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JOURNAL

OF THE

EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION.

Instituted for the independent and disinterested advocacy and promotion, by all legitimate means, of the public interests and welfare of the Inhabitants of India generally.

The Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Bill.

PAPER BY WILLIAM TAYLER, Esq.

READ AT A MEETING OF THE EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION, ON WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 1876.

MR. J. SEWELL WHITE IN THE CHAIR.

A MEETING of the members and friends of the East India Association was held at the Rooms of the Association on Wednesday, June 28, the subject for discussion being "The Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Bill."

Mr. J. SEWELL WHITE (late Advocate-General of Bombay) occupied the chair, and the following gentlemen were present among others: The Rev. James Long, Mr. John Dunbar, M.P., Mr. Dadabhoy Byramjee, Mr. F. S. Chapman, Mr. R. C. Saunders, Mr. F. R. Griffiths, C.E., Mr. W. Dent, Mr. R. B. Swinton, Mr. J. T. Wood, Mr. G. S. Mankar, Capt. W. C. Palmer (Hon. Sec. of the Association), &c.

The CHAIRMAN having briefly invited the attention of the meeting to the paper about to be read by Mr. W. Tayler,

Mr. W. TAYLER (late Commissioner of Patna) proceeded as follows:—

The subject of our discussion this evening will, I fear, be considered as a dull one, but its real importance can scarcely be ignored, especially by this Association, which, under the direction of its Council, has already submitted two memorials on the subject.

The question has, moreover, excited deep dissatisfaction among the people of Bombay, and there has been an unanimous chorus of criticism and condemnation raised by the English and Native Press from one end of India to the other.

The subject, as our programme will have indicated, is a Bill which, I regret to say, has lately passed the Council of the Governor-General of India, entitled ordinarily "Mr. Ellis's Revenue Jurisdiction Bill." To enable us, however, to enter on a profitable discussion of the grave questions which this Bill involves, it will, I think, be advisable that, for the better understanding of those who may not have watched the progress of the measure, I should set forth as fully as possible, consistent with the brevity which our rules require, the exact present position of the case. The facts, then, are these. On the 16th of August, 1873, the Hon. Mr. (now Sir Barrow) Ellis moved for leave to introduce a Bill to limit the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts throughout the Bombay Presidency in matters relating to the land revenue; and leave having been granted, the Bill itself was introduced, after an intermediate postponement required for consultation with the Bombay Government, on the 18th October, 1873. I will here read the Bill, as officially set forth in the *Gazette of India* on the 11th October, 1873:—

"No. 21 of 1873.

"A BILL TO LIMIT THE JURISDICTION OF THE CIVIL COURTS "THROUGHOUT THE BOMBAY PRESIDENCY IN MATTERS RELATING "TO THE LAND REVENUE.

"Whereas in the Deccan, Khandesh, the Southern Mahratta "Country, and certain other territories comprised in the Presidency of "Bombay, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is limited in matters "connected with the assessment and collection of the land revenue;

"And whereas it is expedient that the jurisdiction of the Civil "Courts should be limited in like manner throughout the said Presi- "dency;

"And whereas it is also expedient to revive certain provisions of the "13th Section of Regulation XVII. of 1827 of the Bombay Code, "relative to the recovery of arrears of revenue, which were repealed by "the Land Improvement Act, 1871:

"It is hereby enacted as follows:—

"1. This Act may be called 'The Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction "'Act, 1873:'

"It shall come into force on the passing thereof;

"And it shall extend to all the territories under the Government of "the Governor of Bombay in Council, but not so as to affect—

"(*a*) Any suit regarding the assessment or collection of revenue on "land situate in any place which is a town or city within the meaning "of Bombay Act No. IV. of 1868, or situate in the Presidency Col- "lectorate;

"(*b*) Any suit by a person claiming to hold land wholly or partially "exempt from payment of land revenue, under a guarantee or *sanad* "given by the Governor of Bombay in Council under Bombay Act "No. II. of 1863, Section 1, Clause 1, or Bombay Act No. VII. of "1863, Section 2, Clause 1; or

"(*c*) Any suit instituted on or before the 7th day of August, 1873.

"2. The enactments mentioned in the schedule hereto annexed are "repealed to the extent specified in the third column thereof.

"3. *Notwithstanding anything contained in Bombay Regulation XVI.* "*of* 1827, *Section* 6, *Clause* 1, *or in Section* 25 *of the Bombay Survey* "*and Settlement Act, or in any other law now in force, suits involving any* "*of the following matters shall not be cognizable by the Civil Courts:—*

"*(a) Claims against the Government to inams, or to hold land wholly or* "*partially free from payment of land revenue;*

"*(b) Objections to the amount or incidence of any assessment of land* "*revenue, or to the mode of assessment, or to the principle on which such* "*assessment has been fixed;*

"*(c) Disputes regarding public rent or revenue payable to Government,* "*or complaints of exaction of district or village officers, stipendiary or* "*hereditary.*

"4. At the end of the schedule annexed to 'The Land Improve-"'ment Act, 1871,' instead of the words 'Section 13,' there shall be "read the words, 'The following words in Section 13 (that is to say) "'and demands on account of money advanced as *takávi*,' and 'or of "'advances for former years.'"

We next come to the "Statement of Objects and Reasons," which was laid before the Council according to custom, as follows:—

"STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS.

"At present the law determining the limits of the jurisdiction of "the Civil Courts in matters relating to the land revenue is not uniform "throughout the Bombay Presidency.

"In what (looking to the order in which they became known to the "Legislature) may be termed the older districts, suits regarding the "Government land revenue may be brought in the Civil Courts, even "to impugn a particular assessment on lands admitted to be open to "assessment.

"In the newer districts, on the contrary, all such matters are "expressly excluded from the cognizance of the Civil Courts.

"*The Government of Bombay have recently brought to the notice of the* "*Government of India a case in which an assessment made by the Survey* "*Officers, under the 25th Section of the Bombay Act I. of* 1865, *was*

" *reduced by a Civil Court; and have strongly urged the inexpediency of* " *continuing to the Civil Courts in one portion of our territories a juris-* ' *diction which they are precluded from exercising not only in other parts* " *of the Bombay Presidency, but elsewhere in India as well.*

" *It has been considered that the best and simplest course is to place* " *matters on substantially the same footing in the older districts as they at* " *present stand on in the newer districts, and to effect this is the main object* " *of the present Bill.*

" The Bombay Act VII. of 1863 (for the summary settlement of " claims to exemption from revenue), which is the law for the older " districts, and Act II. of 1863, the law for the newer districts, are both " maintained intact.

" The present opportunity has been taken to revive (in Clause 4) " certain provisions of Regulation XVII. of 1827 (Bombay) which " were inadvertently repealed by the Land Improvement Act, 1871.

" B. H. ELLIS.

" WHITLEY STOKES,

" Secretary to the Government of India

" Simla, 16th September, 1873."

Now, it will be obvious that the cream of the present controversy lies in the paragraphs which, for convenience of reference, I have had printed in italics—viz., the 3rd Section of the Bill itself, and the 3rd and 4th paragraphs of the " Statement of Objects and Reasons." The other portions of the Bill are unimportant.

Looking, then, at the paragraphs and section above referred to, we have the measure which has excited such able and animated controversy. The announcement was scarcely in print when it was met with earnest protest from the inhabitants of Bombay in memorials presented to the Viceroy and Governor-General—was criticized and condemned more or less severely by every newspaper in that Presidency, as well as by many other journals in other parts of India; and last, not least, by an able and exhaustive pamphlet from the pen of the Honourable Vishvanath Narain Mundlik, the eminent Native pleader, himself a member of the Bombay Legislative Council. Another pamphlet, compiled by K. Shama Rao Vithal, a pleader of the High Court of Bombay, was also published, containing a series of decisions, all bearing upon the subject.

This Association did not view the controversy with indifference, for in January, 1874, a committee appointed at a meeting of our Council prepared a brief memorial, which was presented to the then Secretary of State on the 13th of February, 1874, supporting the prayer of the

Bombay memorial in its opposition to the Bill; and subsequently a further very brief memorial to the present Secretary of State, praying his lordship would, under the powers possessed by him in Council, veto the Bill.

The first memorial thus presented by this Association to the Duke of Argyll appears to enter so fully into the points which constitute what we considered—and still, I imagine, consider—the objectionable portions of the Bill, that I cannot do better than read it, for the information of this meeting:—

To His Grace the Duke of Argyll, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India in Council.

"*The Memorial of the Council of the East India Association*

"Most respectfully Sheweth:—

"1. That a Bill, No. 21 of 1873, entitled 'A Bill to limit the Jurisdiction of the Civil Courts throughout the Bombay Presidency in matters relating to Land Revenue,' has been introduced into the Legislative Council of India, against which a memorial has been presented to the Governor-General of India by a number of the Native inhabitants of Bombay; and that your Memorialists would venture most respectfully, on the grounds herein stated by them, to support the prayer of the said memorial.

"2. That the reason assigned for the passing of this Bill seems to your Memorialists to be one of the strongest arguments against it; for it has been avowedly brought in in consequence of an assessment made by the Survey Officer under the 25th Section of the Bombay Act of 1865 having been reduced by a Civil Court; yet, on turning to the case, it is perfectly clear that the Civil Court was right and the Survey Officer wrong in the view they severally took of it. If the proposed law had then existed, the wrong would have been without a remedy, and the injured party would have been shut out from all chance of redress.

"3. The special point on which the decision of the Court turned—viz., that the assessment had not been made in accordance with ancient custom, as laid down in the Regulations—was one eminently fitted for a legal tribunal to adjudicate on.

"4. That, apart from this particular case, your Memorialists are of opinion that nothing could tend more to create dissatisfaction than the union in one and the same officer of executive and judicial functions. He thus becomes virtually the judge in his own cause, and too often but the more firmly adheres to his first view the more strongly and the more justly it may be impugned by those affected by it.

"5. That if the appeal under the present law lay from a more competent tribunal to one less competent, there might, your Memorialists "think, be some reason for the proposed change; but, instead of that, "the very reverse is the case. The appeal, as matters stand, is from the "decision of men who may be excellent Revenue Officers or Surveyors, "but who, from the total absence of any legal knowledge, are necessarily "little skilled in the interpretation of laws and regulations, to a tribunal "whose whole faculties are habitually devoted to the elucidation of such "questions.

"6. That the power of appeal to the Civil Courts, given to the "people as the law stands, but which the proposed Bill would take "away, can never be abused, both because of the cost every appeal case "necessarily involves, and because of the obvious uselessness of it when "the appellant has not clearly right on his side. But were it not so, "your Memorialists think it better that any inconvenience arising out of "this source should be borne by the Government, rather than that the "people, by being deprived of this appeal, should labour under a sense "of injustice, and a feeling that the Government closed the door of the "Appeal Courts in their faces because it knew it would be beaten there "—a feeling which, rightly or wrongly, would be sure to prevail.

"7. That your Memorialists would observe that, in cases relating to "land revenue in Bombay, the course of legislation has recently been "totally different from that which is now proposed to be adopted by the "Supreme Legislative Council of India.

"8. That under the Code of 1827, for instance, certain judicial "powers were reserved to the Revenue Officers, who were constituted "into Revision Courts for certain purposes. They could decide rent "suits, boundary suits, suits about water-courses, and tenures. This "went on till 1838, when by the Act XVI. the power of Revenue Officers "was curtailed. All tenure suits were transferred to the Adaulut, or "Civil Courts proper, and the civil power of the Revenue Courts was "reduced to the cognizance of rent suits and summary suits for possession. In course of time, however, the system underwent a further "change. The anomaly of investing certain executive officers with civil "powers was condemned. It was thought that, whatever the reasons "for sending certain classes of cases to Revenue Officers in the first "instance, with a final appeal to the Superior Court, might have been "in 1827, the improvement of our judicial machinery had advanced so "far as to justify the abolition of that anomaly. Accordingly, a law was "proposed to carry this object into execution. This was known as the "Revenue Courts Bill. It was introduced into the Bombay Council by "the Hon. Mr. Ellis himself, with the following remarks:—

" ' The Hon. Mr. Ellis, in moving the first reading of the Revenue " ' Courts Bill " to divest Courts of Revenue of jurisdiction in certain " ' cases, and to vest such jurisdiction in the Courts of Civil Judicature " ' in the Bombay Presidency," said that when the Judicial Courts were " ' first established, it was supposed that Revenue Officers would be " ' better able to dispose of the class of cases described in Chapter VIII. " ' of Regulation XVII. of 1817, than the Civil Courts. It was felt that " ' the latter Courts, from their want of local knowledge, would not be " ' able to extend that protection to the cultivating classes of which the " ' latter, from their ignorance, stood in special need. The ryots, how- " ' ever, are now much improved in their social position, and were quite " ' able to take care of their own rights. The character of the Civil " ' Courts had also been raised; and it was the general opinion that " ' they could be safely invested with jurisdiction in cases between the " ' ryot and the superior holder. The present Bill would not affect the " ' Bombay Act V. of 1864, nor the Survey and Settlement Act.'

" 9. That on these grounds the Bombay Legislative Council passed " Act II. of 1866, to divest Revenue Courts of their jurisdiction in land " cases, and to confer such jurisdiction on the ordinary Civil Courts in " the Bombay Presidency.

" 10. That later still, in passing the City Survey Act, in 1868, that " measure was so modified as to retain the powers of the Civil Courts to " take cognizance of the acts of the Collector in respect to the title to " any town or city lands, or in respect to the assessment on such lands.

" 11. That so recently as October, 1868, Sir Henry Main, the late " able and accomplished legal member of the Council of India, urged the " necessity of enacting well-defined and fixed laws, in preference to " investing executive officers with discretionary powers, which are apt " to be exercised to the detriment of the interests of the people. He " made the following observations, which are worthy of consideration:—

" ' While I admit that the abridgment of discretion by written laws " ' is to some extent an evil, though under the actual circumstances of " ' India an inevitable evil, I do not admit the proposition which is " ' sometimes advanced, that the Natives of India dislike the abridg- " ' ment of official discretion. This assertion seems to me not only " ' unsupported by any evidence, but to be contrary to all the proba- " ' bilities. It may be allowed that in some cases discretionary govern- " ' ment is absolutely necessary; but why should a people which mea- " ' sures religious zeal and personal rank and respectability by rigid " ' adherence to usage and custom, have a fancy for rapid changes in the " ' action of its governors, and prefer a regimen of discretion, sometimes " ' coming close upon caprice, to a regimen of law? I do not profess to

" ' know the Natives of this country as well as others, but if they are to
" ' be judged by their writings, they have no such preference. The edu-
" ' cated youth of India certainly affect a dislike of many things they do
" ' not care about, and pretend to many tastes which they do not really
" ' share; but the repugnance which they invariably profess for discre-
" ' tionary government has always seemed to me genuinely hearty and
" ' sincere.'

" 12. That it is apprehended that the withdrawal of the jurisdiction " of the Civil Courts in matters relating to land revenue will enable " the officers of the Survey Department to levy assessments in excess " of amounts which are limited and fixed by agreement or usage. Thus " illegal acts and violations of the rights of private property might be " committed, and the people would be deprived of the means of obtaining " redress by appealing to independent judicial tribunals in which they " have confidence. At present several cases are pending in the High " Court of Bombay, in which the executive officers of Government have " demanded an extravagant enhancement of the assessment over and " above the amount permanently fixed in the time of Sir Thomas Munro, " in the province of Canara. Such cases would be removed from the " cognizance of that tribunal, and the unfortunate land-owners would be " completely in the power and at the mercy of the Survey Officers, if " the proposed Bill were passed.

" 13. That your Memorialists would submit that the power of " appeal against the acts of the Government or public officers in India " should be rather extended than curtailed, so as to embrace every " rank and every kind of case, and afford a remedy to all for every " possible species of wrong. This appears to your Memorialists to be " the inherent right of all Her Majesty's subjects there, however high or " however low, and, at the same time, the surest safety-valve against " disaffection which a Government can have. In nine cases out of ten " the dangerous element in India—as, perhaps, everywhere—consists of " persons who have, or who consider themselves to have, suffered wrong " at the hands of the State officials, and who, from some cause or other, " have been denied every means of obtaining a hearing of their case, and " a consequent chance of redress.

" 14. That your Memorialists feel this to be of special importance at " the present time, when it is notorious that a strong and growing feeling " of discontent has lately been spreading itself throughout India among " those who are, from their position, debarred from the privilege of public " and impartial investigation, and who, from their more frequent inter- " course with the English, have learned to understand and appreciate the " importance of publicity in the adjudication of their rights. At such a

" time the withdrawal of a privilege hitherto enjoyed—and that in the " interests only of the Government—appears to your Memorialists to be " singularly inexpedient and objectionable.

" Wherefore your Memorialists, the Council of the East India Asso- " ciation, humbly pray that your Grace in Council, taking the premises " into consideration, will adopt such steps as may be deemed expedient " by your Grace to prevent the passing of the said Bill, or for the dis- " allowing of it if it should be passed, under the powers possessed by " your Grace in Council.

" And your Memorialists will ever pray.

" (Signed) E. B. Eastwick,
" Chairman of the Council of the East India Association.

" 20, Great George Street, Westminster,
" February 13, 1874."

What exactly has occurred since the close of these exertions I cannot precisely ascertain, but what principally concerns us at present is, that in March of the present year this obnoxious Bill was passed by the Governor-General in Council, and now only awaits the assent and confirmation of the Secretary of State to become the law of the land.

And here it will be convenient to refer to some of the arguments urged, at the passing of the Bill, by the officer (Mr. Hope) on whom the mantle of Sir B. Ellis has not undeservedly fallen, and who does battle with the opposing hosts with much spirit, some ability, and, I grieve to say, with, as far as results at present are concerned, very decided success.

But, before I enter on a consideration of these arguments, I would wish to say a few words on the character of the present controversy, and the spirit in which, as it appears to me, it ought to be conducted by the members of this Association.

It is clear, at a glance, that it is a war of *principle*, and as such extends far beyond the points and incidents which have hitherto formed the chief, though by no means the only topics of discussion.

The mere questions of *expediency*, of the relative individual qualifications of Revenue compared with those of Judicial officers; the expense, delay, obstructions, or inconvenience caused by the present want of uniformity—which are urged, I perceive, by Mr. Hope—are subsidiary, and, by comparison, unimportant; and all arguments based solely or to any great extent upon such incidents, whether in favour or condemnation of the Bill, are trivial and, to my mind, altogether unworthy of notice.

In this, as in the cause of "publicity," as the guarantee for justice, which I have endeavoured on several occasions to advocate (and which

was discussed a few days ago at the reading of Major Bell's paper on "A Privy Council" for India), the supreme object, the one great question to be kept in sight, is that which lies at the root of all good government in civilized countries—viz., impartiality in the tribunal of justice; that the judge, whatever his name, title, or position may be, shall be free from all possibility of bias or prepossession, whether personal or official; and that every individual who seeks for the establishment of right or the removal of wrong, shall, whether high or low, stand on equal terms with his antagonist, and be reasonably satisfied that the machinery of justice will never be strained from its straightforward course by favouritism, partiality, or external influence.

And now, in referring to Mr. Hope's arguments, I would wish on my own part to premise that I disclaim all idea or intention of casting any, the slightest personal disparagement on either the originator of the Bill—Sir Barrow Ellis—or its zealous supporter, Mr. Hope.

I am desirous to do this because on one occasion, when discussing the question of publicity in the Indian Council, some remarks which I made on what I termed the "co-operative system of intrigue and trickery" which the system of secrecy encouraged, a member of our Society, himself an officer of Government, objected to the expression I used, under the idea that it referred to the members of the Indian Council, instead, as I need hardly say, to the outside workmen employed in the cause.

And it is the more desirable in the present case that there should be no misunderstanding, because both the officers referred to are men of high character and distinguished attainments, who, it is impossible to doubt, are themselves honestly and sincerely convinced of the wisdom and expediency of the proposed measure.

The arguments of Mr. Hope are embodied in a report of a speech delivered by that gentleman at the Viceregal Council, at the latter end of February; and as it is the latest utterance on the subject, and comprises most, if not all, of the arguments *pro* and *con*, a brief consideration of the speech will bring the whole question before the meeting.

As Mr. Hope in this speech deals with the criticisms and arguments which have been urged by those who disapprove of the Bill, whether in the press or in pamphlets, and as some of these criticisms have been extremely pungent and severe, he himself has, not unnaturally, adopted to some extent the *tuquoque* style, and has met the comments of his opponents with somewhat sharp, though never indecorous recrimination.

Premising that he "did not propose to attempt to correct all the "misrepresentations, or to answer all the vague declamations which had

"been scattered broadcast throughout the Presidency," he proceeds to quote and answer the leading criticisms which have been published.

Passing over what he calls personal and case criticisms—that is, criticisms connected with the action of individual officers, or the results of particular cases—he proceeds to deal with the question, very properly, on broad and general grounds.

While I fully agree with the general purport of his remarks—which indeed, correspond with what I have myself previously said as to the spirit in which the question should be discussed—I cannot for a moment allow that the question of the *general* fitness of the tribunals, or of the presiding officers, is a narrow, "personal, or case" question; but, on the contrary, this is the very marrow of the controversy. While, therefore, we refrain from dilating on the soundness or unsoundness of particular decisions, or the intellectual fitness of particular officers, we are compelled to keep in sight the all-important question, whether this or that class of Courts—viz., the Revenue or Judicial—are the best qualified to pronounce on the claims and disputes of the people.

Taking this exception, then, to the preliminary remarks of Mr. Hope, and agreeing only so far, that we need not analyze any one particular judgment of Mr. John Smith or the accidental intellect of James Brown, I proceed to notice *seriatim* his replies to the general objections urged.

Mr. Hope says: "He would next point out that the scope of the "Bill had been almost universally and in a most remarkable manner "misrepresented or misunderstood. It had been stated over and over "again that the object of the Bill was to place all land-owners in the "Bombay Presidency at the mercy of zealous officers. We were told "that 'all revenue suits would be barred' by it; that 'the Revenue "'officer will be the sole judge of the validity of a man's claim to any "'property,' and so on. It was only necessary to mention such state-"ments for their incorrectness to occur to every member of the Council, "and he need not recapitulate the details of the Bill in order to dis-"prove them. It would be sufficient to state that, so far from placing "all land-owners at the mercy of the Revenue officers, this Bill only "affected certain owners of land; and so far from placing them all at the "mercy of Revenue officers, it would admit a very large section of "them to the privilege of resorting to the Civil Courts, which they did "not now possess. Similarly with regard to property, it would allow "actions in the Civil Courts in respect of property in the new provinces, "which were hitherto not permissible, provided the claim rested on any "one of a large class of proofs."

Now, before we can fairly estimate the force of this reply, we must endeavour to discover the accuracy of the statement that the mis-

representation or misunderstanding pointed out is really "almost uni-
" versal."

As Mr. Hope does not mention the author of the words which he quotes, I have no clue to guide me in this examination. I can only say that in the several articles which I have seen I fail to discover anything to uphold such sweeping assertion.

Doubtless, as Mr. Hope quotes the words, they are to be found somewhere; but before it can be said that such misunderstanding is universal, it will be but fair to refer to the comments of the best-informed of the opponents of the Bill, because arguments in a case like this are, like witnesses, to be weighed, not numbered; and though there may be wild declamation and unfounded assertions by the score, it is to the higher class of the opponents that refutation, to be pertinent or conclusive, should be confined.

Now, apart from the many able criticisms which have been published in the several papers, especially of the *Bombay Gazette*, *Times of India*, and others—who, with an "unanimity that is wonderful," and feelings of indignation that are obviously sincere, have condemned the Bill—there is one writer who, from his known ability, high character, and official position, may be fairly regarded as *facile princeps* among the phalanx of the opposition; I refer to the gentleman whom I have before mentioned, and who is so well known as the Rao Sahib, Vishvanath Narain Mundlik. This gentleman, who himself is a member of the Legislative Council, has published a very able pamphlet on the subject, subjoining thereto extracts from the principal journals.

Well, if any opposition is important, it is the opposition of a public officer like Vishvanath Narain; and if the misrepresentation or misunderstanding is really "almost universal," it would surely be found among the arguments so powerfully put forward by him. But I can find no such statement from first to last in this very able pamphlet, and in regard to the Rao Sahib at least, Mr. Hope may

> "Feel the great joy the warriors feel
> At foemen worthy of their steel."

After some further remarks, which do not appear to me to be essentially relevant, or at all events sufficiently important to notice in detail, Mr. Hope refers to a memorial which was presented by the Natives of Bombay, among whom was the aforesaid Vishvanath Narain Mundlik, and, after certain comments on the arguments contained therein, concludes by saying: "He might, perhaps, have occasion again to refer
" later on to this memorial in a casual manner, but, as a whole, he would
" now dismiss it with an expression of his regret that such a document
" should bear the signatures of some men whose friendship he valued,

"and of many whose talents he respected, but whose influence, when "thus exerted, he deplored."

Now, the chief criticism that Mr. Hope offered in regard to this memorial, after referring to a paragraph in which he says powers were attributed to the Civil Courts which were never claimed, he continues: "It "was next urged in the same memorial that in the course of his (Mr. "Hope's) speech at Simla he had not 'adduced one solitary proof showing "'that the Judicature in the exercise of its functions had ever abused "'the powers conferred on it by the Legislature.' It might not, "perhaps, have been altogether impossible to have adduced some cases "which, in the opinion of Revenue officers, and some others, might have "appeared contrary to law, contrary to facts, or contrary to Native "custom; but to have explained such defects fully would have involved "going through the entire history of such cases themselves, which would "necessarily have elicited replies and recriminations, and caused ill-"feeling, while, after all, the whole would have been altogether irrelevant, "for the reason which he had given at the commencement of his address "that day—namely, that he did not think that in a measure of this "kind the Council ought to be influenced by individual cases either one "way or the other. He thought the Council would consider that he "had exercised a wise discretion in abstaining from such a course as "that which the memorialists appeared to be disappointed at his not "having adopted. The allegation was, not that the Courts had misused "the powers they possessed, but that they ought not to possess the "powers that they did."

Now, it is all very well and very right, as I have before observed, that the accidents of single judgments should not be too much dwelt upon in the consideration of this general question, which is one of principle; but I cannot admit that "a proof that "the Judicature had abused its powers" would be undeserving of notice, or that such proof would not in itself be an argument which Mr. Hope might fairly use in support of his position. And I confess to an internal feeling that if such proof could have been given, the ardent feelings of the promoters of this Bill would, when suffering under the vigorous attacks of their opponents, certainly have induced them to produce it. And this is the more probable because the opponents of the Bill have exhibited no such delicacy or squeamishness, as some might term it, in regard to the Revenue officers, against whom they have adduced most pregnant evidence of "abuse of their powers"—evidence which I must in fairness refer to before closing this paper.

"Abuse of power in the Judicature" is a very different thing from

accidental mistake or misdecision of individual officers; and the "Judicature" may fairly congratulate itself that no such abuse being charged, none exists. "*De non apparentibus, et de non existentibus eadem est ratio.*"

Mr. Hope then, referring to a statement that the proposed Bill was "unconstitutional," enters upon a comparison of the rights of the people of India with those of happy England in the matter of taxation; but this comparison is so totally beside the question, that I may advantageously pass it over.

What is more pertinent to the point at issue is the lengthened comparison which Mr. Hope draws between the functions and general capacity of the Revenue as compared to the Civil Courts for doing justice in regard to cases and claims in which the jurisdiction of the latter is now excluded. These remarks are too lengthy to quote; they may, however, be summed up in a few words—viz.: Firstly, that the Revenue officers possess greater facilities for arriving at the facts, more experience in Revenue matters, greater latitude of inquiry, not being bound to accept only the evidence laid before it; that, if puzzled or bewildered, they "might send for the people aggrieved and converse with "them, and find out what they really meant;" and, secondly, that, in Bombay especially, the judges were incapacitated from deciding Revenue suits, because of late years a civilian, instead of passing from a full-blown collector to a judge, entered the Judicial Department as a raw youth with a skin-deep knowledge only of the Natives.

He then draws a graphic picture, first, of the Revenue officer dealing with a knotty case, bristling with difficulties, which he overcomes triumphantly, and then, by contrast, paints the Civil officer, perplexed and bewildered, and exclaims, "Look on that picture and on this;" and, finally, referring to the incompetency of the Civil officer to do justice to Revenue claims, asks—"Suppose a man's house was leaking, would he "call a consultation of doctors; or, if his health was affected, would he "convene a committee of engineers?"

I can easily imagine that the gravity of the Imperial Council may have been somewhat unsettled by such lively interrogatories, but I hardly fancy they would have been much impressed by their logical application. The cause must, I apprehend, be bad which needs such fanciful *ad captandum* illustrations—illustrations which involve an obvious *petitio principii*; for if the Civil Courts are as incompetent to settle a Revenue dispute as a doctor is to stop a leak, or an engineer to cure a sick man, of course the discussion is at an end—"*cadit questio*," as the lawyers say.

With regard to the essential part of the argument, and not willingly accepting the comparative pictures of the triumphant collector and bewildered judge, I would suggest that, admitting for argument's sake the

general fact that the Revenue officer DOES possess greater facilities for forming a judgment in a contested claim connected with assessment, possession, or title, is not such superior advantage more than counterbalanced by the absence of all possible prepossession or bias in the Civil officer, which is the source of confidence and satisfaction to the parties concerned?

And this is, in fact, the cardinal point of the whole controversy. It is not whether this individual or that enjoys the materials at hand for ready judgment; it is not the fact, which I should be the last to dispute or question, that Revenue officers are "all honourable men"—as honourable as judicial, political, or any other denomination of public officer; it is not that any reasonable man fancies or believes that an English gentleman, because he happens to have selected the Revenue rather than the Judicial branch of the service, is, on that account, as far as he is personally concerned, the less conscientious or the less honourable; but it is that, by the universal consent and concurrence of mankind in general, entire confidence can and is only to be inspired where the tribunal entrusted with the adjudication of conflicting claims is absolutely and completely free from every possibility, whether of feeling, self-interest, prepossession, or idea, which may, even by remote contingency, affect or bias his judgment.

This, in simple truth, is the whole controversy before us; and on this point I would ask, What is the meaning of this general indignation, this universal protest against the Bill just passed?

While preparing this paper, we have received the account of a general meeting, very largely attended, in Bombay, for the purpose of protesting against it, and two memorials, addressed to the Secretary of State, one by the inhabitants of Bombay, and another on behalf of the Managing Committee of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, praying his lordship to veto it, have been forwarded to this Association.

And what has been the alleged immediate and moving cause of so retrograde and impolitic a measure, abrogating, as it does, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, which have been in operation for three-quarters of a century? Is it that the law has been found to be inoperative—that the remedy provided has been found to be ineffectual—that the further progress of civilization calls for still wider and more effectual protection of individual right against official power? Alas, no! Such reasons for interference might indeed call for legislative action, and would doubtless enlist the sympathies of conscientious and thoughtful Englishmen. Would that we were here assembled this evening to forward and support such an enlightened project. So far, however, from this being the case, we have now to protest, as we have already protested, against a law, based not upon enlightened and progressive principles—not having

for its object the greater security of the people, or the more effectual restraint of despotic power—but exactly the reverse. It is not that the former law was inapplicable, but because it has been practically applied; it is not that it was ineffectual for the end for which it was established, but because it has effectively operated for the attainment of that end; it is not because the Government desires to give undue scope to the laws enacted for the protection of the people's rights, but because it seeks to narrow and restrict them—to amplify the power of the executive authority, and weaken the position of the individual.

And what, I may again inquire, is the particular incident which has given sudden impetus to this formal and deliberate effort on the part of the Bombay member? What is the terrible evil which has occurred—the danger to be apprehended? A suit involving the large sum of Rs. 4 has been decided by the High Court in favour of an individual ryot, against the Survey authorities in the Surveying Office, the defendant consenting to the decision as just! *Hinc illæ lachrymæ!* To the minds of ordinary Englishmen this would be a subject of honest satisfaction, but to zealous and able Revenue officers such an issue is (as Dogberry says) "tolerable, and not to "be endured"—and hence the proceedings which have been initiated, and which have to all appearance stirred popular feeling to its depths.

And here it is important to observe, that the law which gave Civil courts cognizance over Revenue suits, has been in force for years! It was a recognized and established principle—and one, too, that, more than any other portion of our administrative system, gave confidence to the people of India—that the meanest peasant had his remedy, when wronged, by suit before the Judge.

Remembering this, what are we to think of the fact, that an individual had thus sued, and had obtained redress before the constituted tribunal of the country? Are we to regard it as a misfortune? Was the law, as solemnly established for so many years, a mere sham or pretence? Is it valuable when inoperative—disastrous when brought into play? something to point at, and talk about—like the hat and coat which the three old maids hung up in their hall because they looked cheerful? Was the law to be dreaded and deprecated only when so used as to answer its legitimate ends? These questions may appear absurd, but yet in sober truth this is the logical effect of the argument used. The moving cause set forth for excluding the action of the Civil Court is that the Civil Court has granted redress, under the law, to an aggrieved individual.

But it is only fair to point out that this ground is not the only one given

for this ill-omened movement. This feeble foundation alone was necessarily too weak to support such a ruinous superstructure, and we find, therefore, a second and more legitimate ground introduced—viz., the *expediency of uniformity*. Now, on this I need hardly observe that uniformity, though desirable in itself, may be too dearly purchased. There is such a thing as "levelling down" as well as "levelling up," and if uniformity is attained by the former process—by changing the better for the worse—such a transfer can scarcely be termed a "consummation devoutly to be wished." We should think an individual far on the way to lunacy who, having a good coat and a shocking bad hat, sought to establish uniformity by substituting a bad for a better coat, and should certainly impugn the sense and sanity of the horticulturist who, for the sake of uniformity, converted his flower-beds into beds of weeds. "Uniformity," therefore, is simply no reason at all; it is an obvious begging of the question, until it is clearly shown that the change by which uniformity is to be attained is, *per se*, a change for the better. We may, therefore, fairly dismiss such a plea as this as being of little weight, only to be taken into account when the change itself has been proved to be desirable.

And now, in concluding this paper, I think it right to mention that, in addition to the able pamphlet, entitled "Law *versus* Discretion," published by Vishvanath Narain Mundlik, another has been given to the public by Shama Rao Vithal, which contains a reprint of twenty-four decisions of the High Court of Bombay, reversing the judgments of the Revenue Courts, and, in many instances, accompanied with very severe rebukes to the deciding officers.

It is painful to read such instances of gross miscarriage of justice, but it is an extremely important item in the consideration of the present case, for it is not mere individual ignorance or incompetency that is exposed, but in many cases a neglect or indifference to the rights of the people, sufficient, certainly, to justify a general distrust in the impartiality of the tribunals.

Whether these shortcomings are sufficiently glaring to justify the concluding remarks of Shama Rao Vithal's preface, I am not prepared to say, but it is sad to contemplate the fact that there is sufficient ground to call for such a condemnation as that which the author puts forth in a published pamphlet, and which, though possibly too severe, at least has the appearance of justification in these High Court decisions. He thus writes: "The result of these facts, which we have the "hearty satisfaction to observe is highly creditable to the British "administration of justice in the Presidency, may, in relation to "the executive Revenue authorities, be briefly stated thus:— "That the Revenue officers have, in the execution of their

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" functions, shown a total disregard of the rights of the people, and of " the different land tenures, customs, and usages prevailing in different " places; that they have been guilty of violations of solemn contracts " entered into by the State with the people; that they have betrayed " their utter inability to appreciate the simplest principles of justice and " equity; that, when called to account by the Civil Courts, they have, " out of a mistaken zeal for the interests of the Government, to the " detriment of public morality and public justice, promoted vexatious " litigation by setting up unfounded justifications and inequitable de- " fences. In short, unless an increase in the amount of revenue *per fas* " *et nefas* is to be taken as the only index of a just and infallible system " of Revenue administration, the way in which the Revenue officers have " been lately acquitting themselves conclusively establishes the fact that, " to give them a complete and absolute freedom from amenability to the " jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, would not only be contrary to true " policy, but will be highly prejudicial to the maintenance of the people's " rights and relations with the Government on a sound and just " footing."

And, in connection with this, it may be useful to quote a separate decision of Chief Justice Westropp, of the Bombay High Court, recently published, confirming the judgment of Mr. Birdwood, one of the ablest and most respected of the District Judges in that Presidency.

I have quoted from the journal in which the decision appears:—

" The District Judge, Mr. Herbert Birdwood, found for the villagers " in all their demands, and this mainly on the ground that, for the period " of 180 years, the smaller sum had been the limit of the assessment— " subject to a few unimportant variations. The Revenue authorities, in " their appeal, boldly contended that the Judge was 'wrong' and in " 'error' on almost every point, and that the village records had been " falsified by the Native accountants. But their Lordships held that the " District Judge was right in almost every respect, and that the fact of " the village assessment being *bandi jumma*, that is, a permanently fixed " money payment, was fully established. They complimented him on " 'the elaborate investigation he had bestowed on the case;' and, though " they did not forget to commend the Advocate-General (Mr. A. R. " Scoble), 'who had addressed the Court for two days, with his usual " 'ability and industry,' they had regarded his case as bad from the " first.

" Turning to the Revenue officers, who have been the relentless liti- ' gants in this losing game,

" 'Their Lordships must hope that the facts of this case were not ' ' wholly known to the Revenue officers of the district; but, looking at

" the way in which the case had been conducted in the two Courts, their " Lordships could not think those officers were unacquainted with them. " It must be remarked that the management of the defendants' case " showed a deliberate disregard for ancient vested rights ; and that the " imperfect, perfunctory, and one-sided manner in which it was conducted " was not the only instance of the over-zeal with which Revenue cases " were managed by Government officers.' "*

And now, that I may not appear to omit any of the important reasons adduced by Mr. Hope during the later stages of the Bill, I will here quote his concluding remarks, as published in the *Homeward Mail*, of the 24th January, 1876 :—

" In conclusion, he would briefly recapitulate the grounds on which " the Council were asked to pass this measure. First of all, the state " of the law was uncertain, so uncertain that we had the leading pleaders " of Bombay at issue with their own Chief Justice and High Court. The " law likewise was exceedingly anomalous, as it was found that in the " new provinces there was an unnecessary exclusion of the Civil Courts, " while in the old provinces there was an extreme admission of them, so " extreme an admission as to be greater than that which existed in any " other part of India or even in the United Kingdom. Further, this " uncertainty and extreme admission of the Courts was not unlikely to " lead to consequences which were embarrassing both fiscally and poli- " tically ; and the chances of such embarrassment were enhanced by the " peculiarity of Bombay judicial officers not also having Revenue experi- " ence. Upon those who objected to the Bill lay the burden of showing " why one portion of one Presidency of India should be treated quite " differently from the rest of India and England, and that they had " altogether failed to do. On the contrary, they had been obliged to " take refuge in a variety of exaggerations and misrepresentations which " had been more or less fully exposed. Under these circumstances, he " thought the Council might pass the Bill without hesitation, in the full " confidence that it would redress the glaring anomalies which now " existed, and remove the risk of complications and difficulties in the " future."

I feel almost thankful to Mr. Hope for the final epitome of the reasons for this unhappy Bill, for thus summarized they appear distressingly weak : uncertainty,—which has had no evil results, and which might be removed, if necessary, as well by the extension as the restriction of the powers of the Civil Courts—an anomaly which at the most can only be

* *Homeward Mail*, January 24, 1876.

described as "not unlikely to cause political and fiscal embarrassments," but which has evidently never yet so caused them. These feeble reasons, topped by an assertion which is certainly not remarkable for the soundness of its logic—viz., that the burden of proof lies on those who wish to retain the *status quo ante*, instead of on those who, after three-quarters of a century, desire to alter the law as it stands,—these, arrayed at the last moment of the debate, form the sum-total of the arguments which, after two years' discussion, can be marshalled by the projectors of the Bill. I confess I am unable to comprehend how, on such light and trivial grounds, the distinguished officers who are the prime movers of the Bill can reconcile themselves to the support of such an innovation; how for such small and paltry objects they can consent to ignore that principle which throughout the civilized world is recognized and upheld as the great guarantee of righteous decision, the very pillar of the temple of justice—viz., impartiality in the tribunal. I do not mean to say that the Civil judge is a perfect being,—far from it. I have myself witnessed instances in which, even in the highest Court in India, personal feeling, wounded pride, and private prejudice have blinded the conscience and influenced the judgment of the presiding officer. But these instances are, I rejoice to say, exceptional. The universal consensus of all civilized men has recognized the great axiom that no man can be a judge in his own cause, that no one who by any possible accident is, or feels himself to be, interested directly or indirectly, personally or professionally, in a case *sub judice*, should be allowed to pass judgment thereon. The noble principle established throughout India that every man, great or small, is equal before the law—that, amidst all other abuses and imperfections, has afforded satisfaction and confidence to the people, and it is with profound regret and deep disappointment that I regard the proposed violation of this principle on the slight and unsatisfactory grounds set forth by the promoters of the Bill. It appears to me to be the first instance in which a system established on a sacred principle of recognized right is placed in subjection to considerations of expediency. It is an evil omen, and I devoutly trust it may not yet be too late to obtain from the Secretary of State the exercise of that supreme and wholesome power which the law has given him, and that the Marquis of Salisbury, by putting his veto on the Bill, will restore confidence and satisfaction to the nation. ("Hear, hear," and applause.)

The CHAIRMAN having invited discussion,

Mr. R. C. SAUNDERS rose and remarked that the subject treated by Mr. Tayler was one on which that gentleman could speak with weight, for twenty years ago he was one of the most distinguished Revenue

officers in the Presidency of Bengal. All present doubtless knew what close and special knowledge of Revenue and Judicial subjects was possessed by an ordinary Civil Servant, and those who knew India would also know that the pick of the Civil Service, after a great many years' toil and successful administration, were sometimes selected for a Commissionership of a large division. That having been the case with Mr. Tayler, his views were entitled to every consideration. With reference to the Act under criticism, he (Mr. Saunders) begged to say that the reasons given for the measure were, in his opinion, very unsatisfactory. Many years ago a declaration was made in India, in the most solemn manner possible, that the separation of the functions of the Judicial and the Revenue Departments was advisable, and that separation was brought about in all the regulation provinces. The only places where the functions were combined in one individual were in the non-regulation provinces. As the paper which had been read would be circulated in England as well as in India, it might be well to mention the difficulties and obstacles besetting a litigant in India. Any one with experience of litigation in India would, he believed, agree with him that out of a hundred cognizable cases which would be brought by prudent men of business before the Courts of England not five of the same character would be brought before the Courts of India, because of the obstacles and enormous fees exacted. Of that small number not five per cent. of the litigants would carry their case to the second Court, and out of the whole number of litigants in India not one in fifty thousand would bring his case into the third Court. (Hear, hear.) That was the position of the litigant in the ordinary Civil Courts. What was the position in the Revenue Courts? No one acquainted with the subject would deny that in the latter case the litigant's position was most unfortunate. In the first place, he knew that the judge would be judge in his own case—prosecutor, judge, and jury at once; so that the appellant must have a very strong case indeed before he can be induced even to present a petition to the Revenue officer. He (Mr. Saunders) having had some experience in the non-regulation provinces in India, begged to know what was the reason of the scarcity of suits in which the defendant was the Government which Native plaintiffs could be persuaded to institute. The Natives knew it was useless to contend with the Government, and therefore they refrained from suing. What also prevented the Natives applying to the law was the enormous cost for stamp duties, which he condemned as altogether wrong. He admitted that for legal proceedings a reasonable stamp duty should be exacted, but the sums which now had to be paid were so heavy as literally to shut the door of justice. As to litigation before the Revenue officials, that was precluded to a great extent by the dislike that the

Natives had to putting themselves in opposition to, or in competition with, the Government, no matter how good their case might be. This state of things, he contended, tended to keep alive a sense of wrong, and was likely to produce disaffection and danger, for the right of free access to Courts of Justice and of Appeal was the safety of India. That safeguard ought, therefore, to be extended and applied to all suits, and if any change was to be made, it should be in the direction of enlarging, not curtailing, the privilege or right of appeal, because a litigant shut out from this would feel injured, and, having no representative institutions, free press, or any peaceable and legitimate means of redress to apply to, would become dissatisfied for the rest of his life. With these remarks he concluded, adding his general concurrence with the views expressed by Mr. Tayler.

Mr. R. B. SWINTON said he felt somewhat diffident in joining in the discussion, as, until the previous day, he had never heard of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Bill, and had not seen any of the criticisms in the Indian press which it had elicited, nor had access to the several local Acts and Acts of the Legislative Council referred to. He presumed that the Bill became law—that it is an Act—when it received the assent of the Governor-General in Council, unless the law in that respect has been changed since 1873, so as to require the previous assent of the Secretary of State. But, from experience in another part of India, it was not difficult to see what is being aimed at—the old story of excluding the Civil Courts—the *bête noir*, the Adaulut of the zillah; and he was afraid it was a vain attempt, for all cases gravitate to them. "Drive Nature out at the door, and it comes in at the window." His own idea was that, if the Court is properly presided over—if, as is too often the case, it is not swamped with arrears—it will now-a-days do the business better than the Revenue officers; but, out of all question, it is indispensable that the Judicial officer (who does not ever freshly impinge upon Native society and sources of information as the twelve jurymen do here) should have been for some years up and down the country in a less stilted position as a Revenue officer, or as a planter—if that were possible—an engineer, or magistrate. India is too poor a country to afford that the minds of its officials should be *tabula ras*, taking notice of nothing but that of which it may judicially take notice; and in that agnostic state of sublime indifference recommended by Mr. Tayler. Were it possible now, as it was half a century ago, that the experienced Revenue official—whose pay, by the way, does *not* depend upon the amount of revenue he raises—should be instructed to hear and determine all Revenue disputes in any way he thought best, short of using bodily ill-treatment, only recording his decision and the reasons,

with an appeal to the Revenue Board and Government, as much satisfaction might be given as by the Courts. But it becomes a different thing when the Revenue officer is called a "Court" too (all are Courts, he believed, down to the village "head" under the tree), and has to attend to a half-and-half civil procedure, and to vexatious and all-penetrating stamp contrivances, and rules of limitation, and is bound to hear professional *vakeels*, and to give weight to all that can be said upon his law—to call the sections of an indifferent Act by that name. His only protection, and that of the litigants, is a perfect code of procedure thoroughly known and constantly acted upon; but again and again the presiding officer of the Court must be thoroughly competent, and stamp fees should be reduced, and his Court must not be in arrears —the fruitful parent of corruption. As a fact, he believed a great deal, in past times, had been saved by certain matters being excluded from the Courts, partly by written law, partly by nobody dreaming of bringing them there. The lands granted as endowments of charities have been thus preserved, and all the emoluments of village officers. Somewhat elaborate regulations for that period (about 1820-30) were made, empowering Revenue officers to decide many other semi-civil disputes, if connected with land or crops, and they decided them in scores, but without any reference to the procedure laid down. There was also in force until recently an Act of 1831, absolutely forbidding the Courts from hearing any suit for, speaking generally, *inam* land. The Courts, too, were forbidden to entertain suits relating to rent-free land. As to suits against Government, they should at least be tried in the highest Courts, and should take precedence in time. Nothing has been more common of recent years than to find the chief representative of Government in a district lumped in as first or fiftieth defendant, and cited before officials who formerly might have been his own subordinates. He was not aware that in the Bombay Presidency it was proposed to take away from the Courts a jurisdiction they had had. Things were sure to slide back into the Courts. The description of suits, too, which are not to be "cognizable by Civil Courts," is very vague. The description should at least be as accurate as the description of a suit in a limitation Act. "Claims" marked A and C—"claims against the Government to "*inams*," and (C) "disputes regarding public rent or complaints of ex- "action of district officers"—can never be excluded, though (B) "ob- "jections to the amount or incidence of any assessment, or to the mode "of assessment, or to the principle on which such assessment has been "fixed," ought most certainly to be excluded. The difficulty in practice "will be that it will be contended that something not an assessment has "been levied."

Mr. F. S. CHAPMAN (member of the Governor-General's Council) remarked that there had been a most extraordinary amount of misconception regarding one very important section of the Act. He alluded to the clause which barred the jurisdiction of the Courts in respect to "objections to the amount or incidence of any assessment of land revenue, or to the mode of assessment, or to the "principle on which such assessment has been fixed." From the observations that had been made, one would suppose that it was proposed for the first time to deprive the people of a privilege that they had hitherto enjoyed and made use of. Now, as a matter of fact, the Courts had never exercised, and had never even laid claim to, jurisdiction in such matters. Whether the vague wording of the regulation authorized their doing so was a point on which there was, he believed, a conflict of opinion in high quarters. But it was certain the Courts themselves did not desire jurisdiction in these matters of assessment; and no sensible man of practical experience in administration would wish to alter what had been the practice hitherto. The amount at which the land revenue should be fixed was, in India, a question solely for the Executive Government to determine, in the absence of any proviso to the contrary; and this was a prerogative which it behoved the Government to guard and uphold most jealously. Then as to the mode of assessment. This was an operation of a highly technical character, and the judges themselves would be the first to disclaim their competency satisfactorily to sit in appeal on questions affecting the proper valuation of soils and the influences of climate. A very little reflection must make it clear to all impartial minds that, were the many thousands of cultivators who stand in direct relation to the Government encouraged and allowed to appeal against the action of the Executive on these questions, the whole machinery would be brought to a dead-lock. He would ask the members of the Association to consider what the effect would be were the taxpayers in this country allowed to resort to Courts of law in every case in which they considered they had been too highly assessed for income-tax, or were the importers of dutiable articles allowed to call in question the appraisement of the Custom-house. As to the "four-rupee" case alluded to by Mr. Tayler, it was not, of course, the amount, but the principle involved, that rendered it of such high importance. And in respect to this particular case, there had, unfortunately, been further misconception. The judges who decided it expressly and guardedly stated that their decision was not to be taken as a precedent. On this particular occasion the officers of Government omitted to put in any defence, and the Court had no alternative but to accept the plaintiff's assertion that the demand of the State was limited to a certain proportion

of the produce. This was an assertion that might and ought to have been easily disproved. He (Mr. Chapman) had already stated that the Courts disclaimed jurisdiction in these questions of assessment; but, on the other hand, it had been held by high authority that the existing law, although it had remained dormant, did authorize their interference. Such being the facts of the case, surely no one could take exception to the course proposed to be adopted—namely, to clearly and unhesitatingly enunciate the law in the direction that both the Courts, the Executive Government, and every person of practical experience considered right and proper, and in conformity with existing practice.

Mr. TAYLER here remarked that Mr. Chapman had only dealt with and explained one objection, and he would like to hear what could be said on the section barring the jurisdiction of the Courts in claims relating to *inams*.

Mr. CHAPMAN then said he had attended the meeting without any intention of speaking, and had thought it best to confine his remarks to the main principle involved in the Act, and regarding which, as he had endeavoured to explain, a great deal of misconception apparently prevailed. As to *inams*, he would briefly explain to those of his hearers who were not acquainted with the Bombay Presidency that the difference between what were termed the "old" and the "new" provinces, consisted in the fact that the holders of *inams* in the former could take the Government into court if they were dissatisfied with the decision of Revenue officers, and that it was now proposed to deprive them of this privilege, and place them on the same footing as the people holding this description of property in the new provinces. This, no doubt, would be a serious matter for complaint if the provision in question were likely to lead to practical consequences. At one time the inquiries into, and decisions relating to, claims of this character gave rise to much heart-burning and discontent. Happily, about fifteen years ago, what was known as the "summary settlement" was adopted, by which the claimants and the Government came to a compromise,—the former consenting to pay so many annas in the rupee, and the latter, in consideration of receiving such payment, agreeing to confirm all titles to exemption without further inquiry. This settlement was almost universally accepted. Whatever, therefore, might be the opinion as to the wisdom or justice of the alteration of the law, he could assure the meeting that for all practical purposes it would remain inoperative. He would further point out that if the Government attempted at any future time to violate or depart from the terms of this settlement, or, indeed, from those of any other engagement they had entered upon, they would be answerable to the Courts, like any private individuals. The Act, as

passed by the Council in Calcutta, contained many other important modifications and concessions than those included in the original Bill.

Rev. JAMES LONG said that it seemed to him, looking at the general drift of the Government, that there was too much law and far too little justice. In dealing with India, they did not want razors to cut mill-stones, but justice at the gate, dispensed by those who knew the manners and customs and morals of the people, and who, from that knowledge, could decide better than by technical rules. The feeling was growing throughout India that there was too much attention given to English notions of legal procedure, and it was a similar feeling that had a good deal to do with the Mutiny. For instance, one of the first acts of the mutineers was to destroy the records in the Judicial Courts; and though it might be urged that other considerations influenced the action, he believed that dislike of the legal system had something to do with it. Many men of property had been ruined by the Courts, while agents and pleaders had become millionaires; and as an instance of the feeling created by the system, the rev. gentleman cited the case of a gentleman of high standing, who, being advised to take a certain dispute to the High Court, said: "If "I were guilty, I should like to be tried there, but, being innocent, cer-"tainly not." Another instance of the Native feeling was given with reference to the *ground*-rent in Bengal, as to the proportion to be taken by the zemindar and by the ryot respectively. This was taken into the Courts; but there was such a strong feeling amongst the people that, through the Courts, they would have the worst of the decisions, that they very properly formed a rent league for their own protection. What was the effect? The Government took the question out of the hands of the Courts, and the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal was now framing a regulation in order to have the question decided by the Revenue authorities and the Commissioners—men who were in a position to test statements by the aid of experience. Another case occurred some time back in the Sonthal district, where the Natives were gradually becoming ruined by getting into the Courts; but at the moment when ill-feeling was growing, Sir George Campbell put aside the technicalities of the Courts, and became alive to the position just in time to prevent an insurrection. It was partly through law agents and usurers that the people in Sonthalia were formerly driven to insurrection. It should be borne in mind that there are two hundred and forty millions of people in India, and that England has but a small force for the defence of the country, and was involved in complications at home and abroad; and therefore, to enforce English laws and customs in India was, to say the least, dangerous. Speaking generally of English law, Mr. Long said a general impression abroad was that it was made for the benefit of lawyers, and he referred specifically to

the land laws in support of the allegation. The people of India did not desire a similar system, and it would be essential for the continuance of friendly relations with them that cases of dispute should be tried by judges cognizant of the habits of the people, who should first have had experience among the people, and were personally acquainted with their habits and their language. It was easy to imagine how incompetent a native of China would be to administer the law in England after a few years devoted to acquiring a scholastic knowledge of the language; and, by the same rule, it was easy to appreciate the difficulties attending the working of the Judicial system in India, and to see that experience was really more essential than strict and formal acquaintance with the law. On these grounds he thought the Government were right in the Bill referring disputes to Revenue, and not to Judicial authorities.

Mr. WILLIAM TAYLER, in rising to reply, said that he was glad that the imperfect address he had delivered had elicited so much discussion. With reference to the remarks made by Mr. Chapman, he was prepared to receive them with all deference. One point, indeed, he (Mr. Tayler) was prepared to admit—viz., that questions as to the amount of assessment might properly be left to the decision of the Revenue officers; but the retrograde measure to which he had drawn attention took away the power of appeal to an impartial tribunal in respect of other matters than those just mentioned. The right to *inams*, for instance, depended on evidence, and this surely was a matter which ought to be decided by a Civil Court, and not by a Collector. He (Mr. Tayler) would not have taken the question up as he had done in his address if the power given to the Revenue officials were simply as to the amount of assessment; but it would have been observed that there were complaints of injustice and exaction. Who was to judge in them? The Civil Courts under the new law had not the power. There was a strong feeling in the Native mind upon the subject, for the assessment was a Government act, and the officers enforcing it were Government officers, from whom there was no appeal; and he (Mr. Tayler) felt that differences could not be so satisfactorily settled by the personal knowledge of the Revenue officer as by an impartial tribunal which gave due weight to the law of evidence.

Mr. CHAPMAN said that in certain cases the complainant would not be debarred from a Civil Court.

Mr. TAYLER asked what these cases were.

Mr. CHAPMAN: The cases barred are such as involve questions similar to an *ad valorem* customs duty, or the assessment of the income-tax.

Mr. TAYLER, continuing, contended that such matters as claims against the Government to *inams* might involve considerations and principles which only a Court of Justice ought to deal with. Then there were complaints of exaction, or the incidence of the assessment, respecting which a good deal might be said on both sides, and for such matters to be settled without the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts he held to be an infringement of the principle of justice, which he could not abstain from condemning. With regard to Mr. Long's objections, he might say that there was no one throughout the whole of India who had more frequently protested against the abuses of the Civil Courts than he (Mr. Tayler) had done. But what Mr. Long had brought forward did not appear to him to be relevant to the present question. He was not asking for the power of the Revenue officers to be taken away, and for the Civil Courts to be turned loose to make assessments, because it was quite possible that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the Revenue officers might be right; but for the hundredth, which might be wrong, he was claiming the privilege of appeal, and if that were withdrawn, a feeling of dissatisfaction would spread throughout the country, and a great principle would be violated. But supposing that some of the proceedings of the Courts were injurious, as had been alleged, he reminded the meeting that the Judicial system, with all its defects, was the best that it had hitherto been possible to give India for the impartial adjudication of disputes of various kinds, and that in providing for the decision of questions affecting the rights of the people by the Revenue officers, the Government were removing that safeguard which the Civil Courts had hitherto afforded.

The CHAIRMAN, in closing the discussion, stated that, in order to understand the true bearing of the question before them, it must be remembered that the rights which had been swept away by the New Revenue Jurisdiction Act were enjoyed by a portion only of the territories under the Bombay Government—namely, some six of the zillahs earliest brought under the regulations—but were denied to the non-regulation districts, and also to the three zillahs, which were not brought under the regulations until 1829 and 1830. It must also be remembered that the Act conceded a certain right of appeal to the Civil Courts—limited, indeed, to a very few cases, but, such as it was, extending to all the regulation districts, without exception; and therefore the three latter zillahs were now, *pro tanto*, in a better position than they were before. Still, he much regretted that the Act had passed in its present shape, and was not surprised that it had excited a strong feeling of dissatisfaction amongst those whose rights it had so seriously curtailed. It was, undoubtedly, a substantial grievance that, having enjoyed for

half a century, if not longer, the privilege of appealing to the Civil Courts against any injury arising to them or their property from the action of the Revenue officers, they should now be denied access to those Courts, and be compelled to seek redress solely at the hands of the chiefs of the Revenue Department or of the Executive Government. In saying that, he (Mr. White) was not one of those who thought that no legislation was necessary on the subject. As he read the Bombay Regulations of 1827, it was open to a Civil Court to deal by way of appeal with all disputes that might arise between the Revenue officers and the parties assessed. He was aware that some high Judicial authorities, for whom he had the greatest respect, had put a more limited construction on the Regulations, and held that the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction to decide questions as to the amount of the assessment or the principles on which it was levied. At all events, reasonable doubts might be entertained as to the true construction of the Regulations, and it was desirable that the Legislature should interpose to settle these doubts. So far as the Act negatived the jurisdiction of the Courts in accordance with the more limited construction contended for, it had his entire approval. The land revenue of India was a peculiar institution. It was not a tax fixed or defined by any Act or Regulation. It rested with the Executive to declare its amount and prescribe the rules under which the assessment should be made, and the tax was also subject, at least in Bombay, to periodical revision at the hands of the Executive. The interference of the Civil Courts in disputes as to the amount of the tax and the propriety of the rules under which it was levied, would have a strong tendency to introduce confusion into the assessment. But the Act under discussion was not limited to the excluding of such questions from the consideration of the Civil Courts: it went much further, and, as he (Mr. White) thought, beyond the necessities of the case. He could not now point out all the instances to which that objection applied, as he had no copy of the Act to refer to, but he might mention as one of them the exclusion from the Courts of all claims to total or partial exemption of payment of land revenue, except such as were based upon a sound or some similar title. Now, in a dispute between the tax-assessor and the tax-payer the general question of liability or non-liability appeared to him to be a very fit subject for the determination of a Civil tribunal. Another instance was where the Act deprived the Courts of jurisdiction in respect of all claims to receive payments out of the land revenue. Such claims were in the nature of charges upon the revenue; they involved no question of taxation, but the rights of individuals to be paid an annuity out of a particular fund when collected, and might safely and properly be left to the arbitrament of a Court of Justice. The Act, however, not only with-

drew all such claims in future from the cognizance of the Civil tribunals, but, as far as he remembered, omitted to protect from the operation of the Act those claimants who, prior to the passing of the Act, had appealed to the Courts and succeeded in procuring decrees in their favour. That appeared to be a great omission, and, if the Revenue authorities availed themselves of it, might work grievous injustice. He might illustrate that by referring to the case of the Givassias, who, after a most protracted litigation with the Bombay Government and its officers, had succeeded in establishing before the Privy Council their right to an annual payment out of the land revenue collected from certain villages. It would be a great hardship if these payments, sanctioned and declared legal, as they were, by the highest appellate Court of the realm, should be discontinued; and yet, if discontinued, it would be difficult to say that the aggrieved parties could appeal to a Civil tribunal in the teeth of the Act now under discussion. In conclusion, he (Mr. White) regretted that the Indian Legislature, in passing the Act, had thought fit to reverse the policy of Mountstuart Elphinstone as indicated in the Bombay Regulations of 1827—a policy that was calculated to make not only a strong government, but a contented people. He (Mr. White) admitted that those Regulations opened too wide a door for appeal in matters relating to the land revenue, and that therefore some fresh legislation was necessary; but he should have preferred, and he certainly thought it would have been more politic, that such legislation should have taken the direction of extending to the three junior zillahs, with the modifications which he had suggested, the rights enjoyed by the six elder provinces under the Regulations of 1827.

A vote of thanks to Mr. Tayler for his address was proposed by the Rev. J. LONG, seconded by Mr. R. C. SAUNDERS, and supported by

Mr. GRIFFITH, C.E., who said: Mr. Chairman, if I am not out of order, I should like to say a few words with reference to some remarks made by the gentleman who first addressed this meeting. He very graphically described an unhappy ryot withering under the cold, grey eye of an offended Revenue officer, against whose decision, however, not one in fifty thousand would have the temerity to appeal, unjust and contrary to law though it might be. I know little about non-regulation provinces, but having lived twenty years in the districts among the ryots of the Deccan, I feel myself competent to say that such a picture is wholly inapplicable to the regulation provinces of the Bombay Presidency, where the Revenue authorities are not regarded with any undue awe; nor are the Natives, I believe, at all backward in appealing against Revenue officers' decisions if they consider they have a good case. I might mention as a case in point that when land required for the Deo-

lalee Barracks, a few years ago, was unfortunately entered upon before the notice required by law had expired, the want of attention to law was at once observed, and an appeal to the High Court resulted in the land-owners obtaining a large sum in addition to that awarded as the value of the land by the Revenue authorities. This right of appeal is, I believe, most highly prized by the Natives of the Bombay Presidency, and it seems contrary to the spirit of the age to take away or even to curtail a right that has been long enjoyed.

The vote of thanks to Mr. Tayler was then put to the meeting and carried unanimously.

The True Line of Defence for India.

PAPER BY COLONEL RATHBORNE,

READ AT A MEETING OF THE EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION ON WEDNESDAY, JULY 5, 1876.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR GEO. MALCOLM, K.C.B., IN THE CHAIR.

A MEETING of the members and friends of the East India Association was held at the Rooms of the Association, on Wednesday afternoon, July 5, 1876, the subject for consideration being "The True Line of De-"fence for India," as introduced by Colonel A. B. Rathborne.

Lieutenant-General Sir GEORGE MALCOLM, K.C.B., occupied the chair; and amongst those present were Major-General Sir G. Le Grand Jacob, K.C.S.I., General Alexander, Lieutenant-General O. Cavenagh, Major-General G. Burn, Colonel Le Hardy, Colonel Wood, Captain W. C. Palmer (Hon. Sec. of the Association), Rev. J. Long, Dr. R. A. Barker, Dr. Alex. Burn, Dr. H. Harper, Dr. G. Paton, Mr. George Foggo, Mr. W. S. Fitzwilliam, Mr. R. C. Saunders, Mr. Bryce McMaster, Mr. H. Danby Seymour, Mr. W. F. Hale, Mr. R. S. Swinton, Mr. T. A. E. Miller, Mr. F. Saunders, Mr. B. F. Hall, Mr. K. M. Dutt, Mr. R. U. Ahmed, Mr. A. C. Mitra, Mr. Kenneth Cornish, &c.

The CHAIRMAN, in introducing the subject for discussion, said the "true line of defence for India" was a topic of the highest importance. How best to preserve our Indian Empire at one and the same time from foreign aggression on the one hand and from internal commotion on the other, was manifestly a matter of the gravest interest to all Englishmen, for both those dangers were of such a character as to act and react upon each other. The whole subject, therefore, was

likely to raise such a sea of questions, and such knotty problems, that any one coming forward before the East India Association with well-considered suggestions upon the matter would receive attention, and especially if, as in the present instance, they were addressed by one so well qualified for the task as Colonel Rathborne. The Chairman then called upon Colonel Rathborne to open the discussion.

Colonel RATHBORNE then delivered the following address :—

The question how India is to be defended against foreign aggression, and the vast possessions of the Empress of it to be preserved for ever to the Crown of England, is one of the largest and most complex that can occupy the nation's mind. To attempt to solve it completely in the short space of time which I can be allowed to occupy on the present occasion would be impossible ; all that I can pretend to do is to call attention to some of the more salient points of the problem, and this I shall endeavour to do in the paper I am about to read to you.

The first essential to the preservation of India against the attacks of any foreign enemy is one that is too often lost sight of; it is that the government of India should be so conducted as to make it a matter of moral certainty that, in the event of any other European Power attempting to oust us from it, there shall be no internal uprising to paralyze the military movements which the authorities may consider, on strategic grounds, the best calculated for its defence. If, like France in her recent contest with Germany, we have to deal not only with the enemy in front of us, but also with revolutionary or rebellious upheavings in our rear, the ablest plan of action may, and probably will, prove utterly useless, because it will be found impossible to adhere to it in this new state of things. On the sagacity, therefore, of the successive civil rulers, as much or more than on that of the successive military commanders to whom the defence of India may be entrusted, must we rely for the preservation of that magnificent dependency of the British Crown. India must be so governed as to leave no room for a particle of doubt or hesitation upon this point ; for if we cannot meet the enemy with our minds unhampered by the fear of anything that may take place in India itself, while we are so occupied, the battle will be half lost before it is commenced even, as it will be equivalent to having to fight the foe with one arm tied. Over and over again has this truth been expressed in one form or other within the rooms of our Association, but it cannot be repeated too often, that no danger from any external foe can approach in magnitude the danger which, not merely by bad government, but by the failure to give a thoroughly good government to the Natives of India, and one that they themselves can appreciate, we shall be preparing for ourselves against the time when the day of trial comes. If we desire

peace, we should prepare for war, as the old adage says; and in no way can we so thoroughly prepare for a war of this kind as by an honest, a single-minded, and an unceasing devotion to the obligations we owe to our Native subjects in India, as well as to the Native Princes in alliance with us; testing every act of ours by the beautiful but simple standard laid down not only in our own Scriptures, but in the holy books of both Hindus and Mahomedans also, that we should do to them in all things as (if our position were reversed) we would be done by ourselves. There is a saying attributed, I believe, to the great Mahomedan Prophet, that "an hour of justice is worth a life of prayer." It is a maxim which I am sorry our Government in India too often violates in the pursuit of what it deems policy; not remembering that no object ought to be paramount in the statesman's eyes to that of not only doing justice to the best of his ability, but also of remedying any act of past injustice, no matter at what cost to his own feelings or to the feelings of those serving under him, if it only be made clear to him that injustice has been done. The ablest strategic combination, I repeat, will fail us if this, the very foundation of our power in India, be neglected; while if it be only carefully attended to, we shall have little to dread from any foreign foe that may meet us on Indian ground.

The next point to be considered is, that for the retention of India we must always be able to maintain the undisputed mastery of the sea. Without this, we could not hold India for a moment in the present state of things. If it were cut off from its base in England, the preservation of a dependency so distant would be simply impossible; and whether the struggle was a long one or a short one, the result would be assuredly the same. We hear a great deal said of the advances which Russia is making in Central Asia, and of the state of the Indian Army, when people are discussing the question of the defence of India; but it must be always remembered that Whitehall has as much to do with the matter as Calcutta or St. Petersburg. For any failure on the part of our Admiralty to maintain our naval supremacy would as effectually destroy all prospect of our retention of India as would the most successful plan of aggression on the part of Russia, or the most fatal miscalculation of our means of meeting such aggression on the part of the Secretary of State for India and the Viceroy there.

Nor must it be forgotten as to this point, that the task of keeping a clear and secure passage for our troop-ships and our store-ships, laden with war material of all kinds, will be found infinitely more difficult than it was when we were engaged in our great war with France, in addition to the immensely increased demands that would have to be made on our Navy for the protection of our merchant ships and commerce through-

out the world. In those days, too, our men-of-war were far more independent of extraneous aid than they are at present. With no coals to carry, and no engines, with all their liability to accident, to occupy the vast space they do, our ships could then be sent, when well supplied with salt provisions and biscuit and ammunition, to sea for months, or even years, only requiring to touch for water, which they could find anywhere, when their own supply was out. Now all this is changed. Our ironclads, with their armour-plating and monster guns, and engines of some thousands of horse-power, may be much more formidable than were the largest of our line-of-battle ships in Nelson's time; but when discussing the question of the defence of India, it must not be forgotten that, instead of continuing efficient for lengthened periods without extraneous aid, they could not, without replenishing their stores of coal, continue under steam at full speed for more than a very few days. Hence all the drawbacks the use of them must necessarily involve in such a war as we are contemplating—the necessity of keeping up coaling stations, amply provided with coals to feed these monsters along the entire route, and the necessity also of providing for the security of these coaling stations against a foreign foe, as well as of protecting the fleets of coal-ships which would have to be perpetually bringing coal from England to replace that which was consumed.

This is a point that must not be lost sight of, because it will never do to look only at the power of our ironclads without taking into account their sources of weakness to us as well. And it would be found an insurmountable source of weakness, under certain eventualities, that they are so completely dependent for their continued efficiency upon the immunity from capture of so many other ships, which are in themselves utterly incapable of either fighting or running, being usually the slowest as well as the least capable of resistance of any that range the seas. Such risks as regards our merchant vessels might be got over by sailing them under a foreign flag, but this would be out of the question as regards our coal-ships and store-ships and troop-ships, or any others carrying contraband of war. These can only be protected from constant capture by securing for ourselves a thorough and complete command of a sea route to India by which they can pass without incurring any chance of being taken by the enemy, while at the same time no nearer and better sea route is left open to the enemy himself.

Such a route as Lord Palmerston foresaw will not be afforded to us by the Suez Canal. In the first place, it is prohibited by its statutes from allowing a passage to any but vessels of commerce. It is a rule, no doubt, that no one thinks of enforcing in time of peace; but we ourselves should be the first to insist on Turkey's observing it in the event

of a war with Russia or with France. For what would be the result of the Canal being kept open to their navies and their troop-ships under such circumstances? Supposing the old route round the Cape to be the only route to India, our naval superiority would always retain for us the mastery over it if engaged in hostilities with either of those Powers. But with this new route to India lying by the very doors of both (for Russia would never respect the Dardanelles under the circumstances), the advantage would be entirely the other way. Our ironclads might, to be sure, and would be able to hold their own as long as they had coal against those of the enemy; but what about our troop-ships, our coal-ships, our store-ships, and our immense line of commercial steamers? These passing, as they would have to do, the whole length of the west and south coasts of France, as well as of the Mediterranean, to the mouth of the Suez Canal, would be exposed to the attacks of endless vessels of the enemy—vessels which could commit their depredations, for the most part, with impunity, being able, as they would be, if pursued by our cruisers, to find the shelter which the laws of modern naval warfare accord equally to both belligerents in the numberless Mediterranean neutral harbours, if they could not, as in the case of France, run into their own ports.

It may be safely predicted, therefore, that if engaged in a war with France or Russia—the only Powers at all likely to attempt to attack our possessions in India—the Suez Canal will not only prove useless to us, but that it will impose on us new difficulties if it be kept open, which I doubt its being. Our great object in such an event will have to be to get it closed, so that the position of the contending parties shall be reversed; and that, instead of our vessels having to run the gauntlet of the Mediterranean, their vessels of all kinds shall have no means of getting to India but by following, in the face of the innumerable men-of-war we should then have afloat, the old and well-known long sea route.

If, indeed, the contrary were the case, if the Canal were really capable of giving us, as is thought by some, an immeasurably firmer hold of India in time of war with any European State, it would be but a fragile reed for us to lean upon, after all; for if the State at war with us found it more to its advantage that it should be closed, it could be closed in spite of all we could do, or that any one could do at any time. A ditch, for it is nothing more, with only about twenty-six feet depth of muddy water in it, which requires constant dredging to keep it even to that depth, so narrow throughout the greater part of it that vessels are obliged to advance singly, while in some places but a few feet divide the steamer from the earthen embankment that for the most of its length forms the Canal's side, is not a very difficult affair to deal with, when the

object is simply to make it impassable for a longer or shorter time. An old vessel or two filled with stones and sunk in the channel, or in the channels leading into it, a few pounds of gunpowder expended in blowing in its banks, or a party of Nubians set to work to fill it in at its narrowest part, would close it for months in a single night.

I think, then, that it will be seen that while, on the one hand, we should have no power to send our men-of-war, or our troop-ships, or coal-ships, or vessels carrying any of the material of war, through the Canal to India in time of war with either France or Russia, so we should be equally unable to send any of our merchant steamers through it, so great would be the risks they would have to encounter, unless they decided to sail under a neutral flag. Our great object, therefore, I repeat, under such circumstances will be not to keep the Canal open, but to get it closed, or, at any rate, to prevent the Power we are at war with having any advantage from it from which we shall be debarred ourselves. If we do that, we shall have done much to avert the danger which Lord Palmerston foresaw to our interests in the East from the opening of the Canal. For if the enemy has to send his men-of-war and troop and store ships equally round the Cape, we may rely on our Navy dealing with them as it has been wont to do of old; while whatever advantages his mere merchant vessels may have, from their comparatively closer proximity to the mouth of the Canal, and consequent immunity from capture when going into it, will be neutralized by our cruisers, which they will find ready to snap them up whenever they come out at the other end—that is, unless they place their commerce under a neutral flag, which seems, indeed, the almost inevitable destiny of vessels so circumstanced since the date of the Paris Conference, as was illustrated so forcibly in the American Civil War.

The conclusion to be drawn from what I have said on this point is, that we must lay aside altogether the illusion of having obtained a quicker and more secure road to India in time of war by our purchase of the Suez Canal shares. In time of peace, no doubt, it is so; but we must base our calculations for the defence of India in time of war on having to send all our reinforcements and coals and stores by the long sea route, as we used to do formerly. The enemy, however, in his turn will have to follow the same route if he wishes to strike a blow, depending in any way on naval combinations, at our power in India. Something has been said, to be sure, about our having the railroad from Alexandria to Suez still open to us in time of war, even if the Canal should be prohibited to vessels so employed, or made impassable. But it would be equally a breach of neutrality on the part of Turkey to allow this, as it would be to allow the transit of our war-ships and store-

ships by the Canal; and if Turkey once violated its neutrality, it would be made short work of, unless, indeed, it is proposed, by making Turkey an ally in such a war, to take on ourselves the defence of it in addition to our other burdens. But even if we did so, that would not in any way get over the difficulty arising out of the geographical position of Alexandria and Port Said in reference to England, and the enormous risk which all but our ironclads would have to run, in consequence, from the very moment of quitting the channel to that of their arrival in Egypt; and it might be found very difficult to keep even our ironclads supplied with coal and ammunition under such circumstances. I should hope, however, that we shall never have a statesman so insane as to adopt under such circumstances a policy of that sort. The worst enemy of England could not desire a worse fate for it than to see it engaged, with its whole available forces, naval and military, at the very end of the Mediterranean, to which they would have to pass along two thousand miles of a running fire, while involved in a war with a great Power at home; and having at the same time to defend from all attacks her commerce throughout the world, as well as her vast dependency, India. We have had enough, and more than enough, of such alliances. The money spent by England in furtherance of its Eastern policy in the Crimean War would have supplied railroads to every part of India, thus immensely adding to its wealth and its security; while no shock that we have ever received to our prestige in the East has been equal to that which was the result of the Afghan alliance. It is not by forming such connections as these that we shall preserve India to the British Crown; they have only helped so far to loosen our hold on it. What we must depend on, and depend on only, in the fighting way, is our own right arm; and what that can do was never more conspicuously shown than by Outram and Havelock, and Clyde and Lawrence, and Nicholson and Hodson, and the host of other heroes which that awful time of trial produced, and which will assuredly be produced again whenever the occasion shall arise for it.

