




THE WESTERN HERITAGE





Stewart C. Easton

HOLT, RINEHART and WINSTON, INC., N. Y.



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THE WESTERN HERITAGE



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*Anonymous colored woodcut of the city of Venice.
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tricità nel cinquantenario della sua fondazione,
1905-1955. Venezia: The Society, 1956. Portfolio.
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Page i

*Ivory statuette of Cretan snake goddess.
BOSTON MUSEUM OF FINE ARTS.*

Page ii

Ceiling of the axial gallery, Lascaux.

Page iii

*View of Los Angeles looking north along Harbor
Freeway. WIDE WORLD.*

Page vii

Ship from the Bayeux Tapestry.

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PREFACE

This volume is the third in a series of books by the present author, the first, published in 1955, being *The Heritage of the Past to the Close of the Middle Ages*, and the second, published in 1957, *The Heritage of the Past to 1715*. The present book, which brings the history of Western man up to date as of 1960, is necessarily less full in coverage than the two earlier works, since it is not significantly longer than either of them. It is designed either for a one-semester course or for those teachers who desire a single text for a two-semester course. In the second type of course the text usually is supplemented by outside readings or collections of documents at the wish of the instructor; for this reason an unusually long list of suggested readings is given at the end of each chapter, with emphasis on the paperbacks that are available to the student at minimum cost. A few remarks are appended to almost all the books mentioned, for the purpose of giving the student and teacher some guidance on their scope and contents.

The book has been designed on a rather rigorously topical basis, and, as in the earlier works, there is more interpretation than is customary in textbooks. It is, of course, much easier to give merely a compendium of facts and to leave all the interpretation to the instructor. It must be admitted that some instructors prefer this kind of text. Obviously not all teachers will agree with all the author's interpretations. But where the teacher disagrees he is free to take up the issue with his students in the knowledge that they will already have one suggested interpretation at their disposal. This will make for a livelier class discussion than if the student had only the bare facts and was compelled to rely upon the instructor for the only interpretation available to him. On the other hand, when the instructor agrees with the author's interpretation, he does not have to start from the beginning and interpret all the facts, but is given the opportunity to add from his own store of knowledge the details that were necessarily omitted from the book for reasons of space.

The history of Western man does not fall naturally into a topical framework, and many important events have to be omitted when they do not, in the author's opinion, have any special bearing upon the topic discussed. The alternative is to present the student with an array of facts in strict chronological order, and attempt to tie them together by brief pauses for synthesis. Synthesis will also, of course, be provided by the instructor. But it has been my experience that in the survey courses for which this book is designed the synthesizing task is almost a superhuman one. In this book therefore I have provided the essential topical framework, allowing the instructor to develop those subjects and periods which lend themselves best to his particular expertise.

Nevertheless, it remains true that difficulties arise from the topical treatment. In dealing with such a topic, for example, as the rise and decline of

the medieval Church, a fairly long time span has to be covered within a single chapter. The events handled in such a chapter necessarily require information that is covered in another chapter, perhaps even a later one, and so has not yet been mastered by the student. The chronological charts that appear in all the historical chapters are supplemented by charts at the beginning of each Part prior to the twentieth century. The use of these charts should help the student to orientate himself in time, and thus to overcome some of the difficulties that arise from the topical treatment. But, whenever feasible in the curriculum, I suggest that the whole Part devoted to a major period be read over lightly by the student before he undertakes the detailed study of each chapter. Then the events will be seen to fall into their proper place in the historical framework, and it will be possible to discuss more fully in class the interrelations among the events handled in different chapters, of which the instructor is aware but which the student cannot be expected to grasp without guidance.


I myself naturally am not a full-blown expert on all the subjects and periods covered in the book. I have tried to use the best sources and the best interpreters of the material that I could find, and to make my work as free as possible from egregious error. I therefore have thought it best not to mention the names of any of those who have contributed to the writing and production of this work, but merely to express my general gratitude for their assistance, and to draw attention once more to the excellent scale maps drawn by Vincent Kotschar, which have contributed so much to the success of earlier *Heritages*.

I am indebted to many persons and organizations for help in finding appropriate illustrations, as is indicated in the credit lines. Special thanks are due to Dr. E. Gunter Troche, Director, and Mr. Dennis Beall, Curator, of the Achenbach Foundation for Graphic Arts, California Palace of the Legion of Honor, San Francisco; Professor Richard M. Brace, of Northwestern University, author of *The Making of the Modern World*; Miss Mary M. Kenway, of the Pierpont Morgan Library, New York; Miss Elizabeth E. Roth, of the Prints Division, New York Public Library; and the staffs of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Museum of Modern Art, and the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, all in New York.

But the contribution made to the book by my wife, both by way of suggestions, encouragement, and criticism, and in the typing of much of the manuscript, deserves a special and unique acknowledgment. Though it is formally acknowledged here in the printed page, it can add little to what I have said to her many times over in private,

STEWART C. EASTON

Apache Junction, Arizona
January, 1961



CONTENTS

I ♦ Before History

1. *The Foundations of an Organized Society* 3
2. *Prehistoric Man* 11

II ♦ The Ancient World

3. *The Heritage of the Ancient Near East* 24
4. *The Heritage of Greek Civilization* 52
5. *From Republic to Empire—The Evolution of Roman Civilization* 89

III ♦ The Centuries of Transition

6. *The Rise of Christianity* 125
7. *The Fall of Rome and the Establishment of Successor States in the West* 141
8. *Successor States of the East—Byzantine and Muslim Empires* 158

IV ♦ The Middle Ages

9. *Political, Social, and Economic Structure of the Middle Ages* 184

10. *The Church to the End of the Thirteenth Century* 219
 11. *The Evolution of National States in the Middle Ages* 245
 12. *Medieval Culture* 276

V ♦ The Emergence of the Modern World

13. *The Rise of Early Modern Individualism—New Ideals, New Worlds, New Faith* 307
 14. *The Evolution of the European State System to the French Revolution* 374
 15. *Science and Culture to the French Revolution* 449
 16. *The Breakdown of the Old Regime—The French Revolution and Napoleon* 492

VI ♦ The Nineteenth Century

17. *Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century* 528
 18. *The Industrial Revolution and Its Consequences* 567
 19. *Liberalism and Democracy in the Nineteenth Century* 598
 20. *Romanticism and Realism of the Nineteenth Century* 630
 21. *The Expansion of Europe in the Nineteenth Century* 668

VII ♦ The Twentieth Century

22. *The Epoch of World War I* 698
 23. *The Rise of Twentieth-Century Totalitarianism* 723
 24. *The Ebbing of Democratic Initiative and the Drift toward War* 757
 25. *The Global War and the Foundation of the United Nations* 786
 26. *Power and Influence in the Postwar World—The Cold War* 807
 27. *Social and Cultural Changes in the Western World in the Twentieth Century* 853


MAPS

Ancient Egypt	25	The Great Schism (1378-1417)	315
Egyptian Empire (1450 B.C.)	30	European Colonization of the World (1700)	340
Sumerian City States	34	New Centers of Trade in the 16th Century	341
Assyrian Empire (625 B.C.)	39	United Provinces of the Netherlands (1579)	358
Persian Empire (490 B.C.)	40	Official Religious Divisions in Europe (1600)	370
Palestine (800 B.C.)	44	Europe Around 1500	375
Aegean Civilization (1500 B.C.)	53	The Expansion of the Ottoman Empire (1481-1683)	380
Greek Colonization (550 B.C.)	58	Europe at Beginning of the 30 Years War (1618)	383
Greece at the Beginning of the Peloponnesian War	67	Europe in 1648	385
Empire of Alexander (323 B.C.)	81	Territorial Expansion of Brandenburg—Prussia (1415-1795)	394
Hellenistic Kingdoms (250 B.C.)	82	The Partition of Poland (1772, 1793, 1795)	397
Expansion of Roman Republic	95	Expansion of Muscovite Russia (1462-1584)	398
Roman Empire in Time of Augustus	103	Russian Expansion (1762-1796)	406
Roman and Hunnic Empires (450)	149	Richelieu's Offensive against Spanish Hapsburg Encirclement	411
East Roman Empire and Germanic Kingdoms (526)	151	Expansion of French Frontiers (1667-1697)	418
Europe and East Roman Empire (590-604)	153	European Treaty Adjustments (1713-1720)	420
Slavs in Europe (814)	163	England and Wales during the Rebellion (1643)	436
Mongol Empire (1227-1405)	164	British North America (1763)	444
Expansion of Islam (750)	171	Europe and the French Empire (1810)	516
Empire of Charlemagne (814)	187	Europe in 1815	531
Division of Charlemagne's Kingdom (843)	190	Latin America (1825)	539
Roman Empire of the German Nation (973)	193	Italian Unification (1859-1870)	548
Settlements of the Northmen	194	The Unification of Germany by Bismarck (1866-1871)	556
Medieval Commerce	211	The Dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire in Europe (1683-1909)	558
Religions of Europe (1060)	227	Europe in 1871	561
The First Crusade (1096-1099)	229	Imperialism in the Far East and Western Pacific (1842-1914)	677
Holy Roman Empire (1190)	232	Africa in 1878	680
Christendom at the Death of Innocent III (1216)	238	The Partition of Africa in 1914	687
England in 886	247		
Possessions of William I of England (1066-1087)	250		
English Possessions in France (1154-1189)	253		
Territory Recovered by England (1328-1360)	266		
Territories in France Subject to English Influence (1429)	268		
Territorial Unification of Spain (910-1512)	272		

Europe in 1914	700	German Invasion of France and the Low Countries (1940)	792
Dismemberment of Germany at Versailles	713	Axis Europe in 1941	793
Europe after World War I	718	The Japanese Assault (1941)	796
The Dismemberment of Russia at Brest-Litovsk (1918)	733	The Reduction of Germany (1945)	798
Territorial Additions in Russia's Western Border (1939-1940)	739	Assault upon the Japanese Empire	800
German Expansion (1936-August, 1939)	753	International Blocs	818
Authoritarian Europe in 1936	780	Europe in 1960	824
Spain in the Civil War (1936)	781	The World (1939)	828
		The World (1959)	830

Maps in Color

Italy: 31 B.C.-A.D. 14, in Time of Augustus	front endpaper
Europe in 1360, Showing Famous Cathedrals and Leading Universities	following page 292
Exploration during the 15th-17th Centuries	following page 320
The Northern Hemisphere—Polar Explorations and the Air Age	rear endpaper



I ♦ BEFORE HISTORY

A prehistoric fresco from the Lascaux Caves, Dordogne, France. Central subject of the left wall in the Nave. Huge engraved Cow, painted in black.

Chronological Chart

AGES OF PREHISTORY

<i>Type of Man</i>	<i>Cultural Epoch</i>	<i>Geological Epoch</i>	<i>Approx. Date (B.C.)*</i>
Pithecanthropus (Java man)	Lower Paleolithic (Food gathering)	Pleistocene Age	500,000
Sinanthropus (Peking man)	Lower Paleolithic (Food gathering)	Pleistocene Age	500,000
Neanderthal	Lower Paleolithic (Food gathering)	Pleistocene Age	150,000
Neanderthaloid	Lower Paleolithic (Food gathering)	Pleistocene Age	150,000
Homo-Sapiens (Cro-Magnon, etc.)	Upper Paleolithic	Pleistocene Age	50,000
	Mesolithic	Holocene (recent age)	8,000
	Neolithic Revolution (Food growing —Middle East and Europe)	Holocene (recent age)	5500 or later
	Followed by: Copper Age		ca. 4500
	Bronze Age		ca. 3500
	Iron Age		ca. 1800

* All the dates above are in dispute, and no consensus is to be found among archaeologists. All that the chart gives is a relative time scale, which will certainly be modified by further research.

The Foundations of an Organized Society

❖ The economic, political, and cultural foundations of a society

ECONOMIC REQUIREMENTS

In all ages and in all societies the human being has had certain fundamental needs. These arise from the very fact that he is a human being, living in a society. No man can live for more than a limited period by himself; even if he could survive alone for his own lifetime, he could not reproduce his kind. He must therefore have some relations with his fellow men, and these relations are necessarily regulated by custom, and usually by law. As a producer and a consumer he has an economic part to play in the life of his society. Finally, he has certain cultural and religious needs, both as an individual and as a member of his society.

The economic needs of the human being are limited. In the modern industrial societies of the West we have learned to consume goods on a scale undreamed of in earlier times. But we still cannot consume an infinite amount. Advertisements constantly draw our attention to gadgets for the man, or woman, who "has everything." But let it be noted that these superfluous goods thus advertised are gadgets, not necessities. On the other hand, there is no limit to the creativeness of the human being in the field of culture; and societies are to be distinguished from one another more by the differences in their cultural achievements than by any differences in their modes of economic produc-

tion. Indeed, it is not until modern times that the economy of the West becomes sufficiently different from that of other societies to warrant detailed discussion. In a pre-machine civilization, such as existed from the Neolithic period to the modern Industrial Revolution, the overwhelming majority of mankind was forced to labor for long hours under difficult conditions to make a bare subsistence. There is nothing especially significant to be said about this type of primitive organization, save that it left most human beings little leisure for cultural pursuits. But the so-called Industrial Revolution, a Western achievement now being diffused to countries outside the West, made its effects felt not only in the economic but also in the political and cultural realms. Chapter 18, which deals with this Revolution, is therefore of crucial importance for the understanding of modern life. But it remains the only chapter in the book devoted exclusively to economic history.

The basic economic requirements of human beings may be limited to three—food, shelter, and clothing. In the earliest societies known to us, their pursuit consumed such an enormous proportion of available human energies that there was little left for other activities. Food could be obtained from animals and wild plants, which were hunted or harvested in accordance with the skills and techniques available to the society. Such an economy may be termed a natural one—man was dependent entirely upon what was provided for him by nature, especially if he clothed himself in animal skins and lived

in caves. When nature failed him, he moved on to a more favorable location, where he continued to live in a natural economy.

At the next stage of development, called the Neolithic Revolution, man ceased to be totally dependent upon nature and began in some degree to control it. He learned to breed and tend animals, so that they were always available to him for food when he needed them, and he taught them to work for him and supplement the labor of his own hands. He also learned to plant crops and harvest them, laying down seeds in some spot cleared for the purpose and in which such plants did not grow by nature. He learned to build himself a home where none had been provided by nature, and he even discovered how to grow special crops, such as flax, from which he could make himself clothing.

Having thus learned in some degree to control and harness nature, man at last found himself both with leisure to produce luxuries which made life more pleasant and comfortable, and with a surplus of crops beyond the consuming needs of his society. These surpluses of manufactured luxuries, and of crops for human consumption, he was able to offer in exchange for goods produced by other men outside his immediate group. This *trade* was ultimately supplemented and fed by the products of *industry*. Industrial production is characterized by a more intensive division of labor under which some members of the society, freed from direct agricultural work, specialize in manufacturing a varied assortment of articles to be consumed at home or to be traded in exchange for foreign products. An economically advanced society is characterized by the diversity of products manufactured, and by efficient organization of production to take advantage of specialized skills and to minimize the waste of human energies in unnecessary labor.

POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS

Protection through government and law It used to be thought that man in a state of nature was forced to compete with all other human beings for his very subsistence, or, in the famous words of Thomas Hobbes, that his life was "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." We

have no record of such a way of life, either in early times or among present-day "primitive" men. And it no longer seems as probable to us as it did in the nineteenth century, under the influence of the biological ideas of Darwin, that human survival was a matter of success in the constant struggle for existence, if this struggle is conceived of as a struggle between human beings. It now seems more probable that survival has always been due to successful cooperation between human beings to resist the always dangerous forces of nature.

The first political necessity for men has always been, and remains still, protection—whether from animals, natural hazards, or hostile human beings; and protection must necessarily mean that some human beings band together under some kind of accepted political organization. The first requirement of any government is that it should possess power to enforce its will upon individuals, forcing them to behave in accordance with its dictates. This power may be either military or moral or both; but a government cannot survive without one kind or the other. It follows that a government must be acceptable either to a majority of the people or to a minority who possess enough moral or military power to coerce the majority. No government, whether by one man or by many, can survive without some support and acceptance.

A government, to ensure its acceptance by any of the people, cannot behave in an arbitrary and unpredictable manner. It must make clear what its policy is to be in matters of daily concern to the people. This need for certainty is satisfied by the establishment of law, which explains to the people what is expected of them, and decrees penalties for the behavior it defines as unacceptable. Law is essentially the regulation of the public behavior of human beings in an organized society. It is enforced by the power of the government as long as the government is able to maintain its authority.

From very early times men have considered that laws should be made in accordance with an abstraction called justice. But, since there has never been an agreed conception of justice at any time in history, individuals in each society have arrived at their own conceptions of

justice and have tried to modify the law accordingly. Justice has remained a valuable ideal, but in fact it has been the enforceable law which has prevailed rather than the abstract and unenforceable ideal. Most lawgivers in early societies claimed that they received the law from the gods and that their laws were therefore in accordance with the ideal of justice; hence they decreed severe penalties for anyone who should attempt, from his feeble human thinking, to change them. In ancient Egypt there was no written law at all until a very late date. The Pharaoh was supposed to "know the hearts of men," and since he was in constant touch with divine powers, he could judge cases in the light of his intuitive and immediate perception of justice.

Evolution of political institutions—From clans and tribes to the national state In every society there has always been some form of government, since authority has always been necessary, however small the social unit. A natural social unit is the family; and it may be that in some far-off age the self-sufficient family may also have been the political unit, with one member exercising an authority recognized and accepted by the other members. This state of affairs, however, presupposes the self-sufficiency of the one family, and such self-sufficiency is unlikely at any time or in any place. The clan, or union of a small number of families, sometimes closely connected by blood relationship, with perhaps a recent common ancestor, is known as a historical unit, with the leaders of the component families exercising the functions of government. A larger unit is the tribe, composed of several clans. When tribes or clans are gathered together in one area, the government may be made up of the heads of families, or perhaps of a tribal chieftain, acceptable to the other heads by virtue of his birth into one leading family, or because of his own personal, military, or other qualities.

When these tribal units emerge into the light of history there is usually such a chieftain occupying the position of the head of the tribal government, advised by other minor chiefs or heads of families, and sometimes by the whole body of adults. These others form an assembly

whose advice is called for on special occasions, and whose consent is necessary for important decisions. Such a government is a primitive democracy, of the kind we shall find in Mesopotamia at an early date. Traces of it are found among other peoples, such as the primitive Greeks, Romans, and Germans of the West. In other societies we find at an early time the institution of kingship, with the ruler having already been granted the power to govern without the formality of consultation with his subjects. Larger units of government are city-states; empires, which sometimes rule over wide areas subdued by warfare; and, in our own times, national states. Common to all these forms of government are systems of law and officials who carry out the policies of the government under authority delegated by it. From the very primitive to the most advanced and modern forms of government the essential function is always the provision of protection to the governed. Though modern governments have undertaken multifarious subsidiary tasks, essentially they perform these tasks because the people have requested or allowed them to do so—tasks supposedly for the benefit of the people which, in their view, can best be performed by common rather than private effort and under direction from above. The modern political and economic theory known as socialism emphasizes the importance of the role of the government in providing for the people what they are unable to provide for themselves.

Historical forms of government—Monarchy, oligarchy, democracy The essential requirement of government is, then, that it be effective, and that its authority should be accepted in the area entrusted to it. Many forms of government may fulfill these criteria, and many forms are known to history; human inventiveness may yet devise new combinations. But three main classifications are usually recognized—monarchy, or rule by one; oligarchy, or rule by a few; and democracy, or rule by the people. Each of these may exist in pure or mixed forms. Monarchy may consist of rule by a king or a single ruler under some other title and his chosen advisers, with the responsibility ultimately resting with the ruler, or it may be a

rule limited by the legal or moral necessity for him to consult his advisers, by whom he may be overruled. The latter form is a limited or constitutional monarchy. Within this classification there are many degrees of limitation, down to the point where the "advisers" rule, and the king is merely a respected figurehead and symbol of unity, as in England. An oligarchy may be elected, or it may be entitled to rule by hereditary right; and it may have to consult the people in certain matters and submit to being overruled on occasion. A democracy may be direct, as in Athens, or representative, as in modern states, the representatives subject to re-election or recall. The form of government, then, is always subject to change and modification in accordance with the needs of the time and the wishes of the people governed; but, whatever the form, and whatever the label—some modern labels are devised purely with the aim of confusing—a government's functions are those described in the preceding section.

THE "CULTURE" OF A SOCIETY

The common elements of all cultures—The accumulated heritage from the past In every society it is the free activity of men—their thoughts, their feelings, and their actions—which molds its characteristic institutions and gives it its characteristic way of looking at life. Together, the social organization, political institutions, economic activities, law, science, art, religion, and thought are called the culture of a society. The cave paintings of the Old Stone Age and the mass-production economic technique of the twentieth century are equally an expression of the cultural creativeness of these particular societies. They are the work of men living in the society, making use of the physical environment provided for them by nature. Their creativeness is limited by natural conditions, but not determined by them. The men of the Old Stone Age could hardly have progressed at a single leap to the mass-production technique of the twentieth century or to its representative political government, since the thoughts of men had first to traverse all the intermediate stages, and the institutions of their society had to be modified in accordance with these newer

thoughts. Men had first to live in settled communities, and develop institutions fit for such communities; they had to make the necessary technical inventions—means of communication, transportation, and production—and again slowly develop social institutions which could release and take advantage of natural human inventiveness.

But it is not necessary for each society to start again from scratch, inventing its techniques from the beginning. It can take advantage of the achievements of its predecessors. Once the Neolithic Revolution had taken place and agriculture was seen to be an improvement over the ancient food gathering, this fundamental invention became a part of the permanent possession of mankind, and any new society could build on the foundations laid by Neolithic man. Cultural progress, therefore, is cumulative. The thoughts of mankind have been, as it were, built into the world—and the world has been changed by them, forever. Only if every literate human being were suddenly killed, and all knowledge of human deeds in the last seven thousand years were lost, would it be necessary for mankind to return to the conditions of the Old Stone Age and start again.

The uniqueness of each culture Yet, although each society does build on the foundations laid by its predecessors and exploits its cultural heritage, it is also, in a sense, unique. The men of ancient Egypt developed a political institution, the divine kingship, which they were unwilling to abandon, yet which was not copied by other societies; they developed an art which had little influence on subsequent art in other countries, and yet has been considered by many to be a perfect expression of the Egyptian attitude toward life. This attitude toward life seems to be the unique element in every society, which gives it its characteristic form. While the ancient Egyptians denied the fact of change, regarding it as illusory, and had therefore no interest in progress, we in the twentieth century not only recognize the fact of change but try to take advantage of it and help it on by our own efforts. We set ourselves goals which we try to achieve; then, having achieved them, we set ourselves ever more distant goals and strive

toward them. We make our ideas into ideals, into the achieving of which we put the whole strength of our wills.

But no society before ours had any such conception of progress. Many societies looked back to a Golden Age in the past which they longed to recapture, and even the Greeks, whose ideas in so many ways were similar to ours, lacked that sense of the importance of building for the future which is characteristic of modern Western civilization. It is necessary, therefore, in studying civilization as it was manifested in a particular society, to try to discover its own characteristic attitude toward life and to view its cultural achievements in the light of this attitude, while at the same time noting those cultural advances which it made and passed on to its successors as part of the total cultural heritage of mankind.

The diffusion of culture Cultural advances first made within a particular society may be taken up by other societies and spread throughout the entire world. But they must be able to find their proper place in the receiving society; they must find a fertile ground for reception and propagation. The divine kingship of Egypt would not have fitted into the contemporaneous society in Mesopotamia, and even if the Mesopotamian peoples had known of it, they would hardly have tried to graft it onto their existing native institutions. On the other hand, the Christian and other religions have been diffused through many countries where they supplied answers to the problems which the inhabitants of those countries had been trying to solve and where they fitted in with the psychological predisposition of those peoples. The system of representative government developed in medieval England was gradually diffused throughout Europe and, especially since World War I, has spread into many countries of the world which desired to accept a form of government that had apparently proved itself to be effective in the war itself. But in other places it has so far failed to take root because of the tenacity of existing institutions.

Technical inventions do not, as a rule, meet with the same opposition as religious or political innovations, and can be passed from one so-

ciety to another with less disturbance. There are thousands of examples of such diffusion of inventions from the earliest times to the present. Probably the idea of food growing and the domestication of animals spread throughout the world from some center in the Near East, though the possibility of the separate invention of such a fundamental idea cannot be ruled out. The invention of writing was almost certainly diffused from the ancient land of Sumer, though the earliest receivers, the Egyptians, modified and improved upon the Sumerian practice, using their own pictures and symbols and developing new writing materials available to them but not to the Sumerians. It is not known by how many millenniums the use of language preceded written symbols, but the languages of peoples in historic times have many resemblances to each other which can only be explained by diffusion from one people to another. Philologists have classified several families of languages, which they have called by such names as Semitic, Hamitic, and Indo-European, and by examining them have even tried to reveal laws under which the changes take place between one language and another after diffusion, in accordance with certain well-defined principles.¹ Other inventions, such as printing, gunpowder, and the cultivation of the silkworm, can be traced in

¹ At one time the different peoples who spoke one or another of these groups of languages were given the same classification. They were called Semitic, Hamitic, and Indo-European peoples, and certain physical characteristics were assigned to them. But recent discoveries have tended to show many similarities among the languages of these peoples, and other more ancient languages have been uncovered which seem to fit into none of these categories (as, for instance, the ancient Sumerian language itself). Informed opinion among philologists has therefore been modified, and at the present time there is a tendency to believe that there were earlier languages as yet unknown to us from which these families themselves sprang. The racial classifications have also been increasingly abandoned as equally unsatisfactory. Though we shall still use the words "Semitic," "Hamitic," and "Indo-European" in this book, the possibility is not ruled out that all these peoples in the not so very distant past came from some earlier root stock or stocks, in spite of a few markedly different physical characteristics which can be noted in historic times.

some detail by the historian from their first use in one country to their full development in another.

Each society, then, receives by diffusion some of its cultural heritage, and it adds to what it has received the characteristic products of its own genius. It may even invent unnecessarily for itself things which have already been developed elsewhere, which it could have received by diffusion if it had had wider cultural contacts. On the other hand, not all knowledge available to any one people has been preserved or transmitted to others. The ancient Sumerians knew all the basic forms of architecture, but the Egyptians and Greeks did not make use of them; medieval European technical knowledge—as, for instance, of the rotation of crops—was in many ways markedly inferior to that of several earlier peoples. The Renaissance Italians had to re-invent many commercial aids known to the Hellenistic world. Each civilization does not accept the entire cultural heritage of its predecessors and build on it; it accepts only what fits its own environment and its own way of living. Even our immense technical achievements, valuable as we may think them—and likely to bring great material benefits if adopted by the peoples we consider backward—may not be universally acceptable. History has yet to show to what extent Western technology will be accepted by a people like, say, the Hindus, who do not share our view of the relation between the material and the spiritual and the relative importance to be assigned to this world and the hereafter. To receive and use what we are willing to transmit to them, perhaps their whole scheme of values must be altered, and their civilization may fall into decay rather than adopt such an alien scheme of values as ours.

❖ The rise and fall of civilizations

THEORIES OF HISTORY—MARX, SPENGLER,
TOYNBEE

In recent centuries the attention of the historian has been especially concentrated on the rise and fall of the many civilizations that have been known in the past. Why, he asks, has

a civilization or a society known some sudden period of great creativeness, and why, then, does life seem to have gone from it, and the cultural leadership of mankind, which it held for a brief season, to have passed from it into other hands? Many have been the answers propounded, but none has gained universal assent. It may indeed be that no answer can ever be given in material terms and that no explanation will ever be satisfactory because in fact there is no explanation of universal validity. Karl Marx tried to show that the economic conditions of an epoch determine the cultural achievements of a civilization, but he failed to give sufficient attention to the diversity of human institutions and achievements in spite of very similar economic conditions at many different stages of history. Hence the Marxist historians have always suffered from the temptation to make the facts fit the theory, tending to neglect those facts which are not in conformity with it. In Marxian theory, then, the fall of a civilization is determined by changes in economic conditions. Oswald Spengler tried to show that the life of a society followed certain laws of growth and decay analogous to those to be found in the plant world, and that its whole life cycle is therefore predestined.

Arnold Toynbee has tried to explain the arresting of progress as a failure to respond creatively to a challenge presented by certain difficulties confronting the society. Toynbee, of course, thus assumed that a society ought to evolve, and make progress; and that if it failed to do so, it was in some way not fulfilling its proper tasks. It is doubtful whether this is a fair assumption, since there is no inherent reason why a society should wish to progress instead of simply being content with its present way of life, as apparently the ancient Egyptians were. The desire to progress is a typically modern and Western ideal, and should not be assumed as part of the make-up of earlier peoples; though perhaps, when we look back upon the history of mankind from our vantage point, we are not unjustified in observing that they *did not* make progress. The value of Toynbee's approach is a moral one. He wishes to remind us that change is always with us, whether we will it or not, and that as human beings we have to learn how

to deal with it by being willing and ready to change ourselves and our outlook in order to cope with the ever new situations that confront us.

THE NECESSITY FOR OBJECTIVITY AND IMAGINATION IN HISTORICAL STUDY

The moralist's approach to history, however, is not one to be wholeheartedly recommended. It obscures too much, and it tends to prevent a true appreciation of the past. The student of history should strive to see each society and civilization first of all in its own terms, and should try to appreciate its outlook and attitude toward life, carefully refraining from moral judgments based on experience in our own society—should see, for instance, whether to be a slave was the same thing in ancient Egypt, in fifth-century Athens or Sparta, and in the nineteenth-century Southern states of America. The student of history might well conclude that it was a totally different thing to be the slave of an Egyptian Pharaoh in the days before individual freedom and self-realization had become an ideal. Nor should he, with the Marxists, overhastily transfer his knowledge of Western European class struggles into the ancient world, and assume, for example, that the breakdown of Egyptian government after the Old Kingdom was in any way the equivalent of the French or Russian Revolutions. He should try to avoid being taken in by the use of the same word to describe events which occurred in totally different cultural contexts.

Such a procedure requires the exercise of historical imagination, and this can only be acquired by study, life experience, and hard effort. But the effort is well worth while, for it enlarges the horizons and develops that perspective which can be of the utmost value in ordinary affairs.

Second, the student should also try to see the indebtedness of one civilization to another, trace the process of cultural assimilation and transmission, and see how each people has stood upon the shoulders of its predecessors. Such understanding may lead him to a sense of responsibility toward his own heritage from the past, and to the determination to pass this herit-

age on to posterity substantially unimpaired, and if possible increased.

The general form of this book has been designed to show the separate characteristics of each society and civilization considered. But it also tries to reveal the cumulative heritage of mankind and the roots of the achievements of our society far back in the past. It would have been impossible for us to have reached our present heights if the slow tedious work of developing the intellectual and physical tools had not been done for us by those giants who went before us, who had so little to work with and such a long road to travel.

When we tend to neglect this debt and overestimate ourselves and our achievements, it is perhaps wise for us to stop for a moment, think, and remember once more that "we are the heirs of all the ages."

Suggestions for further reading

NOTE: Because of the wealth of material available in inexpensive paperback editions, the reading list at the end of each chapter is in two sections, headed Paperback Books and Casebound Books. For the paperback books, the only bibliographical information given is the name of the series. Many bookstores carry leading series in stock and, if the volumes you want are not on their shelves, will be glad to order them for you. If you are unable to order a desired book through your bookstore, you can get the publisher's address in a volume entitled *Paperback Books in Print*, which most bookstores and libraries possess. For the casebound editions, full bibliographical information is given to assist you in finding the book you want in the library or in ordering it from a bookstore.

PAPERBACK BOOKS

Bury, John Bagnell. *The Idea of Progress*. Dover. A classic study of how men have come to the belief that some progress is to be discerned in history. Mostly concerned with the idea of progress during the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, but also has a good section on the nineteenth.

Croce, Benedetto. *History as the Story of Liberty*. Meridian. Influential book by a noted Italian philosopher, using the theme of the advancement of human liberty as the selective principle for his study of history.

Gustavson, Carl G. *A Preface to History*. McGraw-Hill. Interesting introduction to the study of history, its meaning and purpose.

Hegel, G. W. F. *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*. Tr. by J. Sibree. Dover. Seminal lectures by the founder of the modern philosophy of history. The least formidable of Hegel's writings for the beginner. Examples are stimulating and interesting.

Lowith, Karl. *Meaning in History*. Phoenix. Interesting and sometimes profound study of what some influential writers have thought about history and its meaning, from Marx through Vico, Bossuet, and Condorcet to St. Augustine.

Muller, Herbert, J. *The Uses of the Past*. NAL. A series of brief, sympathetic studies of several past societies and their enduring achievements, written by a nonhistorian. Examples chosen to illustrate differences between past civilizations and the modern West. Stimulates thought on what may really be learned from history.

CASEBOUND BOOKS

Einstein, Lewis. *Historical Change*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1946. Stimulating discussion of how changes have come about in history. Written under the influence of World War II, but much is still extremely relevant.

Hightet, Gilbert. *The Migration of Ideas*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. Stimulat-

ing little book on how culture and ideas are diffused, with thought-provoking illustrations from all periods of history.

Hughes, H. S. *Oswald Spengler: A Critical Estimate*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952. Useful digest of Spengler's huge work, suitable as an introduction to his theories.

Namier, Lewis B. *Avenues of History*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952. Influential British historian's essays on his specialty. First essay especially valuable on the task of the historian and the functions of historical study.

Popper, Karl. *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950. Severe but enlightening criticism of historicism, especially hard on Plato and Hegel.

Spengler, Oswald. *The Decline of the West*. Tr. by C. F. Atkinson. One-volume ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1939. Cyclical theory of civilization, stated in pontifical terms, but always interesting. Details often fascinating.

Toynbee, Arnold. *A Study of History*. London: Oxford University Press, 1935-1954. 10 vols. A one-volume abridgment by D. C. Somervell is available for vols. 1-6 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947); also a one-volume abridgment of vols. 7-10 (1957). The unabridged edition is greatly preferable, but the abridgment is honest and careful, though sometimes misleading because of the necessary omission of illustrations. Vols. 1-6 more valuable than later volumes for the beginner.

Prehistoric Man

❖ Difficulties of studying prehistory

It is now believed that a creature recognizable as man has walked the earth for more than half a million years. He has not always lived in the same areas of the earth, for at different times the movements of glaciers and changes of climate have made some regions uninhabitable. But at no time in the last half million years was the whole earth uninhabitable, and immense periods of time have separated the great glacial epochs from each other. Yet it is, at the most, ten thousand—probably not more than eight thousand—years ago that man first began to grow his own food and domesticate the useful animals.

This presents to us at once the great question—Why so long? Could prehistoric man not have taken this supreme step earlier, and started on the road to civilization many thousands of years before 8000 B.C.?

To this fundamental question it is impossible to give an answer. The truth is that we know very little indeed about prehistoric man. The unremitting labors of archaeologists and anthropologists, fruitful though these have been, have only scratched the surface of our almost total ignorance. Besides, no two experts are ever in agreement on all points in their interpretation of the meager data available.

It is necessary to stress this point because all that will be said in this chapter is still in the realm of opinion. It is possible that in two hundred years none of it will be acceptable to our less ignorant descendants. No one should think

that prehistory or even ancient history stands still. On the contrary, the older the history, the more it can gain from archaeology and from the discovery and re-interpretation of documents and inscriptions unknown or neglected before. Every discovery of a new fossil of early man is important; every discovery of a cave, every excavation of an early camp site, may alter in fundamental points some of our reconstructed history of early man—whereas even the discovery of a hitherto unknown manuscript or a painting of Leonardo da Vinci would not alter in any important respect our knowledge of the general history of the Italian Renaissance.

❖ The first beginnings of man

THE EVOLUTION OF MAN AS A SPECIES

The evolutionary theory of the origin of man has been greatly modified since Darwin first propounded it in crude form in the middle of the nineteenth century. There are still many inconvenient facts which seem very difficult to explain on the basis of natural selection; and the entire theory, if viewed dispassionately, often seems to a layman so extraordinarily *unlikely* as an explanation of how the present bewildering diversity of natural phenomena, including human beings, did evolve, as to suggest a willful perversity in present-day men. In this age, on principle, we are inclined to prefer even the most far-fetched of material explanations to the possibility of any kind of divine guidance

or intervention, or the fulfillment of any divine purpose. Chance and probability appear to us so much more scientific, and therefore more credible, than a superhuman power and wisdom which could *direct* the course of evolution. This much, however, may be said for the currently fashionable neo-Darwinian theory—it cannot be disproved, and it explains reasonably well what we know of early man and of his biological inheritance from the animal world. Whether it is likely to be true can only be left to the judgment of the individual.

According to this theory, those species of living organisms which were best fitted to survive in their environment did survive, and were gradually modified in form by the process of mutation, a process which can be observed in the laboratory in the case of certain animals. The ancestors of man were not those most specialized and suitable for a particular environment. On the contrary, they were more “generalized” and adaptable. From time to time new mutations appeared in the species, and those creatures that could survive best in a changed environment did so, and propagated, while the older, less adaptable species died out. The huge animals became overspecialized and incapable of adaptation, perhaps in a modified environment, and so became extinct; while the smaller, unspecialized creatures, forced to adapt themselves or perish, developed mutations with survival value. Thus, it is suggested, the ancestors of man first came on to dry land from the ocean, lived for countless aeons in trees, and at last descended to the earth and began to walk upright, in the process increasing their brain capacity. So we arrive at the first real men, the protoanthropi, of whom the oldest so far discovered is the so-called Java man, or *Pithecanthropus erectus*.

EVIDENCE FOR THE ACTIVITIES OF EARLY MAN

Before we deal with the early men known to us from archaeology it should be stated clearly that it is not permissible to use evidence from people who are living today under primitive conditions and assume at once that they are living in the same way as our ancestors of the

Old Stone Age. It is not impossible that these contemporary “primitive” men, though they now use tools recognizably similar to those discovered in ancient deposits, have lost certain knowledge their ancestors once possessed. Their culture would then represent a decline from some higher stage. On the other hand, they may have made some slight progress in ten thousand years, though not as much as civilized man. We can only use our knowledge of these contemporaries of ours to create an imaginative picture of what stone age men were like, and of the life they lived. But it remains an imaginative picture, which may or may not be true to reality, and it cannot be used as evidence in any way the equal of the inferences we may make from the actual remains discovered by archaeologists.

We have just said that the archaeologist has to make inferences. By this it is meant that he unearths objects, not written records; and the objects tell no clear story by themselves. We have before us, say, a dead body painted with ochre in a corner of a cave, and there are tools beside the body, and perhaps food. We infer some kind of primitive religion from the juxtaposition of these objects, but we cannot be certain of the existence of this religion. It has been suggested that such finds prove the existence of a belief in a future life, in which the soul is supposed to return to earth to use the tools he used once in life and to eat the food left for him; or, alternatively, that he needs these things for his use in a future life. But such a conclusion as this can never be proved true, and, as a result, archaeologists are frequently at odds with each other, and wide agreement is rare. Perhaps the tools were considered to be a part of the man's personality; perhaps they were believed to bring bad luck upon anyone who used them after he was dead. The food might be a simple remnant of a funeral feast partaken of by the survivors. The ochre may have been a primitive cosmetic, and the smearing of the corpse a ceremony of no more significance than the attentions lavished upon the American dead by “morticians” in the twentieth century. The objects alone tell us little beyond the fact that such or such objects were in use. All the rest is inference.

As if it were not fortunate enough for

the historian to be compelled to treat with skepticism all conclusions drawn from his knowledge of the present-day world, the simple material evidence provided by archaeological finds must be interpreted for him by archaeologists and anthropologists who differ greatly among themselves. And with good reason, for these men have at their disposal only random finds—an infinitesimal percentage of the human beings who lived and died in the ancient times they are studying. Seldom indeed does an anthropologist have even a full skeleton at his disposal. He may have a jawbone and a thighbone, found in the same area, but he must then decide if they belong together. One very famous "man," endowed with a name, about whom *Life* magazine built a highly circumstantial story, complete with pictures, in 1955, was nothing but an unusual jawbone that could not belong to any known human species. Through the science of comparative anatomy an entire organism was imagined into which the jaw could fit. Thus "Kanam" man came into existence, and was duly photographed by *Life's* cameramen. The information that follows should therefore be regarded only as a summary of present archaeological opinion, fragmentary and incomplete, quite certain to be considerably modified and added to as more discoveries are made.

The two oldest protoanthropi are *Pithecanthropus erectus javanicus* and *Sinanthropus pekinensis* (Java and Peking men respectively), which may be as old as 500,000 B.C. No tools have yet been discovered which can clearly be traced to Java man. On the other hand, Peking man left debris behind him which has been analyzed. From this it seems that he ate the marrow of his fellow men (raw), knew the use of fire—though it is not known whether he used it for cooking—and was already a maker of tools. Some anthropologists claim that Peking man shows certain physical characteristics of later Mongolian peoples; others believe that the Australian aborigines are descended from Java man. Still others assert that ancient men found in Rhodesia, more recent than Java or Peking men, are the ancestors of the South African Bushman. Most anthropologists, however, fight shy of this type of theory, and the majority do not even recognize the better known Neanderthal

man as the direct ancestor of any men of the present day. Some very ancient skulls from England and France (Swanscombe and Fontchévade) appear to resemble those of modern men more than does Neanderthal, giving rise to a theory that the *Homo sapiens* of modern times has a far more ancient ancestry than had hitherto been supposed. As a further illustration of the difficulties of attaining certainty in this disputed field, actual fakes of ancient men have been perpetrated and, for periods of time, accepted as genuine. Such was "Piltdown man," accepted by most anthropologists, though not by all, for several decades, until a more refined technique of chemical analysis revealed the fraud as recently as 1953.

Neanderthal man (a paleoanthropus) is known to archaeologists from a considerable number of finds, the first of which was in the Neander gorge near Düsseldorf, Germany in 1856. He used to be considered as not much more recent than Java or Peking man. At present, however, the tendency is to place the oldest specimens at about 200,000 B.C. Neanderthal man survived until perhaps as late as 70,000 or even 50,000 B.C. Specimens showing only superficial differences have been discovered in many parts of the world. It is therefore probable that Neanderthal (or Neanderthaloid) men wandered over most parts of the earth for a far longer period than any other known men.

Physically, Neanderthal man was the owner of a brain already of a size not greatly inferior to our own. But at the same time he had a curvature of the thighbone even more marked than that of his predecessors, the protoanthropi. He used chipped bone, he flaked flint tools, and he used fire. A kind of all-purpose tool, something between a pick and an ax, and no doubt serving the purpose of both, was in use (called by the French a *coup de poing*, from the fact that it resembles a human fist). Many of the Neanderthal finds have been in caves, where these men lived for at least part of the year. Some of the skeletons seem to have been laid away with care, in the bottom of the caves, with food and implements beside them, suggesting formal burial practices, if not a belief in immortality.

The period when Neanderthal man roamed

the earth is generally called the Lower Paleolithic age—lower because in fossil deposits the lower remains are earlier, and Paleolithic (Old Stone) because all implements were made of either bone or stone. The classification by implements has become conventional, but it is not satisfactory unless one wishes to speak only of the tools used. The development in tools from the Paleolithic to the Neolithic (New Stone) age was far less important than the epoch-making change from food gathering to food producing which characterized these periods.

The whole of the Lower Paleolithic period is placed within the geological age known as the Pleistocene. During this time most authorities recognize four glaciations for Europe and America. The glaciers stretched down as far south as France, making the climate bitterly cold within their range. When they receded, the climate was as warm as, or perhaps even warmer than, now. It is possible that even at the present time we are in an interglacial period, since it is only about 50,000 years since the last glaciers (Würm glaciation) began to recede, not a long time for an interglacial period. They had perhaps not receded to their present position until almost the end of the Upper Paleolithic age.

❖ Upper Paleolithic period

HOMO SAPIENS—CRO-MAGNON AND GRIMALDI (ca. 50,000 B.C.)

We date the Upper Paleolithic period from about 50,000 B.C., with the beginning of *Homo sapiens*, or modern man (*neanthropi*, as distinct from *paleanthropi* and *protoanthropi*). There are many remains dating from this period which can be fairly accurately dated, and successive phases of Upper Paleolithic culture have been agreed upon. The people of this age in Europe, apparently of Caucasian stock, are called Cro-Magnon. Contemporary with them are Grimaldi men found in Southern Europe, who had physical characteristics similar to those of present-day Negroes. Further south in North Africa are other remains of people who had Caucasian features, as have the inhabitants of these areas today. It is considered unlikely that

a full Negro race was present in Southern Europe in Upper Paleolithic times and then disappeared without a trace. Since naturally no hair or skin has survived, it is impossible to say whether Grimaldi man was actually a Negro.

Cro-Magnon man lacked the protruding eyebrow ridge of his predecessors, and, curiously enough, he had a larger brain than present-day man's. The average height of the specimens examined is five feet ten inches. It is, of course, again possible that only the finest specimens have survived. But the physical examination of Cro-Magnon man conclusively proves that the advances made by Neolithic man did not result from the evolution of a physically superior people. Nor can we say anything about the functioning of the brain from the mere measurement of skull capacity. He would indeed be a hardy male who would dare to put forward such a hypothesis today when it is known that the average female skull capacity in our time is some 10 per cent smaller than the male's!

Cro-Magnon experiments in improved living, however, are impressive by any standard. In toolmaking he began to make a more sophisticated use of bone. There were bone knives, pins, needles, fishhooks, and harpoons as well as sharp bone heads for spears. He made heads of bone for ornament, and later also used horn and ivory. The needles suggest that he (or his wife) sewed and stitched garments. But above all he used paints, not only for covering dead bodies, which are often smeared with red ocher, but for the first real art.

THE CAVE PAINTINGS OF CRO-MAGNON MAN

Cave paintings have been discovered in southern France and northern Spain which were undoubtedly made by men in Upper Paleolithic times. The paintings, in which several colors were used, are mostly of animals, though there are a few also of human beings. Controversy has raged fiercely about these paintings ever since they were discovered, and indeed there are many problems connected with them.

Paintings were sometimes superimposed upon one another; they are often on the walls near the roof of the caves. They obviously were not made to be admired by human beings. How

This photograph shows one of the cave paintings at Altamira, Spain, as it actually appears. Notice that the same portion of the wall is occupied by several animals, and that it is difficult to distinguish between them.



did the artists obtain enough light to be able to make their paintings in such dim, almost inaccessible corners? No primitive torch could give our own artists enough light to duplicate them, even if they could manage, as these early artists manifestly could, to do without living models. There are paintings which are so far from the ground that elaborate scaffolding must have been erected, since the floor does not seem to have sunk since Paleolithic times.

All Paleolithic men lived by hunting and food gathering. They were dependent for their subsistence on manual skills and observation. Living in caves or crude huts, they necessarily moved from place to place as hunting grounds became exhausted or as the climate changed. They lived in the same world as the animals, but had not yet learned to make use of them except for food.

❖ Mesolithic period, ca. 12,000 B.C.

The period following the decline of the great ages of cave painting but preceding the Neolithic Revolution is called the Mesolithic age. Until recently, largely through simple lack of information, it was thought that there was nothing especially worth recording of the long period of several thousand years that marked the transition from the Upper Paleolithic to the revolutionary developments of the Neolithic age.

The domestication of the dog, first authenticated in this period, was regarded as the sole major event, perhaps because it was the prelude to the domestication of other animals characteristic of the Neolithic age. But it was in this period that the glaciers receded for the last time, drastically altering the way of life of the Mesolithic peoples as it altered the climate and landscape. It was therefore no accident that the Mesolithic cultures largely relied upon food gathering in the ocean, since the temperature of the oceans had risen so far that this new way of living was open to them. The climate also favored the accumulation of peat bogs, and the well-preserved material of peat bogs (especially in Ireland and northern Europe) has permitted an accurate reconstruction of the life of the period.

Mesolithic man was less dependent on the vagaries of wild game than his predecessors. He had a more varied diet from the birds of the air and the fish of the sea; and it seems that nomadism declined as a consequence, thus perhaps preparing the way for the Neolithic Revolution. Tools were improved by the use of small stones (microliths), which were hafted and no longer used by themselves. Barbed fishhooks and harpoons are known from this period, as well as numerous weapons suitable for hunting birds. Mesolithic cultures are known in all parts of Europe, which appears to have been, for a brief period, culturally homogeneous. But the next stage of advance, the Neolithic Revolution,



Aerial view of Stonehenge (England). Note how this view emphasizes the fact that these megaliths make up a temple. Beneath the stones at the outer edge of the circle are remains of burials. (COURTESY BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES)

was not to take place first in Europe. It is almost certain that this advance, on the contrary, is to be credited to the peoples of the Near East.

❖ The Neolithic Revolution

When man lived by food gathering and hunting, he was dependent upon his environment. His sole influence upon this environment consisted in his depredations. He could not repair any damage he did to it; his only remedy was to move away. In this respect his life was like that of the animals. If it were not for his art we should be tempted to say that he was still only one of the animals, less specialized and able to make use of tools beyond their capacity, but not yet fully able to use his superior mind to take control of his environment. Control became possible with the conscious growing of plants.

The Neolithic Revolution was a social and intellectual revolution rather than a technical one. Man could have continued, as certain tribes still existing today have continued, to make his living only by food gathering. But he did not. For hundreds of thousands of years he had lived in the same old way, never settling down permanently, building no cities, producing no surplus for a leisured population. Now all these activities became possible.

It is not yet certain when and where the revolution began, nor is it known whether it sprang from a single center and was diffused through other areas. Obviously such a fruitful idea, once it had been thought out, was capable of application by all other peoples in a similar stage of development. Planting sites have been uncovered in many different parts of the world, but opinion is divided on which had priority. Even the dates of the sites uncovered are in dispute.

It is, however, fairly certain that the revolution first occurred in the Near East or possibly in Egypt, and it was many centuries before it spread to Europe.

The obvious possibilities in food growing must have been realized early. All the excavations of Neolithic sites have been of villages or hamlets, small communities presumably living in cooperation. We know nothing about the system of landholding, but certainly a more definite organization was necessary than there had been in the nomadic food-gathering times. In the periods of the year when the crops had been harvested or when they were in the ground, the family must nevertheless remain close to its fields. It could not leave for distant places, as in the past. Crops had to be stored and guarded, and the beasts had to be tended. The result was that more permanent houses of wood and mud were built. Man finally came up above ground.

where he has lived ever since—even though occasionally he has had to go below ground for protection, and may be forced to do so again.

One of the best-preserved Neolithic sites is in Europe, considerably later than the Near Eastern developments but still Neolithic, giving us a fair picture of Neolithic culture as it probably also existed elsewhere. More than a hundred sites have been examined of Swiss lake dwellers who built their houses on piles above lakes and rivers, as well as occasionally in the same style above dry land. The refuse from these houses, dropped into the water and so preserved for future generations, is of the utmost interest. Many different species of plants, vegetables, and fruits were in use, and there were several different kinds of stone tools with wooden handles. These Neolithic peoples, who had learned to spin, used cloth. By this time, however, the bronze age was already in full swing in the Near East, and the first large-scale settlements, the heralds of an urban civilization, had come into being, together with a host of superior inventions.

During the Neolithic period pottery first came into wide use. Almost all known Neolithic communities used it. This was a real invention, probably spread by diffusion from the community that invented it. It had to be discovered that potter's clay can be made to hold its form indefinitely after it has been baked at a fairly high temperature (about 600°C.). The ancient potter molded the clay to whatever shape he (or, as is generally believed, she) desired, then fired it, making this shape permanent. But be-

fore good vases or utensils could be made, the raw material had to be carefully selected, purged of impurities, and, in some cases, supplemented with sand or a similar substance. All these processes were rather complicated, and no doubt took many centuries to perfect. In Neolithic times there is no evidence of the use of the potter's wheel, which in later historic times must have revolutionized the ceramic industry by making large-scale production possible. Crude wheeled vehicles were known as early as 3500 B.C. in Mesopotamia, and it is at about this time that the first pieces of wheel-turned pottery are also known to have appeared. But whether the wheel was invented for use in ceramics or for transport is not yet known.

STONE MONUMENTS—MENHIRS, CROMLECHS, DOLMENS

One feature of the Late Neolithic age in Europe has given rise to controversy at least since the twelfth century A.D., though recent research with scientific techniques has given us new clues. Any visitor to Brittany, Wales, or Salisbury Plain in England is sure to have seen menhirs, large single pillars of stone, and the circles of such stones, which are called cromlechs. Stone slabs or blocks, with other slabs serving as a roof, making a kind of chamber of stones, are not uncommon; these are known as dolmens. The controversy has concerned the purpose of these monuments (which are collectively called megaliths, "large stones"), and most authorities agree that the stones are in



Megaliths at Carnac (Brittany). Note the size of the stones in relation to the size of the man in the left foreground. (COURTESY AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY)

some way connected with the very ancient and natural religion of sun worship.

By far the most impressive of all the Neolithic monuments is Stonehenge on Salisbury Plain in England. This is a circle of megaliths, and is clearly an ancient temple. Close to this temple are burial pits which probably antedate the stone circle itself. The bodies were cremated and the remains buried in these pits.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEOLITHIC REVOLUTION

It will by this time be clear that the Neolithic Revolution was perhaps the most important event in the history of man since he first began to live on dry land. The next great revolution of comparable importance took place only in the nineteenth century, when man first began to use extensively the power of machinery rather than the labor of his own hands and back. From Neolithic times to the Industrial Revolution a condition of universal plenty was never possible, even if men had been able to achieve the social organization required. Every human being can do only a limited amount of work himself in a day. He can produce only a limited surplus, which cannot keep fed and clothed any very large number of people who are not themselves engaged in actual production. The leisured classes in such circumstances must always be strictly limited in number. Improvement in transportation and organization can distribute very widely the surplus of the many producers. But this total surplus can never be very great. This inconvenient fact has conditioned all civilizations between the Neolithic and Industrial revolutions. A small class of leisured people, with their needs and even luxuries provided for, have been the leaders in civilization. In our own times, with the machine harnessed to provide almost unlimited power, plenty for all has at last, and for the first time, become theoretically possible.

Before the Neolithic Revolution man was condemned to live from hand to mouth. He had no means of preserving his food, which had to be killed and eaten as he needed it. He took whatever crops were provided for him by his environment. With the Neolithic Revolution it became possible for some favored people to be

spared the manual labor of farming because each farmer could now produce a small surplus over and above his immediate needs, and this could be used for the support of nonmanual workers. Moreover, it was possible even for the farmer himself to spend at least some of his time in thinking and in cultural activities not immediately connected with his bodily sustenance. Men were now free to turn their attention toward new goals—the better organization of production, the improvement of their social order, and the increase of their technical knowledge, which would in time be used for the production of a new range of materials and manufactured goods.

♦ The beginnings of metallurgy

THE BRONZE AGE (ca. 3500 B.C.)

The earliest development of towns and cities will be considered in the next chapter. With these, and the development of the first written records, we shall have passed out of prehistory into the light of history. But the period that, according to convention, follows the Neolithic Revolution still antedates the first known cities and is characterized by the development of the first use of metals.

Metalworking presupposes a higher degree of social organization than a wholly agricultural hamlet or small village. We shall probably never know who first thought of the use of bronze, or how the invention was made. Bronze, of course, does not appear in nature. It is composed of copper and tin, which must both be smelted to produce bronze. Copper ore can be used in its natural state and can be roughly molded by heating and by other stone age methods. It can thereafter be used without treatment by heat. But copper is never found with tin in a natural state, and tin ore, in addition to being very rare, especially in the Near East where, as far as we know, it was first used, does not look as if it contained any metal at all. What kind of luck was necessary before the idea of bronze could be worked out is difficult to imagine. But the fact is undoubtedly there, awaiting explanation.

Copper tools were known before bronze, but

not long before. Gold was known at the same time, but then, as now, it was primarily used for ornaments, and no doubt "placer-mined" out of river gravels. In some places, therefore, a copper age is recognized before the long-lived bronze age, which only slowly gave way to the age of iron.

THE IRON AGE (ca. 1800 B.C.)

It was at least 2,000 years after the bronze age that the age of iron began. By this time towns and cities and a considerable urban culture had existed for many hundreds of years. Iron in meteoric form had occasionally been molded and beaten into tools before this. Iron ornaments were known long before the first use of terrestrial iron, and their meteoric origin is to be recognized by the high component of nickel always found in this kind of iron. Although iron is so much more common than tin or copper, the process of making steel, the most usable form of the metal, is complex and was not discovered until wrought iron had been in use for many centuries. The processes of extracting tin and copper and bronze founding do not require the extremes of heat necessary for wrought iron nor the long-continued hammering by the blacksmith. There is no reason why a bronze caster should ever discover the use of iron, since his methods would not uncover it. Iron ore would seem quite useless to a bronze worker. Hence, when iron ore was finally smelted and beaten into wrought iron by the muscular activity of the smith, the invention was probably made quite independently of the bronze workers, and made by a people who used or invented the bellows without which the heat necessary for ironworking could not be produced. The Greeks later attributed the invention to a people called the Chalybes in the region now called Armenia, later incorporated into the Hittite Empire. The Hittite kings' monopoly of the product excited the cupidity and envy of their neighbors, and there are records of occasional gifts of iron made by them to friendly potentates.

Once iron had been invented, however, its progress was assured. It was readily available,

and could be used not only by kings, heroes, and nobles, but by common men. It could be used on farms as well as in palaces. Derided as it no doubt was, it was destined to replace bronze for all but decorative purposes until this day.

Suggestions for further reading

PAPERBACK BOOKS

- Childe, V. Gordon. *Man Makes Himself*. NAL, 1936. Somewhat out of date, but probably still the most effective short treatment of the probable stages of development of prehistoric man and his transition to a more settled life.
- Childe, V. Gordon. *What Happened in History*. Penguin, 1942. Supplement to *Man Makes Himself*. Traces development in more detail, including material advances to the time of the Roman Empire.
- Cole, Sonia. *The Prehistory of East Africa*. Penguin.
- Kuhn, Herbert. *On the Track of Prehistoric Man*. Modern Library Paperback.
- Laming, Annette. *Lascaux—Paintings and Engravings*. Penguin. Illustrated booklet giving an account of prehistoric cave paintings in southern France.
- Woolley, Leonard. *Digging up the Past*. Penguin. Useful introduction to the work of archaeologists, by a notable one.

CASEBOUND BOOKS

- Ceram, C. W. *Gods, Graves and Scholars*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1951. Good popular work on the achievements of archaeologists.
- Coon, Carleton S. *The Story of Man: From the First Human to Primitive Culture and Beyond*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954. An anthropologist's account of early man and his society. One of the best in the field, solidly based on our knowledge of the prehistoric finds, but not free from illegitimate inferences from our knowledge of present-day "primitive" men.
- Kroeber, A. L. *Anthropology*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., Inc., 1948. A sound text, containing much supplementary information on the material contained in this chapter.
- Wendt, Herbert. *In Search of Adam*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1956. Very readable account of the progress of archaeology and its successes and failures.



II ♦ THE ANCIENT WORLD



The Pyramids at Gizeh at the time of the inundation of the Nile. (PHOTO BY FUZANI)

View of the Parthenon on the Acropolis at Athens.

The Colosseum, a Roman amphitheatre, constructed by the first two Flavian emperors.



Chronological Chart

THE ANCIENT WORLD

<i>Egypt</i>	<i>Mesopotamia</i>	<i>Hebrews</i>	<i>Greeks</i>	<i>Romans</i>	<i>Century</i>
Neolithic Age	Neolithic Age				5000-3000 B.C.
Old Kingdom	Sumerian cities		Bronze Age in Crete		3000
Middle Kingdom	Amorite conquest of Babylonia	Wanderings of Patriarchs (?)	Height of Minoan civilization	Early invasions of Italy by Indo-Europeans	2000
Hyksos invasion and conquest	Hammurabi's Code				1800
	Kassite rule of Babylonia	Family of Jacob migrates to Egypt (?)			1700
			Mycenaean civilization		1600
Establishment of New Kingdom (1580)					1500
Akhenaton (1377-1360)			Conquest of Crete by Mycenaeans		1400
Rameses II (1301-1234)		Exodus of Israelites (?)			1300
		Era of Judges (1225-1020)	Dorian invasions (1200-1000)		1200
Rameses III (1198-1167)			Fall of Troy (ca. 1184)		1100
		Saul (1020-1004)	Greek settlements in Asia Minor	Terramare peoples in Italy	1000
		David (1004-965)			
		Division of Kingdom of Israel (926)		Etruscans in Italy	900
	Assyrian conquest of Babylon (910)		Homeric poems (850)		800
			Great Age of Miletus (750-550)	Traditional date of founding of Rome (753)	
		Samaria conquered by Assyrians (721)			700

<i>Egypt</i>	<i>Mesopotamia</i>	<i>Hebrews</i>	<i>Greeks</i>	<i>Romans</i>	<i>Century</i>
	Height of Assyrian Empire			Etruscan rule in Rome (616-509)	
Conquest by Assyria (670)	Fall of Assyria (606)	Conquest of Judea by Nebuchadnezzar (586)	Draconian Code (Athens-621)		
	Cyrus, King of Medes, later of Persians (549-530)	Exile in Babylon (586-538)			600
Conquest by Persia (525)			Lycurgan reforms (Sparta-ca. 610)	Establishment of Roman Republic (509)	500
	Darius I (522-486)				
	Alexander the Great (336-323)	Return to Jerusalem (538)	Persian invasions (490-479)	Rome as leader of Latin League (490-430)	400
Conquest by Alexander (332)		Conquest by Alexander (332)	Peloponnesian War (431-404)		
Ptolemy I (323-283)					
	Conquest by Alexander (332)			Samnite Wars (327-290)	300
	Seleucus I (305-280)			Second Punic War (218-201)	200
		Conquest by Antiochus III (198)			
		Revolt of Maccabees (167)			
Caesar in Egypt (48-47)			Macedonia becomes Roman province—Greece under Roman rule (146)	First Triumvirate (60)	100
	Reorganization of Asia by Pompey (66-62)	Conquest by Pompey (63)		Second Triumvirate (43)	
				Reign of Augustus (31 B.C.—A.D. 14)	0 B.C. A.D. 0
Death of Cleopatra (30)		Revolt of Judea and fall of Jerusalem (66-70)		Reign of Vespasian (69-79)	
				Part of Roman Empire	100

The Heritage of the Ancient Near East

❖ Egypt

THE OLD KINGDOM (ca. 3000–2200 B.C.)

It has already been indicated in the last chapter that the Neolithic Revolution first occurred in the ancient Near East. The earliest Neolithic communities known to us are to be found there. It is, indeed, in Mesopotamia that we can first justly speak of civilization, with the beginnings of that kind of culture that can grow only in cities, where there is enough labor available for specialization and enough leisure for strictly cultural pursuits. We should therefore properly start this history of civilization by dealing with the urban culture of Mesopotamia and the city states that fostered it.


Yet in a chapter to be devoted mainly to the achievements of three peoples—the Egyptians, the peoples of Mesopotamia, and the Hebrews—the latter two have such a clear connection that it seems preferable to study Egypt first, in spite of the fact that cultural diffusion, as far as it can be traced, is from Mesopotamia to Egypt rather than the other way round, and Mesopotamia rather than Egypt may more justly be looked upon as the “cradle of civilization.”

Egypt was undoubtedly one of the great civilizations of the world, if only because it persisted so long. At least 2500 years separate the First Dynasty of Egypt from its inglorious end at the hands of the conquering Persians in 525 B.C. During the whole of that period there was little outward change. The fundamental concepts which underlie the Egyptian outlook,

as it is reflected in its institutions and way of life, persist throughout the period. It takes a close and discerning eye to detect those changes that were occurring under the surface, a change from a fundamental optimism to a resigned pessimism, from a concern with this life to an overwhelming concern with the hereafter, from the unquestioned supremacy of the Pharaoh as king-god to a rule by the Pharaoh as titular god by courtesy of an all-powerful priesthood.

These changes can be only briefly indicated in a single chapter devoted to the pre-Greek world.

Ancient Egypt is worth studying for its own sake, in part because of its strangeness. Its fundamental ideas, though alien to ours, nevertheless served to give it a stability our own dynamic Western civilization has hitherto lacked. It is worth studying not because it bequeathed so much to later civilizations but precisely because it did not. The Hebrews derived their cultural heritage almost entirely from the Mesopotamian civilization. They answered questions propounded by the Mesopotamian peoples in a manner which has been found satisfactory by subsequent peoples and has been incorporated even into our own Western tradition by way of Christianity. The Hebrews always believed they had, in their own phrase, “spoiled the Egyptians,” but they had not. Egyptian civilization continued to satisfy the Egyptian people. It had a survival value unique in history; and yet few achievements can be attributed to it that were thought by later peoples to be worth their while to imitate.



he knew *Ma'at*. Literally the word means "harmony," the harmony of the universe, and thus comes to mean, for the Egyptian, everything that is harmonious and in accordance with reality, especially truth and justice. From the earliest times, therefore, the government of Egypt was in the form of a divine monarchy. During his lifetime the king was regarded as Horus, son of Osiris. After death he became Osiris—or perhaps we should say "an" Osiris, since all the monarchs of ancient Egypt were called Osiris after their burial. As Osiris, lord of the afterlife, he was able to help his servants who had been faithful to him on earth, and continued to aid the living. Meanwhile, his successor became a Horus in his turn.

Possessed of authority, perception, and knowledge of heavenly and earthly truth, the king-god was far above man. He made no code of laws; his word, based on his perception, was law. His ministers knew how to judge because he knew their hearts when he chose them for their positions. The whole land of Egypt belonged to him, though in practice, in the Old and Middle Kingdoms, he appears to have taken no material advantage of such ownership. He "made disclosures" rather than asked for advice.

Why the paradox? Was it because Egyptian conditions were peculiar to Egypt and thus its inventions were not transferable elsewhere? Why was the institution of the infallible king-god, the key institution of Egypt, so different from other Oriental despotisms?

Egypt has in ancient and modern times been called the "gift of the Nile." The Nile is a predictable river. It overflows regularly every year, bringing with it not only the life-giving water, but fertile silt which continually enriches the soil of Egypt. Some years the flow is not as high as in others, but always there is an inundation, which appeared to the Egyptians to be the work of heavenly powers. Specifically, these powers were believed to reside in the Pharaoh. He did not predict the rise of the Nile, he caused it. This was by no means the limit of his heavenly powers. He knew the hearts of men, he had access to the wisdom of the spiritual world. To use the untranslatable Egyptian term,



Diorite statue of Khafre, with Horus Falcon behind him. The statue depicts the Pharaoh with the majesty of a god and no sign of human failings.

It does not seem that the people of Egypt groaned under such despotism; indeed there is something to be said for this kind of rule as providing a framework for a certain kind of freedom. There is no doubt that men felt themselves free to rise as far as their talents would take them. When all are equally low in comparison with the monarch, among his servants there is a kind of equality of opportunity as well as equality of status. And from extant inscriptions written by servants of the monarch we can observe a certain pride of achievement, even though the success is correctly ascribed to the favor of the Pharaoh earned by their deeds on his behalf.

We have been accustomed to think of the building of the Pyramids during the Old Kingdom as the work of hundreds of thousands of slaves, since that is the tale given us by the much-read Herodotus, the Greek traveler, who made inquiries from the Egyptian priests more than two thousand years later. Yet there is no contemporary evidence for slavery in the Old Kingdom. Slavery became extensive only in the

later New Kingdom, during the age of foreign conquests. Far more probable is the theory that the Pyramids started during the lifetime of the Pharaoh and completed only after his death, were an act of faith, a labor devoted to ensuring the ascent of the Pharaoh to the heavenly world after his death (we know from the Pyramid texts that this was one of their functions), thus enabling him to continue his beneficent work for the Egyptian people even after he had joined his fellow gods in the heavens. The Pyramids of the Old Kingdom, built with jeweler's precision, with the four corners of the base oriented exactly toward the four points of the compass, were also, of course, a wonderful make-work for the thousands of skilled and unskilled laborers who had little to do at a time when the annual flood was at its height, when the materials could be floated on barges right up to the base of the Pyramid.

In the Old Kingdom of Egypt it would seem that the people enjoyed themselves, that they expected the afterlife to be just like this one, secure in the knowledge that if they had served



Model of the Great Pyramid complex, constructed by The Metropolitan Museum of Art. Note the impressive mortuary temples leading up to the pyramid itself. (COURTESY THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART)

well in this life the Pharaoh would ensure their continued service in the hereafter. There seems to have been no special attention paid to ceremonial burial with support from spells and charms, so characteristic of the later period of Egypt that we associate it particularly with the Egyptians. In short, since the Nile did indeed bless the people of Egypt and provide them with an easy living and reasonable prosperity at a time when there was no overpopulation, when there were no foreign invaders and Egypt was a secure and self-sufficient community, it is not surprising that all Old Kingdom art breathes an air of confidence and self-satisfaction. It is perhaps also not surprising that the great creative achievements of Egyptian civilization—the hieroglyphic writing and alphabet (rarely used but certainly known to the priests), the Pyramids, the characteristic art forms, and the divine monarchy—were all the work of the Old Kingdom. The belief in the eternal stability of the world, the fundamental changelessness of a static universe, likewise was formulated and accepted at this time; and not all the vicissitudes of later eras ever served altogether to dispel this belief.

FIRST INTERMEDIATE PERIOD (ca. 2200–2000 B.C.)

But change at last did come into this changeless land. A Pharaoh named Pepi II lived to an advanced age and apparently lost his grip on the government. Already before his death some of the nobles of Upper Egypt became virtually independent, while foreigners infiltrated into Lower Egypt from the sea and the desert. For almost two hundred years the divine monarch controlled only a small part of Egypt. The old capital of Memphis in Lower Egypt and the later capital of Thebes in Upper Egypt were alike lost to the titular Pharaoh, who now ruled only a small territory around Heracleopolis.

What is of interest to us in this period is the effect change had upon the people who experienced it. From documents of the period we learn that it was widely said that *Ma'at* (order and harmony) had disappeared from the world, everything was topsy-turvy and upside down.

The land, said a priest, "spins around like a potter's wheel." There is no evidence that it was a planned revolution, although its effects were revolutionary in the deepest sense. Possibly the nobles, now independent, rejoiced, but as far as we can judge the people were shocked. When a divine government fails, what is to take its place?

During this time the nobles began to appropriate to themselves texts that had previously been used only for the dead Pharaoh. They began to use the royal funerary customs for themselves, and soon we find what are called "coffin texts" rather than Pyramid texts. The Egyptians, who had scarcely believed that foreigners were human beings at all, now realized to their cost that these foreigners had to be dealt with as if they were. We possess a dialogue between one of the Pharaohs of this time and a minister, in which the minister presumes even to criticize his master for not having given sufficient attention to his land in spite of his heavenly knowledge. The Pharaoh can only agree that he ought to have known and done better.

But at last the anarchy was over. A prince of Thebes in Upper Egypt reunified the country under his control and established Thebes as the capital. The writers breathed a sigh of relief. *Ma'at* had been restored to the land. So the Middle Kingdom began, under the leadership of the great Pharaoh Amenemhat I.

THE MIDDLE KINGDOM (ca. 2000–1792 B.C.)

The Middle Kingdom represented essentially an attempt to restore the conditions of the Old Kingdom. The intermediate period was forgotten and *Ma'at* prevailed again. Once more there were peace and prosperity in the land. But the recent troubles had had a peculiar effect on the monarchy.

The Pharaoh was revered as a king-god as before. All the ceremonial and ritual of the divine monarchy was retained. But the Pharaoh himself may well not have believed the myth any longer. How should he, after the failure of the monarch in the two previous centuries? We see from the texts a new concern for social justice, the Pharaoh regarding himself as a

Chronological Chart

Egypt

Neolithic Age	ca. 5000-3000	New Kingdom: Period of Empire —Dynasties xviii-xx	1570-1090
Old Kingdom: Dynasties i-vi	ca. 3000-2200	Conquest of Syria and part of Mesopotamia	1468
First Intermediate Period: Dynasties vii-xi	ca. 2200-2000	Religious revolution of Akhenaton	ca. 1377-1360
Reconquest of north by Theban princes	2050-2000	Restoration by Tutankhamon	ca. 1360
Middle Kingdom: Dynasty xii	ca. 2000-1792	Rameses ii (captivity and exodus of Israelites?)	1301-1234
Second Intermediate Period: Hyksos Invasion—Dynasties xiii-xvii	ca. 1800-1550	New Kingdom: Post-imperial period—Dynasties xxi-xxx	ca. 1090-525
Reconquest of Egypt by Theban princes	1580-1550	Conquest by Assyria	ca. 670
		Conquest by Persia	525
		Conquest by Alexander the Great	332

Mesopotamia

Neolithic Age	ca. 5000-4500	Battle of Carchemish—End of Assyrian Empire and annihilation of Assyrians	606
Early Copper Age	ca. 4500-3000		
Invention of writing	ca. 3500	Chaldeans and New Babylonians	
Early Sumerian cities (Bronze Age)	3000-2400	Conquest of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar	586
Semitic conquests of Mesopotamia		Fall of Babylon to Persians	538
Akkadians (Sargon)	2400-2200	Persian Empire	
Guti	2200-2000	Zoroaster the Prophet	ca. 600
Amorites	2000-1750	Cyrus of Persia accepted as king by Medes	549
Hammurabi Code	1800	Conquest of Egypt (Cambyses)	525
Kassites	1750-910	Reorganization of Persia by Darius i	522-486
Assyrian Empire		First Persian expedition to Greece (Darius)	490
Conquest of Babylon	910	Second Persian expedition to Greece (Xerxes)	480-479
Conquest of Samaria and deportation of Ten Tribes	721	Persian influence in Greece	410-338
Conquest of Egypt by Esar-Haddon	670	Conquest of Persia by Alexander the Great	330
Fall of Nineveh to Medes, Chaldeans, and Scythians	612		

Hebrews

Wanderings of Hebrew patriarchs (?)	2000-1700	Period of Judges in Israel	1225-1020
Family of Jacob migrates to Egypt (?)	1700	Saul, king of Israel	1020-1004
Exodus of Hebrews from Egypt (?)	1260	David	1004-965
		Solomon	965-926
		Division of kingdom of Israel	926

Hebrews

Fall of Samaria to Assyrians	721	Conquest by Romans under Pompey, ruled by family of Herods, clients of Romans	63
Fall of Jerusalem; Exile in Babylon	586		
Return of Jews to Jerusalem	538	Direct rule by Romans	A.D. 6-41
Building of the new temple	520-516	Jewish revolt against Romans	66-70
Conquest of Palestine by Alexander the Great (part of Ptolemy I's domain)	332	Destruction of Jerusalem by Titus	70
Palestine conquered by Antiochus III of Syria	198	Jerusalem rebuilt under name of Aelia Capitolina; Jews not permitted to live in it; Judaea remains Roman province	135
Revolt of Maccabees against Antiochus IV	167		

Dates (except those for the last four entries) are before Christ. Earlier dates are disputed; others may be a year out.

Chief authority used: G. E. Wright and F. V. Filson, eds., *Westminster Historical Atlas to the Bible* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1945), and J. A. Wilson, *The Burden of Egypt* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. vii-viii.

shepherd of the people rather than their unquestioned master. The royal sculpture now depicts these monarchs as careworn individuals rather than majestic supermen.


In the Middle Kingdom also texts appear stressing that the afterlife with the blessed will be a reward for good deeds performed upon earth. But at the same time far more attention was already being paid to ceremonial funerary practices for as many of the people as could afford them. There is a great necropolis at Abydos where nobles and commoners are buried together. Clearly it was no longer believed, as in the Old Kingdom, that the Pharaoh had the power to take those of his servants with him into the afterworld who had served him well. The people evidently began to believe, as they so clearly believed in the New Kingdom, that they had to look out for their own personal immortality, and could no longer rely upon their divine monarch for this service.

SECOND INTERMEDIATE PERIOD AND THE NEW KINGDOM (1792-525 B.C.)

Rise of Egyptian Empire The period of prosperity and peace during the Middle King-

dom was rudely broken by a new series of invasions by a people known to history as the Hyksos, whose origins are obscure. This conquest was a real conquest by foreigners, not by native Egyptians; and though the Hyksos rulers usurped the Egyptian throne and tried to behave in every way like their Egyptian predecessors, it is clear that they were never accepted as legitimate rulers, however well they in fact ruled the land. Over parts of Upper Egypt their rule was only nominal, however, and in due course it was again a prince of Upper Egypt, Ahmose I, who drove them out and re-established the divine monarchy. The rest of the period of Egyptian independence is called the New Kingdom, though in fact many of the rulers in later centuries were also foreigners who usurped the throne.

The new rulers of Egypt, determined that never again should there be any such conquest as that of the Hyksos, finally decided on an expansion of their own. Under Thutmose III the Egyptians conquered Palestine and Mesopotamia as far as the Euphrates. The results for Egypt were far from an unmixed blessing. The Egyptians came into contact with foreigners, losing forever their sense of isolation and self-



sufficiency; prisoners of war were brought into Egypt and put to work on the great monuments built by the victors. It was during the New Kingdom that the Israelites were enslaved and made to "build bricks without straw." As always when there are many slaves in a country the wages of free labor declined catastrophically, and there was a distinct cleavage between rich and poor that had been missing before.

The religious and political revolution of Akhenaton It was not unnatural that this period should have seen the rise of the priesthood to increased power. Not only did the imperial war-god Amon-Re receive the patronage of the warrior Pharaohs, but the popular religion of Osiris, which was concerned with individual resurrection in the hereafter, became stronger than ever before. This popular religion maintained its hold to the very end of Egyptian independence, so that it was possible for Herod-


otus to describe the Egyptians as the "most religious of peoples." It may be surmised that the conditions of the present life on earth were such that a blessed afterlife seemed more than ever desirable and worth making sacrifices on earth to attain. The priesthood was not slow to respond. They were willing to mummify the bodies of all who could pay for the service, and they sold spells and charms to accompany the dead man on his journey into the afterworld. Especially in the late period of the empire, when all was not going so well with the Egyptians as during their first expansion, there is noticeable a great increase in superstition and fear of the dangers of the afterlife. No longer, as in the Old Kingdom and for a long time thereafter, was there a confident expectation of a continuance of the good life after death. On the contrary, there was a fear of monsters, a fear of being made to walk upside down or of doing forced labor, a fear that the soul would not

properly separate from the body, and above all a fear that one would not know the right answers to the questions asked by the inquisitors in the underworld. A "declaration of innocence" had to be made to them in the proper form. For a consideration the priests were willing to supply to the faithful charms and spells which would enable them to pass the ordeal safely.

It is not surprising, then, that a religious reformer should have arisen, who tried to take away some of the power of both Amon-Re and Osiris and of their priesthoods. This was the Pharaoh Akhenaton (ca. 1377-1360 B.C.), or Amenhotep IV, as he was known prior to his apostasy. This reformer was able to suppress the imperial religion of Amon-Re for the duration of his reign, and substitute the worship of the sun disk, the Aton, whom Akhenaton regarded as the one true god. Thus his religion, like the new art of his period, was naturalistic. The

Pharaoh and his family are portrayed as human beings with ordinary human passions and pleasures, an extraordinary change from the traditional formalism of Egyptian art. The Pharaoh built himself a city which he named after his god, and there he took his courtiers and those who were willing to follow him, while the priesthood bided its time. Akhenaton seems also to have attempted to suppress or at least keep within bounds the growth of the popular Osirian religion, though here we have little evidence to show how far he was successful.

Decline and fall of the New Kingdom Unfortunately for his successors, Akhenaton was so deeply absorbed in his political and religious reform that he neglected to secure his empire. There is extant a large number of letters written to him by his generals, demanding that he bestow on the empire some of his attention. But



The New Kingdom Pharaoh Thutmose III destroying his enemies. Note the gigantic size of the Pharaoh and the conventional puniness of his enemies.





The Pharaoh Akhenaton worshipping. Note how he himself offers worship to the sun god Aton, whose rays enfold him, while his family, at a lower eminence, appear to be worshipping the Pharaoh rather than Aton. (COURTESY CAIRO MUSEUM)

he paid no heed, and when he died peacefully at an early age, almost all classes in the empire were against the regime, and it seems probable that only the special sanctity of the throne prevented an armed revolt. The new Pharaoh, seeing the way the wind was blowing, quickly came to terms with the priesthood. The old religion was restored and the name of Akhenaton blotted from the Egyptian records. Soon afterward an army general succeeded to the throne.

Thereafter it was difficult for the monarchs to keep the empire intact. Rameses II, a great builder and, in his own opinion, a great warrior, exhausted the resources of Egypt in wars against the rising Hittites in the north (a war concluded

by the first extant treaty in history), and in his building program. Soon thereafter the Egyptians were confined within their own borders. Several foreign monarchs occupied the Egyptian throne, there was a short-lived conquest of Egypt by the rulers of Assyria, and finally, in 525 B.C., a conquest by the Persians. Two hundred years later Egypt was again won by Alexander the Great, whose successors, the Ptolemies, were Macedonians, as was Cleopatra, the last of their line. Finally, Egypt fell to the Romans. As the Hebrew Ezekiel had prophesied, no more princes of the land of Egypt arose (until the twentieth century A.D.).



Two collars of beads. The one at the top dates from the XIth Dynasty, the one at the bottom from the XVIIIth. More than seven hundred years separate these two collars, yet the design is the same, suggesting something of Egyptian conservatism. (COURTESY THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART)

THE VALUES OF EGYPT—HER LEGACY TO LATER CIVILIZATIONS


The Greeks considered Egypt the repository of all ancient wisdom, and they accorded to her a respect which was perhaps undeserved. While we may now admire the civilization of the Egyptians, it sometimes makes us impatient that they made so little progress, that the great achievements of the Old Kingdom were not treated as the beginning of an ascending path, a fine start to be built upon rather than a Golden Age of glory to be looked back upon and forever imitated. It was a civilization that looked backward and decayed, as distinct from the picture familiar to us of a Western civilization that looks forward and strives forward, but is chaotic and unstable. If we assume that it is an inborn characteristic of man to wish to advance, it is perhaps well to realize that it was not a characteristic of the ancient Egyptians. Toynbee, in studying Egyptian civilization, was hard put to it to discover his challenges and responses and succeeded in devising a pattern satisfactory to him only by doing grave

violence to the facts of Egyptian history. The Marxian interpretation of history finds little confirmation in Egypt. We are thus left with a phenomenon which seems ultimately to be explained only in terms of itself—that the Egyptians, unlike ourselves, neither wished to advance nor succeeded in doing so after a brilliant start. Yet their civilization endured for twenty-five centuries.

❖ Mesopotamia

THE SUMERIANS

Primitive democracy—The temple community Mesopotamian civilization, on the other hand, was far from stable. This instability parallels, and may in part be explained by, the difference between the rivers of Mesopotamia and the Egyptian Nile. The Tigris and the Euphrates did not overflow regularly, though it was possible to use them for irrigation. The climate was far from equable. Sometimes there were severe rainstorms and hailstorms, which




Jewelry from the graves of two ladies-in-waiting of the Queen of Ur, 3500–2500 B.C. Made of gold, carnelian, and lapis lazuli, this jewelry is the oldest known in the world up to the present time, but the skill shown presupposes long development in craftsmanship from prehistoric times. (COURTESY THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART)

destroyed the crops; sometimes it was so hot as to be almost unbearable. The country, which was marked by no obvious boundaries, lay wide open to invasion from all sides, and history reveals a constant flow of conquerors who ruled the land between the two rivers. But, as in Egypt, the basic components of the culture and the vast majority of its inventions were provided by the first people to settle in the land from without. These were the Sumerians, a people whose origins are still obscure, known to themselves simply as the "black-headed people."

When they first become known to history they lived in self-governing communities in the lower part of the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. There is evidence that government of these states evolved from what may be called a primitive democracy, or rule by elders with the consent of the people, to temple communities where the city-god was the official owner and ruler of the city but governed through an official called a *sangu*, or steward, who managed the god's property and performed

the functions of both priest and king. When the small temple communities, perhaps described best as large villages, coalesced into larger units, this official became an *ensi*, presumably with several *sangus* under him and each responsible for his own smaller community and its temple. When for purposes of defense or for other reasons a number of cities united, then a true king or *lugal* ruled over them, without disrupting the local administration that had preceded his advent. The *ensi* may therefore best be considered as the ruler of a city-state, while the *lugal* ruled either a league of city-states or one city-state dominating a number of smaller ones. Even in the largest of the Sumerian governmental entities and in all the regimes that succeeded them, the ruler continued to exercise what was in theory a stewardship in relation to the gods. In theory it was always the gods who ruled in Mesopotamian countries, while the king was only their representative or steward on earth. The Mesopotamian ruler was never a god himself, as in Egypt, though there are some texts extant which suggest that certain kings did attribute to themselves divine qualities.

Scientific and literary achievements The Sumerians are almost certainly the inventors of writing, although it was the Egyptian method of writing on papyrus with picture signs that was taken over by later peoples, rather than the more cumbersome Sumerian method of cutting wedges into clay and baking the clay. The Sumerian cuneiform signs, however, did evolve from pictures in the same way as the Egyptian script, although quite early the Sumerian pictures became so stylized as to be unrecognizable as pictures. The Sumerians developed also the characteristic *ziggurat* form for their temples, and this was used by the later Babylonians, Assyrians, and Chaldeans. The most famous *ziggurat* is the temple of Marduk described by Herodotus in the Babylon of his day, famous for its Hanging Gardens. The Sumerians were skilled architects and knew all the basic architectural forms used by later peoples—the dome, the arch, and the vault. Building largely in brick, they displayed much ingenuity in using this material in different ways to solve their architectural problems. Finally, the Sumerians



are noted for their mathematical system, no doubt developed because of their commercial needs, which was based on the number 60 rather than 10 (our own decimal system), but was a true positional system like ours and unlike the systems of the Greeks and Romans. The mathematical tradition thus begun by the Sumerians persisted throughout Mesopotamian history. Successors of the Sumerians divided the circle into six units of 60 degrees, and the great astronomical achievements of the later Chaldeans, which provided the raw material for Hellenistic science, were solidly based on the work done so early in history by the Sumerians.

The Sumerian city-states also developed the first written law known to us. The famous Hammurabi Code granted to the Babylonians by the Amorite king Hammurabi at a much later date is drawn from various Sumerian codes known to us only in fragmentary form. These fragments, however, are quite enough to show that already long before Hammurabi the customs of the different states had been crystallized into law, and appropriate penalties and means of enforcement had been devised.



