1935) Pilsudski maintained a veiled dictatorship—governing through parliamentary channels.

During Pilsudski's rule most of Poland's grave problems were at least partly solved. Bankruptcy was avoided by financial retrenchments and foreign loans; dissatisfied minorities—Jews, Ruthenians, Germans, and Lithuanians—were partly appeased through the grant of a degree of self-government; and the poor peasants were aided by the enactment of a law expropriating the holdings of certain landowners with financial compensations. Finally, a feeling of security was engendered in Poland through the creation by the government of a powerful army.

In 1933 the signing of the Four Power Pact by France, Italy, Germany, and Great Britain weakened the faith of the Poles in the security offered by their alliance with France. Believing that the big powers were disregarding the interests of the little states, Poland turned to her former enemy, Germany, and entered into a ten year nonaggression pact. This treaty marked the first serious rift in the French system of alliances; it also signified the initial attempt by Hitler to create a European League against communism. Shortly after this important diplomatic break, France lost her hold over Yugoslavia as well as Poland.

At the conclusion of the great struggle, the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and Macedonians of Serbia and the Dual Monarchy were merged into a constitutional monarchy, called Yugoslavia. These Southern Slavs refused to co-operate. Whereupon the government was greatly weakened as a result of the demands of certain minorities, especially the Croats, to obtain autonomy. Italian opposition to a powerful Slav nation on the Adriatic also hindered Yugoslavia from developing into a strong state. Deprived of control of Fiume and Albania by Italy,

1 For further discussion of Poland see pp. 498-501.
she lacked the necessary seaports and railway facilities for satisfactory economic development. Confronted by these difficulties, King Alexander I of Yugoslavia tried to satisfy the various minorities by recognizing the equality of three major languages. Nevertheless, he endeavored to "Serbify" the various groups by restricting the formation of political parties and by strengthening the central government. The Croats stubbornly resisted this attempt to unify all groups. On October 9, 1934, this opposition culminated in the assassination of King Alexander I and of Barthou, able French statesman, at Marseilles, France, apparently as the result of a Croatian-Macedonian conspiracy and opposition to Barthou's attempt to strengthen French influence in the Balkans.

Agrarian as well as nationalist difficulties confronted the Yugoslav state. Peasants, constituting about 80 per cent of the population, were not satisfied with the size of their holdings, despite governmental attempts to break up the large estates. Inadequate outlets to the sea, poor internal transportation and communication, inability of the government to develop its limited mineral resources—these were just a few of the problems that beset this virtually bankrupt state. Facing possible extinction, Yugoslavia tried to strengthen her diplomatic position by establishing friendly relations with her neighbors, although remaining loyal to the Little Entente. In 1937 she signed amicable agreements with Bulgaria and Italy, and a special trade agreement with Germany. She also renewed the pact of 1927 with France, but many people believed that Yugoslavia was drifting from the French bloc into the Italo-German League.

During the 1930's, Rumania also moved toward the Fascist group. Prior to this time she had been a very staunch member of the Little Entente. As a result of her participation in the war on the Allied side, she had gained more than 60,000 square miles of land formerly belonging to Russia and the Dual Monarchy. Now containing over 17 million people and enormous oil, coal, and iron resources, this greatly enhanced the potential wealth and power of Rumania, and thereby made her an advocate of the territorial status quo. Internal troubles, such as the domestic affairs of her king, Carol II, the demands of land by a dissatisfied peasantry, heavy debts, very little foreign trade, and large minorities, particularly the Magyars, made it difficult for Rumania to attain prosperity and unity. Political strife, resulting in riots, disorders, and great demonstrations, tied the hands.

1 In 1928, Yugoslavia and Greece signed a convention whereby the former was given a fifty-year hold on a Salonika free zone. But the Yugoslavs were not satisfied, claiming that the extent of the zone was too small and Greek freight rates on Yugoslav goods were prohibitively high.
of the government. With the coming of the world depression in the early 1930's, cabinets rose and fell almost overnight. Determined to end this internal chaos, an anti-Semitic Fascist organization, called the Iron Guards, was formed. Opposing the Jewish element in Romania and the government's policy of friendship with France, this group finally forced King Carol on December 28, 1937 to ask Octavian Goga, anti-Semitic, pro-German leader of the National Christian Party, to form a cabinet. Inasmuch as a large majority of the people, including King Carol's mistress, Mme. Magda Lupescu, reputedly of Jewish origin, opposed the Iron Guards, the king in March, 1938, dissolved this government and established a personal dictatorship. Under a new Rumanian constitution, proclaimed by King Carol on February 21, 1938, all political parties were abolished, and the death penalty was provided for anyone violating a decree prohibiting the possession of arms, ammunition, or subversive propaganda.

On April 17, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, leader of the outlawed Fascist Iron Guards, and more than a thousand of his followers were arrested (and killed later while assertedly attempting to escape) on charges of plotting an armed uprising against the dictatorship of the king. Large stores of arms, ammunition, and manifestoes advocating a Fascist coup were seized by the government. In March, 1939, a trade treaty with Germany, negotiated after a week of international panic lest Rumania become another victim of Nazi imperialism, seemed to presage that country's adherence to the Rome-Berlin axis. To prevent German domination of Rumania, France also arranged a commercial agreement with that country whereby she promised to double her purchase of Rumanian oil and to reduce tariffs on Rumanian agricultural products by 60 per cent. Meanwhile Great Britain prepared to offer Rumania and Poland all the support in its power in the event Germany threatened their independence.

Although not directly connected with the Nazi-Fascist bloc, dictatorial governments were established in Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey. Upon the abdication of the autocratic King Ferdinand in favor of his son, Boris III, an energetic politician, Alexander Stambolisky became premier of Bulgaria, ruling from 1919 until 1923. Establishing a dictatorship, he introduced repressive measures designed to help the peasants and to crush the upper classes. In 1923 the propertyed groups brought about his overthrow by a coup d'état. Repression of the peasants and Communists by the bourgeois and landowning classes now followed. In the early 1930's, during the world depression, an attempt on the part of Premier Mushanov to liberalize the government only resulted in the increase of unrest among the peas-
ants and proletariat, many of whom swung toward communism. This spread of radicalism forced conservatives to join a Fascist group, which by 1935 was able to gain control of the government.

Introducing reforms designed to cut expenses and to eliminate corruption, the Fascist ministry soon aroused the opposition of King Boris, who believed that they planned his overthrow. Thereupon he dissolved the hostile ministry and appointed a new government. This new middle-course government soon faced an attempt of the Nationalist Fascists to force Bulgaria into a war with Greece and Yugoslavia over certain parts of Macedonia. The Bulgarian Fascists claimed that these regions were inhabited by Bulgarians and therefore should not belong to Greece and Yugoslavia. But the Bulgarian government refused to enter this trap. Instead, it pursued a policy of conciliation with its neighbors, and in February, 1936, it imposed heavy sentences on high officials who were charged with plotting to overthrow the government. Meanwhile, King Boris III and his prime minister, George Kiosseivanov, strove to avoid extremes of either Right or Left. Taking advantage of the diplomatic struggle of the Fascists and Democracies for control of the Balkans, Bulgaria suggested as a price for her support that Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Greece return the territories taken from her by the peace treaties at the conclusion of World War I.

Of all the Balkan countries Greece perhaps experienced the greatest number of political upheavals. Practically forced into World War I on the Allied side in 1917 by her able, aggressive statesman, Venizelos, Greece developed a desire to participate extensively in the loot of war. But it was not until 1919 that she obtained a real opportunity to enjoy the fruits of the struggle. At that time Greece, with the tacit permission of Great Britain and other Allied powers who opposed Italian acquisition of Smyrna, undertook to acquire that city and its hinterland. In the war which ensued, the Turkish nationalists, encouraged by France and Italy, inflicted a decisive defeat on the Greeks, despite the sympathy of Great Britain for the latter. Forced to withdraw her troops from Asia Minor, Greece agreed, in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), to surrender Eastern Thrace and Smyrna to the Turks. Also, arrangements were made to exchange Greek nationals living in Turkey for Turkish nationals living in Greece.

Dissatisfied as a result of this setback and inflamed by Venizelos the Greeks blamed King Constantine, who had been restored in 1920, for all their troubles. Forcing him to leave the country, they drew up a constitution, and in 1924 established a republic. Under the leadership of Venizelos this government in 1928 introduced con-
siderable legislation designed to improve social and economic conditions in Greece. Proceeds of foreign loans were devoted to the construction of public works and the development of agriculture; social conditions of the wage earners were slightly improved by the enactment of a Workman’s Insurance Act; commerce was stimulated by the arrangement of treaties with Italy, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Turkey (1929–1930).

Accused of dictatorial methods, Venizelos was forced to relinquish the premiership of Greece in 1933. A swing in the direction of royalism now took place. This movement was encouraged by General Kondylis, a former republican. Becoming premier in 1935 he held a plebiscite wherein the people voted in favor of a monarchy. As a result of this election, the exiled King George II was restored to the throne. In 1936, Greece again came under the control of a dictator. Following the deaths of Kondylis, Venizelos, and other political leaders, General John Metaxas, who had become head of the cabinet in April, 1936, determined to fight radicalism and bad economic conditions through the establishment of a dictatorship. Announcing in 1936 that parliamentary government was gone from Greece forever, he tried to increase Greek foreign trade and to establish a corporative state.

But it was in Turkey that probably one of the ablest postwar dictators appeared—Mustapha Kemal. A young officer in the Turkish army, he had in prewar days opposed the reactionary Turkish government and had participated in the Young Turk Revolution (1908). In World War I he proved himself to be one of Turkey’s outstanding military leaders. Because of his independent views, however, the sultan, at the close of the struggle, removed him from Constantinople and placed him in charge of demobilization activities in Anatolia. Accepting the commission, Kemal Pasha proceeded to create a Turkish Nationalist army and to plan the re-establishment of a united and Westernized Turkey.

The severity of the peace terms imposed by the Allies in the Treaty of Sèvres enabled Kemal to carry out his program. The Allies’ dismemberment and economic partition of Turkey had resulted in the calling of an assembly of Turkish notables to consider ways and means of rehabilitating that country. At this meeting, the Turkish national pride was inflamed by the dynamic speeches of Kemal, and they decided to resist Allied attempts to seize additional Turkish territory. Later, the Nationalists held a Grand Assembly at Angora, where they renounced the authority of the British-controlled sultan and proclaimed a new government with Kemal as its head. Between 1920 and 1922 the Turkish Nationalists regained complete control
of Anatolia, France and Russia gladly arranged separate peace treaties with Turkey, in which their respective interests in Asia Minor were defined. Flushed with success, the Turks turned upon the Greeks and chased these invaders from Asia Minor. The victorious forces of Kemal now planned to take Constantinople from the sultan, who was dominated by British interests. Unwilling to risk a war over this city because of public apathy at home, Great Britain and her allies invited Turkey and Greece to attend a peace conference at Lausanne (1922).

At this meeting the Allies discarded most of the Treaty of Sèvres. By the terms of the new settlement, the Turks regained Armenia, part of Thrace, a clear title to Constantinople, the Straits, and certain Aegean Islands. The frontier between Turkey and the new state of Iraq was to be settled by direct negotiations with Great Britain or, should these fail, the Council of the League of Nations. In return for these concessions, Turkey relinquished her claims on Syria, Palestine, her African possessions, most of the Aegean Islands, and the Arab provinces. The settlement included other agreements, in which the Straits and certain frontiers were to be demilitarized, and spheres of influence in Turkey, reparation payments, and capitulations were to be abolished.

Turkey's triumph at Lausanne ushered in the dictatorship of Kemal. After the deposition of Sultan Mohammed VI in October, 1923, a Grand National Assembly at Angora proclaimed a republic. A new constitution, creating a democratic government, was drawn up, and Kemal Pasha was elected first president. In possession of this office he made himself a dictator by abolishing all opposition parties, by obtaining control of the assembly, and by dominating the army as commander-in-chief. As dictator, he introduced his famous Westernizing policies which won for him the title, Atatürk (Father of the Turks). In 1924 the Caliphate was abolished, thus ending the moral leadership of Turkey in the Moslem world. Laws were passed secularizing education, abolishing ecclesiastical courts, establishing universal monogamy, and requiring registration of marriages. New criminal and civil codes were established, and old customs, such as the wearing of the fez, the turban, and the veil were abolished.

In his attempt to modernize Turkish life, Atatürk introduced radical educational reforms which greatly reduced illiteracy. Compulsory education of all children up to sixteen years of age was required; adult education was promoted; a literacy test for citizenship rights was established. Furthermore, the Gregorian calendar, the twenty-four hour day, the metric system, European numerals, and the Latin alphabet were all adopted. To stimulate national feeling, Atatürk
insisted that all streets, public halls, and bridges be given Turkish names. Western art and bourgeois ideas and practices were introduced into Turkey. Public buildings, schools, and even private habitations reflected Occidental designs. In Istanbul (formerly Constantinople) a symphony orchestra played selections from the works of Beethoven, Wagner, and Chopin to enthusiastic audiences. Capitalistic ideas, such as thrift, self-denial, and "rugged individualism," were taught the Turks. The benefits of capital, of large-scale production, and of protective tariffs were frequently extolled. Economic prosperity, attained through the promotion of industry, commerce, and agriculture, was Atatürk's economic objective.

Determined to Westernize his state completely and thoroughly, Atatürk in 1934 inaugurated his Five-Year Plan. Its object was to make Turkey self-sufficient industrially. To carry out this program a large loan was negotiated with Russia in 1934. Agricultural progress was stimulated through the establishment of farm schools, experimental stations, and co-operative credit societies. By purchase of surpluses the government kept up the price of foodstuffs. Industry was also developed; trade agreements were made with Russia and Germany, and Great Britain was asked to send engineers to aid in construction work. Furthermore, the Angora government became owner of all railways in the country by completing the purchase of the last remaining private line, a French railroad extending from Istanbul to the Bulgarian border.

Success attended Atatürk's foreign policies. Although he was a soldier by training, the Turkish dictator adopted a program of peace, friendship, and neutrality. To reach these ends he entered into treaties of friendship with Russia, Persia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. In these treaties many difficulties between Turkey and her neighbors were liquidated. In 1936, Atatürk decided to refortify the Straits, which had been demilitarized by the terms of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. This permission was granted by the League States. On July 20, 1936, France, Russia, Great Britain, Japan, Greece, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Turkey signed the Montreux Straits Convention permitting the refortification of the Straits, on condition that Turkey in time of peace allow all commercial vessels and a limited tonnage of war vessels to pass through this narrow channel. In time of war Turkey had the right to close the Straits to belligerents, provided they were not acting under League authority or in accordance with regional pacts to which Turkey was a party. Turkey also had the authority to close the Straits in the event of a threat of war, unless two-thirds of the League Council requested her not to do so. During 1936 and 1937 Atatürk contin-
ued to arrange treaties of friendship with all Turkey's neighbors. In modernizing Turkey, and in placing her in both the Balkan League ¹ and a Near Eastern League ² Atatürk at the time of his death in 1938 had made his country one of the strongest Near Eastern powers.

Before World War I, Spain, like Turkey, was a backward land. For centuries it had been ruled by reactionary monarchs, representing three privileged groups. First and greatest of these was the landowning class, to whom belonged two-thirds of agricultural Spain. Only one-third of Spanish agricultural property was in the hands of individual farmers, and they paid more than half of the taxes levied on the land. Second of its ruling elements was the Roman Catholic Church. Although it lost most of its property during the nineteenth century, it received in return a large annual subsidy from the government. Its bishops were supported by the king, and many Church rulings had the effect of national laws. Further, the Church had almost complete control of education and opposed the establishment of public schools in spite of the fact that Spain was the most illiterate land in western Europe. The army was the third ruling group. It was responsible to the king alone, and, like the Church, was an important political force. Army as well as Church laws were often the official acts of the nation.

Beneath these privileged groups were the Spanish people. Few belonged to the bourgeois class; most of them were farmers, in fact, many of them were little better than peons. In the cities lived the workers, barely existing on wages which were kept depressingly low. Thoroughly reactionary and inefficient, the ruling groups did little to solve the many problems which afflicted the country's restless and burdened people. As a result, such manifestations of discontent as military troubles in Morocco, general strikes during the years 1919-1921, and the Catalonian demand for autonomy finally led in 1923 to the establishment of a military dictatorship by the Spanish-American War veteran, General Miguel Primo de Rivera. Ruling with a firm hand, he instituted a conservative program by ruthlessly crushing opposition with force, and by destroying the prerogatives of free speech proclaimed in the constitution of 1876. In spite of his dictatorial methods, dissatisfaction increased until a series of army mutinies and riots by university students and workers led to his downfall in 1930. It was then that the weak king, Alfonso XIII, picked up the fallen reins of the government. In spite of the fact that he restored the constitution of 1876, more agitation on the part of liberal elements forced him into exile in 1931.

¹Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece, Rumania were its members.
²Iraq, Iran (Persia), and Afghanistan.
Following the overthrow of the monarchy, a republic was proclaimed, and elections for a constituent assembly were held (June, 1931). The voting resulted in an overwhelming victory for the Leftist Republicans and the Socialists. In control of the assembly, these groups, after five months of debate, completed a liberal constitution which was adopted on December 9, 1931. In this document Spain was declared "a republic of the workers of all classes"; a single legislative body (Cortes) was to be elected every four years by popular vote; the president was to be chosen for a six-year term by an electoral college (consisting of members of parliament and an equal number of electors selected by the voters); religious freedom was proclaimed; the state Church was to be abolished; education was to be secularized; the government was to have the right to expropriate, with compensation, private property, to socialize large estates, to nationalize public utilities, and to participate in the co-ordination of industries.

In the election of December, 1931, the moderate republican leader Zamora was chosen president, and the more liberal statesman Azáña became premier. The new government immediately proceeded to pass laws designed to carry out a program of reform which had been outlined in the general principles laid down in the constitution. In 1932–33, the Jesuit order was dissolved and its property was confiscated by the state; Church and state were separated; autonomy was granted the province of Catalonia by the republican government; and agrarian and labor reforms were inaugurated, involving the confiscation of the great estates of the landed nobility without compensation, and the distribution of over fifty million acres of royal lands among a million Spanish peasants.

These reforms united the obstructionist elements of the Right. Clericals and Royalists worked earnestly for the restoration of the monarchy; and, on the extreme Left, the Communists advocated the overthrow of the republic in order to establish a soviet regime. In the November elections of 1933, the reactionaries succeeded in defeating the Leftish groups. Backed by the Catholic Popular Action Party and the commercial, industrial, financial, and landed interests, the young and wealthy Catholic leader, Gil Robles, tried to modify or weaken the various reforming tendencies. Open revolt soon broke out in Catalonia, and only after military force had put President Louis Companys, of Catalonia, together with a group of cohorts, in jail, did it subside. Meanwhile sporadic revolts and strikes took place in various parts of Spain.

Failure of individual action convinced the liberals that only through a united front could they regain power. Consequently, in the 1936 elections the Syndicalists, Communists, Socialists, and Left
Republicans organized as a Popular Front. The challenge was met by an equally organized group of Conservative Republicans, Clericals, and Royalists. But when the results had been tabulated the Left apparently held the upper hand; Azaña again gained control, and Catalonia was once more given autonomy.

The new Popular Front government at this time took up its program of reform where it had left off before the conservative interregnum. A mild purge was conducted whereby those officers in the army suspected of disloyalty were ordered to inconspicuous posts. Among those moved was General Francisco Franco. Sent to the Canary Islands, Franco evidently waited for the opportunity to strike against the government. When on July 17, 1936, several regiments in Morocco raised the standard of revolt against the Spanish regime, he immediately flew there to take charge of it. More than 90 per cent of the officers and two-thirds of the army now sided with Franco. Though the navy remained loyal to the existing regime, its place was inconspicuous at first, since the land campaign was the decisive military factor in the early phase of the war. More important to the Loyalists (the Popular Front government) was the $700,000,000 gold reserve, the third largest in the world, which it controlled.

At first the Nationalist forces seemed destined to win a quick and a complete victory. Backed by Moorish as well as Spanish soldiers and aided by Italian and German "volunteers," Franco's troops by November, 1936, were at the gates of Madrid. But by this time the Loyalist forces had been strengthened by the organization of a Popular Militia of workers, by anti-Fascist volunteers from many foreign countries, and by military supplies, apparently from Russia. With this aid the Republican Government was able to save Madrid. In 1936 foreign intervention caused the war to take on the aspect of an international struggle. This development was more or less inevitable. Spain was a poor and backward country whose resources as yet had not been exploited. In that state there were rich deposits of coal, iron, zinc, and mercury which two countries—Germany and Italy—needed badly. Moreover, strategically, Spain was of real importance. At the southern tip of the Iberian Peninsula, guarding her trade routes to Egypt and the Orient, Great Britain maintained the powerful fortress of Gibraltar. But this fortified rock could be threatened from the Spanish side or from Spanish Morocco which lay less than a dozen miles from it across the straits at the western end of the Mediterranean. If a strong power could gain control of Spain the British life line to the Orient would be menaced. Thus it was that Mussolini, thoroughly piqued by Great Britain's opposition to his Ethiopian campaign, sought to embarrass England, at first, by interfering
in Spain. His natural partner in that adventure, as well as in his quest for raw materials, was his ally, Hitler. The German dictator apparently welcomed this move to establish a Fascist state south of Germany's historic enemy, republican France, for he realized that Fascist control of Spain's Balearic Islands would threaten French communication with her African Empire. Since the Communists had a strong organization in Spain, both dictators were in a position to claim that they were fighting against the spread of sovietism.

In 1937, thanks to Fascist help, the Nationalists were able to resume their military advance. Though defeated by the Loyalists at Guadalajara in March, Franco gradually extended his control until by October, 1937, all of northwest Spain lay in his hands. Moreover, in the following year a Nationalist thrust between Valencia and Catalonia created a salient separating these important Loyalist centers. Despite these losses, the Loyalists continued to resist with unexpected vigor. In July, 1938, a Loyalist counter-offensive on the Ebro River staved off defeat for a time.

From the beginning of the Spanish Civil War, Great Britain and France realized that this strife might lead to a general European revolution or war. Determined to avoid either catastrophe, France, Great Britain, and the United States adopted a nonintervention policy in which they officially refused to permit the sale of munitions to the Loyalists or the Nationalists in Spain. England also instituted negotiations with Italy and Germany in an attempt to localize the conflict. In 1937, Great Britain, under the conciliatory hand of Chamberlain, tried to reach an understanding whereby the warring elements would be isolated. Finally, in March of that year, a naval cordon was established around the hapless country, and the vessels of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany patroled the coast in an ostensible effort to prevent foreign help to either the Rebels or the Loyalists. During the early stages of the patrol, the German battleship, Deutschland, however, was bombed by Loyalist airplanes, whereupon the Nazi government ordered the shelling of the Loyalist seaport of Almeria by five German battleships. Following this episode, Italy and Germany withdrew from the patrol. A short time later the patrol was re-established, but lacking the support of the Fascist powers, it collapsed. Meanwhile, attacks by unidentified submarines and planes on French, British, and Russian vessels became more frequent, and the number of boats sunk was so alarming that a conference was called at Nyon to deal with this new menace. After the meeting, such sinkings, usually ascribed to the Nationalists or their sponsors, ceased to be a formidable problem.

But the Italian dictator still continued to aid Franco. Chamber-
lain, therefore, decided it would be wise to seek a settlement with Mussolini, rather than let the Mediterranean situation draw Europe into another world war. Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, who had been Britain's leading anti-Fascist diplomat, resigned in protest, claiming that temporizing with a bully was only postponing trouble.

But the British business classes backed Chamberlain's appeasement policy. They opposed the Popular Front governments in France and in Spain because they believed them to be under Communist control. They had no happy recollections of the World War and did not want to fight for Ethiopian savages or Spanish radicals. They were more prosaically concerned with Mussolini's harrying of their trade routes and his apparent attempts to stir up British subject peoples in the Near East. At the expense of some loss of face, they were willing to placate *Il Duce* and his ally, Hitler, until Britain could build her armaments to a size commanding respect.

In April, 1938, therefore, Great Britain and Italy agreed upon a pact which was to be signed after Mussolini had withdrawn his troops from Spain and Britain had obtained League recognition of Mussolini's Ethiopian conquest. *Il Duce* consented to renounce all territorial ambitions with regard to Spain. In return, Britain promised to recognize the conquest of Ethiopia and to acknowledge Italy's vital interests in the Mediterranean. Mussolini also bound himself to respect England's essential interests there because of imperial commu-
communications, and to reduce Italian forces in Libya. Both countries agreed not to propagandize against each other and to adhere to the London Naval Treaty of 1936. Both also promised to adhere to the Suez Canal Convention of 1888 which guaranteed free use of the canal to all powers at all times. Though at first Franco consented (as did the Loyalists) to this settlement, when the actual plan began to be worked out, on August 7, 1938, he proposed changes that virtually nullified it.

Early in 1939 Great Britain and France recognized the Franco regime as the de jure government of Spain, and in March, 1939, Spain’s Civil War finally came to an end. Termination of this conflict which cost more than 1,000,000 lives, untold human suffering, and inestimable property destruction was hastened by the unconditional surrender of besieged Madrid and the almost simultaneous capitulation of the rest of republican Spain and its armies. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy hailed Franco’s victory as “another milestone in the formation of a strong nation allied with the Rome-Berlin totalitarian dictatorships.” According to the Axis, democracy as well as communism seemed to be on the way out.

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CHAPTER XIX

The Liquidation of Peace

DR. HJALMAR HORACE GREELEY SCHACHT

REVOLT OF THE ORIENT

PRIOR to the outbreak of World War I the rapid expansion of Western civilization had changed the Pacific world. New nations had arisen, and old ones were aroused to self-consciousness. In the Americas, the United States became the most powerful state, developing a great empire which extended from the Caribbean to the Philippines in the east. Canada, to the north of the United States, had achieved virtual independence within the British Commonwealth of Nations. In Latin America, the numerous countries, protected from European penetration by the Monroe Doctrine and subsequent American protective policies, managed to retain their sovereignty. Australia and the numerous islands in the Pacific had early come under European or, in some cases, Japanese and American dominion. Of these, Australia and New Zealand, although parts of the British Empire, became virtually independent nations, erecting tariff barriers and developing their rich resources.

After World War I there was a widespread revulsion of feeling against European imperialism and certain phases of Western civilization. In practically every part of Asia and Africa revolutionary movements appeared. The peoples in the Near East, in India, in China, and in some of the islands of the Pacific, revealed hostility to European control. This antagonism even spread to Africa, where the Moslem populations in the north continued to resist the advance of Western capitalism. In central and southern Africa, some of the
blacks prepared charters of liberties and adopted the slogan "Africa for the Africans."

While the Spaniards in Morocco; the French in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunis; and the Italians in Libya encountered opposition, the most serious challenge to Western supremacy in Africa was experienced by the British in Egypt. During the war, Great Britain, in order to prevent a possible Turkish invasion of Egypt, had established a protectorate there and had commandeered considerable grain and many animals. These actions greatly stimulated native resentment to alien rule. Frequent outbursts of violence finally forced the British government in 1922 to abolish the protectorate and to recognize the independence of Egypt. In 1923 a constitution was created and the sultan adopted the title of king. Egypt by now was a semi-independent state, subject to British control over such matters as the Suez Canal, the problem of defense, and the rights of minorities. Despite these concessions, the Egyptians demanded complete freedom. Continuous political demonstrations, resulting in the murder of the British governor-general of the Sudan in 1924, finally forced the imperial government to intervene. In 1925, freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly disappeared, and nationalist agitation was prohibited in the delta. Great Britain, in 1929, concluded a treaty of alliance with Egypt, in which both parties promised mutual assistance in the event of war, and England agreed to withdraw all troops save in the area of the Suez Canal. The Sudan, however, was to remain under the Anglo-Egyptian condominium which had been set up in accordance with the conventions of 1899. In 1930 the Egyptians adopted a new constitution, which created an undemocratic government. Within four years there developed a strong movement to abolish this document and to restore that of 1923. In 1935 came the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, which complicated matters. Recognizing the possibility of an Anglo-Italian conflict over this region, the Egyptians decided to eliminate the British influence in Egypt. Riots occurred, and a united front of all Egyptian political parties demanded the negotiation of a new Anglo-Egyptian treaty and the establishment of a democratic government.

During this period of confusion King Fuad died (1936) and was Farouk I succeeded by his sixteen-year-old son, Farouk I. In the first year of his reign an Anglo-Egyptian alliance was signed. The terms of this treaty provided that Great Britain in time of war should have the right to utilize Egyptian facilities and to require, if necessary, the establishment of martial law. In return, the British promised to work for Egypt's admission into the League of Nations, to exchange ambassadors with her, and to confine British troops to the northern end
of the Suez Canal. Great Britain also agreed to induce various powers to surrender their privileged positions in Egypt. In 1937 the capitulatory nations, i.e., those whose citizens enjoyed the rights of extraterritoriality, met at Montreux and agreed to abolish these special privileges by 1949. Thus, Egypt at last obtained independence, subject to the sole British restriction that the facts of modern warfare, together with the imperial interests of Great Britain, made so close relationship essential.

Moslem peoples in western Asia were as persistent as the Egyptians in their attempts to obtain national independence. After the war they engaged in revolts against Western capitalism. The Arabs, who had helped the British in the war against the Turks, claimed that they had been promised independence and national unity as a reward for their aid. But the Allies refused to grant them complete freedom and, instead, partitioned western Asia among themselves. France established a mandate in Syria; Great Britain did likewise in Iraq, Palestine, and the Transjordan; and the Arabs were forced to be satisfied with independent states in Arabia.

France and Great Britain soon found themselves beset with serious difficulties in these regions. In Syria native revolts forced the French in 1928 to permit general elections for a representative constitutional assembly. The first elections under this constitution occurred amid great disorder in January, 1932. Determined to obtain complete independence, the Syrians refused to agree to an arrangement with France whereby the two states would enter into an alliance under which France would secure for Syria membership in the League of Nations, and in return Syria would permit France to continue to exercise control over her foreign, military, and financial matters. France refused to grant the natives the complete independence they desired, but nationalist agitations, culminating early in 1936 in a general strike, forced the French government to sign new treaties of friendship and alliance with Syria and its neighboring state, Lebanon. According to the terms of these agreements both were to become independent countries within a period of three years. During this time France was to keep troops in the republics and help them prepare their own armies.

Great Britain, too, ran into complications. In Palestine, assigned by the League of Nations to England, the problems were especially troublesome because of the bitter antagonism between the enterprising Jewish minority and the backward Arabs, who comprised over 80 per cent of the inhabitants. The Balfour Declaration of 1917 which committed England to the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine had added to this hatred. Frequent riots took place,
usually near the Wailing Wall of Jerusalem, which was used by the Jews as a sacred place for worship and was claimed by the Moslems as their property. In an attempt to placate the Arabs, the British government in 1931 suspended the immigration of Jews into the country. Meanwhile, the Hebrews refused to co-operate in the election of a legislative council which would represent the various peoples of Palestine, unless they were guaranteed at least an equality in membership with the Arabs. Although they constituted less than a third of the population, the Jews claimed that their economic interests entitled them to equal representation. Thereupon the British government dropped the project of a National Council and declined to restrict further Jewish immigration or to forbid the sale of Arab lands to the Hebrews. Attempting to oppose any further loss of territory, the Arabs now resorted to strikes, civil disobedience, and anti-Jewish riots. These agitations finally forced the British government in 1936 to appoint a commission to investigate the entire situation in Palestine. As a result of its researches the commission recommended in 1937 that Palestine be divided into three parts: The region around the Holy Cities was to remain a British mandate; a section, constituting about one third of Palestine, was to be a Jewish state; and the rest of the region linked with Transjordan was to become an independent Arab state. While the British government accepted this suggestion, the House of Commons voted to refer the matter to the League of Nations. The Council of the League thereupon approved the plan in principle, but insisted that the new Jewish and Arab states should continue under mandate.

In the fall of 1938 the British government, aroused by the killing of hundreds of Arabs, Jews, and British soldiers as a result of this sanguinary Arab-Jewish dispute, considered a number of plans to solve this problem. Opposition of Zionists to any scheme in which the Jews would have minority status, however, made it very difficult for the British to find a workable settlement. Meanwhile, the Arab revolt in Palestine, which had begun as a protest against Zionist immigration, had developed into something far more serious: a war against British imperialism, probably encouraged by Mussolini. This uprising the London government determined to crush at all costs.

The Arabians in Iraq also opposed British control. Handed over to England as a mandate after World War I, the people of this region, unlike the inhabitants of Transjordan, refused to recognize British suzerainty. Having gained control of the oil fields in that region Great Britain finally agreed to transform the mandate into an Anglo-Iraq Alliance (1922). But this concession did not satisfy the natives. They aimed at complete freedom and finally got the British govern-
ment in 1927 to agree to recognize the independence of their country in five years. Accordingly, on October 3, 1932, Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations as an independent power, the European states surrendering their privileges under the capitulations.

The postwar period also witnessed the emancipation of Persia. Formerly divided into spheres of influence by the imperial governments of Russia and Great Britain, Persia shook off Russian influence when Cossack officers retired from the country at the end of the war, but had to wait five years for the British to relinquish their political control. Emancipator of his country from British domination was a former Persian Cossack officer, Reza Khan. Like Turkey's dictator (Kemal Atatürk) he became head of a nationalist army, denounced British rule over Persia, and assumed the premiership (1923). Two years later the shah was persuaded to leave Persia and a Constituent Assembly made Reza Khan hereditary shah. With a newly created army of forty thousand men, he put down the rebellious Kurds and other warring peoples. Then he began shaking a determined fist at Great Britain.

First real shock to reach London was the arbitrary cancellation by the new shah of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company agreement, scheduled to run until 1961. Realizing that enforcement of this oil lease would involve great and expensive military effort, the British government permitted the Anglo-Persian Company to negotiate a settlement whereby the shah obtained increased royalties, promptly earmarked for the army, and other concessions. Reza Khan Pahlavi, as he now styled himself, proceeded to rid himself of British advisers, handed over Persian business to Italian, Russian, and German agents, and persuaded the British to move their naval base further away on the Persian Gulf.

Almost illiterate when he came to the throne, Reza Khan Pahlavi endeavored to make himself a twentieth-century Darius. He imposed his will on hitherto independent fierce tribes, hanging dozens of warring sheiks and making other suspected local chieftains his permanent "guests." Strong-willed followers of the shah whom Reza Khan had deposed developed mysterious maladies, committed suicide, or underwent fatal operations. The modernizing shah summed himself up when he said: "I am a soldier — a simple soldier — and love my job." He combined his knowledge of time-honored Oriental political methods with a superficial passion for reform. Opposed to Western culture in general, he nevertheless admired certain of its phases, such as, for example, its dress and technical achievements. But these modern improvements did not solve the historic problem of Persia—periodic famine which was partly caused by archaic agricultural
methods. Despite the superficial prosperity of the shah's capital city, Teheran, all was not well even by 1939. Scores of beggars greeted incoming travelers. Emaciated natives could be seen sitting around in streets and doorways. As in the past, locust attacks and droughts still made this area one in which a large part of the people existed on the very edge of starvation. Meanwhile, the financing of the shah's ambitious projects had practically bled the country white.

Afghanistan, as well as Persia, experienced an anti-Western movement after World War I. Under the direction of their amir, Amanullah Khan, the people of this wild and rugged country induced Great Britain to recognize their independence. Amanullah now tried to modernize his country, but the conservative tribesmen in 1929 were able to bring about his abdication. Eventually, the leader of these rebels, Habibullah Khan, ascended the throne. Later he was murdered and a nephew of Amanullah succeeded him.

The most important revolution against British rule, however, occurred in postwar India. Long before 1914, the people of this huge peninsula had demanded drastic reforms, and Great Britain, to prevent trouble in India during the war, had promised political concessions, involving increased native participation in the government. After the war, Great Britain soon discovered that India was still a problem-child. Comprising various nationalities, religions, and social castes, it seemed to lack all of the necessary prerequisites for a unified state, save abundant economic resources. Despite these handicaps, the leaders of the three hundred-odd millions of people demanded autonomy, if not independence, of Great Britain. Claiming that the British were primarily concerned with the exploitation of India, the nationalists endeavored to gain economic justice as well as political freedom. They asserted that they should have the right to develop their own industries and refused to purchase British manufactured goods—claiming that England was trying to shield her industries by opposing Indian economic progress.

Recognized champion of Indian Nationalists was Mohandas Gandhi. An ardent advocate of simplicity and asceticism, the Holy One bitterly opposed the Westernization of India. Enthusiastically, the Nationalists adopted his program of nonco-operation and passive resistance. Attempting to rid themselves of British control, they refused to hold positions in the administration, to vote, to purchase foreign goods, especially British textiles, and to pay taxes. Alarmed at the trend of events, the British government in 1919 consented to give the Indians a degree of self-government, but native hostility persisted. Despite Gandhi's opposition to the use of force, the Indians participated in riots, especially during the period of his imprison-
ment in 1922–1924. Aroused by this problem, Great Britain sent a commission under Sir John Simon to investigate the situation. Meanwhile the nationalists decided to demand autonomy or dominion status within the Empire, rather than complete independence. Maintaining that lack of Indian unity made it impossible for the committee to approve the grant of autonomy, the Simon commission in 1930 recommended that the authority of the Secretary of State for India and of the Governor General be increased; that the provincial governors have more power; and that Indians be trained for administrative duties. Regarded as reactionary, these proposals were bitterly resented by the natives.

A strange revolution now followed. Led by Gandhi, the nationalists attacked British control of the liquor traffic, boycotted British goods, and renounced British rule. In an attempt to end this uprising Great Britain held a Round Table Conference in which native representatives and sympathizers roundly criticized the character of British government in India. In 1931, the Indian leader attended the discussions in England, but no settlement was made. Thereupon the British again arrested Gandhi, who, informed that the British, catering to the selfish upper classes in India, were planning to debar the masses from political life, entered upon the first of his famous hunger strikes. After six days of fasting he abandoned his demonstration when the British gave up the proposed plan. At the conclusion of the third Round Table Conference the British government decided not to grant autonomy to the Indians until the various groups, such as the Hindus and the Moslems, agreed to co-operate. Until then the people, in accordance with the Government of India Act (1935), were to enjoy increased political rights under a new India Federal Constitution. According to the terms of this document the responsibility for local administration was to be placed on the provinces, but India as a whole was not to receive dominion status. Considerable opposition to the entire plan existed in India. Some of the natives wanted independence; others were content with dominion status. Most of them, however, opposed the state of semi-independence, in which the viceroy still retained control of matters connected with foreign affairs, defense, and finance. By 1936 another leader, the young Pandit Nehru, had appeared in India. An advocate of complete independence to be gained by force, if necessary, this new messiah announced to the Nationalist Congress in April, 1936, that he regarded socialism as the only solution to India's ills. Thus, many Indians by 1939 seemed to be preparing for a revolt—not merely against British control, but also against Western capitalism.

During the postwar period the most spectacular opposition to
Western capitalism developed in the Far East. Anti-foreign sentiment had existed in China and Japan prior to 1914, but it became particularly virulent and even menacing after the outbreak of the war. In 1915, Japan took advantage of the preoccupation of the European powers to present to China a secret ultimatum known as the Twenty-one Demands. These were tantamount to the establishment of a Japanese protectorate over China. Unable to obtain the acceptance of all of these demands, the Japanese finally arranged agreements with China, Russia, Great Britain, France, and Italy, whereby Nippon secured virtually a free hand in northern China.

At the peace meeting following the conclusion of the war, China tried to throw off alien political and economic control. Unable to reach these objectives, the Chinese refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles, and agitated against foreign penetration—especially the Japanese occupation of the Shantung peninsula (formerly a German sphere of influence). In 1921–1922 China made some gains at the Washington Conference on the limitation of armaments. Japan promised to evacuate Shantung; China was granted greater control of her tariffs; and committees were appointed to investigate the problems of extra-territoriality and tariff autonomy. Also, a Nine-Power Pact adhered to by Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Belgium, China, Portugal, and the United States, guaranteed the independence and integrity of China as well as the status quo in the Far East. A Four-Power Agreement, also arranged at Washington, which included Great Britain, France, the United States, and Japan, established a balance of power in the whole Pacific area.

China, however, lacking a strong government, was torn by frequent civil wars. Cantonese Nationalists tried to suppress the turbulent war lords of the north and to end foreign limitations on Chinese sovereignty. In the early 1920's Soviet Russia attempted to help the Chinese combat Western imperialism and at the same time to spread the seeds of communism. Influenced by this development, Chiang Kai-shek, who succeeded Sun-Yat-sen as the head of the Nationalists in 1925, repudiated communism, and thus secured the favor of the Western powers in his move to suppress the Chinese war lords of the north.

By 1928 the Nationalists, with their capital now removed to Nanking, had extended their control over most of China and had reduced foreign influence considerably. Tariff autonomy was practically established; a new criminal code created; a program designed to achieve democracy was adopted; and an enormous federal army was recruited. Despite these gains, the Nationalist government between 1929 and
1931 was still confronted by civil strife and the danger of a foreign war. Strongly entrenched Communist groups opposed the Nanking regime because of its indifference to Soviet Russia; and Nationalists' attempts to bring Manchuria under their control aroused bitter Russian and Japanese opposition. Furthermore, many of the independent war lords had never been suppressed and only gave nominal adhesion to the central government. In order to protect and enlarge her economic interests in Manchuria, Japan determined, by the summer of 1931, to set up a puppet state in that region. This policy of expansion rose out of a depression which in Japan had been almost continuous since 1921. As her industry and commerce declined, she decided to exploit the rich mineral and other resources of Manchuria and to use this region as an outlet for surplus goods, capital, and population.

Manchuria was a rich agricultural land and contained certain of the most highly industrialized sections of China. Its principal crops were the soy bean, wheat, cotton, and the sugar beet. It also possessed large resources of coal and iron. A network of rivers and railways, built by Chinese, Russian, and Japanese capital, afforded transportation facilities. Long interested in this region, Japanese businessmen supported, with some misgivings, the military clique in its determination to conquer this region and to check the spread of commu-
nism. Accordingly, Japanese armies invaded the country and by 1932 had taken possession of the whole territory, including the Russian sphere of influence. Meanwhile, Russia, desirous of peace, so that she could solve her internal problems, refused to join China in opposing Japanese penetration of Manchuria.

Beset by civil war, floods, and famines, the Nanking government was unable to check the Japanese advance. Accusing Japan of unjustifiable aggression, China appealed to the League of Nations and decided to resort to the economic boycott of Japanese trade. Alarmed at this declaration of economic war, Japan seized the industrial and commercial heart of China—Shanghai. It was believed that the conquest of this important business center would force the Chinese to abandon their boycott.Stubborn Chinese resistance, however, made this military undertaking a costly one for the Japanese. Moreover it aroused the bitter hostility of the Western powers who believed that their stakes in China were jeopardized. Fearful lest direct intervention might lead to a world war, the United States, Soviet Russia, Great Britain, and other interested nations preferred to avoid active interference.

Having forced China to give up her boycott policy, Japan withdrew from Shanghai, but at the same time proceeded to set up a puppet state in Manchuria, called Manchukuo, under the nominal rule

1 The League of Nations, in a voluminous report, exonerated China of all blame in the war and declared Japan to be the aggressor. Thereupon Japan withdrew from the League (1933).
of Henry Pu Yi, the last of the Manchu emperors of China. The
country was practically cleared of insurrectionists; and Jehol, a
Chinese province lying within the Great Wall, was conquered by
the Japanese and made a part of this newly established state. The
League of Nations, however, refused to recognize the puppet state
and branded Japan as guilty of unwarranted aggression. Offended by
the League of Nations' active policy of opposition, Japan, in 1933
reasserted her determination to pursue an independent policy and
to maintain a "Monroe Doctrine in the Orient."

A Russo-Chinese entente in December, 1933, occasioned some
alarm among the Japanese, many regarding it as the prelude to a
military alliance for the purpose of thrusting them out of China.
Serious disputes between Russia and Manchukuo (backed by Japan)
ocurred over the control of the Chinese Railway, This matter was
finally settled when Russia sold her interest to Japan. Despite this
agreement, friction continued between Russia and Japan in the win-
ter of 1935–1936. This hostility was fanned by border incidents along
the Soviet-Manchukuoan and Manchukuo-Outer Mongolian fron-
tiers, and by disputes between Russia and Japan over fishery rights
in eastern waters. There were frequent reports after 1937 of clashes,
but at the time neither side was willing to go to war.