We now come to the third and last point which I have to address you upon, and that is the question of the defence of India *against* any invasion on the land side of it. This, of course, could only be attempted by one European Power, and that is Russia; and though I should occupy too much of your time if I were to attempt to say very much upon the subject, I shall endeavour, at any rate, to draw your attention to the most important feature of it.

There is no doubt that in having to deal with Russia, we have to deal with a Power very able, very far-seeing, and, as a rule, very cautious. One great element of its success is the manner in which it prepares itself

beforehand for every successive move it makes. Nothing is done in haste, nothing is done in passion, nothing is done till every point that the question involves has been carefully weighed and considered. Thus it is that every contingency is provided for beforehand, as far as human intelligence can foresee, and that what it attempts it almost always accomplishes, whether it be little or much. Everything essential for it to know respecting every part of Asia with which it either is or is at all likely to be brought in contact, it makes it a part of its ordinary business to be acquainted with. It always keeps itself accurately informed respecting the power and resources of every such State, the military features of the country, the amount and sources of its revenue, the supplies and carriage which an invading force may expect to find there, as well as the number, the disposition, and the effectiveness of the armies that could be opposed to its attack. It further knows the character of every ruler, the feelings towards him of his subjects, and every other point essential for it to know. There is not an Asiatic language of importance in which it does not number many proficients among its officers; and every route ever likely to be used by its troops has its capabilities as well noted by it as those of France were found during the late war to have been noted by the Prussian staff.

It is a common thing with Russian officers, whether civil or military, to avail themselves of their periods of leave to travel in foreign countries not yet thoroughly examined, and their observations when the journey is terminated find their appointed place at St. Petersburg, in the Archives of the State. The Russian Government affords systematically the most marked encouragement to its employés engaging in work of this kind, and consequently there are plenty of them too happy to undertake it, the accumulated result of whose labours is a mass of information perhaps unparalleled under any other government in the world. This it is that has given rise so frequently to the outcry in India about Russian spies. The gentlemen in question have not been persons in any way deserving of that opprobrious designation—they have been simply officers, civil or military, employing their leave in that way; sometimes in their own dress and name as Russians, at others under the garb and designation of Orientals, like our own Burnes in his travels to Bokhara, or Pottinger in his exploration of Beloochistan. The expenses of their journey in such cases the Government always pays, when the leave so to travel has been obtained from it; and when the country traversed has been little known and the report made on it is more than ordinarily valuable, the writer is sure of being marked out for professional advancement, however previously unfriended and unknown. Thus it is that Russia has in its service, both military and civil, so many men of conspicuous

talent, and so completely devoted to the State by which they are employed. Aristocracy has no doubt its weight in Russia, as in other countries, but it does not possess so great a monopoly of the State's honours as it does mostly elsewhere. There is no cold shade of aristocracy in Russia, such as that spoken of by the great historian of the Peninsular War. The path to distinction is open to every one who has ability and industry to tread it; and, what is more, there are means open to every one, even the humblest, to make his talents known to the Government he serves. No wonder that under such a system the genius of all its officers should be developed to the extent we see, and that the Russian Empire should make the steady and continuous progress that it does.

The system thus described as followed by Russia in Asia generally applies equally to India as well. The chief languages in use there—the Sanscrit, the Arabic, the Persian, and the Hindustani—have their professors at St. Petersburg, paid by the State; and the late eminent Orientalist, Dr. Goldstücker, whose loss we all deplore, told me not long before his death that a professorship of Bengali had been added to the rest. Everything relating to our civil and military administration in India—the movements of our troops, &c., &c.—is equally well known there; and a British officer who happened to be at the Russian capital, and was desirous of learning at what station his regiment or battery was then quartered, could be supplied as correctly with the requisite information from the Russian Adjutant-General's Office as he would be if he applied to the Horse Guards or India Office at home. As regards the general state of the country, and the feelings of the people and Native Princes towards us, they know much more than the generality of Englishmen themselves. The official dust that is sometimes so carefully thrown in the eyes of our countrymen by the Calcutta Government and the India Office authorities, does not affect the vision of those whose business it is to make themselves acquainted with those matters at St. Petersburg; all the little artifices for putting a better face on things than the facts really warrant are quite thrown away there.

I have gone to this length in describing what Russia knows and what it really is, because it is essential that you should fully understand the nature of the only European foe that, as long as you retain your naval supremacy, can ever by any possibility contend with you for the mastery of India. By some it may be thought that in doing so I may be acting indiscreetly; but the worst indiscretion, as was seen in the case of France in its war with Germany, is to shut our eyes to the true character of the foe with whom we may have to deal. It is, besides, for another reason most important that we should thoroughly understand it; because if it is made evident to us that we have to do with

master-minds, we shall be the more certainly able to calculate with precision on the steps that they will take. There is nothing more puzzling in war, as in diplomacy, than to have to deal with an incompetent opponent, because one can never form a guess even at what move he will make next; but dealing with a proficient, one is pretty sure to know beforehand the course he will pursue, because one knows the course he must pursue if, putting aside the mere creation of petty embarrassments (a folly that no real statesman would be guilty of), he would achieve for his country a real and permanent success.

Knowing, therefore, Russia to be what it is, I have no belief that it will ever degenerate, in its dealings with India, into the miserable and petty policy which is too often ascribed to it. Even if it were not inspired by its honour to act as a great empire ought to act, it would be so inspired by its astuteness and its good sense. If, neglecting the warning so often given it, our Government should ever render its rule intolerable to the Native Princes and people of India who are subjected to it, I do not say that Russia will hesitate to take the prize which it will then have but to stretch forth its hand for it to fall into; but as long as our Native subjects and princely allies remain faithful to us, which they will do as long as we deserve their fidelity, and as long as we remain true to ourselves, it will make no attempt at an invasion which would then ignominiously fail. For what really does an invasion of India by Russia imply?

It implies attacking an immense empire, resting on one side in Europe, and on the other in Hindustan—an empire infinitely more wealthy and more advanced in all the arts, including the art of war and its appliances, than it is itself—an empire unassailable to it by sea; while it could drive every war-ship of Russia from the ocean, and capture every merchant ship, and blockade every port. In India, itself, just see what it would have to meet. A large army of Europeans, having for its comrades as many hundred thousands of Natives as we chose to enlist, all delighting in war, and never so happy as when engaged in it; arsenals well filled with cannon and projectiles, and all the material of war, and railroads and steamers everywhere to bring them up to the front; a treasury well filled with money, and the ability to borrow as much more as it might want; endless supplies of provisions and provender, and equally endless supplies of carriage to accompany the troops; carts, bullocks, elephants, camels, and ponies without stint; artillery and infantry provided with weapons of the latest pattern, and cavalry not excelled by any in the world; and all awaiting the approach of an enemy along a line of country watered by five rivers, and which for the richness of its production is hardly equalled by any in the world.

That is what Russia would have to advance to meet; and it would have to do so, for a large part, over long and dreary steppes, producing neither corn nor forage, and with difficulty supplying water even to the insignificant detachments which have succeeded, after encountering endless difficulties, in traversing them as yet; without a railroad to help it on its way, or even a made road of any kind or carriage, beyond the few camels it might press into its service, at the cost of at once making enemies of the people whose camels were thus pressed by it as it went along; with but the scantiest supply of cavalry or artillery, for heavy artillery, or any artillery beyond a few light guns, would be unable to traverse the now sandy, now mountainous path it would have to take: a country it would be almost impossible for a large European army to traverse without tents, which it would be equally impossible for them to carry, while the route would be unbearable in the summer from the heat, and in the winter from the snow and piercing cold. People tell you that it is but a short step from Khiva to Merv, and that when the Russian army shall have got to Merv, India will virtually be lost. Well, then, how much of the Russian army has yet reached Khiva? and what would have been the fate of the army that did reach it if it had consisted only of 13,000 instead of 1,300 men? How many, consequently, could expect to get *viâ* Khiva and Merv to India out of all the thousands it would have to send to conquer it? Then, again, from Merv, is it quite so easy as some persons seem to think to take a large European army even so far as Herat? Then from Herat, again, the army would have to pass by the northern route at foot of the Goor mountains to Cabul, and so by the Kyber to Peshawur, the first post in British India; or by Candahar, if it preferred it, through the Turkha Nurace Pass to Dera Ismael Khan; or by Sira Khila and the Rowat Pass to Dera Ghazee Khan; or by Quetta and the Bolan Pass, or by Khelat and the Catch Gundava Pass, into Scinde. Once, having entered upon either of these lines, they would have, as the next step on the northern one, to beat our forces at Peshawur, and then fight their way across the five rivers, before they got to India proper; while on the southern line they would have to cross the Indus, there a wide and rapid river, without any boats to do so, and in the face of a dozen batteries, and thence to find their way to India across the desert, without supplies or forage, or means of getting it, and nothing but a little brackish and muddy water to drink, if on scooping out the sand they were lucky enough to find any.

Let any man at all acquainted with the districts I have spoken of judge of the difficulty of bringing down even the smallest European army that Russia could have any hope of conquering India with, and unless his vision be distorted by Russophobia, he will tell you that the

whole thing, till at any rate England shall be in her dotage, is an idle dream—an ignis-fatuus, such as lured the great Napoleon on to his destruction at Moscow, but which, from what we know of the character of Russian officers and Russian statesmen, is not likely to draw them into a path that would prove so fatal to them.

Let us but deal, as I have said in the outset, justly and kindly with our Native subjects, and with the Native Princes in alliance with us—let us act towards them as, if our position were reversed, we would have them act towards ourselves, and we shall have no need of ever fearing an invasion of India by Russia, that would be so utterly futile under such circumstances. Clear your heads, therefore, of Russophobia, if it has attacked you, and believe that Russian officers are not the spies and petty intriguers that they are too often suspected to be, but, as a rule, honest and accomplished gentlemen, such as, for the most part, the officers of our own Army are. Their Government may have aims that do not always accord with our aims, both in the East and in the West; but it is a duty to say of them, that so far as my knowledge and experience goes, and I have every reliance on its correctness, they have never acted otherwise than most loyally and honourably in their dealings towards us in reference to India. I only wish that my own countrymen were always as free of suspicion of their motives as I truly and honestly believe them to be undeserving of it; the more especially as it would put an end for ever to that perpetual agitation as to what Russia's designs are, and what we had best do to counteract them—an agitation which is really far more injurious to the best interests of India than anything that Russia could actually do to us. It unsettles the minds of our governors, it unsettles the minds of our legislators, it unsettles the minds of our people, and, above all, it has a strong tendency to unsettle the minds of the Native Princes and Chiefs and people of India. If in this paper I shall have done anything towards allaying the evil, the time will not have been wasted that you have been kind enough to devote to hearing it read by me.

The CHAIRMAN said he was confident he should only express the sentiments of the meeting when he thanked Colonel Rathborne for his able address on a most interesting subject. (Hear, hear.) If he (the Chairman) might venture a remark, it would be to the effect that we must not put too much faith in, or expect too much of, a nation composed of such heterogeneous elements as India. Some of the gentlemen present might have heard the story of a Native of India who remarked that he had lain so long on one side that he would like to turn over. That remark pretty accurately expressed the feeling of very many of

our restless subjects in India. A good government, a beneficent government, and one which the Natives could appreciate and help to administer, was a great safety; but without those measures which assert our courage and energy, the Natives will have no confidence in the Government. As bearing upon the question of strengthening British power in India, he would venture to repeat what on a previous occasion he had written. Writing a few years ago on the present and future position of Russia with regard to India, he said: "Undoubtedly our rule will be assisted "by the material progress of India, and by the development of its re- "sources, which will add to the happiness, comfort, and self-respect of its "inhabitants. But while Government is actively carrying out these "measures, it must never forget to show its ability to defend itself. How "can the people support a Government of whose power and duration they "have doubts? Those measures, therefore, which assert our courage, "energy, and durability are first and foremost. Our position in India is "mainly dependent on the opinion of the people, and only by it can we "maintain our hold of the country against all comers; and this opinion "is practically expressed through the Native Army, which grew up with "the Empire, and which ought to be drawn from all classes of our sub- "jects. Welded by its English officers, this army—*i.e.*, Native troops com- "manded by English gentlemen—is an element of the Government which "is based on its fidelity and its devotedness, and which is strong or other- "wise just as the Army evinces more or less of these qualities. Firmness, "justice, and moderation supported our conquests; but, much as we were "assisted by these, we neither won India by them, nor will they alone "serve us to maintain it. It was invincibility, overcoming all opposition "and quailing before nothing, which bound the Native soldier to our "cause, and any event which affects this, his fundamental view of our "character, is most serious. . . . It is not the actual invasion of India by "Russia (which is very improbable), nor even the hounding on of Afghans "and warlike tribes on our frontier, that I fear, but the effect of the re- "volution and its circumstances upon the people of India, and more es- "pecially on the Native Army. The presence of a powerful nation which "has conquered Balkh and Bokhara, firmly seated in these countries, and "in all its acts expressing a profound indifference to our wishes and move- "ments, must astonish the people of India, and detract from our character "of invincibility. The mass of the Natives have not yet realized all we "know of the power of Russia. It is gradually dawning on them, and "their minds must go through a great transition as regards us before they "can reconcile two such empires in juxtaposition. It requires able states- "manship to carry the Army and people of India without great danger to "ourselves through this period, and we must act everywhere with a view

"to the maintenance of that character which gives them confidence in us. "I do not undervalue diplomatic arrangements with Russia or Persia, nor "pledges given by these Powers; but, however much they may wish to "keep them inviolate, circumstances may prevent this. We should con- "sider the frontier tribes, even to the Afghans, as allies, and their coun- "tries as outposts to protect India from the moral invasion which is as- "sailing it; and let us beware, lest what should be the outposts of our "empire become those of our opponents. It is this we have to work for. "We have it in our hands to secure them, and to prove to them that we "are their safest friends. To do this is a necessity. Dangers which "hitherto have been dealt with in India have been met and are gone, but "the events now being enacted in Central Asia are lasting, their results "more serious as time goes on, and these more damaging in proportion to "our inaction. We may this year do with comparative ease what it "may take ten times the labour to carry out the next, if even it be possible "then at all. We require renewed energy upon those lines of operation "which pass through the Kyber on the north, and through the Bolan on "the south. The work is more for statesmen than for soldiers; but, on "whomsoever it may fall, they will have to urge upon themselves the "necessity of making the tribes upon these lines our allies, and to act in "all matters so as to give them full assurance of this." To these re- marks he had nothing to add, unless it was to state that, in his opinion, Colonel Rathborne's remarks upon the subject of the Suez Canal were particularly appropriate. However, no matter what the difficulties that might arise, he was still confident that English hearts and English heads, whenever necessity arose, would do what became the honour and the history of their nation. (Hear, hear.)

General Sir LE GRAND JACOB said: As far as my deafness has allowed me to follow Colonel Rathborne's reasoning, I understand him to rely, first and foremost, on good government and the contentment of the people of India; and I cordially agree with all that he has said on this head. The true foundation of our strength is belief in our good faith. I have served as a political officer before many here present were born, and have been more and more led to the profound conviction that honesty is the best policy, in spite of seeming temporary advantages that the opposite course, belonging to the Talleyrand school of policy, may offer. Unhappily, this was too much lost sight of. Before the great out- break of 1857-58, the community mostly lost faith in us; hence the explosion. Happily, a wiser policy now prevails. Let us continue to rule with due regard to the rights and feelings of all classes; we may hope for their support. But if any State should rise against us, it could be crushed without difficulty, probably by the help of its own population, of

which the history of India affords us many examples. The Colonel's second line of defence is also, of course, essential—our mastery of the sea. Without it, the long maintenance of our position in India would be almost impossible. But I think him greatly mistaken in his depreciation of our naval power, consequent on change to steam, and in his views of the Suez Canal. I see no probability of this being thrown out of use. Even admitting it to be closed, by political entanglements, for war vessels, our superiority at sea will command both its mouths, and the carrying trade would go forward. If dealt with by an enemy on land, what could hinder us from taking possession and repairing damage? As to the supply of coals and stores for our fleets, we have stations all over the globe, and in this respect have immense advantages over other nations. I remember, a few years ago, an American writer estimating this superiority as equivalent to a million armed men. I have been rather disappointed in hearing no reference to the military defence of India, and the best way of turning our Native soldiery to account, on which the speaker's experience and talents might have thrown light. Regarding an actual invasion, Russia is far too well-informed and prudent to attempt it. Our danger consists in her gradual advance,—led on, by the character of the population, first to Merv, then tempted to Herat, where, in the abundant resources of its rich valley, she might dwell at ease, render the fortress impregnable, and gain strength at leisure for forward movement; meanwhile the position would be a rod held *in terrorem* over the British nation to prevent its interfering with her policy elsewhere.

Mr. GEO. FOGGO wished to enter his respectful protest against one assumption put forward by Colonel Rathborne—viz., that the Suez Canal was to be closed in time of war, and that the transport of war *matériel* and vessels of war would have to revert to the long route round the Cape.

Colonel RATHBORNE: I believe that in the event of war it will be closed.

Mr. FOGGO, continuing, said that England ought not to allow such a thing. (Hear, hear.) The statutes of the Company precluding the use of the Canal for the passage of war vessels in time of war should be revised, or else England would be the laughing-stock of the world.

Colonel RATHBORNE: Suppose there should be a war with France; would the French allow the Canal to remain open?

Mr. FOGGO, resuming, said there was no reason for the purchase of the shares if the Canal was to be closed at a time when a ready road to India was most required.

Colonel RATHBORNE: Lord Palmerston said it could not be done.

Mr. FOGGO: Lord Palmerston was lamentably mistaken in his

views concerning the Suez Canal, which was apparent from the debate in the House of Commons, June 1st, 1858. Mr. Roebuck was then one of the few men who took a statesmanlike view of the project, while Lord Palmerston (backed by Stephenson and other engineers, who denounced the scheme as physically impossible) pronounced it no better than a bubble, and that if carried out, it would prove at variance with the political and national interests of the country, as it would lead to the separation of Egypt from Turkey, and interfere with our communication with India in time of war, when the passage through Egypt might be taken from us. The East India Association were sometimes condemned for being impracticable people, but as one of their number he did not wish the world to think they were in favour of closing the Suez Canal in time of war. Turning to the remarks made by Colonel Rathborne respecting Russia, the speaker admitted that they were worthy of all consideration, as he had always held the opinion that the fear of Russia on the side of India was terrible clap-trap. He believed with the gallant Chairman, that a little more political activity as regarded the frontier tribes would be sufficient to dispose of all fear about Russia, and prevent the present suspicion and tendency to panic.

The CHAIRMAN said he thought it right to take the opportunity of saying, in reference to the remarks which had just fallen from Mr. Foggo, that of course the views expressed by Colonel Rathborne regarding the Suez Canal or any other question did not pretend to be anything more than his own individual opinions, and that they did not in any way commit the Association. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. FOGGO said that some allusion was made by Colonel Rathborne to difficulties of coaling, but he could see none; for the Peninsular and Oriental Company's boats got their supplies of coal from stations all over the world. Of course vessels of war, such as were now in use, had difficulties to contend with which did not exist in the time of Nelson, but they had also advantages in being exempt from being wind and weather bound. On the whole, therefore, he thought the advantage was in favour of the present state of affairs, and we, at any rate, could not revert to the custom of half a century ago.

Dr. A. BURN said the discussion had taken the direction of ascertaining, if possible, the best method of protecting the frontier provinces in India. For his part, he did not see that Russia had taken any steps which, looked at in a proper light, would justify or cause the great anxiety that appeared to prevail amongst certain classes of the community, and which he attributed to the military men of both countries being anxious for something to do. The Czar of Russia was, to his knowledge, a most learned and intellectual man, who had no sinister

design; but behind him there was a great army, with officers anxious for promotion, and these restless people would possibly lead him into war somewhere or other. As to Russia's movements in the direction of India, he believed her only object had been to press on towards China; and she had been forced to subdue those Mahomedan tribes on the road, who from time immemorial had been the cause of mischief as haters of education and civilization. What Russia had done in the way of curbing them, he considered, was something for England to feel thankful for. The best defence of our frontiers lay in friendship with Russia. Besides, the Suez Canal gave us the power of easily outflanking Russia by a military movement up the Indus, but which she would never overlook or forget in her progress towards the East. The introduction of a knowledge of Christianity by Russia was a good thing; it taught and allowed men to use their reason—a faculty of the mind too often ignored by the ruling Powers of the world.

Lieutenant-General CAVENAGH said that, although it might be presumed that if there was one thing that Englishmen were in accord upon, it was upon the necessity of securing the full advantages of the route to India *viâ* the Suez Canal, this question need not be considered in the present discussion. There was but one nation that could interfere with our communications in that quarter, and that was France. But in the first instance he assumed that France was never likely to make an attack on India, and, secondly, France was about the last nation that England would be likely to go to war with, because there were no conflicting interests to separate the two nations, and a cordial good feeling now existed between them. As regards the position of Russia towards England, matters were different. Not that there was any reason to fear an advance being made on India by way of Central Asia, because he did not believe that any such project was entertained by Russia. But the policy of Russia in Europe was likely to clash with that of England, and the use that would be made of the proximity of Russia to India would be to threaten our frontier, and incite the Natives to rebellion, so as to occupy and divert our attention, and at the same time weaken our resources. This policy on the part of Russia he had already brought to notice. In 1855 he warned Lord Dalhousie that there would be war with Persia. He was regarded as a visionary, but his anticipations were verified by the event. In January, 1857, he told the Government they would have the greatest rising in India that it had ever been called upon to contend with, and that it would be, as it were, the tail of the Crimean War. He was still regarded as a visionary, but within a very few months his previsions were realized. Years ago, when a political officer, he became acquainted with a Chief who knew the whole policy of Russia in

Central Asia. His conviction was that Russia had not the least intention of attacking the British position in India, but would endeavour to weaken our government by sowing sedition among the Natives. If Russia had any idea of annexation, it was in the direction of Persia, which was, in his opinion, a future probability. To successfully compete with this policy of Russia, a conciliatory policy should be adopted towards the frontier States, with whom we should form commercial treaties, so as to gain their good-will, and thus constitute them buffers against Russian designs. So long as this point was secured, and we had an efficient and loyal Native Army and a contented people, there would be no fear of any attempt being made by Russia upon the British Empire in India. (Hear, hear.)

General ALEXANDER said that the subject brought forward for discussion was of such vast importance that it seemed impossible to deal summarily with it on such an occasion as this; and among other considerations, we must bear in mind that the "religious question" was an active factor in this, as in every political and social measure now agitating the world. In any observations he may offer he may perhaps be considered as taking a pessimist view of our position in India; but even if so, it may be better to examine what may be said as to the least favourable aspect of that position. In following Colonel Rathborne, and for a clearer understanding of his important paper, and of what may be suggested by it, we should have before us a map of Central Asia, Persia, and the north-western boundaries of India, so as to form some idea of the countries, their forts, and the routes to and through them. It has long been said that the safety of India very much consists in the impassable state of the country between Russian advances and our dominion; but we must bear in mind that history teaches that such difficulties have never been insuperable; that Jenghis Khan marched his army from Pekin through these lands to the shores of the Mediterranean; that Alexander the Great, leaving the Dardanelles, penetrated through Afghanistan, conquered the Punjab, and reached the banks of the Ganges. Hannibal and Napoleon both surmounted the Alps with less efficient means than modern science can bring into the field, and every successful invader, from the Arians to Nadir Shah, has entered India through regions which the more our knowledge of them extends, the more passable they appear to be; and especially may this be said of an approach to Kashmere. Looking geographically at the outside, before we consider the point of collision in attack and defence, what is to prevent Russia doing what has been done before? Look at her progress during the last forty years, and since what I mentioned on a former occasion, that in 1836 a Russian diplomatic agent in Teheran

reported to Prince Menschikoff that "*Persia, which was before the outpost "of British India, has now become our first parallel of attack.*" Persia is now helpless at the feet of Russia, and for aggressive purposes may be considered a Russian province. Now, if we had a map before us we might contemplate the positions of Balkh, Merv, and Herat. The Caucasian range, from the Black Sea to the Caspian, is Russian, and I am informed on good authority that among many pamphlets and much writing in Austria and Russia on the subject of invading India, a very able one by an Austrian officer who had travelled over the Russian acquirements in Central Asia, states as one of the facilities that an army of 45,000 men could be moved from the Caucasus into Persia at once. The capability of mobilizing a very large army in Central Asia is also set forth. Khiva is now a Russian military base, and active work is going on to render the Oxus navigable as far as possible through its course. With a map before us, much might be suggested as to means of communication from Novogorod by the Volga into the Caspian, or by a railroad that now is between the Caspian and Sea of Aral. Possibly what was formerly known as Mouravieff's route to Khiva may, by engineering and hydraulic science, be made comparatively easy. I merely throw out these as suggestive of what may be not unworthy of consideration by the statesman and military strategist. Referring to the remarks of General Sir Le Grand Jacob, the speaker declared that that gallant veteran so combined the heart of a lion with the head of an Indian statesman that his remarks on the subject before them were entitled to the utmost respect and consideration, coming as they did from an administrator who had verified his experience by well-won reputation and success. As to the arguments adduced that India's safeguard will be secured by good government of its Natives, it is so simple a truism that it must be accepted by all as an axiom not needing proof. From the Himalayas to Cape Comorin, India has never been so well and justly governed as it is now; but the question is, are the Natives of all its nations and languages and religions satisfied that it could not be better governed still, and that, too, by themselves? Are the Native Sovereigns and Princes so satisfied that they may not believe they could govern their subjects better without the imperious advice of British Residents and Political Agents? Much stress has been laid upon the loyalty displayed during the recent progress of the Prince of Wales, but it must be remembered that that was all display, and that those talented correspondents who wrote what a French *litterateur* called a new edition of the "Arabian Nights," confessed that they saw not what was beneath the gorgeous and dazzling pageantry of the scene. One correspondent, after describing the Royal reception, the usual complimentary expressions

in Oriental hyperbole, and the magnificence of Scindia's palace, observed significantly that a view from its porticoes was of a British fort, the guns of which could lay it in ruins in less than two hours. Does this ever bring any thoughts to Scindia's mind? has the Nizam no longing for his rich province of Berar? and are the Native statesmen of Guzerat satisfied that they ought to have been of one mind with their European colleagues regarding the deposition of the Guikwar? What knew these highly intellectual correspondents of the 40,000,000 Mahomedans, their feelings, remembrance of former power, and present aspirations? When in India he (the speaker) sought intercourse with and information from Mahomedans, and believes he learned much of their feelings, favourable and unfavourable, towards our Government; but he never heard of a Mahomedan Prince who would not rather receive his sunnud from the Shah of Delhi than from a representative of the Queen of England; nor did he know of one Mussulman who, however loyal, would not gladly have improved our rule by the replacement of Mahomedan nobles and government more in accordance with the precepts of the Koran. But as regards Russian invasion, twice was it within the speaker's knowledge that during the Afghan and Sikh wars several of the Natives of Southern India buried their gold and jewels, believing the most improbable and pitiably foolish reports of the coming of the "Oorooss." A wise and just government is still our mean of internal safety, but we still require to learn and show more consideration in the organization of the Native Army, and for what many Natives consider grievances—to rid ourselves more and more of the *væ victis* element inseparable from such a government as ours in the first instance, but never used with such justice as by our countrymen in India. As our Prime Minister has said, the Natives of India are men known from remote antiquity for their intellectual power and civilization. In my limited way I have met such in all classes, and never have I seen more dignified bearing than in Mahomedan nobles and gentlemen, though I am not blind to their faults more than I am to those of my own countrymen. Let us remember that, however accessible or inaccessible India may be from the north-west, Russia has lately acquired a well-timbered country larger than Canada to the eastward of the Chinese river Amoor, and from Japan, an island with one of the finest harbours in the world, where for some purpose or other she is increasing a powerful fleet. In this respect, too, India is like our own country. We have attained to what we say India should be brought up to, and yet among ourselves we have Home Rulers, Fenians, Communists, Socialists, and others, who would disturb everything in order that they might rule better. We should not be surprised if in India there should be those who look forward with a traitor's

hope to a day when "England's extremity shall be their opportunity;" and, to borrow a wise saying from the *Times* newspaper, we should, in these wonderful, eventful days, be prepared, as far as possible, for "the "unexpected which is sure to happen," and which much of the Native Press in India would too readily bring to pass.

Mr. R. U. AHMED, after congratulating Colonel Rathborne upon the ability with which he had introduced the subject under discussion, begged still to be allowed to differ from him in respect of what he had urged as to the impassable nature of the country lying between India and the Russian Empire, as he believed with a previous speaker that any large army supplied with the modern appliances of war could cross those wastes and steppes, and reach the frontiers of India in formidable force. They had been crossed before by mighty armies, although it was true they had not the modern encumbrances of warfare. Still, while it was true the difficulties were increased on the one hand, they were modified and reduced on the other by the scientific appliances which were the wonder of the age. Coming to the question as to the position of the British in India, it had been said more than once that the best way to strengthen it would be by the practice of justice and moderation in the administration. In this connection he would venture to give his ideas of what justice in India would imply. The Natives of India ought to be placed on an equality with those of England. Personally, he had no objection to be ground to the dust by an absolute Power, supposing that all the subjects of that Power were treated similarly; but he did object to the people of India being treated in a manner altogether different from the people of England. Employment in India consisted of Civil and Military service. The Military Service was virtually closed to the Natives, but the Civil Service was at one time open. Now, however, it was again closed, for that would be the effect of the recent regulation altering the age of admission from twenty-one to nineteen years. A boy, in order to be prepared to enter the Service at nineteen, would have to come over to England to qualify himself at the age of fifteen; and was it to be supposed that any prudent father would send his son away at that early age, with no one to care for him, at the very period when strict parental supervision was of the highest importance? This he (the speaker) had pointed out to Sir Frederick Halliday, and that gentleman said the consideration in question had never occurred to any member of the Council of India. In spite of his being a Mahomedan, and therefore, according to some people, utterly worthless, he would urge with all earnestness the advantage of placing India on an equality with England, instead of marking the former out for servitude and the latter for dominance. He liked tyranny in some of its forms, and under

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certain conditions of society, but then it should be equally shared by all the subjects in the Empire, and one section in the West should not be governed on constitutional principles, while another section in the East were allowed to remain under an autocratic government.

Mr. W. F. HALE considered that the question under discussion possessed two main aspects,—the military and the political; but the address given by Colonel Rathborne appeared to deal more particularly with the political means for the defence of India. He had shown that it was practically impossible for India to be taken from England by Russia, but he had also dealt with the Suez Canal, urging that it should be left entirely out of the calculation. He (Mr. Hale) differed entirely from Colonel Rathborne upon this point, because it appeared to him that the acquirement of an interest in the Suez Canal gave a new feature to the position of the British in India; for, although a good deal might be said upon the possibility of the Canal being obstructed in time of war, it was, in his opinion, essential that an effort should be made to insure a continuance of the speedy means of intercourse with India which the Canal afforded. Instead of shutting it up, as had been suggested, he (the speaker) was clearly in favour of making the most extended use of it, and securing it, if necessary, by a strong guard at either end. The opener of the debate had referred to an opinion given in that respect by Lord Palmerston, but had that veteran statesman lived, the altered circumstances now obtaining might have induced him to change his views. Perhaps Lord Palmerston's reasons for setting his face against the construction of the Canal were sound, although, after the lapse of years, they appeared the reverse. After some complimentary remarks upon the general tenour of the opening address, Mr. Hale concluded with the expression of a hearty wish that the people of India should be put in possession of privileges similar to those enjoyed by the people of England, whenever the circumstances of India should warrant such a course.

Mr. K. M. DUTT contributed a few remarks upon the Suez Canal question. He contended that if, in the event of any international complications, Turkey should remain neutral, an English man-of-war could not pass through the Canal without violating international law, as England has purchased for four millions sterling only a certain number of Suez Canal Shares, *but not the sovereign rights of Turkey*. The Suez Canal, in such a contingency, would be worthless to England; so that it was evident that an erroneous idea prevailed regarding the value of the Canal to Great Britain, at least in time of war. Another reason why the Canal should be discarded entirely from the calculations of England was presented in the fact that the French people hold the largest number of the shares. But supposing France and England to

be united against a common enemy, even then the Canal would be useless, because a war vessel could not go through without interfering with the neutrality of Turkey. Remarking upon the general merit of the opening address, Mr. Dutt specially complimented Colonel Rathborne upon the able endeavour he had made to dispel the Russophobia which was so prevalent.

The Rev. JAMES LONG said he was no Russophobist, but, nevertheless, he could not agree with the conclusions arrived at by Colonel Rathborne with regard to the difficulties of the invasion of India, and, moreover, almost all the military authorities were opposed to the Colonel's views. A recent work issued from the press, entitled "Clouds "in the East," had some valuable opinions on the point; and other writers, such as Sir Henry Rawlinson, Colonel Cory, and Captain Trench, were distinctly opposed to the opinions given to them that day by Colonel Rathborne. The last work on the subject, "Die Central Asiatische "Frage," was printed in German, and written by an Austrian officer, and this also took a military view the reverse of that advanced by the opener of the present debate. Almost every military authority admitted that the point of danger from invasion lies in the direction of Herat, for, as a matter of fact, there are something like a dozen routes by which an army could advance on India.

Colonel RATHBORNE then replied, and, alluding to the observations that had been made with reference to the possession by England of coaling stations all over the world, said that was a reason which induced him to think it better that England should meet her enemies on the long sea route than in a narrow sea open to all kinds of opposition. With regard to the protection of the frontier of India from invasion, he supposed that we should hold our present line, which would give us the means of bringing up stores and *matériel* by railroad or steamer. There was a magnificent river to move up and down, so as to be able to strengthen any weak point that might be menaced. He had been said by one speaker to have forgotten England's rights over the Suez Canal, but it should be remembered that England's representation amounted only to three directors out of a large number of seats at the Governing Board; and did the speaker suppose that the French directors would allow the English minority to alter the statutes? Besides, the use of the Canal would involve questions of neutrality. If Turkey should allow her neutrality to be violated by war vessels being passed through the Canal, that would but add to the difficulty. And, again, if it was an advantage to an opponent to have the Canal closed, it could easily be done; for he had it on the authority of a gentleman who knew Lesseps well, and who has passed something like 400,000 tons of

shipping annually through the Canal, that the Khedive was at one time so disgusted with the Canal that he was anxious to fill it up, but afraid to do so; and the way in which it could be done was suggested by one of his councillors—viz., to destroy the "pilgrims' bridge" quietly, and leave the pilgrims to fill up the passage, and thus they would have no more "bother" with the Canal.

Mr. FOGGO asked, if the Khedive were made independent of Turkey, what effect it would have.

Colonel RATHBORNE said that France and Russia would both have something to say about that, because they would see that the object of making the Khedive independent was to strengthen English interests. In all probability, they would not admit of such a course; for France looked upon Egypt as her own, or nearly so. They might be mistaken, but if anybody thought they would give Egypt up quietly, there must be great misapprehension of the situation. He still held to the opinion expressed by Lord Palmerston, and was supported in it by a naval friend of large experience, because, in addition to being exposed to a running fire along the whole length of the Mediterranean, our vessels would have to meet the enemy at the other end of it. One speaker had suggested, as an element of defence, that we should make the Afghans allies, or something equivalent to it; but so far as the Afghans were concerned, an alliance with them could never be of real value, because they were such a treacherous race, and moreover, in time of war they would commit atrocities which could not be tolerated. If England were to use them against any other Power, she would have to accept the responsibility of any cruelties the Afghans committed, and that would be a serious thing. Unless, therefore, she could transform them from marauders and robbers into disciplined troops, they could not be employed, and their assistance could only be a source of constant embarrassment. Something had been said of Mahomedans in the course of the discussion, but, as to this, he would say that one of the best men he ever had to do with was a Mahomedan. He alluded to the Nawab Mahomed Khan Tora, Prime Minister of the Ameers of Scinde before the conquest, who lent him the most valuable aid in organizing the new Native staff. Mahomed Khan said to him that he confessed he could not rejoice at England having taken possession of the country, because he could be no longer Prime Minister of it, but he added, that having tendered his loyalty, he would never depart from his allegiance. The Belooch Sirdars were a fine race, and his experience of them also strengthened his opinion that Mahomedans are no worse than any other men. It was, therefore, a perfect mistake to condemn them as such, for those who knew them best would admit that they were

much the same as the English themselves. Before closing, Colonel Rathborne observed that a reference had been made to the difficulties of the road to India from Russia, and a hint had been thrown out that they had been much exaggerated. He asked those who held this opinion to remember that in the Crimean War we were beaten by six miles of road which the transport service could not get over, and which necessitated the making of a railway for the purpose. It had also been stated that the army of Alexander the Great had done great things in the way of long marches. That might be true enough, and the same thing could be done again if men were only burdened with bows and arrows, swords and shields. But those who now attacked India would have to contend with the artillery which England could put into position on the Indus, and to meet all the vast appliances of modern warfare. As was demonstrated by the Russian advance to Khiva, it would be impossible to move even eighteen-pounders across the desert. Then suppose an army of 30,000 men on the march with war *matériel;* what did that involve? There would be at least three camp followers for every fighting soldier. That number would require 240,000 pounds of food, or enough to load a thousand camels, only for one day's supply, and that would not include provender for the horses and beasts of burden. Considerations such as these would at once show what an enormous amount of baggage and other *impedimenta* would be requisite, for the country would not even afford food for the camels. It would be utterly impossible, therefore, to bring across the deserts an army sufficiently strong to effect anything against the English Power. Amongst other writers on the subject, Valentine Baker had been referred to. He had glanced through that book, and saw that the writer held the opinion that the Russians were at the bottom of the Indian Mutiny; but he must express his entire difference from the writer on that point, and he could scarcely understand how, with his limited experience, the author's opinion could be supposed to be of any value. Sir Henry Rawlinson's idea was that we should press forward and occupy Herat. But what would then be the position? Possibly a Russian army in front, a desert on one side, the Turcoman tribes on our right flank, and the Afghans in our rear ready to repeat what they did in 1841. Under such circumstances, he contended that he had good reason for differing even from so able a man as Sir Henry Rawlinson. In closing his remarks, he had to thank the meeting for the interest which had been exhibited in the discussion upon the address he had given.

Votes of thanks were then accorded to the Chairman and to Colonel Rathborne for his address, and the meeting terminated.

Annual Meeting, July 19, 1876.

THE annual meeting of the East India Association was held at the Offices of the Society, 20, Great George Street, Westminster, on Wednesday, July 19th, under the presidency of Mr. E. B. Eastwick, Chairman of the Council of the Association.

The report of the Council was submitted by Captain W. C. Palmer, the Hon. Secretary, and is inserted at page 63.

The CHAIRMAN regretted the absence of the President, Sir Laurence Peel, who was out of town. He thought it very possible that the Council had unintentionally fallen into the custom of deferring the annual meeting until too late in the season, when many of their most influential members and friends had left town. The first meeting of the Association was held on the 5th of June, 1867; and he thought that in this, the ninth year of their existence as an Association, it would be a very good thing to revert to their old practice, to fix an early day in June, and inscribe under it "*Esto perpetua.*" Previous to the adoption of the report being formally proposed and seconded, he would take leave to offer a few remarks on some of the topics upon which it touched. The report was divided into two unequal parts, the first having reference to himself, and the rest referring to the general proceedings of the Association during the year in his absence. In the first place, he thought he might fairly congratulate the Council on the help they had given in a very good cause—the reduction of the postage to India; and he hoped that the time was not far distant when they would see a still further reduction, and that 6d. would be the rate for letters *vid* Brindisi, and 4d. *vid* Southampton. Such a reduction would, he felt assured, be soon recouped by the increase of correspondence between England and the East. With regard to the next topic touched upon by the report, the import duties on raw cotton, he would only say that he had recently had many conversations with native mill-owners and merchants of Bombay, and they explained that hitherto they had confined themselves to the manufacture of the coarser cloths, and that in that field they would very soon shut Manchester out altogether and secure the whole business; and, more than that, that they hoped to proceed to the fabrication of the better kinds of cotton goods. But to do this they must have the best cotton, and hence they urged the abolition of the import duty on raw cotton. On the Council's next topic, the visit of the Prince of Wales to India, he was well able to give evidence of its effect upon the people, seeing that he went over his Royal

Highness's whole route, and was in India before and after the progress. It was a matter upon which he had had many conversations with various Princes and rulers in India, and he had mixed with the people and gathered their opinions also. He must explain that before the arrival of the Prince there had been a great deal of discontent in Western India—agrarian discontent; and it was of so extraordinary a character, that he had been assured by not a few experienced men that the feeling was worse even than that prevalent in the time of the great Mutiny. But the Prince has many popular qualities, and was able to ingratiate himself very much with the Princes of India; and the common people also were pleased, because there were processions and pageants, and large sums of money were spent in preparations, even in places where it could only be faintly hoped the Prince would come. Besides, there was very much in the people's eagerness to see sovereignty in flesh and blood, for hitherto they had only seen Royalty, as it were, in commission. All these feelings and impressions, however, must be of a transitory character unless the original cause of discontent be removed. The principal grievance was the continual interference with the assessment on land; and of course, as soon as this practice was renewed the discontent revived. With regard to the Council's address to Sir Salar Jung, he need not say it had his most hearty approval, and he might be allowed to praise it, for, as he was absent at the time, he had no hand in its preparation. It was a most excellent document; while Sir Salar's reply was admirable—so modest, and at the same time so statesmanlike, in all so characteristic of the man. He would just like to remind the meeting that Sir Salar Jung entered upon the administration of the Nizam's dominions in succession to his uncle, and thus became Prime Minister on the 27th of May, 1853. He was then just the age of our William Pitt when he became Prime Minister of this country, and the Nizam's country was somewhat larger than Great Britain, and the population a little in excess of what the population of Great Britain was in December, 1783, when Pitt took office. This was a great charge for so young a man, and yet three years later there came a far more anxious and dangerous trial in the great Mutiny—a trial of which he willingly shared the dangers with the British Government. He (the Chairman) had travelled recently over the Nizam's country, and he was bound to say that the people there were as contented and as well off as the people in British territory. The address which had been presented to the statesman who had so ably served his country did honour to the Association; whilst Sir Salar's reply would live as an historical document. With regard to the Council's reference to the Eastern Question, the members were probably aware that he had taken part in the

discussions both in and out of Parliament upon that matter. To enter upon it now was no part of his intention, for to fully discuss it would occupy far more time than he could venture to take. Suffice it to say, that generally he coincided with the views which Colonel Rathborne had expressed in the address which he had recently given. He (the Chairman) had just returned from the Afghan frontier, and had conversed with the most distinguished European officers there, and with many of the Afghans and Sikhs, from the very highest chiefs down to the ordinary soldiers, and, as a result, his views had been very much modified. He thought the British Administration had made much real and solid progress in that quarter, and that if Major Evans Bell had visited the country and had similar opportunities to those which he had enjoyed, he would have changed his opinions, or at least have modified them very much. The Punjab, he (the Chairman) was quite sure, is at present a strength to us and not a weakness, and every day our position was growing stronger; and one reason for this was the sound judgment of Mr. Edward Prinsep and other officers engaged in the settlement of the revenue. A moderate assessment had been the rule, and the result is that the people are contented and prospering, and in the event of any trouble we are sure of the support of the North-west. With reference to the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Bill, he might mention that he was present at the meeting of the Council at Simla on the 13th of October last, when Mr. Hope re-introduced the Bill, and he heard that gentleman's arguments, which were mainly based on the virtue of uniformity; and that the Bill left a modified intervention which was open also to the new provinces; and therefore Mr. Hope professed to consider the measure a boon rather than the reverse. He (the Chairman) had a great respect and esteem for Mr. Hope, who was an able officer, but he was bound to say that the time selected to introduce his measure was ill-chosen, and further, that he was certainly not the man who should have introduced it. At the time he (the Chairman) arrived in India, there were grave agrarian disturbances. The zemindars of one village took one of the Native Revenue officers, and placing him in a basket, they carried him to a precipice, and then threw him over. When two of these zemindars were afterwards being led out for execution, one of them turned and requested speech with the officer in charge. He said he wished to know whether the muskets of the guard were loaded, and being asked why he desired to know, replied that if they were loaded they might as well be discharged, and he hoped the officer would yield to his earnest request that a volley should be fired over his grave. The man believed that in ridding the people of the Revenue officer he had committed no crime save that of patriotism, and, feeling that

he was dying in the cause of his country, desired to have it recognized. A time when feelings like these existed among the people, when inquiries were in progress regarding the wrongs under which they alleged they were suffering, was certainly no time for the introduction of the Revenue Jurisdiction Bill. As to the point whether Mr. Hope was the man likely to disarm opposition to such a Bill by bringing it in himself, it would be sufficient to mention that not long ago Mr. Hope increased the assessment of the four villages of Katiawadi, Vishalpur, Jamalpur, and Kábilpur from 1,000 to 4,000 rupees, and the zemindars appealed to the Civil Court. Mr. Birdwood declared in their favour. A second appeal in a higher Court maintained the decision adverse to Mr. Hope. While this action was fresh in the minds of the people, it would surely have been better had some one else introduced the Bill. On another point to which the Council of the Association referred in their report—the depreciation of silver—he would not now enlarge. Opinions on the subject were of the most contradictory kind. On the point of the supposed changes about to be introduced into the Civil Service examinations, he did not apprehend that any great revolution was going to take place. Reverting to the first topic mentioned by the Council—his own visit to India—he might say that ever since he had been connected with the East India Association, he had done all that was in his power to aid it in the interests of England not less than those of India, because he believed the objects of the Association were useful to both countries. With these convictions he had gone to India, and on the 22nd of June, last year, he addressed a meeting in Bombay on the subject. He was rather surprised to find that there was great difficulty in finding a chairman for that meeting. Indian gentlemen declined to preside, not because they did not sympathize with the Association and its objects, but because they were really afraid. He had positive proofs that this feeling was not without sufficient cause ; and here he might say, that it was a very unfortunate thing that there should exist a party in India imbued with such a fanatical spirit of officialism, that it would suppress all independence even of thought and expression. It is surprising that there should be men in India who could encourage this spirit, though they themselves had been educated in a country of free thought and speech. But such is the fact. And when he had delivered the address in Bombay, he and the East India Association were made the subject of violent attacks in the *Bombay Gazette*, which throughout his tour did all it could to damage him. As to the result of his journey, he found in all his route that people's minds and energies were fully occupied with preparations for the Prince of Wales's visit. Even in Hyderabad immense preparations were made upon the chance of his Royal Highness coming !

A new street was made throughout the city, and many other expensive alterations. While all this was going on, he did not think it advisable to attempt anything in the interest of the Association, but he took occasion to ascertain that there were several men of high position and influence who would be willing to contribute to the East India Association, and he had every reason to believe that those contributions would shortly be given. He also understood that branch Associations would be established in two of the principal places in India, and that they might, if they so thought fit, amalgamate with another powerful Association in Calcutta. He would, therefore, ask the members to allow him to hold his report in suspense, and he trusted that at the end of the year, or the beginning of the next, he would be able to say something gratifying to the Association on the subject.

Lieut.-General Sir GEORGE MALCOLM moved that the report of the Council be adopted, and in doing so said he would just remark that the East India Association desired to give every facility for the expression of all views elucidatory of the wants of India and of its people, and in doing so they believed they were forwarding the best interests of the English Administration. He cordially agreed with the remarks of the Chairman regarding Sir Salar Jung, and he looked for much permanent advantage in the visits of chiefs and rulers of India to England; for the closer the intimacy of the two peoples the more real and abiding would be their respect for each other, and hence the more conducive to the permanency of the British Empire in the East.

Colonel RATHBORNE seconded the resolution, which was agreed to *nem. con.*

The CHAIRMAN, in proposing the re-election of the Right Honourable Sir Laurence Peel as President for the ensuing year, said he thought it a great advantage to the Association that they had a gentleman for their President who was not only distinguished for his acquaintance with his own profession and India, but who was equally well known as a man of moderation, who was acceptable to all parties—a man in whose judgment confidence could safely be reposed—a man who, while of strong feelings, never allowed them to mislead him into errors of judgment. He therefore had very sincere pleasure in moving his re-election.

Mr. JOHN DICKINSON seconded this, and said that Sir Laurence Peel was a man of high reputation, not only in the profession, but in the country generally, and it was a great advantage to the East India Association to have such a man at its head.

The resolution was then agreed to *nem. con.*

Major-General G. BURN proposed that the following gentlemen be re-elected Members of the Council: Major E. Bell, W. S. Fitzwilliam, Esq.,

Colonel P. T. French, Captain W. C. Palmer, Surajbal M. Pundit, Esq., Colonel A. B. Rathborne, P. M. Tait, Esq., and W. Tayler, Esq. These gentlemen, he said, were well known to the Association, and that was their best title to re-election.

Lieutenant-General Sir GEORGE MALCOLM seconded the motion, which was then put and agreed to unanimously.

Colonel RATHBORNE said that as this concluded the formal business before the meeting, he would venture to introduce another subject, and that was that, as they would soon be obliged to vacate their present premises, it would be desirable to consider the advisability of leasing or erecting a hall sufficiently roomy to accommodate the members as readers or visitors, and their growing library ; and further, to allow of the delivery of lectures on subjects of Indian interest. This hall could be made the centre of lecturing all over the country, and especially when any occasion made an Indian topic of special or sudden interest, as was not unfrequently the case.

Mr. JOHN DICKINSON said that, while there could be little question of the advantage of having such a hall, the first and main difficulty was how to raise the money. To build a hall of any size in that part of London would require a large sum.

After some further conversation on the details of such a scheme, the suggestion was referred to the Council for consideration.

Major-General BURN asked if the Council had taken any action yet on the subject of the depreciation of silver. This was a question of vital interest to thousands of Englishmen, for it involved an income-tax of at least 25 per cent. He did not profess to be able to offer any suggestions on a subject upon which even experts greatly differed, but one had recently been made which seemed reasonable, as likely to retard the depreciation of the rupee, and that was to assimilate it and make its circulation indiscriminate with the English florin.

The CHAIRMAN said the production of the silver mines of America is such an indefinite factor in the calculation that there was really no telling where the depreciation would stop. He could say that the Government were considering the matter in every possible light, but the subject was one of extreme difficulty.

Mr. JOHN DICKINSON said an impression prevailed that strong pressure was being put on the Marquis of Salisbury to introduce a double coinage. The subject was not one which would admit of experiments. Any crude measure would be extremely dangerous. As to forcing a gold currency upon India, he could only say its use would be quite a novelty. Gold used in India was regarded as a mercantile product, and not as a coinage. It was a curious fact that out of the whole

population of the globe, only a very small proportion used a gold standard coinage—at present only Germany and England. A suggestion had been made that England should have a league for the demonetization of gold, or that we should put ourselves at the head of a silver-using league. The subject was of pressing importance, for the depreciation involves frightful loss to everybody connected with India.

Colonel RATHBORNE said he had given some attention to the subject. In 1851, when at Hyderabad, he had charge of the gold taken in the fort there, and it was for sale. Hearing of the gold discoveries in Australia, he foresaw a fall in the price in the market, and urged immediate sale; but the Government hesitated and delayed for two years, and the result was the loss he had foreseen. This circumstance turned his attention to the subject of the currency, and he took up the opinion that it was quite impossible for India to have a different currency from England. Gold, by the way, he might remind Mr. Dickinson, had been in use as a coinage in India; and in Aurungzebe's times it was as much used for this purpose as silver. On the proposal of a gold currency, he had some conversation and correspondence with Lord Ellenborough, who urged that a double currency was impossible, the coinage of the higher standard having an irresistible tendency to leave the country. But at that time the result would have been that the rupee would have been worked out of circulation by the gold beyond what might be required for petty payments, although now the reverse would be the case. He believed that any attempt to remedy the present evil by the introduction of a gold currency now would be utterly useless. The *Times* had made the absurd suggestion that the ryots should be made to pay the State in gold; but, while there was no provision that the ryots should take payment for their produce in anything but depreciated silver, this proposal involved the raising of the ryots' taxation by about 33 per cent.—a hardly reasonable solution of the difficulty. He believed it possible, however, that the present difficulty might be the making of India. The great difficulty of India, as an agricultural question, is the requirement of the payment of the revenue at the beginning of the season. The ryots have recourse to the bankers, who only make advances at enormous charges. The present situation may bring the ryot relief, and if so, it will be the permanent benefit of India.

After some further desultory conversation, the subject was allowed to drop, it being understood that it would be made the theme for a formal discussion in the course of the next session.

The proceedings terminated with a vote of thanks to the Chairman.

ANNUAL REPORT, 1875-6.

YOUR Council beg to submit their Report for the past year, 1875-6. They are glad to be able to report that their Chairman, Mr. E. B. Eastwick, C.B., has returned from his lengthened visit to India, where he took every opportunity of advocating the claims of the Association to general support. They congratulate him on his safe return, and trust that he may long be able to preside over their meetings.

REDUCTION OF POSTAGE TO INDIA.

Reductions having been made in the rates of International Postage between England and several other countries which were not extended to India, the Council addressed a Memorial to the Postmaster-General (Appendix A), in which they pointed out that while a letter, newspaper, and postage card could be sent from Moscow to San Francisco, or from Great Britain to Egypt, America, and Africa, for 2½d., 1d., and 1½d. respectively, the cost to India remained at 12d. for letters and 3d. for newspapers, while the advantage of post cards was denied. They ventured to suggest that, if the advantages accruing from the reduction of postal charge between Great Britain and other nations are, beyond doubt, considerable, the benefits of cheap postal intercommunication between Great Britain, India, and the other Colonies of Great Britain, although involving a slight pecuniary sacrifice, will be still more important; and they expressed a hope that the inhabitants of India might at an early date receive those postal advantages now enjoyed alike by the most insignificant, as by the most important States of Europe, and by large portions of America and Africa.

In reply, the Council were informed that the Postmaster-General was fully alive to the importance of effecting such reductions, if possible, and that, with that view, the question whether it would be desirable for India to become a party to the General Postal Union was being considered.

The Council are happy to state that India has now been admitted to the General Postal Union, and that the postage on letters has been reduced from 1s. to 8d. *viâ* Brindisi, and from 9d. to 6d. *viâ* Southampton, and on newspapers from 3d. to 2d., and book packets from 4d. to 3d. per 2 oz.

INDIAN IMPORT DUTIES ON RAW COTTON.

The Council presented a Memorial to the Secretary of State appealing to his lordship against the continuance of the duty on raw cotton imported into India, which, they stated, appeared to be a sacrifice of the

interests of the whole people of India to the interests of a class of English manufacturers. In forwarding this Memorial, they supported a respectful protest and appeal made by the Bombay Branch of the Association to the Governor-General of India, in which, while thanking the Government of India for the several concessions made in the Tariff Act, they protested against the continuance of the import duty on raw cotton not the produce of Continental Asia or Ceylon, imposed by the Indian Tariff Act of last year.

In reply, Lord George Hamilton stated that he was instructed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to say it would receive Lord Salisbury's careful consideration. The Memorial and reply is given in the Appendix.

This important subject was also dealt with in a very interesting paper read by Mr. Elliot before the Association on the 23rd of May, when Sir George Campbell took the chair, and the whole matter was discussed at some length. A full account of the proceedings at the meeting is given in the Journal.

VISIT OF THE PRINCE OF WALES TO INDIA.

Allusion was made in the last Report to the Prince of Wales's visit to India, and the Council take this opportunity of endorsing the views of their branch in India in expressing their high gratification at the happy termination of his tour through India, and the manifestation of the loyalty of the people of India, who everywhere gave him a grand and hearty reception; and the Council hope, with their friends in India, that the result of the Prince's visit will be to unite England and India in closer bonds, to extend to that country the hearty sympathies of the English nation, and to promote a more enlightened knowledge of the condition and wants of the people of India, and of what is due to their material, intellectual, and moral progress.

PROPOSED INDIAN MUSEUM.

A proposal to erect an Indian Museum on the site of the old Fife House, on the Thames Embankment, having come before the public, the Council, impressed with the advantages that would result from having the India Museum in such a central position, in which its usefulness would be much greater than in its present situation at South Kensington, addressed a Memorial (see Appendix B) to the Prime Minister, praying Her Majesty's Government to take into consideration the proposal, and to give the necessary assistance for carrying it out. The receipt of the Memorial was acknowledged by Mr. Disraeli's private secretary.

ADDRESS TO SIR SALAR JUNG.

Sir Salar Jung, the Prime Minister of his Highness the Nizam, having lately arrived on a visit to this country, the Council presented to him an address of congratulation on his safe arrival in England, in which they expressed their appreciation of the value of his labours, and of the admirable manner in which he has for so many years administered the extensive territories committed to his charge, during which he had succeeded in maintaining between the British Government and the Government of the Nizam, amidst and against many restrictions, the policy of friendship towards Great Britain and a strict fulfilment of treaty obligations, which had ever been the cardinal points of his Excellency's administration. Special stress was laid on the services rendered by Sir Salar Jung at the time of the great Indian Mutiny, when he had to contend against open and covert opposition, that a Minister less sagacious and less determined to pursue at all hazards the path of loyalty and honour might have shrunk from resisting; and hopes were expressed that the result of his visit to this country would be to give additional strength to the friendly feeling which has so long and so happily subsisted between the British authorities in India and his Highness the Nizam. The address, as well as Sir Salar Jung's reply, is given in the Appendix; and all will agree with Sir Salar Jung when he says: "I hope that many persons, whether from the dominions of his Highness "the Nizam or from other Native States, may be led to visit this coun- "try, as I feel confident that a closer intimacy and intercourse between "the gentlemen of England and India cannot fail to be productive of "lasting benefit to either country."

THE EASTERN QUESTION.

The warlike news from the East having drawn public attention to "*The Eastern Question*," the Council held two meetings, at which the subject was discussed. The first was opened by a very important paper, by the Rev. James Long, on "*The Position of Turkey in Relation to* "*British Interests in India*;" and the second meeting was opened by a valuable address from Colonel Rathborne, on "*The True Line of Defence* "*for India*." These papers, with the consequent discussion, are inserted in the Journal.

BOMBAY REVENUE JURISDICTION ACT.

In a previous Report mention was made of the Council having addressed Memorials to the Secretary of State for India and to the Viceroy on the subject of the Bill introduced into the Legislative

Council of India to limit the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in the Bombay Presidency in matters relating to land revenue. The Council considered that the Bill was calculated to create general dissatisfaction, as it would take away the power of appeal to the Civil Courts in cases of land revenue, and thus the injured parties would be shut out from all chance of redress from an independent tribunal. The object of the Memorial was to protest against the withdrawal of the right of appeal against the acts of Government officers in India.

The inhabitants of Bombay also presented Memorials to the Viceroy protesting against the measure, which was criticized and condemned, more or less severely, by every newspaper in the Bombay Presidency, and by many other journals in different parts of India.

Notwithstanding the opposition to the Bill, it was passed by the Governor-General in Council, and now awaits the assent and confirmation of the Secretary of State.

The Bombay Branch of the Association have memorialized Lord Lytton, the Governor-General of India, stating that they have witnessed with regret and alarm the passing of the Bill, that it had been passed in spite of repeated protests from the people, and they asked that the weighty reasons against the measure put forward by the local authorities might be printed in the official *Gazette*.

A Memorial adopted at a public meeting of the inhabitants of Bombay has also been forwarded to the Marquis of Salisbury, in which they submit that the Act is opposed to the fundamental principles of political justice and national equity, and is calculated to weaken in the people of India that confidence in the moderation and fair-dealing of the rulers which is prized above all other bonds by the greatest statesmen.

On the 28th June a meeting of the Association was held, at which Mr. Tayler, in an able paper, reviewed the objections that had been raised to the Bill, and pointed out how general was the protest raised against it, and the meeting endorsed Mr. Tayler's views in the course of a discussion which is printed in the Journal.

POVERTY OF INDIA.

The Council would draw the especial attention of Members to two very valuable papers inserted in the Journal on "*The Poverty of India*," written by Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, in which important facts are adduced relative to the increasing drain of wealth from India to England, from which India is suffering seriously and sinking in poverty; and he justly points out that this gradual impoverishment of India is one of the serious questions of the day, and it would be well if Members would turn their attention to this subject—the drain of India's wealth.

DEPRECIATION IN THE VALUE OF SILVER.

The question of the depreciation in the value of silver, and of the loss to India caused by the continuous drawing of Council Bills, has been under the consideration of the Council, with a view to having a paper read and discussion raised thereon; but it was thought better to delay it until after the report of the Select Committee on the subject had been presented to Parliament.

ROYAL TITLES ACT.

The Royal Titles Act also formed the subject for consideration, but no action was taken on it.

RUMOURED CHANGES IN THE SYSTEM OF COMPETITIVE EXAMINATION FOR INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE.

The Council have had under consideration a letter from the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, expressing their views on the important changes which they understand from the resolutions adopted at the Conference at Oxford, and the apparently inspired tone of some of the articles in influential English papers, are about to be introduced in the system of competitive examinations for the Civil Service of India.

"3. The changes reported are intended—

"(*a*) To raise the limit of age in the case of European candidates "from twenty-one to twenty-five, with a view to enable them "to go through a University course either at Oxford or Cam- "bridge.

"(*b*) To exclude the Natives entirely from these competitive ex- "aminations, and to admit them only through the Uncove- "nanted Service under a system of nomination.

"4. With regard to the first of these proposals, the Sabha say they "see nothing to object to it, and, in fact, in the interests of the Natives "of India, the present limitation of age is a very great grievance, and "the Sabha will welcome the change provided the benefits of this exten- "sion of age be secured to the Natives as well as to the Europeans. "Some few years ago the maximum age was twenty-three years. This "was afterwards, with an undue haste and without assigning any sub- "stantial reasons for the change, reduced to twenty-one. At this time "several Native candidates who were studying for the competitive ex- "aminations in England under the well-grounded belief that no sudden "or uncalled-for changes would be made, had to return to India with "all their hopes shattered. Several protests were made, and the Sabha "believes a motion was brought into Parliament at the time in regard

"to this sudden lowering of the age of the candidates; but Parliament "did not interfere in the matter, and the Indian Civil Service Commis- "sioners were allowed to have it all their own way. The limit of "twenty-one years is too early for a Native candidate for the Civil Ser- "vice. He is not allowed to matriculate before sixteen in the Indian "Universities, and a five years' term is wholly insufficient, except in the "case of exceptionally sharp youths, to complete the extensive course of "studies required by the examination rules. The Sabha, therefore, is of "opinion that the extension of the present limit from twenty-one to "twenty-five is a move in the right direction, and cannot but be produc- "tive of the most beneficial results. It is certainly a change which the "Natives of this country have all along been anxious to see carried out."

With regard to the second point, "the Sabha strongly objected to "closing the door against the Native candidates through which their "European compeers are admitted. The reasons assigned for this exclu- "sion appear to be as follows:—

"(*a*) It is stated that the horoscopes of the Natives are not reli- "able, and therefore their ages are not determinable with "anything like truth.

"(*b*) A competitive examination, it is alleged, is no criterion of "their moral fitness for the high posts they are called upon "to occupy.

"6. With regard to the first of these objections, the Sabha believes "that it arises from sheer ignorance of Native customs and manners. "The clamour about Native horoscopes being not reliable is both idle "and without foundation in fact. . . .

"7. The Sabha, at the same time, declares that no case has been "suggested, nor is it aware of any having occurred, in which candidates "resorted to fraud, and palmed themselves off as being within the pre- "scribed limit, when they were not of that age. . . .

"8. As regards the second objection, the Sabha . . . does not believe that "such ideas would find favour with the responsible leaders of the opinion, "or with the authorities in England, or that they would be advanced in "influential journals as authoritative reasons for the exclusion of the "Natives. The moral effect on the minds of the people of India of "such a view being countenanced by Englishmen in authority may more "easily be conceived than described. All the elevating influences of the "British connection with India will be nullified and turned to naught "by any attempt on the part of Government to retrace its steps and "violate the charters and proclamations which have established the "equality of all classes of Her Majesty's subjects in England and India. "Any attempt at this time of the day to hedge in one portion of Her

" Majesty's subjects with peculiar privileges and advantages, and to brand " another section with ignominy as an inferior order of beings on account " of its different colour and creed, is a policy suicidal in the extreme to " the highest interests of the Empire, and is calculated to engender wide-" spread discontent and disaffection in the Native mind."

The Council made inquiries on the subject, the result of which led them to doubt that such changes were in contemplation; but the above remarks will show the feelings of the Natives of India in case the changes should be advocated.

REMOVAL OF OFFICE.

The Council have to report that they have received a notice under the "Public Offices Act" from the Office of Works that their Office will be required by them for the site of the new Public Offices, which will extend, it is believed, from the new Public Offices to and include all the north side of Great George Street, and from Parliament Street, west side, to the Park. This will oblige the Council to look out for new Offices as soon as the Government plans are definitely fixed.

PAPERS IN JOURNAL.

The Council have published the following Papers in the Journal:—

"India and England." An Address by Mr. E. B. EASTWICK, C.B., F.R.S., to the Bombay Branch of the Association.

"The Position of Turkey in Relation to British Interests in "India." A Paper by the Rev. JAMES LONG, late of Calcutta; with Discussion.

"The Inexpediency of Legislating on the Subject of Law-Reporting in India." Paper by Mr. DAVID SUTHERLAND; with Discussion.

"The Poverty of India." Part I. A Paper read by Mr. DADABHAI NAOROJI, before the Bombay Branch of the Association.

"A Privy Council for India." Paper by Major EVANS BELL; with Discussion.

"Indian Manufactures and the Indian Tariff." A Paper by Mr. ROBERT H. ELLIOT; with Discussion.

"The Poverty of India." Part II. A Paper read by Mr. DADABHAI NAOROJI, before the Bombay Branch of the Association.

"On the Bill before the Legislative Council of India for Cur-" tailing the Jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in the Bom-

"bay Presidency in Matters relating to Land Revenue." Paper by WILLIAM TAYLER, Esq., formerly Commissioner of Patna; with Discussion.

"On the True Line of Defence for India." A Paper by Colonel RATHBORNE; with Discussion.

PUBLICATIONS.

The Council tender their best thanks to the Proprietors of the following Papers, who present copies for the use of the Reading-room, where they may be daily read by members of the Association :—

The Delhi Gazette	Agra.
„ *Aligurh Gazette*	Aligurh.
„ *Native Opinion*	Bombay.
„ *Times of India*	„
„ *Argus*	„
„ *Bengalee*	Calcutta.
„ *Friend of India*	„
„ *Hindu Patriot*	„
„ *Indian Daily News*	„
„ *Indian Economist*	„
„ *Madras Athenæum and Daily News*	Madras.
„ *Madras Times*	„
„ *Native Public Opinion*	„
„ *Indian Public Opinion*	Lahore.
„ *Nafa-ul-Azim*	„
„ *Examiner*	London.
„ *Journal of the Society of Arts*	„
„ *Doctor*	„

Their best thanks are also due to the Council of India for continuing to supply them with Parliamentary Returns and other important papers relating to India, copies of which are placed on the table of the Reading-room, where they are constantly referred to; other copies are sent to Bombay for the use of the Branch there.

LOSSES BY DEATH.

It is with great regret the Council record the loss by death of two of their Vice-Presidents—His Highness the Rao of Kutch, and General the Right Honourable Lord Sandhurst, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., P.C.

ELECTION OF MEMBERS.

The Right Honourable Lord Stanley of Alderley has been elected a Vice-President of the Association.

The following gentlemen have been elected Members of the Council since the last annual meeting, to fill vacancies caused by Members leaving England:—

Stewart Colvin Bayley, Esq., of the Bengal Civil Service.

The Rev. James Long, late of Calcutta.

Lieutenant-General Sir George Malcolm, K.C.B.

Lieutenant-General O. Cavenagh, of the Bengal Staff Corps.

Dadabhoy Byramjee, Esq.

Eighteen gentlemen have been elected Members of the Association since the last meeting.

The following Members of the Council retire by rotation, and the Council recommend their re-election: Major Thomas Evans Bell, M.R.A.S.; W. S. Fitzwilliam, Esq.; Lieutenant-Colonel P. T. French; Captain W. C. Palmer; Surajbal M. Pundit, Esq.; Colonel A. B. Rathborne; P. M. Tait, Esq.; William Tayler, Esq.

ACCOUNTS.

The Accounts for the year have been audited, and will be found in the Appendix.

CASH ACCOUNT, from May 1, 1875, to April 30, 1876.

DR. RECEIPTS.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
1875.		
May 1.—To BALANCE at Bankers	211 7 2	
„ in hand	16 13 3	228 0 5
1876.		
April 29.—To Subscriptions received in London as per List	136 10 8	
To ditto received and returned as per contra	1 5 0	
To Interest on Investments in India	416 7 1	
„ „ „ in London	39 2 2	
To Amount realized by Sale of Government Promissory Notes, Rs. 1,000 4 per Cent. Loan, 1875, received from the Bombay Branch	93 19 0	
To Advertisements in the Journal	17 9 6	
To Sundry Receipts	1 6 6	705 19 11
		£934 0 4

EXPENDITURE. CR.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
1876.		
April 29.—By Rent	150 0 0	
Housekeeper, Coal, Gas, &c.	32 11 9	182 11 9
Furniture, Bookcases, &c.		62 17 9
Salaries		275 0 0
Printing		113 18 1
Newspapers and Books	50 4 1	
Bookbinding	12 6 6	
Stationery	24 10 4	
Postage	17 0 0	
Advertising Lectures and Meetings	11 2 9	
Hire of Room for Lecture	2 12 6	
Reporting and Paragraphing	12 12 0	
Freight on Publications to India	5 8 11	113 17 1
Subscription returned as per contra		1 5 0
BALANCE at Bankers	177 2 5	
„ in hand	7 8 3	184 10 8
		£934 0 4

BALANCE SHEET, April 30, 1876.

ASSETS.	£ s. d.
Investments in England: Rs. 10,900 in 4 per Cent. Loan of 1865	1,044 4 5
Furniture and Fixtures, London	197 4 0
Library	106 7 0
Balance of Bank and Cash Account	184 10 8
	£1,532 6 1

LIABILITIES.	£ s. d.
General Fund Balance carried forward	£1,532 6 1

Examined with Ledger and Vouchers, and found correct.

20, Great George Street,
July 12, 1876.

WILLIAM TAYLER,
DADABHOY BYRAMJEE, } *Auditors.*

W. C. PALMER, *Hon. Secretary.*

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF SUBSCRIBERS

Who have Paid their Subscriptions from May 1, 1875, *to April* 30, 1876.

	For		£	s.	d.
George Appleton, Esq.	1876	.....	1	5	0
Lieut.-General Sir George Balfour, K.C.B., M.P.	„	.....	1	5	0
Colonel W. A. M. Barnard	1875	.....	1	5	0
S. C. Bayley, Esq.	1876	.....	1	5	0
J. David Bell, Esq.	1874-75	.....	2	10	0
Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. Brereton	1876	.....	1	5	0
Alexander Burn, Esq., M.D.	„	.....	1	5	0
Major-General G. Burn	1875-76	.....	2	10	0
H. A. M. Butler-Johnstone, Esq., M.P.	„	.....	2	10	0
Sir T. E. Colebrooke, Bart., M.P.	1876	.....	1	1	0
General Sir Arthur Cotton, K.C.S.I.	„	.....	1	5	0
Major-General F. C. Cotton	„	.....	1	5	0
Clement Dale, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
Juland Danvers, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
Emerson Dawson, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
William Dent, Esq.[1]	„	.....	1	5	0
S. S. Dickinson, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
Robert H. Elliot, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
Colonel H. L. Evans	1875-76	.....	2	10	0
Colonel W. E. Evans	1876	.....	1	5	0
Major-General Sir Vincent Eyre, K.C.S.I., C.B.	„	.....	1	5	0
Cecil J. S. Faulder, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
George Foggo, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
G. W. Forrest, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
R. E. Forrest, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
F. W. Fox, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
H. W. Freeland, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
Colonel P. T. French	„	.....	1	5	0
Colonel W. A. Fyers	„	.....	1	5	0
Right Hon. Lord R. Grosvenor, M.P.	„	.....	1	5	0
Sir Robert Hamilton, Bart., K.C.B.	„	.....	1	5	0
Colonel Edward Hemery	„	.....	1	5	0
T. F. Henley, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
J. F. Hore, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
H. R. Hutchins, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
Major-General Sir G. Le Grand Jacob, K.C.S.I., C.B.	„	.....	1	5	0
Charles Jay, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
John Jones, Esq.	1875	.....	1	5	0
Henry Kimber, Esq.	1876	.....	1	5	0
General Sir John Low, K.C.B.	„	.....	1	0	0
S. P. Low, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
Hon. C. G. Lyttelton, M.P.	„	.....	1	5	0
Major-General C. Mackenzie	„	.....	1	5	0
Lieut.-General Sir George Malcolm, K.C.B.	„	.....	1	5	0
Hon. Justice W. Markby	„	.....	1	5	0

	For		£	s.	d.
Major-General W. F. Marriott	1876	.....	1	5	0
Bryce McMaster, Esq.	Life Sub.	.....	14	0	0
James Matthews, Esq.	1876	.....	1	5	0
S. V. Morgan, Esq.	,,	.....	1	5	0
T. G. A. Palmer, Esq.	,,	.....	1	5	0
Captain W. C. Palmer	,,	.....	1	5	0
Colonel A. Phelps	,,	.....	1	5	0
Colonel A. B. Rathborne	,,	.....	1	5	0
Major-General W. Richardson	,,	.....	1	5	0
Marquis of Salisbury	,,	.....	1	0	0
Rt. Hon. Lord Sandhurst, G.C.B., G.C.S.I. (the late)	,,	.....	1	5	0
R. C. Saunders, Esq.	,,	.....	1	5	0
Major-General E. W. S. Scott	,,	.....	1	5	0
Walter Severn, Esq.	,,	.....	1	5	0
H. Danby Seymour, Esq.	,,	.....	1	5	0
H. Lee Smith, Esq.	,,	.....	1	5	0
Right Hon. Lord Strathnairn, G.C.S.I., G.C.B.	,,	.....	1	5	0
Sir M. Coomara Swamy	1875	.....	0	4	0
Gannendro M. Tagore, Esq.	1876	.....	1	5	0
Thomas Taylor, Esq.	,,	.....	1	5	0
Colonel Edward Thompson	,,	.....	1	5	0
Sir Charles Trevelyan, Bart., K.C.B.	,,	.....	1	5	0
Colonel J. S. Trevor	,,	.....	1	5	0
F. S. Turner, Esq.	,,	.....	1	5	0
Colonel F. Tyrell	,,	.....	1	5	0
Sir David Wedderburn, Bart.	,,	.....	1	5	0
J. Sewell White, Esq.	,,	.....	1	5	0
Sir Charles J. Wingfield, K.C.S.I., C.B.	1875-76	.....	2	10	0
Major J. Andover Wood	1876	.....	1	5	0
James T. Wood, Esq.	,,	.....	1	5	0
P. Ananda Row, Esq.	1875	.....	1	4	3
B. Gopaliah, Esq.	,,	.....	1	4	3
T. Sreenevassu Irengar, Esq.	,,	.....	1	4	3
A. Treenivassu Charloo, Esq.	,,	.....	1	4	4
S. Venkatavaradiengar, Esq.	,,	.....	1	4	4
Raja Pramathu nath Raja Bahadoor	Life Sub.	.....	13	10	3
V. N. Tirumalacharier, Esq.	1875	.....	1	3	6
P. N. Krishnu Moorti, Esq.	,,	.....	1	3	6
Hafiz Sudrool Islam Khan Bahadoor	,,	.....	1	7	0
A. S. Raghavacharier, Esq.	,,	.....	1	2	6
V. N. Narasin Iyengar, Esq.	,,	.....	1	2	6
			£136	10	8

LIST OF LIFE MEMBERS.