Cuneiform tablet recording expenditure and distribution of grain and animals. (COURTESY THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART)

The fundamental myths of the peoples of Mesopotamia also derive from the Sumerians. The Creation story, known to us best in the Hammurabi version, dates from Sumerian times, although only a few fragments remain from the earlier period. In the Hammurabi version Marduk, the supreme Babylonian god, destroys Tiamat, the goddess of chaos, then creates the world and man, who is created solely for the purpose of working for the gods and thus setting the gods free from labor. The Flood story, to be found in the Epic of Gilgamesh and copied by the Hebrews with alterations, was likewise Sumerian. It may therefore be appropriate to deal here with the Sumerian attitude to life as evidenced in these stories and other extant Sumerian literature, rather than describe this attitude as it appears in the later Babylonian and Assyrian literature. The details may be changed amongst these later peoples, but the framework laid down by the early Sumerians persists, and there is no fundamental change before the conquest of Mesopotamia by Cyrus the Persian and its incorporation into the huge Persian Empire.

Attitude to life If a generalization can be made of the Mesopotamian attitude to life it may be said that it was basically pessimistic, as distinct from the initial optimism of the Egyptians. The Creation story shows that man's purpose in the universe is solely to serve the gods, to set the gods free from the labor they had hitherto performed. Man has no rights against the gods, who may be as arbitrary and unjust as they wish. Man has no recourse against them. The gods expect men to do their will. Unfortunately, however, they did not trouble to inform men of just what was desired of them. It was the primary duty of the king, as we have seen, to act as the representative of the gods on earth, primarily of the city-god to whom the city owed especial allegiance. The king, therefore, had the responsibility of finding out what the gods required of their people. There is a very interesting cylinder seal extant on which are recorded the efforts of an ensi of Lagash, named Gudea, to discover just what kind of temple should be built to the city-god and his spouse. Gudea had first been informed of the god's

wishes in a dream, but he made a considerable effort to check his interpretation by various means. When the state was too large for the king to be expected to carry out such a task himself, it became necessary to have a professional priesthood, whose chief task it was to examine whatever signs were available to determine the will of the gods and communicate it to the king, who himself would usually have to perform the particular duties demanded. Thus grew up various practices of divination, such as examining the livers of freshly killed chickens kept for the purpose, watching the flight of birds, interpreting dreams, and, finally, observing the movements of the heavenly bodies, which had the great advantage that they could be predicted a long time in advance. This latter, of course, gave rise to astrology, and ultimately, as a by-product, to true astronomy.

Even the great kings of Assyria, terrifying and powerful conquerors as they appeared to others, were nevertheless constrained to obey the orders of the gods. Their only recourse against the priesthood was to query their interpretations. This it was possible to some extent to do, since the various interpretations were written down in books which could be consulted as well by the king as by the priests. There are texts extant of state letters of the Assyrian monarchs to their priests in which it is asked whether the interpretation is correct that the king must undergo a ritual shaving or stay in a reed hut in the desert for a time. The king, in Mesopotamian thought, besides being their monarch, was a kind of scapegoat for the people. Ritual atonement had first of all to be performed by him, and sometimes by him alone on behalf of the people. All such notions stemmed from the belief that the king was a representative of the gods on earth, that his power was not absolute but limited by a necessary submission to the will of the gods, and that both he and his people were expected to make their primary duty in life the carrying out of the gods' behests. All such ideas are to be found again in Hebrew thought, significantly changed but, in spite of the change, easily recognizable.

The Epic of Gilgamesh, the first of the great poems of quest (cf. the *Odyssey*, *Parzifal*) throws more light on the Sumerian attitude

toward the gods. Though many themes are intermingled in the poem, the central theme is the search for the plant of immortality by Gilgamesh, the king of Uruk. Faced with the death of a beloved friend, Gilgamesh asks himself why men die, and whether there is any way of attaining immortality without death. At last he finds the plant of immortality, only to have it stolen by a serpent, so that thereafter the serpent has immortality (sheds its skin), while man does not. There is no reason given, as there is no true reason why the god Enlil should have wished to destroy mankind in the Flood, a subsidiary story also to be found in the Epic of Gilgamesh. The same question of why man must die is asked by Gilgamesh in another poem which is authentically Sumerian, though only known in a fragment. Here Gilgamesh is told that the gods have given him valor and renown in the world, but this is to be his only solace. There is no immortality. Unlike the Egyptians, who pictured the afterlife as similar to life on earth, the Mesopotamian afterlife is pictured as a dreary existence for shades. This conception of the afterlife is faithfully reflected in the Hebrew picture of Sheol.

All Mesopotamian thought accepts the idea that man is rewarded or punished on earth in accordance with his earthly deeds. He does not, like the Egyptian, have to buy spells or charms. The king and all the people are expected to know what the gods desire and to perform what is required of them. The gods do not require deeds that are ethical, as the Hebrew prophets insisted; they do not ask, like Micah, for man "to do justly and to love mercy and to walk humbly with thy god." They have certain duties to perform, and it is the task of the king and priests to discover what those duties are. Appropriate sacrifices and rituals must be performed. If they are not performed the gods will punish, even though the people were never given any clear indication what, actually, was demanded. Thus, in essence, they are punished for their ignorance. The Hebrews likewise thought that God required the keeping of the Law, the performance of certain rituals, behavior according to certain recognized norms of conduct. The Hebrews likewise were punished if they did not obey the commands of God. But

there was a great difference between the attitude of God and the attitude of the Mesopotamian gods. The latter kept men in ignorance, and treated them as slaves who were not expected to know the reasons for their punishment; whereas the Hebrew God was a loving father who instructed his children and tried to bring them up in the way they should go. Thus again we see how the Mesopotamian peoples raised the problem but did not solve it. Their assumption was that the gods made demands of man and expected obedience; they did not attain to the Hebrew thought that God laid down eternal laws of behavior and punished disobedience to them—still less that God asked ethical behavior from man over and beyond the prescribed dictates of the Law.

The Mesopotamian peoples also were bedeviled by the fact that there were so many gods, whose demands might be contradictory. There was no supreme god, although the god Marduk of Babylon sometimes in the texts approaches this position. There were not only the great gods, representing natural forces, but there were local gods for particular cities and even personal gods, possessed of little power but sometimes able to intercede on behalf of their worshipers. A late prayer points up the dilemma in no uncertain terms when the penitent asks that the fury of not only his own god and goddess be quieted toward him, but also the fury of all the gods whom he "knows or does not know," and for all the transgressions which he "knows or does not know." And the last Chaldean king of Babylon is shown to us as trying to make an image which will be a composite of all the gods in an apparent last desperate effort to achieve some kind of unity. This incident, of course, is referred to in the famous passage in the Book of Daniel where the three Hebrews alone in the city refuse to worship this image and are cast into the "burning fiery furnace." (Daniel: 3)

AMORITE CONQUEST

The Sumerian city-states submitted to their first conquest when a certain Sargon of Agade unified them from the north (ca. 2400 B.C.) and introduced them to the Semitic language of

Akkadian, which was ultimately to supersede the older Sumerian. After Sargon's death, however, the Sumerian cities regained their independence, though intermittently they had to submit to another northern tribe known as the Gutti. However, about 2000 B.C. a more permanent conquest ensued, with the capture of the village of Babylon by the Amorites, a desert people. Babylon was elevated into the capital of the whole territory, and later Amorite rulers made what had been the land of Sumer into a considerable empire stretching far to the north of the territory of the old city-states. Thereafter it is more accurate to speak of the Babylonian Empire, by which term the whole of the Mesopotamian civilization is more commonly known.

Hammurabi Code—General characteristics

Hammurabi is the most famous of the Amorite kings of Babylon. He derived his fame largely from the Code which bears his name, though, as has been suggested earlier, it was by no



A stele showing Hammurabi receiving his code of laws from the sun god Shamash, who was also the god of justice. The code itself is inscribed on the stele. (COURTESY THE LOUVRE)

means original with him. It seems clear that the king regarded his Code as one of the means of unifying his motley empire. The Code therefore is a composite of many Sumerian codes, with the addition of new material especially suitable for an imperial structure. No doubt this accounts for the unevenness of the Code, which in some parts is enlightened, even by modern standards, while in others it appears to us to be both barbarous and based on a very peculiar kind of logic. Most often quoted are sections like that which requires that if a house collapses, killing the son of the owner, the son of the architect who built the house shall be put to death, not the architect himself—for whom it might in our day be considered an excessive penalty, though not inherently an unjust one.

Nature of Babylonian justice Certain features of Babylonian society do emerge clearly from the Code. Justice was unequal. The population was divided into three classes: nobles, free commoners, and serfs and slaves. Crimes against nobles were dealt with more severely than those against the lower classes; but nobles themselves were also in many cases dealt with more severely if they had committed the crime. Property seems to have been rated above human life; crimes against property usually being treated more severely. Even accidental homicide was regarded as a crime against the victim's family and compensated accordingly. Murder was not a crime against the state but against the person. Aliens were treated liberally; women held a relatively high position; and there were extensive regulations for industry and trade, as might be expected in a commercial civilization. Noteworthy is the fact that private tenure of land seems to have been the rule, unlike the system described for the Sumerian city-states. Peasants were sharecroppers or serfs as before; but, in addition to the priests, the government and nobles now owned the land. This probably reflects the changed conditions under a conquering house of invaders, who would not necessarily respect the arrangements made by deities for their sustenance, even while they accepted the general divine order decreed by them. The sharecroppers were protected by law against eviction before the end of the contract year—

as before under the regime of the gods—and against obligation to pay full rent if the crop failed.


Social provisions There are many provisions governing marriage in the Code. Evidently, marriage was a legal contract in Babylonia. Though the wife was the legal property of her husband and brought a marriage gift to him, she had some rights, being permitted to return to her father if ill-treated by her husband. Although marriage was ordinarily for life, divorce was permissible; the bridal gift would be returned with her, and she would keep the custody of the children. Women were allowed to engage in business, and had as many business rights as men. However, if the husband fell into debt, the wife could be sold as payment for it. There are severe penalties for adultery and other sexual offenses.

Significance and influence If we knew more about the earlier law codes and, as said earlier, if we knew how it was administered, we could comment with more confidence upon the significance of this Code and how far it represented an advance upon earlier thinking. But the correspondence of Hammurabi shows at least that he took his duties very seriously. Quite trivial disputes he investigated himself, and there are several instances of his sending back cases for retrial, as well as handing down decisions himself. There can be little doubt that the parts of the Code which stem from Hammurabi and Babylon represent a codification of existing practices in the commercial civilization of Babylonia. It cannot, however, be described truly as the first secular legislation. It is significant that it was represented as having divine sanction and as being unalterable, and that it was enforced by the authority of both the ruler and the gods. Legislation that was truly secular, and subject to change by duly authorized legislators, did not arise until the time of the Romans. Even the Greeks entrusted their basic legislation to individuals who were expected to consult the Delphic oracle before they promulgated it. Men who proposed to modify the laws ran the risk of severe penalties if their proposals were rejected.

It is certain that both the Hammurabi Code and the whole Mesopotamian legal tradition had a marked influence upon the Hebrew law of a far later epoch, especially upon those parts of the Hebrew codes which seem to be the most ancient. Here no fewer than thirty-five provisions out of fifty are similar. Even the language in both has marked resemblances. The probable explanation is the influence the legal tradition had upon Canaanites and other peoples of Palestine rather than any direct borrowing by the Hebrews. The Hebrews would naturally adopt some of the customs of the Canaanites; and if, as seems probable, there were already Israelites in Palestine before the exodus of the captives from Egypt, during the reunion of the two branches of the people after the exodus each branch would absorb something of the customs and laws from the other.

THE ASSYRIAN EMPIRE (910-606 B.C.)

Not long after the reign of Hammurabi Babylonia again fell upon evil times, the city of Babylon falling to the barbarian Kassites who held it precariously until its conquest in 910 B.C. by the Assyrians, whose empire deserves more than a passing mention. The Assyrians had long been resident in northern Babylonia, and at times had been subjected to Babylonian rule. Toward the end of the first millennium B.C., however, a number of Assyrian rulers began to establish a military tradition, training their not very numerous people for war. It was not long before the trained Assyrian army began to expand and conquer its neighbors. The Assyrian rulers adopted a policy of extreme harshness, for which they have been known in all subsequent times—in part because their final defeat




and extinction as a people invites the easy attention of the moralist. At the height of their power the Assyrians had conquered as far south as Egypt, had forced Judah to pay tribute, and had deported the peoples of northern Israel, exchanging them for other peoples from their extensive empire (the "lost ten tribes of Israel").

Their conquests and methods, however, so aroused their neighbors, as well as the half-subdued peoples in their empire, that a coalition was formed against them. This coalition the Assyrians could defeat in battle, but not without some losses which they could not afford. In the end Nineveh, their capital, was captured (612 B.C.)—celebrated in the Bible by the book of the prophet Nahum—and the Assyrians were exterminated. Though the Babylonians survived, there has been no trace of any Assyrian people as a people since that time. In spite of their fate, however, the Assyrians undoubtedly did prepare the way for later, better organized, and more humane empires in the territory they had conquered. They did improve communications, if only to ensure the collection of the tribute they imposed on their victims; and, very important

to us, they collected in the great library of Assurbanipal in Nineveh cuneiform documents from all over the Near East. Since no ancient people dared to lay sacrilegious hands upon the "cursed" site of Nineveh, they were left undisturbed until modern archaeologists discovered them in the middle of the nineteenth century.

THE CHALDEAN EMPIRE (612–538 B.C.)

When the coalition succeeded in destroying Nineveh, the lion's share of the reconquered territory fell to the Babylonians, who founded a new empire, usually called the Chaldean Empire. Babylon was rebuilt, with a new temple of Marduk. Trade recovered and the whole empire attained to a prosperity that it had not known before. It was during this period that the leaders of Judah were carried away captive into Babylon, with such important results for the future of Judaism. The greatest intellectual achievement of the Chaldean Empire was the revival and development of mathematics and astronomy, although the latter science was strictly subordinated to astrology. Correct observations were made of the stars and their movements,



however, and correct predictions could be made with the aid of mathematics. The attitude of the Chaldean people toward their gods and toward life in general does not seem to have undergone any significant change. There was a great deal of personal piety, and there were many questionings of the purposes of the gods and of what they expected of man. There are a number of penitential psalms, but no significantly new thought on any of these matters. A change in Babylonian religion had to wait until the Persian monarchs introduced the higher religion of Zoroastrianism, with its altogether different theology, its advanced ethical teachings, and its idea of a future life.

THE PERSIAN EMPIRE (549-330 B.C.)

Conquest and organization of Near East

Following the breakup of the Assyrian Empire the territory to the east of Babylonia fell into the hands of a people called the Medes, who expanded into the east and incorporated the Persians for a time into their empire. However, an enterprising and able Persian prince named Cyrus in 549 B.C. revolted from the Medes, and after a brief struggle was accepted by them as king. Then the unified Medes and Persians swept westward, conquering Babylonia and Asia Minor. Successors of Cyrus eventually added Egypt to the empire. Thus arose the first of the great Oriental empires to be compared in any way with the empire of Alexander or the Romans. This Persian Empire was thoroughly organized by Darius I, who also sent an expedition against Greece which was defeated at the battle of Marathon in 490 B.C. A subsequent larger expedition sent by his son Xerxes met the same fate, and thereafter the Persians were content for a time with a toehold in Thrace and then with interference in the internal affairs of Greece through the use of money and diplomacy.

Though rather ramshackle in its composition, the Persian Empire did bring the benefits of peace and some degree of civilization to the peoples who composed it. The empire was organized into satrapies under satraps, or governors, responsible to the monarch. The satraps in later times exercised a considerable degree

of independence, but they could always be deposed by the monarch when necessary. The Persians as a rule did not attempt to interfere with local customs, and even the Persian religion seems to have been accepted rather than imposed. The monarch had at his disposal a band of picked nobles called the Immortals, who constituted a force of shock troops. The huge motley army of Xerxes which invaded Greece in 480 B.C. was apparently something unusual for Persia, accounting for the many years spent in preparing the expedition. The difficulty of organizing such an army, with its component parts belonging to different races and speaking different languages, was also no doubt largely responsible for the weakness of the defense offered to the conquering Macedonian Alexander the Great in the late fourth century B.C.

Zoroastrianism. The religion brought by the Persians into their empire has little relation to what they found there. The prophet Zoroaster, its supposed founder, is a rather mysterious figure, and may have lived, if he lived at all, as late as the sixth or seventh century B.C. or many centuries earlier. In any case he should not be thought of as having inaugurated an altogether new religion. Perhaps he performed something of the work of Buddha in India, in that he clarified the ethics of the existing religion and to some degree systematized its theology. Zoroastrianism was deeply concerned, as the older religions were not, with the problem of good and evil—ethical good and evil, and not merely the failure to observe prescribed ritual practices or to understand what the gods required of man.

The world had been created by Ahura-Mazda, the god of light. But though he would ultimately triumph, he was not omnipotent, and was engaged in a constant struggle with the god of darkness, Aingra-Manu, or Ahriman, who was the embodiment of all wickedness, treachery, and deceit and was possessed of almost equal powers. Each of these gods had his attendant host of spirits ceaselessly working for him. It was man's duty—within limits he had free choice—to aid the god of light in his struggle with the god of darkness and help

to overcome him. The Persian kings all claimed their position by the grace of Ahura-Mazda and received it as their duty to support the rule of light upon earth, administer justice, and rule according to righteousness. The priests of Zarathustra, usually called the Magi, kept alive the sacred fire, the symbol of Ahura-Mazda, in their temples.

Zoroastrianism contained a definite and clear belief in a future life. In the process of time the good powers would overcome the evil, and then a messiah would be born to prepare the end of the world. The last great day would then come when Ahriman would be finally vanquished, and the souls of the dead would be judged according to their deeds. The just would at once enter paradise, while the wicked would be cast into Hell with their master, Ahriman. There they would serve him until they too would be redeemed in a far distant future. There can be little doubt that the Christian story of the Wise Men of the East who visited the infant Jesus in Bethlehem to worship him was intended to show that the priests of Zarathustra had recognized in him the Messiah whom they awaited.

The sins which lead to damnation are cataloged: pride, gluttony, sloth, and other of the Christian "deadly sins." Likewise the virtues: keeping contracts, obeying rulers, tilling the soil, showing mercy, giving alms, and not doing to others what one did not wish done to oneself. Early Zoroastrianism, unlike the later religions which developed from it and stressed the evil nature of the material world, did not approve of asceticism, self-inflicted suffering, or excessive fasting and grief.

Successors of Zoroastrianism—Mithraism, Manichaeism, medieval heresies. The elements of this new revealed religion which affected later Judaism and Christianity are obvious; and many of its features found their fruition elsewhere than in those religions which developed directly from it. In Mithraism, which in the Roman Empire presented such competition to Christianity during the first centuries of the Christian Era, there is far more stress laid on Mithras the Redeemer, as also upon the evil nature of the world, than in Zoroastrianism,

with a resultant emphasis on the corrupt nature of mankind and the means of overcoming it in self-mortification. By the time of the rise of Manichaeism in the third century A.D. the world is seen as altogether corrupted by the god of darkness, and matter itself is conceived of as evil. From this teaching came the beliefs of the Cathari and Albigensians in medieval Europe. But these religions and their influence upon Christianity will be kept for a brief discussion in a later chapter.

CONCLUSION—THE INFLUENCE OF MESOPOTAMIA

We have now traced the history of Mesopotamia until the coming of the Greeks. The greatest direct contribution of these peoples to Western civilization was probably their science, which became mingled with Greek science and so was passed on to the West after the conquests of Alexander. The art of writing was discovered by them; they did important work in mathematics; and they laid the foundations of astronomy. Indirectly, their work was of the greatest importance for the Hebrews, since they gave them their basic law; and from them sprang the whole tradition of submission and obedience to the gods who ruled the universe. The Persians, with their conception of the Last Judgment and rewards and punishments in the next world, and their new thoughts on the nature of good and evil, added an ethical emphasis which affected both later Hebrew thought and Christianity. The Assyrians provided a great object lesson on the dangers of undiluted imperialism, which was appreciated and profited from by the Persians who followed them.

In bulk the contribution of Mesopotamia does not begin to compare with the legacy of the Greeks and Romans, though it probably surpasses the legacy of Egypt; but in the depth of its influence it is surpassed by few civilizations. Without the pioneer work of the Mesopotamian peoples in science and religion the lives of all later peoples would have been substantially different. Mesopotamia itself did not cease to be a center of civilization, but again rose to power and influence under the Parthians, the Sassanid Persians, and the Muslim Abba-

sids. But by this time the independent civilizations of the West were growing up and the civilizations of the Near East had only a minor influence upon them. When Harun-al-Rashid of Bagdad and Charlemagne of Aachen exchanged courtesies in the eighth century A.D., each knew almost nothing of the other. The East and West had embarked on their independent journeys.

❖ The Hebrews—the kingdoms of Israel and Judah

REASONS FOR STUDYING HEBREW HISTORY

The third Near-Eastern civilization that merits detailed discussion, even in a brief one-chapter survey, is distinguished from the two already dealt with by the fact that its achievements lie entirely within the realm of religion and religious literature. The Hebrews produced no great art, no distinctive method of government; they had no material inventions whatever to their credit. Yet their influence on later peoples has far surpassed that of Egypt or Mesopotamia. Hebrew religious thought is still believed to be truth by a sizable percentage of twentieth-century men and women. Aside from Judaism itself, both Christianity and Islam have adopted a considerable portion of the Hebrew religious insights as their own. In such a chapter as this the Hittites, who for many centuries possessed a great empire in Asia Minor and surrounding lands, may be dismissed, along with the Lydians, who succeeded them in western Asia Minor and are credited with the invention of coinage, and also the Phoenicians and Aramaeans who performed a notable service as traders by sea and land respectively. The Hebrews, however, require a

more than perfunctory consideration, even though their history as such could be paralleled by many other minor peoples, and though their independence lasted for a paltry few centuries.


Hebrew history would not be worth considering at all if it were not for the fact that it is familiar to millions of Westerners through the medium of the Bible, and for the remarkable fact that the Hebrews were the first people who systematically recorded their history and strove to give it meaning. Events that merely happened were for the first time given significance by the priestly chroniclers of the Hebrews. They were significant because God was the ruler of history. If the Hebrews were defeated in battle by the Egyptians, then it was because God had willed it; and the deed was a reply to an act of disobedience on the part of the Hebrews. If two men were swallowed up in an earthquake, it was because they had sinned against the Lord. This effort to interpret what we might call natural events, or events to be explained wholly by natural causes, was unique at the time, though the method had a future; it was believed to be a proper method of historical interpretation until very recently, and still forms the basis for many philosophies of history even in our own century.

The facts of Hebrew history are still and probably will forever be in dispute. On the whole the Bible had been confirmed as good history by archaeological research more than it has been refuted. Nevertheless, since it is so highly selective, the historical method of the chroniclers leaves a great deal to be desired. Reigns of which we should like to have heard more have been passed over in a few words because there was little of religious significance to be recorded. The sojourn of a relatively small number of Hebrews in Egypt was religiously of supreme importance, and hence, from a purely historical point of view, is given a disproportionate amount of space.

However, history as such is not what we look for in the Bible. The interpretation is, to us, of supreme importance too. The historical background against which Hebrew religion developed is of importance, but it is not for us the crucial thing. So the history itself may be given in a few bald lines.



The earliest coined money in the world. Invention attributed to the Lydians, three of whose coins are shown here. (COURTESY THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART)



HISTORY OF HEBREW KINGDOMS

Hebrew civilization may be said to start with Abraham, according to the Biblical record. He it was who began the religion of Yahweh in Palestine. His grandson Jacob led a number of Hebrews into Egypt at the time of a famine in Palestine. Outstaying their welcome, this band of Hebrews was enslaved by a later Pharaoh and made to work on his building program. In due course a leader arose among them named Moses, who was able to revive in the people a renewed belief in their ancestral God, Yahweh, and, against the persistent opposition of the Pharaoh, led them out into the wilderness, where they remained for forty years. During this period Moses gave them the Law of Yahweh, which, again after some opposition, he was able to make prevail as the Law of the whole people. Trained as warriors and held together by their religion and their Law, the people of Israel were led by Joshua into the land of Canaan (Palestine), which after a long time they finally succeeded in subduing against the opposition of

the existing inhabitants. The kingdom was unified under the rule of a warrior-king named David, who had been chosen and anointed as king by the prophet-priest Samuel (ca. 1000 B.C.).

The unified kingdom of Israel and Judah survived for only one generation after David. David's son Solomon tried to live like an Oriental monarch on resources suitable for a minor kingdom, and he built the first temple at Jerusalem with the aid of the Phoenician monarch, with whom he had an alliance. The cost was heavy, for he had to permit Israelites to work at forced labor for King Hiram of Phoenicia. This bargain resulted in a rebellion on his death, and thereafter the kingdom was split. The larger and agriculturally better favored northern kingdom of Israel (or Ephraim) was in a politically precarious position, surrounded by stronger nations. The only recourse for Israel was to enter into alliances with one or the other of them, necessitating the toleration or even acceptance of the gods of the foreign princess who sat on the throne. This practice brought down

upon the kings of Israel the wrath of the priests and prophets, who claimed that Yahweh was being neglected. It is significant that in the priestly account not one king of Israel did "that which was right in the sight of the Lord." The system of alliances finally collapsed with the rise of Assyria, which succeeded in defeating all the neighbors of Israel, and in 721 B.C. besieged and captured Samaria, the northern capital. Thereafter the people of the northern kingdom were scattered, and an alien people, not worshippers of Yahweh, were brought into the country by the Assyrians to take their place.

Judah meanwhile had to some degree maintained its worship of Yahweh, and the temple at Jerusalem in Judah remained the center of the Hebrew religion. Moreover, the country was poor and did not excite the cupidity of its neighbors to the same degree as Israel. Thus it was permitted to survive by the Assyrians on condition of paying tribute, and not until the Chaldean Empire arose on the ruins of Assyria did Judah have to submit to the yoke of the foreigner. The last few kings of Judah were set up by the Babylonians as their puppets. But, under constant pressure from their priests to refuse obedience to their Babylonian overlords, they soon fell into disfavor and were deposed. As a result of constant rebellions, the Babylonians finally decided to take the leaders of Judah as captives into Babylon. They destroyed the temple and put an end to Hebrew independence (586 B.C.). The exiles in Babylon, however, did not despair. They were held together by priests and prophets, and when the Persians at length put an end to Babylonian independence, the Hebrews, or Jews (as they may now be called), were allowed to return to Palestine and rebuild their temple. This condition of limited self-government under Persian auspices was rudely shattered when Alexander the Great conquered the Near East. One of his successors tried forcibly to Hellenize the Jews, causing a revolt of the orthodox led by the family of the Maccabees. The revolt succeeding, the Jews again had a period of independence until they were conquered by the Romans, who created the province of Judaea in 6 A.D. A later revolt in the seventh decade of the century led to the final destruction of the temple and the scattering of the

people. Until the twentieth century there was never again an independent state of Israel or Judah.

RELIGIOUS ACHIEVEMENT OF THE HEBREWS

Monotheism The Hebrews are, of course, credited above all with the formulation of monotheism, the worship of one God; and this monotheism has been transmitted both to Christianity and to Islam, so that it is the fundamental religious belief of the West. But it is not always recognized that they are also responsible for the precise definition of the nature of sin; and their thought upon the question of sin and punishment has permeated Western thought as deeply as has the concept of monotheism itself. The evolution of Hebrew thought on these two subjects will therefore be treated in some detail in this chapter.

The Hebrews did not come all at once to their idea of a transcendent God ruling the universe. In the period of the desert wanderings we find them given the commandment that they are to have no other gods besides Yahweh, but there is as yet no suggestion that other gods do not exist. He is their special God, their protector and rock of defense, who will keep his promises to his chosen people; but as yet nothing more. It is only in relatively late times that the great prophets picture him as the God of the universe, with all peoples alike subjected to him, and the gods of other peoples as nothing but idols of wood and stone. They were perhaps driven to this conclusion through their belief that God used foreigners to punish his own people, and thus must control these foreigners also.

In early times also it is clear that the Hebrews believed in a rather primitive anthropomorphism, that Yahweh could walk the earth and talk to men, that he needed an earthly habitation. By the time of the end of the kingdom of Judah the priests were emphasizing that God could be neither seen nor heard by human beings, but that he was a spirit, infinitely remote from man though caring for him like a father, dwelling in heaven and not on earth. Ultimately both these concepts—the unity and the spiritual nature of God—were fully accepted by the Jews, and it was in this form that the Hebrew ideas

about God were transmitted to subsequent ages.

The supreme consequence of the Hebrew concept is in the field of morality. Because God is a person, he can take part in human affairs, guiding them, rewarding and punishing his children, thus upholding the moral order.

The Hebrew God, being one, not a force of nature but a transcendent being, separate from the world, could act as ruler and governor, first of his chosen people and then of the whole world. He could issue a law which instructed the people in exactly what was required of them, could define disobedience to the law as sin, and could take steps to see that he was obeyed. The law thus removed any doubt in the sinner's mind as to what he was expected to do and what was forbidden him, while holding out the hope that if he fulfilled these duties toward God, he would be prosperous and happy. We shall see in the next section how the Hebrews were forced to modify this simple concept in the light of their actual experience.

Ethics and morality Hebrew monotheism, then, with its consequent belief that God rewarded and punished men in accordance with their deeds, has been of incalculable importance in the religious and psychological history of mankind. Nevertheless, the traditional Hebrew concept of morality, enforced by God in his capacity as judge, was not to be the last word of the Hebrew thinkers. Some of the prophets saw that the commands of the Law limited morality within a too rigid framework. When Micah spoke of the task of man as to "do justice, love mercy, and walk humbly with thy God," he extended the boundaries of those actions favored by God to less circumscribed activities. And Jeremiah had an inkling of the need for escape from the bondage of the Law when he made this promise in the name of the Lord: "Behold I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel . . . I will put my law in their inward parts and in their hearts will I write it . . . And they shall teach no more every man his neighbor and his brothers, saying, 'Know the Lord'; for they shall all know me from the least to the greatest of them."¹

¹ Jeremiah 31:31-34.

Divine activity in the world The third great development in Hebrew thought concerns the total activity of God in the world. In early times the whole concept of God expressed in Hebrew writings was as protector of the Children of Israel, his chosen and peculiar people. But if he was all-powerful, then he did not have to fight with other nations; he would deliver them into the hands of Israel. What, then, did this deduction mean, from the point of view of other nations? Was he not their God also? Once this problem is posed—and it did not arise so long as Yahweh was only one God among many—the answer must follow. But it did arise when the logical consequences of his supreme power were considered. If his power were not supreme, then he had to fight on behalf of Israel against the gods of their enemies. If he was supreme, then he was their *enemies'* protector too; or else they were left without a true God at all, which would be unjust. There was no way out of the dilemma; the other nations must somehow fit into the world order. It was all very well to denounce Assyria and Egypt, call their gods false gods, and prophesy destruction for them. But could any prophet with a sense of justice allow such a one-sided arrangement and say it was the work of a just God?



A medieval impression of Jonah praying to God for deliverance from the belly of the whale. Evidently the illustrator's knowledge of zoology left something to be desired! From a manuscript, Pseudo-Rudolf von Ems, Weltchronik, ca. 1400. (COURTESY THE PIERPONT MORGAN LIBRARY, Ms. 769, folio 223)

The answer might be, and was, given in terms of Israel's mission. God was using the foreign nations for purposes of his own, for the disciplining of Israel. He could have prevented the Assyrians from oppressing Israel, as he prevented them from taking Jerusalem in the time of Hezekiah; or he could use them to punish Israel's sin, as when the northern kingdom was deported. But to the more thoughtful among the prophets even this seemed rather a cavalier treatment of foreign nations. Were they not judged and punished for their sins; or did only Israel's sins count?

The question is no sooner posed in this manner than it must be answered in the only way possible. If Yahweh were indeed the God of the whole earth, then all the peoples were responsible to him equally, even if Israel had special tasks and special responsibilities as the only people of the earth to whom he had revealed himself and his Law. But the Assyrians were responsible when they broke the ordinary unrevealed natural law, and could be punished for it.

So we have the Book of Jonah, which tells how the prophet was sent to Nineveh to urge the Assyrians to repent. It is nothing short of astounding how daring this thought was that a prophet from the despised nation of Israel should go up to the capital of the mightiest world empire at the height of its power and prophesy its destruction (if it did not repent). The writer shows that Jonah was well aware of his temerity. For at first he did not dare to go, but took a ship going in the opposite direction. Then the Lord sent a storm upon the ship and did not calm it until the sailors had cast Jonah into the sea. Here he was swallowed by a whale, and not released from the belly of the whale until he had repented and promised to fulfill his mission. So at last he went up to Nineveh and preached. And, lo and behold, the Assyrians did repent, and the Lord spared them.

But the story does not end here. Jonah is angry because God has forgiven the Assyrians, thus making him a false prophet. So he sulks in the sun by the gate of the city. A gourd grows to protect him from the sun, and then, at God's command, the gourd withers, showing him by this sign that God has everything in his power,

and that Jonah himself would not survive against God's will. The book ends with the stern rebuke, "Should I not have compassion on Nineveh, that great city, in which are more than a hundred and twenty thousand people who know not their right hands from the left, and also many cattle?" Their ignorance saved them, for they had not been chosen and so had not known of God; when at last they were warned and heard, then God turned from his original purpose.

It should not be thought from this emphasis on the logical thought of the Hebrews that there was anything cold or abstract about their religion or their God. On the contrary, their whole thinking represented God as a person impossibly high above man, but recognizably akin to him, and with the feelings of man. It was thus possible not only to worship God but to love him, and God loved man in return. To the Hebrews man was in a real sense the son of God, who must occasionally be corrected, but always with a fatherly hand. "Those I love I rebuke and chasten," says the writer of the Proverbs. But the emphasis was not always on the chastening. "I taught Ephraim to walk, I took him in my arms . . . with human bonds I drew him, with cords of love. How shall I give you up, Ephraim, how shall I let you go, Israel? My heart turns within me, all my tenderness is kindled, I will not perform my fierce anger. I will not turn about to destroy Ephraim. For I am God and not man."²

Sin and punishment It has already been suggested that later Hebrew thought was disturbed by the discrepancy between the promises made by God to his people—seen by the Hebrews as a special Covenant between God and his chosen people—and the experience of life on earth as they knew it. If they obeyed the Law they should have been rewarded, and if they ceased to obey it, then they should have been punished. But only rarely did this happen; and it was the apparent happiness of the ungodly, and the undoubted occasional suffering of the manifestly righteous, that may have persuaded the later Hebrews to adopt the idea of a future life where justice would be vindicated.

² Hosea 11:3-8.

It does not seem that the Covenant itself was ever seriously questioned. But later thinkers realized that it could not comprise the whole duty of man, nor could the simple theory of rewards and punishments on earth suffice. More thought was needed on this central problem of the relationship between God and man, and much of the profoundest thought of mankind went into the effort to understand it. This thought, embodied in the Old Testament, became part of the imperishable heritage of Western man.

God had created man, not as a slave of God, but in the image of God. He had made man only a little lower than the Elohîm (one of the Hebrew words for God, but sometimes translated by the timorous, who do not appreciate the grandeur of the Hebrew aspiration, as "angels"); he was God's special favorite among all living creatures, a child of God. And God was for man a Rock of Defense. If this were so, and God was all-just, all-righteous, and all-powerful, demanding equal righteousness from man, how could he sometimes seem not to care, and deliver man over to destructive forces of nature or to his earthly enemies? Was this the protection to which he was entitled by the Covenant?

The answer varied in different stages of Hebrew civilization, and according to whether the fate of the Hebrew people or the individual man was being considered. But both problems were thoroughly explored.

The most prevalent early view, the one expounded by the priestly writers when they considered the history of the people of Israel, was that in fact the people had not obeyed the Law and were rightly punished. The individual kings were also punished for leading Israel into sin.

According to the priestly tradition, then, the sins of the people of Israel and Judah were responsible for the destruction of these independent kingdoms; but Judah, because it was the home of David, to whom God had made special promises, would not be destroyed forever, because of God's mercy and because of his oath to David. God therefore was able to act unilaterally on behalf of his people out of his mercy, though the people had not in fact deserved it. The people sinned and deserved punishment; God sometimes spared and sometimes condemned them.

The great prophets, deeper thinkers than the priests, gradually moved away from the strict tradition of the Law as comprising the sum total of human duties, and would not accept the traditional answer. Some of them came to the thought that the sufferings of the people were not the result of sin, but a preparation, a testing, for an even higher destiny. At the time of the fall of Jerusalem to Babylon, and during the Exile, this thought alone seemed to fit the circumstances. It was not only because of God's mercy that the remnant was saved; it was because God had need of them. Not all of them, but those who had continued to worship him in spite of all their disasters. Instead of the idea of suffering as the due recompense of sin was developed the concept of suffering as a discipline, a purification by fire, so that those who survived were fitted for this great destiny. And so ultimately, fully in accord with this thought, followed the idea of a messiah who should redeem the world, sometimes conceived of as an earthly king who would inaugurate the rule of righteousness on earth, and sometimes as a suffering servant, "the man of sorrows and acquainted with grief," who would take upon himself the sorrows of the world. In both cases the mission of the whole Hebrew people was seen as preparing themselves to be ready to receive the Messiah, forming an elect body of righteous men to leaven the great masses of wicked humanity in the new age.

It did not, however, need a prophet to give the answer to the other parallel problem, the sufferings of the individual. To the logical mind, if the man who keeps the Law suffers, there must be some reason. Conversely, if the man who fails to keep the Law is not punished, why not? Here there are more possibilities, and the Hebrews explored all but one—the possibility of a future life of rewards and punishments—very thoroughly. This last possibility, indeed, was abandoned as soon as it was suggested by all the thinkers included in the canonical books of the Old Testament. Moreover, even when it was accepted by some Jews, it did not attain the dignity of a revelation, and was still not accepted by the priestly party at the time of Christ.

We see a suggestion of the problem very early; and already in the Law there is a typ-

ically primitive answer. The sins of the fathers are visited upon the children, an answer scornfully rejected by the prophets Ezekiel and Jeremiah: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge." It is posed frequently in the Psalms: "Why do the ungodly flourish like a green bay tree?" Look to the end of their life, suggests one answer. Their good fortune will change. But manifestly this is not always true. The fullest answer is offered by the book of Job, which is entirely devoted to the problem. Job is presented as a righteous man, afflicted without any known reason. His friends carry on an extensive dialogue with him, trying to persuade him to admit that he has sinned, but in vain. Finally Job appeals to God himself to give him an answer, but the only answer he receives is that man cannot understand the ways of God. This, indeed, is the final answer of the ancient Hebrews. It is beyond the capacity of man to fathom the wisdom of God, and it is purposeless to question his judgments. He must, like the Psalmist, rely on faith in God's justice, and seek the only answer in the sanctuary of God.

The canonization of the Law It should be emphasized that the bulk of Hebrew thought on the relationship between man and God was achieved by prophets and independent thinkers rather than by the priests. But in the last days of the kingdom of Judah a book of the Law was "found" in the temple and became the basis of a thoroughgoing religious reform carried out by King Josiah and the priests. This book is almost certainly the one called Deuteronomy, and from it we can see that as yet there has been no great change in the concept of sin and punishment held in earlier times, no emphasis on righteousness beyond the dictates of the Law. God will prosper the people if they keep his Law. "If you will but heed the commands that I am giving you today, to love the Lord your God, and serve him with all your mind and heart, he will give you rain for your land in due season . . . and he will produce grass in your fields for your cattle, and you will eat your fill."² This is the tone of the whole book, as was indeed to be

expected in a religious reform carried out by the aid of the priesthood. The emphasis was on the tribulations that had come upon the people because they had not kept the Law, and the material rewards that would be their lot if they returned to it.

A short time afterward the kingdom was conquered by the Chaldeans, and some of the leading Jews were taken captive and brought to Babylon. There, in spite of leaders who laid little emphasis on the Law, they were held together as a people by the Law, and on their return to Palestine under Persian auspices it was the priests who supervised the return and rebuilt the temple. As can be clearly seen, especially from the apocryphal book called Ecclesiasticus, or the Wisdom of Sirach, the Law had become the cement binding together both the Hebrew religion and the Jewish nation. The Law in its now definitive form was sufficient for all human purposes. The Torah or Pentateuch (the first five books of the Old Testament) was canonized as the revealed word of God. It was not earthly but divine; and it was unchangeable. It remained for Jesus Christ and his followers to return the emphasis to the *spirit* of the Law, as suggested by Jeremiah, and allow scope for human ethics beyond it.

The influence and importance of the Hebrew religion The importance of the whole Hebrew religion to the world is incalculable. Once the problems of man's relationship with God and the resultant ethics had been wrestled with and certain conclusions reached, the world would never be the same again. One may deny the original premises³ and ask for the evidence for the existence of any God at all; one may say that the Hebrews projected their own highest aspirations into their imagination of a supreme ruler of the universe. But one cannot deny the aspirations nor that the conclusions, as far as they go, follow from the premises. Not only did Christianity, the predominant religion in the West, base itself upon Hebrew thinking, but Islam also adopted the idea of the single transcendent God and much of Hebrew social

² Deuteronomy 11:13-15.

³ The author of Ecclesiastes, a canonical book, even presents this point of view himself!

thought. The teachings of the Old Testament became the standard of conduct and even provided some of the law for the Protestant reformers in the sixteenth century, especially for those who followed the teachings of Calvin. And the Jews themselves have preserved their heritage and their belief in the Promised Land even thirty centuries after the death of Moses, and over nineteen hundred years after they ceased to exist as a separate nation. But more important than all this may have been their belief that man is answerable to God for his deeds on earth, that there is a divine sanction over man's activity. Whether we forget this, or believe with Aristotle that man cannot be happy unless he is good and that, since man must seek for happiness, no divine sanction is necessary, we cannot deny that the concept has profoundly influenced all subsequent civilization. Few men in the West have not at some time in their lives been forced to consider the possibility of its truth.

Suggestions for further reading

PAPERBACK BOOKS

- Albright, W. F. *From the Stone Age to Christianity*. Anchor. A thought-provoking study of early religions in the light of archaeological investigation.
- Breasted, James Henry. *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*. Torch. Unlike Breasted's other books on Egypt, this one is largely free from the tendency to interpret ancient religious thought in the light of modern Christian concepts. Much of the book is quotation, on the whole well translated, but again with Christian overtones.
- Childe, V. Gordon. *New Light on the Most Ancient East*. Evergreen. As customary with this writer, good on material culture, but limited in understanding of nonmaterial elements. Read in conjunction with Frankfort. Illustrated.
- Driver, S. R. *An Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*. Meridian. Pioneer work on biblical history and literature, much of it now incorporated into the work of later writers.
- Frankfort, Henri. *The Birth of Civilization in the Near East*. Anchor. A useful introduction to the newer interpretations of the beginnings of the organized societies known to history. Contains a severe but justified criticism of Toynbee's interpretations of Egyptian civilization, showing their *a priori* nature. Illustrated.

- Gordon, Cyrus H. *Hammurabi's Code: Quaint or Forward-Looking?* Rinehart Source Problems. Topical study of the major provisions of the code, with commentary by the author, an expert in Babylonian language and history.
- Oesterley, W. O. E., and Robinson, T. H. *An Introduction to the Books of the Old Testament*. Meridian. Especially good on the peoples with whom the Hebrews were in contact, but should be supplemented by study in the major work of these two authors, *A History of Israel*.
- Orlinsky, Harry M. *Ancient Israel*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Short, clear, up-to-date account of Hebrew history by a Jewish scholar, taking good advantage of archaeology and recent biblical criticism.
- Olmstead, A. T. *History of the Persian Empire*. Phoenix. The standard history, brilliantly written. Excellent on history, but author not at his best when dealing with Zoroastrianism. Supplement with Dhalla.

CASEBOUND BOOKS

- Breasted, James H. *A History of Egypt*. 2d ed. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909. Still the best general history of Egypt, though in several respects out of date, and not in accord with more recent interpretations.
- Contenau, G. *Everyday Life in Babylon and Assyria*. Tr. by K. R. and A. R. Maxwell-Hyslop. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954. Illustrated account based on recent archaeology.
- Dhalla, M. N. *History of Zoroastrianism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938. Probably the best work on the subject, written by a high priest of modern Parseeism.
- Frankfort, Henri. *Ancient Egyptian Religion*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948. Brief, stimulating essay, especially noteworthy for its effort to place Egyptian religion within the social framework of ancient Egypt.
- Frankfort, Henri. *Kingship and the Gods*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948. Studies kingship both in Egypt and in Mesopotamia. Excellent on both, although especially valuable on the latter. By a practicing archaeologist who had the rare gift of historical and philosophical imagination as well as technical proficiency.
- Gordon, Cyrus H. *Introduction to Old Testament Times*. Ventnor, N. J.: Ventnor Publishers, Inc., 1953. Probably the best work on Old Testament history in the light of modern research and archaeology, by a renowned scholar.

- Graham, W. C. *The Prophets and Israel's Culture*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934. Brief but stimulating study of the prophets, primarily as social reformers.
- Neugebauer, Otto. *The Exact Sciences in Antiquity*. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1952. Re-evaluation of Babylonian contributions to science. Somewhat difficult and technical, but well worthwhile for students with a knowledge of modern science.
- Oesterley, W. O. E., and Robinson, T. H. *A History of Israel*. 2 vols. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1932. Carefully planned, judicious, and readable study, using all the material available at the time of writing. Probably the best general history of the subject.
- Olmstead, Albert T. *History of Assyria*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923. Well-written standard work, perhaps too favorable to imperialism for most modern tastes.
- Smith, J. M. P., and Goodspeed, E. J., eds. *The Complete Bible: An American Translation*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939. This Bible, which contains the Apocrypha, is especially recommended as a modern translation—free from the defects of the King James version, readable and understandable in its content, if not the equal of the King James in poetry.
- Steindorff, G., and Steele, K. C. *When Egypt Ruled the East*. 2d ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957. Attempts to bring Breasted's pioneer history of Egypt up to date, especially the period of the Egyptian Empire.
- Wilson, James A. *The Burden of Egypt*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951. By far the best interpretation in English of the meaning and significance of Egyptian thought, and the relation of Egyptian government to Egyptian religion. Clarifies the changes in Egyptian thought from the earliest times to the downfall of the independent monarchy.

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The Heritage of Greek Civilization


❖ The Aegean civilization

One important civilization, contemporary with ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, has not hitherto been mentioned. As early as 3000 B.C. a maritime civilization had been founded on the island of Crete. As we have seen, the Egyptians tended to be self-sufficient, and did not care to venture beyond the borders of their country in early times. This left open possibilities for any enterprising people who wished to do so to bring foreign products to Egypt, accepting Egyptian goods in exchange. For almost two millennia the Cretans provided this service for the Egyptians, and in the process colonized many islands of the Aegean Sea and a few important centers on the mainland. Almost all our knowledge of this Aegean civilization comes from archaeology. Only within the last few years has the riddle of the Cretan language yielded to investigation. Even now the Cretan script of earlier times has not been fully deciphered, though now that the key has been found by deciphering a later mainland version of the script, it seems certain that in due course it will be deciphered.

Even the history of the island civilization is not yet fully agreed upon. It seems probable that the Cretans first brought some of the benefits of civilization to the native peoples of Greece. Then, somewhere in the second millennium B.C., much of Greece was conquered by a people called the Achaeans, who presumably moved into Greece from the north, perhaps from Central Europe. These Achaeans learned from the Cretans. They also gave better attention to

their military forces, centered in particular around the city of Mycenae, of which Agamemnon was king in the time of the Trojan War. Somewhere around 1400 B.C. the Achaeans attacked Crete and conquered it, perhaps because the Cretans had allowed themselves to become unwarlike in the course of their always successful trading. They ruled Crete for the next two hundred years until they, in turn, were overwhelmed by a new wave of barbarians. These were the Dorians, who had already penetrated into southern Greece and settled there. The success of the Dorian expedition to Crete marked the end of Cretan (Minoan) civilization, which never recovered from this final blow.

Such knowledge as we have of Cretan civilization is, for the most part, derived from the remains of Cretan art and architecture, though there are also helpful references in later Greek writings and in some contemporary Egyptian documents and inscriptions. We therefore know about such things as the Cretan love of sports and life in the open air. We know also of their taste for luxury, and something about their home life. There is also enough information available for us to be able to say with some confidence that the Cretans should be regarded as precursors of the Greeks rather than as legatees of the Egyptians, in spite of the fact that there is a visible Egyptian influence in some of the Cretan works of art. There can be little doubt that the Cretans prepared the way for the later civilization of Greece by giving the Aegean world its first acquaintance with foreign civilization by way of maritime trade. When their



script is finally deciphered and the extensive written material read, it will be easier to assign them their true place in the history of civilization.

❖ The Homeric Age in Greece

From the middle of the second millennium, as has been said, barbarians began to penetrate into Greece from the north. Apart from the Achaeans, the leading groups were the Ionians (who may have been in Greece even before the Achaeans), the Aeolians, and the last group of invaders, the Dorians. The Dorians used iron, and this may in part account for their easy conquest of the bronze-using Achaeans and Cretans, since bronze was an expensive metal

and its use was necessarily confined to a small group of warriors. Much of the history of Greece from the beginning of these conquests is obscure, illuminated only by the Homeric epics, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. These poems, still considered by many to be the greatest works of Western literature, are surrounded by mysteries which will probably never be solved. It is not known who wrote them, when they were written, whether they were both written by the same poet, or whether they are not merely traditional poems edited by a man whom later ages have called Homer.

These problems need not concern us here. All that needs to be said is that these epics purport to tell the history of a part of the war between a group of allies from the mainland of Greece and the city of Troy (the *Iliad*), and



Reproduction of a Cretan fresco from the palace at Knossos, showing the sport of bull leaping. Evidently the man uses the bull's horns as an aid in leaping over the bull, to be caught by his female partner on the other side. (COURTESY THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART)



Reproduction of a fragment of a wall fresco from Hagia Triada in Crete. This famous fresco, showing a cat hunting a pheasant, is the earliest of the frescoes shown in this chapter. (COURTESY THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART)

the story of the wanderings of Odysseus after the fall of Troy. It is probable that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* took their final shape about 800 B.C. The conditions described by Homer are therefore likely to have been similar to those prevailing in the early part of the first millennium B.C., when the invaders were settling in Greece. Society was aristocratic, but the free-men obviously were allowed their say in the council and assemblies; the kings and chiefs held their position by heredity, but they were far from absolute. There is no trace whatever of anything resembling the divine monarchy of Egypt. Agamemnon, leader of the Trojan expedition, holds some special prerogatives by virtue of his position, and, though he is a lesser warrior than Achilles, he is nevertheless strong enough to force Achilles to give up his captive slave-girl after the god Apollo has forced him to give up his own prize. Yet Agamemnon can use no sanctions against Achilles when the latter refuses to fight any longer in the war. For the rest, it is clear that Greece was not yet overpopulated; and there are numerous descriptions of feasts which would have been unthinkable in a later age, when Greece was too poor to support her population save on the most meager of diets. The chieftains themselves knew how to plow and did not regard agriculture as menial work; indeed, farming and sheepherding were clearly the main occupations of the era. It would seem also that the Greeks were not yet skilled in the making of industrial products, and the chief method of distribution of surplus goods was barter.

Not long after the Homeric Age and perhaps even during the lifetime of the poet, all the peoples of Greece, with a few notable exceptions, took part in a considerable movement of colonization. The movement was probably the result of land hunger and pressure of population on the scant resources of the country. The Greek colonies, unlike those of earlier peoples such as the Phoenicians, were not mainly for the purposes of trade. They were rather settlements of citizens, who were expected to make permanent homes for themselves in their adopted countries. The mother state usually organized the colonizing expeditions, and gave them its blessing. In return the


colonists, it was hoped, would eventually produce a surplus of agricultural products which could be exchanged for the goods of the mother country. No jurisdiction over these colonies was asserted by the mother country. The colonies were free to set up their own form of government. It was regarded as an offense against common decency to wage war against the mother country. But if the colonies did turn against her, the latter could do nothing to prevent it. In later times several important colonies did in fact side against their founders in a general war.

In the course of two or three centuries colonies were founded on the borders of the Black Sea, in the coastal areas of Africa bordering on Egypt, and as far away from the homeland as eastern Spain; in addition, the coastal areas of Asia Minor and much of southern Italy were largely peopled by Greeks. It was not unusual for such colonies to be more powerful and prosperous than the often small city-states from which they had sprung.

♦ The Greek city-states

THE POLIS—CHARACTERISTIC GREEK POLITICAL AND SOCIAL UNIT

The very word "political," used in the heading above, comes from the Greek word *polis*, the characteristic Greek unit of government. If the achievements of Greek culture are to be understood, it is necessary to consider briefly what this unit consisted of, and how it may be said to have favored the special development of man as a political being. Historically, the polis probably derives from the period of the invasions, when a strong point was necessary to hold off marauding enemies. This strong point was the *acropolis*, and around it were the cultivated fields and the centers of trading necessary to keep the fortress supplied. The developed polis included not only the central strong point, the nucleus of the city, but all the territory around until the boundaries of the neighboring polis were reached. Thus the polis is a city-state in the true sense of the word, a city plus its environment, over which the gov-



Reproductions of two inlaid daggers from Mycenae. This mainland center was especially noted for the fine bronze weapons it produced. (COURTESY THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART)

ernment of the city exercised jurisdiction. The military leaders in early times necessarily administered the government, but when the invasions ceased to present such a pressing problem, the peaceful farmers and traders naturally expected to be consulted and perhaps to take some responsible part in the government. Each polis, however, had its own interests and liked to exercise its own self-government. Another polis might be absorbed in war, and no doubt in early times many budding *poleis* (plural of polis) were incorporated into the territory of larger neighbors; but such mergers could, as a rule, be accomplished only by war. Each polis strove fiercely to maintain its complete independence and autonomy, and all the citizenry were prepared to defend their polis at a moment's notice against any attempted encroachment.

The number of citizens in a polis naturally varied according to its size. In the smaller polis doubtless everyone knew everyone else, and in a sense this was always the ideal. The polis was at least as much an enlarged family as it was an official governmental unit. Aristotle once remarked that a man who could live without a polis "must be either a beast or a god," that is, he must be either subhuman or superhuman. In his view it was the ideal field of development for man. Man is a creature, he says elsewhere, "whose nature it is to live in a polis." It gave him a sense of belonging and a secure status. If he emigrated to another polis he would be ac-


corded only the status of a *metic*, or resident alien. He did not possess full political rights since he could not be expected to know enough of the aims and ideals of his new polis to participate effectively in its political life.

THE LEADING CITIES—ATHENS AND SPARTA

A study in extremes In the study of Greek political life—a study which has been considered worth while for only about a century, in contradistinction to the study of the Roman Republic, which, even in the Middle Ages, has never failed to find interested scholars—it is fascinating to observe how extreme the two leading cities are as examples of a particular kind of society. Sparta was the perfect type of what the philosopher Henri Bergson called the "closed society," whereas Athens was the almost perfect type of the "open society." Athens was ruined by her democratic excesses, her too extreme freedom, whereas Sparta became a classic case of arrested development, all her forms so rigid that there was no possibility of a peaceful evolution in a necessarily changing world. The student can therefore study these two societies with profit not only for their inherent interest, but for the lessons they have to teach of the danger of excess—a danger which the Greeks themselves fully appreciated. The leading ideal of Greek thinkers was *sophrosyne*, or moderation; but from all that we can discover from their history, they may have continued to seek but did not find it.

Chronological Chart

Early Bronze Age in Crete	before 3000 B.C.
Minoan civilizations in Crete	3000-1400
Mycenaean civilization on mainland	before 1600
Conquest of Crete by Achaeans (?)	ca. 1400
Conquest of Crete by Dorians	ca. 1200
Fall of Troy to Achaeans and others	ca. 1184
Dorian invasions	1200-1000
Settlements in Asia Minor (Aeolians, Ionians, Dorians)	1000-900
Homeric poems	ca. 850
Hesiod	ca. 700
Greek colonization of Sicily and southern Italy	760-700
Great age of Miletus	750-550
First Messenian War (first enslavement of Messenians by Spartans)	736-716
Rule of Areopagus and archons in Athens	ca. 683
Second Messenian War	650-630
Draconian Code (Athens)	621
"Lycurgan" reforms in Sparta	610?
Solonian reforms (Athens)	594
Regime of Pisistratus	561-527
Constitution of Cleisthenes	508
First Persian invasion—Battle of Marathon	490
Second Persian invasion—Salamis and Plataea	480-479
Organization of Confederation of Delos	477
Ascendancy of Pericles	457-429
Treasury of the Confederation removed to Athens	454
Peloponnesian War	431-404
<i>Knights</i> of Aristophanes—Ascendancy of Cleon	425
Athenian expedition to Syracuse	415-413
Battle of Aegospotami—Defeat of Athenians	404
Spartan hegemony of Greece	404-371
Regime of Thirty and Ten "tyrants" (Athens)	404-403
Restoration of the democracy	403
Trial and execution of Socrates	399
Battle of Leuctra—Defeat of Spartans by Thebans	371
Hegemony of Thebes	371-362
Philip II becomes king of Macedon (Macedonia)	359
Battle of Chaeronea	338
Congress of Corinth and foundation of Hellenic League	338-337
Reign of Alexander	336-323
Ptolemy I Soter seizes Egypt	321
Civil War between the generals	322-301
Seleucus I founder of Seleucid dynasty in Asia	305-280
Battle of Ipsus—Final division of Alexander's kingdom	301
Foundation of Museum of Alexandria	286
Eumenes I founds independent kingdom of Pergamum	263
Attalus III of Pergamum bequeaths kingdom to Rome	133
Syria made a Roman province by Pompey	64
Cleopatra (VII) on Egyptian throne	51



Political and social development of Sparta

Lest we be astonished that the Spartans should have developed a society and institutions that seem to demand so much of human nature and go so contrary to what we think of as natural human impulses and instincts, it should be explained at once that there were sound historical reasons for the development of a militarized state. The Spartan nobles, evidently hungry for land, committed an aggression upon their neighbors, the equally Dorian Messenians. After winning the First Messenian War and imposing severe terms on their enemies, the Spartans soon had to defend themselves against an attempt by the Messenians to recover their position. During this war the Spartan homeland was in very grave danger, and only a providential death of the general of the leading ally of the Messenians saved the Spartans from conquest. Recovering from their early defeats, they succeeded once more in conquering Messenia. Then, instead of being content with territorial changes of a minor nature, they decided to enslave the whole Messenian population. This meant that the Spartans were now in the sorry position of having to keep down a considerable population, possibly one outnumbering their own, and forcing them to work for their new masters. And these people were not alien barbarians but Dorian Greeks, in every respect the equal of their masters save

that they had been defeated in battle. Thus, the Spartans, in order to force their victims, who were called *helots*, or state slaves, to work, had themselves to be prepared constantly to put down a revolt; and such revolts were not uncommon, although conditions in the country prevented easy coordination between the scattered *helots*.

Although nothing is known for certain of the famous lawgiver of Sparta who has passed down to history as *Lycurgus*, and we know neither if nor when he lived, the laws are authentic enough. They probably considerably antedate the Messenian Wars, since long before these culminating wars the Dorians of Laconia (whose chief city was Sparta) had had to fight hard to conquer their territory, and the system of state slavery had already been established. Now, however, it was more thoroughly systematized, and the Spartan constitution in effect in the fifth century B.C. was already in operation by the end of the seventh century.

There were three classes of people in Sparta at this time, the free-born, who were called *Spartiates*, the *perioeci*, and the *helots*. The *perioeci* were not Spartan citizens; they could not become professional soldiers nor intermarry with Spartans; they possessed no political rights. Their task was to handle all the economic affairs of the Spartans, especially dealings with for-

eigners. Sometimes, in case of war, they could serve with the Spartan infantry. The helots, as the property of the state, possessed certain elementary rights. They could not be put to death save by the authority of the state, and they possessed a certain amount of personal freedom as long as they farmed well and provided their particular master with enough for his subsistence. In times of grave danger they could serve in the Spartan army, though they were naturally regarded as untrustworthy. It was, however, possible to earn their freedom from helotry by such means. The helot, therefore, was in a sense lent by the Spartan state to the free citizens as a source of permanent labor, relieving them from menial work and leaving them free for a totally military life.

The professional military class devoted itself to nothing but war and preparations for war. This class was rigidly selected. Children who were weak and puny at birth were simply exposed to die. Education for boys consisted of all forms of athletics, military instruction, and

physical exercise. Boys were made to go barefoot and ill-clad in winter, to sleep without coverings, and to prepare all their own meals. Girls fit to be mothers of Spartans had to undergo a similar regime of athletics and games, and were taught courage, endurance, and patriotism. Boys lived at home with their mothers till they were seven years old. Then they went into military training in groups under the charge of older boys, and lived in barracks. At the age of twenty marriage was compulsory, but the husband continued to live in barracks, and could visit his wife only on rare occasions. According to Plutarch, it was hoped that this continence would serve to procreate more healthy children, and in any case it would protect the Spartiate from a possible weakening caused by contact with home comforts. From the labor of his helots each adult had to supply his share of the food eaten at the public mess. If a Spartiate for any reason could not supply his share, he lost status and became an inferior citizen, with reduced political and social rights.



The temple of Poseidon at Paestum, one of the Greek colonies in Italy. In spite of being located in Italy, this temple is older than the Parthenon, and is the best-preserved Greek temple in the world. These Greek colonies were conquered by the Romans and absorbed into the Confederation of Italy at the close of the wars with Pyrrhus. (PHOTO BY MRS. JOSEPH E. WISAN)



Two views of a Spartan kylix (terra-cotta). The painted interior depicts the apotheosis of Heracles. This piece shows that by 580 B.C., the date of the kylix, the Spartans were still able to produce works of craftsmanship comparable to that of the other Greeks. (COURTESY THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART)

To prevent contamination with foreign ideas and people, aliens were rarely admitted to the city; and those who received permits were periodically expelled. To prevent the accumulation of wealth the Spartans maintained a heavy iron currency which was not exchangeable anywhere else.

This logical "Lycurgan" system fulfilled its purpose. The helots were kept under control for more than two hundred years, and Sparta possessed an army which was able to play a noble part in defeating the Persians. Its heavy infantry was unbeaten by any Greek city in battle until the rise of Thebes in the fourth century, and was the most highly disciplined and efficient body of troops in Greece. However, it should be understood that the main purpose of this army was internal control, and not foreign imperialist adventures. Spartan heroism, however, was proverbial, and undoubtedly real. The

social sanctions ensured it, for no Spartan dared go home in disgrace; he dared not even leave the battlefield to take news home.


The other Greeks, with their high ideal of civic virtue and duty, recognized that on this score the Spartans were their superiors. Civic duty was accepted freely by the Spartans as a requirement that the polis might reasonably impose on its citizens. Obedience to the laws of the city was as binding an obligation for the citizen as obedience to divine laws was obligatory for the individual. The other Greeks did not think the Spartans lived under a tyranny, but under a regime chosen for them by Lycurgus and accepted by them. The Athenian would not have accepted such laws for a moment, nor would he have put up with the Spartan food and frugality, which were the object of frequent jests among citizens of other states, frugal as they were themselves by our standards.

It was the privilege of the Spartans to choose their laws and to obey them; and to all appearances they did obey them. We do not hear of Spartans leaving their city to enjoy the delights of Athens or Corinth until after the Spartan victory in the Peloponnesian War (404 B.C.). It was perhaps the heroic nature of their extreme and narrow ideal and the heroic way in which they lived up to it that excited the admiration of their neighbors; whereas the philosophers admired the way they used their laws to form character and the logical nature of the laws themselves. The vulgarity, boasting, and propaganda of modern fascist states distinguish them effectively from Sparta. It was the Spartan's pride that he was a man of few words; and the word "laconic" has passed into our language. And a "Spartan" regime means, not an imperialist, fascist, communist, or oligarchic state, but a regime of simplicity and abstinence.

Athens—Political evolution As soon as we come to study Athens we are at once made aware of a marked difference between the two

peoples. The Athenians themselves, of course, were fully aware of it, and on the whole they tended to attribute it to the fact that they were Ionians while the Spartans were Dorians. The Athenians were experimental; they were willing to take a chance that change might mean improvement; and their ruling classes at a crucial moment in Athenian history did not fight to stave off change and maintain their privileged position, but preferred to allow the political forms of their state to evolve. Once this initial step had been taken they may well have been sorry, since the Athenians went forward to the most complete democracy the world has yet seen. In the process the aristocrats lost all their privileges and had to submit to rule by the majority, which did not mean themselves. It is worth devoting some attention to this process, since it tells us much about the Athenian people and why to this day we remember their civilization as one of the greatest in world history.

The land of Attica, which comprised the polis of Athens, was not a territory rich in resources. Yet it was large in comparison with



This model of the Agora shows Athens in the second century A.D. rather than in the period covered by the text. Many changes were made during the period of domination by the wealthy Hellenistic monarchs; however, the model will serve to give some idea of the layout of the Agora. Although the buildings of the fifth century B.C. were less sumptuous and costly and the arrangement was less orderly, the style of architecture was not greatly different. (COURTESY AMERICAN SCHOOL OF CLASSICAL STUDIES AT ATHENS)

most of the Greek city-states, and Athens had taken but little share in the great colonizing movement of the eighth and seventh centuries. But the Athenians were trying to grow wheat and be self-sufficient on land that was for the most part totally unsuited for it. The result was that the peasants who made up the bulk of the population by the middle of the seventh century were having a great deal of difficulty in making a living. Moreover, the majority probably did not own their own land and had to supply a considerable proportion of their crop to their landlords, who also controlled the effective machinery of the state. The result was that they fell into debt, borrowed money for their new crops, and ultimately had no security to offer but their own persons. They were then sold into slavery abroad. This state of affairs caused the agitation that might have been expected, and there were no doubt murders and much ravaging of property. It should be added that the

landowners used wheat, which was readily salable everywhere, as payment for their industrial imports, in spite of the fact that there was too little wheat at home to fill the needs of the people, even with fair distribution. So the peasants, who produced the wheat, went hungry.

Probably because trade was seriously affected by the disturbances, the peasants found an ally in the traders, who put pressure upon the landowners for reforms. The first effort at reform was merely to produce a code of law so that the peasants could be properly tried before being punished (constitution of Draco, 621 B.C.). But in the early part of the sixth century the aristocrats at last agreed to allow one of the wise men of Greece, Solon, to try his hand at a political and economic reform, which he was peculiarly well fitted to do since he had both landowning and trading interests. Solon realized that the basic difficulty in Athens was the unsuitability of its main crop and the lack of



Each of these three amphorae is from a different century. The one on the left is from the seventh century B.C. and is a product of inferior technique; also, note that the decoration still shows some Oriental influence. The center amphora is from the great age of Pisistratus when Athens was striving hard against severe competition in the export market. The amphora on the right is from the age of Pericles when Athens was secure and prosperous and these amphorae were often used for the home market; note the ornateness of this amphora. (COURTESY THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART)



Farewell scene from a gravestone. Note the way in which the artist has tried to emphasize the common grief of the family, a theme certainly underemphasized in Greek literature. (COURTESY THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART)

industry in the city. To solve this twofold problem he forbade the export of wheat, encouraged the growing of vines and olives instead of wheat, and invited skilled artisans into Athens with the promise of full citizenship. Thus it would become possible for dispossessed peasants to make an alternative living in the city. It meant also that Athens thereafter would be dependent upon imports of grain to make up the deficiency in production, and that therefore, like some modern economies, she would have to export manufactured goods to pay for them. Solon also inaugurated a far-reaching reform of the law courts and instituted an assembly and council made up of propertied classes, but with far wider representation than the old exclusive aristocratic council of the Areopagus.

Solon's reforms were evidently too drastic to be carried out without some degree of com-

pulsion. This was supplied by an enlightened autocrat named Pisistratus, who managed to rule Athens by political manipulation for upward of thirty years and nevertheless die peacefully in his bed. By the time of his death most of the economic problems had been solved; the most recalcitrant of the aristocrats were in exile in Sparta; Athens was a leading exporter of pottery and specialized agricultural products; and she was the possessor of a fine navy. She was now ready for a further dose of democracy.

The occasion for political reform was provided by the autocratic behavior of Hippias, son of Pisistratus, who never recognized that his father had been able to rule only because his rule was accepted by the majority of the citizens. During the regime of Pisistratus the aristocratic exiles could expect to find little support in Athens. But when Hippias began to behave like a real tyrant the aristocrats saw their opportunity. Led by Cleisthenes, they invaded Athens with the help of a Spartan army; but once they had won a military victory the aristocrats fell out among themselves. Faced with this situation, Cleisthenes suddenly decided to join the democratic forces, who accepted him as their leader and instructed him to draw up a new democratic constitution. He fulfilled his mandate loyally. By a piece of skilled gerrymandering, he prevented the rise of another dictator like Pisistratus while giving the Athenians their first real democracy.

The pivot of the Athenian constitution was the Assembly of all male citizens, without property qualification, which had to be called into session at least ten times a year and was absolutely sovereign except for certain safeguards which need not be entered into here. In addition to the Assembly, which decided on all important questions, a Council of 500 was elected, soon afterward if not in the time of Cleisthenes, by lot from a list of eligible citizens who had not sat in the Council in at least the ten previous years. This Council, divided into committees of 50, each the chief committee for a tenth of the year, acted as the executive of the state, looking after all the details of administration. Later there was instituted a board of 10 generals who had further executive duties to perform. From their number the Assembly chose the actual war



This gold bowl was found in Scythia (South Russia). It was evidently an Athenian export item of special interest to the barbarian princes in this area on whom the Athenians were dependent for imports of grain. (COURTESY THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART)

leaders in case of hostilities. The government therefore was a full democracy of a town-meeting type not unlike that of the early American Colonies. It was based on the theory that government by amateurs is best, that each citizen was as qualified as the next one in the somewhat elementary duties of government, and that full participation and interest in the affairs of the state can alone make a democratic government work. The only representative principle in this government is to be found in the board of generals. A general could be elected and re-elected as long as the people had confidence in him. It was customary for each general to represent one of the ten tribes, but it was also possible for some noted citizens, such as Pericles in later years, to be elected at large by all the citizens. It was generally understood who was the leading citizen at any given time, and such a man would usually have the privilege of addressing the Assembly first and putting forward his suggestions. The Council was expected to prepare other legislation for the Assembly and to give it a preliminary discussion;

For a century this government worked on the whole very effectively, probably because the people during this period were still willing to choose as leaders men of ability from the old aristocracy. The government deteriorated badly

during the Peloponnesian War, when the ruling majority too often forgot the interests of the state and showed themselves excessively docile in the hands of warmongering demagogues. Nevertheless, even after its comparative failure at this time, the people restored it as soon as they were able after their defeat and occupation by Sparta, and a form of government quite recognizable as a descendant of that of Cleisthenes remained in Athens until its conquest by Macedonia in the late fourth century B.C.

❖ Intercity relations

THE PERSIAN WARS

Only a few years after Cleisthenes had established the new Athenian constitution all the peoples of Greece were to be put to a severe test. The expanding empire of Persia took over the Greek city-states in Asia Minor, which appealed to their friends on the mainland for help. Athens sent a small expedition, which soon returned after some successes. The Persian king, Darius I, was furious with this interference, however, and sent an expedition of his own against Athens and such other states as would not submit and send earth and water as a token of submission

to the great monarch. The result was the campaign of Marathon (490 B.C.), in which the Athenians almost alone defeated the great expedition. The Persians were ignorant of the country, and had evidently hoped that some influential Athenians would give them aid against their own compatriots. Although the traitors did their best, their aid came too late to help the Persians. Darius' son Xerxes prepared a much larger expedition, which was to proceed by both land and sea. The Greeks knew of the preparations but found it extremely difficult to concert any policy. Athens was obviously best fitted for leadership by sea, and Sparta by land. Matters were further complicated because some of the northern cities submitted rather than defend themselves.

The outcome was the heroic defeat of the Spartans at Thermopylae, followed by the capture and sack of Athens, mitigated by the great Athenian sea victory of Salamis (480 B.C.). In

spite of the loss of their city, the Athenians fought on, and the following year a grand alliance led by Sparta was able to defeat the Persian land forces at the battle of Plataea, while the Athenian and allied navy defeated the Persian navy at Mycale (479 B.C.). Thereafter Greece was free from attack by Persia, though from the end of the fifth century through the fourth until the conquest of Persia by Alexander, Persian influence was strong in Greece, and Persian money played a not inconspicuous part in the final defeat of the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War.

THE CONFEDERATION OF DELOS— ATHENIAN IMPERIALISM

After the war was over the Athenians decided that the only way to prevent a renewed attack was to form a league of defense, composed of Athens herself and as many of the



Ostraka, or ballots, used for ostracism in Athens in the fifth century B.C. Note the names of prominent Athenian statesmen written on them: Kimon, Themistokles, (A)risteid(es), Perikles, Miltiades. (COURTESY AMERICAN SCHOOL OF CLASSICAL STUDIES AT ATHENS)

Aegean islands as she could persuade to join her. Sparta was also invited into the league (called the Confederation of Delos), but firmly and politely inclined. Originally it was a free league, although obviously Athens was the leading partner. Some of the islands provided money, and a few of the larger ones provided ships. The money was used by the Athenians to build ships, but the sailors were trained in Athens and the commanders were Athenian. It is therefore not surprising that the instrument thus forged proved to be too tempting for the Athenians, and under the leadership of Pericles it began to be used for purposes for which it had not been intended. After a defeat had been sustained in the eastern Mediterranean, where the navy had no business to be, Pericles turned the debacle to good account by having the treasury, hitherto located in Delos, one of the smaller islands sacred to Apollo, transferred to Athens. When Athens decided not to permit anyone to leave it, the free league had clearly become an Athenian empire.


THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

In addition to using the fleet as he saw fit, and using the surplus of the treasury for beautifying Athens, Pericles began to interfere in the internal affairs of the islands, encouraging the setting up of democratic governments favorable to Athens in place of the older oligarchies which had been traditional. For a time also he carried on some minor wars on the mainland of Greece until a few setbacks decided him to pursue his ends by the more diplomatic means of trying to bring over states allied to Sparta into his league. Ultimately the fear induced in Sparta and in the leading Peloponnesian trading state of Corinth caused them to launch a preventive war, to be known henceforth as the Peloponnesian War, since the historians of the war were Athenian. Honors in this war were fairly equally divided for the first half, which was concluded by a temporary peace. The Spartans could not be seriously defeated by land (though they did suffer some severe losses in minor Athenian expeditions), nor could the Athenians be defeated by sea; and as long as they held command of the sea they could not be starved. However,

when the peace was broken and the war renewed, the Athenians overreached themselves and, through bad judgment in the campaign, lost the whole of a great expedition sent to Syracuse in Sicily. Thereafter the Athenians were on the defensive. They had lost more than they could recover, a number of the islands revolted, and the Persians saw their chance to finish off their ancient enemy by giving aid and comfort to Sparta. The last Athenian fleet was destroyed at Aegospotami in 405 B.C., and Athens was forced to surrender for lack of supplies, now cut off by the victorious Spartans. Though the Athenians made a partial recovery in the fourth century, they were forever afterward plagued by poverty and never built up a first-class state again.

Throughout the great fifth century, Athens had been able to maintain her position as a first-class power in the Greek world only because of the tribute money that she had at her disposal from the islands in the league. She was always faced with a large visible unfavorable balance of trade due to her overpopulation and general underemployment. But the carrying trade and the balance of money from the islands not actually used for the allied navy were able to make up this deficit. To the use of this money we undoubtedly owe the incomparable artistic achievements of the fifth century.

Both Sparta and Athens, and indeed all Greece, suffered severely from the internecine struggle of the Peloponnesian War. Not only had many thousands of men been killed, but a great deal of the territory had been ravaged, and, perhaps worst of all, the custom had arisen of looking to Persia for support in the fratricidal struggles between the city-states. Persia, however, had no interest in them except to keep as many states as possible weak and disunited. No great thing was achieved by the war, party struggles and bitterness were exacerbated, and the necessary unity of Greece was postponed until the city-states were conquered by the outsider Philip of Macedon in the second half of the fourth century. If Athens, Sparta, and Corinth had learned to live together, or if Athens had been willing to let her league be really free and perhaps ultimately federal, then the work of Philip of Macedon would have been



impossible. It was the Peloponnesian War that made his ultimate rise, or the rise of another like him, inevitable.

❖ Daily life in Athens

The whole social life of Athens, and indeed that of all other Greek cities, reflects, above all, the extraordinary poverty of material resources, which was not only accepted philosophically by the Greeks but regarded as the natural and even desirable order of things. The ordinary man remained a frugal liver, both in

imperial times and in the fourth century. Even what he considered luxuries would be to the imperial Roman very little indeed. Everything must be judged by Greek standards. When Pericles boasts that luxuries from the whole world stream into Athens we must set this against the background of the known national income, and the known social life as shown by the inscriptions, by the artistic remains as well as by the literature. All Greeks wore clothes of the utmost simplicity at all times, an undergarment fastened with a safety pin, and an outer garment draped about their person. The same garment served as a blanket. Beds were usually

planks, without springs. The average house, unlike the temples, was made of sun-dried brick, and houses were built close together. The walls were not decorated, the furniture was crude and utilitarian. When Pericles insisted that Athenian homes were beautiful and elegant, he may have been speaking the truth, because the artistic decorations that the Greeks knew so well how to make may have been in use. If so, we know nothing of such decorations; but the furniture in the house of the most fashionable young man of Athens in his day, a list of which we do possess, is singularly unimpressive. The houses themselves were adequate for living in, but bear no comparison at all with those of pre-Greek Minoan Crete.

The reason for this utter lack of luxury in the private homes of the Athenians is simple enough. The Greek lived primarily in the open air. More hours of the day were spent in the gymnasium, the agora, or the streets than in his house. When it was dark he went to bed, and at dawn he usually rose and went into the street, without breakfast. We hear nothing from any source of any great mansions of the Roman type in classical times, nor of palatial private gardens and pleasure grounds. Rich men contributed their wealth to the polis, and did not use it so much for their own pleasure; but even their riches were small enough by Roman or Cretan standards. There were no gargantuan feasts; food was scarce and lacked variety. Meat was rarely eaten.

The truth seems to be, hard as it may be for us to believe, that the Greek really did not care for luxury, or not enough to give up his leisure to gain it; and it was frowned upon by public opinion. A contrast sometimes made between Athenian luxury and Spartan simplicity is extremely relative. Both lived simply; but the Spartan cultivated simplicity, wearing only one garment in winter and going barefoot, whereas the Athenian had sandals. The Athenian was able to decorate his city superbly because he cared for it rather than for his home; and to the service of his gods and his city he devoted all his unparalleled artistic talents.

The kind of freedom that resulted from this doing without is one that is unique in history, and can never be repeated. But if one delights

in free talk, assemblies, festivals, plays, the development of the mind and the body, self-government, and civic glory, the logical thing to do is to avoid cluttering oneself up with possessions useless to this kind of life. The Athenian was never afraid that he would lose his possessions. Even if his city were to be destroyed it could always be rebuilt—as Athens was rebuilt after its sack by the Persians. But freedom, once it had been lost, might never be restored; and such a loss could destroy the whole basis for life in the polis. In the rest of this chapter we shall see how the Athenians used this freedom.

❖ The searching mind of the Greek

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF GREEK THOUGHT

All knowledge, said the Greeks, begins in wonder—wonder about the world, and wonder about man. The Hebrews asked only one question about man: his relation to his God. The Greeks asked not only this question but all other questions. They were the greatest people for questioning that the world has yet seen, or at all events until our own time. When Aristotle came to write his *Politics* he felt obliged to ask a great many fundamental questions before he dared to generalize. He had amassed material on 158 constitutions, constitutions evolved by generations of men struggling with the problem of how men could best be governed. None of the constitutions was perfect; all had failed in some respects. But the people themselves had discovered the defects, and by asking why and considering the alternatives they had tried to remedy them. So Aristotle conceived it to be his task to classify these constitutions, to see whether he could evolve a system that would have the most merits and the fewest weaknesses even if it would not be ideal. Plato, on the other hand, was looking in his *Republic* for an ideal state. So it was necessary for him to inquire first on what principles an ideal state could be built, and then to find institutions through which it could be expressed. This took him a long way. For, having discovered that it must be based on justice, he then had to find out what justice was. Neither Plato nor Aristotle ever thought

for a moment that it was not the duty of man to improve his institutions, as the ancient Egyptians had thought. And it is this willingness to seek new knowledge and to stake their lives on the result of continuous experiment based on the best thinking of which they were capable that distinguishes the Greeks from their predecessors.

The Greeks wondered about the physical world. What was the underlying stable substratum in a world where everything appeared to be in flux—was it water, air, fire, or atoms? Clearly, everything changed in appearance; but they did not doubt that this change was only an apparent change. Underneath was a unity. When Thales saw the Egyptian notebooks which told of the measurements of the angles and sides of a triangle, his mind leaped ahead to the universal idea underlying all these particulars. And he is credited with the famous *pons asinorum* theorem—in all triangles, the angles subtending equal sides are equal to one another.

The Greeks wondered about man—his nature, the seen body, and the unseen soul that gave life to it. They assumed the existence of the soul, but they tried to find the relationship between soul and body. How does man acquire knowledge? What is the nature of the mind that knows it? What are the laws of thinking? How does one idea connect with another? What is an idea? What are the activities proper to man? What is morality?

In all these questions except the last, the Greeks were pioneers in human thinking; and even in the last they were different from the Hebrews in that at least the later Greeks accepted nothing, not even the gods, as final arbiters. While they might admit that the fear of the Lord was the beginning of wisdom, this to them would only be one more reminder that they were men and not gods. The last thing a classical Greek would do would be to enter the sanctuary and there receive a comfort which would save him the necessity of questioning further.

WONDER ABOUT THE WORLD—COSMOLOGY

The first thinkers to speculate about the nature of the world and the universe were not

Athenians, nor indeed did the Athenians show much interest at any time in physical speculation. Their almost exclusive interest was in man. The early cosmologists hailed from Ionia, and the problem they set themselves was the fundamental problem, which, expressed literally, was: Out of what does everything come? What is the primal substance underlying all visible physical phenomena, however much the form or appearance of objects changes? The Ionians assumed that there was such a substance. Thales suggested water; Anaximenes, air; Heraclitus, fire. Naturally they could not prove which, if any, of these substances was the primary one, although no doubt they had observed such phenomena as the three visible stages of water.

The Eleatic school of thinkers in southern Italy gave consideration to the same problem. Parmenides came to the conclusion, on theoretical grounds, that there could be no such thing as nothing. The whole idea, for him, was inconceivable. Thus there could be no such thing as a real change, since this would involve the appearance of something new that had not been in existence before. Essentially all phenomena must be the same, with the consequence that all visible change must be illusory. This criticism having been accepted by all later thinkers, the question was shifted, and now became a quest for what caused the visible changes in phenomena. Out of all this speculation ultimately arose the Greek atomic theory, explained in detail by Democritus of Abdera. All things, said he, are made up of filled space and empty space, atoms and the void. The atoms were not infinitely small but simply very small (like our molecules). Each atom had its own characteristics, a characteristic shape and a characteristic movement, which gave rise to the qualities observed in objects by men; sweet and sour, hard and soft, and all the infinite variety that we perceive.

The importance of all this speculation was not, of course, in its results, but in the fact that it is altogether new in its objectives and in the kinds of explanation that it offers. The gods are not brought in to explain phenomena; it is assumed that the basis of all things is material. Man had, in his mind, removed himself from his universe and stopped to look at it. He had

taken the first steps along a road the ending of which is not yet in sight, but which, along the way, has led to modern science and a transformed world.

WONDER ABOUT MAN AND HIS PLACE IN THE UNIVERSE—THE ATHENIAN CONTRIBUTION

The relationship between man and gods—Greek tragedy It has become customary to call the cosmologists whose work we have been considering the "pre-Socratic" philosophers. Philosophers or not—and we prefer to think of them as early theoretical scientists—the term pre-Socratic suggests an important truth, that Socrates, though he never wrote a line, is the key figure in the history of Greek thought. The philosophers who follow him build upon his work, while the thinkers before him, notably the great Athenian tragic dramatists, Aeschylus and Sophocles, seem to live in an altogether different world, with different assumptions and different insights. Yet it was not Socrates himself whose thought was crucial. He was the first thinker who tried to repair the damage done to traditional thinking by the Sophists, but the intellectual revolution itself was the achievement of the Sophists. Thus in this chapter we shall deal with the pre-Sophists and their framework of ideas first, show how the Sophists destroyed this framework with their criticism, and finally how the great thinkers—Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle—repaired the damage as far as it could be repaired, and set the world on a new path of thinking that has persisted since their time. Because this intellectual revolution can lay claim to being the most important such revolution in the history of mankind, and is the most distinctive contribution of the Greeks to the intellectual heritage of mankind, most of the rest of this chapter will be devoted to it.

The great question, for the Greeks as for the Hebrews, was, What is the relation between the earthly and the spiritual man—what is the relation between man and the gods? This may well be the question we in our Western civilization should be asking ourselves, but too often we have forgotten it, still under the spell of the Sophists who claimed that it was unanswerable. The central thought of early Greek civilization

was that man lives within a framework of destiny, which the Greeks called *Moirai*. This idea suffuses the work of Homer; it is implicit in the *Odyssey* and extremely explicit in parts of the *Iliad*. In Homer it is made clear that man's deeds on earth, however pleasing they may have been to the gods, will not avail to save him from his destined destruction. Hector, it is explicitly stated, has always fulfilled his religious obligations toward Zeus and the other gods; his moral character has been impeccable; and yet he must fall a victim to the spear of Achilles, who is on all counts his moral inferior. Zeus himself is ruled by the superior power of *Moirai*. He weighs the lot of Hector and the lot of Achilles in the balance; when it is shown by this test that Hector is the one who must die in the duel between the two heroes, then Zeus has to forbid further divine help to him and turns him over to his godly and earthly enemies. Hector himself, elsewhere in the poem, recognizes that he is no match for Achilles and that he will die. Andromache, his wife, cannot persuade him to escape the duel, not with all the love she bears him and he bears her. It is his duty as a man to engage in the conflict, a duty toward himself, or what the Greeks called *arete*. Man can therefore, in the view of Homer, not escape his fate. There is a realm of necessity which is the framework within which his deeds must be performed, and his only task within this framework is to bear himself nobly and with dignity as befits a true man.