Meanwhile, Japan, having decided, as a result of the border dis-
putes, that Russia was not disposed to fight an offensive war, an-
nounced her desire to restore law and order in China. The head
of the Chinese government and commander-in-chief of its army, Chiang
Kai-shek, tried to avoid war by ordering the suppression of anti-
Japanese demonstrations in various parts of China. This policy
aroused considerable opposition, and Chiang Kai-shek was compelled
to make peace with the Chinese Communists and to present a united
front against the Japanese invaders. The military party in Japan,
in complete control of the government, now prepared for a pro-
tracted war in China. In August, 1937, the fighting spread to Shang-
hai, and Japan announced a blockade of shipping along most of the
Chinese coast. Meanwhile, the Japanese armies advanced slowly but
steadily into China. While thousands of Chinese civilians as well as
soldiers were being killed by Japanese bombs in areas removed from
the fronts, the premier of Japan announced that his country had no
territorial designs in carrying on this undeclared war. "If we mete
out direct punishment to the Chinese our final objective must be
Sino-Japanese co-operation."

Foreign nations, for the most part, condemned Japan's policies
severely. On October 6, 1937, fifty members of the League of Na-
tions endorsed a report which expressed moral support of China, and
called a parley of the signatories of the Nine-Power Pact and other interested states to meet at Brussels. At this gathering the Italian delegate, claiming that Japan was fighting communism in China, ridiculed the whole proceeding. Unable to agree upon a common policy, the various nations, in default of positive action, simply drew up a resolution condemning Japan. Backed by Germany and Italy, the Japanese ignored the hostility of Russia and other powers and continued their military operations in China. In December, 1937, Japanese troops entered Nanking, the former capital of the nationalist government. In the early spring of 1938 the Japanese were victorious on all fronts. Supreme in a large part of the north, the Japanese soldiers now seemed ready to invade the southern part of China. At this critical moment, when British, French and other foreign interests in that region were threatened, Chinese resistance to the Japanese advance stiffened. Encouraged and aided by foreign powers, the Chinese seemed capable of prolonging the struggle.

In July, 1938, the Japanese drive on the provisional Chinese capital, Hankow, was temporarily brought to a standstill by a Manchukuo-Soviet border dispute over Changkufeng hill. Prior to this incident the Soviet government had been forced to devote all of its energies to its own economic development. By 1938, however, the Russian Bear apparently felt strong enough to show its claws. Consequently, after a short period of intermittent warfare, Japan, primarily interested at that time in the conquest of China, accepted the Soviet plan to arbitrate this frontier problem. Despite this concession to Russia, Japan realized that fear of German-Italian aggression in Europe would prevent British, French, and Russian intervention in China. Following the German dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in October, therefore, she launched a new assault upon Chinese independence. Troops were landed in southern China, about twenty miles from the British Crown Colony of Hongkong, and the main railway artery, over which munitions purchased by the Chinese in Europe were shipped to Generalissimo Chiang at Hankow, was cut. Assuring Great Britain that her specific interests in south China would be respected, Japan, through her war office, announced that she was determined to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek's regime; "We do not intend to take Hongkong or Singapore or advance southward in the Pacific; but we must and will carry out our program in China."

Ten days after the Japanese troops had been landed in the south, China faced a complete military collapse. Canton was captured by the Japanese without much trouble; the only railway over which Russian supplies could reach Hankow was cut by Japanese forces at Sen Yang; and on the Yangtze River the Japanese captured Hankow
in the latter part of October, 1938. Early in 1939, to the chagrin of the French, whose sphere of influence in southern China was menaced, the Japanese seized the strategic island of Hainan and the French-claimed Spratly Islands. In possession of the most important parts of China, Japan, having already repudiated the Nine-Power Pact and other treaties guaranteeing the territorial integrity of China, seemed to be in a position, in co-operation with the Rome-Berlin axis, to make Japanese hegemony in the Far East a reality. An opportunity to carry out this plan presented itself when the Germans invaded Poland and precipitated another world war.

**The Polish Crisis**

In April, 1939, Nazi Germany informed the world that she was far from appeased. The few remnants of the Czech state had been destroyed; Memel had been absorbed; and an economic penetration of Rumania had been begun. Germany seemed ready to march into Poland, the Balkans, and perhaps the Soviet Ukraine. This threat to the balance of power in Europe led Chamberlain to assume an active leadership in the drive against further Nazi expansion. With France, Great Britain now tried to place a ring of nations around Germany. Special arrangements in the form of treaties were concluded with Poland and Rumania, and a rapprochement was
initiated with Russia. France and England promised military assistance to countries who felt their independence jeopardized by Hitler. According to the British this policy of "encirclement" was not the least aggressive—it was merely defensive. Then, Hitler repudiated the Anglo-German naval pact of 1935, renounced the ten-year peace agreement with Poland signed in 1934, and blamed "British warmongers" and Poland's militarists for these two repudiations. He also enumerated his demands on Poland which he said had been rejected. These were the return of Danzig to Germany with the provision that Poland retain free port privileges there; a German-controlled highway and railroad across the Corridor to East Prussia; acceptance of present boundaries between the two countries as final; a twenty-five-year nonaggression treaty; and a joint guarantee by Germany, Poland, and Hungary of the borders of Slovakia.

Following this outburst, Europe busily engaged in choosing sides for what many believed would be another world war. Germany and Italy, at the end of a long conference at Milan between Foreign Ministers von Ribbentrop and Ciano, determined "to stand together in war and peace, in all circumstances, without limitations." Meanwhile Germany offered the little northern states nonaggression pacts. This proposition was turned down by Sweden, Norway, and Finland. Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Denmark, however, accepted the offer. England finally persuaded the Turks to announce their support of the democracies in the event anyone attacked Rumania, Palestine, or Egypt. Great Britain promised to buy Turkish goods, in case Germany, now Turkey's best customer, stopped doing so. Having brought Turkey into the democratic orbit and thus insuring contact with Russia via the Straits in the event of war, Great Britain then endeavored to gain the support of the Moslem states, such as Iraq and Iran. To attain this objective the British cabinet in May of 1939 tried to obtain the backing of the Arabs by announcing a plan to make Palestine an independent state in ten years, and to restrict Jewish immigration to a total of 75,000 during the period 1939-1944. Reactions to this scheme were immediate and world-wide. Jewish leaders everywhere condemned it and in Palestine the Jews resorted to riots and then to passive opposition. The Arabs also opposed this plan, for they insisted upon the immediate establishment of an independent state.

While Great Britain and Germany were trying to bring the small nations into various kinds of alliances, Soviet Russia continued to be the sphinx of Europe. Apparently unwilling to join in anything less than a clear-cut military assistance pact between Britain, France, and Russia, Stalin of Russia refused to accept Great Britain's proposal.
that Russia promise protection in the event of an attack upon states already guaranteed by France and Great Britain: Rumania, Greece, and Poland. Instead he asked the question: What if Germany wins the next war in eastern Europe? Will the democracies keep on fighting for Russia? Evidently Stalin was skeptical of the ability of the capitalistic states to put up a fight and considered seriously the possibility that Germany might defeat Russia and that Britain might then forsake the Soviet Republic.

For this and perhaps other reasons, the talks between England and Russia were protracted, and, although no progress was made, there were no indications that Russia had other plans in mind. Yet it was at this crucial moment (April 17, 1939) that the Soviet Republic dropped a hint that “there is no reason why she [Germany] should not live with us [Russia] on a normal footing.” Apparently Stalin had determined to arrange a settlement with Hitler, for on May 3 he gave the Nazi ruler another clue when he announced that the “old internationalist,” Maxim Litvinov, would be replaced as foreign minister by Commissar Vyacheslav M. Molotov, “bourgeois-born, but an old-line Communist.”

Hitler was prepared to take the hint. By May he intended to invade Poland, and now he saw an opportunity to do so without be-
German offer. Negotiations continued for weeks. Meanwhile, Hitler's tirades against Poland increased anxiety in an already jittery world. Finally, on August 24, the diplomatic bomb exploded. A joint Russo-German communiqué announced a ten-year nonaggression pact to a stunned world. The way had been cleared for Hitler's attack on Poland.

What was not mentioned at this time, however, was an equally significant secret protocol—the Protocol of August 23. This was a document which divided eastern Europe into Russian and German spheres of influence. The division between the two spheres was a line running from the Baltic to the Black Sea and splitting Poland into halves. Everything east of the line was to be in the Russian sphere. In the north, Russia was given a free hand in the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Finland. In the south, Russia was to get Bessarabia, which had been annexed by Rumania after World War I. Everything west of that line was in the German sphere—though there was no clear definition of the Balkan division, which was later to be a sore point.

In signing this pact, Stalin believed that he would avoid a jam. He knew that if he entered a military alliance with England and France, and war followed, the Poles would not permit Red Russian armies to defend their western front, for fear that Russia would be in a position to take over Poland. On the other hand, Stalin realized that the Red Army could not wait to fight the Nazis until the latter had overrun Poland and were on the Russian frontier. Therefore he determined to do business with Hitler and let the British and the French face the Nazi invasion.

As to Hitler—the Russo-German pact gave him the green light to move into Poland. In the pre-dawn of September 1, the Nazi leader personally issued the orders sending his troops across the frontier. The western democracies, who, perhaps, had visualized a death struggle between Germany and Russia now faced Hitler alone. World War II had begun.

THE PROBLEM OF THE UNSATIATED STATES—THE ECONOMIC STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL.

In 1939 the hellhounds of war were unleashed on the European continent for the second time in a quarter of a century. Since the early 1930's their growls had mounted in a warning crescendo, but the well-fed states refused to heed the ominous sounds until it was too late.

Over the face of Europe millions remembered the searing pain and suffering of four fateful years of World War I and their imme-
mediate aftermath—and they were revolted. Their rulers gave re-
assurances that they understood. Chamberlain, a tall, elderly man
with an umbrella, told the world in tones of heartfelt sincerity, "I am
a man of peace." Daladier, a portly, barrel-chested Frenchman, be-
tween terse and pointed allusions to La Belle Patrie, voiced the de-
sire of his forty million compatriots for its corollary La Belle Paix;
while on the eastern side of the Rhine Hitler, a little man with a
mustache, was somehow convincing his listeners—between "Sieg
Heils!"—that the Big Stick he was brandishing was really an olive
branch. Far to the north, in a building surrounded by massive walls
which shone pink in the sunlight over the steppes, sat Stalin, a
chunky hulk of a man, pulling at his big mustache with one hand
and holding a pipe in the other. And he just sat and pulled at his
pipe and then at his mustache—and didn’t say a word.

Today the world is trying to recover from a conflict which pes-
simists claim may yet prove to be the Armageddon of Western
civilization. Everywhere people are voicing the eternal query: "Why?
Why?" That question has been answered by the philosophers over
and over again. Hate, envy, greed, fear, suspicion—these are the
whys of the recent struggle and its aftermath. It is the historian’s task,
however, to demonstrate not only why, but also how, this blight on
humanity came about.
It was Bismarck who first made the distinction between the "satiated" and the "unsatiated" states. The essence of his dictum is that at any given period of time "the existing equilibrium, the prevailing distribution of powers, the established ratios of territories, populations, armies, navies, colonies, etc., will appear ideal to the States which are its beneficiaries and unendurable to the States which do not feel that they have received their just due." The satiated powers are usually the victors, and the unsatiated states the vanquished, in any war. There are necessary qualifications to such a generalization, however, since the interests of some states are too complex—and even contradictory—to permit the unalterable placing of them in one or the other category.

It is also true that this problem of the unsatiated versus the satiated states is not necessarily a postwar one. As a matter of fact, the broader currents of European power politics have always, with few exceptions, expressed themselves in these terms. As a result of the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War of 1871, that nation was changed from a satiated state to an unsatiated power. Satiation meant the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. The German Empire, satisfied with the status quo created after 1871, was a satiated power. Great Britain, a satiated state, went to war in 1914, not for revision as did the French, but to eliminate the menace of imperial German sea power and German competition in the marketplaces of the world.

Thus the struggle for power goes on without ever really stopping. The equilibrium is never satisfactory to all countries, since the peace treaties that establish it are rarely dictated in the interests of all. The victorious nations impose conditions on the vanquished which automatically produce a revisionist sentiment among the latter. Any attempt by the unsatiated—short of war—to compel a change in the status quo sets up a defense reaction on the part of the satiated in the form of counteralliances and armaments, which increases the precariousness of the equilibrium. Each new step of the "have-nots" to redress the balance of power is met with compensatory policies by the "have" until the breaking point is reached. And the satiated powers consistently balk at changing the status quo in the interest of justice for all until it is too late. In such a situation, a Sarajevo or a Danzig merely marks the point beyond which the gamblers in international power politics are willing or able to go.

After the end of the first world war, certain nations had been unsatisfied with the political, territorial, and economic status quo created by the peace treaties. They repeatedly asked—and sometimes demanded—certain changes in the newly established order, but, as they explain it, they had been unable to obtain the proper
consideration of their demands. In retaliation, they deliberately built up their military forces to bring about changes by threats—or, if necessary, by recourse to arms.

Opposition to the status quo came chiefly from three nations—Japan, Italy, and Germany. Exponents of the post-World War I settlements were France, Great Britain, and the United States. The former three demanded a new deal; the latter three stood pat against changes. Great Britain and France, to believe their spokesmen, were fighting to defend their just rights as delineated by the terms of the Versailles Treaty—terms, let it not be forgotten, which were imposed upon German statesmen who were not consulted but bluntly told to sign or else.

The conflict between the two blocs of powers had lent itself, of course, to glib clichés, some of which find very little justification in the factual details of the situation. One section of opinion regarded the recent issue as a struggle between Democracy and Statism; a few maintained that it represented the rivalry of finance capitalism and barter; others called it, in a most categorical fashion, the battle of the “haves” (the satiated states) and the “have-nots” (the unsatiated states).

But exactly what was this problem of the unsatiated states? Many people found the answer to the question comparatively simple. They maintained that the governments of the unsatiated states wanted nothing less than world supremacy. While the desire for power on the part of these countries originally might have been only a means to enable a state to improve the condition of its people, by the late 1930’s it was, in Germany especially, an end in itself. Therefore, they said, Hitlerism must be overthrown.

To the contrary, another interpretation of the “have” versus the “have-not” theory was that the demands for changes in the status quo arose from conditions of actual need. Exponents of this belief maintained that the origins of the war lay in the resolve of the satiated powers to keep what they had and the determination of the unsatiated states to get those things which they needed.

What did these unsatiated nations want? More land and colonies for increasing populations; more raw materials for expanding industries; and more markets for their increasing industries—these were the fundamental demands of the “have-not” powers. According to them, the world had been parcelled out and the best portions were already occupied when the “have-not” powers became modern industrial nations. Consequently, pressure of population, lack of necessary raw materials, and increasing need of markets to dispose of their manufactured goods had forced them to demand territorial
changes in order to meet the requirements of a higher standard of living for their people. At all times these governments insisted that they did not want war, but that they were prepared to take risks to attain their ends.

It is not difficult to evaluate the claims of these dissatisfied states. Consider first their need for food. In Japan there were, in 1937, 2418 people for every square mile of arable land, as compared with only 100 in the United States. Consequently, it was impossible for Japan to produce enough food within her borders to supply her people with a healthful and adequate diet. Italy and Germany, to a lesser degree, also wanted more land to supply the needs of their citizens. These were not the only countries that had similar desires. Belgium, Holland, China, and India all suffered from lack of fertile land; but they have not been so loud in their protests.

This problem of providing food for a nation of people, however, must be considered in relation to the increase in population. In the United States, England, and France, where the populations were nearly stationary, governments had enough foodstuffs at home or in their colonies to provide for their people. But in Japan and in Italy, where the populations were increasing rapidly, there was a real need of finding employment, and thus food, for the citizens. These people could not obtain pieces of land; and, without raw materials and markets, industries could not expand and thus labor could not be fully absorbed by industry.

In Germany the problem of inequalities in land and population was not so critical. While Hitler, by conquest and by his program to encourage births "to strengthen the German race," increased the population of Germany, it was difficult, prior to the war, to prove that on a war-economy basis Germany was suffering acutely from overpopulation. As a matter of fact, Great Britain was more densely populated than Germany, Japan, or Italy. But England had solved her problem through industry and trade, especially with her empire.

Unfortunately, the unsatiated powers were unable to solve their problems of inadequate foodstuffs and overpopulation by industrialization and trade—manufacturing goods which could be exchanged for food. Germany, Italy, and Japan lacked raw materials. Of the important essentials—coal, tin, copper, petroleum, rubber, potash, and cotton—Germany had a sufficient supply of only two: coal and potash. Even so, she was better off than Italy, for the latter had almost no coal and very little iron. Japan had only a slight advantage over Italy; her coal was sufficient, but even with the mines of Manchukuo her supply of iron ore was insufficient; therefore she had to import iron, steel, and machinery. Many other countries were
also poorly supplied with raw materials; for instance, the Scandinavian states. But these northern nations, especially Sweden, managed to achieve relatively high standards for their people by aiding the small landowner, by establishing controlled capitalism, by expanding the co-operative movement, and by introducing an extensive social legislative and insurance program.

On the other hand, a survey of the resources of the so-called satiated powers only serves to emphasize the inequalities which existed in national wealth. The United States was, by far, the richest of all. She possessed an adequate supply of nearly all the primary raw materials and produced more than enough to feed her people. At the same time, she was not entirely self-sufficient, for she had to import rubber, tin, nickel, wool, silk, manganese, and other minor raw materials.

The Soviet Union, as far as raw materials were concerned, was also a satiated state. She had a surplus of oil, manganese, and chromium, and had more than an adequate food supply.

Great Britain herself was very poor in resources, with a reserve supply of coal only. But her empire as a whole was even richer than the United States, possessing practically all the essential raw materials and foodstuffs. Largely because of her reliance on her empire for these things, Great Britain realized that her existence depended upon her ability to rule the seas.

France's supply of raw materials, even taking her colonies into account, was far from adequate. Of the primary raw materials she had a surplus of iron only. Her colonies provided other items, but she still had insufficient coal, nickel, oil, copper, and other essentials. On the other hand, France produced her own food, and the French peasant and his land, even after World War I, continued to be the foundation of French economy.

An important consideration of the problem showed clearly that inequalities between nations existed—in land, population, and resources—thus accentuating the post-World War I problem of the unsatiated states. But in spite of certain justifiable demands of the "have-not" powers for territorial changes, it was impossible, under the system of intense nationalism which developed after World War I, to expect a redistribution of lands with a view to giving the dissatisfied states a greater share of the essential raw materials. Such a solution of the problem might have been feasible if there had existed some form of international organization capable of working out and enforcing the territorial changes. But without such an agency, the problem of the unsatiated states was not merely economic; it was also political and military. Any attempt to hand over raw materials to the "have-not" powers, asserted certain elements in the "have"
nations, would only aid the "have-nots" in their aim, through power politics, to attain world supremacy.

Granted that redistribution of raw materials was not feasible, the crux of the whole problem seemed at that time to be a question of trade and markets and the factors that limited the purchasing power of the consumer nations. Before the outbreak of World War II, it was often suggested that the "haves" open up the markets of the world to the unsatiated states and enable them to make money enough to purchase raw materials and foodstuffs. But this was not an easy thing to do. To buy and sell under the democratic capitalist system of international trade, a nation had to have a favorable trade balance or a gold reserve sufficient to balance its account. Inasmuch as most nations had only a limited amount of gold, trade could not be carried on for long on such a basis. In short, commerce between nations must in the final analysis be an exchange of goods or of services.

After World War I, a situation developed wherein all nations, satiated and unsatiated, wanted to sell but not to buy. The unsatiated states, according to Hitler, had to export or face economic extinction, whereas the satiated nations, even though they had a major part of the world's gold supply and possessed, directly or indirectly, the essential raw materials and foodstuffs, insisted that the improvement of their standard of living was dependent upon their ability to acquire new and to retain old markets. Facing such intense postwar problems as unemployment, debts, and dwindling trade, they too were bent upon the restoration of economic progress through the expansion of foreign trade.

The struggle for markets was not peculiar to the post-World War I period; it had been going on since ancient times. But it reached a definite crisis in its evolution prior to the outbreak of the recent European conflict. This crisis was the world-wide depression of 1929, which brought about the collapse of the international banking system, further disrupted trade, shattered the economic machinery of the world, and precipitated a bitter economic struggle among all nations, satiated and unsatiated, which finally resulted in World War II.

The economic breakdown was not only a result of the terrific cost of the first world war and the armament race thereafter, it was also a by-product of the injustices of the peace treaties, and the mistakes made by the victorious Allies after the conflict. At the peace conference the democratic powers worked out territorial, commercial, and financial adjustments designed to destroy Germany's military and economic power. In order to do this, they deprived her of valu-
able raw materials, land, agricultural products, and her merchant marine, colonies, and foreign investments; they virtually destroyed her foreign trade by various restrictions; and they forced her to go through bankruptcy as a result of the imposition of heavy financial reparations. Thus they demoted Germany, which, before the war, was rapidly becoming one of the satiated states, to the ranks of the "have-not" group.

While the Allies—France, Britain, and the United States—were making Germany an unsatiated state, they at the same time refused to promote their unsatiated partners in the war, Italy and Japan. Italy was given certain territorial rewards, but she did not receive the share of the German holdings that she said the Allies had promised her for entering the war on their side. Japan also was not satisfied with what she got out of the struggle. Taking advantage of the preoccupation of the Allies during the war, she had presented to China (in 1915) an ultimatum known as the Twenty-one Demands, tantamount to the establishment of a Japanese protectorate over China. Unable to obtain the acceptance of all demands by her coveted neighbor, Japan arranged agreements with China, Russia, Great Britain, France, and Italy whereby she secured virtually a free hand in northern China. This award, however, was practically nullified when Japan, at the Washington Conference (1921), returned the German holding of Shantung to China and entered into pacts with Great Britain, France, the United States, and other interested powers, guaranteeing the independence of China and the maintenance of the status quo in the Far East.

Thus the Allies, while they greatly increased their holdings as a result of the war, at the same time greatly endangered their positions by making three nations—Germany, Italy, and Japan—thoroughly dissatisfied. This situation, together with the menace of postwar communism, should have caused them to recognize the need of some effective organization to maintain the newly established status quo. But the United States refused to participate in the one organization capable of maintaining or of improving the new order, the League of Nations. Instead, we washed our hands of European affairs and adopted a policy of splendid isolation.

France, alone, became the staunch defender of the status quo. Afraid of a German war of revenge, and without the support of her former Allies, Great Britain and the United States, she proceeded to establish her hegemony in Europe by maintaining a powerful army, by arranging alliances with Germany's enemies in Europe, and by using the League of Nations to carry out part of her program. At the same time she hastened Germany's disintegration by
insisting that Germany and her former Allies fulfill all the terms of the peace treaties, including reparations payments.

This policy only served to bring about chaotic conditions in central Europe. The situation finally became so bad that the Allies, fearing a proletarian revolution in this part of Europe, intervened. Money was lent to the prostrate states, Germany, Austria, and Hungary; Franco-German relations were improved as a result of the Locarno Conference, in which Germany recognized the postwar frontier on the west as permanent; Germany was aided by the Dawes reparation settlement (1924); and the cause of collective security, many thought, was advanced when Germany was admitted to the League of Nations (1926).

For a few years it looked as though the unsatiated states were going to experience a real era of economic recovery. German trade expanded; Italian finances improved; and Japan managed to increase her export of goods, especially to the United States, China, and India. But this economic recovery came to an end about 1929–1930, when the satiated states (France, Britain, and the United States), in their attempt to recover from the effects of World War I, precipitated the world depression.

It is a well-established fact that the war of 1914–1918 laid bare the weaknesses of industrial and finance capitalism—weaknesses only too prevalent in prewar England. Practically every nation, once the struggle was over, faced ugly economic and social problems. Millions of men and women were unemployed, industry and trade threatened to collapse, and monetary systems were completely disorganized. These troubles caused many reformers to favor drastic changes in the capitalist system. Some advocated its abolition; others maintained that it should be absorbed by the totalitarian state; whereas many asserted that at least it should be controlled by the government.

The ruling groups in the important satiated states, Great Britain, France, and the United States, however, utterly opposed the introduction of these ideas in their political and social systems. In their opinion, private industry, personal initiative, and unrestricted production and economic expansion would alone bring about recovery. In short, free business enterprise in each state was to work out its own economic salvation.

Private business in these three countries did make a desperate attempt to lead the people around the proverbial corner to prosperity. In France, Big Business (the Bank of France) attempted to bring about recovery by forcing the Germans to pay for the war, by attempting to obtain indirectly, if not directly, the left bank of the Rhine, and by exploiting the resources and dominating the markets of cen-
tral and southeastern Europe. But the Germans failed to pay and the attempt to dominate central and southeastern Europe proved a bad investment.

During the late 1920's, however, France seemed to be on the road to recovery. She was able to feed and employ her numerically stationary population, to increase her gold reserve, and to expand her production. But as a result of her determination to build a powerful Maginot Line and to support her postwar allies by financial loans, France dissipated her resources. Continued currency inflation, hastened by these expenditures, and a decline of foreign trade finally prepared the way for French inclusion in the world depression.

In the postwar period, Great Britain also had trouble in her attempt to attain economic prosperity. For a short while after the war, she enjoyed a period of moderate recovery. But in 1921 the boom collapsed because of insufficient foreign markets and the serious competition of the United States, Germany, and France. England now faced a serious breakdown of her economic system because of high taxes, debts, increasing unemployment, and dwindling trade. Bravely she accepted Prime Minister Baldwin's conservative policy of "do nothing and everything will come out all right in the end." Halfheartedly she permitted Laborite MacDonald to arrange a trade agreement with Soviet Russia and to encourage disarmament, hoping that these policies would somehow bring about a reversal of British fortunes. Prosperity, however, simply refused to turn the corner. Then, in the early 1930's, Great Britain, like the other industrial nations, felt the effects of a sharp decline in economic activity. This time she faced economic and social chaos.

The terrible crisis even affected the United States, youngest and strongest of the great capitalistic powers. After the war, she engaged in a rugged attempt "to return to normalcy." But instead she experienced a few years of artificial prosperity which came to an end with the stock-market collapse of 1929. At that time came the traditional sign of approaching depression, namely, a tightening of trade and investment rates. Credit was restricted; business activity slowed to a standstill; widespread unemployment resulted; and many businessmen, farmers, and bankers experienced economic extinction.

Facing a real crisis, the three great satiated states now engaged in a desperate struggle to save their capitalistic hides. In 1930, three years before Adolf Hitler came to power, the United States Congress passed the unhappy Hawley-Smoot Tariff Bill, designed to protect markets for Americans and to stimulate business thereby. Thus we announced to the other depressed unsatiated and satiated nations of the world that we were perfectly willing to sell goods to them, but we would not
permit them to sell us goods and raw materials that competed with American products, even though the rest of the world owed us billions of dollars which they could only pay by selling to us. Meanwhile, to stimulate industry, President Roosevelt in 1934 decided to manipulate the currency, cutting the dollar to fifty-nine cents. On February 1,

1934, he prepared the way for the creation of a huge pile of gold by sanctioning its purchase at the high price of thirty-five dollars an ounce.

While the United States was trying to revive industry, to expand markets, and to prepare for the proverbial rainy day, Great Britain inaugurated a system of retrenchment designed to lower the tax burden on industry and at the same time to bring about a general business recovery. Like the United States, she decided to undersell the other fellows by going off the gold standard and thus cheapening the English pound. At the same time she endeavored to help industry by refusing to pay interest on the debt she owed the United States and by establishing a British Imperial preference system at Ottawa—a kind of Zollverein.

Nor did France stay out of this economic war for markets. At a time when social democracy was bleeding to death in Germany, France created a web of preferential arrangements with the various parts of her empire—Tunisia, New Caledonia, French India, French
Indo-China, Madagascar, French Guiana, and Algeria. She also decided to pay no interest on the debt due the United States and determined to protect her industries by "elaborating a favorite trade-strangling device—the quota system of limiting imports." She also manipulated her currency with the view of stimulating her export trade. In short, the satiated states (in their attempts to avoid an internal economic crash) resorted to the economic nationalism of the nineteenth century, including many features of national capitalism (mercantilism) of early modern days.

The unsatiated lands did not have a sufficient amount of raw materials and gold to participate in this old-fashioned game of "trade war," and thus the fact that they were indeed "have-not" powers was driven home to them. But why enter a game with those who possess money and raw materials and thus can play for huge stakes? Would it not be better for the unsatiated states to try the difficult but honest way and, like other small "have-not" nations (Sweden, for example) make the best use of what they have? "Nein! Nein!" was Hitler's reply to this suggestion; "Germany must demolish the unjust Treaty of Versailles; Germany must have more room; Germany must export—or die!" "Go ahead and die," was the unwritten reply of bitter anti-Nazis to this dramatic plea.

Meanwhile, the unsatiated gamblers organized their own game, which they called the "War against Communism and for Satiation." Benito Mussolini, in participating in this contest, stopped worrying about balancing the budget and started concentrating upon a policy of imperial expansion. "Italy has need of expansion," he cried, "and expand she will, despite the selfish embargo placed on her ambitions by the older colonizing powers of the Peace Conference." Thereupon he conquered Ethiopia (1936). Shortly after this imperialistic venture, Mussolini, in order to prove that the game was essentially one directed against communism, helped Franco chase the so-called "Reds" out of Spain.

Developments forced Japan to participate in this crusade against communism. Before joining it, however, Japan had tried to play the other fellow's game. Bent upon becoming a great industrial power, she had, during the postwar period of depression, permitted the yen to depreciate some 68 per cent, "thus giving her textile manufacturers a bounty superior to that which England's depreciation had presented to the textile exporters of Lancashire." When angry Britishers said unkind things about the Japanese unfair trade tactics, Tokyo simply replied, "But the Honorable John Bull started it."

After the depression in the early 1930's, Japan encountered sharply declining markets in the United States, India, and China (the result
of a boycott). With dwindling gold reserves, she faced economic ruin and soon decided that she could best play the Italo-German game. Accordingly, she inaugurated her policy of imperialist expansion in China, announced a Monroe Doctrine of the Far East, and proclaimed her hostility to Russian communism.

Germany, however, assumed the leading role in this contest to extinguish radicalism and to attain satiation. With the coming of the world depression she discovered that she was in no position to play the old-fashioned game. German production in the spring of 1928 was 40 per cent above the low of 1926, but toward the end of the year a business recession had begun. In 1929 the extended conferences over the matter of reparations (the proposed Young Plan) caused a great deal of fear and unrest in the world's financial markets. Huge amounts of money (credits) were withdrawn from Germany, exerting severe pressure on German foreign exchange. With the stock-market crash in this country, American and British loans (more than $3 billion dollars in all) to Germany ceased, and money, the lifeblood of German production, was lost. At that time she possessed excellent technical equipment and industrial techniques, thanks to British and American financial aid, but she simply could not operate her industrial machine without raw materials and money.

Germany now entered another period of depression. Industry dropped 40 per cent; prices fell greatly in all fields of economic endeavor; and unemployment reached the alarming figure of 5,670,000. Thus the attempt of Republican Germany to attain satiation with the help of the capitalistic democracies had proved a failure. By the early 1930's these nations, confronted by similar problems, were in no position to help any other country. As stated before, each government decided that the best way to solve the world depression was to put its own house in order.

To accomplish this task, the Germans decided to undergo a thorough housecleaning. The Republic was abolished, and Hitler, head of the Nazi Party, was called to the chancellorship. With the support of certain business interests he proceeded to exterminate communism in Germany, expel all non-German elements, and regiment labor and, later, capital. His objective, as one contemporary writer viewed it, was to build "a strong, self-contained Germany, free from the sapping of international Jews and moneylenders, raising all the capital it needs at home, paying no tribute, withdrawing from the world of international business, being entirely self-sufficient and consuming all its products . . . except exports necessary for the purchase of foodstuffs."

At first the conservative elements in the satiated states welcomed
the rise of Hitler, believing that, like Mussolini, he would check the advance of communism. In a short time, however, Hitler demonstrated that he intended not only to eliminate radicalism, but also to attain satiation for Germany through the restoration of German military power, arming not only in a military way, but economically and socially as well. For to Der Führer war had to be totalitarian, utilizing all the fighting powers of the nation.

At first the National Socialist government, possessing some romantic notions about autarchy, or a closed economy, adopted a policy of retrenchment and isolation. Withdrawing from the disarmament congress and the League of Nations, Nazi Germany immediately opened her campaign against the Versailles Treaty, and announced that she was going to solve her own economic problems. She could not withdraw, however, from the field of industrial trade. She needed coal, iron, and ore for production purposes and, therefore, had to sell in order to obtain these and other materials.

But where and how were the Germans to obtain markets for their goods? When the depression started, the Germans, who had already experienced a period of complete inflation, were afraid to revive industry by tinkering again with the currency. Consequently, with most of the other nations deprecating their money in order to export goods, Germany’s mark stuck out like a sore thumb, becoming so expensive that foreign traders could not afford to purchase it. To make matters worse, the cessation of foreign lending by Great Britain and the United States, especially, had left Germany without enough foreign exchange “either to service foreign debts or to finance German imports.”

Fortunately for the Nazis, they were able to place the German financial problem in the hands of Doctor Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht, the opportunistic Dano-German who had once headed the Reichsbank. As a liberal, Schacht believed that autarchy was suicide for a nation that lacked raw materials. But because his French, English, and American friends were not able to see the foolishness of trying to collect reparations from a country that was not able to export on even terms with other states, Dr. Schacht decided to carry out the Nazi program of the closed economy. At the same time, he asserted that this was but a temporary solution of the problem, which he hoped would help Germany to survive the world depression. Then Germany would return to the old ways of carrying on international trade. Accordingly, he not only repudiated the war debts, but also stopped the transfer, redemption, and interest payments on freely contracted loans of German public and private corporations. When these bonds fell, even beyond depression values, Schacht bought
them up and thus extinguished a good part of the German debt. At the same time, Germans who held foreign stocks were forced to sell these securities to the German Reichsbank at a price much less than they could have obtained if they had sold them on the New York or London exchange. Schacht later sold these equities at a nice profit, which he used for subsidizing German exports.

Meanwhile, Hitler developed his policy of a war economy. This program made it necessary for the Nazis to purchase abroad such important military materials as iron, copper, and oil. At the same time, exports had to be cut down in order to concentrate everything and everybody in the construction of a military machine.

Herr Schacht, still professing to believe that this war-economy business was a temporary development, introduced the system of bilateral barter, "with exports going more and more to those countries that were prepared to trade Germany the raw materials." Export subsidies as great as 30 per cent of the value of all German exports enabled Nazi businessmen to exchange their goods in the Balkans and in South America for oil, grain, tobacco, cotton, and coffee. Frequently, the Nazis demoralized world markets for their suppliers by reselling these goods at knockdown prices in order to obtain needed foreign exchange. As a result of this policy, German exports to southeastern Europe and Latin America increased, whereas exports to western Europe, the United States, and Soviet Russia fell off.
While establishing the barter system, Dr. Schacht also manipulated the mark in such a way "as to put all foreign assets in Germany under protective arrest." The purpose of these various kinds of marks—travel marks, credit-blocked marks, compensation marks, and *Aski* marks—was primarily to create a situation in which Germany "stood ready to sell a certain amount of goods to whoever owned the block credit." Thus "international trade under this plan was to be carried on by regimented nations exchanging goods, rather than by individuals, who under the democratic system of international exchange were able to engage in trade without governmental interference and support." Accompanying this German system of barter was a very efficient program of propaganda, designed to bring Latin American states, especially, into the German economic orbit.

In 1938, Great Britain, France, and the United States decided that this system of barter was not a temporary measure to achieve trading advantages under a peace economy. Instead, they concluded that it was an adjunct to a war economy whereby Germany was to abolish the Versailles settlements and secure room for expansion, markets, raw materials, and territories by power politics and, if necessary, by war.

The satiated states also realized that Japanese expansion and Italian activities in the Mediterranean were not entirely crusades
against communism. Consequently, the conservatives in Great Britain and France, after the totalitarian states had obligingly obliterated the Popular Front government in Spain, decided to adopt protective measures. A close military alliance was concluded between the two powers, and Great Britain inaugurated a five-year armament program, as a counterchallenge to the well-prepared "have-not" powers. Meanwhile, Chamberlain began his appeasement plan designed to delay, if not avoid, the seemingly inevitable conflict between the two groups.

Having extinguished radicalism in western Europe (Spain), the unsatiated states now outlined their programs of expansion under the following headings: abolition of the Versailles Treaty, a place for Italy in the Mediterranean, and China for Japan.

Thereupon, President Roosevelt and others suggested that a meeting be held for the purpose of arranging settlements that would help the unsatiated powers in their attempts to satisfy their peacetime economic needs. It was even stated that certain tentative settlements might be arranged, but neither side paid much attention to these proposals. The unsatiated powers, especially Germany, took the position that the threat of force was the only language the "haves" could understand, whereas England refused to be forced to make concessions.

Germany's demands for a return of pre-World War I holdings, involving the cession of French and British possessions, were bitterly opposed by liberal as well as by conservative Englishmen and Frenchmen. "If we could return to Germany her prewar resources and put her back to her magnificent prewar position," wrote Norman Angell, "we know that that of itself would not give us peace, for when she had those resources and that position Europe drifted to war."

The demand of the "have-not" powers for self-sufficiency also seemed irrelevant. Self-sufficiency, the writers explained, was unnecessary because no industrial country has ever, in time of peace, found itself discriminated against in the matter of access to raw materials. Other things being equal, most owners of raw materials will sell to those people who have cash, credit, or products, regardless of country.

Most of these scribes, however, ignored the fundamental issue between the two groups, namely, control of markets and money. The real difficulty, perhaps, was not lack of raw materials or any denials of access thereto, or any need of bringing them within the borders of each nation (a physical impossibility in any case). It was, rather, the creation of the many barriers to effective international co-operation and international trade that made it impossible to pay for raw
materials. If these barriers could have been removed, or at least modified, the world might have emerged from the depression and World War II might have been avoided.

An understanding of the basic significance of the trade war of the so-called depression years, however, forces one to realize that World War II was not simply a struggle between the "haves" and the "have-nots." In his desire to reach his objective, Hitler seemed determined to permit the issue to become even more fundamental. For in 1939, Der Führer, the man who had absorbed capitalism and had taken over Austria and Czechoslovakia, was perfectly willing to accept the support of Stalin, the man who had smashed capitalism, in order to bring about the downfall of the Western political and social system (he called it "plutocracy"), and thus to insure the supremacy of the authoritarian state. In his opinion the Western powers were not prepared to fight, and therefore he could succeed whereas Napoleon had failed. With this in mind he plunged into Poland.

**Collateral Reading**

V. Chirol, *India* (1931).
F. Soward, *Twenty-five Troubled Years* (1941).
CHAPTER XX

The Second World War: Axis Aggression,
1939–1941

Winston Churchill

England and France declare war

Significance of invasion of Poland

At dawn on September 1, 1939, the mechanized German army rolled across the Polish border, revealing to the world a new type of warfare and opening a conflict that was to be far greater in scope, more devastating, and more decisive than the international passage at arms of 1914–1918. England and France, committed to defending Poland against German aggression, waited for 48 hours for a reply to their demand that the German armies withdraw from Poland and, when the Wilhelmstrasse remained silent, declared war on Germany on Sunday, September 3. The war that was inevitable in the logic of Hitler’s long series of aggressions had come.

The opening of hostilities on September 1 was, in many ways, a convincing demonstration of Clausewitz’ dictum that armed conflict is merely diplomacy carried on at another level, for there were few statesmen in 1939 who did not feel that the German aggression against Poland was but a more intensive phase of a war that had been in progress ever since Hitler began his expansion in central Europe. To some, the shooting war represented a resumption of the hostilities that had been broken off in 1918, the twenty-year interval of peace being but a truce. The essential difference between the reaction to Hitler’s invasion of Poland and the outbreak of war in 1914 was that now actual hostilities came as no surprise but as something of a re-
lease to the western European peoples who had been subjected to a prolonged war of nerves. September, 1939, saw the cards at last face up on the table; gone were all the tensions produced by an eternal weighing of the values of peace against the anticipated horrors of war. Both sides mustered their resources, human and material, for the struggle for survival.

Industrial and economic staying power was to be as decisive a factor in the coming conflict as the degree of striking strength at the front. Because of Goering's Four-Year Plan, German industry at the outbreak of war was highly and efficiently geared for conflict, whereas the Allies' economies were still on an essentially civilian basis. The vital question, however, was that of reserves of raw materials for both military and civilian consumption, and in these the French and English allies had a distinct advantage. Even though the latter would also require huge imports of raw materials in order to carry on the war, they were in a position to tap the world market, whereas Germany, more or less contained in central Europe despite her pact with Russia, was confronted during the initial stages of the war, at least, with the necessity of self-support.

The consequent demands of home consumption, in turn, offset Germany's ability otherwise to maintain equality of numbers at the fighting fronts. When this allowance was made, tentative estimates placed total German man power at three and a half million as against five million for Britain and France. In air strength the Germans, thanks again to preparation, had a numerical superiority in warplanes, although French and British military men were convinced that German superiority in numbers entailed an automatic inferiority in quality of construction. In any case, Allied leaders had sound reasons to hope that their military airplane production could outstrip that of their enemies once the shift from a peacetime to a wartime production had been accomplished.

From a strategic point of view, the initial advantages seemed to lie with Germany. Fighting on interior lines, she could concentrate her forces and her effort rather than scatter her power to protect colonies and defend trade routes, as the Allies were forced to do. The chief disadvantage facing Germany was her lack of allies. Despite the "pact of steel" alliance signed with Italy only a few months before the opening of hostilities, the government of Il Duce made immediate protestations of neutrality when war came and assured the Anglo-French allies that Hitler had gone to war with Poland over Italian objections. In the case of Franco's Spain, frankly Fascist, the Soviet-German pact of August rendered Spanish aid out of the question even if Franco had been materially prepared to join in the struggle.
Moreover, Italian neutrality was no spur toward involvement as far as Madrid was concerned. In the eastern Mediterranean the power constellation seemed to bode ill for the Reich, since the Allies, by mid-October, concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with neutral Turkey which included guarantees to Greece and Rumania. Additional Allied strength was assured by subsequent military conversations and a trade treaty between England and Turkey. In central Europe Hitler had the advantage of having acquired the industrial plants and natural resources of Austria and Czechoslovakia, though the undisguised hatred of the Czechs toward their conquerors might become a serious problem.

Though Germany stood alone, she did not have to face the Bismarckian nightmare of a war on two fronts. To the east, Soviet Russia's leaders observed the neutrality guaranteed by their recent pact with the Reich. Finally, if the German High Command was disturbed by the allegedly impregnable French Maginot Line, Hitler's generals had the satisfaction of knowing that their own defenses—the Siegfried Line, or West Wall—made a direct land assault against the Reich a highly dubious venture for the enemy.

German strategy, however, in September was not concerned with offensive action in the West. It was Poland that was first to feel the offensive might of the German mechanized legions, to be eliminated in a matter of three weeks as a belligerent. To withstand the German avalanche the Poles were poorly prepared, indeed. A predominantly agricultural country, with few industrial resources, the Polish Republic was obviously no match for highly industrialized Germany. Geography, too, made the Polish position weak. The German absorption of Bohemia and Moravia, and the Nazi occupation of Slovakia only a fortnight before the blow fell on Poland put the German armies in a position to outflank the Polish forces easily. On their western frontier the Poles had no natural barrier but that of space, not of much help against an army that could travel up to one hundred miles a day when pressed. As for the Polish army, neither its numbers nor its training could make up for inferiority in specialized weapons, its lack of mechanized cavalry.

Counting on completing the campaign in Poland before the French and British could move their forces into position for an offensive against the Reich, the German High Command left twenty reserve divisions of older troops to man the West Wall, while the bulk of the German army poured into Poland. The grand attack opened with a three-pronged thrust, with Warsaw as its objective. From the south in Silesia, from East Prussia, and from Pomerania the German forces drove against the Polish capital, surrounding the
city by September 16. The slowness of the Polish mobilization, the devastating German air attacks of the Luftwaffe (the German air force), and the speed of the mechanized Wehrmacht (the German army) threw the dismayed Poles into utter confusion.