Maneckjee Aderjee, Esq. (1869).
Veheridas Adjubhai, Esq.
W. P. Andrew, Esq. (1868).
Maharajah S. C. R. Bahadoor
Dr. Rustomjee Cawasjee Buhadoorjee.
Sorabjee Shapoorjee Bangalee.
Limjee Jamsetjee Batleeboye (1873).
H.H. Shree Bawajee.
Mirza Abbas Bey, Esq. (1873).
Laxuman Dajie Bevelkar, Esq. (1869).
H.H. the Tahore of Bhownuggur.
Ruttonjee Bomanjee, Esq.
Alexander Brown, Esq. (1870).
Nanabhoy Burjonjee (1868).
D. F. Cama, Esq.
D. H. Cama, Esq.
D. P. Cama, Esq. (1867).
K. R. Cama, Esq.
P. H. Cama, Esq.
P. R. Cama, Esq. (1870).
A. H. Campbell, Esq. (1866).
Dr. Ananta Chandroba.
John Cleary, Esq.
P. R. Cola, Esq. (1866).
J. G. Coleman, Esq. (1867).
Dhaejee Cosinathjee, Esq.
George Crawshay, Esq. (1870).
Manackjee Cursetjee, Esq.
Anundross Custoorchund, Esq.
M. C. Damanvala, Esq.
Dhunjeebhoy J. Dashay, Esq.
Mathra Dass, Esq.
Krishnaroo Gopol Deshmutsh, Esq. (1869).
Narayan Dharadhar, Esq.
Amratras Dufley, Esq.
Captain F. Duncan (1868).
Muricherjia A. Dustoor, Esq.
E. B. Eastwick, Esq. (1867).
B. K. Erance, Esq. (1868).
Sir James Ferguson (1866).
Robert Fischer, Esq.
W. S. Fitzwilliam, Esq. (1867).
John Fleming, Esq. (1867).
Hormusjee J. Gariallee, Esq.
Misserwanjee K. Ghandy, Esq. (1869).
Baboo Kali Churu Ghoshal (1868).
Dr. P. F. Gomes.
Jahangir Goostadjee, Esq.
P. P. Gordon, Esq. (1866).
Captain W. G. Grove (1867).
Baboo Gungapershad.
Right Hon. Lord John Hay (1867).
Narsingparsad Hariparsaud.
Jandar Hindi, Esq.
Damoder Hurjee, Esq.
Rajah Iykishendoss (1867).
Aspondiarjee Jamsetjee, Esq.
S. Jamshedjee, Esq.
Sorabjee Jamshedjee Jeejeebhoy, Esq.
Vaumalee Jeeva, Esq.
Dossabhoy Karaka, Esq.
Baboo Prasauna Kari, Esq.
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Hormusjee S. Kotharee, Esq.
G. Deshmukh Krishnarad, Esq.
Putvardhun Kurundwadkur, Esq. (1869).
H.H. the Rao of Kutch (1867).
Jeejeebhoy J. Lama, Esq.
J. Logan, Esq. (1868).
Mathuradas Lowjee, Esq.
Chubildas Lullabhoy, Esq.
Kursundas Madhavadas, Esq.
Rao Saheb Mandlik, Esq.
Jalackchund Maneckchund, Esq. (1869).
Dadabhoy Maneckjee, Esq.
Jamsetjee Maneckjee, Esq.
Nanabhoy Maneckjee, Esq.
William Manford, Esq. (1867).
R. M'Ilwraith, Esq. (1867).
Bryce McMaster, Esq. (1875).
Ranchordas Megjee, Esq.
Rustonjee V. Mehrjee, Esq.
Merwanjee H. Mehta, Esq.
P. A. Mehta, Esq. (1868).
Jahangir Merwanjee, Esq.
D. Mockerjee, Esq. (1869).
Ardaseer Framjee Moos, Esq.
Kharsandas Muljee, Esq.
B. Muya, Esq.
Dadabhai Naoroji, Esq. (1866).
Rayhunath Narayan, Esq.

Hon. Mungaldas Nathoobhoy.
Hon. Framjee Nusserwanjee.
W. T. S. Oakes, Esq. (1867).
Dr. Atmaram Pandoorung.
Luxamouras Madhavras Patavurdhim, Esq. (1869).
Dhinyeebhoy F. N. Patell, Esq.
Jairajbhoy Peerbhoy, Esq.
Lulla Gunga Persad, Esq. (1868).
Dhunjeebhoy Pestonjee, Esq.
Dhuramsie Poonjabhoy, Esq.
Raja Pramatha nath Raja Bahadur (1875).
V. Purshotamdas, Esq.
Shrunant G. Putwardhau, Esq.
Shrunant M. Putwardhau, Esq.
Shrinamt Chimnaji Ragunath, Esq. (1869).
Narayan Ramchandra, Esq. (1869).
H.H. Shree Rawajee.
S. E. Rolland, Esq. (1868).
Byramjie Roostinijie, Esq.
Merwanjie Rooshunjie, Esq.
D. Ruttonjee, Esq. (1868).
Shrunant C. R. Pant Sachive, Esq.
H.H. Ramchandra Rao Saheb.
Baboo P. Sarcar.
Baboo P. K. Survadhikari.
H.H. the Chief of Sanglee.
F. Schiller, Esq. (1868).
Kazi Shahabudin (1867).
Dhinshan Shapoorjee, Esq.
Sorabjee Shapoorjee, Esq.
Major-General R. J. Shaw (1867).
Rev. Narayen Sheshadre (1874).
Callionji Shewji, Esq.
Cuthandass Shioji, Esq.
V. J. Simkersett, Esq.
Eduljee R. Soonawala, Esq.
Rustonjee Sorabjee, Esq.
J. W. Sutherland, Esq. (1867).
Gokuljee Tabata, Esq.
Damodardas Tapeedas, Esq.
Molljee Thakersey, Esq.
Javirilal Umiashankar, Esq.
Haridas Veridas, Esq.
Pandit J. C. S. Vidyasagur, Esq.
H.H. Ramah Vurmah (1867).
Major-General Sir Robert Wallace (1866).
F. M. Williams, Esq. (1867).
Walter Wren, Esq. (1873).
Khan Bahadoor Yusif Ali (1873).

LIFE MEMBERS IN KATTYAWAR.

Khachar Alla Chella Khachar, King of Jusdan, Jusdan.
Ruttonjee Kessowjee Kothari, Bhooj.
Rajgar Lalji Ladhaji, Bhooj.
Dr. Dorabjee Hormusjee, G.G.M.C., Bhooj.
Mehta Rowjee Herachund, Bhooj.
Thaker Govindjee Dhurumsey, Bhooj.
Rustomjee Mervanjee and Sons, Bhooj.
Peer Lutfulla Rahimdeen, Bhooj.
Ishvurlal Ochowram, Officiating Dewan, Bhooj.
Jala Jalamsing, Bhooj.
Mehta Valabhjee Ladha, Bhooj.
Nurbheram Hurjeevun, Bhooj.
Nazir Mirza Meeya, Bhooj.
Goorjee Jeraj, Bhooj.
Savai Gooroojee, Bhooj.
Anundjee Vishram, Bhooj.
Thaker Karsandass Naranjee, Anjar, Bhooj.
Veerbhadra Poonjaji of Kunthkote, Anjar, Bhooj.
Jeram Shivjee, Moondra, Bhooj.
Thaker Kalianjee Pitamber, Bhooj.
Utamram Nurbheram, Rajkote.
Nagindass Brijbhookhundass, Rajkote.
Bai Kumribai of Bilkha, Rajkote.
Anundlal Hurridass, Karbhari of Bilkha, Rajkote.
Cooverjee Coyajee, Rajkote.
Dhunjeeshaw Hormusjee Karaka, Rajkote.
Rao Saheb Gopaljee Soorbhoy, Rajkote.
Jagannath Itcharam, Rajkote.
Desai Chagan Bhaichund, Bhownuggur.
Chaganlal Suntokeram, Bhownuggur.
Bhaichund Shamjee, Bhownuggur.
Jaeyatilal Venilal, Bhownuggur.
Jeevunbhoy Nanabhoy, Bhownuggur.
Purbhashankar Gowrishunkar, Bhownuggur.

Vajyashankar Gowrishunkar, Bhownuggur.
Vithaldass Samuldass, Bhownuggur.
Walla Sooraj Gunga, Shareholder of Judpore, Judpore.
Walla Wallera Jussa, ditto, Judpore.
Walla Gorkha Meraim, ditto, Judpore.
Walla Jiva Gunga, ditto, Judpore.
Kessowlal Bhugvanlal, Karbhari, Walla, Judpore.
Narayen Dullubhji, Chief Karbhari of Wudvan, Wudvan.
H.H. the Thacore of Chitore, Chitore.
Bhanjee Kessowjee, Karbhari of Chitore, Chitore.
Nursingprasad Hurryprasad, Joonagudh.
Nyalchund Roopshunker, Joonagudh.
Dewanjee Saheb Luscmishankar Bhai, Joonagudh.
Nanamya Saheb of Ahmedabad, Joonagudh.
Kohelina Mahaji Saheb, Joonagudh.
Bowdeen Meeya, Joonagudh.
Dewan Goculjee Sumputram Jahala, Joonagudh.
Jamadar Sale Hindee, Joonagudh.
H.H. Bahadoorkhanjee, Heir-Apparent to the Nawab of Joonagudh, Joonagudh.
H.H. Mohbatkhanjee, Nawab of Joonagudh, Joonagudh.

LIFE MEMBERS IN BOMBAY.

Dr. Anunta Chandropa, Bombay.
Cursetjee Jehangheer Tarachund, Bombay.
Edaljee Rustomjee Soonawalla, Bombay.
Kashinath Trimbak Telang, Bombay.
The Hon. Justice Nanabhoy Hurridass, Bombay.
The Hon. Rao Saheb Vishvanath Narayan Mandlik, Bombay.
Pestonjee Byrawjee Kotewal, Kurrachee.

APPENDIX A.

REDUCTION OF POSTAGE TO INDIA.

To the Right Honourable Lord John Manners, Postmaster-General.

The Memorial of the Council of the East India Association

SHEWETH:

That your Memorialists have perceived with satisfaction that a reduction in the rates of International Postage between England and several other countries came into operation on the 1st of July last. But they regret to see that no reduction whatever has been made in the postage rates between India and Great Britain or any of her Colonies. While, therefore, a letter, newspaper, and postage card can now be sent from Moscow to San Francisco, or from Great Britain to Egypt, Suez, America, and Africa, for 2½d., 1d., and 1½d., respectively, the cost to India remains at 12d. for letters, and 3d. for newspapers, while it is altogether denied the advantage of post cards.

Your Memorialists are aware that the reduction now made in International Postage will, in all probability, entail for a time some loss to the Postal Department—although that loss will be more than counterbalanced by the advantages conferred on the community at large; but they venture to suggest that if the advantages accruing from the reduction of postal charge between Great Britain and other nations are, beyond doubt, considerable, the benefits of cheap postal intercommunication between Great Britain, India, and the other Colonies of Great Britain, although involving a slight pecuniary sacrifice, will be still more important.

Whatever loss may be intermediately involved will, doubtless, diminish from year to year, and will be mutually borne by the Mother Country and her Dependencies; but such temporary sacrifice, your Memorialists venture to suggest, is not worthy of consideration in view of the immense advantages which a liberal reduction would confer on the wide-spread dominions of Her Majesty.

In bringing this matter before your lordship, as the head of the Post Office, your Memorialists venture to express a hope that the inhabitants of India may at an early date receive those postal advantages now enjoyed alike by the most insignificant, as by the most important States of Europe, and by large portions of America and Africa.

And your Memorialists will ever pray.

C. WINGFIELD,
Vice-Chairman of the Council of the East India Association.

20, Great George Street, Westminster,
September 2, 1875.

REPLY.

General Post Office, London,
September 13, 1875.

SIR,—Having laid before the Postmaster-General the Memorial of the Council of the East India Association, advocating a reduction of the Postage on Corre-

spondence to and from India, I am directed to state to you, in reply, that his lordship is fully alive to the importance of effecting such reduction, if possible; and that, with this view, the question whether it would be desirable for India to become a party to the General Postal Union is being considered.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN TILLEY.

Sir Charles I. Wingfield, K.C.S.I., C.B., East India Association.

APPENDIX B.

INDIAN IMPORT DUTIES ON RAW COTTON.

MEMORIAL TO SECRETARY OF STATE FROM EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION.

To the Most Noble the Marquis of Salisbury, K.G., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India in Council.

The Memorial of the Council of the East India Association

MOST RESPECTFULLY SHEWETH:

That the Bombay Branch of this Association has addressed a respectful protest and appeal to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India against the continuance of the import duty on raw cotton not the produce of Continental Asia or Ceylon, imposed by the Indian Tariff Act of this year. A copy of that appeal is appended.

Your Memorialists appeal to your lordship in Council in the same sense.

Your Memorialists admit that the import duty levied on *manufactured* cotton goods must act in some degree as a protection of Indian manufacturers. This is a circumstance incidental to the necessities of revenue, and one which, if the principles of free trade be true, is disadvantageous to India as well as to England. But this incidental and, at present, inevitable evil cannot be remedied by extending protection and by placing upon India the further disadvantage of a duty protective of English manufacturers—a disadvantage which, being unnecessary, is a wrong.

His Excellency the Viceroy has repudiated the principles of protection, and has declared that "in all financial questions the true interests of the people of India "are the only consideration which the Government of India has to regard." It has not been pretended that the duty on raw cotton is needful for purposes of revenue; and no one, so far as your Memorialists are aware, has attempted to show that it is in any way advantageous to India.

Your Memorialists therefore confidently appeal to your lordship in Council against the continuance of this duty, which appears to be a sacrifice of the interests of the whole people of India to the interests of a class of English manufacturers.

And your Memorialists will ever pray.

(Signed) C. WINGFIELD,

Vice-Chairman of the Council of the East India Association.

20, Great George Street, Westminster,
October, 1875.

REPLY.

India Office, November 3, 1875.

SIR,—I am directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of the Memorial signed by you, on behalf of the Council of the East India Association, respecting the duty imposed by the Indian Tariff Act, No. XVI. of 1875, on the importation into India of raw cotton not the produce of Continental Asia or Ceylon, and I am desired to state that the representations therein made will receive the Marquis of Salisbury's careful consideration.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed) GEORGE HAMILTON.

Sir Charles Wingfield, K.C.S.I.,
20, Great George Street, Westminster, S.W.

APPENDIX C.

PROPOSED INDIA MUSEUM ON THE THAMES EMBANKMENT.

To the Right Honourable Benjamin Disraeli, M.P., First Lord of Her Majesty's Treasury.

The Memorial of the (Council of the) East India Association

RESPECTFULLY SHEWETH:

That your Memorialists, taking a warm interest in all measures calculated to extend in this country a knowledge of the people and resources of India, have had their attention drawn to the proposal now before the public of erecting an India Museum on the site of the old Fife House, on the Thames Embankment.

Your Memorialists are impressed with the advantages which would result from having the India Museum in such a central position, in which its public usefulness would be so much greater than in its present situation at South Kensington.

Your Memorialists are likewise impressed with the advantages which would be likely to arise from the proposal of having a Colonial Museum placed side by side with the India Museum in the same locality, so as to form together an Imperial Museum representing the whole of the dominions under the British Crown.

For these and other reasons your Memorialists pray that Her Majesty's Government will take into consideration the proposals referred to, and give the necessary assistance for carrying them into effect.

For the Council of the East India Association,

(Signed) C. WINGFIELD, Vice-Chairman.

REPLY.

10, Downing Street, Whitehall, June 26, 1876.

SIR,—Mr. Disraeli desires me to acknowledge the receipt of a Memorial, dated

23rd inst., from the Council of the East India Association on the subject of a proposed India Museum on the Thames Embankment.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed) ALGERNON TURNOR.

Sir Charles Wingfield, K.C.S.I., C.B.

APPENDIX D.

ADDRESS TO SIR SALAR JUNG.

To his Excellency Sir Salar Jung Nawab Shuja-ud-Daula Mukhtar-ul-Mulk Mir Torab Ali Khan Bahadur, Knight Grand Cross of the Illustrious Order of the Star of India, Prime Minister of his Highness the Nizam-ool-Moolk, and Regent over all the Territories of his Highness, &c., &c., &c.

SIR,—We, the President and Council of the East India Association, beg to tender to your Excellency our hearty congratulations on your safe arrival in England, and we trust that the result of your visit here will be to give additional strength, if possible, to the friendly feeling which has so long and happily subsisted between the British authorities in India and his Highness the Nizam.

We are not unaware how much of this has been owing to the personal endeavours of your Excellency; nor of the obstacles you have had to contend against, arising chiefly from ancient and not unnatural prejudices which it required the statesmanlike discrimination and patient forbearance of your Excellency to overcome. Your Excellency during a happily long tenure of office succeeded in maintaining between the British Government and the Government of the Nizam, amidst and against many obstructions, the policy of friendship towards Great Britain, and a strict fulfilment of treaty obligations, which have ever been the cardinal points of your Excellency's administration.

No more signal example of this could be found than in the course pursued by your Excellency during the great Indian Mutiny, occurring as it did at a period immediately following one in which the relations between the two Governments had been exposed to some danger of unfriendly interruption.

How loyally you acted at that critical period we can never forget, nor should Great Britain ever be unmindful of the great services you then rendered it, a service for which the more credit is due to your Excellency, because having to contend against an amount of opposition both open and covert that a minister less sagacious and less determined at all hazards to pursue the path of loyalty and honour might well have shrunk from resisting, you succeeded in maintaining for the public good your high office, undiminished in its powers, utility, and dignity.

Of the admirable manner in which your Excellency has for so many years administered the extensive territories committed to your charge, it is sufficient to say that your name will go down to posterity as one whose career will bear a favourable comparison with those of the most illustrious Ministers of Native States, even in the most palmy days of Indian History.

Holding the highest position in the Councils of your own Sovereign, and wearing on your breast the insignia of an order which marks the estimation in which

you are held by our Sovereign, all that remains to us is to express to your Excellency, on the part of a body so well able as is the East India Association to appreciate the value of your labours, the conviction that never was there a more worthy recipient of all the honours which your Excellency has received, and which we trust that a gracious Providence may enable you long to enjoy.

We have the honour to be,

Your Excellency's most sincere well-wishers,

For the Council of the East India Association,

(Signed) LAURENCE PEEL, President.

East India Association Rooms, 20, Great George Street, Westminster, June 2, 1876.

REPLY FROM SIR SALAR JUNG.

140, Piccadilly, July 1, 1876.

To Sir Laurence Peel, President of the East India Association.

SIR,—I have had the honour to receive an address from the Council of the East India Association, of which you are the President, and I have now to request that you will be so good as to convey to your colleagues my best thanks for their good wishes on my arrival in England.

With regard to the expression of your hope, that the result of my visit to England will be to strengthen the friendly feeling which has so long existed between the British authorities and his Highness the Nizam, I have pleasure in assuring you, that, while I fear you exaggerate the importance of my humble visit to this country, yet, that the recollection which I shall carry away with me of the kindness and hospitality shown to me, and of the friendships I have made here, cannot fail to strengthen my efforts to fulfil my duties as the Minister of a faithful ally of Great Britain.

You have been pleased to attribute very much to my personal endeavours the existing state of cordiality between the British and the Nizam's Governments, but I can only claim to have performed to the best of my ability the part which strict honesty and common sense would have dictated, whether in regard to the course pursued by the Nizam's Government during the Indian Mutiny, or on any subsequent occasion. If sincerity and faithfulness of purpose exist, they should be found as much a matter of certainty in time of need as at all other times.

I hope that many, whether from the dominions of his Highness the Nizam or from other Native States, may be led to visit this country, as I feel confident that a closer intimacy and intercourse between the gentlemen of England and India cannot fail to be productive of lasting benefit to either country.

In conclusion, I would venture to observe that whatever success has attended my past administration is, I feel, due to the leading of Providence, and not to any far-sighted discrimination on my part.

Again thanking the East India Association and yourself for your kind expressions and good wishes,

I have the honour to be, Sir, yours sincerely,

(Signed) SALAR JUNG.

The Poverty of India.

PART III.

ADJOURNED MEETING OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION, FOR DISCUSSION OF THE PAPERS ON "THE POVERTY "OF INDIA" READ BY MR. DADABHAI NAOROJI.

A PUBLIC MEETING was held, under the auspices of the Bombay Branch of the East India Association, at the Framjee Cowasjee Institute, on Friday, the 9th of June, 1876, at 5.30 P.M. The object of the meeting was to discuss the two papers on the "Poverty of India" recently read by Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, which were inserted in the Journal, vol. ix., pp. 236, 352.

Mr. W. M. WOOD, on the motion of Mr. TELANG, was called to the chair, and, in opening the proceedings, said: The papers of Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji were so lengthy, and dealt with such a variety of subjects, that many would shrink from tackling them, and he (the Chairman) would therefore suggest that the best plan would be to take up first one section, and then another, instead of attempting the task of criticizing the whole paper. For his own part, he would make but a few general observations. Much valuable time was lost in India by the delay which occurred in making public the information collected in the Government Offices. The system of bureaucracy by which this country was necessarily governed caused many able men to expend their strength and power on minutes and reports which never come before the public, or, if they did, were issued when they were too late to be of much service. He referred to this because it was matter of great regret that the two papers before them were behindhand both in dates and statistics. Mr. Dadabhai, however, had used such materials as he could get. It was, he was glad to say, a subject for rejoicing that a great advance had taken place in the matter of Indian statistics, especially as regarded their accessibility—an improvement which dated from the time of the financial panic, towards the close of 1869, when an impetus was given to the publication of many official papers not previously available. The large round sums in which Mr. Dadabhai dealt were very striking, and some persons might be rather taken aback when they found him giving away millions to his opponents, first with one hand and then with the other; but the plain question was, had Mr. Dadabhai kept within the mark? (Hear, hear.) If he really could spare such a wide margin in his calculation, then his case was all the stronger. He (the Chairman) would just refer to one or two portions of the papers which seemed

open to question. On the first page, after calculating that the total agricultural production of India was worth 200,000,000*l.* sterling, Mr. Dadabhai adds 100,000,000*l.* for the value of manufactures and excise, including also, as he says, a large margin for omissions. Now he (the Chairman) thought we ought to know more distinctly what was included in this. (Hear, hear.) It must include dairy produce, for the people largely depend on milk and butter; and he did not see how these could be reckoned in with the crops. Then there were fruit-trees—a very large item in the sustenance of the people; also the fisheries. Then, speaking of cattle, Sir George Campbell, in his notable Administration Report for 1872-3, spoke of hides and skins as forming a large item in the exports of Bengal, so many as 7,000,000 of hides having been exported in the year under notice. Turning to the Bengal account, Mr. Dadabhai had followed a similar plan, and had thrown in tea, silk, indigo, and opium, which last item alone was several millions. This was done to make up for the course taken by Mr. Dadabhai in reckoning common rice to represent the value of the total production of Bengal; but he (the Chairman) thought this could scarcely be a proper basis when we considered the amazing fertility and well-watered condition of that province. (Hear, hear.) Then, in bringing out the value of yield per acre, Mr. Dadabhai showed about Rs. 17½ for Bengal; and for Bombay without Scinde, about Rs. 21. And as to production per head, his calculation was only Rs. 14½ for Bengal, but over Rs. 36 per head for the Bombay population. Now he (the Chairman) had been accustomed to think Bombay could beat Bengal in anything where they were evenly matched; but when he considered in what a large portion of this Presidency the land was poor and arid, he could not understand its showing such superiority in production. (Hear.) On the other hand, the large acreage and the swarming, impoverished population of Bengal brought down the average rate. And, taking a more general view as to this question of total average production, it must be admitted that Mr. Dadabhai was able to cite some remarkable corroborations. Thus there was the estimate of about 40s. per head, which was similar to the one adopted by Lord Mayo in his famous Public Works speech. Then there were the opinions of Colonel Prescott in Guzerat, and Mr. Pedder in the Central Provinces, whose figures were even less than Mr. Dadabhai's estimate; and we could have no sounder testimony on the subject than that of the two officers just mentioned. (Hear, hear.) He (the Chairman) might state also that since the papers were read he had handed to Mr. Dadabhai the figures of production in the Madras Presidency, recently quoted in the *Madras Athenæum*. His figures showed nearly Rs. 37 per acre for the

yield of wet land cultivation; but the Madras paper, quoting from a much more recent report, gave only Rs. 21½; while for dry land production Mr. Dadabhai's figure was Rs. 19½, but the Madras paper only showed Rs. 8½. Perhaps there was some mistake in this last. Passing on to the political aspect of the discussion, there had been a good deal of strong feeling thrown into it out of doors. That was natural and proper in its place; but in the first instance it was really a question of pure science. There were the facts and the deductions. They might waive political questions altogether, and put the matter thus. Suppose it be admitted that the advantages of British rule to India might be taken as represented by the figure 50; but, as pointed out by Mr. Dadabhai, there were certain drawbacks which were inseparable from foreign rule, and suppose we estimated them at 20. Well, it must be a sensible, a proper course, to consider whether those drawbacks were really represented by 20, less or more; and the next step was to consider how the 20 could be lessened or set off by fresh advantages. (Hear, hear.) There were several persons who wished to speak that night; he therefore would not trespass longer on their time; and he might also remind the speakers that a limit must be placed to the time they occupied. But he would remark, in conclusion, that they must not forget how much credit was due to Mr. Dadabhai for the great pains he had taken and the great amount of research his two papers represented. (Applause.)

Mr. SHAPOORJEE BURJORJEE BHAROOCHA said: There is such a consensus of opinion in favour of the views expressed by Mr. Dadabhai outside this hall, and I believe in this hall, that it would seem boldness, amounting to presumption, to venture on a few remarks before this meeting in opposition to them; yet I beg of you, gentlemen, to divest yourselves of the idea that an opposition to Mr. Dadabhai's views means that I am any the less actuated with those patriotic feelings that I am sure exist in every one of you, or the love of our common country, or any less anxiety to see her moral, material, social, political, and intellectual advancement. I repeat, I yield to none in this hall or outside of it in the love of our common country. I have used the word *common* for a purpose. For some time I have been much grieved and disappointed to hear some members of my community calling themselves aliens. I know they have been led away by the sophistries of the editor of a certain paper, who wished to be on good terms with the members of my community, and yet abused the Indians wholesale. He could not reconcile the two things except by calling us aliens; and I am sure nobody laughs in secret with a greater gusto at our gullibility than the editor of the self-same paper. If twelve hundred years' residence in a country does not make us the children of the soil, what should? Estab-

lish the theory, and then Englishmen are no more Englishmen, but aliens on their own soil, for they are Saxons and Normans; Frenchmen no more Frenchmen, but an accumulation of the races of Europe. Extend the theory further up in point of time, and there will not be a single European who has a country to own, except perhaps the steppes of Chinese-Tartary, said to be the cradle of the European race. How will these wild theorists account for the overflowing patriotism of the Americans for the States, although many families have not been resident there for more than a generation? Sir, if there be any one community more than another that ought to be grateful to this soil, to love and cherish it, that ought to obey all the calls of duty, honour, and patriotism, that community is the community of Parsees. This country gave them an asylum in their direst need, and since then they have prospered with her prosperity, have groaned with her groans, and are now again prospering, notwithstanding all the protests from Mr. Dadabhai. I beg pardon for this digression; but it was necessary that the position should be understood before we could go hand-in-hand with our Hindu and Mahomedan brethren, as pioneers for the intellectual and political regeneration of our country, before we could go as the children of the same soil, as countrymen of the same country, sinking all our sectarian bigotries and prejudices under one common and dear appellation of *Hindees* or Indians. If after this there be any so-called aliens in this hall, let them not thrust their advice on us, for they cannot be just, or impartial. Sir, I have a twofold opposition to offer to Mr. Dadabhai. Firstly, the time selected for lecturing on the poverty of India was ill-chosen. Mr. Dadabhai could not but be well aware of the agitation, almost irritation, in the mind of the people of Western India since the Baroda imbroglio. It is no use mincing matters, but the crystal stream of loyalty to the Raj had become muddied; faith in the plighted word of the British Raj was shaken. The mud was just settling down, the faith was being restored, when Mr. Dadabhai comes to the bank, lifts up a huge stone, and throws it in with a long swing and full force, and the waters threaten to be muddy again. It is as much a political agitator's duty (I use the word in the sense of patriot) so to adjust his time and opportunity for lecturing as to command the greatest attention combined with the calmest judgment. Secondly, the *pros* and *cons* respecting the British Raj were not fairly given. In vain did I strain my ears to hear some compensating advantages, some mutual and corresponding benefits from the Raj, against such a heavy indictment. Of course, I do not for a moment mean to say that *all* the grievances are fictitious or imaginary—that there is not a proper course for the representation of them; but I do say that a political agitator ought to

remember that two truthful witnesses are always better than ten, nine of whom are perfectly truthful, with one found out to be untruthful. The untruthfulness of the one invalidates the testimony of the nine. Mr. Dadabhai has made a statement that the average income of an Indian is about Rs. 25 a-year. This is a conclusion he has come to from an accumulation and adjustment of a mass of figures. He has rejected the returns of the Revenue officers as inaccurate, inadequate, and untrustworthy. Mind, this of those who have the largest information at their command to draw upon! He asks us to accept his statement in preference to theirs. Granted; and yet the statement is absolutely worthless. It would have been invaluable had it been put side by side in comparison to what our income was ten, twenty, forty, and fifty years ago. Happiness, Sir, is always comparative. For instance, the average income of a Briton in 1843 was 18*l.*, in 1875 it was 28*l.* sterling; that of a Frenchman, 15*l.*, in 1875 it was 22*l.*; that of an Austrian, 12*l.*, in 1875 it was 18*l.* *Cæteris paribus*, these people are 50 per cent. better off. By such comparisons we are able to judge whether we are progressing or retrograding, whether the condition of the people is ameliorating or deteriorating. Statements without comparison often mean the contrary to what they indicate. How misleading they often are! Here is an illustration in point: the London *Times*, reviewing the year 1851, says: "We believe that the year has "been unexampled for material prosperity, for the amount of imports "and exports, for the quantity of both British and foreign shipping in "our ports, for the amount of labour employed, for the decrease of the "pauperism, and for the enjoyment and cheerfulness of the people at "large." The same paper, reviewing the year 1875, wrote: "The con- "dition of industry and trade shows for the present no sign of improve- "ment. The Board of Trade returns have during the latter part of the "year shown a reduction of exports, and the elasticity of the revenue is "no longer maintained." Now, if some future historian on the commercial prosperity of England were to pin his faith to these two statements, and were to come to a conclusion that England had reached the zenith of her commercial prosperity in the year 1851, that she was since declining, and had considerably fallen from her pinnacle in the year 1875, I think that historian would be perfectly correct. But should he descend to figures and comparison, what would he find? He would find "that the population of the United Kingdom increased in the "quarter of a century about 20 per cent.; that the people living in "1874 were, on an average, at least twice as well off as they were in 1851; "that they consumed in 1874 twice as much tea and sugar as they "had in 1851, and 40 per cent. more spirits, wine, and beer; that

"they had saved twice as much, and travelled nearly five times as much; "that, taking the increase of population into account, serious crime had "decreased by nearly 70 per cent., pauperism by more than 25 "per cent., while primary education had become six times as general." I have quoted at this length to show what an amount of fallacy statements without comparison carry along with them. Again, Mr. Dadabhai could have ascribed our meagre national income to some other cause than to the fact that we are governed by a foreign nation. The labour market in India is glutted; and those political economists whom the lecturer is so much in the habit of consulting must have told him that when there is a glut of labour "the rate of wages cannot be much higher than the "cost of living"—in fact, it must come down to the bare prices of the simple necessaries of life. What would have been the condition of Englishmen had they stuck to agriculture, had there been for them no outlet in emigration, or in innumerable sources of employment? Why is the average income of an individual of this Presidency higher by 50 and 100 per cent. than that of the sister Presidencies? Because in this Presidency there are more outlets for employment, there is more energy, more enterprise. Go over the list of joint-stock companies at Calcutta, and you will see management and agencies monopolized by English and foreign firms. Go over the list here, and you will see it monopolized by the Natives. That speaks for itself. Why, the average individual income of a Parsee, a Khoja, a Memon, and a Bhattia equals the individual income of favoured nations. Because these people have more energy, more enterprise, and more self-reliance than the people on the other side; because these people seek out different outlets of employment, and when they cannot find them they create them. Why, then, not elevate the other communities of India to the level of the enterprise of the small communities I have named? Then the drain the lecturer has been so much complaining of will be a mere bagatelle. Now about the drain on India. There are other countries sailing in the same boat with us. Amongst them stands conspicuous the United States of America. Mr. Dadabhai has triumphantly refuted Mr. Maclean's statement before the Committee, and his assertion, that the imports of that country exceeded the exports by 141,000,000*l.* sterling in the course of seventy-four years—from 1795 to 1869. He has not accounted for the heavy import of indebtedness. The United States of America have 85,000 miles of railroad. Taking into consideration the high wages ruling there, the numerous broad and rapid rivers to be bridged over, the mountains to be cut through, and with the enormous amount of jobbery the Americans are so prone to, the construction could not have cost less than 20,000*l.*

a-mile. The whole would amount to 1,700,000,000*l.* sterling, half of which—850,000,000*l.*—if not more, is foreign capital. The country has a public debt of about 550,000,000*l.*, half of which—that is, 275,000,000*l.*—if not more, is owned abroad. Add to this about 500,000,000*l.* sterling of foreign capital invested in the loans of different States of the Union, the municipal debentures, the canal, dock, and mining shares, and other enterprises to which Yankees know so well how to give attractive programmes,—the whole would amount to about 1,625,000,000*l.*; deduct from this 141,000,000*l.*, the excess of imports over the exports, and the balance in round numbers will be 1,500,000,000*l.*, the excess of exports over imports; or, taking the population at little less than 40,000,000, about 40*l.* a-head. Add to the annual drain of interest on this vast sum, the insurance premiums paid to foreign companies, the fortunes made by foreigners there, the 78 per cent. of their vast import and export trade carried on in foreign bottoms, and an annual item of about 6,000,000*l.* to 8,000,000*l.* sterling, the expenditure of the travelling Americans abroad. The drain becomes something enormous when we know it to be distributed among a population of 40,000,000. If these Yankees have the same feeling for their country that Mr. Dadabhai has for poor India, why then, Sir, they would be the most lachrymal people alive. Yet I am glad to say I have seldom come across a more cheerful, intelligent, and humorous people on the face of the earth. The public debt of Europe is about 3,550,000,000*l.* Deduct from it about 1,600,000,000*l.*, the national debts of England and France, mostly held by those nations themselves. Out of the balance, Russia comes in for about 600,000,000*l.*, three-quarters of which is owned abroad—equal to an annual drain in interest of about 23,000,000*l.* sterling. Add to this insurance premiums paid to foreign companies, the fortunes made by foreigners there, the import and export trade carried on in foreign bottoms, the proverbial expenditure of Russian noblemen travelling abroad, and the investment of foreign capital in the enterprises of the country, which cannot be less than several hundred millions sterling, when we know that the people of England and France lost in the course of six or seven years 60,000,000*l.* sterling to insolvent South American Republics. Remember, Sir, this drain is divided among a population of 60,000,000, perhaps as poor and ignorant as our own. Sir, they have not the same freedom of speech and the same freedom from interference that we enjoy under the British rule. Yet Russia is said to be prospering rapidly. Now, Sir, if these countries prosper, not in spite of these drains, but because of them, why should we groan under them? India is as rich in mineral and cereal wealth as the United States of America. It is many times superior to the vast icy regions

of Russia. It is superior to both in one great factor of wealth—cheap labour. Our drain compared to their's is a mere bagatelle, two-thirds of which can be dispensed with at pleasure. The able lecturer puts at several millions sterling annually the remittances of non-official Englishmen in India. Well, the remedy is in our own hands. When foreigners go to reside in the midst of other people, they do not complain, they do not groan, but learn as much as they can from them. They invade the enemy's camp and bring back the *loot* taken from them. This Bombay also promised to do between the years 1860 to 1865, by establishing many *branch houses* and *agencies* in London and Liverpool; but by a continual chain of adverse circumstances and unprecedented commercial disasters, many of them failed; and since then (and it speaks volumes for the energy, or rather the apathy, of a population of 200,000,000) very few or none of them have recovered heart or courage to try the same experiment again. Now, when a people are so apathetic, it is our clear duty to tell them that they deserve their fate, that it serves them right, and that their call on Hercules, without putting their own shoulders to the wheel, is a call in vain.

Mr. EUGENE C. SCHROTTKY said: A careful perusal of the figures and facts which Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji has put before us in his two pamphlets, to discuss which we have met this evening, cannot fail to convince the most sceptical that the poverty of the masses of India is not a matter of opinion on which people may differ, but that it is a stern, appalling fact. I have gone through the very same papers, extracts from which form the basis of Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji's pamphlets, my object being to ascertain the state of Indian agriculture and of its agricultural population, and I have been likewise impressed with a deep conviction of the unmistakable signs of universal poverty which our statistics reveal. There seems to be no doubt that the masses of India, as Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji says, do not get sufficient to provide the bare necessaries of life; and to prove that this is no mere theory abstracted from statistics which may possibly not be quite correct, but that it is a deplorable fact, I will read you the following letter from Mr. C. A. Elliot, Settlement Officer. N.W.P., who expresses himself as follows: "I do not hesitate to say "that half our agricultural population never know from year's end to year's "end what it is to have their hunger fully satisfied. The ordinary phrase "in these parts, when a man asks for employment, is that he wants half a "seer of flour, and a phrase so general must have some foundation. I "believe that it has this much truth in it, that 1 lb. of flour is suffi-"cient, though meagre, sustenance for a non-labouring man. That a "labouring adult can eat 2 lbs. I do not doubt; but he rarely, if ever, gets "it. But take the ordinary population in a family of five, consisting of a

"father, mother, and three children. The father will, I would say, eat a "little less than 2 lbs., the mother a little more than 1 lb., the children "about 3 lbs. between them. Altogether 7 lbs. to five people is the "average, which, after much inquiry, I am inclined to adhere to. I am "confident that with our minutely divided properties, our immense and "cramped population, and our grinding poverty, any attempt at heavier "taxation would result in financial failure to the Government, in wide-"spread distress and ruin to the people." Now Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji says in the first part of his paper, page 3: "The whole foundation of all "administration, financial and general, and of the actual condition of the "people, rests upon this one fact—the produce of the country, the ulti-"mate result of all capital, labour, and land." It is contended that the edifice is weak; what, then, can be more natural and efficacious than to commence strengthening its foundation? The poverty of India means the poverty of the masses, it means the poverty of its agricultural population, and to relieve it we must improve the condition of the tiller of the soil. The object of Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji's paper is to obtain for the inherent children of the soil a fair share of the lucrative appointments in the keeping of Government—a very laudable and desirable object; but, I fear, he is wrong in connecting the obtainment or non-obtainment of his object in any way with the poverty of India. It cannot be said that if Government appointments were given to a few thousands of Natives, naturally drawn from the upper classes, it would benefit directly the masses; nor can it be said it would benefit them indirectly by improving the present administration. To relieve the poverty of India, I maintain, we must improve the condition of its agricultural population, we must improve its agriculture, we must enrich the exhausted surface soil by the treasures hidden in the subsoil, we must develop its vast agricultural as well as mineral resources, and then the poverty of India will be a thing of the past. It becomes the duty of the leaders of the Native community to devote their energies and influence rather to improve the condition of their poor fellow-men than to commence by obtaining good things for themselves. It is, no doubt, very creditable to Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji and the East India Association to bring to the notice of Government the claims of the upper classes of Natives; but would it not be more creditable still to lay these temporarily aside for the greater claims of the poorer classes, and to devote their knowledge and influence to the development of the vast resources of this country, in its manufactures, its commerce, and, though last, not least, its agriculture?

Mr. W. TRANT then said: When I heard Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji read his papers, the impression which I concluded he desired to convey was that not only was India poor, but bankrupt. I had a feeling

that although much that he had said was true, yet that to some extent he had overstated his case. I was strengthened in this belief because we who live in Bombay find ourselves surrounded by evidences of material prosperity. There are palatial buildings which would have delighted the heart of Caractacus; at the Band Stand and the Apollo Bunder there are any number of imposing equipages, crowds of elegantly clothed ladies, and hundreds of well-dressed idle dandies; so that, whatever Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji may say about the poverty of India, there can be no doubt there is some wealth in India somewhere. Of course I remembered, too, that, almost within sight and sound of these proofs of prosperity, there are dens where poverty and squalor reign supreme; and I consider it a fair question to ask, how is it that on the one hand there is wealth so great that the mind can hardly conceive it, and on the other wretchedness and misery so abject that the pen and the tongue would alike fail to describe it? The answer is not difficult to find. It is not, as Mr. Dadabhai would say, because India is so poor, but because her wealth is improperly distributed—because, in fact, for ages and generations India has been ruled not for the benefit of the Indians, but for the benefit of a narrow and privileged class who have been at the head of affairs. (Hear, hear.) Now, Mr. Dadabhai's conclusion must be approached with great caution, not only because some of his figures are avowedly guesses, but also because it is a fact that at the present day almost all great countries are in what is known as the progressive state; and it therefore startles one to hear that India, the greatest country of all, is in a retrogressive state. Now, the signs of a prosperous country have been pointed out by political economists. If the inhabitants of a country are increasing their power over nature, that is a sign of the progressive state. England, before the invention of machinery and the telegraph, was very poor compared to what she is at the present day. Well, India has now got railways, steamships, telegraphs, and machinery; and surely Mr. Dadabhai will not maintain that she is poorer now she has those blessings than she was before. Another sign of a prospering country is increased security to person and property. If the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Bill should ever become law, and I hope it never will, the effect will be to drive away capital from investment in land, because the provisions of the Bill render the terms on which land may be held so uncertain and capricious that few would care to risk their money in such a shaky and unprofitable investment; so closely connected are legal and commercial questions! It is true that the measure is a bad one, and its introduction into the Legislature was a retrograde movement; but it is an exception, and no one will deny that life and property are more secure now than they were some

years ago; and this is another sign of the progressive state. A further sign of the same state of things is the greater division of labour, and on this head I cannot say that India has made much progress. This is one thing which keeps her poor. At the same time a little, a very little, headway has been made in this respect, and no one will pretend to say that she is poorer on account of this. I have lately been over the whole length and breadth of India, and I do not think that I once saw a manure cart, and I saw no agricultural implement worthy of the name, at work upon a soil which is already exhausted. It is this which keeps India poor; and one of the greatest reforms that can be effected in this country is to place the ryot upon a proper footing. His hold on the land at present is nothing but a sham, a delusion, and a snare. (Hear, hear.) I do not think the history of the whole world affords an instance of a class having been so bamboozled as the oppressed ryots of this country—(cheers)—and if they were once put upon a just footing, with inducements offered to them to rise, we should have the country richer and the people happier. (Hear, hear.) There is one argument of Mr. Dadabhai I cannot agree with. He quotes figures to show that prices of commodities have fallen, and that wages have fallen, and he argues, therefore, that India is poor. Now, falling prices and falling wages are quite consistent with a prospering country, and indeed, except when other causes interfere, are an effect of it. This is clear, because profits tend to a minimum in countries where production is cheapened by machinery. When commodities are produced more cheaply, they are sold at a less price, and money going further than it did before, men are prepared to work for less wages. Agricultural produce is an exception. It always rises in a prosperous country, because a prosperous people eat more than a poor people, and the demand for food being greater, the price of it rises; and it is worthy of remark that Mr. Dadabhai does not show us that the price of agricultural produce has fallen. I think, then, you will have gathered from what I have said that in my opinion India is no poorer than she has been. Of course, that is not to say that she is no poorer than she ought to be. I have already hinted at a few of the causes of India's poverty. Mr. Dadabhai refers to another when he speaks of the amount of money which goes out of the country—to England—never to return. The peculiar way in which the country is governed has all the evils of absenteeism, and I therefore agree with Mr. Dadabhai in his advocacy of a wider employment of Natives in public offices. It is, of course, wise to give as many persons as possible an interest in the administration of their own affairs; but I would take even a wider ground, and would say that neither caste, nor creed, nor colour, nor place of birth should be any bar to a man

obtaining a public appointment. (Cheers.) The best man for an office should be selected for that office, be he Mussulman, or Hindu, or English, or Parsee. (Cheers.) Surely the time has gone by when we are to be continually reminding the Indians that they are a conquered people. (Hear, hear.) We have conquered territory here enough to satisfy the most gluttonous appetite for glory and supremacy; and as an Englishman, proud of his country, I shall blush for her fair fame if it be not her ambition to be remembered in the future, not as the conqueror, but as the benefactor, of this great Empire over which she now rules.

Mr. H. A. WADYA: With reference to the position of Mr. Dadabhai as a *Parsee* critic, I should like to add one observation to what has fallen from the first speaker (Mr. Bharoocha). The Parsees, when judging of the British rule in India, are free from the prejudices which would influence a Hindu or a Mahomedan. The Hindu, particularly if he be a Mahratta, would think of the fallen position of his race; the Mahomedan might be carried away by religious fanaticism. The Parsee, therefore, when he criticized the effects of the British government in India, was entitled to greater weight, as his opinions would be free from such prejudices. The first speaker took up Mr. Maclean's statistics about America. It must be remembered that Mr. Dadabhai has not yet had the opportunity to refute that gentleman's figures about America after 1869, as he had refuted those prior to that year. Mr. Dadabhai has shown conclusively the fallacy of Mr. Maclean's figures before 1869, and the presumption is that the same fallacy pervades Mr. Maclean's statistics after 1869. It must be remembered that Mr. Maclean had not yet met in any way Mr. Dadabhai's refutation of his former American statistics. Mr. Schrottky complains that Mr. Dadabhai should think the employment of Natives a panacea for the poverty of the Indian soil. But I am afraid Mr. Dadabhai's argument is not properly understood. He says that the capability to produce depends upon the capital in the land, and, pointing to the portion of the yearly drainage of capital represented by the savings and remittances of European Government servants, says that that part of the drain would remain in India to a great extent if capable Natives were employed instead. The capital thus saved would proportionately check the impoverishment of the country. The question before us is, has Mr. Dadabhai proved, or has he not, that India is so poor that whereas taxation in the United Kingdom is 50s. a-head, the total production of India comes up only to 40s. a-head? Has he proved, or has he not, that there is a yearly drain of some millions from India to England, decreasing its producing capacity and year by year accelerating its poverty? These are the official data on which he relies. Let those who would have us disbelieve his conclusions show us

the errors in his figures, or the fallacies of his argument, and we will listen to them with respect. Let them come down with their own facts and figures, instead of making hap-hazard remarks that India must be rich, that she could not possibly be so poor! Another set of critics ask us to look to the Native States, or to compare our position with the administrations of the Shah in Persia and the Sultan in Turkey. As regards the Native States, it is a question how far the British Government is responsible for their anomalous position. You have removed from them all fear of evil, you have destroyed all scope of ambition. Without the ambition to do good, without the wholesome fear of their people, which is the only safeguard against despotism, they have become mere puppets in the hands of Political Agents and British Residents. As for the administrations of the Sultan and the Shah, it is not with these we compare ourselves when we criticize the British rule. The ideal we have formed, the standard we have set up before ourselves, is based upon the professions and principles of British statesmen and politicians. (Cheers.) Then, again, we are charged with disloyalty, because we speak against the Government that educated us. True, you have educated us; you have brought us from darkness into light. But because you have done so, are you to tell us to shut our eyes when in this light, and not see and appreciate and desire the good things which you yourselves are teaching us Nature has brought into being for us all? Because you have educated us, are we to read the lessons of history differently from others? or, reading them as we ought, are we not to apply them to the problems that remain to be solved in our country? or, applying them as we must, are we to come to other conclusions than those arrived at by educated men, under similar circumstances, in other countries and times? And when we come to these conclusions calmly and conscientiously, are we disloyal if we tell them out plainly, and show to our rulers the causes which we believe are imperilling more and more, from day to day, the permanence of India's connection with England? (Hear, hear.) I should like to make one suggestion with the view to turn to some practical account Mr. Dadabhai's great labour and research in this cause. As a rule, we cannot expect a fair and full discussion of such a subject in India itself. I would suggest to the Council whether it would not be advisable to publish these papers separately, and circulate them amongst the members of both Houses of Parliament and others in England. They would then be open to the fullest criticism. We would then know if Mr. Dadabhai is wrong or right. If he be proved wrong, we will no longer be deluded by an imaginary grievance. If he is right, then I believe, knowing, as we all do, that England, after all, means to be just to India—(cheers)—

that something will be done to remedy the evil and remove the causes which, we fear, are imperilling that connection between England and India which we all desire to see maintained for ever. (Cheers.)

Mr. DADABHAI, in reply, said there was no desire that any person who opposed his views should be in any way hampered. He had felt very deeply the responsibility of the subject, and it had taken him a long time to get the materials together, and his only object had been to get at the truth. He would be only too glad to learn he was wrong, and all he asked was that those who opposed him should approach the subject actuated by the same motives as had actuated him. He had shown how he had arrived at his figures and conclusions, and it was hardly fair on the part of those who stated they were wrong not to produce others which were right, nor to point out where they were wrong. (Cheers.) It had been objected that he had not in his papers spoken enough about the good done by the British rule. Why, that was a subject on which he had often spoken; he might say he had spoken on it *ad nauseam*. He had not gone into that subject in his paper because the blessings of British rule were fully recognized. He liked the British rule; on it, he believed, depended the regeneration of India. But that was no reason why he should not point out some of its faults, especially the most important both to the rulers and the ruled. In regard to the question of wages, all he intended to show was that the rise in wages which it was alleged had taken place could not be found, and that wages had not risen, as was supposed. The same remark applied to the alleged rise in prices. He had simply attempted to grapple with a fallacy that had been based on mere assumptions. The question under debate was not the comparative poverty of India, but its actual state. Was it poor or not? Was it or was it not living a scanty subsistence, and was it not an exceedingly poor country at present, as Lord Lawrence said? Was there, not merely comparative, but absolute poverty? And if so, he asked, how was it that this country, once so reputedly rich as to attract many nations to its conquest, was now so absolutely poor? After a few more general remarks, he said, that as the meeting was to be adjourned, he need not then enter into a direct and detailed reply to the remarks made by the different speakers; and he once more assured Mr. Shapoorjee, and others holding different views, that he was very desirous for a full and fair discussion upon so important a subject.

The CHAIRMAN said that due notice would be given when the debate would be resumed, and the meeting adjourned.

JOURNAL

OF THE

EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION.

Instituted for the independent and disinterested advocacy and promotion, by all legitimate means, of the public interests and welfare of the Inhabitants of India generally.

The Depreciation of Silver.

PAPER BY COLONEL A. B. RATHBORNE.

READ AT A MEETING OF THE EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION, ON WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1877.

S. P. LOW, ESQ., IN THE CHAIR.

A MEETING of the members and friends of the East India Association was held in the Rooms of the Society, Great George Street, Westminster, on Wednesday, Feb. 7; the subject for consideration being the Depreciation of Silver, introduced in an address by Colonel A. B. Rathborne.

Mr. S. P. Low (of Messrs. Grindlay and Co.) occupied the chair, and amongst those present were the following: The Hon. Mr. Justice West, Sir Basil F. Hall, Bart., Rajah Rampul Singh, Lieut.-General Sir G. Malcolm, K.C.B., Major-General W. Richardson, C.B., Major-General E. A. H. Bacon, Major W. F. Gordon, Captain W. C. Palmer (Hon. Secretary of the Association), Rev. James Long, Dr. Alexander Burn, Dr. M. C. Furnell, Dr. Nash, Mr. Rudolph Auerbach, Mr. R. H. Barnes, Mr. E. Maule Birkett, Mr. J. Da Costa, Mr. Robert H. Elliot, Mr. A. George, Mr. E. C. George, Mr. A. R. Hutchins, Mr. John Jones, Mr. J. Mackellar, Mr. William Maitland, Mr. A. C. Mitra, Mr. T. Notthaffe, Mr. J. C. Parry, Mr. J. T. Wood, &c., &c.

In opening the proceedings, the CHAIRMAN explained that Sir George Balfour, who it was expected would preside, was unfortunately compelled to be absent on a business engagement. Hence he (the speaker) had been called upon, at the last moment, to occupy the chair, and although he felt he was but an inefficient substitute for Sir George Balfour, yet he readily accepted the invitation, because the subject was

one in which he felt the deepest interest. In his every-day business life he was compelled to come into contact with many persons who had suffered very materially in consequence of the reduction in the rate of exchange. (Hear, hear.) He was not about to take up the time of the meeting at this point, or to anticipate what would be said by Colonel Rathborne; his duty being simply to preside, and, having heard Colonel Rathborne's address, he would invite discussion, and doubtless many were present who were fully qualified to throw light on the question, and to offer valuable suggestions as to how this great evil—for the depreciation of silver was nothing less than a great and serious evil—could be avoided in the future. He had called it an evil, and that it fully merited the name would be felt by those who knew the suffering and deprivations it had caused. The mere narration of the facts would suffice to show the losses it had involved. On the 13th September last India 4 per Cent. Enfaced Paper was quoted in our market at from 82 to 84 per cent.—a fall from former prices which, in fact, reduced the debt of India by 18 per cent. By the latest advices the same stock was quoted at an equivalent of from 90½ to 91 per cent., showing a considerable recovery. It was thus evident that there was some exceedingly disturbing element in the finances of India involving a violent fluctuation of 9 or 10 per cent. in its representative stock in an interval of a few months. When it was considered how large a number of persons in the employment of the Government of India had to make remittances home for the purposes of their families, it would be seen that when it was necessarily done through a medium which had positively fluctuated to the extent of nearly 25 per cent., much serious inconvenience and loss, and even distress, must ensue. And this had proved to be only too truly the case; and officers in India—putting aside the mercantile community—were subjected to an enormous tax and a severe reduction of their emoluments. Looked at even in this light, and disregarding the broader view of the question, there was enough to show that there was scarcely any more important topic which could occupy the attention of those who took an intelligent interest in the affairs of the English empire in the East than the problem of the rate of exchange between England and India. (Hear, hear.) The Chairman then called upon Colonel Rathborne to read his paper.

Colonel RATHBORNE prefaced his address by the explanation that it had been ready since December, and he made this statement because he observed that a leading financial journal a day or two ago had advanced the same views as those he urged in one portion of his address. He then proceeded as follows:—

The world was very much occupied lately with the question of the

depreciation of silver; and although the subject has been already much discussed, it seems deserving of further examination, considering the very great importance of it to the Government and people of India.

In order that, in speaking of the depreciation of silver, it may be quite understood what is meant by the phrase, I may as well say a word or two in explanation. It must be remembered, then, that silver is the standard of value in India, as gold is in England. Rupees, or their representatives in the shape of notes convertible into rupees on demand, are the only legal tender, except for petty payments, in India, just as sovereigns, or their representatives in the shape of notes convertible into sovereigns on demand, are the only legal tender, except for petty payments, in England. It must also be remembered that the arrangements for keeping up the amount of coin required for circulation are the same in both countries. In England the Mint is bound by law to give sovereigns at the rate of 3*l.* 17*s.* 9*d.* for every ounce of gold, of the requisite fineness, that may be brought to it; and in the same way the Mints of India are compelled by law to give rupees at the rate of one rupee for every 180 grains of silver of the standard fineness that may be tendered to them. There is thus but one price, at all times and under all circumstances, for gold and silver of the standard fineness at the Mints of the respective countries. Exactly the same number of sovereigns are obtainable for a pound weight of gold in England now as there were before the immense additions to the general stock of gold in the world brought about by the gold discoveries of the last thirty years, and precisely the same number of rupees are given at the Mints of India for a pound weight of standard silver as were given for the same quantity when silver sold for 5*s.* 2*d.* per ounce instead of the 3*s.* 11*d.* per ounce, to which it had gone down for a short period in July last, or the 4*s.* 10½*d.* per ounce, which is the latest quotation at the time I am writing.

Neither gold nor silver, therefore, has deteriorated, or ever can deteriorate as long as the law regarding each remains as at present, so far as its interchangeable value with coin of its own metal is concerned, in the country in which it forms the standard of value; but once out of that circle, the case is wholly changed. The pound weight of gold may buy precisely the same number of sovereigns as it did before, neither more nor less, and the pound weight of silver the same number of rupees in the like manner; but the purchase power of a pound of gold, or a pound of silver, in respect to everything else has followed, and must always follow, the usual laws of supply and demand, as has also the interchangeable value of the two metals as against each other. Thus there was a considerable fall in the value of gold as compared

with silver after the effects of the great influx of gold from Australia and California began to develop themselves; and in the same way there was, some time back, as we all know, a very great fall in the value of silver as compared with gold, arising from the great comparative excess of silver that was thought by the dealers likely to be thrown on the market over and above the requirements of it. That their calculations on the subject were wrong is now obvious, but whether they were right or whether they were wrong, the consequences for the moment would be necessarily the same; for it is what the dealers are ready to take for their silver in hand, or enter into contracts to supply it for at any given time that necessarily rules the price of the day,—not what the intrinsic value of it may be, or what, if more correctly informed, they might feel entitled to charge for it. The marketable value of silver where it is not the standard of value, like the marketable value of any other commodity, is constantly varying; but the intrinsic value of silver, or of any other article of commerce, can only be affected by causes which for their operation require a considerable time. It cannot go up and down from day to day, as we have recently seen the market price of silver do. Thus not long ago the eminent firm of Messrs. Mocatta and Goldsmid were kind enough to furnish me with a quotation at a fraction over 4s. 2d. per ounce for standard silver, while in a few days after they were dealing in it at a fraction over 4s. 5d.; yet there could be no real change in the intrinsic value of silver within that brief period. The simple solution of the change was this, that on the first of the days referred to the silver market was very dull, there being comparatively little inquiry for it, while on the second of them there had suddenly sprung up a great demand for silver in China, to meet the requirements of an unusually large silk harvest, the produce of which had to be paid for in silver there. Six per cent. was thus added to the purchasing power of silver as against gold on all the silver then on sale in this, the greatest bullion market in the world; and this not in consequence of any increase in the yield of gold as compared with silver, or decrease in the yield of silver as compared with gold, altering the relative value of the two metals, or of any other circumstance that might ordinarily be supposed to affect the question, but simply because some millions of silkworms on the other side of the globe had spun out of their intestines so much more silk than the available stock of silver in China at the moment would have enabled the silk merchants there otherwise to buy and pay for.

I give such prominent place to this fact because nothing could more completely illustrate how much the market value of silver is affected by causes that, so far as its intrinsic value is concerned, can have no pos-

sible effect on it. I can cite to the same purport an instance within my own remembrance, before steamers to India and electric telegraphs had any existence, and when the only way that merchants in England and in India had of communicating with each other was by letters carried in sailing ships round the Cape of Good Hope. In this case bills on England were readily obtainable in Bombay at the exchange of 2s. 2d. the rupee at the beginning of the week, and within three days afterwards it had fallen down to 1s. 8d. Here was an instance of the purchasing power of silver in India as against gold in England falling about 24 per cent. in three days, though intrinsically the relative value of silver as against gold remained, of course, precisely what it was previously. The simple explanation was that the shipment of cotton at the one moment appeared, from the prices ruling at Liverpool and the abundance of freight at Bombay, to be likely to be so profitable that the merchants in Bombay were ready to pay almost any amount of gold in England for rupees on the spot to buy it with, while a few days afterwards a severe storm, disabling many ships in the harbour, added to advices received from England of much lower prices there, made cotton in Bombay a drug, and sent alike the market value of it and of rupees, as against gold to buy it with, down to the lowest point touched for a great many years.

It is this dependence on so many extraneous circumstances for the solution of the question that makes it so difficult to decide as to how far the rise in the price of gold as compared with silver, or of silver as compared with gold, in any particular instance has been brought about by merely momentary causes, or by circumstances likely permanently to affect it. It is, however, very certain that the late heavy fall in silver was not brought about by any causes that would be likely to make the depreciation continuous; being based, as I have before said, to a considerable extent on calculations as to the great amount of silver likely to be thrown upon the market in excess of the demand for it, which further inquiries have proved to be quite fallacious. Indeed, there could not be a better proof of the erroneous nature of those calculations than the fact that silver, when it touched the lowest point in July last, was sold in London at 3s. 11d. the ounce, while at the date of this writing it is quoted at 4s. 10½d., and that the exchange on India, which fell in August to 1s. 6¾d. the rupee, is now at 1s. 10½d. I have appended to this paper a very instructive return showing the variations in the selling rates of standard silver and of bills at sight, on England and on India respectively, during the past year, as well as the price in rupees paid for sovereigns in India during the same period. It extends from January to December inclusive, and has been furnished

me by the able and obliging Managing Director of the Agra Bank, Mr. Thomson, to whom I beg to record my warm thanks for the trouble he has so kindly taken, in which I am sure the Association will cordially join. Perhaps it may be as well to add that the price of silver as compared with gold was 4s. 11½d. the ounce in 1847, before the gold discoveries had commenced, or only 1d. the ounce more than it is at present; and that it rose to 5s. 2d. per ounce after the effects of those discoveries began to be felt in England. So far as these prices are concerned, there can be no doubt whatever that the cause of the decrease for the time in the purchase-power of gold as compared with silver after the gold discoveries was owing to the increased supply of gold only.

Besides the effect on the price of silver caused by such mercantile exigencies as have been described by me, there is another cause existing which has been in operation for some time. This is the large amount of bills drawn in London monthly by the India Council, and payable in India in rupees—that is, in silver. These have of late years amounted to no less than between 15,000,000*l.* and 17,000,000*l.* sterling per annum. Now whenever the balance of trade is such between two countries as to require a large adjustment in money, it is quite certain that the mode in which this money is provided must have a very considerable effect on the market, and that this effect must be very much intensified when the sum is so large and the operation so continuous, going on as it does from month to month, and from year to year, without stopping. Still more so must this be the case when the debt to be discharged is not the balance on any mercantile transactions, in respect of which things have a natural tendency to adjust themselves, but is simply a sum to be paid by India to the India Office in England, without any return except for such portion of it as may be laid out in engines, rails, stores, &c., to be sent there. This difficulty had no existence when the East India Company was a trading body, because then the money required for these purposes was obtained through the medium of what was called the Company's investment; that is, out of the proceeds of the sale in London of the goods sent home to the Company by its agents in India, in China, and the Straits Settlements. Nor after the Company had ceased to exist as a trading body was there any trouble about it either, for the sum annually required for these purposes was then very small, not exceeding, I think, 1,500,000*l.* It is only of late years that the vastly increased disbursements in England on account of India, in almost every conceivable shape, including interest on the railway stock and funded debts, and much larger pay and pension lists, as well as additional home establishments and other charges, have brought up the sum to its present enormous figure. As to the best mode of dealing

with this difficulty, that is a point into which it would be foreign to the scope of my present paper to enter, which regards merely the depreciation of silver. But when the Government comes into the market with so large an amount of bills for sale as for 17,000,000*l.* or even 15,000,000*l.* sterling annually, all payable in silver; and when it is known that practically the bills in question must be sold, whatever the price may be, there being very little, if any, choice on the part of the Government in the matter; and when it is further remembered that these bills are not issued to meet any balance due from India to England on its trade transactions, I think it must be obvious that they would be likely to have a very prejudicial effect on the exchanges of the two countries, and that one of the first results would be an undue lowering of the price of rupees as compared with sovereigns—a result that has happened. If bills are wanted to adjust the transactions of commerce, the number and amount of them will be strictly limited by the requirements of that commerce. Merchants who do not want to remit funds to India to meet the ordinary demands of their business, will not buy bills on it; and if they do require funds there, they will limit their purchases of bills on it to what may be necessary for their purpose. But the India Council Bills are not, either in their inception or in the dealings with them, at all of that character. The India Office requires gold in England, and must have it. The merchants, on the other hand, may or may not have any use for rupees in India at the moment, as to purchase produce there or otherwise; and if they want any at all, they may want them to a much less extent than the Government has to dispose of, and must dispose of within certain limits, on the day appointed. What, then, may be expected to be the consequence of a state of things like that? Why, that the Government, on the one hand, being most anxious to have the equivalent of its rupee drafts in gold in England, and the merchants, on the other hand, not caring particularly to have any considerable sum in rupees in India, the latter will probably only buy, if they can get cheap, what they are thus pressed by the India Office to purchase; while, possibly, by combination among themselves they may manage still further to depreciate the marketable value of the bills in question. That is what might naturally be expected to be the result of such a system. That such actually is the result of it I cannot say; but that such would be the natural result is, I repeat, very certain; and we all know that what is the natural result of any state of circumstances is the result generally produced by it.

Now if this be so, we have here another element tending to the depreciation, and the very serious depreciation, of silver; yet one which has not any bearing at all on its intrinsic value, and ought

not to have, though it obviously must have, a very considerable effect on its price in the market. If the sums thus dealt with amounted only to 2,000,000*l.* or 3,000,000*l.* annually, the operation would not be without its influence on the price of silver; but when they amount to from 15,000,000*l.* to 17,000,000*l.* annually, the effect must be very great indeed in all the silver markets of the world, for no one that wants silver will pay a high price for it in bullion, if he can get it at a comparatively low rate in rupees, with the additional advantage of their being themselves the standard of value in the country where the bills are paid, and with greater facilities for getting them to any part of the world at which he is likely to want his silver than if the order had been sent direct to the Californian silver mines instead.

I am not without some experience of the way in which large sales of this kind by a Government operate. In Scinde, at the time of the conquest, and for some years subsequently, the revenue on all grain crops was paid by setting apart a share amounting on an average to about a third of the produce, agreeably to the Mahomedan system of land revenue which we found prevailing at the time of the conquest of the province. Under this system the Government share of the grain, being collected in the Government granaries, was placed at the disposal of the Collector, who for cash sold grain orders on the granary-keepers from time to time, spreading his sales as nearly as possible over the whole year just as the India Office does with its bills at present. But the great difficulty I found was so to conduct my sales as not to injure private holders. For though as I had not a monopoly of the grain, and could not therefore have raised the price of it above the natural level if I had tried to do so, yet I might have depressed the price throughout the whole district very far below the natural level by excessive or injudicious selling, as long as I had any grain left in the granaries unsold. As it was with me then, so it is with the India Office now. They have a third of the rupees collected throughout all India as revenue yearly to dispose of in London, and though they cannot thereby raise the price of silver above the natural level, as indicated by the available supply of silver throughout the world, they can certainly by mismanagement or by miscalculation depress it far below the lowest level it ought to reach, and would reach but for this circumstance. It is on this account, knowing the nicety of such operations, and the want of special knowledge on such subjects usually prevalent in public offices, that I am led to think that a great deal of the recent excessive depreciation of silver may be due to this source.

One thing, at any rate, is clear, which is that it is not owing to any real excess in the supply of silver, for no such excess has really sprung from

either of the two causes that it has been attributed to. One of these was that the German Government had 8,000,000*l.* sterling worth of silver on their hands for immediate sale—the result of the late change of the standard there from a silver to a gold currency; but it has since been shown that they have no immediate intention of throwing what they have upon the market, and if they had, so moderate an amount as 8,000,000*l.* could not have caused even for the moment so extensive a depreciation as we have recently witnessed. The second cause assigned was an assumed addition of 9,000,000*l.* worth of silver annually to the previous products of the silver mines in the United States, which might, on the supposition that such increased supply would be continuous, and all available for the English market, have had a very serious effect on silver values here undoubtedly. But this assumption seems likewise to have been erroneous, and so far from any additional supply of silver coming from the United States, the supply has been less than it was previously, while a considerable proportion of what they have sent us has been bought back by them to supply silver for the silver coinage of small pieces they are carrying out in their own territories.

Having now said so much as to the ostensible causes of the late great depreciation of silver as compared with gold—causes obviously originating in error and intensified by panic,—I would venture to add some remarks upon the subject of the depreciation of silver generally, and what the prospects before us seem to be in this respect. As far as the depreciation of silver in respect to its purchase-power over commodities in general is concerned, it is quite clear that if the products of the silver mines throughout the world should greatly increase and be thrown in larger quantities upon the market, the purchase-power of silver over other commodities will be diminished, excepting so far as this may be counterbalanced by circumstances having an opposite tendency. Silver, where it is the standard of value, will stand in the same position, so far as this point is concerned, as gold does where it is the standard at present. We all know, for instance, that the purchasing power of gold in respect to wages, rents, the necessaries of life, and its luxuries, &c., has been very considerably diminished by the great additional stock of gold now existing, as the result of the gold discoveries of the last thirty years. Some set down the diminution of the purchase-power at as much as one-half, but none place it at less than a third, or 33 per cent., of what it was previously. This, of course, was foreseen by most men when the great gold fields of Australia and California first began to attract notice; and, indeed, the fears of not a few were so greatly excited by it that they could think of no better remedy than an immediate demonetization of gold and a return to a

silver currency. Happily, there were cooler heads that were not carried away by the excitement; things were left to adjust themselves in their own way, and the great influx of gold, so far from bringing destruction with it, has been productive of the greatest possible benefit. The great prosperity of the present generation dates from these discoveries. The immense addition to the stock of gold in the world has stimulated labour and production of every kind, and the poor as well as the rich have shared the benefit of it. As it was with gold, so it will be with silver, under similar circumstances, wherever that is the standard of value. The largest possible increase in the yield of the silver mines will only, by adding to the general wealth, increase the public prosperity. India would gain all that England has gained from the increased stock of gold, and a new era would speedily dawn upon that great dependency. But there would be this difference, that while in England there is no drawback on the advantages, owing to gold being its standard of value, and its debts and other engagements being contracted in that metal, in India, the standard of value being silver, while a large portion of its obligations is contracted in gold, any considerable depreciation in the purchase-power of silver over gold would stand on a wholly different footing from any corresponding depreciation of its purchase-power over other commodities. This it is, indeed, that forms the whole difficulty. The Government of India has to pay large sums annually in gold, while it collects its rents and its taxes in silver, and can only give bills payable in silver for the gold it has to purchase here. It is the same with its officers, who are paid in rupees, but have to make family remittances payable here in gold, as well as with all, both Europeans and Natives, who have any pecuniary relations with this country. As far as the Government itself is concerned, it would be the least sufferer, for whatever it might lose in the payment of the principal and interest of its gold obligations it would gain in the matter of its rupee debt; and its gold debt and its rupee debt are about equal.

If I shall have been able to make myself as clear as I have wished to do, I think you will perceive that the whole case stands thus: That there was lately a serious and, to a certain extent, an alarming depreciation in the value of silver as compared with gold, from which, however, it is now recovering, if, indeed, I may not say that it has quite recovered; that it is wholly immaterial whether such depreciation, if it should again occur, would affect its purchase-power in relation to wages, necessaries of life, or other commodities; for even if it did so, those who live in India under a silver standard would only be in the same position as those who live in England under a gold standard, which has been undergoing a gradual process of depreciation to that extent ever

since the commencement of the gold discoveries, it being a matter over which legislation is powerless; and that, consequently, the only question of any real importance is whether, in the future, the progressive depreciation in the value of silver, arising as it must, and only can do, from an actual and not presumed excess in the supply of silver, is likely to outstrip the progressive depreciation in the value of gold arising from similar causes; or, in other words, whether the purchasing power and exchangeable value of silver as compared with gold will, as some imagine, diminish, and go on diminishing.

It is not a question that one can argue with any pretension to mathematical certainty, because we have not the necessary data to go upon, but my own impression is that nothing of the kind will happen; and I shall give you my reasons for so thinking, which to me, at any rate, are satisfactory.

In the first place, before reckoning that any such large and continuous excess in the supply of silver will take place, it seems that it would be as well to consider what are and may be the possible demands for it. China, then, to begin with, is a country with over 300,000,000 of inhabitants. It has a trade constantly increasing, and its Government has now commenced improvements on the European model likely to require very large sums of money to carry them out. But in China the standard of value is silver. India, again, is a dependency containing over 200,000,000 of inhabitants; and there, again, great progress is going on on all sides, equally involving a larger outlay and increasing currency; and there, too, the standard is silver. So it is in Persia, so also throughout Arabia and Central Asia, and in all the islands in the Eastern seas. In Japan, also, I believe that silver is the chief currency, if not the standard of value there; so, in the vast empire of Russia, though paper money is in circulation to excess, the standard of value is the rouble, which, as its name implies, is a silver coin. Silver is also the standard of value, or one of the standards where there is a double standard, in Austria, in Italy, in Greece, in Switzerland, in France, in Belgium, and in Holland, as it was till lately in the Scandinavian kingdoms. It was also so till very recently in the United States; and though I see it stated that silver has within these two years been demonetized, except for small payments there, a very large portion of silver is still required to carry out their plans regarding the smaller currency. In Spain and Portugal, and in the South American States, the usual currency is silver; and though Germany has demonetized its silver, a large amount will always be required for petty payments there; as is also the case in England, where it is a lawful tender up to 2*l*. It is true that in many of these States—France, for instance—where there is a double

standard, gold is now more used than silver, and has largely superseded it in respect to large payments. But that was simply brought about, as in the United States, by the comparative cheapness of gold as compared with silver, occasioned by the gold discoveries, and would not continue if the price of silver fell considerably, for then all debtors would elect to pay in silver, and the gold would be melted down and exported, and so cease to circulate. Then, again, look at the national debts of all those countries —debts contracted in silver, and which assuredly they would never think of paying in gold if silver fell in value in the manner contemplated. I was the other day attempting to make a calculation of what these amounted to, and it seemed to me that the total would reach to about 2,700,000,000*l.* sterling, all payable in silver, or something, at any rate, not very far short of that sum. But these were the public debts alone. How much, therefore, should we have to add if we included all the local debts—which in France alone would amount to a very high figure—such as of canals and roads, railways, and municipalities, &c. Add, again, to these all the private debts contracted in those countries, and payable with the interest in silver, and I think you will be able to form some conception of the amount of silver capable of absorption before silver could possibly become from its excess so depreciated in value as some have anticipated. Nor is this all; for while, with the exception of a few late fortunate hits in the mining way, the produce of which has been enormously exaggerated, the progress of silver mining has been slow and costly, we daily see new gold fields added to the old, and, as soon as discovered, attracting the hands required to work them. Silver mining requires skill and capital, and no inconsiderable amount of skill and capital either, to be made productive; while gold-digging is followed, as we know, by the roughest and most unskilled labourers, who have nothing but their thews and sinews to rely upon, and the proceeds of whose work, though so much added to the stock of gold in the world, often utterly fails to pay them for their anxiety and their labour. For more skilled processes, I saw it stated the other day in a letter in the *Times* that it pays in California to crush auriferous quartz if the result gives only $10 a ton, and in Australia if it only gives half that amount.

With all these facts before us, with the knowledge, also, of the immense quantity of paper money now afloat in countries where silver is the standard, and which some day will have to be replaced by silver; with the certainty that as the amount of gold currency increases in any country through the national progress of wealth, it must employ for petty payments a proportionately increased amount of silver; with the knowledge, also, of the increased amount of it required for purposes of

luxury and the arts throughout the world, as well as in some countries—for instance, India, and throughout all Asia—for ornaments and hoarding; —I think that there is not much reason to dread any great excess in the supply of silver, and certainly no reason at all for supposing that the supply will so greatly outstrip the supply of gold as to make any serious alteration to the detriment of silver in the comparative value of the two metals. But this, as I have already pointed out, is the only real point of consequence so far as the present question is concerned; though I have no doubt that as gold-digging and silver mining go on, both metals will, to a certain extent, be subjected to a diminution of their purchasing power over wages, necessaries of life, and other commodities, as since the great gold discoveries they both have done, with not much inequality, however, as far as silver is concerned; for, as I have shown above, it is 4s. 10½d. an ounce at the moment of my writing, with an apparently rising market, and was only 4s. 11½d. an ounce thirty years ago, before the gold fields had come into operation.

It is a curious circumstance that, but for the action taken by the India Office in 1852 in consequence of the gold discoveries—prohibiting the receipt of gold coins at the Indian treasuries—we might have had a gold standard in India, as in England, now, for gold fifteen-rupee pieces had been coined under an Act of 1835, and were receivable in the Indian treasuries up to that time. But for this, the course followed in the United States and in France, and the Latin union, would have doubtless been followed there. The comparative cheapness of gold would have introduced a gold currency superseding the silver, except for petty payments, and gradually led to the former being adopted as the standard of value, which, as it is the standard of value in England, the ruling power, would certainly have been a great convenience in every way. I do not know whether such an opportunity may again occur; but if it should, it would be well, I think, for the Government to take advantage of it, for this, if on no other ground.