This thought is the core also of early Greek tragedy. The tragedian's task was not to entertain but to teach the people. The tragedy was performed at the Dionysiac festival; it was a part therefore of Greek religion. Aristotle, in a famous definition of the purposes of tragedy, explains that it must be "of some magnitude" (concerning matters of moment), must present "an imitation of life," and must, by inspiring compassion and awe, lead to a "catharsis" of these and other emotions. The process of taking part in the performance of tragedy was therefore a cleansing one. For this purpose Aeschylus and Sophocles always showed noble actions performed by heroes who were not fully realistic but were to some degree idealized. In every tragic hero there was some nobility, even though

he may have erred greatly (all Greek "sin" is error; there is no other word in the Greek language for sin but error). Prometheus, in Aeschylus' play, *Prometheus Bound*, has disobeyed the gods in pursuit of a higher task for mankind, so he is punished though it was ultimately within the needs of destiny that man should receive the Promethean gift. The whole house of Agamemnon has been pursued by a cruel destiny that was not of Agamemnon's original making. In the Oedipus trilogy of Sophocles it is expressly shown that Oedipus has been destined to kill his father and marry his mother, and all the puny human efforts to avoid this fate succeed only in deepening the tragedy. Both Aeschylus and Sophocles thought profoundly on these problems. Sophocles in his last play, *Oedipus at Colonus*, suggests as a solution that the sufferings of Oedipus ultimately have been worth while because the land in which he is buried is to be blessed. But, in the thought of these dramatists, as in that of Homer, there is no explanation of why men suffer that can be universally applicable. Human suffering is the work of Moira or the gods, and man has but a limited freedom. It is right for the people to be instructed in these things, to admire and revere the nobility of man in the face of his suffering, and to accept the decrees of the gods and learn humility and fortitude. As Sophocles says in the last words of the *Antigone*, only in old age can man learn wisdom and acceptance.

This was the world of the Athenians before the age of Pericles. In Aristophanes, the great comic poet, who lived in a later and far different age, we can find a nostalgic yearning for the past. His "old men who fought at Marathon" were to him the repository of all the ancient virtues, virtues no more to be seen in his own decadent era. This charge of decadence has been a time-honored complaint of conservatives. But in looking back with the perspective of more than two thousand years we can see that there was something in the substance of Aristophanes' complaints, that indeed there had been an overturning of the old thoughts and the old values, and that these would never reappear. The criticism of the Sophists was fatal; the world would never be the same again.

Criticism of traditional beliefs—The Sophists. The central thought of the Sophists was stated powerfully and succinctly by one of the earliest of them, Protagoras' dictum, "Man is the measure of all things, of things that are, that they are; of things that are not, that they are not," when taken as seriously and as comprehensively as his successors took it, proved to be the lever which lifted Greek traditional thought off its hinges. Everything hereafter must be looked at from the point of view of man. The gods may exist but they do not reveal themselves to us; therefore they may be disregarded. Laws were made by men and for men; the gods do not sanction laws and do not punish those who offend against them. The individual is more important than the community; he has only one life, let him make the most of it and not lose it stupidly. There is no "natural" difference between the slave and the free; it is just an unfortunate but temporary condition due to historical circumstances.

Such thoughts fell upon fertile ground during the days of the Athenian Empire and the Peloponnesian War. Who can really refute the saying of Thrasymachus the Sophist that "justice is the interest of the stronger," or that might makes right? "Of men we know, and of gods we can be fairly sure, that they take power whenever they can," say the Athenian ambassadors to the Melians who try to opt for neutrality in the war. In essence they say, "We are stronger than you, so you may as well submit, and don't believe that the gods will save you. We have as good reason as you to believe they are on our side, not yours." Plato himself, in the *Laos*, has an Athenian stranger remark that the troubles of Athens all stem from their acquired belief that man, not God, is the measure of all things. Alcibiades defends his action in betraying the Athenians to the Spartans by saying that it is only "natural" for an exile to look after his own self and to do everything he can to get back to his old city, even by betraying it to the enemy and returning in the wake of the conquerors.

Euripides, pupil of the Sophists, cannot accept altogether the thought that there are no gods. He is too well aware of the inexplicable fate of man; he is too sympathetic with human

suffering; and he cannot, like the Hellenistic individualists of a later era, merely attribute suffering or success to chance. But for him the gods are unjust, man is not noble and does not often suffer in well-trained resignation and fortitude. So he does not care to show his heroes as heroes in the old sense; he presents them as fallible human beings. His study of Agamemnon in the *Iphigenia in Aulis*, his best and most mature tragedy, is a psychological masterpiece; but Agamemnon is no hero. He is a weak and unfortunate man, ruled by ambition, caught in an impossibly difficult dilemma. So Euripides puts real men and women on the stage; tragic destiny and heroic human acceptance disappear; and all possibility of catharsis is lost. Faith had been a casualty in the warfare, and it was never to be replaced during the rest of Greek civilization.

Reconstruction of religious thought—Search for ethical standards—Socrates. It was left for Socrates, himself a Sophist in many ways, to try to show that the Sophists had neglected an important part of human experience—the inner self. Accepting, in the main, the Sophistic criticism that man has always relied upon traditional thought rather than the best thought of which he is capable, Socrates set out to discover what it is that man really does know and how he comes to know it. Plato tells us how the oracle at Delphi made the categorical statement that Socrates was the wisest man in Greece, and how Socrates, trying to confirm or disprove this statement, searched Greece looking for a wiser man than himself. Finding none, he came to the conclusion that he alone was wise because he alone knew that he knew nothing. This profound paradox is the heart of Socratic thought. It is, of course, already implied in the dictum of Protagoras; and in so far as Socrates stresses the ignorance of those who profess to know, and the unproved nature of all traditional thinking, he is one with the Sophists. But he goes further than they; and this marks his constructiveness as a thinker. We must not indeed take received opinion on trust; but man *can* know through self-examination.

In order to discover this truth, which every man knows inwardly, it is necessary to bring

knowledge to birth. For this purpose Socrates developed a method of question and answer, ever since associated with his name, by which it is gradually discovered first what is *not* true; and thereafter the truth is built up stage by stage, allowing no definition to stand until it has been examined, and no questionable statement to pass without criticism. When the process has finished, the questioner will find that he really knows something, however little, that he was not aware of knowing before. Socrates thus calls himself the "midwife" of knowledge in that he has brought knowledge to birth through the labor of the dialectic (the technical term given to the Socratic method).

Clearly this method is above all applicable to the realm of ethics; and the greater part of the Platonic dialogues in which Socrates seems to be himself and not the mere mouthpiece of his pupil is devoted to inquiry into the nature of the good, and how it can be pursued by man. Furthermore, can virtue (*arete*) or moral excellence be taught? If the code of right behavior is not to be dictated by tradition, received opinion, and the supposed will of the gods, then it must emanate from man. An individual ethic based on man's own best knowledge must replace the traditional one. It is Socrates' belief that if we rid ourselves of all prejudice and previous thinking on the subject, then by constant criticism followed by constructive thought we can obtain an idea of the good which will be the same for all; because the human being is so constituted that he *can* know the good. And, knowing it, he can follow it; for no one who truly knows the good would deliberately choose to follow the evil. This is a typically Greek notion, and is attractive to all rationalists. The greatest medieval rationalist, Thomas Aquinas, goes with Socrates as far as *knowledge* of the good is concerned; but, being a Christian, he also stresses the infirmity of the human *will*, which, being evil as the result of original sin, cannot carry out without divine grace what the intellect indicates as the good. Most medieval Christians would not even allow a true knowledge of the good without grace. But Socrates concludes that virtue is knowledge and ignorance is the root of moral evil; from this conclusion he and his pupil Plato drew out the full consequences.

In dealing with the Sophists, Socrates deliberately points out the inadequacy of their aim of teaching "useful knowledge." He asks pertinently, "Useful for what?" and has no difficulty in showing that the only truly human aim is the pursuit of the good, to which all else is subordinate. He denies their premise that knowledge is relative; but he admits that it must be tentative. No one knows, or can know, the final truth about anything (Plato excepts mathematics); and the frequency with which Plato shows him as dissatisfied with his preliminary destructive criticism, and the tentative conclusions that fill the vacuum he has created by it, suggests the real humility before knowledge which entitled him to the accolade of Apollo of Delphi, god of wisdom.

In spite of his apparently individualistic ethics, Socrates was a profoundly social being and lover of his polis. He had a high opinion of the truth that lay behind the religious traditions of Greece, though he always interpreted them in his own way, as spiritual rather than physical truths. It was not his task to destroy the law and government of his polis, even though they were based on tradition; he fully accepted the right of the democracy to put him to death under its laws. These laws provided the whole framework of his social life; they were not unchangeable and their ethical content might no doubt be improved. But if it happened that he was the victim of the laws in their present state, then it still behooved him as a citizen to abide by them.

Within himself he only answered to the call of his own inner knowledge. He understood very fully that others might be moved by tradition and prejudice; but this was no excuse for him to follow their example. Very gravely and accurately he describes the activity of the human conscience which never tells him what to do but only what not to do. And he calls this his "daimonion," his little god—as indeed for him it was, since it took the place of the sanctions of the gods and the traditional piety associated with them.

The teachings of Socrates may have been too heady for many who were not of the highest moral fiber. Alcibiades, traitor and loose liver, was one of his pupils; so was Critias, oligarchic

leader of the Thirty Tyrants, who instituted and carried out a bloody proscription of the democratic leaders—though it is not altogether reasonable to blame the master for the human frailties of his pupils. We can see in the Platonic dialogues how easily Socrates' method lends itself to misconstruction, and how quickly an enemy could take his gently objective criticism as personal disbelief. In the *Meno*, for instance, Socrates has been showing that no virtuous man has been able to teach virtue to his son. Anytus, one of the accusers at his trial, at once jumps to the conclusion that Socrates is maligning these men instead of using them to prove his philosophical point. In the political conditions of the restoration of the democracy after the oligarchic revolution, it was difficult to believe that any man could be searching for philosophical truth. Yet Socrates continued in the only activity that for him made life worth living.

In 399 B.C. his enemies brought him to trial before the people's jury on a charge of atheism and corrupting the youth. It was a clever charge, for it was, in appearance, true. Socrates took part in all the festivals and performed all his religious observances, but he did speak of his daimonion, a strange god, and he did teach—indeed, the whole of his teaching led inevitably to the conclusion—that a new dispensation had come when man was to be free, to rule himself, not be ruled by the gods. And in so far as this was his instruction to his pupils, then he "corrupted the youth."

The account of his trial in Plato's *Apology* shows his moral courage and his confidence that his own path was right. He defends himself against the charges only by affirming them. Convicted by a small majority and asked for a suggestion as to what punishment he deserves, with the same serene confidence he tells them that he ought to have a pension and be supported at the city's expense for the rest of his life. This irony is too much for human endurance, and by a larger vote the jury condemns him to death. Instead of going into exile as his friends urge, an exile which would undoubtedly have been winked at, he accepts his sentence, not in stoical resignation but with dignity, tenderness for his friends, and good humor. While he awaits the fatal hemlock he discourses on immortality, still

with the same calm reason that he had shown during his life. There is, he believes, an inner self in man, his divine part; this, being of the same nature as the divine, cannot die, and will dwell forever with the gods. But he will soon know. He shows no fear and no regrets. So he drinks the hemlock; and by the manner of his dying he truly ensured his immortality on earth. For it was a turning point in the life of his pupil Plato, then a young man of about twenty-eight years of age.

Constructive philosophy—Idealism of Plato

The heart of Plato's teaching stems from the original conception of Socrates that the human being can know the good; and that, knowing it, he can do it. What Plato seeks to discover is *how* he can know it, and *what* it is exactly that he knows. By using the dialogue form he shows us the whole process by which he arrived at his conclusions; hence the endless stimulation that Plato has afforded to all subsequent mankind. All that we must do is hitch up to his thought at one place, and either follow him to the same conclusions, or, by casting aside some of his thoughts as based on assumptions which we will not accept, move on to different conclusions.

Assuming, then, that man can know the good, with what faculty does he know it, and what is the object of this faculty? To this Plato answers that man is possessed of the power of thinking (*Nous*), and that this spiritual element in man can recognize the spiritual element akin to it—the Idea. This Idea, however, is not in the physical world but in the spiritual world, forever hidden from every faculty in man save the *Nous*. Following this thought further, he concludes that everything we see in front of us is a *particular*, a single example of something, the Idea or archetype of which is really spiritual, and not to be found on earth. We see, for instance, a single plant; but the Idea of the plant is in the spiritual world. From this it is but a short step to the value judgment that the earthly example is necessarily an inferior copy of the ideal plant—that the spiritual reality is more beautiful, more worthy of contemplation than anything on earth.

The next step is to consider how we can recognize this earthly copy as indeed a copy

of an Idea. And to this Plato's answer is that the soul, with its active faculty, the *Nous*, existed before incarnation on earth in a human body. Before it descended to earth it glimpsed these Ideas, which were implanted forever in the soul. Thus knowledge of the universal behind the particular appearance on earth is simply *recognition*. This, it will be seen, completely accounts for man's possession of innate knowledge, which Socrates had shown man did possess.

It is clear that this "idealist" philosophy gives an enormous scope to the philosopher. He is not compelled to examine the phenomena in front of him but may reason *a priori*; indeed, since it is only human thinking that can perceive the Ideas, there is no other method of reasoning than *a priori*. Thus by reasoning, the moral and political philosopher must try to discover for himself the ideal good, and not the practicable good.

The *Republic* is the Platonic masterpiece of this kind of reasoning. But from this it should not be thought that Plato had no practical ends in view. He tells us specifically that he has. No political state of which he has knowledge has been *thought out*; all are defective. But in his view these defects need not be inevitable. For if men know the good they will not deliberately prefer the evil unless they have been warped beyond cure. Since "virtue" may be taught, men can be educated to admire the best, and not choose a second-best polity to live in.

His method, then, is to discover what is the bond which holds society together (justice), and then try to arrive at a definition of justice. He comes to the conclusion that justice in the citizen and in the state is identical. If each man is given a position in the social order which enables him to do that for which he is best fitted, and he performs this task properly, then the ends of both the citizen and the state will be fully served, and the society will be a just one. Plato then proceeds to inquire into how human potentialities can best be realized in a social framework, and what will be the nature of the social institutions required.

Given his premises, the whole work, built up on these lines, is logically impeccable. Its value in all ages has been its suggestiveness, and the joy of following the thought of a truly creative

mind, willing to pursue the argument wherever it will lead, without deference to conventional Greek notions—as, for instance, on the inequality of women. It is not native conservatism or a preference for oligarchy—though these may have been present, they are irrelevant—that forces him to the conclusion that the enlightened despotism of a board of professional guardians (philosopher kings and queens) is the only possible “best” government. These alone have been able to discover the good, and they must be dedicated utterly to its pursuit, without the warping of judgment which would arise from the possession of either material goods or family. With such a body of truly scientific professionals there would be no need for laws or for the exercise of power; for at all grades in the society each man would have received the education, and hold the position, for which he was best fitted.

It has often been pointed out, justly, that Plato makes a number of assumptions which are extremely questionable—for instance, that public and private virtue are identical, and that a state made up of good individuals will be able to function harmoniously as a state. But it will usually be found that these assumptions are the result of his fundamental belief that no one, knowing the good, would deliberately choose to do evil. If the state is a just one, its duties will be just and good; the individual, if he is good, will desire to do this duty. Duty and inclination must coincide. If they do not, then either the state needs to be corrected or the individual needs to be improved—by development and adjustment, not by repression and force.

Plato may also be accused of neglecting the psychology of man, as it *must* have been known to him from experience. What was the use of theorizing about an ideal state when he knew of its impossibility in real life? Again the answer must be that by showing men the ideal good—which was, for him, not impossible of realization but only extremely difficult—he was pointing out a direction for the aspirations and endeavors of man. That it was not his last thought on the subject is shown by his later works, the *Statesman* and *Laws*, in which he outlines the “second-best state,” the state ruled by laws. Laws are directed to the ethical improvement of man, but

cannot be as scientifically impeccable as the personal guidance of the philosopher kings. Elsewhere he shows that he is not unaware of human psychology. He recognizes the irrational part of man, but does not consider it incurable. The desires are controlled by reason, which, in the light of its knowledge of the good, will give man the power of evaluating his desires at their true worth.

As with the state, so with man. The harmonious functioning of all the parts that go to make up the full man, this is self-realization under the guiding power of the *Nous*. It is a psychology the truth of which would be vehemently denied by both Christians and Freudians, who both deny the power of the mind to control the will unaided. Perhaps to these the psychology of Plato would seem naïve; but it was the fullest and most complete expression of the Greek ideal of harmony and *sophrosyne*, and of the Greek belief in the efficacy of human thinking. If it is a glorification of the one specifically human power, this to the Greeks would have been a recommendation. Oedipus to the Greeks was not a complex but a human being, proud and erring but undefeated; and they were glad to be considered of his company.

Philosophy becomes science—Aristotle

Aristotle was the son of a Chalcidian physician in the service of Philip of Macedon. He studied at the Academy of Plato and was unquestionably his most brilliant pupil. He was tutor of Alexander, son of Philip, for several years, returning to Athens and opening a school himself (the Lyceum), where he taught for twelve years. Forced into exile on the death of Alexander, he died a year later in 322 B.C. at the age of sixty-two.

Thus Aristotle stands at the end of the Classical Age of Greece before the great emigration to Asia that followed the conquests of Alexander; and in a very real sense he completed it. Though he left one or two things undone which were repaired by Theophrastus, his pupil and successor (for instance, a work on plants and another on human character), and though he contributed nothing to Greek mathematics, which followed an independent course, in other respects he took all the varied specula-

tions of his Greek predecessors, brilliant and disorganized as they were, and by the giant force of his capacity for system, order, and classification, discharged them from his hands as sciences—a body of work that could be communicated to others in comprehensible form. Once he had laid down the principles of scientific inquiry, the work would not have to be done again. He was the first true scientist in the history of mankind; and few who have really studied his work would dispute his title to be the greatest the world has yet known. And now that we have passed beyond recovery into a world of specialists, there never will be anyone again who will be able to lay claim to the universality of his learning. Any one of half a dozen of his mental achievements would have entitled him to an undying fame. The sum is almost beyond belief.

If this seem excessive praise, let us consider for a moment a few of Aristotle's achievements. Basing his observations upon Plato's theory of ideas, he formulated the laws of thinking, the relation between the universal and the particular, the formal procedure required for arriving at conclusions and correct reasoning, giving in passing a different solution to the problem of the origin of the universal. Disturbed by the way in which objects were described without including all their features, he formulated a method for describing them inclusively (the "categories of being"). Stimulated perhaps by Socrates' remark that he himself knew that his will prevented him from going into exile and not "his bones and sinews," as Anaxagoras would have claimed, he formulated a system for dealing accurately with causation and had to invent a new vocabulary for the purpose. Faced with a mass of biological data, he evolved a system of classification into genus and species which has been followed with modifications ever since.

Aristotle is usually praised in these days rather patronizingly for his excellent and careful observation and description of the animal world, and for his early recognition of facts which modern science, with its greater knowledge and improved instruments, has shown to be true—as if anyone with the time and the patience could not observe correctly! He has been criticized for premature guesses on the basis of insufficient information, for his doctrines of purpose, for his

denial of the atomic theory, and in general for having held back medieval scientists from more correct theories while they elaborated on his incorrect ones instead. But insufficient attention has been paid to the gigantic mental effort required to create order out of chaos, and to make the world *intelligible*, which was his primary purpose. No one before his time had seen the need for a method of inquiry or a classification of knowledge. Philosophers had speculated, and looked for universal principles, every now and then carrying out a few desultory experiments but always jumping to theoretical conclusions of little value beyond their aesthetic appeal. To watch Aristotle at work trying to determine how to deal with zoology with no previous guide, as in the first book of his *Parts of Animals*, is to see the enormous difficulties that faced him in the struggle to put the material in order; and to read any part of the *Metaphysics* is to realize his extraordinary ability to handle the most difficult abstractions of thought with the utmost delicacy and sureness—in which again he had no predecessor. Plato charms us because of his artistry and imagination, and because there is no word that we cannot understand, no thought that we cannot follow. He flatters our ignorance, making us believe we are not as ignorant as we are; in reading Plato we all imagine ourselves philosophers. But Aristotle is hard work, and he makes no concessions to us; even when we think we have grasped one of his thoughts it quickly eludes us again. Then suddenly it becomes clear and fruitful and applicable in a hundred other ways, and we possess a tool for understanding the world.

In following the Aristotelian method, as we have all followed it since his time without acknowledgments, our work has been made easy. But it was not easy for him. He had first to invent the tools of analysis, and then with these to set to work on all the phenomena of knowledge available to the Greek world. Both parts of this work he largely accomplished. His nephew went with Alexander on his expedition, and Alexander himself sent back data that he thought would be of interest to his old tutor. His students collected material for him, and he analyzed and classified it, no doubt with their assistance. For his *Politics* he analyzed and di-

gested the constitutions of 158 different states, this analysis enabling him to classify the different kinds of states on the basis of evidence. He viewed the plays of his own age and the tragic drama of the great era, and in his *Poetics* classified the results, together with his findings in general terms of the requirements of tragedy. He did the same thing for the animal world in his three great works in zoology, the *History of Animals*, *Parts of Animals*, and *Generation of Animals*; and so on. Certainly in some cases he generalized and theorized too soon; but only very rarely did he fail to offer good reasons for the theories and for his acute criticisms of his predecessors. And never did his analysis fail. His successors could have built always upon his foundations, and revised his theories when necessary.

It was a tragedy that Aristotle, of all men, should have been regarded as an authority and the last word on any subject—he who was the most ready of all the ancient investigators to base his theories on the observed facts. But it is now the prevalent opinion that when at last the late medieval scholars did begin to work on his findings at the University of Padua without accepting him as infallible, they only had to revise his groundwork, and criticize some of his conclusions on the basis of their improved knowledge of the facts. Their work made it possible for Galileo, who studied at Padua, to lay the basis for modern science. Aristotle was not abandoned, save by the ignorant; but adapted, improved upon, and commented upon until at last he emerged as the great pioneer he was, but no longer “the master of those who know,” which he was not.

If we examine the conclusions reached by Aristotle in all the numerous fields of inquiry to which he gave his attention, we shall find that they were almost always inspired by common sense. Common sense has not been regarded as a useful tool in modern exact science, with its powerful mathematics and instruments of research. Almost none of the findings of modern science, from the electron to the Copernican theory, from the physics of Einstein to the corpuscular-wave theory of light, is validated by common sense or direct sense observation. For this reason Aristotle's conclusions in the physical

sciences have to be interpreted very spaciouly and charitably if they are to be in any way acceptable, while his conclusions in the social sciences may be as valid as in the days they were written.

Both Plato and Aristotle had an advantage over later thinkers in that the known world was small. Because the whole range of knowledge was not very great, it was still possible for one man to try to encompass it. Frequently, throughout the work of Aristotle, we find him making the statement that any science or art ought to cover the whole of a subject; and it is true that he makes the attempt. But not only this; he tries also to cover the whole of *all* subjects, using his key of logical analysis and systematic organization. This no successor has ever been able to do, and few have tried—though, as we shall see, it was the aim of Roger Bacon in medieval times. But even he did not find it necessary to go over a subject again once Aristotle had “completed” it; though toward the end of his life Bacon suggested that a corps of specialists should be organized for the purpose of producing the necessary compendium. It is certain that no single person will ever try again.

This work of Aristotle was therefore unique, a last and most nearly complete expression of the Greek desire for an orderly and harmonious whole, one of the greatest intellectual monuments in the history of mankind. If the highest praise is to be given, let us say that his work is worthy of the Greek genius.

❖ Influence of Greek thought— Significance of Greek search for new truth

The great thinkers dealt with so far have occupied so much of the space in this chapter because they were the men whose thoughts provided the substratum for all the thinking of later Western man. The revolution ushered in by the Sophists has never been completed and perhaps never will be. At times, especially in the Middle Ages, men have preferred to take the traditional religiously inspired picture of the world as true and have not questioned its validity. This attitude has seldom led to new knowledge. The attitude of resignation in the

face of divine will has sometimes prevailed in Western civilization, but always to the detriment of scientific inquiry. It might be more comfortable and give greater security to the individual to live in a world in which everything is known, and knowledge is contemplated, not enlarged; but such a world would be static. The world of the Sophists, in which one idea is as good as another, is a difficult world to live in, and it cannot be long endured. But the answer may well be that we need another Socrates to help us seek out the good, rather than despairing of finding it and resigning ourselves to the ethical nihilism which too often appears to present the only alternative to the acceptance of the teachings of tradition. The Greeks were the first to escape from the bonds imposed by their ancestors and strike out on a new path, the end of which could not and cannot now be seen. It is this above all that is meant by the Greek spirit. Greek art, perfect in its way as it is, has only been imitated by the West, copied but not equaled. For though we have inherited the Greek view of life and carried it on with our own genius to new realms unsuspected by the Greeks, the Greek feeling for man as a union of soul and body in equilibrium was peculiar to themselves. We of the West can only dimly sense this view when we touch the few authentic masterpieces that have been preserved to us, and wonder at their perfection.

❖ Greek art

ART AS EXPRESSION OF THE GREEK SPIRIT

We have remarked earlier that the Greek ideal was *sophrosyne*, or moderation, although as a people the Greeks markedly lacked this virtue. In the realm of art, however, their search was not doomed to the same failure as in the necessarily imperfect world in which they had to live, and their volatile passions could not be involved in this ideal world as deeply as in the political world of live men and women. In art man is a creator. His materials are at hand but as yet without form. It is for the artist to give form to them. The soul, in Greek thought, is the *form* of the body; it shapes the inchoate mass, the mere raw physical material which decays at death into its original primal matter. So, for the Greek artist, the task is to give form to matter, to give it a soul which makes it live. And it is a curious feature of Greek art above all other art that this illusion of life is indeed given to the dead material, marble. This feature can be perceived best in Greek sculpture, but even the Greek temple does not seem to be altogether dead. We can analyze these temples and see by what technical means certain illusions were created, but the miracle remains. Even with our greatly advanced technical ingenuity, we have not been able to achieve the same results.

Two slabs from the Parthenon frieze known as the Elgin marbles after the English lord who carried them off to England. Note the mastery of the riders in the Panathenaic procession, and the absence of any sense of the strain which is noticeable in some of the realistic sculpture of the Hellenistic Age. The riders are caught in a moment of eternity rather than individualized as riders taking part in one particular procession at one particular moment. The frieze was designed by Phidias and carried out at his direction though by different craftsmen. (COURTESY BRITISH MUSEUM)



The Greeks of the Classical Age did not think of art as useful, nor did they set out to create self-consciously something "artistic." Indeed they did not possess a word for what we speak of as "artistic." Their only word for art was *techné*, which means craft. Every product of the Classical Age in Greece is, by our standards, artistic; form and substance are united in a harmony that can be recognized at once. Form is given to the material in accordance with the nature of the material and the purpose for which the object is to be used. This quality seems to have been an almost instinctive achievement of the Greek craftsman; and though it is very possible that the barbarian princes and Persian nobles who often bought these works did not appreciate what they had acquired, it would have been impossible, working in the Greek artistic tradition, for the craftsman to have made a shoddy and inferior product, even for barbarians.

The same honesty is observed when we consider the temples. The most famous of Greek temples, the Parthenon at Athens, was filled with sculptures that could never be seen by mortal eye, high up in the part of the temple where the statue of the goddess Athena was housed. Yet this sculpture was as honestly and truly wrought as anything in the visible parts of the temple. The building of a temple was the highlight in the life of the Athenian craftsman. We know that Greek artisans all received the same low wage each day they were at work for the city, just enough to maintain their wives and families for that one day. It was considered the highest honor to work for the polis; even those who scorned private employment as unworthy of free men welcomed the opportunity. The temple was a home for the god to whom it was dedicated and whose statue inhabited it. The god thus honored gave protection to the city. The great temple of the Erechtheum at Athens was completed in the darkest days of the Peloponnesian War, with resources which the city could ill spare. Thus the Greek craftsmen, like the medieval craftsmen who built the Gothic cathedrals as an expression both of civic pride and of their devotion to God, gave of their best with complete honesty. The result is what no man would deny as being true art.



The famous Hermes of Praxiteles, the only almost complete statue extant from the fourth century B.C. Note how the god is given truly human features, which should be contrasted with the less differentiated features of the participants in the Panathenaic procession shown in the Parthenon frieze (Elgin marbles).

ARCHITECTURE AND SCULPTURE

The Greek temple is not an imposing building from the point of view of size, and it makes use of the simplest structural forms known to man. Essentially it was composed of the *cella*, a rectangular chamber, the dwelling place of the statue of the god; the columns surrounding the cella and forming a porch; the lintel which rested on the columns and supported the roof; the gabled roof itself; and the pediment, the triangular section under the roof. The style of the temple is determined by the column. Three types were used by the Greek architects: Doric, Ionic, and Corinthian, though the last named was too ornate for classical Greek taste and came into use only after the expansion of Greece into the Oriental world. In the sculpture of the age of Pericles, the era of the Parthenon, the

Greek ideal of man as a harmony of body and soul was brought to perfection. The figures in the Parthenon friezes were ideal figures, perfectly proportioned. There is no striving after effect; each muscle is perfectly rendered, whether in tension or repose. The effect is one of dignity and restrained movement. The horses are prancing, the young riders are in perfect control; a moment appears to have been captured in stone—not an event but a moment of eternity, as if the riders will go on prancing and the young riders will sit their horses forever.

Yet a word of warning should be given. All Greek sculptures were painted, and what we now see in the whiteness of marble must have looked utterly different in classical times, so that it is hard for us to imagine either the Parthenon or the city of Athens as they appeared to the Greeks who lived there, with statues on every corner gleaming and shining in full color in the Greek sunlight. We may think it crude of the Greeks to disguise and embellish their lovely masterpieces, which needed no such adornment. But this is the way the Greeks were, and who are we to criticize them? Can we be so sure that we have learned *sophrosyne*?

❖ The expansion of Greece— The Hellenistic Age


RISE OF PHILIP OF MACEDON

We have briefly alluded earlier in this chapter to the Greek loss of independence to Philip of Macedon. This remarkable monarch came to the throne of his semibarbaric country in 359 B.C. He built himself a small but powerful army, which he trained in new military tactics; he financed his operations by the acquisition of some gold mines through a piece of cunning manipulation; and then he set out to use these assets to conquer all Greece. He never fought a battle if he could win what he needed by diplomatic means, but he was not hesitant to use his army when it appeared to be the best means of achieving his goals. He recognized the venality and poverty of the Greek poleis



*Head of a young athlete (fourth century B.C.). This is a fragment of a statue contemporary with the *Hermes* of Praxiteles, and shows the trend toward increasing realism. (COURTESY THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART)*

of his day and their ruling politicians. He did not scruple to buy their support and sow as much discord as he could among the cities. Demosthenes, the Athenian statesman, was aware of the danger to Greek liberties early in Philip's career, and did his best to rouse the Athenians from their fatal torpor. But he was only partially successful. The aid given to threatened cities that should have been Athenian allies was always too inconsequential to save them. Thebes, the leading power of Greece, always thought that Philip was her friend until the last moment, when it was too late. So, by piecemeal conquest, Philip made himself the master of Greece and achieved a final decisive victory on the battlefield of Chaeronea in 338 B.C. His terms, except for Thebes, were light. He aimed at conquest of Asia; Greece was to be for him only the first step. He desired to go to Asia as the chosen leader of the Greek people, whether they supported him with arms or not.



But before he could organize the Asiatic expedition Philip was murdered. He was succeeded by his son, known to history as Alexander the Great.

THE CONQUESTS OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT (336-323 B.C.)

The military career of Alexander is the most astonishing in all history. He rapidly quelled a revolt in Greece which marked the beginning of his reign, then organized for himself the expedition that his father had planned. Meagerly financed, and hardly supported at all by the Greek cities, which hoped for his speedy defeat and their own liberation from Macedonian rule, he nevertheless succeeded in destroying the huge Persian Empire and succeeding to its rule. He added Egypt to his possessions without more than token fighting. He advanced into India and defeated an army that included elephants, which he had never seen before. Improvising tactics and policy as he went along, never at a loss for an expedient, possessed of a personality that overawed the toughest of generals and quelled incipient revolt among his

followers when they objected to his policy of fraternization with Persians after their defeat, and yet singularly lacking in *sophrosyne* in spite of a personal education at the hands of Aristotle, Alexander and his life and works became legendary soon after his early death. Even now books about him pour from the press, and movies celebrate his deeds. For the purposes of this history it is enough to say that the world was altogether changed by his work. Of no other man can it be said with equal justice that he laid his mark upon all the civilizations that followed him in the lands where he had fought, and upon all those civilizations to the West which in turn took over from them.

Alexander's original purpose was to avenge the expedition of Xerxes. This duly accomplished by the defeat and death of the Persian monarch, he then proceeded to invite immigration from Greece and to become himself the Great King of Persia. As Persian king it was his duty to care for his Persian subjects as for his Macedonians. He thus took Persian nobles into his service, and encouraged intermarriage between Greeks and Persians. Though he roused opposition amongst his Macedonians, who felt

they should have been specially privileged, his policy prevailed. He founded cities throughout the newly conquered lands, and imported Greek institutions suitable for the polis, which, as he had no doubt been instructed by Aristotle, was the most perfect form of social entity. Once the initial distrust had worn off, the immigrants from poor overpopulated Greece began to pour into the country, giving the rather outclassed Persians a dose of Greek efficiency which galvanized the ancient Orient into unaccustomed life.


THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER

Alexander died at the early age of thirty-three, and his generals struggled for the succession. After thirty years of civil war the territory was finally divided amongst the survivors. Ptolemy Soter took Egypt, the prize of the empire, though not the largest section; Seleucus took most of the Asiatic mainland, leaving a small but prosperous kingdom in Asia Minor for Attalus; while Greece and Macedonia fell to a general named Antigonus. The mainland of Greece, from having been overpopulated, now was denuded of its most enterprising sons, and its history need concern us no further. Egypt

became a model of efficient government and expanding economic activity under monarchs who fully appreciated and exploited the old fiction that the Pharaoh of Egypt owned all the land and that all his subjects were royal tenants. The Seleucid monarchs in Asia were faced with many minor wars, but on the whole were able to make of their empire a fairly efficient unit, and pursued a cultural policy based directly upon the original plans of Alexander. Pergamum in northern Asia Minor became a prosperous commercial state noted for the fine buildings, palaces, and temples paid for by royal bounty and the enterprise of individual merchants.

THE HELLENISTIC AGE—MINGLING OF GREEK AND ORIENTAL

The age that followed the death of Alexander is called the Hellenistic Age, as distinct from the earlier Hellenic Age when the center of culture was on the mainland. The Hellenistic period is marked especially by a mingling for the first time of Greek and Oriental culture. To this the Orientals contributed primarily their religions, while the Greeks contributed their philosophy. Within the new cities, populated for





Ruins of the temple of Zeus at Pergamum as they appear at the present time. The size of the ruins will give some indication of the scale of the work of the Hellenistic monarchs of this commercial state. (COURTESY TURKISH INFORMATION OFFICE)

the most part by immigrant Greeks, some of the forms of the old polis were maintained. The governments were made up of assemblies and councils as in Athens; but full self-government and freedom to act could not be granted to them since foreign policy necessarily remained in the hands of the monarchs. Thus to a large extent the forms were a façade. But not altogether; for the most part the cities possessed at least a kind of municipal self-government, a tradition which was of great value to the Romans when they incorporated this part of the world into their own empire. Persians in the Seleucid Empire were able to participate in the new culture and contributed to it. The Greek language prevailed, though no longer so pure as in the days of Pericles. All the educated classes could speak the *koiné*, as it was called—the common tongue of the wider *koinon*, or community of the Hellenes, which composed the whole Hellenistic world.

On the whole it was a prosperous world. The Greeks on the mainland had always been fertile in inventions and expedients. They had invented many financial tools which could now be put to use in a land where there was wide scope for them. But there was far more slavery than in the Hellenic Age, and while there were

more rich men there were also far more poor ones. Moreover, the ancient security of the polis had been entirely lost. Socrates would have felt completely out of place in a Hellenistic city. No one would have known him, no one would have had time to talk. Each man had to look after his business or be defeated by a competitor; no age of the ancient world so much resembles ours as the Hellenistic Age. The result was that a great many of the immigrant Greeks felt they had lost their roots. No imitation polis in Asia could take the place of the old, secure polis, where everyone had status as a citizen and everyone participated in government and held all the responsibilities of the active participator with his full share of responsibility. Cosmopolitanism (the world-polis) could exercise no hold upon his heart and mind. So all men had to become individualists, and seek to make what they could for themselves. The Sophist teaching at last came to full fruition. Each man was an individual; he had to look after his own interests first, and leave the government to Ptolemy or Seleucus.

Hellenistic philosophies—Individualism In a world where not all men could succeed, it was not surprising that there should be a marked growth of religions. Since these will be dealt

with at the beginning of Chapter 6, nothing need be said of them here save that they no doubt performed the important function of giving hope in a better world to those who could not succeed in this. A similar function was performed by the new individualistic philosophies that are characteristic of the Hellenistic Age. Stoicism, Epicurism, even Cynicism, all stem from the desire to attain what the Greeks called *ataraxia*, or a state of "being unmoved," an inner tranquillity of soul. The Cynics scoffed at worldly wealth and tried to acquire wisdom, this wisdom to consist primarily in the understanding of the uselessness of possessions. The typical early Cynic was Diogenes, who lived in a tub and cultivated rudeness and self-sufficiency. The movement, obviously not designed to attract a numerous following, was largely absorbed in the long-lasting and extremely important philosophy of Stoicism, which grew in scope as the centuries passed, much of it being woven into Christian ethics and much into Roman law. The purpose of the Stoic is to become indifferent to all earthly joys and pleasures, not to care whether success is attained or not, and to rest secure in the consciousness of one's own rectitude and obey only one's conscience. There is a Divine Reason which rules in the world, and man also shares in this reason. All men are equal in their ability to discover and obey the dictates of reason; there is no natural inequality, but all men are equally doomed to suffering and all are equally able to rise above it by cultivating the life of the soul and reason. Stoics therefore were the first Greeks to speak out against slavery; and it is an interesting fact that the two best-known Stoic writers, both remembered long after the Hellenistic world had been replaced by the Roman Empire, are Marcus Aurelius the Roman emperor, and Epictetus, born a crippled slave.

Epicurism was likewise an attempt to deal with the conditions of the Hellenistic world. Do not strive for success, said the Epicureans, for it is unlikely to be attained, and desiring what cannot be attained leads to unhappiness. The goal of the Epicurean was happiness, but happiness attained by simple pleasures and curtailment of the desire for more. Epicurus himself lived a simple life, eating frugally and discours-

ing gently on philosophy with his disciples. He believed in the atomic theory of Democritus and that the gods, if they exist, play no part in the affairs of men but dwell peacefully at ease in some remote part of the universe. Free will is possible for man because some of the atoms make an unpredictable swerve (*clinamen*). The affairs of men are ruled by chance and the fact might as well be accepted. The conclusion was that one should make the most of life as it is and not seek to change it by excessive (and unsuccessful) activity. It is ironical that the philosophy of Epicurus, who himself taught a gentle asceticism, should have been so transformed by the Romans that the word Epicurean, in Roman as in our own time, should have been associated primarily with gluttony—although it must be admitted that a purely hedonistic philosophy is



Hellenistic realism. This statue of an old market woman, discovered at Rome, dates from the second century B.C. and was perhaps looted from Greece by the Romans. (COURTESY THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART)



Opinion has varied remarkably at different times on the merits of the Laocoön, a late Hellenistic group showing the priest Laocoön and his two sons grappling with snakes. The impression of strain and power has appealed to many as one of the finest expressions of Hellenistic realism, while others have found the whole composition theatrical and forced and, from the Greek point of view, "bad art."

capable of this transformation. Epicurus may have said "eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we die"; but it was always possible to forget the last four words and leave the first five naked.

Hellenistic science The Hellenistic world is noted for its science, the first really practical science attained by the Greeks. The opportunity for study was provided above all by the Museum of Alexandria, a great research center founded by the Ptolemies and maintained by them with funds gained through the successful management of the estate of Egypt. Here scholars of all kinds were subsidized. Their work did not have to be useful so long as it redounded to the prestige of their master. Here the works of the great literary masters of the mainland were edited and their manuscripts multiplied. Here the Greek astronomers met with the vast records of astronomical data collected in previous centuries by the Babylonian priests and astrologers. Faced with such data the Greek theorists soon began to explain, whereas the Babylonians had been con-

tent to record and use for astrological purposes. Hipparchus discovered (or possibly restated the Chaldean theory of) the precession of the equinoxes, and was able to explain satisfactorily all the known data on the supposed movement of the sun around the earth and to predict correctly on the basis of his theories. Here Aristarchus propounded the opposite theory that the earth moved around the sun but was unable to convince his contemporaries. Here Euclid and Archimedes worked as mathematicians, and Eratosthenes calculated the diameter of the earth. Finally, Hero explained the vacuum and invented a machine using the principles later incorporated in the modern steam engine. Medicine was not neglected, the theories of the earlier Hippocrates, father of secular medicine, being studied and carried further. The great library of Alexandria, containing more than half a million books, was unique in that age and for more than fifteen hundred years afterward.

Hellenistic art—New realism Finally, a word should be said on Hellenistic art. The tendency in Hellenistic architecture was away from classical simplicity. The buildings were larger and the columns more ornate, with the Corinthian coming into fashion toward the end of the epoch. Hellenistic sculpture tended toward realism. There was no loss of technical ability, but there is sometimes, as in the "Laocoön," a rather marked straining after effect. A dying Gaul with blood flowing, and a market woman straining under her heavy burden, are well-known works of this age. But so also is the perfect "Aphrodite" of Melos, and the "Winged Victory" of Samothrace, suggestive of movement in every line, and far removed indeed from the rather static splendor of the Parthenon friezes. There was a great growth of portrait sculpture, for it is clear that art had now, like everything else, become a business, and Greek artists had to find their patrons apart from the polis.

❖ **Summary—Greek influence on subsequent Roman civilization**

When the Hellenistic world was conquered by the Romans, in a very real sense it may be



The Aphrodite of Melos (so called because the statue was discovered on the island of Melos) is widely regarded as the finest statue of a woman ever made. The artist is unknown, but the figure probably dates from the second century B.C. No photograph can do justice to this masterpiece. Located in the Louvre, it is displayed to perfection—especially at night, when it is most effectively lighted. (COURTESY THE LOUVRE)

said that the Greeks made a cultural conquest of Rome at the same time. It was contact with the Greek cities of southern Italy that inspired the first Roman poetry and the first Roman art; and the Near East was always both the most prosperous and the most highly cultured part of the Roman Empire. The second language of every cultivated Roman was Greek, and Greek rather than Latin was spoken in all the eastern domains of Rome. But the Hellenistic world did not and could not supply good government to the peoples of the East, and it did not enforce

peace. So when the unified Romans, with their distinctive gifts in the fields of government and law, were forced into contact with the Greeks of the Hellenistic world through the never-ending internecine squabbles of their rulers, their policy of divide and rule was made to order. They conquered this world by force and diplomacy. But they did not Latinize it. It remained Greek, and became Greek in government again with the fall of Rome. Not until the Muslims took over the Near East in the seventh century A.D. was Greek influence ousted. And even then the Muslims took over much of Greek thought, ultimately transmitting it to a revived Western civilization. But this story will be told in a later chapter.



The Nike (Victory) of Samothrace, a statue (now in the Louvre) in the form of the prow of a ship. Note how the Nike suggests speed and movement, unlike the static figures of the Parthenon. (COURTESY THE LOUVRE)

Suggestions for further reading

NOTE ON LITERATURE OF THE PERIOD: Greek literature in translation is available in many paperback and casebound editions, the most complete offering being that of the Loeb Classical Library (Harvard University Press). Among the author's favorite translations are those of Homer's *Iliad*, by Chase and Perry (Little, Brown); Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens*, by von Fritz and Kapp (Hafner); Pindar's *Odes*, by Lattimore (Phoenix); and Plato's *Dialogues*, by Jowett, revised by Allan and Dale (Oxford). Particularly useful collections are *The Oxford Book of Greek Verse in Translation*, edited by Higham and Bowra; *Introduction to Aristotle*, edited by McKeon (Modern Library); *Selections from Early Greek Philosophy*, edited by Nahm (Appleton-Century-Crofts); and *The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers*, edited by Oates (Random House).

PAPERBACK BOOKS

- Barker, Ernest. *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle*. Dover. Fundamental study by a profound student of ancient and modern politics. Better on Aristotle than on Plato.
- Bowra, C. M. *The Greek Experience*. NAL, 1957. Excellent modern synthesis of the Greek achievement. Thoughtful and analytical, but eminently readable.
- Bulfinch, Thomas. *Bulfinch's Mythology*. Dell. Popular Victorian classic, about one third of which is devoted to Greece.
- Cornford, Francis M. *From Religion to Philosophy: A Study in the Origins of Western Speculation*. Torch. Short but suggestive and stimulating study, throwing much light on the Greek beginnings of philosophy.
- Coulanges, Fustel de. *The Ancient City*. Anchor. In spite of the age of this book (it was published in 1864), modern scholarship has added little to our understanding of its theme—the relation of religion to the life of the ancient city.
- Dickinson, G. Lowes. *The Greek View of Life*. Ann Arbor Paperbacks. A classic, written at the turn of the twentieth century, still unequalled as a presentation of all that we think admirable about the Greeks.
- Dodd, E. R. *The Greeks and the Irrational*. Beacon. Explodes the point of view, still too frequently held in spite of the evidence to the contrary, that the Greeks were a calm and restrained people.

Graves, Robert. *The Greek Myths*. 2 vols. Penguin. By a learned English poet, profoundly interested in mythology and religion. Interpretations often far-fetched, but argued with such overwhelming erudition and determination that they are often difficult to refute by those less learned than Graves. To be treated, like all this author's works, with caution.

Guthrie, W. K. C. *The Greeks and Their Gods*. Beacon. Good discussion for serious students.

Hamilton, Edith. *The Greek Way to Western Civilization*. NAL. An ever popular account, beautifully written and enriched by many quotations; but not a book to be read by itself. Its catching enthusiasm sometimes blinds the judgment of the reader.

Harrison, Jane. *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*. Meridian. Very thorough study, not recommended for beginners, but rewarding for serious students.

Kitto, H. D. F. *The Greeks*. Penguin. Valuable short study.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals*. Anchor. This youthful work of Nietzsche not only is the key to the later work of the nineteenth-century German philosopher, but also contains profound insights into the distinction in kind between early and late Greek tragedy. Nietzsche sees Socrates and Euripides as the promoters of the intellectual revolution which destroyed the religious basis of Athenian society.

Rose, H. S. *Gods and Heroes of the Greeks*. Meridian. By a noted scholar of Greek mythology and religion.

Tarn, W. W. *Alexander the Great*. Beacon. Important study by leading scholar of the period.

Taylor, A. E. *Socrates* (Anchor); *Plato* (Meridian); *Aristotle* (Dover). Three separate studies by a renowned classical scholar, all well written and interesting, all controversial. Taylor's estimate of the influence of Socrates on Platonic thought, however, is widely accepted, especially by those who have read little but Taylor.

Zeller, Eduard. *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy*. Meridian. A good introduction by one of the best of the earlier historians of philosophy.

CASEBOUND BOOKS

- Jones, W. T. *A History of Western Philosophy*. Vol. I. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.,

1952. Well-organized modern history of philosophy with very fair summaries of the Greek thinkers.
- Jouquet, P. *Macedonian Imperialism and the Hellenization of the East*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1928. Thoughtful and analytical study.
- Rostovtzeff, M. I. *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World*. Vols. I and II. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1941. Not as formidable as it looks. Packed with information, but well written.
- Sarton, George. *A History of Science*. Vol. I. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952. A very thorough study by the dean of American historians of science.
- Tarn, W. W. *Hellenistic Civilization*. 3d ed. London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1952. The best study of the period within a manageable compass.
- Warbeke, J. M. *The Searching Mind of Greece*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1930. In my opinion, one of the best introductions to Greek thought, especially good on the nature of the problems Greek writers were trying to solve.
- Zimmern, Alfred. *The Greek Commonwealth*. 5th ed., rev. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1931. Still indispensable as the only relatively brief presentation of ancient Greece in a topical manner, giving full weight to economic and social as well as political data.

From Republic to Empire— The Evolution of Roman Civilization

♦ Republic and empire—a contrast

The study of Rome within the compass of a single chapter presents a peculiarly difficult problem. The history of Rome falls into two distinct parts: the first, ending in 31 B.C., is the history of the republic, governed under forms which can be considered democratic, but which permitted an oligarchy to rule for almost the whole period; the second is the history of the empire, under a monarch, with the forms of the monarchy at first disguised and then obvious to all. Most of the territory acquired by the Roman people and later called the Roman Empire was won during the republic; in the imperial period this territory was thoroughly reorganized and converted into the efficient institution which so much impressed the Christians and which affected so profoundly the whole civilization of the Western world.

The republic is a classic instance of the inability of institutions which grew up to take care of one set of conditions to function effectively when these conditions have altogether changed. The Roman Republic was utterly unable to administer its empire either efficiently or for the benefit of the governed; it collapsed in a civil war amid a welter of blood. Yet the gradual progress toward empire, the policies by which the numerically few Roman people won such a large expanse of territory, the way in which the democratic forms were attained, the

manner in which these forms worked and were ultimately lost, are subjects of perennial interest to all students of history and government. The story of the republic therefore is far more interesting than that of the rather static Empire, which was evolving toward nothing, though it provided a framework for the gradual civilizing of peoples who until then had known little of the blessings of civilization. To understand the republic a considerable amount of intricate detail has to be mastered, as always when a complex governmental system is studied. This detail is out of place in a single chapter devoted to Rome and cannot therefore be given. All that will be attempted is a brief account of the evolution of republican institutions and a description of the government as it functioned at the height of the republic. All detailed explanations of why this should have come about will have to be studied in a larger work.

♦ From kingship to democracy— the evolution of the republic to 287 B.C.

STRUGGLE OF PLEBEIANS FOR EQUAL RIGHTS

The traditional date of the founding of Rome was 753 B.C. This date, however, is not accepted by historians, who are well aware that there was a settlement on the site of Rome at

Chronological Chart

ROME—THE EARLY MONARCHY

Traditional date of founding of Rome	753 B.C.	Etruscan domination	616-509
Traditional first four kings of Rome	753-616		

THE REPUBLIC

Internal history

First secession of plebs—Election of tribunes and establishment of Concilium plebis (plebiscites binding on plebs)	494 B.C.
Establishment of Comitia tributa (Assembly of Tribes)	ca. 460
Twelve Tables	450-449
Valerio-Horatian Laws (legislation by plebs binding on state if accepted by Senate)	448
Intermarriage permitted between plebeians and patricians	445
Suspension of consulship, substituted by military tribunes, open to plebeians	444-367
Licinian-Sextian Laws—Consulship opened to plebeians	367
Censors to give preference to ex-magistrates in drawing up list of senators	310
Loss of senatorial veto on all legislation	287
Tiberius Gracchus elected tribune	133
Tribunate of Gaius Gracchus	123-122
Death of Gaius Gracchus	121
Marius first elected consul	107
Reorganization of army on volunteer basis by Marius	106
Sullan Constitution	83-80
Pompey given extended command against Mithridates	66
Return of Pompey to Rome	62
First Triumvirate	60
Caesar appointed to command in Gaul	58

External history

Battle of Lake Regillus—Roman victory over Latin League	496 B.C.
Treaty with Latin League—Promulgation of Latin rights	493
Rome leader of Latin League—Gradual expansion	490-430
Conquest of Veii (southern Etruria)	396
Invasion of Italy by Gauls—Sack of Rome	387-386
War with Latin League	340-338
Defeat of Latin League—Roman Confederation	338
Samnite Wars	327-290
War with Pyrrhus and Magna Graecia	281-272
First Punic War	264-241
Sicily becomes first Roman province	227
Second Punic War	218-201
Wars with Macedonia	200-197; 171-168
Defeat of Antiochus III (king of Syria) at Magnesia	190
Third Punic War	149-146
Destruction of Carthage and sack of Corinth	146
Macedonia becomes Roman province	146
Jugurthine War	112-106
Marius defeats Cimbri and Teutones	102-101
Social War in Italy	90-88
Sulla undertakes war with Mithridates	87

THE REPUBLIC

*Internal history**External history*

Return of Caesar to Italy	49	Wars with Mithridates (Lucullus)	75-66
Caesar as dictator	46-44	Slave War in Italy	74-71
Murder of Caesar	44	Conquest and reorganization of Asia by Pompey	66-62
		Caesar conquers Gaul	58-51
		Crassus defeated and killed in Parthia	53

THE PRINCIPATE

Second Triumvirate—Proscriptions and death of Cicero	43 B.C.	Reign of Caligula (Gaius)	37-41
Battle of Philippi—Death of Brutus and Cassius	42	Reign of Claudius	41-54
Antony goes to the East	42	Reign of Nero	54-68
Battle of Actium	31	Year of the Four Emperors	69
Death of Antony and Cleopatra	30	Vespasian and the Flavian dynasty	69-96
Augustus given <i>proconsulare imperium</i> and <i>tribunicia potestas</i> for life	23	Final conquest of Britain under Domitian	84
Danube frontier established for empire	15	Nerva chosen emperor by Senate	96
Rhine frontier accepted after defeat of Varus	A.D. 9	The "Good Emperors"—Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius	96-180
Death of Augustus	14	Conquest of Dacia by Trajan	107
Reign of Tiberius	14-37	First barbarian invasions under Marcus Aurelius (Marcomanni and Sarmatians)	166-175

least as early as 1000 B.C. Traditionally the first king was Romulus, a person of whom nothing is known beyond what later and unreliable legend tells us. However, it is certain that during the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. Rome was ruled by a monarchy, and the last of these monarchs was an Etruscan named Tarquin the Proud. It is also certain that the Etruscans, a people whose origins are still obscure but who probably came from Asia Minor, dominated Rome for the last period of the kingship, and Roman legend always speaks of the expulsion of the kings as the beginning of Roman independence under republican forms (about 509 B.C.). All through the period of the republic the name of king was detested by the Romans

in memory of this famous expulsion of men presumed to be tyrants.

The position of the king was taken by two consuls, each holding office for a year, chosen exclusively from the noble or patrician class. In early Rome there was a formal and definite class distinction between patricians and non-patricians, who were called plebeians. Patricians held their position by birth, and it was not possible to rise into the patrician class, since intermarriage between the two classes was prohibited. Thus, traders, small farmers, artisans, and all other free men who did not belong to the noble families were lumped together into the plebeian order. In the class struggles that followed the establishment of the republic, it is natural that

the wealthier and better-placed members of the plebeian order should have taken the lead in fighting for reforms, and it should not be thought that the ordinary peasant or small farmer was likely to be especially interested in breaking down the class distinction or repealing the laws against intermarriage. His daughter was unlikely to marry into the aristocracy, whatever the laws might permit.

Since early Rome was engaged in constant wars, the plebeians who took their share in the fighting had a potent weapon at their disposal for extracting concessions from the patricians. As the result of a strike (about 494 B.C.) of the army when it had been called out for campaign duty, the first concessions were granted. The plebeians were allowed to have two officers of state, called tribunes, with power to veto any acts of the consuls. These men were to be elected by the plebeians themselves, assembled into a council for the purpose. About 449 B.C., probably also as the result of another strike or threatened strike, the law was codified in such a manner that plebeians could expect due process in case of being brought to trial, and they could only be punished for infractions of these definite laws (Twelve Tables). A few years afterward plebeians were permitted to intermarry with patricians. Some time during the years between the first and the second strikes the Assembly of the plebs, which chose the tribunes, was permitted to pass legislation binding on the plebs alone, and the Assembly itself was reorganized to permit the entry of patricians. In 448 B.C. this reorganized Assembly, most of whose members were, of course, plebeians, was permitted to pass laws which were then submitted to the patrician body, the Senate. If accepted by the latter, the laws were considered binding on the whole people. Apart from legislation, however, the Senate continued to dominate the state, and the veto that the senators exercised prevented the plebeians from having any real say in the government. It was, however, a good beginning, and the struggle continued, with ever-increasing victories for the plebeians.

The most important disadvantage now suffered by the plebeians was their exclusion from the highest office in the state, the consulship.

The patricians were reluctant to give way on this, and for a time, rather than admit plebeians to an office of such prestige, they abolished the office altogether. However, in 367 B.C. they gave way, relying upon the fact that they controlled the electoral machinery and could thus ensure that no plebeians would in fact be elected. The attempt to hold up plebeian election by such means was, however, a failure. The plebeians who controlled the legislature so often forced the bill on the Senate that one of the consuls *must* be a plebeian that the Senate at last withdrew its veto, and thereafter one of the consuls always was a plebeian. Gradually, by the same means, all the offices of state were opened to plebeians, until at last all that the Senate had remaining was the veto on legislation. A third general strike in 287 B.C. forced the removal of the veto, and thereafter all legislation passed by the Assembly (*Comitia tributa*) was binding on the state, whether or not the Senate approved it.

CONTINUED STRENGTH OF ARISTOCRATS IN DEMOCRATIC FRAMEWORK

Thus by 287 B.C. there was formal equality within the state, and all offices were open to all citizens. Yet the people did not in fact rule. The august Senate, now made up not only of patricians but of all those citizens who had held important office in the state, managed to rule indirectly for almost 150 years after it lost its veto. This feat was achieved by the effective process of disarming all likely opposition through admitting tribunes (of whom there were now ten, each with a veto) to the Senate and allowing them to call it into session. The tribunes therefore became accustomed to consulting the Senate before they proposed legislation to the Assembly. Since the latter body could only vote yes or no, whereas the Senate could debate for as long as it liked, it was natural for a tribune to go to the Senate for advice and to listen to and take part in its debates. Able tribunes, now welcomed into the homes, and sometimes the families, of the aristocrats, were tempted to adopt the attitudes of their new relatives. Thus the Senate came to have almost a monopoly of talent within its ranks, and it controlled directly both foreign policy and the treasury.

Finally, as if this were not enough, various senatorial factions controlled political machines which ensured that the urban masses of Rome could at all times be outnumbered in voting by senatorial clients and landowners—unless the farmers themselves came into Rome in person to vote on some issue that was of special interest to them, as happened in 133 B.C. at the time of the Gracchan Revolution.

❖ **External history to 272 B.C.—
The unification of Italy**

**SYSTEM OF DEALING WITH CONQUERED
ITALIANS—ALLIED RIGHTS**

As has already been noted, the Romans were engaged in constant wars, originally for

survival against their neighbors and then for the control of the whole peninsula of Italy. In the early years of their independence they were greatly helped by the Latin League, a league of smaller city-states to the south of Rome. Although the league at times resented and feared Roman domination and fought against the Romans, the latter were never left altogether without allies, even though a great deal of prestige was lost on one occasion when the Celtic people called the Gauls descended from the north and were able to sack Rome itself (387–36 B.C.). The secret of the Roman success probably lies in the fact that they never agreed that they had been beaten in all their history. They never were forced to conclude a loser's peace. When they made treaties without winning a war, it was only to resume the war as soon as opportunity permitted. For centuries there was



Ruins of the temple of Mars in the Roman Forum. (COURTESY ITALIAN STATE TOURIST OFFICE)

nothing in Rome worth plundering. A foreign invader could take nothing worth his while. And without exterminating the whole Roman people, there was no way of concluding a war or making a peace settlement that could be expected to endure.


But, perhaps more important than their stubbornness and refusal to admit final defeat, the treaty system invented by the Romans was a crucial element in their success. If any enemy surrendered to the Romans he could usually expect good terms. The Romans seldom destroyed their enemies, but preferred to make it possible for themselves to live at peace with them afterward. Although treaties existed long prior to the Romans (the most famous early treaty known to us was between Rameses II of Egypt and the Hittites), it was the Romans amongst the ancient peoples who developed the art of treaty-making in the most systematic manner. Already early in the period of the republic they showed their talent for law and government that was their most conspicuous gift as a people, compensating thereby to a large extent for their lack of almost all the cultural graces which we associate with the Greeks.

The ability to make effective treaties rested on the Roman concept of citizenship. Citizenship, to a Roman, was vested in a person, and did not depend on his place of residence. Thus citizenship could be granted as well as inherited. Moreover, Roman citizenship included certain specific and definite rights. So it was possible to grant an enemy recently defeated in battle either full citizenship, or some of the rights of citizens. The main rights of citizens were three: the right to trade, the right to intermarry, and the right to vote. The last-named right included many other subsidiary rights, and was reserved for the full Roman citizen. When the Italians who possessed for centuries only Latin rights, or half citizenship, felt at the beginning of the first century B.C. that they needed the right to vote, with all its appurtenances, for their own protection, the Romans resisted the claim, and a severe war had to be fought before it was granted. But in the earlier centuries the Latin allies were content with rights other than the right to vote, and it was customary for the Romans to grant these, thus associating the allies

with the success of the Romans and giving them some share in the proceeds of their victories. When the Romans began to expand beyond Latium into the southern part of Italy they invented a new right, the right of an ally, which entitled the possessor to protection by Rome against external enemies. By the use of this right the Romans took over, in effect, the foreign policy of the ally, who could no longer make war on his own account and was bound to come to the aid of the Romans if they engaged in a war. Since the Romans were seldom at peace, it is clear that they stood to gain more than their allies from such an arrangement. However, as will be seen, the treaty could work the other way also and drag the Romans into a war which they would have preferred to avoid.

SAMNITE AND PYRRHIC WARS

From the latter part of the fourth century B.C. the Romans engaged in hostilities with a people originally more powerful than themselves and their Latin allies together. These people, the Samnites, proved very dangerous to them, especially since some of the Latin allies deserted to the Samnites in the course of the wars, feeling that Rome was becoming too powerful and ought to be restrained. Several times the Romans were severely defeated, but their persistence paid off in the end, and by 290 B.C. the Samnites, who found themselves in the course of the war compelled to set up a confederation of their own comparable to that of the Romans, submitted. This war, however, brought the Romans into direct contact with the Greeks in southern Italy, a people with a far superior culture, who made their living largely by maritime trade. Like most Greek cities they were constantly quarrelling with one another, and the presence of such a strong power as Rome in central Italy exercised an overwhelming influence in a quarrel between any two of them. It was not long before Rome was called in when one of the smaller Greek cities found itself at war with a bigger one. In turn the larger city, Tarentum, called in the aid of a Greek king from the mainland. This new entry brought Carthage, the north African maritime power which controlled most of Sicily at the time, to the aid of the Romans,



For details on Italy, see front endpaper.

since Pyrrhus, the Greek king, had his eye on Sicily and had been interfering there prior to his being summoned by Tarentum. There ensued a war in which Pyrrhus, in spite of being aided by elephants, found himself unable to undertake successfully a two-front war. He was finally expelled from both Italy and Sicily, and the Romans added the Greek cities to their confederation as allies, with allied rights.

❖ The expansion of Rome beyond Italy

THE PUNIC WARS

It was not long before war broke out again, this time between Rome and Carthage. This was altogether natural, and could have been predicted. Prior to the conquest of the Greek cities in Italy the Romans had not been interested in maritime trade. But these cities had been carrying on a running fight with the Carthaginians, who jealously guarded their empire and permitted only very restricted trading rights to others. It was too tempting an opportunity for the Greek cities to resist, knowing that the Ro-

mans were compelled to aid them if they should get into open hostilities. The expected incident soon occurred, and though the Roman Senate did not desire to honor its obligations, pressure by the wealthy classes and the consuls who wished for military commands succeeded in overcoming its opposition, and the first Punic War followed. Again the Romans had the greatest difficulty in winning this war. They were unaccustomed to the sea and they did not trust the newly conquered Greek cities in spite of their alliance with them. More men in this war were drowned at sea than were ever killed in battle. But, as always, sheer persistence won the day; Carthage was defeated and forced to concede that part of Sicily that had been under its control. The island of Sardinia followed soon afterward.

But Carthage was far from subdued, and under a gifted general named Hannibal decided to pursue the Romans in their own stronghold of Italy. Roman leadership at first was completely unable to cope with the well-trained Carthaginian army which crossed the Alps (218 B.C.) and annihilated two Roman armies sent against it. Hannibal did not, however, succeed

in taking Rome, and made no serious attempt to do so. His fine army, marooned in southern Italy and cut off from sources of reinforcement, wasted away while the Romans adopted harassing tactics. At last the Romans found a first-rate general too, and sent an expedition to Africa to take the Carthaginian homeland. Hannibal was forced to return, and was decisively defeated. Once again the Romans had won the last battle.

EXPANSION OF ROMANS INTO GREECE AND THE NEAR EAST

Meanwhile the Romans had found it necessary to protect their allies in eastern Italy, which meant policing the Adriatic Sea. Finding it impossible to do this effectively without a base on the Greek mainland, they proceeded to take such a base, thereby involving themselves with Macedonia, which resented the presence of an alien power on Greek soil. The Macedonians allied themselves with the Seleucid monarch of Asia, and the Romans were forced to deal with him too. Several times they defeated the Macedonians, and apparently tried not to incorporate either Macedonia or southern Greece into their expanding empire. Once a Roman consul theatrically proclaimed the liberation of all Greece, to the accompaniment of ecstatic cheers. But none of these countries could remain free permanently. One faction would quarrel with another and invite Rome in to settle the question. In the end the Romans stayed, and by the middle of the second century B.C. there were enough Romans with a vested interest in the empire, which by this time extended into the Near East, to be able to persuade the Senate and people to engage in new wars even when there was little excuse for them. This effect of the empire upon the government and people of Rome will be considered in a later section.

❖ The provincial system

PROBLEM OF ADMINISTERING LANDS OUTSIDE ITALY

When the Romans were ceded territory beyond Italy it was necessary to decide what

kind of administration the new lands should be given. It did not seem feasible to extend the system of allied rights that had been so successful in Italy itself. Rome did not need or desire the help of these territories in her wars, nor would Roman rights at that time have meant anything to their peoples. What was needed was that the provinces, as they came to be called, should contribute financially to the well-being of Rome, and that their governments should not give Rome any trouble and should not have any independent policy of their own. Manifestly, too many of these lands were incapable of governing themselves to Roman satisfaction—as we have seen, the Romans tried to let the Greeks and Macedonians continue to govern themselves even after they had been defeated in battle by the Romans. Where, however, there was an effective government in the hands of a respectable monarch, the Romans were content to leave him in charge provided he fulfilled certain necessary obligations. This system of client kings was maintained in parts of the Roman Empire till after the time of Augustus and the end of the republic. Herod the Great of Judea was a client king, as was Herod Agrippa later.

GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE PROVINCES

For territories where there was no king available the Romans devised the provincial system. Each province had its rights and duties clearly defined in a provincial law, dictated by the Romans but accepted by the provincials, sometimes with some difficulty—as in the case of Sardinia, where no legal-minded leaders could be discovered amongst the barbarian inhabitants. Under this system there was a Roman governor, appointed by the Senate from the ranks of men who had recently held high office in the state. His term of office was one year. He was assisted by a moderately large body of troops charged with the task of keeping order and preventing rebellion. A stated tax had to be paid into the Roman treasury each year, but, unfortunately, except in rare cases where there had been efficient government before the advent of the Romans, there was no suitable body of bureaucrats available for the collec-

tion of the tax. Thus the system grew up of farming out the taxes to private enterprise. In some of the provinces, including Sicily at the beginning, the tax contract was let to local bankers, who were restrained by local patriotism from fleecing the taxpayers too mercilessly. In other provinces, however—and they formed the large majority by the end of the second century B.C.—the tax contracts were let to Roman bankers, who were restrained by no such gentle feelings. The only safeguard the provincials had was the honesty of the governor, whose good offices were necessary if the tax collectors (*publicani*) were to collect more than their due—a fixed percentage was stated in the law governing the province—and the possibility of prosecuting the collectors and perhaps the governor in Roman law courts.

FAILURE OF PROVINCIAL SYSTEM UNDER THE REPUBLIC

The two safeguards were not likely to be, and were not in fact, very effective. The governor, who held office for only a year and who expected at most two years as governor during his official career, was not allowed by law to take part in any trade or commerce himself. With living expenses, including the expense of election, rising every year, and with no regular source of income beyond what he could squeeze out of his lands, he was thus subject to extraordinary temptation, which, as far as we can ascertain, he did not often resist. Thus the governor and the tax collector flourished, while the provincials could look only to the courts for redress. And, unfortunately for them, the courts were manned by senators who were unlikely to be so austere as to betray their class by a conviction—especially not when there was a chance that they too might be placed within the reach of the same temptation and wish to succumb to it. Toward the end of the second century B.C. the courts were transferred to the equestrian order, a new order in the Roman state made up primarily of businessmen and the middle class. This, from the provincial point of view, could hardly be considered an improvement. The most notable conviction for extortion in the early first century was that of one Rutilius Rufus,

who had in fact himself scrupulously avoided any extortion, and had indeed clamped down upon the businessmen who had attempted it during his regime. The courts, interested only in discouraging honesty in governors, handed down a conviction in spite of the lack of reliable evidence. Rutilius was thereupon invited to take up his residence and live free for the rest of his life in the province he was supposed to have so mercilessly exploited!

Although the provincial system demonstrated the unfitness of the republic to rule an empire without drastic changes, it was not in itself an important factor in the collapse of republican institutions, as has sometimes been claimed. The governors in charge of provinces possessed insufficient military might to present a threat to the republic. As we shall see, it was the long-term commands of proconsuls, with jurisdiction over far more than a mere province, in command of less meager forces than a governor had at his disposal, that finally put an end to the Republic and ensured one-man rule.

❖ Consequences of Roman expansion

ENRICHMENT OF GENERALS, LANDOWNERS, AND BANKERS

In order to explain the many-sided effect of the expansion upon Rome, some preliminary explanations are necessary. The Roman army had originally been made up of both patricians and plebeians, but no man who was entirely without property could serve. The whole army was conscripted for particular campaigns, and the soldiers expected to return to civilian life as soon as the campaign was over. This system worked well enough for some centuries, but when the campaigns took the soldiers ever farther afield, many of those who returned found that their property had been taken over by local landowners, who could not be easily dislodged. Moreover, after the wars with Carthage, and especially after the Second Punic War, when Hannibal occupied a considerable section of Italy, the small farmer found that he had too little capital available to bring his land back into cultivation. The result was that the large landowner, with access to capital, continually

increased his holdings at the expense of the small farmer, who often lost his land with very little compensation. So, when the farmer was conscripted into the army, he began to look upon his land as likely to be lost in any case. He was therefore willing to stay in the army for a longer period, provided he could compensate himself with war booty. Thus he began to gain a vested interest in continued warfare, especially warfare against countries which possessed sufficient movable property for his needs. The commanders of these armies likewise felt that they should make some material gains from the war. Commands were short-lived and the commanders had expenses as high as provincial governors; indeed, they looked forward to being provincial governors after their term of command in the army. Thus they too began to gain a vested interest in profitable warfare.

The middle classes, especially the bankers and contractors, found that tax collecting, and the purchase of provincial tax contracts, was a profitable business. The more provinces fell to the Roman sword, the richer the pickings for them. The populace of Rome, on the other hand, saw little good in warfare. The city was thronged with dispossessed farmers, and Rome never was able to provide much work, save in small industry such as shield-making and the manufacture of goods for local consumption. Imported goods were better and cheaper, and many imports had been merely taken as campaign booty. There were no taxes, to be sure; but it is doubtful whether most of the poor would have paid taxes in any case, since they possessed so little property or income. Their only gain was a subsidized price for grain, a very small consideration to be set against the low wages earned in competition with skilled imported slaves. But these men still had the vote, and the full consequences of their latent political power were not to be exploited until the Gracchan Revolution, when at last two leaders were found who were willing to stand up against the senatorial monopoly of power.

POLITICAL EFFECTS IN ROME

The Gracchan Revolution Tiberius Gracchus became tribune of the plebs in 133 B.C.,

pledged to a program of land redistribution that would break up the large estates and give them to the illegally dispossessed farmers. As soon as he introduced his legislation, he was faced with a veto from one of his nine colleagues. This was one of the traditional safeguards of the senatorial party (called the Optimates); hitherto it had always been possible to bribe at least one tribune. But Tiberius did not take this lying down, as no doubt his predecessors had done. He called upon the people to depose the tribune. This they did, though it was illegal. The legislation duly passed, there came the question of putting it into force, and this needed money. Providentially, just at this moment a Hellenistic king, dying without heirs, bequeathed his kingdom to the Roman people. Tiberius and his Assembly gratefully accepted the gift, while the Senate, the traditional repository of all monies, had to accept the situation with the best grace possible. Tiberius' action was not illegal. He was the representative of the Roman people, as the Senate was not, and the legacy had been made to the Roman people. But the control of finances had long been a cherished senatorial monopoly, so that the action of the tribune was certainly inflammatory. Finally, Tiberius, fearful that any successor would sabotage his program, decided that he himself must be re-elected; but such a re-election was certainly illegal. The Optimates, who controlled the armed forces, were quite capable of using them against such illegality. A band of supporters of the constitution, led by the high priest, murdered Tiberius on election day, and with him three hundred of his supporters. The land law, however, was put into effect, and much of the Italian land was indeed redistributed.

Ten years later Gaius, the younger brother of Tiberius Gracchus, was elected tribune. In the meantime re-election of a tribune had been made legal. Gaius therefore could look forward to several years of leadership in the Assembly if he could hold the confidence of the people. This time the Optimates had a better card to play. They had one of themselves elected tribune as one of the colleagues of Gaius. This man proceeded systematically to outbid his colleague, having no intention of carrying out his promises. His task was made easier by the fact that

Gaius was studiously moderate and not all of his proposals were equally popular with the people. The third year that he stood for office, with only half of his legislative program enacted into law, he was defeated. Fearing for his life, he surrounded himself with a bodyguard, whereupon the Senate, after a few inflammatory incidents had been provoked, called upon the consul to restore order, in effect declaring martial law. Gaius either was murdered or committed suicide, and more than three thousand of his followers were killed. The popular revolution had failed, but the Senate had declared its bankruptcy.

The rise of the soldier of fortune—Preparation for one-man rule—The senatorial oligarchy supported by the monied interests had successfully curbed the possible establishment of a popular democracy in Rome; but it was unable to defend itself against the military. Only if the army was loyal and civilian rule was unthreatened could the Senate, which had few armed forces at its disposal, hope to rule Rome. It had been highly dangerous, as well as ruinous to its prestige, to use military force to suppress the Gracchan attempt at revolutionary reforms, however much provocation it had been given. Power was soon to pass from its hands into the hands of the soldier of fortune with an effective political machine.

Probably few could have foreseen the result of an important but necessary reform of the method of recruiting the army, which was put into effect about 103 B.C. A minor war had been in progress in Africa for some years, which had been going unfavorably for Rome. It was rumored that the generals had been bribed by the enemy, a not altogether unlikely possibility, indeed boasted of by the young African prince who led the enemy. An officer named Marius began to attack his superiors and boast that he could finish off the war if given the command. Instead of being court-martialed, as he would have been in our own day, he was permitted to go back to Rome to stand for election as consul. An efficient political machine assured his election, and when the Senate hesitated to give him the African command, the Assembly conferred it upon him by law. In order to win the war

he reorganized the army, making it into a volunteer army, recruited from any who wished to join. Naturally, the Roman proletariat regarded this as an opportunity to win booty and perhaps pensions at the end of their military service. Instead of being made up of the propertied classes, with a stake, however small, in the Roman state, the army was now made up of propertyless men to whom Rome had been a poor mistress, and to whom they felt they owed little. Their loyalty lay with the general who had trained them and led them to victory and booty, and whose influence could force the Senate to grant them pensions and property when they were too old to fight. From this time onward power was to lie with those generals who had held commands long enough for them to win the loyalty of their troops.

❖ Collapse of the Roman Republic

LAST ATTEMPT AT RECONSTRUCTION BY SULLA

The full results of this policy were not visible for many years to come. Marius himself was a very feeble politician, and he still stood in some awe of the Senate. Not until his last years did he recognize the chance he had missed, when he saw his junior officer in the African campaign, a general named Sulla, dictate to the Roman Senate and people just how they were to behave while he was away on campaign in Greece. It is true that as soon as Sulla had left, Marius recaptured Rome with a rabble army; but he lived for only one month afterward. When Sulla returned triumphant from Greece, the supporters of Marius were given short shrift, while Sulla himself became dictator. If he had wished, he could have become the first emperor of Rome.

But Sulla did not so wish. Instead, he preferred to make an effort to reform the constitution. He deprived the people and their Assembly of much of their power, weakened the office of tribune, which had been so much abused, in such a manner that no ambitious man would wish to hold it, and reorganized the Senate into what should have been a really effective body.

Then he retired quietly to his estates, dying soon afterward. His constitution failed because no one, not even the Senate itself, apparently really wished to try to make it work. As soon as the next crisis arose, the Senate was willing to abdicate its responsibility and give extended powers to the nearest capable military man. At this time a continuous war was being waged in Asia against the most formidable enemy the republic ever had to face, King Mithridates VI of Pontus, so that short-term commands were obviously unfeasible.

POMPEY—THE POPULAR GENERAL

Pompey was the beneficiary of this situation. First elected by the Assembly to a long-term command against pirates in the Mediterranean Sea, and having made short work of these, he was given a further long-term command in the East. There he replaced a senatorial general whose tight-fisted treatment of his troops had caused them to go on strike, to the detriment of the campaign against Mithridates. Pompey, who cared nothing for money, soon settled this situation and proceeded to conquer not only Pontus but also several other countries ripe to be added to the ever-expanding empire. This conquest took several years, but during the period he kept his political machine at home well oiled. Everyone in Rome knew that when he returned home, he would assume whatever power he wished. There was no power in Italy or elsewhere that could possibly withstand his victorious army.

RISE OF CAESAR—THE FIRST TRIUMVIRATE (60 B.C.)

When, however, he did at length return home, he showed no signs of desiring anything but pensions for his troops and the ratification of his acts in the East. The Senate, taking this for a sign of weakness, refused these moderate demands. Pompey, nonplussed, looked around for some political help, as he now held no office himself. He discovered it in the person of Julius Caesar, a rising military man who had just returned from a campaign in Spain and was the consul-elect, and also in the person of a banker

named Crassus, who had financed Caesar's career. Caesar's price was a long-term command in Gaul, Crassus remaining content with financial concessions. Pompey accepted the terms. Caesar accordingly introduced a resolution in the Senate giving Pompey the pensions and ratifications that he needed. When these requests were turned down, Pompey called upon a few troops who were still waiting patiently for their pensions and so could be relied upon, whereupon the Senate thought better of its refusal. For the next ten years the triumvirate of Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus did as it liked. Crassus, though aging, thought he would like a command in the East before he died, and was given it. He was killed in a stunning defeat by the Parthians. Caesar made a thorough job of conquering Gaul, although when he began his career there seemed to be no special necessity to add this province to the empire. Pompey, aging also, stayed close to Rome, taking no active command. Secure in the laurels he had won, he did not realize until too late that Caesar was building up precisely the same kind of loyal military following that he had once possessed himself.

CIVIL WAR AND THE DICTATORSHIP OF CAESAR

The showdown came when Caesar prepared to return to Rome. The Senate had decided that Pompey was less dangerous to the republic than the ambitious Caesar, and had succeeded at last in enlisting his support. But when Caesar crossed the Rubicon and illegally entered Italy with his army, there were no troops in Italy capable of withstanding him, in spite of all the commands that Pompey in theory still held. Pompey and his senatorial supporters therefore crossed over into Greece, where Pompey still had a considerable reputation. But bad management of their campaign played into Caesar's hands, and Pompey was decisively defeated at the battle of Pharsalia in 48 B.C. He fled to Egypt and was murdered shortly afterward. Caesar followed him, making the acquaintance of Cleopatra, Queen of Egypt, in the process. Having settled the affairs of Egypt to his satisfaction, he proceeded to mop up various pockets

of resistance in North Africa and Spain, and returned to Italy to celebrate a magnificent triumph. He began to prepare a campaign against Parthia to avenge Crassus and recover the lost Roman eagles, while setting in motion numerous administrative reforms to take care of the most pressing problems. He had barely started on this work when he was murdered by a group of senators and disgruntled officers in 44 B.C.

None of the reforms initiated by Julius Caesar really touched the heart of the problem, which was in its essence political rather than administrative. Above all, the position of the ruler had to be regularized, and some substitute found for the rule by Senate and people which had so conspicuously failed. Caesar could think of nothing better than to make himself permanent dictator, a title which in Rome always referred to a temporary position held only in times of extreme danger. He thought of becoming king, but realized after a few trial balloons had been sent up that the people would not tolerate such a title. Kings had been execrated too long in Rome for a king to be acceptable now. Caesar was able to put into effect some much-needed reforms in the provinces before his murder, and he set up an important public-works program to give some occupation to the proletariat. He improved the tax system and took steps to ensure a regular supply of officials for public service in the free municipalities of the empire.


It was a good beginning and a considerable achievement for two years of absolute power. But it seems that Caesar could understand only the tangible needs of the empire, and he lacked that sense for the intangibles that characterized his successor and made the latter's work so much more fruitful and lasting. Caesar's attempt to "reform" the Senate consisted in packing it with military men and even provincials, which succeeded only in degrading it in its own eyes. The move might have been a wise one if he had really been interested in making this august and ancient body work. After all, it had ruled Rome for almost five hundred years, and though at the end it had fallen on evil times, it was surely not an institution that could be treated with disdain and given nothing to do but debate and

confer titles on its master. There can be little doubt that the tactlessness with which Caesar treated the Senate was the chief reason for the conspiracy against his life. So, for lack of the art of a true statesman, Caesar must remain as a first-class military man and an administrator of genius (Pompey, in this field, incidentally, must be counted as his equal), but not as the real founder of the empire—though without his preliminary work, the empire could hardly have been founded by his successor and heir.

❖ The foundation of the Roman empire

THE SECOND TRIUMVIRATE AND THE TRIUMPH OF AUGUSTUS

The conspirators who murdered Caesar had no idea of what steps to take next. They appear to have assumed that the government would revert to the Senate and people as heretofore.



Bust of Augustus at the prime of his manhood.
(COURTESY BRITISH MUSEUM)


But the republic was dead beyond any possibility of revival. Caesar's army had, for the most part, been disbanded, but it was still a potent political and military force. And Caesar, through his will, continued to exercise an influence even after his death. Mark Antony as consul commanded an army of Caesar's veterans, and Lepidus, Caesar's official second in command, had a legion at his disposal. Moreover, in his will Caesar, in addition to bequeathing large sums to his troops, had made his great-nephew, Octavian, a young man of little public experience, his heir, with the potent title of Caesar, which he was to exploit to its full value. Antony might have been murdered by the conspirators, but was spared. As soon as he had ridden out the immediate storm, he was able to rouse Rome against them, and they were forced to flee abroad. But Antony made a serious mistake in not giving the troops their donative promised by Caesar. This enabled the young Octavian to gain credit and support from the legions in southern Italy, with which he entered Rome, to be given the command against Antony by the Senate. Antony, faced with one of the conspirators in southern Gaul and with Octavian and the consuls in central Italy, was defeated by the latter and retired to the north, allowing Octavian to return to Rome in triumph. Again the Senate repeated its earlier mistake against Pompey and slighted the young man, refusing him high office in the state on technical grounds.

It was the Senate's last chance. Octavian with his legions proceeded to join Antony, and with Lepidus they formed the Second Triumvirate. All the triumvirs took vengeance on their political enemies with wholesale proscriptions. In part this helped them raise enough money from confiscated estates to put an army in the field sufficient to defeat the remnants of the conspirators, who were arrayed against them in Greece. When they had been disposed of at the battle of Philippi (42 B.C.), Antony and Octavian were supreme. Lepidus could safely be disregarded, and it only remained to come to an agreement about the respective roles that each should play. Antony, as the senior partner, was given the command against the East, while Octavian stayed behind in Italy with a number of minor campaigns to settle.

The uneasy alliance continued for more than ten years. But Antony played into Octavian's hands by acting like an Oriental monarch, and especially by his relations with Cleopatra, regarded by everyone in Rome as a dangerous Oriental princess who had fascinated Antony and charmed him away from his loyalty to Rome. Octavian fostered this point of view by an unexampled use of propaganda, gradually undermining Antony's position so effectively that when the break came, little actual fighting had to be done. Octavian had built up an important political party of his own, and had chosen at least one highly efficient general. So the battle of Actium in 31 B.C. was a foregone conclusion. Most of Antony's troops deserted when Cleopatra insisted on going into battle with him. Thereafter there was no power left in the Roman world to challenge Octavian. Four years later the Senate conferred upon him the title of Augustus, by which he was henceforth to be known.

THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEMS

The magnitude and scope of the problems facing the young ruler (he had been born in 63 B.C. and was thus thirty-two at the time of the battle of Actium) can hardly be overestimated. The old Roman Republic had clearly failed to live up to the responsibilities of empire, and had collapsed from its own weaknesses. Yet some form of government must replace it which was capable of enduring. This government, whatever it might be, must also be able to keep under control the vast territories which had fallen to Roman arms during the previous three centuries. Rome had a responsibility to them also. It was impossible simply to decree their freedom and independence, even if the idea had ever occurred to Augustus. Their earlier forms of government had been destroyed beyond recall and could not be restored by a mere imperial fiat. In the last century of the republic the governors of the provinces had been political appointees of the Senate, anxious only to make their fortunes and return to Rome. By corruption and extortion they had advanced themselves; moreover, they were in league with the equestrian class of Rome, which had milked the



provinces for the sake of its own financial interests. The provinces had suffered abominably from this regular regime, and in many cases had been driven into bankruptcy by the more recent civil wars and irregular extortions by would-be rulers of Rome. There was little encouragement to honesty or efficiency, qualities rarely found in the governors. Was it possible for Augustus to reward these qualities and so improve the provincial system that they would become the rule rather than the exception?

We have seen that the enrollment of volunteer armies by Marius had led directly to the fall of the republic, since the troops relied upon their generals for pay and pensions, and their loyalty was given to these generals rather than to Rome. Moreover, the various armies had swollen to such an extent in the civil wars that there were probably at least half a million men under arms at the time of the battle of Actium. Augustus had to consider what the real purpose of an army was in the Roman Empire, where the various legions should be stationed, how they were to occupy themselves during peacetime, how they could be persuaded to be loyal to Rome rather than to generals. At the same time, the armies must continue to have those professional military virtues whose absence in the earlier armies had compelled Marius to introduce long-term volunteer service.