The final blow to Polish hopes of effective resistance fell on September 17, when the Soviet government, announcing that in its view the Polish state had ceased to exist and that consequently it became necessary to intervene to protect certain "blood brothers" of the Russians in Poland, launched an invasion from the east. The Russian move met little resistance from the disorganized Poles and, while remnants of their armies were being cleaned up by both the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, the Germans and Russians had agreed on a frontier between the forces of the two invaders along a roughly ethnographic line at the Bug River. The German portion of Poland, by far the richest section, was established as a theoretically autonomous province—the future Pale in which Poles and Jews could henceforth be segregated from the "Aryan" citizens of the Reich. The twentieth century Partition of Poland was consummated.

With the Polish scalp dangling from his belt, Hitler, in a speech to the German Reichstag on October 6, suggested a settlement between the Great Powers on the basis of Germany's existing conquests and remaining needs. In London two days later a now skeptical prime minister for once did not rise to the bait. Hitler's terms, Chamberlain asserted, "are vague and uncertain and contain no suggestion for righting the wrongs done to Czechoslovakia and to Poland."

The Blitzkrieg against Poland had stiffened the Anglo-French resolve to resist the German conqueror; unfortunately, it did not demonstrate to the Allied High Command the validity of the truism that the best defense is a good offense. Unable to lend the Poles direct aid during their brief flurry of resistance to the Germans, the western Allies, ensconced behind the Maginot Line, watched interestedly as the Germans transferred their first-line divisions from Poland to positions in the Siegfried Line. In the meantime, the devastating air raids that had been expected on civilian centers failed to materialize. Both Allied and German air operations seemed designed to interfere as little as possible with both sides getting settled in fortified positions. Reconnaissance flights, pamphlet raids for the distribution of propaganda to the German armies, occasional clashes of patrols, these were the answer of the Allies to the massing of German might in the West.

On the seas, however, the Allied offensive jumped off to an early start. In tonnage, the combined Anglo-French fleets had an eight-to-one advantage over the Germans, but the former had a large task to
perform that was spared the Nazi naval forces: the guarding of the main sea routes, including the Mediterranean. Germany's Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, however, soon showed that he was determined to make the most of the Reich's most deadly naval weapon. On September 18 a German submarine sank the British aircraft carrier *Courageous*, and on October 14 the daring undersea raiders slipped into Scapa Flow and sank the British battleship *Royal Oak*. Early in December another of His Majesty's battleships, the *Barham*, was torpedoed but managed to make port. In the air, German and British aircraft took turns bombing surface concentrations at the Kiel Canal, Heligoland, the Firth of Forth, and Scapa Flow. The results were far from decisive.

The submarine campaign against merchant shipping was also initiated early. On the first day of the war the sinking of the British passenger liner *Athenia* gave notice that the Germans were determined to press home an unrestricted submarine campaign against Allied shipping. Winston Churchill, called to take over his World War I post as First Lord of the Admiralty, immediately began the organization of a convoy system, which soon showed results. Another lesson taken by the Germans from the previous world war was the effectiveness of the armed commerce raider. On December 13 the German cruiser *Admiral Graf Spee* was cornered by three British cruisers off the Uruguayan coast after having engaged in a rather successful series of forays against Allied merchant shipping. The German ship managed to limp into Montevideo, but when the Uruguayan authorities insisted upon almost immediate departure her commander scuttled the vessel on direct orders from Berlin and committed suicide three days later in a Buenos Aires hotel room.

On the economic front every combatant nation was doing its utmost to throw the full weight of its material wealth into the scales of battle. Not only were the nations dependent upon importations of vital goods and materials, but continued access to export markets had to be maintained as well, particularly in the case of Britain. As a corollary, it was also necessary to interrupt as much as possible the enemy's traffic with neutrals, a realization that compelled Germany to resort to the submarine and the commerce raider while the Allies utilized a maritime blockade and diplomatic pressure on actual or potential trade with Germany by neutrals. Insular England, highly vulnerable to a blockade and importing the great bulk of her food and raw materials, and France, though practically self-sufficient in food, were fortunate in their control of the sea lanes. Allied naval supremacy, in turn, forced the Reich to depend primarily on her con-
tinental neighbors for the raw materials required for both civilian and military consumption.

Pressure on the neutrals, consequently, was exerted from the very beginning of the conflict. Sweden, important to Germany because of her iron ore, was brought into the Allied trade orbit by December 27. Iceland and Belgium soon took the same turn. In eastern Europe, however, the situation was complicated by Germany’s prewar system of bilateral barter with the Balkan countries. Under the pressure of war, it seemed unlikely that Germany could continue to manufacture sufficient quantities of goods with which to pay for the imports she derived from her neighbors to the southeast. Moreover, the Allies had the enormous advantage of being able to pay in cash for Balkan goods, and under the circumstances fantastic prices were paid for goods in many cases for no other reason than to exclude the Reich from the market. Turkey, for example, was rewarded for her refusal to renew her trade agreement with Germany by a considerable loan and by Allied purchase of her entire output of chromium, figs, and grapes. Yugoslavia’s copper, too, was diverted to the Allies. The adverse balance of trade of the combatants would have made a mercantilist shudder.

In South America the Allies, with their control of the high seas, had an opportunity to do some bargaining in the absence of the German competitor. Even Fascist Spain, desperately in need of foreign exchange, was forced to sell her copper and iron to the Allies instead of the Reich.

The most important development of all, however, was the fact that the United States now made significant changes in the provisions of the Neutrality Law of 1935, designed originally to keep the country out of economic entanglements with warring nations. The sale of munitions and the granting of loans to belligerents were prohibited, even though there still remained the desire to continue trade as extensively as possible short of risking war. American sentiment after September, 1939, however, was gradually swinging in favor of the Allies and it was soon apparent that an unamended Neutrality Law might actually hamper France and Britain in their struggle with Hitler. President Roosevelt, always in the van of those favoring opposition to the Nazis, secured on November 4 a law from Congress embodying the principle of “cash and carry” in respect of selling to belligerents. Arms and munitions could not be carried in American bottoms; all titles to goods exported to belligerents had to be transferred before the shipments left the United States; and the ban on loans to belligerents was retained. But the important point was that
henceforth the Allies could tap the productive capacity of the American industrial machine.

The blockade of the Reich instituted by the British from the beginning proved a highly effective weapon. Instead of gradually adding to the list of contraband as she had done during the first world war, England immediately issued a list that included even "evidences of debt." Conditional contraband, i.e., goods which might be seized if intended for the Reich or its armed forces, comprised all foods for man or animal, as well as the articles used in their production. Navigators' certificates allowing free passage through the Allied control lines of goods being loaded in neutral ports, were another feature of the British blockade system that was now revived. The imports of the Reich thus blocked, the Allies instituted the practice of seizing all German exports wherever found. Despite vociferous protests from most neutral nations, the measure was put into effect on December 4.

One important neutral, however, was untouched by all these measures. The Soviet Union, now contiguous with Hitler's Reich, was apparently carrying on a vigorous trade with her partner of the Polish Partition. Allied discomfiture was added to by Goebbels' choruses of glee that accompanied each new development in Nazi-Soviet relations. On September 29 an agreement between the two countries pledging joint action for peace as well as joint consultation if this should fail was hailed in Berlin as the prelude to Russian intervention on the side of the Reich. Clauses providing for an exchange of German manufactured goods for Russian raw materials seemed to presage the final blow to previous economic relations between the two countries.

For reasons known probably only to the Russians themselves, Hitler's peace offer of October 6 brought an anti-Allied tirade from Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov but also a Russian disclaimer of any intention to terminate neutrality. Furthermore, the flow of Russian arms and Russian raw materials was far below Nazi desires. Whether Russia's leaders were girding their nation for an eventual attack by the capitalist powers of the West or for the assault that Hitler was to launch against them is a question still not answered to the satisfaction of Anglo-American historians. Apparently, the Nazi-Soviet pact of August gave the Russians a feeling of security against attack that they had not known from the beginning of their pariah days as sworn enemies of capitalism.

In any case, too, the Russian foreign office was attempting mightily to consolidate the Soviet Union's southern and northern flanks while the Germans kept the center occupied. An overture to the Turks for the closure of the Straits against outside powers met with a blunt
refusal at Ankara. At the same time Italy and the Balkan nations, alarmed at the possibility of Russian penetration of the Balkans, gave signs that such a move would meet with serious resistance. Late in September and early in October Moscow met with more success in the Baltic republics. The Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian foreign ministers were summoned to the Soviet capital to discuss mutual protective measures. With no opportunity, apparently, to do otherwise, the visitors concluded treaties with the Russians providing for mutual assistance and the concession of certain military rights for Russia in their countries. In order to have no German irredentism within this new sphere of Russian influence, the Soviet Government pointedly invited the German minorities resident there to return to Hitler's Reich.

When the Finns were approached with the same proposition that had been extended to the Baltic countries, along with a demand for certain islands in the Gulf of Finland, a naval base at Hangö, and a cession of territory on the Karelian Isthmus—all designed to protect the approaches to Leningrad—the Finns balked. Nor did a Russian offer to compensate with territory along the center of the Russo-Finnish frontier attract the men at Helsinki. After a disarming lull in the negotiations the Soviet government late in November unleashed a barrage of press abuse against the stubborn Finns. On October 26 Russia, using as an excuse an alleged border incident, threatened armed reprisals, and when the Finns offered to negotiate the Red Army, on November 30, 1939, was ordered by the Soviet government to invade Finland.

The world was aghast at an aggression which had even less moral justification than Hitler's attack on the Poles. The League of Nations Council, appealed to by Finland, attempted mediation, but when the Russians scorned the gesture, the League appealed to all member states to aid Finland. Despite an outraged world public opinion, no major power was prepared to aid the Finns with direct military action. Lacking immediate help from her friends, Finland nevertheless gave a good account of herself. The Russian avalanche struck at five points along the frontier and, after some initial small-scale successes, bogged down, apparently because the Russian troops used and the Soviet's service of supply were not of first-class quality. By December, 1939, both the military and moral prestige of the Soviet Union had struck a low ebb.

As New Year's Day, 1940, dawned, the "Sitzkrieg" in the West, so called because of the lull in fighting, was running its course. From Berlin, Hitler and Goering blustered and threatened over the airwaves, but the German armies in the Siegfried Line gave no indica-
tion that their masters in Berlin were serious. Nevertheless, both Belgium and Holland prepared to withstand a German attack, reposing little confidence in repeated German denials that aggression was intended. A fierce winter, however, gave both the Germans and their enemies a good excuse to postpone large-scale military operations. Everything was quiet on this western front.

In the air and on the sea, however, the struggle never ceased, a conflict in which the Allies more than held their own. The British convoy system, air protection for merchantmen, and other anti-submarine techniques were causing an actual decline in the shipping losses of the Allies. Neutrals, on the other hand, began to suffer severely, and by the end of March nearly 200 neutral ships had fallen prey to the German attacks. But if the neutrals were rapidly being stripped of their ability to keep supplies and munitions flowing to the Allies, the German merchant marine was of little help to the Nazis. By late March nearly 300,000 tons of German shipping were lost, either through capture by the Allies or by German scuttling to avoid capture. With nearly 8 per cent of its merchant marine gone, the Reich found little consolation in the fact that the remainder was either tied up in neutral and home ports or restricted in operations to the Baltic.

Air attacks in full force failed to materialize, and most of the air action was confined to German forays against Allied and neutral merchant shipping, whereas the Allied air arms were restricted to defensive activity against isolated German raiders. No large-scale bombing missions were made by either side, and the losses in war planes were negligible. Both in the air and on the sea, no less than on land, the opponents seemed strangely hesitant to grapple with each other. Efforts seemed to be directed mainly against the economic strength of the enemy by means of the blockade and isolated attacks against shipping.

Unlike the situation in 1914, when all contestants anticipated an early termination of hostilities, the Allies since the outbreak of war realized the necessity of girding themselves for a maximum effort on the home front. For England and France, this involved a thoroughgoing economic mobilization within the framework of a parliamentary system, but the way was made easier in England by the passage on August 24 of the Emergency Powers Bill giving the government sweeping powers for internal regulations, and in France by the Chamber’s confirmation of the ministry’s right to govern by temporary decrees. In neither country did this amount to an abdication of parliamentary powers, for both the House of Commons and the Chamber of Deputies could withdraw their grant of wide powers and
overthrow the ministry if it deemed such action compatible with the national interest.

In England, again following a precedent set during the previous world war, an inner war cabinet was formed, though it was not, like the war cabinet of Lloyd George, a coalition group, since it included neither Liberals nor Laborites. In France, the perennial home of coalition governments, the government was reorganized in the direction of greater concentration of power. Daladier, the premier, took into his own hands the portfolios of war and foreign affairs as well. The declaration of war had been the signal for the government to launch a drive against the Communists, a group greatly discredited by the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August. The party was proscribed and the leaders arrested. In defending his internal policy before the Chamber of Deputies in February Daladier won a unanimous vote of confidence from the deputies. For the time being, it seemed, a union sacrée was assured, but by March 20 the Daladier government was forced into retirement by a Chamber critical of Daladier's conduct of the war, and Paul Reynaud, an energetic exponent of democratic methods and of "sound" finance, was called to lead the French nation at war.

In Germany there was little need to concentrate authority, because of the advent of the Nazi dictatorship in 1933, but even here the need of a co-ordinating body to smooth out the various phases of the German war effort on the home front led to the creation of a "Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich," headed by Field Marshal Hermann Goering. Hitler's appointment of Goering as his successor added little to the lusty marshal's prestige and powers, for Goering was already president of the Reichstag, head of the German Luftwaffe, and director of the Reich's Four-Year Plan which controlled the national economy. Rudolf Hess, the enigmatic alter ego of Hitler, was named deputy-successor in the event Hitler succumbed before the fortunes of war. By January 4, in response to the need for a closer and more intense manipulation of the national economy, Hitler created a General Council for War Economy with Goering again being named as its head.

All belligerents concentrated on a maximum economic effort. To curtail individual consumption for the sake of adding to the resources available for war purposes, rationing of essentials was initiated by all the combatant nations. To serve the same end, prices were allowed to move upward and attempts were made to prevent any serious rise in wages. The agricultural and industrial output of each nation was greatly stimulated by various means. In England an Export Council was set up on February 1 to encourage Britain's
export trade, since British purchases abroad, greatly stimulated by war needs, had jumped alarmingly in relation to exports, thus creating a serious foreign exchange problem.

To cover the mounting costs of war there was the problem of increasing revenues. Current taxation could not possibly meet the need, for already Britons were paying income taxes ranging from 37 to 80 per cent. The French paid a much lower income tax, but this was offset by an increase in indirect taxes and by severe levies on business profits. Germany increased both income taxes and indirect taxes. In fine, the saturation point was being reached in the field of taxation, and it became necessary for the belligerents to borrow on the available funds within the countries. Stringent measures were passed to control private investment returns. All the combatants needed credit resources outside their own countries but few were available. The neutrals had little to extend; loans from the United States were banned by the Neutrality Act. As a consequence, the conflict became, as the British Secretary for Overseas Trade put it, a "cash and carry war."

Meanwhile on the fighting front the only sign of vigorous activity was the Russo-Finnish conflict. The Russians, having learned the lesson that the Finns deserved first-class opposition, opened a massive offensive on February 1 against the Mannerheim Line, the Finnish system of defenses across the Karelian Isthmus. In this campaign the advantages were all on the side of the numerically and materially superior Russian forces, for the Finns, having to defend static positions, were unable to isolate Russian units and cut lines of communication as had been possible when they had retained their maneuverability. The outcome was not long in doubt, for the Russians late in February broke through the Mannerheim Line, and by March 11, 1940, the key city of Viipuri was outflanked and doomed to fall into the hands of the Red Army.

Even before this decisive turn of events, however, the two opponents had been looking toward peace negotiations. Whether it was the danger of a clash with Japan over the Mongolian boundary or simply Stalin's fear of internal repercussions should the Soviet war machine not get the Finnish job over and done with quickly, the fact remains that the Russian government first (February 22) asked England to pass to the Finns a peace proposal, the terms of which were so sweeping that the British refused to act as go-between. The Soviet peacemakers then turned to Sweden, whose position between the warring powers rendered her peculiarly amenable to the idea of being instrumental in bringing a conclusion to Russo-Finnish hostilities. The Swedes, along with the other Scandinavian peoples,
were sympathetic to the Finnish cause, but did not dare join in the war through fear of becoming involved in hostilities between Germany and the Allies. Britain and France had already laid plans for extending direct military aid, but on March 2, 1940, they were refused permission to use the overland communications of the Scandinavians to bring military aid to the hard-pressed Finns. A German invasion of Sweden and Norway would doubtless have been Hitler’s direct retort to such a concession. As it was, the Swedes and Norwegians were spared the necessity of going to war with Russia, the future ally of the Western Powers. Finland, isolated from all effective aid, accepted the peace dictated by the Soviets on March 12. The entire Karelian Isthmus, most of the islands of the Gulf of Finland, the northern port of Petsamo, and a considerable rectification of the northern border between the two countries where it approached the Leningrad-Murmansk railway comprised the Russian grab. The cessions not only represented a considerable economic loss to Finland, but they rendered future resistance to the Russians impossible.

Though both Norwegians and Swedes had hoped to remain uninvolved with either of the two antagonists on the Continent, their geographical position made immunity impossible. Norway had been allowing German vessels to sneak past the British blockade by sailing in her territorial waters, their holds loaded with high-grade iron ore, mined in Sweden and sent to the Norwegian port of Narvik, where it was picked up by the Germans. There was nothing the Allies could do about this Swedish and Norwegian traffic with the Germans, but they could and did protest violently to the Norwegians for allowing the Reich to abuse Norwegian neutrality. Norway rejected Allied demands that she take action against German violations of her neutrality, a refusal dictated out of fear that an immediate Nazi invasion would result if the Allied demands were met. Diplomacy having failed, the Allies proceeded to mine Scandinavian territorial waters at strategic points. The announcement of this move, by the sheerest coincidence, paralleled in time the completion of Nazi plans to occupy Denmark and Norway.

Germany had attempted from the beginning of hostilities to keep the Scandinavian states firmly within her orbit for both economic and strategic reasons. The Finnish war and the concomitant possibility of Allied intervention had underscored Germany’s need to preserve access to Scandinavia and to prevent the Allies from securing either diplomatic ascendancy or a military foothold in the peninsula. The best evidence today points to German preparation for the invasion of Denmark and Norway as early as February. Ships were collected and troops were trained in landing operations along the
Baltic coast. The German press, as early as March 16, ominously ranted against Anglo-French attempts "... to force little peoples into the service of their war strategy." On April 5 Dr. Goebbels allowed German editors to forecast a radical change in the course of the war, one promising to affect neutrals in a fateful way. On the same day the German invasion fleet set out for Norway, the holds of both merchant and naval vessels loaded with heavily armed and highly trained marines and troops of the Wehrmacht. Despite the fact that German naval units were sighted by British patrols as they steamed to their northern destinations, despite the fact that on April 8 a German troop transport was sunk by a British submarine off Lillesand, the French and English peoples, and apparently their responsible leaders as well, were puzzled by the meaning of these events.

On the morning of April 9 the German forces crossed the Danish border and descended upon Norway, each unit assigned to the capture of a strategic post along the thousand-mile stretch of coastline. Ultimatums were delivered to the helpless victims after the operations began. Denmark, small in size and population and unfortunately placed geographically, had long recognized that her only salvation lay in the international good faith of her larger neighbors rather than in armed resistance. Less than a year before she had been promised security against attack by Hitler. Now the German invasion was "justified" by the Reich on the grounds that Denmark's neutrality was about to be broken by Allied aggression. No real resistance was offered by the Danes, for such would have been entirely useless. By mid-afternoon on April 9 the little country was under effective German control and King Christian issued a proclamation accepting the situation under protest.

The Norwegian adventure of the Nazis proved a more difficult nut to crack, but the very difficulty of the operation only underscored the efficiency of the German invader. The attack was launched against six key ports, from Narvik in the extreme north to Oslo in the south. At all six ports the surprise was practically complete. At Oslo grimly capable German units filed out of the holds of merchant ships which had been innocently lying in port during the preceding several days. Some resistance was met at Oslo, but it was quickly overcome, thanks to the confusion born of surprise, the activities of the local fifth columnists, and the indubitable supremacy of the German air force. At the mouth of Oslo Fjord shore batteries sank two German warships and several transports before they were silenced. The sum total, however, of Norwegian resistance, such as it was, sufficed merely to delay the German occupation of the capital by only twelve hours.
A German ultimatum demanding immediate surrender, submitted early on the morning of April 9, 1941, was rejected, and the Norwegian government fled first to Hamar and then to Elverum to organize the country's resistance. In the meantime, British reconnaissance at sea discovered what was afoot early enough to bring heavy units of the Royal Navy into action against the German surface forces. Bad weather and poor visibility enabled the German pocket battleship *Scharnhorst* and her companion, the cruiser *Admiral Hipper*, to escape destruction on the day of the landings. On April 10 British destroyers entered Narvik Bay, sinking a German boat and leaving several others in flames. Four days later the English battleship *Warspite*, with the help of several destroyers, completed the destruction of the remaining German naval units in the Bay. Serious as these losses were to the Germans in ships and supplies, communications from the Reich to Norway were not greatly impeded, nor were the Nazi occupying forces disturbed unduly.

The vital point in the German communications line was the Skagerrak and Kattegat, the narrow and tortuous stretch of water between Denmark and the Scandinavian peninsula. It might have been possible for the British navy to cut the line had it not been for the fact that the German *Luftwaffe* dominated the air over this important water link. Major British fleet units, consequently, were not committed to such a danger-fraught task, and the upshot was that Allied submarines and mines failed to snip the steady flow of German forces northward.

To prevent the union of the widely separated German units in Norway and to establish a foothold for the opening of a second front the Allies next resorted to a military invasion. An expeditionary force of 12,000 troops was landed at the two small ports north and south of Nazi-held Trondheim, namely, Namsos and Andalsnes, in the hope of cutting off the Germans in Trondheim and establishing contact with Norwegian troops in the interior. Lightly equipped, with no tanks or airplanes, and inadequate anti-aircraft artillery, the Allied forces were prevented by German air action and naval bombardment from encircling Trondheim. The Norwegians were contacted at Lillehammer, but with insufficient forces to affect materially the military situation. By the end of the month Allied troops were hopelessly battered and scattered. Withdrawal came on May 1–3, an evacuation that left the Germans in unchallenged control of most of Norway. At Narvik 15,000 Allied troops forced the occupying Germans into a temporary retreat toward the Swedish border. The Germans refused to surrender, the Allies failed to pursue them, and, when a much greater calamity befell the Allies in
France early in June, the Allied force occupying Narvik was recalled. Effective resistance to the Germans thus completely ceased. The Norwegian government of King Haakon was to operate henceforth in London, while the Nazis ruled Norway through their local puppet, Vidkun Quisling, whose name forthwith became synonymous with a venal traitor, and whose days of glory were to be ended before a Norwegian firing squad five years later.

The Allied failure in Norway was a terrible blow to Anglo-French fortunes in many ways. Germany had greatly extended her striking power, both by airplane and submarine, against Britain's eastern flank; she had removed the danger of Allied operations against the Reich from the north; Sweden, with her rich iron ore resources, was completely reliant on Germany's whim; the considerable flow of Danish and Norwegian dairy products, bacon, timber, and wood pulp to England and France was cut off; accumulated stocks of Norwegian oil were in German hands; and, most important of all, the German flank was protected while a powerful blow was struck against the Allies in the Low Countries and France.

In England the Norwegian fiasco fanned into an open flame the smoldering resentment of the British public, long suspicious that its leaders were not prosecuting the war with sufficient vigor. Prime Minister Chamberlain, the man who personified a stage in British foreign policy that every loyal Englishman wanted to forget, was naturally the butt of criticism. Chamberlain's appeasement record, his snubbing of men who urged a more vigorous course, his inept prosecution of the war thus far, his transparent optimism—all these now recoiled against him as his own party, the Conservatives, revolted against his leadership in the House of Commons on May 8. When the Man of Munich attempted to broaden the basis of the ministry, the Labor leaders bluntly refused to participate in a Chamberlain-led cabinet. On May 10 Chamberlain resigned and Winston Churchill, the heretofore First Lord of the Admiralty, the man who, above all others, had sounded the warning against the Hitler menace during the preceding six years, came to the helm. Britain stood in sore need of a man who had the courage to offer the nation nothing but "blood, toil, tears, and sweat." The advent of pugnacious, indomitable and eloquent Winston Churchill as prime minister coincided with and was chiefly caused by the fall of the German sledge hammer on the Low Countries and France.

The sudden termination of the so-called "phony war" in the West by the Germans was anything but unexpected. Since November, 1939, German troops movements and concentrations on the Dutch and Belgian frontiers had disquieted Amsterdam and Brussels. The
The airplane of a German officer landed in Belgium "by mistake," and his briefcase held details of invasion plans which suggested a frontal attack on the Liège area. Despite such evidence of German intentions, neither the Belgians nor the Dutch made an overture to the other looking toward co-ordination of defensive arrangements. Nor was there any willingness to toy with the idea of Allied preventive measures. They apparently relied on their combined forces of 1,000,000 troops and a system of fairly substantial defense works to stave off the German thrust. There was a weak link in the chain of Belgo-Dutch defenses, however, which represented a standing invitation to the invader, the so-called Limburg appendix, a narrow peninsula of Dutch territory extending southward into the center of Belgium's northeastern frontier near the fortress area of Liège. Only one strong point, Maastricht, stood in this forty-five mile stretch of indefensible frontier.

It was precisely at the Limburg appendix that one of the three German spearheads thrust on the morning of May 10. One German army contained the northern Dutch forces by an attack across the northern frontier; another penetrated the Limburg appendix and soon threatened to turn the southern flank of the Dutch and the northern flank of the Belgians; the third German force slashed quickly through helpless Luxemburg and the adjacent thinly fortified Belgian frontier. Two gigantic pincers were threatening to close in on both Dutch and Belgian armies.

Within two hours of the Belgo-Dutch appeal for help the French and British troops were moving to the front, but they did not move fast enough. In four furious days of destruction the Nazis captured Maastricht, overran the northern Netherlands, enveloped the Dutch water defenses, and their Luftwaffe systematically and pulverizingly bombed communications centers. Parachute troops were dropped behind the lines to spread rumors and confusion. Rotterdam surrendered, but the Luftwaffe insisted on blasting much of its residential section even after the capitulation in order to strike terror into the hearts of those who might wish to continue resistance. By May 17 the entire country was in the hands of the Germans, and Dr. Seyss-Inquart, the betrayer of the Austrian republic, was put in charge of the prostrate Dutch by the Germans. Nazi frightfulness and an active fifth column had again proved effective subsidiaries of a nearly flawless war machine.

In Belgium the German Blitzkrieg was slightly retarded but nevertheless moved just as surely to victory. In two days' time the key Belgian fortress, Eben Emael, fell to the invaders, and the Belgians retreated upon their secondary line of defense, the Dyle River Line,
where they were joined by a handful of arriving Allied troops. But German armored weight, a sky black with *Luftwaffe* bombers, and an almost irresistible momentum compelled the defenders to fall back once more. To the south developments were even worse for the Allies. A gap had been left temporarily in the French line before the

![Image: The Maginot Line guarding France's Eastern Frontier](image)

An invisible French army in the military cities underground awaited with false security the *Wehrmacht* during the "Sitzkrieg."

Ardennes Forest, which the French deemed capable of delaying the German advance. The French forces moved northward, leaving the gap unblocked, while the Germans knifed through the Ardennes at an average speed of forty miles per hour, and two days later emerged between Namur and Sedan to confront a bewildered and poorly prepared Allied force. The chance had come for the German High Command to turn the Maginot Line. During the next few days a sixty-mile wide wedge was driven between the armies in Belgium and France. When the Germans reached Abbéville on the Channel on May 21, the Allied forces in Belgium were cut off from their main base to the south.

To complete the encirclement of the Allies in Belgium the Germans rapidly spread northward along the Channel coast from Abbéville. On May 28 King Leopold of the Belgians surrendered, after having assured himself that the cause was hopeless. To the south of the German lines General Maxime Weygand, who had replaced the defense-minded Gamelin as Supreme Commander of the Allied forces, attempted to break through to join the surrounded Belgian,
British, and French troops in Belgium, but his efforts scarcely dented the German lines. The closely pressed Allied armies in Belgium retreated on Dunkirk, the sole port that the Germans had thus far failed to capture. There, because of the sheer pluck of British airmen and seamen, 335,000 troops were picked up off the beaches by thousands of ships and small craft of every description while the screaming, death-dealing Stuka dive-bombers of the German Luftwaffe were prevented from interfering by an umbrella of Royal Air Force planes.

The Dunkirk evacuation was the culmination of the greatest defeat suffered by British arms in modern times, but it also represented an impressive tribute to the indomitable courage of the Englishman at bay. The expeditionary forces left behind almost all their military equipment and stores, about 13,000 dead, and 40,000 prisoners of the Germans. Moreover, the Reich had come into possession of great accumulations of oil and food stocks, and the equipment of highly industrialized Holland and Belgium was in hand for the production of war matériel to be expended against the Allies. Belgian coal and Luxemburg ore represented a tremendous economic gain for Germany. Strategically, the conquest of the Low Countries was even more important, for it turned the Allied flank in France, and it gave the Germans valuable submarine and air bases within easy striking distance of Allied shipping and British industrial centers.

With resistance in the Low Countries overcome, the Germans turned their attention to the French and British armies facing them south of the Somme River. The titanic struggle began on June 3, with about 2,000,000 men participating on each side. But again the remorseless warplanes of the Germans, their brilliant, slashing tactics with highly mechanized units, and a frighteningly confident élan among the attackers gave Hitler the victory. Within ten days after the Battle of France began, the German armies were crossing the Marne River in force, their spirits stimulated even more by the fact that on June 10 Italy's Mussolini, convinced that the war was virtually over, declared war on the Allies, threw his legions across the Alpine passes and thus speeded up the German victory by containing French troops desperately needed to fill the gaps opened in the French lines to the north.

The armies defending the Somme quickly fell back, badly demoralized; the French government fled to Bordeaux, and the populace of Paris streamed out of the City of Light in a mass exodus, accompanied by the strafing German Air Force that made no distinction between military and civilian personnel. Paris was declared an open city—it would have been suicidal to try to defend the
metropolis. On June 14 the Germans, in all their mechanized might, rumbled triumphantly down the Champs-Élysées while the hooked-cross emblem of the new Napoleon fluttered from the Arc de Triomphe. Two days later the ancient hero of Verdun, Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, was named premier by a despairing French leadership. Pétain, convinced that further resistance by the French was impossible, spurned Winston Churchill's dramatic proposal of June 16 for a complete union of Britain and France, with common citizenship and a single parliament for both countries. To make matters worse from the British point of view, the new government of Pétain petitioned Germany for a cessation of hostilities while promising London and Washington that the French fleet would be kept from Germany, but neither the Americans nor the British reposed any faith in Pétain's ability or willingness to keep his pledge, for the new French cabinet was a frankly reactionary and even pro-Nazi group.

The Nazi Führer was in no hurry to give the French surcease from their suffering, and he continued the German advance for another eight days. Finally, on June 22, the French leaders were summoned to the same railway car in the Compiègne forest in which the armistice of 1918 had been signed. There the humiliated French armistice commission accepted the German Diktat providing for the release of all German prisoners of war, the disarming and disbandment of French military forces, the immobilizing of French naval units in Axis-controlled ports, and a prohibition against any French merchantmen putting out to sea. German soldiers, moreover, were to garrison slightly more than half of France, including the principal industrial and food-producing areas and the entire French coast down to the Spanish frontier. The French were to pay for the cost of German occupation and to administer that part of France outside German jurisdiction. Mussolini, as a reward for his jackal role in the defeat of the Third Republic, was allowed to remain in possession of a narrow strip of French territory on the Alpine frontier, and given minor colonial concessions at the expense of the French in Djibouti and Algeria.

The Third French Republic had run the full circle, born out of the defeat of 1870–71, died in the bitter ashes of German conquest seventy years later. Unimaginative military leadership, overconfidence in the invulnerability of the vaunted Maginot Line, internal social and political cleavages, susceptibility to German defeatist propaganda—these as much as the German superiority in almost every department of warfare had brought the French low. No Gambetta appeared this time, no Clemenceau; only a tired old man whose
entire reputation rested upon his immobility at Verdun many years before, a fitting leader of a France whose preoccupation with static defense had cost the nation its independence, territorial integrity, and—most humiliating of all to Frenchmen—honor. Yet the new chief of state, given the authority now to devise a constitution for his defeated compatriots, announced as his policy, “le travail, la famille, la patrie”—and “l’honneur.”

The new government of Pétain consisted of men of unabashed totalitarian sympathies, sitting at Vichy. In docile acquiescence to the German demand, one of its first acts was to arrest, imprison, and hold for trial all former governmental leaders charged by Germany with having involved France in war. The French multiparty system was abolished, economic life was regimented, censorship was instituted, even anti-Semitic laws were promulgated, all in the hope that such measures would bring to France the favor of her conquerors, now regarded as assured of victory everywhere. There were Frenchmen, however, who refused to acknowledge France’s defeat, who were desirous of carrying on the war against the Nazis from the French North African Empire. These patriots found their leader in General Charles de Gaulle, who had for years attempted unsuccessfully to convince the French military leadership of the need of mechanization of the armed forces. In London de Gaulle set up a Provisional French National Committee, dedicated to carrying on the war with all the “Free French” sympathizers it could find. Britain recognized the Committee on June 28, 1940, and lent it her full support. In the French African Empire, however, only Equatorial Africa came promptly to the support of de Gaulle’s government in exile. The other regions professed loyalty to Vichy France.

After Dunkirk Britain stood alone, surrounded by Nazi power. In her dire extremity, her most eloquent expression of courage, Winston Churchill, told his countrymen and the world: “We shall fight on the beaches. We shall fight on the landing grounds. We shall fight on the fields and in the streets. We shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender.” The nation, gravely conscious of its position as the last active challenge to the Nazis, thrilled to these words. Britshers forgot prewar political differences and set themselves the task of transforming their island into a mighty fortress and arsenal. Aside from their courage, they knew they could rely on their navy to keep a surface invasion from materializing and their gallant air force to shield them from the Luftwaffe. At long last, too, the United States was stirring out of its dream that Hitler was the concern of Europe alone, and Roosevelt voiced the hopes of the British and the rudely awakened conscience of the American people when he made
it clear that he intended to give more than moral support to the beleaguered British.

Hitler's smashing victories in the West pointed up the threat to others than the British and Americans. In Moscow, the leaders of the Soviet Union soon realized that the removal of France and the Low Countries spelled the domination of Continental Europe by the Nazis. In the logic of the situation the turn of either England or the Soviet Union was next, for the men in the Kremlin more than suspected by this time that Hitler had not given up his dream of gaining access to the riches of the Ukraine. As insurance against attack by their technical "friends" in Berlin, the Soviet leaders completed their penetration of the Baltic states that had been initiated in October, 1939. Soviet troops occupied the countries and a Russian-sponsored plebiscite revealed that the Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians wanted absorption by their big neighbor all the time. Pressure was applied, too, to Rumania, but King Carol, having decided he could no longer play Russians off against Germans, cast his lot with Hitler in the hope of stemming the Russian tide. The move availed him nothing, however, for with Germany busy conquering France, Hitler was unable to bolster Carol against the Russians. Before the end of June, 1940, Soviet forces were occupying Bessarabia and northern Bukovina.

The Russian grab, in turn, whetted the appetites of Rumania's neighbors, Bulgaria and Hungary, who both demanded slices of Rumanian territory. War threatened until Hitler and Mussolini stepped in as "mediators" and forced Rumania to turn over most of the Dobrudja to Bulgaria and half of Transylvania to Hungary. The now unpopular and discredited Carol was driven from the country by the pro-Nazi Iron Guard, which provoked such disorders in the country that German troops soon moved in "to restore order." In October Hungary formally joined the Italo-German alliance; in Yugoslavia an impressed government of appeasers moved in the direction of closer co-operation with Hitler. Most of southeastern Europe had fallen into the German sphere of influence and for the time being, at any rate, the Russian advance had been halted.

In still another part of the world Hitler's partners were busily engaged in helping toward the realization of Axis plans for world conquest. The fall of France removed all doubt in the minds of the Japanese militarists that Hitler's star was in the ascendant. Early in July, 1940, Prince Konoye, representing the interests of aggressive militarism, became premier and eagerly listened to the urgings of German agents in Tokyo that Japan begin her long-dreamed-of expansion toward the south. Already Pétain had acquiesced to Japanese
demands that shipments of war matériel over the Haiphong-Kunming railroad be stopped. On July 17, Churchill was forced to promise Tokyo that the Burma Road route into China would be closed until the following October. The next day saw the Konoye Cabinet fully organized to pursue its campaign for the creation of a Far Eastern new order.

As a token of good faith to the Japanese, Berlin pressed the Vichy government into making important strategic concessions to Tokyo in its war against the Chinese. The gesture bore early fruit, for on September 27, 1940, Japan, Germany, and Italy concluded a ten-year pact which provided a free hand to the Japanese in the establishment of their new order in Greater East Asia; Germany and Italy were to co-operate in creating a new Europe; and all three were to lend each other economic, political, and military aid. Both the Japanese and the Germans profited from the arrangement, for it promised to worry the Russians sufficiently to prevent them from interfering with either German or Japanese aggression, and it was hoped that the existence of the new Triplace would immobilize the United States. The Japanese were to lose little time in making use of their now avowed friends.

In the West an all-out effort by the United States, now awakened to its danger, to provide Britain with the tools of war and a gradual stiffening on the part of the Russians toward the German Reich added up to an easing of the enormous pressure Hitler was bringing to bear on the island fortress. England stood in direst need of assistance. The fall of France had made the Channel passage untenable, the Mediterranean lifeline was endangered by the lack of active French naval assistance, but, worst of all, Britain itself was open to land and air attack from many quarters. The loss of much of its armored equipment on the Continent, the still inefficient organization of war industries, the lack of military preparedness to meet an invasion, all made Britain during the winter of 1940–41 a woefully shaky bastion against Axis might. Winston Churchill’s fighting eloquence, however, spurred the people into a thorough preparation for the invasion they had all thought impossible. Beaches were turned into barbed wire entanglements, tank traps were dug, civilian home guards were organized. When Hitler, on July 19, appealed to Britain to “listen to reason” and to arrange a “common-sense peace” through negotiations, Foreign Secretary Halifax, replying for the nation, asserted, “We must realize that the struggle may cost us everything. . . . But we shall not stop fighting till freedom, for ourselves and others, is secure.”

Confronted with this retort, Hitler opened in earnest his air
"blitz" against England. Gradually increasing the tempo of *Luftwaffe* attacks, the Reich's Air Marshal Goering ordered the death-blow struck. The onslaught reached its peak on September 15, when

![Image: "Homecoming"
After many hours of digging, Civil Defense workers told him his wife was dead in the wreckage of his London home.](image)

Goering himself reputedly flew over London to assess the damage done by his airmen. It was appallingly high. Civilian property, shipping, port installations had suffered severe blows, though the Royal Air Force had taken a heavy toll of the sky-borne invaders. The Nazis suffered heavy losses in both airplanes and pilots, heavier losses than
could be sustained over a long period of time. Accordingly, mass daylight raids were abandoned after mid-September, and heavy night attacks were inaugurated. This time no effort was made to concentrate on military objectives; at the peak of the campaign the entire city of Coventry was virtually wiped out. The tempo of this destruction, however, lessened little by little, since both British anti-aircraft gunnery and the R.A.F. proved a match for the German bombers and night fighters. Hitler’s projected invasion of Russia, too, called for a reorganization of the German air force. But while they lasted, the air attacks on Britain wrought fearful damage, killing fifty thousand civilians, and retarding industrial production. The stark fact remained, however, that the R.A.F. was still in command of the skies, the threat of annihilation had been warded off, and the national backbone was tremendously stiffened against future trials. In tribute to the British airmen who had won the first Battle of Britain, Churchill again struck off a line that echoed Britishers’ sentiments when he said, “Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.”

On the seas the British were fighting what seemed to be a losing struggle. The fall of France, the Low Countries, and Norway had spelled a tremendous jump in losses of merchant shipping. During the year following Dunkirk more than 6,000,000 tons of shipping were lost, a quantity far beyond the then capacity of the United States and Britain to replace. The problem of supply was a serious one, and not even the swapping to Britain by the United States of fifty “over-age” destroyers in return for certain strategic bases in the Western Hemisphere gave England a sufficient destroyer force to cope effectively with the German submarine menace. The island kingdom was facing slow strangulation.

Despite these blows the British managed to maintain an effective blockade of the Continent and to force Hitler’s surface fleet to resort to hit-and-run tactics. The pocket battleships *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, pride of the Reich’s admirals, were bombed nightly at St. Nazaire; and, when the great new battleship *Bismarck* downed the British *Hood*, it was speedily dispatched to the bottom. British courage and United States material aid were confronting Hitler with the realization that perhaps he, like Napoleon, had best dispose of Russia first before delivering an all-out offensive against Britain.

In the Mediterranean theater the balance of sea power was so precarious that the British Admiralty decided to prevent the reinforcement of Axis naval strength by the French fleet immobilized by Hitler’s peace terms at Compiègne. The bulk of the French navy was concentrated at Mers-el-Kebir near Oran, taking its orders from
Vichy. On July 3 the admiral in charge received an ultimatum from the commander of a British battle fleet standing off Oran. Several alternatives were offered: that the French ships join the British and fight out the war; that they proceed to a British port, whence their crews would be repatriated; that they steam to Martinique for demilitarization; that they sail to American waters and entrust themselves to the United States. When the French commander failed to make a choice the British guns damaged or sank all the French surface units, though a number managed to escape to Toulon.

Much the same fate overtook the ships of the Mediterranean Caesar. Mussolini had a superior fleet to that of the British—on paper, at least—as well as such strategically valuable bases as Pantelleria, guarding the narrow Sicilian Straits, and several strongholds in the Dodecanese Islands from which to challenge Suez. The superiority proved an illusion, for on July 9, 1940, the first Anglo-Italian naval clash saw an Italian battleship severely damaged by a British torpedo while the rest of the squadron scurried away from an outnumbered British group. In November of the same year the Royal Navy, emboldened by such Italian reticence to give battle, descended upon the Italian base of Taranto, smashing or disabling many great warships of the Duce. In March, 1941, Sir Andrew Cunningham’s eastern Mediterranean fleet ran into a large unit of Italian ships off Cape Matapan. Before the smoke of battle cleared, the greater portion of the Italian force had been liquidated. Another of Mussolini’s boasts had proved notably empty.

In Africa Italian troops had quickly overrun the whole of British Somaliland by August, 1940, but British domination of vital communications routes: a well-prepared British counteroffensive, utilizing, among others, Ethiopians anxious to restore their Haile Selassie to the throne of his fathers; and Italian weakness added up to the British conquest of Italian East Africa, including Ethiopia, by May, 1941. In the case of Italian Libya, the situation was quite otherwise. The fall of France had given Mussolini a chance to bid for Suez and the entire Near East, basing the thrust on a territory that was both close enough to the mother country to maintain communications and adjacent to Egypt, the bastion of British power in the Near East. The first Italian advance across the Egyptian border was led by the seasoned campaigner Graziani in September, 1940, but the British navy constantly jeopardized his supply lines and his master in Rome was unable to reinforce him sufficiently, because of an unexpectedly ferocious Greek resistance to still another Italian drive toward control of the Near East. British General Sir Archibald Wavell’s small North African force opened up its counterattack in
December, driving the Italians back along the African coast into western Libya, capturing over 150,000 of Il Duce's warriors and seizing huge stores of supplies. The disgraced Graziani was recalled; German tank units under the command of Germany's ace desert fighter, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, were shuttled across the Mediterranean to repulse the British threat. By April, 1941, the Axis forces were strong enough to push Wavell back through Bengazi, Bardia, Sollum, and Halfaya Pass to the Egyptian frontier, though some surrounded Britishers managed to maintain themselves at Tobruk, from which a second British offensive was mounted on November 20, 1941. This time the British Imperials, under the command of General Auchinleck, moved more slowly, but by Christmas Day of 1941 the Union Jack was again flying over Bengazi, an accomplishment far from decisive in the North African war as a whole, but certainly a much needed morale lift to an Allied world that had just witnessed disheartening disasters in the Soviet Union and in the Pacific.