Perhaps it might contribute something towards such an end if the Government, without demonetizing silver, were to do as was done in India in Akbar's reign—that is, without buying any gold itself, to coin all that might be brought to it, on payment of the small expenses attending the assay, melting, and refinement of it, and a trifling seignorage to the State, and allow the pieces so coined to be received at their fixed value in all the Indian treasuries. This value in Akbar's time—who reigned, as you know, in the latter half of the sixteenth century, before the silver mines of America were in operation—was, as compared with silver, one to twelve; it is now one to fifteen and a-half, that being the extent of the result of those discoveries within the three and a

quarter centuries that have elapsed since Akbar's day. His gold coinage embraced gold coins of every description, from the largest—a monster coin equal to a hundred and one gold mohurs of twelve rupees each—to the adilgoolka, which was of the value of nine rupees, and indeed there were some, I think, even smaller. It would be enough, however, for us to confine ourselves to the coinage of an Empress gold mohur and half-mohur, the former of which, owing to the altered relative value of silver and gold since Akbar's time, would be of the value of fifteen and a-half instead of twelve rupees, and would be as nearly as possible the equivalent in gold of twenty-nine shillings and twopence in English money. This would involve no demonetization of silver in India, and, it being optional with persons to take them there, though they would always be receivable at the public treasuries, the measure might be introduced and carried out without any difficulty and at very little expense; while it would rapidly lead most probably to more profitable arrangements as to remittances home, they being here receivable at their intrinsic value in gold as compared with sovereigns, twenty-nine shillings and twopence, and at that rate convertible into sovereigns at the Mint in England if necessary. Should the plan succeed as well as I think it would, it might cause the new gold currency to be largely used in payments to the Indian treasuries, as well as among the people generally, and so enable the Secretary of State to draw bills on India payable in gold instead of in silver, or to order consignments of gold to meet the home requirements if necessary. I know, of course, the objection that may be raised about double standards, but this would be a totally different thing, though even a double standard would be better than two separate and antagonistic standards, the one adopted in the ruling country, and the other in the greatest of its dependencies. In this case, however, the arguments regarding a double standard would not apply. Those who contracted their obligations in silver would still be obliged to fulfil them in silver if their creditors insisted on it; while as to all new contracts, persons would be at liberty to make them either in gold or silver, as they thought fitting. All that the Government would do would be to coin all the gold brought to it for the purpose into Empress mohurs of the weight of the present silver rupee and half-mohurs, and to proclaim its readiness to receive such in payment of debts and dues of all kinds at its several Indian treasuries; while, as with individuals, it would be open to it, while paying its rupee debt in rupees if required, to make all future contracts in gold or silver, as it thought proper. Seeing how small has been the decrease in the exchangeable value of silver as compared with gold for so long a term as three and a quarter centuries, including the period of the discovery of the silver mines

of America, it is not likely to be so great as to have any perceptible effect for a long time to come. The price is, indeed, the same now within a penny the ounce as thirty years ago. What variation there may be will, I believe, be rather to the disadvantage of gold than of silver; and, in that case, so far from limiting the circulation of gold, it would, according to the known laws that regulate those matters, greatly extend it.

One point more, and I have done. In Akbar's time, it is stated in his Institutes, there was found a great quantity of gold in the southern and mountainous parts of his dominions; while his liberal regulations as to coinage induced merchants to bring it from every neighbouring nation. It is true he mentions that though the quantity was so large in India proper, it did not in most instances pay to work it; but what would not pay to work then might pay very well now, with our increased knowledge and appliances.

Why should not the Government, then, see what can be done in this direction? Why should not India produce its own gold, as, under proper management, I have no earthly doubt of its being capable of doing? If the gold was there in the sixteenth century, it must be there now; and if it is there at all, it would certainly, in a land where labour is so cheap, and the necessaries of life so plentiful, pay abundantly for the working of it. Besides which, there are millions on millions of hoarded gold in India. Here, then, would be a method infinitely better for supplying the Secretary of State with what gold he wants than selling bills for rupees on India. And who knows but that if the product was large, and it would be practically inexhaustible, it might not be the means of rescuing the Indian Government from those financial difficulties which seem to be ever rising like a spectre before it, and to which, if they should ever culminate in inability to meet its engagements, we shall most assuredly be indebted for the loss of our magnificent Indian Empire. Famines, and the deficits they occasion, would then no longer frighten us; we could look with calmness to the possibility of losing our opium revenue; we should not be obliged to be perpetually screwing up the rents in India; and we should not be compelled to maintain protection tariffs for the sake of the few hundred thousands that they bring us. Our Queen was proclaimed, on the first day of the new year, the Empress of India; let our Government endeavour to begin with this new year a new era there—a golden era in every sense—so as to mark her accession to this splendid inheritance by something even grander, as well as more durable, than a passing pageant.

RETURN showing the Rates of Exchange between England and India, and vice versâ, in the several Months named, in the Year 1876, *together with the Prices in Rupees paid for Sovereigns in India during the same period, and also the Prices paid per oz. for Bar Silver in England, kindly furnished by the Agra Bank, Limited:—*

1876. Month.	Highest Current Rate in London for Bills at sight on India.	Lowest Current Rate in London for Bills at sight on India.	Highest Current Rate in India for Bills at sight on England.	Lowest Current Rate in India for Bills at sight on England.	Highest Current Rate paid in India for Sovereigns taken by the Bank there.	Lowest Current Rate paid in India for Sovereigns taken by the Bank there.	Highest and Lowest Current Prices paid per oz. for Bar Silver in England.	
							Highest.	Lowest.
	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.	s. d.	s. d.
January	1 9⅛	1 8⅞	1 9⅞	1 9⅛	11 1 6	11 1 0	4 8	4 7¾
February	1 8⅛	1 8¼	1 9⅛	1 8¾	11 10 6	10 10 6	4 6⅞	4 5
March	1 8¾	1 8	1 9	1 8¾	11 11 6	11 10 6	4 5¾	4 4¾
April	1 8⅝	1 8	1 9¼	1 9	11 11 0	11 9 6	4 6	4 5¼
May	1 8½	1 8	1 9	1 8⅛	11 12 6	11 9 0	4 5⅝	4 4⅛
June	1 7⅞	1 6¾	1 8⅝	1 8⅛	11 14 0	11 13 6	4 4	4 3
July	1 7⅝	1 5¾	1 7	1 6¼	13 0 0	12 2 6	4 3	3 11
August	1 8¼	1 6¾	1 8	1 8	12 4 0	12 0 6	4 4½	4 2¼
September	8	1 7⅜	1 8	1 7⅜	12 1 0	12 0 0	4 4	4 3⅛
October	1 8⅝	1 7⅜	1 8¼	1 7⅛	12 0 6	12 0 6	4 4¾	4 4⅛
November	1 9 1/16	1 8	1 8 5/16	1 9 5/16	11 14 6	11 8 0	4 6⅛	4 5¼
December	...	...	1 10½	...	...	...	4 10½	...

The CHAIRMAN said he was sure that whatever might be their individual views or opinions on the subject of the depreciation of silver, they would concur in thanking Colonel Rathborne for his very able address. Before proceeding to invite discussion on the subject, he would take the opportunity of reading a letter which had been received from Sir George Balfour, as it contained the expression of some opinions which would be heard with interest, as coming from a financier of great experience in India and elsewhere, and therefore the views of a man of weight and authority. (Hear, hear.) Sir George Balfour wrote as follows: "Sir George Balfour's compliments to the Secretary of the East "India Association, and begs to say that the delay in replying to the re- "quest, in the note of the 31st of January, to take the chair at the meet- "ing to hear Colonel Rathborne's paper, has arisen from a desire to do "so, if the other engagements of long standing allowed thereof. "But Sir George Balfour now regrets to state that two meetings on "Wednesday next, between two and four o'clock, will prevent his pre- "sence at the Rooms of the Association; and he regrets this because "Colonel Rathborne's views about the depreciation of silver, like all his "other views on Indian subjects, well deserve attention. Sir George "Balfour was anxious to explain one part of the complications about "silver, and that is the diminution of late years of the use of silver for "a circulating medium, owing to the enormous extension of paper notes. "In former years about 160,000,000*l.* to 200,000,000*l.* of silver currency "coin were in circulation. It is known to have been greatly diminished. "Lord George Hamilton, in one of his speeches last year in the House of "Commons, stated 160,000,000*l.* to be the silver coin circulation, but did "not state the data on which his statement was based. Sir George "Balfour is fully prepared to accept this great reduction, but would be "glad to have the details. This may be traced to the note circulation, "not so much to the notes actually in circulation with the public on a "particular day, but to the power the Government have of manufac- "turing notes to the extent of five and often seven times the bullion cir- "culation of coins from the Mints. The Government have also created "in July, 1872, the five-rupee notes, and they have increased also the "notes of 10,000 rupees, which are used for remittances and for many of "the purposes for which coins were formerly used. It is this economy "which has allowed of the circulating medium of bullion coins being de- "creased to one-half, and hence has allowed of silver coins being used up "without inconvenience for ornaments, whereby the importation of silver "into India for coinage and for ornaments has been so cut down as to "make silver a drug in the London market." The Chairman proceeded to add that, rightly or wrongly, he believed that

the depression in the price of silver was a secondary cause, and not a primary cause, of the depression in the rate of exchange. In his address Colonel Rathborne had not alluded to one very important fact in the consideration of the question—viz., the power the Secretary of State for India has of drawing bills on India, and the issue by the Bank of England of quantities of interest bills, which are sold in the market here, and thus come into competition with the ordinary trade of the country. It would be very useful if some member of the House of Commons were to obtain the particulars of these amounts of interest bills which the Bank of England now draws annually upon the Government of India for the payments of dividends in this country; for he believed that this practice had added very considerably to the amount of money required to be brought to this country. Exchange, after all, must be the balance of trade between one country and another, seeing that barter only exists between uncivilized communities; and, practically, what regulated the exchange was the amount of indebtedness of one country to the other. But in this case they had the great disturbing element with regard to India: the Secretary of State for India draws a number of bills which are not represented by the trading wants of the country. These bills are an unknown quantity, because they are increased and added to by the bills which are drawn by the Bank of England for interest. The result is, that these bills must be thrown on the market, whether they are wanted or not, for the purposes of trade, and the prices bid are regulated by the factitious standard made by speculators. If he understood Colonel Rathborne rightly, he was under the impression that the depreciation of silver might, to a certain extent, be remedied by having a gold currency in India. But if this be so, Colonel Rathborne had left out of consideration the very important fact that the rents payable in India to the Government are based upon a silver currency standard, and he could hardly see how the Government, without breaking faith with its tenants, could demand payment in gold. (Hear, hear.)

Colonel RATHBORNE said the payment would be optional, and the use of gold would come in gradually.

The CHAIRMAN continued by saying that if this were so the tenants would avail themselves of the option which at the time would best pay them. But he believed the recent depreciation in silver to have arisen from what might be called a "scare." A fall in the price of silver was seized upon to affect the rate of exchange; but really the rate of exchange between the two countries must be affected more than anything else by the amount of what might be called "factitious" paper created by the Secretary of State and by the Bank

of England, under his directions, in the shape of interest bills. Of course, there was the extraordinary fact that the price of rupee paper in the two countries does not represent the difference of exchange. If silver were shipped, its price would, of course, have to be augmented by the transit expenses. At the present time there is also looming in the near future another Indian loan, necessitated by the lamentable famine, and this prospect is reducing the price of the rupee paper. Speaking broadly, then, his opinion was that the depreciation of silver arose from the large drawings made against India in this country. In the old days of the East India Company, when the Company wanted to replenish its coffers, it issued an advertisement stating what it was prepared to sell, and the minimum price; and the merchants, on application, received their allotment of bills. Then the advertisement was withdrawn, and bills could only be obtained through the various bankers and others who, having allotments, were left to deal with the bills as the market ruled. Indeed, this practice was carried out so rigorously that on one occasion, which he remembered, something like 1,000,000*l.* sterling was taken at one time by the combined bankers and traders from the Company; and yet, with the Company's wants supplied, and none of its bills offering, a good profit was made on the whole transaction. All this, of course, had been altered by the new practice of fortnightly drawings. Bidders now have to accept the risk of a choked and stagnant market, and they must bid a price with a margin for this risk; and thus the business became an eminently speculative one. In this—as, indeed, in not a few other matters relative to the administration of Indian affairs—he regretted the loss of the old East India Company and its Court of Directors. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. JOHN JONES said that it appeared to him that Colonel Rathborne, in his address, had anticipated what the Chairman had said in regard to Government bills in that portion of his remarks where he named the sum of between 15,000,000*l.* and 17,000,000*l.* as the amount which was claimed from India as a sort of tribute for the services of this country. Colonel Rathborne had also explained what he thought would avoid the difficulty of the falling off of the exchange. But it occurred to him (the speaker) that there was a very simple mode of correcting what was complained of. There was no need for India to have a double standard. If the Mint of England were required to coin our English florins of the same weight as the rupee of India, there would be a complete and immediate solution of the whole difficulty. In the rupee there are 165 grains of fine silver; in the florin there are 161½ grains of fine silver—the difference between the two coins being 3½ grains, or a trifle less than a halfpenny in actual value of metal. Why should the English

Mint continue to make the large profit of 60,000*l.* a-year upon the silver coinage? Silver, which in England stands in the ratio to gold of 14·28 to 1, is in France 15·5 to 1, and in the United States 15·98 to 1. Our Mint was, therefore, giving less silver for gold than any other nation, and this, to his mind, was a sufficient reason why the Mint should adjust itself to the market value of silver as compared with gold by giving an extra halfpenny value in the florin. Then there would be an interchangeable value between the florin and the rupee, and he would suggest that the coins should be stamped both "rupee" and "florin," so as to make them available in India and England. By this means there would be an easy way of meeting the difficulty which had been before the public of late. Supposing there to be a great accumulation of silver in England, there would thus be an immediate outlet for it in India. England bought last year no less than 70,000 tons of wheat from the North-west Provinces of India; about one-third of our total importation of wheat was from India; and if this commodity came from a country where they would take our silver florin or rupee in payment, there could be no excess of silver in England. The course he suggested, too, would entirely get rid of the burdens of exchange, for the cost of transmission would only be about 1 per cent. At all events, 1 per cent. ought to be sufficient to pay freight and insurance, as there was no intrinsic reason why the P. and O. Company should not carry silver as cheaply as lead, there being no more difficulty in transport. The adjustment of the coinage between the two countries might thus be effected, with the exception of the 1 per cent. for transit; and, in his opinion, the alteration would prove an immense benefit to the trade of both countries, and it could be brought about easily enough by a simple proclamation, which would have the result of giving people in England the proper value for their money, the Mint being the only sufferer by the alteration. (Hear, hear.)

Dr. FURNELL said the idea which had been propounded by the previous speaker was just the idea that had struck him some time back, and he had only wondered that it had not occurred to those more directly interested in the coinage question. He had come here to enter upon the question, but the wind had been completely taken out of his sails by Mr. Jones's remarks on the advisability of making the rupee and the florin interchangeable. He remembered that when home on furlough in 1869, Colonel Tomlinson was engaged in presenting petitions to the House of Commons with the view of calling attention to the paucity of silver in England, and showing how the poorer classes were incommoded by the scarcity of small silver coins to assist them in their marketing transactions. He remembered, too, at the same time

what a difficulty he had in procuring change for a sovereign on various occasions, and how, after fruitless efforts on one Monday morning to obtain change from tradesmen, he had at last to have recourse to Messrs. King and Co.; and yet, at that very moment, he believed the Indian rupee was worth about 1s. 6d. He could not help being struck with the scarcity of silver in England, whilst they were told there was such an abundance elsewhere as to cause the rupee to be depreciated. In order, therefore, to avoid this disparity, the suggestion as to the florin was most valuable, as by its adoption the Secretary of State for India would be relieved of the necessity of accepting tenders of as low as 1s. 6d. for the rupee. Why, instead of coining the rupee, should not the florin be coined? And, making it the legal tender for India, any officer would be willing to take his pay in silver florins, and a difficulty at present affecting both civil and military officers would be surmounted. The Queen of Great Britain being now Empress of India, the occasion was most opportune for carrying out the alteration. Colonel Rathborne had made a remark in his able address about the Emperor Akbar having coined gold which he got from the southern parts of his dominions and those of neighbouring rulers. Well, on that subject he (the speaker) possessed some little information, for in 1862 he wrote a letter to the *Bombay Times* (now the *Times of India*), pointing out that the quality of the quartz in the Wynaad district was identical with that of Australia, and expressing the belief that there was an abundance of gold in that plateau; and Dr. Maxwell used at that time, he remembered, to go about showing people gold obtained by the natives of the southern slopes of the Wynaad mountains. Quite lately, too, he had heard of a company having been formed to work the plateau and the Neilgherry hills; and, therefore, Colonel Rathborne was quite justified in saying that gold existed in that quarter. (Hear.)

RAJAH RAMPUL SINGH expressed the opinion that the merchants should be at liberty to buy and sell the metal silver, but that they should not be able to interfere with, or to limit its value as a coin. A different state of things ought not to have been possible under the same Government, and India being under the same Government as England, the coinage ought to be similar to that of England. In England there was no change in the value of the shillings, and twenty shillings were always equal to a sovereign. Why, therefore, could not the coinage of India be so adjusted as to prevent the deterioration of the value of the rupee?

Mr. W. MAITLAND, remarking upon the allusions made to the existence of gold in India, said that at the present moment two com-

panies were arranging for the exploration of those tracts of country supposed to be auriferous ; and this information he knew to be accurate, being a shareholder in the coffee plantation on which gold had been found. His immediate object in speaking on the present occasion, however, was to point out that the address dealt with the condition of things which existed some months back, but which, happily, had been altered by the rise in the rate of exchange of the rupee, and the improvement in the price of silver. When the period of depreciation was current, a meeting was held in the theatre of the Society of Arts, and he then gave his view of the matter. That view had been justified to a certain extent by what had occurred since. He on that occasion said he would not enter into the consideration of the scientific side of the question, but would refer simply to some practical points. First of all he would say, as a merchant, that while he felt the importance of the influence exercised by the fall in the rates of silver and exchange,—which, though no doubt some had benefited by it, must, on the whole, be considered injurious,—some of the evil effects then being felt were due to the general state of trade in the East for some time past. He remembered most vividly the events in India at the time of the cotton famine, being then at the head of a mercantile firm in India, and when tens of thousands of pounds were drawn for by them at the rate of 2s. 2d. and 2s. 3d. per rupee. At that time, large quantities of silver came from Europe in payment for cotton, and a flood of wealth poured into the country which had a marvellous effect, enabling many of the ryots and others to pay off debts which had been hanging over them nearly all their lives. God forbid that any such event as the American Civil War should occur again ; but if the quantity and the value of Indian produce were so to increase as to turn the balance of trade, including the 15,000,000*l.* or so annually drawn for by the India Council, it would go far to remedy the evil. That fall in the price of silver, concerning which those remarks he had just cited, had been recovered, at all events for the present, and a normal condition of things had been reverted to, silver at the present moment being nearly what it had been for some time previous to the great fall which attracted such serious attention. His belief, formed upon his experience of India for many years, was that the great fall was due to a panic to a very considerable extent. This panic was greatly attributable to the bad state of the commerce of India, which, unfortunately, was only too well known by many merchants. Whether the commerce of India had improved could only be accurately known by the returns of the exports from India, which, however, were not yet published, the last return being up to April, 1875. The publication of these returns was a long way behindhand but when the document was

obtained he believed it would show that the commerce of India had largely increased. He had seen a statement in the *Gazette of India* which showed that in the seven months from the 30th April, 1876, the exports had increased in value by 1,480,000*l*. In this increase of the trade of India there was a guarantee for its future prosperity. He remembered the beginning of the jute trade; and as a director of the Assam Tea Company, he had also knowledge of the extent of the growth of the tea trade; and both of these products had materially benefited India. Quite lately there was another article which was attracting attention, and could not fail to be of great benefit to India and England. He alluded to wheat, which was now being exported from India in very large quantities. In 1873 there were only 13,000 tons exported from Calcutta, while in 1876 there were exported from that place 170,000, and from India generally upwards of 200,000 tons. He believed that this trade, if properly cultivated, would be more than equal to the supply of England, and thus make England entirely independent of the Russian supply and of that from the United States. The Indian railways were awake to the desirability of encouraging the trade, and had lowered their rates for the carriage from the interior to the coast; and the Indian Government had most wisely encouraged the development of the trade by removing the duty. He believed, therefore, that the wheat trade was yet in its infancy. It had been tried years ago, but the long voyage *viâ* the Cape of Good Hope was too much for it, on account of the destruction of the grain by weevils; but now that the Suez Canal saved so much time, the wheat trade, as well as the other exports from India, would be stimulated, and the difficulty in connection with the exchanges, which created so much alarm a little time back, would be much lessened. In his able address Colonel Rathborne had referred to the fact that what caused the first improvement in the rate of exchange was the movement in the silk trade. The silk crop being deficient in Europe, orders were sent to China for such large quantities—for which payment had to be made in silver—that the exchange at once improved greatly. For the future he looked hopefully to the growth of trade and increasing exports from India, to prevent the recurrence of any difficulty in connection with the silver currency of a kind such as that which had been lately experienced. The Chairman had referred to the effect of the sale of the Government bills; but they were not, as had been hinted, an unknown quantity. The system of enfacing paper was no new one; the quantity here was well known. That the amount of the Secretary of State's bills had an effect on exchange everybody must be aware, but at the same time he (the

speaker) would like to have this problem solved: The Secretary of State's bills on India are what they were in amount last year, yet it is known also that the quantity of silver shipped from England and the Continent has increased very largely, so that, in point of fact, in spite of the Secretary of State drawing only as much as he did last year, a large amount of silver in excess of last year was finding its way to India. To his mind that fact gave reason to believe that the commerce of India was on the increase. Colonel Rathborne had remarked upon the great amount of silver fractional currency in America, and he (the speaker) had lately seen that at the present time there was a Bill in the American Congress known as "Bland's Bill"—having already passed the House of Representatives—which, in effect, provided for the establishment of a double currency in America, since it would make the payment of debts not specifically stipulated to be in gold optional in either gold or silver. That would have a great effect on the currency question should it become law; but of that there was some doubt. In concluding, Mr. Maitland expressed his obligation to Colonel Rathborne for his able exposition of the question.

Mr. RUDOLPH AUERBACH expressed a general concurrence in the views of Mr. Jones, believing that if the English system of coinage were made to correspond with that of India now that India was a portion of the British Empire, great advantage would accrue. The speaker then proceeded to review the currency question in its various phases from the year 1816 down to the present time, following the history of the constitution of gold as the legal tender of the country, and contending that commerce had been greatly impeded by the legislation upon the subject. Periodical money panics had occurred in nearly every decade since the year 1825, and the rates of discount had ruled higher than on the Continent. The system of a gold standard had its glittering aspect, but in practice it had many drawbacks, as shown in the repeated suspension of the Bank Charter Act and the progress of the Continent in the producing power of their manufactures, which was due, to a great extent, to the advantage of low rates of discount. In 1835 a great difficulty was experienced in the exchange with India, and the East India Company made an effort to bring the Indian currency into something like harmony with that of England. The silver currency of the East, the rupee, had to be brought into community with the gold currency of England, and this because our silver currency, being overstrained in value as much as 10 per cent., could never offer a starting-point. But the basis was not properly arranged, and the consequence was seen in the oscillating value, which operated to the detriment of our com-

merce and the discontent of the people. After referring to many difficulties attending the present system, Mr. Auerbach urged that England should strike a coin called the rupee or florin, with a specific weight of 190 grains, and thus at the price of 5s. per ounce standard establish a currency worth 1s. 11¾d., which would have the advantage of being received gladly by every commercial community in the world. In connection with this the speaker also advocated the coining of a double florin or rupee, which he said would drive out the dollar and build the bridge of an universal financial commonwealth. Further, he urged that payment in silver to the extent of 20 per cent. in any sum up to 1,000*l.*, and 15 per cent. beyond that sum, should be permissible, so as to impart to silver a stable and solid basis, which would prevent any such collapse as that which recently occurred. Nor would there be any fear of becoming overburdened with silver coin, for it would be readily absorbed at home and abroad, and consequently give increased work to the Mint. It would, moreover, put the Government in that most desirable position to be able to command thoroughly the silver market, as the German Government does actually *now* through the instrumentality of its appointed agent over here. The detrimental competition between the silver bullion sales and those of the drafts on India would be effectually got rid of, as *then* the India Office could against their Council drafts ship, without loss of interest, &c., to which private firms have to submit, such quantities of silver or silver coin as would periodically be deemed advisable, leaving the remaining drafts to be put on the market at proper periods of the year. The cardinal benefit, however, would be the introduction into the commerce of the world of the true tenth part of our gold sovereign and the real fifteenth part of the gold Imperial Victoria mohur, both gold coins being of the same fineness as heretofore, but the latter being simply increased to 184·9 grains. By this means the Imperial British-Indian coins would be placed on the same footing, and would thus circulate freely over the greater part of the globe.*

Mr. ROBERT H. ELLIOT directed a few observations to the suggestion made by the opener of the discussion, to the effect that the Government, without buying any gold, might coin all that was brought to it at a trifling allowance to the State over and above the actual cost of coining, allowing the pieces so coined to be received at their full value in all the Indian treasuries. No doubt that would be desirable in one sense,

* For further information regarding Mr. Auerbach's views, see Appendix, page 126.

but there were difficulties which would prevent any such course being followed. He alluded to the existence of the currency notes. The planters in Mysore, for instance, got the currency notes and cashed them at the treasuries; but they certainly would not take gold for them, because the payments to their labourers were too small. The only way in which the gold of India could be turned to account would be to stop the small currency notes, restricting their use to a thousand rupees, or higher; then the gold ten-rupee coin could take the place of the ten-rupee currency notes. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. J. T. WOOD suggested that, in printing the paper which had been read, Colonel Rathborne should add some comparative tables of the value given for silver at the English Mint, and the value of the rupee in India.* With regard to the suggestion made, that the rupee and the florin should be made to tally, he thought that as the florin was the standard fixed in England, there should be no difficulty in altering the number of grains in the rupee to tally with the florin,—a course which, indeed, had been suggested by his father when Accountant-General of India. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. JUSTICE WEST, alluding to the remarks as to the discovery of gold in India, said he failed to see that it was a matter likely to bear materially on the question brought under notice by Colonel Rathborne. If gold was found in India, could it be worked at a profit? If it could, the Indian Government, by putting on royalties, might appropriate to itself the difference between that profit on the production of gold and the ordinary rate of industrial profit, and so far the Government would be the gainer; but so far as the ratio of exchange between silver and gold was concerned, the effect would be no more than this. In proportion as the total quantity of gold in the world is increased, the range and purpose of its uses remaining the same, gold will be depreciated and silver raised to a precisely corresponding extent. This would be the effect on the relations of the two metals; but as to the exchange between the two countries, the fact would have no effect at all. Mr. Jones had suggested that the rupees and florins should be made convertible, and a supposed illustration of the necessity of this was offered by Mr. Furnell; but the test which that gentleman applied was, he thought, fallacious. He instanced the difficulty of getting change for a sovereign on a Monday morning, but the real test would have been to ascertain if for 19s. 6d. in silver he could have got a sovereign. He could not; and the reason for the seeming scarcity of

* See page 125.

silver was, that Saturday being the day upon which the wages of the great mass of the people are paid, the larger coins pass on that day into the hands of the tradesmen, they giving the change in smaller coins, which, later on in the following week, are expended in small purchases, and thus come again into the hands of the retailers. That was the fact which explained the scarcity of silver which Dr. Furnell experienced on a Monday; but the scarcity did not lead to or indicate any substantial advance in the value of silver, as could have been readily tested in the way he had suggested. Now, as to the coinage of the rupee and the florin being made equivalent, we know that the basis of the English system is that of a single standard, and that the silver coinage is merely subsidiary. If you say that the florin shall be identical with the rupee, all the system on which the English monetary scale is based will be subverted. There would be an immediate influx of rupees. If they were made a legal tender for more than small sums, a double standard of currency would be established; and if they were not made a legal tender for more than small sums for which silver at present is a legal tender, no results worth consideration would be produced. English statesmen, however, would not submit to have the control of the British currency taken out of their hands, to be placed in those of the Indian Government. A heavy tax would thus be imposed on the home community, and as silver streamed in gold would flow out, since by artificial arrangements it would be impossible to effect a permanent alteration in the relative value of gold and silver in the markets of the world, and our merchants, finding gold unduly depreciated at home, would use it abroad. With reference to the supposed effect upon the exchange of the drawings of the Secretary of State, he was of opinion that the effect upon the relative value of silver and gold was almost *nil*. Mr. Maitland had pointed out that the drawings of the Secretary of State this year were the same as last year; and yet how different the rate of exchange was this year! If the low rate of exchange was due to the Secretary of State's drawings, it should be the same this year. The drawings continue, but the rate of exchange has risen. The real reasons for the depreciation of silver were to be found in a different direction. It was caused partly by the great quantity of silver on the market, and partly by the anticipation of more being thrown on the market; and in order to discount the probabilities of the future, the dealers in bullion rushed suddenly on 'Change with their silver, causing an inordinate depression. Now, however, silver was oscillating towards the other extreme, but would eventually resume its proper value in relation to gold—a value determined by the labour it cost to procure the one as compared with the other. The

Secretary of State's drawings on India in silver or gold affect the value but momentarily, although in connection with the operation there may be one circumstance telling at first sight against this view. From the extraordinary demand for cotton during the American War, the exchange in favour of India went up considerably; there was a continued drain from India of cotton, which had to be paid for in silver, as that was most immediately appreciated by the Indian people. Gold also, however, had begun to flow in 1865-66; and had the inflation of Indian trash continued, the supply from other parts of the world would have adjusted itself, and silver in India resumed its normal position. Referring next to the exportation of grain, to which Mr. Maitland appeared to look for the restoration of the balance of trade, the speaker said this matter was to be considered in conjunction with the increasing demands made upon the ryots of India for the expenses of Government. The ryots could not pay in silver or gold unless they sold their goods; consequently their goods were forced on the market. It became possible, therefore, to export the more bulky and less costly goods to England, and this supposed extension of Indian commerce might prove to be what Montesquieu had pointed to as a possible indication, if not, as he thought, a cause, of the impoverishment of a country. The extension of external commerce was thus no infallible sign of prosperity, but it might account for another circumstance—viz., the increased importation of silver into India to meet the demand for coins in order to effect the extended transactions with which the increased taxation would have to be met. In conclusion, Mr. West said he threw out these remarks in the form of suggestions for thought and inquiry, not in any way as statements to detract from the merit of the points brought under notice by Colonel Rathborne, who deserved the warm thanks of every one interested in Indian affairs.

Colonel RATHBORNE briefly replied to some of the remarks made in the course of the discussion, and said he was glad to learn that gold was about to be worked in India. As to the point of having a gold circulation, Mr. Elliot thought it would not answer because of the currency notes; but his (the speaker's) experience was that the traders and Banians would not take the currency notes if they could help it, and therefore he was sure they would prefer gold. At all events, the gold experiment was worth trying, and if it did not answer, it could be sent back to the Mint and turned into sovereigns.

Votes of thanks to the Chairman and Colonel Rathborne closed the proceedings.

Note by Colonel Rathborne.

In reference to Mr. Wood's suggestion that in printing this paper I should add some information regarding rupees and florins being equalized in value and made current in both countries, I have to remark as follows: The public can take as much gold to the Bank of England as they please and obtain sovereigns for it at the rate of 3*l.* 17s. 9d. the ounce of standard purity. There is a standing notice at the Bank of England to that effect, the Bank making the purchases on the part of the Mint authorities. In the same way the public can take as much silver as they please to the Mint authorities in India and obtain rupees for it at the rate of a rupee for every 180 grains of silver of the standard purity. This I have already explained in my paper. The Mint in England, however, is not obliged to coin silver brought to it by the public, or to give silver for gold coins. The coinage of silver is made at its discretion, acting in concert with the Bank of England, through which its silver coins are supplied to bankers and the general public. In India there are no gold coins made at the Mint, and none, consequently, can be obtained, as the law now stands, in exchange for rupees there. There would be no advantage in coining more silver of any kind in England than is required for small change here. On the contrary, if there was a large surplus over the amount required for the ordinary purposes of the public, it would be a heavy loss to the latter, because, while, on the one hand, they could only force people to take it in payment up to 40s., on the other hand, they could not get rid of it as they do with the surplus sovereign, by melting it down or sending it abroad to be melted down; because the English silver coinage is purposely made of a lower intrinsic than denominational value; so that 20s., if melted down, would be very far from sufficient to buy a sovereign's weight of gold, whether the gold was in coin or bullion. This is sufficient at once to show the fallacy of any relief being obtainable by making the silver coins of England and India, say the 2s. piece and the rupee, of the same intrinsic value. To effect this, it would be necessary to do one of two things—either to lessen the amount of silver in the rupee, which is now 180 grains, to 174 grains, the quantity in the florin, in which case people would get so much *less* in proportion for their rupees when exchanging them against gold than they do at present; or to raise the amount of silver in the florin, 174 grains, to the amount of silver in the rupee, 180 grains, which would obviously put the British Government to an enormous expense without one particle of benefit as far as Great Britain was concerned; while it is equally clear that it would not in the smallest degree increase the exchangeable value of the rupee as against gold, the rupee remaining intrinsically and precisely the same value as it is at present.

APPENDIX.

MEMORANDUM COMMUNICATED BY MR. RUDOLPH AUERBACH ON THE DEPRECIATION OF SILVER.

We find that in the year 1816, after the great wars which raged on the Continent, and which cost this country, according to the statement of Mr. John Bright in his recent speech at Llandudno, not less than 1,000,000,000*l.* sterling, our then Government, under Lord Liverpool, enacted a law by which the drained exchequer of this realm might be replenished with metallic mediums. Gold had risen in our island to a premium of not less than 30 per cent.; guineas were worth 27s., against their par value of 21s. Silver had gone to America and the Continent, and was everywhere in the greatest request. England having been at that time, if not quite the only, at all events the principal purveyor of manufactures for nearly all the globe, our legislators enacted then that our legal tender system should be based principally on gold—that is to say, sovereigns of 20s.; that 40 lbs. troy weight of gold should be coined into 1,869 sovereigns; and again, that 1 lb. (troy weight) of silver, of the actual market value of 60s. to 61s., should be coined into 66s. worth as currency. Furthermore, a clause was embodied that it should not be incumbent on any one to receive payment in which more than 2 per cent. of silver were contained. By this clause the receiver was guarded against the possible loss of 10 per cent. on its intrinsic value on more than the 2*l.* sterling in the 100*l.* payment. But what was the result of that law? True, it prevented, as it was then intended to do, the re-exportation of silver when once struck by our Mint into coin of the realm, and it forced the foreign buyers of most of our goods, produce, and manufactures, to remit us back our gold at 20s. per 1*l.* sterling, or say 3*l.* 17s. 9d. per ounce (troy weight) of gold. But did this measure contribute to our prosperity? has it conduced to our commercial progress? or was it not rather a hindrance and a drawback to our commerce? Have we not here in England been greatly impeded by this mono-metallic currency system? have we not had our periodical monetary panics through this one-sided system,—panics which, with never-failing regularity, have occurred in nearly every decade since the year 1825? and have not our rates of discount in many more cases, and that very obstinately, too, ruled ever so much higher than the rates of almost all our neighbours on the Continent? If superior prosperity has been, and, I trust, will for ever be, our lot, it is owing to our insular position, our colonial possessions. Our amassed fortunes are attributable to our having been the first to render water subservient to fire, and the first to inscribe "free trade" on our commercial flags. This system of a gold standard has its glittering aspect, but in practice it has its drawbacks, as shown to us by the suspension of our Bank Charter Act in 1857 and 1866; and much of the Continental progress in the produce of manufactures is due in a great measure to unequal strife between our 5 per cent. to 10 per cent. against their 3 per cent. to 4 per cent. rates of discount. Had we a more liberal legal tender system, a gold standard with a more extended margin of optional silver payment, in the form of a silver coin of a genuine and sterling character—had we not, those sixty years long, hermetically closed to our commerce and the commerce of the world that valuable factor, genuine silver, as a more proportionate payment than the actual 2 per cent., but then consisting of a full-weighted and sterling coin, representing a florin, and at the same time a rupee of a description which I shall

presently give you,—then these two chronicled episodes in our commercial history could never have happened. Had we possessed, besides gold, another hard specie payment, as valuable and quite as sterling in its kind as the former, to fall back upon likewise, we should never have been exposed to such high rates of discount, neither to the expediency of having had to ask for an Order in Council for the suspension of our Bank Charter Act, nor should we ever have to fear that another dilemma of this kind might again befall us.

But let us examine what other prejudicial influence has been brought about by this legal tender system. About the year 1835 some similar difficulty was experienced in the exchange of our Indian commerce; then, as now, it was felt that something should be done. In that year the East India Company tried their best to bring into something like harmony the Indian currency with that of our country.

To what expedient were these authorities reduced to have recourse? The silver currency of the East, the rupee, had to be brought into community with the gold currency, the sovereign of our realm, and this because our silver currency, being overstrained in value as much as 10 per cent., could never offer a starting-point. It was, therefore, thought advisable to take the intrinsic standard of our gold system, 22 carats, or say 916⅔ m.—not our standard of silver, 222 pennyweights (925)—as the standard at which the rupee (silver) should be coined or struck; thus leaving the rupee as near as possible 9 in the 1,000th part, say 9 m., behind the intrinsic standard of our coinage; fifteen of these rupees, each weighing one tola, to go to one mohur of one tola weight, or say 180 grains of gold. Our sovereign of 20s. being of the weight of 123,27·62 grains, would require, in order that the mohur should represent 30s., this coin to be of 184,9119· grains; but being likewise only 180 grains in weight, it leaves the rupee the one-fifteenth part of it, again ·027⅓ m. in arrear against our gold currency—our sovereign. We thus see a discrepancy of ·036⅓ m. in all rupee payments, which generally are, or have been up to within recent years, considered pretty well equal to 2s. in value. The evil has its origin in the subsistence of two systems, which, not being properly connected, work both of them unsatisfactorily. So long as we do not establish a common basis for both, so long will the two scales of the balance be oscillating to the detriment of our commerce, to the discontent of our populations. Now the advice that was offered by some political economists, and also a most able writer of City articles in a principal daily paper, and which advice was based on the proffered plan of a former high official in Calcutta, and was even submitted to the Governor-General of India by the Chamber of Commerce of Calcutta, was that of the introduction of a similar legal tender system to ours —that is, a gold standard for our Indian realm. His Excellency the Governor-General in Council in India rejected this proposal, and thus prevented the loss which such a measure would have entailed broadcast on our Eastern brethren. But what most important enunciation was contained in the various paragraphs which formed his Excellency the Governor-General's answer to the propositions laid before him? The second paragraph was worded as follows (see *Times* of Oct. 24, 1876): "That it is most desirable in the interests of trade that the standard "of value in India should be the same as the standard of value in the chief coun-"tries with which India interchanges commodities."

Here we are forcibly brought to the only issue possible for the proper, the satisfactory solution of this momentous question, and that is, that our obsolete legal tender system which was introduced more than sixty years ago, simply and solely because at that remote epoch silver was scarce, should be altered now,

when this most indispensable factor can momentarily be obtained with greater ease than at that time.

The opinions of unquestionably high authorities in commercial countries, like America, California, and the Continent of Europe, all go far to prove that the double standard was their saving. The intercourse of France and other countries with our Indian Empire was fostered by the shortcomings of our single gold standard; our inability to find in our Bank vaults, in our private reserves, silver that will suit the commerce with the East, were causes that—as, for instance, in the years 1863 and 1864—each year 13,000,000*l.* sterling and above of silver were shipped from France alone to our Eastern Empire. Even Austria has of late shipped often 500,000*l.* sterling per month to Calcutta, and the Mint at Vienna struck last year more silver for the East than ever before. (See *Economist*, 17th Feb.).

But I would not recommend, for all that, as a remedial measure, a double standard purely and simply. The middle course which I submit will be welcome to both hemispheres. This measure, besides ultimately putting right the discrepancies which now prevail so glaringly in our systems, will cement two nations, and foster an elective affinity between them which no Russian propaganda will ever be able to tear asunder.

The political incentive at the inauguration of the new era in the just-created German Empire gave rise, as was but quite natural and right, to the introduction, about three years ago, of a uniform coinage system. Sadly mistaken, however, and entirely unwarranted was the prototyping of our legal tender system and the contingent demonetization of silver in Germany; endless losses were thereby entailed on both the State itself and on German commerce and society. It will take that new realm still many years before this ill-devised silver demonetization and its corresponding gold substitution can possibly be completed. As to the apprehensions that the opening out of prodigious veins in the Comstock Mines would overstock the world with silver, they are beginning to fade away; the exaggerated accounts, after stricter inquiries into the real facts, have lost much of their prejudicial effects. The pure metal cannot be brought to market at a price much below its former average market price; the depreciation of value just experienced was entirely uncalled for, considering the actual cost of extraction of silver and the uncertain yield of the silver mines. Thus silver value is everywhere, and is up till now even in Germany, held in its proportion to that of gold as being 15½ to 1 of the latter. The United States have, even as recently as the beginning of this year, computed and accepted these very proportions as a basis for the proposed introduction of their new legal tender laws for a double standard.

But we have not to look far back for an analogous case. Similar reports as now about silver were in the year 1847 afloat about gold. In 1847 the Californian gold regions poured forth their volumes of gold treasures. Such was the sensation, that people began to speculate on the future of gold. We heard then, as now is the case with silver, that gold could not hold its own; even bullion brokers were of opinion that gold would get so abundant as to bring it to a level with silver, and the gold currency prove disastrous to our country.

But what occurred to dispel suddenly all these preoccupations of the timid multitude? The year of revolutions, 1848, followed. All over Europe Stock Exchange people became frantic—the possessing classes out of their wits from fear of the proletarians—the so-called Red Republicans. Every one sold stocks, shares, and paper values; all were eagerly laying in gold and silver.

Gold, that only a few months before was on the cards to experience an immense

depreciation, came suddenly into the most unprecedented request. The great fall that was predicted was all of a sudden arrested,—not unlike the recent fall of silver was a few months ago stemmed by political complications in the Orient, and the fears of an outbreak of a fresh European war. In Paris gold rose up to 30 per cent.; our sovereign was eagerly purchased at 29 francs. But silver was in such a pressing demand abroad that all Continental Mints had their full share of work on hand; day and night they turned out their freshly-struck coins; silver rose to a premium of 2 to 3 per mille, and rupees even were in great quantities thus drafted to the Continent from India for refining and coinage purposes. If this does not prove that it is advisable to have at our command a basis for international trade balance equalization, but likewise for our own home trade—a bridle that leads both sides of the road, that of gold and silver—then all arguments must be futile.

But incongruities are existing in our currency that should not be tolerated—incongruities which, when exposed, will prove of the highest importance. We oblige every one to use proper scales, weights, and measures; have we anything like decent measure in our silver currency? It cannot be termed, as it ought to be, sterling money; far less can it serve as money for the commerce of the world. Had we such sterling silver coins, never would this invidious question of demonetization have made its appearance—never would silver, with all these Washoe and Nevada mines, have been depreciated.

No one grudges the Government the profit it makes on the silver coinage,—on the contrary, we should do our best that it should increase yearly such profits; but let it do so by legitimate means—profits that will, by the extension we can impart to the silver coinage, triple themselves. The measure I submit will do so in the fullest degree. There will be no more hesitation on the part of our Indian people, or even our Continental friends, to possess themselves of the silver coins which, ennobled by a full complement of volume, would serve us here, as it would at once be hailed with immense joy by all Indian banks, Indian bazaars, and Indian villagers. No ryot, no planter, no factor, would take exception at it. We shall no doubt see all colonies, Dutch and Portuguese possessions, the Straits Settlements, even China, accept more readily the coins we strike then, than the coin which we have to import from Mexico and America—the dollar—at such a cost to ourselves and profit to those countries of the New World. Five-franc pieces, German dollar pieces, and Austrian florins will be superseded by such a coin of ours.

I have said that the bazaars in India would not take exception at receiving, in preference, a better coin of silver than the one which is now circulating in India. The rupee is, by false application—or, say, by our fallacious standard system of 916⅔ m., our gold, against 925 m., our silver standard—placed in the abnormal and anomalous state of possessing no attracting quality. In the bazaars and banks in India—nay, even in China, Java, and the Straits Settlements—silver in bars must be of B 17½ fineness, or say 997,916 m. Now, gentlemen, if we would strike a coin called the rupee or florin, of our silver standard, 222 pennyweights, which is equal to 925—therefore, 8⅓ m. intrinsically better than the present rupee—and if the specific weight of such a coin be fixed at 190 or 191 grains, we would, at the price of 5s. per ounce standard, establish a currency worth 1s. 11⅞d., or 1s. 11¾d., leaving, when silver will even reach again its normal value, to the State its 3 per cent. or 1½ per cent. for seignorage, with this advantage, that no commercial community would ever be so fastidious as not to receive gladly such a currency. We would at once open to our own (the British) and the Indian coinage the gates of all

empires of the world. Our double florin and our double rupee piece would then drive out of China, Japan, the Dutch Indies, everywhere, the dollar,—we would build the bridge of a universal commonwealth.

The present large discrepancy between the real and fictitious value of such an all-important and growing factor as silver is, and which this precious metal must remain, in spite of all its adversaries, is, I maintain, utterly out of all reason. It is palpably wrong, then, to keep this legal tender system on its present exploded basis,—exploded, I say, for one more, one by far weightier reason even, and that is because our gold supplies are decreasing, and are not any more in our power to be commanded by natural ways and means, that of our exports, &c., and will be less so should all countries adopt a gold standard. Our cord-strings, the Bank rates, are ofttimes failing to act as they formerly did, as a powerful magnet for the attraction of gold. We thus lack the power to prevent the so-called Latin races—the nations girded by the Mediterranean, who have all still, and no doubt will be glad to have for ever, a double standard for their legal tender,—I say we have it not in our power to prevent these countries from putting their premium on gold up to 10 or 15, and even a higher per-centage in cases of emergency.

If we embody a clause in our proposal that it shall be optional to the payer to tender as part payment, say, 20 per cent. in each given sum up to 1,000*l.*, and 15 per cent. above that sum, in silver or bank-notes represented by such proportions, and that the receiver could not take exception on receiving such relative payments, then we should possess ourselves of the advantage of being able to fall back, in cases of emergency, upon the additional portion of legal tender payments —we could then allay the preoccupations of our principal political economists, and those of the one who wrote under date of the 11th December, 1876, in the *Times*, as follows: "The bullion tables give matter for reflection, especially at "such a period as this, when the uncertainties of the future are great, and the "diminished export trade reduces our power of commanding supplies of money "from abroad. The stock of gold is just now declining, and our financial dealings "with Germany and other countries render us liable to sudden calls from these "nations, should schemes of coinage or political crises make it desirable to recall "bullion from London. In such circumstances the condition of our Bank reserve "is one of the most important considerations to which attention can be directed; "but this is the only subject of immediate anxiety suggested by these tables." All these preoccupations on the part of this writer and the multitude would be at once allayed. The Bank of England returns would not show then every week, as they are forcibly obliged to do now, an open column of "silver bullion;" against this item there would be no need then to put in every week's publication a blank bar against this silver bullion—that blank which, occasioned by our shortcomings, affords thus to other nations chances of gains in their trade with our Indian Empire of which we cannot at present avail ourselves.

This measure adopted would impart to silver its stable and solid basis. Silver would never again collapse into such an unsteady, such an unreliable, nay, such a dangerous state as it did a short while ago, and for three years past. Neither should we ever be overburdened by our silver coin; readily and steadily it would get absorbed here and abroad. It would give our Mint increased work—nay, even at times would tax its energy to the utmost to fulfil its task. With improved coinage machinery, with newly-invented mechanical appliances for superseding costly labour in refining gold and silver, the profit would furthermore be increased. The further incalculable advantage to be derived from

this measure would be this, that, while in tendering bar silver to the Mint here or in Calcutta for coinage purposes, the buyers and shippers of this bullion would, until they obtained the equivalent in florins or rupees, have to incur anyhow some loss of interest,* porterage, &c., even if they were allowed, contrary to what the law in England entitles them, here in England to do—viz., to tender silver for coinage to the Mint—the ready-struck new coin, the florin or rupee, or even sub-divisional parts of this then correct unit of our present sovereign, and also new Indian coin, the Imperial Victoria, or Victoria mohur, as it might appropriately be styled, could be shipped anywhere. The Mint would not less obtain, and that in very great and yearly increasing proportions, the respective seignorage. Again, Council drafts could be issued against such quantities of the new silver coin as the Government might deem expedient to ship itself, as by so doing this pernicious competition would be knocked on the head, this permissive adverse rivalry between the sales of Indian drafts and silver would cease, and be effectually stopped for ever.

I can show that whenever the German Government—who, by its injudicious silver demonetization, incurred the double task of getting rid of 200,000,000*l.* sterling of silver of the French indemnity, besides an immense amount of its own silver—perceived that large amounts pressed heavily on our market, it had recourse to the following measure. It ordered its agent to buy large sums of our East India Council drafts, and by so doing counteracted the impending greater fall of silver, steadied the bullion market, and profited in the end by the transaction. The following extract from the *Daily News*, of the 4th October, 1876, proves the correctness and wisdom of these operations: "The market for bar silver is "flat, and a sale has been made this afternoon at 52¾d. per oz., although the "colonial price is still called 52⅞d. It is understood that the German Govern- "ment is not shipping any silver direct by the to-morrow's boat, but doubtless a "good deal will be sent by it from its stock here. We have heard that the Ger- "man financial authorities are buyers forward of Indian paper, and this being "the case, it will enable them to ship a considerable quantity of their surplus "stock of silver, which, as we mentioned this morning, is likely to be increased "shortly, thus practically competing against Council drafts."

Again, we read in the article on "Trade and Finance" in the *Daily News* of the 30th October, 1876: "The German Government is popularly believed to "possess a fair amount of demonetized silver in stock in London, which is held "for a shade better price than that now obtainable, and they have also taken "time by the forelock in buying forward Indian drafts to provide," &c., &c. *Daily News*, 19th October, 1876: "We still understand that the German "Government is in the market for Council drafts deliverable two or three months

* Concerning this loss of interest on bullion tendered for coinage purposes, I may state that it has to be taken in account to an extent which gives to the Government the advantage over private individuals by 5 to 6 per cent. per annum, and quite irrespective even of the loss of 1½ per cent. private firms have to incur owing to the time which the transmission requires from Europe to India, where the rates are rarely less than 6 to 9 per cent. per annum. As a case in point, I allude to the measure recently adopted by the Bank of France, which reduced their buying price of gold and dorés ⅛ per cent., in consideration of loss of time occasioned by the delay on the part of the Mint. By this measure the French exchange has to recede to 25f. 10c., to allow the shipment of gold bars from London to Paris to be effected at a profit. (See Money Article in the *Times*, 21st February, 1877.)

"hence, which will provide them cover for their direct silver shipments to the "East, and the eventuality of the war would undoubtedly cause more anxiety to "realize the surplusage of the depreciated silver, and gold would be taken from "this side in consequence."

The object which our Continental friends attained in our market was, that they raised the price of silver, which stood as low as 46¾d. in July, to 58¼d. per oz. in December last year, showing thus a recovery of not less than 25 per cent. in the value of silver and a like rebound in the corresponding rate of the Indian exchange.

Is it not obvious, therefore, that our own Government could, by judicious arrangements, have recourse to equally practical measures? Just as the German Government does; so could our Indian Council proceed, in order to steady the course of the Indian exchange, and to counteract the pernicious effects of this permissive, adverse competition of the silver sales! If, moreover, the placing of the Council drafts were made periodically—that is, if it was so arranged that they were offered in the market when, at the respective seasons for returns to be made to India against produce of various kinds, and which time generally is at the fall of the year and in the spring, a natural large demand exists for Indian paper—then all impediments, dead-locks, and all chances of violent fluctuations would for ever be avoided, and a healthy, even state of exchange would surely then be established. It would merely require the outlay of a very inconsiderable sum per annum for the proper arrangement, superintendence, and management of all this, to effect such a salutary, such an indispensable change, to save millions of pounds sterling to the Government, to free our East Indian merchants and traders from all anxiety—in fact, to bestow on our Indian communities a boon for which they all yearn. The sooner this be done, the freer will breathe all those who have such heavy interests at stake in the proper solution of this all-engrossing question.

Now for the last, but not the least, boon which we shall derive from this measure—the cardinal benefit to be obtained by it. We should introduce at once into the commerce of the world our silver unit, our Victoria florin and rupee, of 190 grains in weight by 925 m., or 222 pennyweights, our present standard left intact, as the only, the true tenth part of our gold sovereign, and the real fifteenth part of the Imperial Victoria gold mohur—both of these also of an unaltered, identical fineness, as heretofore, of 22 carats, the latter simply increased to 184·9 grains specific weight.

Our Imperial British-Indian silver coins and both our gold currencies, by this most simple measure placed on one and the same footing, comprehensively and feasibly, would henceforth freely circulate over the surface of more than half the globe. Our edifice would be crowned!

The Poverty of India.

PART IV.

ADJOURNED MEETING OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION, FOR DISCUSSION OF THE PAPERS ON "THE POVERTY "OF INDIA" READ BY MR. DADABHAI NAOROJI.

AN adjourned meeting of the Bombay Branch of the East India Association was held on Monday evening, July 24, 1876, at the Framjee Cowasjee Institute, to discuss Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji's paper on "The Poverty of "India." There was a fair attendance of members and visitors. On the proposal of Mr. ARDASEER FRAMJEE MOOS, Mr. RUGHNNATH NARAYEN KHOTE was called to the chair.

The CHAIRMAN, in opening the proceedings, said: Gentlemen, in inviting you to offer your remarks on the subject of the very able papers which our worthy friend, Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, has presented to you, and to discuss it fully in a fair and impartial manner, I desire to draw your particular attention to the scope within which your remarks ought, in my opinion, to be confined. There seems to be some misapprehension as to the real drift of Mr. Dadabhai's paper. Some people seem to entertain the opinion that it is designed to show that the British Government contrasts unfavourably with the previous Native rule in respect of the happiness of the people. Others, again, appear to think that though no such comparison is intended to be made between the respective aptitudes of the British and Native Governments to promote the happiness of the people, still the design of the paper is to cast an indirect slur on the character of the British Government. But there is no ground for imputing such motives to the writer of the paper. The paper makes no attempt at all to show that the British rule in India is worse than the Native rule we have had, or to maintain that we earned from the soil of our mother country more for our maintenance and support when we were under Native administration than we do now under British rule. Not only has the paper made no attempt to institute any such comparison between Native and British rule, but it has not even attempted to compare India with any other country. All that the writer wants to show is, that, taking all things into account, what is left in the hands of the large population of this country is hardly 40s. per head per annum—a sum evidently insufficient to keep body and soul together, not to speak of comfort or

decency. He professes to draw his conclusions, not from imaginary premises, but from statistics and returns derived from official reports. In fact, he believes they are arithmetical truths; and we know Mr. Dadabhai sufficiently well to feel sure he will be the first person to own his errors if any be pointed out to him. In this matter you have not to deal with metaphysical subtleties, nor with any political questions, but with stubborn facts and figures. Mr. Dadabhai has dealt with them in a manner which has led him into certain conclusions, and those differing from him have only to show where he has made the mistake, and the discussion should be confined to these figures and to the deductions he has drawn from them. That the British rule in India has been productive of much benefit, and has done much to promote the good of the people of this country in various ways—in the spread of education, for instance, in the security to life and property, in giving an impartial administration of justice, in conferring freedom of speech and thought—has been freely acknowledged by Mr. Dadabhai on several occasions, and must be admitted by all the masses of our countrymen, and there can be no two opinions on that point. Under no other Government could we enjoy these blessings; and it is a pleasure always to make this acknowledgment, openly and frankly. To say of Mr. Dadabhai's paper that it only holds out to public gaze the black side of British administration is to say something which is not true. Certain investigations and calculations from official statistics have resulted in the discovery of the existence of a state of poverty among the people of India which calls loudly for immediate attention. He has endeavoured to trace the causes which, he thinks, have brought about this deplorable state of things, and all we have to do is to determine whether the picture he portrays is a real one or not. If it be found that there are no errors in Mr. Dadabhai's deductions and calculations, it will then be our bounden duty to draw the pointed attention of our humane rulers to the fact thus established, and respectfully to solicit them to adopt effective remedial measures for the amelioration of the condition of the millions of this country whose destinies Providence has placed in their hands. With these few preliminary remarks, I will now invite you to enter on the discussion of the subject before us.

Mr. JOHN COLLETT commenced the discussion and said: I have to thank the Committee of the Bombay Branch of the East India Association for this opportunity of replying, in a more formal manner than is usually permitted at the meetings of this Association, to the two papers on "The Poverty of India."

The chief points which Mr. Dadabhai insists upon are that "the "existing system of administration" is causing "the gradual im- "poverishment of India," and that the principal agent in this work is the home charges, amounting to from 15,000,000*l.* to 20,000,000*l.* sterling every year. I will not attempt to show that the home charges are not a burden on the people of India, nor do I wish to urge that they should not be reduced as far as possible, but I insist that they are not a drain on the trade and resources of India, and will not produce the fatal consequences predicted of them. An examination of the course of the foreign trade of India shows that her trade with the United Kingdom is conducted on perfectly sound principles; and we may justly infer from a fair consideration of the whole subject that the home charges almost disappear owing to the advantages which India undoubtedly possesses under the British Government, notwithstanding it is a foreign rule.

In his first paper on "The Poverty of India" Mr. Dadabhai takes the total of exports and imports of India, and finding that the exports are about 20,000,000*l.* more than the imports, he makes a calculation how much that sum will amount to in a period of thirty-eight years, from 1835 to 1872, and finding that, after making some deductions from this formidable total of 760,000,000*l.*, sterling, the sum left is 200,000,000*l.*, he says that sum represents a total loss to India during that period; he calls it "a drain from the very produce of the country, that disables us from build- "ing our railroads from our own means." In addition to this loss, the benefit derived by England during that period is estimated at 500,000,000*l.* sterling, exclusive of the profit from Government stores and articles used by Europeans in India. We may, I think, at once dismiss the consideration of these figures as visionary, for, if true, the country would have been a barren waste in half the eighteen years Mr. Dadabhai has selected by which to test the consequences of British domination.

I will therefore consider the annual amount of the home charges. We are told that India has derived no benefit from the expenditure of this money; that, on the contrary, it has been all absorbed in England, and, in short, that the result of the annual drain on account of the home charges is the same as though the money had been forcibly taken out of the country and spent in England. This is, however, an unreasonable view to take of the matter, for not only is a very large portion of the money usefully employed by the Government, but the sum it represents in the total of the exports is employed profitably before it eventually falls into the hands of the Secretary of State in London. Out of it the Government pays interest

on capital borrowed and spent in the construction of public works, the pensions of former servants of the Government, and for the purchase of stores which are used in India or for the benefit of India.

The money, however, is usefully employed before it reaches the Secretary of State; for it must be borne in mind that the home charges are taken from the total of the exports after those exports have been sold, not necessarily in England, as I will presently show you, but in other countries as well. Assuming that the cultivators of the soil do contribute the whole of the home charges out of the assessment they pay on their land, I think it is very clear that though they may be losers, others may be gainers. One instance will illustrate the whole. Supposing the produce of the land belonging to any one cultivator realizes the sum of Rs. 1,000, including the land assessment, the produce representing this sum is bought up by the agents of purchasers residing, perhaps, at a distance, when it immediately becomes a source of profit to the purchaser and to a vast number of others through whose hands it must pass till eventually it reaches the market, which may be in England, on the Continent of Europe, in China, or some other part of the East. It is clear that this quantity of produce is a source of profit to every one concerned; and to whatever extent a portion of it may be a drain on the resources of the cultivator, it is none whatever to the rest of the people of India. Now this is precisely the case with the whole of the quantity of produce that goes to make up the total of the exports of this country.

I will now analyze the figures which make up the totals of exports and imports in a series of years, for the purpose of tracing the course of the foreign trade of India and illustrating the point under consideration. Mr. Dadabhai, in estimating the total loss which he says India suffers from the deficit in the imports compared with the exports, has taken the years from 1835 to 1872. I have not the books at hand which show the returns of all those years, but I have those which show the totals of exports and imports from 1858 to 1875—a period of eighteen years, fourteen of which are the same as those taken by Mr. Dadabhai. The total exports of these years amounted to 910,995,000*l.*, and the imports to 764,310,000*l.*, showing a difference of 146,600,000*l.*, which Mr. Dadabhai would call a total loss. If I separate the figures that represent the trade of India with the different foreign countries, I find that the total of exports for this period to the United Kingdom amounted to 490,000,000*l.*, and the imports to 527,600,000*l.*, showing a balance of imports over exports for the whole eighteen years of 37,600,000*l.* As far, therefore, as the trade of India with the United Kingdom is concerned, the principles on which it is conducted are perfectly sound and healthy.

This sum gives a surplus of about 2,000,000*l.* every year; so that, looking at the matter from this point of view, India is able to pay the cost of the home charges out of the profits of her trade with the United Kingdom alone, and to receive a surplus besides. Calculations of the huge profits gained by England, which are placed at 500,000,000*l.* as the lowest figure, all vanish into very thin air indeed. There still remains to India her trade with the Continent of Europe, with China and the rest of the East. The exports to France, Germany, and the Mediterranean ports for these eighteen years amounted to about 6,000,000*l.* sterling every year, but the imports only amounted to about 800,000*l.*—less than 1,000,000*l.* every year. To China and the rest of the East the exports amounted to about 23,000,000*l.* every year, but the imports ranged only from 7,500,000*l.* to 9,000,000*l.* every year during the eighteen years I have selected. We learn from these figures that India's trade with the Continent of Europe and with China and the East amounts to about 30,000,000*l.* every year, and the imports amount to about 10,000,000*l.* every year. It is, then, in the difference between the exports and imports in this trade that we meet with the sum of 20,000,000*l.* every year about which so much has been written. As the trade of India with the United Kingdom does not give the Secretary of State the opportunity of drawing bills on the Indian Treasuries, he avails himself of the balance in India's trade with the Continent of Europe and the East to supply himself with the money to pay the home charges, because this portion only of India's trade shows a balance in payment of which gold or silver must be sent; and those who have to pay India in this way find it more advantageous to take the bills of the Secretary of State for India in London than to send specie. England's large trade with the Continent of Europe and with China renders the negotiation of this business a very easy matter. But towards the payment of these demands of the Secretary of State for India the opium duty—which, remember, is paid by the Chinese, not by the Natives of India—contributes a clear sum of about 6,000,000*l.* sterling every year. Turning, then, to the figures already given, we have in the eighteen years under notice a total deficit of 146,600,000*l.*, or about 8,000,000*l.* sterling a-year; but the trade to the United Kingdom shows a surplus during that time of 37,600,000*l.* If we take the opium duty of 6,000,000*l.* a-year, we get from that source for those years a total of 108,000,000*l.* contributed by China alone towards the home charges; and the final result shows a sum of 2,000,000*l.* a-year which represents the burden of home charges on India. I think, then, that the conclusion we must come to from all this array of figures is that the home charges are not a drain on the resources of India for which there is no equivalent return; that they are not, therefore, exhausting

her capital; that though they are necessarily a burden the pressure of which ought to be lessened as much as possible, yet that burden is borne without producing any of the ruinous and fatal consequences which are stated to be inevitably connected with the payment of this tribute by India for her foreign rule.

An important point for consideration in the result we have arrived at is that the incidence of the home charges remains the same; it does not rest on the capital employed in trade, though trade supplies the means wherewith to pay those charges, but only on the producer or tax-payer, by whom the cash balances in the Government Treasuries are maintained. The merchant or banker who takes in London the Secretary of State for India's bill for a lakh of rupees is repaid his advances out of the cash in the Government Treasuries in Calcutta, Madras, or Bombay, as the case may be, and that cash is the proceeds of the taxes collected from all classes of the community. The capital employed in trade is not, therefore, exhaustively drawn upon to pay the home charges, but the whole of it is profitably employed in the negotiation of the ordinary business of the merchant or banker. The amount of the home charges is really another source of profit to those engaged in trade, and it enables the transfer of that portion of capital from England to India to be made at the most advantageous rates and with the greatest safety. The incidence of the taxes remains the same, and I have shown that whenever that portion of them which goes towards paying the home charges is absorbed in the capital employed in trade, it is at once a source of profit to all those through whose hands it passes. We may, therefore, now leave this part of the subject, and turn our attention to another important point raised by Mr. Dadabhai.

I have taken the consideration of the difference between the totals of exports and imports before that of any other point in Mr. Dadabhai's two papers, because on that really hangs the significance of all that those papers contain. I proceed now to examine the correctness of the figures put before us to prove that the people of India have not enough food to live upon. The average annual income per head of the 150,000,000 of inhabitants in British India is first said to be 27s., or Rs. 13-8 at par rate of exchange. This sum gives to each man, woman, and child Re. 1-2 per month of thirty days, or 7 pies a-day each, out of which they must be fed and clothed; 40s. a-year a-head is finally fixed on as the average income of the people, which is called "a high "estimate." This, on a rough calculation, would give less than one anna a-day for every man, woman, and child in the British dominions in India. I think I may say at once that almost any one will admit that at this rate a large number of persons must die from physical exhaustion every year,

and to such an extent that the population must be steadily and rapidly decreasing. With the exception, however, of the famine in Orissa a few years ago and the late famine in Bengal, we have not heard for many years past that any unusual number of deaths has occurred, nor has any statement been made that the population is decreasing in any part of India. On the contrary, some statisticians were calculating a year ago that because the population of India is increasing so rapidly the Government of India would be greatly puzzled and, perhaps, seriously embarrassed to know what to do with the additional millions that at the present rate of increase might be reasonably expected to be added in a few generations to the existing population.

Considerable difficulty is met with in getting at any reliable statement of the actual amount of produce which the soil of India annually renders to its industrious cultivators. Mr. Dadabhai says that the land assessment is about one-eighth of the produce; that the land revenue amounts to about 21,000,000*l.* a-year, and then, multiplying that sum by eight, he takes 168,000,000*l.*, the result given, and, after making a few additions, he fixes on 200,000,000*l.* as the total which represents the income of "less than 27s. a-head for the annual support of the whole "people," and, finally, by adding still further to the value of the produce, he takes, he says, "40s. a-head for the gross production as a high estimate." I think we may consider that the people of India have sufficient food to prevent them from starving, and a careful estimate of the true amount of the assessment on the land confirms this view. In the Deccan, the amount of the assessment, after a long series of years of observation, has been pronounced by competent Government officials to range from one-fifteenth to one-forty-fifth of the gross produce; so that we may double the produce of the Deccan reckoned by Mr. Dadabhai, and other parts of India show similar results. In Bengal, for instance, the loss of revenue Government has to submit to every year from the permanent settlement has not been taken into account. This loss may be from 3,000,000*l.* to 5,000,000*l.* a-year, and, by Mr. Dadabhai's mode of calculating the value of the produce, would add not less than 25,000,000*l.* sterling to the value of the produce for Bengal alone. In the N.W. Provinces the average assessment is one-sixteenth of the produce; in the Central Provinces, where every variety of tenure in India exists, the average rate of the assessment is 1s. or 8 annas an acre. In Madras the rate is an average of 3s. 9d. per acre, or Re. 1-12. In the Bombay Presidency the rate is certainly not more than one-sixteenth, and in some instances not above one-fortieth, of the gross produce of the soil. Difficult as it is to fix any figure which correctly represents the rate of the land assessment, I think we

may certainly discard the estimate of one-eighth as a figure that in no single part of British India represents the rate of the assessment on the produce of the land. In order, therefore, to have some adequate notion of the probable value of the produce of the land in India, we shall be nearer the truth if we take one-sixteenth as the average rate of the land assessment. Then we shall only allow each person one anna a-day to live upon, and if we double the value again, still we have only 2 annas a-day for each person. These figures would make the land assessment the one-thirty-second part of the produce instead of the one-eighth; but Mr. Dadabhai in his calculations shows that this may be correct, to the extent that they prove that the people of India have enough food to eat, for in the figures he gives of the value of the produce in the Punjab and N.W. Provinces he makes them purchase about 2 lbs. of the best wheat a-day for every man, woman, and child in those provinces—more than enough for their daily wants. The result is not, however, satisfactory. It is, indeed, impossible with existing means to ascertain clearly what the amount and value of the produce really are. Of two things we may, notwithstanding, be certain: first, that the land-tax in India is very much less than one-eighth of the produce; and, secondly, that the people of India are not perishing from starvation. The people have food enough to maintain their bodies in as sound and healthy a condition as they have been able to do for the last five or six hundred years; and during the time the British Government has ruled the country the population has greatly increased in numbers and in wealth.

I must now pass to the subject of wages and the general condition of the people. What the rates of wages are amongst a population of nearly 200,000,000 in a country like India, where no records exist of the condition of the people at different periods in their history, it would be difficult to find out, but as the people are not perishing for want of food, I think we may fairly assume that they have the money wherewith to buy it. The Government have made some attempts to ascertain the daily wages of skilled and unskilled labourers in the different presidencies and provinces throughout India, and from the figures given in these official returns I find that in the Central and Northern Provinces skilled labourers—of whom, I fear, there is a dearth throughout India—are paid 6½ annas a-day, and unskilled labourers about 3 annas; in the Bombay Presidency and southern parts of India skilled labourers are paid about 8 annas a-day, and unskilled about 4 annas. In Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras the daily wage of a skilled labourer is not less than Re. 1, and of an unskilled labourer about 6 annas. But leaving out these great cities, we get from the figures I have just quoted an average of 7 annas a-day for

skilled and 3½ annas for unskilled labour, or perhaps we should not be far from the truth if we took an average of 4 annas a-day for the whole of India. With respect to the quantity of food, clothing, and other necessaries of life which may be purchased out of this sum, we have very slender means of finding out; but if, as Mr. Dadabhai says, 40s. represents the average income of the people, and wheat can be bought in the Punjab and N.W. Provinces at an average of 43 lbs., for one rupee, even at that low rate of 40s. a-head, they would have enough food to eat, and there would be a good margin left every day, out of what I reckon to be the average daily wage of 4 annas, for the purchase of something besides food.

The condition of the people of India is, however, one of great poverty; but the climate confers one great advantage—the poor can endure their poverty more easily than in colder regions. To attribute, however, to British rule the poverty of the people is to ignore the previous history of the country. Mr. Dadabhai and other writers whose inclinations naturally lean towards Native rule may find a few pages in the past history of India under Native rule which tell of advancement, prosperity, and good government, but I am afraid not a single sentence can be found in the entire history of India before the arrival of the English which would lead the reader to suppose that any systematic, continuous, and determined attempts have ever been made to develop the resources of the country. The land, for instance, has been allowed to produce as much as the seasons or the richness of its component parts have permitted, whilst no efforts have been used to supply the losses which centuries of regular cultivation have necessarily caused; and we find that in every part of India the land produces much less than it ought, and always less than in some other countries. Take the article cotton, for instance, the production of which per acre is only about 50 lbs., when it ought to be not less than 250 lbs. an acre; in Egypt it is 400 lbs. Rice is produced at 800 lbs.; in America and South Bavaria 2,000 lbs. an acre are produced. Wheat in India is produced at the rate of 650 lbs. to 700 lbs., in Europe at 1,500 lbs.; and we may justly conclude that the indigenous *bajree* and *jowaree*, the most prolific and useful grains in the world, are produced at less than one-fourth the quantity they might be. In the dry climate of Sind, for instance, *bajree* and *jowaree* may be produced three times in the year with the help of a little irrigation. Of course the condition of the people of India can only be poor and miserable when such a state of affairs as this is permitted with the land, the final source of all the people's prosperity. As to the deterioration in the condition of the people under British rule, some of the extreme poverty

which is to be met with may, I think, be traced in part to the sudden changes in the mode of collecting the land assessment which were made as soon as the land passed into British hands. The cultivators, who had previously paid in kind, were called on to pay their assessments in cash; and this change was ignorantly made and insisted upon, causing forced sales of produce at ruinous rates. I am not fully acquainted with the actual condition of the cultivators in this Presidency at the present moment, but I think that probably one cause of the ryots being unable to improve as fast as they might do is that Government is too modern in its mode of collecting the land assessment, and that payments in kind might be sometimes taken, so that the ryots might have afforded them every facility in the paying of their assessments. The most appropriate and effective method for assisting the ryots and improving their condition would be the opening of agricultural banks in the districts and lending the cultivators money on their produce at easier rates than they can possibly borrow now; but these are details into which I cannot now enter. But notwithstanding the many extracts from the reports of district officers which are quoted to prove the assertion that the people are becoming poorer every day, I think we may fairly come to the conclusion that the Government is now beginning to find out how completely Native rule had blighted the prospects of the poor ryots, who never received any attention from their rulers, and who, so long as they paid their assessments, were considered to be prosperous and happy, and not to require any further notice. The miserable condition of the people, their ignorance and their poverty, are mainly caused by the unreasonable dread of *kala pani* with which their religion has inspired them, which has destroyed the spirit of enterprise which the Hindus once possessed, and made them listless and indolent. Added to this, indifference to all else but their own personal gain has been the great fault of all the Native rulers, till the country finally has fallen an easy prey to foreign, but energetic, intelligent, and, I think I may add, just rulers, whose object undoubtedly is to develop the resources of the country and improve the condition of the people; and both these results have been in a measure attained, though the way of carrying out these benevolent intentions has often been, and is still, in many respects very clumsy, and the cause, occasionally, of a great deal of mischief.

I would point out before concluding my remarks that, besides this country, both France and America show in their returns of exports and imports that the exports exceed the imports. In France, during fifteen years, from 1860 to 1874, in only five of those years were the imports more than the exports, and during the rest of the time the exports were from 3,000,000*l.* to 15,000,000*l.* sterling every year more than the im-

ports, and yet France found the money amongst her own people to pay the heavy expenses of the war with Germany, as well as the indemnity paid to Germany afterwards. In the United States of America the exports have exceeded the imports for several years past by from 10,000,000*l.* to 16,000,000*l.* sterling every year.

The acts of the English in India are not free from very severe censure on many occasions, especially in the early part of the history of their connection with India, but the British Government has not treated the people of India as did the Goths and Vandals who sacked the cities of the Roman Empire and even Rome itself. The people of India do not pay too highly for the security of life and property which they enjoy, though there is, nevertheless, room for improvement, which will probably be made in time, but the cost may be reduced most effectively by progress in the arts and sciences, and especially in the manufacturing industry of the country; and we may, without indulging in any extravagant anticipations, look forward to a prosperous future for India, and certainly we need not burden ourselves with the gloomy forebodings which Mr. Dadabhai asks us to entertain.

Mr. W. MARTIN WOOD said: With regard to the propositions that had been distributed, and were to be placed before the meeting by the Committee, he should like to make a remark or two. He referred more particularly to Nos. 8, 13, and 15. It must not be supposed for a moment that the Committee implied that Europeans were not needed in the public service of India. For his part, he believed they would always be the backbone of the Services. Some persons talk loosely about the English training the people of India to govern themselves, and then leaving them. That had never been his view of the matter. He believed that the two races had qualities which were the complement of each other. (Hear, hear.) The possession of India by England was a benefit to both countries; he could see that in many ways it had been an advantage to the English people. But it was the recent excess of European officials in India that the proposition referred to. Though it was true patronage was abolished, and entrance to the public service can only be gained through the narrow gate of competition, they had seen departments multiplied in every direction, and the constant demand for places resulted in more and more employés being sent out. Service in India was good for Englishmen and good for India, but this overdoing the thing reminded him (Mr. Wood) of a saying which he believed used to be current on the Continent so long ago as the sixteenth century, to the effect that "the worst of these English is, that when they get a "good thing they make it too common." (Laughter.) These references

to the undue number of English officers in India were not put forward by the Committee as a plea for the increased employment of Native officials. He (Mr. Wood) believed there was not near such a crave on this side of India for entry into the public service as there was, for instance, in Bengal. There was, he hoped, more self-reliance amongst the Native population here. The Committee put forward these propositions as having an urgent political and financial bearing on the welfare of British India as a whole; and they must remember that the terms used included reference to the vast additional expense thrown on India by the much larger proportion and greater expense of British troops since the amalgamation. (Hear, hear.) Then, too, if they looked at proposition No. 15, they would see that there was no wish to depend too much on appeal to Jupiter. This Association desired to incite the people to help themselves as much as possible. Though, as Mr. Dadabhai's paper shows, capital is the great want of India, there are some funds in the country which might be more freely used in the development of its latent resources. This was a time when their capitalists ought to do all they can in this direction, and not always wait until they could be quite sure of securing their profits of 10 and 12 per cent. (Hear.) They must be willing to risk something in promoting new industries and making new paths of trade. He could think of numberless instances in England where men had spent fortunes in this way. Sometimes these pioneers of industry lost their money, but in many other cases they or their sons had reaped the reward of their foresight and adventure, while the country in any case benefited enormously from such efforts. Therefore, he hoped that, now they had discussed this political subject, some member would next read them a paper on a mechanical or industrial topic. (Applause.)

MR. DADABHAI NAOROJI'S REPLY.

I begin with Mr. Maclean. He has very much misunderstood my papers. As a first instance, when he asks me to deduct the exports of India (less the exports from Native States) from my estimate of the production of India, he does not see that my estimate is for the *total production* in India, and that what is exported is not to be deducted therefrom.