Behind the great political and administrative problems was the ever-present social and economic background. Rome was not a great manufacturing city, not even a trading center of importance comparable to its size and population. There were far too many people in Rome unable to make a living and requiring public support. Yet these men were citizens and possessed the right to vote. In the last century of the republic the votes of this urban proletariat had always been for sale to the highest bidder. Could they be made into a self-respecting citizenry by any means available to a capable administrator? How could the numerous slaves live side by side with a free citizenry without depressing wages? In spite of the fertility of much of the soil, Italy had never really recovered from the depredations of Hannibal nearly two centuries earlier. The small estates had been swallowed by senators and capitalists and made

into large specialized agricultural units, usually worked by slaves under overseers. Moreover, the small landholders who survived suffered from chronic insecurity of tenure, their properties often being sequestered for the benefit of veterans. And throughout the length and breadth of Italy, especially near Rome, rich men built their villas, too often neglecting the land itself and its cultivation.

The cleavage between rich and poor had undermined the old Roman traditional virtues, and the search for ever-increasing luxury among the upper classes had replaced the stern frugality of the earlier republic. Family life in the upper classes had almost disappeared, with divorce to be had for the asking and marriage used for political and financial advancement. The birth rate among the free Romans had naturally been declining. Was it possible to arrest this process, at least the decay of public morality, even if the ancient virtues had disappeared forever?

These were a few of the problems with which Augustus had to contend. If he did not solve them all, at least he perceived their existence and made an attempt to solve them. And the organization of an empire which endured for many centuries, the most enduring indeed that the Western world has yet seen, is almost entirely his work. The essential administrative structure was built by him, though the conquests themselves were bequeathed to him by the Roman conquerors of the republic.

THE WORK OF AUGUSTUS

The establishment of a legitimate government. The most difficult problem of all was undoubtedly the reorganization of the government; and it was the most fundamental. Not even a provincial reorganization, the establishment of an equitable system of taxation, nor the enlargement of the conception of Roman citizenship, would have been of any permanent value without a governmental system which was capable of controlling the empire and which was at the same time acceptable to the people. Any dictatorship or arbitrary military rule can be cut short by assassination, as Caesar's own career had shown. It was a measure of the

genius of Augustus that he made his government both acceptable and legitimate. Though he did not solve permanently the problem of succession, this may be only because, as will be discussed later, the problem may well be insoluble within the framework of absolute monarchy.

According to the tradition believed by the Romans, Rome had existed as a city for more than seven hundred years. For almost five hundred it had been free and self-governing. Though occasionally defeated in individual battles, it had never lost a war and had never been compelled to sign a peace with an undefeated enemy. For five hundred years magistrates had been elected and the noblest of the citizens had sat in the Senate and given their advice to the magistrates. The Senate was a body of incomparable prestige, even though in the last century, often through its own incompetence, it had been forced to bow to arbitrary military men with armies at their backs. The people of Rome had accepted its supremacy and shared in the glories won by their armies under its leadership. Though Rome was not a state, the Romans were truly a people, and Roman citizenship was prized by everyone who possessed it; those who did not possess it valued it and sought to win it for themselves. During all these years the name of *rex* or king had been detested. The Romans no less than the Greeks regarded it as an office fit only for barbarians.

Yet Augustus realized that he must be king in fact, even though he did not hold the title. It would never have occurred to him—nor indeed would it have been possible—to have ruled the empire, with its many different peoples of varying degrees of culture, through any kind of representative government. The empire was too vast and heterogeneous for any such experiment. But if the government had been returned to Senate and people as under the republic, the same weaknesses would have led to the same breakdown of government. Only a monarch could hope to hold it together.

Augustus solved his dilemma by one of the great creative compromises of history, a species of legal fiction which bridged the gulf between the fallen republic and the monarchy which had to come. In time the republic was forgotten, the monarchy supplanted it, and the necessity for

the fiction disappeared. But in the competent hands of Augustus—who understood it, the reasons for it, and the behavior required of him to maintain it—the fiction worked. Though thinking Romans of course knew that he was the sole ruler and that his power was ultimately based on the army and the treasury, nevertheless, to the mass of the people, the republic still survived. They felt at home in the new Roman state. The magistrates were still elected by the same procedure as before, though no candidate would even have run for office without the approval of Augustus; the Senate and the Assemblies still met for debate and legislation; and though there was now a *princeps*, or first citizen, a title and office unknown to the republic, he was not obtrusive, he scrupulously respected all the old republican forms, and his public and private life were beyond reproach in the best tradition of the early days of the Roman Republic.

Augustus confined the offices held by himself personally to the minimum required for his possession of the reality of power. He had a permanent proconsular military power (*proconsulare imperium*) conferred upon him, giving him supreme command of the army; he was granted a permanent civil power as previously exercised by the tribunes (*tribunicia potestas*), which gave him the power to introduce legislation and veto it. He became chief priest (*Pontifex Maximus*), giving him authority in religious matters; but, characteristically, he did not assume this office until the death of Lepidus, who had been ousted from his position as triumvir in 36 B.C. and consoled for his loss of power by appointment to this honored position. Occasionally, in the early years of his rule, Augustus allowed himself to be elected consul, feeling that he needed the civil as well as the military power inherent in this office. But consuls, praetors, aediles, and even tribunes were elected as before to perform the specific duties of these offices under the guidance of the *princeps*.

Augustus tried his best to maintain the dignity of the Senate. He encouraged it to give him advice, and he presided over it personally as *Princeps Senatus*. The judicial functions of the Senate were maintained and even increased

under his rule. By setting aside certain provinces to be ruled by ex-magistrates under the direct control of the Senate and not of himself, he made it worth while to move through the full sequence of offices (*cursus honorum*) to the exalted position of consul. The Senate also had its own treasury. From the equestrian order, Augustus recruited a body of public officials, paid out of the imperial treasury (*fiscus*), but with the same duties as tax gatherers and tax assessors that they had performed in their own interests under the republic. Under later emperors these men became part of the imperial civil service.

When it was proposed that he should be worshiped as a god (his adoptive father had already been deified), he refused the honor, but permitted his Genius to be worshiped instead. According to old Roman belief every man had a guiding Genius, and the Genius of the head of a family guided the fortunes of that family. In allowing a cult to be set up to his Genius, Augustus was therefore directing Roman worship toward the state of which he was now the controlling Genius. Later this indeed became the worship of the living emperor as god, a state cult to which all had to subscribe or be condemned for treason. But Augustus in his lifetime never claimed to be a god except in the Hellenistic world, which had for centuries been accustomed to a divine monarchy.

Unsolved problem of the succession. The greatest difficulty inherent in his position as sole ruler, the difficulty of the succession, Augustus never solved. Perhaps the problem is incapable of solution and is one of the inherent defects of absolute monarchy. The possibilities are strictly limited. The Roman ruler had to be an exceptionally capable man. If hereditary succession were to be used, the chances of any ruler's having a son capable enough are not especially good. If such a son possesses good natural talents, the experience of being brought up in the household of an absolute ruler is likely to damage his character, as was so often true in the history of the Roman Empire. If the choice were to pass into the hands of a civilian body such as the Senate, then political considerations might become predominant. The army

might not accept the choice; and it was certain that there would be disgruntled candidates ready to make trouble for the new incumbent. Moreover, there would be a period of transition between the death of the old monarch and the election of the new which could be dangerous for the empire.

It was necessary for all to know who the new ruler was to be before the old one died. One possibility was to designate the old ruler's son as the heir. The other possibility was for the ruler to choose his successor and transfer enough power to him in his own lifetime to ensure that there would be no competitor in the empire strong enough to prevent his succession. In fact, this is what usually happened in the empire unless the incumbent came to an untimely death before he had made arrangements. But Augustus, who had no surviving male heirs in the direct line, preferred to use the principle of adoption. Tiberius, who was his stepson, was also adopted as his son and forced to marry his daughter, after divorcing a previous wife. Later a number of childless emperors adopted their successors, choosing the most effective men they could find. During this period (A.D. 96-180), known as the age of the "Good Emperors," the empire reached its greatest heights of prosperity and good government. But the last of these, Marcus Aurelius, had a son Commodus, whom he did not wish to pass over. Thus the claims of paternity and the claims of good government came into conflict. Commodus was one of the worst of the emperors, as it turned out, and his reign was a disaster from which Rome never really recovered.

The reorganization of the provinces. The reorganization of the provinces was a further example of Augustus' efficient use of such opportunities as existed. He saw at once that it was not necessary to keep armies in every province, as had been the custom in the later years of the republic. Those that had long been pacified and had no frontiers to be defended against barbarians needed no more than enough troops to ensure local discipline. Such provinces (see the map for details) he entrusted to the Senate, which was given the power of appointing governors and administering the tax monies.

These provinces, as under the republic, were reserved for ex-magistrates, and constituted a reward for those who had progressed through the sequence of offices. In addition, the arrangement gave the Senate some real work to do and served to maintain its prestige. And though Augustus exercised a final supervisory jurisdiction over these provinces, he left them largely to themselves. Those provinces, however, which needed legions of trained troops, and whose frontiers had continually to be defended against enemies, were under his direct control, which he exercised through the appointment of salaried legates, personally responsible to him, who could hold their positions as long as they proved efficient. This arrangement gave them the opportunity to gain a real knowledge of their provinces and to win the loyalty of their troops, but in later times it proved a serious danger to the state in the event of a disputed succession to the throne. Egypt, as the richest province and the primary source of the grain supply for Rome and Italy, was given a special status, in keeping with its history as well as its present importance. As in the past, the ruler was divine and the owner of all the land. Augustus, therefore, was a Pharaoh in Egypt, with all the privileges of this office. He did not perform his duties as king-god there himself, but entrusted them to a prefect of equestrian rank, responsible to himself. The country, however, was farmed as an imperial estate rather than as a province with a certain degree of self-government, and its revenues accrued directly to the ruler. No one of senatorial rank was permitted within the territory without the permission of the princeps. Finally, a number of kingdoms on the outskirts of the empire were permitted self-government under their kings, who became clients or vassals of Rome.

The provinces of the Roman Empire had always been made up of more or less self-governing municipalities, city-states on the Greek model, together with a number of other communities whose position had been defined by treaty, usually without full self-government. Augustus encouraged as much local administration as was compatible with the imperial relationship, thus saving the burden of direct administration. The corrupt tax system of the

republican period was not abolished by Augustus, probably for lack of any alternative method of collection. His successors, especially Claudius and Hadrian, developed a regular civil service which gradually supplanted the tax companies. Meanwhile, the abuses of the system were checked through more efficient supervision by the princeps, even in the senatorial provinces. Penalties for extortion were severe, and even senatorial governors were far too much under control to be able to lend the efficient aid to the tax farmers that had been the custom under the republic in its last years. The nucleus of the later civil service was formed with the inclusion of treasury officials in the staff of the governors.

The entire system of provinces was reorganized thoroughly by Augustus. New boundaries were set, chosen for the sake of efficient administration and defense (see map). In the process, a number of minor conquests had to be undertaken to round out territories acquired haphazardly by the republic. Augustus always hoped to make the northern boundary the Elbe rather than the Rhine, as shorter and more easily defensible. Such a boundary, however, would have necessitated the conquest of a large part of Germany. Though progress with this conquest was made in the earlier years of his reign, his armies suffered a severe defeat toward the end of his life, and the project was abandoned. The Rhine became the northwestern frontier, while Augustus maintained the Danube in the East, refusing to move into Dacia (the modern Rumania) to the north of the Danube on the grounds that it was indefensible. This policy was maintained until the reign of Trajan (A.D. 98-117), who not only took Dacia but engaged in extensive wars in the East, the spoils of which had to be abandoned by his successors, as Augustus had predicted. The empire was held together by the great Roman roads, which were constantly extended throughout the imperial period and over which the imperial post traveled, bringing news to the emperor and his instructions in return.

The provincial system proved to be the most enduring of the reforms of Augustus. Whatever happened at Rome, the life of the provinces went on much as usual, under good rulers and bad

alike. Only when the burden of taxation was heavily increased, and prosperity declined as a result of the continuous civil and foreign wars in the third century A.D., was the strength of the provinces slowly sapped. But while the Roman peace (*Pax Romana*) gave them a respite from war they had never previously enjoyed, their prosperity increased, and with it the ability to pay the taxes which ensured the continuance of Roman rule.

Augustus himself was an Italian rather than a Roman, and always regarded Italy as the center of his dominions, the homeland with special privileges, with Rome as first the capital of Italy and then of the empire. The inhabitants of Rome, however, were no longer exempt from all taxation, as Roman citizens had been under the republic. But their taxes always remained lighter than those of the provinces. Every native freeborn Italian was a Roman citizen, with all the privileges attached to the position. The provincials could achieve Roman citizenship, but Augustus regarded it as a privilege to be earned and not a right to which they were entitled by birth. This policy was gradually abandoned by his successors, until in A.D. 212 citizenship was granted to every free inhabitant of the empire.

The reform of the army By virtue of his proconsular power, the princeps was naturally commander in chief of the army. Augustus, drawing upon the experience of his predecessors, and especially of his adoptive father, laid down a permanent basis for recruitment and for the composition of the army, which survived in its essentials throughout the whole empire. The regular troops, or legionaries, were drawn from Italians and the most Romanized provincials, who received citizenship on enlistment if they did not already possess it. They served for twenty years, receiving a regular salary and a pension on retirement. In addition to these were auxiliary troops who received citizenship only on retirement. These were also salaried men, but drawn from the less Romanized provinces, and served primarily within these provinces. Their officers were originally drawn from the same territory, but later, after it had been shown that these troops were capable of rebellion in the interests of their own provinces,

Italian officers were substituted. The armies were by no means always engaged in active warfare, although the legions might at any time be transferred to a danger spot on a distant frontier. During the first two centuries, however, the general practice was for the legionaries to live in camps, behind permanent fortifications built by themselves. There were strategic roads to be built, ditches and moats to be dug, walls to be erected; and many of the troops necessarily became skilled artisans as well as soldiers, not unlike the modern corps of army engineers. These men—holding Roman citizenship, speaking Latin, imbued with Roman tradition, enjoying even on the frontiers the comforts of Roman civilization, such as warm baths—naturally mingled with the peoples among whom they were stationed, and served therefore as an important instrument for the Romanization of the empire. The army, however, in its own estimation, was rarely paid enough in proportion to its value to the state. Its chronic dissatisfaction and its sporadic insistence on bonuses gave ambitious generals the opportunity to make lavish promises in exchange for support of their candidacies to the throne.

Social and economic policy Rome had never been an important industrial center, and even as a commercial city its usefulness was impaired by its lack of a good harbor. The muddy Tiber had constantly to be dredged to keep the harbor of Ostia at its mouth open for commerce at all. Puteoli, where Paul landed on his journey to Rome, became the regular seaport for Roman trade. It developed into a great city, peopled largely by Greeks and other foreigners, who remained the leaders in maritime commerce as under the republic. But in spite of the absence of large-scale industry, there were innumerable small manufacturing shops in Rome and throughout Italy. For centuries Italy was the chief manufacturer for the Western world, though its products were far surpassed in quality by those of Alexandria and the East. Nevertheless, if Rome is included with Italy, the Italian balance of trade was always unfavorable, since Rome remained a parasite on the economy.

Augustus did not take any active interest

in the economy as such. Except for Egypt, industry in the Roman Empire was overwhelmingly in private hands. There was no state industry, nor monopolies of the kind that later developed in the Eastern Roman Empire of Constantinople. But, indirectly, the establishment of the Pax Romana, with its network of roads and safe transportation, increased prosperity for all classes throughout the empire. Augustus used the tax money that came from the provinces to pay for an enormous program of public works, chiefly temples and other public buildings, gardens, and baths; and in this the majority of those emperors who had the money available and were not too heavily engaged in unproductive warfare followed his example. These public works provided a market for numerous products made by small industry throughout the empire, and direct work for the large army of unemployed in Rome itself. The provincial municipalities engaged in similar programs, and it became a matter of civic pride for wealthy citizens to improve their cities with gifts of parks, gardens, temples, and other public buildings.

The unemployment problem For the poor of the city of Rome, who were grossly underemployed, Augustus found no remedy beyond his public works programs and a continuance of the republican practice of providing them with cheap or free food. In addition he, and more particularly the later emperors, provided lavish public spectacles to keep them amused. This program was called by the later satirist Juvenal "bread and circuses." Since the elections were arranged and laws were now really made indirectly by the princeps, the Roman people, so powerful in the last century of the republic, when their votes were necessary for the election of magistrates and army officers, lost their power. Riots could be dangerous on occasion, but they could now be easily suppressed. On the other hand, all the rulers were anxious to keep the people as contented as possible, and tried to provide for their needs. Augustus, recognizing the irresponsibility that went with their unemployment and dependence on imperial handouts, tried to give them some status in the community and in their own eyes

by incorporating them formally into an order, the plebeian as distinct from the equestrian and senatorial orders. But since they had no real duties in addition to their privileges, it is probable that the gesture remained an empty formality. We are not told what the plebeians themselves thought about it.

The city, in the time of Augustus, was efficiently policed, and a fire brigade was established, first under elected officials and then under appointees of the princeps.

In agriculture, Augustus strove to increase the number of small farmers. He gave security of tenure to those who had farms already, and he made an effort to instill a real love of the Italian countryside into the free peasantry. In this effort he was ably assisted by the poet-farmer Vergil, whose *Georgics* are a long paean of praise of the rural life. But the tendencies of the time were against Augustus. It was difficult to arrest the growth of large farms and estates which could be worked more economically than the small unit. The exodus of farmers to the cities, which had been such an important feature of the last years of the republic, continued. Not all the praise of rural life could prevail against the hard necessities of making a living. Though there was, as has been seen, chronic underemployment in Rome, at least the citizen could scrape a living somehow, and free bread and circuses were available, as nowhere else. Not until the Industrial Revolution in modern times did it become possible to work farms efficiently with a small labor force, and at the same time keep millions employed in the large cities through the production of machine-made goods and the provision of multifarious services. The problem of Rome itself was almost certainly insoluble by Augustus, however great his power and intelligence.

Estimate of the achievement of Augustus

It is difficult to find in the records of all history a greater political and administrative genius than the first princeps of Rome, the "architect of empire," Augustus Caesar, and there are few who have approached him. He has suffered in comparison with his great-uncle, who was undoubtedly a more impressive personality, with more spectacular and captivating qualities. He

has also suffered from his biographers in ancient times, who could not appreciate at their true worth his farsightedness and understanding of the real problems involved in the transition from republic to monarchy, and who paid too much attention to minor failures.

He was conservative, cherishing the old virtues and the old institutions, and appreciating their value; and he devised means to continue what seemed good in them. He did not try to set back the clock in his governmental reforms, nor yet leap forward rashly into impossible experiments forbidden by the nature of the times. The most difficult and rare art of the statesman is to see the limits of the possible and pursue only the possible. And his monument was the Roman peace and the Roman Empire, which endured for hundreds of years in the framework which he had invented. The empire did not collapse after his death, as did Charlemagne's, nor fall to pieces because of military overextension, as did Napoleon's.

Augustus faced a tremendous job, in which all his predecessors had failed; yet once he had achieved supreme power he substituted, almost without friction, a legitimate and acceptable civil government for civil warfare and domestic anarchy. There is a tale that a man was brought before him who had attempted a conspiracy against him. Augustus reasoned with the man, asking him how he proposed to replace him, and succeeded in convincing him of the impossibility of any alternative. Thereupon he forgave the would-be murderer and even promoted him in the public service. The tale may well be apocryphal, but it is surely significant that Augustus evidently did not discourage belief in it. Perhaps Augustus was fortunate in being a young man with many years of life ahead to make full use of the opportunity with which he had been presented. But he was never a healthy man, and it is one of his titles to greatness that he was able to overcome the handicap. He lived without ostentation, and never let anyone believe that he had any other ambition than to be first citizen in a restored and transformed republic. He is the most eminent disproof in history of the famous dictum of Lord Acton that "all power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely."

❖ The successors of Augustus

TIBERIUS AND THE DECLINE OF THE SENATE

It is not necessary in a book of this compass to go into detail on the achievements of the successors of Augustus. The reign of Tiberius (A.D. 14-37) was marked by excellent provincial administration but a growing disharmony between the princeps and the Senate. Tiberius most certainly lacked his stepfather's tact, and he was already a morose and disillusioned elderly man when he became princeps. It was not surprising that the senators for the first time realized the potentialities for an imperial tyranny that had been masked under the principate of Augustus. Many of them began to look back nostalgically to the lost republic, viewing it through rose-colored glasses since few of them had actually experienced it. Brutus and Cassius, the tyrannicides, became their heroes, for they had defended with their lives the dignity of senators. Throughout the reign of Tiberius there were constant intrigues over the succession, even while his son, later poisoned by the orders of his favorite, the praetorian prefect Sejanus, was still alive. Betrayed by the one man he had trusted, Tiberius countered the opposition to him with new laws against treason and new rewards for informers, setting a precedent followed by too many of his successors. There were many real conspiracies against him, but, more than anyone else, Sejanus, master of Rome when Tiberius retired to Capri for a little peace in his old age, betrayed him; and though Tiberius was strong enough to crush this conspiracy, the aftermath of treason trials and executions was always remembered against him by later historians and posterity.

The position of the Senate was indeed unenviable. It had a long tradition of power under the republic, and its position, even at its worst, was always one of dignity. Augustus had given the senators work to do, but there was no doubt that all real power had been taken from them, and they were deeply offended. Tiberius would preside over the Senate; and though even the anti-imperial historian Tacitus admits that, at least in the early part of his reign, he en-

couraged the senators to speak freely, most of them were careful to catch every sign of approval or disapproval, so that they would not be found in opposition to the princeps. This subservience wounded them in their dignity. They were forced out of fear to agree, and their true opinions were not valued. As long as any republican tradition remained, as it did at least until the death of Nero, A.D. 68, they were bound to regret their lost freedom, human dignity, and respect. Not all the outward dignity of a special toga could compensate them. In the reigns to come only the Stoics, since they had a philosophy to sustain them and, at the last, a sword to fall upon, provided any real resistance to the rulers; and it was no accident that the tyrannous emperors especially singled out the Stoics as their enemies and treated them accordingly.

THE JULIANS, FLAVIANS, AND THE "GOOD EMPERORS"—RECURRING PROBLEM OF THE SUCCESSION

At last Tiberius died, and was succeeded by Caligula (A.D. 37-41), a young man of no ability and no experience who soon became insane, his insanity revealing itself in an undisguised tyranny and sadistic cruelty. When he was murdered in a praetorian conspiracy, he was succeeded by Claudius (A.D. 41-54), an able administrator and student of history who effected many valuable reforms in the provincial administration but was unable to keep order in his own house, being ruled by his successive wives. He was murdered by his last wife, who thus succeeded in securing the succession for her son Nero (A.D. 54-68), who was the stepson of Claudius. Nero lost no time in getting rid of his stepbrother, who was a real son of Claudius, but for five years he allowed his praetorian prefect Burrus and his tutor Seneca to exercise the actual rule of the empire. Thus the first five years of Nero's administration became proverbial for excellent administration at home and abroad. Then Nero began to show himself as the misfit he was on the throne—a second-rate artist, anxious only for the plaudits of the crowds for his theatrical performances, and careless of his administration. The people loved him for his

spectacular games and gladiatorial shows, but he degraded the imperial dignity, emptied the treasury, and won only contempt and enmity from the upper classes—contempt which culminated in conspiracies against his life. Thereafter no one in Rome was safe from his vengeance, and especially not his former friends. His tyranny in his last years equaled that of the madman Caligula. When he was overthrown by an open revolt, perishing at the hands of a freedman because he lacked courage to take his own life, no provision had been made for the succession and no direct heir remained of the Julian house (called Julian after Julius Caesar). First the commander of the Spanish legions took the throne, then the praetorian prefect, then the commander of the German legions, none surviving the year (A.D. 69). Finally the commander of the Eastern legions, a plebeian general of rural ancestry, gained the throne and restored order.

Vespasian (69-79) ruled sensibly and restored some of its earlier dignity to the principate. He was succeeded by his two sons (the Flavian dynasty), one of whom died after two years, while Domitian, the second son (81-96), a suspicious tyrant but a good administrator, fell victim to a conspiracy. This ended the hereditary principle for nearly a century. For the first time no obvious candidate was available for the throne, and the choice fell into the hands of the Senate, which selected Nerva (96-98), a mild, elderly man whose most important act was the adoption of the best general in the empire as his son. Thus the adoptive principle superseded the hereditary, and the result was the period known as the era of the "Good Emperors." Each of the four emperors who reigned between 98 and 180 was a good administrator, and Trajan (98-117) was a great general, though it is not certain that his policy of enlarging the empire was altogether a wise one. The province of Dacia, north of the Danube, acquired by him in addition to territories in Asia, had to be abandoned before most of the rest of the empire, but not before it had been civilized by the Romans. The old Roman province of Dacia, the present-day Rumania, still has a language based upon Latin. Hadrian (117-138) was one of the ablest of the Roman

emperors as an administrator. He it was who systematized the civil service, the most competent body of bureaucrats outside China in the ancient world, recruiting its members almost exclusively from the equestrian order, which was now entirely dependent upon himself. Hadrian also gave impetus to the study and codification of the Roman law by abolishing the edicts of the annually elected praetors (see the next section). By Hadrian's time it was recognized that the will of the emperor was the true source of law for the empire, and it may be said that with Hadrian disappeared the remnants of the old republican tradition. Antoninus Pius (138-161) further improved the law and provided a long reign of almost unbroken peace. Marcus Aurelius (161-180), the Stoic writer of the *Meditations*, was compelled to spend most of his reign defending the empire against barbarian tribes who were threatening the frontiers, but maintained the record of his predecessors in the administration of the empire.


All these emperors were chosen by their predecessors and adopted as their sons. The Augustan title of princeps, though still formally used, no longer seems appropriate for these absolute rulers. Unfortunately, as has already been mentioned, Marcus Aurelius was not, like the others, childless, and chose as his successor his worthless son Commodus (180-193), whose reign marked the beginning of the serious decline of the empire. But, whatever the principle of succession used, there was no thought now of restoring the republic. The monarchy as an institution had proved itself; the republic was a subject fit only for historical study.

♦ The provinces in the first two centuries

Life in the provinces was rarely affected by the disturbances in the capital. The chief annoyance undoubtedly was the arbitrary increases in taxation necessitated by the spendthrift habits of some of the early emperors, especially Caligula and Nero. Imperial governors usually remained from one regime to another, and senatorial governors continued to be appointed as before unless the emperor was

especially interested in the appointment. The Roman peace was maintained without a break in almost the whole empire. The only power in the first two centuries that presented any danger was the Parthian Empire in the Near East, which was already on the decline in the second century. Trajan inflicted several severe defeats upon it, altering the Augustan settlement in this region by annexing several new provinces. But his successor recognized the great difficulty of holding them, and the fact that the expense involved could ill be afforded. For this reason he returned some of the new provinces to client kings. Not until the reign of Marcus Aurelius was the Roman peace seriously threatened by the first movements of barbarians against the frontiers; and even this was of no moment to the interior provinces, save for increases in taxation to pay for the wars.

The first two centuries of the empire were characterized by an increasing centralization of the government, above all through the growth of the bureaucracy, or imperial civil service. Hadrian brought every official, including those in Italy, under direct imperial control, even in some cases nominating the governors of sena-



Bust of the Emperor Antoninus Pius. Note the Greek influence and the careful attention to detail characteristic of this period, as shown in the treatment of hair and beard. (COURTESY THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART)

torial provinces, who were in any case by now the prisoners of the bureaucracy provided for them by the emperor. The municipalities also lost some of their responsibilities. Though the "Good Emperors," including Hadrian, were not personally tyrants, and indeed kept on very good terms with the Senate, being themselves drawn from the senatorial class, their policies tended toward an increasing absolutism which was ultimately recognized by the formal changes in the nature of the monarchy brought about by Diocletian at the end of the third century A.D. It should be added, however, that the Senate no longer provided any opposition to the absolutist tendency, for it had itself been chosen by previous emperors, and the old qualification of nobility of birth alone had long ago disappeared. The tyrants Caligula, Nero, and Domitian had paid careful attention to see that it should.

By the end of the second century the Romanized provinces had become the real heart of the empire, though Rome, of course, remained the capital. The rank and file of the legions was made up exclusively of provincials, and the officers now came as often from the Romanized provinces as from Italy. One of the reasons why Trajan's wars in the East were ultimately so dangerous to Rome was that the most thoroughly Romanized provinces, Gaul and the two Spanish provinces, provided so many of his troops. These men too often did not return to their homelands; if they were not killed in the East, they were likely to settle there. All the emperors after Nero had had long experience in the provinces and recognized their importance; Trajan and Hadrian were both Spaniards. The Italian patriotism of Augustus was therefore slowly replaced by the wider patriotism of the citizen of the Roman Empire itself. This reality was ultimately recognized in the famous edict of the Emperor Caracalla in 212, which granted Roman citizenship to every freeman of the empire.

♦ **Influence of the Roman imperial idea**

The Roman Empire, then, by the end of the second century, had become fully established

and accepted as the natural order of things. Internal opposition had disappeared, and the idea of the Roman Empire had such a hold on the hearts and heads of men as no empire in the past had ever achieved, with the possible exception of the Chinese Empire under the Hans. There was some excuse for the belief that it was eternal, that it had even been willed by the gods. It was in this atmosphere of eternity and impregnability that the foundations of the Christian Church were laid, and this Church, the spiritual successor of the Roman Empire, was deeply influenced by it.

The achievements of the empire had already been enormous. Rome had always given tolerable and often excellent administration and an equitable law to a vast area, and it had given this area a peace it neither knew before nor has known since. If liberty was missing, this was a lack not felt by the people of the time. No one alive had known it from experience. It survived, at most, as a philosophical ideal. In the remainder of this chapter we shall see the other contributions to the cultural heritage of the world made by this hard-headed, efficient, practical, but hardly inspired people who first unified and ruled the Western world.

♦ **General characteristics of Roman culture**

CONTRAST WITH CREATIVENESS OF THE GREEKS

It is one of the ironies of history that, in spite of our admiration for the Greeks, Western civilization has always been nourished far more by Roman ideas and institutions than by Greek. With the recovery of Greek literature in recent centuries and the opportunity to study some of the masterpieces of Greek art in the original, we have been able to make a comparative estimate of Greek and Roman contributions; and few would today claim the Romans to have been qualitatively superior in any single field of cultural endeavor to which the Greeks turned their attention. Roman architecture made use of far more forms than the Greeks had found necessary for their simpler needs, Roman en-

gineering solved practical problems that were outside Greek experience. But though we are impressed by the grandeur of the Pantheon in Rome and admire the excellence of Roman roads, bridges, and aqueducts, it is to the Athenian Parthenon that we go for an ideal of architectural beauty. Yet our own public buildings are copied from the Romans, we are inclined to use the Corinthian rather than Doric or Ionic capitals, and our columns, like Roman columns, too often support nothing and are merely superfluous decorations. Remove a Greek column and the building will collapse. To us the Greek world is remote, to be admired but not imitated, whereas the Romans are close to us. We feel we understand them. They are people like ourselves. To enter the Greek world requires an effort of the imagination; but the Romans, nearly as far away from us in time, can be understood, it seems, without any such rare and difficult mental activity.

It would appear that even to the Romans themselves the Greeks were a people apart. They admitted that in every branch of cultural activity the Greeks were their teachers and masters, and they did their best to imitate them. But they never seriously tried to think in the way the Greeks had thought. It is impossible to conceive of any Roman with whom we are acquainted taking time out to consider the fundamental problem of the early cosmologist: What is it that is stable in a world of changing appearances? No Roman could speculate like Plato or reason like Aristotle. The simpler ideas of these masters they could understand, at least in part. But whenever they tried to explain what they had read—and many Romans, notably Cicero and Seneca, made a real effort to cope with the problems of philosophy—the result always appears as oversimplification, not touching the root of the matter, in some way debased. The truth seems to be, however it may be explained, that the Roman mind simply *could* not think in the Greek manner. Yet such thinking did not die out in the Roman period. The Greeks, Claudius Ptolemy the astronomer and Galen the physician, both lived in the second century of the Roman Empire. Recognizably Greek in their thinking, they were worthy intellectual descendants of the classical Greeks.

PRACTICAL NATURE OF THE ROMAN GENIUS

The great Roman contribution to world culture therefore lies not in the field of thought but in the application of thought in the ordinary world of men. In this way they served as a complement to the Greeks. They reaped the harvest of whatever had been thought before them, putting it to practical use. Where the Greeks had been concerned with ethical speculations, the Romans translated these into practical, everyday morality; where Democritus had speculated on the constitution of matter, and Epicurus had drawn the conclusion that in such a cosmology there was no need of gods, the Roman Lucretius makes a passionate attack on religion and superstition as the prime causes of human suffering; where human morality is conspicuously missing from the adventures of Odysseus as told by Homer, the Roman Vergil, in his *Aeneid*, emphasizes the filial devotion of his hero, and the glorification of Rome and its destiny—the purpose of the voyage of Aeneas—breathes in every line of the poem.

♦ Roman law

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

The Romans, then, were the greatest transmitters of culture the world has yet seen, though to a lesser degree the Arabs later performed the same function. But the Roman spirit is nevertheless imprinted on every line the Romans wrote, every idea they took up and put to use. They should not be regarded as mere copiers. Moreover, when the Greeks left no model, the Romans showed themselves quite capable of developing new forms of their own, as in satire, epigram, letter writing and perhaps even fiction. If anyone had ever had the temerity to translate a Roman work into Greek, it would at once have been recognized as Roman handiwork. So, though we can recognize the merits of these minor achievements, it seems best in a brief chapter to devote ourselves to a fuller study of the really great achievement of the Romans, their law. Owing to the extant writings of so many great jurists, and to the firsthand description of the working of republican courts

derived from such men as the practicing lawyer Cicero, we are fortunately able to trace its development almost from earliest times.

As was seen earlier, the first codified law of Rome was the Twelve Tables, drawn up by a committee of ten in 449 B.C. under the stimulus of the second secession of the plebs. Primitive as this law was, it remained the basic statute law of the Romans. In addition, statute law was made from time to time by the Assembly. These laws, however, covered primarily constitutional and criminal matters, which have only limited importance. They were applicable only to Rome herself and her citizens. Since no principles were involved, they were incapable of wider application.

THE RIGHTS OF THE ROMAN CITIZEN— JUS CIVILE

But the Romans did have a new and quite original conception of citizenship, which covered certain well-defined rights, discussed earlier. The rights belonged to the man who was a citizen; they were inherent in his person, wherever he might happen to be. This is the first time these particular rights, which in earlier times accrued to a man only by birth, were believed to be vested in a *person*. In Athens the city gave certain privileges to its citizens, but there was no kind of contract between them and the city, and naturally they possessed no privileges unless they were living in the particular city which gave them. But Rome guaranteed certain definite rights to its citizens, and these they retained even when abroad. These rights collectively were known as *jus*, and a Roman citizen was entitled to have any case tried under the *jus civile*, or civil law.

Now this law was rarely affected by statutes (*leges*) passed by the Assembly. It was built up ordinarily in early times by the priests, who stated on authority what the law was. This task then passed to a special official called the *praetor urbanus* (city praetor). The praetor, however, was an elected official, probably a would-be general rather than a jurist. It was hardly possible for him to state what the law was, or to decide all cases personally, and it was not his duty to do so. He had as assistants

judges who came from noble families, and who were in charge of the actual trial. But even these judges were not as a rule trained lawyers, though they had more experience than the annually elected praetor.

When, therefore, a civil case was brought to trial, it was necessary for the parties to the case to have some knowledge of what the law was likely to be in their case. So it gradually came about that the praetor every year, on assuming office, made a public statement of the law that he would use while in office. This was called the *edictum*, and it was made up largely of the instructions that he proposed to give to the judges. These instructions were called *formulae*. The edict was made up, for the most part, of decisions that had been made by his predecessors in office.

It will be seen, then, that in this way a collection of decisions was built up which really had the force of law, even though no statutes had been made on the subject. Statute law was of course taken into consideration by the praetor, but even this he could interpret, as our judges and higher courts interpret law today. And this interpretation would probably be incorporated in the edict of the next praetor and so be binding for the future, unless a praetor for good reasons decided to depart from it—as our judges may also on occasion depart from interpretations of their predecessors.

THE RIGHTS OF FOREIGNERS—JUS GENTIUM

This, then, was the system of public and private law for Roman citizens, and it lasted for a considerable length of time. But cases also arose where one party to a lawsuit was a Roman citizen and one was not, or where two resident noncitizens might engage in litigation with each other in the Roman courts. If the case concerned a foreigner's personal status, it would clearly be impossible to settle it through the *jus civile*, applicable only to citizens. So in 242 B.C. a *praetor peregrinus*, or foreign praetor, whose task was to look after such cases, was elected for the first time. Thus the idea arose that foreigners also had rights, and the new law under which they were judged was called the *jus gentium*, or law of peoples. Both praetors now

issued annual edicts covering the cases for which they were responsible.

INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW—BEGINNINGS OF JURISPRUDENCE

As the Roman state grew in importance and undertook more and more responsibilities, and as legal decisions of wide significance had to be made by unqualified persons, an innovation was made which proved to be the real foundation of Roman jurisprudence. It became the custom for certain skilled lawyers, who had also held high office in the state, to assist the praetors in drawing up their edicts and in answering questions put by judges. They could also give advice to litigants. These men were not paid, nor did they hold any official position, but undertook the work from a sense of duty and for the prestige involved. Since these *juris prudentes* (men skilled in the law, hence our word "jurisprudence") were appealed to for advice, especially in cases where the law was doubtful, they became specialists in interpretation, and theirs was now the chief responsibility in the building up of new law for the future. It was among these men that the conception of equity (*aequitas*) grew up as a principle which could override a strict interpretation of the law. In time, especially under the empire, certain individuals among them became known for the excellence of their opinions, as certain Supreme Court Justices of the past may still be quoted and accepted in the United States even though they have been long dead.

INFLUENCE OF PHILOSOPHY—JUS NATURALE

Many of these *juris prudentes* were strongly influenced by Stoicism, with its conception of the natural law of divine reason (*jus naturale*), which became a commonly accepted ideal, a kind of ideal law in accordance with which all statute law should be made and all legal decisions rendered. The strongly humanitarian viewpoint of the Stoics thus became incorporated into Roman law.

Under the early principate the same system was maintained. But naturally the edict of the praetor and the opinions of the *juris prudentes*

had to take account of the new influence of the princeps; and with the increasing absolutism of the emperors the decisions in public law tended to reflect the increasing importance of the state. There was also far more statute law in the empire than under the republic. The Assembly declined as a lawmaking body after Augustus, but the Senate now became for the first time since 443 B.C. a real legislative body, though its laws were naturally in accordance with the emperor's wishes. The emperors after Augustus also issued decrees which had all the force of law. Under Hadrian the praetors' edicts were codified into a perpetual edict, and the *juris prudentes* and their interpretations assumed still greater importance than before. After Hadrian many of them began to hold official positions in the imperial service, often serving as advisers to the emperor, who now felt in need of skilled legal assistance. The law continued to develop, often in accordance with newer Greek and Oriental philosophical ideas.

By this time there was virtually no distinction between the *jus civile* and the *jus gentium*, since the vast majority of the inhabitants of the empire by the time of Hadrian, and all by A.D. 212, were Roman citizens. It was the principles of the *jus gentium*, which had always been more nearly universal and thus more in accordance with philosophical principles as well as contemporary requirements, which prevailed. In the last stage of the empire, the great codification of the law began. Creativeness declined under the absolutist emperors. The opinions of the great *juris prudentes* of the past were taken as actual law, and a number of dead jurists were named whose opinions must prevail. In the event of a conflict, the opinion of the supposed greatest, Papinian, was to be decisive.

THE GREAT CODIFICATION OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE

The Theodosian Code of A.D. 438 was a collection of imperial edicts binding in the Eastern and Western Empires. This code was followed in the sixth century by the great definitive code of Justinian, drawn up by Tribonian and a group of distinguished jurists in Constantinople. The latter code, known as the

Corpus Juris Civilis, had four parts: the Code, which consisted of the imperial edicts of all the emperors (*constitutiones*); the Digest, which contained the decisions of the great *juris prudentes*; the Institutes, primarily a manual on legal principles for use in schools; and the Novels, a series of new laws which Justinian found necessary to complete the whole structure. Naturally the Digest was the most important part of the code for posterity, since these opinions, based on the best thought of the greatest jurists in accordance with their conceptions of the natural law, were to a large extent free from limitations of time and place. This law code, however, differed from earlier ones in that Christian influence had now been admitted to it. Religious crimes, such as heresy, were included, but on the whole the Christian influence made for the humanization of the law. Christian disapproval of slavery, in particular, was reflected in the Justinian *Corpus*.

The influence of Roman law is almost incalculable. It is not so much that codes of law in many modern countries are still largely Roman, nor that the canon law of the Church is almost exclusively Roman; but that this civilizing work was done by the Romans once and for all, and there was no need ever to do it again. The primitive laws of the barbarian invaders of the empire were so far behind Roman law in principles and sheer intellectual grasp of the problems involved that all took freely from the Romans, and no code in the Western world has not been influenced by it. It was used as a political tool to help the development of the national state by medieval monarchs. It was so patently superior to feudal law that when the king's justice was modified Roman, and the local law was feudal, every litigant, if he had the choice, would prefer the king's justice. When Napoleon needed a new law code for France in the early nineteenth century, it was to Roman law that he went for a model.

In the Middle Ages the great tradition of the *juris prudentes* was carried on by the jurists of the University of Bologna. Indeed, the university itself only came into existence as a law school with the rediscovery of the *Corpus Juris Civilis* of Justinian, which had been lost in the ages of barbarian domination of Europe.

❖ Roman art

ARCHITECTURE—CULT OF THE GRANDIOSE

Since far more Roman remains than Greek exist in Europe today, a few words should be devoted to Roman art, architecture, sculpture, and engineering, which owed much to the Greeks during the period of the republic, but became to a large degree emancipated during the empire.

After the Punic Wars, Greek influence became predominant in Rome, and during this period Roman buildings, public and private, were usually copies of those in Hellenistic cities. But even in this copying the Romans knew what they liked, which was invariably the ornate and the grandiose. The Corinthian column was preferred to the more severe Ionic and Doric, and in large buildings the post and lintel construction was abandoned in favor of the dome, vault, and arch. Gradually the Greek forms which the Romans, like ourselves, felt to be "artistic" became merely decorative on Roman buildings. They solemnly inserted useless columns, supporting nothing; they carefully fluted their columns, although the fluting now served no practical purpose. The volutes at the top of the columns became more and more luxuriant and decorative, the Corinthian and Ionic capitals now being welded into a new composite.

When the spoils of war began to flow into Rome during the last century of the republic, private houses, often built by successful bankers and generals, became larger and more ostentatious. For the most part they were still constructed by Greek architects, and often furnished with Greek works of art looted during the successful campaigns. Pompey built the first permanent Roman theater out of his spoils; Julius Caesar, from his Gallic booty, built a new Forum and repaved the old. Roman taste at this time, as usual with the new rich, ran to the extravagant and splendid, with elaborate ornamentation and statuary (copied from the Greek, of course) in wild profusion.

With the advent of Augustus, Roman architecture came into its own, and we begin to hear of Roman architects and engineers, even though Greek influence was still strong and perhaps



A Roman theater at Arles, in southern France, as it appears today.



Aerial view of the Colosseum at Rome, built by the Flavian emperors for the display of such public entertainment as gladiatorial fights. (COURTESY ITALIAN STATE TOURIST OFFICE)

predominant. The rebuilding of Rome by Augustus, and the construction of vast new temples in accordance with his religious policy of trying to restore the old gods to honor, influenced provincial cities also to take advantage of the new prosperity and rebuild their cities. In the imperial period every city of any importance had its baths, and even the smaller cities were able to build theaters, amphitheaters, and basilicas, which were used for public business and to house the law courts. The best known of the Roman amphitheaters is the Colosseum, constructed by the first two Flavian emperors. Much of it is still standing today—a huge round structure with a great arena for the spectacle. Underneath the arena is a network of passages, enabling performers—beasts and men—to reach any part of the arena as required. The basilica is a typical Roman structure, the plan of which, with nave, aisles, and clerestory windows, was adapted by the Christians for their early churches. The cross-vaulting of the Romanesque

cathedrals seems to have been a Roman invention, and allowed far greater size to the buildings.

SCULPTURE—REALISM

Like architecture, Roman sculpture was first influenced by the Etruscans and then by the Greeks. Indeed, the Romans had such a high opinion of Greek (almost exclusively Hellenistic) sculpture that to the end of the empire many sculptors were employed simply at making copies of Greek statuary for the Roman market. But aside from these copies there is a pronounced difference between Roman and even Hellenistic sculpture, a difference which is in full keeping with the Roman character as we know it. The Romans liked their sculpture to be realistic, thus completing what was only a tendency in the Hellenistic world. In this preference they followed the Etruscan tradition also. The Romans therefore developed the art of realistic portraiture far more than the Greeks.



Left, a Roman of the third century B.C. (portrait bust in bronze). Right, a Roman of the first century B.C. Note how the Roman sculptors strove to express character in their subjects' faces. It would appear from their literature that the Romans indeed believed character showed in a man's face. This may perhaps account in part for the relative frequency of the bust in comparison with the full-size statue. (COURTESY THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART)

When the Greeks, even Hellenistic Greeks, carved a portrait, they were always conscious of the harmony between body and mind or soul, between life itself and the material it informed. So the Greeks preferred to carve the whole body, of which the head and face were only a part. When, at the request of the Romans, who usually desired merely a portrait bust, Greek artists took to portrait sculpture, they remained aware of the mind which lay behind the mere features, and thus strove to reveal character through the features and the harmony of the whole composition. The details thus fitted into place as part of the whole, but were not insisted upon, and perhaps the Greek sculptor did not really care whether or not he caught the actual features of the model. This tendency is what is usually meant when we speak of the idealism of Greek sculpture.

The Romans, on the other hand, were as always preoccupied by the outer appearance,

which they carved exactly as they saw it, including lines of anxiety and unruly hair. For a period in the early empire the two tendencies fully harmonized, the realistic detail being combined with the psychological penetration of the Greek. Then the Roman tendency again disappeared, late imperial and other portraits often being only suggestive of the subject rather than realistic likenesses. In noting the insistence of the Romans on detail, one is reminded of the way in which Tacitus describes the senators watching the emperor Tiberius for any change of facial expression, trying to discover what he was thinking from the outward appearance. It is clear that the Romans believed the outward face to be the true expression of a man's individuality, and they probably did not wish any detail, however apparently unimportant, to escape them. Hence their emphasis on what we call realism.

In technology the Romans made progress



This famous Roman aqueduct, the Pont du Gard in France, gives some idea of Roman engineering skill and the gigantic size of Roman public works of the imperial period. Such construction is even more impressive when one realizes it was carried on with only the most primitive machinery.

beyond their masters. Even in early republican days they developed a new technique for making roads, paving the best ones with stone and surfacing secondary roads with gravel. They built their roads up carefully from a depth of several feet below the surface of the surrounding country, using small stones and even concrete. It seems to have been by accident rather than through any scientific knowledge that the Romans discovered how to make a real concrete, composed of lime and a volcanic ash which happens to contain the necessary ingredients. This discovery enabled the Romans to construct their public buildings out of a readily available material. The always expensive marble was freed for use as a veneer.

The Romans knew how to construct strong bridges through the extensive use of the arch; they made tunnels through difficult mountain terrain; and they understood, but rarely used, the principle of the siphon for their baths and aqueducts. The many Roman remains, not only in Italy but throughout Europe, are ample testimony to the strength of the materials used and the effectiveness of the Romans as engineers.

❖ The empire at the close of the second century

In this chapter we have traced briefly the history of Rome from the establishment of the republic to the reign of Commodus. There can be no doubt that for the peoples of the empire the rule by emperors and bureaucracy was a great improvement over anything they had known when they were ruled by Senate and people. The empire had given them peace and the opportunity for prosperity. Roman officials, as yet, were for the most part honest and uncorrupted. A considerable amount of self-government was permitted, and the Romans tried to interfere as little as possible. The English eighteenth-century historian Gibbon asserted that this was probably the period in world history when more people were contented and secure than at any other time, and there may well be some truth in his remark. It is true that the emperor Marcus Aurelius had to spend a large part of his reign in unwelcome campaigns

against German barbarians. But probably few Romans or provincials recognized the permanent and ever-growing danger of these barbarians to the security of the empire, still less that in the fullness of time they would destroy it.

In the next chapter Christianity, which in so many ways succeeded to the Roman heritage, will be considered, and in the following chapter the fall of the empire will receive attention. But it would have been a singularly inspired prophet who could have predicted either the fall or the legatee at the close of the second century.

Suggestions for further reading

NOTE ON LITERATURE OF THE PERIOD: Roman literature in translation is available in many paperback and casebound editions, the most complete offering being that of the Loeb Classical Library (Harvard University Press). Among the author's favorite translations are those of Juvenal's *The Satires*, by Rolfe Humphries (Indiana); Lucretius' *Of the Nature of Things*, by Charles E. Bennett (Classics Club); Tacitus' *The Annals of Imperial Rome*, by Michael Grant (Penguin); and Vergil's *The Aeneid*, by Kevin Guinagh (Rinehart). Particularly useful collections are Caesar's *War Commentaries* (Everyman); Horace's *Satires and Epistles* (Phoenix); *The Portable Roman Reader*, edited by Basil Davenport (Viking); *Latin Literature in Translation*, edited by Guinagh and Dorjahn (Longmans, Green); and *Roman Civilization*, edited by Lewis and Rinehold (Columbia).

PAPERBACK BOOKS

- Barrow, R. H. *The Romans*. Penguin. A good first chapter on the Roman character and an excellent summary of Roman law and jurisprudence. Otherwise not especially distinguished.
- Carcopino, J. *Daily Life in Ancient Rome*. Tr. by E. O. Lorimer. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960. Lively and detailed picture of Roman life in the time of the emperor Trajan.
- Cowell, F. R. *Cicero and the Roman Republic*. Penguin. The book is far from exclusively concerned with Cicero. Presents a vivid and factual picture of the last century of the Republic.
- Dill, Samuel. *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*. Meridian. An old classic (1904), still in many respects the best on the subject.

Hamilton, Edith. *The Roman Way to Western Civilization*. NAL. Similar to her more famous *Greek Way*. Obviously written for her own pleasure and to be read for enjoyment, the book makes extensive use of literary sources but is otherwise not a work of scholarship, nor does it offer any analytic treatment of its material. "Warm" and impressionistic.

Mattingly, Harold. *Roman Imperial Civilization*. Anchor. Up-to-date study, using much new material, including evidence from coins.

Mommsen, Theodore. *History of Rome*. Wisdom Library. This classic history of the Republic remains the finest single work in its field, and modern research has not greatly changed the picture even though it has added much lost detail.

Yourcenar, Marguerite. *Hadrian's Memoirs*. Anchor. A well-written historical novel, which conveys much information on the life and homes of the second-century emperor.

CASEBOUND BOOKS

Abbott, F. F. *History and Description of Roman Political Institutions*. Boston: Ginn & Company, 1911. Most useful work on the subject likely to be available in the United States libraries.

Buchan, John. *Augustus*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Company, 1937. Masterly biography, very favorable to Augustus, written from the point of view of a British imperial administrator who recognized the difficulties experienced by Augustus in establishing the legitimacy of his rule.

Duff, J. W. *A Literary History of Rome to the Close of the Golden Age*. Ed. by A. M. Duff. New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1958; *A Literary History of Rome in the Silver Age from Tiberius to Hadrian*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927. Still the two best histories of Roman literature.

Grant, Michael. *The World of Rome*. New York: World Publishing Company, 1960. Excellent

presentation of Rome during her period of greatness as a world power, by a classical scholar. Organized on a topical basis. Fine illustrations.

Graves, Robert, J. *Claudius*. New York: The Modern Library, 1934; *Claudius the God*. H. Smith, 1935. Two first-rate historical novels, giving a colorful and accurate picture of the early principate.

Homo, L. *Roman Political Institutions*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1929. Lucid account, sometimes minimizing the difficulties of attaining certainty in the absence of sufficient source material.

Marsh, F. D. *The Foundation of the Roman Empire*. 2d ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1927. Well balanced and judicious. Best read in conjunction with Syme.

Marsh, F. D. *The Reign of Tiberius*. London: Oxford University Press, 1931. Masterly attempt to rehabilitate the second Roman princeps, especially by acute criticism of Tacitus.

Mommsen, Theodore. *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*. 2d ed. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909. An old classic, still not superseded; though supplemented, for example, by Mattingly.

Moore, F. G. *The Roman's World*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1936. Useful survey.

Rostovtzeff, M. I. *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1926. Standard work, though judgments often controversial. Excellent illustrations.

Showerman, G. *Eternal Rome*. Vol. I. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1924. Well-written and well-illustrated history of the city of Rome—an interesting vantage point for the student.

Syme, Ronald. *The Roman Revolution*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1939. Argumentative and opinionated (but extremely valuable) work on the last century of the Republic, stimulating to new study and thought. Well documented by an excellent scholar.

III ♦ THE CENTURIES OF TRANSITION

Main façade of the Byzantine Church of St. Marks' in Venice



Chronological Chart

THE CENTURIES OF TRANSITION

<i>Roman Empire</i>	<i>Christianity</i>	<i>Century</i>		
Reign of Augustus (31 B.C.-A.D. 14)	Birth of Jesus (probably 4 B.C.)	0 B.C.		
Reign of Tiberius (14-37)	Crucifixion of Jesus Christ (probably 30)	A.D. 0		
Reign of Nero (54-68)	Neronian persecution of Christians (64)			
The Good Emperors (96-180)		100		
Barrack Emperors (255-284)	Decian persecution (249-251)	200		
Reign of Diocletian (284-305)	Diocletian persecutions (303-313)	300		
Reign of Constantine (312-337)	"Edict of Milan" (313)			
Foundation of Constantinople (330)	Council of Nicaea (325)			
Theodosius the Great, last Emperor of East and West (379-395)	Conversion of Goths to Arian Christianity (340-348)			
<hr/>				
<i>Western Roman Empire</i>	<i>Islam</i>	<i>Century</i>		
Honorius moves capital to Ravenna (ca. 400)	Pope Leo I (440-461)	400		
Sack of Rome by Alaric (410)	Negotiations of Leo with Attila (452)			
Invasion of Huns (452)	and Vandals (455)			
"Fall of Rome" (476)				
<hr/>				
<i>Barbarian Kingdoms</i>	<i>Eastern Roman Empire</i>	<i>Christianity</i>	<i>Islam</i>	<i>Century</i>
Clovis, King of the Franks (481-511)	Reign of Justinian (527-565)	Pope Gregory I (590-604)	Birth of Mahomet (570)	600
Theodoric, ruler of Italy (493-526)	Loss of Italian possessions (568-571)		"Flight" of Mahomet from Mecca (622)	
Byzantine conquest of Italy (535-554)			Military expansion of Islam (635-733)	700
Lombard invasion of Italy (568)	Reign of Heraclius (610-641)		Defeat of Muslims at Tours (732)	
Charles Martel, Mayor of the Palace (714-741)	Reign of Leo III (717-740)	Donation of Pepin (756)	End of Ommeyyad Caliphate (750)	
Victory of Charles at Battle of Tours (732)	Iconoclastic controversy (726-843)		Abbassid Caliphate (750-1258)	
Pepin, King of the Franks (752-768)			Independent Ommeyyad dynasty in Spain (755)	800
Charles becomes King of Lombards (774)	Peace between Byzantines and Charlemagne (803)	Coronation of Charlemagne (800)	Caliphate of Harun-al-Rashid (785-809)	
Reign of Charlemagne (768-814)				

The Rise of Christianity

❖ Religious conditions in the Roman empire at the beginning of the Christian era

THE GREEK BACKGROUND

In order to understand the setting for the new faith that is to be considered in this chapter, a faith that was destined to supersede the numerous religions current in the Roman Empire, it is first necessary to consider the religious conditions in the Augustan Age, especially in the Hellenistic world in which Christianity arose. We have already noticed briefly the political changes that occurred in Greece after the conquests of Alexander. When the Greek city-states lost their independence, the old civic pride, and with it civic religion, declined; but the Greeks did not lose their vitality and creativeness, nor their intellectual curiosity. The whole Hellenistic world became the field for their activities, and under their stimulus a momentous change came over the native Oriental peoples. No people in the whole Near East remained untouched by the Greek spirit, and Greek restlessness communicated itself to the others. After the Roman conquest, the Greeks absorbed the Romans into their culture, which continued to expand ever further westward as the Romans provided the means.

Deprived of what had been the joy of his life in earlier times, the restless Greek engaged in commercial activity, transforming the economy of the Near East; he introduced his lan-

guage, his art, his literature, his philosophy, his sports, and his whole way of life wherever he went. But still he was not satisfied. Something essential had gone from his life, and for all the great show of activity, too often he felt that his existence was empty. The gods were pleasant myths to be explained away, and Chance ruled now; but though she could be wooed, she could hardly be loved or worshiped. Nor could philosophies hold the allegiance of the Greeks. The Skeptics were busy showing that all philosophies were based on untenable assumptions and that the truth could not be known. The vacuum could be filled only by a religion which appealed to the heart, giving meaning to the aimless life of the now cosmopolitan and rootless Greeks.

First came a revival of the native Greek mysteries of Eleusis and Samothrace, which, as Plutarch tells us, left the initiate feeling as if he had indeed had an experience of divinity. These mysteries had always demanded much of their devotees, but in return had assured them of immortality, through the undergoing of certain trials which purified the soul. Throughout the Hellenistic world the Oriental religions all experienced a revival. The cults of Cybele and Isis and of Mithra offered impressive ceremonial, festivals, ritual, and initiation, as well as purification and redemption of the soul with the aid of a mediator who sacrificed himself for the salvation of men. At last the Orient ceased to accept from the Greeks without giving in return. Now the culture became truly Greco-Oriental, with the Romans, as outside conquerors, resist-

ing or succumbing to the allurements of this culture, but always alien in the Hellenistic world.

THE JEWISH BACKGROUND

But there was one Oriental people which held itself aloof, for the Jews had already received their separate promises. The Jewish religion had absorbed elements from the other Oriental teachings, and the more orthodox Jews now believed in the future life, in the Satan and demons of Persian Zoroastrianism and Mithraism; but they also held fast to their more ancient law and ritual which, with the ascendancy of their priesthood, had become ever more strict and rigid. They remained monotheists, believing that all other gods than Yahweh were either demons, idols, or nonexistent. Above all they were looking for a messiah who would come to redeem the faithful people of Israel; for him they must remain apart, a chosen people, the only righteous ones on earth, the only ones ready to greet him when he came.

The center of the Jewish religion was the holy city of Jerusalem, which had retained a precarious independence under the Maccabees only to fall to the arms of Pompey, and thereafter submit, first to a client king, Herod of Idumaea, and then to the direct government of Rome under an equestrian procurator. The Romans had never been able to understand the Jews. From sad experience they knew that they could not drive them into making any compromises with polytheism, not even the formal acknowledgment of the divinity of the emperor. So at last they accepted the fact and let them alone, giving them religious privileges withheld from any other subjects of Rome, for the Romans felt that the Jewish faith did not constitute any real danger. It seemed impossible that such a small and exclusive sect could expand so far that it could undermine the loyalty of the vast population of the empire.

But the Jews in Jerusalem were by no means the only Jews in the Hellenistic world. Elsewhere, in every city of importance, there was a Jewish colony which sent representatives to the great festivals at Jerusalem, willingly acknowledged the temple there as the headquarters

of their religion, and from their greater wealth often sent donations for the poorer Jews of the religious capital. The widely scattered Jews of the Diaspora (Dispersion) lived in Greek cities, and were subject to the all pervading influence of Greek culture. They could not all be so strict in their religious observances as their brethren of Jerusalem. Though they studied and loved the Hebrew Law, they also studied Greek philosophy at Greek schools; they were familiar with all the intellectual currents of the Greek world. Such a one was Saul of Tarsus, who was to become the first great Christian missionary.

Even in Jerusalem itself not all the Jews had kept themselves free from Greek influence. As some had been ready to collaborate with the Greeks, so some also collaborated with the Romans. It was necessary for these Hellenized Jews (Sadducees) to play a very careful game with the Romans, for the ultimate benefit, as they no doubt felt, of the whole Jewish people. These men provided the High Priest at the time of the Crucifixion, and probably also a majority of the Jewish Council (Sanhedrin or Synedrin), which was entrusted by the Romans with local government, subject only to the general supervision of the Roman procurator. The Sadducees, however, differed in one important respect from their fellow Jews, the Pharisees. They did not believe in the resurrection of the body or in immortality.

With many fervent men and women looking for a messiah, and with no certainty of when he would come or how he would reveal himself, it was natural that there were many who claimed to be the Messiah. These men gathered around themselves fanatical bands of disciples, who were too often determined that their Messiah should prevail, if necessary by force. But all failed, and by the time of the birth of Jesus there was none who had been able to command the faith and allegiance of all the Jews. The Sadducees had found it necessary to suppress these would-be messiahs, for they were held responsible by their masters for all riots. Some Jews, like the Essenes, had gone into the desert, purifying themselves by ascetic practices, but they too were waiting for the Messiah to reveal himself. Others, like the Pharisee Hillel, had

begun to teach the people that the true religion was a religion of the heart, one that emphasized love for one's neighbor, rather than only an affair of religious observances and ritual.

Such, then, was the atmosphere in Judaea and Palestine when Jesus was born.

♦ The life and death of Jesus Christ

We do not know as much as we should like about the early history of Christianity or the actual life and work of its founder, for reasons not unlike those already discussed in connection with the Hebrews. Almost all that we know is gathered from the four Gospels (the Greek word is *evangelion*, meaning "good news," hence the writers were called Evangelists). But the Evan-

gelists were highly selective, choosing only those parts of the story which each felt to be essential. They were not systematic historians or biographers. Their purpose was to "preach the good news." Thus, to a later historian, there appear to be contradictions and even discrepancies, as, for instance, in the differing accounts of the birth of Jesus and the events immediately following the birth which are recorded by Matthew and Luke. Yet these Gospels are all that we possess in the way of external record, and from them must be constructed such consecutive history as is possible. The personality of Jesus Christ shines out so clearly from all four narratives that there has never been any real question of their general truth and authenticity.

The story that follows will therefore necessarily be drawn from the Gospels and the other



The Evangelist St. John writing his gospel. The eagle, always associated with St. John, symbolized, according to the inscription, the evangelist's yearning toward the heights. From a book of gospels (Anglo-Frankish), ca. 1150. (COURTESY THE PIERPONT MORGAN LIBRARY, Ms. 862, folio 144)

books of the New Testament, with the reminder that it may not be fully accurate and cannot be independently verified by any means now available to us.

Jesus was born in Bethlehem of Judaea, as prophesied by the Hebrew prophet Micah. His mother was Mary, whose husband was Joseph of the lineage of King David. Mary had been informed by an angel that the child was to be born and was to be a "son of the Most High." Thereafter, according to the account in Matthew, the infant Jesus was visited by three wise men or kings, an event which excited the suspicion of King Herod, who commanded that all newly born children should be put to death. Joseph and Mary, warned in a dream, took the child to Egypt, returning to Nazareth to live after all danger was over. In the Luke account the child was visited by shepherds and adored by them, but thereafter returned peacefully to Nazareth, the home town of his parents. Only one further incident of the childhood of Jesus is recorded in the Gospels: a visit to the Temple in Jerusalem at the age of twelve, when he escaped from his parents and was later found by them disputing with the Rabbis, both hearing them and asking them questions.

Thereafter there is a break in the narrative until all four Evangelists record a visit to an Essene prophet, John the Baptist, who had been preaching the imminent coming of the Messiah and urging the people to change their way of thinking in preparation for this event.¹ John had already declared that he himself was not the Messiah. When he saw Jesus coming, he immediately recognized him as the one who should come, "the latchet of whose shoes I am unworthy to unloose," and baptized him in the river. A voice was heard from heaven saying, "This is my beloved son in whom I am well pleased," and the Holy Spirit was seen descending from heaven in the form of a dove.

This is the beginning of the Messianic mission of Christ (the word *Christus* means the "anointed one"). For the next three years he

preached to the people and healed the sick, giving many signs of his Messiahship.² Sometimes he taught straightforwardly, attacking above all the strict Pharisees, whose religion was mere outward show. At other times he hid his true message within parables, sometimes adding, even as he gave one interpretation, the words, "Let him hear who has ears to hear." He chose twelve men to be his special aides, and these were called apostles; around him gathered many more who came to listen to him. Those who decided to follow him were called disciples.

Throughout Christ's teaching there is always the emphasis that true religion comes from the heart, and that "the Law and the prophets" are comprised in two commandments, the love of God and the love of one's neighbor. Though these teachings, with their evident wealth of hidden meanings, have inspired Christians ever since, nevertheless it is not the teachings of Christ so much as his life and death and whole personality, as revealed by the Gospels, that have been taken by the Christian Church and Christian believers as the truest evidence for the divine origin of his mission and for the divinity of his person. The Gospels thus gave Christianity some of its human appeal over such competing religions as Mithraism and the Egyptian mystery religions. The central figure of Christianity was a man who had actually lived on earth, and had been seen and could be remembered by his followers. The teachings have been expressed by others almost equally well, and there is nothing profoundly *new* in them. But the inspiration of the death and resurrection has been constantly renewed in countless Christian hearts in all the centuries since.

The Gospel accounts are in substantial agreement with each other on the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. After three years of preaching and healing he had aroused the resentment of many Jews, who had not been convinced by his signs or his teachings. But it was one of Christ's own apostles, Judas Iscariot,

¹ The Greek word *metanoeite* means literally "change your outlook" or "change your way of thinking." This conveys a different sense from the word *repent*, by which it is usually translated.

² The Greek word *semeion* or "sign" was translated into Latin in the authoritative Latin Bible of St. Jerome as *miraculum*; hence our word *miracle*, which probably gives the wrong impression of these symbolic acts.

Chronological Chart

Birth of Jesus	(probably) 4 B.C.
Mission of Jesus Christ	(probably) A.D. 26-30
Crucifixion of Jesus Christ	(probably) 30
Missionary journeys of Paul	ca. 34-60
Paul appeals to Roman emperor	60
Fire of Rome—First Martyrdom of Christians	64
Pliny's correspondence with Trajan about Christians	111-112
Rescript by Marcus Aurelius against Christians	169
General persecution of Christians by Emperor Decius	249-51
Diocletian "persecution"	303-13
Constantine succeeds to throne	312
"Edict of Milan"	313
Council of Nicaea	325
Conversion of Goths to Arianism (Bishop Ulfilas)	340-348
Rule of St. Basil	ca. 360
Julian the Apostate	361-363
Theodosius I forced to do penance for massacre at Thessalonica	390
Proscription of pagan religions by Theodosius	392
Death of Augustine (<i>City of God</i> , ca. 425-430)	430
St. Patrick's mission to Ireland	432
Invasion of Italy by Attila the Hun	452
Western bishops subjected to Pope Leo I by Emperor Valentinian III	455
Rule of St. Benedict	529
Irish monasticism of St. Columba	533-597
Columba founds monastery at Iona and Scottish Church	563
Missionary work of St. Columban in Europe	590-615
Pope Gregory I the Great	590-604
Conversion of England to Catholic Christianity	597
Synod of Whitby—Submission of Irish Church	664

who betrayed him to the leading Jews, who thereupon sent a guard to take him prisoner. Christ made no attempt to defend himself, and indeed forbade his disciples to use any violence against the guard. He had already warned them that he would be put to death and raised from the dead after three days, but they had not understood him. When they saw that he was captured and would not defend himself, they deserted him. The leading apostle, Peter, even went so far as to deny publicly that he had ever known Christ, thus again fulfilling a prophecy of his master.

Christ was then examined by the High Priest, and admitted that he was the Son of God. The High Priest and Council, declaring that this admission was a blasphemy, wished to put him to death in accordance with Jewish law, but to do so they needed confirmation of the sentence

from the Roman procurator, Pontius Pilate. Pilate then questioned him, but finding that his offense seemed to be only a religious one, was anxious to release him. However, when the Jews insisted that Christ wished to make himself "King of the Jews," Pilate became afraid, no doubt remembering that Tiberius was on the throne, and had recently passed severe laws against treason. He therefore confirmed the sentence and Christ was crucified. A rich follower claimed the body, and buried it in the tomb prepared for himself.

At this point it must have seemed to anyone alive at the time that Christ's mission had failed. The new Messiah had been put to death, and his followers, mostly men and women of the lower classes and of no influence, had deserted him. Like other Jewish messiahs, of whom there had been many, he would be forgotten,

♦ The early Christian Church

THE CONVERSION OF ST. PAUL AND THE NEW MISSIONARY IMPULSE

This time, however, there was a strikingly different outcome. On the third day after his death Peter, John, and a woman follower of Jesus named Mary Magdalene went to the tomb and found it empty. Then they saw their master once more alive in the body, and he showed himself to his disciples several times. This experience gave them new hope and energy, and after they had seen the resurrected Christ received into heaven, they all awaited the last fulfillment of his promise—the coming of the Helper or Holy Spirit who, according to the promise, could come to them only after Christ had died and been resurrected. One day, when the apostles had gathered together in an upper room and after they had chosen by lot a twelfth apostle to replace Judas Iscariot, who had, in remorse, hanged himself, there was suddenly “the sound of a rushing mighty wind.” They were all filled with the Holy Spirit, and began to prophesy, and speak each in the tongue of the land of his origin. The onlookers thought them drunk, but with new inspiration they began to preach the resurrection of Christ and to make converts. One of the disciples, Stephen, addressed an assembly of Jews, accusing them of always having maltreated, rejected, and put to death their prophets. The Jews, goaded beyond their endurance, stoned him to death, making him the first Christian martyr (Greek for “witness”). Apparently the Roman officials looked the other way and did not interfere.

Present at the stoning was Saul of Tarsus, a Roman citizen, an orthodox Hellenized Jew of the sect of the Pharisees, who at once saw the danger from these new fanatical believers in a messiah who had failed and died without fulfilling the mission expected of him. Saul therefore, with a band of determined helpers, proceeded to lead an expedition of extermination against the Christians, presumably with the aid, or at least the connivance, of the authorities. Having done his best in Jerusalem, he set out on a journey to Damascus in Syria to continue the persecution of converts in the north. On the

road to Damascus he had an experience in which the crucified Christ appeared to him in a vision. This experience gave him an absolute conviction from which he never afterward wavered, leading him to regard and speak of himself as an apostle called out of due time. At first, however, he was paralyzed and struck blind; his servants brought him to Damascus, where his faculties were restored by a Christian. From this moment Saul, whom the records thereafter call Paul, was as strongly for the Christians as he had previously been against them. After a period of retirement during which he was apparently coming to an understanding of his experience on the road to Damascus and the realization of his mission, he went to Jerusalem, where he was naturally received with some distrust by his late enemies. But, even without any real authorization from the body of Jewish Christians who had now formed a church in Jerusalem as headquarters of the new religion, he set out on a missionary journey. During the course of this journey he took the epoch-making decision to baptize Greeks and other non-Jews as Christians without making them become Jews first, sparing them the Jewish rites and ritual which Peter had been insisting on in Palestine.

Returning to Jerusalem, Paul reached a compromise with Peter that Gentiles outside Palestine need not become Jews, while the church in Jerusalem would continue with the requirement. Then Paul set out again, making converts everywhere, especially among the Greeks to whom he, with his Greek education, was able to speak in their own language and in their own terms. At Athens itself, finding an altar dedicated “To the unknown God,” he showed the Athenians who this God was, and why he hitherto had been unknown to them. With rare organizing ability and drive, he founded churches in all the places he visited, and kept in touch with them afterward by correspondence. His letters, the earliest authentic Christian documents, expounded the new Christian theology, which seems to have been almost entirely his own work, and answered the numerous questions put to him. In all the cities Paul visited in Asia Minor and Greece, his most determined opponents were always the Jews.

OPPOSITION OF THE JEWS TO CHRISTIANITY

It cannot be stated categorically why the Jews were so determinedly hostile as a body to the Christians, although individual Jews were of course converted, especially in the Hellenistic cities. The Jewish leaders, Pharisees and Sadducees alike, had instigated the proceedings which led to the Crucifixion, but only a few took an active part in this event. The usual explanation is that the Jews were looking for a messiah of an entirely different kind from Jesus Christ, one who would give them temporal power and not merely redeem them through suffering. Their prophet Isaiah had devoted his matchless eloquence to a description of a "suffering servant," a "man of sorrows and acquainted with grief"—but it was not certain that this prophecy referred to an actual man, a messiah. It might only refer to the people of Israel as a whole. Moreover, by no means all Jews had yet accepted the idea of a future life. If there was no such future life and no heavenly kingdom, then clearly such a messiah as Christ was worse than useless, since his religion tended to create a schism within Jewry which could not be tolerated. All through Hebrew history there had been such schisms, and in Jewish belief these had been punished by Yahweh. They had, indeed, been responsible in part for Yahweh's continual postponement of the fulfillment of his promises. The temptation offered by Christianity, therefore, was just one more test of their faith. Even those Jews who took account of political rather than religious realities could see that Christianity represented a grave danger to the privileged status of their religion in the Roman Empire. They realized that the Romans would look upon Christianity as a Jewish sect—but potentially dangerous not only because of its exclusive monotheism but also because of its zeal for conversion, from which the Jews themselves had usually been free.

Christ had been a Jew, thoroughly grounded in the Law and the prophets. But he had claimed that the Law itself had to be newly interpreted, not in the manner of the rabbis, but through breathing a new spirit into it. Many were impressed by the authority with which he spoke, even daring to criticize Moses—"Moses said to

you, but I say." Now Paul, claiming a similar authority as an apostle, was even more explicit. The Law, he wrote in a letter, is a schoolmaster to bring us to Christ. The Law had been given to the Hebrews because at that time they did not know right from wrong, nor did they know how God was to be worshiped and what he required of them. Now, however, under the new dispensation of Jesus Christ, they were no longer children, needing to be kept under discipline, but "sons," with their knowledge of right and wrong coming from within, through faith and love. Therefore, although Hebrew thought, formerly an exclusive possession of the Jews, was spread throughout the whole Western world by Christianity, the orthodox Jews took no pride in this dissemination of their heritage, for if this heritage was to be a possession of the world, then their mission as a chosen people was over.

ST. PAUL AS THE FOUNDER OF
CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY

On the whole Paul met with little opposition from Greeks and Romans unless, as at Ephesus, he offended the priesthood of a powerful Greco-Oriental mystery cult. But regularly the local Jewish community tried to prevent him from preaching. Several times he was thrown into prison by the Roman authorities for causing riots, but in general it was the Romans who protected him. When at last he returned to Jerusalem, opposition to him was so strong that he was first taken into protective custody by the Romans. Then, when he was about to be punished for his part in the riots, he used his right as a Roman citizen and appealed to Caesar (Nero). The local governor was thus forced to send him to Rome, where he was allowed a limited freedom even before his trial came up. We know nothing further of his life for certain, but tradition has it that he was beheaded during the first organized persecution of Christians in Rome about A.D. 65.

Paul was the real founder of Christianity as a universal religion. If the other apostles, who wished to confine Christianity to the Jews, had been successful, it hardly seems possible that it could have survived. Paul also deserves to be considered as one of the most influential

thinkers of history. It was no mean feat to transform what was, after all, to external eyes nothing beyond the life and death of a great prophet, into a system of theology—logical, clear, and compelling—which has stood the test of time, and is still the fundamental theological doctrine of all Christian churches, Catholic and Protestant alike.

Christ, according to Paul, had been the Son of God—a God-man—though he was also fully a man by virtue of his incarnation into a human body. Every man born into the world suffers from the sin of Adam, ("As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive.") Man would have been doomed to hell if it had not been for the voluntary sacrifice of Christ upon the cross, which redeemed mankind through his blood, and made possible man's salvation and reception into a blessed immortality in heaven. For Paul the necessity for man was to believe in Christ—a faith effecting an inner transformation of his whole being, freeing him from the bonds of original sin and enabling him to be good also on earth. Thus man was not saved through good works, but the good works were the fruit of his faith. The symbol of the washing away of the original sin of Adam was baptism; by which a man of his own free will declared his faith in Christ, and was received into the Church.

It should be added that, although Paul founded churches as communities of Christians who had all accepted Christ and been baptized, it was not the reception into the Church which was decisive for salvation, but the inner act of "putting on the whole armor of Christ," allowing Christ to live within the inner self—the symbol for which was the baptism in water, which symbolically washed away the sins of the convert. Only in later days, with the growth of the Church, did the belief come to be accepted that the Eucharist and the other sacraments were necessary to salvation, and that the transubstantiation, the miracle of the turning of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, was the supreme need of all human beings. The baptism then became a rite to be performed in infancy, and not an affirmation of faith by a believer; from childhood a Christian

was cleansed from original sin and was thus eligible for heaven even though he never lived to participate in the other sacraments.¹

THE APPEAL OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE ROMAN WORLD

Christianity, as it emerged from the mind and heart of St. Paul, was eminently fitted to make the deepest appeal to religious men and women throughout the world. It promised salvation in the hereafter to all who would accept Christ, and this acceptance was simply an act of faith. Thus, in spite of its complex theology, perhaps never understood by more than a small minority of its adherents, it was basically simple. It was no respecter of persons. The meanest slave was eligible for salvation, and to him it also offered the fullest compensation for his hard life on earth—which was merely a testing ground for the hereafter. No distinction was made between men and women, and there were no difficult trials or initiation ceremonies to be undergone by the convert. And in early days there was a belief in the imminent second coming of Christ to judge the world, so that the faithful Christians might not even see death. No religion in the world of the time, not even the mystery religions, could offer as much to its converts—community fellowship, a sense of mission and urgency, a promise of a blessed immortality, and a systematic theology and philosophy which could satisfy even the Greek mind when later it set to work on it. If at first Christianity lacked gorgeous ceremonial, this was later added in full measure by the Church. And in the recorded sayings of Christ it had a fund of ethical and moral teachings which could satisfy even the Roman feeling for active morality.

Yet it did not appeal in early times to the upper classes among either the Romans or the Greeks; indeed, for centuries it was primarily a religion of Greeks and Orientals, with com-

¹ It may be noted that there are varying interpretations of the teachings of St. Paul, and that what has been said here is still in dispute among theologians.



Very early sculptured figure of Christ at Santillana del Mar (Spain).

paratively few Roman converts, no Roman pope for two centuries, and hardly a single Roman martyr. The Romans, even when they were correctly informed about it, regarded it as a religion for slaves and foreigners, and it was difficult for men who considered themselves morally superior to the rest of the world and destined to rule, to accept as a redeemer a man who had belonged to a despised people and had suffered a slave's death in a remote part of the empire. His origin and manner of dying offended their class consciousness and pride of race, while the Greek intellectuals considered his teachings at first as philosophically negligible. In time, however, as the Greeks learned more

about the religion, many of them began to take an active role in the formulation of Christian theology, and, especially in the early days of the Byzantine Empire, they entered passionately into theological controversy.

Physical conditions in the Roman Empire, however, were ideally suited for the spread of Christianity. The establishment of the *Pax Romana* made it possible for missionaries to travel in perfect safety from one end of the empire to the other, and the strategic Roman roads provided an ideal means of communication. The common languages of Greek and Latin could be understood everywhere. Roman protection was extended to all without discrimination, at least until the new religion was proscribed as a subversive organization. And, as we have seen, any missionary like Paul who happened also to be a Roman citizen had special privileges in addition to the general protection extended by the Roman Empire to all its subjects.

The Romans, in general, were hospitable to all religions. But the religion of emperor-worship, which was the official cult of the empire, was both more and less than a religion. On the one hand, it was not expected to command the religious devotion of the people, but on the other hand no one, save only the Jews, whose uncompromising monotheism was well known to the Romans, was exempted from paying at least formal tribute to the emperor as a god. This allegiance the true Christian was unwilling to give, since he regarded worship as the prerogative of God alone. Roman attention was first officially drawn to the Christians when they were accused in the reign of Nero of having set fire to Rome (A.D. 64). At that time Christianity became a proscribed religion, and the first Christians were put to death by the Roman authorities. The steadfastness of the martyrs, whose number traditionally includes Peter and Paul, probably aided the Christians more than the laws against them harmed them. The religiously indifferent Romans had never been treated to such a display before; and even while the majority ridiculed, it is certain that a minority was impressed. When the immediate persecution died down, the laws against Christianity remained on the statute book, presenting

a difficulty to Roman officials who regarded them with distaste. An interesting correspondence between Pliny, a Roman writer and official, and the emperor Trajan is extant, in which Pliny asked for advice about enforcing the laws. The emperor instructed him to take action only when Christians were denounced to him and refused to pay the required worship to the emperor.

This indifference remained the official Roman policy until the middle of the third century A.D., by which time Christianity had become a powerful organized religion, whose leaders commanded more respect from their followers than the often shadowy emperors of that epoch from their titular subjects. Several emperors revived and strengthened the laws against Christians, but they were not effectively enforced until the reign of Diocletian, who, as we shall see in Chapter 7, was able to secure his own position and rule as an absolute monarch. A part of his program for the re-establishment of imperial authority was the revival of emperor-worship. In this aim he naturally came into conflict with Christian beliefs. The persecution, however, in spite of creating many martyrs, ultimately failed, and a few years later (312) Constantine, opposed by a sun-worshiper who was competing with him for the throne, called upon the Christian God for support in his struggle. When the victory was won, he and his co-emperor in the East authorized the toleration of Christianity, and during the course of his reign he himself became converted. Thereafter all the emperors but one (Julian the Apostate) acknowledged themselves as Christians, until the emperor Theodosius in A.D. 392 proscribed all other religions, thus making Christianity the official religion of the empire.

❖ The organization of the Church

IN THE PROVINCES

As the Church grew, so naturally did the complexity of its organization. St. Paul himself, as we have seen, kept in touch with all the congregations he had founded, giving them advice and visiting them when he could. As yet

there were no priests or Church officials of any kind, and the simple ceremonies and meetings did not require the services of men set aside for purely religious duties. The affairs of the churches were managed by elders, active men in the congregation who took the initiative in matters of religion. But as ever more congregations were organized and it was realized that they might drift apart both in doctrine and in practices if left to themselves, it became clear to the leaders that some kind of more elaborate organization was necessary to keep them united. Living, as they did, within the Roman Empire, there was obviously one particular pattern of organization that could best be imitated, the organization of the empire itself. Within the congregations three hierarchies differentiated themselves in the process of time: deacons, whose task was to give help to Christians in their ordinary daily affairs and especially to take care of the administration of charity; presbyters, who looked after religious affairs of the church; and then an individual leader, called an overseer or episcopus, from which comes our word *bishop*.

In early times neither presbyters nor bishops were in any way superior to the ordinary layman, nor did they go through any special ceremony when they were elected to their position. But by the end of the second century, with the elaboration of the ceremonial of the Church, and the growth of the belief that its services were needed for salvation, these clergy became set apart as a class of real priests who were *ordained* by the bishops. Ordination, like baptism and the Eucharist, had now become a *sacrament*, while the ceremony of ordination became a ritual conferring special sanctity upon the holder. For several centuries more it was the congregations who chose their bishops; but once chosen, these men had full monarchical power within their churches. As time went on, it became necessary to have archbishops, whose seats were usually in the Roman capitals, or chief cities, of the provinces, and who were in charge of all the churches in their respective provinces. These men were called metropolitans. The bishops in the whole empire met from time to time in ecumenical (universal) councils, presided over by the metropolitans or by the bishop of

Rome (later called pope*), to consider doctrinal problems and to discuss matters which concerned the Church as a whole.

IN ROME—THE BISHOP OF ROME— PETRINE SUPREMACY

The bishop of Rome had a peculiar position as the head of the church in the capital city of the empire. Probably as early as the second century A.D. the Roman congregation was the largest in the empire. The church in Rome, according to tradition, had been founded by the apostle Peter, who had become its first bishop and been martyred and buried there.

But it was a long time before St. Peter's position was supposed to confer any supreme authority upon his successors. Other bishops claimed to be the equal of the bishops of Rome, and it was usually the reputation and personality of individual bishops which gave them whatever authority they might possess in spiritual matters. Ambrose, bishop of Milan in the fourth century, was clearly the most influential bishop of his day, and was able to force the emperor himself to do penance for a massacre he had committed. But in the course of time it gradually became accepted doctrine that Peter, who had been entrusted by Christ with the task of founding the Church, had delegated his authority to his successor, and the latter to his successor, right down to the present time. This theory of the Petrine succession, as it is called, is still the basis for the authority claimed by the Catholic Church.

As long as an emperor ruled in Rome, the bishop's authority was naturally limited to his spiritual domain. But when Honorius, Emperor of the West, removed his court to Ravenna at the end of the fourth century, the bishop was left as the chief dignitary in Rome, and at times he performed the functions of a Roman ruler in the city. One great pope, Leo I, negotiated with Attila the Hun, and succeeded in diverting him

from the city; and the same pope negotiated for the safety of its inhabitants during the sack of Rome by the Vandals. As the Roman provincial administration gradually collapsed in the fifth century, under the impact of the barbarian invaders, the bishops in many of the provinces took over from the helpless Roman governors and tried to protect the interests of the people as best they could. They now started to look to the pope (as we may now call the bishop of Rome) for guidance in political policy as well as for spiritual leadership. Pope Leo I was given official recognition by Emperor Valentinian III of Ravenna, who conferred upon him full authority over all the bishops in the empire. He did not hesitate to use this authority, demanding implicit obedience from them and pronouncing final decisions in matters of doctrine.

❖ The establishment of Christian doctrine

THE QUESTIONS NOT ANSWERED BY ST. PAUL

St. Paul, as already mentioned, was the founder of Christian theology; but his teachings, usually given in response to definite questions put to him by his churches, were very far from satisfying inquiring minds, especially those of his Greek audience. Early in the history of the Christian Church his authority was accepted as that of an apostle chosen by the resurrected Christ to explain the nature of his relationship to God the Father and other mysteries of the religion; and by A.D. 170 his letters, together with letters of the other apostles, the four Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, and most of the present books of the New Testament were accepted as canonical or inspired books. These are the basic books of Christianity, and nothing else written by any later Christians has quite the same authority. Other men might add to this theology, but these men were not apostles; they had never known Christ personally on earth, and there was no inherent reason why one man's ideas on the subject should be better than any other man's. Yet clearly all the questions that could be asked had not been answered by Christ, Paul, or the other apostles. And it was equally clear that some questions really did need

* The Latin word *papa* merely means "father," a title given by courtesy to other priests than the pope. It is not known for certain when the word *pope* was first applied exclusively to the bishop of Rome.

answering. Moreover, many men came into Christianity after earlier experience in the mystery religions, and they were not all ready to abandon what they had been taught before conversion.