Other weak spots in Britain's domination of the Near East were given prompt attention by her troops. When in April, 1941, the ruler of Iraq, Rashid Ali, a usurper and pro-Nazi, demanded the evacuation of British troops and mobilized his native warriors, the British easily subdued the Iraqi and installed an administration in Iraq friendly to the Allied cause. British suspicion that Vichy planned to hand over to Germany the French-mandated territory of Syria and the Lebanon as a base for Axis operations against Suez and the Nile led to a combined Anglo-Free French invasion of Syria in June, 1941. Over Vichy protests, the invaders defeated the small force of French soldiers on the spot. Of even more strategic importance was the Kingdom of Persia (Iran), whose monarch's acute interest in the promises of German agents led to a joint Anglo-Russian occupation in August, 1941. In January of the following year the two occupying powers agreed "to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence of Iran," and to evacuate their troops not later than six months after defeat of the Axis. Allied control of Iran was to prove highly valuable as a channel through which war supplies could be funneled into a Russia hard-pressed by the Wehrmacht.

In the Balkans, however, the fortunes of war distinctly favored the Axis. From his dependency of Albania Mussolini prepared the conquest of Greece, a venture probably inspired by the Italian dictator's distrust of Hitler's recent penetration of the Balkans. Without the benefit of German co-operation, Mussolini peremptorily demanded of the Greeks on October 28, 1940, "control of certain strategic points" under pain of immediate invasion. The preceding Italian propaganda campaign against the Greeks, in the best Ger-
man style, had given the Greek military an opportunity to organize
an effective resistance force. The Italian note, consequently, was re-
jected, and when the forces of Marshal Badoglio plunged into the
inhospitable mountains of northwestern Greece a vicious Greek army
stopped them in their tracks and then assumed the offensive in its
turn. Throughout the winter of 1940–1941 Mussolini poured re-
forcements into the Greek chopper, but to no avail. At home
Fascist confidence was severely shaken; Badoglio, the best of Il
Duce’s soldiers, was retired from his post; and German troops as
well as German agents infiltrated Italy in increasing numbers—Ber-
lin was becoming impatient with the military ineptness of the Roman
legions.

Hitler had reason to be impatient, for as long as his southern flank
was unprotected his planned invasion of Russia presented serious
difficulties. Not only Greece, but Yugoslavia as well were vital fac-
tors in the projected offensive against the Soviet Union. In Belgrade
a venal pro-Nazi Regent, Prince Paul, and his Prime Minister, Cvet-
kovich, lent a ready ear to Hitler’s offer of the Greek port of Salonika
and a guarantee of Yugoslavia's integrity in return for a nonaggress-
ion pact. Despite the roar of public indignation that followed when
news of the negotiations leaked out, Cvetkovich signed his name in
Berlin to the neutrality pact on March 25. Two days later Yugoslav
military chieftains repudiated the bargain, headed a revolution
which deposed Prince Paul and his ministry, and proclaimed young
Peter as their ruler. Nazi revenge descended savagely. The German
Blitz, spearheaded by warplanes and Panzer divisions, struck down
Yugoslavia in an eleven-day campaign which reduced part of Bel-
grade to rubble and put King Peter to flight. Formal surrender came
on April 17. Yugoslavia passed under German, Italian, Hungarian
and Bulgarian control; what remained was administered by local
puppets of the Axis.

The turn of the Greeks to feel the slashing attack of the German
armies was next. Nazi mechanized divisions had entered Salonika
on April 8. Athens fell less than three weeks later despite the pres-
ence of British reinforcements brought up from Libya and valiant
help from the R.A.F. When it became apparent that the Greek cause
was doomed, the British forces evacuated the mainland and retired
to the Anglo-Greek haven of Crete. Here, ignoring British com-
mand of the sea, German troops in gliders and parachutists dropped
on the island, the first large-scale operation of its kind. With no air
cover, poorly equipped Britishers wilted under a relentless machine-
gun fire and bombing from the sky. By June 1 the entire island was
in Nazi hands. The Greek islands as well as the homeland were
turned over to the Italian soldiery for policing, and Bulgaria, which had joined the Axis on March 1, 1941, was rewarded with Thrace.

Only one important power remained in the path of what seemed at the time to be a Nazi drive into the Near East, strategically situated Turkey. The mutual-assistance pact which the Turks had signed with the Allies in October, 1939, had long since become a dead letter for all practical purposes, since Angora had declined to abandon neutrality and openly sold goods to both sets of belligerents. Though this policy certainly convinced the British that their pact with the Turks was anything but a diplomatic victory, London had the satisfaction of knowing that it was at least militating against a wholesale Turkish sell-out to the Nazis. But when the Axis conquered the Balkans the highly impressed Turks on June 18, 1941, signed a treaty of "mutual trust and sincere friendship" with Germany. It seemed that Hitler had not only secured his southern flank against attack during his forthcoming invasion of the Soviet Union, but that he might have as an active partner a traditional enemy of Russia. Like Napoleon, the German Führer was to need all the help he could find when he gave the signal for the conquest of the northern colossus; like the Corsican, too, he was to learn that all the forces of a subjugated Europe were not sufficient to accomplish his conqueror's dream.

The Russo-German Nonaggression Pact of August, 1939, governed technically the relations of the two countries from its inception down to the "surprise" Nazi invasion of Russia on June 22, 1941. The history of Nazi-Soviet relations under the aegis of this agreement, however, had proved to be anything but cordial. For both the Kremlin and Wilhelmstrasse regarded each other with thinly disguised suspicion while the Nazi war machine was smashing its way along the path of European domination. Despite the fact that the Russians officially termed the German war on western Europe a typically capitalistic-imperialistic conflict, the practical position of the Soviet Union during the first year of the war in the West militated against the Anglo-French allies and favored the Nazis. Soviet wheat, fodder, and oil were sold to the Reich, and the Russians gladly permitted the transport across the U.S.S.R. of goods originating in Japan and destined for the Reich. Nor was the flow of benefits all one way, for German machinery, airplane designs, and technicians were supplied to Russia.

When the Finnish War of 1939-1940 broke out the Nazi military leaders apparently drew the same conclusions from the Russian performance as did the rest of the world, namely, that the Soviet Union's
fighting capacity was amazingly low. Conversely, the German victories in the West in 1940 undoubtedly convinced the Kremlin that the belligerents were not evenly matched and were hardly likely to ruin one another. Nazi power pointed toward an early total victory over its enemies. Once triumphant in the West, would the Reich turn its attention eastward, where the broad acres of Ukrainian wheat, the rich Donets coal basin, and the oil of the Caspian region invited the Nazis to make good their loudly trumpeted plans for eastward expansion?

The Russian occupation of the Baltic republics, of Bessarabia, and of the northern Bukovina, already noted, heightened the tension between Moscow and Berlin, though the Nazis made no official protest. But the ultimate intention of the Germans was plain when, in August, 1940, ten infantry and two Panzer divisions were moved from the West into positions along the Russo-German border in partitioned Poland. British leaders attempted to warn the Russians of an impending German aggression against the Soviet Union, expecting as a reward a clear-cut Russian statement of friendship toward the West. But such advances were rebuffed by the Kremlin; the Soviet leaders apparently were well apprised of the threat and seemed to attach little value to British, and later American, advices that the Reich was about to drive its legions into the heart of Russia. Nevertheless, when the Triple Alliance agreement of September, 1940, brought Japan into a closer relationship with the Axis, Stalin and his advisers had to consider the possibility of a two-front war, and hastened to conclude a neutrality pact with the Japanese which was to run for five years. Foreign Commissar Molotov and a staff of experts were also sent off to Berlin in November, 1940, apparently to work out some sort of modus vivendi between the Soviet Union and the then colossal German power. Molotov lent approval to a limited German penetration of the Balkans for the purpose of rescuing Italy from her difficulties and, in return, was assured of Nazi sympathy with Soviet aspirations to the Straits and adjustment of the Soviet-Turkish frontier. A joint official communiqué declared that agreement had been reached on all points of mutual interest. The November talks were followed by a Russo-German pact in January, 1941, concerned chiefly with economic and resettlement matters.

It was during midwinter of 1940–41 that the German leaders, despairing of lowering the Soviet Union to a state of vassalage like that of Mussolini’s Italy, made the decision to postpone an all-out offensive against Britain for the sake of disposing first of the big neighbor to the east. While a highly suspicious Soviet leadership grimly girded the Russian nation for any eventuality, the Wehrmacht
slashed through the Balkans, in the process bringing Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary completely within the German orbit. Stalin reacted by taking over the Soviet premiership himself, fully conscious now that the German military had already singled out Russia for the next blow. Once the conquest of Yugoslavia and Greece had been accomplished and the Turks drawn close to the Axis, the German troop movements toward the Russo-German border could mean but the imminent end of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939. Accordingly, Red Army maneuvers were moved up from autumn to May and when Hitler’s forces crashed across the border on the morning of June 22, 1941, they were confronted by Soviet strength estimated variously at 150 to 160 divisions.

Why did Hitler undertake such an enormous gamble? In the first place, growing Russian military might had to be crushed before the Nazis could give their undivided attention to an invasion of Britain—provided a defeat of Russia did not cause despairing Britain to sue for peace. Undoubtedly, too, the rich sources of raw materials in Russia were an inducement, for grain, coal, oil, and other items were much needed by a blockaded Germany. Perhaps, too, the intention was to open up a land front in Middle Asia with an attack on India via Transcaspia. But most of all, Hitler had finally reached the conclusion that he could not meet Stalin’s opposition to the Nazi invasion of the Balkans and the latter’s demands for postwar swag. The fateful disagreement between the two leaders came in November, 1940, when Stalin demanded bases on the Dardanelles and staked his claim on the Persian Gulf area as “the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union.” Hitler balked. The next month he issued his directive for “Operation Barbarossa”: to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign. He knew that speed was of the essence, for a protracted campaign against the Russians would give American industry adequate time to supply Britain with the material strength to undertake an invasion of the Continent.

On the morning of June 22, 1941, the gargantuan offensive against Russia got under way. Participating in Operation Barbarossa, as the German High Command called it, were Germany’s allies, Italy, Finland, and Rumania. Hungary and Slovakia sent detachments while volunteers were enrolled in Franco Spain, Vichy France, and even Belgium. Only Bulgaria, because of the pro-Russian sympathies of much of the population, remained inactive in the great crusade against Red Russia. The Germans alone had approximately 3,000,000 men in the operation. From Finland to the Black Sea the battle-line stretched. Under the leadership of Baron Mannerheim the Finns attacked in the north; in the south Rumanian armies lunged at the
Russians around the Black Sea region. The master stroke, however, was reserved for the German armies. Nazi strategy envisaged a three-pronged attack, the northern group heading for Leningrad under the command of von Leeb, the central army of von Bock aimed for Moscow, and the southern army to hammer into the Ukraine. The first few weeks of campaigning lent substance to the earlier German boasts that the Wehrmacht would "cut through Russia like a knife through butter." The western world shuddered as the German armies unleashed their offensive; only western Communists expressed hope for the Soviet Union, the pioneer Socialist Commonwealth. For the Communists and fellow travelers of the West the war had now assumed the nature of world defense against predatory Fascism; forgotten were the days when the conflict represented only a clash of capitalist imperialisms.

From the front came German High Command communiqués announcing "annihilation" of various Russian forces. What was happening, however, was that the Russians had thrown up a screen of frontier guards whose job it was to delay the German advance while the bulk of the Red Army concentrated far to the rear behind the Stalin Line along the Dnieper River. Not until the forces of von Bock reached Smolensk on the central front was the real Russian defense encountered. Heavy German attacks in mid-July and again in mid-August failed to dislodge the tenacious Russians. It was not until October 1 that the hard-fought Germans were able to resume their drive on Moscow to the accompaniment of Hitler's exultant declaration that "Russia is broken and will never rise again." In the south von Rundstedt's armies conquered the rich Ukraine; Kiev, Odessa, Kharkov, Rostov-on-Don fell in rapid succession—just over the horizon lay the oil fields of the Caucasus and the Middle East. As the Red Armies retreated they left nothing for the conquerors, destroying industrial establishments, laying bare the countryside, and even blowing up the greatest material monument of the Soviet regime, the Dniepropetrovsk Dam. In the north German and Finnish forces closed in on Leningrad, major manufacturing center and base of the Russian Baltic fleet. The foes settled down to one of the greatest siege battles in history. The city held firm. The over-all picture presented the basic fact that the German attack had failed because of the Russian system of fighting in depth, which allowed great freedom of movement. The Red Army that faced the Germans had proved to be quite different from that which had been held at bay by the Finns two winters before. Nazi skill in the co-ordination of mechanized implements of war was matched by the Russians, and Soviet artillery proved the scourge of Hitler's legions. Losses of man
power were about evenly proportioned between the two opponents, but Germany could not hope to stand the bleeding that Russia was capable of taking in stride.

Once committed to a Russian war, Hitler could not stop halfway. If sudden and complete victory could not be obtained at every point along the 2000-mile front, then the obvious goal should be the definitive defeat of the Russians at some segment of that line. The capture of Moscow might yet bring about a collapse. Accordingly, most of the German mechanized strength, two-thirds of the Luftwaffe, and half of the infantry were concentrated for an all-out drive on Moscow. The gigantic operation got under way on October 1 over a 400-mile front west of the Russian capital. The German tactics actually took the forces of Hitler to within fifteen miles of Moscow, but did not achieve either of the original German objectives, the capture of the city and the trapping and annihilation of the Russian armies of the center. The Soviet government had removed hurriedly to Kuibishev east of the Volga; women and children had been evacuated from Moscow; and the Russian armies had been forced to evacuate thousands of square miles of territory—but the Soviet troops, fighting what they called the "Great Patriotic War," were still barring the way to their capital city, still confident, still refusing to be surrounded. The second great German offensive had fallen short of its goal. To make matters worse, Soviet Marshal Georgi Zhukov in December began a counteroffensive, relieving the pressure on Moscow, and forcing the commencement of a long and hard winter retreat by the German troops. The dreaded Moscovite winter, the insidious and deadly work of Russian guerrillas, Russian ingenuity in building impromptu defenses, the skillful use of Russian reserves, plus the fact that the Germans lacked the strength to press their initial advantages, all had contributed to the frustration of Hitler's grandiose dreams.

Yet their successful defense had cost the Russians dearly. Thousands upon thousands of troops had been lost, as had most of European Russia, and incalculable resources were wasted. As yet the aid flowing from Britain and the United States could not begin to compensate for these losses. But the Red Army by the close of 1941 had proved a match for the vaunted Wehrmacht. By the end of the year, too, the most powerful industrial nation in the world had entered the war on the side of Hitler's enemies.

When the German invasion of Poland lifted the curtain on World War II, the United States government declared its neutrality, the only policy feasible in the face of divided opinion at home. There
were few admirers of Nazi Germany in the country, but there were some statesmen and fewer private individuals who clearly saw the meaning of open war between Hitler and the Anglo-French democracies. Recollections of the unhappy outcome of American participation in a previous world war added to an earnest desire to avoid a second embroilment in a conflict which most Americans did not consider to be of concern to the Western Hemisphere. Presidential warnings that isolation in a global war was impossible were not taken seriously. Nor had Roosevelt won approval of his attempts before September, 1939, to amend American Neutrality Laws in order that the United States could throw its material support into the scales against an aggressor nation, despite the fact that he clearly indicated that strict observance of the Neutrality Laws might actually entail aid to an aggressor while denying it to the victim. On the very eve of war in Europe, American senators denied Roosevelt’s request for authority to aid the victim of aggression, and scoffed at the idea that war was imminent.

When war came, however, Roosevelt managed to induce Congress to alter the neutrality legislation sufficiently to permit the export of war goods to the belligerents on a cash-and-carry basis. Immediately Britain and France placed huge orders for munitions and weapons with American firms, and, despite a flurry of diplomatic fuss over the operation of the British navicert system which aimed at keeping cargoes out of the hands of the enemy, American policy toward the Allies gradually became one of all aid short of war.

The second official act of the United States which reflected the country’s determination to immunize itself against direct involvement was the conclusion on October 7, 1939, of an agreement with the other New World republics. This agreement proclaimed “sea-safety zones” around the Americas, into which the warcraft of belligerents were forbidden to enter. The Panama Declaration, as it was called, was not only a violation of accepted principles of international law, but it had the much graver shortcoming of being incapable of enforcement. Incursions into the safety-zone by belligerent ships brought protests from the Western Hemisphere which were abruptly rebuffed.

In retrospect the American policy seems to have been to remain neutral while putting the material resources of the country at the disposal of those fighting Hitler. The British navy controlled the Atlantic and the threat of Nazi penetration of the Western Hemisphere seemed remote. Meanwhile, the United States was gaining the time to put its own defenses in order. And since the American navy was not yet strong enough to defend both the Atlantic and Pacific
approaches to the New World, neutrality in the Atlantic area might serve to strengthen American policy in the Pacific. The whole policy, however, rested on two assumptions which were to prove erroneous in the extreme, namely, that the French Maginot Line and the British blockade would either wear out Germany or at least delay the Nazis until United States defense preparations were completed; and that Japanese aggression in the Far East could be prevented so long as the bulk of American naval strength was concentrated in the Pacific.

The military developments of 1940—the conquest of France, the entry of Italy into the war, the Battle of Britain—had important repercussions in the United States. Elimination of France and Holland and the concentration of British concern on the war in Europe opened enticing vistas of expansion for Japanese imperialists in the Far East. Vichy-French concessions to Japan in Indo-China and Britain's temporary closure of the Burma Road at Japan's behest aroused the American State Department to the fact that there was an integral relationship between the fortunes of war in western Europe and the role of the Japanese in the Far East. The implications of Axis victories for the United States were even more serious in the Atlantic area. Neither British supremacy on the seas nor French military domination in Europe had stood up to the impact of the Nazi Blitzkrieg. The extension of German control to the entire western coast-line of Europe spread the British navy so thin that little strength was left for patrolling the Atlantic; France, of course, had ceased to exist as a military force against Hitler. The conclusion was obvious: the United States could no longer afford the luxury of a leisurely preparation to defend itself.

On May 16 President Roosevelt conjured up the vision of Nazi attacks on America and called for fresh appropriations to increase defenses on land and sea and in the air. With a clear majority of the American people solidly behind the president's appeal, Congress quickly appropriated the sums requested. Additional requests for funds were matched by ready grants by Congress, and by the end of the year a total of seventy billion dollars had been appropriated—several times the cost of World War I. While the Nazis marched triumphantly into Paris, a selective service bill was introduced into Congress. Isolationist senators opened up a heavy barrage against what they deemed an unnecessary and dangerous measure. This opposition plus a still sincere desire to avoid war led to a presidential promise that the draftees would not be sent to participate in "European wars." In September the bill was passed with a one-year limita-

\footnote{See pages 540-541, above.}
tion of service and a prohibition of service outside the Western Hemisphere.

Direct diplomatic pressure was exerted on the belligerents with little effect. Early in 1940 President Roosevelt sent Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles to Europe for the purpose of discussing with the major Western powers "the present possibilities of concluding any just and permanent peace." Among other attempts to advance the cause of peace in Europe Welles urged upon Mussolini continued Italian neutrality and promised that Italy's legitimate aspirations would be considered at the peace table. The American envoy, however, was forbidden to offer specific proposals for the restoration of peace and his audience with Mussolini proved unfruitful when Il Duce declared war (June 10) on a defenseless France, a move Roosevelt promptly termed "a stab in the back." In mid-June, when Pétain was appealing to the Nazis for an end to hostilities, Anthony Biddle, then representing the United States, recommended to Pétain and French Admiral Darlan that the French fleet be dispersed at various points in the Mediterranean to avoid capture by the Nazis, a disposition agreed upon at the time of the armistice negotiations.

The conclusion of the military alliance between Japan, Germany, and Italy in September, 1940, underlined the direct threat to the United States, for the Soviet Union was explicitly excluded from the scope of the treaty. Obviously, if the United States took up arms against the Axis, then Japan could be expected to attack America from the rear. On the other hand, if an American-Japanese war eventuated the Nipponese could expect an Italo-German offensive against the United States. The Triple Alliance, therefore, meant that the United States would have to hold the bulk of its naval forces in the Pacific. The corollary was that America should also try to buttress British naval power in the Atlantic. Partly because of the pledge by Wendell Willkie, the Republican candidate for the presidency at the time, that aid to Britain short of war had his approval, President Roosevelt on September 3, 1940, transferred fifty "average" destroyers to Britain in exchange for eight naval bases on British territory in the Western Hemisphere. Substantial quantities of weapons, too, were released to the British to help compensate for the losses suffered during the disastrous campaign on the Continent.

Having won the election of 1940, Roosevelt stiffened his attitude toward the Axis, assuring Congress that his continuance in office connoted trenchant resistance to Axis victory. The world, he asserted, should be given certain basic freedoms, for without them the security and happiness of nations were impossible—freedom from want, freedom of worship, freedom of speech, freedom from war. A short time
later he proclaimed the United States "the arsenal of democracy" and asked the nation to give material assistance to states whose independence was considered necessary for the safety of the Republic itself.

Implementation of the idea was not long in coming. For in January, 1941, the American Congress was confronted with an administration proposal that the president be authorized to sell, transfer, lend, lease, or otherwise dispose of military supplies of all kinds to any country whose defense the president deemed vital to the protection of the United States. Repayment for the supplies could be made in cash or in any other manner approved by the chief executive. The Lend-Lease Bill, as it was called, was aimed primarily at helping Britain, but the provisions could be applied in such a manner that the United States could easily become an arsenal of world democracy. In London, of course, Winston Churchill hailed Lend-Lease as "a monument of generous and far-reaching statesmanship." Not all Americans agreed with the British leader.

In Congress friends of the bill claimed that it would help insure against American involvement in the war, whereas opponents of the measure argued that it would lead precisely to that unhappy predicament. For more than two months isolationists and those favoring aid to Britain debated, and finally the bill was enacted into law by comfortable majorities in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. The administration, now with an appropriation of seven billion dollars at its disposal, extended enormous credits to Britain. Munitions, raw materials, food, repair facilities in the United States for damaged British merchantmen and naval vessels, and many other goods and services were made available to the hard-pressed islanders.

By 1942 the stream of Lend-Lease goods moving across the Atlantic became a torrent. When German submarines threatened the eastbound merchantmen the United States promptly established "neutrality patrols" on the sea and in the air over the Atlantic to protect the Lend-Lease merchantmen, and when American ships were actually attacked by the U-boats Roosevelt ordered the American navy to shoot Axis craft on sight, an act which amounted to an undeclared naval war upon Germany and Italy. After the Nazis invaded Russia American supplies were shipped promptly to the Soviet Union, despite the long-standing antipathy of many Americans to the Communist way of life. Regardless of differing ideologies, the fight against Hitler and his allies provided one uniting purpose: defeat of the Axis. Lend-Lease assistance to the Red forces holding Hitler at bay aroused little opposition in the world's foremost capitalistic state.
In the meantime the alignment of the United States with the anti-Hitler forces found expression in a statement of general principles—the Atlantic Charter. In mid-August, 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill met aboard ship off the coast of Newfoundland, accompanied by their military and economic advisers. Plans for collaboration between the United States and Britain should the former become a full-fledged belligerent were apparently discussed, as well as aid to Britain and Russia and a policy to be pursued with Japan; but what the world heard was a statement of principles upon which the Anglo-Americans intended to base their anti-Axis actions in the future. The document, known as the Atlantic Charter, disclaimed all interest in territorial aggrandizement for Britain and the United States; it proclaimed Anglo-American desire to see "no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned"; and it assured the world that Englishmen and Americans respected the right of all peoples to select the form of government under which they will live. In the economic sphere, the Charter asserted that the two powers would try to equalize opportunities of all states in securing access to world trade and raw materials, a statement apparently intended as a reply to those who held that commercial rivalry and "have-not" status were proper inducements to conflict. Moreover, the Charter affirmed the principle of "freedom of the seas," denounced the use of force in the settlement of international issues, promised that after the aggressor nations had been overpowered and disarmed the United States and Great Britain would work toward lightening the armament burden, and even hinted at the establishment of "a wider and permanent system of security." Ten other Allied nations in all, the Soviet Union and nine governments in exile, promptly endorsed the Atlantic Charter. In principle, at any rate, the anti-Axis forces of the world had found a common platform, vague though it was.

While Roosevelt and Churchill conferred in Newfoundland Bight, the United States was girding itself for more direct involvement on the side of the British than sending Lend-Lease supplies. The Selective Service Act passed in the summer of 1940 was bringing the army up to fighting size, a "two-ocean navy" was under construction, and stockpiles of strategic raw materials were being accumulated. By the spring of 1941 American aircraft production was approaching the British and German output of 1500 planes a month; in July the first Flying Fortress—an American heavy bomber—reached Britain, as well as fighter craft. The gigantic steel companies of America were turning out nearly 80,000,000 tons of steel a year; shipyards were rapidly fabricating hundreds of merchant and naval vessels.

The shipping shortage was particularly serious despite United
States production of new bottoms. To help overcome this difficulty, vessels in United States ports belonging to Axis nationals or to countries that had been overrun by the Germans were commandeered. The Neutrality Law was further modified so as to permit the arming of American cargo carriers and their entry into certain maritime war zones and belligerent ports. American troops were dispatched to Greenland in April, 1941, and a short while later a force was sent to replace the British garrison in Iceland. In the undeclared war against Hitler the American president and Congress were taking advantage of every opportunity to check the Nazis short of actual conflict. America was neutral in name only.

Though American attention seemed to be riveted for the time being on the menace of the Nazis, Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull were fully aware of dangers even more immediate in the Pacific. Relations with Japan had occupied both Churchill and Roosevelt at the Atlantic Conference in July, 1941. The British prime minister had urged Roosevelt to join with him in flatly warning the Japanese that their aggressions in the Far East must stop, but the American president thought it best to stall off the Japanese for the time being in view of the unpreparedness of the British, Dutch, Australian, and American forces in the Far East. Roosevelt was making no concessions to Japanese aggression, but he did feel that time was needed to prepare for the showdown that all agreed was inevitable. He had his way, for before the Atlantic Conference disbanded it was agreed that the United States should take the lead in seeking a peaceful solution in the Pacific, while both Washington and London would let the Japanese know that further aggressions in the South Pacific would not be tolerated.

In the spring of 1941 the Japanese, through their newly appointed ambassador Nomura, proposed that the United States and Japan should share supremacy in the Pacific on the condition that the former recognize Japanese domination of China. Secretary Hull replied with a four-point counter-proposal: (1) that the status quo should be maintained, only with the consent of the people involved; (2) that the sovereignty of all nations, including China, be respected; (3) that there should be no interference in the domestic affairs of other nations; and (4) that commercial and cultural opportunities should be guaranteed to all on a basis of equality. The policies of the two countries were obviously poles apart, and the Hull-Nomura conversations ended temporarily. The United States was not willing to appease the Japanese, and the latter had no intention of giving up any gains thus far or even to refrain from new aggressions.

During July and August the proof of this became more unmistak-
able. When the Germans invaded Russia—a move that was really a double-cross of Japan—the Japanese expansionists concluded a fresh bargain with the Reich wherein the Japanese promised to repudiate their Nonaggression Pact with Russia sometime later and held out the bait to the Germans of future co-operation against the United States. In return Germany was to force Vichy France to consent to full occupation of Indo-China by Japan. The Japanese demands for occupation of Indo-China were shortly forthcoming, and Vichy, under pressure from Berlin, gave way. By July 29 more than 100,000 Japanese troops were in the French Far Eastern possession: Tokyo controlled all of the strategic bases in the central and southern provinces, as well as the important naval base of Cam Ranh. Indo-China was to pay the costs of occupation. The Japanese push to the south had begun.

The Government of the United States, along with the other Pacific powers, strongly protested the Japanese move and adopted precautionary measures. Japanese assets in the United States were frozen; General MacArthur was sent to the Philippines to take command of American and Filipino troops; United States marines and a number of gunboats in China were withdrawn and stationed at Manila; both the army and navy speeded up plans for defense in the Pacific. Obviously there was a very real fear in official circles in Washington that the crisis with Japan might break momentarily.

The very core of the antagonism between the United States and Japan, however, was the cleavage over China. The Americans not only refused to betray China, but insisted that Japan stop fighting Chiang Kai-shek, pull her armed forces home, and abide by the "Open Door" principle; Japan, on the other hand, insisted that she have a free hand in China and be allowed to mold the destinies of the East as she saw fit. In short, the Japanese claimed that they wanted to apply a "Monroe Doctrine" to the Far East. In the whole plan, China was the key. This was shown during the August crisis over the Indo-China affair. Admiral Nomura then proposed to Secretary Hull that in return for Japanese withdrawal from Indo-China the United States should force Chiang Kai-shek to accept a negotiated peace on Japanese terms. When Hull snubbed the proposal, Nomura then suggested that the Japanese prime minister, Prince Konoye, and President Roosevelt confer personally in order to arrive at a definitive solution of Japanese-American relations. At the time Roosevelt was secretly on his way to the Atlantic Conference, a fact which might indicate that the Japanese knew that their own policies were about to be discussed by their two foremost opponents. When advised of the Nomura suggestion, Roosevelt expressed a willingness
to meet with Prince Konoye provided there existed a sufficient pre-
liminary agreement on basic principles to make such a conference
worthwhile. These basic principles would involve a recognition by
Tokyo of the Hull Four-Point Program enunciated by the secretary
of state during the previous spring. Konoye replied that he sub-
scribed "fully" to these principles and then added so many qualifica-
tions and modifications that it was obvious that he did not do so at
all. The conference was still-born.

It seemed that a period had been put to Japanese-American nego-
tiations. Shortly after Konoye's rejection of the American statement
of basic policy in the Far East he was succeeded as premier by Gen-
eral Hideki Tojo, spokesman for the military extremists. Imme-
diately, the Japanese press assumed a more belligerent tone toward
the United States. On the other side of the Pacific American military
intelligence warned Washington officials of growing German pres-
sure on the Japanese to take action against their enemies in the Far
East. Philippine posts were reinforced, and the move to put Ameri-
can outposts in the Pacific on a full war footing was speeded up.
Meanwhile the diplomats prepared the way for the break.

In this atmosphere Tojo dispatched Saburu Kurusu to Washing-
ton to assist Admiral Nomura in creating what apparently was in-
tended to be a diplomatic smokescreen. Kurusu stated Japanese terms
for peace in the Orient to be: (a) the stopping of all American aid
to China, (b) the revocation of the freezing order against Japan,
(c) American supplies of oil to Japan, and (d) American aid to the
Japanese in gaining access to raw materials. Kurusu's quid pro quo
was a promise that Japan would not advance southward beyond Indo-
China. The American reply was not immediate, for Hull and Roose-
velt now wanted to "buy" a little more time in which to prepare for
war by relaxing the freezing order. Such a move, however, was vig-
orously opposed by the other ABCD powers (British, Chinese, and
Dutch), and the idea was consequently dropped. On November 26
Secretary Hull submitted his reply to the Kurusu "offer." The terms
of the proposal were hardly designed for Japanese acceptance. The
seven powers of the Pacific were to conclude a nonaggression treaty;
six of these (excluding Russia) were to agree to respect the integrity
of Indo-China; Japanese forces in both China and Indo-China were
to be withdrawn; both Washington and Tokyo were to renounce
extra-territorial rights in China, and, finally, commercial relations
between the two powers were to be renewed. While Kurusu with-
drew to the Japanese Embassy to formulate a diplomatic reply to
the American counterproposal, the ships and planes of the Mikado
were converging on America's great naval bastion at Pearl Harbor.
in Hawaii. The sequence of events on December 7, 1941, provides a curious commentary on the inscrutability of Japanese diplomacy.

Between the time the Japanese Embassy in Washington telephoned the State Department asking for an appointment for the delivery of Japan's answer to Hull's communication and the appearance—twenty minutes late—of Kurušu and Nomura at the offices of the secretary of state the naval radio at Hawaii announced a Japanese aerial attack on Pearl Harbor. In full knowledge of the Japanese blow, Hull read the contents of the Japanese note, which accused the United States of frustrating Japan's peaceful intentions at every turn. No diplomatic polish or obtuseness dulled the angry Hull's sharp reply to the two Japanese envoys before him: "In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions—and famous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them."

With only a single dissenting vote the Congress of the United States passed a declaration of war upon Imperial Japan (December 8). Three days later Hitler and Mussolini, for once in keeping with their alliance engagements, declared war on the United States. To the Reichstag Hitler shouted that "A historic revenge has been entrusted to us by the Creator, and we are now obliged to carry it out." In Washington the tone was one of grim determination. "We are now in this war," said President Roosevelt. "We are in it all the way. Every single man, woman, and child is a partner in the most tremendous undertaking of our American history." The losses at Pearl Harbor underlined the gravity of the situation, for the Pacific fleet had been completely crippled. At a cost of only five two-man submarines and twenty-eight aircraft the Japanese had caused 4500 American casualties, sunk five of eight battleships, a target ship, a minelayer, and a floating drydock. Three destroyers, the three other battleships in Pearl Harbor, cruisers, and several other ships suffered damages; 187 airplanes had been completely wrecked. It was a costly disaster for the United States, but all debate on war or peace had been cut short. The path was unerringly marked out for the North American colossus.

On New Year's Day, 1942, twenty-six powers signed the Declaration of Washington which obligated all members of the now United Nations to accept the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to conclude no separate peace, to prosecute the war with their respective enemies to a successful conclusion. Signatories included, besides the United States and Great Britain, the British Dominions, China, Russia, all
Central American Republics, Haiti, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic. Before the end of the year Mexico, the Philippine Commonwealth, and Brazil formally joined the original signatories. The other Latin American states, except Chile and Argentina, broke off relations with the Axis. The global strategy that was to defeat the Axis was thus given its political impetus.

The constellation of powers now directly committed to defeat of the Axis was huge indeed, but the task ahead was no less gigantic. Germany and Italy bestrode the European continent; the Soviet Union was holding out, but in dire straits; German submarines were sinking thousands of tons of war matériel destined for Britain and Russia; Japan was in a first-class defensive position in the Far East, thanks to her earlier aggressions, her powerful sea and air arms, and combat troops highly seasoned after several years of Chinese campaigning. In the struggle for the world that loomed ahead the United Nations needed all the courage and power of Britain's Royal Air Force, her gallant navy; of Russia's indomitable Red Army; but, most of all, the anti-Axis forces needed American reserves of energetic man power, American industrial and food-producing capacities, and American organizing genius, both at home and on the fighting front.
CHAPTER XXI

The Second World War: Defeat of the Totalitarians, 1942–1945

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE turning point in the struggle of the United Nations against the combined forces of Germany, Italy, and Japan occurred in 1942. The next three years saw the Axis powers almost literally wiped from the face of the earth. Beaten into abject ruin was the Nazi Reich, whose power had reached from the northern regions of the Scandinavian Peninsula to the desert sands of Africa, from the French Atlantic Coast to the Caucasus; its ally in Europe, Mussolini’s Italy, was eliminated early from the conflict and, before war’s end, even assumed the status of a “co-belligerent” on the Allied side; in the Far East the Japanese Empire, bloated by successful aggression, extended from the Aleutians to the South Pacific Islands, and to the border of India, but by the end of the war the Nipponese had been stripped of their fabulous empire and forced back upon their homeland. Not only territorially but in other ways as well, the Axis aggressors were brought low. The German Wehrmacht was utterly shattered, the Luftwaffe was beaten to earth, the Führer was forced to take his own life, and his henchmen were captured or killed. Mussolini was executed by anti-Fascist Italians, and his African empire was completely dissipated. Japan lost her once great navy, her troops were left stranded on Pacific outposts, her cities were pulverized by American bombs, and an all-consuming horror had been struck into Nipponese hearts by the visitation of the most fiendish weapon yet contrived by man, the atomic bomb. The annals of history know no
defeat so decisive as that which brought the Axis powers under the
heel of the United Nations.

Directly responsible for this collapse of once mighty empires was
a war-born alliance between two great camps of power: the nations
of the West, led by the Americans and British, and the Union of
Socialist Soviet Republics. The former won the Battle of the Atlantic
against the German U-boat menace, swept the Mediterranean and
North Africa free of Axis forces, invaded and forced Italy into capitula-
tion, freed France and the Low Countries, conquered southern and
western Germany, bolstered China in her long struggle with Nippon,
and struck down the Japanese Empire in the Pacific. The Russian
colossus, with the help of great quantities of munitions and supplies
from the West, pushed the Nazis back to the Elbe and the Danube,
and then compelled the Japanese surrender on the Asiatic mainland.
Neither side alone, perhaps, could have achieved victory unaided by
the other.

The pattern of the Allied triumph was a complicated one, but the
key to victory was the superior organization of the United Nations
war effort. Within a month of Pearl Harbor the decision was made at
Washington to co-ordinate the activities of the British and American
forces under a single command, the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Im-
portant, too, was the resolve made at the same time that the Anglo-
American war effort should be directed principally against Germany
as the closer and stronger enemy. Despite a popular clamor in the
United States for a quick American revenge on Japan rather than a
coalition war against all the Axis forces, Washington recognized the
wisdom of dealing first with the Nazi enemy. Moreover, since the
Russians at the time were bearing the brunt of Wehrmacht offensives,
direct aid to the Soviet Union became an essential part of the Allied
strategy. Rather than preparing immediately an assault on Hitler’s
Festung Europa from the West, therefore, the Anglo-Americans con-
centrated on funneling munitions and supplies to the Red armies
through the Arctic approaches and Iran.

The strategy of the anti-Axis leaders during the year following
Pearl Harbor was essentially one of defense. It could hardly have
been otherwise, for the Germans and Japanese still held the initia-
tive; both were fighting on interior lines, while the over-water supply
lines of their enemies were several times as long as the predominantly
overland supply routes of the Axis powers. Axis aircraft and sub-
marines, consequently, attempted to sever these vulnerable arteries
of the United Nations, a task made far easier by the necessary shift
of American naval strength to the Pacific.

Concentration on the maintenance of Allied supply lines, too,
The Second World War: Defeat

plains in large part why the Japanese were allowed to advance their conquests in the Far East almost without hindrance. They moved quickly through the Gilbert and Solomon Islands, New Guinea, and the East Indies; they surrounded Burma and the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal; they isolated China and invaded India. The Japanese advances were matched by renewed Axis offensives during 1942 in Europe and North Africa, for Germany began her great advance toward the Volga and her desert-war expert, Field Marshal Rommel, made his last but dangerous stab toward the Nile and the Suez. During the year, too, Allied shipping losses mounted as German and Japanese forces converged toward the Middle East. If Japan and the Reich had co-ordinated their offensives with a view to joining hands in the Middle East, the Allied cause might well have suffered irreparable damage, for a Japanese severance of the tenuous Allied supply lines in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf would have rendered defense of Egypt unfeasible and the retention of Stalingrad by the Russians impossible. But American acquisition of stepping stones to Australia and the British occupation of Madagascar persuaded the Japanese to confine their interest to the American and Australian sectors of the Pacific front, a decision which led them to the Aleutians and the Solomons, but also to naval defeat off Midway Island in June, 1942. American counteroffensives on Guadalcanal and New Guinea were quickly forthcoming, and by the time the Japanese were contained within their area of Pacific Ocean expansion, the Middle East had been secured against the Axis menace. The chance for a coordinated German and Japanese attack in this vital area was gone completely—and with it doubtless went the possibility of Axis victory.

Pearl Harbor was only the beginning of the Japanese drive into the South Pacific area. Island after island fell before the ably led, fiercely fighting soldiers of the Rising Sun. Hong Kong, British bastion in South China, fell on Christmas Day, 1941. The Philippines, manned by poorly trained Filipino militia and ill-equipped Americans, put up a stout resistance to the invaders but had to be surrendered after an heroic struggle on Bataan and the fortress island of Corregidor in Manila Bay. While General Jonathan Wainwright discussed surrender terms with the conquerors, General Douglas MacArthur was establishing headquarters in Australia, from which he vowed to return to the Philippines. Thailand (Siam) yielded to the Japanese after a few hours of token resistance, and the Japanese moved on down through the Malay Peninsula. On February 15, 1942, the formidable British naval base of Singapore, long reputed to be
invulnerable, capitulated to the Nipponese. In Burma British troops were forced to evacuate, thus allowing the Japanese to seal off the Burma Road over which supplies had been transported to Chiang Kai-shek. Even Ceylon came under attack by Japanese sea and air forces, and India was threatened. The menace to Britain’s “Jewel of the Empire” brought a promise from London that the Indians could have eventual dominion status and even decide in the future what their relations with other member states of the Commonwealth should be. When both Hindu and Moslem leaders, however, refused to be cajoled into active support of Britain’s efforts against Japan the British once more resorted to repression.

Australia, too, faced the danger of invasion. Nipponese airplanes bombed several points on the north coast. In this extremity, the Australian Imperial Forces that had been fighting in the Middle East were hastily brought home and convoys of American troops were rushed to east-coast Australian ports. Only Japanese defeat at sea by American naval forces, under the command of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, decisively relieved the threat. In the Battle of the Coral Sea a Japanese naval expedition, steaming toward southern New Guinea, was frustrated by United States navy airplanes. In June another Nipponese task force en route to Midway Island was discovered. Again opposing surface units scarcely saw each other, but the battle in the skies between American and Japanese fighting airplanes cost the Nipponese so many carriers that they called off their whole venture. North America, too, was threatened by a bold Japanese occupation of the westernmost islands of the Aleutian Archipelago, though insufficient reinforcement of the garrisons there rendered further advance impossible.

The major land fighting of the year in the Far East was in the Solomons, where Japanese and Americans slugged it out to decide just how far south the former were to go. These islands had been occupied early in the Nipponese drive, but in August, 1942, United States marines landed on various islands and after bloody fighting captured Henderson airfield on Guadalcanal, from which the enemy had hoped to mount bombing missions against Australia. Repeated attacks by Japanese forces failed to dislodge the Americans, who were reinforced by Australians. Until the final year of the war Australian and American troops fought off enemy attempts to break through this southern barrier to Australia and lower New Guinea. The Japanese tide was checked in 1942, but it had taken a full six months for the Allies to reconquer but a small fraction of what the enemy had won in less than half the time. The war in the Pacific promised to be a long, hard struggle carried forward at a snail’s pace.
If 1942 was a crucial period in the Pacific war it was no less momentous in the European theater. Throughout the early months of the year the Red Army chewed into the long German lines extending from Leningrad to the Crimean Peninsula, aided by fierce guerrillas and a winter that brought horrible suffering to the ill-prepared Wehrmacht. When spring came, however, the German armies moved eastward once more, striking at the Crimea and capturing Sebastopol after an heroic resistance by the Russian garrison. Then a drive against the center of the Russian lines which aimed at outflanking Moscow began, but the Russian troops held firm once more. The offensive here was halted in July. The second major offensive of the summer was more successful, for the Nazi troops crossed the Don and swept into Rostov. From here the German forces were split, with one group bearing down on Stalingrad on the lower Volga, and the other speeding toward the Caucasus and the vital Soviet oilfields. The oil-rich territory around Maikop fell to the Nazis, but the drive on the still better developed section at Grozny, on the northern edge of the Caucasus, failed.

At Stalingrad was fought an epic battle that can only be compared to the siege of Verdun in World War I. The city was a highly important industrial center, poorly located for defense, since it sprawled out for thirty miles or more and backed upon the Volga, over which Russian troops and supplies had to be ferried. In August the Germans began their third and final lunge upon Stalingrad which within two weeks carried them to the edge of the city. The greatest siege battle of the war had begun. Before the battle was a week old more than half of Stalingrad was flattened by heavy bombs and artillery fire. With all the skill and resources at their command the Nazis pounded away at what was left of the city, and during September and October and on into November they managed to occupy most of the beleaguered town. Tank and infantry divisions were thrown into the struggle by the German commanders, but the Red Army, with the help of civilian workers, nurses, and even housewives, fought them every inch of the way from behind great rubble barricades, from the cellars of bombed-out buildings, in the alleys, from house to house, and from room to room. The once attractive city was turned into a huge cemetery of rotting corpses, wrecked tanks, shattered buildings. Over the weeks, the German war machine wore itself out against the grim Soviet resistance.

The Russians were not content merely to deny Stalingrad to the Germans, for from outside on November 19 came relieving Soviet armies which drove the invaders from the city, cutting down German, Italian, and Rumanian divisions like wheat before the scythe.
By February 2, 1943, 330,000 Nazis and their allies were completely surrounded and their commanders had no choice but to surrender. Tons upon tons of equipment fell to the Red armies. One of the most decisive battles of the war came to an end. It was the worst defeat yet recorded for German arms. In Germany four days of public mourning were decreed by the Führer. Stalingrad was a great disillusionment to the German people, who had considered the Wehrmacht impossible to stop; it was also a warning that if Aryan "supermen" faltered now the Fatherland would surely be inundated by " Asiatic vandalism." In Russia an invincible offensive spirit took hold of the Soviet Union's peoples.