As a second instance, he asks me to add 15,000,000*l.* for cotton manufactures. My estimate for production *includes* all *raw* cotton of British India, and I have already included in my estimate the additional value the raw cotton acquires by the application of industry in its conversion into cloth. Coal and foreign stores that

are used in the mills are paid for from, and are therefore *included* in, the production I have estimated. The only additional value is that of the labour employed. But even if we allow the *whole* additional value acquired by raw cotton in its conversion into cloth, what will it be? Mr. Maclean's "Guide to Bombay" (1875) (which is much later than the time of my notes) gives the number of the then working spindles as about 6 lakhs in the whole of the Bombay Presidency. Taking 5 oz. per day per spindle and 340 working days in the year, the total quantity of raw cotton consumed will be about 81,300 candies, which, at Rs. 150 per candy, amounts to about 1,220,000*l.* The price of cloth is generally about double the price of raw cotton, as I have ascertained from the details of two or three mills of Bombay; so that the whole addition caused by the mills to the value of raw cotton is only 1,250,000*l.*, say 1,500,000*l.* sterling to leave a wide margin. Then, again, there are, about the time of my notes, yarn imports into India worth about 2,500,000*l.* per annum. This, of course, is paid for from the production of the country. The value added to it is its conversion into cloth. Now the cost of weaving is about 25 per cent. of the value of yarn, so that the value thus added is about 600,000*l.*; say 1,000,000*l.* to include any contingency, making the total value to be added to the raw production of about 2,500,000*l.* If deduction is made for coal and foreign stores, this amount will be much lessened. Again, we know that hand-spinning is much broken down, and there can be but a little quantity of cloth woven out of hand-spun yarn in India. Giving even 500,000*l.* more for that industry, the outside total of addition to the raw produce would come to, as a high estimate, 3,000,000*l.* instead of the 15,000,000*l.* which Mr. Maclean asks me to add without giving a single figure for his data. Let him give any reasonable data, and I shall gladly modify my figures so far.

As a third instance of misunderstanding my paper, when Mr. Maclean asks me to take 5,000,000*l.* for gold and silver ornaments made in this country, he forgets that gold and silver are not produced in this country. All bullion is *imported*, and is paid for from the produce of India; it, therefore, can add nothing to my estimate of production. The only addition is the industry employed on it to convert it into ornaments. This industry for the ordinary native ornaments will be amply covered by taking on an average an eighth of the value of the metal, which will give about 625,000*l.*, or say 750,000*l.* sterling, or even 1,000,000*l.*, while Mr. Maclean wants me to take 5,000,000*l.*

As a fourth instance: while Mr. Maclean tells me to add 15,000,000*l.* and 5,000,000*l.* when there should be hardly one-fifth of these amounts, he does not see that I have actually allowed in my

paper for all manufacturing industrial value, to be added to that of raw produce, as 17,000,000*l.*; and, further, for any omissions 30,000,000*l.* more (*East India Association Journal*, vol. ix., No. 4, page 257).

These four instances, I think, would be enough to show the character of Mr. Maclean's criticism, and I pass over several other similar mistakes and mis-statements. I come to what is considered as his most pointed and most powerful argument, but which in reality is all moonshine. After contradicting flatly in my paper his assertion that the exports of the United States were in excess of imports, I had said that I had no reliable figures for the years after 1869. To this he replies, "Here they are;" and he gives them as follows. I quote his own words: "Mr. Dadabhai says he cannot get 'authentic figures' of "American trade for a later year than 1869; here they are for "him:—

Imports—Merchandize and Bullion.		Exports—Merchandize and Bullion.	
1869	£87,627,917	1869	£99,330,735
1870	97,779,351	1870	117,534,993
1871	112,552,770	1871	138,084,908
1872	117,259,899	1872	128,337,183
1873	132,709,295	1873	142,240,730
1874	119,172,249	1874	130,582,689
	£667,085,481		£756,111,238

"The excess of exports over imports for the six years is, therefore, "89,000,000*l.* sterling, giving a yearly average of nearly 15,000,000*l.* "against only 11,500,000*l.* for India. The explanation of the deficit in "imports in the case of the United States is, of course, similar to that "which accounts for so much of the Indian deficit. The United States "form a favourite field for investment of English capital, the interest of "which is paid by America in the form of exports of produce. Yet we "never heard an American citizen complain that his country was being "drained of its wealth for the benefit of foreigners. He is only anxious "to borrow as much English capital as he can, knowing that, invested "in reproductive works, it will repay him a hundredfold the paltry rate "of interest he has to send abroad."

To these remarks of Mr. Maclean I reply, that he has taken his figures from the "Statesman's Year Book." This book has made curious mistakes. It has *included* bullion in the figures for exports of "merchandize," and *again* given bullion separately; and it has *not* converted the "*currency*" value of exports of "domestic produce" from the Atlantic port into *gold*. These two and some such other mistakes render this book's figures for the years quoted above, taken by Mr. Maclean, utterly wrong. I give the following illustration of these mis-

takes in the figures for the year ending 30th June, 1871. The correct official* figures are :—

RE-EXPORTS (GOLD VALUE).

Merchandize	$14,421,270
Gold and Silver	14,038,629
Total	$28,459,899

EXPORTS.

Merchandize.		Specie and Bullion (Gold Value).	
From Atlantic Ports. Currency Value.	From Pacific Ports. Gold Value.	From Atlantic Ports.	From Pacific Ports.
$464,300,771 ... (equal to Gold Value) $414,826,393 ...	$13,712,624	$76,187,027 ...	$8,318,229
		Total...	$84,505,256

Total—Mixed Value, $562,518,651, equal to Gold Value, $513,044,273.

TOTAL EXPORTS.

Domestic Exports (Gold Value)	$513,044,273
Re-Exports (Gold Value)	28,459,899
Total (Gold Value)	$541,504,172

Now, instead of the above correct official figure of $541,504,172 as the *total* exports from the United States (including bullion), the "Statesman's Book" makes "merchandize" $590,978,550 and bullion $98,441,989, which I find to be made up as follows: It takes from the official returns *total mixed* value of domestic exports, $562,518,651, and then adds to it the *total* re-exports, $28,459,899, and makes the addition of these two figures as the total for "merchandize"—viz., $590,978,550. It will be now seen by a comparison of these figures with the official ones, that the "currency" value of the domestic exports from the Atlantic ports is *not* converted into gold, and that though in the two official totals of $562,518,651 and $28,459,899, bullion is *already included*, the total of these in the "Statesman's Book" is given for "merchandize" alone, and a further statement is given for bullion as $98,441,989, made up nearly of $84,505,256 of domestic exports and $14,038,629 of re-exports.

Mr. Maclean takes the total $590,978,550 of "merchandize" (which *already includes* bullion) and bullion *over again*, $98,543,885, and makes the exports $689,420,539, or 138,084,908*l.* It will thus be seen that his figure for 1871 contains bullion to the extent of $98,543,885, or 19,889,198*l.* taken *twice*, and the *currency* value of domestic produce exported from the Atlantic ports *is not* converted into gold value, making a further error of $49,474,378; or the total error in

* Monthly Reports on the Commerce and Navigation of the United States, by the Chief of the Bureau of Statistics, for the year ending 30th June, 1871, p. 380.

Mr. Maclean's figure for exports for 1871 alone is $98,543,885 + 49,474,378 = $148,018,263, or nearly 31,000,000*l.* sterling at 50d. per $.

I take 50d. per $, as the Parliamentary Returns for Foreign States, No. XII., have taken this rate of exchange.

Mr. Maclean has given the figures for six years. I am not able to verify the figure for 1874, so I give a comparison of the *official correct* figures and his figures for the years ending June, 1869, to 1873.

The "Statesman's Book's" wrong figures :—

	Imports. Merchandize.		Bullion.	Exports. Merchandize.		Bullion.
1869...	$417,506,379	...	$19,807,876	$439,134,529	...	$57,138,380
1870...	462,377,587	...	26,419,179	529,519,302	...	58,155,666
1871...	541,493,774	...	21,270,024	590,978,550	...	98,441,989
1872...	572,510,304	...	13,743,689	561,808,381	...	79,877,534
1873...	642,030,539	...	21,480,937	626,595,077	...	84,608,574
	$2,635,918,583		$102,721,705	$2,748,035,839		$378,222,143
Add...	102,721,705		...	378,222,143		...
Total	$2,738,640,288			$3,126,257,982		
				2,738,640,288		
				$387,617,694 Excess of Exports.		

Official correct figures* :—

Imports—Including Bullion. (Gold Value.)		Exports—Including Bullion. (Gold Value.)			
			Domestic.		Foreign.
1869	$437,314,255	1869 ...	$318,082,663	...	$25,173,414
1870	462,377,587	1870 ...	420,500,275	...	30,427,159
1871	541,493,708	1871 ...	512,802,267	...	28,459,899
1872	640,338,706	1872 ...	501,285,371	...	22,769,749
1873	663,617,147	1873 ...	578,938,985	...	28,149,511
Total	$2,745,141,403		$2,331,609,561		$134,979,732
Deduct Exports ...	2,466,589,293				
Excess of Imports...	$278,552,110		Total... $2,466,589,273		

Mr. Maclean's total error for the five years, 1869 to 1873, is therefore $278,552,110 + 387,617,694 = $666,169,804 = 138,785,000*l.*, at 50d. per $; or $133,233,961 = 27,757,000*l.* per annum.

In making, however, a comparison between the trade returns of India and the United States, there is one important matter to be considered, and when taken into account, as it ought to be, the imports of the United States will be some 16 per cent. more than they are above shown to be. In India the exports are declared at the value at the port of export. It is the same with the United States. The imports

* Monthly Reports on Commerce and Navigation of the United States, by Edward Young, Ph.D., Chief of the Bureau of Statistics, for the year ending 30th June, 1874, p. 177.

in India are declared at the "*wholesale cash price* less trade discount"* at the *port of import*, which means the value at the foreign port of export, *plus* freight, insurance, and other charges to the Indian port of import, and also *plus* 10 per cent. for profits. This is the principle on which the imports are declared in the Custom Houses in India when the tariff value is not already fixed, or the market price not agreed upon by the importer and the Custom House. But in the case of the United States the declared value† of imports is only the value declared at the *foreign port* from which the merchandize was *exported*, which means *without* adding the cost of freight, insurance and other charges, and 10 per cent. profits. Now Mr. Edward Young, the "Chief of the Bureau of "Statistics, Treasury Department" of the United States, calculates 6 per cent.‡ as representing the freight from foreign ports to America.

This 6 per cent. for freight (without taking the further additional charges for insurance, commission, &c., into account), together with the 10 per cent. as calculated in India for declaration for imports, makes it necessary to add 16 per cent. to the imports of the United States, before the actual excess of imports of the United States, on the principle adopted in India, can be ascertained and compared with that of India. In that case the actual excess of imports over exports in the United States will be \$717,774,734 = 149,536,403*l.*§ for the five years, 1869 to 1873, or \$143,554,947 = 29,907,280*l.* per annum. Thus the correct result about the United States (on the principle of the Indian Custom House) is that, instead of there being an excess of *exports* of 15,000,000*l.* sterling per annum, there is actually an excess of *imports* of *double* that amount, or nearly 30,000,000*l.* sterling; thus making a difference between Mr. Maclean's and the correct figures of nearly 45,000,000*l.* sterling per annum.

* Customs Act (6) of 1863, section 180, also inquiry at the Custom House, gave 10 per cent. to be added on the importer's invoice, or 20 per cent. on the manufacturer's invoice.

† Annual Report of Commerce and Navigation, 1873, says (p. 3): "Import "entries: sworn specie values at foreign places of export."

‡ Monthly Reports for the year ending 30th June, 1874, p. 352: "The value "of the imports of merchandize, as presented in the first table, being those at the "ports of shipment, it will be proper to add thereto the amount of freights to the "several ports of the United States . . . it is believed that 6 per cent. on the total "value of imports is an estimate of approximate accuracy."

§

Total Imports	\$2,745,141,403
Add 16 per cent. ...	439,222,624
	\$3,184,364,027
Deduct Exports	2,466,589,293

Excess of Imports ..... \$717,774,734, at 50d., for five years = £149,536,403
Average per annum, \$143,554,947, at 50d. = £29,907,280.

Mr. Maclean clearly admits my most important statements; he says: "It has been estimated that the amount of the annual earnings "of Englishmen connected with India which are thus transmitted "home cannot be less than 20,000,000*l.*, and we should be inclined to "place it at a *very much higher figure.*" *

Again: "To decrease these (home remittances) by clipping estab- "lishments, or rather re-framing on an economical basis, *by never employ-* "*ing other than natives of this country** except when good policy and "public convenience demand it, and, if possible, by establishing some "check on the extravagant follies of the Secretary of State, should be "the task of the Indian Government."

This is just what I say, that there is an enormous transfer of the wealth of this country to England, and the remedy is the employment of Natives only, beyond the exigencies of the British rule. But for this single circumstance, his remarks about the United States would apply to India perfectly well—viz., "He (the American) is only anxious to "borrow as much English capital as he can, knowing that, invested in re- "productive works, it will repay him a hundredfold the paltry rate of "interest he has to send abroad."

The Indian will do *just the same;* but while the American derives *the full benefit* of what he borrows, the Indian, borrowing with one hand, has to give the money away to England with the other hand in these "home remittances" of Englishmen and "home charges," getting for himself the *burden* only of the debt. The very idea of comparing the circumstances and condition of the United States and India as being similar, is simply absurd; on this point another reason will be given further on.

I will now answer Mr. Shapoorjee, who says India is in the same boat with the United States. In support of his assertion, he says the United States have foreign debts of about 1,625,000,000*l.* I requested him to show me any official or sufficiently reliable authority for these figures, and he shows me none.

Had Mr. Shapoorjee read my paper carefully, he would not have said a word about America's public debt, for he would have seen that I have excluded from my total of imports and exports those very years in which the United States contracted nearly the whole of its public debt (1863 to 1866). Again, Mr. Shapoorjee tells us that the railways of the United States "could not have cost "less than 20,000*l.* a-mile," while the "Railway Manual" for 1873-4, which he has kindly lent me, gives the average cost at $55,116, and the "Statesman's Book" gives $50,000 a-mile. This is about 10,000*l.* to 11,000*l.*, or nearly half of Mr. Shapoorjee's

* The italics are mine.

figure; and thus nearly half of his "850,000,000*l.*, if not more," of foreign capital for railways disappears. Now I give one more reason why Mr. Shapoorjee's figure of 1,625,000,000*l.* sterling as the present foreign debts of the United States cannot be accepted. Mr. Edward Young, whom I have already mentioned,—the highest official authority on the Treasury statistics of the United States,—calculates and gives (in his official "Monthly Reports on the Commerce and Navi- "gation of the United States for the year ending June 30, 1874," page 352) his own personal and unofficial estimate of the "aggregate "foreign debts of the United States." He says: "Although there "were no national securities held abroad at the commencement of our "late war, yet some of the bonds of the commonwealth of Pennsyl- "vania, and probably of Massachusetts and other States, as well as rail- "road shares and securities, were owned in Europe. In the absence of "accurate data on the subject, it is believed that $50,000,000 is an ample "estimate for these *ante bellum* securities. With this addition, our "aggregate foreign debt amounts to nearly TWELVE HUNDRED MILLION "DOLLARS." Such is Mr. Young's estimate of the aggregate debts, "national, State, municipal, and corporation, held in foreign countries"—*i.e.*, $1,200,000,000—when Mr. Shapoorjee asks us to take the figures nearly seven times larger,—1,625,000,000*l.*, equal to $7,800,000,000. I trust I may be excused for not accepting his figures, and his conclusions based thereon. Again, Mr. Shapoorjee has been good enough to give me an extract from the *Westminster Review* of January, 1876. This extract gives (in 1875) the national production of the United Kingdom as 28*l.* per head of population, of the United States as 28*l.* per head, and of Russia as 7*l.* 10s. per head; France, 22*l.*; Austria, 18*l.*; and Italy, 15*l.*; while India hardly produces 2*l.* a-head. The simple fact, then, that the United States is the second richest country in the world, and its people have *all* their revenues and resources at *their own* command and for *their own* benefit only, is enough to show that it is simply absurd and idle to compare it, in its circumstances and condition, as being in the same boat with the half-starving and ever-draining India. When the Americans are subjected to a "home remittance" to a foreign country of some "very much higher figure" than 20,000,000*l.* sterling a-year, and "home charges," and when a large number of foreigners engross all official and important positions to their own exclusion, causing thereby such heavy drain, *then* will be the proper time to make a comparison between America and India.

The comparison with Russia and other European States is equally unreasonable. In spite of the inferior administration of Russia, and the great military expenditure, its national income is nearly four times as much as that of India, and that of the other

European States is much larger still; and they have no "home remittances and charges" to remit, which India has to do from its wretched income of hardly 2*l.* per head per annum.

Mr. Schrottky misunderstands me when he thinks that in the present discussion about the *material condition* of India, I mention the necessity of the employment of Natives as anything more than the only remedy by which the capital of the country can be saved to itself, to enable the agricultural as well as all other industries to get the necessary life-blood for their maintenance and progress. If it were possible that every European coming to India would make it his home, so that the item of the "home remittances and charges" would be nearly eliminated, it would not matter at all, as far as the present question of the material prosperity of the country is concerned, whether the European or the Native is in office. The only remedy is, that either the Europeans must, like the Mahomedan conquerors, become Natives and *remain in* the country, or remain *out* of office beyond the exigency of the British rule. If not, then it is idle to hope that India can rise in material prosperity, or be anything else but a wretched drudge for England's benefit. On the other hand, a natural and just policy would make India, with its teeming population, the best customer for England, and the best field for England's enterprise, and its agriculture would derive all the aid which Mr. Schrottky could desire in the goodness of his heart.

To Mr. Trant I have only to say that his political economy may be applicable to a Native-governed country, but when he takes the element of the "home remittances and charges" into account, he will not differ much from me.

In reply to Mr. Collett's remarks, I have to request him to take several elements into account which he appears to have forgotten.

1. To add 15 per cent.* profits to exports. (During the American

* For the following countries the profits, or excess of imports over exports, are as under, subject to modification for foreign debts or loans :—

The United Kingdom	25 per cent.	(1858 to 1870)
Australia	15 ,,	(1858 to 1868)
British North America (*East India Association Journal*, vol. ix., No. 4, page 263.)	29 ,,	(1858 to 1868)
United States (as under)	18 ,,	(1869 to 1873)
Imports		$2,745,141,403
Add 6 per cent. Freight (leaving other charges—Commission, Insurance, &c.—alone)		164,708,484
		$2,909,849,887
Deduct Exports		2,466,589,293
Excess of Imports, or Profits—say 18 per cent. above Exports		$443,260,594

War, the percentage of profits on the exported produce was very much larger.)

2. To deduct from import nearly 140,000,000*l.* of foreign debt (public and railway) incurred during the eighteen years he has taken.

3. To remember that the profits of opium as well as of all India's commerce are as much India's property and resources as the profits in coal, iron, and all other exported produce and manufactures of England are England's property and resources, though all such profits are derived from foreign nations; and that all the profits of opium and general commerce of India are included in my total production of India.

4. To remember that, notwithstanding that opium and the profits of commerce are legitimate property and resources of India, even after deducting these amounts, or that, in addition to these amounts being sent away to England, there is the further amount of about 200,000,000*l.* in principal alone gone to England during the thirty-eight years I have taken; and that Mr. Collett has not pointed out any mistake in my calculations.

For his eighteen years also, if he will take the items he has forgotten, his results will not differ from mine.

For 1858 to 1875 his figure for Exports is		£910,995,000
Add 15 per cent. Profits		136,649,250
Total proceeds of Exports		£1,047,644,250
His Imports are	£764,310,000	
Deduct Loans Imported, about	140,000,000	
Actual Commercial Imports (including Government Store)		£624,310,000
Excess of proceeds of Exports		£423,334,250
Deduct Railway Interest		51,133,987
Transfer to England from India's resources (excluding Interest on Railway Loans)		372,200,263
This transfer is equal to the whole of the Opium Revenue	£108,156,107	
The whole of Profits on Exports	136,649,250	
And furthermore, from India's resources	127,394,906	

or nearly 130,000,000*l.* in addition to the railway interest. The actual transfer is even larger than this, as will be seen further on.

Mark, then, during Mr. Collett's eighteen years *all* opium revenue, *all* profits of commerce and guaranteed interest on railways, are transferred to England, and 130,000,000*l.*, besides making a total, in principal alone, of 424,000,000*l.*, or 372,000,000*l.*, excluding railway interest. Moreover, it must be remembered that during the American War great profits were made, and this having to be added to the exports, is so much more transferred to England.

Thus, as Mr. Collett's figures are imperfect, I need not trouble the

meeting with any comments on the confusion into which he has fallen on account thereof. I have taken his own figures and shown what they lead to, as the best way of pointing out his mistake.

Thanks to my critics, they have led me into a closer examination of some points, and I find the case of India worse than what I have already made out. I have to modify some of my figures,* which I now do.

I have shown that the imports into India (*including* bullion) from 1835 to 1872 are 943,000,000*l.* Now, in making out a nation's balance-sheet with foreign countries, the balance of profit should be taken between the price of exports at the port of export, and the price of imports as *laid down* or costing at the port of import, and not the *market* price at the place of import, which include the profit on the import obtained in the importing country itself.

I may illustrate thus: I laid out Rs. 1,000 in cotton and sent it to England. There it realized proceeds, say, Rs. 1,150. This may be remitted to me in silver, so that when the transaction is completed, I receive into my hands Rs. 1,150, in the place of Rs. 1,000 which I had first laid out, so that the country has added Rs. 150 thereby to its capital. But suppose, instead of getting silver, I imported, say, ten bales of piece goods which were laid down in Bombay for Rs. 1,150. The gain to the country so far is the same in both cases—an addition of Rs. 150. But any gain to me *after* that in the sale of these piece goods in India itself is *no* gain to India. Suppose I sold these goods for Rs. 1,300. That simply means that I had these goods and another person had Rs. 1,300, and we simply exchanged. The country has no addition made to its already existing property. It is the same—viz., the ten bales of piece goods and Rs. 1,300; only they have changed hands. Bearing this in mind, and also that the declared value of imports into India is not the *laying down* price, but the *market*† price, which means the *laying down* price *plus* 10 per cent. profit, it is necessary, for ascertaining the *real* profits from the *foreign commerce* of India, to deduct 10 per cent. from the declared value of imports (merchandize). Doing this, the total imports from 1835 to 1872 should be taken at 943,000,000*l.* minus 62,000,000*l.*,‡ which will be equal to 881,000,000*l.* In that case the real deficit of imports under what the imports ought to have been (1,438,000,000*l.*) will be 557,000,000*l.* in place of the nearly 500,000,000*l.* I have given in my paper.

The figure of the amount, after deducting opium and profits of

* *East India Association Journal*, vol. ix., No. 4, p. 264.

† See the first note at page 149.

‡ Imports—merchandize, 1834-5 to 1872, 618,000,000*l.*, 10 per cent. of which is nearly 62,000,000*l.*

commerce, will be 248,000,000*l.* instead of nearly 200,000,000*l.*; or the total transfer of wealth to England in addition to the railway interest (40,000,000*l.*) will be 517,000,000*l.*, instead of 453,000,000*l.* given in my paper, and the yearly average of every five years of this amount of 517,000,000*l.* will be proportionately larger—about 13 per cent. The averages will be about—

1835 to 1839	£6,000,000
1840 to 1844	6,600,000
1845 to 1849	8,700,000
1850 to 1854	8 400,000
1855 to 1859	8,700,000
* 1860 to 1864	19,000,000
1865 to 1869	27,500,000
1870 to 1872	31,000,000

This average during the American War would be much increased if the whole profits on the exported produce of the time could be ascertained.

In preparing this reply I have had to work out all the figures hurriedly, but I hope they will be found correct.

I have not seen the late Administration Reports, but I trust they give fuller details than the previous ones with which I had to deal, and if so, more precise results could be obtained as to the actual annual production of the country, which is the most important point to be settled to give us an accurate knowledge of the actual poverty or otherwise of this country.

Since I wrote the above I purchased a copy of the latest Administration Report of Bengal (1874-5) in the hope of obtaining from it some more definite statistics about production than I have been able to embody in my paper. Great was my disappointment when I read Sir R. Temple's statement: "Again, the survey embraced only the exterior boun-"daries of each village or parish, and afforded no details of cultiva-"tion and waste, culturable or unculturable." The question at issue is a simple matter of facts and science. Is there so much cultivated land or not? is there so much produce or not? and are such and such the prices or not? And then common arithmetic gives you certain results. No amount of indirect reasoning or assumption can falsify facts and arithmetic, and make 2 and 2 equal 5. So far as the official statistics are imperfect, it is the duty of the Government to give to the public full details. We know the national production of other countries, and there is no reason why the Indian Government should not

* I could not find the amount of enfaced paper given for every year before 1860. I have, therefore, taken the whole amount in 1860, which increases the average for 1860-64, and correspondingly diminishes the average of the previous years, but not to a large extent.

be able to give us similar important information. That would be the best and surest guide and test of the actual condition of the people of India, and our rulers would see from them their way clearly to the most proper and effectual remedies. I have not the least doubt in my mind that if the English Government once clearly see the evil, they will *not shrink* from applying the proper remedies. My estimate of 40s. a-head has been accepted and argued upon by an Under-Secretary of State (Mr. G. Duff) and a Viceroy (Lord Mayo), and another Viceroy (Lord Lawrence) has told us that the mass of the people are half-fed. It is not the question of the ordinary proportion of the poor in every country. Mr. Grant Duff, in his reply to Mr. Lawson, asked whether the "already poor population of India" was to be ground down "to the very "dust" by the removal of the opium duty. So the margin between the present condition of India and of being ground down "to the very "dust" is only the opium revenue. Is this prosperity? I have been lately reading the expression, "balance in favour of India." The writers evidently suppose that what they call the balance of trade in favour of India was something that India had to receive some time or other. They do not seem to understand that of all the *deficit* of import against the proceeds of export, not a single pie *in cash or goods* is to be received by India; that, similarly, of all the *excess* of imports in all the other parts of the British Empire to the extent of 15 to 25 per cent. over exports, or 18 per cent. in the United States, not a single farthing has to be paid to any country. It is, in fact, the profit of their exports, and the deficit of India is so much transfer of its wealth to England.

Mr. Dadabhai concluded by thanking the meeting for extending so much indulgence to him, and the many gentlemen who had come forward to join in the discussion. When they first met in that hall, their fear was that they would have none to oppose or to criticize the paper; but he was agreeably surprised to find that it had been criticized by so many, and he was sure that this would bring out the real truth, and he hoped that in future his critics would exert their influence to make India something like the United States. ("Hear, hear," and cheers.)

After Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji had finished his reply, Mr. K. T. TELANG, one of the Joint Secretaries, presented the following propositions on behalf of the Committee, as embodying the chief facts and deductions comprised in Mr. Dadabhai's two papers and reply:—

1. That from official and other evidence adduced in the papers and reply read by Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, it plainly appears that the total annual production of British India cannot be estimated at more than

40s. per head of the population, and that the masses of the population are exceedingly poor. That since the decline of prices (which had set in about 1866-7), it is to be feared that the income of the masses is even lower than the figures above deduced as the average.

2. That on a comparison of various tables of diet, brought down to the lowest limit compatible with supporting adults in health (such as prisoners, emigrants, sepoys, and agricultural labourers), it would appear that the masses of the Indian population must be under-fed and imperfectly nourished.

3. That the difficulty of taking the first steps towards remedying this low condition of the people is felt most directly and palpably in the deficiency of capital in all agricultural districts.

4. That the natural desire for saving, and the normal increase of capital which would become a self-acting agency for developing the resources of the country, are checked, and accumulation becomes more and more difficult, because of a large portion of the annual revenues and resources of India being transferred to England, instead of, as in countries with home government, where the taxes are chiefly expended amongst the community from which they are raised.

5. That it plainly appears, on a comparison of trade returns, debt, and other financial statistics, that the transfer from the revenues and resources of India to England is as follows: That whereas, in other parts of the British Empire, the total imports are in excess of total exports—for the United Kingdom (1858-70), 25 per cent.; for British North America (1854 to 1868), 29 per cent; for Australia (1854 to 1868), 15 per cent.; and for the United States, 18 per cent., subject to modification for foreign loans,—or, in other words, while the normal condition of the foreign commerce of those countries is that the imports are equal to exports, *plus* at least 15 per cent. of profits,—the case with India is entirely the reverse. The exports (*including* bullion) of India for the years 1834-35 to 1872 being about 1,120,000,000*l.*, the imports (with an addition of 15 per cent. upon exports for profits, or about 168,000,000*l.*) should be about 1,288,000,000*l.* Besides this, India has incurred to foreign countries in that period about 50,000,000*l.* of public debt and about 100,000,000*l.* for railways, making altogether an amount of 1,438,000,000*l.* That instead of the imports amounting to this figure (as would be the case under normal conditions), they actually amounted to only about 943,000,000*l.* (*including* bullion). Deducting 62,000,000*l.*, as the 10 per cent. profits declared on imported merchandize (618,000,000*l.*), leaves a balance of about 881,000,000*l.* as the *actual* total imports (*including* bullion). The excess, therefore, of the above 1,438,000,000*l.* over the imports is about 557,000,000*l.* in prin-

cipal alone transferred from the revenues of India to England. Deducting the interest on railway loan of about 40,000,000*l.*, up to 1872 (which is included in the exports), as being a matter of business, the transfer from 1835 to 1870 amounts to about 517,000,000*l.* in principal. This, with interest at 5 per cent., would amount in 1872 to about 1,055,000,000*l.*, or, at 9 per cent. (the ordinary Indian rate), to 1,500,000,000*l.* The figures for the transfer of wealth from India to England previous to 1834 are not included in Mr. Dadabhai's papers; but supposing them to be on an average only 3,000,000*l.* annually from the year 1800, the total amount with 5 per cent. interest to 1834 will be about 255,000,000*l.*, and to 1872 to 1,500,000,000*l.*; but reckoning 9 per cent., the amount up to 1834 will be 362,000,000*l.*, and to 1872 will be about 3,400,000,000*l.* That the annual average, taken every five years, of the above transfer of 517,000,000*l.* (in principal alone, from 1834-5 to 1872), and not including interest on railway loan, will be found as follows, showing a continuously increasing transfer of revenues and resources :—

Years.	Yearly Average.	Years.	Yearly Average.
1835 to 1839	£6,000,000	1855 to 1859	8,700,000
1840 to 1844	6,600,000	1860 to 1864	19,000,000*
1845 to 1849	8,700,000	1865 to 1869	27,000,000
1850 to 1854	8,400,000	1870 to 1872	31,000,000

6. That all the above transfer is in addition to the value of Government, railway, and other public-works stores, and supplies for the wants of Europeans (which are all *included* in the declared imports), besides the profits of legitimate commerce, freights, and insurance earned by British shipping and insurance offices; it being at once evidence and result of the present exhausting withdrawal of revenue that the ordinary commerce between the two countries is exceedingly small, the *total* imports (including bullion, all kinds of stores, any proceeds of loan, &c., &c.) into India from the United Kingdom and Suez being on an average less than about 3s. per head during the seven years, 1864-5 to 1872 (excluding 1867), as thus shown—

1865	£30,240,001	
1866	33,530,719	
1867 (figures given for eleven months only.)		
1868	31,629,315	Average imports under 32,000,000*l.* a-year for a population of 238,000,000, or under 3s. per head.—(Parl. Ret. [C—870] of 1873.)
1869	35,399,073	
1870	30,357,055	
1871	28,849,903	
1872	32,730,458	
	£222,736,524	

* As the amount of the enfaced paper in England is not given for years previous to 1860, the whole amount is taken for 1860. This increases the average for 1860-4, and diminishes that for the previous years, but not to a large extent.

7. That though some transfer of resources is unavoidable under foreign rule, the actual withdrawal, as just shown, is much in excess of such necessity, and goes far to counteract the good which British rule is capable of conferring on India.

8. That the excessive amount of the present drain is in a great measure owing to the undue and increasing employment of Europeans, of late years, in all the departments of public service directly or indirectly connected with the State.

9. That India is unfairly treated in being saddled with the whole of the debt now debited to her, that debt having been mainly made up of the cost of the acquisition of India by the British nation, of payments of profits and dividend through the late East India Company, and of the cost of the Afghan and other wars which were either the work of the British Cabinet or undertaken with objects in which the interests of the population of India were not concerned.

10. That while the people of India most gratefully acknowledge the inestimable value of peace and security under British rule, it is plainly the first duty of every Anglo-Indian statesman and politician to lessen the amount of the annual transfer of capital, and to adopt any obviously suitable remedies for the undue pressure now laid on India and its scanty monetary resources.

11. That the first and most urgently required step towards this end is for the British Government to give an Imperial guarantee for the Indian debt.

12. That the second measure, also long past due, is for England to sustain a definite proportion, or certain portions, of the Indian Home Charges, and thus begin to contribute something towards the maintenance of that control over the Indian Empire which has been, and continues to be, of enormous advantage to the United Kingdom.

13. That besides curtailing, as far as possible, every outlay in England on account of other than expenditure on reproductive works in India, it is the duty of the Government of India to resist, beyond what the absolute exigencies of British rule may require, the importation from Europe or engagement in India of European employés for the public services, and to utilize instead the services of the people of the country, according to regal and parliamentary promises made during the last two generations.

14. That only by the adoption of some such policy, together with all reasonable economy and retrenchment in public expenditure, is there any chance of the people of India becoming able to save, the capital of the country being conserved, and the development and material progress of the Empire being secured, whereby great benefits would accrue both

to England and India from an increasing extension of legitimate commerce between the two countries, and thus loyalty, gratitude, and attachment of India towards British rule would be afresh evoked and strengthened.

15. That, towards the same end, it is also the duty of English and Indian capitalists to experiment in and promote all remunerative manufactures and other industrial operations, which will utilize Indian raw material, indigenous talent and labour.

16. That the primary object in the Government of India's Public Works projects should be to provide *cheap* means of communication between the different provinces of India, and especially from the interior to the coast; and also to promote the storage of water and irrigation works wherever practicable.

On the motion of Mr. MORARJEE GOKALDAR, a vote of thanks to Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji for his valuable papers on "The Poverty of "India," was passed.

The Chairman having been next thanked for his able conduct in the chair, the meeting dissolved.

JOURNAL

OF THE

EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION.

Instituted for the independent and disinterested advocacy and promotion, by all legitimate means, of the public interests and welfare of the Inhabitants of India generally.

The Indian Problem and Indian Famines.

PAPER BY MR. ROBERT H. ELLIOT.

READ AT A MEETING OF THE EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION, HELD AT THE PALL MALL RESTAURANT, ON WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1877.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL, K.C.S.I., M.P., IN THE CHAIR.

A MEETING of the members and friends of the East India Association was held at the Pall Mall Restaurant, Regent Street, on Wednesday afternoon, February 28, 1877, the subject for consideration being "The Indian Problem and Indian Famines," introduced by Mr. Robert H. Elliot.

Sir GEORGE CAMPBELL, K.C.S.I., M.P., occupied the chair, and amongst those present were Sir Charles McGrigor, Bart., Sir Basil F. Hall, Bart., Rajah Rampul Singh, the Honourable Mr. Justice West, Rev. James Long, Major-General W. Richardson, C.B., Captain G. E. Price, M.P., Major-General G. Burn, Major-General R. Unwin, Colonel P. Dods, Colonel W. A. Fyers, Colonel Nassau Lees, Colonel A. B. Rathborne, Lieutenant-Colonel Evans, Lieutenant-Colonel Keith Jopp, Lieutenant-Colonel Percy E. B. Lake, Lieutenant-Colonel G. M. Payne, Lieutenant-Colonel W. Smith, Major Felgate, Major W. F. Gordon, Major W. Hill, Captain George W. Cockburn, Captain Grant, Captain Alfred Hutton, Captain W. C. Palmer (Hon. Sec. of the East India Association), Lieutenant Lake, Dr. M. C. Furnell, Dr. Nash, Dr. D. H. Small, Mr. Bryce M'Master, C.E., Mr. H. Auerbach, Mr. Rudolph Auerbach, Mr. George Bain, Mr. Robert Bain, Mr. Juland Danvers, Mr. J. G. Davis, Mr. Edward O. Douglas,

Mr. J. Dudgeon, Mr. K. M. Dutt, Mr. Frank Fearon, Mr. E. C. George, Mr. W. J. Grazebrooke, Mr. W. F. Hale, Mr. Roland Hamilton, Mr. John Jones, Mr. J. S. Laurie, Mr. William Lindsay, Mr. J. F. Lordon, Mr. G. S. Mankar, Mr. William Maitland, Mr. James Moffat, Mr. Philip Nolan, Mr. J. O'Dwyer, Mr. J. Peirson, Mr. E. G. Petre, Mr. H. Rees Phillips, Mr. P. C. Rajaviah Chetty, Mr. R. Rice, Mr. R. Ranken, Mr. Robson, Mr. R. C. Saunders, Mr. P. C. Sen, Mr. R. B. Swinton, Mr. R. O. Tayler, Mr. William Tayler, Mr. A. Douglas Temple, Mr. Thomas S. Townend, Mr. M. J. Walhouse, Mr. O. Watson, Mr. J. T. Wood, Mr. Frank Wyllie, &c., &c.

The CHAIRMAN, in opening the proceedings, said he was confident the subject which had called them together was one that was exciting great, and he might even say appalling, interest at the present time; and he was sure the matter could not be better dealt with than by Mr. Elliot, who would now proceed to read a paper which he had prepared, entitled "The Indian Problem and Indian Famines."

Mr. R. H. ELLIOT spoke as follows:—

Of all subjects in the world, Indian subjects are the most trying, the most irritating, and the most melancholy; and of all Indian subjects, that which is now to occupy our attention is incomparably the saddest. Nor, in mentioning India, can we ever shake famine out of our remembrance even for a moment. We may, indeed, attempt to do so by dwelling on the thousands of miles of railways we have made, and the many costly works which the iron hand of the Western invader has plastered on the surface of Eastern civilization. We may endeavour to banish the spectre from the feast by filling the imagination with the glories of our Indian conquests, or by dazzling the eye with the glitter of Royal visits and assemblages of subject Princes. In the show so lately held at Delhi we tried, indeed, to keep the subject out of view, and there no place was found for a single sample of those humble peasants who painfully wring from their worn-out soils the means of supporting the splendid pageantry of our Eastern Empire. But Lord Lytton's poetic eye doubtless beheld a famine-stricken, shadowy form flitting restlessly amidst the throng—surveying the scene with melancholy wonder, and regarding with a bitter sneer that gorgeous heraldic coat which, we are told, cost two hundred English pounds. And who can charm away this melancholy spectre? Who can even declare that it will not some day quite overshadow the land, and swallow up our Oriental Ireland? But it is unpractical to loiter longer on the way. The Indian Problem lies before us. Let us see what can be done to

solve it, beginning with a general view of the situation, advancing to a consideration of famines and the evils that must arise from relieving them, continuing with the suggestion of measures for the future, and terminating with some remarks on the present famine.

It is extremely unsatisfactory to find an element of uncertainty at the very outset of my inquiry into this important subject. But the plain truth is, that no one knows what amount of unoccupied culturable lands there is in India, and I cannot, therefore, fix the exact date at which the soil of India will be absolutely unable to support the population. The Government is, however, rapidly proceeding with the statistical survey of India, and by the time it is completed we ought to be able to treat the subject with almost mathematical accuracy. And the possibility of our being able to do so is, I may remark, by no means a wild conjecture, because, now that we have determined that the people of India shall not die of famine, it is perfectly obvious that we have removed all those prudential motives which might influence them in keeping down their own numbers. But though exact accuracy is not at present attainable, we are not altogether without information as regards the unoccupied culturable lands of India, and some might even deem it sufficient to draw practical conclusions. We have, it is true, no information as regards Bengal, and none that I can discover as regards the Bombay or Madras Presidencies; but we have information as to important areas of India to guide us towards an approximation of the probable facts as regards the whole peninsula, and I will now proceed to give it to you as briefly as possible.

Let us take Southern India first, and glance at the facts as regards the province of Mysore, which is generally admitted to be, from an agricultural point of view, above the level of South India. Well, by the Administration Report of 1870-71, you will find that of its 29,717½ square miles, 16,097½ miles are marked as unculturable; and making a liberal allowance for an over-estimation of unculturable land, we may fairly assume that one-half of the province is unfit for the plough; and if that is a reasonable assumption, it follows that the same may be said of all Southern India. Now let us go north, to the Punjaub, and we shall find that, of its 102,001 square miles, 45,155 are marked as unculturable; while of the 80,524 square miles of the North-west Provinces, 30,130 are of the same description. In the Central Provinces, of 84,643 square miles there are 33,243. Cross over to Burmah, and of 93,664 square miles, 48,258, or more than half, are marked down as unavailable for the agriculturist. Now no one can treat these statistics as more than approximations; but taking into consideration the large desert tracts, the immense areas of mountain ranges, and the vast tracts of jungle lands

that cannot be encroached on without serious danger to the rainfall and the climate, it is highly probable that at least one-half of India is unavailable for the plough. Now, should this be the case, or even nearly the case, observe what a startling prospect we are brought face to face with as regards the population. By the last return it has been calculated that the population of British India is upwards of 200 to the square mile, but if we have to deduct one-half of the land, we get practically to a population of 400 to the available square mile. From these available square miles, however, a very important deduction must be made, because a considerable area of these cultivable lands must be reserved as pasturage for cattle; and that this area must be considerable, no one who is acquainted with the inferior grass-growing capabilities of India can possibly doubt. But if we leave this last-named area out of our calculations, it ought certainly to bring our estimate of 400 to the available square mile of culturable lands within the truth; and if we come to consider that the people almost entirely look to the soil as their sole means of support, the population to available area is enormous.

And now let me give you a comparison which will, I think, impress upon you still more clearly the gravity of the situation. Let us suppose for a moment that British India is an enlarged Belgium, and that the proportion of waste land is the same in each country, and compare the pressure of the agricultural population on the soil. Well, acre for acre, the population of British India already exceeds the agricultural population of Belgium to the square mile; but if we deduct the vast waste tracts of India, you will find her population much exceeds the double of the agricultural population of Belgium. For purposes of rough comparison, then, it seems within the mark to say that, practically speaking, the population of British India is to the square mile about double that of the agricultural population of Belgium.

And now I have to advance to a part of my subject which, if we are ever justified in using such an expression, is simply awful. Let us observe the facts as briefly as we can. Nor is much comment necessary, for three sentences are sufficient to measure the frightful responsibilities we have taken upon ourselves. The population of all India is at least 240,000,000. In the opinion of Mr. Beverley, under whom the Bengal census was taken, it is increasing at the rate of 1 per cent. per annum. In twenty years' time the population will rise to nearly 293,000,000, in forty years to over 357,250,000, and in eighty years to nearly 532,000,000. Some there are who have ventured to say that it is no part of our duty to keep the people of India alive. I maintain that as long as we hold India it is our duty to do so, even if we had to pay annually for the purpose out of English taxes. The duty of a Govern-

ment as to this has been well put by Mencius, the Chinese philosopher, who wrote more than 2,000 years ago. "There are people," said Mencius, "dying from famine on the roads, and you do not know how "to issue your stores for their relief. When men die you say, 'It is not "'owing to me—it is owing to the year.' In what does this differ from "stabbing a man and killing him, and then saying, 'It was not I—it was "'the weapon'?" And if we do not feed them, the alternative is equally clearly expressed by the same philosopher. "Here is a man," said Mencius, "who receives charge of the sheep and cattle of another, and under-"takes to feed them for him; of course he must seek for pasture ground and "grass for them. If, after seeking for them, he cannot find them, will he "return his charge to the owner, or will he stand by and see them die?" But it is needless to say more upon this point, for the English people have very justly decided that the Natives of India are to be fed whenever a famine occurs; and it is perfectly evident that, as long as we maintain possession of India, the people must be fed, either from the resources of India or, failing those, of England.

Such, then, are the leading and probable facts of the situation. There is the certain fact of a population of 200 to the square mile of that British India for which we are solely responsible, and which, stating it at lower than the probable increase, must rise to 400 to the square mile eighty years hence. There is the probable fact that, in consequence of the vast waste areas, the population is at least 400 to the available square mile, which will therefore give us at least 800 to the square mile eighty years. But there is another important element of the situation which must still further tend to aggravate the financial difficulties of our rule in India. This great fact has been noticed by Sir Henry Sumner Maine, though he has not anticipated from it what must be the inevitable result. And accordingly you will find in his "Village Communities" that one of the great changes introduced by us has resulted in what he terms "the growth of individual legal right," or, in other words, the right of an individual to call in the aid of the State to enforce from the community obedience to ascertained rule. Now, I have no time to treat this important branch of my subject at length, and I must, therefore, content myself by saying that the growth of individual right is the thin end of the wedge which must lead to a wide-spread, State-relying pauperism. For it must, in the course of time, develop still further, till at last it will be generally received that each individual stands alone, without any claim on anybody but the State. In future, then, I anticipate that ties of community, caste, and family will gradually loosen, and that all that support which is at present given to the poor by their relatives will by degrees be thrown on the Government. This process will, no doubt, be

slow, but it will surely come at last; and in making any forecast as regards the future in India, this point must be kept carefully in view. And it must never be forgotten that the results I have just been anticipating must be largely hastened by our admission of the claims of the people to be fed in times of famine.

Let us next proceed to consider the financial evils that must arise from this admission of the claims of India, and the fatal effect it must have on the character of the people. As for the financial evils, they are sufficiently apparent; and assuming that the government is conducted as it is at present, it seems evident that every successive famine must cost more and yet more; for the people go on increasing, and as the land becomes more divided, and the soil poorer and poorer (for the people even now have not manure enough to replace what is annually taken from the soil), they must become more and more poverty-stricken. So that in the famines of the future we shall necessarily have not only more people on our hands on account of the increase of the population, but a much greater proportion of them to feed than we have now. Assuming, then, that no remedial measures are adopted, it seems evident that a famine of eighty years hence must cost at least 15,000,000*l.*, and possibly a great deal more.

Then, as to the effect of our paternal policy on the character of the people. We all know what must arise when everything is done for, and nothing by, the people, and to what an utterly childish state of dependence they must be reduced. And in Indian climates it is a very willing dependence. But why, after all, should the people take any thought for the morrow? Even here, in a climate most favourable to the energy of the human race, we see that an excessive attention to the wants of the poor produces a thick crop of the very evils sought to be cured. But I need not employ many words to show that the more ready we show ourselves to do everything, the greater distress we must ultimately cause, and the greater weakness in the character of the people. A benevolent Imperialism, which at once gives entire freedom of personal action, and utter absolution from all responsibility, may have its advantages, but it absolutely extinguishes all those qualities which make a people a people. The people of India cannot be represented, and exert themselves actively in the affairs of the State; they must, therefore, be forced by the reigning power into exertions which will show them that on them the welfare of the State does depend. There may be an evil, and to our notions a very great evil, in turning out the inhabitants of a village to clear out tanks and irrigation channels, and plant trees; there is a far greater evil in letting them go to sleep, and giving them nothing whatever to do or think of. Even a mild grievance is

better than a dull monotony of childish, helpless emptiness. Nor do the people thank us, or like us any the better, for letting them alone. On the contrary, I have heard an intelligent Native say that the great fault of our government was that we did everything for the people. There are, then, I repeat, two grand evils connected with relieving famines—a financial difficulty to the State, and a moral evil to the people, because it abolishes the idea that anything depends on their own exertions. By the measures I shall now have to propose both these important evils can be largely modified.

What is a famine? It is a scarcity which may stop short at the semi-starvation, or extend to the slaughter, of multitudes. It is, too, a scarcity which is usually accompanied by the semi-starvation or death of large numbers of cattle, on which, I need hardly add, the agriculturist relies for ploughing and manuring the soil. In India it is a state of things caused by a want of rain, and of that invisible aerial moisture which is so necessary to plant life. Now, if there is a thing which man can modify in a tropical climate, it is the condition of the atmosphere, the distribution of the rainfall, and the economization of rain after it has fallen. By stripping a country of wood, you may desiccate the air, increase the heat, cause the rain to fall in disastrous torrents, instead of in gentle showers distributed over lengthened periods of time, dry up the springs, and, in short, ruin the land. By adding wood again, you may restore the conditions that have been destroyed. If these are facts (and none are more readily provable), it is evident that we do hold in our hands an extraordinary power over famines, if Government could only be persuaded to use it. Wherever, then, it is practicable and advisable, the Government should compel each village to plant and maintain a solid block of trees, varying in size with the capabilities and necessities of the situation. And these trees should be of two kinds: one suitable, from its pods and seeds, for food for cattle; the other for the manurial value of its leaves. For the former purpose two varieties of the Acacia (A. Arabica and A. Leucophlœa) are the most useful I know of; and the value of the leaves of particular trees for manure can easily be ascertained in most parts of India. In the present famine such blocks of plantation would have been of immeasurable value, for the supplies of pods and seeds they would have furnished, and the grass they would have shaded; while their effect on the temperature, and the shade they would have afforded, would have been of great service to the famine-stricken animals.

And here it may be well to remark on the value of having good supplies of leaves for manure, and especially for litter; for it is in consequence of this want of litter that nearly all the liquid manure—the most valuable portion of the excreta, I need hardly say—is lost. So

that if you had abundant supplies of leaves, you would not only be supplying a very important manure in itself, but I think it is hardly too much to say you would be doubling the manurial resources of India. Nor is this all, for the great defect of Indian soils is the want of vegetable manure to form that kind of padding which, by improving the texture of the land, makes it more easily and deeply workable. And you must consider, further, that by increasing the absorptive and radiating power of the soil, which you would do by altering its texture, you would produce a very important effect on the temperature. In concluding this branch of my subject, I may observe that you will probably be surprised to find that I place tree-planting first, and not what is usually meant by the term irrigation. But tree-planting is irrigation, and ought to be considered, what it really is, a very important branch of irrigation works.

I have said that tree-planting is irrigation, and much regret that I have no time fully to develop that remark; but I must at least say a few words on the subject. What, then, is a tree from an irriguous point of view? Well, briefly, to plant a tree is to sink not only a self-acting, but a self-supplying well; for its roots penetrate the soil to a great depth, and along the outsides of them the rain-water is rapidly conducted out of the reach of evaporation, partly to be absorbed by the roots and, through the leaves, returned to the air, partly to find its way to the springs, and by slow degrees to the rivers. And, in order to give you some idea of the extent of leaf evaporation, I may mention that, from an experiment described in a work I am about to allude to, it has been calculated that an oak tree can, in a single summer's day, pass from its leaves into the air 420 gallons of water.* Trees also water the air and land by cooling down the breezes, and precipitating the invisible moisture they contain. They preserve, too, the humidity of the air and ground by arresting the sweep of strong parching winds and converting them into moist and gentle breezes. Without trees, the rain is apt to fall in disastrous torrents, which run rapidly off the land, and inflict incalculable mischief. With trees, the rain, as it falls in more gentle and long-continued showers, is partly evaporated from the surface of the leaves and stems, partly preserved to feed the springs, and partly returned to the air through the leaves, to be used over and over again, and, in short, detained in the country and economized to the utmost, instead of being hurried wastefully back to the ocean. Such, then, are some of the ways in which trees act as irrigation works both for land

* For particulars of this experiment, *vide* "Forests and Moisture," by John Croumbie Brown, pp. 76 and 77. The experiment is not meant to prove that, in ordinary circumstances, an oak tree *does* evaporate at the rate of 420 gallons a day; but that, under certain given conditions, it probably can do so.

and air. But time presses, and I can remark no further on this deeply interesting subject, which I cannot better conclude than by recommending to your notice a most valuable work, which is entitled "Forests and Moisture," by Mr. John Croumbie Brown. It is full of interesting information collected from all parts of the world, is well worthy of attentive study, and, I may add, was published some time during the current year.

The next measure I have to propose is one for the attraction of capital to land by offering large advantages to those who, at their own cost, would undertake to construct small irrigation works in the shape of tanks and wells. This measure is that, wherever an individual (acting, of course, with the sanction of the Revenue officer) turns dry into wet land, he should be given a fee-simple tenure, or a permanent settlement of the land, and at the rate he formerly paid for it, which, I need hardly say, is a rate much less than that at present paid for land under irrigation. I would also offer a permanent settlement, at the existing rate of tax, to all those who have land under petty irrigation works, on condition that they undertook to keep them in thorough good order. And, in order to facilitate the first class of works, I would offer small loans to the people at moderate rates of interest. By such measures as these an immense impetus would be given to irrigation, and the investment of capital in land; and the effect of this on the famines of the future it would be impossible to over-estimate. Another, and by no means an unimportant consideration is, that all petty irrigation works would gradually fall into the hands of private individuals, and the attention of the State would then be exclusively directed to the larger irrigation schemes. Some there are, and very competent authorities, who would give a permanent settlement to all India at the existing rate of land-tax; but as long as our rents are paid in silver, and the finances continue in their present precarious state, I am of opinion that it would be advisable to reserve the bait of a fee-simple tenure in order to promote the important ends we have just been considering.

The third measure I have to propose is one which would gradually have the effect of producing a better distribution of the population; for, as you are no doubt aware, the people are at present enormously crowded on some tracts, while others are sparsely populated. Now, we cannot alter this evil, but we may modify the increase of it by putting a stop to the further breaking up of the grazing lands in the vicinity of villages, except, of course, in cases where the grazing land is clearly in excess of the requirements of the village. This, in the course of time, would force a certain proportion of the increase of the people on to the more thinly-peopled districts. And this would be accompanied by great agricultural

advantages to the villages from which the people were thus forced to emigrate; for it would prevent the manurial resources of each village from diminishing, which, relatively to the land under plough, is a process that has been steadily going on in numerous instances. Field can only be added to field by diminishing the pasture land, and if that is not in excess of the requirements of the villages (and it often is not), the result is that you have an increased area under the plough, with diminished means for keeping stock. Now, the soil and cattle of India are sufficiently starved as it is, and it is so evidently of importance that they should, at least, not be further reduced, that I need say no more in favour of the measure I have suggested.

Such, then, are the measures to which attention should be at once directed; and, in addition to these, I need hardly add, the Government should do all it can in the way of sound irrigation schemes. And when, it will naturally be asked, will such measures produce any visible effect on the famines of the future? Well, I do not think that much can be hoped for under about forty years from this time. In the meanwhile, the famines of the future will have to be paid for. And this leads us to the consideration of what, considering the circumstances, our future financial policy ought to be. And here our course is plain. Judging from the experience of the past, we may reasonably expect a famine somewhere in India every three or four years. To meet this, a clear sum of 2,000,000*l.* per annum must be saved, of which 1,000,000*l.* might be invested in readily realizable securities, and the other applied to the reduction of debt. Supposing that this process went on for two years, and that at the end of the third there was a famine, costing 6,000,000*l.*, the Government would then sell off 2,000,000*l.* worth of securities, borrow 2,000,000*l.*, and use the 2,000,000*l.* saved in the third year. And the money must, remember, be saved out of the existing revenues. To increase the revenues by 2,000,000*l.* would be at once barbarous and foolish, for India, God knows, is taxed enough already, and further to impoverish the people would be to increase these very famine evils which threaten to swallow up the Empire. But, to effect a saving, we must part with many pieces of valuable patronage, resolutely refuse to increase the liabilities of the Empire by borrowing more money for railways, and throw overboard many pet Public Work schemes. Nor are we without the means of saving in many directions. The abolition of the costly method of government in Bombay and Madras, with their separate commands-in-chief, has long been regarded as a saving that might easily be effected without the smallest detriment to the public service. The Native Army might be placed on a different footing, and still be far superior to any force it would ever have to fight; enough

men being kept in constant employ to furnish the necessary guards, and the remainder sent to their homes on half-pay and called out once a year. Much saving might be effected by allowing the Government in India to purchase directly, in any part of the world, all the stores it needs. A considerable portion of the English Army might be localized, and supplied with men far more cheaply than through the costly depôts in England which India has now to pay for. The opinions of the gentlemen who compose the India Council would find their way to the surface through the Press quite as effectually as by being whispered into the ear of the Secretary of State in that chamber in the India Office from which the public is so jealously excluded. An Imperial guarantee for the liabilities of India would also relieve her finances without any additional risk to England, for though legally India is solely responsible for its liabilities, it is, practically speaking, a mere delusion to talk of Indian debt when nearly all the money has been lent by us.

But it is vain to go on with an enumeration of the reforms that might be effected. It is sufficient to say that unless large reforms are instituted, the harmonious rottenness of our Indian Empire must reveal itself before long to every English family. But the physician, and the only one that has any chance of a hearing, cannot be very far distant. In one of the telegrams lately sent from India I observe that it is asserted that if famines are to be relieved irrespective of cost, national bankruptcy must sooner or later occur; and, indeed, a rupture with China,* or the determination of that country to protect its home-grown opium, may bring it on us at any moment. But bankruptcy, though no doubt a disagreeable physician, is often a good one for nations as well as individuals—at least, if it arrives in good time. And if India is to be administered exactly as it is now, I have no hesitation in saying that the sooner it becomes bankrupt the better, for the more you add to its liabilities, and the longer the necessary landed and financial reforms are deferred, the greater and more incurable will be the ultimate collapse.

In conclusion, permit me to offer a few remarks on the present famine. It shows us very clearly what we might have expected—namely, that roads and railways have no power to prevent the Government having to pay for a famine. There is plenty of food, but the people are too poor to buy it. But the worst feature of

* Recent consular reports from China prove the rapid increase of the home-grown product, and that, if China chose to put on a prohibitive opium protection tax, it could soon grow enough for its own requirements—in other words, do without our Indian opium. It is evident that Indian finances must always be rotten as long as they depend so largely on such a precarious source of revenue as opium.

this deadly drought is the starvation of the unfortunate cattle; and I think, if there is a useful lesson to be learnt from the famine, it is the necessity for adopting, as quickly as possible, the tree-planting measure I have suggested. Man we can feed, but the cattle are beyond our reach. The state of things as regards the cattle is really alarming, and for years must prove a serious check to the prosperity of the country, by diminishing the power of tilling and manuring the soil. The manager of my plantations on the western ghauts of Mysore informs me that even my cattle have been suffering from the want of grass, and yet they are close to the very wettest parts of the western mountains, and at an elevation of upwards of 3,000 feet above the level of the sea. The heat he describes as something awful, and the letter to which I refer was written on the 16th of December—the very height of the cold season. And if the cattle are suffering on the western ghauts, what must be the state of the arid plains of the interior? And this grass famine, remember, extends itself over an immense area of India,—from Poonah right down to Tinnevelly, in the south of the peninsula. As for the famine, as far as concerns man, I need not detain you longer. The people must be fed at the expense of the State, and they are being fed at the expense of the State, and there is nothing more to be said, except that the work is being efficiently carried out by the finest body of officials in the world.

The CHAIRMAN having invited general discussion,

Mr. NOLAN (Bengal Civil Service) rose and said he was sure that he only expressed the general sentiment of the meeting when he thanked Mr. Elliot very heartily for the instructive address which he had just given. (Hear, hear.) It was clear that Mr. Elliot had learned to approach Indian subjects in a practical spirit, and in going to the bottom of the grievances with which he dealt, he did so with a sympathetic disposition towards the great population of India. (Hear, hear.) If, therefore, he (the speaker) had to give utterance to some criticisms upon portions of the address, he was at the same time desirous of acknowledging its value as a whole. Mr. Elliot had expressed fears that the relief given in India during famines might demoralize the people, and he spoke of such relief as "the thin end of the wedge which "must lead to a wide-spread, State-relying pauperism." Further on, too, the lecturer had said, "We all know what must arise when every-"thing is done for, and nothing by, the people, and to what an utterly "childish state they must be reduced." Now he (the speaker) attributed importance to these words, coming from an independent source, as he found in a recent document on the subject of the present

famine that Lord Lytton, in giving instructions to Sir Richard Temple, said that grave fears were expressed that there might be demoralization by excess of famine relief. The two statements, then, he took to be evidence of a prevalent fear, which, in his opinion, however, was altogether groundless; and he believed that on careful examination this would be seen to be the fact. It was true that in England many intelligent gentlemen considered that poor-law relief had a very demoralizing effect; and he quite agreed that where the principle was carried to excess, this would be the natural result. But the poor-law relief of England is a constantly recurring relief. The working man who does not save any of his earnings for a bad time knows that he can get maintenance from his parish, and that assurance may in some cases operate to prevent a man from joining a benefit society. In India, on the other hand, the whole circumstances are vastly different; relief being given only on rare occasions, and at irregular and long intervals. Mr. Elliot had remarked that a famine was to be expected in India as often as once in every three or four years; but on each occasion the dearth is confined to a limited tract, and, judging from our past experience, a famine might be expected to recur in the same district only once in forty or fifty years at the most, so that the man who receives relief once is not at all likely to receive it again in his life. (Hear, hear.) He asked, therefore, how the prospect of receiving relief for a short time once in a lifetime, and in a period of general depression, could demoralize a man? (Hear, hear.) He had observed the condition of men in districts where famine relief had been distributed with a generous hand, but he had entirely failed to trace any demoralization; on the contrary, he had witnessed the greatest readiness on the part of the people to pay off the debts they had incurred to private individuals during the famine, and had frequently heard them express the most sincere gratitude for assistance given by Government. Turning next to the statement that, owing to the increase of population, every famine in India must be more extensive and costly than the preceding one, the speaker said he entirely dissented from such an assumption, and particularly from the conjectural statistics which put the cost of a famine eighty years hence at 15,000,000*l.* sterling. Experience hitherto had shown that each recurring famine was not more severe, but less severe, than the preceding one. In the famine of 1770 it was said that 10,000,000 of people died, in 1866 about three parts of a million died, and the last famine was fatal to a much less number. Distress was always local; there was never such a thing as the general failure of crops throughout India, and, therefore, the improvement of the means of transit in the country by means of railways, roads, canals,

&c., enabled us with the surplus of one part of the peninsula to supply the deficiency of another. These transit facilities enabled the Government to grapple successfully with a local famine, and these facilities being extended and improved in the future, would correspondingly diminish the dangers of famine. (Hear, hear.) The measures which had been suggested by Mr. Elliot were seemingly of a practical character, although, in his (the speaker's) opinion, not so all-important as might be supposed. The planting of trees, for instance, was a useful work all over the world, and it was nowhere better understood and appreciated than in India, it being carried out by many private individuals in Bengal and other parts of the peninsula. It might, of course be profitable for the Government to encourage such operations. Then as to the suggestion that the land upon which improvement took place should be permanently settled upon the cultivator, it was a fact, at present, that under existing regulations the rent of the land could not be increased in consequence of an improvement effected by a ryot on his own account, and this law private individuals are not allowed to defy. Further, an impetus is given to cultivation by the system of advances for improvements, which any ryot can obtain by giving security. Another suggestion that had been made by Mr. Elliot was, that a sum of 2,000,000*l.* sterling should be saved every year from the revenue, and reserved for the mitigation of famines. Such a policy could not be adopted. The new policy was to make provision for famine relief from local sources, and in this way he believed the expense of the present famine would be met. For this, however, a new rate would be necessary. It had been said that the expenditure on railways should be decreased, but he contended that it was only by the increase of means of communication that the resources of the country could be developed and made available to meet the contingencies of famine. Education also might fairly be regarded as a famine-preventer, and at the moment there was a movement in Bengal for a large extension of the system of primary education which the hon. gentleman occupying the chair had the merit of initiating. The intelligence that would thereby be distributed amongst the young would enable them, as men, to deal more efficiently with famines than officials could ever hope to do. The increasing security of life would also lead to the increase of wealth, by enabling men to provide for their own support in times of scarcity. In 1866 this was seen. In Bengal the prosperity of former years had enabled the peasants to accumulate money, with which they were able to purchase rice for themselves. In Orissa the case was different, and there the people felt the full force of famine and were helpless. It was to be hoped that the causes which he had recapitulated would tend

to make the people of India generally more like those of Bengal in 1866, and less like those of Orissa. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. W. TAYLER (late Commissioner of Patna) observed that time passed away so rapidly that it seemed but the other day—although it was really in 1873—that he was engaged in reading a paper upon the famine with which the hon. gentleman in the chair had, as Lieutenant-Governor, to deal, and regarding which discussion and controversy had not yet ceased. He had, however, to congratulate those who were present, for Mr. Elliot, somehow or other, always managed to introduce something of an attractive character, passing "from grave to gay, from lively to severe." Appalling and awful as the subject of famines was, the lecturer had not failed with his usual skill to arrest attention by his opening paragraphs, in which he pictured "Lord Lytton's poetic eye" seeing a famine-stricken figure beholding the gorgeous assembly at Delhi on the occasion of announcing the new title of the Kaiser-é-Hind. There was something dramatic about this which detracted from the gravity of the subject; but only for the moment, for, truly speaking, the subject was in all respects an awful one, and one which could not be too frequently or too deeply considered. In Mr. Elliot's address there were one or two points deserving of special notice. He regretted that Mr. Elliot had not made any allusion to the remarkable discovery which, it appeared, had been made by Dr. Hunter, as disclosed in the letter of the Calcutta Correspondent of the *Times*, published on the previous Monday. Dr. Hunter connected the deficient rainfall with periods of minimum solar maculation—when the sun shows the fewest spots—these periods averaging an interval of about eleven years. Thus Dr. Hunter calculated that famine in India was inevitable every decade or so, not including those occasional smaller scarcities which accidentally arise. If these figures and the theory by which they were evolved could be relied on, and calculations made for the recurrence of a famine every eleventh year, the course of action for meeting these dreadful visitations assumed a different aspect. Hitherto all had been uncertainty, but now it would be a matter of calculation. The present famine would probably cost about 6,000,000*l.* sterling, the previous one cost a great deal more; but if the famine is to be a regularly recurring visitation, provision can be made for it. As long as the coming of the famine remains a matter of doubt and uncertainty, we buoy ourselves up with the hope that when the time comes we shall get over it somehow, doing our best, and especially confident when we have so good a general as Sir Richard Temple to deal with the difficulty. But if we can seriously calculate on a famine every ten or eleven years, the certainty would, at all events, enable us to make provision and calculate the expense. Much

had been said—indeed, he himself had been mad—about irrigation; and he still firmly believed that if the money which was spent in relief had been expended in judicious systems of irrigation, the calamity they were all now deploring, if not averted, would have been very much mitigated. If it was found that a certain calculation could be made as to the periods when a famine would recur, they could settle down fairly and methodically to calculate the cost of irrigation, and what would be its results if a sum were expended equal to that demanded for the relief of famines extending over fifty years. (Hear, hear.) If Dr. Hunter's discovery were proved to be accurate, it would be of the utmost use, for it would give value and precision to the calculation to which he had just referred. The proposals made by Mr. Elliot were too capacious to be dealt with in a brief speech. He would, however, venture a remark on one point in which he was peculiarly interested—viz., the matter of tree cultivation. At that moment he was engaged in the preparation of a lecture for delivery at the Society of Arts upon "The Marvels or Eccentricities of "Trees," and he had collected many wonderful things in connection with them, but certainly the statement made by Mr. Elliot as to an oak tree passing into the air in one day 420 gallons of water, he should place at the head of his catalogue. (Laughter.) There was, however, no question about tree-planting being a most important thing for India, and it is a matter which has been far too much neglected. With regard to the value of leaves for manure, it is perfectly well known that their utility in agriculture is very great. The leaves of the vine are the most valuable manure for the vine itself, and there is no doubt that the Almighty has given us these leaves with these fertilizing properties to constitute them a valuable and readily applicable means of replenishing the soil. In the science of medicine very often we find the ingenuity of the most able physicians exhausted in vain, and then we discover some wonderfully simple remedy has been provided by Nature herself. Thus an ordinary drug or root, and often simple water, is found to be an efficient cure for dangerous disease. Tree-planting in India is, undoubtedly, a natural means of correcting drought, and it is comparatively easy of practical application. With regard to the large subject of the demoralization of the people by systems of relief, Mr. Elliot had at least not overlooked the great moral principle, that if we hold India we are responsible for the lives of its people. It has been whispered in some quarters that we are going too far in admitting the responsibility of providing food for the people on occasions of scarcity. His own decided opinion was, that if the English people accepted that conclusion, and the Indian Government shirked the duty of alleviating the sufferings of the Indian people and preserving their lives, they had better pack up bag and baggage and leave India to herself. (Hear, hear.)

RAJAH RAMPUL SINGH complained that many men of high caste, who had never done manual labour in all their lives, were compelled to accept relief under conditions which were most obnoxious to them, and were not allowed to do work suited to their capacity and social position. He thought that for such persons a subscription would willingly be made by the Princes and Chiefs of India, and he suggested that this was a matter which deserved the best attention of the Government.

Mr. HALE, after cordially complimenting the lecturer, said the theme upon which his remarks were based was one which could not fail to be of deep interest to every thinking man. India was an enormous possession, and the continual recurrence of famine within its limits affords a problem the most serious which the British Government had ever yet encountered in its Empire in the East. On the whole, he inclined to the view which had been expressed by a previous speaker, that Mr. Elliot had dealt with the "Indian Problem" with too exclusive and absorbent a regard for famines, and he would have preferred to hear more about the real Indian Problem, which he took to be the condition of the country generally, and the relations of the British Government to the people. (Hear, hear.) It appeared to him that India is capable of great development, and that more railways for the facilitation of trade and a sound and comprehensive system of education would be two most important steps towards placing India in such a position as would enable her to pay her own expenses both now and in the future; and as regards other public works, such as irrigation systems, canals, and roads, he was equally of opinion that their extension was most essential to the progress and prosperity of India. The probability of the soil of India becoming inadequate to the support of the inhabitants (they averaging 200 to each square mile of British India) was, however, a new problem for the study of the English Administration and English people generally; for few men had regarded this issue as likely for two or three generations. Personally, he confessed he did not think there was much ground for alarm in this respect, for his conviction was that the great peninsula could produce several times as much substantial and valuable food as at present by careful and scientific cultivation. The problem involved was, doubtless, a very serious one, especially as it was necessary concurrently to make both ends meet; but he looked forward to the time when, with an improved and comprehensive system of education, and the general development of trade and agriculture, the frequency and seriousness of famines would be much less, and the problem of Government made less difficult, and that India would

eventually, and probably ere long, repay the home country for the anxious care and serious trouble which had been taken to develop her resources and to promote modern civilization among her vast populations.

Colonel A. B. RATHBORNE said that in 1834, precisely forty-three years ago, he published some remarks in India on the subject under discussion. Having had an opportunity in an official position of studying the working of the land-tax and the condition of the cultivators, he had come to the conclusion that the whole source of difficulty was comprised in this, that it is absolutely impossible for the Government to adequately fulfil the duty of landlord all over India. The question of irrigation, for instance, was admitted by everybody to be of overwhelming importance, and once carried into effect, the result would be an enormous increase in the food supply. Every one was prepared to advocate and praise irrigation as the one thing needful, but, unfortunately, we have no money to deal with the matter in a comprehensive manner. We have to keep soldiers in India, to build barracks, and to meet a very large expenditure for various other purposes; and unless there is a surplus—which very seldom occurs—it is utterly impossible for us to do what is required of us as landlords. It was a very different thing with the Native Governments. Even in the state to which the Natives have now advanced, a Native Government can better act as landlords than a European Government. The land of India is, doubtless, fertile beyond conception, but it is not cultivated to nearly its full extent, the agricultural system being an entire failure owing to the difficulty which is experienced in getting those works executed which a private landlord would find it to his interest to carry out at once. The only cure for the present unproductiveness of the soil of India was to disestablish the Government from the position of landlords, seeing that it could not fulfil the duties of proprietors properly.

Mr. GRAZEBROOKE said he was one of those people who had been extremely proud of the grandeur of the British Empire in India, and he had always felt much indebted to the East India Association for the useful work it was doing in advocating the cause of India in England, and in familiarizing the minds of the English people with topics of Indian interest. The lecture they had just heard, however, had raised some questions in his mind, and he would venture to state them. First, he would ask, is India over-populated, or is India likely to be over-populated? For himself, he thought not, as he found there were serious fallacies in the calculations and the basis on which such a theory was raised. He had heard it argued by Mr. Elliot that the population in a

certain number of years would increase so largely that the food products would be inadequate for its support. He would, however, remind the calculator that when a population has thus increased, Nature steps in and provides remedies which are outside all ordinary calculations. Pestilence sweeps over the land and takes away the weak, wars break out and destroy the strong, and the undue increase of mankind is so prevented by Nature's own laws, which sooner or later find us out. Minute calculations in advance, therefore, are fallacious. The meeting had been told that there was about one-half of India not under cultivation. Well, something similar was the case in England and Ireland. There was a vast acreage not under cultivation, for the reason that it would not afford a margin for profitable cultivation. Under the existing state of things, this land would not pay for tillage; but if the prices of agricultural produce increase by the demands of the population becoming larger, then it will be possible to bring the land into cultivation. If in India the land-tax were reduced, there can be little doubt that a large quantity of land now outside the possibility of successful and profitable cultivation would be worked to advantage. It had been stated, and properly too, that considerable parts of the country are covered with jungle which must not be cut down, and that there are other districts almost entirely treeless. Upon this point he would venture to invite attention to what had been done in Scotland in many parts. The hillsides there were unavailable for cultivation, but they were planted with larch trees, and the fifty years' return from these was found to be much better than for cultivated land. A similar result might be attained in India by growing certain plants which would thrive in the various kinds of soil and climate unsuited for other cultivation. Of the value of plants and trees for distributing moisture he was quite assured, and he was prepared to admit and confirm the accuracy of the statements made by Mr. Elliot in this respect. Although one of the speakers had caused a smile by hinting at the impossibility of an oak tree evaporating, in the course of a summer's day, 420 gallons of water, he (the speaker) had heard on good authority that a cabbage, in twenty-four hours, would give off half its weight in water by the process of evaporation through its leaves —a process which is always going on in vegetable life. The works of nature go on silently but surely, and although nothing strikes the eye, hundreds of tons of moisture are continually being raised by the sun in evaporation from the soil. These processes of nature should have the most careful attention, for if the laws by which they operate are disregarded, nature will sooner or later take its revenge. Reverting again to the question of cultivation, the speaker expressed his conviction that a large amount of unproductive land in India was susceptible of cultivation,

although at present supposed to be outside the range of successful manipulation. A comparison had been instituted in regard to the populations of India and Belgium, and other parts of Europe; but the different circumstances should also be taken into account. In India we have nature in its most fertilizing conditions. Let but water be supplied, and the land would smile forth in such a teeming cornucopia of blessings as can hardly be realized by the dweller in temperate climates. This being so, general irrigation would be found to be the cure for what was now complained of. Apply money raised by a large and systematic operation carried over a number of years, and renew the old irrigation systems, thus increasing the fertilizing properties of the soil. The land, in such circumstances, is capable of supporting a vastly greater population than is likely to appear in the next half-century at least. Should population ever become a difficulty, there are other methods by which it can be met. The vast territories of Australia are but a moderate distance from India, and although at the moment the inhabitants of India would dislike the idea of going to Australia, yet in the course of years, should the peninsula become much over-populated, the Natives will surely be wise in their generation and acknowledge the necessity for carrying out a scheme of emigration. Looking from India, the Government will be able to see valuable fields around for the disposal of surplus population, and long ere India becomes over-populated, outlets will have been found for the industry of its people,—outlets which will add to the increasing power of the British Empire. This reflection reminded him of a proposal made by Mr. Elliot, that our army in India should be reduced. He was, however, of a different opinion, and thought such a suicidal course would never be adopted by any Government in India. (Hear, hear.) Instead of reducing the army, it would be well to prepare for the contingencies of the future. Through Central Asia the enemy was approaching the confines of India, and it would be necessary to prepare for the day when we shall have to fight to retain our Empire in India; and at this moment, while European nations are muttering and scowling at each other, our Indian Empire, with its vast bodies of men, might be made a valuable factor in the cause of peace and in support of the endeavour to promote good-will and commerce throughout the world. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. P. C. SEN confessed that he was unable to follow all the topics that had been broached. He desired, however, to say a few words upon the system of land tenure, to show the imperfection of agriculture in India, to speak of the costly method of Indian government, to say a little about railways and public works, and, lastly, to refer to the tendency to

Anglicize India. To exhaust these topics would occupy some hours, but he only proposed to touch each very briefly. First, then, the question of land tenure; and he would venture to express the opinion that it was to the present system that they might attribute the famines which periodically afflicted the country. The Chairman, in the Cobden's Society's Papers, had said that the cause of Indian famines was to be traced to the system of land-holding, and in support of this statement many facts were adduced to show the imperfections of the various systems in operation in India. By comparing the systems of land tenure in Belgium, Russia, and other parts of Europe, it would be seen that reformation in this respect was much needed in India. The second matter to which he desired briefly to call attention was the imperfect system of agriculture in India. He (the speaker) had made it a point to study agriculture with a view of adapting his study to the requirements of India, and of ascertaining in what particulars agriculture in that country could be improved, and what things are suitable to the climates and the soils of India. He had always been struck with the fact that the agriculture which had been practised in India from time immemorial had not been improved upon. It was now just as it was in the beginning, and the subject was one of such importance that it deserved, and ought to receive, a larger share of attention than was usually accorded to it. If India was to be saved from famines, and to progress like other nations, her agricultural system would have to be improved. India had reached the second round of the ladder of social progress, having passed from the nomadic stage to the agricultural. It had yet to reach the manufacturing stage, and he feared it would be a long time before it did so. Meanwhile, all who were anxious for the prosperity of their country, India, should study every possible method of increasing its productiveness, find out the peculiarities of its soils and climate, and the crops that were likely to be cultivated with success in the different parts of the country. Touching next upon the costly system of government, Mr. Sen contented himself with quoting the following words by Professor Fawcett, M.P., as sufficiently conclusive: "India has suffered from carelessness, mismanagement, and ex-
"travagance. She requires the frugality and the attention to minor
"details which characterize a well-ordered household. The most ad-
"mirably devised laws and the most skilled systems of jurisprudence
"will be of little avail if the gulf between the rulers and the ruled is
"permitted to widen. Not only must we secure the sympathy of the
"people in order to obtain contentment, but until they become partners
"with us in the government of their country, we shall never become
"sufficiently acquainted with their habits, their wishes, and their wants,
"to enable us to justify the continuance of our empire in the East,

"by proving that it promotes the happiness and the moral and material "advancement of the people." (Hear, hear.)