There were questions of doctrine, in particular concerning the relation of the Son of God to the Father and the relation of both to the Holy Spirit, a question which was to exercise theologians for many centuries; and there were practical questions, such as the respective roles of faith and good deeds in the achievement of salvation, and the effect of God's infinite foreknowledge and omnipotence upon man's free will. Many differing opinions on these matters had been stated publicly by the time of the conversion of Constantine, and there was no evident way of establishing the truth. Yet the truth must be established if Christianity were not to divide into many competing sects, each holding its own beliefs as established truths.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ORTHODOX DOCTRINE

The question of heresy. Constantine himself in 325 summoned a council at Nicaea, over which he presided in person. Here the bishops of the empire assembled and a statement of beliefs, or a creed, was agreed upon. The teachings of a certain Bishop Arius, who claimed that Christ was sent from God, possessed divine substance, but was in no sense co-equal with God the Father, were condemned. The teachings had been making considerable headway, especially among the barbarians who were in the process of being converted to Christianity. Indeed, this simpler belief appealed to some of the emperors subsequent to Constantine, and they continued to permit Arianism to be preached by the missionaries in their domains. The consequence was that all the Germanic barbarian peoples who later penetrated into the empire, with the single exception of the Franks, had already accepted Arianism before the fall of Rome. They were thus hostile to the papacy, which adhered to the teachings of Athanasius, another bishop, whose teachings were pronounced by the papacy to be "orthodox" (the

"right opinion"). Arianism was termed a "heresy" (Greek word for "choice"), and true Christians were forbidden to hold it.

Arianism, however, was far from the only heresy of the early centuries of Christianity. Especially in Constantinople there were numerous heresies, sometimes supported by the emperor and his nominee, the patriarch who was the chief Church official in the East. In the eleventh century the Eastern and Western Churches were finally split over a doctrinal difference. But in the West, as the doctrine of the Petrine supremacy gained acceptance, it was agreed also that the pope, by virtue of his authority as the successor of St. Peter, could declare the true doctrines of the Church which must be held by all believers. He could also state which of the early Christian writings were authoritative, and contained truths inspired by the Holy Spirit. Thus grew up the authority of the Fathers of the Church, whose teachings were to be regarded as orthodox. Indeed, the Catholic Church today teaches many dogmas that are not to be found in the Bible, but have been derived from the inspired writings of the Greek and Latin Fathers.

The teachings of St. Augustine. Most influential among these Fathers was St. Augustine (354-430), bishop of Hippo in North Africa (to be distinguished from the later St. Augustine of Canterbury, who was sent by Pope Gregory I to convert the English), who criticized severely the teachings of one Pelagius, who had claimed that man could be saved by his own good deeds. Augustine argued in reply that the human will is too weak to perform good deeds unaided; indeed, the human mind cannot even know the good without God's grace. Christ's sacrifice had made possible the receiving of grace by mankind, even though it remained God's choice whether man would receive grace or would remain forever ignorant and evil. The Church was the medium chosen by God to administer the sacraments, which were the means of grace. Not all who partook of the sacraments would receive grace; but without them there could be no grace and no salvation. Thus St. Augustine made clear the necessary

role of the Church in the winning of salvation, and this part of his teaching became the orthodox teaching of the Church. The simple performance of good deeds according to whatever light may be in us, as advocated by Pelagius, was stigmatized as heretical teaching.

Augustine was also a pioneer in another field of thought at least as influential as his theology. An earlier Christian Father, Eusebius, had written an *Ecclesiastical History* which interpreted all the events of his own and earlier times in the light of the Old Testament, and especially of Hebrew prophecy. But Augustine went much further, and in his *City of God* wrote a history designed to show that with the coming of Christ an entirely new phase had opened. Attacking the pagans who claimed that the sack of Rome by Alaric was due to the desertion of the old gods by their worshipers, Augustine declared that this was part of God's scheme. Rome belonged to the "City of Man," which was only temporary and must pass away, to give place to the "City of God" on earth, which would endure forever. The beginnings had already been made under the Hebrew theocracy, and now from the coming of Christ must be continued by the Christian Church. Augustine with great passion and power described God's whole plan for the world, the creation and fall of man and the old dispensation, followed by man's redemption in the new age and the building of the City of God. It need hardly be pointed out how much this conception owes to the Hebrew interpretation of history, already discussed in an earlier chapter.

In Augustine's own thought it is clear that the perfect City of God can never exist on earth; but it is the ideal to which all Christians should aspire, and the beginnings of the building can be made in the here and now. Christians in subsequent ages, however, took it to be the ideal of Christendom, a working plan for all Christians to follow, justifying the extirpation of heresy as treason to the City of God, and later justifying also the extermination of infidels as a fulfillment of God's plan for the unity of all men on earth in the Christian religion. The *City of God* was perhaps, after the Bible, the most influential book in the medieval world.

❖ The persistent ideal of holiness and poverty—Monasticism

Over the first Christian centuries Western men thus gradually came to accept the new religion, and Christianity became a part of their lives. The Church was omnipresent, and penetrated to a greater or lesser degree into every aspect of the life of a Christian. Representatives of the Church baptized the newborn child, and prayed for his soul as his end approached. The Church became a great organization. It held lands and administered property. It became rich and influential, and, as we shall see in later chapters, it too often became embroiled in secular affairs, sometimes to the detriment of its spiritual mission. But in spite of its position as a great organized institution, it was also able to take care of the needs of those who felt that the true purpose of religion was to occupy oneself with deeds of personal piety.

Very early there appeared men and women who wished to take little or no part in the affairs of the world. They wished to follow personally the teachings of Christ, who had told a young man that he should sell all his goods and follow him. In the East such people became ascetics, and were regarded as holy men by their contemporaries. Some became hermits; others lived in small communities with like-minded men, holding all goods in common. The Church at first had difficulty in maintaining any kind of discipline among them, but ultimately was able to some degree to institutionalize their practices, adopting in the fourth century the moderate Rule of St. Basil, which prescribed an orderly, regular life for these monks, as they came to be called. This Rule required the monks to live in a communal dwelling house or monastery, in which each did a share of the work required for his subsistence.

In the West asceticism of the kind practiced in the East was not feasible. But there were many who wished to devote themselves to prayer and worship. For these, the leading Rule among many that were sanctioned by the Church was the Rule of St. Benedict, who founded the great monastery of Monte Cassino. Those who lived by the Rule of St. Benedict had to cut off all



The monastery of Monte Cassino, in southern Italy, as it was before it was destroyed during World War II. It is now being rebuilt.

ties with their family and their previous life before entering the monastery. They took vows of obedience to the abbot, the head of the community. Periods were set aside each day for prayer and worship; the rest of the day was to be spent in manual labor, either in the fields, which were cultivated with great care and made to yield all the food required by the community, or in the monastery itself. No monk was permitted to own anything at all; all property was to be administered by the abbot, whose word was law within the monastery. Monks slept in a common dormitory and ate in a common dining room.

By the eighth century the Benedictine Rule was adopted by the vast majority of monasteries in the West except the Irish. For centuries it was the model life for the religious, and faithfully observed by those who had chosen it. Even when abuses began to creep in, all those who undertook reforms returned to the Benedictine Rule, or some modification of it, as the ideal Rule for a religious community. There was no doubt that in spite of its initial reservations the Church was wise to permit and ultimately take the lead in organizing these communities of monks. For if it was necessary to institutionalize the Church, and the papacy had no doubt of this necessity, then it was also necessary to take care of those deeply earnest men and women

who wished to devote all their lives to their religion, and to live a communal life of poverty that seemed to them in accordance with the teachings of Christ. As long as the monks continued to live holy lives, they were a standing example of the virtues of Christianity; they troubled no one, and at the same time they absorbed into their communities all those who might have attacked the Church for its institutionalism and worldliness.

The Irish monasteries alone did not conform to the Benedictine Rule. Remaining for centuries unconnected with the Church in Rome, they were unaware even of many of the newer teachings of the Church. The result was that they developed a Christianity that was never institutionalized in the Roman manner, and they retained a fervor, especially in missionary activity, that had begun to disappear from Europe. St. Columba converted some Celtic tribes in Britain before they had yet been visited by official emissaries of the Church; St. Columban penetrated into Gaul, making converts in places where Christianity had as yet no foothold and founding monasteries there; another Irishman founded the great monastery of St. Gall in what is now Switzerland. Moreover, once the first monks had gained a knowledge of Greek, it continued to be taught in the monasteries, and was never allowed to die out in Ireland. The only

great philosopher of the Dark Ages in Europe, John Scotus Erigena, was an Irishman.

But this progress of the Irish monks was rudely checked in Britain. Pope Gregory I (the fourth and last of the officially recognized Latin Fathers of the Church), at the end of the sixth century sent a missionary to Britain named Augustine, who succeeded in converting the South. As this Catholic Christianity progressed northward it came into contact with the communities converted from Ireland, which had quite unknowingly adopted a different form of ecclesiastical usage. Both sides agreed to accept the decision of a synod at Whitby (664), presided over by the king of Northumbria. The question hinged upon the Petrine supremacy. The Irish could point to no such authority as that of the pope, descended from St. Peter. Their failure was decisive. The Roman Church received the award, the new English Church was organized after the Roman manner. The monasteries accepted the Benedictine Rule; in time even the Irish themselves accepted the inevitable, and adopted the discipline and organization of the central Church in Rome.

❖ Summary

With the acceptance of Christianity and its gradual diffusion over all Europe, Western civilization had acquired its own religion, which is indeed a peculiar possession of this civilization. Whenever Christianity has spread outside the borders of Europe, it has been carried by Western peoples; non-Western peoples have accepted it, with rare exceptions, only when they have also accepted Western civilization.

Christianity itself owes much to its predecessors. The religion of the Hebrews gave Christianity its idea of God, its concept of sin and punishment, and its fundamental ethics; Christianity of course inherited its Old Testament from the Hebrews. From the Greeks Christianity took much of its theology and almost all its philosophy. The hierarchical organization of the Christian Church was adapted from the contemporary Roman practice of government, and Church (canon) law was solidly based upon Roman law.

The barbarians who were later converted to Christianity were made most aware of the organization and ritual of the Church, and for centuries only a few understood anything of its theology. But Christianity showed itself capable of adapting itself to many pagan practices that survived from pre-Christian days; and in turn the pagans were often able to accommodate themselves to the new religion by adding certain elements from Christianity without totally abandoning their former beliefs. Thus resistance to Christianity was rarely prolonged. When missionaries faltered, the State felt it to be its duty to compel at least an outward conversion; while the monopoly enjoyed by the Church made an alternative religion hard to come by. Christianity became the accepted and universal religion of the West, a position it still holds today, even though the Catholic Church itself has no longer a monopoly of Christianity.

Suggestions for further reading

PAPERBACK BOOKS

- Asch, Shalom. *The Apostle*. Pocket Books. A fine attempt by a non-Christian to evoke in historical fiction the life, work, and times of St. Paul.
- Cumont, Franz. *The Mysteries of Mithra*. Dover. Important, though no longer quite up-to-date work on Mithraism, or as much as we knew of it in the early part of the century.
- Deissmann, Adolf. *Paul; a Study in Social and Religious History*. Torch. Scholarly estimate of St. Paul and his influence, using all available sources, including papyri.
- Grant, Frederick C., ed. *Hellenistic Religions: The Age of Syncretism*. Liberal Arts Press. Documents bearing on the religious background of Christianity in the Near East.
- Marrou, Henri. *St. Augustine and his Influence through the Ages*. Men of Wisdom Series. Small but valuable book, dealing briefly with the life and thought of St. Augustine, and more fully with how his thought was retained and transformed in the Middle Ages.
- St. Augustine. *The City of God* (abridged). Ed. by Vernon J. Bourke. Doubleday Image. This tedious and rambling but immensely influential work is all the better for its abridgment, which contains the most important passages.

- Waddell, Helen. *The Desert Fathers*. Ann Arbor. A classic account of the Greek Fathers of the Church who escaped from organized Christianity into lives of solitude.
- Weiss, Johannes. *Earliest Christianity From 30 A.D. to 150 A.D.* 2 vols. Torch. Very thorough and interesting work making use of all available sources, and written with great insight.

CASEBOUND BOOKS

- Bettenson, H. S., ed. *Documents of the Christian Church*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1947. Valuable collection of primary documents.
- Fisher, G. P. *The History of Christian Doctrine*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923. Very full and thorough, without noticeable bias, but not easy.
- Goodenough, E. R. *The Church in the Roman Empire*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1931. Short readable account without much attention to doctrine.
- Latourette, Kenneth S. *A History of Christianity*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953. One of the standard histories, and in many ways the best. Good on early Christianity.
- Pegis, Anton C., ed. *The Wisdom of Catholicism*. New York: Modern Library, 1949. Contains important selections from the writings of the Church Fathers and others.
- St. Augustine. *Confessions*. Tr. by F. J. Sheed. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1943. Excellent translation of Augustine's famous account of how, in spite of doubts, he came to accept Christianity. Another translation available as Pocket Book.
- Shotwell, J. T., and Loomis, L. R. *The See of Peter*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1927. Documents on the growth of the papacy and gradual acceptance of the bishop of Rome as head of the Church.

The Fall of Rome and the Establishment of Successor States in the West

❖ The beginning of the end

The murder of Commodus in 192 was the signal for the opening of a period of outright domination of the Roman emperor by the army, a condition which was to last till the fall of the empire. The first half of this period, up to the accession of Diocletian, was characterized by the increasing disintegration of the civil government under a series of military usurpers whose chief, and sometimes only, ability lay in the military sphere. The empire itself was, on the whole, successfully defended against external pressure on the boundaries, but at tremendous cost to its internal stability. The second half of the period was characterized by the development of a totalitarian state under a civil administration backed by a usually obedient professional mercenary army, directed by an absolute emperor.

The economic and military policies of the emperor who succeeded Commodus, a general named Septimius Severus (193-211), may with justice be debited with the semi-anarchy that persisted, except for short intervals, until the accession of Diocletian in 284. Severus evidently had little knowledge of the political and economic basis of the empire; still less was he aware of the delicate basis of consent combined with effective military supremacy that underlay the position of the princeps. A soldier himself, and

only a soldier, Severus was primarily interested in providing for the needs of his army, and he ruled as a military despot rather than a civilian magistrate. The army was dissident as long as its pay was uncertain. Only the still fairly prosperous cities could find its pay, and the surplus produce of the peasants had to provide for its subsistence. Meanwhile, the relatively unproductive proletariat had to be kept contented, and prevented from undermining the emperor's position while he was away on campaign. These elementary needs were taken care of in a rough-and-ready manner by the policies of the emperor, quite certainly without an awareness of what they would come to mean for the future of the empire.

To ensure that his treasury was kept full, Severus initiated the policy of making municipal magistrates personally responsible for the collection of the taxes due to the emperor from the cities they nominally ruled. If they were not paid in full, the magistrates themselves had to make up the difference. To see that all sources of income were tapped and that all officials were kept to their duty, Severus inaugurated a secret police to report directly to himself on any failure to fulfill obligations and to warn him of any tendencies toward treason. On the other hand, he won the approval of the proletariat by increasing its dole from the state, and passed other special legislation which protected its interests.

THE ASCENDANCY OF THE PEASANT ARMY

But the real danger of the policy of Severus was in the favoritism he showed to his legions. Their pay was considerably raised, and many concessions were made to them which had the effect of impairing their usefulness to the state, while incidentally lowering their efficiency. Married soldiers were allowed to live with their wives in towns behind the lines; auxiliary divisions were given permanent lands; and social clubs in the army were encouraged. This policy made the troops relatively immobile and unfit for service on an endangered frontier. It also made them less willing to fight and less amenable to discipline. Time after time in the third century we hear of mutinies and of the assassination of military leaders when they called upon the troops to fight in defense of the frontiers or tried to instill some discipline into them. Moreover, Severus now made it possible for all provincial soldiers to rise to the position of centurion, which carried with it equestrian rank. Since this was the class favored both by Severus and by his successors for all posts in the imperial bureaucracy, the result was that a military career became the best means of entry to the highest positions in the state, and civilian rule was gradually replaced by military. The very highest offices in the imperial service brought their holders within the senatorial aristocracy, which carried special privileges. Thus the senatorial order became increasingly filled with successful soldiers who acquired large tracts of land and settled down, unencumbered by taxation, having in their progress from the ranks avoided any payment of taxes whatever, and having acquired a vast contempt for those more productive members of society upon whom fell the whole burden of their upkeep. Thus the army became a privileged career, and the military caste, pampered and favored by Severus and all the third-century emperors, became a state within the state, entirely irresponsible, and giving its support only to those rulers who perpetuated its position and catered to its demands.

By opening to soldiers from the ranks the way even to the crown itself, the emperors might have attracted into the army men from the upper and middle classes. But, though Italians and

provincials of equestrian rank did continue to provide some of the officers, the bulk of the army was recruited, by design, from the peasantry. It has even been suggested that this was a deliberate policy to increase the class struggle between the peasantry and the urban middle classes. It would seem more probable, however, that the conscript army could find recruits in sufficient number only from the peasantry, and that the concessions made were of the kind more likely to appeal to a largely illiterate and semi-civilized peasantry, which had always found it difficult to make a living from the land. The result of the whole policy, as doubtless intended, was to undermine the position of the upper classes and infiltrate them with uncouth but able soldiers; but it was probably not foreseen that the army itself would become progressively barbarized, nor that it would prefer its privileged life behind the lines to defending the state. The soldiers preferred to follow only those leaders who promised them the most at the least cost to themselves in military activity. So many emperors were assassinated by rebellious troops during fifty years of the third century that only one of eighteen such "emperors" died peacefully in his bed.

FIFTY YEARS OF ANARCHY—THE "BARRACK EMPERORS" (235-284)

There is no need to dwell on the lives, activities, and sudden deaths of these "barrack" emperors. No real rule of succession was observed, though on a few occasions fathers were in fact succeeded by sons who had made appropriate donatives to the legions; frequently there were several competing emperors supported by their own troops but not accepted by any others. On several occasions the Germans penetrated into Gaul, once even passing the Alps and only meeting ultimate defeat in northern Italy. For ten years there was a separate and completely independent kingdom of Gaul. Without effective central administration, tax collecting was by the rough-and-ready method of requisition of supplies and forced levies of money. Almost the whole of Roman Asia acquired virtual independence for a time (267-273) under the leadership of a desert city

Chronological Chart

Murder of Roman Emperor Commodus	192	Sack of Rome by Vandals under Gaiseric	455
Reign of Septimius Severus	193-211	Visigothic kingdom of Spain	466-711
Edict of Caracalla—Extension of Roman citizenship to virtually all free inhabitants of the empire	212	Odoacer deposes last emperor ("Fall of Rome")	476
"Barrack Emperors"	235-284	Clovis consolidates Franks into kingdom	481-511
Reign of Diocletian	284-305	Merovingian kingdom	481-754
Constantine emperor of West, Licinius of East	312	Conversion of Clovis and Franks to Roman Catholicism	486
"Edict of Milan"	313	Invasions of England by Angles, Saxons, and Jutes	5th and 6th centuries
Constantine sole emperor	324-337	Invasion of Italy by Theodoric the Ostrogoth	488
Council of Nicaea	325	Murder of Odoacer—Theodoric king of Italy	493
Foundation of Constantinople	330	Theodoric the Ostrogoth king of Italy	493-526
Conversion of Goths to Arian Christianity	340-348	Execution of Boethius	524
Advance of Huns into Europe, defeating Goths	372	Vandal kingdom of Africa reconquered by Justinian	533-548
Goths permitted across Danube by Emperor Valens	376	Reconquest of Italy by Justinian	535-554
Battle of Adrianople—Gothic victory—Death of Valens	378	Southeastern Spain conquered from Visigoths by Justinian, but lost soon afterward	554
Honorius moves Roman capital to Ravenna	ca. 400	Invasion of Italy by Lombards	568
Vandals advance into Gaul	406	Gradual conquest of northern and central Italy by Lombards	568-605
Roman legions leave England	407-442	Conversion of Visigoths in Spain to Roman Catholicism	587
Sack of Rome by Alaric and Visigoths	410	Pope Gregory I, the Great	590-604
Visigoths move into Spain	415	Mission of St. Augustine of Canterbury to England	596-597
Vandals move into Africa	429	Conquests of Angles, Saxons, and Jutes completed by	615
Vandal kingdom of Africa	429-534	Influx of Celtic Christianity into England from Iona	633 onward
Aetius becomes master of the troops under Valentinian III	430	Conversion of Lombard ruler to Roman Catholicism	ca. 650
Franks penetrate into Gaul	431 onward	Synod of Whitby—Triumph of Roman Catholicism over Celtic Christianity	664
Rise of Attila to power among Huns, moves west	445	Charles Martel "mayor of the palace" in France	714-741
Battle of Chalons—Partial victory of Aetius over Attila	451	Pepin crowned king of the Franks (Pepin the Short)	754
Attila invades Italy	452		
Death of Attila	453		
Murder of Aetius by Valentinian III	454		
Sack of Rome by Vandals under Gaiseric	455		
Puppet rulers in Rome	455-476		

named Palmyra, and its queen, Zenobia. The middle classes and active peasants were progressively impoverished; it hardly seemed worth while to plant crops or to engage in any commercial activity when so little could be kept from the insatiable maw of the army. Near the frontiers the Germanic barbarians at times were able to enter the empire and plunder at will.

But at last a succession of emperors from Illyria was able to re-establish discipline in the armies. And though the greatest of these, Aurelian, was himself murdered (275) after enjoying only five years of supreme power, it was not before he had restored Asia to the empire, defeated the Parthians, brought Gaul back to her allegiance, and unified the old Roman Empire almost within her ancient boundaries, though the province of Dacia, added by Trajan, had been lost forever.

❖ Re-establishment of discipline— Totalitarianism

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ABSOLUTE GOVERNMENT—DIOCLETIAN AND HIS ASSOCIATES

When Diocletian (285-305) became sole ruler of the empire in 285, having vanquished his only serious rival, he was faced with problems beyond the capacity of any ruler to solve. The years of anarchy had impoverished the middle classes to such an extent that desperate measures to ensure their continued service to the state and payment of taxes had already been put into effect; the industrial and agricultural workers were already being regimented in a similar manner. Trade had been meeting increasing difficulties, not only because of the insecurity of transport but because of constant depreciations of the currency. The Illyrian emperors had been driven to the expedient of inviting warlike barbarians to serve in the imperial armies for pay, and even in the ranks of the officers barbarians were rapidly becoming as frequent as Roman citizens. But at least these barbarians were usually willing to serve; and, being professional soldiers, they fought better than the peasantry of the earlier part of the


century and were better disciplined, not yet having grown to look upon the army as a privileged existence which entitled them to live indefinitely off the civilian economy without giving services in return. On the other hand, they owed no loyalty whatever to the empire. Serving for experience and pay alone, they were loyal to their paymaster the emperor, but to no one else.

Finally, there was no acceptable method of succession to the throne, and no apparent way of preventing usurpation by the strongest commander.

Diocletian, though in no sense an innovator, may justly be regarded as the refounder of the Roman Empire. The character of the empire he ruled was forever changed by the emphasis on strong, absolute government that was necessitated by the conditions of his age. But the empire itself survived as an institution in the West for almost two hundred years, while in the East its successor state, the Byzantine Empire, survived for more than a millennium, with institutions recognizably similar to those of Diocletian and Constantine I, the founder of Constantinople on the Bosphorus.

Realizing that the administration of the empire and the defense of its boundaries against the increasingly dangerous barbarians were too much for one man, Diocletian invited Maximian, another Illyrian general, to act as his colleague in the empire, sharing the title of Augustus. Maximian and he then chose two seconds-in-command, with the title of Caesar. The two Augusti were to retire after twenty years in office, to be succeeded by the two Caesars, each then naming a Caesar who would in turn succeed him. Unfortunately, not all these potentates were as disinterested as Diocletian himself, nor were the sons of the Augusti willing to be discarded in favor of generals of greater experience, even under parental pressure. The scheme actually never worked at all except when Diocletian was able to compel the Augusti to keep to their agreement, and civil wars continued until Constantine (312-337) established for good the hereditary principle, in spite of the danger that the empire might fall into childish or incompetent hands.

The scheme of the two Augusti and the two



A reconstruction of the huge palace, which the Emperor Diocletian built for his retirement after he abdicated, at Split, Yugoslavia. (COURTESY YUGOSLAV STATE TOURIST OFFICE)

Caesars proved effective enough in Diocletian's own lifetime to enable him to put into effect the necessary administrative reforms that made the empire into what may reasonably be called a totalitarian state. The frontiers were guarded, a number of minor revolts were quelled, and the expanding Persian Empire was held in check.

Diocletian and Maximian as Augusti took divine titles, although they did not call themselves actual gods. They withdrew as much as possible from direct participation in public life, instituting an elaborate court ceremonial of an Oriental kind, including prostration and kissing the hem of the emperor's robe when the privilege of an audience was granted. The persecution of Christians which accompanied the elevation of the monarchy has been discussed in the last chapter. Many new temples were built to the old gods, while there was an insistence on greater observance of the imperial cult.

REORGANIZATION OF ARMY AND PROVINCES UNDER IMPERIAL CONTROL

Under Diocletian and Maximian the army was considerably enlarged; friendly barbarians

were allowed to settle in frontier districts with an obligation to military service; companies of barbarians, sometimes even under their own chiefs, were welcomed. The more warlike sections of the empire provided further conscripted recruits; if not of high quality, their discipline and training were better than they had been for years. Diocletian also organized a force of picked men who could be moved from one part of the empire to another as danger threatened, helping to stiffen the resistance of the resident legions. The army was under the direct command of the emperor and his associates, who were all experienced generals, so that there was less opportunity for local armies to revolt and try to set up a new emperor.

The number of the provinces was increased by subdivision to 101, with every governor an appointee of one of the emperors. The governors were subject to control by vicars, who had about seven provinces (dioceses) each, and in their turn were responsible to four prefects, personal representatives of the four rulers. The vicars, however, had the right of direct appeal to Diocletian, as senior emperor, against decisions of the prefects. Thus was established a graded

hierarchy responsible to the emperor and his associates alone.

It was clear at once that the expenses of the new administration could not be less than the old. The increased burden of the army and the building program could be met only by increased and more efficiently collected taxes. This necessarily entailed an increase in the unproductive army of imperial bureaucrats whose task it was to see that the taxes were paid. Diocletian's solution was simply to use his army and his bureaucrats, including secret police and paid informers, to ensure the collection, and hope to keep up the necessary agricultural and industrial production by all the legal weapons available to him.

REGIMENTATION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE

In all fields of activity Diocletian exercised compulsion when he deemed it necessary for the security of the state and the stabilization of production and finances. The free farmer was compelled to pay taxes based on the number of cultivators on his land and on the amount of land under cultivation, irrespective of its yield. By the time of Constantine he was forbidden to leave it. These *coloni*, as they were called, became virtual serfs, and in many cases sharecroppers, having lost their land to the privileged large landowners, many of whom became so powerful that they could avoid payment of taxes to the emperor. These men were the real beneficiaries of the imperial policy, and their large estates, or villas, survived the fall of the Roman Empire itself.

Since municipal magistrates had been made personally responsible for the collection of taxes in their areas, it was not unnatural that men who were eligible for the position should have attempted to escape the responsibility. Diocletian, however, compelled men of the necessary property qualifications to become magistrates, and to undertake the various financial obligations involved. Constantine laid the same obligation on all men belonging to the class eligible to hold magistracies. These *curiales*, as they were called, could not even escape by disposing of their property. Unable to escape from the im-

perial net, the class was gradually ground down until it virtually disappeared.

City workers were likewise organized into castes, each worker compelled to follow the trade of his father. Members of the *collegia* (guilds) were forbidden to change their occupation, and thus became a docile proletariat at the disposal of the emperor.

CONSTANTINE AND THE PERFECTING OF TOTALITARIANISM

Economic and military policy By the end of the reign of Constantine the totalitarian state was complete, and the hereditary caste system no longer had any loopholes in it. Each man was securely fixed in the position in which he had been born; and his obligation to fulfill his quota of work and provide a surplus for the ever more insatiable needs of the army was absolute. The police and the bureaucracy were ubiquitous in ferreting out any source of income, returning escapees to their duty, and requisitioning food and supplies when money was unavailable.

Constantine completed the barbarianization of the army by carrying Diocletian's policies to their logical conclusion. The old frontier legions, which had been at least recruited from Roman citizens, even though they had been little enough influenced by Roman civilization, were now degraded to a local militia, and troops still drawn from the citizen body were made inferior in status to the German mercenaries. The real army was a mobile field army, recruited from the neighboring barbarians, chiefly the Germanic tribes in the West and the Sarmatians on the Danube. The elite corps of cavalry, the crack troops of the empire, were entirely composed of German mercenaries. It was possible for the foreign mercenaries to reach the highest position in the army and become *magistri militum*, or masters of the troops. From the time of Constantine onward, and especially in the fifth century, we find German masters of the troops far more powerful than their puppets who wore the purple and were still called emperors. As a rule, the barbarian leaders did not aspire to the throne themselves—a possible reason for their appointment to the supreme mili-

tary position. This army, at least in the hands of Constantine, was the most efficient instrument the Romans had possessed in centuries for its two primary purposes—the defense against unauthorized barbarian immigration and armed attacks, and the enforcement of discipline upon the civilians who paid for its upkeep. Always increasing as defense needs grew more imperious, it devoured the substance of the civil population, laying its heavy, unproductive hand upon all enterprise until the Roman Empire collapsed from within under the impact of foreign peoples with a population almost certainly far short of its own. But the army at least served to introduce many of the most able barbarians to the civilization of the empire, which trained them and gave them military experience—an experience turned by many of them in later years against the empire itself.

New Rome on the Bosphorus The most significant act of the reign of Constantine was the founding of a new capital near the incomparable site of ancient Byzantium on the Bosphorus at the entrance to the Black Sea. This city, called Constantinople, quickly grew to surpass Rome. The eastern provinces of the empire, though equally ground down by taxation, never sank to the level of the more agricultural West. Some cities still prospered and trade continued, if less luxuriantly than in the past. It was certainly for this reason that Constantine founded his new capital in the midst of this area. The western provinces hardly served to support themselves and their defense, whereas the defense needs in the East were not so vast. Moreover, the provinces provided some surplus for luxuries appreciated by the now entirely Orientalized court of the first Christian monarch.

Constantinople was also a port, which Rome had never been; it could be made impregnable by sea and it was strongly fortified by land. Not very far from the capital was the river Danube, more easily defended than the distant Rhine. Time and again the barbarians threatened the Danube, and on some occasions they crossed it and reached almost to Constantinople. But, faced with the formidable bastion of the city itself, they realized they could hardly conquer it with their crude weapons.

Constantine himself ruled over the united empire, and he ensured the succession of his sons to the throne. But he realized the empire was too vast for efficient rule by one man; since he had two sons, he divided it between them. Thereafter, though in theory they were co-emperors of the whole, the empire was in fact divided between two emperors, one resident in Constantinople, the other with an official residence in Rome, but more often living in Milan, Trier, or Ravenna.

❖ External dangers to the empire— The barbarians

Little has been said up to this point of the uncivilized peoples who lived beyond the boundaries of the empire. These peoples, known to the Romans as barbarians, had always been a threat to the empire. Some had penetrated into Italy and even defeated occasional Roman armies long before the fall of the republic. Others had pressed into the empire in the second century A.D. and compelled the Stoic emperor Marcus Aurelius to spend much of his reign in military operations which he detested. By the end of the fourth century most of these peoples were on the move—the Germans call the barbarian invasions simply *Völkerwanderung*, wanderings of the folk—sometimes pressed from behind by Asiatic peoples such as the Huns. Moving westward, they necessarily came up against the defended boundaries of the Roman Empire, and were compelled either to fight or make terms with the Romans. They certainly had no desire to conquer the Roman Empire. Indeed, all evidence suggests that they admired the empire and were attracted by its culture.

Most of the Romans, on the other hand, despised the barbarians as uncivilized, although Roman military men had a wholesome respect for their fighting abilities. They were therefore usually willing to admit limited numbers into their own armed forces, but wished to control the immigration of their wives and families, and above all maintain their frontiers intact and never allow wholesale immigration. As the empire became internally weaker, however, they found themselves unable to maintain the fron-

tiers, especially in the West, and they had need of military aid wherever they could find it. A partly Romanized barbarian often was willing to defend his new masters even against the people to whom he had formerly belonged, and in time the Roman armies became composed predominantly of barbarians. On the other hand the Eastern, or Byzantine, Empire (after the old name of the capital, Byzantium), being internally stronger, was able to control barbarian infiltration better than the West, and on some occasions Byzantine emperors were able to persuade barbarian leaders to move westward, thus saving their own territories at the expense of the West.

As among all primitive peoples, the basic unit of the German invaders was the family, and a number of families composed a clan or tribe. The clan had a hereditary chieftain who was the leader in war and peace. There was also a tribal assembly of all free men, who met in council to discuss policies suggested by the chief. If they agreed, they showed their assent by clashing their shields. In later times many tribes would unite under a king; as a rule, when the Romans came in contact with them, it was with the king they had to negotiate.


The most distinctive organization among the German barbarians was the *comitatus*, or league of companions. In a fighting people it was to be expected that powerful warriors would sometimes arise who held no hereditary position. These men would attract around themselves others who looked to them for leadership. They fought together, and if necessary died together. The leader looked first to the needs of his men, and they in turn were bound to him by the strongest ties of loyalty. In this institution we evidently have the germ of the later feudal relationship between lords and the vassals who were tied to them by an oath of fealty, and who owed military service to them.

The men of the German tribes spent most of their lives fighting or looking after the animals. The women stayed home and looked after the household, while the slaves, who had some personal freedom though tied to the land, looked after such crops as the tribes possessed. Since they were not closely attached to any piece of land, it was not difficult for whole tribes or

nations to migrate, either in search of better pastures or cropland or from simple restlessness. None of the Germanic peoples had moved very far from the nomadic life; whereas other barbarian peoples who now began to endanger the empire were still truly nomads. Some of these, especially the Huns, pushed the more settled peoples before them and, as a result, set an even larger migration in motion.

The invasions themselves need not detain us long. Late in the fourth century the Asiatic Huns began to move westward into Europe, forcing the Germans to press ever more strongly against the Roman frontiers. One group of barbarians, the Ostrogoths (East Goths) were penned into an area close to the Black Sea; another, the Visigoths (West Goths) crossed the Danube and killed an emperor of Constantinople in battle. They were finally persuaded to move off toward the West, leaving a minority permanently ensconced within the Byzantine boundaries. This minority, however, was small enough to be "digested" by the Byzantines without ill effect. Another group of Visigoths, under Alaric, sacked Rome in the early fifth century, but when Alaric died soon afterward, the Goths retired without conquering Italy. During the fifth century the bulk of the Visigoths settled in Spain.

The Vandals, whose name became a byword for later generations because of the destruction they wrought in Gaul and their subsequent sack of Rome, passed through Spain and made a permanent settlement in North Africa. A few years later (451) Attila and his Huns invaded Gaul. Here he was turned back by a predominantly barbarian army led by a Roman general. The following year Attila invaded Italy, but did not take Rome. When he died soon afterward the Hunnish hosts disintegrated, leaving the Germanic groups masters of Europe and facing a greatly weakened Rome. The emperors had retired to Ravenna in northeastern Italy, leaving the pope in charge of their former capital. Barbarian generals were now in command of the armies still called Roman, but it was clearly only a matter of time before some general would decide to capture Rome and depose the shadowy emperor at Ravenna. This was accomplished in 476 by a Herulian named Odoacer, who did



not long enjoy his conquest. In 493 the Ostrogoths, freed from the Hun menace, penetrated into Italy under the command of Theodoric, a Byzantine-trained general, and established a kingdom in Italy. Meanwhile the Franks had moved into Gaul, and under their king, Clovis, were engaged in consolidating their rule in that thoroughly Romanized province.

Thus, by the turn of the sixth century, the Vandals were ensconced in North Africa, the Visigoths in Spain, the Franks in Gaul, the Ostrogoths in Italy and Illyria, and the Angles and Saxons in much of England, which had been abandoned by the Romans at the beginning of the fifth century. Other groups, notably the Burgundians in southeastern Gaul, had smaller areas under their control, and were intermingled with the above-named barbarians in all the provinces of the former Roman Empire, as were the Romans themselves. The latter were now in a minority, save in Italy; and though, as we shall see, Roman institutions long survived the fall of the empire, the character of Western European government was for the future to be determined by the Germanic invaders rather than the Romans.

♦ The barbarian kingdoms—Italy

We have already noted that Theodoric established an Ostrogothic kingdom in Italy. During the reign of Theodoric (493-526), Italy knew a period of good government such as she had not known for centuries. The Roman administration of government and justice was maintained; the Senate remained, on the whole, loyal to the king; and taxes were drastically reduced, since there was no longer the need for them. Agriculture and commerce revived; even private enterprise began to reappear. Theodoric dredged the harbors, rebuilt aqueducts, and restored the cities as far as he could with his limited means. No longer having a vast empire to maintain, and with a greatly reduced population to support, Italy became the self-supporting territory she had always had it in her power to be.


The king was content to acknowledge the theoretical overlordship of the surviving em-

peror at Constantinople; and though he was in the eyes of the pope an Arian heretic, as were all his people, he maintained correct relations with the pontiff, and made no attempt to convert his orthodox Roman Catholic subjects to Arianism. There was even a brief revival of culture in his reign, with the two great scholars Boethius and Cassiodorus the chief ornaments. Boethius, foreseeing correctly the loss of all Greek culture in the West under the barbarian monarchies, spent much of his life translating the logical works of Aristotle into Latin. He also wrote textbooks based on the dying Greek knowledge, but suitable for the barbarians and barbarized Romans who alone would remain to study them. Unfortunately, he was suspected of treasonable designs against the throne and was cast into prison. There he wrote the *Consolations of Philosophy*, which has been read ever since, and was especially popular in the Middle Ages. Ultimately he was executed by order of Theodoric. Cassiodorus, however, long outlived the Gothic king, supervising the translating and copying of manuscripts in a monastery which he founded on his own estate. He also wrote a *History of the Goths*.

RECONQUEST OF ITALY BY THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE

Italian policy of Justinian Theodoric's kingdom, however, did not survive his death. It was evidently only his personality that held it together. Civil war disrupted the kingdom, the succession, as so often in the Germanic kingdoms, being disputed between several contestants; in 535, Justinian, the emperor of the East, decided that the time was ripe for the restoration of the old Roman Empire. Justinian was also a strong zealot for the orthodox faith, as long as he was allowed to interpret it himself. In the laudable aim of extinguishing Arianism, he had the moral support of the papacy in Rome, plus whatever more tangible support it could give him—at least until the popes recognized that Justinian's authoritarianism extended to the field of religion as well.

Destruction of the Ostrogothic kingdom—Economic and strategic consequences In a



long-drawn-out and ruinously expensive war, Justinian's generals, Belisarius and Narses, reconquered Italy piecemeal. Behind them came the imperial bureaucracy and the tax collectors from whom the fortunate Italians had been free for a generation. The Ostrogothic nation resisted to the last, and was virtually destroyed. Italy was devastated. Twenty years of warfare, in which neither side showed any mercy, was the final crippling blow to a country which had been able to recover from so many in the past. From this latest invasion she did not recover for centuries.

Justinian, leaving an *exarch*, an imperial official, to rule Italy from Ravenna on his be-

half, and a pope grateful for his orthodoxy but disliking intensely his autocratic manner of dealing with spiritual matters, turned his attention to other affairs. He died soon afterward, having saddled his empire with a territory almost useless for exploitation, and incapable of self-defense against any barbarian horde that wished to enter.

INVASION OF ITALY BY LOMBARDS (568)— PARTITION OF ITALY

The Lombard conquests (568-605) A new invasion was not long in coming. Justinian had not been in his grave three years before the

Lombards, another Germanic people, but by far the least civilized of any that had hitherto penetrated into Southern Europe—nominally Arians but in fact nearer to heathenism—swept into Northern Italy, where there was no one left to oppose them. This time they made no compromises with the emperor, nor were they interested in Roman civilization. The Italians lost their estates, which were simply sequestered by the Lombards. Northern Italy was consolidated under their rule in seven years, and they began to push southward. The exarch of Ravenna maintained his stronghold, still theoretically the ruler of Italy under the emperor; but neither he nor the rest of Italy could obtain any support from the various emperors of Constantinople, who were fully engaged elsewhere. Nor did the emperors give any aid to the other isolated areas in Italy under their nominal rule.

The Lombards had united only for conquest and plunder. They had no partially civilized king, such as Theodoric had been. Their leaders (dukes) took what Italian land they could, and kept it for themselves. By 605 all Italy except Ravenna, Naples, Rome, and parts of the extreme south were in their hands.


Remnants of Byzantine rule What remained to the empire from the warfare of Justinian was the isolated and relatively useless Ravenna, and the south. Rome acknowledged the overlordship of Constantinople on the principle that a distant overlord is better than a local one, especially if he is powerless to intervene. Since such acknowledgment carried with it no obligation to obedience, the popes were content to give it for centuries to come.

The pope of Rome was now at last in fact its temporal ruler. He was the spiritual lord of all Christendom, the owner of many scattered estates in Italy which had been given to the Church in the troubled times, and the defender of Rome against the barbarian Lombards, from whom he had managed to keep his city intact.

Position of the papacy—Gregory I (590–604) This achievement was the work of one man—one of the greatest of the popes, a Roman by descent, a saint, and a gifted administrator and diplomatist—Gregory I, the Great.

It is possible that the Lombards, vastly superior in numbers as they were, could have taken Rome by force if they had united against it. But they seem to have respected the person of the pope, and perhaps the sanctity of the city, in spite of the fact that they were only nominal Christians, and a heretical sect at that. At all events, they never made any serious effort to do so, perhaps in part because of their internal disunity. Thus for centuries the popes were able to exist, often isolated and always precariously, until they were rescued in the eighth century by the orthodox Frankish kings. Gregory, who had at an earlier stage in his life been an official agent of the papacy in Constantinople, knew how useless it was to look for help from this quarter. He therefore accepted the position, negotiating directly with the Lombards. The emperor continued to bid him resist, and for many years refused to accept his arrangements. Ultimately, the empire recognized the conquests; and Gregory, through the negotiations, was allowed to keep his city and the territory around it.

Perhaps the most important of Gregory's work was his insistence that all the clergy of Europe should obey the papacy and receive instructions from it. He was not very successful in France, where the appointment of the clergy was largely in the hands of the Merovingian kings, but the bishops nevertheless listened to him with respect, and later popes could quote Gregory as authority for their own claims. Newly converted Spain and England accepted the overlordship of the papacy from the first. Wherever there were orthodox clergy in Italy, they too accepted his supremacy. Though Gregory could not actually alter the domination of the Church by the state in Constantinople, he constantly repeated his claim that all the Eastern bishops and the patriarch of Constantinople were subordinate to the Holy See by virtue of the Petrine supremacy. In all these things he gave a lead to the popes who followed him. For, though the practice of appointing bishops by lay rulers was never abandoned in France and Germany, and discipline could hardly be enforced, the clergy nevertheless did look to the papacy for guidance in spiritual affairs when they felt the need for it. This dependence



largely remained even when the papacy fell into weak hands, and when Constantinople and the Eastern Empire drifted entirely away from papal rule.

❖ Conquest of Gaul by Clovis— The Merovingian kingdom

Like the other Germanic peoples who entered the Roman Empire in the fifth century, the Franks had no unified leadership. In 481, however, a young prince named Clovis became the ruler of one small kingdom clustered around the modern Tournai. Able and ambitious, he began to expand his kingdom to the south by judicious murders, treachery, and open warfare. France at the time was peopled by Visigoths, Burgundians, Alemanni, as well as the old Gallo-Romans, including a Gallic noble who called

himself king of Rome. Defeating this pretender first, Clovis then drove the Alemanni back across the Rhine into Germany (to which they gave their name, *Allemagne* in the French language) and incorporated their kingdom into his; then he turned south and drove the Visigothic remnants into Spain to join their fellow tribesmen; and at last, having disposed also of his fellow Frankish kings, he consolidated a kingdom not much smaller than present-day France (481-511).

CONVERSION OF CLOVIS TO ORTHODOX CATHOLICISM

Clovis, as it happened, had a Christian wife, Clotilda, who was orthodox and not Arian. After his victories he allowed himself to be converted by her clerical adviser and with him his Franks, who thus became the first barbarian

group to deviate from the otherwise universal Arianism. Publicly baptized at Reims by a Catholic bishop, by this act he gained the support of the entire clergy of France, who now rallied to his aid. This was no mean help, since they controlled what was left of the old Gallo-Roman administration, while the remainder of the old Gallo-Roman population, also orthodox Christians, offered Clovis at least their moral support. From this time onward the Frankish monarchy remained the papal favorite among secular powers, and it was to the Franks that the papacy looked for help and military aid when it became involved with the Lombard kings, or when its official overlord in Constantinople showed himself unable or unwilling to provide effective aid.

MEROVINGIAN KINGDOM

After the death of Clovis his kingdom, according to Germanic custom, was divided among his four sons, who spent most of their lives fighting against each other. They did, however, unite against all non-Frankish outsiders, consolidating their total dominions by the addition of almost all the remainder of modern France. The Merovingian kingdom (418-754, so called after Meroveus, grandfather of Clovis) was sometimes under the rule of one member of the family and sometimes subdivided. But until the eighth century at least one of Clovis' descendants occupied the throne, though in later years the authority of the kings was only nominal. The real power was in the hands of hereditary officials, chief stewards, who are usually, and incorrectly, called mayors of the palace (*major domus*). Ultimately, as we shall see, one of these officials deposed his titular master with papal approval and became king of the Franks himself.

It is difficult to generalize about the state of the country in Merovingian times. Some of Gaul had been thoroughly Romanized, and remained so, even under alien monarchs. On the whole, it can be said that the Latin element tended to prevail. The French language has barely four hundred words of Germanic origin, all the remainder being of Latin origin. Much of Roman law and even of the Roman govern-

mental system remained, especially in the center and the south, while in the north German customs prevailed. On the other hand, the barbaric habits of the kings, their addiction to murder—wholesale and retail, their lack of care for commerce and trade so long as they were able to have the Oriental luxuries, especially of dress and ornament, in which they delighted, their general propensity to treat their territories as if they were private estates to be exploited for their own gain, and their failure to control the rapacity of local, semi-independent chiefs called counts—all these tended to push the unhappy country further into barbarism, which historians have politely called a fusion between German and Gallo-Roman culture. This fusion undoubtedly existed, and the result, after many centuries, was the modern kingdom of France, far more Latin than Germanic—in this showing once again how the superior culture tends to absorb the inferior. The best that can be said for the Merovingian monarchy is that, by providing government of a sort and by not interfering too drastically with institutions they were incapable of understanding and with a culture that meant nothing to them, they preserved France for a brighter future when the Dark Ages which had fallen on all Europe should at last come to an end.

♦ England, Spain, North Africa

Finally, a few words should be said about the other barbarian kingdoms. When the Romans left England, they laid open the way for invasion by the Celts, who had been kept in check by Roman forces. But the Celts were not to become the Roman successors. Angles, Saxons, and Jutes soon entered England from Scandinavia and Germany, driving the various Celtic peoples back into Wales and Scotland, which are still largely peopled today by their descendants. England was converted by missionaries sent from Rome by Pope Gregory I, and by Irish missionaries who had lost contact with Rome and practiced a somewhat different form of Christianity. The Roman faith, however, ultimately triumphed, and England became one of the most loyal of Catholic countries. In

the ninth century England had to submit to Danish rule for a period, but on the whole it was perhaps the most successful of the Germanic kingdoms, although not united into a single kingdom until the time of Alfred the Great in the ninth century. In the eleventh century the Danes again conquered the kingdom, but the crown reverted once more to an Englishman, Edward the Confessor (1054-1066). In spite of the Norman conquest that followed the latter's death, the predominantly Anglo-Saxon makeup of the people persisted, making England the most nearly Germanic of the countries peopled by the barbarian invaders.

The Visigothic kingdom of Spain remained under Gothic rule until the eighth century, when it was conquered by the Muslims. A small part in the south remained under Byzantine control for a short period, and some sections of the north never submitted to Muslim rule. The Vandal kingdom of North Africa was captured in the early sixth century by Justinian, who converted it into a Byzantine province which fell to the Muslims a century later.

❖ The end of an era

With the fall of the Roman Empire we reach the end of an era. Though the successor state in the East, the Byzantine Empire, survived for almost a thousand years longer, its civilization was so different from the old Roman Empire that it will be discussed separately in the next chapter.

The achievements of Greco-Roman civilization were far from lost, even in the West; but the destruction of its political system and the decline of its culture as a living creative force threw Europe into a condition of political, social, and cultural degradation which used to be called the Dark Ages. If these centuries are not believed by modern scholars to be as dark as earlier historians thought them, the term remains not altogether inappropriate. It was a period of fermentation which ultimately proved to have in it the potentiality for new life and creativity; but while the fermentation was in process life was dark indeed, and no one could have foretold what would arise from it.

The conditions which made possible the Greek and Roman achievements had disappeared—as it proved, forever. The Roman Empire had survived as long as it had because it was able to make use of the old city-state culture which was the distinctive achievement of the Greeks. The empire had succeeded in the one field in which the Greeks had failed; it had provided a political framework under which the ruinous intercity warfare was no longer possible. But the later empire had destroyed the basis for its own government when, by relentless pressure, it undermined the ability of the cities to survive as independent entities. It was not possible to force them to produce in the same way they had produced under their own impetus; and though the peasant has always been ready to work his land under the most tyrannous oppression, either by landlords or by monarchs, Europe was too vast to treat as if it were an Egypt. No emperor could be strong enough to keep every landlord in Europe directly subject to him and obedient to his orders. No basis therefore remained for absolute government; the army could not be maintained when the cities and peasants refused to work. The army was merely an instrument for compulsion; it could not itself produce.

With the destruction of the cities, land alone remained; and for the next few centuries the rule of Europe was in the hands of landlords, sometimes nominally subject to monarchs, but actually exercising almost independent control of comparatively small areas which were not beyond their capacity to rule. With the subsequent rise of cities, it again became possible for monarchs to use their aid to subject the landlords to control. But never in subsequent history have any European monarchs been able to exercise permanent rule over territories as extensive and diverse as those of the Roman Empire.

This is not to say that this fact was ever accepted by contemporaries. To the people who could remember, or whose institutions had been formed by the Roman Empire, it seemed that the natural form of government was a huge universal state ruled by an emperor who, at least according to Christian thought, was responsible to God, or perhaps to God's spiritual representative on earth, the pope. Many were the efforts

made to restore it, both in the form of a revived empire and in the form of a spiritual rule of Christendom by the Roman pontiff. But all were destined to fail.

There was no restoration of the Roman Empire, either by secular or by religious powers. It had served its purpose in history. Its achievements had been many: It had given to the Western world its first long experience of peace; it had spread Greek culture, with its ability to deal with abstract thought, its thirst for experimentation and explanation, and its tendency to think of life in terms of this world; and it had itself introduced mankind to the idea that each human being has rights which should be embodied in a law which ought to be just, clear, and not arbitrary, and as far as possible in accordance with what man could discover about the Divine Reason. It had given hospitality to an Oriental religion which gave man hope of a blessed hereafter, and explained this life as a proving ground for a world to come; and it has been contended that it also laid the impress of its own thought on the ancient Hebrew idea of man's atonement for sin by making it into a contract between man and God, with salvation as the reward. It certainly gave the organization of the Church as a gift to this religion. It provided a language for the Church which could be understood throughout Europe, and which has remained its chosen language to this day.

If little that was authentically Roman survived outside the Church in the Dark Ages, Roman and Greek rationalism was not lost forever. When the human mind awakened again—when, with Anselm, it was first found necessary to *prove* the existence of God—the process was set in motion that led to modern Western civilization. And in this the work of the Greeks and Romans, gradually recovered and assimilated, had no mean share.

Suggestions for further reading

PAPERBACK BOOKS

Bede, The Venerable. *A History of the English Church and People*. Penguin. The finest historical work of the seventh century, by an English monk.

Boethius. *The Consolation of Philosophy*. Ungar. A dialogue concerning the merits and values of philosophy, written when the author was in prison awaiting his execution by Theodoric.

Burckhardt, Jacob. *The Age of Constantine the Great* (1852). Anchor. Penetrating study of the period, out of date in some of its facts and interpretations but still well worth reading.

Dawson, Christopher. *The Making of Europe*. Meridian. The early chapters cover this period. Excellent on the heritage of the Roman Empire, but in the later chapters appears over-anxious to establish the contention that the "Dark Ages" are misnamed.

Dill, Samuel. *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*. Meridian. An old classic, never superseded, now available in paper back.

Duckett, Eleanor S. *Alfred the Great: The King and His England*. Phoenix. Very brief account of the essential facts, by a noted scholar.

Taylor, Henry Osborn. *The Emergence of Christian Culture in the West*. Torch. Covers also the later period of the Middle Ages by a fine cultural historian. His *Medieval Mind*, discussed under Chapter 12, is a masterpiece.

Whitelock, Dorothy. *The Beginnings of English Society*. Penguin. A competent survey of Anglo-Saxon England.

CASEBOUND BOOKS

Dill, Samuel. *Roman Society in Gaul in the Merovingian Age*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926. Exhaustive study of Merovingian society rather than an analysis of the remnants of Roman culture in Frankland.

Duckett, Eleanor S. *The Gateway to the Middle Ages*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. Fresh and interesting, making especially good use of literary sources. Somewhat impressionistic.

Gibbon, Edward. *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. 3 vols. New York: Random House, n.d. This great eighteenth-century rationalistic classic, a masterpiece of historical writing, is valuable today mainly for its entertainment value and for its style. Few of Gibbon's judgments still stand, and far more source material is available to his successors. Gibbon plays favorites; definitely not favored was Christianity. Paperback extracts are available for some chapters of his work (Torch),

and a large selection is available in the Viking Portable series.

Gregory of Tours. *History of the Franks*. Tr. with an introd. by O. M. Dalton. New York: Oxford University Press, 1927. Colorful account by an observant Merovingian bishop, on which all historians have had to rely for the social and political history of the time.

Lot, Ferdinand. *The End of the Ancient World and the Beginnings of The Middle Ages*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1931. The most adequate analytical account in English of the

fall of the Empire and the establishment of successor states.

Moss, H. St. L. B. *The Birth of the Middle Ages, 395-814*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1935.

Good, brief general picture of the last period of the Empire, the barbarian invasions, and the new European states, written with admirable clarity.

Tacitus. *Germania*. An indispensable prerequisite to the study of the later Germans, written by the famous first-century Roman historian. Brief and pointed.

Successor States of the East— Byzantine and Muslim Empires

♦ Constantine and his successors— The heritage of despotism

When Constantine founded New Rome on the Bosphorus in 330 A.D., he was certainly motivated by the desire to have a capital that was not simply an overgrown city-state like Rome, which had none of the requisites of an imperial capital except history and tradition. Constantinople, it is true, lacked both history and tradition; but it was capable of becoming a great seaport, it had an incomparable site, and communications by sea and land could be constructed which would unite it with all those provinces in the empire which were worth retaining. Though Constantine and his early successors were not yet ready to abandon the West to its fate, when the barbarians became too strong to be prevented from settling in the empire, the rulers in Constantinople contented themselves with preserving the Eastern provinces. This territory was far more manageable than the ramshackle Roman Empire. Although the Byzantine rulers continued to pretend that they ruled a "Roman" empire, and it pleased them to call themselves Romans (spelling the word in the Greek language), in fact it was a Greek empire that they ruled, Greek and not Roman in culture and language. The only distinctively Roman contribution was that of law and administration, which had proved itself superior to anything the Hellenistic rulers of the East had evolved for

themselves prior to the Roman conquest. Indeed, from the Byzantine point of view, the new empire based on Constantinople might well have been thought of as the revival of the Greek (Hellenistic) rule of the Near East, after an unfortunate interlude of a few centuries of submission to the barbarian Romans, who, through their superior military might, had kept control of land rightfully Greek ever since the time of Alexander.

There was in fact in Constantinople little that was derived from earlier Roman tradition, nothing from the days of the Free Roman Republic, and almost nothing from the days of the principate. What was inherited by the Byzantines was the despotic rule of Diocletian and of Constantine—the control by the state of all phases of life and activity within the empire, the Oriental tradition of absolute obedience to, and worship of, the emperors, as systematized by Diocletian, and the late Roman notion that "the pleasure of the emperor has the force of law." The idea of the absolute supremacy of the emperor extended also into the relations between Church and State in the Byzantine Empire. The chief official of the Church in the empire was the patriarch of Constantinople, appointed by the emperor and deriving his power from him. Although at times in Byzantine history the patriarch after his appointment opposed his master, he was always subject to dismissal. He was not, like the popes in Rome, chosen, at least

in theory, by the clergy, and after appointment responsible only to God. Thus the Byzantine emperor, through his patriarch, had much more authority in the realm of religion than any ruler in the West was accorded by the pope; even though Western rulers sometimes assumed it.

The Byzantine heritage of absolutism, which persisted as long as Constantinople remained independent, was taken over on the one side by the Ottoman Turks, who captured Constantinople in 1453, and on the other by the tsars of Russia, who acquired almost all their cultural and governmental traditions from Constantinople. Subsequent Russian history cannot be understood without reference to the Byzantine heritage, any more than the organization and history of the Roman Catholic Church can be understood without reference to the Roman imperial tradition which it inherited; and if the cultural and religious history of the Balkan peninsula is to be understood, it must always be remembered that the Slavic peoples of the peninsula were civilized by Constantinople, adhered to the Church that was centered in Constantinople, and maintained their religion and culture even through the long centuries during which it was ruled by the Muslims and Ottoman Turks.

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE

The Byzantine Empire survived for more than a thousand years, largely by reason of the strength of its economy. Despite being taxed heavily and saddled with an expensive bureaucracy, the empire was honeycombed with prosperous cities. Though there were many state monopolies, there was considerable scope for private enterprise. Constantinople was a center of industry, as Rome had never been. If one became rich, one paid heavy taxes; but, at least, with the surplus, life could be made more pleasant. There were luxuries to be bought, there were innumerable forms of entertainment, new and old, especially horse and chariot racing in the Hippodrome in Constantinople. The bureaucracy was not permitted to grow beyond reasonable bounds; and though at times it was

corrupt, it was usually efficient, and most of the emperors kept it in firm control. In spite of intrigues over the imperial succession, numerous foreign wars, rule by dissolute women and incompetent and irresponsible men, the state never went bankrupt in all its history; several times it was even able to produce an effective ruler from most unpromising sources, just when to an outsider it would have seemed that all was lost.

Although the state was in danger successively from the Persians, the early Muslims, and the Bulgars, and the territories of the empire were sometimes so contracted that the capital was almost the only great city left in Byzantine control, Constantinople nevertheless was not conquered until the Western crusaders took it by treachery in 1204. Even then the Greeks had sufficient strength to recapture it in 1261 and give it another lease on life until the final conquest by the Turks.

Perhaps the greatest source of Byzantine strength, in comparison with the Roman Empire, was the refusal of the Byzantine rulers to be tempted by imperial expansion. On the whole their wars were defensive in nature—attempts, largely successful, to hold on to what they had inherited from Rome. Although they lost Egypt and Palestine to the Muslims in the seventh century and never recovered them, they were able to push the Muslims back from Constantinople and recover Anatolia, which was far more important to them. The great exception to the rule of defensive wars was the effort to reconquer Italy, undertaken by Justinian (527–565)—an effort whose very success was to prove nearly disastrous in a later age. Justinian's generals succeeded in destroying the relatively civilized Ostrogothic kingdom of Italy, and in subjecting Italy for a brief period to Byzantine rule. They also destroyed the Vandal kingdom of North Africa, and acquired a foothold in Spain. But a few years after the death of Justinian the Lombards invaded Italy, leaving the Byzantines only a few remnants of their domains in the south, the exarchate of Ravenna, and the theoretical overlordship of Rome. Justinian's neglect of the northeastern frontiers of his state, and his payment of tribute to the growing Persian Empire to stave off invasion,

Chronological Chart

Foundation of Constantinople	330	Reign of Leo III (the Isaurian)	717-740
Theodosius the Great last emperor of East and West	379-395	Beginning of the iconoclastic controversy	726
Reign of Justinian	527-565	Conquest of Georgia by Muslims	727-733
<i>Corpus juris civilis</i> of Justinian	533	Battle of "Tours"	732
Conquest of North Africa	533-543	End of the Ommeyyad caliphate	750
Conquest of Italy	535-554	Abbasid caliphate	750-1258
Great Persian War	540-562	Conquest of exarchate of Ravenna by Lombards	751
Fifty years' peace with Persia—Justinian to pay tribute	562	Defeat of Lombards by Pepin the Short, king of the Franks	754-756
Loss of Italian possessions to Lombards (except Rome, Ravenna, and Naples)	568-571	Independent Ommeyyad dynasty under Abdu-r-Rahman in Spain	755
Birth of Mahomet	570	Ommeyyad caliphate in Spain (Cordova)	756-1031
Reign of Heraclius	610-641	Donation of Pepin of Lombard (Byzantine) lands to pope	756
"Flight" of Mahomet from Mecca to Medina	622	Reign of Charlemagne in the West	768-814
Persian Wars of Heraclius	622-630	Caliphate of Harun-al-Rashid	785-809
Organization of the commonwealth of Islam in Medina	622-630	Peace between Byzantines and Charlemagne (Byzantines retaining southern Italy, Venice, and Dalmatia)	803
Return to Mecca of Mahomet	630	End of iconoclastic controversy; image worship restored	843
Death of Mahomet	632	Fatimid dynasty of Egypt	968-1171
Caliphate of Abu Bekr	632-634	Bulgaria incorporated into Byzantine Empire	1018
Caliphate of Omar	634-644	Final schism between Rome and Constantinople	1054
Conquest of Syria by Muslims under Khalid	635-641	Capture of Bagdad by Seljuk Turks	1055
Conquest of Persia by Muslims	635-641	Reign of Alexius Comnenus	1081-1118
Conquest of Egypt by Muslims	639-655	The First Crusade	1096-1097
Conquest and slow subjugation of North Africa	643-711	Latin Conquest of Constantinople (Fourth Crusade)	1204
Ommeyyad caliphate founded by Moawiya	661	Latin Kingdom of Constantinople	1204-1261
Blockade of Constantinople by Muslims	673-678	Capture and sack of Bagdad by Mongols, execution of last Abbasid caliph	1258
Thirty years' peace concluded between Byzantines and Muslims	678	Reconquest of Constantinople by Michael VIII	1261
Conquest of Carthage by Muslims	698	Rise of the Ottoman Turks in Asia Minor	1326
Conquest of Transoxania and part of Turkestan by Muslims	705-712	Serbs under Stephen Dushan at the gates of Constantinople	1355
Conquest of Punjab by Muslims	708-715		
Conquest of Spain by Muslims	711-715		
Invasions of southern France	715 onward		
Second siege of Constantinople by Muslims	717-718		

Siege of Constantinople by Turks under Bayazid I	1391-1397	Siege and Capture of Constantinople by Ottoman Turks	1453
Defeat of Turks by Tamerlane at battle of Angora	1402	Marriage of Ivan III, Grand Duke of Moscow, to Zoë, niece of last emperor of Constantinople	
Council of Florence—Agreement by Byzantine emperor to religious union with Rome	1439	—Ivan takes title of Tsar, and adopts Byzantine court ceremonial	1472

stored up trouble for his successors; and though southern Italy and Sicily remained for long intervals under Byzantine control, such control, though costly, was seldom of much value to the empire.

RELATIONS WITH PAPACY

Suzerainty over Rome was of little practical value to the Byzantines. Rome on several occasions appealed to Constantinople, and until the ninth century acknowledged the Byzantine emperor as the only true emperor, inheritor of the mantle of the Roman emperors. From the papal point of view this acknowledgment meant that the Byzantine emperor had the duty of protecting Rome from encroaching barbarians and other secular powers. The Byzantine emperor, however, regarded the pope as in duty bound to protect his interests in Italy and render what aid he could to such material projects as the preservation of the exarchate of Ravenna. Furthermore, he expected the pope, as a good subordinate, to follow his religious dictates, if he issued them. Justinian himself, in particular, fancied himself as a theologian, giving much offense to the pope, who, in religious matters at least, acknowledged no superior. When the Byzantine emperor Leo III commanded that icons (holy pictures) should be destroyed, since in his opinion they were becoming an object of idolatry rather than an aid to worship, and his successors, with one exception, for more than a century adopted a similar policy, the Roman pontiffs refused to obey, thus embittering relations between Rome and Constantinople and ultimately causing the pope to look elsewhere for his protection (Iconoclastic Controversy). By the beginning of the ninth century a pope was willing to offend Constantinople by crown-

ing another emperor in the West. He also adopted a theological position concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit (that the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father and the Son, rather than, as held in the East, from the Father *through* the Son) which finally divided the Eastern and Western Churches forever in the middle of the eleventh century. Thus the relation between the two powers that had been established by Justinian was seldom of value to either. The pope obtained no protection, and the emperor no control over papal policy. The pope in the end learned to look to the Franks for protection, and the Byzantines set up their own "Orthodox Church," whose spiritual head was the patriarch of Constantinople. The pope remained the head of Western Christendom, as the emperor was the head of the empire which still called itself Roman, and ruled Eastern Christendom through the patriarch.

CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS IMPERIALISM OF THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE

If the long history of the Byzantine Empire is considered, it must be stated that its contribution to the cultural heritage of the world is relatively small. The great period of Greek history in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. was incomparably more creative in all realms. Even the Hellenistic period was notable for its artistic and scientific achievements, and its philosophy was far from negligible. But the great creative genius of the Greeks was no longer in evidence in the Byzantine world. The Byzantines preserved the ancient Greek heritage—the works of the earlier Greeks were studied and commented upon, the language developed, and there were many literary craftsmen of the second rank. But Justinian closed the School of Athens

and expelled the last of the pagan philosophers. Several of these took refuge in Persia, whose rulers encouraged their work. As a consequence, a great academy was founded with Persian aid at Gondisapur. Here the invading Muslims first came in contact with Greek philosophy, which they grew to admire. Through the medium of Gondisapur Greek philosophy became known throughout the Muslim world, and translations were made into Arabic. Many of these works, especially those of Aristotle, indeed came to the West through Arabic translations discovered in Spain by the Western conquerors in the twelfth century. But in Constantinople itself there was a greater interest in theology than in philosophy. The Greeks, even the illiterate classes, took a passionate interest in theological controversy. Many were the heresies which sprang up in Constantinople and made their way to the outposts of the empire, where even today they still have their adherents.

On the whole the Byzantines in literature and learning must be regarded as preservers rather than creators or innovators; but even this preservation was of great value to the world. When the West wished to recover its knowledge of Greek classical learning, it was to Constantinople that it went for teachers and for the manuscripts long unknown in the West. The Greek revival of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that forms part of what is customarily known as the Renaissance owed much to the Greeks of the day, and to the heritage which they had preserved and absorbed.

It was far otherwise with Byzantine art, which only in recent years has obtained any serious appreciation in Western Europe. Byzantine art is suffused with religious thought and feeling. To many, Byzantine art, like medieval art, seems alien and remote, comprehensible only with difficulty. It was art created with the express purpose of arousing religious feeling, not intended in itself to be beautiful. One meditates upon the painting or mosaic; it is not the aesthetic feelings that are aroused. To a Westerner the figures often appear distorted; yet the distortion is fully intended and is in no sense the result of inability to portray the human form. The mosaic was not a Byzantine invention, but developed to a high degree of per-

fection by Byzantine religious artists. The art essentially consists in using colored materials such as marble, glass, and even wood as an inlay in some other material to fashion a picture—geometrical figures, flowers, animals, or human beings. In the Byzantine churches mosaics were used with extraordinary sophistication; in the Hagia Sophia, in particular, the use of gold backgrounds and gold cubes was able to produce scintillating effects of great richness.

More influential than Byzantine painting, and even than mosaic, was Byzantine architec-




Church of the Holy Wisdom (Hagia Sophia, Sancta Sophia) at Constantinople, built by the Emperor Justinian. This building embodied altogether new principles of architecture. Especially difficult was the erection of the huge dome. The angle of this photograph sets off the commanding position of the church, which is often obscured from other directions by the modern Turkish buildings. The minarets close to the church are later additions dating from the period when the church was used by the Muslim Turks as a mosque. In the foreground is the Mosque of Sultan Ahmed, one of the minarets of which appears just in front of the camera. (COURTESY TURKISH INFORMATION OFFICE)

ture. The great majority of the edifices were influenced by the wonderful church of Hagia Sophia (Holy Wisdom), built by architects in the employ of Justinian. Except for its size, this huge church is unimpressive from without—again by intention. For its interior, before it was desecrated and altered by the Turkish Muslims, must have been the most beautiful and impressive in the world. In spite of the fact that the dome has to be supported on arches which rest themselves upon huge pillars, it appears to be supported by nothing and to float in space. This effect is created by numerous windows,

which allow the light from outside to illuminate the dome. Byzantine church architecture was imitated widely in the West, especially in those areas influenced in other respects by Constantinople. At Ravenna there is a church only slightly subsequent to that of Hagia Sophia, which has mosaics almost the equal of those that must have decorated the older church. The much later church of St. Mark's in Venice, illustrated on page 123, remained Byzantine in conception, as do numerous churches in Russia.

The Byzantines also excelled in decoration, and Constantinople was full of skilled craftsmen




—jewelers, metal workers, weavers of fine materials, and others. The luxury goods thus manufactured were greatly sought after, not only within the lands of the Byzantine Empire and among foreign princes allied with Constantinople, but also in the West, where such articles for centuries had to be imported and could not be manufactured at home. The imperial purple, a royal monopoly, was allowed to be exported by the emperor only to princes who were in his favor.

CONVERSION OF SLAVS

From early times the Byzantines were active in missionary work. The Arian emperors of the fourth century were instrumental in converting the barbarian peoples to Arianism; all the barbarian peoples who later settled in the empire sooner or later came to accept the Christianity preached by Greek missionaries from

Constantinople. In some cases the barbarian princes would have preferred the Roman rite, since acceptance of Roman Christianity would have saved them from even a nominal subservience to the head of the Eastern religion, the patriarch nominated by the emperor. The subservience in fact was far more than nominal; it brought them within the political as well as the cultural and religious orbit of Constantinople. But the peoples who formed part of the Byzantine cultural orbit never were able to escape indefinitely into the Roman sphere. The Roman clergy insisted on the Roman liturgy and the Latin language for Church services; and this could not be accepted by the Slavs or Bulgars, who were permitted by Constantinople to use a liturgy in their own tongue.

Perhaps the best known of Byzantine missionary efforts was the conversion of the Moravians to Christianity by two brothers, Cyril and Methodius, about 862 A.D. The prince of



Moravia, a Slavic territory in Central Europe, living in a land where Christianity was far from unknown and where German missionaries had already been active, sent to Constantinople for missionaries, probably in order to escape the influence of the German clergy. The emperor sent the two brothers, one of whom had invented, or perfected, a Slavic alphabet (Cyrillic). The missionaries were successful and introduced their alphabet and a liturgy in the Slavic tongue to their converts. By a strange quirk of fate, the Moravians and other western Slavs were ultimately brought into the Western Church by the papacy; but the alphabet and liturgy devised for them was made use of by the eastern Slavs, who remained within the fold of the Eastern (later to be called Orthodox) Church. Shortly afterward the Bulgars, after some hesitation, joined the Eastern Church. Russia remained pagan until the end of the tenth century, when the Grand Duke of Kiev, Vladimir I, married a Greek princess and per-

mitted Greek missionaries to convert his people, in spite of much opposition by them. The Russians thereafter became the most steadfast and faithful of Christians. Kiev and Novgorod became cities of churches. Orthodox Christianity in Russia survived the long Mongol occupation of the country (1240-1380) and the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks. Thereafter, Moscow became the center of Orthodox Christianity, though the Greek Orthodox Church was recognized by the Turks and survived their rule.

BYZANTINE INFLUENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE

The Byzantines had an incalculable influence on all the invading peoples whom they introduced to civilization. Among these should be numbered the Bulgars, the Serbs, and other Slavic groups. Although the Bulgars fought the Byzantines in several long and destructive wars, and at one time seemed within measurable dis-



Most Byzantine icons were destroyed during the iconoclastic controversy by order of the emperors. This picture shows a fifteenth-century Russian icon, with Christ enthroned. Painted in oil on wood, these pictures received a reverence from pious worshipers that the Byzantine emperors claimed was close to idolatry. (COURTESY THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART)

tance of inheriting the Byzantine Empire, they were ultimately defeated and settled down in the empire. At a later date (fourteenth century) a great Serbian monarch (Stephen Dushan) died when marching on a Constantinople that was greatly weakened, and might well not have been able to resist the man who had created a Greater Serbia and subjected almost the entire Balkan peninsula to his rule. But his ambition and power died with him. Both Bulgars and Serbs fell victim to the Ottoman Turks.

Hungarians, Croats, and Slovenes for short periods came within the cultural radiation of Constantinople, but ultimately followed their religion into the Western sphere. They are Roman Catholics, and owe no adherence to the Eastern Orthodox Church. The Russians, however, were Orthodox Christians and took over the greater part of their cultural and political heritage from Constantinople. When Constantinople fell to the Turks, the Grand Duke of Moscow married the niece of the last Byzantine monarch, and proclaimed his realm as the center of the true faith. Ivan III called himself Caesar, or Tsar, thus using the name of the Roman emperors. He proclaimed his capital of Moscow to be the "third Rome." The Muscovite court was Byzantine, the architecture of the great Russian city was Byzantine, and the religion was Byzantine. As far as was possible in such a vast domain, the government and administration were Byzantine. When Ivan proclaimed himself sovereign of all Russia, he ruled the only territory in Eastern Europe comparable to that of the Turks. If the Ottoman Turks had inherited the body of Constantinople, Ivan III and his successors had surely inherited the soul. And if today the Russians still do not possess the body, it has not been for want of trying.

BYZANTINE EMPIRE AS BULWARK AGAINST EXPANDING ISLAM

Finally, to go back several centuries in time, a few words should be said of the role of the Byzantine Empire as a bulwark against the Muslims. Though Constantinople was ultimately to fall to the Ottoman Turks, it had been able to hold all their Muslim predecessors at bay. In

the great expansion of Islam in the seventh century, the Byzantines were successful in driving the Arabs from the gates of Constantinople. Long wars with Persia had weakened the empire and made prolonged resistance to the drive of the Arabs through the more remote Byzantine possessions impossible. As we have seen, these were lost to the Muslims forever, and never recovered by the Byzantines. But after five years' resistance to a blockade by the Arabs (673-678), the Byzantines concluded a peace and recovered their immediate hinterland of Anatolia, their most valuable territory. Again the Muslims came up in force in 717-718, but were driven back by the Byzantine emperor Leo III. Thereafter Muslim dynamism and power waned, and they turned toward territories easier to conquer than the impregnable city on the Bosphorus. The Seljuk Turks were turned back in the eleventh century with the aid of Crusaders from the West. But the Ottoman Turks could not be held. A brief respite was afforded at the end of the fourteenth century by the successes of an Asiatic conqueror, Timur Lenk (Tamerlane), who captured the Turkish monarch even as he was preparing to attack Constantinople. Timur himself made no attempt to conquer Constantinople, and died soon afterwards while trying to add China to his dominions. The Turks recovered, and at last captured the prize in 1453.

If Constantinople had fallen to the early Arab attack, the history of Europe would have been incalculably different. At that time there was no comparable Western power, and Eastern Europe might well have been overrun. The victories of the Byzantine emperors in 678 and 718 were far more fateful than the turning back of a Muslim advance guard at Poitiers in France in 732. Constantinople survived as a bastion of Christianity and Western culture into an age when the West had grown too strong to be defeated. Though the Ottoman rulers were able to besiege Vienna in the time of Charles V, they could not take it; though they ruled most of Hungary and the entire Balkan peninsula for many years, they could not convert it to Islam.

Thus, even if it cannot be credited with very many enduring achievements in the realm of thought and culture, the Byzantine empire may nevertheless be credited with the supreme

success of preserving its Greek and Christian heritage for all the peoples of Eastern Europe. Insofar as Europe is today a cultural and religious whole, distinct from the continents of Asia and Africa that border her, much of the glory of this achievement must surely be given to the persistence and will-to-endure of the Byzantine Empire.

♦ Beginnings of Islam

If the Romans could have foreseen which people would enter into their inheritance in North Africa and much of the Mediterranean, they would surely have been astonished, for they were hardly aware of the existence of the Arabs. Parthians and Persians they knew and respected as dangerous enemies who sometimes defeated them in battle. But the Arabs, in the days of the empire, had remained in their desert peninsula. A small Roman province had been organized in the north, but the Bedouin tribesmen, always fiercely independent, had given the Romans no trouble, and in turn were left untroubled by the Romans. They spent their lives wandering from oasis to oasis with their flocks—warlike, hospitable, illiterate but with a remarkable natural shrewdness and understanding, fiercely loyal to their tribes, families, and chiefs (sheiks); but quick to take offense and as quick to avenge a slight as an injury. The sheiks were independent chieftains, owing homage to no man, and their country was without political organization of any kind; the few families who made up a tribe were part of no larger unit.

Along the coasts of Arabia, however, the land was more fertile, and a few cities had grown up. Jidda was the seaport; Mecca and Yathrib were trading cities, with their bazaars selling the products of the country—meat, dates, nuts, palm oil, and other foodstuffs, luxuries imported by sea and caravan or made by local industry. From these cities camel caravans set out to the north, south, and through the desert to the east, manned by shrewd Arab traders and Jewish merchants. The cities, like the Bedouin tribesmen, were dominated by local families. One of the greatest of these was the Kuraish, which dominated Mecca, the chief commercial

and religious center of the country. Though often warring among themselves, the Kuraish, with their many collateral branches, could be relied upon to unite when the family interests were threatened.

Probably such a people as this would never have been united by political means; no king had yet arisen among them. Loyalty from such a people could not be commanded or enforced. But what could and did unite them, and make of them one of the greatest fighting forces the world has yet seen, was a new and dynamic religion whose early successes, often against overwhelming odds, must have seemed to doubters proof indeed of its divine origin.

RELIGION BEFORE ISLAM

Before the days of Mahomet, Mecca was already a religious center. A stone, believed to have fallen from heaven (a meteorite?), around which a temple, the Kaaba, had been built, was the chief object of veneration. Arabs from distant lands came to pay homage at it, to the financial advantage of the trading community. Idols and other sacred objects were worshiped. Both in the holy city of Mecca and elsewhere there seem to have been many varieties of sacrifice offered both to deities and to deified forces of nature. But, as far as we can tell, no synthesis of beliefs or religious practices existed which would justify our calling it in any way a religion. This was surprising, since Judaism and even Christianity were known to the Arabs from traders and wandering missionaries. And yet, as we shall see, the religious spirit was there, quiescent, waiting for the words of inspiration that would kindle it. This task was the lifework of Mahomet.

Mahomet (the name is spelled in even more ways than Shakespeare's) was born in Mecca in 570 of one of the poorer and less influential branches of the leading Kuraish family. His childhood was apparently spent in the shadow of poverty. But when he was twenty-five he began to work for a widow Khadija, older than himself, a business woman of ability and in comfortable circumstances, whom he later married. By her he had his only child, Fatima. From this time on Mahomet prospered as a

trader, and until the age of forty gave no indication that he would later preach a new religion. But it seems clear that he must have pondered long on what he knew of the other religions of the Near East and often have thought of the religious backwardness of his native land. It is said that for a month each year he went into the desert. There his thoughts became clearer, and he prepared himself so that at last, when the revelation came to him, he was ready. The revelation was that there was only one God, Allah, and that he, Mahomet, had been chosen to be God's prophet. Islam therefore stands firmly on the revelations to Mahomet, as Judaism stands upon the revelations to Moses. It is consequently a religion that calls for faith, with all the dynamism that such a religion entails. Although Islam contains much from the older religions, commingled with observations growing out of the customs of the desert tribes, it should not be regarded as a religion that was simply tailored by the keen intellect of Mahomet to fit the circumstances of his country. Students of history should avoid such an easy assumption, which is sometimes made when we speak of *syncretistic* religions, or those which draw their chief elements from several others of the day.

RELATION TO OTHER RELIGIONS

The fundamental belief in Islam (Arabic for "submission") is monotheism of the strict Judaic kind. For the Muslim,¹ there is no Trinity of Persons in God. Mahomet did not claim to be a god, but a prophet of God. There had been, in his belief, other prophets before him, among whom he numbered Moses and Jesus Christ; but he himself was to be the last, revealing the whole truth as it had been partially revealed to his predecessors. There was thus no reason for despising these earlier religions, or for denying their teachings; but they were not complete, and not fully understood. Islam therefore did not wish to exterminate the other religions. Those who converted to Islam showed

that they were a chosen people, since they had been able to accept the higher revelation, and for this reason in a Muslim country were entitled to special privileges. Those who preferred to keep their second-class religions could do so, but they must then expect to be treated as second-class citizens in a religious state. As "people of the Book," believers in other religions were permitted to keep their Books. Only those who had no Book and no religion were to be converted by force. This attitude always remained the religious policy of Islam, and was reflected in its political policies. A holy war (*jihad*) could be proclaimed only against heathen, or when Islam was forced to defend itself against other religions which attacked it. A holy war, enjoined upon the faithful only in certain well-defined circumstances, could never be arbitrary, or for the sake of simple conquest; the true religion must first be endangered by the enemy.

THE KORAN—HADITH, ULEMA

Mahomet, from the time he began his mission, received many revelations from, as he proclaimed, the angel Gabriel. These were given to the people orally, but collected after his death in the sacred book of Islam—the Koran. Each revelation (or *sura*) is separate, and the compilers assembled them only in order of length. There is thus no logical, chronological, or other order in the Koran, and if read consecutively by an unsympathetic critic, it appears to be a medley of unrelated teachings, most of them concerned with everyday life and behavior. This appearance of confusion is the natural result of the fact that Mahomet did not trust to his own judgment to answer the innumerable questions put to him in his earlier years. When asked for an authoritative answer, he meditated in the desert until the answer came. This was then a new revelation, later to be incorporated in the Koran. It may be added that throughout the book the language is beautiful, the words are chosen with masterly care, and the whole betrays a poetic imagination which makes it not unworthy to stand beside the Hebrew Scriptures. It has never been difficult for any believing Muslim to accept it as inspired, in spite of occasional contradictions between various instruc-

¹ The word *Muslim*, also Anglicized as "Moslem" or "Mussulman," means one who "surrenders himself to God."

tions to the faithful. These contradictions are explained as a progressive understanding of his mission by the Prophet—who, after all, was not divine, but partook of some of the frailties of mortals.

The Koran contained all the positive teaching given by Mahomet in his lifetime; but, as with Christianity, not all points of Islamic theology had been cleared up by the Prophet himself. Since the Koran was also a guide to ethics and ordinary worldly activity, it early became necessary to have authoritative rulings on knotty points of doctrine. Moreover, Mahomet had also given oral instructions to his disciples, which were not direct revelations like the *suras* in the Koran, but were almost equally authoritative. Thus were added to the teachings of the holy book itself the *Hadith*, or traditions, which derived directly from the Prophet; and a number of learned men, the *ulema*, became recognized as the interpreters of the sacred text and the *Hadith*. These *ulema* still exist today with the same tasks in orthodox Muslim communities, even though there is no priesthood.

ORGANIZATION AND DOCTRINES OF ISLAM— SIMPLICITY, APPEAL TO JEWS

In Islam there has never been any recognized priesthood. Each community may have an *imam*, who leads the prayers, and there is also a *muezzin*, who summons the faithful at sundown to turn toward Mecca and pray. The prayers are regularly prescribed, as are also fast days: and a whole month, Ramadan, is set aside during which no Muslim may break his fast between sunrise and sundown. In addition, there are moral duties to be performed, such as giving alms to the poor and showing hospitality to strangers. There are injunctions against pride and worldliness and taking advantage of the difficult position of one's neighbor. There are laws of ritual cleanliness to be observed, following the general pattern of the Jewish codes: the pig is unclean, and there are ritual washings to be performed. No wine or strong drink must be taken, and there must be no images or idols of any kind, since these will divert the faithful from the strictest monotheism, persuading them to believe that other beings beside Allah have

godlike attributes. The articles of belief are few and equally simple. There is a resurrection of the body and Paradise for the righteous, and an unending suffering in Gehenna for the wicked; both places are eloquently described in the Koran. There are also angels of God and evil beings, emissaries of the Devil.

Thus the religion is essentially simple. It does away with the complexity of Christianity, with its Trinity and doctrine of the redemption, and concentrates on the few essentials which proved acceptable to the simple people to whom these were preached. The simple elements of Jewish ritual were alone retained, while the whole of Jewish legalism was abandoned. The ancient desert morality at its best—such virtues as simplicity, straightforwardness, hospitality to friends and even enemies—was enshrined now as moral law, binding on the faithful, so that little change was needed from what was already practiced. The religion, there can be little doubt, was intended to appeal to Jews as well as to the heathen, and much of early Hebrew legend is incorporated in the Koran as fact. Although in the process of time many Jews within this culture were indeed converted, on the whole Islam did not succeed in weaning them from their law. In early times there were many wars against Jewish communities, but the communities were not destroyed; and within a Muslim state Judaism was tolerated in the same way as Christianity. Mahomet, who always regarded Jerusalem as a holy city, and indeed chose it himself as the place from which he ascended to Heaven, ultimately did not adopt it as the chief, but only the second, holy city in Islam, the place of supreme honor being reserved to his birthplace, Mecca.

❖ Expansion of Islam

The progress of Islam was at first very slow. Mahomet's family did not accept him. His uncompromising monotheism offended all those, including the Kuraish, who had a vested interest in the old religion. Most of his early followers were in Yathrib, rather than Mecca, and it was to Yathrib that he finally decided to go. The date of the "flight" from Mecca to Yathrib

(622 A.D.) marks the birthday of the religion of Islam, and 622 is therefore the year from which the Muslim era is counted. Yathrib was renamed Medina, the city of the Prophet.

Having organized Medina and gained many converts also among the Bedouin tribes, Mahomet was ready to take on Mecca and his own powerful family. The latter, threatened by a large army, decided to cast in their lot with the Prophet, and thereafter the peninsula of Arabia became, as it has always remained, a Muslim preserve. Two years after his return from Medina (632) Mahomet died, and the astonishing progress of Islam began.