Soviet leadership had not been certain during the spring and summer of 1942 that the Germans could be successfully resisted, for Marshal Stalin openly agreed with those in the United States and Britain who were clamoring for a second front, i.e., an Allied invasion of western Europe. Stalin criticized the Allies for restricting their operations against Hitler to mass bombings of German industries, which had no apparent deterrent effect on the German hordes lunging eastward. Allied leaders, though unconvinced that their preparations thus far warranted an assault on the Continent, were at least willing to test the Nazi coastal defenses. Accordingly, a contingent of Canadians and British, plus a small detachment of American Rangers, put ashore at Dieppe on August 19 under a strong Allied air umbrella. For a few hours the invaders clung to their toehold, but the German defenses forced them back. All equipment had to be left behind, as well as the bodies of several hundred Allied troops. The fiasco—it can hardly be termed anything else in view of the utter waste of man power and equipment involved—had at least the effect of silencing the cries for a second front. Stalin was far from convinced, however, and continued to complain that the Red armies were shoulder- ing most of the weight of the war against Hitler.

Considerable aid was getting through to Russia, Stalin's laments notwithstanding. From British ports to Archangel and Murmansk war supplies moved steadily in huge convoys through icebergs, Luftwaffe attacks, and submarine hunting grounds. Through Persia, too, British and American supplies poured into Russia after being hauled almost halfway around the globe. Vehicles, foodstuffs, munitions, airplanes, and tanks were dumped on the docks at Iranian ports, whence they were transported hundreds of miles overland or across the Caspian Sea to their Soviet destination. Important as this material aid was to the Russians, even more vital to the success of Soviet counteroffensives was the fact that the Germans were being compelled to send reinforcements to their desert legions under Marshal
Rommel, who was being hard pressed by an Allied advance in North Africa.

The early weeks of 1942 saw the brilliant Rommel open an offensive against the British forces in Tripolitania. For months a fast-paced, mechanized pursuit of the Imperials continued until the British managed to dig in just sixty-five miles from Alexandria at El Alamein. Thus within easy striking distance of the Suez Canal, Rommel was held at bay. If he had been given a half-dozen new divisions for the final punch the Nazis might easily have attained their Middle East objectives. But the British retreat had shortened their supply lines, over which now came a mounting bulk of matériel. Two capable British generals were put in charge, Bernard Montgomery and Harold Alexander, the former perhaps the most brilliant, if not the most personally attractive, British commander of World War II. By October 23, 1942, the British forces were sufficiently reinforced and equipped to assume the offensive. Rommel’s Afrika Korps fell back before the sheer weight of the British attack. Far to the Germans’ rear the Royal Navy and the R.A.F. played havoc with Nazi coastal positions and Axis supply vessels. The British army traveled 1350 miles, driving the enemy back upon Tunisia. This gratifying success coincided with the Russian victory at Stalingrad and the American occupation of Guadalcanal; the beginning of the end of the Axis seemed to be at hand.

At the other end of the Mediterranean a gigantic Anglo-American amphibious invasion struck the coast of French North Africa at several points. More than 800 warships and transports comprised the armada that unloaded guns and troops at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers. Under the command of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the invaders quickly subdued the token Vichy French resistance and drove upon Tunis. On November 11, the supreme commander of the French forces in North Africa, Admiral Darlan, ordered cessation of all French resistance and a few days later entered into a de facto war alliance with the Anglo-Americans. While Allied spearheads thrust eastward along the Algerian coast, Darlan was named administrative head of occupied French Africa by the Allies. The admiral’s Vichyite background, as well as his well-known Anglophobia, provoked a storm of protest over the selection, a clamor that was stilled only by the assassination of Darlan on Christmas Eve of 1942.

The Allied collaboration with Darlan requires a word of explanation, for on the surface it appeared to be a direct betrayal of General de Gaulle, the man who was the recognized head of Free French—and anti-Nazi—forces. It seemed to smack, moreover, of traffic with the puppet Vichyites. The original Allied plan envisaged the consoli-
dation of the Moroccan and Algerian French under the leadership of General Henri Giraud, a gallant and picturesque French soldier, untainted by Vichy connections, though somewhat lacking in political sagacity. But when Eisenhower learned that obedience to a cease-fire order could be obtained, not by Giraud, but by Darlan, Pétain's right-hand man, there was actually no choice left to the American commander unless he wanted a full-scale war with the Vichy French in North Africa. As it turned out, Darlan delivered North Africa to the Allies, Pétain disavowed the acts of his subordinate, and American diplomatic relations with Vichy were ruptured. What was more important, thousands of British and American lives had been spared. Giraud was named to succeed Darlan when the latter met his death, but this selection, like that of the Vichy admiral, antagonized General de Gaulle, who felt that he alone deserved the nomination. Little by little de Gaulle was to crowd Giraud out of the picture and finally win recognition as supreme leader of all Frenchmen abroad.

In the meantime Hitler reacted quickly and violently to these North African developments. The Germans occupied all of metropolitan France, including Corsica, though French warships in Toulon were denied the Nazis when their crew scuttled the lot. German reinforcements, too, were dispatched across the Mediterranean to the Axis forces in Tunisia, and a long, bitterly fought campaign began in the mountains. From the east came Montgomery's fighters, now nearing the end of their long push across North Africa; from the west struggled the Anglo-American armies of Eisenhower. The pincers were not closed immediately, for the battle for Tunisia did not end until the middle of May, 1943. The victorious Allies then bombarded Pantelleria into submission, thus opening up a path for Allied shipping through the Middle Sea. The "soft underbelly" of the Axis, in Churchill's pungent phrase, was ready to be punctured. Allied prestige soared in Spain, Turkey, the Balkans, and the Arab states of the Middle East. In Italy, Mussolini's Roman legions apathetically prepared to withstand invasion.

On the sea the struggle continued unabated in 1942, though not so spectacularly as the land fighting. In February the Nazi warships, Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, and Prinz Eugen, slipped out of hiding at Brest and, under a protective cover of Luftwaffe fighters, made their way through the English Channel and the North Sea and into the Baltic. This daring defiance of the R.A.F. and the Royal Navy, plus the news that Singapore had fallen, provoked much criticism by the British public, so much that Winston Churchill staged a cabinet shake-up and brought in some new and more vigorous blood.

The German submarine campaign was continuing at a terrific
pace, with something over 500 U-boats roaming the sea-lanes searching for Allied prey. Allied convoys now found themselves under attack, not by one or two U-boats, but by “wolf-packs” of a dozen or more, which suddenly appeared in the center of a convoy, let loose with torpedoes in all directions, and then made off at about surface speed. These tactics were paying off, for over six million tons of Allied shipping were sunk during 1942, the peak coming in November. To answer the challenge presented by the submarines, American shipyards, using assembly-line techniques, began turning out merchant vessels and light naval ships at a tremendous rate. American naval units, too, began to provide aircraft patrols over the sea-lanes and to use escorts to protect convoys. Escort carriers, merchantmen with a flight deck built on, became common convoy guards. Sonar buoys, magnetic detectors, radar—all were now used to insure the passage of men and matériel across the seven seas. The Royal Navy patrolled 80,000 miles of seaways, protected convoys, and kept Axis Europe blockaded as well. Dozens of naval engagements were fought, to say nothing of encounters with submarines. Until America’s two-ocean navy appeared the British carried the workload in the Atlantic and they did an excellent job.

In the air the Allied strategy seemed to be aimed at drawing off German airplanes from the Russian theater and smashing industrial objectives and U-boat bases in Axis Europe. Thousand-bomber raids now became common. In May, 1942, Cologne was wrecked by such a foray. Essen, Bremen, and other German cities received the same treatment in turn. On Independence Day, 1942, American airmen made their first flights over Nazi-held Europe. The Nazis retaliated, of course, but the German Luftwaffe restricted itself largely to sneak attacks on British seaports, doing slight damage.

In the Pacific theater of the war, 1943 was a relatively quiet one, for it was a time when the American navy was gathering its strength for the great campaigns of the following year. Growing superiority in the air enabled the United States to expel the Japanese from a few strategic points while ground forces cleared the enemy out of eastern New Guinea, New Georgia, Bougainville, and most of the Solomon Archipelago. In May American troops, as a result of growing naval power, were able to drive the Japanese from the western islets of the Aleutians, an accomplishment which made feasible bombing raids against the neighboring Japanese-held Kuriles. In the central Pacific, the Gilberts came under attack, with American operations focusing on the tiny island of Tarawa, which was captured after one of the bloodiest battles of the Pacific war. The dearly bought chunk of coral reef was to prove a handy base for bombing opera-
tions against the Nipponese homeland, to say nothing of providing lessons in the technique of amphibious assault. On the Asiatic mainland, Japanese and Russian armies remained on the alert against each other in Manchuria. Neither power was taking any chances on a stab in the back. The fact that fear was mutual probably accounts for the renewal of a prewar treaty granting Japanese fishing rights in Siberia and for the fact that the Japanese navy allowed small shipments of Lend-Lease supplies to be hauled from the United States to Vladivostok in Soviet ships.

Meanwhile, the Allies were preparing the assault on Italy from North Africa. Mass strikes of workers in the northern industrial cities of Italy and bickering among the top men of Fascism reflected Italian nervousness at the prospect. Mussolini clamped down hard on insubordination among his henchmen and defiantly assumed an en garde position toward the threat from the south. He did not have long to wait, for on July 9, 1943, an Allied amphibious expedition of some 3000 ships left Africa’s shores. On the beaches of Sicily the Allied troops met surprisingly little resistance, and within a matter of days the entire island was occupied, putting the Allied air forces within easy striking distance of Axis targets on the peninsula. When Mussolini, long subservient to his fellow dictator in Berlin, was told that the Germans were in no position to increase their aid to Italy, the Fascist Grand Council deposed and arrested Il Duce. The backsliders were robbed of their prey, however, when Nazi parachutists boldly snatched Mussolini from under their noses, transported him to northern Italy, where he proclaimed a “Fascist Republic” and assured his benefactors that he intended to carry on the war to the bitter end.

Il Duce’s German sponsors, not relying too heavily on Mussolini’s belligerent utterances, established General Kesselring as commander of military operations and governmental affairs in the central sector of the peninsula, while Rommel took over in the north. In Rome, however, King Victor Emmanuel III was vested with supreme authority by the Fascist revolutionaries, and Marshal Badoglio assumed Mussolini’s position. With the king’s approval Badoglio secretly negotiated with the Allies for an armistice and, on September 3, 1943, the agreement was published. The surrender was unconditional, though for reasons of military security the conditions of the armistice were not divulged. Italian soldiers received orders to turn in their arms, the remnants of the Italian fleet, merchant marine, and air force were surrendered to the Allies. Until the Allies had captured Rome, an anti-Fascist ministry would provide the interim authority. Fascist institutions and personnel were eliminated. Before long the
Badoglio Ministry declared itself a “co-belligerent” by going to war with Germany. The quick drive into Rome anticipated by Allied leaders and peoples failed to materialize; however, because of a sturdy German defensive action. Anglo-American troops early in September gained a foothold on the peninsula and proceeded northward, but when the Germans proved capable of slowing the Allied march to a crawl, an American thrust in the rear at Salerno was attempted. Only by dint of heavy naval support did the Americans manage to cling to their beachhead. British troops entered Naples on September 30, Sardinia and Corsica were captured, but progress northward was dishearteningly slowed down by thirty-five Nazi divisions and formidable natural obstacles. Axis Europe’s underbelly was proving not so soft as Churchill had opined.

The turning of the tide in favor of the Allies was evident, too, in the developments on the sea and in the air. Early in 1943 Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz, a veteran submariner and originator of the U-boat wolf-pack strategy, was named head of the German naval forces. His advent marked an immediate stepping up of the U-boat campaign. Within three months sinkings touched a new high. Gradually, however, Allied technical superiority made itself felt. Greater numbers of patrol craft assigned to convoy duty, the more intensive use of airplanes against submarines, and many new and ingenious anti-submarine devices decisively broke the U-boat menace. During the last three months of 1943 more German submarines were sunk than Allied merchantmen. Ship losses for the year as a whole were only two-fifths of the preceding year. As a token of Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic, a British squadron caught the German battleship Scharnhorst trying to destroy a convoy en route to Russia and sent her to the bottom. Command of the seas had been fully regained by the Anglo-American naval forces.

Bombing attacks on the Reich attained such proportions during 1943 that many air enthusiasts predicted that bombing alone would bring Germany to her knees. Round-the-clock operations, made possible by close Anglo-American air force co-operation, pummeled the vital war industries of the Ruhr Valley time and again, Berlin being eliminated piecemeal, and other major German centers taking devastating punishment. Germany was being slowly pulverized by these saturation raids. Military reverses in Russia, Africa, and Italy, and the failure of the U-boat campaign did nothing to ameliorate the heavy gloom that was descending upon the German home front. Hungry, poorly clothed, inadequately housed Germans were beginning to question the promises of their leaders. Not even the Führer’s reiteration of the dire consequences of defeat—annihilation pure and
simple—was enough to pierce the despondency of the "Aryan supermen."

In Russia the year was one of almost unremitting military gains by the Red Army. Leningrad's blockade was broken early in the year, though the siege was not lifted; Kharkov, a Nazi keypoint, was recovered a month later. An abortive offensive was undertaken by the bleeding German armies in July but met with a Russian resistance that soon turned into a counterattack. By Christmas the Red armies had liberated about two-thirds of the territory once held by the Nazis and were beginning another winter offensive. Slowly, but in good order and with apparently unimpaired morale, the German forces retreated before the twin furies of a Russian winter and a numerically superior Red Army.

Russian military successes went hand in hand with the appearance of a new political attitude toward the rest of Europe on the part of the Soviet leaders. Jan Christian Smuts, the South African statesman, had characterized the Soviet Union as "a colossus bestriding the Continent," and many in England and the United States were beginning to wonder whether the massive Soviet power was about to be used for imperial conquests or perhaps for securing "strategic frontiers" against possible invasion in the future. The coincidence of Soviet military gains on the one hand with certain Soviet pronouncements concerning Russian territorial intentions on the other hand was certainly suggestive. Early in 1943, after the Stalingrad victory, the Soviet Union put forward claims to Bessarabia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, which had been annexed in 1940 when Moscow and Berlin were still at peace. In London and Washington these claims met with a cool reception, and Polish Premier-in-Exile Sikorski inveighed loudly against Russian designs on eastern Poland, the Soviet's share of the spoils gained from the 1939 partition. In April, 1943, Moscow severed diplomatic relations with the London Poles and established an organization of Polish Communists in the Soviet capital in opposition to the London group. This break in the solidarity of the United Nations gave further stimulus to rumors that Russia might be considering a separate peace with Germany. However, Allied victory in Tunisia in May and the strategic decisions reached at the Roosevelt-Churchill conference in the same month laid the specter. The inclusion of the Soviet Union among the powers to whom Italy surrendered further cleared the political atmosphere.

The year 1943 was also one of conferences among the Allied leaders, the purpose of which was to unravel the tangled problems connected with co-ordination of the military effort against the Axis and with the drafting of a rough plan for the construction of a durable world
peace after victory. In January, 1943, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and their advisers conferred at Casablanca in French Morocco on plans for the tasks that lay ahead. Understanding was attained and it was announced that unconditional surrender of the Axis would be the only terms upon which the Western nations would conclude an armistice. Stalin, who was invited to the conference but begged off on the grounds that military affairs at home made it impossible for him to leave Russia, endorsed the unconditional surrender formula.

In recognition of the fact that the reconstruction of Europe after victory would be almost as big a task as attaining victory itself, a conference of Allied specialists on food and agriculture was held at Hot Springs, Virginia, in May, 1943. The upshot of this meeting was a vague understanding to work for higher dietary standards for the peoples of the United Nations and to give economic aid to farmers and peasants. Forty-four nations, including the Soviet Union, participated in the conference. Much more urgent, though, was the problem of how to provide food, clothing, medical care, seeds, tools, livestock, and the like for postwar populations, as well as how to care for the displaced persons of Europe, men, women, and children driven and torn from their homes by the German war machine and German war industries which demanded a never ending influx of labor. The Allied answer to these problems was the convocation of a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (U.N.R.R.A.) at Atlantic City, New Jersey, in November. Special committees were established to take up particular aspects of the whole problem of relief and rehabilitation, such as food, public health, shipping, etc. The former governor of New York, Herbert H. Lehman, was named head of the new organization. Activities of U.N.R.R.A. were to be financed out of fixed levies on member states whose soil had not been invaded, while those which had been invaded were expected to do what they could to sustain their own populations. The principle was that of helping the liberated peoples to help themselves, and under no circumstances was the U.N.R.R.A. administration to enter a country unless invited to do so by the government; nor were its agents to meddle in the internal politics of any country they were aiding.

Several conferences were held, too, which had a direct bearing on the more immediate problems of political and military co-operation among the Allies. In August, Roosevelt and Churchill met at Quebec, at which time the two leaders and their military advisers refined plans for the prosecution of the war against Japan and for an assault on Hitler's Atlantic Wall. Stalin was again absent, allegedly because the
conference concerned Japan, with whom the Soviet Union was not yet at war. Solidarity of the Big Three, however, was soon demonstrated in October when the foreign ministers of the triumvirate, Cordell Hull, Anthony Eden, and Molotov, conferred in Moscow. It was the first political conference of the Big Three, and it produced a whole series of agreements and understandings. The outstanding accomplishment of the foreign ministers' gathering was a mutual pledge to continue the Grand Alliance after the war in order to attain international peace and security. Specifically, it was stated that the international organization after the war would be based on the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states and would be open to membership of all such states for the maintenance of peace and security. The Four-Power Declaration—the Chinese ambassador in Moscow also affixed his signature—stated that the United States, Russia, Britain, and China would continue hostilities against the Axis powers “with which they are respectively at war until such powers laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender.” On three points of common concern, Italy, Austria, and war criminals of enemy countries, the Allied statesmen at Moscow made definite commitments. In Italy fascism was to be destroyed completely, a democratic regime established, and an advisory council on Italian affairs, consisting of representatives of the Big Three, of General de Gaulle’s Free French, of Greece, and of Yugoslavia, would be set up. Austria was to regain her freedom and independence. Major Nazi war criminals would “be punished by the joint decision” of the Allied governments. The Moscow Conference was hailed in the Allied world as a great step forward, and well it might be, for the growing suspicion and mistrust between Russia and the West had been dissipated, the United Nations were assured of an effective military co-operation among the Big Three in the fight against Hitler, and, most important of all, the text of the Four-Power Declaration provided the seed of the United Nations organization in the postwar world.

While the Allied nations were still jubilant over the Moscow manifestation of solidarity, Roosevelt and Churchill conferred at Cairo with Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on the war and the peace in the Orient. The Anglo-American leaders were convinced that the Chinese, long virtually isolated from their Western allies, should receive prompt and considerable aid. China, furthermore, should recover Manchuria and Formosa, and Korea “in due course” would regain her independence. As for Japan, the Mikado’s empire was to be stripped of all Pacific islands seized or occupied since 1914, and all territories it had taken from the Chinese. It was at this con-
ference, too, that a vague understanding was reached that Russia should acquire the Kuriles and the southern part of Sakhalin Island, while the Japanese-mandated islands of the central Pacific would be turned over to the United States.

From Cairo, Churchill and Roosevelt moved on to Teheran, capital of Iran. Here was held the first personal meeting of the Big Three leaders. After cordial conversations lasting from November 29 to December 1, the policymakers issued a communiqué which marked the political turning point of the war. Little that was new was added to the understandings that had been achieved at Moscow, but the Teheran Declaration was important for the high degree of solidarity it attested. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin declared that "victory will be ours," and that complete agreement had been reached "as to the scope and timing of the operations to be undertaken from the east, west, and south." They affirmed their desire for a "world family of Democratic Nations," and promised to seek the help of all freedom-loving states in the elimination of "tyranny, slavery, oppression, and intolerance."

Though much of what happened at Teheran still remains obscure, subsequent revelations were extremely enlightening. At war's end it became known that Stalin at Teheran had promised that Russia would wage war on Japan as soon as a decision had been forced against Germany. From Teheran, too, dates the United Nations' decision that the Anglo-American and Red armies should fight through to total victory over the Nazis. It would seem that to win Stalin's approval of these ambitious plans Roosevelt and Churchill had to accord him a virtually free hand in settling political relations with Poland, Finland, and, by implication at least, the Balkan states. In short, at Teheran was laid the first stone in the structure of a "Soviet Security Zone" from the Baltic to the Adriatic. There were some misgivings, no doubt, on the part of the West concerning the concessions made to Russia, but the hard fact remained that the Western Allies needed the Soviet Union far more than the Russians, now winning their war against the Germans, needed the West. If the Allied leaders of the West wanted to make good on their promise to win an unconditional surrender from the Reich, an alliance with the Soviet Union was absolutely essential. But the price was high. Churchill had many misgivings, but Roosevelt apparently felt that if the Soviet colossus could be brought into a peaceful postwar family of nations, concessions now might induce the men in the Kremlin to co-operate with the West on the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Until the end of the shooting war, however, there was no indication that Roosevelt was unjustifiably optimistic. The most important and immediate
problem facing all the anti-Axis forces at the time of the Teheran conversations was winning the war.

The Moscow, Cairo, and Teheran conferences shaped the political framework for the prosecution of the war during the fateful year of 1944. The preceding two years had established the military pattern of the Allied march to victory as well. In the Pacific, the Americans and Australians kept up an irresistible, though time-consuming, pressure on the Japanese; in Europe the Russians and the Western Allies converged upon Nazi Germany; superior Allied air and sea power ceaselessly pounded Axis Europe and maintained Allied supply lines as well as the blockade of the Continent; and, finally, the Allies planned for reconstruction and peace in the postwar world.

Both military and political events of the early months of 1944 reflected the decisions of the previous Big Three conferences. Late in December General Dwight D. Eisenhower was replaced as Commander in the Mediterranean by Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, and departed for London, where, as Supreme Allied Commander, he began the organization of huge invasion forces to be thrown against Hitler's Festung Europa. In relation to the Soviet Union, several developments showed how the winds were blowing in the realm of high politics. Eduard Beneš, president of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London, concluded on December 12 a twenty-year alliance treaty with Moscow, an early step in the Soviet Government's realization of a ring of "friendly governments" in central-eastern Europe. The Polish tangle, too, was further snarled by the advance of the Red Army's winter offensive into eastern Poland, territory annexed by Russia in the 1939 partition agreement with Germany. The 1939 annexation, the recent severance of diplomatic relations with the Polish government in London, and the reoccupation of eastern Poland spelled Moscow's snubbing of the London Poles' protests against Soviet reaffirmation of the right of conquest. On January 11 a Russian declaration offered minor rectifications of the Ribbentrop-Molotov frontier of 1939 in Poland's favor and expressed the Kremlin's desire for "a strong and independent Poland." But the London Poles were not considered capable of establishing friendly relations with Moscow or of organizing "an active struggle against the German invaders of Poland." Therefore, the proposals of the Soviet Government were made to "the Polish people." When the London Poles appealed to the United States and Great Britain to aid them in organizing a four-power conference to settle once and for all the Polish boundary question, Moscow rejected the suggestion and turned its attention to developing the Union of Polish Patriots, a Moscow committee of Polish Communists that propagated for a
new "People's Poland" linked in alliance with Russia. From that
group a new Polish Government eventually emerged, first at Lublin
and later in Warsaw.

In the Pacific theater of the war the time was drawing near when
American experience gained in the leap-frog advances of 1942–1943
and American naval power would make stupendous advances feasible.
The Japanese-held Marshall Islands came under heavy aerial attack
at the end of 1943. In February, 1944, the first piece of Japanese-
owned territory fell to the Allies when Kwajalein, Nipponese naval
base in the heart of the Marshalls, was carried by the American assa-
sault forces of Admiral Nimitz. During the spring and summer the
next major Pacific objectives, Japanese strongholds in the Marianas,
Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, were taken, though not without heavy
fighting and appalling casualties to the attackers. From Saipan in
November, Superfortresses, the giant new American heavy bombers,
opened a campaign of bombing the industrial cities of Japan that was
to play a prominent part in the ultimate collapse of the Nipponese
war effort.

October, 1944, saw the assault forces of General Douglas Mac-
Arthur make their victorious lunge at the Philippines, a move that
represented the fruition of MacArthur's plans ever since he was
forced out of the Philippines early in 1942. Surprise American land-
ings were made on the Gulf of Leyte under cover of American naval
guns. The Japanese navy, however, was determined to break up the
American invasion at whatever cost. Three battle squadrons of the
Japanese fleet converged on the landing operations. Despite Admiral
Halsey's almost fatal blunder of allowing himself to be decoyed away
from the main scene of activity, the enemy was decisively beaten and
scattered. The shattered remnants of the once-proud Japanese fleet
limped northward, while the Americans proceeded with their Philip-
pine campaign. Further landings were effected on Luzon and Mindo-
lo. Aided by Filipino guerrilla forces, MacArthur's troops began
the long, tough struggle against the Japanese garrisons in the Philip-
pines, a task made even more difficult by the fact that reinforcements
continued to arrive for the defenders despite American naval suprem-
acy. Yet the battleline had been brought 2500 miles closer to Japan,
and the proof had been advanced that the United States could suc-
cessfully prosecute a war on two fronts.

In other parts of the Oriental theater the Japanese were compelled
to disgorge some of their gains. Early in 1944 they rushed into eastern
India from Burma, but British Imperials pushed them back and then
launched an offensive through northern Burma with the help of
American and Chinese troops. In New Guinea and the Solomons only
scattered pockets of Japanese marred complete conquest by the Allied forces. In the Carolines the Japanese naval station on Truk, often referred to as the "Nipponese Gibraltar," was knocked out of the conflict by an American carrier force under Admiral Spruance. In China, however, the sons of Nippon managed to improve their position by clearing a land corridor from Malaya, by way of Korea, to the home islands themselves. And well they might, for by August, 1944, American submarines claimed a total of 700 Japanese ships sent to the bottom. From China, too, American Superfortresses carried their huge bomb loads over Nipponese industrial targets.

In the West events of such magnitude were taking place that the considerable Allied advances in the Far East were given only secondary attention by the United Nations' public. The prime development was the Anglo-American amphibious assault on the coasts of France, an attack accompanied by Allied hopes that Hitlerism would be eliminated from the Continent by the end of the year. The progress was mighty, indeed, but the tenacious Germans not only held out in 1944 but launched a counterattack of their own in December.

The Allied operation against Hitlerland—known as "Operation Overlord"—represented the most stupendous achievement in military logistics the world had ever seen. Planned to the minutest detail, the invasion had been under preparation for many months. By June 6, 1944 (D-Day) American forces in Britain, gathered from the Mediterranean theater as well as the United States, numbered more than a million and a half men. Amphibious techniques, developed out of the experiences acquired in North Africa, in Sicily, in Italy, and in the Pacific war, were studied and refined. To facilitate the occupation two gigantic prefabricated harbors lay waiting to be towed across the Channel to the landing beaches. Preparation included, too, a month's-long softening up by Anglo-American airmen of the Nazi fortifications along the French coast as well as strategic and devastating bombing of rear area supply concentrations and communications.

The Germans, for their part, knew that an attack was imminent, but they did not know where it would come. The section of the French coast picked by Eisenhower for the landing, the shores of Normandy, midway between Le Havre and Cherbourg, was not considered by the German High Command as the likeliest danger spot. Nevertheless, the Normandy coast, as well as other strategic stretches, was alive with underwater and land mines, submarine obstructions, barbed wire, pillboxes, machine-gun nests, and heavy artillery emplacements. The Wehrmacht was as well prepared for the onslaught as it would ever be.

During the night of June 5-6, American and British paratroopers
and glider troops were landed in vital areas behind the German coastal defenses along the Normandy beaches from Caen to Cherbourg. At 6:30 on the morning of the 6th, the first Allied assault wave hit the shore under cover of enormous aerial and naval bombardment. Nearly 4000 Allied ships, protected by over 700 naval vessels, poured their avalanche of men and matériel ashore. The German coastal defenses, harassed by naval gunfire and aerial bombing, nevertheless sent a hail of destruction at the invaders. But there was not enough firepower in all of France to stop the human and material tidal wave that rolled up the beaches and over the Nazi emplacements. By the end of the day a full quarter of a million soldiers, half Americans, half Britishers, had been put ashore, and once the initial German resistance was overcome the Allies quickly merged their beachheads to form a continuous front of sixty miles. Both the German U-boats and the German Luftwaffe, which the Nazis had expected to blunt, if not turn, an Allied amphibious assault, had failed completely in their task, mainly as a result of months of Allied destruction at sea and in the air.

The German resistance centered at Caen and there the British and Canadians were held up for several weeks. On June 27 the Americans slashed into the port of Cherbourg, giving the Allies a chance to bring their artificial harbors into action. Rough weather in the Channel wrecked supply ships by the dozens, but man power was funneling through the port. During most of July fierce fighting raged through Norman towns and hedgerows. On the 25th sufficient strength was gathered by General Omar Bradley to mount a powerful offensive which broke out of the beachhead through St.-Lo and Avranches. That laid central France open to rapid conquest. General Patton, commanding the highly mechanized American Third Army, knifed through the German lines, isolating the Nazis in the Brittany peninsula. Swirling to the southeast, Patton then drove another 25,000 Germans into the "Falaise Pocket," following this accomplishment with a rapid dash eastward which put his forces across the Moselle by September 7. Meanwhile, French and American troops entered Paris on August 25 as the Germans fled the French capital. From the lower Seine British and Canadians dashed to the Somme, crossed it, and spread out over northern France and into Belgium. Brussels fell to them on September 3, Antwerp the next day. The pace of the advance was so rapid that it seemed German collapse was a matter of days. Simultaneous with these operations in the north, another American army, the Seventh, under the command of General Patch, poured ashore on the French Riviera from Italy and North Africa, and proceeded to drive the German forces up the valley of the
Rhône. By the end of September, France and Belgium were completely liberated. In the mountains, members of the French underground organization, the Maquis, mopped up isolated pockets of resistance.

As the Allied armies neared the German frontier, however, German forces were drawn up for a desperate stand behind the West Wall. The Allied supply lines were being stretched, too, and logistical difficulties slowed down the advance. A brief period during which the Anglo-Americans took a breather and waited for their supplies to catch up with them was followed by a winter offensive that got off to a slow start across the low country before Cologne and the Rhine. The Nazis fought grimly, and with great technical efficiency, for now their Fatherland was directly menaced. On December 16, Field Marshal von Rundstedt threw twenty-four divisions against the thinly held American sector in the Ardennes region of Belgium. The drive's objectives were the capture of both Antwerp and Paris and the cutting of the one great Allied line of supply. In a slashing and costly attack the Nazi divisions chewed through the American lines to a depth of fifty miles, actually pushing to within easy striking distance of the Meuse river. By Christmas Day, however, Allied counter-measures took hold, featuring a heavy pummeling from the air of the German armored columns, as well as supply and assembly bases to the rear. The Battle of the Bulge resulted in a
complete elimination of the German gains, but it had been a tactical success for the Germans, since the main Allied offensive was delayed for almost two months. On the other hand, Rundstedt’s melodramatic gamble had used up a large part of the German reserves, nullifying the chance of carrying on a sustained defense of the homeland itself.

On the Italian front a stalemate had followed the initial Allied attempt late in 1943 to break through the winter defenses of the German armies. On January 22 a leap-frog jump to the beaches of Anzio brought the Allies to less than forty miles of Rome, and desperate German onslaughts against this beachhead failed to drive the invaders into the sea. In the rugged country south of Cassino fighting was heavy and not until mid-May was the city itself captured, a victory bought partly at the expense of reducing to rubble the historic Benedictine monastery of Monte Cassino in order to deny its use to the Germans as a military base. One day before the Normandy landing, General Mark Clark led his American Fifth Army into the Eternal City amid the enthusiastic plaudits of a Roman populace anxious for peace. During the summer the Allies advanced slowly northward through Florence, Pisa, and Rimini, backing the Germans into the fastnesses of the Apennine barrier stretching all the way across the Italian peninsula. The diversion of troops from Italy to the war in southern France hampered the pace of military operations, but the decisive factor in bringing a halt to the northward drive of the French, American, British, and Polish troops operating in Italy was the combination of stouter German resistance and the mountainous terrain.

During the German retreat to the West Wall and northern Italy, the Red Army had made spectacular advances in eastern and southeastern Europe. In the northern sector of the Nazi-Soviet battle lines, the Russian armies struck at the enemy from the Leningrad district, pushing them into the former Baltic Republics, and then hammered the bleeding Germans almost completely out of those areas. In June, the Finns, too, felt the sledgehammer blows of the Red armies in the north, and by September they begged for an armistice. Moscow required recognition of the boundary set at the end of the first Finnish war in 1940, except that the Petsamo district, rich in nickel mines, was surrendered to the U.S.S.R. The Finns, too, were handed an indemnity bill of $300,000,000.

In the central sector the Soviet armies drove across White Russia in June and July and over the 1939 Polish frontier, the pace slowing down only when the Vistula was reached. The proximity of the Russian armies to Warsaw caused Polish underground forces in the capital to make a desperate bid to wrest control of the city from the Ger-
mans, confident that a Russian offensive upon Warsaw was at hand. For over two months the insurgents maintained themselves in the face of German siege artillery and heavy tanks, which took over a quarter of a million Polish lives and leveled many sections of the city. Throughout the uprising, Russian armies practically within gunshot of Warsaw failed to render effective assistance. Another bitter chapter had been written in the long and tragic story of Russo-Polish relations.

The southern armies of the Soviet Union made even more breathtaking gains than their comrades to the north. German forces were swept out of the Ukraine and the Crimea during the spring, and by July Red Army troops were in Galicia. Rumania, too, was penetrated as early as April and, after a savage battle near Kishinev in which the Germans lost over twelve divisions and the Rumanian army was liquidated, Bucharest, in September, withdrew from the war. Not only did Rumania lose Bessarabia and the Bukovina to the Soviet Union, but she had to promise to fight at the side of her erstwhile enemy against the Germans. In return, the restoration of that part of Transylvania which the Hungarians had taken was promised by Moscow. The Rumanian capitulation opened a passage to the lower Danube for the Red armies, which caused the Bulgarians to ask the Allied Headquarters at Cairo for an armistice. In order to win the dictate of Bulgarian surrender terms, Moscow declared war on the helpless Bulgars and received their surrender on September 7. Russian occupation of Bulgaria, in turn, led to a grand attack on Hungary, and by the end of 1944 Budapest was entirely surrounded. After a siege that lasted almost fifty days the Hungarian capital capitulated. By this time, Yugoslav partisans, under the command of the Moscow-trained Communist, Marshal Tito, pushed northward and joined hands with the Russians coming in from the east. Belgrade, on October 20, was recovered. The Western Allies did not allow the Soviet Union to make a clean sweep of Balkan liberation, however, for in September British paratroopers landed in Greece. A two-months' campaign by Britishers and Greek guerrillas ousted the remnants of German occupation forces.

It was plain to all except the most blindly fanatical Germans by midsummer of 1944 that the German cause was lost. The Reich's enemies were converging on the country from all directions, the material wherewithal to prosecute the war was gone, the nation's great cities lay in rubble, and practically every family in Germany had forfeited loved ones to the insatiable Nazi war machine. In such straits most Germans were willing to call a halt to the suicidal resistance, regardless of how furiously Dr. Goebbels' propaganda ma-
chime ground out stories of German invincibility, of the necessity of going under fighting, if go under the Germans must.

It is an interesting commentary that the first and only open, internal, wartime opposition to the Nazis now came from the Rightist underground, the leadership of which was comprised of certain high military men, with the rank and file of the anti-Nazis consisting of trade unionists, conservative Social Democrats, churchmen, industrialists, and members of the Prussian and Bavarian aristocracy. They looked toward forcing German surrender to the Western powers, for the fear of the Soviet colossus was strong upon them. Knowing the conspirators' intense anti-Soviet leanings, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden refused, out of fear that Russian suspicion and distrust would be aroused, to aid the plotters. The conspirators seem to have been convinced that Allied victories in June and early July, 1944, made the moment ripe for a "palace revolution." On July 20, while Hitler and his staff were bending over a map at headquarters in East Prussia, a time-bomb exploded under the table. Four were killed and thirteen injured, but the Führer escaped with minor injuries. Simultaneously in Berlin, a handful of officers attempted to occupy the War Office and win over locally stationed troops to an insurrection. With little difficulty, the military leaders in Berlin, still loyal to Hitler or fearful of the consequences of being otherwise, promptly squelched the uprising and had the ringleaders summarily shot on the spot. Gestapo chieftain Heinrich Himmler followed up this opportunity to indulge in a housecleaning of suspicious elements in both military and civilian ranks by accomplishing the execution of thousands of dissenters, with thousands more preferring suicide to firing squad or concentration camp. The whole proceeding was, indeed, a formidable and daring effort to get rid of the Nazi fanatics, but resulted only in a tightening of the Party leaders' grip on the army and a stiffening of their resolve to take the nation along with them to total destruction.²

While the battles raged in Europe and the Far East, Allied statesmen turned with new vigor to the problem of insuring international peace and security after victory. In the spring of 1944 economic and financial experts of forty-four United Nations conferred at Bretton Woods in New Hampshire. There an accord was reached which called for the establishment of an International Monetary Fund to be manipulated, under U.N. supervision, in such a way that national

² For a full treatment of the conspiracy and its aftermath, see Allen W. Dulles, Germany's Underground (New York: Macmillan, 1947). Dulles was an O.S.S. representative who, from Switzerland, maintained contact with various dissident elements inside Germany, including the agents of the conspirators of July 20.
currencies would be held on a stable basis. The United States promised to contribute a third of the $8,800,000,000 fund. A second agreement provided for the setting up of a World Bank which would make loans for reconstruction purposes. As with the International Monetary Fund, the various member states of the United Nations were to pay into the Bank according to their ability. Together, the World Bank and the Fund were designed, above all, to forestall the kind of economic warfare between nations that had characterized the post-World War I period. By March, 1946, thirty-five nations had ratified the Bretton Woods agreement. The Soviet Union, Australia, New Zealand, and six others had not signed.

At the historic Dumbarton Oaks mansion near Washington representatives of the Big Four, China, Russia, Britain, and the United States, negotiated for several weeks on the nature of the joint security organization which the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers had agreed upon in principle. Specific plans for the prevention of war in the future and for the promotion of international economic and social stability were worked out by the conferees. The sponsoring governments then submitted these proposals to all of the United Nations for study in anticipation of a general meeting to work out a final charter for international peace and security. At San Francisco in the spring of 1945 the general session produced the Charter of the United Nations, a forward-looking document which will be discussed in connection with the postwar period.

If Dumbarton Oaks and the San Francisco meetings were concerned with the problem of working out an international security organization based on the principle of “sovereign equality,” the meeting of the Big Three leaders at Yalta early in February, 1945, concerned itself with the power relationships of the world-dominating triple alliance of Russia, Britain, and the United States. From the published report released by the conferees and from subsequent revelations the rough outlines of the decisions at Yalta can be pieced together. The meaning of these decisions can best be appreciated by keeping in mind the current military situation of the powers concerned. Russian armies were on the Oder and the Danube, in Bulgaria and in Yugoslavia. Moscow, furthermore, had already indicated that eastern Europe was to be considered a Soviet sphere of influence. On the other hand, the Allies were faced with the necessity of curbing what seemed to them to be undue Soviet ambitions and yet retain the Russian alliance for final operations against Japan. At the time of the conference, too, the Western Allies had failed to break through the German West Wall, in sharp contrast to the rapid Russian advance into Europe. When Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met at
the one-time palace of the Russian czars, therefore, the Soviet leader was in a position to ask a high price for continued co-operation. Yalta represented indubitably a Russian diplomatic victory.

The Yalta Agreement announced that a defeated Germany was to be partitioned into four zones of occupation, with the Big Three plus France providing the administrative and military personnel to govern their respective areas. The German armed forces and the general staff were to be dissolved, war equipment and war factories were to be destroyed. Nazi institutions were to be uprooted, the Nazi mentality exorcised. Germany was to make restitution for war damage "in kind to the greatest extent possible."

In Poland the Provisional Government created out of the Russian-sponsored Lublin Committee would be "reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad." The country's eastern frontier was to follow, in general, the Curzon Line, though Poland was promised that she would receive "substantial accessions of territory in the North and West." The government of Yugoslavia likewise was to be revamped, and the Allies would help other liberated nations or former Axis satellite states in establishing governments by democratic processes.

A secret agreement concerning the Far East directly reflected Roosevelt's desire to retain the active support of the Soviet Union in the war against Japan. The southern half of Sakhalin Island and the Kuriles were definitely promised Russia, as well as special railway and harbor rights in Manchuria. Stalin was also told that Russia might occupy that section of Korea north of the 38th parallel. Russia's "interests" in the Orient were recognized.

Finally, at Yalta it was agreed that a general conference of the United Nations should be held in April in San Francisco to work out the charter of an international security organization in accordance with the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. That the conversations of the Big Three at Yalta did much to smooth out tensions and prepare the way for the reorganization of Europe once Germany had been defeated there can be little doubt; but it is just as true that the Soviet Union had gone far toward winning a position of political predominance in the victorious coalition of powers. Winston Churchill, for one, foresaw the possibility of grave difficulties involved in such an upset to the balance of power. "Somber indeed would be the fortunes of mankind," said he, "if some awful schism arose between the Western democracies and the Russian Soviet Union, if all the future world organization were rent asunder, and if new cataclysms of inconceivable violence destroyed all that is left of the treasures and
liberties of mankind." If Roosevelt had misgivings he did not express them. In the meantime, there was a war to be won.

As the Yalta conferees separated, victory in Europe was approaching at express-train speed. Even then American and British spearheads were piercing the vaunted German West Wall, which proved as vulnerable as the Maginot Line almost five years earlier. The great push by the Allies commenced on February 23, with Cologne falling to the invaders on March 6, laying the whole Rhineland open to the armies of Eisenhower. By the middle of the month all territory west of the Rhine was in Allied hands, and bridgeheads had been secured at Remagen and Oppenheim. With the aid of an air force that bombed enemy supply lines, communications centers, armored columns, and other strategic targets, seven mighty Allied armies, once across the river, lunged forward. The strongest attack was launched against the Ruhr, which the Allied airmen had reduced to shambles. By April 1 British and American armies had surrounded
and destroyed some 350,000 Germans in the area. From that point on, the Allied offensive amounted to a series of rapid thrusts by various armies into the heart of Germany. The Canadian First Army pushed the Germans back to the North Sea and liberated the Netherlands; the British Second Army moved on Hamburg; General Patton’s armored forces sped through Nuremberg and Munich, and then struck out into Austria. Other units moved southward through the Schwarzwald; still others entered the mountains of Czechoslovakia. On April 25 an American patrol met the Soviet vanguard on the Elbe. Germany had been cut in two.

On the eastern front, the Russian armies, after a short breather, opened up their irresistible winter offensive in mid-January from the Baltic to the Carpathians. In the space of three weeks the outnumbered and outpowered Wehrmacht had been pushed back to the Oder and forced to sacrifice several bridgeheads on the western shore of that river. There the Russians paused long enough to get set for the coup de grace, the capture of Berlin. To the north other Soviet armies pushed through East Prussia, Danzig, and Königsberg. By the thousands German refugees fleeing before the fierce Russian drive swarmed into a Reich that was being slowly squeezed to death. In the south the Soviet advance was likewise irresistible. After the surrender of Budapest, northern and western Hungary fell before the Reds. Then the Russian pincers closed in on Vienna, forcing the surrender of the ancient Danubian metropolis on April 13. Still another Soviet army, the “wild men” of Malinovsky, roared into Slovakia and bore down on Prague, where the Czech inhabitants revolted against their German masters and wrote their revenge in blood. A few days later Russian forces moved into the city. In Yugoslavia, where Russian troops had already joined hands with Marshal Tito and his Partisans, the last pockets of German resistance were cleaned out, while Yugoslav contingents swept into Fiume and drove on Trieste.