The CHAIRMAN here rose and said that he heartily concurred with the words of the first and other speakers with regard to the excellence of the address they had heard, and the debt which the members of the East India Association owed to Mr. Elliot for the able and interesting manner in which he invariably treated any subject that he brought under their notice. As regarded the many important views which the opener of the discussion had put forth, he (the Chairman) would say that he concurred with many of them, although there were some with which he was not entirely agreed. He was afraid that, as in many similar cases, he could agree as to the faults and evils pointed out, although he was not quite so sure of the efficacy of the remedies which were recommended. The greatest and most pressingly important topic of the opening address and the subsequent discussion was with regard to those terrible famines which seem periodically destined to visit India. They had been told that a very distinguished countryman of his—who discovered a great many things—had now found out some facts with regard to the demeanour of the sun which accounted for these periodic calamities. Famines were by him attributed to the spots on the sun, and the climatic variations which occurred in consequence. If this theory proved to be true, Dr. Hunter had certainly discovered a cause which was beyond mortal control. It was hardly likely that means could be found for controlling the sun, and, consequently, they would have to make up their minds that famines must occur. Meantime, however, he did not know how far this theory of Dr. Hunter's could be substantiated. In India they had certainly to deal with a climate extremely liable to great variations. These extreme variations must necessarily lead to a recurrence of those distressing events—famines—one of which was now afflicting so large a portion of the peninsula. It is true that we find some means of mitigating famines by the improved means of communication which are now available. The great railways introduced in the country have been enormously fruitful in alleviating the horrors of the present famine, food having been poured into the suffering provinces with great rapidity. He was not quite clear, however, that these improved means of communication were all to the good from a famine point of view. Improved means of communication led to more rapid and continual export. There was greater temptation to export, and thus to drain the country in times of prosperity. There was less of that storing up and hoarding in the years of plenty which used to prevail in India—in a similar way to that adopted by Joseph, in the time of Pharaoh, in

Egypt. This Indians had done from time immemorial. During recent famines, however, it had been discovered that export was going on concurrently with the existence of want; improved means of communication afforded a facile means of draining the country of its surplus grain; although, of course, this disadvantage might readily be counterbalanced by the equally ready means afforded for importing food in a period of scarcity. That import, however, cost an enormous sum of money, for it was utterly impossible that the poorer population could find money to meet these disastrous famines. It seemed, in fact, to amount to this: In England we have continual pauperism; in India we cannot avoid having occasional pauperism to deal with. Owing to their institutions, the people of India are generally able to support themselves in times of ordinary prosperity; but in the distress occasioned by these great climatic disturbances to which the country is chronically liable, they have no reserve upon which they can go back for support. They must, in such cases, either be supported or they must die. In former ages they have died; and that was uniformly the mode by which the famine difficulties were wont to solve themselves. He confessed he did not take the hopeful view entertained by some in thinking famines were becoming less severe; on the contrary, he believed their tendency was to become more severe. He believed that the changes of climate, the denudation of forest lands, the excessive cultivation of the country, and the growth of population were all causes tending to occasion famines to be increasingly intense when they came. Allusion had been made to the Bengal famine of 1770. He had occasion to look into the returns upon the subject, and he believed that in reality that famine was not more severe than the famine with which they were at present dealing. The fact was that the visitation of famine at that time was new to the English in India, and it created a greater feeling than subsequent famines which were equally severe. To his mind it was certain that the recurrence of famines must be looked for, if not at precisely ascertained periods, yet certainly at intervals of a few years; and if we are to save life—and upon that all are agreed—a great expenditure would always be necessary. The great question of the day was not whether the expenditure should be incurred—that had been definitely resolved upon; but how the money was to be raised—whether by local or Imperial resources. That part of Mr. Elliot's address in which he said that harm accrued from destroying local self-government among the Natives, he quite coincided with. He believed the great evil of the British government of India—although on the whole our government is not bad—is that we are not preparing the Natives for self-government, but are, on the contrary, doing much to

destroy the ancient forms of self-government which we found in existence at our advent. For the principle of government by communities we have substituted central government of despotic power; and we are not looking forward to a time of self-government for the people of India by training the Natives in self-government, so that the people would be able to govern themselves at a future day. We failed to do this, although we knew it was possible that we might be put in such a position as would render it necessary for us to ask the people to assume the task of governing themselves. He had heard it urged in regard to Turkey that if we were to send some Anglo-Indian officials there, they would govern the disturbed provinces well. He quite agreed that these officials would exhibit a capacity for administration, but he took leave to doubt whether this paternal system would be for the permanent benefit of the people. In conclusion, the hon. gentleman urged that the great aim in India should be to teach the people to govern themselves, as England at this distance could not hope to govern them efficiently, sympathetically, and thoroughly, unless the active interest of the people themselves was called into play by the re-introduction of forms of self-government which would familiarize them with the difficulties which administration ever involves. (Hear, hear.)

Dr. M. C. FURNELL claimed for Mr. Pogson, the Astronomer (of Madras), the honour of the discovery that had been attributed to Dr. Hunter.

Colonel NASSAU LEES said he was glad to hear the last remark, as he would attach more importance to the discovery if coming from such a source. He suggested that as the debate had been so well sustained, and several gentlemen were desirous of speaking, the discussion should be adjourned to another meeting.

This course was agreed upon, and a vote of thanks to the Chairman closed the proceedings.

The Indian Famines and Village Organization.

PAPER BY JOHN BUDD PHEAR, Esq.

(Late Judge of the High Court, Calcutta.)

READ AT A MEETING OF THE EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION, ON WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 1877.

COLONEL A. B. RATHBORNE IN THE CHAIR.

A MEETING of the members and friends of the East India Association was held in the Rooms of the Society, Great George Street, Westminster, on Wednesday, April 11; the subject for consideration being the Indian Famines and Village Organization, introduced in an address by Mr. J. B. Phear (late Judge of the High Court, Calcutta).

Colonel A. B. RATHBONNE occupied the chair, and amongst those present were the following: Rajah Rampul Singh, Rev. James Long, Lieut.-General O. Cavenagh, Colonel P. Dods, Colonel R. Ranken, Captain W. C. Palmer (Hon. Secretary of the Association), Mr. Rudolph Auerbach, Mr. Robert Bain, Mr. H. S. Bascom, Mr. G. A. Ballard, Mr. G. Buchanan, Mr. K. M. Dutt, Mr. A. R. Hutchins, Mr. John Jones, Mr. C. C. Macrae, Mr. W. Maitland, Mr. G. S. Mankar, Mr. S. A. Rahman, Mr. William Tayler, Mr. E. N. Walker, Mr. C. E. White, &c., &c.

The CHAIRMAN having briefly introduced the lecturer,

Mr. J. B. PHEAR spoke as follows:—

For a third time within the last twelve years famine is stalking gauntly through the length and breadth of large provinces of India; and populations rivalling in numbers the total inhabitants of the United Kingdom are demanding from the Indian Government extraordinary assistance, measured by millions sterling, to save them from starvation. Those among us who can realize to themselves the terrible facts comprehended under this short designation, "famine," feel compelled to ask, "Ought these things to be? Are not these periodic national "calamities symptoms of maladministration? Should every season of "materially defective agricultural production need the special interpo-"sition of the supreme Government to keep the cultivators of the soil "alive?" When once the normal condition of the people of India is apprehended, it is not difficult to perceive that a very small disturbance of it may be sufficient to bring about serious scarcity of food over

extensive areas of country. The circumstances of cultivation may be said to be tropical in their character throughout the whole of the peninsula, from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin; for though the northern tropic passes through Calcutta, the centre of maximum temperature during the year lies in the Punjab. It needs, therefore, hardly to be explained that the production of the food crops is immediately dependent upon the supply of water, and that this supply is periodic, proceeding primarily from the monsoon downfall in the rainy season of the year, and also from monsoon-fed rivers. The equatorial stream of vapour-laden atmosphere which constitutes or feeds the south-west monsoon, on meeting the southern extremity of India, is divided, as by a wedge, into two principal currents: the one, flowing up the Bay of Bengal, sweeps in its course the eastern flank of the Indian peninsula, passes over the Bengal delta, and then is turned by the mighty wall of the Himalayas into a north-westerly route along the great Gangetic trough; the other similarly traverses the western flank and the valley of the Indus; and the two commonly encounter each other in the tract of country about Delhi. At times either (or both) of these is exhausted of its moisture before it reaches its northerly terminus; at others, they will precipitate less than the average proportion of their burden as they flow, and reserve the complete discharge of it until the journey's end; or, as a third alternative, they may bestow their favours scantily throughout. And at present it does not appear to be within human power to control this capriciousness, or within human foresight to anticipate the event. But a short supply of water from this source at the usual season means inevitably defective crops for some lands and no crops at all for others of a few inches higher level.

Then comes the question, how are the cultivating classes of the country prepared to face such a contingency? If on the average they are possessed of an accumulated capital equivalent to at least a season's subsistence, they can bear the strain; if otherwise, they must obtain relief from the outside, or succumb. Let us endeavour to ascertain what the actual state of things in this respect is. It will be as well to look somewhat closely at a typical example.

The province of Bengal is in its deltaic portion, and indeed in Behar, quite one of the most fertile in India. There, if anywhere, the cultivator ought to be able to lay up the means of tiding over the emergency of a season's scarcity. Yet a no lengthened survey of the rural population is sufficient to satisfy the inquirer that he seldom contrives to do so. In the Delta the villages are often charming enough to view in the distance. A mass of glorious foliage—palms, mangoes, tamarinds,

pipels, bamboos, in rich confusion—covers the slightly rising ground which bounds the rice plain, and here and there a picturesque thatch peeps out, or a hut stands forth. On entering these woody precincts they will be found, more or less, full of like structures, and these, in the aggregate, will be the village. But, as a rule, there is no appearance of a street, or of any arrangement in the order of the houses. Indeed, of houses, in the ordinary English understanding of the term, there are none. Each family dwelling is a small group of about four huts, commonly so placed as to inclose a quadrangular area, and may be appropriately called a homestead. It is the unit of which the entire village is made up, as the family which inhabits it is the unit to which Indian society may be reduced. The huts of the homestead are of bamboo and matting, or of bamboo wattle plastered over with mud; or, according to the locality, of mud, or sun-dried clay, alone. The floor is commonly earth-raised above the site of the homestead, and each hut is a single apartment, say, some fifteen or twenty feet long, by ten or fifteen wide, without a window. The side walls are low, but the roof is high, peaked with a gracefully-curved ridge, and is thatched with some jungle grass; while the eaves, projecting far and low, serve to form well-protected verandahs on the back and front of the hut. The huts are usually ranged on the sides of the quadrangular house-space, to a certain extent inclosing it, and are designated by the members of the family as the east house, the west house, and so on, respectively. The principal or front one of the set will have a door opening outwards, in addition to the one which opens on the house-space, and this front door will form the proper entrance to the dwelling. Strangers and men not belonging to the family will be received here, and it will be the ordinary sleeping-place for the male adults of the family. A mat laid on the floor of the hut, or in its verandah, is the only fitting thought necessary for this purpose, save that the head of the house, perhaps, may enjoy the luxury of lying upon a web of coarse tape stretched across a charpoy, or rough four-legged frame of wood. A second hut is appropriated to the women and children; another is a store-house for grain; in a fourth is the indispensable domestic utensil, the denkhi, or long lever-shaped mortar, by which the paddy, or rice grain, is husked for eating. Another hut may be the stable of the diminutive plough oxen, with a slight bamboo loft in it for the primitive plough and other small implements of husbandry. If the family is well-to-do, and comprises a third generation, there will probably be more huts than these in the homestead. For instance, each son with his wife and children may have a hut to themselves; but, as a rule, all the huts alike will be one-celled and windowless. The walls will be bare, except for a rude shelf

or two, and here and there a peg. The floor is merely the hardened earth, and all the furniture is perhaps two or three pitaras, or boxes, and some sleeping mats. The homestead thus composed is generally surrounded by large trees, under which are sometimes small irregular clearings, hardly by any stretch of courtesy to be called gardens, and a certain ill-defined space around constitutes the compound.

A loose aggregate of many such homesteads forms at once the apparent tree-covered mound and the village. In the midst there are, now and again, vacant places—unoccupied sites of dwellings—and ponds of water in the excavations, from which came the materials for the raised ground of the homesteads and their huts. Some of these pools, with their broken grassy banks and overhanging jungle, crowded in parts with bright flowering plants, present perfect little pictures for the artist's pencil; but they are, in truth, only too often rich in every sort of abomination. Still, they are amongst the most prized possessions of the village. It is to them that all classes of people go for their daily ablutions, to wash their body cloths, and to catch their fish! Of made or metalled roads there are none—seldom even a wheeled trackway; for streets and lanes are narrow paths threading in and out between the homestead compounds under the jungle, over the earth-banks, round the tanks. There is little trace of accumulated capital to be seen in all this. The land which the dwellers in these homesteads cultivate is the low-lying open *math*, or field, which is spread out on all sides around the wooded village upland. And here the terms high and low are strictly relative, for a very few feet serve to measure the difference of level between the highest and the lowest parts of the two tracts. The cultivators are all, with certain distinctions, holders of the land they till, and pay a rent for it to some superior. This person is for them the zemindar, and they are his ryots (subjects). The manner of it is shortly this: The culturable math is plotted out in small parcels (or *khets*), and the family of each homestead, usually consisting of a father and sons, or of brothers, or of cousins, hold and till several of these jointly. The plots so held together will seldom all be in juxtaposition, but one here, and another at a little distance off, and so on, with varying productive capabilities, dependent upon slight differences of level; so that each family may, if possible, have its early rice, its later rice, and its rubbee crop.

The culture is of the simplest. The archaic plough stirs, but scarcely turns, the soil; a rough besom of bamboo, or of *babul*, drawn over it serves as a harrow; a heavy wooden slab, instead of a roller, presses and smooths the surface; and the tiny, ill-fed oxen which drag these rude implements betray the owner's limited resources of maintenance. Perhaps the chief skill and labour expended by the husbandman is in irrigation

at the due season of the year. The members of one homestead, according to circumstances, will hold from two to ten acres. A man and his young son, with a plough and two small oxen, can till, say, about three acres, and so on in proportion. There is no class corresponding to that of the agricultural labourer in England, supported as he is solely by the wages of labour done on the land of another; but on occasions the spare hands of a poorer family work for their neighbours; and inasmuch as, by reason of differences of situation and other circumstances, the rice crops do not ripen in all districts simultaneously, small gangs of people will sometimes go from one locality to help in the harvest of another. In such a case the foreigners hut themselves on the ground, improvize a threshing-floor, and, on completing their job, thresh out the one sheaf in seven which is their portion, and return home, like the sons of Jacob laden with their bags of grain.

The introduction of English capital into the country, with the large public and private works always in progress, has afforded much employment for the poorer members of the village population, and has familiarized them with money wages. There is probably, now-a-days, everywhere a more or less recognized rate of wages for unskilled manual labour, but the ryot must become a much wealthier man than he now is before the practice of cultivating the land with hired labour can become anything other than most unusual.

A few lines will suffice to sum up an ordinary cultivator's possessions. For the site of the homestead huts and the small surrounding compound he pays to the zemindar some 2s. to 4s. a-year. The huts and outbuildings he erects at his own cost, and whenever he changes his place of dwelling, he is entitled to remove so much of the materials of them as he can, or to sell them. In the whole, they may, perhaps, represent a money equivalent of, say, from 8*l.* to 15*l.* His household utensils—such as an earthenware water-pot or two, brass pots, plates, and the like—may be worth 10s. or 15s.; boxes and sleeping mats, 6s. or 10s.; a low stool or two, of bamboo, no assignable value. The clothing of the family is surprisingly small in amount. Each male or female member of it has two loin-cloths, of about twelve feet long and three broad (Manchester piece goods), for daily wear. Besides these, all well-to-do people have—the women, a country-woven *sari* and a jacket; the men, a somewhat similar sheet and sewn vest. When at work the men wear the slightest possible covering, made of old cloths torn into smaller sizes. The average value of all the cloths (they are scarcely clothes) belonging to each individual may be put at 4s. or 5s. The quilts, usually stuffed with rags, and the pillows, of like composition, altogether may be worth another 6s. or 8s. The articles in the cook-house, inclusive of the curry-

stone and the husking pestle and mortar, may be valued at 6s. or 7s. for each separate family. The cost of the cattle in an ordinary homestead may be estimated at some 4*l.*, and of the ploughs and other agricultural implements at 10s. Perhaps another 5s. or 10s. should be added for billhooks and hoes. The quantity of rice, mustard-seed, &c., laid by for the year's consumption and for the next season's sowing, varies, of course, with the means and size of the family, and the extent of land cultivated by it. For a moderately well-to-do household, tilling three acres or so, it would amount in value, probably, to some 4*l.* or 5*l.* The only other form under which a ryot's savings can be found is that of ornaments. They, in truth, constitute his bank. All his spare cash is turned into ornaments for his females. These are commonly kept concealed in an earthen pot, buried under the floor of one of his huts or elsewhere. They are exhumed and worn on such occasions as weddings; and whenever money is wanted, they are sold or pawned for the purpose of raising it.

It thus appears that, in the whole (the ornaments only omitted), an ordinary ryot's family may be possessed of some 20*l.* or 30*l.* worth of accumulated capital, and the ornaments will amount to perhaps 2*l.* or 3*l.* more. Many families are, no doubt, to be found in most parts of the country who are better off than this; but, on the other hand, there is a large class of ryots whose circumstances are much more narrow, who have but one hut, without even a box or a charpoy in it, a couple of cloths for clothing, a brass *lota*, a platter, a plough and harrow, a billhook, and perhaps a tiny cow or two—the entirety of their assets not exceeding 3*l.* in value!

Besides the purely agriculturist class, every village, of course, has its artisans and petty tradesmen: the *modi* (or general dealer), the blacksmith, the potter, the weaver, the barber, the fisherman, &c. If the community is one of somewhat more than average importance, there will also be in it a cloth-shop or two, where Manchester piece goods and other textile fabrics are sold. But even of these there is hardly a family which does not cultivate some portion of land, small though it may be.

The mediocre uniformity in the means and style of living which has been indicated pervades all classes alike. From one extremity of a village to the other no material difference is discernible in the homestead, whether it be the dwelling of an ordinary ryot or of a, comparatively speaking, wealthy trader. In both households there is the same absence of anything like furniture; and in the habits of life, and even food, of the two families, there seems little to distinguish them. Wealth (if such a word can be here used without absurdity) is expended in marriage spectacles, religious readings, and other social shows—never in appli-

ances of refinement and convenience, which are, in truth, absolutely unknown.

The village country gentleman, who lives on his own means, has not, perhaps, more, at the utmost, than 20*l.* or 30*l.* of income per annum. His property is, most likely, a share of the village in which he lives, or of several villages together, held jointly with others on some tenure which could not be easily described to the uninitiated in these matters; and his income is derived from the payments of the ryots, or sub-tenure holders, after the expenses of collection have been defrayed, and the claims of Government, or of some superior holder, satisfied. His day's routine is most uneventful and colourless. He rises at daybreak, washes in the tank or river, receives in his verandah, or sitting-place, all who come to him for business or gossip, both of which are aided by the ever-present and indispensable hookah; then, having anointed and bathed himself, he goes for his first and mid-day meal to the part of the dwelling where the women and children are, and where, in an accustomed place, the floor has been swept and a square piece of carpet spread for him. He seats himself upon this, and, with his children around him, is served by his wife on a stone platter. His food is rice, in large quantity, split pulse of some sort, a small portion of a vegetable, separately prepared, a fish curry, with milk and sugar to drink. The food is conveyed from the platter to the mouth by the fingers of the right hand. When the eating is done, he washes his hand and mouth, takes the pan and betel prepared for him by the women of the family, and returns to his own sitting-place. After smoking his hookah for awhile, he lies down and takes a siesta of a couple of hours during the hottest part of the day. The following part of the day almost repeats the first; except that the gentleman then goes the more often out for his gossip and recreation; and the second meal, which ends the day at ten P.M., is the first over again.

The universal frugality of living, where the best-to-do classes know no better fare than this, is a most noticeable characteristic of the people; and with it, in a tropical country, under conditions favourable for the production of the cereal rice, the human kind can be maintained only too easily at a certain low standard of life. Fourteen shillings a-month will measure the cost of existence for a whole family, half-a-crown will feed an adult man, and eighteenpence an adult woman for a month! If all things have gone right with them, the substantial cultivators of the village have in general constantly enough rice laid up for their own home consumption and for seed, though certainly with but little margin. The other villagers get their unhusked paddy from time to time in small quantities from the general dealer's (modi's) shop. And almost all go there, the poorer ones daily, for salt, curry, spices, oil, palm sugar

tobacco, &c., paying for their little modicums of purchase in cowries, of which 5,120 go to a rupee or two-shilling-piece.

To complete this outline sketch of the economic circumstances of a Bengal rural population, it is necessary to add an account of the cultivator's relations with two very different personages—namely, the mahajan and the zemindar. The latter is the generic designation of the person to whom the cultivator of the soil is bound to pay dues or rent in respect of the user thereof. He appears under many varieties of form, and sometimes is a very complicated entity. As a typical case, however, it may be assumed that his zemindari holding (for which, it may be remarked, by the way, he, on his part, pays either a rent to a superior holder or a revenue to Government) consists of several entire villages and their respective lands.

It is seldom that one homestead family cultivates more than ten acres—more commonly about four or five—and only pays, as a rule, for the quantity actually under tillage, which varies from year to year. Each plot, also, is assessed separately according to quality of soil, and sometimes according to crop; and the whole payment for the year is apportioned into instalments respectively due at certain fixed times. Sometimes, again, the dues of the cultivator are discharged in kind—*i.e.*, in the shape of a definite share of the produce, or of a money commutation therefor. The account between each ryot and his zemindar is, consequently, far from being a simple matter, and the business of collecting the rents from a whole village requires quite an official establishment. Accordingly, the zemindar's office (*kachhri*), with its clerks, (*amla*), is the first characteristic feature of the Indian village, and is, doubtless, a survival from very early times indeed. Almost inseparable from this institution is the corresponding one of the ryots' representative—the village headman. He is the mouthpiece of the cultivators, and the guardian of their rights and customs, in all matters between them and their zemindar. Also he and some few other leading and influential members of the community constitute the village panchayat, before whom most disputes are brought and settled. Their omniscience and power in all village matters, and even in the personal affairs of individuals, is very remarkable. In the more obstinate cases the additional aid of the zemindar, if he resides in the village, or, if not, of his local representative at the *kachhri*, is invoked; and by this voluntary home tribunal, even at this date, criminal and civil justice is very largely administered throughout the country, and recourse to the more cumbrous and expensive machinery of the regular public courts *pro tanto* saved.

It has just been remarked that this appears to be a true survival from an earlier state of things; in truth, it was a state of things which

subsisted till historically recent times in India, and wherein each village community practically took care of its own affairs. A village council, constituted very much as the panchayat, just mentioned, with the zemindar's naib to represent authority, was the local government. Necessarily knowing all the more considerable members of the community, and familiar with the customs and traditions upon which alone the personal and proprietary rights of every one depended, with the hereditary village officers advising or sitting with them, and every man's pretension gauged at its just value, they maintained social order without difficulty, and settled decisively all disputes arising out of conflict of right.

Until a very modern date the country at large was but an aggregate of separate villages, thus internally regulated, with, here and there, a town grown up about a military chieftain's stronghold. The rajah, khan, emir, or by whatever other name the chieftain was designated, concerned himself but little with the village, and only knew it as an asset in some zemindar's holding, the ultimate item to which his revenue could be traced through the network of the zemindari system. The rajah's personal government, such as police and judicial administration by the hands of his appointees, extended but little beyond his town. There was no national feeling to unify the general population. Neighbouring villages, differing perhaps in the race of their original settlers, remained almost aliens to each other. The only common bond, such as it was, took the form of an attachment to the ruling dynasty. There was little or nothing of that which is now comprehended in the idea of state government. The chief and the fighting caste around him obtained power, privilege, and revenue. Palaces and tombs were built, costly displays and spectacles took place. From time to time grand public works of the nature of strategic roads, or of serais, tanks, and bunds, were undertaken by the prince out of his revenue, which else went to pay his soldiers, officers, and retainers, or to expenditure of ostentation. But there was no conception of any other internal domestic administration than that which each village community effected for itself within its own limits, and the collection of the revenue. This latter was thus substantially the only public matter which engaged the attention of the ruling authority; and accordingly, while the fiscal organization of the kingdom was brought to an advanced stage of perfection by such Oriental monarchs as the great Akbar, we find nowhere any extended public service directed from a common centre and trained to the general care of the public weal. Order and right among the people were left to the charge of the villages, each of which was in truth a little republic in itself.

These remarks, if well founded, go far to explain the absence in the East, even up to these modern days, of a public business morality. They would, however, be entirely out of place here, and beyond the scope of this paper, were it not that they serve to indicate the ground of the vitality which the village system still manifests in India. And it becomes most important for the English statesman to consider whether the yet living spirit of local management, so deeply rooted as it is in the traditions and life of the people, cannot be turned to very valuable account in aid of the central English administration. It will be one of the purposes of these pages to endeavour to show that such an inquiry can only be answered, and that most emphatically, in the affirmative.

To return to our survey of the existing village—there remains the mahajan to view. Strictly speaking, the mahajan has no recognized place in the social edifice of the village; yet he is all essential to it, for he is the village capitalist and money-lender, to whom almost all have recourse for the sinews of war in their battle of life. A cultivator very rarely indeed has any accumulated means; as a rule, he lives pretty much from hand to mouth. It is true that his money wants are not great, and that, with good luck in the long run, the proceeds of his crops will cover them. Nevertheless, he is called upon by the nature of his business, from time to time, to incur certain money expenditure, and periodically he is obliged to make what are for him large payments. For instance, a hut of the homestead has to be rebuilt or repaired, a new billhook to be got, a bullock to be bought, some special labour to be paid for, grain for seed to be procured, the family store of rice to be supplemented, an instalment of the zemindar's rent to be met, and so on; and this, too, may, and indeed generally does, happen at a time when his never large stock of ready cash is exhausted, and before new crops can be got in and realized. What, then, does the unfortunate man do? He goes to the mahajan, who is at once his banker and his granary. It is a matter of ordinary business—nothing is so common. Throughout a large portion even of the fertile delta of the Ganges, very few ryots, after discharging the past year's obligations out of the season's crop, have margin enough left to carry them over all the demands upon them which must intervene before the current year's produce can be made available. The mahajan is the institution which enables him to meet the contingency.

The most usual course of dealing between the parties is this: Such rice grain as is needed by the ryot for sowing or for food, or, indeed, any other grain, is provided by the mahajan on the understanding that it is to be returned, together with an addition of 50 per cent. in quantity, at the time of harvest, and the money required for purposes immediately

connected with the jote (or holding of the ryot) is advanced as the occasion occurs, on a like understanding that it is to be repaid at the time of harvest, with interest on the loan at the rate of 2 per cent. per mensem for the interval, and that this is to be effected either in the form of an equivalent of rice grain, reckoned according to bazaar prices, or in cash, at the option of the lender. It is not unfrequently the case that the mahajan, by way of securing the due performance of this arrangement, takes a formal hypothecation of the ryot's future crop, and eventually helps himself on the threshing-floor in the open field to the stipulated portion of the produce.

The state of things thus arrived at is certainly at first very surprising to an English observer; and as it prevails with much generality, its true significance must be seized before the actual condition of the cultivating classes throughout India can be understood. In the result, concisely put, it would seem that the zemindar, who is so often spoken of as if he were in the situation of an English landlord, is scarcely more than a rent-charger possessing peculiar powers of enhancing his rent; the cultivator, notwithstanding the apparently beneficial character of his occupation, is a field labourer, barely able to earn his livelihood; while the mahajan is the capitalist of the concern, who, practically, bears all the expenditure, pays the rent, and takes all the profits. Yet, it must be remembered, the mahajan is merely a stranger to the land, without any proprietary interest in it, and is simply a creditor minded to employ and recover his money as advantageously as possible. Of such portion of the produce of the land as comes to his hands in the way just now described, he retains as much in his golas (or granaries) as he is likely to need for the ensuing year's advances in kind to his clients, and with the rest he pursues the business of corn-factor towards the outside public, dealing in the neighbouring hâts (or markets) or in the bazaars of the nearest towns.

And here we come to the point at which the microcosm of the village touches the greater external world. The rural market, or hât, presents a scene of so much picturesqueness and character that it has not failed to obtain frequent description both with the pencil and in print; but it may be doubted whether its importance in the municipal economy of the country has even yet met with due recognition. An open space, conveniently situated on the banks of a khal, or on a cart-road, and overshadowed by two or three huge pipal trees, is the market site. Wholly unfurnished with fittings of any sort as it is (except in some rare instances, where, perhaps, a long, narrow, low shed roof, supported on bamboo poles, covers a slight-raised floor of earth for the benefit of the piece-goods sellers), the vendors sit cross-legged on the

ground, each with his wares ranged around him. Here the cultivator brings his rice grain, his pulses, his millets, his mustard-seed, his betel-nuts, his sugar-cane, his treacle, his gour, his chillies, gourds, yams, &c.; the fisherman brings his fish, the seed-crusher his oils, the old widow her mats or other handiwork, the potter his ghorrahs and gamlahs, the trader his piece goods, shawls, and so on. On this common exchange arena the local modis and other shopkeepers meet the agents of the town merchants, and the rural folks supply their little wants. In some places heaps of grain piled on an extemporized flooring of mats, or a diminutive cow, with her calf, tethered to a stake, may be seen awaiting a purchaser; in others, rice, brought in cargo boats or on little pack bullocks, is offered for sale. In short, the hât is the channel through which the dispensable products of the village flow out and the needed commodities of foreign parts are drawn in.

With the aid of the close scrutiny which has here been attempted of the normal circumstances of a deltaic village, it ought to be easy now to apprehend the course of change by which a local scarcity of produce becomes converted into a state of famine. The deficiency of crop first affects the poorer cultivators, who have the least resources of their own. For a time, after the consumption of their petty stores, they can obtain advances in grain or money from the mahajan, in whose books they are; but sooner or later, if the scarcity of food-stuffs prevails, this aid must come to an end. Such small stock of jewels as the family may possess is then turned into money. This, however, would not be enough to last long even at normal prices, and is soon exhausted under the rise which takes place. Next, perhaps, the bullock goes (if, indeed, he has not already died of starvation), then they pawn their cooking pots, and so the process of depletion continues until at last the family is left absolutely without the means of procuring food. Before this stage is quite reached, the able-bodied members of the family will, in many instances, have departed in search of some employment which will enable them to earn money to send back for the support of the rest of the family at home. And it must be understood that almost invariably in India, by reason of the closeness and strength of the family tie, destitution goes by families, rather than by individuals, as in England; and even in the extremity of distress those who have nothing are for a time kept alive by those who have little. The case of those in the village who are in the habit of earning money by any craft or labour is at first not so bad as that of the needy cultivator. The deficiency of crop does not necessarily of itself immediately affect their means; it is the rise of price which eventually, if at all, breaks them down.

Let us endeavour to analyze the manner and the occasion of this rise. For this purpose it will be convenient to imagine a specific village or limited district of country under, say, the designation Rajahkhet, and to put the letter D. for the whole body of persons who usually make it their business to deal in food-stuffs therein or in any connection therewith. D. will cover members of various classes, such as the actual growers or producers of the food-stuffs, the cultivator's mahajan, whose dealings with his ryot clients are on the footing of special relations with them, the local modi, and the wholesale trader; and these will, according to their respective circumstances, be actuated from time to time by differing motives in offering their goods for sale.

It is not difficult to perceive that the quantity of food-stuffs which is tendered for sale within Rajahkhet at any given time is affected by, and may be said to depend upon, both the price which apparently rules there and also the circumstances other than the anticipated price which are specially personal to, or immediately influence, D. in the conduct of their business. For instance, an increase in the amount of food-stuffs tendered for sale in Rajahkhet might occur in view of an unchanged price, either because some considerable section of D. has fallen under pressing need of money, or because the price of food-stuffs had become lowered in some market to which D. had been accustomed to resort as well as to Rajahkhet, or for other reasons of a like kind. If at the time when an increased amount of food-stuffs is for any cause held out for sale in Rajahkhet no more food-stuffs are wanted there than was the case before, or no more at the supposed price, then the offered food-stuffs cannot all find purchasers, and in the effort which is made for the purpose the price of offer is lowered. This is comprehended in the generalization that in the competition of sellers for purchasers the price inevitably falls. If, again, on the other hand, no cause is in operation with the sellers of any class to induce them to offer an increase of food-stuffs at the existing or apparent price, and yet an increase of such stuffs is wanted and can be paid for within Rajahkhet, then the endeavour of persons in Rajahkhet to obtain, each by way of preference to others, that which in the aggregate exceeds the amount offered by D. leads to an event which is tantamount to an offer on the part of the buyer of a higher price; that is, D. as a whole become sensible of the pressure of the buyers for their goods, and will not part with them except at an increase of price. Thus in the competition of buyers after the goods the price rises.

Starting from these positions, and assuming that our sample locality, Rajahkhet, is scarcity-stricken, we will suppose, moreover, that simultaneously the price of food-stuffs has not become *lowered* in any market

which lies within D.'s usual length of reach, and that no cause has arisen to induce D. to offer *more* food-stuffs in Rajahkhet at the old price than before. Yet by the nature of the case more are wanted, and must be had if possible; and the first effect naturally is, that the price rises in the competition of buyers, by reason, as was just now mentioned, of the persons who want food endeavouring to get a preferential share of the food-stuff actually in the market to the disadvantage of some others who would have been able to secure it in a distribution at the old price. It is obvious that in the state of things supposed (which, indeed, may represent the first stage on the road to famine) the raising of the price in this manner is the only possible mode in which an increased amount of food-stuffs can be drawn into Rajahkhet through the ordinary machinery of trade. If no abnormal conditions supervene, this rise of price will readily and speedily have the effect of drawing to the Rajahkhet market the increased amount required. Those of D., or some of them, who have any store of food-stuffs under their immediate command will, under the attraction of increased profit, at once add somewhat to the quantity which they offer, or which they are willing to part with. Also, inasmuch as the others besides those who furnish the added margin get the benefit of the new price, the business on the whole, other things being the same, will command larger profits than before; and operations in it will, therefore, become correspondingly extended, both by reason of D. enlarging their dealings and by new persons and fresh capital being attracted to the employment. Generally, in the end the supply of food-stuffs thus stimulated will be somewhat greater than the want expressed by the increased price, and, therefore, the price will again descend, until at last the supply is commensurate with the new demand at a price probably intermediate to the first advanced price and the old price.

This process of adjustment is universally possible and assured, because there is, practically, now-a-days for every village in India a body of men, having various and conflicting interests, all concerned in promoting it, and a market for exchange of food-stuffs within easy reach of them, connected by easy channels of communication with the outside world. It may be that, under the ordinary circumstances of the district, the flow of grain is outwards, but even in that case, when the demand changes its aspect, the stream will readily reverse itself. By the route that Manchester piece goods come in (and scarcely a village in India is without them,—the very blacksmiths' shops are supplied with iron by the hoops which bind the bales), by the same rice can and will enter in answer to a money demand. If the scarcity which has been supposed to prevail in Rajahkhet is general in its character, the price of food will

rise throughout large areas contiguous thereto, for the same reason that it rises in that place. In this state of things D. must, on the whole, go farther and pay more than before, in order to procure even that quantity of food-stuffs which they have been accustomed to furnish to Rajahkhet. In other words, D.'s capital and means, unless they be in some way augmented, are inadequate even to effect the same amount of supply within Rajahkhet as before. Also some of D., anticipating on good grounds a still higher rise of price, will for a time refrain from offering within Rajahkhet such food-stuffs as they have in their power, expecting that they will ultimately, through this holding back, realize in one transaction as much profit as they might have done in the same time by a succession of transactions and the employment of larger capital. Under these circumstances there will be an interval during which a rise of price within Rajahkhet will not only fail to bring an increased supply of food-stuffs, but may most legitimately, in a certain sense, be the cause of an actual diminution in the supply. Still, it is beyond question that if food-stuffs are purchasable within a practicable distance of Rajahkhet, and if the people of Rajahkhet who want food-stuffs have money enough to remunerate traders for purchasing and bringing these to Rajahkhet, then by the insensible process of the market bidding the price will rapidly rise to the point which in the end will have the effect of adequating the supply to the demand. In such a case much inconvenience, and possibly pressure of want, may occur during the short period of adjustment; but it is only when among the persons who want food-stuffs in Rajahkhet some have not money to purchase at the market price enough food to sustain life that true famine is reached.

The Bombay Government has recently somewhat quaintly said in an official "note" on the policy pursued by it for affording relief to the distressed or famine-stricken districts of its Presidency: "There is no "actual scarcity of food in the country, and none is anticipated at "present; but there is no employment for the people, and it is this that "it is the task of Government to provide." Plainly, the want of employment on the part of the people here merely means the want of some channel by which the people can draw to themselves the money requisite to purchase food. And another passage in the same note shows that if the purchasing power be given to them in their own homes, the food will reach them there. The present editor of the *Friend of India and Statesman* (himself an Indian statistician of mature experience) remarks, with reference to this passage of the note: "This is what famine in India "generally means. In Orissa it was otherwise; there it was actual "food that was wanting. But, as a rule, it is not so in Indian famines." And it may be added that it appears from Major St. John's narrative in

"Eastern Persia" that even during much of the great Persian Famine of 1870–72, food was to be procured at no very extravagant price: it was the means of purchasing it which was shortcoming.

The truth appears to be that, whatever was the case at earlier stages of the history of India, and with a less settled state of affairs than at present generally prevails throughout the country, it may at the present time be accepted as a safe conclusion, that hoarding of grain will not occur to any mischievous extent, and that a sufficiency of money will everywhere attract to itself the necessary supply of food-stuffs insensibly through the ordinary channels of private enterprise, unless, perhaps, some extraordinarily disturbing cause intrude itself, as happened in the case of Orissa.

We may take it, then, that so long as all the people in Rajahkhet can afford to pay the Rajahkhet market price of food-stuffs, there will always be a supply of food-stuffs there—a statement which partakes of the character of a truism. When, however, any persons in Rajahkhet have not the means (either original or derived) to purchase at the market price the amount of food-stuffs which is reasonably sufficient to support life, then, as has been already remarked, famine exists, and a discontinuity occurs in the working of the customary machinery of supply. In such a case, it may be predicated, the market price of food-stuffs in Rajahkhet will be a price which will distribute all the food-stuffs offered there among those who want food and who have money, more or less. Those who have money enough to be indifferent to the amount expended will pay whatever price is necessary to obtain the quantity of food for their unstinted wants; others having less money will limit their wants, and pay whatever price is necessary to obtain the quantity of food which will satisfy their wants thus limited; and a third class will lay out all the money they have and not obtain their absolute wants. Or, better, the purchasers may be represented as of two classes—namely, Y., those who obtain food, at least to the extent of their substantial wants; and Z., those who expend all their money and fail to obtain as much as they actually want. Practically, of course, the price is the same for all. That this is a determinate price may be easily perceived. Let it be designated by (a); then, obviously, a less price than (a) will enable Z. to get as much food as they do at the price (a), and leave them money to spare; but as this quantity is, *ex hypothesi*, less than Z.'s wants, they will try to get more with the excess money, and the price will go up. Also a larger price than (a) will oblige Z. to forego some of the food which the expenditure of all their money would have brought them at the price (a), and the excess quantity thus left on the market by Z. will not be taken up by Y. at the higher price, inasmuch as they did not do so at the price

(*a*); therefore, this excess quantity will be seeking a purchaser, and so will bring down the price. It may, consequently, be said of the market price during a state of famine that it is a price at which all the food left in the market by the class able to supply its wants exhausts all the money of the class not able to supply its wants.

It is most important to notice the character of the disturbance of trade conditions which ensues on the occurrence of this pauperism in a portion of the consuming classes. While the pressure continues the money resources of both Y. and Z. (which may be of the nature of current earnings, or otherwise) will, on the whole, diminish, not increase; and therefore, on the reasoning just followed, if the amount of food offered at a price, and taken, within Rajahkhet remains constant, the price must be a reduced price. Similarly, if in these circumstances the price remains unchanged, it must be because the amount of food offered and divided has diminished, and, therefore, the amount of unsatisfied want increased. But a further diminution in the quantity offered would, by raising the price, have drawn at least the same amount of money from the purchasers, and we may, consequently, be sure that it is the one of the supposed alternative events which would occur, corresponding, of course, with a still more increased amount of unsatisfied want.

On the supposition, again, that the quantity of food offered within Rajahkhet is not altered, while an addition to the purchasing power of Z. is caused by a donation from Government, or in other form of alms, or even in payment for labour, the price of food will go up; the number of those who do not get enough to satisfy their actual wants will be increased, but some will get more than they did before, and the distribution of food will tend to become the more even. But if the deficiency of food products is general, and affects large areas around our typical place, Rajahkhet, then the quantity offered in Rajahkhet must, for a time at least, be diminished. D. find that the cost of procuring and bringing food-stuffs to Rajahkhet increases, while their capital and means certainly do not materially increase. To get the same profit as before, they must sell at a higher price; in other words, they will only sell, if at all, at a higher price; which means (as has been already shown) that they will offer less within Rajahkhet—they will contract their operations to avoid loss. At the same time D., as a whole, will continue to offer food-stuffs as long as they make at least their former profit.

It thus appears pretty plain that, under the circumstances of a generally prevailing deficiency of produce throughout considerable areas around Rajahkhet, an *increase* of food will not come there by the ordinary processes of trade until at least the price rises to a point which will give D. a larger profit than before; and that, further, unless the

pecuniary condition, so to speak, of Rajahkhet be altered for the better, the price of food can only rise there as the effect of a diminution in the quantity of food offered. The result appears to be, in short, that an increase of food can only be drawn to Rajahkhet by the operation of an increase of the money fund in Rajahkhet, reckoned relatively to the persons wanting food—a condition which seldom, if ever, admits of being satisfied by the unaided efforts of the people of the place alone. Things would only right themselves in the end (if the event can be termed righting) by the paupers being starved off until the necessary ratio between money and mouths is re-established. It must be added, that D., perceiving their customers diminishing, as well as the increasing strain upon the means of those of them who remain, can have no assurance of the safe continuance of trade to justify them in increasing their operations and enlarging their expenditure even in view of the rising price.

The conclusion of the argument is that if, from the commencement of the state of want, the paupers of Rajahkhet—*i.e.*, those persons who have no food at their command, and are unable to earn the money needed to purchase it—are, as the need arises, furnished from without with that money at their homes, then the ordinary machinery of trade will work continuously, and scarcity of production will not grow into famine. For in this way the population of the place will be enabled to promote and to support the requisite rise of price, and thereby to draw in a sufficiently enlarged supply of food-stuffs at the hands of the existing D. and such others as may be induced to become importers by the prospect of high profits. Of course, a step of this kind can only be effected by the application of the State power; and it is manifest that it ought not lightly to be undertaken, because obviously the first consequence of it will be to put a new pecuniary pressure upon those who hitherto had been able to buy for themselves a sufficiency of food.

Another form of Government action for the purpose of affording relief is to give money or food at fixed central depôts to those who come there for them, subject to the imposition of labour or other tests of pauperism on the recipients. It must be apparent almost at a glance that this is far inferior in most important respects to the remedy of supplying the money at the family home. When people are taken in considerable numbers from their dwellings and massed together in large bodies on limited areas of ground, a disturbance of a double aspect occurs in regard to the distribution of food-stuffs, for the stream of supply to the old places is checked, and there is no existing channel large enough to take an abnormal quantity to the new. It is true that the withdrawal of the indigent from the villages to seek food or money else-

where does not take place until—so far, at least, as they themselves are concerned—the supply has already very nearly approached its end; but the knowledge that Government is about to enter the field of competition, or to take measures for the support of the people elsewhere, speedily has the effect of leading private local traders to relax their efforts. While, on the one hand, the persons whom we have designated by D. would undoubtedly maintain the supply of the market so long as they can be assured of their price,—on the other, the very moment that they find themselves in prospect of competing with Government, both in the buying and in the selling market, and of entering into contest with it for the means of conveyance, they naturally restrict their dealings to the smallest point. The great command of money and of service which the Government possesses is such that whenever it engages in extensive commercial transactions without regard (as must generally be the case) to profits, all other competitors must necessarily be driven off the field; and even the bare anticipation of Government being about to enter upon a course of this kind is sufficient to check private enterprise. It may be taken as certain that the institution of large central relief works does of itself tend very materially towards prematurely paralyzing the exertions of private enterprise in the local ramifications of trade. It need hardly be remarked that the resulting mischief is very serious in its character; for though Government may thus be able, quite unintentionally, to drive D. off the field, it can never be strong enough to do the whole of D.'s work, or nearly the whole of it. Indeed, at the best, it could only hope to supplement it. And the cessation of D.'s dealings not merely means a corresponding stoppage of the Rajahkhet normal supply, but it would be accompanied by diminution of a paying industry and proportionate addition to the ranks of the indigent.

In its second aspect the disturbance gives rise to evils of capital magnitude, which it seems beyond the power even of administration by very experienced hands to avoid or to reduce to insignificance. They may be grouped under the heads of *extravagance* on the part of the Government, and *fraud* on that of the recipients of relief.

It is impossible that Government interposition of this kind should be otherwise than costly and wasteful. The organization needed for the purpose has to be created as best it can be under much pressure of time, and is not likely to be in any high degree economical in its working. The collecting of food-stuffs, and the conveying of them to the central points, has to be effected under grave disadvantages. Contracts, whether for delivery of grain or for vehicles, can only be entered into at exorbitant, or, at best, guess-work prices. When the abnormal condition of things passes away, the civil courts abound in most amusing examples of litigant

contractors quarrelling over their unholy gains. Even the most honestly-minded of the Englishmen who, in the Tirhoot Famine of 1873–4, engaged with Government to convey rice from the railway to the depôts, found their profits alarmingly large. The writer of this paper was told, on most trustworthy authority, of the case of three young indigo planters who cleared as much as 10,000*l.* by a joint undertaking of this kind. And when Government takes the transport into its own hands the matter is by no means mended. The local officers are ordered to hire and have in readiness at specified places and times the means of conveyance for certain specified quantities of food-stuffs, and only those who have seen the preparations for the march of an English battalion in India from one station to another can fully realize what the result of such an order is. Every bullock cart and bullock, or other available vehicle, is, by the aid of the police, pressed into the service from all sides within an extensive area, and these are kept together for days and weeks at a time, of course at the public expense, in order that there may be no failure at the appointed hour. Such small agricultural and other industry of the country as would otherwise have some activity is entirely stopped, and, what is worse, the operations of the private trader are effectually put an end to.

That there is gross fraud on the side of the recipients under any system of centrically-administered relief, seems to be the one lesson to be learned from the experience of all the Government famine proceedings, ranging from those of Ireland in 1847 to those of Tirhoot and Behar in 1873–4. During the last of these famines village modis replenished their shops gratis at the Government stores on signing a bond of repayment, often in fictitious names, and sometimes to be denounced by rivals who had been scarcely more truthful. And even at so great a distance from the distressed districts as was Calcutta, garden labour was most difficult to procure, because, as the writer of this paper learned to his cost, the mallis had gone off in large numbers to the Government "famine operations." Probably it would involve but little error to estimate that half the amount of money thus expended, if discreetly given to the sufferers at their own doors, would have dissipated the famine altogether, and have left the next season's crop well in train. The only difficulty which appears to lie in the way of doling out the money to the indigent at their homes appears to be that of devising a sufficient and trustworthy machinery for the purpose—sufficient to reach the remotest homestead, trustworthy to discriminate between real and simulated cases of indigence.

Now, if the foregoing account of the existing condition of the village in India be in any substantial degree correct, it can hardly be doubted

that the old village organization, somewhat revivified and strengthened, affords exactly the means that is wanted, and that there is need only of an administrator of experience and ability to shape it to the end. A well-selected panchayat would be nearly omniscient in regard to the circumstances, when in question, of all dwellers in the village, though probably it could not safely be trusted to exercise its judgment in this respect impartially with a view to the expenditure of public money unless it were constrained thereto by a sense of self-interest. But the presence of an adequate motive would be insured by imposing on the village a contingent duty, of a qualified character, to recoup the money expended. It would, of course, be fruitless to expect that a famine-stricken village should very speedily after its distress become able to return to the Government the whole of the money advanced to keep its people alive; but there seems great reason that it should, by the fact of receiving the relief, incur a liability to pay back some proportionate part of it in the event of its coming into a condition to do so.

During the Bengal Famine of 1873–74 the Local Government made the recipient of relief enter into an obligation to repay: the proposition here made is that this obligation should be placed on the village.

This is not the place for the exposition in detail of any particular plan for making use of the village organization in the way proposed. The general principle only of the suggestion need be indicated; and, indeed, the application of it would probably have to be varied in the different parts of India according to the differing circumstances of the people. The basis of the scheme is the village panchayat, which should be constituted of members chosen by the inhabitants of the village, of the representative of the zemindar, and, perhaps, of an *ex-officio* member or two. The responsibility of the elected members should be insured by their being limited to persons qualified for the purpose by a process of property assessment, and by liability on the footing thereof to contribute rateably to any quota of money payment imposed on the village. The assessment itself would not be a matter of serious practical difficulty, inasmuch as the absolute amount of it would for this purpose be unimportant, and proportionality only would be the object to be aimed at in making it. This could be secured by a proper appeal machinery, whereby any one aggrieved should be entitled to complain not merely of his own assessment being too high, but also of that of others being too low. The panchayats should be grouped by Thanah or similar districts, and each group subordinated to a committee composed of delegates and official appointees. It is not necessary now to pursue the links by which the Thanah committees could be most conveniently connected with the centre of government; neither would it be con-

venient here to apportion the relative work and responsibility of the panchayats and the Thanah committee.

The concern of the organization which it has been the object of this paper to lead up to and to shadow forth would be the direct sustaining of the distressed populations by due and judicious house-to-house administration of money relief, and in some cases by the formation of local depôts of food-stuffs, and distribution therefrom. But the duty of Government does not end at this point. It has been the object of this paper to press that, under the present conditions of social order and interdependence which prevail throughout British India, the mouths which want food need only be furnished with sufficiency of money to insure the food coming to them of itself, and that in no other way can the food be got to the mouths with equal cheapness. If the trader can only make sure of his market, it may be relied upon that he will bring his wares there. But it must be remembered that with every increase in the spread of the famine conditions, and of the distances from which the food-stuffs have to be drawn, the difficulties of the trader's operations and his expenditure are more than proportionally magnified. The Government, however, always has it in its power to alleviate these in some degree. It can do much to help the trader to forecast the state of the market, and can influence the destination of new capital to the business of bringing food-stuffs to our representative village, Rajahkhet, or to the neighbouring hât, by collecting and frequently publishing accurate information of all kinds relevant to the various questions, which the importer has to solve for himself, with regard to local prices, means of transport, and so on. In particular, it should make known precisely all such steps intended to be taken by itself in any contingency as might in any way affect the private trader. And it can often with public advantage do something material towards diminishing the cost of conveyance of food-stuffs, both as regards money and time, by improving roads and canals, by suspending duties, tolls, &c., and by otherwise increasing the means or rapidity of communication between the distressed districts, and the routes by which the food-stuffs can come in.

It is the more important to insist strongly on this point, because hitherto the customary action of the Government in famine emergencies has been of entirely opposite tendency. Private enterprise, to work effectively, must work smoothly from the external source of supply (it may be in Burmah or elsewhere) on the one side to the minute ramifications of the rural hâts of a district in Bengal on the other. It is not too much to say that Government, by the mystery in which it has usually found it necessary to veil its movements, by the derangement

and even stoppage which it causes in regard to local means of carriage, by its displacement of the populations, by its abnormal distribution of food-stuffs in kind, has succeeded in reducing the data upon which the private traders depend to a state of the utmost confusion and uncertainty. It is a proof of the extraordinary vitality of private enterprise that it survives in any degree the appearance of Government in the field.

And on the occasion of the famine of 1873–74 it was even seriously proposed that Government should prescribe maximum prices for food grains, and should prohibit the exportation of rice. It is not impossible, of course, to imagine a country and its government to be so situated as to justify comparison with a blockaded fortress and its commander, or a ship under stress of provisions and its captain; but the fact that prohibition against export is necessary to prevent rice from going out of the country in ordinary course of trade seems to effectually dispose of any true analogy between the cases. And it may, without presumption, be asserted that a Government which attempts any intermeddling in the matter of price, or any interference with the discretion of the trader or the producer in his own business, without being prepared to accept the responsibility of ultimately supplying with food the whole population, rich and poor alike, gratuitously aggravates the very mischief which it pretends to cure.

In the foregoing argument it has been assumed that, in view and during a period of extreme scarcity, the conduct of the very composite body of traders D. in the way of their trade dealings will not, on the whole, materially differ in kind from that which they would exhibit in ordinary times. There is, however, unquestionably a very wide-spread belief in times of pressure that the mere prospect of an impending scarcity suffices to convert the whole class of D. from sober-minded traders to wagering speculators. The occurrence of the first considerable rise in the market price of food-stuffs is accounted for by the assumption that all dealers throughout the country are banded together with the common purpose, or are actuated by the common intention, to buy up all existing stocks, and then to hold them back from the market until, under the pressure of famine, they can extort an altogether extravagant and fictitious price for them; and the supposition usually is that they are so unprincipled and reckless in this course that, unless controlled by external force, they will pursue it even to the acceleration of the famine and the starvation of the multitude.

It is, perhaps, worth while for the moment to recall to mind that very frequently in the history of European nations the like beliefs have prevailed almost universally with regard to every conceivable subject of

exchange, not excepting even manual labour, and that the English Statute-book in its earlier pages is full of ever-fruitless enactments regulatory of prices. And it certainly would be matter for extreme astonishment if the popular notions on this point were in any substantial degree well founded, for they involve the hypothesis that the food-stuffs which D. as a whole managed to secure in their hands and withhold from the public are such in quantity as would, if properly distributed in regard to space and time, satisfy multitudes who, as a consequence of D.'s behaviour, are reduced to starvation; and it follows plainly that much of this stock must remain in D.'s hands unsold, because those who can afford to pay the exorbitant price for which it is supposed that D. have held out, will assuredly not buy more than they absolutely want. That is, in other words, it is the case that in times of great scarcity the entire class of D., as a rule, outstay their market and cause a large waste of food-stuffs, such as would not take place in ordinary times!—a conclusion which speaks for itself. The alternative is, that D. actually do dispose of their whole stock at the enhanced price sought for, and that it is consumed. And if this be so, there is, on the reasoning which precedes and need not be repeated, not merely no real ground of complaint against them, but, on the contrary, cause for holding that they have advantaged the community. But it may be perceived by a glance even at the constitution of the class D., how impossible it is that all its members should be united, whether by design or otherwise, in the purpose of unreasonably withholding food-stuffs from sale. For instance, it may be safely assumed that the village mahajans throughout the country, who live by the business of advancing money and grain to the cultivators, will not let their clients die before their faces as long as they have the means of saving them; the village modi, who has paddy in his gola, or can procure and sell it without loss, will not see his customers disappear while he calmly sits waiting for a higher price; the country produce merchant, with his cargo boats scattered along the great rivers, and his hundis falling in to be paid, cannot stand out an indefinite time for a speculative profit. In the large centres of trade, the auratdar and his beparis, with their account-book relations *inter se*, are a group little likely to be found sharing in a widely-spread purpose to play tricks with the market. The nacoda, with his bottomry bonds to meet, and a long ship's bill at his Jewish agents, cannot afford to refuse a profitable return for his outlay in the trust that the common action of the whole body of D. (of which he can have no assurance whatever) will eventually enable him to realize something magnificent; and so with all others who go to make up the class.

The truth is, that in times of scarcity private trade is, as a whole,

carried on just as soberly and carefully as at other times. The insecurity of ill-governed Oriental countries is, of course, fatal to it. On the first serious pressure, internal commerce and food distribution ceases, and hoarding commences. With such conditions, Government interference must needs be unceremonious. But in India this state of things is of the past. No doubt the very rumour of a threatening famine warns loudly of an abnormal state of things which is pregnant with uncertainty and contingency; and no trader would then be right in acting as if it were otherwise. But every trader does not, therefore, become a mere speculator and gambler. So far as the trader can be stimulated into action by the prospect of a natural rise of prices in the affected districts, so much the better. Mischief may lurk in the possibility of a speculation that if food-stuffs can be withheld long enough, Government or central relief committees, who have no profit to regulate them, must and will buy, whatever the price asked. But this, for the causes just mentioned, can never have wide extent, and owes its existence to the fault of the Government. In Orissa the principal cause which so fatally delayed the advent of relief was ignorance of the real extent of the demand in the earlier stage of the visitation. The mistaken belief that large stores existed in the country, and were held back for higher prices, was then, as usual, unfortunately universal, and actually had especial strength given to it by the tenour of official reports. Private enterprise from without was in that way completely stopped; and when at length the true facts burst into light, by reason of the peculiarity of the case, the great time for action—whether on the part of the trader or of the Government—was gone by.

The sum of the matter is this, that if food-stuffs do not exist within reach of stricken districts, the Government is powerless to create them there; but if they do exist, and if private traders are assured that upon conveying them there they will obtain a remunerative price for them, it is certain they will be so conveyed, unless a special barrier of some sort intervenes to prevent this result. The proper function of Government is to foster and sustain such an assurance, and, when necessary, to address itself to the reduction of such a barrier.

The country has now arrived, under British rule, at such a state of social order and security that private enterprise may be depended upon to feed the people as well throughout areas of want and scarcity as under normal circumstances, provided the latter can pay them for doing so; and the Government has the means, by a proper revival of the village organization, to secure the fulfilment of this condition even in a famine emergency.

Note.

It is obvious that the machinery here advocated for the relief of famine-stricken populations is available for the purpose of local taxation; and a few years ago, when the Government of Bengal was engaged in the task of creating and moulding the Road Cess Act, the writer of this paper ventured to put forward a scheme of this sort as a preferable alternative. He afterwards wrote in a Calcutta periodical, with reference to such a scheme, to the following effect: "On the "whole, with the agricultural population, the incidence of taxation is "chiefly felt in three modes—in the payment of *rent*, in the price of "*salt*, and in the *stamps* needed for every proceeding in a court of "justice or public office, or copy of any paper filed in any court or "office, or document of agreement or receipt, &c. Omitting the latter, "as being in some degree of a voluntary character, the two others "remain as the two great burdens upon the ryot. It has been explained "how extremely poor the ordinary ryot is, and how he depends upon "the mahajan system for his means even of paying his rent. It seems "impossible, then, at first sight to devise any method by which the "public revenue of the country can be increased by contributions from "this class of the community. Lately an attempt has been made in "this direction by the imposition of a road cess. The cess may be "roughly described as a small rateable addition to the rent of each "ryot affected by it, which he is to pay to his rent receiver, through "whom it is eventually transmitted to Government, together with a "further small addition to be paid by the rent receiver himself. There "are many very grave objections to this form of increased taxation "intrinsically, but the fatal objection to it is that it is capriciously "unequal; it exacts more, for instance, from the ryot, who is already "highly taxed by his rent, than from him who is less so. And it is "not possible, by any general rules of exception, to bring about even "approximate equality in this respect. If the amount of taxation must "needs be increased, it can only be done so equitably by a contrivance "which shall have the effect of apportioning the tax to the means of "the payer. While the general body of the ryots are miserably poor "and can hardly bear the existing taxation, there are, no doubt, many "among them who are comparatively well off, some of them being rent "receivers, in some manner or another, as well as cultivating ryots, and "there are, besides, in every village well-to-do persons, petty dealers, "and others of more or less accumulated means. These all have a "margin of means which may be said to be at present untaxed relatively

"to their neighbours, the ryots, and which would fairly enough admit "of being taxed if some equitable plan of making the levy could be "discovered. It might, perhaps, be imagined that something in the "nature of an income-tax would answer this purpose. But the fact is "that an income-tax must always fail in this country, even if it be only "for the reason that the necessary machinery for assessing and "collecting it is inevitably corrupt and oppressive. But probably the "difficulty might be overcome by making an assessing body out of the "village panchayat, who should be charged with the duty of assessing "the means of every resident of the village above a certain minimum "amount, and then allotting to each village certain local burdens of a "public character, which should be discharged out of rates to be levied "from the persons assessed under the superintendence of local officers. "In this way some of the work now done at the cost of Government "for local objects out of the national funds might be better carried out "than it is at present, and even additional work done by the village "itself; and so the money in the hands of Government in effect be "correspondingly increased." So far as can be judged from the telegraphic summary of Sir J. Strachey's Budget which has lately been received from Calcutta, the need of additional taxing power is now more pressingly felt than ever by the Indian Government; and this method of localizing special burdens, to be borne through a system of village assessment and rating, seems to have acquired a new importance.

The CHAIRMAN having invited discussion,

Mr. WILLIAM TAYLER (late Commissioner of Patna) rose and said that the subject which had been treated by Mr. Phear was of great interest, and he was glad to congratulate the lecturer upon the able, graphic, and intelligent details which he had set forth in regard to the village organization of India. (Hear, hear.) It was a subject which few knew much about, and, so far as his memory served, it had never been set forth with such completeness and accuracy as in the address they had just heard. Unfortunately, the village organizations were, to a large extent, things of the past, and he was afraid that, notwithstanding their importance, there was little likelihood of their being resuscitated. In the facts brought out in the course of the lecture he (Mr. Tayler) recognized two extremely important principles as desirable to govern the action of the authorities. One was the principle which would prevent interference in the exportation of grain, as such a course would seriously imperil private enterprise. He remembered that upon this point, in a previous visitation of famine, Lord Northbrook and Sir George Campbell differed. One advocated prohibi-

tion, and the other declined to take any such step. The latter view was Lord Northbrook's, and he (the speaker), in a paper which he read on the subject, had ventured to concur with him; and he believed that by the present time every one had learned to see that interference with private enterprise was mischievous in the highest degree, and that such a course would not again be advocated by any one acquainted with the actual facts. The other principle, upon which he placed great importance, was the value of the village organization. He feared, however, that the time for this agency was past. The tendency of English administration in India for years past had been to ignore, to set aside, or altogether to swallow up all self-action and organization on the part of the people. There was once a remaining link of the old principle in the village *chokeedar*, whom all Anglo-Indians would recognize as the village policeman, who invariably sided with the thief against the Government. But in spite of that peculiar characteristic, he was a useful link between the people and the governing authorities, and he knew well all that was going on. He was a sort of medium between honesty and scoundrelism—(laughter)—and if properly managed, would have been a ready means of communication with the people. But in place of this link we have a set of demi-military police with guns in their hands, who prove themselves most admirable instruments of torture, but altogether useless as a link between the people and the Government. The result of this is that we know nothing of what is going on, nothing of the internal organization, and nothing of the real feelings of the people. We have no means of feeling their pulse; and he (Mr. Tayler) quite believed that a conspiracy could be organized throughout the length and breadth of India without our knowing anything at all about it until it burst upon the world. That had been the tendency of our rule in recent years. We had never encouraged the *panchayat*, or the village organizations, which were most valuable as a means of reaching the people; and the consequence was that the English Government had so far failed to satisfy the people. The native organizations had fallen to decay, and all present knew how difficult and almost impossible it was to revive any discarded form of local government in India. If the principle of consulting the people were admitted, something might yet be done; but he feared it would be Utopian to expect it, knowing the predilections of Indian administrators and judges (among whom Mr. Phear was an exception), and the jealousy with which they regarded any proposition which would tend to diminish or divide their authority. For his part, he looked upon the *panchayat* as a most admirable institution, and he believed that ninety-nine out of a hundred questions which came before the judges would be as well or better adjudicated by this ancient

tribunal than by the most able judges in the High Court of Calcutta. Therefore, interested as he was in India, he should look with the greatest possible satisfaction upon any reasonable attempt to resuscitate the institution of the *panchayat*. But it would not be by a single lecture, able though it was, or by the expression of opinion in public meetings, that it would be brought about. The principle would have to be recognized in India, and it was there where the difficulty would be found. He believed that the local authorities would look with extreme jealousy at a dispute being adjudicated by the village *panchayat;* but the case was not altogether hopeless, and he sincerely trusted that before things got worse—as they would otherwise do—we should see the advisability, in the cases of famines and other difficulties, of calling in the aid and counsel of these *panchayats*. In regard to famines, it would be most difficult to organize authority to receive money for distribution honestly; but with such an agency as the village *panchayat* we might better get through these visitations, which we have been lately assured we must expect every ten years, besides intermediate smaller visitations of scarcity. With 6,000,000*l.* or 8,000,000*l.* to be expended on each of such calamities, the prospect was most disheartening, and needed careful contemplation. Still, he (the speaker) would hope for the best, and with such contributions to the sum total of opinion as had been placed before the meeting that day, he trusted that some beneficial remedy would be eliminated. (Hear, hear.)

Rev. JAMES LONG said that it had been his privilege to see the working of the village system in two countries—in India and in Russia—and he heartily concurred with the opinion expressed regarding it by Mr. Tayler, and thought the late census of Bengal was a case in point to prove the usefulness of the system. An estimate was sent to the Government that the census could not be taken under a cost of twenty lacs of rupees, but when the question came before Sir George Campbell, he said, "Try the village system." The heads of the villages were appointed to take the census, and it was carried through with the greatest economy and success. From his own observation he (Mr. Long) believed that the spirit of the day was inclined to favour the return to the village system, and the admission of the principle of decentralization. The peasants of Russia in the days of serfdom were quite as degraded as the peasants of Bengal; and yet emancipation, thirteen years ago, had been begun based upon this village system, and it is working successfully. Whilst travelling in Russia with a nobleman, he (Mr. Long) was introduced to a village court of justice, over which the head of the village presided—a kind of small cause

court. The system in vogue was, that while the Government fixed the amount of taxation to be raised in the Empire, it assigned so much to each village; while the mode of raising the money fell upon the heads of the village in concurrence with the elders. This system was found to work well and efficiently. This Council was called the *mir*, and there was another superior to it, called the *volost*, composed of persons elected from the village to form a sort of district authority; and over this again there was the Zemstoo, or provincial assembly, to decide cases which might be referred from the lower authorities. This method of government was so successful that it encouraged him to hope that an attempt would be made to work out the same principle in India, as the famine experiences of the last few years conclusively demonstrated, to his mind, the utter impossibility of Government carrying out any system of relief with efficiency and economy. He would illustrate it. Ten years ago it was his lot to act as honorary Commissioner for the relief of a district south of Calcutta, in time of famine. When he began he was struck with the number of women coming to him for relief, and he accordingly announced that he did not intend to give money, except to widows. What was the result? In the next village he discovered that every woman was a widow! (Laughter.) There were no husbands to be found at first; and he actually found some women in the act of hiding their husbands. He accordingly had to alter his method of procedure; but still it was very difficult to provide against imposture. A similar thing had occurred in regard to the fees for education. As soon as the announcement was made that the school fees of the children of the poor would be paid, every one was poor the very next day. The only way to check this sort of thing was by reverting to the village system which existed three thousand years ago, and which might still be clearly traced in the Slav countries, and was still in full working in Russia. In England traces of it still remained, as might be seen upon the examination of the Commons question now before Parliament. The village system of government at one time regulated the English peasantry, and it might be traced back to the time when it came from Central Asia with the Aryan race. The proof of its usefulness was its survival, and he thought that a good and sufficient reason for hoping that ere long it would be adapted to the requirements of the people of India, and recognized by the Government as one of the best methods of dealing with the immense population under their care. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. K. M. DUTT observed that the village system, of which the two last speakers had expressed their approval, was not altogether dead. On the contrary, it existed in many parts of India, and carried

on the original duties ascribed to it, though possibly it was not much known or noticed by the Government. If it were not for these village organizations, the number of cases which come before the Judges would be at least ten times as numerous as they now are. The majority of simple cases are still decided by the village *panchayat*. If in some places the system was dying out, it was owing to the centralizing tendency of the Government, which was altogether different from the method of government adopted by Akbar and other ancient rulers of India. Every one knew what took place in the animal economy if any one of the organs or parts ceased to perform its functions. There the inactive part or organ gradually wasted away, and thereby enfeebled and disorganized the whole system. As the health and strength of an organized being depended upon the due development and exercise of the functions of all its individual parts, so also the well-being and strength of a nation or state. Therefore, an important part of the organization for carrying on the government of India was this village system; and hence it should be fostered. Not only should it be permitted to live, but it should be directly encouraged; and then in times of trouble —famine or other difficulty—it would be found of great service to the central Government. The real remedy for famines was, of course, obvious; but in order to be prepared for it it would be necessary to take very careful meteorological observations, and keep registers of the annual rainfall and the produce of grain in every district. Such a record was not to be found in India, and he (Mr. Dutt) contended that it was the duty of the Government to obtain such information, as being essential to provision against famines. Another thing, as bearing upon the question of famines, was the desirability of improving the methods of agriculture. In Bengal it was reckoned that 40,000,000 of acres were under rice cultivation; but were they properly cultivated? He thought not; because were they properly cultivated they should raise food enough for thrice the population of Bengal. At the last meeting of the Association, in the paper read by Mr. Elliot, it was stated that the population of India was increasing so rapidly that fears were expressed as to what would be the result seventy or eighty years hence. He, however, had no gloomy fears for the future if the resources of science were brought to bear on agriculture, and the causes of the peculiarities and changes of climate determined by scientific observations. It would then be possible to be prepared for the time of scarcity, and to have a store of provisions collected, so that distribution would not be difficult. Although there were great variations of temperature and climate in India, he was of opinion that the seeming irregularities could, by close study and careful observation, be shown to

occur as the results of certain conditions which recur at certain intervals. Foremost, too, amongst the means of providing against famines he (Mr. Dutt) placed irrigation and canals. Where irrigation works had been judiciously carried out, they had been made to pay. The great Ganges Canal had paid $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., and the Western Ganges had shown 26 per cent. on the outlay. Many would be able to remember when the Jumna Canal saved the inhabitants 500 villages, and crops valued at 1,500,000*l.* sterling. Another argument in favour of canals was the improvement which they effected in the drainage, and, consequently, on the health of the people. As compared with railways, too, canals had always been financially successful, and they were a much cheaper means of communication than railways, especially for carrying purposes.

The CHAIRMAN here gave the speaker a hint that he was diverging from the subject before the meeting.

Mr. K. M. DUTT said he would only remind the meeting that in the last Bengal famine, out of the total cost of 8,000,000*l.*, 2,500,000*l.* were expended upon carrying food to the famine districts. Nearly one-third of the cost of the famine was for transport, and his point was that by the introduction of more canals, in conjunction with an improved system of agriculture, and a careful registration of meteorological changes throughout the country, the disasters of famine might be, if not averted, at least very materially mitigated.

RAJAH RAMPUL SINGH remarked that the village customs of India differed very much. For instance, in the North-west Provinces the custom was not the same as in Bengal. For his part he did not concur in the suggestion that had been made as to leaving disputes in the hands of the village *panchayats*. He thought it would not be right, because in some parts of India they were generally *sudras* who were entrusted with the care of the village, and they were not sufficiently educated to decide disputes arising among the different classes of people, some of whom were Hindus and others Mussulmans. The people could not all be guided by the same rule, because their customs and manners were so widely different. For instance, what would do for Bengal would be quite unsuited to the North-west Provinces.

Mr. PHEAR here explained that it was not proposed that the *panchayat* should determine judicial questions, such as those which seemed to be in the mind of Rajah Rampul Singh; the main propo-

sition that he had submitted for consideration was the applicability of the *panchayat* to the purposes of administering relief in time of famine.

RAJAH RAMPUL SINGH thanked the lecturer for the correction, and resumed his seat.

Mr. WILLIAM MAITLAND said he had listened with extreme pleasure to Mr. Phear's address, as it contained much that was new to him, although he had lived in India—as a merchant in Calcutta—for about eleven years. Of course he had gained a theoretical knowledge of the position of the village communities which had been described so graphically by the lecturer, but he was glad to add to his information concerning them. Although commending the lecture generally, he would venture to express an objection to some portion of it. The most important part of it was that which pointed to the use of village organizations in periods of famine; Mr. Phear's idea being that, instead of the present system of relief works, the Natives should look for relief in their own villages by the agency of the *panchayat*. For instance, in one part of Mr. Phear's address it was urged that "a well-selected "*panchayat* would be nearly omniscient in regard to the circumstances "of all dwellers in the village;" but it was admitted that "probably "it could not safely be trusted to exercise its judgment in this respect "impartially with a view to the expenditure of public money, unless it "were constrained thereto by a sense of self-interest." To provide this sense of self-interest, then, it was proposed to impose an obligation to repay, and that this obligation should be placed on the village. The objection that he (the speaker) had to this course had been alluded to by Mr. Long, who had said very truly that it was most difficult to prevent fraud amongst the Natives on such occasions. But, independently of that, there was another objection which he desired to urge, and that was that although it might be considered objectionable to remove people to a distance from their homes, by doing so there was a labour test enforced. All persons in distress are compelled to do something by way of return for the assistance they receive, and in the Madras Presidency a certain number of them were occupied with such useful labour as that connected with the formation of railways. If relief was given to the applicants at their own homes, there was the danger of fraud, because of the absence of the labour test; and, further, it would be a consideration that nothing was received in return for the relief granted. That appeared to him to be a very reasonable argument in favour of relief works as against the distribution to the people at their homes by the agency of

the *panchayat*. In another part of the lecture it was urged that Government should make known precisely all steps intended to be taken by itself in any contingency which might in any way affect the private trader; and further, that it could often, with public advantage, do something in the direction of diminishing the cost of conveyance of food-stuffs, both in regard to money and time, by improving roads and canals, by suspending duties, tolls, &c., and otherwise increasing the rapidity of communication with the distressed districts. With this he (Mr. Maitland) was perfectly in accord, as he was convinced of the necessity for such inducements by what he had learned from his friend Col. Baird Smith, of the Engineers, who was deputed on an errand of famine relief, and who had favoured him with his experiences of the difficulties he encountered in taking food into the distressed districts. The Government, he believed, were aware now of this difficulty, and were doing all that lay in their power to give facilities of communication. In proof of this, he would quote some remarks lately made by Lord Northbrook at a meeting at the Society of Arts. His lordship said he "did not think any one who had any knowledge of India could doubt "that the railway system was one of the most profitable investments "that ever was made by a great nation. It had been remarked that "in regard to dealing with famine in India, the extension of railways "was the most effective means of guarding against any such calamity. "It had been mentioned that during the time of scarcity in Bengal, in "1873-4, there were no less than 800,000 tons of food grain brought "into the famine districts by means of railroads. That was perfectly "accurate, and what he had simply to add was that it was only the "existence of railroads in India that had made it possible for any "Government, with any exertions, and at the expenditure of any sums "of money, to meet these calamities. They had heard of famines that "had taken place in former times, in which there had been great "mortality, such as the one which occurred in Rajpootana, where the "scenes were perfectly heartrending. It was impossible at that time "in any manner to have met that calamity. The distance from the "parts of India in which there was plenty, and the difficulties of "transport were so great that he did not believe any foresight would "have met the famine in Rajpootana then. On the other hand, he "thoroughly believed, from what he had heard elsewhere, that the "measures which the Indian Government and the Governments of "Bombay and Madras were now adopting to meet the scarcity in those "districts would be successful. They would be successful mainly, in "his opinion, because of the railroads which now traversed almost the "whole area of the scarcity, and enabled the enormous quantity of food

"grain now produced in India to be conveyed to those parts of the "country which required it." Those were the words of the late Governor-General of India, and they referred to the famine which was now being dealt with, and which unhappily would continue for some months longer. There was one important part of the lecture to which he (the speaker) desired to refer in concluding the remarks he had ventured to offer. That was the reference to the question of whether it would not be found advisable and necessary to raise something more in the way of taxation, and the idea of the *panchayat* might do something towards solving the difficulties which stand in the way of an income-tax. He (the speaker) was one of the Commissioners in India for hearing appeals in cases of alleged over-charges of income-tax, and he found—and, indeed, every one seemed to be perfectly aware—that there was a large number of persons who contributed very little to the support of the Government under which they flourished. Sir John Strachey, the present Finance Minister in India, had lately expressed his opinion in favour of a moderate income-tax, as originally imposed; and he (Mr. Maitland) entertained the same view. The tax had been increased and made too heavy, and to this, as well as to its being necessarily of a more or less inquisitorial character, he attributed the outcry against it and its future abolition. If the village *panchayats* could be used without fraud to levy a moderate rate for the local purposes to which Mr. Phear had referred, a great difficulty in the system of taxation would be removed. Again thanking Mr. Phear for increasing his information concerning India, Mr. Maitland resumed his seat.