Unfortunately the Prophet himself was unique, and no provision had been made for a successor as head of the religion. Mahomet had himself received all the revelations from Allah, including military instructions, and he was looked upon as the infallible leader. Should the leadership go to Ali, his son-in-law and cousin, or to his father-in-law Abu Bekr? Both had been faithful followers of Mahomet from the first. As it turned out, the choice fell upon Abu Bekr, and only later did Ali gain the title, after two intervening successors had been murdered. Ali himself was likewise murdered, whereupon the succession fell to the Ommeyad family, whose members were not descended from Mahomet. The events of this time caused a major schism in Islam which has persisted to this day, the Shiite sect, centered mainly in Persia, believing that the succession should have passed through Mahomet's own family, and the Sunni contending that the succession of the Ommeyyads was legitimate, since they had been chosen by the faithful followers of the Prophet.

Meanwhile the caliphs, as they were called—both a political and a religious title (Arabic for "successor")—had been spreading the new religion into the countries bordering Arabia, and meeting with remarkable success. The long wars between Persia and Constantinople had greatly weakened both powers, and the Arabs were able to conquer both Persia and the eastern Mediterranean lands of the Byzantine Empire with comparative ease. The inhabitants of the countries had been ground down by heavy taxation to pay for the wars, Islam offered them special privileges if they converted,

including freedom from formal taxation, which was replaced by the Koranic religious obligation of giving alms and undertaking charitable works for the benefit of the faithful. If, like the Christians and Jews, they were "peoples of the Book," then, as already noted, they were permitted to keep their religion, but were required to meet the burden of ordinary taxation. Only pagans were converted to Islam by the sword. Instructions for all these matters were contained in the Koran.

The Muslims did not feel it to be their duty to extirpate the cultures of the countries they conquered. On the contrary the Arabs, having only their primitive desert culture, often became actively interested in the cultures of the peoples they subjected to their rule. The result was that an advanced culture such as that of the Persians not only survived but gained from the dynamism of the Arabs. The religion of Islam replaced their own religion, which had long before fallen into decay. But Persian culture itself gained a new lease on life, especially under the Abbasid dynasty centered on Bagdad (750-1258). It was this quality of cultural tolerance which made the Muslims and the civilization they created the most influential transmitters of culture that the world has yet seen, superior to the Romans in that these new imperialists took also from the best that India and the Far East could give. Only when the Turks entered into the Muslim heritage, after it had been in decay for centuries, did Islam become fanatical, and, on the whole, destroy more than it created and preserved.

The Ommeyad dynasty, after the murder of Ali, chose as its capital the Syrian city of Damascus. There it ruled from 661 to 750. The period from the death of Mahomet in 632 to the end of the Ommeyad caliphate was the great period of expansion. During this time Constantinople, as noted earlier, was twice besieged but not captured. Palestine, Persia, North Africa, and ultimately Spain were won by Muslim arms. In the later stages the new converts, especially the Berbers of North Africa, carried the religion onward rather than the Arabs themselves, who were spread thinly through their empire. Beyond Persia Arab rule did not go; but the religion was carried further by Persian converts



and traders. In the course of the next centuries parts of India, the Malay peninsula, and most of Indonesia were converted to Islam. They remain Muslim to this day.

When the Ommeyyad dynasty was overthrown by Abbas, a direct descendant of Mahomet, the Spanish conquests were retained by an Ommeyyad who had managed to escape the systematic destruction of his family attempted by the Abbasids. There he set up a separate caliphate. Abbas himself founded a long-lived dynasty and changed the capital from Damascus to Bagdad. As caliph, he claimed allegiance from the whole Muslim world; but the Ommeyyad ruler in Cordova, Spain did not acknowledge him. In the tenth century Egypt and North Africa escaped from Abbasid control and likewise set up their own caliphate. Thus Islam split into separate states, each with a caliph who was recognized only by his own subjects. In the early sixteenth century the Ottoman sultan of Constantinople, Selim I, proclaimed himself caliph, and as the only important remaining Muslim potentate his title was generally recognized by the Muslim faithful. But the title of successor to the Prophet, signified by the word *caliph*, was clearly no longer meaningful—though the secular ruler of an Islamic state has always remained head of its religion as well.

The governments of Syria and Bagdad were Oriental despotisms of a familiar kind, owing much to the example of Constantinople. Their courts were centers of luxury and culture; but both were, on the whole, more creative than Constantinople, which relied too exclusively on its ancient Greek heritage. The subjects of the caliphates of Syria and Bagdad were kept under central control as far as it was possible for the monarchs to establish such control. But the Bedouin tribes of Arabia, whose dynamism had been responsible for the upsurge of Islam in the first place, were unwilling to submit to any kind of central rule. Nor were the warlike tribes in Africa. So the despots made only sporadic efforts to enforce their authority over these tribes, which, for the most part, remained independent under local leadership, retaining to this day the religion of Islam but never more than nominal subjects of the Muslim political empires. Islam as a religion was congenial to

them and did not interfere with their way of life; but the political system of the Muslim Empire interfered with their traditional independence, and it is not surprising that they rejected it.

♦ Muslim culture

Perhaps the greatest contribution of the Arabs that can be specifically credited to the Arabs themselves, rather than to their converts, is the incomparable Arabic language. The Koran may not be translated into any other language, according to the law of Islam. And the Koran must be read by all the faithful. Therefore it was necessary to learn Arabic, which became, as Greek had once been, the common language of the whole empire and of the whole area converted to the religion of Islam. It is true that the original language was greatly altered in its transmission through these lands. But it proved capable of meeting the demands made upon it. When necessary, words were imported from the Greek, and other words were invented to express concepts that had never before been needed in the lands of the desert. Arabic, with its delicate signs used so beautifully in decorative work designed in Muslim lands, has remained one of the great languages of the world, strengthened and enlarged through the centuries, but retaining still the marks of its Arab origin.

As has already been said, the Arabs, unlike the Romans, were genuinely interested in learning. As a practical people, the Arabs were chiefly interested in science. But there were also many learned philosophers in the new Muslim Empire, though their influence was probably not as great as the quality of their work would have justified. Philosophy never seems to have become a regular subject of instruction in their academies, perhaps because of the difficulties that always arise when philosophy and revealed religion must be reconciled. The Muslims took from the people in their empire what interested them, and neglected the remainder. They did not, for instance, show any interest in Greek literature or poetry, probably because there was already a long Arab tradition in these fields and the work in the ancient Hellenic tradition did

not lend itself to translation into Arabic. Moreover, Greek religion, which suffused Greek literature, would not be acceptable to confirmed believers in the Koran. No Roman work except the law seems to have come into Arab hands at all, suggesting that, with the exception of Spain, Latin knowledge had died out in the territories which they controlled.

In every field they touched, the Muslims added something of their own. Though they regarded Aristotle as the real master of philosophy, calling him simply "The Philosopher," they nevertheless tried to understand him, and the great Muslim philosophers took his work as the starting point and added commentaries, trying to explain and enlarge his often brief and cryptic remarks. They took the great synthesis of Greek scientific knowledge written by Claudius Ptolemy in the second century A.D. as the point of departure for their own science, and then added numerous observations to it, especially in the fields of optics and astronomy. Since they were in contact with Hindu thought also, they added the mathematical knowledge of the Hindus to the work of Euclid and the great Greek geometricians, and they advanced trigonometry beyond the point that Ptolemy had reached in his fundamental work. These instances are only given here to suggest the kind of work that the Muslims performed; a later section will give more detail on their specific contributions. The Muslims were the heirs of all the ages up to their own time; and though little that is really new can be credited to them, they preserved the Greek and Persian heritages, added something of Hindu achievements, and even took a fundamental invention from China, paper. This heritage they handed on to Western civilization intact and improved. Though much in Western civilization owed little to the Muslims, and their influence should not be exaggerated, nevertheless in theoretical and applied science their influence was crucial. The large number of scientific words incorporated into Western languages—most of them words in daily use, such as *algebra*, *alcohol*, *zenith*, and *zero*—sufficiently demonstrates this fact. Muslim commercial invention and innovations made possible the voyages of discovery, the exploitation of which led directly to the modern world.

PHILOSOPHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC ACHIEVEMENTS

In a book of this scope it is unnecessary to do more than indicate the special fields of competence of the Muslims. In philosophy the great names are Avicenna and Averroës, the former an eleventh-century Persian, the latter a twelfth-century Spaniard. The philosophical work of both these men was read and appreciated far more by medieval Western scholastics than by their own people. Both were extremely competent as philosophers, Avicenna developing Neoplatonist thought and Averroës writing commentaries on Aristotle which became so widely known among medieval thinkers that he came to be called simply "The Commentator." Avicenna was better known in his own country for his great *Canon* of medical knowledge, which was not superseded in the Muslim world until very recent times.

The Western world knows the Arabs for their supposed invention of the "Arabic" numerals, which, however, were not invented by the Arabs at all, but adapted from similar signs used by the Hindus. Their importance does not lie in the particular signs used—any signs with a universally accepted meaning would have sufficed—but in their combination with the zero. The zero may have been of Muslim origin, but is usually regarded as also invented by the Hindus, whose work the Muslims, of course, knew well. The use of the Arabic numerals with the zero permits a positional system to be used instead of the cumbersome letter system of the Greeks and Romans. Such a positional system, based on the number 60, was already in use as early as the ancient Babylonian civilization. The so-called Arabic system is based on the number 10, requiring the use of nine numerals and the zero. The fundamental work on the subject was written about 810 by one Al-Khwarizmi (from whom comes our word *algorism*). His system was introduced to the Western world by Leonardo of Pisa at the beginning of the thirteenth century. The same Muslim mathematician wrote a basic textbook on algebra. Algebra itself appears to have been a genuine Muslim invention (as is the word itself), though based on the work of earlier Greek and Hindu mathemati-

cians. The Muslims also were well acquainted with trigonometry, using the work of Claudius Ptolemy, the second-century Greek scientist, and developing it further. Another Muslim, Al-Farabi (died 950), was responsible for the elements of musical notation and the measurement of time values in music.

In the field of physics Al-Kindi, the only true Arab who gained eminence in science, invented a complex theory concerning lines of force, based on optical observations. Even more important work in optics was done by Al-Hazen or Al-Haitham (*ca.* 965-1038), who wrote extensively on the reflection and refraction of rays. This work was the foundation for the optical studies carried out in medieval times by such noted figures as Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon. The Muslims were naturally much interested in astronomy, as might be expected of a desert people, but they were for the most part content to rest their theoretical knowledge on the great second-century compilation of Ptolemy. They were also interested in astrology, and much of medieval astrology is indebted to the Muslim technique for casting and interpreting horoscopes. More important, perhaps, than anything else done by the Muslims in this field was the invention of the astrolabe (illustrated in the text), used to observe the movements of the heavenly bodies.

It has already been noted that certain exiles from Constantinople founded the academy of Gondisapur in Persia. When the Arabs conquered Persia, they inherited the academy, and soon persuaded the Hellenized Christians they found there to turn their accumulated learning into the Arabic language. Thus the Muslims had at their disposal, among other things, the whole corpus of Greek medical writings. For many centuries the Muslims were noted as doctors and observers of diseases. They were greatly sought after in the Middle Ages, since medieval medical knowledge was, for the most part, a terrifying compound of superstition and quackery.

Muslim chemistry is not always judged fairly, owing to the prevalent belief in the transmutation of elements, the search for a universal catalyst (the philosopher's stone), and the diversion of intellectual and practical effort to these unprofitable pursuits. In the practice of this science of alchemy there was much that



An Arabic astrolabe. This instrument, which was suspended by the ring at its top, was used to take bearings by the stars. The crosspiece, called the alidade, was directed toward a particular star, and the navigator or astronomer took his bearing by sighting along it. By the fourteenth century it was customary to use two alidades and thus take a double bearing and calculate exactly the position of the ship. (COURTESY THE OWNER, MR. BARNEY OF NEW YORK. PHOTO BY MORTON A. BERGER)

we should call excessively mystical, even in the hands of the Muslims. But if we have lost our wonder at the marvelous transformations possible in the world of chemistry, this is not because there is nothing wonderful in it but because we have been so accustomed to think of all scientific wonders as commonplace. The fact remains that in their experimentations the Muslims discovered how to isolate many important chemicals, including sal ammoniac, saltpeter, and a number of oxides, and learned how to prepare sulfuric and nitric acids. There can be no doubt at all that Muslim alchemy laid the basis for modern chemistry by performing this

pioneer work, whatever the objectives of their experimentation may have been.

The Muslims made considerable progress in agriculture, especially in the science of irrigation. They improved the irrigation system in Egypt by carrying the Nile water further from the river and up slopes to higher ground; in Spain they brought water from the higher regions down to the plains, which had always been arid. It is possible that Spain was never so well cultivated in all her history as under the Omeyyads. Vineyards were planted, and scientific methods of terracing were used, perhaps learned from the Far East. Cordova was noted for its beautiful landscape gardening, made possible by irrigation.

Muslim voyages into areas previously unknown to the West and to the Near East made possible a great increase in geographical knowl-

edge, and an improvement in map making. The best-known geographer, Al-Idrisi (1099-1154), was employed by the Normans in Sicily in the twelfth century, thus introducing the best geographical knowledge of the day into the West. The Muslims also introduced, if they did not invent, the crucial mariner's compass. The actual inventor is unknown.

ART

Architecture The most characteristic Muslim structure is the mosque, which differed essentially from the Christian church or the Greek temple in that no provision had to be made for the celebration of the mass, nor was there, of course, any god to be housed in it. The Muslims, keeping strictly to the law against "graven images," allowed no representation in



A Moorish temple in Tetuán, Spanish Morocco, features a horse-shoe arch typical of Moorish architecture. (COURTESY THE SPANISH STATE TOURIST DEPARTMENT)

their mosques of either human beings or animals, thus limiting sculpture to flowers and leaves, but above all to geometrical patterns which reached a high degree of intricacy and beauty (arabesques). On the other hand, since the Koran had to be read publicly, a pulpit was necessary; a place had to be provided for the ritual washing; and, from the mosque, the muezzin called to prayer. For the last-named function the Muslims added to their mosques the graceful minaret, so characteristic a feature of all Muslim ecclesiastical architecture—a feature which was, as usual, copied by other peoples who did not use it for any such purpose. In other hands the minaret became mere decoration, like the Roman and Renaissance columns which supported nothing. The campanile, or bell tower, of Christian churches, however, was often modeled on the Muslim minaret.

The Muslims used many different forms of the arch, especially the horseshoe arch, almost a signature of Muslim architecture. For decoration the Muslims, like the Byzantines, excelled in mosaic. This seems to have been a Persian invention taken over by both the Byzantines and the later Muslims. The dome, brought to perfection by the architects of Justinian, was almost universal in Muslim architecture.

Applied arts Muslim craftsmen were noted throughout the world for the excellence of their handwork, their only competitor being the Byzantine Empire. The process known as damascening, the inlaying of gold and silver on cheaper metals, was called after the city of Damascus and was a Muslim invention. Persian carpets are still famous today. The tooling of leather was a specialty (morocco, cordova), and swords and rapiers of Toledo steel were valued by Christian knights as the finest weapons in the medieval world. The designing of silks, brocades, muslins, and other materials was brought to high perfection, and many of the materials used still keep their Arabic names (damask, muslin).

Literature When we think of Arabic literature we think almost automatically of the *Rubā'iyāt* of Omar Khayyām and the *Arabian Nights*. The former, written by a Persian mathematician, gives expression to the refined

hedonism and polite fatalism of late Muslim Persia, and is, of course, known to the West through its very free translation by Edward FitzGerald. The poem is, in fact, better known in English-speaking countries than in its native Persia, where Omar was only one of many great poets. The *Thousand and One Nights* reflects the society of Bagdad in the time of Harun-al-Rashid, who appears in many of the tales in person. Arabs had always been fond of storytelling, even in the days before Mahomet, and this is one of many collections which was to exercise a considerable influence upon medieval and even modern storytellers. Boccaccio especially was influenced by the mode; though as a rule he wrote on contemporary themes, nevertheless many of his stories made use of those of his Arabic predecessors. The minstrels of Spain had a decisive influence on Provençal medieval poetry associated with the troubadours, and for a long time the whole civilization of Provence, so ruthlessly destroyed in the Albigensian Crusade, was indebted to the Muslim culture of Spain.

Finally, a few words should be said of the man who was the greatest of Muslim historians, and one of the few philosophers of history from earlier times whose works may still be read with profit today. He took the history of the Arabs as a special example of the expansionist urge in a people and considered seriously and carefully the question of why they had been able to conquer sedentary peoples with so much ease. His conclusions led him further to speculate on the reasons for the rise and fall of all empires. Ibn Khaldun is one of the few historians whose generalizations are fit to be compared with those of the great Greek Thucydides, and it is by no means certain that, having regard to the material available to each, the Muslim historian would come off second best.

DECAY OF MUSLIM CIVILIZATION—SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Muslim civilization was unable to recover from the political disasters that overtook it from the eleventh century onward. The Seljuk Turks from Central Asia took over effective control of the Abbasid Empire in the middle of the eleventh century, though permitting the Abbasid

rulers to retain nominal sovereignty. The Mongols captured Bagdad in 1258, forcing the last of the Abbasid family to flee to Egypt. Bagdad was captured by Mongols again in 1400, and later by Persians and Ottoman Turks. But by that time the distinctively Muslim civilization was over. Only in this century have there appeared signs of a cultural renaissance in Islam, though now under the spur of nationalism as well as religion.

The achievements of Muslim civilization have sometimes been minimized and sometimes exaggerated, especially by scholars who have enjoyed contrasting medieval European backwardness, lack of science, and superstition with Muslim enlightenment. The Muslims were not, on the whole, great creators or innovators, but they were incomparable imitators and assimilators. For many centuries they acted as the sole bridge between East and West. They studied Greek science, neglected and almost unknown in the West of the day, and they studied and translated Greek philosophy. They did not add much to Plato and Aristotle beyond commentaries, but they added a great deal to Hellenistic science from their own thinking and observations. They were able to make use of Hindu speculation and discoveries hitherto unknown in Europe. Their medicine, both theoretical and practical, was renowned in Europe, and the first European medical school at Salerno was originally staffed by Muslims.

The Muslims were an extremely mobile people, and their traveling merchants carried more than news and gossip and geographical information over the thousands of miles of their trade routes. They carried Persian techniques and manufacturing processes into Spain and Sicily, and so ultimately into Christian Europe. They navigated the seas and brought the perfected astrolabe, quadrant, and mariner's compass to the West. Their storytellers provided the basis for much of medieval European literature. If the West had had to discover for itself all that the Muslims taught it, Western civilization might have been delayed for centuries.

But it is hardly fair to judge the Muslims by what they gave to the West, great though our debt is to them. Anyone who visits southern Spain today and sees the ruins of the great works of the Muslims, who looks at the

arid lands which were made to blossom by Muslim genius and are now desolate, does not need to be reminded that this was a great civilization in its own right. The peoples who worshiped the one God Allah, whose prophet was Mahomet, do not need to fear comparison with the greatest there have been—even though their genius has been overshadowed in recent centuries by the expansionism and dynamism of the Christians and of Western civilization.

Suggestions for further reading

PAPERBACK BOOKS


- Bury, John B. *History of the Later Roman Empire, 395-565*. 2 vols. Dover. Detailed and thorough history of the period, which, though relatively old (1923), was the author's masterpiece and is in very few respects outdated.
- Dawood, N. J., tr. *The Thousand and One Nights*. Penguin. The famous collection of Arabic and Persian stories of the days of the Caliph Harun al-Rashid.
- Dawson, Christopher. *The Making of Europe*. Meridian. Already noted in the reading list for Chapter 7, the chapters devoted to Byzantine civilization are especially interesting. The author regards it as a civilization in its own right, with its own unique character.
- Gibb, H. A. R. *Mohammedanism*. NAL. A very fair and objective brief study.
- Guillaume, A. *Islam*. Penguin. Another good survey by a noted Arabic scholar, currently out of print.
- Hitti, Philip K. *The Arabs—A Short History*. Gateway. The earlier chapters of this popular but scholarly and factual work cover the period dealt with in this chapter.
- The Koran*. Tr. by N. J. Dawood. Penguin. Fundamental work of Islam.
- Rice, D. Talbot. *Byzantine Art*. One of the best brief manuals on the subject.
- Runciman, Steven. *Byzantine Civilization*. Meridian. Well-written account by a renowned Byzantine scholar.
- Ure, P. N. *Justinian and His Age*. Penguin. The age as seen by contemporary writers.

CASEBOUND BOOKS

- Arnold, T. W. *The Caliphate*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1924. Succinct account of the relation between Muslim political life and the religion of Islam.
- Arnold, T. W., and Guillaume, A., eds. *The Legacy*

- of Islam*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1931. Especially good on geography, commerce, and the minor arts in which the Muslims excelled. One of a generally excellent series of "Legacies" of the different civilizations.
- Baynes, Norman H. *The Byzantine Empire*. Oxford: Home University Library, 1943. The best short survey, covering Byzantine civilization topically. Large bibliography.
- Baynes, Norman H., and Moss, H. *Byzantium*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1948. One of the admirable "Legacy" series, covering, as always, many subjects, and including information difficult to find as conveniently elsewhere.
- Cross, S. H. *Slavic Civilization*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948. Excellent short essay, covering very well the influence of Byzantium on the Slavs.
- Diehl, Charles. *Byzantine Portraits*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1927. Part of a larger work, this book by a Byzantine specialist admirably portrays the Eastern Roman Empire through the lives of Byzantine men and women of different classes.
- Margoliouth, D. S. *The Early Development of Mohammedanism*. London: Constable & Co., Ltd., 1926. Explains clearly the relation between Islamic law and the teachings of the Koran.
- Nicholson, R. A. *A Literary History of the Arabs*. 2d ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1941. Excellent and full account of the subject.
- O'Leary, De Lacy. *Arabic Thought and Its Place in History*. Rev. ed. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1939. *How Greek Science Passed to the Arabs*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1949. Probably still the two best introductory books on this subject, although both are in some respects inadequate and not well organized. Can be supplemented by more technical books, which require more knowledge on the part of the student.
- Sarton, George. *Introduction to the History of Science*. Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1931. Volumes I and II contain well-considered thumbnail sketches of various Muslim scientists.
- Thorndike, Lynn. *A History of Magic and Experimental Science*. Vols. I and II. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923. Contains an account of the work of several outstanding Muslim scientists.

IV ♦ THE MIDDLE AGES



Manorial tenant touching his cap to his lord. From a Book of Hours (Flemish), ca. 1515. (COURTESY THE PIERPONT MORGAN LIBRARY. Ms. 399, folio 4)

Chronological Chart

THE MIDDLE AGES

<i>Papacy</i>	<i>Empire</i>	<i>England</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>Spain and Portugal</i>	<i>Century (All dates A.D.)</i>
Coronation of Charlemagne (800)	Reign of Charlemagne (768-814)	Alfred the Great (871-900)			800
	Otto the Great crowned (962)		Rollo becomes Duke of Nor- mandy (911)	Conquest of León by Castile (1037)	900
			Hugh Capet, king of France (987)	Christian ad- vance into Muslim	1000
Pontificate of Gregory VII (1073-1085)	Henry IV does penance at Canossa (1077)	Edward the Confessor (1042-1066)		Spain (1072 onward)	
First Crusade called (1095)		William I of England (1066-1087)		Union of Cata- lonia and Aragon (1137)	1100
	Frederick Barbarossa (1154-1190)	Henry II (1154-1189)	Philip Augustus (1180-1223)	Earliest Cortes in Castile (1188)	
Pontificate of Innocent III (1198-1216)	Frederick II (1220-1250)	John (1199- 1216) (Magna Carta-1215)			1200
	Last Hohen- staufen exe- cuted (1268)	Simon de Montfort's Parliament (1265)	Louis IX (1226-1270)	Capture of Cordova from Mus- lims (1236)	
Pontificate of Boniface VIII (1294- 1303)	Rudolph of Hapsburg becomes em- peror (1273)	Model Parlia- ment of Edward I (1295)	Philip IV (1285-1314)		1300
Babylonian Captivity of the Church (1305-1376)				Portuguese in- dependence assured by victory over Castile (1385)	
Great Schism (1378-1417)				Union of crowns of Castile and Aragon (Fer- dinand and Isabella- 1469)	1400
		Loss of all France ex- cept Calais (1453)			
		Wars of the Roses (1455-1485)			
			Death of Joan of Arc (1431)		
			Louis XI (1461-1483)		

Introduction

There are several ways of considering the Middle Ages, to which the next four chapters are devoted. They may be thought of as the "springtime" of Western civilization, during which the tendencies which came to fruition in later centuries first became visible. To those who regard the Middle Ages in this way, there is no marked break between the medieval and the modern periods. The Renaissance was in no sense a rebirth, but rather the natural cultural expression of the urban civilization of the later Middle Ages. Once the rise of the towns had made possible the growth of a small but influential leisure class, it was only to be expected that this leisure class should turn away from the predominantly religious interests of the "age of faith" that preceded it, when only the clergy had enough leisure to engage in serious cultural activity.

A second way of regarding the Middle Ages is to look upon them, as the men of the High Renaissance did, as a unique period sandwiched between the great age of antiquity and their own. They themselves were the moderns, and the men of Greece and Rome were the ancients. Both ancient and modern civilizations were dynamic and creative, whereas the civilization of the Middle Ages was static and culturally stagnant. It was, indeed, this latter concept of the Middle Ages that was responsible for the name that we still apply to them. The Middle Ages are in the middle between the civilizations of the ancient and of the modern world. The men of the Renaissance held that the civilization of the Middle Ages had been backward, dominated

by clerics, possessed of a barbaric architecture (disparagingly called Gothic), interested in the next world rather than in this, uninterested in the search for new knowledge, and content with merely commenting on the Bible and the few works of antiquity known to it.

Although some truth may be conceded to this picture by twentieth-century historians, the whole would today be accepted by no one. For it is certain that almost everything in modern Western civilization can indeed be traced back to its roots in the Middle Ages, and the more knowledge is accumulated about the Middle Ages, the more it is possible to discern these roots. Yet the Middle Ages do also exhibit certain well-defined characteristics. An outlook clearly recognizable as medieval is visible, and it came to a rather abrupt end in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. A medieval voyager like Marco Polo appears to be almost different in kind from a conquistador like Hernando Cortes or an adventurer like Sir Francis Drake. The collapse of medieval civilization can be seen in the peculiar reaction to the Black Death, with its mass hysteria, the parades of flagellants, the violent attacks on the immorality of the clergy and the Avignon papacy, the almost universal belief that the plague was a punishment of God for the wickedness of the people, the interest in devil-worship and the dance of death. Such a reaction to social and physical catastrophes was distinctly medieval and never reappears in such a form in later centuries. The people of the time, at least in Europe outside Italy, indeed felt that a world was coming to an

end, that the world they had known was passing away, perhaps even more clearly than the Romans had perceived the disintegration of their world in the fifth century under the hammer-blows of the barbarians.

With the passing of the Middle Ages, there passed away also the concept of a Europe coterminous with Christendom, whose natural form of government was a universal state, inspired by a universal Church. The universal state—an idea inherited from the Romans, who actually ruled such an empire—became split up into many national states, and the universal Church ceased to be universal under the impact of the Protestant Reformation. Even in states whose national religion remained Catholicism, the Church was no longer a truly universal Church. The pope, though recognized as head of the Church, was no longer all-powerful in matters of religion. The French Gallican Church, for example, though Catholic in doctrine, was nevertheless dominated by French clerics and by the French king, rather than by the pope.

If one considers the period of the Middle Ages from the point of view of its political and religious theory and, to some extent, its practice, it may be distinguished with considerable sharpness from the period that succeeded it—but less sharply from the Roman era that preceded it and was also dominated by the notion of universality. The Germanic barbarians accepted the Roman framework they had inherited and changed it as little as they could. Charlemagne added to his empire some countries that had never been in the Roman Empire. But the means that he used to incorporate them within his polity were provided for him by the Church; and he himself was as interested in the conversion of the heathen as he was in merely subjecting them to his political jurisdiction. He regarded himself as the ruler of Christendom rather than as the ruler of a united Europe. The philosophy and theology of the Middle Ages were solidly based upon the work of the Greeks, Plato and Aristotle. Medieval philosophy struck out along no new paths. The problem of knowledge (epistemology), which has dominated modern philosophy since at least the time of Descartes—How does the subjective mind know the objective world?—was not felt to be such

a crucially important question in the Middle Ages. The Middle Ages were interested rather in the question of universals—whether the Idea, or abstraction, is real, or whether the particular alone has reality—a problem inherited from Plato. Interest in this problem simply appears to evaporate in modern times, and now is usually regarded as a tiresome splitting of hairs indulged in by medieval thinkers.

Thus the Middle Ages can also, in a sense, be regarded as the culmination of the ancient world, its last dying thrashings before the opening of a new era. If this is the correct way to view the Middle Ages, then the seeds of the new era that are undoubtedly visible in the period should be taken for what they are, seeds planted then that bore fruit in later times. The historian should search for such seeds and identify them. The age looked both backward and forward, some elements conservative and looking to the past for inspiration, others looking forward, discontent with their heritage from the past and feeling something new stirring within them. The historian should attempt to discern both impulses and to distinguish between them.

In the chapters that follow, the Middle Ages will be treated as a whole, as if the period were a separate civilization. Each chapter covers a single topic, or series of topics, from the fall of the Roman Empire to the last days of the Middle Ages. The writer is well aware that the centuries covered could have been treated separately, and within a chronological framework—for example, the early Middle Ages, to 1000 A.D.; the High Middle Ages, from 1000 to 1300; and the decline of the Middle Ages, from 1300 to 1500. From a strictly historical viewpoint such an arrangement might well have been preferable. But it would have entailed the separation of the older manorial system from the feudalism of the High Middle Ages, which rested upon manorialism as its economic base. A few paragraphs would have covered the towns of the early Middle Ages; a more extended treatment would have been reserved for the later periods, when the towns became really important and exercised much influence. The early kings would have become separated from the later kings; and so on.

Rather than make these separations, it has

been thought preferable to attempt to deal with the key institutions of the Middle Ages as a whole, and to depart from a strict chronological treatment. Chapter 9 begins with the early attempts to restore the universal empire and the failure of these attempts. It continues with a discussion of the fragmented Europe of feudalism and manorialism. The chapter concludes with an account of the revival of commerce and trade and the rise of towns—how they escaped from feudal control, and how trade and industry were organized within the towns. Chapter 10 is devoted to the Church, the key institution of the Middle Ages—its rise to supremacy in the thirteenth century, the means by which this dominance was attained, and the weaknesses to be observed in the ecclesiastical structure by the end of the century. Chapter 11 deals with the rise of the national state, the institution that put an end to the universalist aspirations of Church and State. This chapter is therefore concerned primarily with the medieval seeds of modern times; the history of the national states in the modern period is picked up again in Chapter 14, which carries their story right up to the French Revolution. Lastly, Chapter 12 is devoted to medieval culture as a whole, from the beginnings of this characteristic culture in the time of Charlemagne down to the close of the period. A discussion of those elements in

medieval urban life which came to fruition in later centuries, especially the rise of capitalism and the new intellectual and aesthetic outlook of the Renaissance, is deferred until Chapter 13, which includes also a discussion of the decline of the medieval Church and its fragmentation as a result of the Protestant Reformation.

There can be no doubt that this topical arrangement will present certain difficulties for the student, who will be expected to jump about somewhat in time. To assist him in his chronological orientation, a special chart appears on page 180. This chart shows the key events, century by century. It should therefore be consulted whenever it is desired to place any event in its proper historical perspective and to see what is taking place in some other sector of medieval life at the same time. The separate chapters also have their own charts, which deal in more detail with the events recounted in them. But for an over-all view of medieval history, it will be essential to turn back to this special chart. The time sequence of events and the relation between religious, political, economic, and other spheres are essential to an understanding of the period. By assigning the ordering of these events to a chart the writer has taken a calculated risk that the student will not neglect this task, which is necessary for his proper comprehension.

Political, Social, and Economic Structure of the Middle Ages

♦ The political structure of the early Middle Ages

We have now considered the Roman Empire and the states that entered into its inheritance in the East, where a centralized government was still possible and the Roman governmental structure to some degree survived. In the West, however, such centralized rule was impossible. Throughout the period which followed the fall of the Roman Empire, which is conventionally known as the Middle Ages, all rule was local, based upon much smaller units than in Roman times. The only truly effective rule for many centuries was that exercised by the landowners over those who dwelt on their lands. Kings continued to exist; but though their title might be recognized and a formal allegiance paid to them, their authority was always challenged by some landowners in their kingdoms, and their writ seldom ran beyond the areas which they could control and threaten with their troops. No monarch until the late Middle Ages had any bureaucracy worthy of the name. He could call upon the services of the literate clergy to perform some of his administrative chores; but these men were not full-time paid servants. Tax collection was rudimentary, confined, as a rule, to a few indirect taxes and certain irregular obligations. Even the armies at the disposal of these monarchs were rarely paid. The troops were obligated to serve for a stated period and

had to provide for their own subsistence during that period.

The papacy, on the other hand, retained at least a skeleton of the Roman organization. The papal court always had its quota of full-time bureaucrats, whose effectiveness increased in the later Middle Ages. Though far from strong in the early Middle Ages, as an organization it was always more effective than that of any contemporary medieval monarch. At the height of the Middle Ages it was by far the most efficient administrative system in the West, as its duties were more numerous and its interests more widespread than those of any monarch. The medieval Church was a unique institution, and its interests and tasks were both religious and secular. Its rise to power and its decline in face of the competition offered by the growing national states will therefore be studied in a special chapter. In the present chapter there will be occasional references to the position of the Church within the feudal system, and some of its relations with secular powers will be discussed. The fuller consideration of the Church itself will be reserved for Chapter 10.

THE FRANKISH KINGDOM AND EMPIRE

Mention has already been made of the kingdom established by Clovis at the end of the fifth century. This kingdom his successors were unable to hold together, and only for brief periods

was it united under one ruler. The later Merovingian monarchs, although they retained their title of king, tended to lose any real authority they possessed to their chief ministers, who were called stewards of the household, or "mayors of the palace" (*major domus*). This position, in turn, tended to become hereditary. In the early eighth century one of these mayors, Charles Martel (the Hammer) was able to unite the whole Merovingian kingdom once more under his effective rule. For a few years he ruled without even troubling to fill the vacancy in the monarchy, and he increased his prestige immeasurably by defeating a Muslim expedition which penetrated into France (Battle of Poitiers or Tours, 732). However, Charles himself was of illegitimate birth and, perhaps for this reason, did not himself aspire to the title of king. His son, Pepin the Short, inherited the position of his father, but for some years was content to rule as mayor. He kept the old Merovingian monarchy in being by ensconcing a scion of the royal Merovingian house once more on the throne. The time came at last, however, when he considered himself strong enough to send his puppet to a monastery and legitimize his rule by having himself crowned king.

It should be recognized that Pepin, strong as he was, possessed a relatively limited authority in his domains. The Frankish nobles objected to any kind of control over them, and certainly preferred a merely titular ruler. Such power as Pepin was able to wield he owed to his control of royal lands, which were greater in extent than those of any other individual lord, and the military rights that went with his land and the royal position. He could command also the services of the higher clergy, who were appointed to their positions by him. These services were extremely useful to him, since literacy was virtually confined to the clergy at the time, and such administrative regulations as he was able to enforce had to be prepared in his chancery and promulgated in written form. It would therefore clearly be of the greatest value to him if he could secure the legitimization of his own position, and command not only the compelled support or acquiescence of his subjects, but their freely given loyalty.

As it happened, at this time a new king

of the Lombards named Aistulf was engaged in consolidating his domains in Italy, and had built up a fairly effective fighting force. If he wished to rule a united kingdom even in northern Italy, two obstacles stood in his way. The exarchate of Ravenna, the old Roman imperial capital of the fifth century, had been in Byzantine hands since the conquests of Justinian; while Rome itself owed a nominal allegiance to the Byzantine emperor but was in all important respects independent. The popes might certainly in ordinary circumstances have hoped for help against Aistulf from their theoretical overlord in Constantinople, particularly since the emperor's own possessions in Italy were also threatened. But the imperial throne was occupied in 951 by a strict iconoclast, Constantine V, and his relations with the papacy were embittered by the controversy. Pope Zacharias, who occupied the papal throne, was of no mind to settle the controversy in the emperor's favor; but on the other hand his predecessors had not been able to persuade Charles Martel, Pepin's father, to give them any aid against the Lombard predecessor of Aistulf, since the latter was Charles' ally and had helped him against the Muslims. Thus the request of Pepin to the head of Christendom, asking his opinion "whether he who held the power should also hold the title," must have been recognized at once by the astute Greek from southern Italy who occupied the papal throne as a heaven-sent opportunity to gain the Frankish support he so sorely needed. He therefore replied in the affirmative, whereupon Pepin called together a group of Frankish lords, who duly proclaimed him king.

Stephen II, who succeeded Pope Zacharias the following year, followed his predecessor's policy with energy. Aistulf had already captured Ravenna, and it could be only a matter of time before he marched on Rome. Pepin's alliance must be secured by a more signal act of favor than mere acquiescence in his assumption of the throne. The aged missionary St. Boniface, the leading churchman in Frankish realms, who had spent much of the second half of his life in reforming the Frankish Church with the aid of Charles Martel and Pepin and with the full support of the papacy, was instructed to crown Pepin king of the Franks. This was accom-

plished early in 752. Soon afterward negotiations were begun between Pepin and the pope, while the Lombard monarch prepared to march on Rome and the papal lands in central Italy. In 753 Stephen addressed a last appeal to his overlord in Constantinople, but took the precaution of sending emissaries to Pepin at the same time. When the overture to Constantinople met with no promise of support but merely instructions to demand the restoration of Ravenna by the Lombards, while the overture to Pepin met with a prompt invitation to visit him, Stephen decided to make the voyage to France. There he crowned Pepin once more with his own hands, threatening with papal wrath anyone who presumed in later times to dispute the crown against any of Pepin's descendants.

The negotiations having proved satisfactory, Stephen returned to Rome. The next year (755), Pepin came over the Alps with an army, and shut up Aistulf in his own capital of Pavia. He was permitted to emerge only when he promised to abandon his recent conquests. Having no intention of carrying out his promises, he returned to the attack as soon as Pepin's back was turned, to the extreme discomfiture of Stephen, who now addressed more piteous appeals than ever to the Frankish king. The latter came over the Alps again in 756, and again defeated Aistulf, imposing the same terms as before. But this time Pepin made an outright gift of the lands taken from the Lombard to the pope. This was the famous Donation of Pepin, a legitimate donation of lands won by conquest. Although it was some time before the popes were able to exercise full authority over this territory, the Donation remained the legal instrument by which the popes maintained their lands in Italy until the nineteenth century. It is probable that Pope Stephen had already asserted his rights to the lands thus given to him by presenting to Pepin a document known as the Donation of Constantine, which had evidently been recently forged by the papal curia. According to this document, the Roman emperor Constantine, having been cured of leprosy and converted to Christianity by Pope Sylvester I, granted to the pope and his successors all his western dominions. The pope was to be the

"highest and chief of all priests in the whole world." It is not known whether Pepin was impressed by this document, but much was to be made of it by the papacy before it was unmasked as a forgery by the fifteenth-century humanist Lorenzo Valla.

By the end of his reign Pepin was able to bequeath to his two sons a united kingdom which was now the recognized ally and supporter of the papacy. The emperor at Constantinople, having failed to respond to papal appeals and too weak to assert his own rights by force, had lost his exarchate forever. Neither king nor pope was ever to relinquish it again. The new monarchy had been twice sanctified, by the Church as well as by the nobles of the kingdom. The ground had thus been prepared for the reign of Charlemagne (Charles the Great) and the restoration of the empire in the West. His younger brother having died within three years of the joint accession of the brothers to the rule of the kingdom, Charles was able to enjoy undisputed rule thereafter.

The long reign of Charlemagne (768-814) is notable above all for the fact that for the first time since the fall of Rome, the West knew a ruler whose lands were greater than those of the emperor in Constantinople, but whose rule, as we shall see, was no stronger than the hands that wielded or the institutions that supported it. Charles was unquestioned master in his own realm. He kept his lords loyal to him by oaths and the threat of severe sanctions, which he had no hesitation in inflicting on the rebellious. He fought the Saxons for twenty-three years, compelled them to accept Christianity, and incorporated their territories into his empire. He defeated the Asiatic Avars to the east of Germany, and converted them to Christianity likewise. He was compelled to intervene in Italy again when a new Lombard monarch tried to retake his former possessions, deprived the monarch of his kingdom, and ruled it through his own nominees. He assured the undisturbed possession of the Donation of his father by the papacy, though reserving the right to see that it was well ruled. Only in Spain did he suffer a severe defeat when the Basques fell upon his rear guard at Roncevalles. Even



so, he was able to establish a Frankish zone on the Spanish side of the Pyrenees, in charge of one of his counts.

The administrative system of Charles was simple, but, as long as he himself lived, it was effective. Every freeman in his realms was bound to him by an oath of allegiance, and every lord had certain duties to perform for the monarch. The monarch saw to it that the lords did what was assigned to them, on pain of being charged not only with dereliction of duty but with perjury. He appointed counts to look after subdivisions of his realm, called counties. He issued ordinances (*capitularies*), giving all his officers detailed instructions on every matter that concerned him, from the management of his own personal estates to the duties of his emissaries when they were abroad on his business. At regular intervals he sent out personal

emissaries (*missi dominici*), a count and a bishop or other leading clergyman from some other jurisdiction, to enquire into the administration of each county. For the frontier areas, where the counts needed to keep a military force in being against possible raids from beyond the empire, Charles appointed special "counts of the march," or *margraves*. These were responsible to him for the preservation of peace on the frontiers they guarded, and were entitled, when necessary, to the support of his own troops. As with the civil and military administrators, so with the Church. Charles appointed, or caused the local clergy to appoint, men of whom he approved to all the high positions in his realm. He had no hesitation in calling upon their services—as, for example, to serve as *missi*—often to the detriment, as some of them discreetly complained, of their dioceses. No one

was spared from attending his annual assemblies of notables, save on grounds of illness or infirmity.

Charlemagne was one of the most autocratic of rulers the world has yet seen. He was one of the few who was able to exact absolute obedience from all his subjects. Yet, autocratic as he was, he recognized his responsibility to God. He felt himself to have been chosen by God to rule. His courtiers called him David, and frequently made allusion to his role as a second David, destined to lead the Christian people in a new age and to convert the heathen to the true religion. His favorite work was Augustine's *City of God*, which, being himself illiterate, he had read to him whenever he could, and always kept by him. He tried to rule with justice and administer his heritage according to the light that God had given him.

This did not mean that he regarded himself as in any way responsible to God's vice-regent on earth. On the contrary, he looked upon the

pope as a useful collaborator, but in no sense his superior. He was willing to grant the pope every honor due to him as the representative of God and the head of the Church, but there is no evidence that any time he ever deferred to the pope's opinion on any subject. When an important heresy (adoptionism) was proclaimed by a Spanish archbishop and by a bishop within the empire, it was Charles who summoned a synod to declare the bishop heretical, and it was he who pronounced sentence upon him; it was Charlemagne who took a strong position on the procession of the Holy Spirit, thus forcing the pope into a more direct opposition to the Byzantine emperor than the more diplomatic pontiff desired. It was Charlemagne and his clergy who stated the moderate position on the iconoclastic controversy that was afterward adopted by the papacy. When Leo III became pope, Charles addressed a fatherly letter of advice to him as to how he should conduct himself. Later he restored this pope to the throne from which he



Portion of mosaic, dating originally from the ninth century, outside the Lateran in Rome. St. Peter is shown bestowing a pallium on Pope Leo III (left) and a banner on Charlemagne (right). According to the inscription St. Peter gives life to the pope and victory to the emperor. (PHOTO BY ALINARI)

had been violently driven by enemies who accused him of adultery, perjury, and other crimes. Yet the manner in which he handled this restoration made it clear that he was pleasing himself. Contrary to the advice of Alcuin, head of the palace school at Aachen, who reminded him that "the pope could not be judged by anyone," Charles required him to take an oath attesting his innocence, thus in effect sitting in judgment upon him. Throughout the affair he behaved as if the attack on the pope were an attack upon one who held his confidence and was entitled to be supported as a lord supports his vassal.

On Christmas Day, 800, Charlemagne was crowned emperor by Leo III in St. Peter's in Rome. His biographer Einhard claims that the new emperor was annoyed because he had not been consulted in advance. There has been much controversy among historians ever since as to why he should have been annoyed. It is held by some that Leo would never have acted without the sanction of Charles, and that the emperor had for years given every indication that some day he proposed to take the title. Others have pointed out, with justice, that Charles might well not have relished being crowned by a pope who only two days before had cleared himself of serious charges by an oath. There is no doubt that the coronation embroiled Charles further with the Byzantine Empire, whose ruler alone was entitled to be called emperor. It is also possible that Charles, without the gift of foreseeing the future, might have realized that coronation by a pope would come to be regarded as the legitimizing of the imperial position, and that subsequent popes could make their own terms for their participation in the ceremony. That this may very well have been in Charles' mind is suggested by the care with which he had his own son Louis crowned emperor before he died—a wasted precaution, since Louis in fact had himself crowned by the pope as soon after the death of his father as he could. It is a historical fact that all the subsequent emperors did not regard themselves as truly crowned unless the ceremony was performed by the pope, and many popes drove hard bargains before they would agree to it.

It does not seem that Charles ever gave

much thought to what was to become of his empire after his death. It was the Germanic custom that an inheritance of land should be divided among the sons of the testator. Charles evidently regarded the empire as his own personal domain, of which he could dispose at will, as a landowner divided his land. In 806, while he had still three sons living, he decreed the division of his empire between them and forbade them to interfere with one another in their respective realms. Between 806 and 813 two of these sons died. Only then did he decide to crown his surviving son Louis emperor, and thus ensure the continuance of the empire which had been personally bestowed upon himself by God. Louis, on his own death in 840, did indeed divide it among his three sons, though the eldest was alone to have the title of emperor. Since these sons and their own sons fought constantly among themselves for the preservation and enlargement of their domains, and all had to fight against invasions of Northmen and Magyars, the Carolingian Empire, before the end of the ninth century, ceased to be an empire worthy of the name. Indeed, the Carolingian male line itself died out. None of the national monarchs who succeeded to the various subdivisions of the empire was descended directly from Charlemagne; all rose to power by their own efforts and by the choice of their nobles. Much of the territory given by Louis to his eldest son, Lothair, became a no man's land, disputed between France and Germany to this day (Alsace-Lorraine).

Yet Charles was in a very real sense right in his initial understanding that his empire was a personal possession. Although the Church was anxious to have a Western empire to replace the Eastern empire, which was powerless to protect it and adopted its own theological positions without reference to the papacy, it could not create such an empire when conditions for it did not exist. Obsessed as it was with the notion that there ought to be a universal State coterminous with Christendom, as there was a universal Church—a notion that derived largely from its early history in the Roman Empire—the Church did not see that the conditions in Europe were not ripe for the restoration of an empire. High clerics in the reign of Charle-



magne and his successors did their best to make the empire of Charlemagne survive, but they could not succeed in their enterprise. For Charles had created no imperial institutions, no civil service that could rule once his strong arm was removed from the helm. The officials who performed services for Charles were not paid servants, but men who were given lands, the only form of wealth at the time, in exchange for their services. This land they could retain as their own private possession afterward, when the monarch had ceased to be able to compel their services. The landowners and nobles, who had wielded power in the Merovingian age, had not lost their power in the reign of Charles. They merely hid their time, while submitting with good grace to the obviously superior resources and greater military might of the emperor. Charles had conquered more lands outside of the Frankish kingdom, but had given them over to the rule of his subordinates. These

subordinates had little difficulty in throwing off the authority of his successors, and became rulers in their own right. The disputes among the successors of Charlemagne merely enabled them to obtain their independence sooner.

FOUNDATION OF THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE —OTTO I

Yet history was to show that the imperial idea had not been laid to rest. Though the title of emperor in the Carolingian succession was extinguished with the death of Ludwig the Child in 911, and the Germanic lords who had formally acknowledged him as king were by this time entirely independent, the latter nevertheless were accustomed to the idea of having a German monarch, even though they had no intention of giving him much power or authority. They thus returned to their ancient practice of electing a king as their acknowledged leader

Chronological Chart

Foundation of Venice	ca. 568	Robert, Count of Paris and brother of Odo, elected king of France	922
Reign of Pepin the Short	752-768	Battle of Augsburg—Magyars defeated by Otto I	955
Pope Stephen II crowns Pepin king of Franks	754	Otto the Great crowned emperor by pope	962
Donation of Pepin to papacy	756	Hugh Capet king of France	987
Reign of Charlemagne	768-814	St. Stephen I king of Magyars (Hungary)—Completion of conversion of Hungarians to Roman Catholic Christianity	997-1038
Charlemagne defeats Lombards and assumes title of king	773-774	Canute (Cnut) Danish king of England	1017-1035
Battle of Roncevaux—Defeat of Charlemagne's army under Roland in Spain	778	Normans conquer southern Italy from Byzantines	1042-1068
Charlemagne completes conquest of Saxons	785	Venetian war with Constantinople—extensive maritime trading rights granted to Venetians	1063
First invasions of England by Northmen (Danes)	787	Invasion of England by Duke William of Normandy—Battle of Hastings	1066 (Oct.)
Charlemagne crowned emperor by Pope Leo III	800	Normans conquer Sicily from Muslims	1072-1091
Reign of Louis the Pious	814-840	Norman sack of Rome (Robert Guiscard)	1084
Oaths of Strasbourg	842	Norman kingdom of Sicily	1091-1266
Treaty of Verdun	843	Diet of Roncaglia—Frederic I asserts imperial rights over Italian towns	1158
Division of Empire at death of Lothair	855	Alliance of Lübeck and Hamburg to protect Baltic trade routes	1244
Continuous invasions of England by Northmen	856-875	Privileges granted to German towns in London	1282
Foundation of Novgorod, traditionally by Rurik	862	Confederation of Cologne—League of Hansa towns against Denmark	1370
Alfred the Great, king of England—Danes checked	871-900	Richard II of England renews Hansa privileges	1377
Charles the Fat, emperor and king of East and West Franks (West Franks 884-887)	881-887	Last assembly of Hanseatic League	1669
Foundation of Kiev by Northmen	882		
Siege of Paris by Northmen	886		
Deposition of Charles the Fat	887		
Magyars cross Carpathians into Central Europe	ca. 895		
Rollo becomes Duke of Normandy	911		
Trading rights granted in Constantinople to Varangians	907		

for occasions when they had need of one. The second such king, Henry the Fowler, formerly duke of Saxony (919-936), justified their choice by defeating the Magyars and was also able to win the land of Lorraine from France. Thus he bequeathed a strong position to his son Otto I, who was chosen king without opposition. Otto was by far the strongest lord in Germany, but his position would not be secure if his nobles decided to combine against him. He needed powerful allies, and there was one place where he might hope to find them. This was the Church.

The Church had certain manifest advantages as an ally. It possessed the best administrators in the realm; it had an efficient working organization; and it was controlled by the higher clergy under the nominal, but not in this age effective, control of the papacy. What was necessary if the Church organization were to be used for the benefit of the kingdom of Germany was that Otto as king should make all the appointments, without the approval of the papacy. The obvious way to accomplish this was to constitute himself, like Charlemagne, the protector of the papacy, and control the appointment even of the popes themselves. The higher clergy in Germany were drawn from the feudal families, but their position could not be inherited, in part owing to the canon law against the marriage of the clergy (which was not very strictly observed), and because in any case all appointments lapsed at the death of the incumbent. Otto here was in a strong position. He had the right to appoint all the higher clergy in his realm, and since they had no other regular source of income, they needed the land which he alone could give them.

Thus was inaugurated the policy of what was later called lay investiture, which, though it was not new with Otto, was carefully systematized by him. The bishops were tied to him by feudal tenure, required to provide both military and financial aid from their territories. Certainly the Ottonian bishops were not noted for their piety, but he was careful to appoint competent and loyal administrators—his first appointments, indeed, being made from his own very competent family. Many of these clerics actually went to war themselves on his behalf,

some of them becoming noted warriors, no doubt the envy of Otto's brother rulers in Europe. In short, the German Church, though partially independent, like other feudal magnates, usually lent its aid to the monarch, helping him to keep the lay feudal nobles in their place.

In 951 the first opportunity occurred to interfere in Italy. The Lombards had revived their kingship, but it was ineffectual; and the greater part of Italy had become the prey of rival lords. Taking advantage of a dispute over the Lombard crown, Otto made short work of the pretender, married the widow of the previous king, and became king of the Lombards himself, a title, it will be remembered, once held by Charlemagne. Recalled to Germany by renewed pressure from the Magyars, he was summoned for aid by a pope (John xii) in 961 against, as usual, the Lombards. This time, after his customary victory over the Lombard nobles, he forced the pope to crown him emperor. At the same time he extracted a formal promise, from a council called for the purpose, that his confirmation was to be required for all elections to the papacy.

The Roman nobles, who for many years had been accustomed to this privilege, usually electing one of the feeblest of their own number, objected; and as soon as Otto had left they proceeded to elect a pope of their own. Otto returned, ousted the Roman choice, and put in his own nominee. When this one, too, was driven out, the new emperor lost his patience, returned with yet another army, and inflicted a sanguinary punishment on the rebels. Thereafter Rome was quiet. The emperor had established the right to approve of the election of popes; he was likely to be untroubled by papal interference with his choice of the German clergy; and he was now the accepted overlord of Germany and Italy. And the Roman dream of Charlemagne had once more been revived, to the irreparable damage, as we shall see, of both countries.

The papacy still possessed its estates in Italy, now under the overlordship of the German emperor. But it had lost what authority it had over the German clergy, being no longer able to choose the appointees or invest them. A pope




could not even hold his own office without imperial approval. He was as much a servant of the secular power as ever the popes were under Charlemagne. Yet, from the papal point of view, there was one advantage, slight as it was, that Otto had over Charlemagne. He was no theologian, and his appointees were not chosen for their piety. The empire was thus vulnerable on religious grounds; a movement for the reform of the clergy would have the support of true Christians throughout Germany and the Christian world, and might even be fortunate enough to find some day a successor of Otto the Great who was himself a Christian before he was an emperor. Already, even in the darkest hour of the papacy, when the Holy See itself was a plaything of the Roman nobles, the reform movement had been set in motion which was ultimately to lead to the re-establishment of the authority of Church and papacy, and to the

destruction of the empire itself.

RENEWED BARBARIAN INVASIONS— NORTHMEN AND MAGYARS

Before we come to the feudal system and the economic substructure that nourished it, a few words should be said on the invasions which helped to destroy the Carolingian Empire and made organized government on a larger scale than the county or duchy difficult for more than a century. Asiatic Magyars penetrated into Eastern Europe and were a constant menace, in particular to the Germans, before most of them settled down in the country now known as Hungary. Muslims working out of Tunis disrupted what Mediterranean trade survived, until their power was broken by the Normans and the rising Italian maritime cities. But the most important invaders were the Viking Northmen,



who raided Western Europe constantly until they too finally settled down in various parts of Europe. It was they who founded the duchy of Normandy, which was received as a fief from the French crown. For a long time the Northmen terrorized much of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and exercised rule intermittently over considerable sections of those countries. Lastly, a group of Northmen in the late tenth century conquered Sicily and a part of southern Italy. Wherever they settled, they adopted the feudal system of neighboring countries, but adapted it to their own ends, making it far more systematic and efficient than in the countries of its origin. On the whole, the

Norman kingdoms were the best organized and managed of any realms in the early Middle Ages.

The renewed invasions of the Northmen and Magyars meant that the Europeans were compelled to band together under whatever local authority was in a position to offer resistance, since they could not rely on the weak central authority to come to their aid. Thus the Carolingian Empire, which for a time had postponed the full establishment of what came to be called feudalism, in the end succumbed to its advance. The empire of Otto the Great was itself a wholly feudal empire, in this respect differing in essential features from that of Charlemagne. Feudal-

ism, in essence a substitute for central authority, came to full fruition in the centuries after Charlemagne, and persisted throughout the Middle Ages until it was gradually superseded by the national state and national monarchy of the later Middle Ages. The rest of this chapter will therefore be devoted to a discussion of feudalism as a form of government and social organization, followed by a brief account of the economic substructure which enabled it to function. In the following chapter we shall take up the history of the Church in the Middle Ages, and thereafter return to the national monarchies and the national states which were ultimately to replace the outdated concept of the universal empire.

♦ The feudal system

When the empire of Charlemagne disintegrated, and the successor monarchs were unable to establish effective rule over even their relatively small territories, power relapsed into the hands of the landowners who had been compelled to submit to the superior power of Charlemagne in the heyday of his empire. These landowners possessed private armies supported from their own resources and were thus able to maintain law and order to some degree within their own territories. This power, it should be understood, was not exercised in a completely arbitrary manner; there was a network of customary and legal sanctions upon its exercise which, though not so strong as sanctions exercised by monarchs who had armies and bureaucracies at their disposal to enforce their will, were nonetheless adequate to keep powerful landowners from doing everything their fancy dictated. The relationship between lord (*suzerain*)¹ and vassal, between the bestower and receiver of the fief, is the heart of the medieval feudal system; and the duties imposed on each party to the transaction by feudal law

and custom are the chief sanctions on the arbitrary use of their power by either. A vassal had the power to go to war against his suzerain, and, indeed, only too frequently he did so; but, if he did, unless the suzerain had failed to perform his own duties, the vassal not only broke the feudal law and could be called to account for it in the feudal court of his lord, but also broke an oath of fealty which he had taken. And this itself, in an age when an oath was taken upon the Cross or upon holy relics, and was considered sacred, was enough to brand him as a false knight and hold him up to infamy.

So the sanctions in the feudal system were both material and moral, as under any effective law. The difficulty was that too often the law could not be enforced, and it never could be enforced without war; hence a man might brave the moral sanctions if his material interests were involved and if he thought he had a chance in the ensuing conflict. It was thus an ineffectual system rather than an arbitrary or immoral one; and since it was also an unequal one, in that the peasants and lower classes had few rights, and those unenforceable without military power to back them, it was not one that would obtain the assent of more than a small minority. It was likely to endure only as long as the effective power could be kept within the small class of nobles. Later medieval and modern history can be viewed largely as the attempt to destroy the privileges of the upper class and replace them with a more equitable system, giving more rights to ever increasing numbers of people. The national state, under a monarch backed by a middle class which hardly existed in earlier medieval times, provided such a system, however imperfectly; and the establishment of national states in several European countries, coincident with the destruction of the greater part of the feudal system, may be said to mark the real beginning of modern history.

THE ROMAN HERITAGE

The origin of the feudal system lies far back in the Roman and Germanic past. In the later days of the Roman Empire, as we have seen, there was a tendency for the large estates to

¹ The word *suzerain* is used in this chapter to denote the superior lord in a lord-vassal relationship, although the word has in certain countries a definite technical meaning not applicable to all such overlords.



This castle at Obidos (Portugal), only slightly restored, is now a government hotel.

grow larger, and for the independent small landowner to put himself under the protection of a larger one, who was better able to defend himself against the encroaching barbarians. This practice was called *patrocinium*, or patronage. As a rule, military services were not required so much as cultivation of land, whether such land was given to the farmer by the lord or already belonged to him. This relationship between patron and client is entirely a late Roman feature, and has little to do with the patron-client relationship in earlier days, when the client was usually of the same social class but inferior in worldly goods.

During the period of the Merovingian kings there was as much danger to a small independent man as in the late Roman Empire. So we find in the early Middle Ages an established practice of *commendation* by a poor and landless man, who asked for protection from a noble in a better situation. The more powerful nobles could gather large bands of followers in this way; the greater they were, the more men would commend themselves to them, for the safer would be the protection. Some of these followers were lesser nobles themselves and not farmers, but for some reason they had lost their land. In these cases the patron, after commendation, would take them into his service as military followers.

Another heritage from Roman times was

similar to that of commendation. A free farmer who suffered from insecurity or had fallen into debt could yield up his land either to his creditor or to some noble, and ask for it back again as a tenant. This was called *precarium*, or requesting. Another form of *precarium* was simply the prayer by a landless farmer for some land to cultivate in exchange for goods and services. Since the noble had far too much land to cultivate himself, it was to his advantage to give it out to a good tenant. So the *precarium* helped him to take care of his needs, and was mutually advantageous. The Church, in particular, found the system valuable. It was forbidden to alienate Church lands altogether, but a precarious tenancy permitted it to have its lands cultivated without losing them; and in feudal times it had enough sanctions of its own peculiar kind at its disposal to permit it to protect its tenants as well as a secular lord.

The *precarium*, by the eighth century, had largely been replaced by the *beneficium*, or benefice, which was practically the same thing under a different name. Both were tantamount to leases of land for a limited period; but the later benefices rarely took land from freeholders and gave them back, for there was little such land available by this time. Benefices were given frequently by the great nobles to their officials and assistants in lieu of a money income. They were also given to lesser nobles who could

provide great nobles with troops paid for out of the proceeds of the benefice. The Carolingian kings gave out such benefices freely, in many cases including an immunity from taxation and the performance of feudal services; then the land was held as a virtual freehold.

THE GERMANIC HERITAGE

The development from Roman times seems to be fairly clear. But in the system described above there seems to be an obvious parallel with the German custom of *comitatus*, already noted. Here, it will be remembered, the old warrior bands of Germans used to join the troop of an independent chieftain, to whom they were bound by ties of honor and fealty and for whom they were ready to fight and die. It would seem that in the early feudal period, before Charlemagne, Roman custom was predominant, and that the precarious system noted above arose in response to the definite needs of the time. But the necessity, under Germanic influence, became converted into a virtue; and all the ancient sanctions of the *comitatus* were gradually invoked to tie the lesser landholder and benefice holder to his lord. Moral sanctions now became established in addition to sanctions that were merely legal, and in addition to the ordinary ties of self-interest between landlord and tenant. The vassal, as he shortly came to be called, owed loyalty and allegiance to his lord, a virtue conspicuously missing from late Roman and Merovingian times. This development corresponded with the increasing militarization of the whole society and with the rise of a class of nobles whose interest ceased to be in land. Though of course he had to own land, the noble gave out most of it again to vassals in exchange primarily, not for goods and ordinary menial and farming services, but for military service under his command.


It is in this post-Carolingian period that feudalism based on the possession of fiefs comes to the fore. A fief was really only a hereditary benefice,² but almost invariably the obligation

upon the vassal or fief holder was to supply warriors. Knights who could ride on horseback and provide their own equipment were the most valued. Anyone who could not do this was unlikely to be given a fief. Hence fief holders finally became warriors belonging to the class of the nobility, or churchmen with such warriors under them, who could perform the same service.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LORD AND VASSAL

The theoretical relationship—Practical complications—Subinfeudation. The developed feudal system thus contained the lord or suzerain who held his land, originally or theoretically, by gift from the king, who was in theory the owner of all the land. This suzerain let out most of his land to vassals in exchange for military and certain other stipulated services to be described later; but he retained some land as a demesne from which he obtained the subsistence required for himself, his family, his personal landless military retainers, and his servants. The land received as fiefs by his vassals could also be subdivided, and let out again as fiefs to yet other vassals who would perform for them the same services as they themselves performed for their suzerains. This was a method of passing on some of the military obligations to others, and was called subinfeudation. At times the greater lords tried to check excessive subinfeudation, since by it they tended to lose control of their subtenants, who owed them no direct allegiance and could be reached only through their own personal vassals.

At this stage the process is not too complicated. Diagrammatically, it would look like this:




But unfortunately it was not in practice so simple. Any vassal could hold any number of

² A fief was not necessarily even land. Some honor or right could be held as a fief, entailing the usual obligations of a vassal.

fiefs from different suzerains; and sooner or later it would happen that, say, Vassal 2 in the diagram above would have let out part of his land as a fief to Suzerain 1, and would thus be in the relationship of a vassal to the vassal of this suzerain (Vassal 1), and yet be a suzerain in relation to the suzerain of his own suzerain! If this appears complicated, it is only a reflection of the actual state of feudal society, and may be illustrated in a more complex diagram (arrows indicate the direction of the services rendered).

Part of Suzerain 2's land is held as fief from Suzerain 1, and another part, in a different locality, he has let out to the same suzerain:



Puzzle: What happens when Suzerain 2 decides he will cease performing feudal services for Suzerain 1, and what will Vassal 3 do when called out by his respective suzerains?

The answer to the puzzle is that, if a vassal were anxious to do the right thing, he would give his personal service to one lord while allowing his own vassals to perform the remainder of his service. But clearly this would not hold good if he were called out by two lords at the same time who happened to be at war with one another.

It can be easily seen from these diagrams and examples that there was endless occasion for feudal wars. These could hardly have been avoided even if the feudal aristocracy had not in any case regarded war as a positive pleasure, their one great vocation in life, while they were content to hand over the management of their estates, from which they obtained their subsistence, to baseborn hirelings.

The legal structure—The feudal court. In order to enforce his rights, the lord would periodically hold a court to which he summoned all his vassals. If any vassal did not appear, or if his equals in the court condemned him for

failure to perform his proper feudal services, his fief could be forfeited. If he were accused by another vassal in his lord's court, he could claim the right to single combat with his accuser. If he lost, he was presumed to be guilty.

The enforcement of the decree, however, was another matter. There were no means for driving him from a fief which he held in actual possession save war. It was thus of importance that all the vassals should sit on the court, since it was they also who would have to enforce the decree. If the guilty vassal had no greater lord to protect him, it was probable that the other vassals, fighting in unison under their suzerain, would succeed in compelling him to yield up the fief. It need hardly be emphasized how rough and ready such justice was; nor need it surprise us that many of the lesser nobility in later centuries supported the efforts of the kings to establish a king's justice, containing elements of Roman law, in preference to the feudal variety.

The duties of the lord toward his vassal. The lord, of course, provided the vassal with his land in the first place. But it was also his duty to protect this land and the vassal from other lords or invaders. In this he was, in theory, only protecting his own land. It was also his duty to protect the vassal in other ways. If, for instance, a vassal were summoned to the king's court for an offense, as became possible when the kings began to hold courts for the administration of justice, it was the lord's duty to defend him. In theory, if the lord did not fulfill his obligation to protect the vassal, the contract was terminated, and the vassal no longer owed him allegiance. We find Pope Gregory VII later using this as an excuse for his deposition of the German emperor, and it is the basis for the much later idea of the supposed social contract, under which, as expounded by the English theorist John Locke, the people were released from their allegiance to the king if he did not maintain their "natural rights."

The duties of the vassal toward his lord. The first duty of the vassal to his lord was allegiance, symbolized in the (Frankish) ceremony of homage. On being given, or on inheriting

ing, a fief, the vassal would kneel, place his two hands within those of his lord, and declare himself his man. If the lord accepted the homage he kissed him as a sign of recognition of his vassalage. Since in theory a fief was not hereditary, an heir, on coming into his father's estate, had to do homage for his fief, which could, in theory also, be refused. In practice, the eldest son of a vassal inherited the fief of his father, and merely had to do homage for it, perform certain special services, and pay special dues, the equivalent of an inheritance tax. If a vassal died without male heirs, then the fief theoretically escheated (was restored) to the suzerain, even if there were a surviving daughter. But in practice this daughter inherited it, though the suzerain took her under his protection and saw that she was provided with a suitable husband, who then undertook the duties of the vassal. If there were no heirs, male or female, then the land did escheat. The fief was not subdivided between many sons, but passed down intact to the eldest (primogeniture), who could, of course, let it out by subinfeudation if he desired.

The chief duty for most fief holders was to provide a stipulated number of knights (mounted warriors), calculated in accordance with the size of the fief. The custom, however, varied in different parts, as indeed did all feudal arrangements. These warriors were bound to serve only for a definite, quite limited, period, a fact which made long campaigns difficult. The period, as a rule, was forty days in each year. However, the lord could promise booty or other rewards and then have his vassals follow him voluntarily—as, for instance, when William the Conqueror invaded England on the understanding that there would be new fiefs for all. In later medieval periods the military service could be commuted for a sum of money called *scutage*. The money was often more appreciated by the lord than military service, since it enabled him to hire mercenaries who would serve for a longer period of time. The Church also on occasion paid *scutage* instead of military service, since it had easier access to money than to warriors. Nevertheless, most ecclesiastical fiefs had some military service to perform, which was usually done by subinfeudation to lords who were willing to undertake the service.

The vassal had the duty of providing hospitality to his lord when the latter visited him. As this visit might be very expensive if the lord arrived with a large retinue, it was limited by custom and sometimes was commuted for a regular sum of money. The vassal also, as we have seen, had to attend the lord's court when requested.

When the lord was in financial difficulties—as, for instance, if he were trying to raise money to go on a Crusade—the vassal could be called upon for a gift, known as an *aid*. Aids were also given for the ransoming of the lord, for the knighting of his eldest son, and for the marriage of his eldest daughter. These again were limited by custom according to the size and value of the fief.

A further sum of money, known as a *relief*, was provided by the vassal on certain specified occasions. When an heir inherited his fief, it was customary to pay a relief, which might amount to as much as a whole year's revenue. When the lord himself died and was succeeded by his heir, a relief was also paid. Lastly, when a vassal wished to transfer his fief to someone else (the equivalent of a sale), then he had to give a relief to the lord in exchange for his permission to the transfer. All these reliefs were fixed by custom, and when the money economy began to take the place of the earlier commodity economy, the reliefs usually took the form of money payments. An heiress who wished to marry without the consent of the suzerain might persuade him to give it by offering him a sum of money. One of the best, if most irregular, sources of income for a lord was from the fief of a minor, or of an unmarried girl, whom he looked after till he or she came of age. The child for the time gave up what would have been his rights had he been of age to become a vassal, and the lord took the income from his estate. The lord did not have to reimburse the child for any losses he sustained during his infancy.

It should be emphasized that the lord did not live off the income provided him by his vassals, which was quite limited and given only at irregular intervals. He lived off the income from his *demesne*, which contained his personal manors run by his servants. These will be dealt with in a later section. Every vassal belonged

to the feudal nobility himself, and he always possessed a demesne of his own unless he was a personal retainer living with his lord—a situation which became rare in the later feudal age. The primary purpose of the feudal system was to provide warriors for protection and prestige. It was the manorial system, the private demesnes of these feudal lords, which provided the economic base for the feudal system. The feudal nobility therefore was a military aristocracy which incidentally owned land, rather than a landed aristocracy which occasionally had to defend its property by military means. With the exception of the lord himself, the managers of the estates were of a different class from the nobility, were hired by them, and were treated as social inferiors. Most of the lords felt themselves too superior, and were too busy with their military affairs, to pay much attention to their estates. If this had not been so, they would not have given out so much of their land in financially unrewarding fiefs; they would, like the later Roman nobles, have lived in the lap of luxury from the intelligent exploitation of huge estates worked by laborers who could not rebel or leave the land.

THE SPECIAL POSITION OF THE FEUDAL KING

In view of the later importance of kings, a few words are necessary here on the anomalous position they occupied during the feudal age. Theoretically, as we have seen, the kings owned all the land, and every noble in a given country owed allegiance to his king. But, as a matter of historical fact, the greater nobles, perhaps the majority of them, had never received their land from a king, but had taken it for themselves during the period of disintegration following the breakup of the Carolingian Empire. The king, in fact, exercised very little power over them. The king's effective power was only what he derived from his own feudal estates, which were often, as in the case of France, by design of the nobles smaller in extent than those of many of the lords who owed nominal allegiance to him. The French lords, in choosing their king from the Capetian family, had probably agreed on the choice for the simple reason

that he was less powerful than they, and thus likely to present little threat to their power.

The king's position was naturally different in each country, according to the local conditions found there. The German king, who was usually also at the same time the Holy Roman emperor, was elected from among the German nobles; and, though there was a tendency to keep the office within certain families for long periods of time, it never did become formally a hereditary position. The king's power, as elsewhere, was derived from the estates of his house. His election as king conferred only prestige in addition to what he had had before, with two important exceptions. He had in his hands the appointment of the bulk of the higher clergy, a patronage that an astute monarch could manipulate to great advantage; and land left without heirs altogether escheated to him and not to any other noble. His prestige and title gave him the first refusal of the command in any all-German or all-European war, such as the Crusades. When the emperors tried to make good their claim to Italy, and sent a regular "Roman expedition" of German warriors over the Alps, their leadership was not challenged. For the rest, the only real feudal tie between the nobles and their elected monarch was the oath of allegiance which they took to him after election. The right to absolve from oaths, claimed by the papacy by virtue of its spiritual power, was indeed used as a political instrument for the deposition of an emperor. When Gregory VII wished to depose Henry IV of Germany, a prerogative naturally contested bitterly by this emperor, he solemnly absolved all the German nobles from their oaths of allegiance so that they could elect another emperor.

In England, after the conquest by Duke William of Normandy, the kings of his line actually did own all the land, since it had been acquired by conquest. They gave it out as fiefs, with certain restrictions on the raising of private armies which will be discussed in a later chapter on the rise of the English national state. It is only important here to note that in England the theory corresponded to the actual facts, with incalculable advantages for the monarchy.

The position of the French king, however,

is of greatest interest, since the Capetian kings used their theoretical powers and their prestige to such good effect that they were ultimately able to unify France under their rule. Hugh Capet and his successors actually owned only a small compact area around Paris. They owned this as counts, and their armies were only such as could be drawn from this comparatively small territory. Yet, as kings, they were socially of a higher rank than any of the more powerful lords in their realm. They were solemnly anointed as kings by the archbishop of Reims, and made to swear a coronation oath under which they promised to defend the humble, help the oppressed, preserve peace, maintain justice, and perform a number of other functions which were fantastically outside the scope of their real powers. But in theory they were expected to do this, and in their efforts they could usually count on the full support of the Church and the ecclesiastical officials, who had nothing, as a rule, to gain from the lawlessness created by the independent nobles. In addition, the king held in his hands much of the best patronage of the Church, especially in northern France.

The king, as theoretical owner of all the land in the territory vaguely called France, was owed allegiance by all the lords in his realm. His prestige was such that most nobles, at all events those of French origin, usually did perform the act of homage once in their lives; it cost them nothing, since the king was not in a position to take away their fiefs, and they did not have to give him anything substantial unless he was in a position to compel them. He was theoretically entitled to the usual military service from them, and could summon them to his court for the administration of justice. None of these rights was worth much as long as the kings were unable to enforce them. But in a society which laid so much store by custom and loyalty, they were not negligible. And the king had one immense advantage which was ultimately to prove crucial: If any lord did not obey the summons issued by him, then the lord was in the wrong. The king had the feudal law on his side if he went to war with the rebellious noble, and he had the right to call upon all the other lords in the kingdom to aid in punishing the

rebel. Naturally the other nobles would consult their own interests in deciding whether or not they would obey the king; but it happened frequently enough that these interests would best be served by joining him and dispossessing the rebellious vassal. Philip Augustus used this power with extreme skill and effectiveness against his English vassal, John, king of England, as will be seen in more detail in Chapter 11. Philip in fact owned less land even in France than John himself. When John refused to obey his summons, Philip called upon the other French nobles to dispossess him; and since John commanded few French sympathies, Philip was able to take away the bulk of his lands and bestow them on his own followers as fiefs—with the great difference that Philip was now their real overlord, and not merely a theoretical one.

Finally, the king had all the social prestige belonging to his title. His wife would be queen, unlike the wife of any other noble—a position naturally sought after by heiresses. The king was often chosen as the most fitting protector of minors and of young women who had not yet found a suitable husband. And, like the German emperor, the French king was the natural leader for a crusade or other foreign war if he wished to go. It can be seen, therefore, that in shrewd and able hands the position of king, in spite of his relative poverty, had certain manifest advantages over the rest of the feudal nobility; and perhaps it will no longer seem so strange that from these small beginnings the French monarch was ultimately able to unify France and effectively control that feudal nobility which had elected him in the first place with far different expectations.

THE FEUDAL LORD AND LADY

The life of the feudal lord need not detain us long. Since their primary task was to provide protection for their family and retainers, all the greater lords tended to live in castles which were fortified to the best of their ability and surrounded by a moat. The castles themselves were often primitive enough. They were damp and unattractive inside, unless the lord was able to buy luxuries from the Orient, as many were



This medieval miniature shows the Israelite general Joab entertaining Abner, whom he is planning to murder. As in all these miniatures, the picture faithfully represents the illustrator's contemporary experience, and the feasting scene depicted here is no doubt authentically medieval. From a Picture Bible (French), ca. 1250. (COURTESY THE PIERPONT MORGAN LIBRARY, Ms. 638, folio 37)

able to do in the later Middle Ages. The lord himself, if he was a typical medieval aristocrat, enjoyed hunting and fighting; if there were no real wars to be fought, he engaged in jousting—mock battles which could be dangerous enough to the participants. He ate heartily, meat and venison predominating in his diet. His lady superintended the household, and busied herself in embroidery and needlework. Not infrequently she had to undertake the administrative duties of her husband as well as her own. If he went on a Crusade, she had to manage the fief; if he were killed on campaign, she had to undertake all his duties until she found herself a new husband or one was found for her by her relatives or by her late husband's suzerain. She might have to negotiate with her suzerain lord for permission to be allowed to remain a widow.

If a noble lady did not find a husband or did not care for the choices made by her male relatives, she could go to a convent. If she did not bear a child to her lord, preferably a male, then there was not usually much difficulty in finding some high cleric who would declare that the marriage was within the prohibited degrees and thus null and void from the beginning. This annulment was not too hard to reconcile with a clerical conscience, since so many members of the nobility were indeed closely related to one another.

In the later Middle Ages a code of chivalry, especially extolled by wandering troubadours and minstrels, sprang up, many features of which tended to glorify womanhood, making use of more romantic conceptions than were current in real life. The young knight was expected to form



Two knights do battle for a demoiselle, who is seen watching the combat. From a miniature, Tristan, ca. 1450. (COURTESY THE PIERPONT MORGAN LIBRARY. Ms. 41, folio 49)

a romantic attachment to a lady of the court, who was to be his ideal and for whom he was expected to perform deeds of gallantry. He was always to observe perfect courtesy toward her, including the courtesy of loving and cherishing her above all other women. When he went out in the world, it was the custom for the knight to defend her honor and challenge to combat any who spoke words against her. The cult of chivalry glorified the feudal ideals, separating them from the practices of the day, which were far from noble in our sense of the word. And in turn this movement had its effect upon feudal practices, softening them and making them, in fact, more "noble" than they had been. Knight-hood, with its many ceremonies, was stressed as the great and noble goal to which all youths of aristocratic rank should aspire, and knights were urged to keep faith, to speak the truth at all times, to protect the weak, and to practice numerous other virtues.

THE POSITION OF THE CHURCH IN THE FEUDAL SYSTEM

It has already been noted that the Carolingian monarchs appointed their own clergy and expected the clergy to perform duties on their behalf. In general it may be said that

throughout Europe in the early Middle Ages the king and the nobility were the patrons of the Church and made all appointments, right down to the parish priests, who had the actual task of ministering to the spiritual needs of the people. The local higher clergy might have some say in the appointments, but since they too were drawn from the noble class, their choices were not likely to differ greatly from those made by the noble lords themselves. The quality of the clergy under these conditions was not likely to be high. Most appointments were given to relatives, to friends, or to those who could afford to buy them. The reason for this system of patronage was simply that the clergy, like everyone else, had to live. They could live only from the continuing income assured by the possession of land; and in order to possess land they had to fulfill the feudal obligations that went with it. In the early Middle Ages rulers and nobles certainly chose their appointees from those who were noted for competence rather than for piety.

So the Church itself became part of the feudal system, with the higher clergy drawn from the feudal class and performing feudal duties in addition to their tasks as clerics. On the other hand, the Church did have one manifest advantage in a rude age; it had at its

disposal all the powers of compulsion wielded by the nobility. The clergy could discipline their flocks, even if they had to bow to their own feudal overlords; and they had their own courts in which to try offenders against ecclesiastical law and regulations. They could enforce their decisions either by exacting spiritual punishments (penances) or by handing over offenders to the secular authorities. On the whole, with certain notorious exceptions, it would seem that their influence was exercised in a more humane manner than that of the nobles; moreover, their influence on the nobility was not negligible, and probably greater than it would have been had they belonged to a different and more despised class.

❖ The manorial system—Economic basis of feudalism

Under the feudal system the entire noble class was supported ultimately by the labor of the peasantry, the sole producers in feudal society outside the few towns. As we have seen, most feudal lords gave away the greater part of their land to vassals in exchange for military service. But all lords, whether owning large or small estates, were compelled to keep some land which was cultivated for their own use. From this land

they obtained the bulk of their income, since the feudal aids and reliefs were comparatively small in total and only reached them at irregular intervals. The income from their own estates or manors was, on the contrary, entirely regular, and under their own control, either directly or through officials appointed by and responsible to themselves. Only from the proceeds of their manors could they pay for the soldiers they were forced to furnish to their lords, and make the various feudal payments described above. It was therefore necessary for every lord to keep in his hands as many manors as was necessary for the purpose. A wealthy lord, with large obligations, might have a considerable number of manors, quite beyond his ability to supervise personally even if he had the competence. These manors were supervised by bailiffs and stewards, who in every respect drew their authority from him, and carried out his orders as his representatives.

MANORIAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY

The lord's demesne Every manorial estate had on it a manor house inhabited by the lord or his officials, a certain amount of arable and pasture land, and probably some forest land. There was probably also a parish church, whose priest lived in his own house and was appointed



Óbidos, in Portugal, stands at the top of a hill overlooking a valley. Within the walls, which completely surround the village, live a few hundred people; their houses are only slightly modernized from medieval times. This is one of the two European cities which still possess their medieval walls intact (the other being Carcassonne).

to his position by the lord. There was a village where the peasants lived, together with other workers required by the estate but not employed on the land—such men as blacksmiths, wheelwrights, shoemakers, and other specialized workers.

A portion of the land, fixed by custom, as everything else on a manor, was set aside as the lord's personal demesne. It was seldom more than a third of the whole property and might be as little as a sixth. This land was worked for him by the peasants, usually under the direct supervision of one of their number chosen by the other peasants, and according to the instructions of the lord or steward. When they were working on the lord's land the supervisor had authority to beat the peasants if they did not work hard enough. All the produce from the lord's demesne belonged to the lord and constituted the major source of his income.

The land of the peasants The remainder of the manorial land was worked by the peasants for their own account, whether they were free-men or serfs, and was subject to taxation. Each peasant had a certain acreage allotted to him, varying from a half dozen to about thirty acres. But the acres were not all together, making up a self-contained farm. They were in strips, each strip containing about an acre, and each of the length that a team of oxen could plow before it needed to take a rest (from which comes the measure *furlong*—furrow long). A peasant's strips were separated from each other, sometimes by a quite considerable distance, perhaps in order to give each peasant his fair share of the best and the worst land. Among these strips were also the strips belonging to the lord, which had to be cultivated by the peasants without profit.

The peasant lived in the village in a small thatched hut. The hut had a small plot of land attached to it, which he could use as he wished. In this he grew vegetables and kept a few chickens or geese, which could pick up enough food to sustain life and yield a few eggs a year. He lived on black bread, fresh vegetables if he was thrifty enough to grow them, porridge, cheese, very occasionally meat or fish, and wine. The staple field crops to which he had access were rye and wheat, planted in the fall, and barley,

oats, beans, peas, and sometimes spring rye, planted in the spring and harvested in the fall of the same year. Rye was the cereal used most for the peasant's bread, wheat for his lord's.

Subsidiary workers on the manor Many of the menial tasks were done for the lord by free peasants and serfs. In the lord's mill millers were needed, and bakers for the lord's household. These men might receive full-time employment from the lord, or they might also have a few strips to cultivate. The blacksmith, carpenter, mason, and the rest had their houses in the village and might combine their specialized work with agricultural labor. The aim of the lord was naturally to be as self-sufficient on his manor as possible, for money was scarce and there were some items which must be imported, such as salt, spices, and all the luxuries for which he could pay. Moreover, it was only the surplus of the manor that provided him with such money as he had, and therefore it was not to his interest to keep more peasants working on the land than could be profitably employed. It was better to use any surplus labor on the manufacture of goods that could be exported and bring him some cash income. Indeed, one of the reasons for the later improvement of the status of the peasantry was the taste for luxury acquired by the lord, which forced him to improve his system of production; this often meant hiring free laborers, organizing them more efficiently, and allowing the manufacturing part of the village to become specialized into a town.

Status of the peasant In practice, the peasant was not altogether without rights, though in theory his lord could do almost anything he wished with him. The lord could if necessary enforce his own rights in the manorial court, presided over by himself or his steward. Here also serfs could obtain justice against other serfs, and villeins against villeins.³ But no class had any rights against a higher class.

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³ A *villein*, by derivation, means simply a "villager." Customarily it is used to designate a peasant who was theoretically not a serf, but was at the same time not wholly free, owing to his lord special manorial services not owed by the real freeman.



Dances in the street. From a Book of Hours (French), ca. 1474. (COURTESY THE PIERPONT MORGAN LIBRARY. Ms. 677, folio 137)

Amusements of the peasantry The peasant's life was hard, and, as we shall see, a very large percentage of the fruits of his labor was yielded up to the lord. But there were certain compensations of a simple kind. He did not have to work, and was indeed forbidden to work, on Sundays, and on the festivals of a considerable number of saints. On these festival days there was always dancing in the village—in the parish hall if there was one; if not, in the streets or even in the church itself. Two or three times a year most lords entertained their peasantry—especially at harvest time, or after the hay was in; after sowing; and at the great festivals, especially Christmas, when the peasants decorated the manor house and were allowed to enjoy themselves in it afterward. In wine country there was always a vintage festival. Some-

times jugglers and acrobats came through the village and performed for the villagers either in the manor house or in the parish hall. In the later Middle Ages fairs became common to which the peasants could take their produce and enjoy themselves in the towns for the day.

Though these occasional joys did not compensate for the hardness of the peasants' work and the scantiness of their reward, they did mitigate their lot. We should remember also the fact that every peasant had a secure place, however humble, in his society; that he belonged to the same religion as his neighbors and had to cooperate with them every minute of his life. He was dependent upon them, as they upon him. When one considers all that this means for psychological security, it can be more easily understood why, even in our own century, those


who were compelled by circumstances to come to America have not always made their peace with it until the second generation.

THE INCOME OF THE LORD OF THE MANOR

From his demesne land The lord's land was cultivated by his peasants, and he took the produce from it. Though the lord in theory could make unlimited demands upon the labor of his peasants, custom usually regulated the limit placed on it in fact. The regular work was called *week work*, and limited as a rule to not more than three days a week. The time depended naturally upon the size of the lord's land and the number of peasants available. At certain times the peasant could be called upon for additional work, as at harvest time. This was called

boon work, and included such extra duties as bringing in firewood and hay for the lord. Finally, the peasant was made to do forced labor on the estate, such as digging ditches and making roads, while his wife and children might be called upon for housework in the manor. This labor was called *corvée*. The amount of *corvée* required was again regulated by custom as well as by the need of the lord, and depended upon the status of the peasant—whether he was a serf or technically a freeman. The building and repairing of a castle were a very heavy burden on the peasant, but they were done by *corvée*.