On the Italian front, long dormant during the winter, Allied contingents comprising Americans, Brazilians, British, Indians, New Zealanders, South Africans, Poles, and French, gathered themselves for the final assault on the forces of von Kesselring guarding the "Gothic Line" south of the Po Valley. The drive was opened on April 10, and three weeks later the German armies were ready to surrender. Allied troops then raced across the Po Valley, over the Alpine passes and down into Austria, where they joined Americans and Russians driving in from west and east. On May 2 the German commander, General Vietinghoff-Scheel, who had replaced Kesselring in March, surrendered unconditionally. In the meantime,
Italian guerrillas, who had been of great help to the Allies in sabotaging the German defense, intercepted Mussolini and his Fascist Republican cabinet as they attempted to cross over into Switzerland. Beside lovely Lake Como the ex-Caesar, his mistress, and his colleagues were summarily dispatched. A few days later their bodies hung head down in the center of Milan, the objects of anti-Fascist defilement.

Inside the beleaguered Reich the Nazi leaders still believed that total collapse could be warded off by splitting the Allies diplo-

The German collapse

matically, but there was no agreement as to how this could be accomplished. One group urged approaching the Russians, another wanted to negotiate with the West. Hitler, for once, made no decision but that of refusing to do anything. There was really no choice, for the Soviet armies now burst across the Oder in tremendous numbers and on April 21 laid siege to the city. Heavy artillery pounded Berlin day and night, then ferocious Soviet troops, remembering their own devastated land, surged forward, smashing everything before them, inexorably working their way to the center of the city, street by street, building by building, until Unter den Linden was
VICTORY IN EUROPE.

Courtesy of Richard Eade Harrison.
reached. By April 30, they were in possession of government offices. On the same day the Führer, now face to face with the final reckoning, chose the easy way out. He turned over governing authority to Admiral Karl Dönitz, and while Soviet shells burst overhead married his mistress, Eva Braun, in his underground retreat. A double suicide made an end of Mr. and Mrs. Hitler. Martin Bormann, following his Führer's orders to the last, cremated the bodies.

"This is the Moment"
Field Marshal Montgomery with the German delegates who came to discuss surrender terms

During these last days an effort had been made through a Swedish nobleman, Count Folke Bernadotte, to initiate peace negotiations with the Allies, but it came to nothing. Heinrich Himmler and Admiral Dönitz tried to erect a transitional government after the death
Zones of Occupation in Germany at the Close of World War II
of Hitler, but met failure when the Allies refused to accept anything less than unconditional surrender. No alternative was left. Berlin lay in ruins, German generals were unsuccessfully trying to surrender to the Anglo-Americans, German armies had disintegrated. At Reims on May 7, 1945, Nazi emissaries, acting on a High Command refusal to continue the fight, signed a formal armistice. On the following day in Berlin Marshal Keitel, chief of the German armies, surrendered to the Russians, with German naval and air force commanders sharing the humiliation. The former Reich was brought forthwith under the occupation and administration of Russia, France, Britain, and the United States. The monstrous Nazi conspiracy against the civilized world had been irrevocably crushed.

On the other side of the world the Allies were also sweeping toward total victory. From the beginning of 1945 the Pacific offensive of the combined American, British, Chinese, Dutch, and French forces pressed relentlessly forward. The early months of the year saw British and Chinese armies expel the enemy from Burma, while French units struck at the Japanese in Indo-China. In Nationalist China, the armies of Chiang Kai-shek, now equipped with American weapons, pressed hard upon their traditional enemies.

The bulk of the Far Eastern offensive, however, was an American assignment, and the Yanks were delivering devastating blows on several widely scattered fronts. MacArthur's invasion forces in the Philippines, after the clearing of Leyte and the capture of Manila, proceeded with the investment of the entire archipelago, but not without much costly campaigning, especially on Luzon. Farther north, United States marines landed on Iwo Jima in the Volcano group, less than 800 miles' distance from Tokyo. Despite a softening-up bombardment of the island by American airmen since December, 1944, an entire month of the fiercest fighting in the Pacific war was required to complete the subjugation of the Japanese garrison. Only a few weeks later (April 1) an American assault fleet of more than 1400 vessels landed troops on the island of Okinawa in the Ryukyus, 325 miles from Japan. The first penetration was not particularly difficult, but then the Japanese resistance stiffened. For weeks Japanese and Americans attacked and counterattacked, with casualties mounting swiftly for both sides. Japanese suicide planes—Kamikaze—hurled themselves against the American naval forces offshore, while the Baka, or piloted flying bomb, played havoc with the invader. After 82 days of battle Okinawa was completely under American domination, but the cost to the conquerors of this base for operations against the Japanese homeland was tremendous. Men and matériel had been expended on a scale that made all previous
Pacific operations seem insignificant. If every one of the islands in the Japanese home group had to be taken in the same manner the war promised to stretch out over many more weary months of bloodshed.

In the meantime the air assault on the Japanese homeland was carried forward with vigor. Tokyo, Nagoya, Kobe, Nagasaki, and other important Nipponese industrial centers were subjected to Superfortress bombing raids that killed or made homeless hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians. On the sea, powerful United States fleets penetrated Japan's Inland Sea. By early August the once powerful Japanese navy was fit only for the scrap pile.

From the Japanese leaders came peace feelers during the late spring and summer, aimed at securing a peace short of unconditional surrender. When the Allied leaders met at Potsdam late in July the desperate Japanese unsuccessfully bid for Russian mediation. From Potsdam, instead, President Truman, who had become the American Chief Executive upon the death of Roosevelt early in April, presented the Japanese Government with the unhappy alternative of unconditional surrender or complete destruction. While the men in Tokyo deliberated, the decision was made by the Americans to put a period to hesitation in Japan. On August 6, 1945, the bomb-bay doors opened up in the belly of an American Superfortress and a missile weighing only a few pounds sped earthward on the Japanese city of Hiroshima, an industrial center of several hundred thousand population. A few seconds later Hiroshima was flattened by a single explosion. While thousands upon thousands of the city's inhabitants wilted before a whirlwind of super-heated air, a gigantic, mushroom-like cloud billowed into the skies. The Atomic Age was born.

Two days later the Soviet Union, apparently worried that its scheduled declaration of war against Japan on August 15 might come too late to net Russia a voice in the dictation of peace terms, opened hostilities with the Nipponese in Manchuria. On August 9 another atomic bomb was dropped upon Nagasaki, almost matching the devastation wrought at Hiroshima. Japan now begged for peace on
the sole condition that the Emperor's prerogatives be not prejudiced. The diplomats took over at this juncture, while military operations against Japan slackened. Despite loud cries against any accommodation for Hirohito, President Truman on August 14 announced that Japan had accepted the Potsdam Declaration and ordered an end to offensive action. The Mikado was to continue on the throne of his fathers, but subject to the Supreme Allied Commander. On September 2 representatives of both the Japanese military and civil authorities signed the surrender document aboard the American battleship Missouri, anchored in Tokyo Bay. One week later, General Douglas MacArthur, now Allied commander-in-chief, entered Tokyo to begin the American occupation of a prostrate Japan.

Total victory for the United Nations had at last been won at a cost in blood and treasure that stupefies the imagination. There was cause for rejoicing, to be sure, and everywhere in the Allied world men and women gave thanks that the dangers and horrors of war were past. The celebration of victory, however, unlike the hysterical days following the Armistice of 1918, was sobered by something more than a recollection of lost loved ones. This time, the highest spirits were

"HELLO, TOVARICH"
American and Russian soldiers meet on the wrecked bridge over the Elbe River
tempered by the implications of atomic energy, and many believed that all but the last great war of men against men had been fought—unless the victorious states could hammer into being a constructive and durable peace.

Collateral Reading

G. M. Barnes, Weapons of World War II (1947).
J. P. Baxter, Scientists Against Time (1946).
W. Churchill, Blood, Sweat, and Tears (1941).
E. Curie, Journey Among Warriors (1943).
Sir F. De Guingand, Operation Victory (1947).
Col. C. P. Romulo, I Saw the Fall of the Philippines (1943).
J. Scott, Duel from Europe (1942).
W. Shirer, Berlin Diary (1941).
R. P. Stearns, Pageant of Europe, Chap. XLIII (1947).
W. Willkie, One World (1943).
TOTAL war had presented a staggering bill to humanity. Over a period of six years the military dead were estimated to number close to 15,000,000, with another 5,500,000 permanently incapacitated. Civilian casualties, too, ran into the millions, with air raids, firing squads, starvation, sickness, Nazi gas chambers, and other forms of mass murder grinding out the lives of noncombatants on a scale incomparably greater than the loss of civilians in World War I. Property damages—the destruction of homes, factories, ships, roads, bridges, libraries, schools, churches—defied computation. In Europe and the Far East millions were homeless and destitute. For all combatant nations war expenditures totaled more than one thousand billion dollars. In Russia alone it was estimated that the physical destruction amounted to more than a quarter of the fixed capital of the state.

Europe after the war was truly a “Dark Continent.” The economic mechanism which had been more or less integrated by the Nazis was twisted out of shape; armies and air forces had smashed means of communication, of production, of distribution. "Scorched earth" tactics had devastated huge tracts of European farmland. Its fertility was reduced by neglect, by the lack of fertilizers, and by the scarcity of farm implements and draft animals. Decimated were the flocks and herds. And to complete the economic devastation currency inflation weakened further the shredded economic fabric of the liberated nations.
Across Europe and Asia, too, famine and death continued into the peace, for there were appalling deficiencies in life's essentials—fuel, food, clothing, housing, medical care and supplies. Six years of destruction had taken their toll of human endurance. Europe's millions were steeped in discontent and restlessness. Aggravating the tragedy of Europe were the millions who had been Axis prisoners of war, slave laborers in Nazi factories and farms, and refugees who had fled before the sweep of mighty armies. Homeless, dazed, many of them did not want to return to their homes, because of war-born political changes, or they simply did not have homes to go to. To the Allied armies fell the task of housing, feeding, and clothing these uprooted men, women, and children.

The years of indoctrination with ideas of hate and godlessness, years of terror, of noise, of destruction, of malnutrition, of family separations, of blow after blow to an orderly pattern of living—all this now bore its fruit in a relaxation of the moral fabric of entire nations. In finding a few scraps of food the law of the jungle prevailed; black-marketeering was rampant; thievery and sexual promiscuity were accepted as inevitable by-products of the war. Morally and materially the war-torn areas were a wilderness.

A world thus brought to the brink of ruin could only recognize the need to prevent another—and perhaps the last—war by organizing to maintain the peace, and co-operating in the task of creating a world from which aggression and fear of aggression had been banished. The conflict just past had taught the victors the abiding lesson that war and peace are indivisible, that a quarrel between any two nations is a threat to the peace and security of all. Scientific advancement, economic interdependence, and a global war pointed to the inexorable conclusion that mankind, indeed, had a common destiny.

The determination to erect an effective international organization to keep the world's peace had appeared, as noted in the preceding chapter, long before the cessation of hostilities. The Four Freedoms of the so-called Atlantic Charter, the principles enunciated by President Roosevelt during his shipboard conference with Churchill in August, 1941, were subsequently admitted by the American Chief Executive to have been merely a handout to newspapermen to disguise the real nature of the conference, which related primarily to the possibility of United States involvement in a war with Japan. The fake charter, however, at least provided the anti-Axis crusade with a statement of high moral principles. The first official and concrete program for the creation of an organization to be based on principles of justice and "the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states" was a product of the Foreign Ministers' Con-
ference at Moscow in November, 1943. At Teheran a month later the Big Three leaders called for "a world family of Democratic Nations." Actual drafting of a tentative charter for the international body to be known as the United Nations Organization got underway at Dumbarton Oaks just outside Washington, D. C., between August 21 and October 7, 1944. Qualifications were added at Yalta in February of the following year when the problems of voting procedure and the admission of the Soviet Ukraine and White Russia were resolved by Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill. It was further agreed that a general conference of the United Nations should meet at San Francisco in April to decide upon a definitive charter along the lines of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

While plans were maturing for the San Francisco meeting, the Roosevelt cause of the United Nations and postwar peace received a severe blow in the sudden death (April 12) of President Roosevelt at Warm Springs, Georgia. Much of the deep grief that descended upon the Allied world was undoubtedly due to a tacit recognition of the fact that in Roosevelt the cause of peace in the postwar world had lost its staunchest supporter. Moreover, Roosevelt, as no other Allied statesman, had had the confidence of little people everywhere, the same kind of faith transcending national boundaries that gave another wartime president a tremendous opportunity to confront self-seeking victors with the aspirations of those who bear the greatest burden of war, the nameless masses. Roosevelt's direct contribution to the creation of the U.N.O. was recognized at the San Francisco Conference when the steering committee called upon the assembled delegates to "stand in a minute of silent thought for the man who not only conceived the idea of a United Nations, but gave his life for it. . . ."

In the hospitable and cosmopolitan atmosphere of San Francisco the representatives of the anti-Axis states in the course of nine weeks hammered out their divergent views as to the content of the Charter. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals were taken as the point of departure, but changes and additions were recommended by the hundreds. In the final draft the fundamentals of the Dumbarton Oaks scheme, however, were incorporated; most of the additions made at San Francisco conformed to the wishes of the Big Three, despite all that Australia's foreign minister, Herbert V. Evatt, could say in championing the interests and aspirations of the middle-sized and small nations.

Though twice the length of the League of Nations Covenant, the plan of the new security organization bore more than a vague resemblance to the defunct League. Two differences, however, were central in the entire pattern. The new body was to have a military force
which, in due course, might be used against a violator of the peace, a distinct advantage over the old League, whose only means of effective coercion was the use of sanctions. On the other hand, it is difficult to discern progress in the fact that in the new organization the world's peace and stability were to be dependent upon the perpetuation of the wartime coalition of the Big Three—or, by courtesy, the Big Five. Plus one and minus one usually add up to zero.

The legislative branch of the United Nations Organization is the General Assembly, composed of representatives of every member country, each state having one vote. Meetings are held once a year, but the Assembly may be called into special session. The main function of the body is to suggest general policies and to revise these policies after further study and experience. Its members discuss on their own initiative, anything that has a bearing on peace, even a specific international dispute, provided the dispute is not under consideration at the time by the Security Council. Once the latter group has a matter under consideration, the General Assembly may not even make pertinent suggestions unless the Council asks advice on any such matter—a drastic commentary on the essential impotence of the Assembly. The six nonpermanent members of the Security Council, as well as all the members of the Economic and Social Council and the International Court, are elected by the Assembly. It also admits new members to the U.N.O. and suspends or expels members on recommendation of the Security Council. Important decisions of the Assembly require passage by a two-thirds’ majority.

The Security Council, the all-powerful executive body, is composed of eleven members; that is, the Big Five (United States, Britain, U.S.S.R., France, China), holding permanent seats, and six nonpermanent members elected for a two-year term, with three of them being elected each year in order to provide a rotation. The Council is organized so “as to be able to function continuously.” Procedural matters require the approval of any seven Council members, but on all other matters the seven votes required must include those of all the permanent members. In function, the Council alone has the right to order the use of force against a wrongdoer, but the action is subject to the veto of any of the Big Five, even if the vetoing nation is the guilty party. In short, if any one of the Big Five chooses the path of aggression the United Nations is powerless to prevent it. This strange state of affairs owes its existence to the argument—advanced by the United States as well as the Soviet Union—that the most powerful states have the heaviest responsibilities and, therefore, should have special voting privileges. It would require a critic of no great ability to demonstrate that precisely because the
Big Five are the most powerful states they should be subject to the restraining hand of some authority other than their own, collectively or individually. In view of the veto power granted each of the Big Five, it is difficult to see, too, the utility of a whole series of steps to be taken against an aggressor, ranging from advice to all U.N. states to break off diplomatic relations, through the imposition of economic sanctions and a blockade, to calling upon member nations to furnish armed contingents to be used against an aggressor. In short, if a non-major power violated the peace it would find itself outside the law; if one of the Big Five did likewise it could legally forestall any such fate for itself. Finally, the Security Council is to discuss and investigate international disputes.

In quantities fixed by special treaties, the member states are to place military forces at the disposal of the Security Council, and to hold on call contingents of air power to be used against a violator of the U.N. Charter, should the Council so decide. A Military Staff Committee, composed of the chiefs of staff of the Big Five or their deputies, is to advise the Council on all military affairs. Partly of a military nature, too, is an Atomic Energy Commission, created by the Assembly in January, 1946, to “consider problems arising from the discovery of atomic energy.”

To handle routine business of the U.N.O. is a Permanent Secretariat, headed by a Secretary-General elected by the Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. The first Secretary-General was Trygve Lie, the Norwegian foreign minister, elected in London in January, 1946, at the first meeting of the General Assembly.

Similar to the Permanent Court of International Justice under the League of Nations is the new judicial body of the U.N., the International Court of Justice. Like the earlier court, it is to meet at The Hague. There are fifteen judges, with five new justices to be elected every three years, each with a nine-year term of office. No two judges are to be from the same country. Membership in the Court is determined by a concurrent majority vote of the General Assembly and Security Council. In matters relating directly to war the Court has no jurisdiction since the “Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression.” Only “justiciable” quarrels between nations, such as interpretation of treaties and points in international law, are within the Court’s competence. On April 18, 1946, the Court was formally opened at The Hague, with Dr. José Guerrero of El Salvador as Chief Justice.

To study and make recommendations on world social and economic conditions which are conducive to international strife and
discord an eighteen-member organ, chosen by the Assembly, was created as the Economic and Social Council. The members are elected for a term of three years, and the Council is to meet at least three times a year. In addition to its surveillance over economic and social matters, the body is to assume financial, intellectual, and humanitarian responsibilities, the latter concern a legacy handed down by the League of Nations’ International Labor Office and other affiliates. An important subordinate agency of the Economic and Social Council is the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), designed to further intellectual and cultural co-operation among the member states. Other organizations affiliated with the Economic and Social Council are the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the Civil Aviation Organization (to deal with problems connected with commercial air transportation), as well as several others which closely parallel League of Nations agencies.

A real improvement over the mandate system of the old League is the United Nations trusteeship plan for colonial dominions. A Trusteeship Council is made up of members of the U.N., who administer trust territories, those of the Big Five who do not administer such regions, and other members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly. This organization is charged with furthering the welfare of the inhabitants of any areas placed under its jurisdiction, which may be those taken from enemy countries or areas voluntarily placed under trusteeship by powers which previously controlled them. It is also prescribed that parts of trustee territory may be earmarked as strategic zones under the jurisdiction of the Security Council.

That the Charter of the United Nations established a far from foolproof system of international security is obvious from the foregoing outline. The very conception that only “peace-loving nations” might be members is not only sanctimonious but hypocritical and unhistorical, especially when the test of a “peace-loving” nation for entrance into the U.N. was that it must have been at war with the Axis. Sweden, Switzerland, and Iceland, who loved peace so much that they did not declare war on the Axis, were excluded from membership. Again, though it is true that the plan of the organization was ratified before war’s end, the establishment of peace saw only two obviously great powers, Soviet Russia and the United States, not the five major powers recognized in the courteous and convenient, but perhaps dangerous, fiction that Britain, France, and China were, in terms of military or economic strength, on a par with the United States and Russia. The very weakness of the British, Chinese, and
French as against the other two states undermines the specious arguments of those statesmen at San Francisco who spoke of great power carrying commensurate responsibilities, and thus justifying special privileges such as an absolute veto in the Security Council. Actually, the United Nations promotes the very sort of thing World War II was ostensibly fought to prevent, namely, the military domination of the world's family of nations by two great powers. The organization has neither the funds nor the armed forces to match against an aggressive national state; it has only judicial formulas to oppose to an act of aggression, and even these are inoperative if any of the five permanent members of the Security Council are guilty of breaking the Charter. The gravest defect of all is, of course, the veto power held by the Big Five. Since only great powers are likely to make wars of any consequence, the U.N. is impotent to curb any really powerful aggressor. In this respect the new organization is even weaker than the League of Nations. The crux of the matter lies in the unwillingness of any of the Big Five to surrender an iota of their national sovereignty for the sake of guaranteeing against future wars. Though of late there has been an increasing disposition on the part of Britain, France, the United States, and China to reconsider Article 27 (the veto provision), the Soviet Union became even more tenacious of her veto power when American aid to Greece and Turkey was clearly indicated by President Truman as a "stop-Russia" move, and when the American press began to indulge in open talk about a possible war with Russia. The remedying of problems inherent in Article 27 will apparently have to come by some other means than striking it from the Charter.

Obviously, then, the United Nations Organization stands or falls on the wartime alliance of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, the alliance from which it was born. Obviously, too, the authority of the U.N. is almost exclusively a moral one. This being said, the future of the organization appears far from bright, since the world is being split between American and Soviet camps of power, and Russia's exhaustive use of her veto in the Security Council denotes little concern for moral authority, if by that is meant the collective conscience of the majority of U.N. members.

On the brighter side there is this to be noted. Russia and the United States, the two strongest powers on earth, are still in the United Nations, and so long as membership in the organization is not compulsory there is reason to believe that both Washington and Moscow consider world opinion as something of a force, so far as their respective policies are concerned. The conflict between the two powers has been termed a "cold war," but the delegates to the United States, and the United Nations.
Nations of both the United States and Russia are still arguing their countries' cases before the bar of world opinion, which seems to indicate that the government of neither Russia nor the United States completely believes that survival lies in an utter disregard for all other views than its own.

The United States gave early promise of helping to make the U.N. a success. Unlinked as the new security organization was to the negotiation of peace treaties with the defeated powers, the United States Senate approved American participation by an overwhelming majority, and on October 24, 1945, Secretary of State Byrnes signed the protocol of the U.N. The Charter of the organization had officially become "a part of the law of nations."

The first meeting of the U.N. General Assembly was held in London in January and February, 1946. Though its primary business was the completion of the organization of the Security Council, Russo-American differences were brought to light when the Iranian delegation demanded that the Soviet Union withdraw its occupation troops in northern Iran, alleging that the continued presence of Red Army troops was an impairment of Iranian sovereignty and independence. The United States, backed by Britain, supported the Iranian argument, while the Russian delegate denied that his government had any offensive intentions, and that in due course the Russian forces would be withdrawn. At the first official meeting of the Security Council on March 25, 1946, the debate was renewed in more bitter tones, with Anglo-American delegates trading charges and countercharges with the Russian representatives, the latter at one time deliberately walking out of the Council meeting. The decision by the major powers to arrange for a final peace conference forced an adjournment of the whole squabble. At the peace conference held in Paris in midsummer, 1946, Russia demanded a postponement of another meeting of the Security Council until after the signing of the peace treaties, but both the Americans and British insisted that the Council take up its work in New York again in September, 1946.

A second meeting of the General Assembly was held at the old World's Fair grounds in Flushing, Long Island. Between October 23 and December 16, 1946, the disarmament question was debated. The ultimate decision was contained in a declaration favoring general disarmament and outlawing of the atomic bomb. The majority request that a count of armed forces abroad be reported was countered by a Russian demand that the U.N. in the future be given reports by the nations concerned on the manufacture of atomic weapons. A resolution was adopted by a majority urging that the veto power be
used sparingly by the Big Five on the Security Council. Before the meeting adjourned, the members voted to accept a gift of $8,500,000 by John D. Rockefeller, Jr., to purchase a site in New York City as a permanent home for the United Nations.

In the meantime the Security Council held intermittent sessions at Lake Success on Long Island. General disarmament and atomic weapons were again the core of the discussions. By early February, 1947, a stalemate had been achieved, with the United States insisting that the scrapping or controlling of atomic weapons should precede consideration of general disarmament, while the Soviet delegate held out for disarmament prior to settling the control of atomic weapons. The Russo-American split was becoming ever wider, and the rest of the U.N. member states began to wonder whether their destiny was to be that of referees or mere spectators at the struggle between the two giant powers. Opinion both in the Assembly and in the Council was divided as to the merits of the arguments emanating from Washington and Moscow, but in the number of times the veto power was used the Soviets had the higher score—Gromyko's masters were obviously determined that the majority will of the U.N. was not going to be allowed to balk Russia in her foreign policy objectives. Yet Russia made no move to indicate that she contemplated carrying on her obstructionist tactics outside the United Nations organization. The first step in the direction of a major policy frankly ignoring the United Nations was taken by the U.S.S.R.'s transatlantic opponent.

On March 12, 1947, President Truman announced to the American Congress that the territorial independence and integrity of Greece and Turkey were menaced by "aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes." Russia was not mentioned by name, but it was clear to the legislators that the Chief Executive was talking about the Soviet Union's drive for ideological and political hegemony in Europe. In view of this menace, Truman asked for loans of $250,000,000 for Greece and $150,000,000 for
Turkey in order that those states might strengthen themselves against
Soviet expansion. With surprisingly little haggling the Congress ap-
propriated the sums asked and within three months of Truman's re-
quest American missions were arriving in Turkey and Greece to
oversee the expenditures made in the name of stopping com-
munism. For the next year American money and supplies apparently
sufficed to prevent Communist victory in either Turkey or Greece,
though many American observers were of the opinion that it
amounted to pouring money down a rat-hole. The postwar situ-
ations of both countries were hardly conducive to concluding other-
wise.

Greece, under German occupation, had been thoroughly milked
of her economic assets, and liberation in the spring of 1945 saw the
country torn by civil strife between resistance groups with a hard
Communist core and supporters of a restored monarchy who, in the
main, had made little contribution to the fight against the Nazis.
Backed by a British occupation force, however, the Rightists man-
aged to retain Archbishop Damaskinos as Regent for the country
during the absence of London-domiciled King George. The mon-
archists, who called themselves Populists, instituted, under British
military protection, a reactionary regime which made no political
concessions whatsoever to the left-wing groups, collectively known
as the E.A.M. The repression of the radical groups reached the point
soon after the war where the E.A.M. felt impelled to ask for inter-
national support to end a "regime of terror more hideous than
Greece's periods of slavery under the Turks and Germans." Along
with the civil feud between Left and Right went a rapid economic
disintegration of the country. Early in 1946 the U. S. Export-Import
Bank granted a loan of $25,000,000 to buy supplies and equipment,
and the American State Department advised the government to take
rigorous measures against inflation, set up a more efficient civil
service, and concentrate on a revival of Greek trade and industry.
Britain, too, lent economic aid in the form of a $40,000,000 loan in
addition to railway rolling stock, vehicles, textiles and other non-food
items.

In an effort to satisfy criticism from the Western Powers as to the
democratic nature of the regime, general elections were promised by
the Greek government for March 31, 1946. Invited to observe the
elections, Great Britain, France, and the United States sent missions
for the purpose, but the Soviet Union, utterly out of sympathy with
the Populist group in Greece, refused. The E.A.M., feeling that the
election could prove nothing, stayed away from the polls. The vote
gave a victory to the Populists, a result termed by the Allied mission
"the true and valid verdict of the Greek people." Constantine Tsaldaris formed a Royalist cabinet and on September 1, 1946, held a plebiscite to determine the wishes of the Greek people as to whether they wanted a return of the monarchy. Of 1,801,140 registered voters, 1,691,592 voted for the monarchy. Within a month George II was in Athens and Tsaldaris was confirmed in his refusal to broaden his cabinet to include non-royalist elements as requested by the British and American governments. This measure both London and Washington believed was needed to end civil strife in the peninsula, a conflict which, by late 1946, was threatening to broaden into an international dispute with Greece's neighbors to the north and northwest.

Communist-dominated Bulgaria had demanded western Thrace from the Athens government, a move that had the full backing of the Soviet Union. This territorial acquisition by Bulgaria would have split the two anti-Communist states of Greece and Turkey, and allowed Bulgarian control of the Aegean approaches to Constantinople and the Straits. Marshal Tito, dictator of Yugoslavia, claimed Greek Macedonia, including the important port of Salonika. Thus there was some basis for strife on an international plane, but the complicating factor in the civil war in Greece was the fact that the Greek Communists, now fighting from the northern hills, were being encouraged and allegedly armed by Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The charges of Russian-Bulgarian-Yugoslav collusion with the Greek Communists became so insistent that the United Nations Security Council felt impelled to intervene. The Soviet Union counterattacked during a meeting of the Council early in 1946 with the request that British troops be withdrawn from Greece as a threat to the peace, and she used her veto power to prevent a formal declaration by the majority denying the Russian charge. By the end of the year, however, demands, led by the United States, for a U.N. investigation of the Balkan situation culminated in the creation of an investigating commission of representatives of the eleven powers sitting on the Security Council, empowered to travel anywhere in Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania. This time the Russians agreed, though insisting that the real cause of the trouble was the "reactionary" government of Greece.

Despite the fact that the government of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria refused to co-operate with the special U.N. investigating committee, the group spent three months gathering information and on April 19, 1947, reported back to the Security Council that Greece's Balkan neighbors were guilty of promoting guerrilla warfare. There the matter rested, so far as the U.N. was concerned, for
all three of the Balkan states denied the charge. In the meantime, the civil war had grown apace in Greece. In August, 1947, the guerrillas proclaimed the organization of a military government in "Free Greece," under the leadership of their commander-in-chief, General Markos Vafiades, and in the following month, Andrei Gromyko, Soviet representative to the U.N., introduced a resolution calling for the withdrawal of all foreign military personnel from Greece, the establishment of a U.N. commission to oversee economic aid to that country, and for placing complete blame for the Balkan trouble on the Greek government in Athens.

The Athens government, let it be said, was doing little in the meantime to heal the civil strife. As political advisers, the Americans had replaced the British, and they had tried all along to persuade the Athens politicians to make peace with the non-royalist elements in the country by setting up a more liberal government. Royalist Premier Tsaldaris and his cabinet resigned in August, 1947, because of their failure to unite the country and combat the guerrillas successfully and because of the belief of the United States aid mission that a more liberal regime could do better. When other politicians had been sounded on the subject, however, no leader was found, and Tsaldaris returned to power with a cabinet only one member of which was not a Populist. United States pressure during the next few weeks resulted in still another change of cabinets when Sophoulis agreed to form a government of thirteen Populists and eleven Liberals. As the year 1948 opened, the Sophoulis cabinet had proved as incapable as its predecessor of bringing an end to the civil war. In the north, the guerrillas, more than ever supported by Russia's Balkan satellites, were defying the authority of the Athens government, and in monarchist Greece neither the original American loan of $250,000,000 nor the promise of additional funds under the Marshall Plan had overcome governmental inefficiency and corruption, to say nothing of the obvious ineptitude of Royalist military leaders campaigning in the north. In the United States there was talk of sending military contingents to Greece to clean up the mess, but there was also a growing conviction in some quarters that the Truman Doctrine, as applied to Greece, was hardly a success.

In the case of the other beneficiary of American largesse under the Truman Aid Bill, Turkey, there was little pretense that money was needed in order to forestall a formidable Communist menace. In Turkey, aid was rather frankly designed to bolster the country's military establishment, a fact officially confirmed on May 12, 1947, by the Turkish president, and by the arrival less than two weeks later of a joint American Army, Navy, and State Department com-
mission in Ankara to determine Turkish requirements. The menace, then, was avowedly military, and it came in the form of a Russian demand for the establishment of military bases in the Straits of the Dardanelles. The Turks, of course, refused this obvious demand for a sacrifice of their sovereignty, as well as another Russian request for the establishment of joint Russo-Turkish defense of the Straits and narrowing the control of the Dardanelles to the Black Sea powers alone. Ankara based its refusal on the claim that the administration of the Straits was a concern of the United Nations and suggested that the Montreux Convention of 1936, still in force, might be reworded, provided the United States, Turkey's financial benefactor, take part in the revision proceedings. The United States stood firmly at the side of Turkey in the issue, reminding the Soviet Union that the Potsdam agreements contemplated a conference of all the powers, including the United States, to consider a revision of the Montreux settlement. Turkey, according to the American State Department, was the only legitimate defender of the Straits and, if the Straits were attacked, the U.N.'s Security Council should deal with the matter. Great Britain and France both agreed.

Russian demands on the Turks were of a territorial nature as well, for a request was made for the cession of large parts of northeast Anatolia and of the Turkish Black Sea Coast. Alleged Russian support of the autonomy demands of the Kurds in Turkey, along with the concurrent Soviet advance in Iranian Azerbaijan, were construed as a threat by the government at Angora. The Turks, however, long inured to being the central pressure point in Near Eastern questions, stood firm against Russian pressure, secure in the knowledge that the Western powers were strongly committed to giving diplomatic and possibly military support against Russia. Moscow seemed to sense the cocksureness of the Turks, too, and did not raise these claims officially. By the end of 1946 Russia seemed to have dropped her claims against Turkey, and when Soviet troops were withdrawn from Iranian Azerbaijan on Turkey's flank, the men at Ankara began to breathe more easily and turned their full attention to using American money for the strengthening of Turkey's defenses and to taking full advantage of the anti-Communist sentiment of the country's American benefactor to suppress all opposition at home in the name of rendering Turkey safe from communism. Clearly, from the American point of view, postwar Turkey was an important ally in the Near Eastern strategic objectives of the United States.

A broadening of the implications of the Truman Doctrine to include all of Europe came in the summer of 1947, when Secretary of State George C. Marshall, in a speech at Harvard University, stated
almost casually that if the European nations would make an estimate of their requirements in order to put their economies on a stable footing the United States stood ready to underwrite the expense. The Marshall Plan, as it was immediately labeled, was not intended as an entirely gratuitous assistance but as a measure designed to help Europeans help themselves. The alternatives posed were unpleasant to most Americans, for it was claimed by the advocates of European aid that if American help were not forthcoming in short order there was every chance that a hungry Europe would fall victim to communism, with the shots then being called from Moscow. Early estimates placed the over-all cost to the United States somewhere between seventeen and twenty billions of dollars.

In western Europe the Marshall Plan was greeted enthusiastically as a "great and generous" gesture, and the war-weakened nations quickly sent representatives to a conference at Paris to map out a blueprint of their recovery needs. Sixteen states in all were repre-
presented at Paris as the conference opened on July 13, 1947. Though the invitation had been sent to all European nations, including the Soviet Union, none of the states within the Russian sphere of influence participated. Rumania, Hungary, Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, along with the Soviet Union, spurned the opportunity of sharing in the American aid. From Moscow came blasts in the press concerning American “economic imperialism” and “buying friends with dollars.” Czechoslovakia’s Communist premier, on a visit to Moscow at the time, telephoned the government at Prague to withdraw its acceptance to attend the Paris conference, and the day before the meeting in Paris opened he and President Beneš arrived back home in the Czech capital with a five-year trade agreement with Russia, the Kremlin’s award for the Czech boycott of the Marshall Plan. An economic war was in the making.

The sixteen states represented at Paris, however, soon had their estimates ready, based on a four-year recovery program, and after some alterations these were turned over to the American government. In Washington, Senate and House pundits argued back and forth as to how the plan was to be administered, how much each of the countries concerned should receive, whether political conditions should be attached to the economic aid, and other such considerations. That the European Recovery Program, as it was now designated, would become law, however, there was little doubt. Administration estimates for the first year’s requirements were more than five billion dollars, but Republican politicians were promising, by mid-winter of 1947-48, to pare down that figure considerably. Secretary of State Marshall, with the help of the Republican Party’s advocate of a bipartisan United States foreign policy, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, was urging quick passage of the bill in order to stave off what were claimed to be imminent Communist coups in both France and Italy. Already the United States had extended considerable sums by way of interim aid to western European countries, pending the passage of the E.R.P. bill. On October 31, 1947, the United States Bureau of the Budget reported that American postwar aid to foreign countries amounted to $16,250,000,000, exclusive of any amounts that might be given under the E.R.P., a remarkable commentary on the probable outcome of spending an almost similar amount under E.R.P. to halt the spread of communism. Would another fifteen or twenty billion dollars achieve what the earlier expenditure had failed to accomplish? That was the question being asked by a very vocal and influential segment of American opinion, but there seemed no other way out of the situation. In the American view, one conclusion seemed irrefutable: if western Europe were
not helped with dollars, those dollars would soon be worth little or nothing outside the Western Hemisphere. Americans were predominantly of the opinion in the spring of 1948 that an economically unrevived Europe would necessarily be a Communist Europe.

In a speech at a small college in Missouri in 1946 Winston Churchill, England’s pugnacious wartime prime minister, made a statement which, at the time, seemed to Anglo-Saxon peoples at least to reflect a pessimistic, Cassandra-like attitude. He spoke eloquently but grimly of an “iron curtain” extending from the Baltic to the Adriatic, created by the Soviet Union, and behind which Communist totalitarianism was thriving on a diet of terror and bullying administered by Russia, a totalitarianism which one day would force the free and democratic world to gird itself once more for defense. Churchill at the time was excoriated by sincerely patriotic liberals throughout the Western world as a warmonger, as an alarmist, as a sensationalist on the world political stage. But in the months intervening between that pronouncement at Fulton, Missouri, and the present, developments in Europe have appeared to vindicate the Englishman’s assessment of world currents, just as did his warnings during the 1930’s against the menace contained in Hitlerism. Today, there is an “iron curtain” down the center of the European subcontinent, to the east of which Communist totalitarianism holds sway, to the west of which nations, most of them long accustomed to democratic parliamentary procedures and economic individualism, are in the process of rebuilding their defenses against the enemy to the east. Within the Soviet sphere of influence now lie Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Albania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Finland; in between the Soviet and Western spheres lie Germany, Austria; still technically in the Western camp of powers, but facing the threat of capitulation to communism within, is Italy; Greece and Turkey, though located to the east of Winston Churchill’s “iron curtain,” retain their connection with the West, chiefly because of their status as Mediterranean powers; clearly resolved on an anti-Communist course are the governments of France, Norway, Sweden, the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg), Denmark, Great Britain—and behind them, the United States; Franco’s Spain and reactionary Portugal have, in general, remained outside the main stream of conflict between East and West. Once acceptable to Hitlerian fascism, they are now trying to moderate their totalitarianism of the Right sufficiently to win their way into the good graces of the Western powers and are achieving considerable success in the doing. How these nations attained their present status-
with regard to the fast-congealing antagonism between East and West is the concern of the following discussion.

One of the first states to find common ties with Soviet Russia during the postwar years was Poland. The reader will recall that during the war a Polish Provisional Government had been established under Soviet sponsorship in Moscow and that, during the final stage of the war, it had been transferred to Lublin. In London, on the other hand, another Polish government, consisting of leaders who had fled the German attack in September, 1939, refused to recognize the claims of the Communist-dominated Lublin group. In accordance with the provisions of the Yalta conference of the Big Three leaders, the Soviet Union on June 12, 1945, called for both the London Poles and the Lublin leaders to join in reorganizing the Polish Provisional Government. Two weeks later a national government was created in which Edward B. Osobka-Morawski was named premier and Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, former head of the London government, was elected deputy premier. Mikolajczyk accepted the post on the condition that free and unfettered elections to a national assembly be held quickly, and the cabinet promised both Great Britain and the United States that such elections would take place in the immediate future.

What had made the issue such a pointed one, even as early as June, 1945, was that the provisional government then constituted was in reality a totalitarian one, controlled by a small Communist minority—a condition considerably encouraged by the fact that Red Army troops had freed Poland of the Nazis and were, during the postwar months, in complete military control of the country. The fact, too, that the Soviet Union, in order to justify its claim to the Polish territory east of the Curzon Line which it had seized in 1939, stood firmly in favor of the Polish demand for all German territory as far west as the Oder and Neisse rivers considerably enhanced the position of the Polish Communist Party, which could and did lay claim to being the instrument of the apparently profitable Russo-Polish friendship. With a strong Communist majority in the first place in the government, the Communists, little by little, undertook a campaign of suppression of opposition groups in the country. Only one party was allowed to fight openly against the dictation of the Communists, namely, the Polish Peasant Party of Mikolajczyk.

By mid-August, 1946, Communist acts of oppression against the opposition groups became so numerous that both the British and United States ambassadors handed in notes demanding free and immediate elections, but it was not until November 13, 1946, that Communist President Bierut signed a decree fixing the date for
general elections at January 19, 1947. In the meantime, however, government persecution of the opposition mounted steadily. Communist-dictated acts of aggression against the Roman Catholic Church in Poland evoked on October 20, 1946, a pastoral letter from Cardinal Hlond, Primate of Poland, in which the prelate called on Polish Catholics not to have anything to do with a government so manifestly opposed to the teachings of Christianity, a plea which brought a warning from the Communist president that official Roman Catholicism must either remain silent on political matters or suffer the consequences. The Peasant Party issued a manifesto, too, calling for the restoration of civil liberties and the subordination of the security police to the elected representatives of the people. The challenge brought such retaliatory persecution of Peasant Party leaders that the American State Department tried to secure British and Russian co-operation in issuing a statement demanding that the Polish Provisional Government halt its persecution of the opposition so that the forthcoming elections might be conducted fairly.

The elections were hardly fair, for the chief opposition party, the Peasant Party, was allowed but a restricted number of candidates, and before the results of the voting were known Mikolajczyk announced his intention of asking for Polish Supreme Court nullification of the vote. Out of a total vote of eleven and one-quarter million, the Communists had received over nine million. Less than three months later Stanislaw Mikolajczyk stepped off a Royal Air Force airplane in London announcing that he had escaped to avoid being “shot and killed like a sheep.” Behind him in Poland, the victorious Communists dedicated their regime to closer collaboration with Soviet Russia.

Germany’s central European satellite, Hungary, emerged from the war with a strong agrarian party, a ruined economy, and a vociferous Communist minority. The first postwar elections were held on November 4, 1945, and they proved a landslide for the Small Landowners Party, a group desirous of creating a new Hungary based on the prosperity of small, independent farmers. Though Communists received only 17 per cent of the votes in the November election, they held the decisive posts in the cabinet. One of their number, Matyas Rakosi, was named vice premier, and another, Zoltan Vas, held a key post on the Supreme Economic Council. Another victory, however, for the Small Landowners came in February, 1946, when Ferenc Nagy was elected premier. For over a year Nagy’s Small Landowners remained a majority in the government, but during that time the pressure from the Communist minority increased steadily. In the wrecked economy of Hungary during the postwar period there was
every opportunity for the Communists to undermine the position of the government from within.

Russia was in control of Hungary's oil and bauxite, her two most important natural resources, and had controlling shares in the nation's transportation system, as well as its leading financial and credit institutions—all achieved in the name of spoils of war. To make matters worse, the nation was forced to pay heavy reparations to the Soviet Union, and severe penalties were imposed for any arrears in payment, a situation which called forth an American protest on July 23, 1946, that such a condition was a violation of the Yalta agreement which had provided for concerted Big Three aid to former German satellites in their attempts to solve their pressing political and economic problems by democratic means. Already the United States had granted a ten-million-dollar loan (early 1946) and the U.N.R.R.A. had performed sterling service in keeping Hungarians from dying of starvation and want. To help stabilize Hungary's currency, the United States had also turned over to the Budapest government thirty-two million dollars of Hungarian gold reserves held in Germany. Inflation was not halted, however, for by May, 1946, the value of the pengo, normally 20 cents, was down so far that a single American dollar could buy two and one-half billion pengos. The government tried the heroic remedy of deflation and in August introduced a new currency; by December, 1946, the Budapest government was able to announce the first Hungarian budget since 1943. But the cost of curing inflation had come high.

Supported by the Russian military commander in Budapest, the Communists demanded a political purge in late June, 1946. Obediently, the government complied, dissolving the Boy Scouts, Catholic youth groups, student organizations, and instituted a campaign of political arrests against even non-collaborators. As in Poland, the Catholic Church was ordered to refrain from political or anti-Communist activities. Politicians and army officers who favored the Western version of democracy were ruthlessly purged. The Communists made political capital, too, of the peace treaty imposed on the country, for Hungary was reduced to the limits of 1938, to retrocede a section of its northern frontier to Czechoslovakia, to cede Transylvania to Rumania, and to pay a war indemnity of $300,000,000. The beginning of the end of the Small Landowners Party and its leader, Nagy, came on January 4, 1947, when the Communist-controlled Minister of the Interior announced he had discovered a "plot" to return Admiral Nicholas Horthy, Hungary's war-time Fascist dictator, to power. Eight members of the majority party in the parliament, the Small Landowners, were deprived of their legislative im-
munity and faced the demands of the Deputy Premier, Rakosi, the boss Communist, that they be convicted of conspiracy and executed. For the second time in two weeks the Soviet Union rejected United States demands for an investigation of the Hungarian political situation. The future course of affairs in Hungary was obvious.