Mr. JOHN JONES said that one of the great difficulties under which India laboured was that which was caused by a large proportion of the annual produce of the soil going into the hands of those who were not permanent residents in the country. The question of absenteeism was therefore ultimately connected with the position of India. That absenteeism did away with the opportunity of providing poor law relief. Some such system would, however, have to be adopted if the Government is to be periodically called upon to support these great deficiencies in the food-supply of the people. With regard to the village system of India, his (Mr. Jones) own experience connected with a remote locality in Wales indicated that in every neighbourhood there is some person to whom the villagers apply upon any question of general equity; and in Wales the judgment of such a person would be received as more conclusive and binding than that of a magistrate, because all feel that the person to whom they submit their case is capable of judg-

ing the question from all sides. On the other hand, the people feel that in submitting their case to a magistrate, he, being above them in *status*, has not the intimate knowledge of all the circumstances and interests involved in the dispute. His observations in this respect led him to think that if the Government of India could find an analogous person to whom they could commit the decision of minor matters, they would give a large amount of satisfaction. To such a person, too, the distribution of money could be entrusted in times of famine, the whole community being responsible for its repayment in the manner suggested by Mr. Phear. This person would then take care, having himself to bear his proportion of the expenditure, that the money was wisely distributed. As for taking people away from their homes to work at public relief works, thus causing them to neglect the tillage of their lands, which was necessary in order that the next crop should be forthcoming, it appeared to him to be a most barbarous proceeding, and one which should be replaced by a system of loan relief, which would enable the recipients to weather the storm without taking them away from their homes and fields to labour at central relief works.

Mr. PHEAR, in rising to reply, said that the kind and favourable reception accorded to his address relieved him from the necessity of making any lengthened reply. He would, therefore, confine himself to repeating an illustration given in his text by way of meeting the only substantial objections which had been raised to the proposals made in his paper. He understood Mr. Maitland to say that the labour test at present applied in India did serve in some degree as a test to separate those who were really indigent and in want from those who were not destitute. He understood the same gentleman also to say that the relief works were to a small extent remunerative, and so far brought in some trifling return for the money expended. With regard to this last point, he (Mr. Phear) was sadly afraid that very many of the great embankments, tanks, and cuttings left as evidence of famine relief activity, have little or no permanent utility; while the roads seemed as often to be made without any effective purpose. And the best answer that he could make to show the insufficiency of such works as a labour test was to give his anecdote. During the Tirhoot Famine of 1873-4, it happened that he had some garden work in his grounds at Calcutta which he was anxious to get completed at that particular season of the year. He had asked his head *malli* to bring in additional hands, and to push on with the work. The *malli*, week after week, delayed doing so, in spite of the repeated urging of the speaker. At last, however, the secret of the delay came out, as the *malli* said,

"There are no men to be got; they are all gone up to the famine works "in Tirhoot." (Laughter.)

The CHAIRMAN said they were greatly indebted to Mr. Phear for his address, as in it he had touched the real root of the evils existing in India. The fact was that the ryots were in such a state of poverty—it did not signify for the present purpose to inquire from what causes—that usury was triumphant among them, and interest on advances was frequently exacted at the rate of 50 per cent. The result of this was that the ryots were in a continual state of borrowing; they had not one season's food to fall back upon. With such a state of things existing in a large country like India, it was evident that there must be something radically wrong in the landed system of the country, because, if the landed system were in a healthy condition, the ryots could not be in such a degraded state as was described, accurately enough, by Mr. Phear. In a famine in India, two things occur: there is a great falling off in the crop, and the absence in the main of inducements for speculators to bring corn in to reduce the scarcity. When, in England, there is a deficiency in the wheat crop, nobody troubles himself about it excepting the farmers. The people get their supply of food, the only difference being that instead of sixpence the loaf, it may be eightpence. The reason of this was that in England its wealth attracted the supply required for the community, and thus a failure of our own crop gives us little or no anxiety. But go to Ireland, and there you would see a country which used to be in the most miserable state possible, with a people reduced to cultivate potatoes simply for their own eating. There was no sound system of agriculture, owing to the absentee landlordism. When the pinch came, the people starved and died, and the charity of the Government had to be invoked for their aid. That famine was due to evils of the landed system, and much the same thing was the case in India; and he urged most strenuously, therefore, that a Commission should be appointed to go thoroughly into the state of the landed system of India, with the view of remedying the evils which were admitted to exist, and improving the condition of the ryots, who ought to be enabled to have a reserve of at least one year's crop to fall back upon in times of scarcity, instead of having everything screwed out of them between the Government and the Banians, and thus being left in an emergency to die, or become dependent upon the Government for support.

On the motion of the CHAIRMAN, seconded by Mr. WILLIAM TAYLER, a vote of thanks was passed to Mr. Phear; and on the motion of Lieutenant-General CAVENAGH, seconded by Captain PALMER, a similar compliment was paid to the Chairman, and the sitting then terminated.

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OF THE

EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION.

Instituted for the independent and disinterested advocacy and promotion, by all legitimate means, of the public interests and welfare of the Inhabitants of India generally.

The Eastern Question in its Anglo-Indian Aspect.

PAPER BY THE REV. J. LONG

(*Late of Calcutta.*)

READ AT A MEETING OF THE EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION, ON WEDNESDAY, MAY 16, 1877.

LIEUT.-GENERAL ORFEUR CAVENAGH IN THE CHAIR.

A LARGE meeting of the members and friends of the East India Association was held at the Rooms of the Association, Great George Street, Westminster, on Wednesday, May 16th, the subject for consideration being "The Eastern Question in its Anglo-Indian Aspect," introduced in an address by the Rev. J. Long, late of Calcutta.

Lieut.-General ORFEUR CAVENAGH, late Governor of the Straits Settlements, occupied the chair; and amongst those present were the following: Sir B. F. Hall, Bart.; Sir Charles Trevelyan, Bart, K.C.B.; Lieut.-General Sir George Balfour, K.C.B., M.P.; Lieut.-General Sir George Malcolm, K.C.B.; General Alexander; Major-General G. Burn; Major-General Stannus, C.B.; Colonel P. Dods; Colonel P. T. French; Colonel E. Hardy; Colonel Le Hardy; Colonel R. Ranken; Colonel A. B. Rathborne; Major W. F. Gordon; Captain Candy, R. A.; Captain W. C. Palmer; Rev. C. May; Rev. A. Tien; Rajah Rampul Singh; Dr. George Birdwood; Dr. Underhill; Mr. C. W. Arathoon; Mr. Rudolph Auerbach; Mr. W. Austin; Mr. R. H. Barnes; Mr. Peer Bukhsh; Mr. A. H. Campbell; Mr. W. J. Christall; Mr. K. M. Dutt; Mr. Fitzgerald; Mr. W. S. Fitzwilliam; Mr. George Foggo; Mr. H. W. Freeland; Mr. G. E. Gavey, C.E.; Mr. L. A. Gillham; Mr. W. J. Grazebrook; Mr. W. F. Hale; Mr. J. N. Higinbotham; Mr. John Jones; Mr. William Maitland; Mr. W. Martin; Mr. Kerry Nicholls;

Mr. Philip Nolan; Mr. H. Rassam; Mr. John Smith; Mr. T. Thornicroft; Mr. Rustomjee Viccajee; Mr. E. N. Walker; Mr. C. E. White; Mr. Vasudeva Krishnaras Wharirjavan, &c., &c.

The CHAIRMAN, in opening the meeting, said the subject of the lecture to be delivered was one of such vast national importance, and at the present crisis attracted such wide-spread interest, that he was satisfied no preliminary remarks from him were needed to induce the meeting to give the lecturer the consideration which his subject demanded. Without further remark, then, he would call upon the Rev. James Long to proceed.

The Rev. J. LONG then proceeded to read the following paper :—

It is with considerable hesitation I have undertaken to read a paper introductory to a discussion on the Eastern Question in its Anglo-Indian Aspect before the members of the East India Association, on account of the difficulty of the problem to be solved—the most puzzling question of the day. My main inducement, however, in now coming forward has been a wish to throw a little light on an obscure subject by observations founded on the study of it during a thirty years' residence in India, two years in Russia, and two visits to Turkey. I spent five months the last winter in Petersburg and Moscow, where I have had the opportunity of hearing the question discussed both by the press and in society. I have myself, however, always viewed the relations of England and Russia mainly in their aspect towards the great point of the Christian civilization of the East, and especially of India.

The materials, drawn from Anglo-Indian and Russian sources, are ample; my difficulty has been to compress them within the limits of a paper. All I can do is to glance at some of the salient points.

THE EASTERN QUESTION—A PUZZLE.

This Eastern Question is by far the most difficult of the day, not so easy to solve as popular meetings would have it, involving the very serious problems—Who shall have Constantinople on Turkey collapsing? who is to take the Turk's place in Europe? What will be the position of Hungary?*—the bitter, deadly enemy of the Slavs, who, though a Christian Power, has been as oppressive to them as the Moslem Turks. Should not the Slavs gain their rights in the Austrian Empire against the unjust dual Government? Is Turkey to be scrambled for? is it Russia or chaos? On the dismemberment of Turkey, what can prevent the disintegration of Austria? How to deal with Bulgaria in connec-

* The Hungarians originally came from the country north of the Great Wall of China about the Christian era. They were driven by the Chinese west of the Caspian, and entered Europe, the inveterate enemy of the Slavs.

tion with the Slavs?* How will the Greeks and Slavs be induced to combine (the Greeks originally invited the Turks to help them against the Slavs)? The effect of a probable Russian occupation of Asia Minor on British interests in the East? England's policy towards Turkey in its influence on the Moslems of Central Asia and India?

The Eastern Question started with Turks and Slavs, but the real question that underlies it is Europe, Russia, and the Central Asia Question. On Turkey collapsing, how are the Sick Man's goods to be divided? Will Russia incur such enormous expense merely for the Slavs, without anything to recoup her? Who is to hold Constantinople? But whether Russia conquers or is defeated, does not Turkey seem likely to sink from financial exhaustion or demoralization? What is to fill the void? Is it to be Russia or chaos? This was the question of Nicholas's day; it is the question now. Can anything be done to maintain the Osmanli as a stop-gap? While one party in England overlooks too much the sufferings of the Slavs and overpraises the Turks, the other shirks the difficulties connected with a Russian occupation in Turkey and the position of England and Russia in Central Asia; but both recognize the importance of the Duke of Wellington's view, which he so tersely expressed: "The Ottoman Empire exists not for the "benefit of the Turks, but for the benefit of Europe; not to keep the "Mahomedans in power, but to save the Christians from a war of which "it would be impossible to define either the object, extent, or duration."

IS INDIA TO BE ENDANGERED FOR AN EXPIRING TURKEY?

The days when the Turks threatened to stable their horses in Westminster Abbey are passed for ever. The Turkish wave, which dashed for the last time against the walls of Vienna in 1683, while it is now rapidly ebbing along the Danube and the Euphrates—the mystical Euphrates—is being dried up; the Turks are dying out. And what traces of civilization have they left? The proverb answers, "Where the Turk "treads the grass grows not."

Could Turkey be reformed, it would be most desirable not only for the peace of Europe, but also as showing the capabilities for government of an Asiatic race. But India proves in this respect that a period of transition and training under European superintendence is necessary between simple Native rule on the old feudal lines and an improved rule where the welfare of the people is the main point. If we find for India an enlightened or patriarchal despotism is the best form of government until, by the process of education and municipal training, a class of Natives is formed capable of taking part in the government,

* According to Schaffarik, Bulgaria is composed of a mixture of Turks, Fins, Mongols, and Slavs.

à fortiori, how much more necessary is this in Turkey? Turkey has blindfoldedly and doggedly rejected the Protocol, and promises without guarantees have been proved vain in her case. The serious question arises, *Are we, then, to sacrifice the substance for the shadow, and to imperil our relations with India by indirectly backing up Turkey against Russia?*

That Turkey must collapse soon, do what you will, is evident to the Anglo-Indian, who views it from the Indian stand-point. It lies in the same category with Delhi, the Punjab, and Oude, where it was found impossible to maintain the Native Governments, as they were rotten to the core, without any healing or renovating power. It would be an insult to the memory of the Moguls in India to compare them with the Turks.*

We know in India what a time it takes to train a nation to representative institutions, and therefore the Turkish Parliament must be, like the negro responsible Government in America, the rule of carpet baggers and political adventurers.

SLAV AUTONOMY A DIFFICULTY.

Except on the grounds of humanity, the future of the Danubian Provinces—whether they are to form individual autonomous States, a South Slav Confederacy, or to be subject to Austria or Russia—affects England very little. Should the latter be the case, which seems more likely, from sympathy of language, race, and religion, the Slavs can never harmonize with Hungary, Austria, or Germany; but when Russia advances further in the process of a decentralized administration, as the head of 70,000,000 Slavs in Europe, they may prove an important barrier against the Germanizing process. The Slavs want deliverance from Turkey, not dependence on Russia; they know what the Russian bureaucratic or *Tchinovnik* system means. The *Tchinovnik*, or bureaucracy, are the horror of the Russians themselves, as expressed in the following Russian proverbs: "Who is the father of the Tchinovnik? the devil;" "The "Tchinovnik only takes up his pen; the peasants pray and birds "tremble." They know that Panslavism means Russification, which is now being attempted in Poland and the Baltic Provinces. The protecting Power, however, will find them troublesome customers, giving more care than profit.

The Slavs—as semi-Oriental in their manners, literature, and mode of thought—present a subject of interest to Anglo-Indians and to all those who consider that an enlightened Orientalism is absolutely necessary as a medium for diffusing civilization in the East.

* One of the best works on Turkey is Farley's "Turks and Christians." 1876.

Viewed from an Anglo-Indian stand-point, then, Russia involving herself in the meshes of Panslavism, will give her more trouble than profit; by occupying her attention in Europe, it will ease off her pressure in Asia.

These Slavs have seen England spend 80,000,000*l.* sterling and sacrifice an immense number of valuable lives in order to prop up the Turkish Empire; but, as that is collapsing, in spite of all the doctors called in to keep the Sick Man alive, Christians must come to the front and take the reins of power; but, though far superior to the Turks, they are at present badly qualified for it, both morally and intellectually. Turkish rule has been a bad training school for them; the degradation of ages has gone deeply into the soul. I give a few Russian proverbs in illustration. These proverbs, like stones on a current, show the degeneracy of many of the Native Christians, and how much they require training for their future career: "Out of two caldrons in "which the Jews were boiled in hell the devil has shaped one "*Armenian*;" "A Russian can be cheated only by a Gipsy, a Gipsy by "a Jew, a Jew by a Greek, and a Greek by the devil;" "A *Greek* will "tell the truth once a year;" "One Jew equals in cheating two Greeks, "one Greek two Armenians, and one Armenian two Pultowa nobles."

ENGLISH NEGLECT OF EASTERN SUBJECTS BEARING FRUIT.

The extraordinary apathy of English diplomacy for twenty years in Turkey, in not watching over and enforcing on the Turks the carrying out of reforms, has tended to bring things to the present pass. I know, when I was at Constantinople five years ago, it was as much as a man's character was worth to say a word at the Embassy against Turkey. The ignorance in England of the East and hand-to-mouth policy, and the tendency in England to look at questions with insular and party views, is seen in the general tone of the English Press on the Eastern Question. The tone of some leading papers in the English Press towards Russia is very severe, and calculated to call out reprisals in the Russian Press, and so complicate relations between the countries. The Conservatives partially poohpoohed the desperate condition of Turkey and her atrocities, and are answerable for much of the doggedness with which the Turks have opposed all real reform. *The people of Russia hence hold England responsible for the extremity things have come to.* On the other side, the Liberals do not look ahead at the eventualities that must arise in the East from the inevitable breaking up of the Turkish Empire; while the well-meant, but unfortunate, expressions of their advocates, "Perish

"India," "Expel the Turks, bag and baggage," have given a handle to their opponents.

England does not sufficiently take into account that the Conference having failed, the Russian Government, equally with Europe, baffled in their reform plans, has been forced by the pressure of its subjects, quickened in their zeal by the excitement of the English public meetings, and by the harrowing details of the Bulgarian atrocities, to resort to the dire arbitrament of the sword. I was in Moscow and St. Petersburg during the excitement arising from the Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria, and can bear testimony to the genuineness of the humane and brotherly feeling which pervaded all ranks, from prince to peasant—all cheerfully made sacrifices for the relief of their brethren in faith and blood of the Slav race, who bear a relation to Russia similar to what our American cousins do to us. Of course, as England would not act effectively, can Russia be expected to spend enormous sums in preparation and war without something to recoup her? Then comes the struggle. Let us not forget the lesson of the Krimean War, which drove the Christians into the arms of Russia, and sent the Russians south towards India, but which, according to the Russians, benefited Russia very much by introducing, though with a storm, the grand era of reform.

RUSSOPHOBISM IN ENGLAND IN ITS BEARINGS ON INDIA.

The severe tone of some of the leading English journals towards Russia, looking exclusively at the dark side and ignoring the difficulties of her position, bodes no good to India, whose interests require that England and Russia should adopt a policy of mutual conciliation and concession. This tone is calculated to provoke reprisals in the Russian Press, and to embitter Anglo-Russian relations in Kabul, Kashgar, and all along the Indian frontier; while the Natives of India will see that their country is being made the shuttlecock for political parties, and that India's welfare is sacrificed to island politics. They observe that the English Press, while dwelling on the strength of the British fleet in the Bosphorus, forgets that the North-west frontier of India is the vulnerable part of Achilles' heel.

Russophobism, so called, while useful in keeping public attention awake to the progress of Russia in Central Asia, and to the danger, ere long, of a collision between England and Russia on the Indian frontier question, has done great injustice to Russia by ignoring her reforms and her commercial necessities, which compel her to open out new marts for trade in Eastern Asia, and, above all, by treating her advance in Central Asia as necessarily hostile to India. Russophobism, by mag-

nifying unduly the resources of Russia, and underrating the defensive powers of England, has created a bug*bear* alarm among the Natives, and doubts of the stability of the Indian Empire. We quote on this subject a very candid article from the *Calcutta Englishman* of August last. *O si sic omnes!*

Russia has a perfectly good and pacific reason for pushing forward her railways on commercial grounds. The old caravan route across Central Asia has ceased to be able to compete with sea-borne traffic through the Suez Canal. The statistics of the great national fair at Nijni show that the trade from China *viâ* Siberia has been steadily declining, and that it is now doomed. Up to 1862 Russia resisted all attempts at competition with the Central Asia caravan route. She refused to allow tea to enter her harbours, and it was only in 1862 that the import of sea-borne tea was legalized in Russia. Even then it was subjected to an almost prohibitive duty, with a view to protecting the national caravan route *viâ* Siberia to Pekin. But the actual facts of commerce have an invincible tendency to triumph over artificial restrictions. The Russian Steam Navigation Company now bring tea and the other commodities of China direct from Hankow to Odessa. The Suez Canal has given the *coup de grâce* to the Central Asia caravan. From Odessa the railroads take the tea to Nijni, and distribute it to the other marts of Southern Russia. It is only the highest priced sorts which can stand the cost of the caravan route. That route occupies twelve months; the Odessa steamers take six weeks. Russia now proposes, by means of her Central Asia Railway, with one terminus in Northern China at Pekin and another terminus in Southern China at Hankow, to reduce the time of transit across Asia from twelve months to a fortnight. It is simply out of the question for a mercantile country like England to arrest a policy of commercial development such as Russia has now sketched out. The sense of the whole civilized world would be against us. It only remains for British Ministers and Indian statesmen to bear vigilantly in mind that this policy of commercial development has another aspect, pointing to military enterprise and territorial aggrandizement.

The Russophobists might attend to the remark of Lord Beaconsfield, that Russia has as much right to Tartary as England has to India, and to the fact that Russia, pent in, required new marts for trade, new openings out to the Indian and Pacific Oceans. As Dr. Schuyler shows, Central Asia trade yields little profit; she must look beyond, to a railway connecting her with India and China.

Russophobists forget that if Russia can foment disturbances in India, England can retaliate in Central Asia, by stirring up the Moslems to revolt,—a miserable alternative, however. Sir H. Rawlinson, in his valuable work, "England and Russia in the "East," makes an observation on this subject which is of great moment at the present time: "The followers of the Prophet every-"where regard the Russians as more incorrigible infidels than the "English. We English could instigate a great anti-Russian Maho-"medan movement north of the Oxus with much greater facility "than Russia could stir up the Sikhs and Hindus beyond the Indus."

Dr. Schuyler points out (in his work on Turkestan), on the evidence of Russian officials, "the burning discontent that exists among the "Natives, owing to the increase of taxation, the corruption of Russian "officials, their ignorance of the language and feelings of the people."

But, on the other hand, let Russophobists read the deeds of blood in Central Asia, going on for ages, and then reply to this remark of Gurovski's: "If mankind is to form in the future an harmonious whole, "the solitudes of Asia must be stirred up, vivified, and the death-like "quiet prevailing there must be broken. Tartary, Tibet, Mongolia, "the snowy northern regions of Asia, deserve as much human, "European, civilizing solicitude as Asia Minor, India, parts of America, "or any other spot whatever on the globe." Is there any other country but Russia to do this?

OPTIMIST VIEWS REGARDING THE LION AND THE BEAR.

We must face danger—not, like the ostrich, ignore it. The Optimists see no danger to India from the Russian advance. The English, at the beginning of the Indian Mutiny, saw no danger, though the ground below them was undermined; as those do who regard a Russian move on our Indian frontier as impracticable. Russia has a base at Astrabad, on the Caspian, 1,200 miles from India, with the Valley of Herat*—fertile, capable of concentrating an army of 100,000 men—with Afghanistan probably on her side, and a diversion in the direction of Kashgar. Captain Burnaby, in his valuable work, "The Ride to Khiva," states on this question:—

At the present moment, the greater part of the forces in the Western Siberian, Orenburg, and Kazan districts might be concentrated in the neighbourhood of Tashkend and Samarcand, and no one in this country would be the wiser. We have no Consular Agents in any of the towns through which these troops would have to march on their road to Turkestan. No Englishmen are allowed to travel in Central Asia. Owing to the Russian newspapers being completely in the hands of the authorities, the information which is published may be purposely intended to mislead. If the Governor-General in Turkestan were forming large étapes, or depôts, of provisions and arms in Samarcand, Khiva, and Krasnovodsk, we should be equally ignorant, until, awaking up one morning, we might discover, instead of our having to fight an enemy 2,000 miles distant from his base of operations, that a base had been formed within 350 *miles of our Indian frontier which was as well supplied with all the requisites for war as St. Petersburg or Moscow.*

* Herat is the key to India—or, to use the expressive language of Sir H. Rawlinson, "Russia in possession of Herat would have a grip on the throat of India"—a place where a large army could be concentrated and supplied, commanding the easiest roads to Kandahar and Kabul. Sir F. Goldsmid says the Herat Valley is capable of affording supplies to 150,000 men. (See Colonel Coryat's "Shadows of "Coming Events.")

Colonel Lees, an Indian authority, who has written a very able pamphlet on "The Central Asia Question,"* thus writes: "Can the "Russians invade India? My opinion is, if there could be any doubt on "the point, it was settled before the birth of Christ. What the Alex- "ander of two thousand years ago did, with hosts possibly not less "numerous than the armies of modern days, surely the Alexander of "to-day can do. After what Lord Napier's forces effected in Abyssinia, "with the Indian Ocean between his forces and their main source of "supply, it is simply folly to talk o the impossibility of a Russian inva- "sion of India." Since this was written we have had the invasion of Khiva—one of the boldest feats in modern times.

There is no space in this paper to argue out the question; there are plenty of books of reference. I simply remark, that all who have *studied* the Central Asia Question admit the practicability of a Russian move on the Indian frontier; and I can assure them that it is contemplated, in case of a rupture, which the Russian people do not wish. The military class especially, which has great influence at St. Petersburg, views as a matter of certainty a contest with England on the Indian frontier, promoted by internal revolt in India. I have with me numerous extracts that I have made lately from the Russian newspapers of the day, on this subject. The *Golos*, in a recent article, compares England, away from her sea-base on her North-west frontier, to a crab on a sandbank.

RUSSIA—HER POSITION AND PARTIES.

In Russia, as in other countries, there are two parties—the party for reform and internal development, and the war party for foreign aggression. Unfortunately for the commercial and reform interests of Russia and the peace of Europe, the latter have lately gained the ascendant, propelled by the Panslavs and the revolutionists. The latter see that, by plunging the Government into the perplexities of a foreign war, they have adopted the surest means towards their own ends. They say that the Krimean War led to internal reforms on a large scale, and as Russia is now undermined by Socialism and Nihilism, the soil is prepared for another revolution, which, aided by a war, will overthrow absolutism and bureaucracy. This may be, but one thing is certain, the war will be very exhausting to the financial resources of Russia, and any conquests she may make will give her a morsel difficult to digest. She has not yet digested Poland.

* "The Central Asia Question from an Eastern Stand-point." London: 1871.

RUSSIA AS AN AMBITIOUS POWER—HER PROTECTIONIST POLICY.

We deprecate the ambition of the war party in Russia, which, reckless of the financial difficulties of their country, and rejecting that peace so necessary to consolidate reform and develop the resources of an empire, comprising the vast regions of the Amour and Central Asia. Russia unquestionably is *ambitious*, and has acquired an immense territory, the extent of which is damaging to her finances and dangerous in the ascendency it gives to the military class. But has not a similar ambitious spirit actuated France in her Cochin-China and Algerian conquests? Has it not pervaded Germany and America? Nor are we, who in India have risen from trading merchants to be the rulers over one-fourth of the human race, free from it. All nations are ambitious as they have opportunities.

The practical question is, have not these conquests on the whole been the means of promoting the moral and material improvement of the subject races? Contrast the past and present of the Caucasus; compare South Russia under Tartar rule with what it is now. Looking at Central Asia, "that sink of barbarism, iniquity, fanaticism, and "oppression;" looking at the desolation wrought in Eastern Turkestan by Chinese and Mussulmans, we give as a specimen—in one case the Chinese ripped open two Mussulman chiefs, cut out their hearts whilst alive, and threw them to the dogs, then cut off their heads and placed them in cages in front of the city gates. "The dark places of the "earth are full of the habitations of cruelty."* Is not Russian conquest, then, a boon to barbarous tribes?

The *protectionist* system of Russia which has raised strong prejudices against her, is undoubtedly a great evil; but this has been left out of sight, that the duties are lower than they used to be. The fact is, Russia is finding out the truth of what Mr. Gladstone announced long ago, that high duties are a premium on smuggling; in Russia they simply throw the trade into the hands of the Jews. Schuyler shows that in the Zarepha Valley of Central Asia 500,000 lbs. of tea were smuggled in one year; much of this was Indian tea which was prohibited. Notwithstanding this protective

* English writers on Central Asia occasionally take fancies for facts, developing an elephant from the depths of their consciousness; in this respect service has been rendered by Terentief, who, in his Russian work, "Rossiye i Angliye v "Shredoin Azei"—which ought to be published in English—though marked by strong prejudices against England, yet gives a plain, matter-of-fact account of Russian progress in Central Asia, showing the reader that Russia was l-d on by pretty similar motives in Central Asia as England was in India: factories were turned into forts, and one conquest led to another, to the benefit of the conquered races.

system, our exports to Russia in 1875 amounted to 11,346,000*l.*, and our imports from Russia to 20,660,000*l.*; while the same year our exports to all Turkey were only 6,347,000*l.*, and our imports 6,560,000*l.* Our exports to Russia have in ten years increased 175 per cent., those to Turkey only 4 per cent. In 1875 the number of vessels entered and cleared between the ports of the United Kingdom and Russian ports was 7,360, with a tonnage of 2,843,000. The corresponding figures for the Turkish dominions were 835 vessels, with a tonnage of 550,000.*

THE ANGLO-INDIAN OR IMPERIAL STAND-POINT.

By the Anglo-Indian stand-point we mean not the Island, but the Imperial view, as expressed in the terse language of Lord Beaconsfield. *England is a great Oriental Power;* having 40,000,000 Christians in Great Britain and the Colonies, to 240,000,000 Hindu, Mahomedan, and Buddhist subjects in the East. Her policy is to train India gradually for self-government—not to destroy, but to reform Native institutions; to uphold Native dynasties on an improved basis, always regarding the interests of the people as paramount to those of princes. The Queen's glorious title, Empress of India, is a pledge that England's policy will not be the absorption of Native States, but their reorganization on an improved basis of local autonomy in subordination to Imperial interests. She must, in accordance with this, be opposed to the (so-called) bag and baggage policy of expelling the Turk from Europe. She has striven after a noble but evidently impracticable object, to uphold a reformed Turkish Empire; but, alas! it has been found impossible to build without suitable materials. *Ex nihilo nihil fit.* This stand-point gives England a strong interest in the Mediterranean approach to India, in the Moslem States of Persia, Beluchistan, Kabul, and Kashgar, which border India, and in Russia as an Oriental neighbour. Can anything save Turkey, or prevent the expansion of Russia?

The question has been discussed in relation more to European interests, and particularly to Germany and Austria,—on this I refer to General Fadaief's pamphlet—it gives the Panslav view.† But the most serious question of all for England is, as events lead on to an inevitable *contact* between England and Russia, how is that to be prevented becoming a *collision?* The joint action of Russia and England is indispensable in Asia for the putting down fanaticism and feudalism,

* Holmes' "Commercial and Financial Aspect of the Eastern Question."

† "Menije o Vostochnon Vopros." Fadaieff on the Eastern Question. Stansfield: London, 1871.

and for the promotion of Christian civilization. Of this we may be assured, that without a good understanding between the Empires, on the basis of mutual conciliation and concession, little progress will be made in the East.

The English view of this question is too apt to leave the Indian position out of view. India, as usual, is too often left out in the cold. Russia in the Mediterranean controlled by European States, and under their consular vigilance, is one thing, but Russia and England put face to face in Asia is very different, and suggests a watchful but, at the same time, conciliating policy, arising from the consciousness that both can help each other, and can also damage each other seriously.

England, ruling over 240,000,000 Natives in India, should pay attention to the impression this Eastern Question is likely to have on them. The Hindus hate the Mussulmans, and have little sympathy for Turkey except as an *Oriental* Power. They know that the Russians, like the English, are Christians and conquerors in the East; they complain of many defects in English administration, but they do not know how far more defective the Russian is, and that the change of masters would be for the worse. Light, however, will come in on this subject, and Schuyler's "Turkestan" ought to be translated into the Indian languages. The mass of the Natives in India know little of Russia except what echoes from the bazaars; for many years the bazaars of India have rung with reports about the "Russ" spread through merchants from Kabul and Central Asia, fomented by Russian spies; these reports told of the advance of the Russ, conquering all before him, and superior in military power to the English. They gained confirmation by the effusions of Anglo-Indian alarmists spread in the English and translated into the Native Press.

The intelligent class of Natives see their country made, to a certain extent, a shuttlecock between political parties in England, the Conservative Press being anti-Russ and pro-Turk, the Liberal Press pro-Russ and anti-Turk. The Conservative organs cannot see that Turkish reform is hopeless; the Liberals ignore the consideration of what is the real question—the relations of England and Russia in the East.

The Hindus know too little of European politics to take a direct interest in the Eastern Question; but touching the Native's pocket wounds him in the most sensitive part. It is only when fresh taxation would be called for to maintain an additional European army of 40,000 men at least, with new frontier posts, that they would begin to cry out, "Why should India be sacrificed to party politics in a contest between "England and Russia for power?"

THE MOSLEMS IN INDIA—HOW FAR SYMPATHIZING WITH THE TURKS.

Of late considerable interest has been taken by Moslems in India in the fate of Turkey, but this is chiefly confined to Presidency towns, and to leaders moved by agents sent from Turkey, by Mahomedan papers, and Turkophil Europeans. Some look up to the Sultan as the Kaliph, or successor of Mahomed, and regard him as the Romanists do the Pope in Rome, and doubtless these would look on the expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople as a terrible disaster and disgrace.

There is no doubt, however, of this—whether we look to the Wahabi movement of Arabia and India, the Baba reform in Persia, the Mahomedan revolt against the Buddhist Chinese, or the Kashgar uprising—all show that the Moslem mind is waking up, and beginning to feel that all is at stake with their religion, as the Hindus did at the time of the Indian Mutiny in relation to caste.

Among all the Mussulman population of India—40,000,000 in number—some of Turkish race, and all of solidarity more or less in religion, but few view the Eastern Question with interest. Many-tongued rumour brought them years ago reports that Samarkand and Bokhara the Holy the Mecca of Asia, have fallen, and the prestige of Islam for 1,000 years has sunk, eclipsed by the glories of the "white Czar." The last mail communicated the intelligence that about Rs.13,000 have been subscribed by the Mahomedans of Kurachi in aid of Turkey, and Russia has been publicly cursed in all the mosques.

The question, however, is, can the Moslems unite in an alliance against the uncircumcised infidel, the hated Russian Kafir,—will Shia and Suni join; or will it be as with the Greeks and Roman Catholics at the siege of Constantinople, who contended against each other in bitter polemics when the Turkish guns were thundering at the gates? The Turks were as hostile to the Wahabis in Arabia as the English were to them on the Indian frontier; while the Wahabis—no friends to the Turk—the most stirring and bigoted class in India, are in constant feud as Moslem Puritans with the other Moslem sects. Shia and Suni, Persia and Turkey, are as hostile as the Leaguer and the Huguenot, as the Slav and the Hungarian.

WILL THE MUSSULMANS OF INDIA SUPPORT ENGLAND IN UPHOLDING TURKEY?

The Mutiny throws light on this. England in 1854 had lavished her blood and treasure in order to preserve the integrity and independence of Turkey. Were the Moslems of the East thankful for this? So far from it—Persia fought against England in 1856, and was on the

side of Russia against the Turks, as she is at the present moment; and in 1857 the Mussulmans of India rose in mutiny, and were, with the exception of the Punjab Mussulmans, inveterately hostile to the English.

When a ball and supper were given to the Sultan out of Indian revenues, with the view of conciliating the Moslems of India, the latter were careless about it, while the Hindus looked on it as a misappropriation of public funds. The fact is, the Mussulmans of India are chiefly composed of agriculturists; who trouble themselves little about foreign politics, and of a decaying aristocracy rotting in ignorance and poverty. The few that think of other countries see Islam gradually decaying before the two Christian Powers of England and Russia, while in India they find the Hindus have shot far ahead of them in power and wealth.*

RUSSIA A NEIGHBOUR TO ENGLAND ON THE KABUL FRONTIER.

Russia's plans, carried out surely and steadily, have been to extend her territories until they shall run conterminous with England in South Asia, and with China in East Asia, so as ultimately to have her trade terminus in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. She can do little with Central Asia, where not 5 per cent. of the land is culturable, and in which, according to Dr. Schuyler and Russian authorities, there is so much maladministration.

The inevitable force of events has established Russia, by her recent conquests, as a neighbour within 300 miles of Peshawur. She runs now almost conterminous with Kabul—a menace to India in case of a rupture. The Afghans owe a bitter grudge to England, and their ruler wavers in uncertainty whether to have an English or a Russian Protectorate. The last news is, he has rejected the offers of England. Kashgar must soon submit, *nolens volens*, to a Russian Protectorate; and this will bring Russian influence down to the frontiers of Kashmir. On the side of Beluchistan, Russia draws near to Herat through Persia, over which she exercises a *quasi*-protectorate—thanks to English diplomatic blunders.

"The day is inevitable when the Russian and English Empires shall "be conterminous, and the presence of a first-class European State on our "border shall have power at any time to fan into a flame those elements "of spasmodic disaffection which of necessity are ever smouldering in any "country won and held, as India was and is, by an alien sword." So wrote Wylie, no Russophobist. Some would pooh-pooh this, but I can only

* The Government of India have of late taken measures to improve the social and educational condition of the Mahomedan, which has been very bad. They have been left without a career. See "The Indian Mussulmans," by Colonel Lee, which paints in vivid colours the mischief done to India by the neglect of the Mussulmans on the part of the ruling authorities.

refer them to the works of Cory, Baker, Trench, Ferrier, Vambery, who give ample proofs of the above position.*

This danger is not imaginary. A Russian journal stated ten years ago that "the diplomatic dispute in Constantinople will be transferred to the "slopes of Peshawur: antagonism to Russia in Turkey implies antagonism "to England in India." The beginnings of this are cropping up in Kabul, the glacis of the Indian fortress. The war cloud threatens to burst, and ere long we may have an Afghan war on our hands; for Shir Ali, while receiving a Russian agent, has refused to admit an English one on the plea that he could not guarantee his safety! *He does not use that argument with regard to a Russian agent.* The last news informs us that Lord Lytton has demanded that a British officer should be permitted to remain at Kabul to represent the English Government there and to keep it informed of what goes on in Central Asia, but he has refused! Is this step not necessary to secure, not only the defence of our Indian frontier, but also to maintain good relations with Russia, by defining the frontier of both Empires? Is not the time come when a British Resident, to give advice and exercise a due influence, is indispensable at Kabul? Perhaps many of the present evils might have been *nipped in the bud* had there been one before. With *Russian* agents in the country, some authoritative exponent of British interests is required. The ruler of Kabul is hesitating whether he will have a Russian or English Protectorate. An English Protectorate of Kabul would involve England in heavy expenses in a country whose normal condition is anarchy; while, on the other hand, a Russian Protectorate would give Russia a *point d'appui* to sow the seeds of revolution, and to compel England to keep up a large army, consequently involving a heavy outlay and chronic discontent.

ENGLAND AND RUSSIA AS NEIGHBOURS—THEIR DUTIES.

"Those who are in glass houses should not throw stones." The neighbourhood of England and Russia on our Indian frontier is such that both can injure each other, waste in internecine war funds that had been better bestowed in promoting internal improvements in their respective Empires. There is room enough for both in Asia. With England ruling one-fifth of the population of the globe, and Russia occupying one-seventh of its land, surely means might be adopted so that conterminous frontiers might not lead to collision. Both nations

* Cory's "Eastern Menace," Baker's "Clouds in the East," Trench on "The Russo-Indian Question," Ferrier's "Afghanistan," Sir H. Rawlinson's "England and Russia."

ought to be impressed with the conviction that the points in which they agree are vastly more important than those in which they differ.

We should know each other better. Ignorance is the cause of half the misunderstandings between nations which lead to war. How few Russians have an idea of the rise of British power in the East, and the benefits conferred by it on India; how few Anglo-Indians look beyond the tops of the Himalayas at the great civilizing work which Russia, with certain drawbacks, is carrying on in Central Asia; and how few Englishmen in our island home have an idea of the development and reform in Russia! In this respect Mackenzie Wallace's "Russia" is a great boon, giving correct information drawn from authentic sources. Consult also a Russian author, "Gerebzof Histoire de la Civilization en Russie" (Paris, 1858), Eckardt's "Russia," Hepworth Dixon's "Free Russia."

While adopting a more vigilant policy, more active means, as is done in Khelat, to strengthen our North-west frontier in the direction of Herat and Kabul, let us, so far from entertaining a mean, green-eyed jealousy, welcome the advance of Russia in her route through Central Asia on to the Chinese frontier, where she will have ample room. We cannot stop Russia's advance if we would; and if we could, we ought not; she occupies ground which we could not occupy. The two great Empires in Asia of England and Russia can and ought to work together. It is not like, as in ancient times, between Rome and Carthage, or, as in modern times, between England and France in India.

Englishmen denounce the conquests and ambition of their countrymen in India, as they do those of Russia in Central Asia. But, without justifying the proceedings, in all respects, of either Empire, how wonderful is the rise of both Empires! In 1722 Russia had a population of only 14,000,000; now she has 80,000,000. England then was confined to the three towns of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras, with a united population of 1,000,000; now she has 240,000,000. In 1689 the foundations of Calcutta were laid amid swamps surrounded by tigers and alligators; shortly after that Peter the Great began St. Petersburg, amid swamps and sandbanks also, and beset by bears and wolves. Russia from that period went South in her conquests, and England North, until now they have become neighbours in Central Asia. May they rival each other in carrying the torch of civilization to the dark places of the earth, full of the habitations of cruelty!

RUSSIA AS A CIVILIZER IN THE EAST.

We should, while watchful of our own house and securing our doors, regard our neighbour with an unprejudiced look, seeing the bright as

well as the dark side, and recognizing that while Russia is far behind England in her civilizing tendencies, she is stirring in that direction. That Russia, notwithstanding a variety of deficiencies, is a civilizing Power, there is sufficient evidence; among others, we shall quote two competent witnesses.*

Dr. Bellew, well known in connection with Afghanistan, and fully acquainted with the politics of our North-west frontier, makes in his last work, "Kashmir and Kashgar," the following remarks on the Russian advance in Central Asia. He states, the two southern cities of Yarkand and Khutan are in the hands of British traders, while the northern states from Kashgar to Turfan resort to the markets on the Russian sides of the passes (north of Kashgar) :—

> The progress of Russia there is but a repetition on the steppes to the north of the mountains of our own career, not so very long ago, on the peninsula to the south of them. The might which was our right—we must remember this point—against the Aryan nations of the South is none the less her right against the Tartar people of the North. For each on his own side gives to a kindred race the blessings of civilization, instead of the curses of barbarism; each has for its object the prosperity, peace, and freedom of its subjects, according to its own established forms of government. The main difference is, that Britain on the south has maintained her conquest and grown up in the full vigour of the strength acquired by a long term of tenure; whilst Russia on the north is yet in the course of growth, and lacks the vigour of maturity.
>
> As the Sutlej and the Indus have not served to give us a frontier on the plains of India, neither can we expect the great rivers of the steppes of Tartary to give them such a limit on the plains of Central Asia. As we on the south have been compelled to advance to the foot of the hills, and exercise sovereign influence over their provinces on our side of the great water-shed of the Asiatic continent—the great natural division of its northern and southern climes and nations—so may we expect a like force to impel them on to similar positions on its north side.
>
> The foreshadowed approximation of the frontiers of the two great Christian Powers in Asia is an eventuality, the consummation of which cannot be considered very remote from this time, unless, indeed, the present rate of Russia's advance towards the intervening boundary receive an unforeseen—however improbable such may be—check. And that, what, under any circumstances, concerns us, is the proper appreciation of the nature of our own position on this same frontier of junction, and the assurance that we are there prepared to keep our own rights and respect theirs.

Dr. Schuyler, an American, while fully and impartially laying bare the faults of the Russian administration in Central Asia, makes the following admissions: "The Russians have done something for the material

* Consult further, Mackenzie Wallace's "Russia, Barry's "Russians at Home," Graham's "Progress of Science and Art in Russia," and in Russ, Golobatchov's "Desyet let Reform," or "Ten Years of Russian Reform, 1861-71."

† Schuyler's "Turkestan," p. 234.

"interests of the country. The roads are being greatly improved; "bridges are being constructed over the chief rivers, and canals for "purposes of irrigation are being projected." "Despite the drain upon "the Imperial Exchequer, it is practically impossible for Russia to with- "draw from her position in Central Asia. Notwithstanding the many "faults that may be found in the administration of the country, the "Russian rule is, on the whole, beneficial to the Natives, and it would be "manifestly unjust to them to withdraw her protection and leave them "to anarchy and to the unbridled rule of fanatical despots."

Schools, roads, improved houses, the decay of Moslem intolerance, are beginning to mark Russian rule. The Mullahs are complaining of the falling off in religious observances. The Rei, or religious chief, is no longer allowed to compel the people, by the application of the whip, to go to the mosque. I met at the Oriental Congress of St. Petersburg last year a descendant of Genghis Khan, now a Russian prince.

Russia has a great work in the old Bactria, the seat of Greek civilization after Alexander's time, whose cities, Samarkand and Bokhara, in the time of Genghis Khan, were the seats of greater refinement and politeness than any city in Europe in the twelfth century; while in the fifteenth century the Court of Herat vied in magnificence with that of any Court in Europe.

The glaring case of religious persecution in Poland by Russia is brought forward and justly stigmatized by the English Press, and would be so by the Russian Press were it free. I have myself heard the strongest condemnations of such conduct on the part of Russians. But it should be borne in mind, that when one looks at the state Russia was kept in under the Emperor Nicholas, and what England was under the bigotry and despotism of George III., what were the penal laws against Roman Catholics and Dissenters, one is pained but surprised. Every country has its dark as well as its bright side, but all admit that of late years the Russian Government has become much more tolerant towards Dissenters and Jews. Every year is swelling the current of reforms, ecclesiastical, educational, social, political, in Russia itself. These must react on the foreign possessions of Russia.

Schuyler has exposed the great abuses of administration in Central Asia, and the corruption of officials. The lamentable case of the massacre of the Yomuds at Khiva by the Russians is a stain on the Russian administration; but Dr. Schuyler, who brings forward the charge, observes: "The Russian movements in Central Asia have been marked "(on the whole) by great discipline and humanity."* We in the Indian Mutiny were not spotless on this score.

* Schuyler's "Turkestan," I., 76.

RUSSIAN EXPANSION—ITS EFFECTS.

Will not the case of Russia be like that of ours in India? The torrent of conquest will flow on until by expansion it has spent its force, and spreads out, calm and fertilizing, over a wide surface. The torrent may be divided, but not embanked. England has reached the consolidating stage; Russia is in that of extension. England rules over 240,000,000 subjects gained by conquest; Russia over only one-tenth of that number. Russia is extending southward towards the Persian Gulf, and eastward towards the Pacific, until her great railway lines—linking Pekin with Petersburg, Hankow with Tashkend, Central Asia with India—are completed, until she faces the Pacific slope of America on the east, and the Indian Empire to the south—the golden line of civilization extending from ocean to ocean. Mongolia, once the seat of mighty empires and the abode of civilization, will be brought within the European circle; for the Russian rail, 1,400 miles shorter through Mongolia than through Siberia, will pass through a populous, fertile, and well-watered plain—with the exception of a three-days' march near the Desert. (On this see the reports of Richtopher, but, above all, of Hochstetter.) While England's line is south towards the sea, Russia's is central towards Eastern Asia.

Terentyef, in his interesting work, "The English and Russian Trade "Contest,"* states a fact important in its bearings. "What is Central "Asia to Russia? It is a poor, thinly populated region, which will "never pay its cost. But it has one great advantage, in providing us "with a splendid station where we can take breath and collect our "forces." For what? we may ask. Doubtless, in case of war with England, to lock up the English forces in India, and to serve as a point for disturbing India.

But the great drift of Russia is eastward on to China, and south to the Persian seaboard. Central Asia is only a half-way house in this respect. The Russian wave will dash at the base of the Himalayas, but it will rebound on its north-eastern flank to China, to open out through Mongolia a highway through the Desert—a subject of rejoicing to all the friends of humanity.

For two centuries Russia has been making great exertions to develop an overland trade with China; but railroads are absolutely necessary, as her tea trade *vid* Kiachta, owing to the expense and delay of the transit, is being superseded by the sea route from Hankow to Odessa. Hence the Moscow and Nijni tea merchants, seeing ruin facing them, find their only ark of safety in a Mid Siberian railway *vid* Tuimen, Semipalatensk, Hami, and Hankow, to be extended on to Pekin to meet the North

* "Rossiye i Angliye v bore Za ruinke." M. Terentyef. St. Petersburg, 1876.

Siberian Railway. From Nijni to Pekin the rail will be 4,700 miles long, one-fourth more than the line from New York to San Francisco. In connection with this route between Pekin and St. Petersburg, so important for Russian trade, to link the Baltic with the Pacific, the expedition of Colonel Sosnofski to Western China for the purpose of exploring a new route has been successful.* A road has been found nearly 1,400 *miles shorter than that by Kiachta.* This road from Launch on the Yellow River to Zaisar is perfectly fit for wheeled vehicles, leading through a fertile, populous, and well-watered plain; only for a three days' journey does it traverse a sterile country. From Zaisar it passes through Semipalatensk and Omsk; it goes through the centre of China, through a fertile and populous country, to the great marts and railway network of Russia, avoiding the barren steppes and shifting sands of the Desert, which was the old route between Russia and China *vid* Kiachte.

A work has been published in Vienna which ought to be in the hands of those wishing to know the lines of Russian railway extension in Asia:† "Hochstetter Asie Seine Zukunfts Eisenbahnen." Appended to it is an excellent map, pointing out the Russian railway lines in Asia, with an account of the chief cities the proposed lines will pass through, and a reference to reports and statistics.

Ever since and even before the days of Peter the Great India has been looked on as the Eldorado of Russia. The Russian mind is full of it. He sent an expedition to Khiva in furtherance of that design, and, had his life been spared, considerable progress would have been made; the object being to bring back into its old channels the trade which formerly flowed from India and China through Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Black Sea, to Central Europe, until the capture of Constantinople by the Turks stopped that channel up.

A rail to India is popular in Russia for commercial and strategetical purposes. The first stage is opened to Orenburg, and sanction has been given for an extension, *vid* Orsk, to Tashkend. The whole distance from Orenburg to Peshawur is 2,270 miles; but the country is poor, the gradients very steep, and will attract very little of the sea-borne trade of India, as the following fact illustrates. The Russians import tea into Odessa from Hankow. Though laden with heavy duty, it undersells at Nijni the tea brought overland *vid* Kiachta. Hochstetter, however, gives the preference to the Caucasian-Persian line, and calculates the journey

* Richtopher, however, the great Austrian explorer of China, discovered this route before Sosnofski, and marked it off in the map of Hochstetter. The cities of Kashgar rose to importance, as being on the line of this caravan route *vid* Andijan to China.

† See also Colonel Yule's edition of "Marco Polo" and Heeren's "Researches."

will be made by rail from Paris to Calcutta in eleven days at a cost of 60*l*. The line *vid* Poti, Erivan, Julpha, and Teheran will be shorter and cheaper than the Euphrates Valley line.

RUSSIAN EXPANSION—CHECKS ON.

But the great check on this expansion of Russia is the *financial*, the strain on revenues which are not very elastic. Russia is weak internally, is beginning to feel that extension is weakness, and that her conquests, though profitable to the employés and young militaires restless and panting for promotion, are costly to the nation. Wherever you go in Russia the impression is, plenty of land, but where are the people? Russia, for instance, has acquired the territory of the Amour, in East China—a region as large as France—but with the sparse population, she can do little to colonize it or develop its resources. The same with Central Asia, where she has a territory equal in extent to Austria, Germany, and Belgium taken together, but the population of the whole is not greater than that of London, though the Valley of the Oxus is very fertile.

Russia is fermenting internally with revolutions and tendencies towards some form of representative government. When this is secured it will direct attention from barren conquests abroad to consolidation at home. Russia heaving with socialistic throes will turn her eyes inward, and with this the sting will be taken from the military party.

RUSSIA'S MOVE ON ASIA MINOR.

Asia Minor is not Russia's route to India. Sir G. Campbell, who has written a "Handy-book on the Eastern Question," valuable for the new light that his Indian experience throws on the Turkish Question, makes the following important remarks: "I have thought that Russian "ambition in Europe might rather turn the current from Asia; and, on "the other hand, if a strong backwater on the European side turns it "on Asia, so much the more rapid will be the advance there."

Lord Dunsany, in his "Gall or Teuton," expresses a similar view: "In 1854 the eyes of Russia were turned to the West, and her back to "India. Repulsed in the West, she turned to the East; and a very "short space now separates her advanced posts from our East Indian "frontier. Had we failed in the Crimean War, and Russia been successful in her designs on Turkey, she would have had far too much "occupation in Europe to have made progress in Central Asia. Success "was on our side, and upon the road by which, if at all, Russia must "invade India, her advance has been immense, and, what is more, well "secured."

Russia is not likely to occupy the Slav Provinces, except a portion of Bulgaria, to carry out these reforms in the land system. Russia knows that a prolonged occupation of those Provinces would not only create difficulties with Austria, but also with the Slavs themselves, who have a wholesome dread of the Russian bureaucracy. The Servians had a taste of it from the Russian volunteers, many of whom, by their bad conduct and ill-treatment of the Serbs, have left no pleasant memories behind them, while others, it is reported, have wasted much of the funds raised in Russia for the sick and wounded Serbs in indulging themselves in champagne and other luxuries.

Russia cannot localize the war by confining it to the Slav Provinces. The Armenians of Asia Minor suffer from the Turks as much as the Slavs of the Balkan. Russia's object is to emancipate the Christian Armenians as well as the Slavs. In Asia Minor she would have to deal only with England's objections. The invasion of Asia Minor by Russia, and the possible occupation of a portion of it, is viewed with increasing suspicion by the English Press, as endangering eventually the overland route to India and the proposed neutrality of Constantinople. There is no time to discuss this question here; but let us not forget, on the other hand, that the subduing this country would be an expensive and long process for Russia, and its consolidation would be the work of many years, and, along with Russia's expenses in Central Asia, would embarrass her finances. Sir G. Campbell makes on this subject a remark which deserves serious attention: "The "very task of acquiring and administering this rich and great country "[Asia Minor] would divert Russia's energies from the profitless Tur- "kestan, and would probably tend greatly to delay an appeal to India." It would be also a diversion of Russian forces. Russia is a torrent against which it is not easy to raise an embankment, but which you may divide.

The state of things in Asia Minor is becoming a subject of increasing anxiety. With chaos ruling in Constantinople, with the head in a state of atrophy, what is to be expected of the provinces of Asia, where oppression and bad government are carried on with as high a hand as in the Danubian Provinces.* And yet the Turkish Press, instead of throwing oil on the troubled waters, stirs up the fanaticism of the old Turks, and cries out "that Europe stands in awe of Islam, and all inter- "national conferences are held in the capital of Islam." An endeavour is being made to rally, but in vain.

Three-fourths of Asia Minor lie uncultivated, presenting such a vast

* See "Armenia and the Lebanon," by J. Probyn. (Papers of the Eastern Question Association, No. 10.)

sphere for colonization and for cultivating the vine, olive, mulberry, cotton, &c., which were so flourishing under the Romans. "Its splendid "cities have vanished, and the populous countries they animated are "turned into a marshy solitude, exhaling desolation and death;" while its 3,000,000 inhabitants are scattered in the midst of deserts, marshes, and ruins.* She has the raw materials for producing cotton and grain equal to any country, forming the connecting link between two continents, with ports both in Eastern and Western waters. Mines of iron, coal, lead, copper, and silver abound. Skill and capital only are wanted, and these must come at present from the Europeans. Is there any chance for remedying this state of things, or of having the Euphrates railway, unless the country is placed under some European Power? The Turkish soldiery starved, without pay, are sure to cause disturbances which will call for intervention. Is there any other chance of a railway from Constantinople to the Persian Gulf but in Asia Minor being taken over by an European Protectorate?

CONSTANTINOPLE AND RUSSIAN DISMEMBERMENT.

Against the possession of Constantinople by Russia, as giving her the key of the Mediterranean route to India, there is a very decided opinion held by men of all parties in England. One thing, however, has been overlooked. Though the popular and ecclesiastical feeling in Russia is in favour of holding it, called as it is by its traditional title as Czarigrad, or the City of the Czar, yet Russian statesmen sympathize little with those views, as they see the complications it might involve them in with Germany and Austria interested in the mouths of the Danube, and they doubt how far it would increase the political power of Russia, as it might lead to the dismemberment of an empire already large; they are finding extension does not imply increased military power. Count Gurovski,† an able Russian writer, treating on the effects of the occupation of Constantinople by Russia, makes the following remarks:—

> The monarch and his grandees will abandon the cold, misty, frozen, marshy, mouldy, and gloomy region of St. Petersburg, with its monuments of murder and parricide, for the unrivalled beauty of the Bosphorus. The Greeks, the Phanariots, the Slavic Rajah of the South, will soon prevail in the palace—it may be in the modern seraglio—against the genuine Russian. By-and-bye they will surround the master, creep into his counsels, and crowd out therefrom the men of the North. Even the cunning and servile German, so influential now in the northern capital, will be pushed aside. In one word, the Court in Byzantium, or Czarigrad, will soon cease to be Russian; it will become estranged to the nation, and autocracy will soon become disabled. It will lose its control over the people; its old indi-

* Tchikatchef, "Une Page sur l'Orient." Paris, 1868.
† "Russia and its People," p. 294.

genous flavour will disappear; the historic tie between the Czar and his subjects will be rent asunder; the men of the North will cease to recognize their hereditary master in the despot revelling on the Hellespont.

The writer then points out the effect it will have in spreading liberal ideas among Russians.

Why may not Constantinople be placed in the position of Delhi—the Kaliph Sultan, like the Great Mogul in India, left with all his outward state, but the springs of power moved by an European Commission; or made another Belgium?

We conclude this brief sketch, fully agreeing with the principle that British interests in the East, which are the interests of the Native races too, should be defended and maintained at any cost. There is one aspect of this question which has gained little attention in England, but in which political reformers, missionary societies, and philanthropists in Russia and England have a common interest—the internal development of their own empires and the spreading of Christian civilization abroad amid the 600,000,000 heathens, Mahomedans, and Buddhists of Asia, who at present cry out, "See how these "Christians hate each other!" Serf-emancipating Russia and slavery-abolishing England ought to set a better example in the nineteenth century. We close this introductory paper in the words of Hochstetter, the great Austrian geographer: "Like a mighty storm concentrated "from north and south over Central Asia and Persia, is the world-"convulsing encounter of the two greatest empires on the earth. We "hope, however, in spite of all, that this life-and-death contest will not "take place, that the clouds will disperse, and that England and Russia "united may fulfil their historical mission, to raise the people of the "East, sunk through Oriental despotism and superstition, and to waken "to life the fallen states of Islam—a mission which England is in so "wondrous a way executing in India, and which Russia has begun in "Central Asia."

The following is a Précis on the foregoing Paper on "The Eastern Question in its Anglo-Indian Aspect."

The Eastern Question is for England a Russo-Indian question—viz., the securing at any cost the neutrality of Constantinople and the Isthmus of Suez, as they affect the route to India and our relations with Russia in her position in Asia Minor and on our Indian frontier, where Russia has now become our neighbour. Is India to be endangered for Turkey? Are we to sacrifice the substance for the shadow?

England's interests in India demand that, while defending with the

utmost vigour the above positions, she should maintain towards Russia a conciliatory tone, on the ground that the progress and civilization of Asia depend very much on both Empires working out, each in its own sphere, the suppression of feudalism, fanaticism, and all those evils under which 600,000,000 have groaned for many ages, and acting on a policy that the points in which they agree are vastly more important than those in which they differ.

On the other hand, those in glass houses should not throw stones. The antagonism of England to Russia in Turkey means the hostility of Russia to England in India, the vulnerable heel of Achilles. With the two Empires hostile, a great discouragement would be given to the work of civilization; it would be like working over a mine ready to explode at any moment.

A war with Russia would not save Turkey, but would rather hasten its dissolution, from the inherent rapid decay to which this Empire is sinking, in spite of all the doctoring; while serious injury might be inflicted on India, as Russia, being a neighbour on our frontier, through her influence over Persia and Afghanistan, might inflict great damage, requiring, according to military authorities, an increase of 40,000 European soldiers, which implies increased taxation and, consequently, increased discontent.

The day is inevitable when the Russian and English Empires shall be conterminous, and the presence of a first-class European State on our border shall have power at any time to fan into a flame those elements of spasmodic disaffection which of necessity are ever smouldering in any country won and held, as India was and is, by an alien sword.

Few of the Moslems of India know much about Turkey. Their co-religionists, the Persians, do and always have sympathized with Russia against Turkey; while the Afghans are at present hostile to England. England in the Krimean War shed her blood and treasure for Turkey, —but the Moslems of India were the first to rise in the Mutiny in 1857. Can they be trusted now?

Will not the case of Russia be like ours in India? The torrent of conquest will flow on until by expansion it has spent its force, and spreads out, calm and fertilizing, over a wide surface. The torrent may be divided, but is not easily embanked. England has reached the consolidating stage; Russia is in that of extension. She is now on the inclined plane in Central Asia, on her way to Eastern Asia, and it is difficult to stop.

England, while maintaining a watchful policy, and strongly armed for defence, should regard Russia's inevitable expansion in Central and Eastern Asia with kindly feelings. We cannot stop Russia's advances

if we would, and we ought not if we could. She occupies ground which we could not occupy. Russia is ambitious—but so has England been; but England is in the stage of consolidating her conquests, Russia of extending them, to which, ere long, financial reasons and internal revolutions will put a check.

Asia Minor must fall under the hands of some European Power, in order to the development of her great material resources. In the hands of Russia, it would not be on the way to India, but rather a diversion from it.

The sentiment of Hochstetter, the great Austrian geographer, is a noble one on this: "Like a mighty storm concentrated from north and "south over Central Asia and Persia, is the world-convulsing encounter "of the two greatest empires on the earth. We hope, however, in spite "of all, that this life-and-death contest will not take place, that the "clouds will disperse, and that England and Russia united may fulfil "their historical mission, to raise the people of the East, sunk through "Oriental despotism and superstition, and to waken to life the fallen "states of Islam—a mission which England is in so wondrous a way "executing in India, and which Russia has begun in Central Asia."

Major-General Sir G. LE GRAND JACOB, C.B., K.C.S.I., sent the following letter on Mr. Long's paper: "I greatly regret my being kept "away by an unusually severe paroxysm of my chronic malady. I have "been too ill to do more than glance over the paper you kindly sent me "last night, but the impression it leaves is that it is an able essay, the "writer evidently wishing to take impartial views of questions that "have stirred up and brought the nation into a critical position. I "think, in his desire to lessen the animosity of a large part of the "community to Russia, he has too much smoothed over her offences "against humanity and her treatment of Turkey, where her action has "been very injurious, and he defends the declaration of war on the plea "of the feeling got up by the 'Bulgarian atrocities,' forgetting how "much its Government helped to fan the flame, and how they aided "insurrection before openly declaring war. The Turkish reformers "made gigantic efforts to do away with the old rotten system of "government. They dethroned their Sultan at the cost of the lives of "some of their best men; they took measures to secure equality between "Christian and Turk. Did not equity deserve that time should be "given them to mature their measures, instead of interfering by force "to prevent them? Mr. Long is scarcely fair to the Turk."

Sir CHARLES TREVELYAN opened the discussion. He observed that the excellent address just delivered covered a large surface—too large, indeed, to be adequately dealt with on a single occasion. But in it there was one point of such vital importance at the present time that he felt it to be his duty to be present, as even the smallest brick in the edifice of opinion which was to guide future action was of some consequence. In viewing the question opened up by the Rev. Mr. Long he thought Constantinople might be left out of consideration, for it might be assumed that the whole of Europe was determined that Russia should not take possession of Constantinople. (Hear, hear.) It might be asked, What is to prevent her? "We have no confidence in Russia," some people will say. But, he asked, are there not ten thousand *quasi*-Russians of the dangerous classes living amongst us in London, and, though we have no confidence in them, we have confidence in the police? That is exactly the case with regard to Constantinople. Although we may not have confidence in Russia, we have confidence in the Powers of Europe, and in the enlightened self-interest of Austria, Germany, France, and Italy; and, above all, we have confidence in ourselves. (Hear, hear.) It is a great mistake to think that we have more reason to fear Russia than Russia has to fear us. This is perfectly understood in Russia, and was plainly indicated by the despatch lately sent by Lord Derby to Prince Gortschakoff. (Hear, hear.) Had such a letter been addressed to us, should we have sat down quietly under it? But Russia knows "which side her bread is buttered," and that it is not for her interest to quarrel with us. Leaving Constantinople, therefore, out of the question, what have we in Asia Minor? No doubt Russia will break down the Turkish defence in Asia Minor, and after taking Kars and Erzeroum, the whole of Armenia will be at her disposal. But will Russia then be any nearer to India than she is now? Supposing she chose that road, she would find herself faced with insuperable difficulties. The Persian Gulf, observe, is the sea. Now, how did we acquire India? By the sea. How shall we keep it? By the sea. Just as Russia is a great landed Power, England is a great maritime Power. There is a fable about Antæus gathering strength each time he touched the ground; but we gather strength by touching the sea. So that Russia in possession of Kars and Erzeroum will be no nearer India than she was before. Her only road to India is that by which Alexander and Tamerlane went of old—by Herat, Meshed, and Candahar; that is Russia's direct road to India, and she has already entire control over the commencement of it. She has the Volga and the enclosed sea—the Caspian—where no one can touch her. The whole road is before her; so that if she were

to invade India, that is the way she would take. Russia, then, having already the best road to India, why should we disturb ourselves, because she is carrying on military operations upon a more circuitous and much less available route? It is said by some that although the road by Asia Minor may not be Russia's road, it is our road, and a few years ago a great deal was said about a railway by it to India. But it has now been dropped; and why? Because, on consideration, it was found to be quite untenable. We want a road to India which is entirely under our control, and at our sole disposal in peace and war, without placing us at the mercy of all the intermediate States. That we have through the Isthmus of Suez and the Red Sea, and that will suffice, at all events for the next fifty or sixty years, when, possibly, a new state of things may arise. The maritime road to India, *viâ* Suez, must be our road, and no one here present will see a railway to India by Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. Well, then, we return to the Caspian, and thence by Meshed, Herat, and Candahar. Nadir Shah invaded India by that road, but he had great advantages. He had entire command of the resources of the intermediate country of Persia. He first usurped the Persian Government and established himself there before thinking of India, and though at the other end there was an effete and perfectly worn-out dynasty, he spent two years in establishing himself on the road, and the third year he went to India; but he was so much afraid of being cut off in the passes on his return, that he was in a desperate hurry to get back. And that was at a time when armies were provided for in the rudest way. At present, with the enormous quantity of *matériel* required for the successful conduct of military operations, and with all the resources of England and India organized at the Indian end of the road, it is simply impossible that Russia can think of invading India. (Hear, hear.) I entirely dismiss it as a myth and a chimera. Then, again, there was the Pamir scare. But Russia could never think of coming that way. Any person whose knowledge of Turkestan is confined even to Mr. Schuyler's book will see that it is a long, circuitous, round-about road. Seeing the effort it cost the Russians even to get possession of Khiva, it is easy to conceive what it would be to organize in that direction a force sufficient to invade India. Only five per cent. of Russian Turkestan is cultivated; there is hardly food enough grown for the people, much less for the support of an armed force sufficiently large to invade India. And hostile elements abound in all directions, which would, in such a case, be organized and backed up by us. How could the Russians carry the *matériel* of war across the whole of Central Asia? The progress of mechanical science has settled that point. We cannot make war without railways. War has

adapted itself to railways, and without them there can be no serious military operations. I do not know whether any one present remembers the Russian scare of Vichovitch. (Hear, hear.) The Russophobian folly had so increased, and we had got into such a sensitive state, that we were ready to believe anything. A certain Russian officer appeared at Cabul, and that proximately led to the Afghan War and the great Afghan disaster—one of the most painful and discreditable passages in our history. As a military operation it was one of the most disastrous, and as a moral action one of the most shameful, because we entirely brought it on ourselves. What business had we to thrust ourselves on the Afghans without their wish? But human affairs seem to run in a circle, and in this case it is a vicious circle. The generation which profited by that experience has nearly passed away, and a new generation has sprung up, who have revived the anti-Russian cry, and I fear that our recent policy in India has given countenance to it. (Hear, hear.) Afghanistan is a real barrier against Russia. It has all the characteristics of a barrier. It is a very strong country, inhabited by a very warlike people, who have a remarkable commercial genius, and are very independent and jealous of their freedom; and if we only deal with them in a spirit of respect for those characteristics, and abstain from meddling with their affairs, they will be useful friends. I am sorry Mr. Long has suggested the appointment of a Political Agent, as I entirely agree with the Ameer of Cabul in his objection to them, considering the reputation for meddling which our Agents have left there, and the difficulty of insuring their personal safety. I repeat, that if we refrain from interfering with the Afghans, and give them assurances that we do not intend to intrude ourselves upon them, and cultivate their goodwill, and, above all, if we establish every possible facility for commerce, there is no doubt we shall have Afghanistan as a barrier intact and inhabited by a friendly people; whereas, by an opposite policy, we simply hand it over to the enemies of English rule in India. (Hear, hear.)

RAJAH RAMPUL SINGH expressed the opinion that Russia would not be permitted by Germany and the other Continental Powers to take possession of Constantinople. As to Russia's intentions concerning India, he believed they were of a very definite character. He had it on good authority from a friend who had served in the Russian Army, that the Emperor of Russia said that during the winter he wished he could be in India. Besides, there were many instances which could be quoted to show the existence of a desire to take India; and as the English did not take any defensive steps, it was to be feared

that some day Russia would push forward, having already firmly planted herself in Turkestan.

Colonel RATHBORNE, referring to the speech of Sir Charles Trevelyan, took objection to the simile which had been used, in likening the Emperor of Russia to the criminal classes of England. The Emperor Alexander had shown himself, in many respects, an admirable character, and he had reluctantly gone to war with Turkey; and he (the speaker) must protest against his being linked with or likened to criminals needing the surveillance of the police.

Sir CHARLES TREVELYAN said that the simile was not used by him in any disrespectful sense as regarded the Czar, but simply to illustrate the position of the European nations. (Hear hear.)

Colonel RATHBORNE accepted this explanation, and proceeded to say that he entirely concurred with Sir Charles's opinion concerning Russia's position in relation to India, and that opinion had been expressed by himself in a paper which he read before the East India Association some time back on "The True Line of Defence for India." In that he pointed out the insuperable difficulties attendant upon bringing down an army, accompanied, as it would have to be, with guns, ammunition, and *matériel*, for the purpose of invading India. Such a thing, in his opinion, was, under existing circumstances, an utter absurdity. He was glad to see that at Livadia the Emperor, in conversation with Lord Augustus Loftus, repudiated, as an absurd chimera, the idea of Russia invading India. As far as the Suez Canal was concerned, he was somewhat doubtful of its retention in war time as a means of communication with India. There was an understanding that the Canal was not to be available for ships of war, but recently Sir Stafford Northcote told the House of Commons that we should not object to Russian war ships going through, because, in the event of war or disturbance in India, we should have to send our own war ships through. But the Canal could be readily rendered useless by blocking it up either by sinking a ship, or by using gunpowder on its banks, or by employing Nubians to fill it up; and he very much feared that if war ships used the Canal in time of war, it would soon be blocked. As regarded Constantinople, he thought there was a great deal of misconception going forward. Mr. Cross, in his House of Commons speech the other day, said, "Is it "necessary that Russia should approach, attack, or occupy Constan- "tinople? I, for one, say, No." But an answer to that question was given in a Russian paper of great influence shortly afterwards, and

from quite an opposite view. He (the speaker) did the same, for whenever one country is making war against another, the chief object is to strike at the capital. No satisfactory result could be arrived at except at the capital—at the heart of the country. Would Napoleon the Great ever have been put down without his opponents taking this course? When Germany quarrelled with France, their army made for Paris, and the French, on the other side, cried, "à Berlin!" It was utterly impossible to suppose, therefore, that Russia could, in the event of the war continuing, settle satisfactorily with Turkey except at Constantinople. One of two things must happen. One was that the Turks, beaten at the outset, may foresee their fate and come to terms; and the other was that Russia, if successful, would go to Constantinople and cleanse the Augean stable there—(No!)—which the Turks themselves could not do. It was not the fault of the people—they were good, honest folk enough—but the abominable nest of Pashas and villains of every description who were ruining the country. (No, no!) It was these who were carrying on the war, and were ready to sacrifice in it their countrymen as they would so much vermin. (Dissent.) Well, he had the courage of his opinions, and was willing to allow the same to everybody else. (Hear, hear.) Referring to the despatch which had been sent by Lord Derby to Prince Gortschakoff, and which had been so applauded upon the allusion to it by a former speaker, who had said that if a similar one had been sent to England, we should not have tolerated it, he had only to say that we had the means of comparing the manner in which different countries treated our despatches. Prince Gortschakoff took no notice of our despatch; and though we lately sent a despatch of another character to Turkey, of such a nature as had never before been sent to any State, insisting on the punishment of murderers and a multitude of other things, what did the Porte do? It immediately promoted Shefket Pasha, the chief of those criminals—(murmurs of dissent)—and yet we did nothing. (Renewed dissent, in the course of which Colonel Rathborne resumed his seat.)

Mr. KERRY NICHOLLS complimented Mr. Long upon his able and exhaustive address, and observed that the speaker having disclaimed any desire to deal with the question on party lines, it was not fair to attribute to him any Russian proclivities. Nevertheless, the paper resolved into this—that we should shake hands with Russia across our Indian frontier. Well, a great deal had been urged concerning the strategic difficulties which Russia would encounter in the invasion of India; but as regards the absence of railways, it should not be forgotten that in the present age anything could be done by money. America had laid down the Pacific Railroad at the rate of a mile a day, and

Russia, it should be borne in mind, possesses most able military engineers, and can, if desirous of attacking India, lay down railways, and do all that is required for the transport of troops and stores to the Indian frontier. With Russia as a neighbour to India, as suggested by Mr. Long in his allusion to the possibility of conterminous frontiers, how would English interests be affected? Russia has already extended her position in the North Pacific, 200 miles of coast having been absorbed within the last year. If we are to have Russia as a friendly neighbour, there can be no particular danger so far as our trade is concerned. But coming to one of the other points—the Russian advance in Asia Minor—he thought sufficient stress was not laid upon that matter. If we could receive Russia in either direction on the footing laid down by Mr. Long, we need have no fear; but if we have really cause to fear Russia's craving towards Constantinople, every foot of territory on which she advances in Asia Minor must be of considerable interest and importance to us. A battle was lately fought at Batoum, and that was a place long desired by the Russians—(hear, hear)—and he thought it very likely they would obtain it. At any rate, it was an important strategic point in the advance upon Constantinople. As to our position in the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal, we should remember that it was Peter the Great who said that the commerce of India was the commerce of the world, and that he who held India was the real sovereign of Europe. Now, in relation to the Suez Canal, it had been stated that we were not able to take any steps to prevent Russian ships, or the ships of any belligerent Power, from passing through the Canal. Well, we were not in a position to take any action, being simply there on sufferance. From an international point of view we have no more right there than any other European Power. The Canal runs through a strip of Egyptian territory, which at the present time is a part of the Ottoman Empire. The Canal was constructed by virtue of a *firman* granted by the Sultan of Turkey, and we were interested in it only by virtue of a concession obtained from the Khedive, which concession declared the Canal open to the ships of all nations as a neutral highway. It might be asked, "Has "our position altered by the purchase of shares?" and to that he replied that we became only shareholders in a commercial undertaking. If we talk about defending the Canal, how, then, could we do it? Where is the fleet to be stationed for its defence? It cannot be defended by a fleet cruising up and down the Mediterranean, or by a fleet stationed at Malta. We hold Malta and Gibraltar, both valuable strategic positions, and having given the Ionian Islands to Greece—an act which he could never understand—events pointed to the necessity of taking up

another strategic point at Port Said or Alexandria. He (the speaker) could not leave the subject without contending that British interests in the East must be maintained at all costs, and therefore we could not ignore the vital importance of the position of Constantinople as a strategic point to insure the safety of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. This fact could not be ignored by any who desired to maintain the integrity of the British Empire. (Hear, hear.) The speaker concluded by thanking Mr. Long for the fitting opportunity he had selected for the discussion of this vitally important question.