From the peasants' land—Different forms of taxation The lord was not content with having his peasants work his own land for his benefit. In numerous ways he levied toll upon



Farm animals. From a miniature, Petrus Crescentius, ca. 1460. (COURTESY THE PIERPONT MORGAN LIBRARY. Ms. 232, folio 212)

what the peasant produced for himself. The levies were not arbitrary, but fixed by custom; this, however, did not prevent them from being very heavy, and there was nothing except the probable resistance of the peasants, perhaps by armed revolt, to prevent the lord from increasing them.

There was usually a head tax paid annually by all serfs, and there was a direct tax upon the property of every peasant, known as tallage (French *taille*). There were many "gifts" to be made at specified seasons of the year, and there was a special tax to be paid when a serf inherited his land. The last two were similar to feudal aids. These taxes were seldom excessive, and could be regarded as the equivalent of rent, while the tilling of the lord's land could be regarded as a form of sharecropping—though a modern sharecropper does not have to pay rent too!

But far more annoying and probably more costly in actual cash or produce paid out were the payments that had to be made for the use of various facilities provided by the lord, whether the peasants wished to use them or not. The lord, for instance, provided a bake oven, and the peasant was not permitted to make one for himself. He had to use the lord's bake oven and pay a fee for the privilege. He was not permitted to grind his own wheat, but had to use the lord's mill and the services of his millers, who usually cheated him. He was made to buy wine whether he wanted it or not, use the lord's winepress, and use the lord's hull for breeding; moreover, the lord erected toll houses on his roads and bridges, which everyone had to use. These nuisance taxes were called *banalités* and were extremely difficult to get rid of. The French nobles never gave them up till the French Revolution, and they were largely responsible for the fact that the conservative peasants helped to foment it. And always, the lord could enforce the payment of fines for breaking his regulations, and impose fines for any other breach of the peace or misdemeanor brought to him for trial.

It is impossible to say what percentage of the actual produce of his manor went into the lord's pocket by one device or another. But it was certainly a large one, and kept the peasants

from accumulating much that they could call their own. It sufficiently accounts for the ability of the feudal nobility to engage in their pleasant pursuits in spite of the low production of the manorial economy.

THE PEASANT'S INCOME

What he had left over after paying all taxes and fines belonged to the peasant. Though it was not much, there would be something if the land were fertile and he and his wife were good managers. He could convert his produce into cash at the fairs, and we do know that enough agricultural produce found its way into the towns to feed the townsmen, though some of it also came from the lord's demesne and what he had collected in kind from the peasantry. There might be enough in the peasant's sock or mattress to pay a small amount to the priest to educate his son, or to pay the apprentice's fee for his son to learn a trade in a town. But seldom do we hear of any luxury in the peasant's home. It would, in any case, only have invited unpleasant attention from his lord.

It should be noted that if a serf stayed away from his manor for a year and a day, he earned his freedom. This was probably the principal loophole through which he was able to put an end to his servitude. With the growth of towns (to be described in the next section), there was some other place for him to go. When Crusades were called, the lords were under great pressure from the Church and public opinion to allow the serfs to leave. Few returned alive, and those who did survive naturally did not return to the manors.

The lord's desire for luxuries beyond what an ordinary manor could provide under its generally inefficient management was also an aid to the peasants. More efficient management meant fewer serfs, and large numbers were freed, especially from the thirteenth century onward. In later times it was found that sheep raising earned larger dividends. This discovery gave rise to the enclosure movement, which turned many former manors into estates run by a few laborers, though at the cost of great hardship to peasants who found themselves deprived by legal means of their strips. When the kings

began to establish their authority over the feudal nobility, they found themselves in constant need of mercenary soldiers. These again came from the ranks of the peasantry, and no lord could pursue and bring back a peasant who had joined the king's army. Other peasants were freed by the simple process of emigration to new lands in Northeastern Europe. These lands, settled from the thirteenth century onward, were in dire need of labor, which could be recruited only from the more thickly settled territories of Western Europe.

The manorial system itself survived for many centuries, but it was greatly transformed. The servile status of the peasants and the legal power of the lords disappeared first, and in most Western countries did not survive the thirteenth century. Tenant farmers and small proprietors took the place of serfs, the former still bound by the ancient customs and the ancient taxes, and still forced on occasion to do *corvée* and to pay the *banalités*. But when the taxes were raised, the peasants soon learned that they had the power to revolt. And though the revolts were usually mercilessly suppressed, reforms did come in time, for the lords as well as the peasants were the losers by them.

More than anything else, it was probably the inefficiency of the early manorial system that condemned it. With the growth of towns and the commercial revolution, a more efficient use had to be made of the land; and this could be provided neither by the warrior class of feudal nobility nor by the manorial system which nourished it.

♦ The urban sector—Rise of the towns

In the early Middle Ages there was very little industry; and because there was little industry, there was little trade. It was some centuries before the old trade and industry of the Roman Empire fell into complete decay. But by the time of Charlemagne almost all the manufactured goods in Western Europe were produced either in small villages or on the manors. In short, the economy of the early Middle Ages was overwhelmingly rural. The

small agricultural surplus from the manors provided almost the only articles that entered into commerce, and the great bulk of what there was available was merely exchanged on a barter basis for the produce of other manors.

In the East, on the other hand, the Byzantine Empire was still a center of industry. But few of its manufactures could be taken by the West, which had so little to offer in exchange for them; the bulk of the meager supply of precious metals found its way to Constantinople and the East, and the gold, at least, could not be replaced from domestic sources. In the time of Charlemagne the only coins in general circulation were made of copper; the larger denominations of money were used simply as units for measurement. The one exception to the uniform lack of important cities in the West was Venice, a city built almost upon the sea itself, founded in the sixth century as a refuge for fugitives from the invasions. Unlike the Mediterranean seaports, Venice was immune from Muslim ravages; and it kept up a trade with Constantinople based on its own products as well as on those few items which were manufactured in the West. But Venice, though geographically in Italy, was a city whose civilization was far closer to that of Byzantine than of Western Europe. Indeed, for centuries it was nominally a part of the Byzantine Empire, although in fact self-governing.

By the eleventh century the Italian seaports of Genoa, Pisa, and Amalfi had begun a revival which culminated in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The Crusades, to be described in the next chapter, were of great assistance to all the medieval maritime cities. Not only did they make profits from transporting those Crusaders to the East who could afford the cost, but they were able to bring back to the West the Oriental luxuries they found in the hitherto more prosperous and economically developed East. They also kept the Crusaders who stayed in the East supplied with those Western products which continued to interest them. In part as a consequence of the First Crusade, and in part as a consequence of the conquest of Sicily by the Normans in the eleventh century (a conquest aided by the Genoese), Genoa and Pisa increased their trade with the Muslim countries




The Palace of the Doge (Duke) of Venice. Note the Byzantine influence. (COURTESY ITALIAN STATE TOURIST OFFICE)

of North Africa and gradually ousted the Muslims from the carrying trade of the western Mediterranean. Venice, however, was the greatest gainer from the Crusades, and the notorious Fourth Crusade, which was diverted to Constantinople and will be described in the next chapter, was under Venetian direction.

In the rest of Europe there were still few towns of any size by the time of the First Crusade (1095). Milan, Florence, Lucca and other inland Italian towns had continued their separate existence from Roman times, but had shrunk in the early Middle Ages to a fraction of their former size. The manors were largely self-sufficient, and from most of them there was only a small surplus available for trade, far too little to support the needs of a whole group of specialized workers who would have formed the population of a town. Only a few nobles and higher clergy, with the produce of many manors to draw upon, could guarantee a regular supply of food and at the same time provide a market for the specialized wares of a town. In those days of poor transportation, it was essential that a surplus move regularly into a town, or that the

townsmen themselves spend a large part of their time in agriculture. In the earliest medieval towns we find, as a rule, both of these conditions fulfilled. A noble or a bishop with his entourage would live in a town and provide it with its market from the produce of his lands. The workers themselves, who lived there under his protection, looked after some of their own food supply while at the same time producing various specialized wares for exchange. A very few continuously inhabited cities, centered in strategic places on trade routes, might be able to make their living from trade and industry alone, exchanging their products for agricultural goods drawn from fairly wide areas. But, on the whole, the vast majority of towns were of the first kind—the seats of lords or bishops who provided the food and protection needed by the townsmen.

During the period of the Viking invasions in the ninth and tenth centuries the towns suffered severely. It was the custom of the marauders to ascend the rivers in their boats, sacking and pillaging. At the end of the season they would return to their own countries, Al-



most every city in Western Europe was sacked at one time or another by the Vikings, and defense against their raids was exceedingly difficult. Usually the Vikings did not wait to fight; if any army approached it was easy to escape by water, and it was impossible for an army to pursue them. Only slowly did the feudal nobility and the townsmen learn to defend themselves against such aggression; and by the time they had learned the Vikings themselves were ready to settle down. The taming of the invaders, and the lessened interest of the feudal lords in fratricidal warfare provided the opportunity for the towns to resume their growth.

THE ESCAPE FROM FEUDAL SERVITUDE

The majority of European towns, as has been noted, owed their very foundation to feudal lords or to the higher clergy. As the towns began to grow, merchants—men engaged exclusively in trade, who had been free for generations and had never been personally dependent upon feudal overlords—began to settle there permanently. It was natural that these men should resent the disabilities placed upon them because the town itself was subordinate to the lords. They began to think themselves capable of making their own defense without calling upon their lord; and yet within the city the lord had certain traditional rights of collecting tolls and rents which seriously interfered with the merchants' freedom and ability to make profits. Lords, in other words, ceased to be worth their keep, from the townsmen's point of view, and at the same time, as their demands for money and luxuries increased, especially after the Crusades, they tended to try to milk the burghers or townsmen for more.

So we find from as early as the end of the eleventh century onward efforts made by towns throughout Europe to escape from the galling restrictions of an earlier age. It was not difficult for the burghers to recognize their strong position against the aristocracy. The lords possessed military power, and they had the old feudal law on their side. On the other hand, if they used this military power, they would destroy the source of their income. They needed regular income, not one single great looting followed by

nothing. If they destroyed a town, they would have to rebuild it afterward or forego their income. If traders refused to trade because conditions were made too onerous, then likewise no tolls could be collected. Most independent lords in these circumstances found it better to compromise with their towns, drawing up a charter stating exactly what the towns had to do for them, what rents and tolls had to be paid, what scutage or commutation of military service had to be paid, if any, what hospitality and similar feudal services were owed. They thus saved themselves from possible total loss through successful revolt.

Very great lords, and kings, not being dependent in the same way upon their income from any particular town, could hold out against the demands of the towns and could even afford to inflict punishment upon them. On the other hand, these great lords could provide the towns with more efficient protection and were thus worth more of what they cost the burghers than was the smaller lord. So we find that in countries where there was an efficient central government under a king, the towns maintained only a limited independence and usually did not have their rights confirmed by charters. This was the case in England, and in France after the thirteenth century—where, indeed, many towns lost their charters after the king had established his supremacy over the whole country. On the other hand, the Italian and German burghers, living in countries where the official ruler exercised only sporadic and never very efficient control, were able to secure and maintain their independence far more effectively. The northern Italian towns united in the Lombard League were able to defeat and force concessions from even such a powerful ruler as Frederic Barbarossa, and in a later age were able to hold their own against the even more powerful Frederic II.

Some cities, however, had to fight long and hard for their freedom. Many of the higher clergy and the nobility refused to accept the inevitable peacefully, and resisted the rising power of the bourgeoisie with all the force at their disposal. Bishops, especially bishops who had purchased their office and expected to make the town pay their debts, were often the last to

accept the new order. Many towns had to fight hard against the bishop and his hired mercenaries, and cases of a victorious bishop's looting his own town are not unknown.

THE GOVERNMENT OF A COMMUNE

Self-governing towns, with or without a charter, are usually called communes. The essential element of a commune was its right to be treated as a whole, a corporation, as distinct from its constituent members. The town as a whole undertook obligations toward the lords and received privileges in return, thus making a distinct break with feudal traditions, whose obligations were always binding upon individual persons and not on groups. To fulfill these obligations the town had to be self-governing, assessing taxes and duties upon its citizens and paying them in a lump sum to the lord. Though its independence might be limited by the terms

of its charter, and it might not have full control of its foreign relations, within the city itself the government was substantially autonomous. And when the charter could not be easily enforced, as in the cities of northern Italy, they became for all practical purposes city-states not unlike those of the ancient world.

The government of the towns varied in different parts of Europe; almost the only generalization that can be safely made is that the richer merchants usually had effective control, unless the town was still ruled by its hereditary feudal aristocracy. As early as the twelfth century efforts were made by the lower classes to take away the monopoly of power from the richer merchants, who were able to use it tyrannically in the interests of their class. At one time the commune of Milan was ruled briefly by a kind of trade union of workers. But none of these efforts was permanently successful, and the oligarchy was eventually replaced, not by a



The Cloth Hall of Ypres (Belgium), one of the most perfect examples of a medieval commercial building. The hall was destroyed during World War I. (COURTESY BELGIUM GOVERNMENT INFORMATION CENTER)

more democratically based government, but by the one-man rule of the despot, merchant, feudal prince, or some adventurer.

THE MERCHANT GUILDS

In a static society, in which it was generally believed that only a limited quantity of trade and industry was possible, all efforts were directed toward ensuring that foreigners should have as little share of it as could be managed, and that the workers in the city should all be assured of a reasonable living and secure employment. Competition was frowned upon, especially unfair competition by such means as price cutting. Rather, cooperation was the ideal, enforced by strict regulation on the part of the authorities.

The earliest form of organization within the towns was the merchant guild, or guild merchant. This was originally a union of merchants and traders, including also the upper class of artisans; and its purpose was to prevent foreign competition and to divide up the home trade equitably among the members. In some cases the merchant guild came into existence even before a town had a charter, and indeed it was often the guild which succeeded in extracting the charter from the overlord of the town. In many towns the guild afterward became the actual municipal government. The merchant guild, like the later craft guild, was a closed shop; traders who did not belong to the guild found themselves excluded from trade within the city.

The monopolies held in trade matters varied from town to town. Reciprocal privileges could be granted to foreign traders when they seemed to be in the interest of the guild, but severe penalties were always enforced against price cutters. It was possible to enforce penalties because exclusion from a guild meant that the offending trader lost his business. Cases are also known of the assaulting and beating of offenders.

THE CRAFT GUILDS

Purpose and function The craft guild was an organization formed to protect the working

conditions in a particular industry and also to protect the public. Not all industries were formed into guilds, and the guild organization was not uniform throughout Europe, being strongest in the German and northern towns and weakest in Italy. The regulations of the craft guild were very rigid and very strictly enforced, but always logically worked out to attain certain objectives.

The product had to be sold at a just price, which included the cost of labor and raw materials. It is clear that if any artisan skimped on his material, used inferior workmanship, or cut wages, then the resulting product would be priced too high in relation to its actual value if the price were the same as for goods of standard quality; and of course price cutting was strictly forbidden. Regulations governing the standard of quality were set up by the guild masters in each guild, since only these experts could determine what was the correct quality in their particular craft.

Hours of labor were prescribed and enforced. Nightwork was, as a rule, entirely forbidden, both because it tended to spoil the quality of the work and because the worker who labored for additional hours would in this way be able to get ahead of his neighbors. If one group of workers did overtime, it was clear to the medievals that others would have to do the same, in the same way that one price cutter would force all others to cut their prices too. Improved methods of manufacture were not regarded kindly if introduced by individual craftsmen; it was therefore usual to insist that any such improvements should be agreed to by the guild, which would have the opportunity of spreading the information among all its members.

Advertising of all kinds was forbidden. No salesman could draw attention to his wares in any manner whatever; even a diplomatic sneeze when a customer passed was considered improper and, in one place, was forbidden. Craftsmen had to do their work in shops which were visible from the street so that their practices were at all times open to inspection. Shops were limited in size so that no master could become a regular employer of labor, and thus drive

down his costs and perhaps cut prices; and it was forbidden also to attempt to entice away workers from a rival shop.

In brief, the central ideas of the craft guilds were that there was enough work for all if everyone worked for reasonable hours and produced goods of first-rate quality; that every article had a fair price which customers should be able to pay; that the customer who paid this fixed price should be protected from his probable ignorance of the quality of his purchase; and that there was no need to cut this price, since everyone would suffer, and in a limited market no increased business for all would result.

Internal organization of the craft guild
The young artisan first entered the guild by becoming apprentice to a master, on payment of a fee. The apprenticeship might last for as long as twelve years, depending on the nature of the particular craft; the usual period for most crafts was seven years. The boy, however, became an apprentice when his family signed an indenture. It was the master's task to supervise the boy's morals and behavior as well as his work. The apprentice boarded at the master's home, and had to obey his orders in everything. When the apprenticeship was over and the boy was thoroughly trained in his craft, he became a journeyman (dayworker) and was free to leave his master and take work at regular wages wherever he could find it. He could stay on with his master, and perhaps it was the usual custom in early times for him to do so. But in certain trades, especially the building trade, it was of great advantage for the journeyman to work in foreign cities, improving his knowledge of his trade by examining or taking part in the building of churches, cathedrals, and public offices.

In the early Middle Ages there was no difficulty in the way of a journeyman who wanted to set himself up as a master. While business was gradually increasing, there was enough work for all; and the guild had no objections, provided the journeyman had sufficient savings to enable him to purchase the shop and the raw materials and had a wife who could take care of his apprentices. He had to

pass an examination before the guild master (or warden), demonstrating his efficiency and his good character and financial standing. Foreign journeymen were sometimes admitted as masters in early times, though in later times, when the market had become saturated, this practice was abandoned.

All artisans were theoretically members of the guild, though apprentices could not take part in elections or in the management of the guild until they became journeymen. In later times journeymen were also excluded, leaving the guild a monopoly of the masters. As trade increased and serfdom declined it became increasingly difficult to maintain the monopoly; but for a long time the masters attempted to maintain it by every means at their disposal. Before the middle of the fourteenth century apprentices and journeymen probably did not feel the guild as a restriction upon their freedom. There really was enough work for all at a fair price, and an apprentice could look forward to a secure future and ultimately a mastership in his chosen craft. But from this time the situation changed seriously for the worse, as will be discussed in Chapter 13.

MARKETS AND FAIRS

So far in this section we have considered primarily the larger towns and the manner in which industry came to be organized in them. But it should always be remembered that until the later Middle Ages the towns were scarce. Much more common were very small towns, or large villages, which acted almost exclusively as centers for the exchange of the surplus produce of the manors. But even people in the larger towns had to eat; and though some food was always produced within the borders of the towns, for the most part the townsmen bought their supplies in the markets, which existed in every town of any size.

The lord of the manor, as we have seen, had his own land worked by the peasants. But he also required payment in money from his peasants for many of their manorial dues, and the peasants on most manors had only one place to go for money—the town. Likewise, if the

lord had many manors and wanted to convert his surplus produce into cash for luxuries, he too had to patronize the town. The townsmen also displayed their wares for the countryfolk, and supplied them with the few things they could afford.

In the early Middle Ages the towns and their markets were usually under the protection of some lord, or even the king. The lord gave his permission for a regular market to be held, usually once a week, in exchange for market dues to be paid to him. If the market was the center of a flourishing area with many manors, there was probably enough surplus food, as well as agricultural raw materials such as flax, for the merchant to buy in quantity for export. The markets therefore to some extent served as feeders for the export trade as well as centers for the exchange of agricultural and urban goods.

A market on a much larger scale was the international fair, held in some area with easy access by boat or road. Preparations for these fairs might take weeks, while the goods were being assembled from all parts of the country, or indeed from many parts of Europe. Transactions were carried out on a considerable scale and needed many special arrangements. Certain lords took a keen interest in these fairs, since they could be made into an excellent source of income if handled honestly and with benefit to all concerned. The greatest European fairs during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were those held in the plain of Champagne, under the patronage of the counts of Champagne, who were responsible for their management. Safe passage to the fair through the count's territories was guaranteed, and extended as far as possible beyond them. The Church also lent what protection it could. The fairs were under the management of a warden, with a considerable staff under him made up of weighers, measurers, porters, and such; and they were well policed. A special seal of the fair was used to authenticate all purchases made by contract; and, of course, money-changers had to be present to facilitate trade between the participants from countries with different monies. Moneylenders were also to be found for those

who needed quick cash. Storage facilities were provided, as well as entertainment of all kinds—minstrels, jongleurs, dancers, clowns, and all other amusements which appealed to medieval people. Peasants were usually permitted to make at least one trip to the fairs by their manorial lords. Even though they might lack money to make purchases, they could always enjoy themselves at small expense.

ATTITUDE OF THE CHURCH TO URBAN ACTIVITY

A few words should be said in conclusion regarding the attitude of the Church toward business activity. In general, it may be said that the Church was in full sympathy with the monopolistic tendencies of the guilds. It was the belief of the Church, as of most people in the Middle Ages, that every man was born to a certain position in society, in which he was expected to remain. His economic needs were determined by his status. A noble was naturally entitled to consume more than a peasant, and it was permissible for him to indulge in display and to consume luxuries which would have been out of place in the life of an artisan or a peasant. If the latter had aspirations beyond their station, then it was likely that these were dictated by envy or pride, deadly sins condemned by the Church and society. If the common man had a desire for luxury or display, he must be actuated by some form of sensuality, another sin. If he simply wished to accumulate wealth, then he was motivated by avarice; or if he wished to consume too many of the good things of life, then he was a glutton. Finally, if he wished to save enough money for a comfortable old age, then he was slothful and lazy; he wished to avoid work, and this desire, too, was a deadly sin. In view of such restrictions, it is clear that public and ecclesiastical opinion would condemn any enterprise undertaken by the poor and lowborn man for the sake of profit. Life on earth, according to the teachings of the Church, should not be too pleasurable; the proper task of man was to prepare for the hereafter and endure whatever came to him in this life without expecting too much of it.

The Church likewise objected to the making of profits by merchants, unless the profits were a payment for work honestly performed. Like Karl Marx, the Church held a labor theory of value. The cost of an article, plus a reasonable wage, was all that the merchant was entitled to. Thus it was possible to calculate a fair and just price for every piece of merchandise. Any price fixed above this was profiteering. It was particularly reprehensible to engross, or try to corner the market, since the increased price represented no honest labor; the practice was morally evil in that it meant taking advantage of the necessities of poor men and charging them highly because the goods which they needed had been made artificially scarce. Forestalling was a similar crime; this was the practice of buying up goods from the peasant before they reached the market, and for the same purpose of pushing up prices. Even coming between the producer and the consumer unnecessarily and buying and selling at a profit was considered wrong, unless there was an obvious need for a middleman's service. The practice was called regrating.

Lending money at interest had always been considered wicked by Christians because money was supposed to be sterile, having no value in itself; and, further, to take money for helping others when such a service should be provided free was contrary to Scripture. It was taking advantage of the poor; and indeed, since loans for consumption purposes—the type of borrowing a poor man usually does—were poorly secured, the interest rates for consumer credit were high then, as now. In the early Middle Ages, since it was impossible to do without some form of consumer credit, this business was in the hands of Jews, who were, of course, not bound by ecclesiastical regulations, and who were prevented by various restrictions from making a living in other fields. All lending of money was called usury, whether for high or low rates of interest, and was considered sinful. Secular and clerical authorities constantly condemned and attempted to regulate it. But in an age of growing capitalism, it was found impossible to maintain all the artificial restrictions which were suited to a static society. For several centuries, however, the guilds followed

faithfully the rules laid down by the Church, with which, indeed, they were not unsympathetic, since they too believed in a static society.

In the next chapter we shall consider the nature of the medieval Church, and how it came to have such influence that it was able to compel respect for its views not only from the towns but from the secular rulers. In Chapter 11 we shall deal with the national states, and thus resume our account of the political institutions of later medieval times. The economic changes in the later Middle Ages, unspectacular if considered in isolation, in their totality achieved nothing less than a new orientation for the economic striving of the West. These changes will be considered in Chapter 13, which begins the history of modern times.

Suggestions for further reading

PAPERBACK BOOKS

- Brandsted, Johannes. *The Vikings*. Penguin. Original recently published popular work on the Norsemen.
- Dante, Alighieri. *On World Government (De Monarchia)*. Tr. by Herbert W. Schneider. Liberal Arts Press. The important political work by the world-famous medieval poet who looked for the unification of Italy under the emperor.
- Dawson, Christopher. *The Making of Europe*. Meridian. See under Chapter 7.
- Hoyt, Robert S. *Feudal Institutions: Cause or Consequence of Decentralization*. Rinehart Source Problems.
- Lopez, Robert S. *The Tenth Century: How Dark the Dark Ages?* Rinehart Source Problems. Extracts from contemporary sources, with interesting commentary. The result of the inquiry—pretty dark, but the "darkness of the womb."
- Painter, Sidney. *French Chivalry: Chivalric Ideas and Practices in Mediaeval France*. Compass. By the leading American scholar in this field.
- Painter, Sidney. *Medieval Society*. Cornell. A short essay giving a clear picture of the various strands of medieval society.
- Pirenne, Henri. *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*. Harvest. The "Pirenne thesis," now almost exploded, is of course in evidence in this relatively short work by one of the most noted medieval scholars of this

- century. But it in no way mars the general excellence of the material and its presentation.
- Pirenne, Henri. *Medieval Cities*. Anchor. Short, but the best picture of urban life in manageable compass.
- Power, Eileen. *Medieval People*. Anchor. Presentation of the lives of six medieval people, drawn from original sources, but embellished by the author. One of the best books for getting the feel of medieval society.
- Stephenson, Carl. *Medieval Feudalism*. Cornell. Clear account by an American medievalist.
- Tawney, R. H. *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*. NAL. Classic study of relation between religious concepts and the growth of trade and commerce. The book studies in particular the influence of Protestantism, but the incidental picture of contrasting medieval commerce is always interesting.
- Usher, Abbott P. *A History of Mechanical Inventions*. Beacon. Useful and original study, with information on medieval inventiveness that will no doubt be surprising to many.
- Winston, Richard. *Charlemagne: From the Hammer to the Cross*. Vintage. Well-written biography which makes the most (and perhaps somewhat too much) of the few available sources.
- Davis, H. W. C. *Medieval Europe*. London: Oxford University Press, 1948. A Home University survey, which, though old (1911), is still one of the best introductions to the subject.
- Davis, W. S. *Life in a Medieval Barony*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1923. Imaginative picture of a French seigniorship drawn from authentic feudal sources.
- Farrar, C. P., and Evans, A. P. *Bibliography of English Translations from Medieval Sources*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1946. This invaluable work lists all medieval source material that had been translated into English at the time of writing, and where it may be found. Should be used throughout the medieval chapters, when it is desired to find whether a particular book has been translated or not.
- Fichtenau, H. *The Carolingian Empire*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957. Scholarly study of all aspects of the reign of Charlemagne, by far the best on the subject.
- Heaton, Herbert. *Economic History of Europe*. Rev. ed. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948. Excellent text, topically organized—should be used here and elsewhere for economic material.
- Holmes, U. T. *Daily Living in the Twelfth Century*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1952. An interesting picture, based on the observations of Alexander Neckam, a medieval traveler and indefatigable student.
- La Monte, J. L. *The World of the Middle Ages*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1949. Up-to-date, readable, and full account, including specially valuable sections on relations between Western Europe and Constantinople.
- McLaughlin, Mary M., ed. *The Portable Medieval Reader*. New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1949. Not all the selections are of equal interest, but there are enough to make it worth while, with some judicious skipping.

CASEBOUND BOOKS

- Baldwin, S. *Business in the Middle Ages*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1937. Argumentative, but a useful brief account. Should be supplemented by one of the good economic history texts. A Berkshire study.
- Clough, S. B., and Cole, C. W. *Economic History of Europe*. Rev. ed. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1947. This good economic text contains much out-of-the-way and useful information. It should be consulted whenever supplementary economic information is needed.

The Church to the End of the Thirteenth Century

♦ The Church in the tenth century

ECCLESIASTICAL ORGANIZATION IN EUROPE— LAY INVESTITURE

It will be clear from the last chapter how completely the Church had become integrated into the feudal system. Throughout Europe the emperor, kings, and chief nobles appointed the bishops and the archbishops; the clerical assistants in the episcopal sees (cathedral chapters), who were responsible for the administration of the diocese, were appointed by the bishops; while the parish priests, chosen by local lords, usually from their own free peasantry, were ordained priests by the bishops whenever the latter found time for it, without inquiring too closely into the qualifications of the priests. There was no way in which the papacy could interfere in the process, though in theory all the high clergy were at least subject to confirmation by the Holy See. If the rulers desired to sell the offices of the Church or give them to their friends and relatives, no papal wrath could stop them; if the bishops accepted fees illegally for the performance of their ordinary duties, if they inflicted fines as penance and put the proceeds into their own pockets, perhaps to pay the sum exacted from them by the kings in exchange for their appointment, no one could

insist on their obedience to the laws of the Church, which forbade such practices. If the parish priest had no qualifications for his office, knew no Latin, permitted gaming and dicing in his church, was unable to celebrate mass with due order and dignity, and betrayed the secrets of the confessional for private gain—if his manorial lord did not discipline him, no one else would. All these practices were common, and there was not much that anyone in high authority in the Church could do about it.

THE PAPACY IN THE FEUDAL SYSTEM

The papacy itself was in no position to institute reforms. When the pope was not chosen by the local Italian nobles and people, he was chosen by the emperor. If he offended the emperor, he could be deposed; if he offended the local nobles, they also could depose him by force unless the emperor objected. The revenues of the Papal States in Italy were collected through the papal bureaucracy; but this also was composed of local nobles, who could direct them into more suitable pockets than the pope's.

In such circumstances few would have ventured to predict that in little more than a century a pope would have brought an emperor to beg his forgiveness in the snow, still less that in two and a half centuries Pope

Innocent III would be successfully disciplining every monarch in Europe. Such an achievement therefore deserves a careful analysis in itself as a political event of the first magnitude. Moreover, the swift collapse of papal power that followed Innocent's triumphs may also reveal the necessary limitations on the exercise of political authority by a power whose claims were spiritual, and whose sanctions depended on moral rather than on military and political force.

THE THEORY OF SALVATION

The means of salvation In our modern age, when Christianity has been split into numerous sects, when a large number of people are religious skeptics, and when power rests firmly in the hands of secular authorities, it is clear that the moral reform of the individual can only be enforced, if at all, by secular authority through legislation. A Church can only hope to induce moral reform by persuasion, and by the threat of cutting off such ecclesiastical comforts as it can supply. In the Middle Ages, however, Catholic Christianity was a religious monopoly, and there is no evidence that anyone in the whole of Christendom in the tenth century doubted its main teachings, so far as they were understood. The central teaching understood by all was that there was a God in Heaven, a Devil in Hell, and that after death human beings went to either Heaven or Hell according to a verdict given by God in his capacity as judge. The supreme aim of man's life on earth was to win a favorable decision at this last judgment. And it was universally believed that the purpose of the Church was to help man win the decision and thus attain Heaven.

Largely on the authority of Pope Gregory I a further important doctrine had been propounded for the belief of the faithful, though it was not widely understood: the doctrine that there was an intermediate place between earth and Heaven through which those who were destined for Heaven would pass. This was called Purgatory, the place where sins were purged through punishment, leaving a purified

soul to pass on to Heaven. It was only a temporary abode, but the period passed in it varied according to the sins committed on earth. The Church could also help mitigate the punishment in Purgatory.

The role of the Church in the attainment of salvation. According to the theory of salvation put forward by Augustine in the fifth century, modified by Gregory I, and generally accepted as the true teaching of the Church, man was saved only through grace, bestowed as a heavenly gift by God, a gift made possible by the sacrifice of Christ. Grace, however, was given to man only through the medium of the sacraments of the Church, which had been founded by Christ for this purpose.

There were seven sacraments: baptism, by which the newborn child was redeemed from original sin, with godparents accepting Christianity on his behalf; confirmation, when a child of about twelve accepted Christianity for himself; the Eucharist, the most sacred and important of the sacraments, offered daily, in which through the miracle of transubstantiation bread and wine were made into the body and blood of Christ; matrimony; penance; and extreme unction, which prepares the Christian for death and wipes away what is left of his sins. The seventh sacrament (holy orders) was the ceremony by which a layman was made into a priest, setting him apart from ordinary men, and enabling him to celebrate the Eucharist and grant absolution from sin.

The sacrament of penance needs a few words of explanation because of its role in the disciplining of the Christian by the Church, and the consequent power conferred by it on the clergy. In theory the Church could not guarantee salvation; all that was sure was that salvation could not be won without the aid of the Church—a distinction not always clear to the unschooled Christian. But the Church could save the Christian sinner from having to suffer the consequences of his sin in Purgatory—provided always that God had chosen to grant him salvation and an entry into Heaven. Christ and his saints, according to Church doctrine, had made full satisfaction to God for the sins

of every man on earth, and thus a treasury of merits had been accumulated which was at the disposal of the Church for helping repentant sinners through Purgatory.

If a sinner repented truly and confessed his sins to a priest, then it was the duty of the priest to absolve him. This was the sacrament of penance. But the consequences of the sin still remained, and in the absence of any intervention by the Church, full punishment for it would be exacted in Purgatory. But the Church could remit the punishment by assigning some temporal punishment on earth, in the form of the repetition of a certain number of prayers, the undertaking of special fasts, the performance of a useful social work, such as building a bridge, or even a pilgrimage to some sacred place such as Rome or Jerusalem. Such an act would relieve the sinner of some period of punishment in Purgatory. The statement of this remission of punishment was called an indulgence. A plenary indulgence, which was the chief inducement offered to Crusaders, remitted the whole time of punishment in Purgatory. If, therefore, God has chosen to save a sinner who had been given a plenary indulgence, then he would enter Heaven at once without having to spend any time in Purgatory.

It is clear that this complex theory would not be understood by the ordinary ignorant layman. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at that only too often the sinner who possessed an indulgence regarded it as a safe passport to Heaven; and it is also not too surprising that the temptation to abuse the sacrament of penance and sell the indulgences for money was sometimes too much for a Church that had many uses for money. It was the flagrant abuse of the indulgence in the sixteenth century that was the principal factor in the rebellion of Martin Luther against the Church which began the Protestant Reformation.

Since the receiving of the sacraments was necessary for salvation, the most severe penalty that could be meted out to a Christian was to withhold them, a penalty known as excommunication. Complete excommunication, which could be pronounced by the higher clergy or

by the pope, meant that the offender was severed from all services performed by the Church. No Christian might have any dealings with him on pain of excommunication himself; he could not attend services of the Church or receive any sacraments; and he could not be buried in holy ground. If the State accepted the excommunication it would sometimes withdraw the benefits of secular law from him also, making him an outlaw. He could then be killed with impunity, and by the Church action he was necessarily condemned to Hell. If excommunication was to be lifted by the Church, the offender would be expected to make a complete submission, and undergo severe penance.

As a supplement to excommunication when directed at a monarch or an independent feudal lord, the Church could also declare an interdict upon his whole territory. This was a kind of excommunication en masse of a whole population, and its purpose was to bring the pressure of public opinion to bear on the offending ruler. In a land laid under an interdict the Church performed none of its duties at all—though exception might be made by special dispensation for some of the essential sacraments, such as baptism and extreme unction. When it is remembered how many duties the Church performed in the Middle Ages that we now regard as functions of the State, it can readily be seen how effective this weapon might be in the hands of a Church obedient to its leaders.

Clearly neither of these disciplinary powers, however, would have any effect at all if the local clergy did not cooperate. When, as in the tenth century, the clergy were nominated by local lords, they could not be used; and probably no cleric could even be found who would read a bull excommunicating a high noble or a monarch.

In addition to these weapons, the pope, who alone could pronounce an interdict, claimed the right to depose a king. No king, theoretically, could hold office from the moment of his excommunication; and the oath of allegiance made to him by his subjects became automatically void. Naturally this right was never admitted by the rulers, who themselves

claimed to hold their power from God and not from the Church. The pope's ability to make his decree effective depended entirely upon the conditions in the country concerned—as, for instance, whether there was any rival for the throne, or whether any foreign king could be induced with papal support to overthrow the offending and deposed monarch.

THE CHURCH AS REGULATOR OF CHRISTIAN MORALITY—CANON LAW

The Church had always claimed jurisdiction throughout Christendom in all matters which concerned faith and morals. In the early centuries of Christianity authoritative creeds—statements of what Christians must believe—had been drawn up by councils. But gradually it was recognized that a single authority must be accepted in such matters, and this, after many centuries of doubt as to where the authority lay, was granted by consent in the Western world to the pope. From time to time popes also promulgated new dogmas which must be believed by the faithful. Those who refused to subscribe to these beliefs could be charged with heresy, and handed over to the state for punishment. If they did not recant, they could be put to death by burning (without the shedding of blood, forbidden to churchmen). Before the establishment of the Inquisition in the thirteenth century, heresy trials were in the hands of the bishops. By such means the Church attempted to guard the purity of the faith.

In the realm of morals, which covered a very wide field and which the Church in the days of its power sought to make ever wider, the authority was the canon law, the rules laid down by the early councils, combined with decrees made by various popes. These were codified by Gratian in the twelfth century.

Canon law stated that all clerics, both regular and secular, and even those in minor orders—assistants of the higher clergy and even, later, students at universities—were subject only to the jurisdiction of the Church and were not to be tried for any offense whatever by the temporal powers. It claimed that all crimes against religion, whoever committed

them, were to be tried by the Church. These crimes included not only heresy, simony, and blasphemy; but also sorcery, adultery, and sexual crimes, usury, and even the illegal fighting of duels. If these were not punished by the state of its own accord—and in the early Middle Ages many of the chief offenders were rulers and nobles in high position who did not even recognize these acts as crimes—then the Church claimed the right to try the offenders instead.

Finally, canon law regulated all civil cases connected in any way with one of the sacraments—as, for instance, marriage settlements and divorces, wills, and civil contracts which concerned inheritance. The canon law, observing Roman principles and taking into account such things as motives (not recognized as important under feudal law), served to mitigate some of the evils of feudal law, besides adding to the power of the Church.

Again, however, it must be emphasized that the Church was able to regulate such matters only if the State permitted it to do so. In general, the Church was allowed to have its way in matters that were not of great moment to the rulers. The higher courts were always crowded with legal business at a time when feudal law was only rudimentary, and incompetent to deal with much that occupied the Church. The Church, however, was rarely allowed much say in the matter of feudal inheritance; but when a quarrel was precipitated with Henry II, a strong king of England, over his efforts to establish a uniform law for clerics and laymen alike, it was the Church, not the king, who won the victory.

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PAPAL AUTHORITY IN EUROPE

From the above it can be seen what relation the claims of the Church had to the reality of its power in the tenth century. It remains to be considered what essential changes had to be made if the pretended power were to become real. First, and underlying all the rest, the Church had to re-establish its moral supremacy in Europe, so that Christians throughout the whole area could see that it was not just an

oppressive secular institution, demanding tithes and feudal dues and contributions, but a body with a true spiritual mission, able to help in the saving of souls. It must renew the faith of the people both in Christianity itself and in the mission of the Church.

Second, and as a consequence of this, it must attract to itself as a body sufficient voluntary financial support to enable it to carry out its duties and maintain some independence from the feudal lords. Voluntary support would be forthcoming only if the people believed in its efficacy for salvation. And the Papal States, the best immediate source of income, must be thoroughly subjected to the pope and firmly administered.

Third, the papacy must free itself from the domination of the German emperor and the Roman nobles and people. This would enable it to carry out a consistent policy, dependent not on imperial or local desires, but upon what it considered best for the Church. The most obvious way was for a pope to name, or have a large share in naming, his successor.

Fourth, the control of appointments to the higher clergy must be taken out of the hands of the feudal lords and kings and put under the control of the papacy. If the higher clergy were papal appointees, then the lower clergy would likewise become responsive to papal policy through these nominees. This policy meant, of course, the suppression of such practices as the sale of Church offices (simony), the bestowal of them on relatives (nepotism), and incest, since a Church office might become hereditary if a clergyman had sons to succeed him.

This tremendous program was substantially carried out in the next few centuries. Its instrument, as so often in the Church reforms of the Middle Ages, was found in the monastic system. The monastic system had for a long time ceased to play any important part in the public life of the Christian world, but it was now to show itself capable of a self-renewal that was as unexpected to the papacy as it was welcome. In the end, as it happened, it was the monastic reform that took over the papacy, instead of the papacy's taking over and exploiting the reform.

❖ The Cluniac reform and its consequences

For a long time the monasteries had been trying to reform themselves, but they were so deeply influenced by the social conditions of the time that they had experienced little success. Then, in 910, a feudal lord, Duke William of Aquitaine, died, leaving a considerable piece of land at Cluny, in eastern France (Burgundy), to the abbot of a monastery of the Benedictine Order in exchange for prayers to be said for his soul. The land was to be entirely free from either royal or feudal jurisdiction, and subject only to the papacy. From this modest beginning the Cluniac movement spread with great rapidity. The abbot of Cluny insisted on maintenance of the strict Benedictine Rule, although manual labor was not stressed as much as in the original Rule. Soon the abbot began to found daughter houses, called priories, which attracted churchmen who were ready to make their lives a moral example to the Christian world. No land was acceptable to the Cluniac Order unless it was given free from feudal obligations. But the terms were met, since the donors believed, as William had, that the prayers of the Cluny monks would be more efficacious for salvation than those of the ordinary churchman, busied as he was with secular affairs.

The Cluny movement from the beginning was interested in ecclesiastical reform, and it had a free hand to do what it could. The sanctity of the monks was, as a rule, sufficient safeguard against actual violence offered by the nobility; and violence was the only way available for hindering their work. They were able, by their preaching and wide influence, to effect an improvement in the whole religious life of Europe; but, even more important, they trained a body of sincere clergymen to fill the high offices in the Church when they became vacant. It was not at first of much significance that the papacy itself was sometimes in the hands of unworthy appointees of the emperor, since the movement, although theoretically subject to the papacy, was not in practice under papal control. The second stage of the Cluniac Reform involves the reform of the papacy itself. Since

Chronological Chart

Foundation of monastery of Cluny	910	Pope Lucius III condemns Waldensians	1184
Growth of Cluniac influence	910-1030	Saladin recaptures Jerusalem	1187
Henry III appoints four successive reform popes	1046-1054	Third Crusade	1189-1192
Schism between Eastern and Western Churches	1054	Henry VI emperor	1190-1197
Treaty of Melfi—Robert Guiscard invested with southern Italy by Pope Nicholas II	1059	Capture of Richard I of England by Henry and payment of heavy ransom	1192-1194
Norman conquest of Sicily	1072-1091	Pontificate of Innocent III	1198-1216
Saxon rebellion against Henry IV	1073-1075	John King of England	1199-1216
Gregory VII becomes pope	1073	Fourth Crusade	1202-1204
Synod of Rome—decrees against simony, clerical marriage, and lay investiture	1075	Capture and sack of Constantinople	1204
Henry IV quells rebellion of Saxon nobles	1075	Innocent lays interdict on England	1208
<i>Dictatus papae</i> by Gregory VII	1076	Albigensian Crusade	1208-1213
Synod of Worms, called by Henry IV, deposes Gregory	1076	Frederick Hohenstaufen becomes king of the Romans	1212
Penance of Henry IV at Canossa	1077	Innocent deposes John and invites Philip Augustus to execute the sentence	1213
Second deposition of Henry IV by Gregory VII	1080	John submits, doing homage to Innocent for throne	1213
Sack of Rome by Normans	1084	Battle of Bouvines—victory of Philip over allies of John	1214
Proclamation of First Crusade by Urban II	1095	Magna Carta	1215
Capture of Jerusalem by Crusaders—Kingdom of Jerusalem	1099	Deaths of John and Innocent	1216
Compromises over lay investiture in England and France	1107	Louis, son of Philip Augustus, abandons efforts to gain English crown	1217
Concordat of Worms	1122	Fifth Crusade	1218-1221
Conrad III first Hohenstaufen emperor	1138-1152	Frederick II crowned emperor by Honorius III	1220
Muslim reconquest of County of Edessa	1144	Dominican Rule confirmed by Pope Honorius III	1220
Second Crusade	1147-1149	Franciscan Rule confirmed by Pope Honorius III	1223
Frederick I (Barbarossa) emperor	1152-1190	Sixth (Frederick's) Crusade	1227-1229
Frederick states claims on Italian cities at Diet of Roncaglia	1158	Excommunication of Frederick by Gregory IX	1227
Peter Waldo organizes "Poor Men of Lyons"	ca. 1176	Frederic negotiates ten-year truce with Muslims	1229
Battle of Legnano—Defeat of Frederic by Lombard League	1176	Foundation of medieval Inquisition by Pope Gregory IX	1233
Peace of Constance	1183		

Defeat of Lombard League by Frederic at Cortenuova	1237	Conradin, last Hohenstaufen prince, executed	1268
Death of Gregory IX	1241	Rudolf of Hapsburg elected emperor	1273
Two-year interregnum in papacy	1241-1243	Sicilian Vespers	1282
Synod of Lyons—deposition of Frederic by Innocent IV	1245	Peter III of Aragon conquers Sicily and becomes king	1282
Ferdinand captures Seville	1248	Pontificate of Boniface VIII	1294-1303
Lombard cities defeat Frederick at Parma	1248	Boniface issues bull <i>Clericis laicos</i>	1296
Death of Frederick II	1250	Philip forbids export of precious metals from France	1297
Conrad IV emperor	1250-1254	Papal jubilee	1300
Manfred regent, later king, of Sicily	1250-1266	Philip summons States-General	1302
Interregnum in Empire	1254-1273	Boniface issues bull <i>Unam sanctam</i>	1302
Battle of Benevento—defeat and death of Manfred	1266	Death of Boniface VIII (Anagni)	1303
		Clement V elected Pope	1305
		"Babylonian Captivity" of papacy	1305-1376

this is associated with the name of Pope Gregory VII (1073-1085), it is sometimes called the Gregorian Reform, though it was a natural consequence of the Cluniac Reform and involved no change in policy.

As mentioned earlier, the main line of the attack on secular control of the clergy was directed verbally against the abuses in appointment—against simony, nepotism, and incontinency. This criticism had for a long time little effect. The secular clergy had been accustomed to living openly with their wives or concubines, and considered the monkish demand for celibacy inhuman. Most rulers also were not willing to give up their patronage so easily, though there were some notable exceptions who greatly advanced the cause of the reform.

But, slowly and carefully, the ground was prepared; and at last it was possible for the popes, several of them from Cluny, to decree that only the pope was entitled to appoint the higher clergy. There must be no more appointments to Church positions by the laity. Thus was precipitated the quarrel between rulers and the papacy over lay investiture.

It was a demand for more than the popes could hope to gain. The clergy required an income, and income could at this time be obtained only from land. The Church had no land to give to its clergy. Hence the feudal

lord must give the land, and the Church was willing to allow him to invest with the symbols of sovereignty. But the reformers nevertheless went boldly ahead, demanding the abolition of lay investiture altogether.

RELEASE OF PAPACY FROM SECULAR CONTROL—ELECTION BY CARDINALS

It was not possible for the papacy itself to be independent until it could free itself from control by the emperor. The reformers therefore waited patiently for a suitable opportunity to throw off the shackles. This presented itself when a child (Henry IV) was elected emperor. The papacy then announced (1059) that the pope henceforth would be elected by the cardinal-bishops (later by the whole College of Cardinals). The cardinal-bishops at this time were the heads of certain Roman churches, and the other cardinals held important positions in the papal court. In time the cardinals came to be chosen from all the clergy of Christendom, and the title became an honorary one, carrying great prestige and power because of the cardinal's role in the election of a pope, but held in conjunction with any other office in the Church he might possess. The importance of the announcement at this time was that cardinals could be appointed only by the pope.

and they held office for life. Thus continuity of policy could be maintained. The papal appointees of the previous few reigns chose the next incumbent; the emperor had nothing to do with the choice.

ROLE OF THE PAPAL LEGATES—BY-PASSING OF THE SECULAR CLERGY

A third feature fundamental to the program was the growth of a new position in the Church, that of papal legate. The legate was a personal representative of the pope and had precedence over any clergyman in the country to which he was sent. The local clergy and nobles might not like these ambassadors, but they could neglect them only if they also intended to defy the pope. Legates could proclaim the announcements of the pope in the churches of their diocese; they could read the bulls which the local clergy might have wished to suppress; and they could excommunicate or lay an interdict upon the country by the direct authority of the pope himself. By means of the legates the pope could make a direct appeal to public opinion over the heads of the clergy.

The reform movement could not now fail for want of publicity given to the decrees of the pope in the countries for which they were intended.

THE EMERGENCE OF A STRONG PAPACY UNDER CLUNIAN INSPIRATION— HILDEBRAND (GREGORY VII)


From the middle of the eleventh century all the popes were serious reformers. One of the powers behind the papal throne for much of the second half of the eleventh century was a monk named Hildebrand, who did not, however, himself take the chair as Gregory VII till 1073. But as assistant to several popes, he had a share in the determination of papal policies.

When Henry III died, his son was only a child, and during the regency of the child's mother the popes were able to prevent the Germans from playing any active part in papal affairs. When Henry IV grew up, he found himself in trouble with his own nobles, who constantly rebelled against him. He wished for

a united Germany under his leadership, and full control of his own clergy and the nobility. He saw at once that he needed his clergy to help control the nobles, in the manner of Otto the Great. He also needed money, most easily obtained by simony, for the purpose of keeping always at hand a body of faithful servants who would help him when necessary to crush the feudal nobility, especially the Saxon lords, who resented the fact that they no longer provided the emperors.

It was thus very difficult to retain control of Italy as well, nor could Henry usually find the time to curb the reformers. Indeed, it was necessary for him even to recognize the reforming popes, in spite of the fact that, in his view, they had been illegally elected since 1059, when election was handed over to the cardinals without his permission. But in Germany he continued to ignore the fulminations of the reformers. He did nothing about clerical marriage; he continued to sell Church offices for money for his campaigns; and of course he made all clerical appointments without reference to the popes. He thought he could afford to wait to deal with the papacy; when it suited him, he could always repudiate his recognition of the popes since 1059, and claim they had all been illegally elected, including any pope who tried to discipline him.

Gregory VII, who was now pope, was ready for the encounter. He was certainly well aware of Henry's difficulties with his own nobles, and he knew that the German clergy, though not in any sense loyal to the pope, were not likely to support Henry against the nobles if the latter were supported by the pope. At the right moment, after formally forbidding lay investiture altogether and making a full statement, circulated by his legates, of what he held to be the true position of the papacy in relation to secular rulers and its right to discipline them, he excommunicated Henry and deprived him of his kingdom. At the same time he released the German nobles from their vows of allegiance, which they had taken when Henry was elected king. Since the German clergy wavered and showed signs of deserting the monarch who had appointed them, and the nobles, led by Rudolph of Swabia, took active



measures against him. Henry found himself isolated and without means of resistance. The nobles took him into custody and called upon the pope to come to Germany and preside over the election of a new king.

Gregory was therefore on the point of triumphing and establishing once and for all his right to discipline rulers. Unfortunately for him, Henry escaped and made his way to Canossa, in northern Italy, where Gregory was spending a few days on his way to Germany for the election (1077). This presented the pope with a cruel dilemma. Since Henry expressed his penitence, it was his duty as a priest to absolve him, even though it might mean the collapse of his German policy and result in a civil war within Germany. Nevertheless, absolve him he did, and Henry re-

turned over the Alps. It was assumed by everyone that the pope had restored him to his kingdom. Some of the nobles and the bulk of the German clergy hastened to join him, giving him enough strength to defeat and kill Rudolph. Although Gregory excommunicated Henry again in 1080, the moment of decision had passed, and this time the action was ineffectual. As a final irony, Henry himself crossed the Alps with an army in 1083 and drove Gregory into exile.

But Gregory's work did not die with him in 1085. Henry was still excommunicated, and, in the eyes of the papacy, still dethroned. Rebellions continued against him for the rest of his life. Finally, his son was elected king by the nobles with papal support, and Henry died a year later, without a throne. The new

king, later Emperor Henry V, had to take forceful action in Italy on several occasions. But the cardinals continued to elect the popes without hindrance, establishing enough precedent for the practice to make it impossible for any emperor later to question its legality.

Meanwhile, a series of popes continued to negotiate on the matter of lay investiture with Henry V. After a number of agreements had been made, which were later repudiated, a lasting compromise was arranged, embodied in the Concordat of Worms of 1122. Under this settlement the emperor invested the clergy with land and secular authority, symbolized by the scepter; while the pope invested them with spiritual authority, symbolized by ring and staff. Thus each had a veto on the other's appointments—a clear gain for the papacy, for it now gained something it had never previously held—while the emperor lost his right to make nominations without reference to the papacy. As long as the popes remained reformers, simony and incontinency could be held in check, since they could refuse to invest any priest who did not fulfill their moral and religious requirements. A similar compromise was arranged with the kings of England and France, who had, like the emperor, been accustomed to making clerical appointments in their realms.

❖ The expansion of Europe— The Crusades

Meanwhile, in 1095, only ten years after the death of Gregory VII, the papacy was provided with an opportunity to give leadership to a movement for the expansion of Christendom to the East. The Crusades could be described from any of several points of view. They have been regarded as an early example of typical European imperialism—as efforts by feudal lords to obtain new lands and new sources of income at a time when the fertility of their manors was decreasing, as efforts by merchants to find new trade routes and new items of trade. The Crusades, incidentally, were all of these things. But they were unique in being summoned by a religious

leader with ostensibly solely religious ends in view. It is true that the later Crusades escaped altogether from papal control, and in the process brought discredit to the papacy as well as to the participants. Their ultimate effects upon Western Christianity and the Church were relatively unimportant. Far more important was their incidental effect in opening up a part of the East to the West, stimulating Western commerce, and assisting the spread of towns.

The reformed Cluniac papacy was still in power and the investiture struggle not yet settled when Pope Urban II called the First Crusade in response, in part, to an appeal from a pilgrim named Peter the Hermit. Peter had reported that Christians were finding it hard to deal with the Seljuk Turks, who had captured Jerusalem from the Abbasid caliphs of Bagdad. The latter had interfered little with Christian pilgrimages to the Holy Sepulcher—a fairly common penance undertaken by Christians. But the Turks who now controlled the Asiatic dominions of the Abbasids were more fanatically Muslim than the later Abbasids, and did not look with favor on the Christian interest in Palestine. Urban had also received an appeal from Alexius Comnenus, the Byzantine emperor, many of whose lands had been overrun by the Turks. Although by 1095 the Eastern and Western Churches had been separated for over forty years, the pope no doubt cherished the idea of a possible reunion and increased influence at Constantinople if the Crusade were successful.

In an impassioned speech, therefore, Urban urged all Christians to unite in driving the infidels from the Holy Land, and promised a plenary indulgence to all those who went on the Crusade. The appeal met with a wide response from most classes in society. The traders and merchants could envisage new markets and new products, as well as profit in transporting some of the Crusaders by sea and keeping them supplied. The proper business of feudal lords was fighting, and land was becoming short in Europe. Perhaps they could win new fiefs for themselves. The peasants had little to lose, and if they won nothing else they might win freedom from serfdom if they survived. Only the kings and



greater lords hesitated, for they might lose much by absenting themselves from their realms. If they stayed, they might hope to gain the lands of Crusaders who never returned. But beyond and above all these private considerations the religious zeal was unmistakable. Many in the full flood of enthusiasm went against their material interests. With scarcely the vaguest idea of where Jerusalem was, still less of what they would find there (never having seen an infidel), they received absolution from the Church, donned the sacred emblems which showed they were Crusaders, and set out by land, determined to recover the Holy Sepulcher. Afterward it became necessary for the popes to use coercion, and leadership fell into the hands of kings who went because it was expected of them. But no one was coerced for the First Crusade; and it was the only Crusade that was successful.

The First Crusade was not very well organized, and the Byzantine emperor gave only limited help. But the Crusaders reconquered most of Asia Minor, which they had to return to the emperor, and the following year moved

into Palestine. Since the Seljuk Turks made only a token resistance, leaving the unfortunate Egyptians and others who lived in Jerusalem to bear the brunt of the Crusaders' fury, Jerusalem was captured without much difficulty. A kingdom of Jerusalem was then established as a fief of the papacy, with the leading Crusader, Godfrey of Bouillon, duke of Lorraine, as king (1099). Other nobles won fiefs for themselves, and several religious-military orders were founded to assist in the defense of the Holy Land. The Venetians, Genoese, and Pisans brought out regular reinforcements from Europe each year, and began to take back Oriental products for the European markets. Lacking religious zeal, the merchants encouraged fraternization and peaceful relations with the infidels. In due course the Crusaders themselves began to relax their severity, adopt Muslim customs and dress, and lord it over their realms like Oriental princelings, leaving defense to the new military orders and to mercenary armies locally recruited from the Oriental population.

As it happened, the success of the First

Crusade had been due to the fact that the Turks were so heavily involved elsewhere that they could not undertake the effective defense of Palestine. But Muslim power was far from broken. As soon as the Muslims had secured their own position, they began to encroach upon the lands recently conquered by the Crusaders. Edessa, an outlying fief to the north-east of the kingdom of Jerusalem, fell to Muslim arms in 1144. Thereupon a second Crusade was called, in which the Holy Roman emperor and the French king took part. The Crusade was completely unsuccessful, and Edessa remained in Muslim hands. Toward the end of the twelfth century a great Muslim prince named Saladin united the two countries of Syria and Egypt under his rule and marched on Jerusalem, which fell to his arms without much difficulty (1187). Immediately, another Crusade was called, to which Frederic Barbarossa, the French king Philip Augustus, and the English king Richard I (the Lion-Hearted) responded. The old emperor was killed while crossing a river in Asia Minor. The two kings, who had gone separately, had different motives for joining the Crusade. Philip had no interest in the Crusade as such. He was primarily interested in seeing that Richard became thoroughly involved in it so that he could return to France and try to conquer Richard's lands in France. Richard, on the other hand, was interested in performing knightly deeds. He was successful in taking Acre from the Muslims but had no success in his efforts to recapture Jerusalem. Finally, he returned home without accomplishing his objective, and was captured and held for ransom by the new Holy Roman emperor, Henry VI.

By this time it was clear to many in Europe that the crusading spirit was almost dead. Kings had to be threatened with spiritual sanctions if they did not obey papal commands. The nobles recognized that there was little opportunity left for new lands. Jerusalem was too difficult to conquer, and if they went on the Crusade there was a good chance that some rival lord would filch their European fiefs from them. Only the traders were still interested. But the eyes even of some of these, notably the Venetians, were evidently already straying

in the direction of Constantinople, an important competitor and perchance a source of loot. These facts of life did not, however, deter Pope Innocent III from calling another Crusade, and popes were to continue calling them until all hope had been lost of capturing the Holy City. The Fourth Crusade, however, was a disgrace in all respects. The Crusaders who accepted the call assembled at Venice, hoping for transport, and heavily in debt for their initial expenses. The Venetians agreed to transport them to what they believed would be the Holy Land. In fact, the Venetians had no intention of going there. They did not, however, reveal their intentions until the Crusaders were safely embarked. In the end, for reasons that do not need to be detailed here, the Crusaders went to Constantinople and, through intervening in a disputed succession at the request of the ousted monarch, were able to enter the city without fighting. A few days later, dissatisfied with their spoils, they fell upon the defenseless city and sacked it. The Byzantine emperor fled, and the Crusaders established the Latin Kingdom of Constantinople, which lasted from 1204 to 1261. Innocent III was unable to prevent the Venetians and the Crusaders from completing their nefarious enterprise in spite of threats of excommunication. Ultimately he accepted the new kingdom as a blessing, since it reunited the Eastern and Western Churches for the first time in a century and a half.

Nothing daunted, Innocent again proclaimed a Crusade at the Lateran Council of 1215. The king of Hungary agreed to go by way of Egypt, but so bungled the enterprise that after capturing the key city of Damietta, his armies were defeated and Damietta was lost. Later in the century the Holy Roman emperor Frederic II—threatened with excommunication if he did not go on a Crusade, as he had promised Innocent in his youth—returned after starting his voyage, whereupon he was in fact excommunicated by Pope Gregory IX. Frederic proceeded to Jerusalem shortly afterward and recovered it by negotiation—a feat which was regarded unfavorably by the pope, who preferred more spectacular ways of treating infidels. The Holy City remained in Christian hands for only fifteen years. Thereafter it was

never again recovered, despite the efforts of other Crusaders, including the saintly French monarch Louis IX. The last Christian possession in Palestine, the city of Acre, fell in 1291.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE CRUSADES FOR THE PAPACY

The economic results of the Crusades will be dealt with elsewhere. Here we are concerned with their effect on the power of the Church and the papacy.

There is no doubt that the success of the First Crusade redounded to the prestige of the papacy, which had called it, as the failure of the others to some extent discredited it. The overlordship exercised by the popes over the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem was never more than nominal. The papacy was unable to prevent the Crusaders from tolerating and fraternizing with Muslims, once the early fanaticism was over. Very little attempt was made to convert the Muslims themselves to Christianity. Many Crusaders married Muslims and took over some of their customs. They were far more influenced by the superior Muslim civilization, even in its decay, than they themselves influenced the Muslims. It has also been suggested that contact with the Greek Orthodox Church and with the various heretical groups that had been living peaceably in Palestine for centuries under Muslim rule made them realize that Western Catholicism was not as universally accepted as they had been led to believe, but actual evidence is necessarily missing for this assumption. There can be no doubt that the inability of Innocent to control the Crusaders who sacked Constantinople was a blow to his prestige for which even the temporary forced union between Greek and Roman Churches was but a slight compensation. This failure did not, however, prevent his subsequent success in dictating to the kings of Europe.

The times had changed. The true crusading spirit had disappeared from all but a few remaining knights-errant, such as St. Louis IX of France. The commercial spirit symbolized by the Fourth Crusade showed that men now had other interests than salvation. Indulgences

had been cheapened by their indiscriminate bestowal on the Crusaders, the purity of whose deeds and motives was questionable. The political activities and worldliness of the Church did not escape the notice of the more earnest Christians. And, as we shall see later, the faith of the people, which was ultimately the only basis upon which all papal claims must rest (a truth which had been recognized by Gregory VII but forgotten by Innocent), had been put to a severe test by the actions of the papacy. Within the Church and outside it a movement had been growing since the eleventh century which called for a return to an earlier and more ideal Christianity. But discussion of this movement will be left to a later section of this chapter, after we have considered the position of the papacy at the height of its power under Innocent III.

❖ Growth of the papacy to supreme power in Europe

CONFLICT WITH HOHENSTAUFEN EMPERORS

Having considered the role of the papacy in the Crusades, it is now time to return to the Church as it was at the time of the First Crusade. We have dealt with the Concordat of Worms in 1122, under which the investiture struggle between the emperor and the papacy was settled. The pope was therefore in a stronger position than before the reign of Gregory VII. But, as it happened, the papacy now had to meet a challenge of a different kind, for which it was ill-prepared. The empire, having been for a time in the hands of relatively weak rulers, who had difficulty in holding their own within Germany itself and could hardly aspire to rule beyond German boundaries, in the twelfth century fell under the rule of the family of Hohenstaufen, one of whose members, Frederic Barbarossa, reigned for thirty-eight years (1152-1190). This emperor desired nothing less than the restoration of a truly Roman Empire, called in his day the Holy Roman Empire. This meant that he must subject Italy, which was dotted with prosperous towns, mostly independent, to his sway. The



pope, possessor of lands in Italy (including Rome, presumably the capital of an empire called Roman) which he had no intention of yielding to the emperor, was compelled to aid the Italian towns in their resistance to Frederic, while the latter attempted to control the papacy once more through his own nominees.

In 1178 Frederic was severely defeated by the Lombard League, and thereafter abandoned his ambitions. But before he died he had arranged for the marriage of his son Henry to the heiress of Sicily, a well-managed Norman kingdom which included parts of southern Italy. This combination was too much for the Italians and the papacy to resist; and for a brief period, 1190-1197, the new emperor Henry VI kept Italy in submission. The popes of the period had no alternative but to accept the situation. The feeble weapons available to them would not have been effective to change

it, but the expansionist policy of the emperors had brought the papacy into the thick of Italian and imperial politics. The papacy, in short, was rapidly becoming a secular power, wielding what spiritual weapons it had, but in the interests of secular and not religious policy. Then Henry VI, who was only thirty-two years of age, suddenly died, leaving a son of three in Sicily and no one of his family strong enough to hold the empire together. One year later, in 1198, Innocent III ascended the papal throne.

Innocent's policy was thus all prepared for him. His task was clearly to prevent Sicily and the empire from ever falling into the same hands again, and to keep the two chief German families at each other's throats. He accomplished the second not very difficult task by throwing his support first to one family and then to the other, while Germany fell into the throes of a civil war. He kindly took the infant

Frederic Hohenstaufen of Sicily, son of Henry vi, under his personal patronage, made him his ward, and promised to keep the kingdom of Sicily for him until he was grown up—with the determination that at all costs he must be kept from the empire.

In the century since Gregory, the papacy had gained no new weapon; it could exercise its influence to disrupt, and hope to make incidental gains from the discord. Nevertheless, the breathing space after the extreme danger of the reign of Henry vi was enough for Innocent to display the papacy at the height of its temporal power; even though to hindsight its foundations were no stronger than the temporary division among the natural opponents of papal prerogatives in the secular realm.

THE PAPACY AT THE HEIGHT OF ITS POWER

In 1198 Innocent, who regarded himself as the spiritual lord of Christendom, commanded the French king Philip Augustus to take back his Danish wife, whom he had repudiated without papal consent. When Philip refused, Innocent laid an interdict upon his territories. Philip then submitted. Soon afterward, John, king of England, insisted on choosing his own archbishop of Canterbury, contrary to the wishes of Innocent. When the pope laid an interdict on England, John resisted; whereupon Innocent "gave" his kingdom to Philip, with whom John had been constantly at war in an effort to retain lands in France that had been acquired by the English crown as part of the dowry of John's mother. In danger of invasion and deserted, for reasons that will be discussed in the next chapter, by most of his barons, John finally submitted, yielding his kingdom to the papacy as a fief. Innocent then tried to protect his new vassal against Philip's son, who was preparing to invade England, and against John's rebellious barons. He also declared Magna Carta, a document which John had just been compelled by his barons to sign, null and void. Innocent was unable to achieve any of his aims in England, and even his own appointee to the archbishopric of Canterbury sided with the rebellious barons. Innocent himself died in the year following Magna Carta.

It is clear that it was Philip who was the gainer from Innocent's intervention, not the pope himself. Although the interdict damaged England severely it would not have forced John to submit, in spite of the difficulties he was having with his barons. Philip took back his wife because he looked forward to papal support in his struggle with England, not because he recognized the papal right to interfere in his marital affairs. Moreover, it is doubtful whether these ventures into national politics increased either the power or the prestige of the papacy. Papal taxation in England, which resulted from her position as a papal fief, was certainly extremely unpopular in that country. It gave rise to numerous complaints against papal avarice in the thirteenth and later centuries. It contributed to baronial resentment against John's successor, the pious monarch Henry iii, who strove to fulfill his papal obligations. Innocent's policy, therefore, was distantly responsible for the baronial revolt which led to the first English Parliament.

Finally, it should be noted that Frederic, son of the emperor Henry vi, was able to have himself elected Holy Roman emperor, in spite of Innocent's efforts to divide and rule in Germany. Ironically enough, Innocent himself was left no option but to support his candidacy.

❖ Reactions to the worldliness of the Church

THE FAILURE OF THE MONASTIC ORDERS

It was not possible for the Church to become so heavily embroiled in secular affairs without losing some prestige as a spiritual organization. The papacy was compelled to enter into alliances, especially with the Italian towns or with some faction in the towns; it was in constant need of money; and its religious sanctions, such as the interdict used so freely by Innocent iii, necessarily brought it into constant conflict with secular powers. As an organization, the Church was becoming wealthier and more powerful, thus moving, in the opinion of many sincere Christians, ever further away from the Christian ideal of pov-

erty that had been stressed by its founder. Even the monasteries, which in earlier years had appealed to those religious men who had wished to follow a purely religious life, were growing wealthy. The monks too often were worldly. Almost every religious order at one time or another had had to be reformed, and forced back into a stricter observance of their Rule.

In the twelfth century an ascetic and mystic, St. Bernard of Clairvaux, for a time acted as the conscience of the Church. Despising earthly power, possessions, and wisdom, he did not hesitate to attack the secular clergy for its excessive interest in worldly matters and for neglect of its religious duties. He was instrumental in aiding a new religious order, the Cistercians, to set itself upon a more spiritual path. For a time the Cistercian Order maintained its austerity, but, as with all the other successful orders which did not keep themselves separated from the world, the wealth that flowed into it from the faithful undermined its discipline. Long before St. Bernard's death the Cluny Order that had started so auspiciously had likewise fallen into decay and become involved too exclusively with ecclesiastical politics and other worldly affairs. So, in the twelfth century, it was to a considerable degree the heretics rather than the Church that set the example of unworldly living.

THE GROWTH OF HERESY

As early as the eleventh century attacks on the worldliness of the Church and the failure of the Church to heed them had driven occasional reformers into an uncompromising position which could only mean actual separation from organized religion. There were no other Churches to join; only one great Church, authoritarian and dogmatic, which had to be accepted or rejected. And the penalty for rejection, or heresy, was death if the heretic refused to change his views. Many heretics no doubt found their way into the reformed monasteries, where they could spend their lives in personal worship and outward conformity. If no such monastery appealed to them, then there was no other recourse than heresy.

Earlier heresies, in the main, concerned questions of theology; at a time when Christian theology had not yet crystallized into dogma, or beliefs necessary for salvation promulgated by authority, such heresy was to be expected until the authority was universally accepted. Twelfth-century heresy is of a different kind. With a few minor exceptions it was anticlerical in origin. It was above everything against the established Church; and though in some cases a different doctrine was preached, the doctrine was subsidiary to the anticlericalism, and usually grew out of it. The common element in all twelfth-century heresy was the belief that true Christianity consisted in leading a life more consistent with the life of Christ as it had been portrayed in the Gospels. It was, then, a reaction against the apparently non-Christian life of the Church and its clergy.

The Waldensians Of the two important heretical groups of the twelfth century, the Waldensians moved a shorter distance from the doctrines of the Church. The founder, one Peter Waldo, had discovered in the Gospels that Christ had owned no property but given all his goods to the poor. Waldo, who had been a merchant, followed his example; then, gathering around him a number of disciples, began to preach poverty. He applied to Pope Alexander III for permission for himself and his followers, who were known as the "poor men of Lyons," to take vows of poverty and to preach. The pope gave his permission but insisted that the Waldensians first obtain permission from the local clergy. This they neglected to do. Their opinion of the local clergy was a low one and they did not attempt to conceal it, thus exciting the wrath of all those who did not care to follow the Waldensian example. Faced by such opposition, the Waldensians in time began to insist that there need be no clergy at all; and they gained adherents among all the anticlerical groups in society, especially in the towns and among the poor. It was no great step to organizing their own churches, based on the ideal of the early Christian Church as far as they understood it. Waldensianism was condemned by a Church

council, and in later years pursued by the Inquisition. But the movement was never altogether suppressed. In later years it became part of Protestantism, and even today a small Waldensian Protestant sect is still in existence.

The Cathari The heresy of Catharism was for a long time far more dangerous to the Church. The teachings of the Cathari (the "pure ones") stemmed from Manichaeism, a Persian cult with a central teaching that there were two great powers in the world, good and evil, light and darkness, and that it was the task of mankind to cast out everything that pertained to the realm of darkness. For the Cathari this included such things as certain kinds of food, sexual intercourse, and private property. From the first the movement was anticlerical, regarding the Church as an instrument of the powers of darkness. Naturally not all Cathari adhered strictly to the list of permitted and forbidden practices. There were degrees amongst them, consisting of "believers," who did not have to live a fully Catharist life, and of "perfected ones," who had undertaken the full ideal of austerity.

Catharism may be considered as a heresy if it is taken into account that Christ appears in it as the emissary of the forces of light, or as a separate religion if one considers mainly its Manichaean origin. It obtained a surprising success in parts of Europe, notably southern France, where it set up its own Church and clerical hierarchy. It was protected by secular powers, especially by the counts of Toulouse, within whose feudal jurisdiction the majority of Cathari lived. For this reason the Cathari are also called Albigensians, since the city of Albi was one of their centers.

For a long time the heretical activity in southern France had troubled the papacy, and several attempts had been made to turn the Albigensians from their heresy. But public debates between representatives of the Catholic and Catharist Churches invariably ended in victory for the latter, and the Catholics were often roughly handled. Innocent III was not the man to permit such a heresy to exist side by side with the Church without taking action against it. He attempted first to work through

a special evangelical mission. But since this was in the hands of Cistercians, who were not trained for such work, it failed like all the others. Finally, Innocent proclaimed a "Crusade" against the Albigensians. Since the lands they occupied were some of the fairest in France, and the lords who obeyed the papal call might expect to win fiefs for themselves from the rebellious count of Toulouse, who continued to try to protect his subjects, there was no lack of volunteers. There was little danger, for most of the Cathari were pacifists and would refuse to fight, whereas the nobles and their retainers were relatively few. After a number of terrible massacres by the "Crusaders," and some fighting with the nobility, the Albigensian movement was eradicated from that part of France. The entire territory was not pacified until 1229, however, long after the death of Innocent. By that time the son of that count of Toulouse who had protected the heretics had inherited his father's lands, and, by aiding in the last suppression of the Albigensians, was able to oust the crusading nobility who had temporarily occupied the lands.

THE MENDICANT ORDERS

The Dominicans When the first phase of the crusade was over Innocent did his best to help in the work of reconverting those Albigensians who had survived. He permitted St. Dominic (1170-1221), a young Spaniard who had formed part of the earlier Cistercian mission, to form a new order for the purpose of preaching to the heretics, although the Dominican Order (Order of Preachers) was not given official sanction until the reign of Innocent's successor (1216). The Dominicans took vows of poverty, thus setting an example to the worldly clergy; and though they, in turn, became unpopular with the secular clergy, throughout the thirteenth century they were strongly supported by the papacy, and undertook many missions for the popes. Together with the Franciscans, who also took vows of poverty, they were the most influential churchmen of the thirteenth century.

The religious life of the towns had been seriously neglected for centuries. The parish

priest had far more difficulty in the towns than on a compact manor in keeping in touch with his flock, and the higher clergy had too many other duties to give the townspeople much attention. The monasteries were, as a rule, founded in country districts, and had no influence in the cities. But these new orders of friars (brothers), as they were called, went out preaching to the people directly in the market place or in the local church. The Dominicans early became noted for their learning, and were able to give instruction in a manner hitherto unknown. As missionaries, first within Christianity and then to heathen countries, their influence and activity were enormous. Convents were founded throughout Europe where the friars could live, and which they could use as their headquarters for missionary activity. But unlike the monasteries, the convents were modest institutions. Very little land was required, nor was regular income needed from feudal dues, since the brothers lived at the beginning entirely from begging (hence they were called mendicant orders). From the first they were directly subject to the papacy through their chief officer, called a minister general, who ruled authoritatively through provincial ministers in each country.

The Franciscans The Franciscan Order was founded by St. Francis of Assisi (1182-1226), the son of a merchant in good circumstances who was able to provide Francis with a life of modest luxury. But Francis was suddenly converted from this life of ease by reading the Gospels. At once he gave away all his possessions save the coarsest and simplest of clothing, took, in his own words, Lady Poverty for his bride, and began to preach.

If there has ever been a true Christian saint since the founding of Christianity, then St. Francis was he. By his example and utter sincerity, and by the simplicity of his life, he won the hearts of all those who listened to him, and a band of disciples quickly grew up around him. It was not only that he was kind to everyone, even the outcasts of society—the sick and the maimed and the lepers, whom no one would touch. The quality of love seemed to shine out from him in a way that no one could resist or wished to resist. But behind this genuine simplicity there was also a rare intuitive understanding of the life around him. He knew that it was impossible for the Church ever fully to accept him, he knew what dangers and temptations his order would have to meet; he knew to how few it is given really to lead



An almost contemporary (ca. 1265) miniature of St. Francis of Assisi preaching to the birds. From a Psalter (Franco-Flemish). (COURTESY THE PIERPONT MORGAN LIBRARY. Ms. 72, folio 139)

such a life of absolute poverty as his. He did not want to organize his order formally; he did not want it to have rules and regulations which would inhibit the spontaneous outpouring of love in which lay his own special genius. He did, however, have an interview with Innocent; but it was only natural that the pope should be hesitant, his shrewd diplomatic mind grasping the dangers that such a movement held for his Church. Dominic was dangerous enough, but a leader like Francis was a hundred times more so. It is said that Innocent had a dream in which he saw the Church supported by only these two orders, a dream later enshrined in a famous fresco of Giotto. Whether he heeded the dream or not, he temporized, and it was his successor who drew up the Franciscan Rule and confirmed the order (1223). Francis himself refused to be minister general, and insisted on appointing the most worldly of his band to the position, because, as he said, it was right for himself also to be subject to discipline as a Christian duty.

Francis disapproved of learning as unnecessary in a pure gospel of love, and the preaching of his order in his lifetime corresponded to his own. The task of Franciscans was rather to help and heal, to teach by example and not by precept, to go about among the poor bearing the Gospel and praising God for his blessings, and encouraging them to do likewise.

It was inevitable that after the death of Francis there should be a schism within his order. No organized body, but only rare individuals, could live up to such an ideal. Money poured in upon the order, which was not permitted by its Rule to keep it. The appointment of a papal procurator to handle the funds of the order did not solve the problem, and in the eyes of the uncompromising followers of St. Francis, this subterfuge was a betrayal. With the resounding success of both the Dominican and Franciscan Orders and the support given them by the papacy, privileges showered in upon them, and ever more recruits flocked to the Franciscan Order. The life of primitive simplicity had to be abandoned; and the begging of the friars before long became a scandal to those who knew of the order's wealth. Friars of both orders began to seek learning, and the

influence of the papacy was able to gain them chairs in theology even at Paris. The secular professors, resenting this unfair competition, unleashed a torrent of scurrilous pamphlets on their way of life and their hypocrisy, which was replied to in kind by the leading friars. In the convents of both orders learning was approved, and preaching to the people ceased to be universal; friars were permitted to hear confessions, and before the end of the century a friar was pope.

The Dominicans, to whom in any case poverty had never been such an essential part of their movement, accepted the inevitable; the Franciscans split in two. For a while most of the ministers general were men who had known St. Francis and knew what poverty had meant to him; and those dissident Franciscans who objected to the ownership of property, whether by brothers or by the order itself, were protected by them. But by the end of the thirteenth century it was clear that the order was doomed if it could not heal the schism. The path that was probably inevitable from the first was chosen. The Conventuals, who accepted the compromise on absolute poverty and who were in a majority within the order, expelled the Spirituals, who wished to retain strict poverty and were ultimately treated as heretics by the Conventuals. By the early fourteenth century the Spirituals had been formally declared heretical.⁵ Some were handed over to the Inquisition, while many more languished in Franciscan prisons. Their movement persisted for a long time, being used by secular powers against the Avignon papacy when they wished to castigate its pride and luxury. Ultimately, the remnants found refuge in Protestantism.

THE INQUISITION

Great though the influence of the mendicant orders was, heresy did not disappear as a result of their efforts. In the early thirteenth century Pope Gregory IX established a regular

⁵ By this time, indeed, they had accepted certain prophetic teachings which could be considered formally heretical, although the Spirituals themselves denied that they were.

Inquisition into the beliefs of supposed heretics, which was entrusted first to the Dominicans, and later to both orders. The purpose of the Inquisition was to fix a procedure for the detection and punishment of heretics. The Inquisitor, a papal appointee, paid periodical visits to the various cities within his jurisdiction, calling upon heretics to declare themselves and upon the faithful to denounce those suspected of heresy. If a heretic confessed and recanted, he was usually let off with a comparatively light penance imposed by the Church. If he refused to recant, then torture was permitted to compel the confession. Testimony was taken, but the defendant was not allowed a lawyer nor was he permitted to know the names of his accusers or the nature of the evidence. If two witnesses of good character agreed, then he could be condemned.

The purpose, however, was always to obtain a confession and to persuade the heretic to recant, in which case, if he had been a long time making up his mind to confess, he might receive a severe, but not a capital, punishment. Except when in later years the Inquisition became a tool of the secular powers, who used it to confiscate the property of heretics, this provision was usually carried out, and there were


far fewer death sentences imposed than penances. If the heretic refused to recant, he was handed over to the secular authorities to be put to death, customarily by burning. If a heretic recanted and then relapsed into heresy he was regarded as incorrigible, and likewise handed over to the secular authorities.

The Church, however, was not all-powerful in the medieval period; it could not impose the death penalty itself. Only when the secular authorities agreed could the death penalty be exacted. They must therefore share the opprobrium for the Inquisition with the Church. That they backed it up as much as they did is because they too regarded heresy as treason, and heretics as rebels against the established order.

❖ The papacy and secular powers in the thirteenth century

THE IMPOSING EDIFICE OF INNOCENT III

In the last section we have, for the sake of convenience, included events after the death of Innocent III, and it is now time to consider and summarize the position of the papacy as it was left by Innocent. In 1215 the pope summoned



a council to be held at the Lateran in 1215. All the potentates of Christendom came or were represented. The pope proclaimed a new Christian dogma and gave fatherly advice to all the rulers present. It might have been thought by any contemporary that Christendom was close to becoming a true theocracy, ruled by the representative of God upon earth. At the time the pope was the feudal suzerain of England, Aragon, the Two Sicilies, Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria, and the Latin Kingdom of Constantinople. The English and French monarchs had to all appearance been successfully disciplined by him. He had so weakened the Holy Roman Empire by his political interference that it seemed likely that no emperor could again win the power that had rested in the hands of Henry VI. When he summoned a new Crusade at the Lateran Council there was some show of enthusiasm, and the king of Hungary promised to go. Southern France had been restored to the Catholic fold after several generations of heresy, even though at the cost of many lives. Finally, the Eastern and Western Churches had been reunited as a consequence of the Fourth Crusade.

It was an imposing edifice that Innocent had built. Yet history was to show that not one of the triumphs was really significant or proved to be lasting. The Latin Kingdom of Constantinople came to an end in 1261, when the Greek emperor was restored, and the empire itself had been so seriously weakened by the Crusade that it was never able fully to recover. The two kings of England and France were not in fact properly controlled. They had given way when it suited them, and another time they could resist the same weapons. The quarrel between England and France had been the pope's opportunity, as the premature death of Emperor Henry VI had been his opportunity in Central Europe. He had crushed the Albigensians because he offered land to the nobles, not because they were the obedient Christian executors of his wishes. He had been unable to prevent the Venetians and Crusaders from sacking Constantinople, though he had been willing enough to take advantage of their victory. In short, whatever the appearances, the secular powers held all the sources of power in their hands,

and they only needed a more favorable moment to throw off the illusory yoke of the pretended theocracy.

Innocent III betrayed no real understanding of this state of affairs. Even if he had, there was still little that he could have done about it save the last thought that would have occurred to him—to become a spiritual power alone, the moral arbiter of Europe and not its dictator. When a hint of this other way was revealed to him by St. Francis, he looked hastily in the other direction.

He had no understanding of the growth of commercialism in the century before his day; his eyes were on the past glories of the Crusades, and not upon the present reality that the crusading spirit had disappeared from Europe. His political interferences without exception led in the longer run to exactly those results most dangerous to his office and authority, as when he made the English king his vassal; he failed to understand the basis of heresy in a justified anticlericalism, and preferred to wipe out heretics with the sword.

The heritage he left to his successors was a long struggle with the secular powers which could never be won, a universal Church with ambitions beyond its power to achieve, and a tradition of authoritarian dictation which made an ultimate schism inevitable.

By not understanding the nature of the City of God, he helped to make it forever impossible.

RESUMED STRUGGLE OF PAPACY WITH THE EMPIRE

Trouble between the papacy and the empire was not long in coming. Before the end of the reign of Innocent, Frederic Hohenstaufen, his young ward, was chosen king by the Germans, with Innocent's approval. Honorius III, who succeeded Innocent in 1216, could not prevent the young king from being crowned emperor also, thus uniting the Norman kingdom of Sicily with the empire, as in the time of Henry VI.

Frederic II was one of the most remarkable of medieval rulers. Scientist and freethinker, educated almost as much by Muslims as by

Christians, with an excellent understanding of both his Sicilian and his Germanic heritage, in his day he was known as the "wonder of the world" (*stupor mundi*). He was unfortunate in the opposition of two popes who were anxious to curb his power. Gregory IX appears to have been as horrified by his freethinking as he was opposed to his policies. He it was who excommunicated Frederic for not going on a Crusade as he had promised Innocent, and kept the ban on him even when he later fulfilled his promise. While Frederic was away on the Crusade, Gregory attempted to deprive him of his Sicilian lands. When he returned, he engaged in war with the Lombard towns and attempted to add them to the empire. In this enterprise, too, he was naturally opposed by the pope, who raised money and troops for the defense of the revived Lombard League. Finally, the pope attempted to depose the emperor, whereupon the latter seized and imprisoned a boatload of cardinals. At this point Gregory died and Frederic insisted that the cardinals elect a man acceptable to himself. But when such a man had been elected under the name of Innocent IV, the new pope escaped to France, from which safe haven he proceeded to depose the emperor again, and tried to raise a rebellion against him in Germany.

Meanwhile, Frederic had run into trouble in Italy. In the early part of his reign he had subdued almost the whole of the peninsula. But in his last years he lost an important battle, and had not recovered his position when he died at the age of fifty-six (1250). The pope was able to prevent the Sicilian crown from going to the same man as the empire. But Frederic's illegitimate son Manfred, who ruled Italy, could not be dislodged until a later pope, Clement IV, called in a French noble, Charles of Anjou, to dispossess him. Thus Hohenstaufen influence in Italy was exchanged for French. Charles killed Manfred in battle (1266) and captured the last Hohenstaufen of the direct male line. With the approval of the pope, he had him beheaded in Naples. Meanwhile, the Hohenstaufen who was on the imperial throne died, and the electors could agree on no other ruler. Thus from 1254

to 1273 there was no Holy Roman emperor, while a French noble ruled over Sicily and much of Italy. To such a pass had papal imperial policy led. The empire was virtually destroyed, and its influence in Italy seemed to be over.