On May 14, 1947, a government announcement stated that Premier Ferenc Nagy was taking a three-weeks’ vacation in Switzerland, and that during his absence Matyas Rakosi, the deputy premier, was in charge. Two weeks later it was announced that Nagy had telephoned his resignation from Geneva, but the premier, from his Swiss retreat, indignantly denied that he had any reason to resign. In Budapest, Rakosi promoted himself to premier and ordered a purge of “anti-democratic” elements in the army. Despite the denial of the Russian chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary that he had had any influence on the course of events, the British and United States governments registered unavailing protests. More to the point, the American State Department suspended a $15,000,000 credit to Hungary pending a “clarification of developments” in Budapest. True to form, the now Communist Hungarian government issued an official White Book alleging a “conspiracy,” indicating the Western powers as the inspirers and supporters of the supposed plot. By the end of the year both the Hungarian Liberty Party and the Hungarian Independence Party, the last of the opposition, had been eliminated by the terror and strong-arm tactics of Communist storm troopers. As Hungary withdrew behind the “iron curtain,” there was no more fitting commentary on the cynical manner in which totalitarianism had been imposed than the government’s denial in August, 1948, of charges that there was no free speech in Hungary and later its arrest of a Catholic cardinal.

In Bulgaria, a Fatherland Front coalition government, dominated by Communists, came to power in September, 1945, and for a full year there was a pretense made of allowing opposition groups to share in government. At the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers late in 1945 it was decided that representatives of at least two democratic groups should be included in the government. The most important of these democratic forces were the Agrarians, under the leadership of Nikolai Petkov, and the Socialists led by Kristo Pastukhov. Both groups demanded guarantees of civil liberties, freedom of the army from party influences, and new elections. On January 7, 1946, the Communist minister of the interior, Anton Yugov, visited Moscow for advice on how to deal with democratic demands, while Andrei Vishinsky, the Soviet Union’s most accomplished vilifier of the non-Communist way of life, lectured the democratic opposition in Sofia.
and threatened that "history will pass by such people and will follow its course." The United States made repeated efforts to force a broader representation in the Fatherland Front cabinet in line with the Moscow agreement, and on March 31, 1946, a change of cabinets occurred. Democratic elements were still not included, however, because, as the government leaders explained, "the Soviet Union considered the terms presented by the opposition for participation in the government . . . unacceptable."

The new government proved more extreme than the former, for it immediately introduced a bill gagging opposition newspapers, purged the army of officers unsympathetic toward the regime, and put one of the Agrarian leaders, Georgi M. Dimitrov, and Socialist Pastukhov on trial for sabotaging the government. An end was made to the Communist monarchy on September 8, 1946, when a plebiscite sent the child King Simeon II and his mother into Egyptian exile, and a "People's Republic" was proclaimed. In the general elections of the following month the Communists emerged as the strongest single party, holding 277 seats out of a total of 465 in the Bulgarian parliament.

The election was engineered by the veteran Communist leader and erstwhile Secretary-General of the Communist International, Georgi M. Dimitrov (no relation of the Agrarian leader). Trained in Moscow during the war, Dimitrov, with the militant support of his Bulgarian National Committee, dominated the political situation. Official recognition came for Dimitrov shortly after the general election, when he was named prime minister. By the end of 1946 the democratic opposition was effectively smashed, and the sole remaining personal opponent of the regime, Nikolai Petkov, the head of the Agrarian National Unity Party, was arrested in mid-1947 and charged with plotting the overthrow of the Communist regime. His trial elicited the intercession of both Great Britain and the United States, but it availed the hapless Petkov nothing, for on August 16, 1947, he was hanged in Sofia.

The peace treaty for Bulgaria was in one respect very lenient, for the state lost no territory and acquired the southern Dobrudja from Rumania, but her armed forces were reduced to 55,500 men, and an indemnity of $70,000,000 was divided between Greece and Yugoslavia.

On July 20, 1945, King Mihai of Rumania was awarded the Soviet Order of Victory, the Soviet Union's highest decoration, and the Russian commander of the occupation forces averred that the friendship between Russia and Rumania was becoming "closer and closer." Rumania's geographical proximity to the Soviet colossus was highly
conducive to such a process. The young Mihai, who had waited out the war in Nazi-occupied Bucharest, might well have smiled at the intensity with which his new conquerors sought "friendship." The end of the war saw his country, like his Bulgarian neighbor to the south, dominated by a coalition of several left-wing parties, the National Democratic Front, under Communist inspiration. As it was with Petkov in Bulgaria, so it was with Juliu Maniu, the leader of the Rumanian peasantry. He and the Western democracies were the butt of the official propaganda barrage laid down by the government. The Big Three meeting at Moscow late in 1945 insisted that the regime broaden the cabinet by the inclusion of democratic elements, that it restore liberty of the press and prepare for free elections. When the Rumanian government promised these concessions London and Washington officially recognized the postwar regime, but terrorism and repression of opposition groups in the country continued. Russia refused to go along with the British and Americans in a proposal for international supervision of the forthcoming elections, and the last guarantee of their relative fairness was removed.

As in Hungary, Rumanian economic life was completely co-ordinated with that of the Soviet Union. A network of jointly owned Sovrom companies throughout the country controlled all the major economic and transportation enterprise, and the Russian-controlled companies were granted special privileges, priorities and rebates, giving them a tremendous advantage over private business. In addition to war booty carried off by the Russians, the entire Rumanian war indemnity of $300,000,000 was channeled into the coffers of the Kremlin. This drain on the national economy, the loss of farm machinery and draft animals, and a severe drought during the summer produced a serious crisis in agriculture in the fall of 1946. An inflation, rocketing prices, and heavy taxes reduced the Rumanian middle class to near poverty. In the space of five months, the Rumanian leu stood at 90,000 to the United States dollar, one-third of its value in the summer of 1946. The nationalization of the Rumanian National Bank in December, 1946, was only a partial solution. In addition to the heavy war indemnity, the Rumanian peace treaty confirmed the cession of northern Bukovina and Bessarabia (occupied by Russia in 1940) to the Soviet Union, and southern Dobrujda to Bulgaria. From Hungary was acquired Transylvania, inadequate compensation for the loss of her other territories, but Rumania was hardly in a position to dispute the point.

The course of the Communist Party's seizure of power paralleled that in the other central European states, both in tempo and technique. General elections were held in November, 1946, but Com-
munist terror at the polls assured a victory for the extreme left-wing minority. The opposition leaders sent a joint message to the Moscow Conference of the Big Three in the spring of 1947 protesting the widespread arrests of non-Communist politicians; in May the National Peasant Party asked the American diplomatic representative in Bucharest for United States aid in restoring democratic liberties, and the Independent Social Democratic Party appealed to world opinion to protect it from persecution by the Communist-run government, but effective support was denied by the efforts of the Soviet Union to see its Rumanian protégés in complete power. In July the National Peasant Party was dissolved by decree, and Dr. Juliu Maniu and other party leaders were arrested on trumped charges of conspiracy. Since Rumanian law does not provide for capital punishment, Maniu was sentenced to life imprisonment. In the meantime, the Communists put into effect a monetary stabilization law devaluing the national currency, thus virtually confiscating the savings of the wealthy; by decree it increased production costs for private enterprise, and gave considerable material advantages to industrial workers. In an equally arbitrary manner, the regime took over the two largest British oil companies in the country.

As Rumania withdrew from contact with the West two events underscored the fact that, indeed, a new day had arrived in the land by the Danube. On November 7, 1947, Ana Pauker, a woman with a reputation as a Communist organizer almost equaling that of Georgi Dimitrov, was handed the portfolio of foreign affairs. Press photos of the occasion showed King Mihai, descendant of a decadent royal line, shaking hands with his proletarian foreign minister, a woman of the masses. Less than two months later Mihai himself stepped off the throne when his government decided to make an end of the Communist monarchy. As he departed his heritage, the Kremlin lent its blessing to the proclamation of the Rumanian People’s Republic.

When peace came to Yugoslavia, Partisan resistance forces under the leadership of a competent Communist guerrilla leader calling himself Tito, had risen to a predominant position in the country. The earlier nationalist groups, the Ustashi and Croatians and the Chetniks of Draja Mihailovitch, were discredited. There was considerable evidence that Mihailovitch’s Chetniks, in the face of more effective resistance to the Germans by Tito’s partisans, had begun to collaborate to some extent with the occupational forces. When peace came to the Balkans, therefore, Tito was in a position to demand that Mihailovitch’s “fascists” lay down their arms and acknowledge his supremacy. Tito’s supremacy, furthermore, had been assured to a
great extent by Allied preference during the closing months of the war, and there seems to be little doubt that his Partisans had a wider base of popular support than did the supporters of Mihailovitch. In any case the Soviet Union was frankly pro-Tito, and the Partisan leader soon gave every indication that he intended to set up a totalitarian regime in liberated Yugoslavia.

As early as July 2, 1945, the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party opposition, Vladimir Matchek, made the charge that Tito was attempting to establish a complete Communist dictatorship, and it was not long before Tito did secure his hold on the country. In the general elections on November 11, 1945, the ex-guerrilla leader presented what he called a “Liberation Front” list of candidates. The election returns put Tito and his henchmen in full control of the country, and during the next two years their conduct of domestic and foreign policies hewed strictly to the line and pattern set by Moscow, even to the point where the Yugoslav state was transformed into a set of six autonomous “Soviet Republics”: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slavonia—each with its own administration but directed entirely and unified by the Yugoslav Communist party. At the top sat Marshal Tito as premier. This quick establishment of a Communist dictatorship in the Balkans brought official recognition by the United States, but Washington pointed out that the regime was not in line with the spirit of the Yalta agreement.

Hostility of the West toward his government deterred Tito not in the least. In June, 1946, Mihailovitch and twenty-three of his associates were tried and sentenced to death as collaborators, a cause célèbre which found the American and British governments highly sympathetic toward the convicted Chetnik leader. The affair touched off a long period of bitter antagonism between the United States and Yugoslavia during which Tito’s ground forces shot down several American airplanes flying over Yugoslav soil. His controlled press ranted about the “imperialism” and “reactionary” character of the Western democracies, and in September, 1946, Tito suspended the United States Information Service in Belgrade. Nor was he more amiably inclined toward the U.N. Balkans Investigating Committee when the latter was attempting to gather information on the question of Yugoslav, Albanian, and Bulgarian aid to Greek Communist guerrillas, an attitude partially conditioned by Tito’s territorial demands against Greece.

In other respects Tito’s rule in Yugoslavia followed much the same pattern as that in other Russian satellite states. Roman Catholicism’s Archbishop Stepinac was accused of collaboration with the Germans
and sentenced to sixteen years in prison. On December 5, 1946, all private economic enterprise was nationalized. Along with his regimented domestic order, Tito attempted to establish Yugoslavia as the western pivot of Communist Pan-Slavism. In December, 1945, a Pan-Slav Congress was held in Belgrade, the upshot of which was a Yugoslav demand for the annexation of Trieste and a claim for a Bulgarian outlet to the Aegean sea at Greek expense. Further, when nine European Communist leaders conferred secretly in Poland late in 1947, a conference which, in effect, re-established a Communist International, an "Information Bureau" (Cominform) was created in Belgrade to organize "the exchange of experience and in the case of necessity" to "co-ordinate the activities of the Communist parties on the basis of common agreement." Yugoslavia had come into its own as the spearhead of the Communist advance westward.

This leadership, however, was challenged by the Cominform in July of 1948. Charging that Tito's party and government were highly nationalistic, had departed from Marxism, and were courting the western powers, the Communist International Information Bureau stamped Tito as a renegade. In reply Tito insisted that he was carrying out the Communist program in Yugoslavia and quietly went on his way. As a result no one knew whether this episode marked a serious split behind the iron curtain or was just a family quarrel.

Of all central European states, Czechoslovakia was the last to disappear behind the "iron curtain," despite the fact that the Czechs had the longest tradition of co-operation with the Soviet Union, even before World War II. The country was liberated by Red Army forces, and there was a strong pro-Russian feeling in the little republic, an attitude conditioned, furthermore, by the "sell-out" of Czechoslovakia at Munich in 1938. Nevertheless, the Czechs were keenly aware of the Western orientation which their nation's founder, Thomas Masaryk, and his friend, Eduard Beneš, had established during the 1920's. As a result, the government almost from the beginning was torn between what was considered a debt of gratitude owed the Soviet Union and the pull of Western-style democratic procedures. In postwar Europe, the Czechs were to fall victims to the exacting creditor in the East.

The first concern of the Czech leaders after the war was to rid the country of its troublesome national minorities, one of which, the Sudeten Germans, had been the cause of Czechoslovakia's prewar humiliation and dismemberment. Within four months of the liberation, both German and Hungarian minorities were deprived of citizenship by presidential decree, and the Sudetenland Germans, more than three million strong, were transferred physically to the
defeated Reich. By early 1947 the Hungarian minority had been similarly expelled.

Czechoslovakia's conversion to Communist totalitarianism was a very slow process despite the fact that the nation's first postwar premier, Klement Gottwald, was a Communist. It was not until mid-1946 that Gottwald was able to form a government in which the key ministries, interior, foreign affairs, information, and national defense, were assigned to Communist Party members. Once installed in these strategic posts the Communists little by little led the country toward the left. A Nationalization Law of October, 1945, had already made the nation a highly socialist state, but the totalitarian measures which ordinarily accompanied socialization did not begin until late 1946. Then a bill was presented by the government to regulate the press and the journalistic profession, and the country adopted an official propaganda line accusing the United States, in its postwar aid to Europe, of having imperialistic and interventionist motives. Nevertheless, it is matter of record that Czechoslovakia, of all countries in the Soviet sphere, had achieved by the end of 1946 the best reconstruction and had done so without sacrificing the majority of her democratic liberties. Furthermore, full cultural contact was maintained with the capitalistic West, due to the urgings of President Beneš and Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk.

Even Beneš and Masaryk, however, had to recognize the close economic and political ties with the Soviet Union which Czechoslovakia's geographical position made mandatory. While these two leaders apparently retained a balanced view of the country's intermediate position between Communist totalitarianism and Western democracy, the bulk of the Czech populace could know only what a Communist-dominated cabinet was willing to reveal. As a consequence, by midwinter of 1947–1948, Gottwald and his henchmen had considerable popular support. Even so, the Communist Party did not feel secure enough to allow a general election which was scheduled for early spring of 1948 and decided on a coup to forestall an unfavorable decision at the polls. With the full personal support of a high Soviet official, Gottwald demanded of President Beneš that the cabinet be made into a completely Communist body. When news of the putsch reached the public, demonstrations were held in the streets of Prague, but Communist-controlled police soon quelled the indignant cries of the opposition. President Beneš bowed before the inevitable and assented to the reconstruction of the government in line with Gottwald's wishes. A few days later, one of Czechoslovakia's two remaining "Westerners," Jan Masaryk, chose suicide rather than
continue in a government which represented the complete denial of all the democratic principles upon which his father had hopefully created the Czech Republic three decades earlier. As Czechoslovakia turned its back on the West, the tragic figure of Eduard Beneš served to remind his countrymen that they had forsaken their birthright.

By the spring of 1948, the status of three countries, Germany, Finland, and Austria, was an equivocal one in respect to the conflict between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. Finland was on the verge of falling completely within the Soviet orbit, while defeated Germany and Austria were divided between the Soviets and the West. That Finland would soon be lost to the democratic forces there was little doubt, but in Austria and Germany the presence of Allied occupational forces and the failure of the victorious powers to decide upon peace treaties made the ultimate orientation of the two countries an open question.

The troubles of little Finland did not end with the peace established between her and her Anglo-Soviet enemies. The Finns were forced to pay an indemnity of $300,000,000, and to cede the Petsamo area, Viipuri, and the Karelian region to the Soviet Union. The territorial sacrifice entailed a loss of 10 per cent of the country's population as well as strategic and economic assets. Despite a wrecked economy the Finns staged a real recovery. Reparations payments were kept up to date, homes were rebuilt, and the rubble of their ruined cities cleared away. A credit of $35,000,000 was granted by the American Export-Import Bank, trade was maintained with Sweden, and a favorable trade agreement was negotiated with Russia in May, 1946. Three months later the government gave proof of its earnestness in staging a recovery when it required all citizens to turn over to the Bank of Finland their shares and bonds in foreign firms in order to strengthen the government's recovery effort.

Premier Juho Paasikivi (president after March, 1946) early announced his platform of conciliation with the U.S.S.R. and in the postwar years managed to hold together the various political factions of the country while steering a cautious course acceptable to Russia. Nevertheless most Finnish people maintained a stout resistance to any encroachment on their basic liberties, but by March, 1948, the Kremlin had decided that the time had come for the Finns to cement their ties with the Soviet Union. Thereupon the Finnish cabinet received a Russian "request" for a friendship pact and a military alliance between the two countries. After two weeks' debate the Finnish Parliament voted to accept the Russian summons to talk about a pact which held all the seeds of Finnish surrender to Soviet domination.
The biggest bone of contention between the Anglo-American and Soviet camps during the postwar period has been the shattered German Reich. At the Potsdam meeting in August, 1945, President Truman, Marshal Stalin, and England's new Labor premier, Clement Attlee, issued the Three-Power Declaration providing that the supreme authority in Germany was to be exercised by the commanders-in-chief of the Big Four occupying armies, with a Joint Control Council in Berlin to deal with matters affecting Germany as a whole. Germany was divided into four parts, each administered by one of the Big Four powers, France, Russia, England, and the United States. In general, Great Britain was assigned an area stretching across north Germany from Lübeck and the Baltic to the Dutch and Belgian frontiers, an area containing almost twenty-three million Germans. The United States forces occupied the more sparsely settled sections of Bavaria and West Central Germany. The French controlled western Württemberg, southern Baden, the Saar, and the southern Rhineland in the west. The territory between the Elbe and Oder rivers, including most of Mecklenburg, Brandenburg, as well as Saxon and Thuringian lands, was assigned to the Soviet Union. All territory east of the Soviet-controlled zone was immediately occupied and administered by Poland and Russia as permanent annexations. At Potsdam it was agreed that Königsberg and the eastern tip of Prussia were to be administered as part of the U.S.S.R., while the rest of the former German territory east of the Oder and Neisse was turned over to Poland. However, the Potsdam conference agreed that these boundaries in the east were provisional and would be settled at some future date when the German peace treaty was written. The stake was considerable, for this east-Oder territory comprised thirty-nine thousand square miles and a population (as of 1939) of almost ten million. There was no question, however, about the other territorial acquisitions at German expense made by Poland. The recreated Polish state was given the remainder of East Prussia, part of Brandenburg, the port of Stettin, most of Pomerania, and the rich industrial province of Silesia.

This postwar territorial rearrangement imposed a considerable population pressure on the shrunken Reich, for Poland uprooted the German population in the territories she occupied and forced them to move west of the Oder, where they gravitated toward the British and American occupation zones. Another several million Germans trekked westward from Danzig and the Polish Corridor, as well as from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the Baltic Provinces, where they had been transplanted by Hitler during the war and given new homes in Nazi-conquered lands. The influx of these millions more
than "compensated for Germany's losses of four to five million military and civilian war dead."

There were more mouths to feed but less land from which to feed them. The territory lost to the Poles and Russians was Germany's breadbasket, but neither Poles nor Russians felt impelled to ship food west of the Oder. Nor could Germany import foodstuffs, for she had neither the money with which to buy them, nor the manufactured goods which could be used in exchange, since the Allied reparations policy prevented the manufacture of goods in sufficient quantities for export. The agreement that Russia was to help feed Germans in the American and British zones out of the food stocks in her own highly agrarian sector came to nothing, with the consequence that London and Washington were hard put to it during the winter of 1945-1946 to prevent mass starvation in the western zones. In 1946 the United States sent $200,000,000 in food to Germany, and Britain shipped in almost twice as much. In February, 1947, Herbert Hoover was sent on a personal mission by President Truman to study the problem of feeding the Germans at less expense to American taxpayers, and, despite some very sound suggestions in the report submitted by Hoover on his return to the United States, the fact remained that six months later United States food shipments to Western Germany were averaging almost one-half million tons of grain per month. While the United States and British zones were torn by numerous hunger strikes by German workers protesting their low calorie allowances, the Germans in the relatively well-fed Russian zone fell easy victims to the Soviet propaganda line that the Anglo-Americans were intent upon a conqueror's peace for the dismembered Reich.

The whole problem of feeding the hungry Germans of the western zones was intimately connected with both the reparations question and the attitude of the victorious powers toward the industrial revival of Germany. Russia demanded reparations amounting to twenty billion dollars and the Anglo-Americans avoided direct approval by allowing the Soviets to take reparations in kind, which meant an enormous transfer of German industrial equipment, motor vehicles, and rolling stock to Russia. There was not too much objection from the American side to this procedure for, at the time, the American occupation authorities were attempting to implement the so-called "Morgenthau Plan," which entailed forcing Germany back into the status of a predominantly agrarian country incapable of producing war matériel. Accordingly, the Americans themselves were engaged in dynamiting many industrial plants. By mid-1946 the realization dawned on the Western powers that they were, in effect, committing
themselves to support Germans out of their own pockets while denying them the equipment with which to produce goods which could be traded for the means of subsistence. In September, 1946, therefore, the American Secretary of State, James Byrnes, in a speech at Stuttgart, called for a reversal of the Potsdam decisions regarding the agrarianization and partitioning of Germany.

Byrnes demanded an elimination of economic barriers between the occupation zones and an economic merger of the United States and British sectors. France and Russia, however, refused to join in the economic unification of Germany, despite a Potsdam provision calling for the treatment of Germany as an economic whole. Not until early 1947 did Washington move to implement this new policy. Ex-President Herbert Hoover, reporting back to President Truman in February, 1947, came to the conclusion that German industry required rebuilding in order that the Germans could meet their own industrial needs and at the same time ship enough exports abroad to pay for the food required to maintain themselves. Since the Hoover Report the American and British zones have been merged and the United States has assumed the operating expenses of the British sector. The industrial recovery of Western Germany is being cautiously pursued by the combined Anglo-American economic administration, and in the meantime American foodstuffs in enormous quantities are required to keep the Germans alive in "Bizonia." Russian demands for reparations out of current German production during 1947 met a firm refusal on the part of the American secretary of state, who declared that such a policy would make Germany "a congested slum or an economic poorhouse." During the winter of 1947-1948 several ugly mass strikes and near riots by Ruhr coal miners and other German workers have pointed up the continuing gravity of the Anglo-American position. Internationalization of the Ruhr in the early spring of 1948 removed only one of the French objections to the restoration of German light and heavy industries.

Closely related to the economic crisis of Germany has been the question of political reconstruction of the Reich. The Potsdam Declaration authorized German political parties on a zonal or state basis only, not on a national basis. Nevertheless, political parties have emerged, with loose connections between the occupation zones. The Liberal Democratic Party demands respect for private property and the separation of Church and State; the Christian Democratic Union looks toward a reconstruction of Germany on a Christian political basis; the Social Democrats envisage a Socialist Germany within a Socialist European Federation; the Communists, of course, want a Soviet Germany established on the Russian model. Because elections
have been held at different dates and on different levels under different systems of representation in the various zones, it can only be said that the Social Democrats and the Christian Democratic Union are the two most powerful groups in the American, British, and French-occupied territories. In the Russian zone non-Communist candidates were excluded in many constituencies, and the Social Democratic Party has been merged with the Communist Party in a "Socialist Unity Party." Since the beginning of 1947 Soviet occupation authorities have been negotiating for admission of the Socialist Unity Party as the successor to the Communist Party in the western zones, in exchange for the admission of Social Democrats to the Russian sector. To date the United States military authorities have refused permission for a merger of the Russian zone's Socialist Unity Party and Bavaria's Communist Party.

A fundamental principle of all major parties from the beginning has been the reorganization of a national German state, as well as the liquidation of Nazism and the rehabilitation of the German people. The Social Democrats and the Christian Democratic Union in the western zones have favored a unified federal state—in contrast to a unitary state—with a representative parliamentary government. Operating as they do within the framework of Allied Military Government and licensed by the occupying authorities, these parties can have at best but an artificial status. Nevertheless, the American Military Government's policy of creating popularly elected Länder governments and providing for democratic procedures at lower levels gives promise of a politically experienced and democratic corps of German politicians capable of operating a unified Germany, should the occupying powers decide to let the Germans rule themselves. There seemed to be serious obstacles to such an eventuality, however, because the Russian policy was diametrically opposed to the long-range Anglo-American objective of creating a unified Germany on an extremely federalist basis. A Russian proposal that the German people themselves decide by plebiscite whether their future state have a centralized or federal government was firmly rejected by the other three occupying powers, for London, Washington, and Paris were convinced that political unification of Germany in the immediate future would mean a Communist seizure of the restored Reich.

The prospects of a recreated and an independent German Reich within the predictable future appeared slim indeed by the spring of 1948. Between the Soviet Zone and those of the Western powers an impenetrable wall has been built by the divergent policies of the occupying governments. Since there seems to be no immediate prospect of either Russian or Anglo-American withdrawal, a resolu-
tion of the political situation in Germany, for all practical purposes, must await the showdown between Russia and the Western powers that apparently must come. In attempting (in April) indirectly to force the representatives of the Western powers out of Berlin, Russia seemed determined to nail down her "iron curtain" in Germany, despite the threat of a real crisis. To the surprise of the western powers she refused to permit the transportation of food, coal, goods, or people from Allied-controlled Germany across the Russian sphere to the part of Berlin occupied by the Allies. To meet this challenge the United States and Britain transported supplies by means of an "airstream" to the German city and forbade the exportation of anything to the Russian Zone. During the summer attempts were made to arrange a settlement whereby a uniform Russian currency would be used in Berlin and the Russian so-called blockade would be lifted. Neither side seemed willing to give way. The western powers were determined to prevent the establishment of a Communist Germany.

Of little help toward the political rehabilitation of the German people were the denazification of German officialdom and the war crimes trials of Nazi civil and military leaders. The definitive results of denazification in the Russian zone have not been made public, but in the American and British zones a thorough elimination of Nazis in posts of even minor responsibility was undertaken during the early months of occupation. It was found, however, that such a procedure was denying occupational authorities the services of many capable administrators and presenting denazification courts and boards with an almost insurmountable task, so numerous were the defendants. By late 1946 the tide in the American zone, at least, had obviously turned, for General McNarney, the United States commander-in-chief in Germany, granted an amnesty to more than 800,000 Germans liable to denazification proceedings for minor offenses.

For the Nazi chieftains, however, there was no escape. Beginning in late summer, 1945, and continuing well into 1947, the Allied authorities conducted an elaborately documented trial at Nuremberg of the twenty-one top men of Nazidom still living and in custody. A new precedent was set in international law when the prosecution established the principle that conspiracy to make war and the instigation of crimes against humanity, such as mass murders, were indictable offenses. Of the group in the prisoners' box, only Hermann Goering refused to shunt the burden of guilt to the dead Führer; Ribbentrop, Keitel, Schacht, and the others pleaded personal innocence on the ground that they were merely following Hitler's orders. Eleven of the Nazi leaders were sentenced to death, seven to prison, and three were acquitted. Goering cleverly contrived suicide before
THE WAR TRIALS AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY
A court room scene
he could be forced to mount the klieg-lighted gallows. Throughout the Nuremberg trial no German voices were raised in defense of the accused save their own and those of their lawyers. The prevailing sentiment among the German populace was one of indifference, almost boredom, with no apparent sense of personal responsibility for the regime of terror and destruction which their apathy had helped create. Crawling about on empty stomachs amid the ruins of a Reich that was to have lasted for a thousand years left little opportunity for a sense of collective guilt to develop. Those who had the inclination and energy to think at all seemed to find more satisfaction in contemplating the division among their conquerors than in pondering Germany’s war guilt.

The fate of Austria, Germany’s partner by virtue of the forced Anschluss of 1938, had also to be decided by the spring of 1948. Like the German Reich, the little country was put under occupation by the Big Four powers immediately after the close of hostilities, with the Soviet Union in control of the rich industrial areas of Lower Austria (excluding Vienna, which was set up as an internationally controlled enclave), while the French, British, and Americans shared the occupation of the rest of the country. Again the Soviet Union forced a tremendous drain on the economic life of the state by transferring industrial equipment, locomotives, and vehicles to Russia. Throughout the first year of the occupation, the Austrian government, headed by Dr. Karl Renner, a veteran Socialist, and aided by the American and British governments, tried to ease the economic burden and to limit the occupation forces. Russian confiscation of Austrian industrial equipment was justified by Moscow on the ground that such equipment was in reality German property and therefore liable as “war booty” to removal by Russian agents. The Allied representatives, furthermore, were unable to come to an agreed definition of Nazi or German assets, a major stumbling block to the conclusion of a peace treaty. In July, 1946, President Truman, in a move to strengthen the moderate Socialist government of Renner, agreed to turn over to the Austrians all German assets in the United States Zone, a step supported by London. Further to strengthen its stand, the Austrian government undertook a nationalization of most big industries—mines, iron and steel works, locomotive and electrical plants, chemical factories, oil wells, and banks.

Until late 1946 the most serious crisis confronting postwar Austria was a food shortage, brought on chiefly by the unwillingness of the Russians to co-operate with the other three occupying authorities in pooling the food resources of the country. Only when starvation threatened in December, 1946, did the Soviet authorities agree with
the United States on proposals promising to ameliorate the food situation by allowing the Austrian government to distribute pooled food stocks. Russian compromise in this respect, however, did not lead to co-operation with the Anglo-Americans in regard to a restoration of the Austrian economy. The Soviets insisted that the peace treaty for Austria contain provision for bilateral Austro-Soviet negotiation of differences concerning German assets and demanded Soviet control of exports and profits of Russian-held establishments in Austria, a stark contrast to the United States agreement with the Austrian government in mid-1947 providing for American payment of 308,000,000 schillings as a final settlement of American occupation costs during the preceding two years.

Repeated conferences by the Big Four foreign ministers failed to write a definitive peace treaty for the little republic, and there seemed small likelihood that one would be completed until Soviet differences with the Anglo-Americans in regard to the German settlement were ironed out. In the meantime, the presence of Western troops seemed to guarantee, for the time being at least, that President Renner's Socialist government would be supported against a Communist seizure of power in the Balkan manner, even though Russian occupation authorities at various times have attempted to force Austrian cabinet ministers to appoint Communist Party members to key posts in the police and administrative bureaucracy. The Austrian problem, in the eyes of both Anglo-American and Soviet statesmen, was intimately connected with the final solution of the German question, all of which more or less implied an unclear status for Austria for some time to come.
COLLATERAL READING

POSTWAR developments in Italy and France indicated in the spring of 1948 the possibility of a third world war. In the case of Germany's Axis partner, the peace settlement after the second struggle was soon decided upon by the victorious Allies. It was a severe treaty, despite the anti-Fascist coup of July, 1943, which overthrew Mussolini and took Italy over to the Allied camp as a "co-belligerent." Nor did the expulsion of the war-guilty House of Savoy and the substitution of a republic materially ameliorate the harshness of the settlement. Stripped of her entire African empire, certain border areas along the French frontier, and the Dodecanese Islands in the eastern Mediterranean, Italy was once more pushed back within the confines of her peninsula. Most of the Istrian peninsula was lost to Italy. A "Free Territory of Trieste" was carved out of the western part, and its integrity and independence were placed under the guarantee of the U.N. Security Council. Severe limitations were placed on Italian armed forces, and heavy indemnities to Greece, Yugoslavia, Albania, Ethiopia, and the Soviet Union were imposed. In the north, a small American army of occupation was installed, which was not withdrawn until December, 1947. The price of Caesarianism had come high for Mussolini's former minions.

Left to their own devices politically, the Italians faced the problem of whether or not they wanted to live under a republican or a monarchical form of government. That a new constitution would have to be created was a point of universal agreement. In the spring of 1946, a quarrel between the parties of the Left, who wanted a constituent assembly to have the right to decide between a monarchy
and a republic, and the monarchists, who favored a plebiscite on the question, resulted in a compromise. It was agreed that a plebiscite was to be held simultaneously with the election of a constituent assembly, without penalties for nonvoters. On May 9, 1946, little King Victor Emmanuel III formally abdicated, hoping thus to save the throne for his son Humbert who, as Lieutenant General of the realm since June 5, 1944, was in line for the throne. Humbert succeeded as king, but his actual powers were no greater than those connected with his former status, nor was his tenure as long.

The fateful election was held early in June, 1946, and the result was a clear verdict in favor of a republic (12,717,923 as against 10,719,284 in favor of monarchy). In general the southern provinces voted for the monarchy, while the northern part of the peninsula favored republicanism. On June 14 King Humbert II was provided a free airplane ride to Portugal and exile. Mazzini had triumphed over Cavour after all.

Enrico de Nicola was elected provisional head of the state by the Constituent Assembly which convened in Rome on June 25, and Christian Democrat Alcide de Gasperi was commissioned to form a new ministry. Socialists, Christian Democrats, and Communists were soon vying with one another for control of the government, and by January, 1947, the continuing economic depression had resulted in an upswing of sentiment in favor of communism. The Socialist Party split, with the larger faction, led by Pietro Nenni, demanding closer cooperation and ultimate fusion with the Communists; while the smaller group, led by Giuseppe Saragat, stood for the freedom and autonomy of the Socialist Party. Under constant fire from both Socialists and Communists—the latter led by Palmiro Togliatti, a brilliant orator and politician—Premier de Gasperi twice resigned office, but was called back each time when President de Nicola was unable to find a moderate willing to form a new cabinet. On May 31, 1947, de Gasperi formed a government which for the first time excluded Communists and Socialists, a signal for open warfare with the Left. Communist Partisans in northern Italy took to the hills for guerrilla warfare, and Togliatti threatened the use of force to obtain a change in government.

Togliatti's declaration of war was no idle threat. In September, 1947, a million agricultural workers in the Po Valley went out on strike; 900,000 steel workers stopped work for 48 hours; 30,000 farm laborers around Rome and Arezzo not only went on strike but began seizing farms as well. On into November and December the violence continued to the accompaniment of Togliatti's denunciations of the government and of interference in Italy's domestic affairs by the
United States. On November 28 the prefecture and other government buildings in Milan were seized by Communist bands. Matters were clearly coming to a head. Washington thought so, too, for President Truman's advisers were convinced that the Soviet Union's finger was in the Italian brew, and on December 13, 1947, Truman warned that the United States would take "appropriate" measures if the independence of Italy was threatened "directly or indirectly." In the face of American financial aid to the moderate Italian government, the Soviet Union expressed a frank interest in the success of the Togliatti forces in the peninsula, and held out the promise of Russian backing of an Italian Communist government's claim for Italian trusteeship under the U.N. for Italy's prewar African colonies. There was even talk among Italian Communists about Russian support of an attempt to bring Trieste back under Italian control.

Though firmness in dealing with Communist-inspired strikes and unrest had won for the de Gasperi government a breathing spell in February, 1948, Palmiro Togliatti was buoyantly confident of the outcome of the national elections scheduled for April 19. Italian moderates, on the other hand, were holding their breath, hoping that quick passage of the E.R.P. bill in the United States Congress would put them in a position to pit the value to Italy of American friendship against that of the Russian embrace. In various municipal elections throughout the peninsula the Socialist-Communist "popular Democratic Front" was polling half the votes, and Premier de Gasperi's newspaper Risorgimento warned that "... there can be little illusion that unless something is done, the national political elections will have similar results." American aid under the E.R.P. and the promise by the Western powers of the return to Italy of Trieste and the Italian colonies encouraged the conservative Italians in their successful attempt to prevent a Communist victory on April 19. In Italy, as elsewhere, the fate of the nation seemed to hinge on the outcome of the gigantic struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union for the support and sympathies of Europeans west of the "iron curtain." How long the new constitution of the Italian Republic, which went into effect on January 1, 1948, would stand up under the Russo-American tug-of-war in Italy was something the Italians were incapable of determining without outside assistance. As usual, Italy was unable to make good on that ill-advised boast of Charles Albert, uttered a century before: "L'Italia farà da sé" (Italy will go it alone).

France, too, faced constantly a Communist threat during 1948, a predicament produced by a peculiar political and economic evolution since liberation. The expulsion of the Germans from France in
1945 brought to the head of the country its outstanding military figure of the resistance, General Charles de Gaulle, who presented himself as above the play of political passions. The general elections held in October, 1945, however, revealed that the country as a whole stood far to the left of De Gaulle, for the Communists, Popular Republicans, and Socialists, gained a sweeping victory. The rather revolutionary co-operation of these leftist groups was short-lived, and factional strife soon broke out, once pre-1939 leaders, political outlook, and institutions had been repudiated. The central issue was the nature and extent of the governmental control they all wished to see established over the social, economic, and political life of the nation. Various blueprints were advanced for a complete and all-embracing constitution for a rejuvenated France. During most of 1946 the real issue was whether or not the acrimonious relations between the radical groups would result in more conservative forces seizing control of the unstable government.

In order to consolidate the opposition of the right De Gaulle resigned the presidency of the Provisional Government under a barrage of criticism from radical quarters. The short-lived presidency of his Socialist successor, Felix Gouin, represented a stopgap government, which attempted mainly to cut the budget, reactivate economic life, and draw up a new constitution which would satisfy the country. A national referendum on the Socialist draft of a constitution resulted in its rejection, apparently because the French bourgeoisie were fearful that the proposed weak executive and strong assembly would give too much power to the Communists, greatly strengthened by the fact that they had played a major role in the French resistance movement during the war. When another election was held on June 2, 1946, to select a new constituent assembly the Popular Republicans gained the most seats, while the Socialists placed third, despite the fact that French Socialism's "Grand Old Man," Léon Blum, had just successfully completed a credit agreement with the United States.

For the next several months the Popular Republicans led by premier-President Georges Bidault withstood the sniping activities of De Gaulle, who by now was attacking his old Popular Republican allies as well as the Marxist parties. In spite of an intensified campaign by De Gaulle, denouncing the new constitutional draft as legalized anarchy and dictatorship, an apathetic electorate on October 13 gave a narrow majority to the Popular Republicans' version of the nation's constitutional needs. The new constitution of the Fourth French Republic maintained a weak executive, a strong lower house, and an indirectly elected second chamber with only consultative powers. A unique feature of this constitution was the
provision of equal rights and duties for all colonial peoples under French rule, rights and duties that put them on a political par with the citizens of metropolitan France.

The new constitution was put into operation by the National Assembly elected on November 10, 1946, a legislature which contained a greatly strengthened Communist bloc on the left and a resurgent Republican Party of Liberty at the other end of the political spectrum. The gains of neither right nor left, however, were sufficient to take practical politics out of the realm of coalition rule. On January 16, 1947, Vincent Auriol was elected the first president of the Fourth Republic, and a week later Socialist Paul Ramadier formed a coalition cabinet of nine Socialists, five Popular Republicans, and five Communists.

The political history of the Fourth Republic is inexplicable save in terms of economic pressures owing their origin to an economy shattered by six years of war. France strove mightily to catch up with prewar production figures and almost succeeded. Improvement in food, clothing, and housing was noticeable within a year after liberation. Nevertheless, the essential weakness of the economy came to light when inflation set in, a development which the government tried to meet by drawing up a master five-year plan designed to spur production. State planning and thorough socialization, however, did not go hand in hand. In addition to an already state-controlled Bank of France, leading credit banks and transport, only electricity, gas, coal mining, steel, and part of the insurance business were nationalized; everything else remained under private control. Despite significant boosts in industrial and agricultural production during 1946, over one billion dollars in United States credits had to be extended; almost two billion dollars' worth of consumed Lend-Lease material was written off; and huge quantities of American war surplus material were sold to France at greatly reduced prices to be used for reconstruction purposes. But even this fillip to the French economy was insufficient, and by the end of 1946 the government was asking the International Bank for additional credits of $500,000,000. A shortage of man power was also a serious obstacle to reconstruction, and even the offer of the French government to 700,000 German war prisoners permitting them to settle permanently west of the Rhine, as well as a long-range immigration program, failed appreciably to relieve the situation. Along with augmented production, too, came higher prices and living costs, despite various governmental curbs, reductions in the civil service, and other budgetary economies.

Strikes and other forms of labor unrest broke out throughout France in 1947, some of them perhaps stimulated by the Communists
in an attempt to force the government to abdicate in their favor, but
the French economy was in such a poor condition that Communist-
inspired unrest merely added to the confusion and seriousness of the
economic crisis. A general strike in February, 1947, of the mechanical
unions, office workers, policemen, and public utilities workers, and
the hesitating attitude of the Ramadier government in dealing with
the demands for higher wages and lower prices gave De Gaulle an
opportunity in the spring of 1947 to form a political organization
known as the Réunion du peuple français (R.P.F.), dedicated to
putting the general at the head of France, ending the economic crisis
by returning to a system of “economic freedom,” ousting both Com-
munist and Socialist influences in government, and creating what
De Gaulle vaguely referred to as a “strong state.” The ex-leader of
the Free French forces claimed that his followers were not a political
party, that the movement cut across party lines, a veritable ralliement
of the French people. Left-wing groups were quick to point out that
De Gaulle’s semi-mystical appeal to the national character of the
French bore a remarkable similarity to the “blood and soil” pro-
nouncements of Hitler and the Italianità program of Mussolini. Ap-
parently the majority of the French people shared this suspicion to
some extent, for acceptance of De Gaulle and his movement was not
in sight by the fall of 1948, despite social unrest.

In June, 1946, Ramadier had tried what he called a “distress” pro-
gram—deflation and economy, plus more work, wage ceilings and
price fixing, a policy that brought down the execrations of the Com-
munists. To bolster Ramadier’s position the United States Export-
Import Bank made $32,000,000 available to France for the purchase
of coal and other industrial materials, and in October, 1947, poured
in another $50,000,000. This priming of the pump, however, failed
to strengthen the government sufficiently to continue, and when the
coal and metal workers, and other industrial organizations set up a
clamor against Ramadier in late November, 1947, the Socialist pre-
"mier gave up the struggle and turned the reins over to his sixty-one-
year-old minister of finance, Robert Schuman, a member of the
Catholic Popular Republican Movement. Schuman’s cabinet repre-
sented a compromise between the advocates of managed economy and
laissez faire supporters. The government announced immediately a
policy of higher wages while protecting public order and “the right
to work.” To deal with serious Communist-inspired strikes then
sweeping the country, Schuman proved himself a man of some
strength when he put before the National Assembly an anti-strike
measure calling for police use of 80,000 military reservists. Only the
Communists voted against the measure.
As 1948 opened the Communists were still highly hopeful of undermining Schuman’s moderate government, and a French economy badly in need of additional aid from the United States pending the granting of credits under the European Recovery Program promised to make the Communist threat a serious one. In the United States it was commonly held that if Italy fell to a Communist coup the fate of the Schuman government, with or without United States aid, was sealed. In the meantime, General De Gaulle’s R.P.F. was making an all-out effort to point up the threat from the extreme left but in the process was probably doing more to weaken the government’s position with regard to the Communist menace than to weaken the Communists themselves. Many patriotic Frenchmen were convinced that De Gaulle was determined on establishing a dictatorship of the Right in France or wrecking the country’s chances of recovery in the attempt. There was a growing conviction, however, among many French people in the fall of 1948 that the salvation of France was to be achieved by neither the extreme right nor left, but by a combination of American dollars and the united efforts of moderate Socialists and left-wing bourgeois parties, a coalition already taking hold of the French public’s imagination as the “Third Force.” On the other hand, there were those who believed that the need for order would eventually result in the election of De Gaulle to the presidency. Meanwhile, Dr. Henri Queuille, a Conservative Radical Socialist, as premier, endeavored to continue Schumann’s moderate policies and thus prevent France from going to the extremes of left or right. Tax-avoiding profiteers made his job difficult.

Abroad, France followed her idée fixe: to prevent German resurgence. In line with this objective, the Quai d’Orsay demanded that the Ruhr and the Rhineland be divorced politically from Germany, that Germany be kept decentralized, and that German economic productivity be sharply curtailed, if not eliminated entirely. The attainment of these security objectives, however, depended entirely upon the acquiescence of the Big Three powers, and, for reasons of their own, co-operation with the French was unacceptable. When Britain refused to budge on the Ruhr question France’s offer of an understanding with her was withdrawn. During the early months of the Allied occupation of Germany the Anglo-American determination to implement the Morgenthau Plan calling for the agrarianization of Germany made harmony with the French policy possible, but when, late in 1946, Britain and the United States agreed on higher productive levels for German industry than those fixed at Potsdam, the French hopes of seeing the Reich permanently prostrated faded. To the French a revived German economy meant an
ultimately resurgent German military power. The sting of the Anglo-American decision, however, was removed in March, 1947, by the signature of a fifty-year Anglo-French treaty of alliance, and by a decision in the early spring of 1948 to internationalize the Ruhr. Later that year, France opposed the plan of certain American interests to hand control of the Ruhr back to its German owners.