Mr. GEORGE FOGGO referred to the remark of Colonel Rathborne, to the effect that Russia must, of necessity, go so far as to take possession of, or at least to occupy, Constantinople. If that were so, it involved very grave considerations—(hear, hear)—for it was at present the almost unanimous feeling of the country that such an event, or rather such an intention, would necessitate a fight between England and Russia. (Hear, hear.) Whether right or wrong, if that were the issue, he contended that those in authority—that is, the Government—should at once put the case plainly before the public, so that there should be no possibility of a misunderstanding. (Hear, hear.) But he would call attention to a remark of Mr. Mackenzie Wallace in his book on Russia, to the effect that the possession of Constantinople would not give Russia command of the Mediterranean, but only command of the Black Sea; and it was natural that Russia should wish to have a position on the Black Sea the same at least as Turkey, because at present, by her power of closing the Dardanelles, Turkey could at any time blockade all the Russian ports on the Black Sea. The same authority contended that the possession of Constantinople, as it would not give Russia command of the Mediterranean, would not interfere with our passage to India, provided we continued preponderant as a naval Power in that sea. With regard to the Anglo-Indian aspect of the question, he thought that England must make up her mind to see Russia, sooner or later, a neighbour in Asia, and that, at any rate, it was impossible for England to bolster up semi-barbarous Powers, like Persia and Turkey, longer than the Ruler of the world thought fit, or than the course of events would naturally allow. Then we surely could hold our own, and Russia would not be so unwise as unnecessarily to make an enemy of Great Britain.

General ALEXANDER said that one of Europe's great statesmen recently remarked that nothing was more transparent than the diplomacy of the present day; and taking the speech of the Emperor of Russia

at Moscow, in which he said that Constantinople would only embarrass him, and that he had no wish to go to war with England, it would really seem so. He (General Alexander) could believe that under present circumstances Constantinople would be an embarrassment before affairs in Asia as well as in Europe are settled, and that though the Emperor has no wish to go to war with England, it will not be his fault if England should hereafter go to war with him. Russia has a purpose, and is determined to achieve it. The question now before the meeting was, how the English position in India would be affected by war between England and Russia. He was old enough to remember the days of Vichovitch, which had been alluded to by Sir Charles Trevelyan, and a time beyond that. He also remembered the Afghan War, and its results, which were anything but beneficial to us; and he would, therefore, speak from such experience as he had learned in India, and thought over since; the question being, what is in the mind of Russia in regard to India? The answer is, that Russia believes that she has a destiny in the East; and the common condition of the literary, social, political, and military mind in Russia is, that if war does occur it is in India where England must be attacked. In the event of war, we could shut up Russia in the Black Sea and Baltic by our fleets. She could not attack us in the west, and any attempt to attack her would be what Mr. Long has told us is the Russian similitude of our being like a crab upon a sandbank. Then, what were the facilities for an advance upon India? In the days of Vichovitch Russia had none of the positions she now holds in Central Asia. The first Russian expedition that started from Orenburg nearly perished in the snow. But things were very different in the present day, as Captain Burnaby's and Mr. Schuyler's books will show. Russia possesses Central Asia from the shores of the Black Sea to the western borders of China and Kashgar, with garrisons and outposts south and east of Orenburg, at Khiva, Tashkend, Petropoloski, Samarcand, Bokhara; and her last move was to Merv. From thence there remains the march to Meshed and Herat, with Khelat in view of future events. Taking, say, even Moscow as a basis, there is a railway to Novogorod and the Volga. The Volga flows navigable into the Caspian; between that and the Sea of Aral is another railroad, and on the Caspian has lately been put a fleet of transports, each capable of carrying 500 men. All pains are being taken to improve the navigation of the Oxus and Sir-i-Duria, which latter deep river takes its rise in Pamir, to which allusion has been made, and borders on Cashmere, now known not to be geographically inaccessible. But, besides this, Russia, bending round China on the north, has a country larger than Canada to the east, with the Amour river, flowing

from Siberia, for a boundary. Lately, too, she has obtained from Japan an island with one of the finest harbours in the world, where she has a fleet with a postal service of gunboats, and in war time room for any number of Alabamas, commanded by daring men who would naturalize, or obtain commissions, to luxuriate in the hope of prize money from our China and Indian trades. This harbour would be as a centre to a circumference sweeping from Herat, the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, round the Cape of Good Hope, across South America, including the Pacific Ocean, our Australian, New Zealand, and other colonies, the shores of India, Burmah, and the Straits, for us to defend, while her ships could be salient on any radius they might choose. The march of Alexander the Great had been alluded to by Mr. Long, and he (General Alexander) would remind his hearers that Genghis Khan marched from Pekin to the shores of the Mediterranean, and found provisions wherever he went, as the Russian or any other army would more easily do in the present day; for, besides what could be brought from the Caspian and Central Asia, we may depend upon it, an army will take whatever it requires, regardless who starved. Then, again, people talked of geographical difficulties; but what were they? Formerly it was considered impossible to reach India through Cashmere; now it was considered not only possible, but quite feasible. Some years ago he was talking with a Peninsular General on the question of the invasion of England at the time when the French were thought likely to attempt it, and in reply to the question, "With such an army as was then at Cherbourg and "Boulogne, in readiness to embark in a few hours, if he was French "Minister of War, what would he do?" he answered quickly, "Why, "I would invade you directly," though fully satisfied in his own mind that we should soon drive them back. Now, in danger of being called a Russophobist, let us look at what Russia had already done. She now covers Central Asia and encompasses China; she has full possession of the Caspian and the Sea of Aral, and she is making progress in Armenia; she is adding to her Navy, and enormously increasing her military strength in the East. Even in arranging a postal service she calls gunboats into employment. If ever war does come between the two Powers, it will surely be in the East that the great struggle must occur, and England will then have to defend the circumference, assailable from within and without, for Russia would use both points of attack on which we are vulnerable. Russia has been preparing for more than thirty years, even dating from the time of Vichovitch. He had since seen the gradual approach of Russia overland, and along the shores of the Caspian Sea, and her operations in Persia; and now that Russia is in Armenia, she can push onward towards Syria and Egypt, there to be met by both

France and England in defence or compromise of the claims of the first, and of our interests and safety in India as dependent upon the Suez Canal. It is not long since that a semi-official paper expressed regret that an opportunity of securing the Valley of the Euphrates had been missed. It may be called Russophobia or Pessimism, but any military man would tell them it was a great error not to consider an enemy's means of attack and defence; and in the event of war between England and Russia, he could only contemplate a Russian attack upon India and our Eastern commerce, as the blow to be struck at the Achilles' heel of our Empire.

Mr. W. F. HALE thought that upon so important a subject every one who possessed information might prudently express an opinion. For himself, he was loth to question or to impugn the motives of Russia, although, so far as England and one or more of the other Powers were concerned, there appeared to be a difficulty as to what might be behind Russia's declared intentions. As to the present Emperor of Russia, he concurred with the opinion of Colonel Rathborne, that in him there was a different specimen of humanity to deal with than the last Emperor and his predecessors. So far as the present Czar was known, he had been a liberal ruler, and had proved worthy of great respect, and therefore he agreed in the objection raised to Sir Charles Trevelyan's simile. In his opinion it was not right to talk of Sovereigns of Europe with whom we are in friendly alliance in such a fashion, because the susceptibilities of even such a man as the Czar of Russia were likely to be wounded by statements made at public gatherings. Reverting, however, to the possibility which had been hinted at, of the Russians going to Constantinople, that appeared to him to be a most weighty consideration, and one which might constitute a *sine quâ non* in framing a course of action on the part of England, either with or without the other Powers. There was, however, at the moment no evidence to show that Russia meant to advance to Constantinople, and, indeed, her ruler had plainly said that he did not intend to proceed thither —(A Voice: A Russian promise!)—but would only go as far as was necessary for the reorganization of the Christian provinces. Russia's stated policy was to keep to that position. With regard to the Suez Canal, a letter from an Alexandrian correspondent of the *Times* had that day been published, and he would venture to read an extract, as it bore directly on the subject under consideration. The writer says: "A topic now prominent "in Egypt is the Suez Canal. M. de Lesseps, in the early days of "his project, when Lord Palmerston strongly opposed it on political

"grounds, proposed that an Article should be inserted in the Treaty "of Paris guaranteeing the neutrality of the Canal. But the idea "was never carried out. The Canal remains part of Egyptian terri- "tory, leased for ninety-nine years to a company, at the end of which "period the Egyptian Government may enter into full possession on "paying to the company the value of all the plant and material. By "Article 14 of the Deed of Grant, on which the title of the company "rests, and which was signed by Said Pasha on the 5th of January, "1856, the international character of the Canal is very clearly limited "to the free passage of trading vessels: 'We solemnly declare for "'us and our successors, under the reserve of the Sultan's ratification, "'the great maritime Canal from Suez to Pelusium and intervening "'ports open for ever, as neutral passages, to all ships of commerce, "'crossing from one sea to the other, without any distinction, "'exclusion, or preference of persons or nationalities, on payment "'of the duties and execution of the rules established by the "'Universal Company, to whom the concession has been made "'of the use of the said Canal and its appurtenances.'" Now it appeared to him (Mr. Hale) that England was not in a position to control the Canal, because it was in Egyptian territory, and under the ultimate control of the Porte. Russia being at war with the Porte, it might be that she would be justified in blockading the Canal, although he hoped such an outrage upon the commerce of neutral Europe would not be committed. Viewing the Eastern Question as a whole, he could not but hope that the present crisis would terminate satisfactorily, and that in the end all right-thinking people would have little reason to complain that Russia had taken in hand (with her armed forces) the solution of a problem which the other Powers had practically declined at present.

Mr. H. W. FREELAND said that, first of all, he wished to reply to the observations of a preceding speaker as to the duty of England. It had been urged that we should not interfere or bolster up a kingdom which was decaying, but, on the other hand, he contended that we ought not to accelerate that decay, or facilitate the destruction of a State by introducing or conniving at the introduction of the armies of an ambitious Power, having its own interests to serve, and its selfish objects to gain. As to the amelioration of the condition of the Christians, Mr. Cross had truly said that result would never be gained by war, and, for his own part, looking at the past history of Russia in Poland and elsewhere, he was at a loss to understand what such a Power meant by her sympathy with suffering peoples. (Hear, hear.) Turning

to the remarks which had been made concerning Constantinople, Mr. Freeland observed that one speaker had said it would be a necessary result of the campaign for the Russians to go to Constantinople. But what would be done when Russia got there? If she once got there, it might not be easy to get her out again. (Hear, hear.) Mr. Foggo had quoted Mr. Wallace to show that the possession of Constantinople by Russia would not seriously interfere with the position of England, or give Russia the control of the Mediterranean. That proposition involved many considerations, not only for England, but for other European Powers. (Hear, hear.) If Russia had the entire command of the Black Sea, and made it a Russian harbour, with dockyards all round, with possession of Constantinople and the command of the Straits, would not Russian fleets be enabled to come down to the Mediterranean in force, and compel us largely to increase our naval forces there? Further, he wanted to know whether, if we are to keep open the Suez Canal, the possession of the Black Sea as a harbour by Russia would not put us to the expense perhaps of doubling our naval forces. (Hear, hear.) And who could tell whether the navies of other Powers might not be brought into combination against us? If we are to forecast the future, we must calculate on such contingencies. Then, again, Sir Charles Trevelyan spoke of the position of Russia in Asia Minor, and if he (the speaker) followed him rightly, he hinted at a possible annexation of Armenia by Russia. That seemed likely to be the result of the present movements of Russia. Sir Charles Trevelyan, he understood, did not regard that as a very great matter, but, with reference to the question before the meeting that day—the bearings of the Russian movements upon our Anglo-Indian Empire—he looked upon it as a very serious matter indeed. (Hear, hear.) He could not but regard the possession of the sources of the Tigris and the Euphrates, in connection with the railways which Russia always makes for military purposes, as indicating a possible move down the Euphrates Valley, which naturally would be looked upon with intense jealousy by every Englishman who viewed the maintenance of British interests in India as of vital importance and as consistent with the interests of civilization and humanity. Sir Charles Trevelyan had said that it was only the water-way to India that we should have to keep open and defend, but if Russia got possession of an important district in Asia Minor as a basis for future operations, what was to prevent her from marching down through Syria and giving us a land difficulty which we might have to deal with on the banks of the Suez Canal, if our water-way to India was to be kept open? He was not a military man, but he would venture to say that the danger of which Sir Charles Trevelyan

seemed to speak lightly would be a very real and serious danger. (Hear, hear.) The lecturer had asked the question, "Could Turkey be reformed?" and he had pointed to the unhappy condition of affairs, and the projects of reform that had been spoken of. In the House of Commons,* some years ago, he (the speaker) had called attention to the sources of decay, and urged on the then existing Government, in the strongest language that a man could use, the necessity for pressing on this work, to save, if possible, a tottering Empire, and since that time he had never ceased to point out, in his humble way, the same necessity. It was known that our Government and other agencies had worked in the same direction, but in vain. He believed that one of the great obstacles to reform in Turkey had been, for years past—and he did not make the charge lightly, but solemnly and sincerely, believing it to be true—the ceaseless intrigues of Russia, who, by working on the elements of internal disorder, had sought to bring about the disintegration of Turkey for the purpose of her own aggrandizement. (Hear, hear.) Mr. Long had suggested that England and Russia should work together in the interests of civilization, but he took leave to say that working together implied one basis of mutual action, without which common action would exist only on paper. Common action, to be worth anything, must rest on a basis of trust and confidence. He asked whether, as between Russia and England, there could be that basis? (Hear, hear.) To go no further back, consider the Conference lately held, and the Protocol signed in the interests of peace, but followed by a declaration from Russia which was certain to procure its rejection by Turkey, and to make the Protocol as valueless as a piece of waste paper. (Hear, hear.) He asked, could any Englishman look at these matters in the light of past experience, and yet think it possible that confidence could be the basis of common action between England and Russia? (Hear, hear.) In conclusion, he desired to refer to the recent despatch sent by Lord Derby to Russia. When in the House of Commons, he sat as a Liberal; but he could not do other than regret the action lately taken by those who got up the St. James's Hall meeting and by some members of the Liberal party, though he was willing to give them credit for talent, zeal for humanity, and purity of motive. He, for one, could not but regret and deeply deplore the course that they had taken, as it seemed to him that they had played into the hands of Russia—("Hear, hear," and dissent)—and had hurried on the commission of this wicked act—this declaration of war on the part of Russia—which would bring on the unhappy provinces of Turkey an amount of misery compared

* Hansard's "Debates," May 1, 1861, and March 14, 1862.

with which that resulting from the massacres in Bulgaria would be but trifling. In conclusion, Mr. Freeland expressed his conviction that the despatch just sent by Lord Derby would place matters in a right light. He thought it one of the ablest and most thoroughly English despatches ever penned by any English statesman. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. W. J. GRAZEBROOK said that it was extremely refreshing to hear the last speaker. ("Hear, hear," and laughter.) He was previously about to rise and reprove the English people at this moment for their disregard of their true interests. He had heard the latter part of Sir Charles Trevelyan's speech, and was astonished that he should speak of there being no danger of war in our time, and that there was no chance of India being invaded in our time. Even if that were true—which he would venture to doubt—we had still to guard the Empire for our children to take our place, as our forefathers in their time did for us. (Hear, hear.) They guarded the Empire, taking their share of the burthen when it came to them, and, therefore, he, as an Englishman, could not understand the morality of leaving to our children what we ought to do ourselves in regard to that Empire, which we hold, as it were, in trust. For himself, he was not surprised at the declaration of war by Russia. He had carefully watched the whole of the negotiations, and he remembered also, by the light of past history, that Russia had ever been the most aggressive of all the Powers. He saw her faithless, lying, and deceitful. He found her absorbing territory after territory of her immediate neighbours, and always under the pretence of doing good. (Hear, hear.) Hence he looked in distrust upon the benevolent professions of Russia. Yet Englishmen were asked to believe the protestations of the Russian Emperor and the Russian Ministers that they do not mean aggression, that they do not wish for Constantinople. Was it possible to believe that these men are above all human selfishness? Constantinople, to Russia, means the pinnacle of Russian ambition: holding the most important commercial and strategic position in the world. It means, as had been pointed out, the future naval domination of the world. Holding the Black Sea as a wet dock and a practising ground for her future fleets, nowhere throughout the world would there be such a strong position with such an extraordinary natural outlet into the sea as the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. That, in the hands of the Russians, would prove an impenetrable barrier. Their arsenals would be in perfect security and peace. England had spent millions of money on the defence of Portsmouth, and the French had done the same at Cherbourg, and yet those were only in a small degree fortified positions, while a few torpedoes in the Bosphorus and Darda-

nelles, and guns on the banks—and they would bristle with guns—would secure Russia from the combined forces of the world. They would be in a perfectly impregnable arsenal, and by-and-bye, having increased their power, they could come down the Channel and sweep all before them. Russia, in such a position, would compel England to have a score of ships to guard the Suez Canal, and to maintain a large fleet especially to mask that position would be an enormous addition to our expenditure. With regard to our Indian Empire, did any one think Russia would send an army along any road without first ascertaining what supplies could be obtained? Wherever Russia goes she plants a block-house, makes a road, and then all behind is plain sailing, whatever lies before. That before may appear insurmountable, but gradually she gets farther and establishes a station, makes her arrangements for enormous military stores, and, providing good roads, goes forward again. With good roads men can be carried into any country, though railways would be better. He (the speaker) did not, however, believe that Russia was going to India at once, or in the next ten years, but he contended it was the duty of England to prevent the possibility of Russia invading India at any future time. He asked Englishmen to rise to the occasion, and not to wait until Russia had reached Constantinople. We should at once enter into an alliance with Austria, offensive and defensive—(hear, hear)—and if they help us when our interests are assailed in Asia, we will help them when their interests are assailed in Europe. In this way the dangerous and aggressive Russia would be muzzled and disarmed, and we should have some chance of holding that which was bequeathed to us by our ancestors, who fought so gallantly in their day. That would not be done by accepting the peaceful and philanthropic professions of Russia, as, by opening our eyes, we should see, under this garb of friendship, this mask of philanthropy, the hidden dangers which will, at no distant date, strike at the integrity of the British Empire. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. WILLIAM MAITLAND thought the discussion had travelled out of the Anglo-Indian aspect of the Eastern Question. As to the question of Russia taking Constantinople, he could not but endorse the opinions of Mr. Freeland in attaching great importance to what had been said by Mr. Cross the other day in the House of Commons. That speech was one of the wisest and most impartial contributions to the discussion of the Eastern Question, and it clearly laid down that if England was to interfere, it would only be in the protection of definite British interests. Mr. Cross also defined what those interests were in regard to Egypt, the Suez Canal, and Constantinople. He (the speaker)

was strongly of opinion that Russia would not touch Constantinople, for in spite of what had been said he could not believe that Germany or Austria would stand by and permit such a thing. Moreover, the general consensus of opinion would be in favour of the English Government interfering in such a contingency. (Hear, hear.)

Colonel RATHBORNE said he thought it right to explain that when he referred to Russia taking Constantinople, he did not mean to imply that she would hold it. That would never do, because she could be sealed up by the other Powers. He believed that Russia would take it and place the disposal of it before the European Powers in Conference.

Mr. WILLIAM MAITLAND, proceeding, said he was inclined to think that Russia would not attempt Constantinople, and if she did, it would constitute a reasonable ground of interference. He regretted that some gentleman with military experience had not given the meeting the advantage of his opinions of the progress of Russia in Asia Minor, as it was likely she would take Kars and Erzeroum, and march down the Valley of the Euphrates. At the same time, he thought there was an undue amount of fear as to Russia—a great deal of Russophobia. He had read Schuyler's and Burnaby's and other works, and from them he gathered that Russia had got her work to do in Central Asia, which was a poor country, and unsusceptible of adding to the revenue. He thought that with the embarrassment of holding sway over such a wide area, Russia had not the power to interfere with India. With these remarks he concluded, hoping that some military authority would speak as to the power of Russia on the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, and its possible effects.

MIRZA PEER BUKHSH regarded the declaration of war against Turkey as involving a religious question, and intended to drive the Mahomedans out of Europe. Some people supported Russia in this, saying, "The Mahomedans are bad; let them go." He, however, would point out that four centuries ago the Mahomedans settled in Europe, beginning with a handful of people, and they had progressed ever since. In India there were 60,000,000 of Mahomedans, and they felt for the Sultan of Turkey as their Caliph. Their Empress was Queen of England, and they felt, therefore, that the English Government was bound to consider the opinions and feelings of her 60,000,000 of loyal subjects in India. (Hear, hear.) Not that he was afraid Russia would do much harm; Turkey would be too tough a morsel for her stomach. (Laughter.) But Russia, in dealing with her own

people, was a thousand times worse than Turkey. Why did she not look after the condition of the Christians in her own country before going to preach reform in other people's houses? Turkey had shown a desire for reform in the Constitution recently promulgated, and had always been more liberal to other religions than Russia. The Greeks, the Jews, and the Roman Catholics in Constantinople were allowed liberty, and the soldiers even presented arms to their bishops. There was not that toleration in Russia, or even in Germany. In fact, the Turks were the best people in the world, and, all things considered, it would be to England's interest to assist Turkey against Russia. Russia's dream is to go to India, for Peter the Great said that the trade and commerce of the world turned upon India. England was dependent upon foreign lands for her supplies of food, and could not subsist on her own produce for three months. Hence she must prevent Russia getting power, and could not allow her to get Constantinople; because, if that were to come about, England would have to spend many millions in increasing her fleet. England's commerce was all over the world, and she must keep up her means of communication at any cost, and, therefore, she ought to help Turkey or check Russia for the sake of her own interests.

Mr. K. M. DUTT disagreed with the last speaker, and urged that there was abundant proof that Russia was more civilized than Turkey. (No.) Reviewing the late insurrection in the Herzegovina and Bosnia, the speaker called attention to the despatches sent by the British Government to Turkey, telling the Porte to stop the insurrection. But the Turks, with all their indomitable pluck, for which they were so much praised, were not able to suppress the rising. Then came the rising in Bulgaria, and the means taken to suppress it agitated the whole English nation.

The CHAIRMAN here reminded the speaker that the question before the meeting was the Anglo-Indian aspect of the Eastern Question.

Mr. DUTT, resuming, said the previous speaker had urged that England should spend blood and treasure because of the Mahomedans in India. He denied that there were more than 20,000,000 of Mahomedans—*Soonis*—in India who recognize the Sultan as their spiritual head, and of that number not a fourth took the slightest interest in the Eastern Question. The *Shias* did not care at all about it. Therefore, the Mahomedan consideration ought not to weigh with the English Government in going to war in support of Turkey, as that, in his opinion, would be the greatest crime England could commit.

Regarding the progress of Russia towards the south, he felt sure that the whole of Europe would unite to prevent her going so far as Constantinople. He could not see why these continuous attempts should be made to prevent Russia from becoming strong in the Mediterranean. France had her stations at Toulon and Cherbourg, but we did not stop her; and neither would we succeed in stopping Russia, because the principle was wrong.

Mr. R. AUERBACH said that, from his experience of the last few years, Russia had had no reason to complain of her power in the Black Sea, for the commerce there was carried on by Russians, and not by Turks. Russia, therefore, was clearly not checked by Turkey. On the broad principle of civilization and fertilizing the world, it was necessary that England's power should not be diminished, and, therefore, he thought it was quite legitimate to do our utmost to prevent Russia gaining preponderance in European affairs.

Mr. JOHN JONES desired to say a word with reference to what he had seen some years ago in the *Moscow Gazette*, in justification of Russia's action in Circassia, and taking possession of that part of what they called the Caucasian Isthmus. The journal in question pointed out the necessity for Russia taking possession of the whole length of the Isthmus lying between the Black Sea and the Caspian, for the purpose of anticipating any possible possession of that territory by any maritime Power; for, they argued, if any maritime Power takes possession of any part of that Isthmus, that Power, by establishing dockyards and arsenals on the Caspian, will be an immediate Gibraltar in threatening demonstration against our undivided and isolated possession of the Caspian, and will, therefore, put a limit to our proceedings in Central Asia. That view seemed to point to the policy of Russia in the present position of affairs; so that they may have, as a solution and end of the war, not Constantinople, but the whole Caucasian Isthmus, as a defence from all possible aggression on their western boundary. They describe this Isthmus as the Poland of their Asiatic territory. The position of Constantinople was really more serious to England, as, in the event of Russia obtaining control over it, she could tax the whole of our bread-supply. (Hear, hear.) Since we gave free trade in corn, a new vitality has been given to the Danubian Provinces, which would now sustain a disastrous check. Mr. Jones then concluded his remarks somewhat abruptly, owing to the wish of the meeting to bring the protracted discussion to a close.

The Rev. Mr. LONG having waived the right of reply,

The CHAIRMAN then rose, and observed that, although it was clear that all present did not agree with Mr. Long in the deductions he had made and the opinions he had expressed, they must all feel extremely indebted to him for the many interesting facts he had brought to notice, and the able exposition he had given of his views upon a very important subject. (Hear, hear.) One point upon which all would be in accord was the folly of the hand-to-mouth policy of England. Now, he was afraid that, whichever party was in power, our political motto would be "Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof;" and we seemed to be inclined to leave the future interests of England to the management of the generations yet to come. Had it not been for this tendency, in all probability this Eastern Question would have been settled long ago. But, whichever party held office, we neglected to insist upon the proper government of the Danubian Provinces, and the policy of masterly inactivity prevailed. The same policy ruled at one time in India, and was much lauded. Then there was a rebound, and it was thought essential to extend our influence in Afghanistan, and to cultivate intimate relations with Shere Ali, who was fêted and supplied with arms and money, for which we received no equivalent; and now our "faithful" ally was found to be wavering in order to get a larger bribe from another Power. In this respect Russia is wiser in her generation. She has a fixed policy, and she will pursue it to the end. When she is checked, she retires, but only with a view of preparing for another spring. In regard to India, he, many years ago, formed the opinion that our policy in India was a mistaken one, as he had always questioned the wisdom of interfering in dynastic disputes. The policy to which he alluded might secure us the good-will of the ruler for the time being, but, on the other hand, it might alienate the good-will of the people. Had we contented ourselves with a policy of non-interference in political questions, and turned our attention more to the negotiation of commercial treaties in which we could have secured a reasonable *quid pro quo*, it would have been much better, as, in the course of years, we should have acquired an influence over surrounding States which would have been more permanent than our present power, because it would have been based on the good feelings of the people. Commercial intercourse is sure to be succeeded by political influence. Referring to the remarks contained in his paper, the Chairman expressed an opinion that Mr. Long had been hardly fair to England in some of his allusions.

Mr. LONG: I gave the Native view—not my own.

The CHAIRMAN, resuming, said he believed one reason why Eng-

land took such deep interest in the Eastern Question was because it involved the welfare and prosperity of our Indian subjects; as it was only since India had been more closely connected with England that the public had evinced so much interest in the Eastern Question. Thirty or forty years ago we hardly thought about it. As regarded the military question, in reply to Mr. Maitland, he could only say that it was difficult to give an opinion without knowing the views or intentions of Russia. But this much was clear to him as a soldier: the nearer Russia got to India, the nearer would be her base of operations, and the more India would be threatened. Still, he did not think India would be invaded by a Russian force in his time, and, as indicative of his opinions, he would venture to quote the following from a paper written by himself some ten years ago: "As regards our North-western frontier, so long as we are bounded "by States which, although not actually hostile, have no special "interest in cultivating friendly relations with us, it will be re- "quisite for our protection from foreign inroads to station a large "military force along the border; for, although there is, perhaps, little "probability of Russia marching a regular army through the passes of "Afghanistan for the invasion of India, yet, in the event of complica- "tions arising in Europe, the astute diplomatists at St. Petersburg "would not fail to operate upon our weak point, and to incite the "several warlike border tribes to make forays into our territories; "whilst among our own subjects in every quarter intrigues would be "set afoot to cause dissatisfaction, and, whenever opportunity offered, "open rebellion. For this, so long as Russia maintains her present "influence over the Court of Persia, the means will never be wanting. "These means were used in the Indian Mutiny, and in great "measure led to that outbreak. (Hear, hear.) The Persian War "and the Indian Mutiny followed close upon the invasion of the "Crimea. Fortunately for us, there was a slight interval; but this "may not be the case a second time. With all our desire to rule "justly, and to advance the welfare of our subjects, amongst the "heterogeneous masses over whom we hold dominion, a clever intriguer, "by misrepresenting our intentions, may always contrive, on one point "or another, to create suspicion and dissatisfaction. It is from outside "action alone that there is any real danger." One other point raised in the discussion was the feelings of the Mahomedans of India towards the Sultan of Turkey. His opinion, formed after rather long experience, was that the Natives of India, who were Sunnis, did recognize the Sultan as the head of their sect. It was true that, as a rule, they might have a very vague and indistinct idea with regard to the position and power

of the Sultan; still the notion prevailed that he was the defender of their faith. In closing his remarks, the Chairman moved a vote of thanks to the Rev. Mr. Long for his able address. This having been carried, on the motion of Mr. Freeland, the thanks of the meeting were awarded to General Cavenagh for presiding; and the sitting then terminated.

Annual Meeting, July 4, 1877.

THE Annual Meeting of the East India Association was held on July 4, at the Rooms of the Association, 20, Great George Street, Westminster.

Colonel A. B. Rathborne occupied the chair, and amongst those present were Lieut.-General Sir George Malcolm, K.C.B., Major-General Sir G. Le Grand Jacob, K.C.S.I., Lieut.-General Orfeur Cavenagh, Lieut.-Colonel P. T. French, Rev. James Long, Captain W. C. Palmer (Hon. Secretary), Mr. Alexander Burrell, &c., &c.

Captain W. C. PALMER (Hon. Secretary of the Association) submitted the Annual Report of the Council, which will be found on page 275.

The CHAIRMAN said the meeting would observe that the Report was not a very voluminous one, but if the work of the year had not been very great the statement would show that a good deal of quiet work had been done. The Association had now been in existence ten years, which was not a very long time to look back, but he thought they had made their mark on the policy of the Government of India. At any rate, they had always found the Government very ready to receive any suggestions which the Association might make; and if it was true that the Association had not always been successful in its applications to the Secretary of State, there were certainly marked signs that its representations had not been without effect. It was much to be regretted that the Princes and Chiefs of India did not fully understand and support the Association, as it was of great importance to the Natives of India that there should be an organization of this kind in London, to support the Native views and wants. He thought there were many of the Native grievances—grievances which they felt very deeply, and which they could find no means of getting remedied—which would obtain speedy redress if they were put before the British

public and Parliament by means of such an organization as the East India Association. (Hear, hear.)

Major-General Sir G. LE GRAND JACOB, in moving the adoption of the Report, said he must confess that he could not but join with the Chairman in expressing regret that the Association was not more fully supported by the wealthier classes of India. He thought this neglect must proceed partly from the Oriental apathy which is proverbial, and partly from the fear that their support might be construed into an action hostile to the Government; and another reason might be that the Natives fancy that the Association did not sufficiently regard private grievances. The rule of the Association was to take up only matters affecting "the public interests." For all these reasons, and for the general reason that it was impossible to please everybody, the Association did not get the Native support which it deserved. He had hoped to have heard it stated in the Report what results had followed Mr. Eastwick's journey to India, and whether he had succeeded in interesting the leading men in India in the work of the Association. He was afraid there was a general feeling amongst the leading official authorities of India that this Association is too Radical, and too much given to interfere with the due course of Government, and, therefore, that it should be rather stamped out than patronized; but this is so mistaken a view of the objects and aim of the Association, that all its members and friends should spare no pains to dissipate it from the minds of any of the Indian officials with whom they might be brought into contact at any time. Indian officials should be assured that there was no intention whatever to put a barrel of gunpowder under them; but, on the contrary, the Association were anxious to support the authorities in India in sustaining the real interests of the country and people. (Hear, hear.) As to the remarks in the Report of the Council on the Eastern Question, he very much regretted that his ill health prevented his attendance at the meeting on the subject, as it was a matter which he had studied for many years past; and he had taken up views upon it which were very much opposed to what appeared to be the views of the Association as represented in the report which appeared in the *Times*. That report conveyed the impression that the Association, while nominally neutral, on the whole supported, what seemed to him, the greatly mistaken policy of Mr. Gladstone. He looked upon Mr. Gladstone as labouring under a sort of monomania on the subject, as he had become utterly incapable of seeing anything that was opposed to his own views. He dwells on what wrongs Turkey has committed, just as if no effort whatever had been made by the Turks to reform themselves. He speaks of

them as if two Sultans in succession had not been swept away; as if, in spite of overwhelming difficulties, they had not succeeded in enforcing the reign of law, and establishing an equality of Christian and Turk before the law; as if a Parliament had not been assembled wherein debates occurred, and which seemed to conduct itself with propriety—as if all these things were non-existing; and he dwells only on what had been done in the past. Why, the common sense of English fair play should lead us to say, "Let us see what they will do." But just at the moment when they are doing their best to reform, then Russia comes in with her bear's paw to crush Turkey; and Mr. Gladstone and his following support the attack, ignoring all the past history of Russia, and simply actuated by the single and fanatical idea that because Turkey has done wrong she must go down, and British interests be disregarded; the Dardanelles may be opened, and Russian fleets may sweep the Mediterranean, so long as the Bulgarian massacres are avenged.

Lieut.-General Sir GEORGE MALCOLM, K.C.B., seconded the motion for the adoption of the Report, which was agreed to *nem. con.*

The CHAIRMAN proposed, "That the Right Hon. Sir Laurence Peel be re-elected President for the ensuing year."

Lieut.-Colonel P. T. FRENCH seconded this, and it was adopted *nem. con.*

Lieut.-Colonel P. T. FRENCH then moved, "That the following "gentlemen be re-elected Members of the Council: Lieut.-General "Cavenagh, Sir Mootoo Coomara Swamy, W. Dent, Esq., Dadabhai "Naoroji, Esq., R. H. Elliot, Esq., Dadabhoy Byramjee, Esq., G. Foggo, "Esq., Rev. J. Long, and Major-General Marriott, C.S.I."

Mr. A. BURRELL seconded this, and it was adopted; and this closed the formal part of the proceedings.

Mr. A. BURRELL said that, as the youngest member of the East India Association, and an outsider, he begged to be permitted to say a few words. It seemed to him that the great Indian problem is its teeming population, and the earnest efforts of the Association and of all other friends of India should be devoted to inducing the capital of the home country to find its way to India, where it was wanted, and where it could be most remuneratively engaged. In a letter from Sir James Sinclair, M.P., in the *Times* of that day, the appalling doctrine was set up, that the rule of the British in India, so far from having been a benefit to the country, had been a profound calamity, because the British Government imposed

peace on the great peninsula, and as a consequence the population was increasing beyond the means of the country; whereas, in the olden days, the frequent wars, droughts, and unrelieved famines kept the population down. But what he wished to know was, why cultivation and manufacturing industries should not be encouraged in India. Something had, indeed, been done in that direction, by the cultivation of cotton, tea, cinchona, coffee, and some other products, and with the most satisfactory results; and his main object in rising on the present occasion was to urge that more attention should be given to the culture of wheat in India. He had some of the best authorities on his side in making the statement, that the quality of wheat raised in India was exactly what was required in the English market. The last home crop was an imperfect one, and the Indian wheat which came to hand proved admirably suitable for mixing with the English wheat; and any quantity of it could have been sold at the top prices. The Government had, indeed, done something to encourage the growth of cereals and other products by the construction of railways, but much more remained to be done in this and other directions. The facts were very simple. In England wheat is wanted; in the Punjaub so plentiful is it that the Natives even regard a great crop in the light of a misfortune. Look what had occurred in the cultivation of tea. The English had created a large industry in the growth of tea, and the result had been of enormous advantage to the Natives. In urging the Association to give sedulous attention to the encouragement of commercial enterprise in India, as the most prominent mode of securing the moral and material improvement of the people, the speaker said the true solution of the Indian problem was to bring English capital into harmonious co-operation with the cheap labour of India. He held in his hand a copy of the "Commercial "Reports by Her Majesty's Consuls in China," which gave force to the remarks he had just made. There was a time, not long ago, when England was entirely supplied with tea from China, but the export of tea from India during the last fifteen years had been something marvellous in the rapid and constant expansion. Consul Medhurst says: "Fifteen years ago, the growth of tea in India was regarded in the light "of an experiment rather than as a movement destined in a short time "to furnish one of the main staples of the country's exports. Much "less was it anticipated, when the first plantations under European "management were laid down in Assam, that the competition of the "Indian would affect the development of the China leaf; but such has "been the case. From 1,300,000 lbs. in 1861, the export from Calcutta "has advanced to 25,000,000 lbs. in 1875 (and probably will be "40,000,000 lbs. in 1877). When we consider that fifteen years ago

"China held the monopoly of tea production, these figures show not "only what a formidable rival Indian tea has become already, but they "almost lead one to fear that if no change in the mode of cultivation "or packing takes place, it is only a question of time when China will "be ousted from the field altogether. The statistics relative to Indian "teas also show us that the consumption in Great Britain during the "last four months of 1875 exceeded the whole quantity imported in "1868. It is an ominous fact for China tea that, whereas up to last "year the increased demand for tea in Great Britain was shared by "China and India equally, last year the consumption of China tea was "for the first time stationary; the whole of the increase going to the "credit of India." Further on the Consul says: "We have to look to "India for the perfection of tea culture. There planting, picking, and "firing are all in one hand, and the needful capital outlay to produce a "good result is not spared. In China these desiderata are absent alto-"gether, and the proceeds are in the primitive and unscientific style "dear to the natives of this country. Nothing, it may safely be ad-"vanced, but the introduction of European capital and enterprise into "the tea districts will save the foreign trade of this country from "decay." In the history of the growth of tea cultivation in India, they might read a lesson on the proper mode of advancing the public interests of India.

General Sir G. LE GRAND JACOB, interposing, said: But you ought to point out how you wish to make all these remarks applicable to this Association.

Mr. BURRELL said he was suggesting that the Association should leave the region of *tante politique*, and take up such questions as those of which he was speaking; and by advancing the commercial prosperity of India, raise the morals of the people by the same act.

The CHAIRMAN said he thought it right to say that Mr. Burrell was evidently labouring under a mistake as to the scope of the work of the Association. As its title stated, it was "insti-"tuted for the independent and disinterested advocacy and pro-"motion by all legitimate means of the public interests and wel-"fare of the inhabitants of India generally," and if Mr. Burrell had not been a very new member of the Association, he would have been aware that economical questions of the kind to which he referred were very frequently and very fully taken up by the Association, and that what had been styled "high politics" was not held to be their field. Two years ago, he (the Chairman) read a paper to the Association on

the subject of Land and its Tenure in India—a matter which was the very foundation of agricultural prosperity; and he then urged the same arguments as the last speaker in favour of the introduction of English capital into India. He mentioned this to show that debates on such matters were common and customary with the Association. The Association was not a political society; politics were absolutely excluded from its professed sphere; and this might be gathered from the fact that the Council were men of the most diverse politics. Sir Le Grand Jacob had, indeed, made some observations on the present occasion which doubtless entered the field of politics; but that gallant soldier-administrator was held in such affection and exceptional veneration, not only by his friends in the East India Association, but by all the outside world who knew him, that the Chairman might well be excused in allowing him such latitude, especially when that Chairman himself, no longer young, had been the junior officer of the venerable speaker in the days gone by. (Hear, hear.) As regarded the exportation of Indian wheat, he might mention that, twenty years before, Sir Charles Napier brought the question forward, when he (the Chairman) was Collector in Scinde. The difficulty then was the very heavy freight and transport charges, as the matters stood at that time; otherwise there was no doubt even then that Indian wheat would have been introduced into the London market in the same way as those other products to which Mr. Burrell had referred. Twenty years ago no tea was exported from India; now it is superseding the tea of China. However, he would not further dwell on the subject, as he had simply risen to assure the speaker who had just sat down that, so far as the East India Association was concerned, there was no doubt that every question of this kind received full attention, and was dealt with at the hands of gentlemen fully competent to take it up, and whose papers were always welcome and fruitful of interesting discussion.

On the motion of Lieut.-General CAVENAGH, a vote of thanks was accorded to the Chairman, and by him briefly acknowledged.

This terminated the proceedings.

ANNUAL REPORT, 1876-7.

Your Council beg to submit their Report for the past year, 1876-7, from which it will be seen that they have continued to carry out the objects for which the Association was instituted—viz., the independent and disinterested advocacy and promotion of the public interests and welfare of the inhabitants of India.

PROPOSED INDIAN MUSEUM.

In the last Report the Council mentioned having presented a Memorial to the Prime Minister, praying that Her Majesty's Government would take into consideration the proposal to erect an Indian Museum on the site of the old Fife House, on the Thames Embankment, and give the necessary assistance for carrying it out.

A copy of this Memorial was sent to the Secretary of State for India, with the expression of a hope that he would endeavour to aid in securing the establishment of the Indian Museum on the proposed site.

Since then upwards of fifty Memorials have been sent to Her Majesty's Government, from the Chambers of Commerce, cities, towns, and important associations in the United Kingdom, all urging that England should aid the Colonies and India in securing the proposed Museum in a central position in London, and advocating the proposed site on the Thames Embankment as the one that would best satisfy all the required conditions. In every instance the Memorialists expressed the opinion that England should share in an expenditure which hitherto has fallen exclusively on India. After this expression of opinion favourable to the scheme, the Council saw with anxiety a statement in an important daily paper, on apparently official authority, to the effect that the project might be considered dead in so far as the co-operation of the Indian Government was concerned; and they again addressed Lord Salisbury on the subject, and pointed out the great interest which the proposal had evoked throughout the Colonies, and that as regards the Indian portion, a strong feeling existed that, on both commercial and general grounds, it was for the interest of the people of India that the Museum should be transferred to the position where it would be most accessible to all classes; and the Council ventured to express a hope that it would be possible for his lordship to see a way for promoting the accomplishment of such a desirable object.

In the reply from Lord Salisbury it was stated that in the present state of the Indian finances it was impossible for the Government of India alone to carry out such a scheme, and that the Lords of the Treasury do not see any prospect of being able at present to afford any assistance by a grant from Imperial revenues.

It is hoped that when the state of the finances improves the scheme will be taken up and carried out. Your Council will keep a watchful eye on the subject.

BOMBAY REVENUE JURISDICTION ACT.

In a previous report mention was made of the Council having addressed Memorials to the Secretary of State for India and to the Viceroy on the subject of the Bill introduced into the Legislative Council of India to limit the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in the Bombay Presidency in matters relating to land revenue. The Council considered that the Bill was calculated to create general dissatisfaction, as it would take away the power of appeal to the Civil Courts in cases of land revenue, and thus the injured parties would be shut out from all chance of redress from an independent tribunal. The object of the Memorial was to prevent the withdrawal of the right of appeal against the acts of Government officers in India.

The inhabitants of Bombay also presented Memorials to the Viceroy protesting against the measure, which was criticized and condemned, more or less severely, by every newspaper in the Bombay Presidency, and by many other journals in different parts of India.

The Bombay Branch of the Association memorialized Lord Lytton, the Governor-General of India, stating that they have witnessed with regret and alarm the passing of the Bill, that it had been passed in spite of repeated protests from the people, and they asked that the weighty reasons against the measure put forward by the local authorities might be printed in the official *Gazette*.

A Memorial adopted at a public meeting of the inhabitants of Bombay has also been forwarded to the Marquis of Salisbury, in which they submit that the Act is opposed to the fundamental principles of political justice and natural equity, and is calculated to weaken in the people of India that confidence in the moderation and fair-dealing of the rulers which is prized above all other bonds by the greatest statesmen.

On the 28th June, last year, a meeting of the Association was held, at which Mr. Tayler, in an able paper, reviewed the objections that had been raised to the Bill, and pointed out how general was the protest raised against it, and the meeting endorsed Mr. Tayler's views.

Notwithstanding the opposition to the Bill, it was passed by the Legislative Council.

A Memorial (copy of which is inserted in the Appendix) was again presented to the Secretary of State by the Council, begging him to disallow the Bill.

INDIAN FAMINES.

For the third time within the last twelve years a severe famine has been stalking through the length and breadth of large provinces in India, and compelling populations as large as those of the United Kingdom to demand extraordinary assistance from Government. This has had the anxious consideration of the Council. Two public meetings have been held, at which papers were read and discussion followed, with a view of eliciting suggestions for the amelioration of the condition of the Natives, and of lessening the ill effects of such visitations in future.

The first paper was written by Mr. R. H. Elliot, on "The Indian "Problem and Indian Famines."

The second paper was by Mr. J. B. Phear, late Judge of the High Court of Calcutta, on "The Indian Famines and Indian Organization."

Many important opinions were expressed at those meetings, for which the Council would refer their members to the full reports inserted in the Journal; and the Council would only here refer to the point which was brought out very clearly—viz., the harm that has accrued from destroying the ancient forms of self-government among the Natives which were found in existence, and substituting a centralized bureaucratic government.

INDIAN IMPORT DUTY ON COTTON GOODS.

Communications have been addressed to the Council expressing the great anxiety which exists in the minds of a large number of the Natives of India in respect to the endeavours which are being made by a very influential body in England to obtain from the Government the abolition, at the earliest possible period, of the five per cent. *ad valorem* duty now levied in India on the importation of cotton goods. This duty realizes a sum of about 800,000*l.* a year. The Natives strongly object to the selection for abolition of a duty which is in itself a fair one, and represents all that is contributed to the Indian Exchequer by the English exporters thither of goods to the value of 16,000,000*l.* sterling per annum, and which, if abolished, would necessitate the simultaneous imposition of new taxes of equal amount upon the already heavily taxed people of India. To strip the matter of all confusing phraseology, it would be simply to take from the people of India

800,000*l.* sterling per annum in addition to what they already pay, in order to increase to that extent the profits on their Indian trade of the cotton manufacturers of Manchester. The Council have, therefore, presented a Memorial on the subject to the Secretary of State, pointing out the objections to the withdrawal of the duty, and suggesting that before coming to any final decision the Government should institute a full and searching inquiry into the whole subject, and appoint a Commission to take evidence from the Natives of India, as well as from representatives of the great Manchester houses in India, the result of which would be a mass of information which would enable the Secretary of State to arrive at a conclusion beyond the reach of cavil or question on either side.

The Memorial is inserted in the Appendix.

THE EASTERN QUESTION.

The momentous events occurring in the East consequent on the war between Russia and Turkey have been watched by the Association; and the opportunity of public opinion being occupied with the subject was taken advantage of for having a paper read on "The Eastern Question "in its Anglo-Indian Aspect." This was undertaken by the Rev. James Long, and a very interesting discussion followed, in which the Chairman, General Orfeur Cavenagh, Sir Charles Trevelyan, General Alexander, Col. Rathborne, Mr. Freeland, and several Native gentlemen took part.

ADDRESS TO THE PRINCES OF INDIA.

In the autumn of last year the Chairman of the Council (Mr. Eastwick) announced his intention of again proceeding to India, and the Council availed themselves of his offer to bring to the notice of the Princes and people of India the desirability of liberally supporting the Association, and they considered it a favourable opportunity to issue an Address, inviting them to contribute towards the funds, and thereby increase the efficiency of the Association, and enable it the better to promote the interests and welfare of the people of India; for it should be remembered that such an association in this country, whatever the object, whether political, social, or religious, can only carry on their work efficiently if supplied with the funds necessary for the purpose. The sums subscribed for these objects in the United Kingdom throughout the year are enormous, and the Council cannot but express their regret that the example is not more largely followed by those who have such immense interests at stake, the Native Princes and people of India. A copy of the Address is given in the Appendix.

REMOVAL OF OFFICE.

The Council last year reported that they had received a notice under the "Public Offices Act" from the Office of Works that their Office would be required for the site of the new Public Offices, which are to extend from the new Public Offices to and include all the north side of Great George Street, and from Parliament Street, west side, to the Park. No further notice has, up to date, been received; but it is probable that the Council will have to look out for new offices as soon as the Government plans are definitely fixed.

PAPERS IN JOURNAL.

The Council have published the following Papers in the Journal:—

"The Poverty of India." Part III. A Paper read by Mr. DADABHAI NAOROJI, before the Bombay Branch of the Association.

"The Depreciation of Silver." A Paper read by Colonel A. B. RATHBORNE; with Discussion.

"The Poverty of India." Part IV.

"The Indian Problem and Indian Famines." A Paper read by Mr. ROBERT H. ELLIOT; with Discussion.

"The Indian Famines and Village Organization." A Paper read by Mr. J. B. PHEAR; with Discussion.

"The Eastern Question in its Anglo-Indian Aspect." A Paper read by the Rev. J. LONG; with Discussion.

The Council hope, during the next session, to take up various questions affecting the interests of India, and amongst them they would mention the subject of "The Indian Ryots and Irrigation," on which Miss Florence Nightingale has kindly promised a paper. Papers are also promised on the subject of "The Position of the Native Princes in "India," "The State of Affairs in Afghanistan," "The Native Army "in India," and "The Position and Prospects of the East Indian Com- "munity."

Eleven gentlemen have been elected Members of the Association since the last meeting.

The following Members of the Council retire by rotation, and the Council recommend their re-election: Lieut.-General Orfeur Cavenagh, Sir Mootoo Coomara Swamy, William Dent, Esq., Dadabhai Naoroji, Esq., Robert H. Elliot, Esq., Dadabhoy Byramjee, Esq., George Foggo, Esq., Rev. James Long, Major-General W. F. Marriott, C.S.I.

PUBLICATIONS.

The Council tender their best thanks to the Proprietors of the following Papers, who present copies for the use of the Reading-room, where they may be daily read by members of the Association :—

The Aligurh Gazette	Aligurh.
„ *Native Opinion*	Bombay.
„ *Times of India*	„
„ *Argus*	„
„ *Bengalee*	Calcutta.
„ *Friend of India and Statesman*	„
„ *Hindu Patriot*	„
„ *Indian Daily News*	„
„ *Leader*	„
„ *Madras Athenæum and Daily News*	Madras.
„ *Madras Times*	„
„ *Native Public Opinion*	„
„ *Indian Public Opinion*	Lahore.
„ *Nafa-ul-Azim*	„
„ *Examiner*	London.
„ *Journal of the Society of Arts*	„
„ *Doctor*	„
„ *Journal of the National India Association*	„

Their best thanks are also due to the Council of India for continuing to supply them with Parliamentary Returns and other important papers relating to India, copies of which are placed on the table of the Reading-room, where they are constantly referred to; other copies are sent to Bombay for the use of the Branch there.

ACCOUNTS.

The Accounts for the year have been audited, and will be found in the Appendix.

GENERAL ABSTRACT OF ACCOUNTS OF THE EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION.

CASH ACCOUNT, from May 1, 1876, to April 30, 1877.

DR. *RECEIPTS.*	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
1876.		
May 1.—To BALANCE at Bankers	177 2 5	
„ in hand	7 8 3	—184 10 8
1877.		
April 30.—To Subscriptions received in London	151 7 11	
To Advertisements in the Journal	25 4 9	
To Interest on Investments in London ..	36 17 4	
„ „ „ in India	384 15 2	
To Sundry Receipts.....	4 9 6	—602 14 8
		£787 5 4

EXPENDITURE. *CR.*	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
1877.		
April 30.—By Rent of Offices, Coal, Gas, &c.	189 3 9	
Salaries	286 6 8	
Printing Journals, &c.	160 13 3	
Books and Newspapers.....	29 0 7	
Stationery and Postage	32 11 4	
Expenses of Lectures, Advertising, &c.	34 10 0	
Freight on Publications sent to India ..	6 14 6	—739 0 1
BALANCE at Bankers	46 9 10	
„ in hand	1 15 5	— 48 5 5
		£787 5 4

BALANCE SHEET, April 30, 1877.

ASSETS.	£ s. d.
Investments in England: Rs. 10,900 in 4 per Cent. Loan of 1865..	1,044 4 5
Furniture and Fixtures, London.....	180 0 0
Library	106 7 0
Balance of Bank and Cash Account.....	48 5 3
	£1,378 16 8

LIABILITIES.	£ s. d.
General Fund Balance carried forward.....	£1,378 16 8

Examined with Ledger and Vouchers, and found correct.

30, Great George Street, Westminster, S.W.,
June 27, 1877.

A. B. RATHBORNE,
J. LONG,
} *Auditors.*

W. C. PALMER, *Hon. Secretary.*

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF SUBSCRIBERS

Who have Paid their Subscriptions from May 1, 1876, to April 30, 1877.

	For		£	s.	d.
George Appleton, Esq.	1877	.....	1	5	0
C. W. Arathoon, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
Rudolph Auerbach, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
Lieut.-General Sir George Balfour, K.C.B., M.P.	„	.....	1	5	0
Colonel W. A. M. Barnard	„	.....	1	5	0
M. T. Bass, Esq., M.P.	„	.....	1	5	0
S. C. Bayley, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
J. David Bell, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
Major-General James Black	1875-76	.....	2	10	0
Colonel J. A. Brereton	1877	.....	1	5	0
Peer Bukhsh, Esq.	1875-76	.....	2	10	0
Alexander Burn, Esq., M.D. (the late)	1877	.....	1	5	0
Major-General G. Burn	„	.....	1	5	0
Dadabhoy Byramjee, Esq.	Bal. Life Sub.	.....	10	0	0
Miss Mary Carpenter (the late)	1876	.....	1	5	0
Lieut.-General Orfeur Cavenagh	1876-77	.....	2	10	0
Lord F. C. Cavendish, M.P.	1874-76	.....	3	15	0
P. C. Rajaviah Chetty, Esq.	1877	.....	1	5	0
Sir T. E. Colebrooke, Bart., M.P.	„	.....	1	1	0
J. J. Coleman, Esq., M.P.	„	.....	1	5	0
John Corbett, Esq., M.P.	1876-77	.....	2	10	0
General Sir Arthur Cotton, K.C.S.I.	1877	.....	1	5	0
Major-General F. C. Cotton, C.S.I.	„	.....	1	5	0
J. C. Currey, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
A. Cursetjee, Esq.	1876	.....	1	5	0
Juland Danvers, Esq.	1877	.....	1	5	0
Emerson Dawson, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
William Dent, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
John Dickinson, Esq. (the late)	1876	.....	1	5	0
S. S. Dickinson, Esq.	1877	.....	1	5	0
Robert H. Elliot, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
Lord Eslington	1874-76	.....	3	15	0
Colonel W. E. Evans	1877	.....	1	5	0
Major-General Sir Vincent Eyre, K.C.S.I., C.B.	„	.....	1	5	0
C. Forjett, Esq.	1876	.....	1	5	0
H. W. Freeland, Esq.	1877	.....	1	5	0
Colonel P. T. French	„	.....	1	5	0
Colonel W. A. Fyers	„	.....	1	5	0
S. Grove Grady, Esq.	1876	.....	1	5	0
Dr. A. Graham	„	.....	1	5	0
Right Hon. Lord R. de A. Grosvenor, M.P.	1877	.....	1	5	0
Sir Robert Hamilton, Bart., K.C.B.	„	.....	1	5	0
Colonel Edward Hemery	„	.....	1	5	0
H. R. Henderson, Esq.	1876	.....	1	5	0
T. F. Henley, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
J. N. Higinbotham, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
James F. Hore, Esq.	1877	.....	1	5	0
H. R. Hutchins, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0

	For		£	s.	d.
Major-General Sir G. Le Grand Jacob, K.C.S.I., C.B.	1877	.....	1	5	0
Charles Jay, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
H. A. M. Butler Johnstone, Esq., M.P.	„	.....	1	5	0
John Jones, Esq.	1876	.....	1	5	0
Henry Kimber, Esq.	1877	.....	1	5	0
J. Stuart Laurie, Esq.	1875-76	.....	2	10	0
Colonel W. Nassau Lees	1872-76	.....	6	0	0
Lieut.-General Sir John Low, K.C.B.	1877	.....	1	0	0
S. P. Low, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
Hon. C. J. Lyttelton	„	.....	1	5	0
John Macdonald, Esq.	1876-77	.....	2	10	0
Major-General C. Mackenzie	1877	.....	1	5	0
Lieut.-General Sir George Malcolm, K.C.B.	„	.....	1	5	0
William Markby, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
Major-General W. F. Marriott, C.S.I.	„	.....	1	5	0
Hugh Mason, Esq.	1876	.....	1	5	0
Francis Mathew, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
James Matthews, Esq.	1877	.....	1	5	0
Joseph O'Dwyer, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
T. G. A. Palmer, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
Captain W. C. Palmer	„	.....	1	5	0
J. C. Parry, Esq.	1876	.....	1	5	0
John Pender, Esq., M.P.	„	.....	1	5	0
Colonel A. Phelps	1877	.....	1	5	0
Colonel A. B. Rathborne	„	.....	1	5	0
Major-General W. Richardson, C.B.	„	.....	1	5	0
Right Hon. the Marquis of Salisbury	„	.....	1	0	0
R. D. Sassoon, Esq.	1876	.....	1	5	0
Major-General E. W. S. Scott	1877	.....	1	5	0
Walter Severn, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
H. Danby Seymour, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
Major-General Robert Shaw	1875-76	.....	0	10	0
H. R. Shroff, Esq.	„	.....	2	10	0
D. H. Small, Esq., M.D.	„	.....	2	0	0
St. John Stephen, Esq.	1877	.....	1	5	0
Colonel T. Stock	1876	.....	1	5	0
Field-Marshal Right Hon. Lord Strathnairn	1877	.....	1	5	0
David Sutherland, Esq.	1876	.....	1	5	0
Gannendro M. Tagore, Esq.	1877	.....	1	5	0
Thomas Taylor, Esq.	„	.....	1	5	0
W. Thom, Esq.	1876	.....	1	5	0
Sir Charles Trevelyan, Bart., K.C.B.	1877	.....	1	5	0
George Turnbull, Esq.	1874-76	.....	3	15	0
Lieut.-Colonel F. Tyrrell	1877	.....	1	5	0
S. Venkatavraniengar, Esq.	1876	.....	1	1	11
Sir David Wedderburn, Bart.	1877	.....	1	5	0
F. H. Westmacott, Esq.	1876	.....	1	5	0
J. P. Wise, Esq.	1875-76	.....	2	10	0
James T. Wood, Esq.	1877	.....	1	5	0
			£151	7	11

LIST OF LIFE MEMBERS.

Maneckjee Aderjee, Esq. (1869).
Veheridas Adjubhai, Esq.
W. P. Andrew, Esq. (1868).
Maharajah S. C. R. Bahadoor
Dr. Rustomjee Cawasjee Buhadoorjee.
Sorabjee Shapoorjee Bangalee.
Limjee Jamsetjee Batleeboye (1873).
H.H. Shree Bawajee.
Mirza Abbas Bey, Esq. (1873).
Laxuman Dajie Bevelkar, Esq. (1869).
H.H. the Tahore of Bhownuggur.
Ruttonjee Bomanjee, Esq.
Alexander Brown, Esq. (1870).
Nanabhoy Burjonjee (1868).
Dadabhoy Byramjee, Esq. (1874).
D. F. Cama, Esq.
D. H. Cama, Esq.
D. P. Cama, Esq. (1867).
K. R. Cama, Esq.
P. H. Cama, Esq.
P. R. Cama, Esq. (1870).
A. H. Campbell, Esq. (1866).
Dr. Ananta Chandroba.
John Cleary, Esq.
P. R. Cola, Esq. (1866).
J. G. Coleman, Esq. (1867).
Dhaejee Cosinathjee, Esq.
George Crawshay, Esq. (1870).
Manackjee Cursetjee, Esq.
Anundross Custoorchund, Esq.
M. C. Damanvala, Esq.
Dhunjeebhoy J. Dashay, Esq.
Mathra Dass, Esq.
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Walter Wren, Esq. (1873).
Khan Bahadoor Yusif Ali (1873).

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Ruttonjee Kessowjee Kothari, Bhooj.
Rajgar Lalji Ladhaji, Bhooj.
Dr. Dorabjee Hormusjee, G.G.M.C., Bhooj.
Mehta Rowjee Herachund, Bhooj.
Thaker Govindjee Dhurumsey, Bhooj.
Rustomjee Mervanjee and Sons, Bhooj.
Peer Lutfulla Rahimdeen, Bhooj.
Ishvurlal Ochowram, Officiating Dewan, Bhooj.
Jala Jalamsing, Bhooj.
Mehta Valabhjee Ladha, Bhooj.
Nurbheram Hurjeevun, Bhooj.
Nazir Mirza Meeya, Bhooj.
Goorjee Jeraj, Bhooj.
Savai Gooroojee, Bhooj.
Anundjee Vishram, Bhooj.
Thaker Karsandass Naranjee, Anjar, Bhooj.
Veerbhadra Poonjaji of Kunthkote, Anjar, Bhooj.
Jeram Shivjee, Moondra, Bhooj.
Thaker Kalianjee Pitamber, Bhooj.
Utamram Nurbheram, Rajkote.
Nagindass Brijbhookhundass, Rajkote.
Bai Kumribai of Bilkha, Rajkote.
Anundlal Hurridass, Karbhari of Bilkha, Rajkote.
Cooverjee Coyajee, Rajkote.
Dhunjeeshaw Hormusjee Karaka, Rajkote.
Rao Saheb Gopaljee Soorbhoy, Rajkote.
Jagannath Itcharam, Rajkote.
Desai Chagan Bhaichund, Bhownuggur.
Chaganlal Suntokeram, Bhownuggur.
Bhaichund Shamjee, Bhownuggur.
Jaeyatilal Venilal, Bhownuggur.
Jeevunbhoy Nanabhoy, Bhownuggur.
Purbhashankar Gowrishunkar, Bhownuggur.

Vajyashankar Gowrishunkar, Bhownuggur.
Vithaldass Samuldass, Bhownuggur.
Walla Sooraj Gunga, Shareholder of Judpore, Judpore.
Walla Wallera Jussa, ditto, Judpore.
Walla Gorkha Meraim, ditto, Judpore.
Walla Jiva Gunga, ditto, Judpore.
Kessowlal Bhugvanlal, Karbhari, Walla, Judpore.
Narayen Dullubhji, Chief Karbhari of Wudvan, Wudvan.
H.H. the Thacore of Chitore, Chitore.
Bhanjee Kessowjee, Karbhari of Chitore Chitore.
Nursingprasad Hurryprasad, Joonagudh.
Nyalchund Roopshunker, Joonagudh.
Dewanjee Saheb Luscmishankar Bhai, Joonagudh.
Nanamya Saheb of Ahmedabad, Joonagudh.
Kohelina Mahaji Saheb, Joonagudh.
Bowdeen Meeya, Joonagudh.
Dewan Goculjee Sumputram Jahala, Joonagudh.
Jamadar Sale Hindee, Joonagudh.
H.H. Bahadoorkhanjee, Heir-Apparent to the Nawab of Joonagudh, Joonagudh.
H.H. Mohbatkhanjee, Nawab of Joonagudh, Joonagudh.

LIFE MEMBERS IN BOMBAY.

Dr. Anunta Chandropa, Bombay.
Cursetjee Jehangheer Tarachund, Bombay.
Edaljee Rustomjee Soonawalla, Bombay.
Kashinath Trimbak Telang, Bombay.
The Hon. Justice Nanabhoy Hurridass, Bombay.
The Hon. Rao Saheb Vishvanath Narayan Mandlik, Bombay.
Pestonjee Byrawjee Kotewal, Kurrachee.

APPENDIX A.

To THE MOST HONOURABLE THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY, &c.,
Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India in Council.

The Memorial of the Council of the East India Association

MOST RESPECTFULLY SHEWETH:

That when a Bill, No. 21, of 1873, entitled "A Bill to limit the "Jurisdiction of the Civil Courts throughout the Bombay Presidency "in matters relating to Land Revenue," was before the Legislative Council of India, a Memorial was presented against it to the Governor-General of India by a number of the Native inhabitants of Bombay; and that the Council of the East India Association addressed a Memorial to your lordship's predecessor, his Grace the Duke of Argyll, in Council, under date the 13th of February, 1874, in which they ventured most respectfully, on the grounds therein stated by them, to support the prayer of the said Native Memorial.

That the Bill thus so strongly memorialized against has, your Memorialists believe, now passed the Legislative Council, and they humbly trust that your lordship will, by the exercise of the powers of disallowance vested in your lordship in Council, prevent a retrograde measure from being engrafted on the India Statute-book, which is fraught, as your Memorialists believe, with most injurious consequences to the landowners and ryots of that portion of the Western Presidency, who had hitherto enjoyed the right of resorting to the Civil Courts for the redress of their grievances in matters relating to the Land Revenue.

That your Memorialists entered so fully into the grounds of their objections to the Bill in the Memorial to your lordship's predecessor, above referred to, that they think it unnecessary to repeat them here, but would merely refer your lordship to the printed copy of that Memorial which they have herewith annexed.

Wherefore your Memorialists humbly pray that your lordship in Council, taking the premises into consideration, will disallow the said "Bill to limit the Jurisdiction of the Civil Courts throughout the Bombay "Presidency in matters relating to Land Revenue," under the powers possessed by your lordship in Council.

And your Memorialists will ever pray.

(For the Council of the East India Association)
(Signed) E. B. EASTWICK, *Chairman.*

EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION ROOMS,
20, GREAT GEORGE STREET, WESTMINSTER,
July 19th, 1876.

APPENDIX B.

Address of the East India Association.

The East India Association was founded in the beginning of 1867 "for the independent and disinterested advocacy and promotion by all "legitimate means of the interests and welfare of the people of India "generally." At a large and influential meeting of members of the Association, which was held on the 5th of December, 1867, to present an Address from the Princes of Káthiawár to Sir Bartle Frere, it was well said "that much might be done by the Association as a mere "means of conveying information to English public men, but the As- "sociation had a far higher purpose than the collection and diffusion of "information, and he regarded it as one of the means which, by the "blessing of the Almighty, might assist India and England to achieve "successfully the great work which His providence had set before "them."

Since those noble words were uttered by one of the most illustrious of the friends of India, the Association has continued its labours under many difficulties, and through various vicissitudes, and has now almost reached its decennial anniversary. But the action of the Association, and the extension of its influence, have been checked by its having no permanent place of residence, no place at all, where the friends of India can meet in numbers "frequent and full" to discuss the ever increasing array of subjects in which India, and England through India, are so profoundly interested. To provide a suitable and permanent local habitation in a convenient site, that is, in the vicinity of the Houses of Parliament, where members of both Houses could conveniently attend, and to increase the efficiency of the Association, would demand the outlay of not less than 20,000*l*. This sum it is now proposed to raise by subscription among the members of the Association in this country and in India.

It cannot, however, be expected that members residing in England can raise any very considerable portion of the required sum among themselves. They give their annual subscriptions, and they give what is of still greater value and importance, their time and influence to promote the interests of the Association; but in this country there are very many other calls upon their liberality, and being, for the most part, retired members of the Indian Services, they have not the means of making large donations to the fund. It is hoped, therefore, that the powerful and wealthy Princes of India will take the main burden of this

good work upon themselves, and remembering that India, having but a very limited privilege of representation, stands in the greatest need of such a channel for communicating the wishes of its people as this Association affords, will come forward with that munificence which distinguishes them, and provide the Association with a building worthy of the great ends for which it has been established, and of that vast empire of which it has the honour to be the representative.

The Princes are invited to subscribe, and to direct their Secretaries to record their names with the proper titles, which will then be inscribed in gold letters on tablets in the hall, under the head of benefactors and patrons of the Association.

Should the requisite amount of money be obtained to erect the hall, it is intended to present a humble petition to Her Majesty to become the supreme patron of the Association.

APPENDIX C.

To the Most Noble the Marquis of Salisbury, K.G.,
Secretary of State for India.

East India Association,
20, Great George Street, Westminster.
19th April, 1877.

My Lord,—On the 21st July last, the Council of this Association had the honour of enclosing a copy of a Memorial, which it had addressed to the First Lord of Her Majesty's Treasury, in favour of the proposal to establish an Indian and a Colonial Museum on the Victoria Embankment, and it took occasion to express the hope that your lordship would endeavour to aid in securing the establishment of the India Museum on the proposed site.

The numerous Memorials which have been addressed to Her Majesty's Government afford evidence of the interest with which the proposal is being regarded by the representatives of the chief commercial centres and many of the principal towns in this country, and the Association has viewed with great satisfaction the fact that the Memorialists in every instance have expressed the opinion that England should share in an expenditure which hitherto has fallen exclusively on India.

The statement which recently appeared in an important daily paper

—on apparently official authority—to the effect that the project might be considered dead in so far as the co-operation of the Indian Government is concerned, has, therefore, caused considerable anxiety. The interest which the proposal has evoked throughout the Colonies, renders it almost certain that if Her Majesty's Government will only undertake to provide the site, the money will be forthcoming for the Colonial portion of the buildings. As regards the Indian portion, a strong feeling exists that it is, both on commercial and on general grounds, for the interest of the people of India that an effort should be made to secure the transference of the India Museum to a position where it would be most accessible to all classes; and it is hoped that, even notwithstanding the financial exigencies at the present moment, it will be possible for your lordship to see a way of promoting the accomplishment of such a desirable object.

In conclusion, I am desired to express the hope that your lordship will consent to see a deputation from this Association on the subject.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

(Signed) J. F. LEITH.

(For the Council of the East India Association.)

Reply.

India Office, 27th April, 1877.

SIR,—I am desired by Lord Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th instant, on the subject of the establishment of an Indian and Colonial Museum on the Victoria Embankment. In reply, I am to inform you that in the present state of the Indian finances, it is impossible for the Government of India to undertake alone the carrying out of such a scheme, and that the Lords of the Treasury, in reply to a reference which was made to them, have informed Lord Salisbury that they do not see any prospect of being able at present to afford any assistance by a grant from Imperial revenues.

In these circumstances, Lord Salisbury desires me to say that he does not think any good would result from his having a deputation from the East India Association upon the subject.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

J. F. Leith, Esq., Q.C., M.P.

APPENDIX D.

To the Most Noble the Marquis of Salisbury, K.G., &c., &c., &c., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India in Council.

The Memorial of the Council of the East India Association

Most respectfully Sheweth:

That great anxiety appears to exist in the minds of a large number of the Natives of India in respect to the persistent endeavours which are being made by a very influential body in England to obtain from the Government the abolition, at the earliest possible period, of the five per cent. *ad valorem* duty now levied in India on the importation of cotton goods.

That the only arguments adduced in favour of the abolition are that the duty in question is in its nature a protective duty, and that its abolition, therefore, would be a boon to the people of India at large, in their capacity of consumers of British cotton goods.

That it has recently been shown, however, in a very able letter addressed by Mr. Sorabjee Shaporjee Bengallee, a member of the Legislative Council of Bombay, to the Viceroy, that the cotton goods of India and those of England have so little in common that it is only to an almost inappreciable extent that they can come at all into competition with each other; the whole of the cotton goods of Manchester, with very trifling exceptions, being above all effective rivalry at the hands of the Indian manufacturer; while the cotton goods turned out by the latter, owing to their comparative coarseness and cheapness, are for the most part outside the range of competition on the part of Manchester. The only real competition that exists appears to be a competition between the mill-owners of India and the hand-loom weavers there.

There being thus no appreciable competition between the cotton goods of Manchester and those of India respectively, the whole argument, based on the allegation that the import duty levied in India is a protective duty, of course falls to the ground; and this has been clearly admitted by the Tariff Committee appointed by the Government of India. It would, indeed, be difficult so to characterize, under any circumstances, so small a duty as a five per cent. *ad valorem* duty—an amount not very greatly in excess of that retained on the importation of corn into Great Britain when the corn laws were abolished.

That with the argument based on the charge that the duty is a protective duty there also falls to the ground the argument based on the

assumption that the remission of the duty would be a boon to the people of India at large, in their capacity of consumers of Manchester cotton goods. For nothing can be clearer than that, Manchester having the command of the Indian market, so far as its own products are concerned, the greater part of the duty so remitted would find its way into the pockets of the Manchester mill-owners, in the shape of additional profit, and not, in the shape of lower prices, into the pockets of the consumers in India.

That this will probably not be denied by the Manchester advocates of the abolition of the duty, the proposition being self-evident. Indeed, it would be but a poor compliment to their well-known intelligence to suppose that they would take all the trouble they are taking, and have taken, for the purpose of forcing on the people of India a measure which the latter do not want, and wholly fail to appreciate, unless they were themselves to reap some substantial benefit from it.

That the case being as stated, it appears to your Memorialists that even if the finances of India were in so flourishing a condition that a sacrifice could be made of the 800,000*l.* sterling per annum which this duty amounts to, there could still be no valid reason for selecting for abolition a duty than which none, in their opinion, could be more legitimate.

That, in support of this assertion, they would beg to remind your lordship that the state of things which enables Manchester to find a market for its goods in India to so vast an extent as is indicated by the duty—viz., 16,000,000*l.* sterling worth annually—has not been brought about without an immense expenditure by the Government and the people of India;—expenditure in the shape of harbours and roads, police and well-ordered legal tribunals, protection from external attack and the maintenance of internal order, the development to a high degree of the country's resources, and the numberless other items which it were needless to go on enumerating. Of all this expenditure the Manchester mill-owner who sends his goods to India reaps his full share of the benefit, in the shape of the secure and extensive market thus provided for him there; while, if it were not for this trifling duty levied on his fabrics, he would absolutely contribute nothing whatever towards it.

That it was on this very ground, that of the justice of compelling a trader to contribute something towards the expenditure of a country he exports to, in protecting and facilitating his commerce, that Adam Smith, the great apostle of free trade, advocated the reasonableness of levying a moderate customs duty on imported goods, while denouncing the imposition of prohibitory or protective tariffs intended to give a monopoly to indigenous producers.

That your Memorialists think it very natural that the Natives of India should, under these circumstances, be so strongly opposed to the abolition of this duty, even if the finances of India were in such a condition as to enable the Government to dispense with the money it produces; but the finances of India being as they are, they have double reason to protest against a measure which would obviously necessitate the laying on them of new burthens.

That the burthens they have to bear, as it is, are very heavy, and in some instances—as, for example, the salt-tax—may, without exaggeration, be called oppressive;—a tax which not only presses very severely on the working classes of India generally, but is also very destructive to the cattle, which are the mainstay of the Indian cultivator; so much so, indeed, that it has been estimated by Europeans who have had practical experience as planters in India that the virtual prohibition of the use of salt as a cattle condiment owing to its dearness, occasioned by the enormous duty on it, has had much to do with the frequent murrains there, that carry off the cattle by thousands, and give a blow to the agriculture of the districts affected which it requires years for them to recover from.

That besides this there are other imposts, though not of so objectionable a nature, the only valid excuse for the retention of which is the impossibility of doing without them; and your Memorialists cannot, therefore, be surprised if the Natives who have called their attention to this matter should oppose so strongly the selection of a duty for abolition which is in itself so fair a one; which represents all that is contributed to the Indian Exchequer by the English exporters thither of goods to the value of 16,000,000*l.* sterling per annum; and which, if abolished, would necessitate the simultaneous imposition of new taxes of equal amount upon the already heavily taxed people of India. To strip the matter of all confusing phraseology, it would be simply to take from the people of India 800,000*l.* sterling per annum in addition to what they already pay, in order to increase the profits on their Indian trade of the cotton manufacturers of Manchester.

That if the Natives of India had any representation in Parliament, and more especially if they had any representation at all commensurate with their numbers, their importance, or the 50,000,000*l.* sterling they pay into the Indian Treasury annually, they might safely be left to fight their own battles with Manchester in that assembly; but as it is, excluded as they are from all voice in the management of their own affairs, the case seems to be peculiarly one in which the greatest care and deliberation are requisite before coming to any final decision upon it; for nothing could be more deplorable than that a feeling should arise

among them that their interests were sacrificed to the interests of Manchester; and the more powerful, politically and commercially, those interests are, the more important it seems to your Memorialists that all ground should be taken away for the possible creation of any such impression.

That your Memorialists venture to think that nothing could be more conducive to the avoidance of such a danger than for the Government to institute a full and searching inquiry into the whole subject before coming to any final decision in regard to the policy to be pursued in respect of it. This might be done by means of a Commission, impartially selected and sitting with open doors at Bombay, the chief seat of the British cotton trade with India, as well as of the Indian cotton manufacturing industry. Before it might be examined all the Natives who had any evidence to offer, as well as the European representatives of the great Manchester houses in India; and the result would be, doubtless, a mass of information which would effectually set the matter in its true light, and enable your lordship to arrive at a conclusion beyond the reach of cavil or question on either side.

Your Memorialists, therefore, most respectfully pray that this or some other equally satisfactory method may be adopted, with a view of finally terminating an agitation which at any time would be most undesirable, but which is particularly so at a moment when it is of the utmost importance that England and India should be cordially as well as politically united.

And your Memorialists will ever pray.

(For the Council of the East India Association)

(Signed) A. B. RATHBORNE.

East India Association Rooms,
20, Great George Street, Westminster,
June 27, 1877.

Reply.

India Office,
June 28, 1877.

Sir,—I am desired by the Marquis of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of a Memorial from the Council of the East India Association, to which his lordship will devote his best attention.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) W. G. BUTLER.




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