The French Empire showed signs of disintegration during the post-war period. In French Indo-China an independence movement got started shortly after the defeat of the Japanese, and before the end of 1946 rebellious natives had proclaimed the Viet Nam Republic. The revolt spread into the southern part of Indo-China and soon Saigon was placed under siege. French troops, including Foreign Legion contingents, were dispatched to the East, and throughout 1947 a bloody guerrilla warfare was conducted in the area. Cambodia, too, attempted revolt, but was quickly overrun by French forces. Back in Paris, French Communists did their best to obstruct military operations against the Viet Namese by refusing to vote for military appropriations. A serious uprising against French authority in Madagascar brought the establishment of martial law in the island, and by late 1947 the rebellion appeared to have been only temporarily suppressed.

Another country that faced a serious postwar rebellion in her colonial empire was the Netherlands, and it came at a time when Holland needed all her energies for reconstruction at home. The winter of 1945–46 was a season of starvation for the Dutch, but by hard work and with the help of U.N.R.R.A., the food situation was considerably eased by mid-1946. The areas flooded during the war were drained, dykes repaired, and thousands of wrecked homes made habitable once more. In the Parliament, the Dutch reached a working compromise between moderate Roman Catholics and the Social Democrats, and neither reactionaries nor Communists made much of an impression on the political life of the state. But in the Dutch colonial empire rebellious natives allowed the government little repose.

A few days before the surrender in August, 1945, the Japanese decided to grant formal independence to the Indonesians in the hope that an Indonesian nationalist movement would embarrass the Allies. On August 11, 1945, the Indonesian Nationalists, under the leadership of ex-collaborator Soekarno, received independence for their country from Japanese Field Marshal Terauchi. Proclamation of the Republic came on August 17, 1945. Since the Netherlands East Indies had been placed under the supreme authority of British Admiral Lord Mountbatten's Southeast Asia Command, British
troops spent the remaining months of 1945 in bloody conflict with the new Indonesian Republic. By late 1946, however, the British forces withdrew from the islands and Dutch troops, many of them armed and trained in the United States, moved in. In February, 1946, a Dutch statement outlined the structure of a Commonwealth in Indonesia. An Indonesian citizenship was to be established. The domestic affairs of the Commonwealth were to be managed independently; and for the Commonwealth as a whole there was to be a democratic representative body containing a substantial Indonesian majority, together with a cabinet and a representative of the crown as head of the executive. This structure was to remain in force until conditions prevailed in which the Indonesians could freely decide their political destiny.

After several months of continued guerrilla fighting, negotiations between the Indonesians and the Dutch Commission resulted, on October 14, 1946, in a truce, and a final political agreement by March 25, 1947. This agreement, known as the Linggadjati Agreement, was hailed as marking a new epoch in the history of colonial peoples. The Netherlands government recognized the government of the Indonesian Republic as exercising de facto authority over Java, Madura, and Sumatra. The formation of a federal United States of Indonesia is provided for, consisting of the Indonesian Republic, Borneo, and the Great East, as well as a Netherlands-Indonesian Union to promote joint interests (foreign affairs, defense, and finance). Both the United States of Indonesia and the Netherlands-Indonesian Union are to be established before January 1, 1949.

The Indonesians agreed on all points but one: that the police force be under joint control, a condition which they felt might impugn the de facto authority granted them under the agreement. Agitation against this condition resulted, July 21, 1947, in the launching of a Dutch military offensive against the Indonesians, an action termed by the Dutch "police action of a strictly limited character." In the meantime, the Pasoendan Party, claiming to represent some twelve million Sundanese, proclaimed the independence of West Java and asked the Dutch for military protection. The implication that the Dutch themselves had inspired this revolt against the new-born Indonesian Republic was obvious. When war between the Dutch and Indonesians broke out afresh the United Nations Security Council called on both sides to "cease hostilities forthwith" and to "settle their disputes by arbitration or other peaceful means." The Netherlands government issued a cease-fire order in Indonesia on August 1, 1947, but apparently found sufficient excuse to continue operations against the Indonesians. Repeated appeals by the Security
Council had failed, by the spring of 1948, to put an end to the fighting, and it appeared that Indonesian independence would have to be earned by further bloodshed. In the meantime the Dutch, fearful that Indonesian resistance would inspire other natives in the Netherlands East Indies to revolt, hastened to establish the self-governing territory of East Borneo. On December 29, 1947, the Dutch recognized the creation of another state, Negara (Sumatra), the second fragmentation of the Indonesian Republic, whose authority had been recognized in the Linggadjati Agreement. That this policy of divide and rule could long sustain the Dutch grip on the East Indies was doubtful.

Nevertheless, determined to prevent the establishment of a United States of Indonesia, Dutch troops invaded the Indonesian Republic in December, 1948, and reached the oil refinery city of Tjepu. The Indonesians charged the Dutch with violating clauses of the truce, while the Dutch claimed that the Republicans had failed to cooperate in agreements to create a United States of Indonesia. At the same time the Dutch told the United Nations Security Council that its intervention would be useless. Again the U.N. faced the problem of Asiatic nationalism vs. western imperialism.

Holland’s neighbor, Belgium, was spared military operations in the postwar years, but her internal problems kept the country in a disturbed condition. The little state achieved an early economic recovery, but by late 1946 the same ills besetting other war-wrecked countries made themselves felt, and the cost of living was rising dangerously. By the spring of 1948 it was almost certain that complete recovery could be attained only through close commercial ties with other western European states and a generous slice of financial assistance from the European Recovery Program. The foremost political problem after the war was the question of King Leopold’s right to the Belgian throne. Belgian workers threatened open resistance if the government allowed the absent king to return. For his part, Leopold refused to return to Belgium, but he also refused to abdicate. The answer of the Belgian Parliament was to vote on July 17, 1945, to bar the king from the throne and to continue the regency of Prince Charles. In Belgium, as in Holland, political control was divided between the Catholics (Christian Social Party) and the Socialists, with no concessions to Communists. In the sphere of foreign policy, the government strove for a western European union, and by March, 1948, a regional organization for western Europe within the framework of the U.N., designed for mutual defense, was attained.

In the Scandinavian Peninsula Sweden and Norway helped block
the drive of Communist influence westward, but how long they would manage to remain as semi-capitalistic barriers to the expansion of Soviet Russia was a moot question by the spring of 1948. Their geographical position, like that of little Finland, made it appear that their turn was next in the succession of states to fall within the Communist orbit. Sweden, neutral during the war, did not have her political life very much disturbed during the postwar years, but the Swedes well knew that they could not immunize themselves against the chaotic economic conditions prevailing in western Europe; Germany, one of prewar Sweden's biggest trade relatives, was no longer in a condition to buy timber, iron ore, and other minerals. Sweden was beset by depression and budgetary difficulties but slightly less than the rest of Europe. Politically, however, the constitutional monarchy seemed as secure as ever, though there were indications that Swedish politicians were nervous about the prospect of Russian pressure in the manner it was exerted on Finland. In 1946 the government extended a $278,500,000 credit to the Soviet Union to facilitate the exchange of Swedish manufactured goods in return for Russian raw materials, a move frowned upon by the United States. The _modus vivendi_ between the Russians and the Swedes, however, did not exclude the Swedes from aid under the European Recovery Program. The realm of octogenarian King Gustav was still west of the "iron curtain."

Norway's postwar problems were more complex. The German occupation had left a physical legacy of 9000 children of German fathers and Norwegian mothers who had to be cared for without making them outcasts; 60,000 traitors, members of the _Norsk Samling_ (Norwegian Nazi organization), had to be tried and punished, along with war profiteers; devastated areas and bombed cities required rebuilding. Food, too, was something of a problem, though the Norwegians contrived better rations than did the British. Reconstruction and recovery were vigorously attempted. The Spitzbergen mines, destroyed by the Nazis, were recovered and made to yield 300,000 tons of coal during 1947. The Norwegian merchant marine, once a major carrier of the world's goods, was strengthened by the addition of new tankers and other types of ships. An electro-iron works close to the Arctic Circle, designed to prevent a recurrence of Norway's prewar dependence on German iron and steel, was in the blueprint stage in 1946. With parties of both right and left cooperating wholeheartedly to strengthen and improve the economic condition of the country, unemployment was practically unknown, and labor peace seemed assured by long-term contracts and cost-of-living adjustments. An abundance of common sense and hard work, how-
ever, was insufficient to bring about anything like prewar stability and material well-being, so in February, 1948, the Norwegians, like the other western Europeans, were anxiously awaiting the distribution of American assistance under the E.R.P. No more than those of Sweden could Norway's leaders forget their country's vulnerable position with regard to the westward push of the Soviet colossus.

In England the postwar period was marked by a severe and continuing economic crisis, in many respects more discouraging than that across the Channel. The first year of peace was one of continuous demobilization of armed forces, reconversion of industry to a peacetime footing, hardship in food rationing, an export drive hampered by insufficient coal production, and nationalization of the Bank of England and the coal mining industry.

The Labor victory at the polls in the summer of 1945 gave Clement Attlee and his subordinates a set of difficult problems to solve. Continued high taxation saved the country against inflation, as did government control of capital. The Borrowing Control Act gave the government the power to control capital issues and capital export and enabled the Exchequer to guarantee loans for much-needed reconstruction and development purposes. Under the law nationalizing the Bank of England (February, 1946), the government was enabled to control short-term borrowing. A United States credit of $3,750,000,000 proved a temporary life-saver, but by the spring of 1948 London was awaiting anxiously the British share of the American E.R.P. appropriation. England's budgetary difficulties in the postwar era seemed almost insurmountable.

Another serious problem facing the government in its efforts to restore Britain's war shattered economy was a serious lack of man power, since the women employed in industry and on the farms during the war were returning in great numbers to their domestic duties, while the army was kept at a relatively high figure because of the demands of foreign commitments. Housing, a critical problem, was slow in coming as a result of the labor shortage and the lack of building materials. Barracks, intended originally as 'temporary' quarters, had to be adapted for permanent use, and for several months homeless veterans and their families pre-empted empty rooms, flats, and houses. Postwar exports reached a higher than prewar level, though they remained insufficient to meet current needs. Coal production, down during the first winter after the war, was gradually increased, partly because of the use of young labor made possible by demobilization of miners in the armed forces. On January 1, 1947, the mines were nationalized. In the domain of food production, droughts, war destruction, lack of transport and fertilizers proved devastating.
Rationing, therefore, had to continue, and on July 21, 1946, even bread, unrationed throughout the war, was put on the list. The use of prisoners-of-war on the farms partially alleviated the food crisis, but with their repatriation, beginning in September, 1946, a worse labor shortage than ever was threatened in the vital agricultural effort. By mid-1947 a member of the Royal College of Physicians reported that Britain was a country slowly dying of starvation, and that it was "the worst-fed nation in western Europe—including Germany."

The Labor Government, perhaps partly because of bureaucratic confusion and waste, was unable to inject sufficient life-blood into the economic body of the nation to do more than slow down an unmistakable decline all along the line. The situation was indeed desperate by August, 1947, when Clement Attlee called for modified wartime powers to freeze workers in essential industries, to control investments, to intervene in the management of inefficiently operated companies, to cut foodstuff imports from dollar countries by 40 per cent, and to ration gasoline and raw materials. In response to the crisis, the Parliament passed the Emergency Powers Bill a few days later, marking the introduction of an almost fully regimented economy. But this was not enough. On December 20, the government announced a four-year plan to muster all her men, money, and materials to get the nation out of the red. Planning to make Britain self-supporting by 1953 when the American-financed Recovery Program comes to an end, the scheme called for continued austerity and a massive production effort, including the doubling of oil output and the raising of coal and agricultural production.

In the field of foreign policy Britain during the postwar years was in full retreat or, at least, on the defensive. On the Continent, of course, the big problem was relations with Russia, and England found herself tied by considerations of co-operation with the United States to the point where it can hardly be said that she pursued an independent policy toward the Soviet Union. Certain vital issues, however, were not sacrificed. When Russia put pressure on Turkey for a share in the control of the Straits, London, with American support, stood firm on the Montreux Convention of 1936. In Iran, when the Russians penetrated into the northern province of Azerbaijan, Britain supported Iran's insistence on retaining full independence and territorial integrity. In Germany, the British stood firmly by the side of the United States in resisting Soviet reparations demands and co-operated with the Americans in raising the level of German industry and in merging the American and British occupation zones. In the various Balkan states, London and Washington worked hand in hand in trying to stay the swift seizure of power by the Com-
munists. England had definitely chosen to throw in her lot with the United States in blocking the westward expansion of Soviet political and ideological influence.

It was in the sphere of imperial relations that Great Britain suffered the greatest blows. The end of the war in Europe found the huge sub-continent of India seething with a spirit of impatience with British rule, and both Hindus and Moslems were anxious now to compel Great Britain to carry out the promises made during the war in return for India's co-operation. With full British approval, conversations looking toward ultimate Indian independence were held early in 1945 between Mohandas Gandhi, the spiritual leader of India's Hindus, and Mohammed Ali Jinnah, representing the Moslem League. When this conciliatory move failed it became apparent that London would have to take the initiative. The foremost problem was that of "Indianization" of the Viceroy's Executive Council. On June 14, 1945, L. S. Amery, British Secretary of State for India, promised that if the offer of the government were accepted, the Indians might hold all the portfolios in the Viceroy's Council, with the single exception of that of Minister of War. Even the conduct of foreign relations was to be put into Indian hands, which meant the appointment of fully accredited representatives abroad and naturally a boost in the international status of India. On the new Executive Council Hindus and Moslems were to be represented in proportion to their numbers.

At Simla on June 25, 1945, representatives of the Indian political parties met with Viceroy Wavell for the purpose of submitting names from which the latter might choose after consultation with party leaders. The Simla Conference broke down, however, when Jinnah demanded that all Moslem members of the proposed council should come from his own Moslem League. This British move having failed, a British Cabinet Mission was sent to India late in March, 1946, for the purpose of setting up machinery through which the Indians could draw up a constitution for themselves. When this attempt, too, failed, the Cabinet Mission suggested constitutional proposals of its own. It was suggested that the central Indian government be a minimal one, limited to defense, communications, and foreign affairs. Moreover, the British proposal included a plan for the provinces of India to be empowered, if they wished, to form groups, each with its own executive and legislature. This "three-tiered" constitution, if adopted, would have given the Moslems the substance of the independent state they desired (Pakistan), without a partition of India. With several qualifications, both the Hindu Congress Party and the Moslem League accepted the British long-range plan, but Moslem unwilling-
ness to take a position in the new arrangement in accord with their numerical inferiority led to a Moslem boycott of the Indian Constituent Assembly which met late in 1946. Pandit Nehru, leader of the Hindus, nevertheless made the announcement that India was to be a sovereign republic, and the meeting was adjourned until January 20, 1947.

On that day in London the House of Commons was told by the government that British control of India would end by June, 1948, an announcement that brought down a barrage of criticism from the House of Lords, but also a declaration by Nehru that the British decision was "wise and courageous." Jinnah and the Moslem League, however, still held out for an independent Pakistan, and violence in Bombay, Calcutta, Karachi, and the Northwest Frontier Province was an earnest of Moslem determination on independence. In the face of Moslem intransigence, Great Britain once more took the initiative and offered India dominion status and a plan for the division of India into two states, with the Hindus in Hindustan, and the Moslems in Pakistan. Both the Congress Party and the Moslem League accepted the British offer immediately, and on July 18, 1947, Royal Assent to the Indian Independence Bill was obtained. Jinnah was elected Governor General of Pakistan, and on August 15, 1947, independent Pakistan applied for membership in the United Nations. In Hindustan Nehru was elected prime minister of the Hindu dominion.

Indian independence had been won, but even in the flush of victory Moslems and Hindus began a bloody series of mass murders when Hindus in Pakistan and Moslems in Hindustan attempted to migrate to their respective states. From September through November, 1947, hundreds of thousands of Hindu, Sikh, and Moslem men, women, and children were massacred and died of starvation, a tragedy that elicited from India's man of peace, Mohandas Gandhi, the pronouncement that Hindu India "may have to go to war" against Pakistan. By early 1947 the Mahatma chose self-immolation through a hunger strike rather than call for additional bloodshed. Moslems and Hindus alike agreed to a truce when Gandhi was at death's door. The final chapter was written in the long story of religious and racial hatreds when a Hindu assassin sent three shots through the body of the man who had dedicated his life to the cause of Indian independence and amity between her warring peoples. India's independence was sealed in blood, and her destiny was at last free of the influence of Great Britain. In London Winston Churchill mused grimly on the circumstances that had forced him to witness, though not preside over, the liquidation of the British Empire.
Meanwhile Indian troops invaded the independent state of Hyderabad in the summer of 1948 and overthrew the Moslem Nizam, who ruled over a country that was predominantly Hindu. Then on January 1, 1949, another civil war came to an end. India and Pakistan agreed to a cease-fire ending of fourteen months of fighting in the
princely state of Kashmir on their northern border. They also accepted the proposition to have a plebiscite under U.N. supervision settle whether India or Pakistan would possess the state.

In Egypt, too, the current against British imperialism was running strong. The Egyptian government on July 30, 1945, demanded a revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, the evacuation of all British troops in the country, the merging of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan with Egypt proper, and the abolition of all financial and economic restrictions. Difficulties arose, too, in connection with joint defense arrangements for the Suez Canal. The 1936 treaty permitted the British to maintain military and naval forces in Egypt for canal defense. British evacuation of Egypt began on May 12, 1946, but the process was too slow for the Egyptians. British troops were withdrawn during 1946 to the Canal zone proper, but the continued presence of British forces in the Sudan and the Egyptian claim of sovereignty over that area led to demands by the Sudanese that both England and Egypt recognize their independence. On the ground that the Sudanese should have the right to choose their own future, British troops were maintained in the Sudan while the Egyptian government presented her claims for annexation of the area to the Security Council of the United Nations. The Security Council soon reached a deadlock on the Egyptian question, though allowing the problem to remain on the agenda. In the meantime, Egyptian protests have taken the form of anti-British riots in Cairo and Alexandria, and the British have announced their intention of proceeding with an economic development program in the Sudan without waiting for a decision by the U.N.

More successful were the Burmese in their demands for cutting the tie with London. On December 20, 1946, the British government offered independence on the same terms as those given India, and during the following month talks in London between the government and Burmese leaders resulted in the decision that Burma was to hold elections for a constituent assembly in April, and that Britain guarantee economic assistance to the Burmese while they were establishing their independent state. By mid-1947 the Burmese Constituent Assembly had adopted a draft constitution for the future free Union of Burma, and on January 1, 1948, Burma became an independent republic.

The problems of Burmese and Indian independence had been solved by Great Britain through direct negotiation with native leaders, and the Egyptian question, though referred to the United Nations for a verdict, was still essentially a matter of Anglo-Egyptian concern. In one part of the British Empire, however, the postwar...
years brought to life a conflict which the government at London turned over to the world security organization for final solution, namely, the Palestine problem. This British-mandated territory had remained under the control of London ever since World War I, and though the question of erecting there a Jewish homeland in accordance with the famous Balfour Declaration had caused much criticism of the British policy of limiting Jewish immigration, the matter did not come to a head until the defeat of Germany in 1945 caused thousands upon thousands of European Jews to attempt emigration to Palestine rather than return to the countries in which they had been persecuted by Nazis and Nazi satellites. Britain refused to admit the refugees on the ground that it would be unfair to the Arab majority in the Holy Land. Immediately powerful Jewish agencies the world over set up a clamor against the British policy, and in the United States influential segments of public opinion demanded that their government take a strong stand in favor of lifting the immigration barriers in the mandate. The Arab world of the Near and Middle East found its voice, too, when it began to appear that one of its parts was about to be demographically submerged through a relaxation of British bans on Jewish entry into Palestine.

Early in 1946 an Anglo-American committee of inquiry undertook an investigation of the problems of European Jewry in connection with the Palestine problem. On March 29 it recommended that 100,000 Jewish victims of Nazi-Fascist persecution be admitted to the Holy Land immediately and urged continuance of the British mandate, pending the execution of a trusteeship agreement under the United Nations. The committee's report warned that "Any attempt to establish either an independent Palestine state . . . or states would result in civil strife such as might threaten the peace of the world." In London Prime Minister Attlee announced that implementation of these recommendations depended on "the extent to which the United States government would be prepared to share the resulting military and financial responsibilities." Nor did the committee's recommendations satisfy either the Arabs or Jews. The Jewish Agency for Palestine immediately put forward a counterproposal for the creation of an independent Jewish state in the Holy Land, while a congress of Arab princes and presidents, convened near Cairo by Egypt's King Farouk, threatened retaliation if the Anglo-American report were accepted. In Palestine itself Jewish and Arab terrorism broke out afresh; airfields, armories, and military posts of the British forces were attacked by the inhabitants; on July 22, 1946, the Irgun Zvai Leumi, a Jewish military organization, dynamited the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, the headquarters of the British mili-
tary and civil secretariat. Ninety-one persons were killed outright and another forty-five injured. By midsummer the tide of Jewish immigrants attempting to force their way into Palestine became a flood, a development which led the British to ship all new arrivals to camps in Cyprus.

On July 1, 1946, London produced a plan of its own for Palestine. It called for immediate issuance of 100,000 immigration certificates to displaced Jews and proposed a partition of the Holy Land into a provisional Jewish province, a district of Jerusalem, and an Arab district of Negeb, with over-all sovereignty remaining with the British High Commissioner, who would be responsible for defense, foreign relations, customs, and excise. Both Jews and Arabs refused this so-called "Morrison Plan," for by now the former wanted "a viable Jewish state in control of its own immigration and economic policies in an adequate area of Palestine instead of the whole of Palestine," and the Arabs were irreconcilably opposed to partition on any basis. On October 9 President Truman urged London to issue immediately the immigration certificates on the basis of the Jewish counter-proposal.

Discussions in London during the ensuing months between the government, Arab, and Zionist representatives resulted in still another stalemate. To break the deadlock the government offered a second compromise solution envisaging the creation of semi-autonomous Arab and Jewish states subject to British authority and the entry of 100,000 Jews every two years. If, by the end of a five-year trial period, the plan was not a success, the problem was to be turned over to the United Nations Trusteeship Council. When Zionists and Arabs refused this suggestion, Foreign Secretary Bevin confessed failure and announced the government's decision to turn the case over to the U.N. with no recommendation as to its solution.

At the request of Great Britain, U.N. Secretary-General Trygve Lie on April 13, 1947, summoned the full membership of the organization to a special session on Palestine. A Special Committee of Inquiry on Palestine was created and ordered to make an on-the-spot investigation, a none too pleasant task in view of the continuing violence in the Holy Land. Nevertheless, while Arab and Jewish representatives at Lake Success harangued the General Assembly, the committee went ahead with its work and on August 31, 1947, signed its final report, which recommended termination of the British mandate in Palestine and partition of the Holy Land into two independent states. Less than a month later London announced British relinquishment of the mandate and promised to withdraw British troops and civil administration in the near future. On November 29,
the General Assembly voted for the partition of Palestine into two independent states, one Jewish, one Arab; Jerusalem was to be established as an international zone. Announcement of the decision brought jubilation among the world’s Jews, but it also brought a grim resolve by the reinvigorated Arab League that the U.N. decision must never be put into effect.

By mid-February, 1948, more than 1000 Arabs and Jews had been killed in Palestine since November 29, and not one major step had been taken to realize the partition plan. The United States, whose backing had helped with U.N. approval for partition, was now reluctant to support it. Washington’s politicians had optimistically hoped that the moral force of the U.N. would be enough to achieve partition, but it was now clear that it would have to be accomplished by force if the U.N. decision was not to become a dead letter. Some government leaders were even recommending a reversal of policy, even to the extent of repudiating partition, on the ground that in a future war the United States would be heavily dependent on Arabian oil as well as the friendship of almost fifty million Arabs for Middle East airfields. The Arab League was threatening open war against partition, and in the streets and on the rooftops of the Holy Land British troops still stood guard, but refused to open up a port for Jewish immigration, beginning February 1, as the U.N. had recommended; to permit the organization of a Jewish militia to defend that new Jewish state against Arab attack; or to welcome the U.N. Commission to Palestine before May 1, only a fortnight before it was scheduled to assume responsibility for administering the partition. There was little reason to hope that British withdrawal from the last of her Middle East strongholds would bring anything but open war in an area in which both the United States and the Soviet Union claimed to have strategic interests. In March of 1948 President Truman announced a right about face on the Palestine partition by abandoning the plan of settlement for a temporary United Nations trusteeship. According to Secretary of State Marshall the United States reversed its stand because of fears that the Arab-Jewish war would touch off another world conflict. Plainly the United States did not relish the prospect of Russia gaining a toehold on the rich oil resources of the Arab world, either through a shift to the Arab side, or through participation in the U.N. military forces to enforce partition.

On May 15, 1948, a real crisis was reached when Great Britain laid down her mandate and proceeded to evacuate its troops from Palestine. Immediately the Hebrews at Tel Aviv declared the establishment of a new independent state of Israel. This was followed by the
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outbreak of a war between the new republic and the Arab League. Thereupon the U.N. appointed Count Folke Bernadotte, nephew of the King of Sweden, to negotiate a settlement between these bitter enemies. He obtained a truce, but was assassinated before he was able to arrange a settlement. Then the shrewd King Abdullah of Transjordan decided to bring about "a peaceful solution of the problem." His proposal, the unification of Arab Palestine and Transjordan, however, was opposed by other Arab countries, especially Egypt. They claimed that he was Britain's pawn and challenged his right to arrange a peace with Israel. But this opposition did not worry clever Abdullah; he was quite certain he was on the winning side. Moreover he had the best Arab army.

In the Far East, too, there were evidences during the post-war years that Russo-American relations were heading toward a crisis. In China, still torn by civil strife, the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek, armed with United States war surplus material and backed by United States dollars, was in a deadlock with the forces of Chinese Communist armies, allegedly receiving direct aid from the Soviet Union. In defeated Japan an American occupation since September, 1945, sponsored a minimum economic recovery, but as yet the United States and Russia have not been able to agree sufficiently on peace terms to write a peace treaty for the conquered country. Though the absence of Russian occupying forces in the Japanese homeland made direct conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States impossible, both Moscow and Washington were pursuing divergent policies with respect to the Mikado's former imperial possessions, especially in Korea.

The defeat and prostration of Japan was welcomed by the Chinese as the end of an eight-year period of hardship and privation in resistance to aggression. On September 9, 1945, the Sino-Japanese war came to an official end when the commander of the Japanese forces in China signed the surrender document at Nanking. But even as hostilities were terminated, Chinese Communist forces, refused permission by the Kuomintang of Nationalist China to accept the Japanese surrender, raced to control the important centers in north China and Manchuria. Open civil war was about to begin, now that the mutual enemy had been defeated.

In the struggle between Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government and the Chinese Communists, both the Soviet Union and the United States entertained a keen interest. On August 14, 1945, the Generalissimo signed a treaty of friendship and alliance with the U.S.S.R. which provided for recognition by China of the independence of Outer Mongolia, Sino-Soviet joint-ownership
and administration of Manchurian railways for thirty years, Port Arthur to be made a joint Sino-Russian naval base and Dairen to be a free port. In return for these concessions, the Russians were to withdraw their forces from Manchuria, promise noninterference in Sinkiang, and give moral and material support to the Nationalists against the Chinese Communists. On December 15 of the same year, President Truman declared that the United States government deemed the cessation of the Chinese civil war, inclusion of more democratic elements in the National government, and elimination of the Communist armies, the prerequisites for the creation of a strong, united, and democratic China.

Late in 1945 the Soviet Union consented to, and the United States government assisted in, the landing of Nationalist troops in Manchuria for the purpose of forestalling Communist control. General George C. Marshall was sent to China by Truman to bring about a meeting of minds between Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communist leaders. For almost a year Marshall tried to heal the rupture, but was denied success by the fact that neither the Kuomintang nor the Communists wanted to be in a militarily and strategically weak position in Manchuria when and if an agreement was reached. To complicate matters still further, American and Russian policies in China parted company in 1946, when Soviet troops delayed their scheduled evacuation of Manchuria long enough to permit the bulk of Manchurian industrial and farm machinery to be carted off to Russia. The United States violently objected to this move as a violation of previous understandings concerning Japanese reparations, and in March, 1946, Chiang Kai-shek's government itself had to block a Soviet claim to all enterprises in Manchuria that had served the Japanese Kwantung Army during the war.

The interest of Chinese Communists and Nationalists and of the Soviet Union for control of Manchuria was quite to be expected, since the farm lands and mineral deposits of this area, almost twice as large as Texas, were the richest in the Far East. To the Chinese, the future of their country seemed irrevocably linked to Manchuria, containing 70 per cent of China's industrial capacity. To the Russians, Manchuria was of great strategic and economic importance, since it could provide the Soviet Union with its only ice-free ports in the Pacific.

In attempting to hurry along a cessation of the Chinese civil war, the United States government opened its purse many times to the Nationalists. The Export-Import Bank approved, in January, 1946, a $35,000,000 credit to China for the purchase of American cotton. In August a Sino-American agreement made it possible for Nationalist
China to receive about $800,000,000 of wartime United States properties in China and the west Pacific. It was revealed, too, that during the year following the Japanese surrender China received about one billion dollars in Lend-Lease material from the United States. Despite this considerable assistance Chiang's government was unable to forestall a grave economic crisis or to defeat the Communists. The on-again-off-again policy of the United States in regard to China did not help matters, either. The failure of General Marshall's mediation efforts in the civil war led to an official announcement in Washington that further armaments and credits were to be withheld, a decision which Chiang Kai-shek, in February, 1947, blamed for prolonging the war. By midsummer, 1947, the economic and financial chaos in Nationalist China prompted President Truman to dispatch General Wedemeyer as his special representative to make "an appraisal of the over-all situation" in China. Wedemeyer's report was not published, but the conclusion apparently reached in it was that further American aid, both military and financial, was necessary to stop Chinese communism. But George C. Marshall, now secretary of state, had come to quite another conclusion as a result of his year-long investigation in 1946. American policy toward China, therefore, was to be one of limited aid. Washington was fearful of the consequences of a Communist victory in China, yet Secretary Marshall indicated that officially the United States was unwilling to underwrite the Chinese economy on a larger scale than $300,000,000 over a fifteen-month period. Time and American indecision seemed to be on the side of the Soviet Union, so far as China was concerned, for by the spring of 1948 the Chinese Communist armies had Chiang's forces checkmated.

By the winter of 1948, the Chinese "Reds" had pushed the Nationalist armies out of Manchuria and were approaching Nanking. Apparently the Nationalist government was fighting for its life. At this critical moment Mme. Chiang Kai-shek visited the United States to seek more aid. But this time she did not succeed. While the American government opposed the Communist menace, it refused to support a financial and political dictatorship set up by the ruling families behind Chiang Kai-shek, with graft and corruption sapping the government. Chiang represented what seemed to be a lost cause.

More to the liking of American officialdom was the postwar development of Japan. By the Moscow Agreement of December 27, 1945, a Far Eastern Commission and an Allied Advisory Council for Japan were created. The former comprised representatives of the United States, China, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Philippines,
and determined occupation policies in the defeated country; while the Advisory Council, sitting in Tokyo and consisting of representatives of the United States, China, the British Commonwealth, and the Soviet Union, consulted with and advised the Allied Supreme Commander (MacArthur) in his execution of occupation policies. General MacArthur’s forces were, of course, chiefly American, although the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and India maintained small detachments subject to the Supreme Commander’s authority. Thus far, there was little need for occupying armies, for the Japanese proved to be utterly docile in defeat, and the relations between the populace and the occupying forces were markedly cordial.

Following the Japanese surrender in August, 1945, the overseas possessions of Hirohito were divided among the conquerors. Korea was promised independence after a period of Allied trusteeship not to exceed five years; Formosa was returned to Chinese rule; South Sakhalin and the Kuriles were occupied by the Red Army troops of Russia’s Far Eastern forces; Dairen and Kwantung were to revert to China, although the Soviet Union was in no hurry to end its military occupation of the areas. As for the former Japanese-held islands in the South Pacific—the Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls—no final disposition was arranged in 1945, but on April 2, 1947, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved a United States proposal to place the islands under U.N. trusteeship, with the United States in a controlling position. In addition to these territorial losses, the material and human losses sustained by defeated Japan were appalling. A tremendous number of Japanese men, women, and children had lost their lives during the war; American bombing had destroyed huge sections of Japan’s major cities—Tokyo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki were particularly hard hit. Imports of foodstuffs from the empire were now at an end, and to make the lot of the living still worse, many thousands of demobilized troops and Japanese colonials were dumped into the war-wrecked homeland, people demanding food that was not available, housing that no longer existed, clothing that the country’s shattered factories could not produce. Japan had come the full circle and more in its relations with Western civilization since Perry set foot on the Land of the Rising Sun.

The political reconstruction and economic democratization of the devastated country were more easily achieved than economic recovery, the latter a responsibility of the Japanese government. General MacArthur’s rule was exercised indirectly through a reconstituted and democratic Japanese government. Emperor Hirohito, in accordance with the surrender terms, was allowed to remain as titular ruler. War criminals were tried, political prisoners released, the
special political police abolished. Though freedom of the press was upheld as an ideal, Japanese newspapers were subject to the United States military censorship (as were the stories of even American correspondents). The big interlocking monopolies in business and finance were broken up, and measures instituted which envisaged an amelioration of the lot of Japanese tenant farmers, long held in a status of virtual slavery under an oppressive system of absentee landownership. A systematized attack on that part of the cultural heritage of the Japanese people which tended to instill militaristic and aggressive qualities was undertaken, and even Hirohito repudiated his own divinity and any "master race" claims for his subjects. Female suffrage and other democratic innovations were introduced into Japanese politics. Traditional political parties like the Seiyukai and Minseito were eliminated and their places taken by groups calling themselves Progressives, Liberals, Social Democrats, and Communists. In the first postwar elections, held in April, 1946, over 70 per cent of the registered voters sent the two conservative parties, the Progressives and the Liberals, into the Diet with a majority. Elected to the new parliament were thirty-eight women. By the end of 1946 the Conservative government’s failure, despite prodding from Allied headquarters, to take firm steps to control prices and wages, to check inflation and institute unemployment relief brought on a wave of strikes, public demonstrations, and attacks in the Diet by Communists and Social Democrats.

A remarkable feature of the new Japanese constitution, promulgated on November 3, 1946, was the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy. No provision was made for the maintenance of armed forces. The emperor was stripped of all real political power; sovereignty resided in the Japanese people, with the popularly elected lower house possessing supreme lawmaking powers. To complete the democratization of Japanese politics, the new basic law provided for full cabinet responsibility to the Diet, and a bill of rights was made an integral part of the document.

Democratization of Japan’s political and economic life, however, did not prevent the deterioration of the nation’s economy. A serious food shortage, intensified by crop hoarding on the farms and by the diversion of food to the black market; a price spiral in the face of commodity scarcity; a steady reduction in the value of an inflated currency; low industrial output, due to raw material shortages, the uncertainty of reparations removals, the labor shortage, a greatly hampered coal production, and a shortage of electric power supply, all contributed to the creation of an economic morass out of which Japan could hope to extricate itself only by means of rigid govern-
mental controls and considerable self-sacrifice on the part of the Japanese people, General MacArthur's headquarters, though not responsible for the rehabilitation of the Japanese economy, from time to time issued general directives on the establishment and enforcement of price controls and consumer rationing, prosecution of black market activity, and forcible food collections from the country districts. Socialist leader Tetsu Katayama, prime minister after May, 1947, undertook to impose effective economic controls. Until Japan, the great workshop of Asia, once more had a really productive economy, there did not seem to be much prospect that the final stage of the Allied occupation would be reached—the peace settlement.

By September 2, 1947, however, General MacArthur apparently thought otherwise, for he announced that the Japanese economy was beyond all danger of imminent collapse and called upon the Allied nations to write a peace treaty soon. But the United States and the Soviet Union were not even agreed on which powers should participate in the formulation of that settlement. Russia wanted the treaty to be written by only herself, the United States, Great Britain, and China, while the United States held out for participation by all nations that had fought Japan.

In the former Japanese-held peninsula of Korea, Russo-American disagreement in the Far East came into sharp focus. Defeat of the Japanese brought, not liberation, but invasion and conquest by American and Soviet armies, with a Russian force pouring into North Korea and hastening southward as far as the 38th parallel, and American troops occupying the peninsula south of that line. What complicated the situation was that the only agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. concerning the country was Russian confirmation at Potsdam of the earlier decision reached at the Cairo Conference of November, 1943, by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek, that Korea "shall, in due course, become free and independent." No such development had eventuated, for in the north Russia proceeded immediately to establish a Communist police state, rigging elections to put native Communists in power, confiscating private property, imprisoning and executing Koreans opposed to Communism; while in the south the Americans, totally unprepared for an occupation, but unwilling to evacuate and allow the Russians to take over the entire peninsula, found themselves with an agricultural area entirely lacking in major industries as well as the money for bringing in goods. The Russians knew what they wanted to do and did it by maintaining an army of 250,000 men living off the country, setting up a Korean puppet government, exploiting the industries in their zone, and preparing to stay until the Americans
should get weary of it all and go home. Koreans in the American zone sank deeper and deeper into poverty, prices skyrocketed 200-fold, bankruptcy and ruin spread through the country like a plague. Politically the country degenerated rapidly. Koreans wanted immediate independence, but since neither elections nor political action were permitted them, even this objection was soon dissipated. Communists in North Korea still clamored for independence—on their own terms. Meanwhile the American Congress refused to consider a request for half a billion dollars with which to build up industries in South Korea that would put the area on its feet; despite the fact that our military strategists insisted that if all Korea fell into Russian hands both China and Japan would be subject to Soviet domination. In the meantime, 30,000,000 Koreans endured their hapless position between the millstones of Russian and American rivalry.

By the spring of 1948 there was little reason for Europe's millions to be of good cheer. Every month since 1945 had brought a calamity graver than most of the major battles of the war years. East of the "iron curtain" there were 228,813,000 persons (exclusive of the Soviet Union) who had forsaken their liberty for a dubious security. To the west, more than 288 million others, though finding that war-born poverty had necessitated a sacrifice of much economic freedom, had managed to retain most of the political liberties bequeathed by happier times. Those under the control of the Soviet Union were apparently lost to the cause of human freedom until resolution of the Russo-American struggle was reached. Viewed from the other side of the "iron curtain" they were the forgotten people, whose continued existence had meaning only in terms of added human weight to the Russian juggernaut that had ground to but a temporary halt in its lumbering course westward. In the minds and hearts of western Europeans, on the other hand, there was fear of a new totalitarianism seeking to submerge all of Europe. They were asking what kind of a "peace" it was. Most of them called it no peace at all, but a "cold war," a silent struggle between American dollars and Russian propaganda appeals to the hungry and despairing of western Europe. The probable winner in the struggle for supremacy over them was not within their power to determine. The keys to the enigma lay in Washington and Moscow, but time was not playing into the hands of the men in the Kremlin, for by the close of 1948 the United States seemed to have drawn a clear line beyond which Russian advance would not be tolerated.

The ramifications of the Russian problem perplexed an America
which found itself for the first time compelled to assume responsibilities commensurate with her position of military, economic, and political power. Ever since V–J Day the United States and the Soviet

![Image: One World or Two Worlds?](image)

*One World or Two Worlds?*

—Fitzpatrick in the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, March 12, 1946

Union had raced to consolidate the Russian and Western zones of Europe. Germany, Austria, and Greece had been key areas on the border between the two, but Italy as well lay in the danger zone, while Finland, surrounded by direct Soviet power, had to submit. There seemed, indeed, to be a crying need for Washington to come to some decision as to precisely how far eastward American
power could be made effective, at what point would Russian aggression be regarded as directly inimical to vital American interests. To make such a commitment entailed the dangerous move of co-operating politically and militarily with the countries of western Europe, a development that might well bring a Russian countermove to force similar commitments on Sweden and Norway and to press ruthlessly for a Communist victory in Italy. There was the danger, too, that such commitments would extend United States military obligations in western Europe for decades to come, as well as the difficulty of negotiating an agreement to deal with aggression by infiltration and manipulation such as characterized the Soviet advance since 1945. Dangerous as such commitments might appear, they did not seem in themselves to lead down the road to war; rather, there was the growing feeling among Washington officials that half-measures and timidity were the real dangers.

By the close of March, however, there was less hesitation and uneasiness. Committed to defend the principles and purposes of the United Nations the United States had arranged practical security measures with other nations to defend them. Committed, along with half of Europe, to the Marshall Plan which had aroused the objections of the Soviet Union, Washington had organized a security system to defend western Europe or restrain the U.S.S.R. Finally there was talk of a system of alliances including the United States and other western powers, but there was no apparent decision on whether those alliances were to be of a military nature, designed to go into effect if Soviet Armies crossed a specific border, or whether they were to deal with the fear of Communist fifth column aggression by infiltration. Moreover, the American president had obtained a restricted selective service law and additional money to strengthen the armed forces, and there was evidence that all of these measures were arranged to fit into a pattern of close military alliance with the countries receiving aid under the E.R.P.

Western Europe, on the other hand, was showing an increasing clarity of vision by March, 1948, in respect of the essential problem of stopping the Soviet march westward; a movement was definitely under way toward western European union. On January 22 Britain's Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, basing his proposal on Britain's realization that it was useless any longer to deal with Russia, called for a compact union—military, economic, and political—of western Europe. No immediate action was taken on his suggestion, but within three months the nations in the West were talking about and moving toward unity, as witnessed by the conclusion on March 17 of a defensive military alliance between England, France, Belgium, the
Another Road to War?

**GERMANY:** The issue is whether the new Germany is to be oriented toward Soviet Russia or toward Western Europe and the U.S.

**SEPARATIONS:** The issue is whether Russia is to be granted reparations out of current production of the Ruhr Zone of Western Germany.

**IENA:** The issue is whether the Russians are to have a voice in the control of Europe’s most important heavy industrial area.

**SHERIL:** The issue is whether the Eastern Powers will yield to Russian pressure to withdraw from the former German capital.

**DANUBE:** The issue is whether river trade is to be controlled by the Russian bloc or whether the West is to have a voice.

**TRENH:** The issue is control of the Adriatic’s best harbor, which is now jointly occupied by Yugoslav and Western troops.

**AUSTRIA:** The issue is whether economic clauses in the peace treaty will orient Austria to the East or to Western Europe.

*After the New York Times*

**RUSSIAN-DOMINATED AREAS IN EUROPE (hatched) AND THE EIGHT MAJOR ISSUES CONFRONTING THE BIG FOUR IN THE SUMMER OF 1948**
Netherlands, and Luxemburg; by Franco-Italian discussions for a customs union; by an accomplished commercial union of the Benelux countries; and by the termination of Britain's reluctance to make military commitments on the Continent. The second scheduled meeting of the sixteen Marshall Plan nations in Paris promised to face up to the problem of effectuating immediately political and military conventions along with a plan for a progressively achieved economic union. The American aid to be given under the Marshall Plan was confidently anticipated, but more than that, political agreements and pledged military support by the United States were considered essential corollaries of economic assistance and the only practical obstacle to further Russian encroachment. Whether Americans liked it or not, the Marshall Plan, unless it were only to slow the economic decline which brought it into being, was destined to involve political and military commitments by the United States. The hard fact was that whatever arrangements—military, economic, or political—the western European countries made among themselves, all efforts were futile unless they had the energetic support of the United States—including a United States military guarantee of western Europe's defensive alliance. However, it was apparent to many people that the inclusion of America in a western European alliance would signify the establishment of another balance of power, maintaining a precarious equilibrium. Within a period of three years the world seemed to be divided into two groups, which meant that if and when another war began it would be global in its scope from the very beginning.

Europe was not the only danger zone in the East-West struggle, as has been made clear by the proceeding description of the situations existing in China, Korea, India, and Palestine. In fact there are those who claim that the revolts in Asia, while demonstrating leftist tendencies, are fundamentally uprisings against the leadership of the white man and demonstrations of Asiatic nationalism. But it was in western Europe that the United States and the Soviet Union seemed most likely to clash head-on, and thus precipitate the terrible world tragedy. And western Europe was fearful, not that the United States would fail to intervene, but that the champion of Western democracy and private enterprise would fail to intervene in good time with sufficient intelligence and with enough force to avoid a final holocaust which might well make the Atomic Age the shortest and the last in the history of civilization.
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