In 1273 the first prince of the House of Hapsburg was chosen emperor—a minor lord who was the choice of the nobles primarily because he held little initial power or land of his own. French influence in Sicily was not to be broken until 1282, when the Sicilians staged a massacre of all Frenchmen who could be found (Sicilian Vespers). By a remarkable irony, the daughter of Manfred married the heir to the throne of Aragon, who inherited the lands of the Hohenstaufens in Sicily and maintained his rule even when the pope of the day called a Crusade against him.

CONFLICT WITH FRANCE AND ENGLAND

If the popes had but known it, not the empire but the national states presented the real danger to papal interests. It is true that the popes in the thirteenth century were secular rulers, and therefore the interests of the Papal States were the equivalent of national interests, to be maintained with all the power available to their rulers. But papal interests in fact were far wider than those of any national state or ruler. Only by virtue of its position as spiritual leader of Europe did the papacy have at its disposal the services of the ecclesiastical bureaucracy, the clergy, and the religious orders. These latter groups were dragged along behind the papal chariot to their own irreparable damage. The empire had been destroyed, for what the victory was worth; but it had not been destroyed by the united forces of an outraged Christendom, nor even by the authority of the pope, entitled as God's viceroy on earth to see that the monarchies of the world were in worthy hands. It had been broken by the naked swords of Charles of Anjou and his feudal vassals, and by papal mercenaries whose wages were paid out of the gifts and tithes of faithful Christians.

Naturally the political warfare waged by

the papacy was well understood in royal chancelleries. The pope was treated with respect for the power that he commanded. But he could expect little more consideration than secular rulers if his power should wane. Even though he still commanded the same spiritual sanctions as in former days, the monarchs and their advisers naturally tended to regard these as political weapons, and estimated them accordingly. The popes would have only themselves to blame when political weapons available to the monarchs were used against them.

At the close of the thirteenth century Boniface VIII, an Italian jurist on the papal throne, engaged in a trial of strength with the French monarch. The contest cost him his life, and cost the papacy a long period of exile from Rome in Avignon, under French protection. Both French and English monarchs resented bitterly the efforts of the papacy to lay taxation upon their peoples. Both Philip IV (the Fair, 1285-1314) and Edward I of England (1272-1307) were engaged in an important work of

national consolidation, which will be considered in more detail in the next chapter. Neither wished to allow any revenues to leave their country to be swallowed up in the papal treasury, probably to be spent in unprofitable wars in Italy. Both Philip and Edward made the decision to tax the clergy, which was forbidden under canon law. Boniface promptly issued a bull (*Clericis laicis*, 1296) reasserting the principle that secular rulers had no right to tax the clergy, adding that kings who did so would be automatically excommunicated. Edward responded by withdrawing the protection of English law from the clergy, which soon afterward submitted. The only exception, the archbishop of Canterbury, could be safely ignored, since Edward was ready to antagonize the pope, the Archbishop's only protector.

Philip, however, went further, laying an embargo on all silver, gold, and bills of exchange leaving France, thus effectively shutting off French money from the papacy—a procedure which would not have been possible in



The Palace of the Popes at Avignon, used during the "Babylonian Captivity" and the Great Schism.

earlier reigns, before the country was as well organized as it was at the end of the thirteenth century. The pope submitted temporarily, withdrawing his edicts and permitting taxation of the clergy in certain circumstances. A few years later, after Philip had suffered a serious military reverse and the papacy had improved its financial position, the quarrel was renewed. Boniface announced that he would call a council to pronounce upon Philip's crime in prosecuting a bishop for treason, and Philip summoned a special assembly of the three estates of his realm, including the bourgeoisie and the clergy, for the purpose, among other things, of sending a protest to the pope. Boniface then issued the bull *Unam sanctam* (1302), in which he reiterated his claim that both spiritual and temporal powers were in the hands of the pope, and followed this up with the startling declaration that "we state, define and pronounce that it is altogether necessary for salvation for every human being to be subject to the Roman pontiff." He then demanded complete submission from Philip under the threat of excommunication.

Philip's patience was exhausted. Even while the pope was preparing a final bull of excommunication, which would release Philip's subjects from their allegiance to him, Philip sent his chancellor Nogaret to take possession of the person of the aged pope and bring him to France. With the aid of some Italian opponents of the pope, Nogaret forced his way into the papal presence at Anagni. After a scuffle during which the pope was manhandled, the royal emissaries were driven from the city by the townsmen. But the pope himself survived only a month.

Clearly Italy was a dangerous place for the popes. Papal opponents from the Italian nobility were not above laying sacrilegious hands on the person of the vicegerent of God; while the powerful French monarch had evidently had his fill of papal interference. After much hesitation the cardinals elected a French pope, who tried for a short time to resist Philip's demands while settling the monarch's quarrel with his predecessor. Finally, he decided to leave Rome and go to France, where

the city of Avignon was placed at his disposal. Thus began the so-called Babylonian Captivity of the papacy (1309-1376), which will be considered further in Chapter 13.

THE PAPACY AT THE END OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

In less than a century, the position to which Innocent III and his predecessors had lifted the medieval Church had thus been eroded to the point where the pope was no longer master even in his own realm. Instead, he had to seek the support of a secular ruler who was himself fully in command of his own kingdom and regarded the support of the pope as unessential, even though he continued to make use of the local Church for his own purposes. As we shall see, the monarchs made deals with the popes for a share of papal revenues, and the papacy, even at Avignon, retained much of its formidable financial and organizational strength. But it was no longer deferred to by secular rulers, who consulted their own national interests first.

Although new heresies were to arise in the fourteenth century, the Christian religion was to remain a Catholic monopoly for another two centuries. But interests had shifted from religious to secular affairs, and the Church could no longer command the consciences of Christians and their unquestioned obedience even in religious matters. For this the worldliness of the Church and the political activities of the papacy must bear some of the blame; and though the interests of the people of Europe had changed and the medieval Church could never have prevented the change, it might perhaps have been possible for the Church to have reformed itself into a purely religious institution and thus have avoided the degradation of the papacy in the Babylonian Captivity and the Great Schism. When it reformed itself later it was under the spur of Protestantism, and at a time when Protestantism had become too strong to be dislodged even by the reformed Catholic Church. The historian may speculate on whether the Church could have remained the only Christian Church, and thus retained the full right to the word Catholic (universal).

if it had listened to the heretics and the anti-clericals and read the signs of the times aright. But the question, like so many others, must remain an idle speculation. The Church did not reform until reform was thrust upon it, and the medieval Church, one and universal, comprising the whole body of Christian believers, has passed into history.

Suggestions for further reading

PAPERBACK BOOKS

- Chesterton, G. K. *St. Francis of Assisi*. Image. A brief and eloquent appraisal by the famous English Catholic man of letters.
- Dawson, Christopher. *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture*. Image. See under Chapter 6.
- Jorgensen, Johannes. *St. Francis of Assisi*. Image. A good short account.
- St. Francis of Assisi. *The Little Flowers of St. Francis*. Image and Penguin. Two translations of the fourteenth-century tales of St. Francis, compiled a century after his death from the accounts of those who had known him.
- Villehardouin, Geoffrey de, and Joinville, Jean de. *Memoirs of the Crusades*. Tr. by Frank Marzials. Everyman. This book contains Villehardouin's *Conquest of Constantinople*, an eyewitness account of the Fourth Crusade, and Joinville's story of the crusade of St. Louis IX, contained in his *Life of St. Louis*, written when he was in his eighties.

CASEBOUND BOOKS

- Bryce, James. *The Holy Roman Empire*. Rev. and enlarged ed. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926. Although some of Bryce's comments are not accepted today, this nineteenth-century classic remains valuable for its insights into the nature of the Empire, and the anachronism involved in the attempt to revive the Roman Empire in an age no longer suitable for it.
- Cheyney, E. P. *The Dawn of a New Era, 1250-1453*. 4th ed. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1936. The first and one of the best of the series, "The Rise of Modern Europe," edited by William Langer. Several chapters deal effectively with the decline of the medieval Church and the rise of heresies.
- Crump, C. G. and Jacob, E. P., eds. *The Legacy*

of the Middle Ages. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1926. The first essay, by Sir Maurice Powicke, is especially valuable for its lucid presentation of the necessary conflict between Christian ideals and the organized Christian Church.

Flick, A. C. *The Decline of the Medieval Church*. 2 vols. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1930. Contains a great deal of information regarding all phases of life in the later Middle Ages. Organized around the decline of the Church as the key medieval institution. Not as formidable as its bulk would suggest.

Kantorowicz, Ernst. *Frederick the Second*. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc., 1931.

A fine, scholarly biography of the emperor, which provides at the same time a great deal of information on the relations between Church and State in the thirteenth century.

Lamb, Harold. *The Crusades*. New York: Doubleday & Co., n.d. 1 vol. Two volumes in one, the first (from *Men and Saints*), concerned with the first Crusade, the second (*The Flame of Islam*) with the struggle between Christians and Muslims for the possession of the Holy Land. Popular and stirring account.

Lea, H. C. *A History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages*. New York: Russell & Russell, n.d. 3 vols. Somewhat anticlerical and in a few respects outmoded, but still the fullest and most accurate account. By a businessman turned historian.

Lagarde, A. *The Latin Church in the Middle Ages*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915. Clear, competent, and fair-minded, containing most of the information the general student needs to know.

Mandonnet, P. F. *St. Dominic and His Work*. St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder Book Company, 1944. By a noted Dominican scholar. Fair and accurate.

Oldenbourg, Zoe. *The Cornerstone*. Tr. by Edward Hyams. Pantheon Books, 1955. My favorite novel of the Crusades and the contemporary medieval world. The story of an old man who went on a Crusade and the family he left behind him. Scholarly and evocative.

Packard, S. *Europe and the Church under Innocent III*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1957. An excellent brief survey.

McLaughlin, Mary Martin, ed. *The Portable Medieval Reader*. New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1949. There is a useful extract (pp. 202-

- 216) in this book from the manual of Bernard Gui, an inquisitor, concerning his procedure.
- Runciman, Steven. *A History of the Crusades*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951-1952. 2 vols. The most up to date and the fullest of the complete histories. Very readable.
- Smith, Lucy M. *The Early History of the Monastery of Cluny*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1920. Useful account, not too specialized for the beginning student.
- Tout, T. F. *The Empire and the Papacy, 918-1273*, 8th ed. London: Rivingtons, 1941. A fine general history, giving a clear account of the facts, but without very much interpretation.

The Evolution of National States in the Middle Ages

❖ The national state as the key political institution of Western civilization

CONTRAST WITH CITY-STATE AND EMPIRES

Prior to our own Western civilization the governmental institution which developed the most advanced political forms was the city-state, whose weaknesses were discussed at length in the chapter on Greece. City-states, unable to solve their problems, and especially unable to refrain from fratricidal warfare, were usually replaced by great empires, of which we have seen many examples in this book. But it is difficult to point to many instances in the ancient world of the true national state, whose inhabitants were bound by ties of loyalty to their fellow nationals, who felt that they had some kind of common kinship merely because they inhabited a certain area of land, larger than a city.

Perhaps the nearest to the modern national state was ancient Egypt, which was considerably more than a mere geographic entity. The Pharaoh of Egypt was a king-god who was responsible for the welfare of Egypt and not that of other countries; he commanded loyalty from his people as their protector. The Egyptians, in the manner of some modern states, despised the people of Babylonia, who were

unfortunate enough to have a "Nile in the sky," and called them "wretched Asiatics." The ancient Hebrews also had a patriotic feeling beyond that of the city-states, and again they had a national God to lead them. But their loyalty was religious and cultural rather than based on the possession of a particular territory, and Northerners soon separated from Southerners when political and economic conditions suggested a division.

The national state, therefore, is a relatively modern phenomenon, and is not even necessarily the final political form to be evolved by the human race. But its achievements up to this time have been impressive enough, even though it too has failed to solve the problem of fratricidal interstate warfare. The national state, possessing within its borders economic resources far greater than those commanded by city-states, has proved superior to the city-state in being able to support comparatively efficient governments manned by professional officials, free from excessive dependence upon foreigners and possible enemies for essential supplies; and it has been able to maintain public security better than the empires. But, above all, the national state has not proved too large to permit individual citizens to feel they have some share in the government. As a consequence of this added sense of responsibility on the part of the public, the modern national

government has been able to enforce certain basic human rights in a way that even Roman law could not, since Roman law was not written in Heaven, as the philosophers claimed, but drawn up and administered by servants of the ultimately irresponsible empire.

Although a national state must always have a national government in effective control of the whole territory, a government which is recognized as such by the people of the state, there are otherwise no acceptable criteria for what constitutes a national state. A common language may be an important aid to the establishment of such a state, but multilingual national states, such as Switzerland, exist; and, conversely, many different states speak the same language. If culture is taken in the widest sense, a common national culture and common ideals are an even greater aid; and it is perhaps arguable that no state has ever been permanently united without them, though, for instance, present-day Yugoslavia has a partly Catholic and a partly Orthodox religious culture.

If the national state is the dominant institution in the world at any given time, as at present, then it is likely that all countries which feel they have enough in common will desire to organize themselves into separate sovereign states. This process can be observed in operation in the twentieth century. Great difficulties have arisen in the attempt to determine how small national units should be; and conversely, in the efforts of peoples divided into numerous tribal entities to form national states large enough to command world attention. But, one and all, the inhabitants of those countries, especially in Africa, which are not yet independent national states feel that they should belong to a nation, and that the nation is entitled to all the prerogatives of nationhood, including separate diplomacy and a seat in the United Nations.

It is therefore of importance for us to consider how the national states evolved in the Middle Ages, what institutions they developed, and how their inhabitants came to feel that the national state is the natural form of government to which all peoples should aspire.

THE FAILURE OF GERMANY AND ITALY TO ATTAIN NATIONAL STATEHOOD

Three major national states, whose history as national entities has been continuous to this day, came into existence in the Middle Ages—England, France, and Spain. The more populous and in some ways more advanced countries, Italy and Germany, did not become national states until the second half of the nineteenth century. Germany was bedeviled by the ghost of the Roman Empire. At a time when both France and England were relatively unimportant, the Germans under the Holy Roman emperors were trying to establish their dominion over territories whose geography made permanent union unlikely. After the imperial dream was over, the German feudal nobles had grasped so much substantial power that for centuries it was impossible to dislodge them; and German towns constituted a league of states beyond the control of German monarchs for two crucial centuries. No one lord was powerful enough to rule the whole. The emperor was elected by the very nobles to whom he presented a threat, and they were therefore careful to elect only those of their peers who seemed to be least dangerous; if a family made gains while it held the imperial throne, an effort would be made to see that none of its members were elected next time. We shall see in a later chapter how the feudal lords of Germany finally became free of the emperor in the middle of the seventeenth century, as a result of the Thirty Years' War. But it took more than half a century of patient work by the largest German state, masterly diplomacy, a modern army, and three wars before Germany could be united as a nation in the nineteenth century.

Italy, at first forced to defend herself against the regular invasions of the emperor, for a while experienced freedom under city-state government, and for two centuries led Europe in commercial development. But the country was divided. Venice always dominated the northeast, the Papal States stretched across the backbone of the country from the Mediterranean to the Adriatic, extremely resistant to

any moves looking toward the unity of the country as a whole. The south was under the domination of foreigners, either Spanish or Angevin princes who could usually count on foreign aid to bolster their kingdoms. Several times the possibility of union seemed to open, and Italian writers and publicists from Dante to Machiavelli were well aware that Italy desperately needed unity. But not until Napoleon was the dream almost realized; and after his collapse more than half a century of propaganda, war, and diplomacy was needed to achieve it.

In this chapter, therefore, we shall discuss those states whose development was continuous. In England national unity under a strong monarchy was achieved early, and interest is centered both upon the means by which this early achievement was possible and upon the efforts made by the nobles to curb the power of the monarchy. In France the central monarchy had difficulty in establishing itself, but once it had done so, the king's power remained intact until the French Revolution in the eighteenth century. Unity in Spain was attained largely through the shared experience of driving out the Muslims; and though partially representative institutions were developed, the kings retained almost absolute power until recent times. The contrast, especially between England and France, will serve to explain much of the modern political history of these countries; the strength of representative government in England, based upon so many centuries of tradition, and the weakness of French representative government in a country whose traditions until recent times were all absolutist and monarchical.

❖ The Anglo-Saxon monarchy

The English national state is the oldest in Europe. It arose at the end of the ninth century as a result of the invasions of the Vikings and the resistance offered to them by the Anglo-Saxon kings of Wessex. For a period, the whole of the eastern part of England was subject to the Danes, as the English



called them. The ancient northern and central kingdoms of Northumbria and Mercia were unable to withstand the Danes, but the kings of Wessex retained their independence and staged a counterattack. King Alfred the Great (871-899) ruled over a united kingdom which included Danes who had been permitted to remain. Thereafter the throne of England was occupied by descendants of Alfred until the conquest of the country by Sweyn and Canute in a renewed invasion by Scandinavians. After the death of Canute, who ruled as king of England from 1042, Edward the Confessor, a descendant of Alfred, reigned until his death in 1066. Soon afterward William of Normandy conquered England and established a new dynasty that lasted almost a century.

The Anglo-Saxon kingdom of England had developed certain institutions not unlike those of the feudal Continent, although differing in some important respects. The king was advised by a council of great lords, or thanes, called the Witan. This council constituted an important check on royal authority, which, in England as elsewhere, was not as great in practice as in theory. The king could summon a na-

Chronological Chart

The English National State

Reign of Edward the Confessor	1042-1066
Norman Conquest of England	1066
Domesday Book completed	1086
Oath of Salisbury	1086
Reign of Henry I	1100-1135
Interregnum in English monarchy (reign of Stephen)	1135-1154
Marriage of Henry Plantagenet to Eleanor of Aquitaine	1152
Henry II king of England	1154-1189
Assize of Clarendon (grand jury)	1166
Murder of St. Thomas Becket	1170
Richard I held to ransom by Emperor Henry VI	1194
Reign of John	1199-1216
Loss of French lands to Philip	1202-1204
Struggle with Pope Innocent III	1205-1213
Magna Carta	1215
Provisions of Oxford	1258
Simon de Montfort's Parliament	1265
Reign of Edward I	1272-1307
The Model Parliament	1295
Outbreak of the Hundred Years' War	1337
Treaty of Brétigny	1360
Reign of Richard II	1377-1399
Renewal of war with France	1383
Henry V claims throne of France	1415
Treaty of Troyes—Henry V regent of France	1420
Deaths of Henry V and Charles VI of France	1422
Joan of Arc burned at Rouen	1431
Loss of all France except Calais	1453
Wars of the Roses	1455-1485
Henry Tudor, Henry VII of England	1485

The French National State

Reign of Hugh Capet	987-996
Dissolution of marriage between Louis VII and Eleanor of Aquitaine	1152
Reign of Philip Augustus	1180-1223
Reign of Louis IX	1226-1270
Reign of Philip IV, the Fair	1285-1314
Summoning of States-General	1302
End of Capetian monarchy	1328
Hundred Years' War with England	1337-1453
Battle of Poitiers—capture of King John II	1356
The Jacquerie—murder of Etienne Marcel	1358
Treaty of Brétigny	1360
Duchy of Burgundy granted by John II to his son Philip	1363
Reconquest of most of territory lost to England	1369-1380
John the Fearless becomes Duke of Burgundy	1404
Intermittent civil war in France between Burgundy and House of Valois (Armagnacs)	1407-1435
Henry V of England invades France	1415
Reign of Charles VII	1422-1461
Joan of Arc at siege of Orléans	1429
Coronation of Charles VII at Rheims	1429
Death of Joan of Arc	1431
Peace of Arras between Charles and Burgundians	1435
Reform of French army	1445-1446
Expulsion of the English	1449-1461
Reign of Louis XI	1461-1483
Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy	1467-1477
Edward IV of England bought off by Louis	1475
Battle of Nancy—defeat and death of Charles the Bold	1477
Unification of France as a national state	1480

Spanish and Portuguese National States

Muslim conquest of Spain	711-719
Christian kingdom of the Asturias reconquered	718-737
Partial conquest of northeastern Spain by Charlemagne	778
Expansion of Christian kingdom of León	910-914
Reign of Abdu-r-Rahman III (height of Muslim power)	912-961
Rise of Castile to independence	930-966
Conquest of León by Castile	1037
Capture of Toledo by Alphonse VI of Castile	1085
Christian advance into Muslim Spain	1072 onward
Union of Catalonia and Aragon	1137
Earliest Cortes in Castile	ca. 1188
Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa—decisive defeat of Muslims by Alphonse VIII	1212
Capture of Cordova by Ferdinand III of Castile	1236
Capture of Seville by Ferdinand	1248
Conquest of Sicily by Peter III of Aragon	1282
Portuguese independence secured by decisive victory over Castile	1385
Marriage of Isabella, heiress of Castile, to Ferdinand, heir of Aragon	1469
Isabella succeeds to Castilian throne	1474
Establishment of Spanish Inquisition under royal control	1478
Ferdinand succeeds to throne of Aragon	1479
Fall of Granada, last Muslim stronghold in Spain	1492
Expulsion of Jews from Spain	1492
Expulsion of Moriscos from Spain	1609

tional militia for the defense of the realm. But the service the militia owed him was limited; after the service had been completed, the lords and their servants were entitled to return home. Often the king had to rely upon special troops known as housecarls, who formed his personal retinue and were dependent upon him. The latter were not, however, the king's personal feudal vassals, as they were in France.

The king was also the theoretical head of the judiciary, and certain kinds of lawsuits were always referred to him for decision, in spite of the fact that other law courts existed with their own systems of law. In general, however, almost all law was local, and enforced locally, until the Norman and Plantagenet kings were able to make inroads into local and feudal courts and establish the king's justice as the supreme law of the land.

The central government was rarely strong enough to control the whole country, and though the king had many rights owed him by villagers in the country, he usually granted these rights to his lords, or thanes. It was the thanes who maintained order and executed justice in their territories. According to an Anglo-Saxon law, every man must either have land which he possessed freehold, or have a lord. This lord must give him the protection that the king, too distant and with too little authority, was unable to provide.

One of the greatest achievements of the Anglo-Saxons in England was their system of local government, much of which was maintained by the Normans. The country had already been divided into shires, later called counties, which differ little from those of the present day. The shires were administered by the bishop, the earl, or the chief lord, and an appointee of the king known as the *shire-reeve* or sheriff. The latter had the important function of looking after the king's business in the shire, especially the mustering of the national militia and the collection of such taxes as the Danegeld, originally paid to keep the Northmen away but continued, like so many taxes in modern times, long after the immediate necessity had passed away. There was also a shire court that tried civil and criminal cases which came under its jurisdiction, presided

over by the sheriff with the aid of the bishop and occasionally, when necessary, the earl. Minor cases were handled in a subdivision of the shire, called a hundred. It was in the hundred that the apportionment of taxes to each person was made by men of local knowledge under the guidance of the sheriff. These administrative divisions had since early times given the kings a means of enforcing their will; and because the sheriff in most cases, and the assessors in all cases, were local men, the germ existed for the combination of decentralized government and responsibility to the central government which made representative government possible later, and provided a vehicle by which consent for taxation could be asked and given.

THE NORMAN CONQUEST AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Imposition of feudalism By the time of the Norman Conquest there was no fully developed feudal system in England. The relationship between lord and vassal existed, but in primitive form; courts presided over by the lords operated in cases involving themselves and their dependents, while other courts operated for different offenses not concerned with land tenure. The king had certain rights over the common land of England, and these rights had real meaning; but he was not even the theoretical owner of the remainder of the land, as in France. The English thanes owed him military service as a national obligation rather than because they held land from him; they owed it to him as chief warrior, who was constantly having to call upon them through the persistence of national danger from the Danes.

The great change made by the Norman Conquest was therefore not the establishment of an entirely different system, but the imposition of order upon a mass of customs which had been gradually growing up, and the speeding up of the feudalization process by a series of able kings, in whose French possessions there was already a well-developed feudal system.

When Edward the Confessor died, leaving



no direct heir, the Witan elected as king the most noted warrior in the country, son of its greatest earl. Harold, the new king, however, was faced by two threats, one from Scandinavia and one from Normandy, whose rulers both claimed the English crown. Harold was able to defeat and kill the Scandinavian claimant, but his army was too exhausted to stand against William of Normandy, whose feudal army, swelled by adventurers from all parts of France, defeated and killed Harold at the battle of Hastings (1066). After subduing the rest of the country, a task that occupied five years, William (called the "Conqueror") declared that all lands were forfeited to himself. Any English lords who wished to retain their land were compelled to swear allegiance to him and do homage as his vassals. The remainder of the lands were given to William's Norman followers in return for the same recognition of himself as their suzerain. Thus

the Conquest made what was elsewhere only a theoretical position real in England; William was the actual lord or suzerain of the entire land of England. Under the Norman kings there was no land whatsoever that was free (or *allodial*); every land had at least one lord, the king.

The king, however, could not administer such a vast estate himself through his nominees or servants. He retained the greater nobles as his direct vassals, or tenants-in-chief. But these were permitted, indeed encouraged, to let out the land again to subvassals (subinfeudation), who owed service to the king's tenants-in-chief as vassals. The service was composed of the usual feudal aids, and these subvassals were said to hold their land, as customary in the feudal system, by knight or military service. But, in William's eyes, this did not justify the subvassals' fighting on behalf of their lord in his private quarrels. Though private warfare was not altogether quelled, especially under later kings, it was never legal for a vassal to fight for his lord unless the king himself had authorized the calling out of troops. And this he did only in national wars. A subvassal under this system therefore owed military service only to the king; but he was called upon for military service by his own overlord on behalf of the king. Thus the king had the advantage of indirect control over his subvassals, saving him the labor of administration involved, while at the same time he had all the benefits which accrued to a mighty feudal landowner, able to command the military service not only of his own tenants-in-chief but of every landowner in the country.

Through the sheriffs the king likewise exercised the old Anglo-Saxon privilege of direct taxation of the people without the intervention of the vassals and subvassals, and he retained and extended the power of the king's courts, though feudal lords could hold their courts to deal with matters within their own jurisdiction. No lord could erect a castle except with the king's license, and theoretically every castle in the country belonged to him. It will be seen, therefore, that, with customary Norman intelligence, William made full use of everything that could help him in the existing Anglo-

Saxon system, while adding to it elements of Norman-French feudalism which could be used with profit to himself. He took full advantage of the Anglo-Saxon system of sheriffs. Bishops and earls were far harder to control than his own appointees. He therefore excluded the former from the government of the shires and hundreds, and made the sheriffs supreme, subject to dismissal only by himself. Hoping to make it entirely clear that the members of the new English nobility were no longer to have the privilege of making private war, and that all military service was owed only to himself, in 1086 William summoned to Salisbury all the landowners in the country, whether tenants-in-chief or only subvassals, and made them swear fealty to himself. They swore that they would be loyal to him even against their direct suzerains. Thereafter every tenant doing homage to his own lord for his fief had to add, "Saving the faith that I owe to my lord the king," which, of course, expressly covered military service, taxation, and legal appeals, which were the prerogatives of the Crown.

In order to have an exact knowledge of the dues of all kinds owed by every man in the kingdom, whether to himself or to any of his vassals, William sent out clerks into his shire courts. Every landholder, whether free or serf, had to appear and, under oath, answer certain questions about his land—how many people worked on it, how much meadow and forest it contained, how many streams, and who had the various rights involved. All this information was written down in the *Domesday Book*, a magnificent example of Norman administrative genius altogether unique for that period, and only possible in a country which had developed the necessary local institutions through which the information could be collected. The king now had his hands upon the pulse of the whole realm, but few English kings ever had such power again. The lords, who had been robbed of so much that belonged to their class elsewhere, did not hesitate to take advantage of any later weakening in the central government, and in so doing ultimately paved the way for the limited monarchy and representative institutions which have been the special glory of the English political genius.

Machinery of government The king had so many tenants-in-chief that the customary feudal council, made up of the king's vassals, would, in England, have been a most cumbersome body. William did call it on occasion, but preferred to work with a committee of these tenants-in-chief, which took the place of the Witan. The whole body was entitled to be consulted, but few lords desired the privilege, and it became the custom for this smaller council to give advice to the king when he summoned it for the purpose. The whole assembly at this time is known as the *Curia Regis*, or Court of the King, but in practice the *Curia* was made up of those tenants-in-chief whose presence William especially desired, and the majority did not attend. William's younger son, Henry I, made this committee a formal institution.

William used a small number of regular officials in a full-time capacity. Chief of these was the justiciar, who ruled England in the king's name when, as fairly often happened, he was forced to look after his ducal interests in Normandy. The justiciar also became head of the departments of finance and justice in William's time, though these were separated by his younger son. The chancellor and chamberlain, two important officials in later centuries, at this time had duties in the king's household. Whenever the king needed any further help he called upon his higher clergy and members of his *Curia*, whom he authorized to perform special limited tasks in the country, usually in conjunction with the sheriffs. With the feudal system working so efficiently in his behalf, William did not need a great corps of officials in his employ. All that was really needed was competent supervision of the work carried out for him by his tenants-in-chief in return for the land they had received from him, and this was provided by the few officials that he had.

The institutions of William the Conqueror have been discussed at considerable length because they gave the English monarchy a strength which was to endure for many centuries, in spite of rebellious nobles. They established certain principles which outlasted even the conversion of the monarchy into a consti-

titutional kingship in the eighteenth century. For many centuries it was held that the king ought to live from his own resources and was entitled only to specified dues from his people unless they agreed to grant him temporary assistance, that only the king could raise an army, and that all acts were done in the king's name. Even today the king, not the government or people, is the owner of the colonies beyond the seas; and constitutional changes in the colonies are effected by orders-in-council—that is, by orders issued by the king in the presence of, and by the advice of, his chosen councilors. The king chooses his own prime minister, although his choice is necessarily based on the result of the most recent parliamentary elections. He invests the ministers chosen by the prime minister with their offices, and the cabinet remains in theory the king's council. The advice it offers to the king he is, however, now bound to accept. No legislation is valid unless it has received the king's assent, and it is in theory the king who legislates by the advice of and with the consent of his ministers.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT UNDER SUCCEEDING MONARCHS

Reign of Henry I The work of the monarchs of the next few centuries was a continuation of what had been begun so auspiciously by William. It may therefore be discussed more briefly, with indications of the major developments effected in each reign.


In the long reign of Henry I (1100–1135), the younger son of William the Conqueror, there was a considerable improvement in administration. By appointing to his personal staff a number of gentlemen who were not of the highest nobility and granting them lands as his direct vassals, and by paying careful attention to his ecclesiastical appointments so that they were occupied by the best administrators in his realm, Henry succeeded in creating a council of advisers whose positions were not hereditary and who were thus closely tied to himself. This small council was the governing body of the realm under the king, who rarely called together the great council com-

posed of all his tenants-in-chief. The small council ultimately became the Privy Council and in modern times the cabinet. Henry also reorganized the treasury, so that at all times he was aware of how much money was due to him and how much had been collected on his behalf. Twice every year his treasury officials met to scrutinize his accounts, using a table covered by a cloth divided into squares, representing the pounds, shillings, and pence he had received. The cloth gave rise to the word *exchequer*, which has ever since been used for the English treasury.

It has already been noted that many different kinds of law were in use in England. Henry made a serious effort toward unifying the law. He granted writs to complainants to enable them to use the king's courts in cases where they believed they had not received justice. He was the first to send out justices

to try cases in the country, and to observe the conduct of the local sheriffs—a practice similar to that employed by Charlemagne, who, as recounted in Chapter 9, sent out *missi dominici* to observe the behavior of his counts. The sheriffs on occasion were also instructed to hold sworn inquests, in the course of which neighbors were summoned to give testimony under oath that a crime had been committed. Thus, in the reign of Henry I, we find already the germ of the grand jury and the beginnings of what later came to be called the common law—that is, the law common to the whole realm.

The interregnum of Stephen and restoration of royal power by Henry II Henry's work, however, was almost undone in the anarchy that followed his death. It had not yet been established in England that a woman



could succeed to the throne, and Henry left a daughter, but no son, on his death. Henry's nephew, Stephen, supported by a considerable number of the nobles, claimed the crown, as did also Matilda, his daughter, supported by other nobles. In the ensuing civil war, which persisted for the greater part of the reign that appears in English records as that of Stephen (1135-1154), the nobles recovered all the power that they had lost since the time of William the Conqueror, and were a virtual law to themselves. They erected castles, contrary to royal decrees of the past, and Stephen was never able to exercise an effective administration. Each noble was lord in his own area, and submitted to no authority from others. The English monarchy might never have recovered from this setback had it not been for a number of fortuitous events which resulted in the establishment on the throne of Matilda's energetic son, Henry II (1154-1189), with the aid of French nobles who were the vassals of his wife, Eleanor of Aquitaine.

Eleanor was the sole heir to much of France when she was married at an early age to Louis VII of France. After the failure of the Second Crusade Louis, dissatisfied with the behavior of his wife during the crusade, divorced her. She thereupon married Henry, who was several years her junior, taking her possessions, including Aquitaine, with her. Henry himself inherited further French lands from his father, Geoffrey of Anjou, a French noble. Armed with such might from his French possessions, Henry was able to force Stephen to recognize him as his heir to the English throne and, on the death of Stephen, he was able to compel the English lords to recognize him as king—the first of the Plantagenet line. Henry promptly restored the lords to their obedience and ruled the English with an even stronger hand than had his grandfather, Henry I, and great-grandfather, William the Conqueror. He restored the administration to efficiency, incidentally dismissing almost every sheriff in the realm. But his greatest claim to fame is his reform of the judicial system on the lines indicated by his grandfather, and the institution of many new arrangements which laid the

foundation for the entire modern legal system of all English-speaking countries.

Reformation of the legal system. Influenced by Roman law, which was beginning to be studied in England, Henry nevertheless retained the bulk of the English law, thus making the English system in some ways superior to the ancient law of Rome, and capable of very great modification and development. From the beginning Henry seems to have realized that the enforcement of the common law above all earlier systems of law was essential to his power, and this unification was fundamental to all his reforms.

Though the sheriff's courts remained, any complainant could apply to the chancery of the king to set a legal case in action within these courts. A writ could be purchased from the chancery for any of a great number of cases, and these at once became cases in which the king was interested, to be settled by the king's law. Writs could even be obtained in which the king directed the sheriff to enforce judgments which were the results of lawsuits, thus giving the king a hand in legal matters previously under the jurisdiction of local courts and accustoming the people to the idea that the king was the source of all justice.

The grand and the petit, or trial, jury both have their origin in Henry II's reign, although the grand jury of Henry is much closer to the modern grand jury than was his small jury to the modern counterpart.

The grand jury's primary function was to ascertain what duties were owed to the king and whether they were being fulfilled. This was the sworn inquest of the earlier Norman monarchs in a different form. The sheriff was instructed by the king's writ to call a body of jurors together who were to swear such matters before the royal justices. But under the Assizes of Clarendon and Northampton (1166 and 1176), the sheriffs were instructed to bring before the king's justices a group of men who were to swear whether any of various specified crimes had been committed in their neighborhood, and to say who, in their opinion, had committed them. The accused would then be

subjected to the ordeal or trial by combat. But as time went on, perhaps not at all in the reign of Henry, certain pleas could be made by the accused in front of a sworn jury—such as that he had been elsewhere at the time (*alibi*), or that his accuser had been actuated by malice. He was finally allowed to appeal to a jury of his neighbors on the whole question of guilt or innocence; but it should be emphasized that for a long time the accused did not need to submit to the new procedure but could demand the old trial by ordeal or combat. Nevertheless, even if the accused were successful in the ordeal, the king could order him banished from the realm.

Under Henry I, as has been seen, the king's justices paid visits to the shires to see that justice was done. These visits, however, in Henry I's time seem to have been spasmodic and not regular. Henry II sent out justices regularly into each shire to hear criminal

cases brought before them by the grand jury, and he sent out members of his own Curia irregularly to check upon officials, again using the device of the grand jury or sworn inquest. These judges even listened to complaints about the quality of beer sold in a shire, and a check was supposed to be kept on every matter of public importance; but, needless to say, this court was popular with few, and in later years its visits became rare, though it remained a salutary reminder to the people that the king's justice was capable of reaching them in any case of offense against the public interest.

It was as a result of his attempts to make a uniform law code for England that Henry quarreled with the Church in the person of his Archbishop of Canterbury, St. Thomas Becket. Becket had been Henry's chancellor, and the king felt sure that he could rely upon him as archbishop to support the royal reforms. But Becket at once upon investiture



The murder of Thomas Becket by the knights of King Henry II of England. From the Ramsey Abbey Psalter (English), 1285-1300. (COURTESY THE PIERPONT MORGAN LIBRARY, Ms. 302, folio 4)

became a stubborn supporter of all papal claims, and in particular of the right of the Church to try all offenders, whatever their crimes, as long as they were ecclesiastics. Becket refused to accept the Constitutions of Clarendon (1164), the main provisions of which deprived the ecclesiastical courts of the right to try "criminous clerks," or clerics who had committed a crime against the king's law. The recalcitrance of the archbishop ultimately resulted in his murder, after the king had in a rage incited some of his knights to the deed. The murder shocked the country. Henry had to do severe penance, and he withdrew part of the Constitutions. The remainder continued in force, allowing the king to make ecclesiastical appointments and preventing the papacy from directly taxing the English Church without the king's consent. In addition, certain important regulations regarding the possession of property by the Church were allowed to stand. The ecclesiastical courts experienced a continuous growth for some time in England after the murder, and Henry was effectively prevented from establishing his jurisdiction in the matters which had customarily been allowed to the Church.

DIMINUTION OF ROYAL POWER UNDER LATER PLANTAGENETS—MAGNA CARTA AND THE BEGINNINGS OF PARLIAMENT

The system set up by Henry II was strong enough to survive an absentee monarch (Richard I, 1189-1199) and a monarch who was uniformly unsuccessful in everything he undertook (John, 1199-1216). But the English nobles in the latter reign were able to force some recognition of their traditional rights from the monarch. Richard (called the Lion-Hearted) had been captured on his way home from the Third Crusade and delivered to the Holy Roman emperor Henry VI, who had exacted a huge ransom before permitting him to return to England. One of the feudal aids, it will be remembered, was the payment of ransom for a suzerain captured in battle. The English lords were therefore liable under feudal law to pay this ransom. When Richard was killed only a few years after his return,

the ransom was still owed to the bankers and others who had provided the ready cash. John therefore succeeded to a debt that was a serious burden on the monarchy, and on the nobility and people. But John was also engaged in a desperate struggle to retain his French territories against the attacks of Philip Augustus, king of France. This struggle was of little or no interest to the English nobility, since no loot could be taken and John, in any case, was an inefficient leader. Thus they insisted on sticking to the letter of their ancient rights, namely that they had to serve for only forty days a year, and could not be compelled to pay scutages beyond what was customary.

Finally John embroiled himself, as we have seen, with Pope Innocent III, and the land was laid under an interdict. This again decreased the means of the people to pay for John's wars and other expenses. When Innocent bestowed the kingdom on Philip Augustus and Philip's son Louis made preparations for attacking England, John submitted and gave the kingdom to the papacy as a fief. This in no way lessened John's expenses, but rather increased them. By 1215 he had almost the whole people united against him. The nobles forced him to a small island in the River Thames called Runnymede, where he signed the Magna Carta ("great charter"). In essence, Magna Carta was a document signed by the king stating that he would not do certain things which he had grown accustomed to doing but which were forbidden under feudal law and custom. The nobles compelled John's successor, Henry III, to bind himself by an oath not to do the things forbidden by the Charter, an oath which he repeated several times. In later years the Charter came to be regarded as the cornerstone of English liberties, but of course it was nothing but a declaration made by the king concerning what he would not do. It could not be enforced save by a rebellion, such as the nobles staged in 1215. At the most, the nobles could remind the king of his promises and, in Henry III's case, of the promises that had been made by his predecessor.

Toward the end of his reign John ceased to choose good men as officials, and his ad-

ministration became weaker than in the days of his brother and father. This tendency became even more marked in the reign of John's rather feeble son, Henry III (1216-1272), who was much influenced by foreign friends of his wife and appointed many of his personal favorites to high positions which they were not qualified to fill. Henry tried also to live up to his obligations as vassal to the papacy and to provide his suzerain with money for his Italian wars. At one time he was even willing to accept the Sicilian kingdom on behalf of his son, who would have had to fight hard for the position—as usual at the expense of the English people. The nobility therefore were always restive during Henry's reign, and when they found a leader in the person of Simon de Montfort, formerly one of Henry's French favorites, they decided on direct action to compel the monarch to observe Magna Carta and to take greater account of the wishes of his nobles and people. In 1258 a number of feudal lords summoned other barons to a gathering, known as the Mad Parliament, to concert measures for keeping the king under control and restraining his taxation. They proceeded to issue the Provisions of Oxford, a series of reforms which the king was forced to accept. Some of their grievances he was compelled to redress, and for a while he was virtually controlled by this self-constituted committee of greater barons.

Two years later the barons evidently felt that they, too, needed a wider basis of support and authority. They therefore summoned to a special assembly three knights from each shire, who would represent the interests of the lesser lords of the realm who were not tenants-in-chief of the king. The king issued counterinstructions to the knights to come to meet him instead, thus adding to the confusion. It was impossible for the king to accept indefinitely this kind of dictation from his vassals, and it was clear that civil war could not be long delayed.

When it came, in 1264, Simon de Montfort and the barons were at first successful, defeating the king in the battle of Lewes and imprisoning him. But there was no intention of harming the monarch; the sole interest of

Simon and the barons was in forcing Henry to yield some of his powers to the feudal aristocracy. The king's own son, later to become Edward I, supported the lords against his father for a time. Simon summoned four knights to be elected to meet the king during 1264, but nothing came of the effort. Then he summoned a full parliament, of lords and higher clergy, though he was careful to choose only those who favored his party. To these he added representatives from the shires (two knights from each, to be elected in the presence of the sheriff) and, for the first time, two representatives from each city and borough. This Parliament of Simon de Montfort was the most representative assembly that had been called since the Conquest, but it came to nothing. Edward deserted him, returning to his father, and Simon was defeated and killed in the battle of Evesham in 1265. But Edward seems to have remembered the salutary lesson, and it was in his reign that Parliament first became an established institution, giving advice to the king, who was expected to legislate only after having taken careful consideration of its advice.

THE MODEL PARLIAMENT OF EDWARD I

In 1295 this same Edward, now Edward I (1272-1307), summoned the most inclusive assembly yet called in England, known as the Model Parliament. This did not mean that he considered Parliament as the legislature of the realm. He himself had already promulgated the majority of those fundamental laws which have earned for Edward I the name of the English Justinian. These laws he declared he had made only after consultation with various great men of his realm, without reference to any parliament. For more than a century the king continued to draw up the statutes himself with the aid of his council, but the statutes were supposed, after the time of the Model Parliament, to be in conformity with what Parliament had advised him. When members of Parliament complained that the statutes did not conform, it was with a sense of grievance, as if the king and council had cheated them; ultimately they forced the king to allow them

to make the statutes, to which he had only to give his assent.

In the Model Parliament the sheriffs were instructed to cause two knights of each shire, two citizens of each city, and two burgesses of each borough to be elected. In addition, the monarch summoned the nobility and the clergy as in earlier times; but by no means all of the king's tenants-in-chief were summoned. Indeed, the nobility was considerably outnumbered by the clergy. It is not known whether the members who were summoned by virtue of their rank or position sat separately from the elected members from the beginning, but before long this was the custom.

The knights of the shire were, of course, landholders, and might be presumed to have many interests in common with the larger barons. But they also had divergent interests as subvassals rather than tenants-in-chief; though they might also be minor tenants-in-chief of the king, they usually were not. At all events, these knights decided—and it was a decision of supreme importance for the development of constitutional government—that they would throw in their lot with the townsmen, by whom they were outnumbered, but to whom for centuries they supplied leadership in Parliament. These two groups grew into the modern House of Commons, and both were classified as part of the third estate, while the higher clergy (the first estate) and the higher nobility (the second estate) became the House of Lords.

As a member of either House would have considered it in his time, the primary purpose of having a Parliament was to regulate and minimize the power of the king, especially in matters of taxation. The Parliament presented petitions to the king and could ask for justice even in minor complaints, which the king would refer to the suitable court or department of state. In time these petitions became a means of initiating legislation; the petitions would be discussed and recommendations given, and the king was then expected to act upon them. But the king usually called Parliament only when he needed money, and thus gave Parliament the opportunity to go into the whole question of his expenditures. It

gradually became accepted that the power of taxation was in the hands of Parliament, except for those taxes which belonged to the king from ancient times and were his under feudal law. It was this principle, and its acceptance, that led directly to the limited monarchy at the end of the seventeenth century; and it was also ultimately to make the House of Commons superior to the House of Lords, since revenue from the former was far more elastic than anything a few lords and bishops could hope to raise. Only two years after the Model Parliament, at a time when the Crown was in great need of money and was engaged in controversy with Pope Boniface VIII over the taxing of the clergy, Edward tried to collect money without the consent of his Parliament and to force his barons to serve in a foreign war. The barons took to arms, supported by the merchants whose commodities the king had claimed to be able to tax. The king was forced to give way, swearing an oath that he would not make such new taxes in the future without the common consent of the realm. His grandson later had to confirm the promise, and it became generally accepted as the law and custom of the land.

WEAKNESS OF LATE MEDIEVAL MONARCHY— FORCED ABDICATIONS, DISPUTED SUCCESSIONS, AND CIVIL WARS

It is unnecessary to go in detail into the growth of Parliament once it had been established as a going institution, entitled to be called regularly for the purpose of petitioning the king, even if he himself had no demands to make on it. The son and successor of Edward I, Edward II (1307–1327), was deposed by the barons led by the queen and one of her favorites. The only point of constitutional interest in his reign is the insistence of the heir to the throne that his father must abdicate before he could take the position. This heir, who reigned from 1327 to 1377 as Edward III, was in constant need of money for the Hundred Years' War with France—a war begun by Edward, as discussed later in this chapter. The war was, for the most part,

popular with the soldiers and nobility; it was usually successful, and loot was available. But the townsmen were not always so contented with the war, and Edward had to find many new sources of revenue. It is at this time that the customs and excise (tunnage and poundage) became a regular imposition, though granted by Parliament for only limited periods and not intended to be a permanent source of revenue for the king. There were a number of other experimental taxes, including income, personal property, and poll taxes. But, as always in the Middle Ages, the new taxes were only temporary grants for definite needs. A permanent source of revenue beyond the king's regular income from Crown resources and the proceeds of his courts of justice, was never acceptable until comparatively modern times. Edward even resorted to loans from Italian bankers, then found himself unable to repay, in spite of their acceptance of the English crown as security.

The reign of Richard II (1377-1399), short as it was, was of considerable constitutional importance. Coming to the throne as a boy of eleven, Richard was at first dominated by his council, which was constantly opposed by the great lords in Parliament who were not in the council. When he finally came of age, he attempted to rule personally, calling Parliament irregularly or not at all, and trying to use his executive power to collect sufficient money for his needs. But a baronial revolution overthrew him, and the indictment drawn up against him in Parliament declared that he had offended against the laws and customs of the realm by trying to rule and tax without the consent of Parliament. Again, as in the case of Edward II, Parliament deposed him and compelled him to abdicate, choosing as king, under the title of Henry IV (1399-1413), a noble of the House of Lancaster who was clearly not the best heir to the throne. No doubt Parliament was influenced in its choice by the fact that Henry had led the revolt against Richard, who was murdered shortly afterward.

Owing his position to parliamentary support, Henry allowed Parliament to perform all the functions it claimed for itself, and

rarely succeeded in imposing his will upon it. He was the only fully constitutional king of the Middle Ages. The House of Commons began to audit the king's accounts, and directed the expenditure of the money it voted to him. The wording of legislation was now determined by Parliament before a bill reached the king for signature.

Though Henry V (1413-1422) safely succeeded to his father's position, it was not without opposition from another noble house, which had, in its own opinion, a better right to the throne—the House of York. At least in part in order to head off such dynastic opposition, Henry V picked a quarrel with France and plunged his country into a foreign war, in which he was brilliantly successful, winning by the Treaty of Troyes (1420) the consent of the deranged French king to his own succession to the throne of France. Henry, however, died prematurely, and, as we shall see, his son was unable to make good his father's claim to the French crown. As this son, Henry VI (1422-1461) was intermittently insane and never exercised an effective control over it, Parliament in his time was usually supreme.

When Henry VI became permanently insane, the House of York decided to take matters into its own hands. The whole of France except Calais had been lost; mercenaries defeated in France returned to England, where they preyed upon the countryside almost with impunity; the officials of the government were unable to exercise their functions and were frequently unpaid and corrupt. In these circumstances Richard, Duke of York, claimed that the country required a competent king and that this should be himself, by a hereditary right superior to that of the actual reigning monarch, Henry VI. The supporters of the Lancastrian house did not accept his claim and war broke out.¹ Richard was killed. His son and heir Edward (IV) proclaimed himself king in 1461. But his title was not uncontested, and he continued to wage the War

¹ This war is called the War of the Roses because the Lancastrian emblem was a red rose, while that of the House of York was a white rose.

of the Roses until his chief opponent, the Earl of Warwick (the Kingmaker), was killed at the battle of Barnet (1471). Henry's wife and young son were defeated in the same year at the battle of Tewkesbury. Edward's title to the throne was then formally acknowledged by a subservient Parliament.

Edward may be considered as the real founder of the absolute monarchy. Henry VII, the first Tudor king, merely followed Edward's policy, with various improvements. Edward called Parliament rarely, and used various indirect means for gaining money for his rule, especially from the townsmen. The latter did not mind taxation, even severe taxation including forced loans (called benevolences!), provided the War of the Roses did not break out again and ruin everyone.

Edward's monarchy was strong, and it was far from constitutional. He had come to power by violence and he did not mind using some violent means to maintain his throne. He no longer had any wars with France on his hands, and his increased revenue obtained from the towns, plus a merciless use of his judicial powers to extract further income, enabled him to be free of Parliament, as Henry VII was also able to be when he wished. When Edward died his sons were children, and they were imprisoned and are generally believed to have been murdered by their uncle, Richard III, who usurped the throne but reigned for too short a time (1483-1485) and with too little security for any constitutional changes to take place in that period. He called only one Parliament. In 1485 he was killed at the battle of Bosworth, and an outright usurper, with hardly more than a shadow of a claim to the throne through his mother, was accepted as king by Parliament, on the condition, or at least after a promise, that he would marry the heiress of the House of York. Thus began the great Tudor monarchy, and the establishment of an absolutism, under which Parliament was clearly an unequal partner in the rule of the country. The subsequent history of England, the ascendancy of the Tudor monarchs beginning with Henry VII, and the final assertion of superior power by Parliament will be dealt with in Chapter 14.

ENGLAND AND FRANCE

We have now studied the English national state up to the end of the Middle Ages, concentrating on the development of the characteristic English political institutions. A few words should also be said on the relations of the English monarchy with France, although these will be dealt with in rather more detail in the French section of this chapter. In the reign of Henry II, as we have seen, more than half of France was made up of fiefs of the English crown, for which the English monarchs had to do homage to the French king. The latter had certain rights over the English king as a vassal, but these were not of much use to him unless he had the power to enforce them. The English kings usually performed the act of homage in the prescribed manner, since there was nothing derogatory to their dignity in this in a Europe still in the feudal age. On the other hand John, king of England, married a noble lady who had already been promised to a French baron. This brought Philip Augustus into the picture since he had to protect the rights of the baron, who was also one of his vassals. He summoned John to his feudal court to answer for his crime. When John refused to appear, Philip was given a legitimate cause of war against him as a faithless vassal. Furthermore, when John murdered or caused to be murdered the young count of Brittany, his own nephew, who had possibly a better right to the English throne than himself, Philip was able to have John condemned by his feudal court since the count was likewise a vassal of the French king. Thus the English king's position as a French noble might bring him into difficulties in circumstances where the French king would have the support of his other vassals. On the other hand, the French nobles and people did not regard the English king as a foreigner against whom could be stirred up xenophobic feelings—not at least until the later Middle Ages, when, as we shall see, nationalism was rising in France.

Once Philip had deprived John of most of his French possessions by war, it was difficult for the English king to recover them. Henry III

agreed by treaty to relinquish his right to most of the lands taken from his father, on condition that he be allowed to keep Aquitaine, Gascony and Guienne, in southwest France, had not yet been taken over by the French monarch.

In the fourteenth century various quarrels between the French and the English, including one over the French king's rights in Flanders, where much of the English wool crop was manufactured into cloth, culminated in the claim by Edward III of England that he was, through his mother, the rightful king of France. This set off the so-called Hundred Years' War, the first phase of which went strongly in favor of the English. But in the later phases, after England with the aid of French (Burgundian) allies had occupied much of France and had the English king's right to the French throne accepted by treaty (Treaty of Troyes, 1420), there was a sudden national revival in France under the inspiration of Joan of Arc, which resulted in the expulsion of the English from all France except Calais.

There can be no doubt that this expulsion was to the eventual benefit of the English, who were thus enabled to build up a national state apart from the Continent. Under the Tudor dynasty of England (1485-1603) the English were able to develop an exclusive patriotism and nationalism of their own which was to stand them in good stead in later centuries. But these developments will be picked up again in Chapter 14.

♦ The French national state

THE EARLY CAPETIANS

It has already been noted that the French royal line is not descended from Charlemagne, although the grandson of the great Charles was the first king to reign over a kingdom not far different from what was later to be France. The crown left the family of Charlemagne when Charles the Fat was deposed by his nobles in 887 for cowardice and inertia. It was later given to the descendants of Odo, who had defended Paris against the Vikings. One

of Odo's descendants, Hugh Capet, founded the Capetian dynasty in 987. The direct descendants of Hugh Capet ruled France, eldest son succeeding eldest son, until 1328, when the crown went to the collateral house of Valois. In 1589 the house of Bourbon inherited the crown, retaining it in that branch of the old Capetian family until the Revolution.

The early history of the French monarchy need not detain us long. The Capetians were not among the great landowners of France when the crown passed to them. Before very long they had lost some of their possessions to other great lords, and were confined to little more than the Ile de France, the area around Paris, and the title of king. This latter meant that the monarch was the titular overlord of every noble who had any possessions in an area generally conceded to be that of "France," and that the other lords had to do homage to him at some time in their lives for their lands. In early years the Capetians could not compel their nobles to make even this gesture of respect to them. But they did at least have, in addition to the perquisites of a feudal king described in Chapter 9, a fair amount of ecclesiastical patronage in their hands, and the French clergy on the whole favored a monarchy over feudal decentralization. The clergy were continually urging the kings to establish and maintain justice beyond their mere feudal domains, and were, for the most part, willing to lend what aid they could.

The early Capetians, very sensibly in view of their position as relatively small landholders, rigidly refused to take part in foreign adventures in which their vassals were gaining glory and even kingdoms for themselves. The kings stayed at home looking after their affairs, and the fact, already mentioned, that there was never any doubt as to the succession and that most of the kings lived to an advanced age, thus obviating the need for a regency, aided them in their policy of gradually improving their position. In the early Middle Ages the French kings used the old Germanic custom of appointing household officials and giving them charge of various departments connected with the management of their feudal estates. But for a long time they did not even have

control over these appointments, which tended to pass from father to son, like the old "mayors of the palace." However, the king also gave appointments to clergymen, who were barred by celibacy from handing down such appointments. As the kings from the twelfth century onward managed to establish some order in their own territories, a task in which some of the earlier kings had indifferent success, so they were able to obtain control over their official appointments and began to appoint commoners who were more susceptible to royal control.

Louis the Fat (1108-1137) was the first French king who fully controlled his own territories, and he began to extend his jurisdiction beyond them, summoning to his court occasionally vassals who only owed him allegiance as king, and sometimes succeeding in enforcing his will. His son Louis VII married Eleanor of Aquitaine, adding to his kingdom for a time territories far greater than his own. This marriage was the direct result of his position as king, since the lady's father had asked Louis to look after her when he died. But Louis divorced her after the Second Crusade, as we have seen, and she married Henry II of England, taking her lands with her.

Louis had little success in dealing with Henry. But his successor Philip Augustus (1180-1223), by shrewd diplomacy and occasional military campaigns, was able to take back from Henry's sons almost all the land that had gone to the English crown through the action of Louis VII. More English possessions were also added by Philip's successor, Louis VIII. As we have noted in the last chapter, Philip was also the beneficiary of the Albigensian Crusade, when he became the overlord of the southern French lands formerly belonging to the count of Toulouse. The important county of Flanders fell into his hands as a result of a military victory in 1214. Philip was thus the actual rather than the merely theoretical suzerain of the greater part of France. He developed an administration that was efficient and in keeping with his needs, thus bequeathing to his successors a nearly united kingdom and a strong monarchy of a feudal type. In view of his effective work for the monarchy during

his long reign, it is not without justification that he was called Augustus, after the founder of the Roman principate and organizer of the Roman Empire. It should be understood that Philip Augustus and his Capetian successors were, however, feudal monarchs, and far from absolute. It was left to the Valois kings, Charles VII and Louis XI, to lay the foundations of that absolutism which is characteristic of the *ancien régime* of France, and which endured substantially to the French Revolution. In this chapter more attention will therefore be paid to the latter phase, which just falls within the traditional period of the Middle Ages, although the basis laid by the Capetian monarchs will also be dealt with as far as is necessary to explain what came later in the fifteenth century.

CONTINUED GROWTH OF POWER OF CAPETIAN KINGS

Full exploitation of feudal powers The French king, unlike the English, had no ancient customary rights to enforce, nor had he hedged his barons with restrictions on their independence like William the Conqueror of England, for his vassals owed a more direct obedience, more easily enforceable, to their own suzerains. So the kings had to concentrate their attention on trying to make their own domains at least subservient to themselves. Within this domain they did provide an administration far superior to those of other ordinary feudal lords, one which was capable of being extended as soon as the domain itself was enlarged. The earliest official was the *prévôt*, who looked after the king's interests in matters of justice and finance. As *prévôts* were paid by the grant of fiefs, their offices became hereditary, and it was not possible to do much to improve their administration until the king was in a position to pay them in money, and appoint and dismiss them at will. This reform was largely the work of Philip Augustus, who, by the help of his new feudal possessions, was able to find for the first time enough money for royal needs. He appointed *baillis* to watch the *prévôts*. These new officials at once became the chief instruments of royal policy. Their instructions were to support not only the king's feudal prerogatives

but also as many of his kingly ones as they could, including within their jurisdiction as much of the king's nonfeudal territory as possible, and extending his influence in areas where he was not the feudal suzerain. This was done especially through listening to complaints against the local administration of justice and trying to substitute an appeal to the king's justice instead of to the feudal court.

The king himself made effective use of his power of summoning his vassals, direct and titular, to his court for advice and assistance, accustoming them to regard themselves as his real vassals, and, as we have seen, he led them against the English possessions in France at a profit to themselves as well as to him. But one of his greatest titles to fame was his recognition of the importance of the towns, which were as prosperous as any in Europe in the thirteenth century. Philip was entirely willing to grant them charters giving them freedom to organize local internal government, in exchange for suitable amounts of money. The towns recognized the value to themselves of having an efficient king rather than an irresponsible feudal nobility as their protector. So they provided him not only with money but with soldiery, and in many cases guaranteed to undertake their own defense. Philip also appointed townsmen to high positions in his government.

But it was, on the whole, the conquests of Philip that made all the other successes possible. He had the nucleus of an administration which took care of very small territories; when the territories were enlarged he increased the number of his officials and maintained the same organs of government, adding only a few new officials, such as seneschals. All the officials had to be watched carefully by each king, since it was not easy to control them.

Perhaps as early as Philip Augustus the officials of the king, sometimes, in committee, tried cases under feudal law in which the king's interests were involved. This committee of the king's council ultimately developed into the Parlement of Paris, the chief law court of the realm. Another committee looked into the receipts of money that came into the king's treasury to see that the baillis and seneschals were doing their duty. But by the time of



St. Louis IX, King of France. From a *Moralized Bible (French)*, 1226-1234. (COURTESY PIERPONT MORGAN LIBRARY. Ms. 240, folio 8)

Louis IX (1226-1270) the king was asserting successfully his prerogative of administering justice for the entire kingdom of France, and not only for his feudal vassals. The king had always in theory been supposed to be the protector of all and the maintainer of peace. He and his lawyers now asserted that many cases tried locally by feudal nobles came within his jurisdiction. By decree Louis forbade feudal warfare, and tried to persuade contenders in disputes that might have led to war to come to his courts, either to himself, for he often gave personal judgments, or to the Parlement of Paris, which was under his control; and he forbade also, following the example of the Church, all recourse to trial by ordeal and combat. He did not trouble, as a rule, to obtain the consent of his vassals to his decrees, as had been the previous custom; but since he was everywhere revered as a saintly person—he was later formally canonized as a saint—this addition to royal authority was generally accepted,

and on several occasions he obtained the signatures of a representative selection of vassals. Louis, finding that the communal government of the towns given charters by Philip Augustus too often failed to work well because of internal quarrels between merchants and other burghers, suspended many charters and renewed them only when the towns could show that they deserved them. He made the towns have their public accounts audited by his officers, and introduced officials of his own, such as mayors, which for centuries were royal and not local appointees.

Centralization of public finance and administration It should be understood that the French kings as yet had no right to tax, and though occasionally they attempted taxes for special purposes, such as Crusades, there was always such an outcry that the attempts were abandoned immediately. Philip iv (The Fair—1285–1314) and the able corps of lawyers who formed his body of advisers recognized the importance of money in any centralized administration. They set themselves determinedly to find new sources of royal income, which was used for the purpose of enlarging the realm and controlling the feudal nobility by an increasing use of mercenary rather than feudal troops. On the towns he laid increased customs duties, forced loans, and sales taxes. He assessed the nobles highly for the privilege of avoiding military service; he expropriated the Templars, originally one of the crusading orders in the Holy Land, which by now had become extremely wealthy and had undertaken the duties of the kings' bankers. As we saw in Chapter 10, Philip also succeeded in taxing the French clergy. All accounts were carefully scrutinized by a special accounting department staffed by salaried officials.

Philip reorganized the official organs of state into what will hereafter be called the king's council, which had an inner group consulted on special occasions. This group remained the chief advisory body to the Crown until the Revolution. The Parlement of Paris, under the king's direction, became a real law court composed of trained lawyers. One branch was given the task of listening to requests that

the king rather than any other court render justice. The Parlement of Paris also assumed jurisdiction over local courts, transferring their cases, when necessary, to itself.

It may be mentioned that the king's council, made up largely of lawyers trained in the Roman law, was something new at this early period, and was found to be extremely effective in enhancing the king's authority. Looked at with suspicion by the feudal nobility, which in France throughout history remained an aristocratic military caste and made no effort to control the civil administration or even to cooperate with it, these lawyers had only one duty and one aim—to aid the monarchy which had appointed and could dismiss them. Paid in money and not in lands, they never became part of the aristocracy; even in later times, when lawyers and assistants to the king were ennobled, they became a separate nobility, known as the nobility of the robe rather than of the sword. Moreover they were in the time of Philip iv, laymen and not clergymen, and thus could be independent even in dealing with the Church. As the power of the monarchy grew, so must their own power with it; while if the monarchy's power declined, they personally would lose any authority they possessed. They therefore took every opportunity to exalt the power of the monarchy over any competitor that threatened it; and, being thoroughly educated men, took the lead even in appeals to public opinion. It was the king's counselors in particular who dominated the great appeal to national unity presented by the quarrel with Pope Boniface VIII, which has already been discussed in Chapter 10.

The States-General The calling of the States-General in 1302 by Philip iv was essentially an appeal to public opinion, and was intended by the lawyers who dominated it to be precisely this, presenting a complete contrast with the English Parliaments of the same period. Parliaments were called by the English kings in response to pressure by the barons and taxpayers, and diminished rather than increased the absolute authority of the monarchy.

The representation in the States-General was substantially similar to that of the English

Parliaments. The first estate, the clergy; the second estate, the nobility; and the third estate, the remainder, especially representatives of the towns, were the same as in England, though there was nothing in France to correspond to the crucial group in England, the knights of the shire, who gave leadership to the bourgeoisie without being dominated by their special urban interests. In Philip's assembly his policy had virtually unanimous support because the quarrel was so well calculated to appeal to all. No one was anxious to see France dominated by an authoritarian and grasping papacy. Bishops, monks, and friars were as favorable to the king's position as were lords, bourgeoisie, and university professors. If the king had called them, as later kings were compelled to call them, for the purpose of extracting funds from them, there would have been no such impressive unanimity. However, the precedent had been set for an assembly of all classes of the realm, dominated by the king and his council; and we should note in passing that the sentiment of nationality must have been growing if the well-informed and able lawyers who knew what they wanted found it worth while to couch their appeals in this vein.

FRENCH FAILURE TO ACHIEVE REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS

The end of the Capetian monarchy After the death of Philip the Fair in 1314 the feudal lords made a determined effort to regain some of their power lost to the encroachments of the monarchy. Philip's successors were forced to make a few concessions, defining the limits of the royal power and the rights of the nobles. But the nobles lacked effective means of enforcing their rights, which remained a dead letter as long as the monarchs retained the power they had acquired in the later Middle Ages under the Capetians.

Meanwhile, the Capetian monarchy was nearing its end. Louis x, who reigned only two years, left no son to inherit his throne. He was therefore succeeded by each of his brothers in succession, none of whom left any male heir. The last of the Capetian kings designated his cousin Philip of Valois, son of the brother of

Philip the Fair, as king, and he was accepted by the French nobility and duly assumed the crown. But Edward III, king of England, whose mother was the daughter of Philip the Fair, asserted that the French throne could descend through daughters in default of sons, as had been accepted by this time in England. This was the excuse for the Hundred Years' War, which was briefly touched upon in the first part of this chapter.

Contrasting roles of French and British nobility In a very real sense the end of the Capetian monarchy in France marks the close of the consolidation of the French kingdom, much as the reign of Edward I in England marks the greatest power of the later medieval English monarchy. Thereafter both monarchies lost power to the as yet undefeated forces of feudalism, while the two countries fought with each other and with the feudal nobility. But France had developed no constitutional counterbalance to the Crown, and at the end of the period of medieval disintegration absolutism was re-established in a modern form with relatively few changes from the monarchy of Philip IV. In England the institution of Parliament had grown throughout the period of disintegration, and remained still potentially strong even during the period of absolutism that followed it. During the Hundred Years' War it seemed, for a brief period, that the French monarchy would be brought under control by the same forces that limited it in England; but the chance was missed and it never recurred again. Fundamentally, it was the failure of the nobility to accept any social responsibilities, and its insistence on remaining a privileged and irresponsible group harking back to a long-outmoded military tradition, which handed absolute power back to the monarchy. The bourgeoisie found it impossible to cooperate with the lords, and made few attempts at effective action on their own. Preferring an orderly absolute monarchy to a disorderly and irresponsible feudalism, they were willing to pay the price exacted of them.

Nothing really new came out of the struggle: the French nobles learned nothing from their disasters, and far too much of the mon-

archis' energies had to be spent in combating them. Throughout the sixteenth century the nobility still pursued its own interests, waging war against the monarchs, intriguing for the succession, or trying to gain the ear of the kings. The civil wars of the sixteenth century were complicated by religious struggles; but in France, unlike England, the religious struggles were not used to extract concessions from the monarchy. When the French civil wars finally came to an end with the establishment of the Bourbon monarchy at the close of the sixteenth century, the king's position was secure. Subsequent rebellions by the nobles were suppressed without great difficulty, and the absolute monarchy continued substantially unchanged until the French Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century.


Subservience of States-General to the monarchy The States-General, the germ of a French parliament, might have been used in the Hundred Years' War as an instrument for the curbing of royal power. When the monarch needed subsidies to enable him to prosecute the war, he was compelled to call the States-General. But sooner or later it granted what the king wanted, the nobles who dominated that body probably recognizing that they too constituted a privileged class, and needed the king if they were to survive. They preferred alliance with the king to an alliance with the bourgeoisie. When Paris during the war rose in revolt under a merchant named Étienne Marcel, the nobles preferred to join the king in suppressing the rebels to joining with the rebels to force concessions from the king. The peasants were always on the verge of revolt, especially after the Black Death, a plague which killed an estimated fifth of the whole population of France. Faced with a scarcity of labor, the nobles tried to act as if there had never been a plague, and proceeded to exploit the peasants as before. When they revolted, the nobles joined the king in suppressing them.

Having thus irrevocably cast their lot with the king, the nobles, through the States-General, granted him the means by which he could carry on the war and maintain his government.

Although intended to be temporary, the two important taxes thus granted—a sales tax and a tax on hearths—were made permanent by a later monarch. With these taxes and the all-important *taille*, to be described later, at his disposal, the French monarch, unlike the English, seldom had to resort to calling the States-General for money. The last time it was called before the French Revolution was in 1614. Since this meeting in fact granted nothing, its very failure made the monarch aware of the truth that he could do perfectly well without it.

THE HUNDRED YEARS' WAR AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ABSOLUTISM

The early stages of the Hundred Years' War went uniformly against France, in part because of the refusal of the French nobility to abandon its old feudal methods of warfare in face of the yeoman archery of the English. In the later years of the fourteenth century the French recovered and improved their methods of warfare. Under the Valois monarch Charles V (1364–1380) the English were almost driven out of France. Then the tide turned again soon after the accession of Charles VI (1380–1422), who was





Portrait of Charles VII, King of France (the Dauphin, later king, to whom Joan of Arc was sent with her famous message). Painted by Fouquet.

insane for much of his reign. To understand the last phases of the war, however, it is necessary to consider what proved to be the most dangerous threat to the centralized French monarchy in the later Middle Ages. This was nothing less than the rise of a power which for a time possessed greater resources and territories than the Valois monarchy and ruled a substantial part of present-day France. This was the duchy of Burgundy, created by the Valois monarchy during the Hundred Years' War, and granted initially to a Valois prince, with the permission of the Holy Roman emperor, who was the suzerain of a part of the duchy.


Anglo Burgundian alliance The dukes of Burgundy by the early part of the fifteenth century had greatly increased their territories by marriage and conquest. Allied as they were with the French royal family, it was natural for them to try to win the French crown for themselves during the troubled years of the war; or failing that, at least to control the government of the mad king Charles VI. The easiest way to do this

was to ally themselves with the English, and hope for the opportunity in due course to oust the English. Thus the dukes entered into an alliance with Henry V of England (1413-1422). After the great victory of the latter at the battle of Agincourt in 1415, it was the Burgundians who compelled the French monarch to give his daughter in marriage to the English king, and to sign the Treaty of Troyes (1420), under which Henry was to inherit the French throne after the death of Charles VI. In fact Henry and Charles both died in the same year of 1422, and Henry's infant son was proclaimed king of France by the English and by the Burgundians, who at that time controlled much of northern France, including Paris. The dauphin Charles (later Charles VII) was thus deprived of his inheritance. Not only was much of the north and east of his country controlled by the Burgundians and their English allies, but the English possessed in their own right parts of southwestern France. It was at this unpromising moment that Joan of Arc, the Maid of Orléans, took a hand. Her aid to Charles was largely instrumental in effecting

the changes that were to drive the English out of France and the Burgundians from their alliance with the English.

Role of Joan of Arc The work of Joan of Arc is sometimes minimized, but there can be little doubt that it was crucial. Her story of course is well known—how she heard voices which instructed her to go to the Dauphin, as he was still called, since his right to the throne was in doubt;

how she recognized him at once and greeted him as king; how she breathed new life into the dispirited royal forces, and led them to the great victory at Orléans, which was the first substantial check to the English and Burgundians. With a sure instinct she recognized that until the Dauphin was crowned king at Reims, like his ancestors, he would not be accepted as king by the majority of the French. So after the victory of Orléans she insisted that he be



crowned (1429). When the ceremony was over her real work was done, but she insisted on continuing to lead a part of the French forces until she was captured by the Burgundians and sold to the English. The latter had her tried by the Inquisition in a process of very doubtful legality, since the bishop who presided was an old enemy of the Maid's, and was not authorized by the Church to hold the trial. Moreover, he was in any case not a free agent, since the English were not prepared to accept any verdict but condemnation; they wished to break Joan's influence by having her convicted as a sorceress. After her capture Charles attempted to ransom her, but he lacked power to rescue her. Thus Joan, after recanting briefly, was put to death as a relapsed heretic.

Meanwhile Charles and his chief adviser, Reginald, archbishop of Reims, patiently negotiated with the Burgundians, and were at length able to persuade them to abandon the English alliance—a negotiation which would have been unthinkable without the victories won for Charles by the Maid. The English, robbed of their allies, were unable to keep their gains; and at last Charles, with the aid of a strong army, paid for out of new taxes, was able to drive them from the country. Without the initial impulse contributed by Joan none of this would have been possible, and Charles, the dispirited dauphin, would never have won the title of Charles the Victorious that he merited before his death.

The work begun by Charles (1422-1461) was finished by his son Louis XI (1461-1483), a tireless schemer and indefatigable bureaucrat, who was able to put an end to the Burgundian menace forever by the use of bribes and shrewd diplomacy, aided by a good dose of luck. Before the end of his reign France was again united within substantially the boundaries that she has today.

THE MACHINERY OF ABSOLUTISM AS
DEVELOPED BY CHARLES VII
AND LOUIS XI

The secret of French absolutism is to be found in the financial autonomy granted by the States-General to the French kings during

the Hundred Years' War, and in the efficient organization of an improved bureaucracy to collect the new permanent taxes, devised in part by Charles VII but perfected by Louis XI and his two Valois successors. Until the rise of modern Germany, France was always potentially the richest country in Europe, possessed of the finest resources and the hardest-working peasantry. When she has been well governed, prosperity has always been quick to return. In a centrally administered kingdom so many possibilities existed for corruption, so many opportunities for personal enrichment presented themselves to unwatched officials, that the kings were often ludicrously short of money in a country where ample funds were really available.

The work of Charles VII consisted in obtaining the authorization from the States-General, or the nobility and bourgeoisie, to collect taxes on a permanent basis beyond the simple receipts from the king's property which were all that a feudal king commanded. Charles was granted this in order that he might be enabled to defeat and expel the English. The taxes thus granted, however, were never abandoned by the monarchy, though the fiction was observed that some revenues were temporary and extraordinary, while others were ordinary and regular. The chief tax granted in 1439 was the *taille*, a tax imposed upon all financial and real property throughout the kingdom. A remarkably complex system was inaugurated to collect this tax, which remained the chief tax in France till the Revolution and even afterward. The total amount needed by the Crown for each particular year was assessed. This total was then divided by the officials through each unit of government down to the level of the parish, which was assessed for its portion of the whole. On tax collection day in the parish the bells were tolled and the citizens were informed what their total contribution was to be. Then they had to elect assessors, who determined what the individual share of each must be. Naturally, every peasant wished to avoid his tax, and tried to conceal his wealth—a French custom which has persisted to this day—and many were the expedients adopted. But the *taille* could be collected, even though large

parts of the collections found their way into the pockets of the officials through whose hands they passed on the way to the treasury. Louis XI was extremely careful to check all corruption, as in general the best French kings were, until the later kings defeated their own objectives by granting excessive numbers of immunities from taxes to favorites.

The aids, or sales taxes, and the customs duties, both interior and those collected at the ports, and the proceeds from royal monopolies, especially the infamous *gabelle*, or salt tax, were given into the hands of tax farmers, who established their own collection posts and bought the whole contract for taxes from the king. The latter was therefore able to command the expected income from these taxes without having to go to the trouble of instituting a system for collecting them himself. This task was performed by private enterprise, which helped itself to considerably more profit from the collection than was officially permitted by the kings. The difficulty was the control of the tax farmers, and again, only the most efficient kings were able to keep them in order. With such possibilities for living beyond their means, many French kings in later times would persuade the tax farmers to give them several years' income in advance, and thus would be short of income in later years when it might be equally needed.

With the money thus newly available, and with the services of a great financial expert to assist him, Charles VII reorganized the French army. It was officially announced in 1439 that only the king could levy and maintain troops. Charles then proceeded to enforce this decree by levying an army of professional troops, with a permanent cavalry of twenty companies (about six hundred men to a company, including bowmen and lancers). Then a further body of bowmen was organized for the infantry, the soldiers (free-archers) being exempted from the *taille* in time of peace. They were to be chosen by the king's officials, the *baillis*. They were instructed in the use of firearms and artillery, engaged in periodic maneuvers, and were kept together according to the regions from which they hailed—the ancestors of the modern regiments. In addition to these French soldiers,

enormous numbers of mercenaries from all the countries of Europe were added when necessary.

It will be seen that the basis for all this military activity was the ability to collect the taxes to pay for it. If the mercenaries were unpaid, they preyed upon the country; if the king could not establish his authority firmly, the trained troops might just as easily join a pretender or a feudal lord who promised to pay them. For most of a century, or at least until the death of Francis I in 1547, the French kings were the masters of France through possession of an adequate income and well-paid troops able to maintain the king's peace against any feudal lord, and during this period France had a growing prosperity. When the royal government again failed in the middle of the sixteenth century, feudalism, which had only temporarily been held in control, burst forth anew.

The new financial regime called forth thousands of new officials, and it is from this time that a bureaucratic career became the position of honor in France that it remained until very recent times. Louis XI, an indefatigable bureaucrat himself, took very great care of all the appointments that he made, and he watched the behavior of his nominees with the most meticulous attention. He would stand no communal nonsense from the towns and insisted on appointing all the superior officials in them. Every official in the country had to be absolutely loyal to Louis, on pain of instant dismissal. Each official felt it to be his duty to enhance the authority of the king, his master, and incidentally his own at the same time. He received a good salary, and there were many valuable perquisites to be obtained from office. Thus it came to be the custom that the positions were actually purchased by the incumbents; and the kings did not usually dismiss them unless they proved exceptionally inefficient or disloyal. The majority of the officials of whom we know died safely in office, after designating a successor who would have to pay an indemnity to the king for confirmation of his appointment (as well as another to the departing official who had selected him). When a king died, the officials were all required to receive a confirma-

tion of their title to the office, which helped the new king over what would otherwise have been financially a difficult time.

The system worked, for the interests of kings and officials were one. The sufferers were the taxpayers who groaned, but for a long time thought that the comparative efficiency of the government was at least far better than the anarchy and civil war that had preceded it. Under feeble kings the officials paid less to the treasury than under the efficient ones, but they still paid something. The country was administered, and a high degree of stability was ensured. The law courts functioned, administering the king's justice as in the earlier medieval period; and the accounts were audited, or at least examined, by the central bureaux set up in earlier reigns for the purpose. At the top were the great officials of the king's council, appointed directly by him, usually from the ranks of the Church or the upper bourgeoisie.

When the Crown failed in the middle of the sixteenth century the system endured for a while, until it too collapsed under the recrudescence of feudal anarchy. But as soon as the centralized government was re-established by Henry IV in 1589, few indeed were the changes that had to be made. The machinery of the late-medieval *ancien régime* was the machinery in all essentials that lasted till the French Revolution of 1789; and by no means all its earlier features were changed even by the Revolution. Almost as much as in England can the structure of modern France be traced back to its medieval antecedents.


✧ The Iberian peninsula

Although Spain was not unified into a single national state until the late fifteenth century, the separate states of the Iberian peninsula were effective feudal kingdoms during the period when England and France were ruled by feudal monarchs, and similar institutions were developed to keep the feudal monarchs under some control. As the result of the long occupation by Muslims, however, the history of the Iberian peninsula has from the beginning presented certain important contrasts

with the development of other European countries. The process of driving out the Muslims took several centuries, and was not completed until the end of the Middle Ages. A kind of continuous crusade, backed by the Church, was in process during the greater part of the Middle Ages.

Not all of Spain was subjected to the Muslims. In the northwest the kingdom of the Asturias was able to defy the efforts of the Muslims to drive the Christians from the peninsula, while the Basques in the north were never subdued by them, and retained a fierce independence which drove them to attack the Franks in the eighth and ninth centuries. Eventually the kingdoms of León in the northwest and Navarre in the north became fully independent of the Muslims, while the territories which were to become the great Spanish kingdoms of Aragon and Castile were still subjected to them. But persistent effort by the Christians culminated in the capture of Toledo in central Spain in the middle of the twelfth century, while Cordova, the Muslim (Moorish) capital of southern Spain, was taken in 1236. Seville followed in 1248, leaving only the kingdom of Granada in the extreme south in Moorish hands, where it remained until 1492.

In the twelfth century León and Castile united into one kingdom, the most powerful in Spain, while Aragon was united with Catalonia and other areas in the northeast. At the end of the eleventh century Count Henry of Burgundy had been granted a fief in the west of the peninsula in exchange for help given to the ruler of Castile in the wars against the Muslims. Henry's successors, by hard fighting—which included wars against the Castilians as well as the Moors—gradually built up the kingdom of Portugal, which was to remain independent of the rest of the peninsula. In 1383, however, the throne would have gone to the Castilians, since the sole heiress was married to a Castilian prince. This the Portuguese nobles and people would not permit. They had fought too hard in past centuries against the Castilians to let the kingdom fall quietly into their hands. John I, grand master of the Order of Avis, a Portuguese crusading order whose main task had been the expulsion



TERRITORIAL UNIFICATION OF SPAIN

of the Muslims from the country, was chosen king instead; and when he inflicted a crushing defeat on the Castilians, the independence of the kingdom was assured. The dynasty founded by John was to lead Portugal, small as she was, to her crucial role in the expansion of Europe to the East in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

By the middle of the thirteenth century there were thus four well-established Christian kingdoms in the peninsula. The northern kingdom of Navarre comprised territories on the French side of the Pyrenees as well as on the Spanish side, and from 1234 was ruled by a Frenchman. Ferdinand III of Castile united León and Castile permanently in 1230. Thereafter the country was simply known as Castile.

The kingdom of Aragon was a confederation of many separate entities, each of which retained some autonomy. But it was ruled effectively by the house of Aragon and its kings, whose possessions were not confined to Spain. They possessed a number of French fiefs, and, as we have briefly noted in the last chapter, from 1282 they fell heir to the Hohenstaufen kingdom of Sicily.

In all the Spanish kingdoms the feudal monarchs had to submit to a limited control by their subjects, who fought hard for their privileges. As in France, the three estates—clergy, nobility, and townsmen—were summoned by the monarch when he was in need of money. But these Cortes, as they were called, were far more effective than in France, and

obtained the right to present petitions and be consulted on taxes and legislation. On the other hand, the Spanish rulers were always more powerful than the late-medieval English monarchs, who had to call Parliament at regular intervals and who needed Parliament to finance their wars. When necessary, the Spanish rulers were always able to make their will prevail, and by the end of the Middle Ages the Cortes were clearly subordinate to them, as the States-General was subordinate to the kings of France, save in exceptional circumstances.

In 1469 a great step toward the unification of Spain was taken when Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile, heirs to their respective thrones, were secretly married. In due course they inherited their thrones; and though the two countries were not officially amalgamated, and the union was only a personal union of the monarchs, in fact under their joint rule Spain became at last a national entity (1479). When Isabella died before her husband, a number of important Castilians tried to sever their kingdom from Aragon. But the movement quickly collapsed, and the whole kingdom was inherited by the daughter of the two monarchs, who proceeded to marry into the Hapsburg family. The son of Joanna, this first queen of Spain, was Charles V, who was elected Holy Roman Emperor, thus bringing Spain as a great power into the politics of Central Europe.

Ferdinand and Isabella brought together the commercial experience of Aragon and the great military tradition of Castile, which had been the leader in the wars against the Muslims. At once they proceeded to consolidate the entire peninsula except for Portugal. They drove the French out of that part of Navarre that was south of the Pyrenees, and they drove the Muslims out of Granada in the south, where they had been harmlessly living for centuries, paying regular tribute to the kings of Castile. For good measure, Ferdinand and Isabella then expelled the Jews, to an estimated number of two hundred thousand. This was an economic as well as a human disaster for the country, as many of these people, skilled in commerce, industry, and agriculture, could hardly be replaced. However, converted Mus-

lims (Moriscos) were permitted to remain for another century, and it was not till the expulsion of these latter in 1609 that the disastrous policy of persecution had its full effect. It is generally conceded that much of Spanish economic backwardness to this day can be traced to the systematic destruction or expulsion of those classes which had always borne such a large share of the economic activity of the country.

For the suppression of the feudal nobility the monarchs, especially in Castile, won the support of the towns, which, as usual, preferred absolutism to feudal anarchy, and by enlisting picked troops from the towns they were able to make considerable headway. But perhaps the greatest instrument for enforcing absolutism was the Spanish Inquisition, the adaptation of an established and accepted institution for new ends hardly in conformity with its original purpose.

As a "crusading" people, engaged for centuries in war against the Muslim infidels, the Spanish had a horror of heresy, and were deeply attached to militant Christianity. Moreover, the monarchs themselves were very strict Catholics and detested heresy no less than did their subjects. The relatively mild papal Inquisition, discussed in an earlier chapter, had fallen into disuse in Spain. Ferdinand and Isabella therefore requested the papacy to set up a new and more severe Inquisition, no doubt with the intention of subordinating it to the monarchy and using it for political ends. Pope Sixtus IV was reluctant to permit it, but allowed himself to be persuaded, and in 1478 the so-called Spanish Inquisition was duly established. The monarchs were indeed successful in gaining control of it, using it to establish their supremacy over the Spanish Church by driving out of the Church many of the local clergy, who were at this time rather lax in their discipline and observances, and replacing them with rigid disciplinarians. They also used the Inquisition against dissenters and their own personal enemies, and later, of course, against Protestants. They met little opposition from their own subjects, who were, on the whole, very religious and very orthodox. As long as the monarchs presented

their persecutions under a religious guise they could rely upon popular support.

The result was a reformed Church in Spain which was able, in the following century, to give much-needed leadership to the Catholic Reformation, made necessary by the initial successes of the Protestants. Spain thus became dominant in Europe for a time by the use of religious as well as political and military means.

Even so, the Spanish would not have possessed enough resources to maintain this position without the aid of the riches of the New World, discovered at the end of the fifteenth century by the Italian sailor Christopher Columbus, who had taken service under the monarchs of Aragon and Castile. A few years previously, the Portuguese, from their separate and independent kingdom, had succeeded in making their way down the coast of Africa, and in 1498, six years after the first voyage of Columbus to the East, the Portuguese sailor Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope, and reached the town of Calicut on the west coast of the Indian peninsula.

♦ Switzerland

After a consideration of the major national states of the Middle Ages, a few words may be added on the formation of another tiny national state, which has survived to the present day. The antecedents of Switzerland are to be found in the late thirteenth century, when three peasant cantons united in a confederation. The purpose of the confederation was to escape domination by the growing power of the Hapsburgs, many of whom held the imperial crown, and whose ancestral lands bordered those of the Swiss. Several times the Swiss peasants defeated numerically larger feudal armies sent against them. Other cantons, urban as well as peasant, joined the confederation as it succeeded in its objectives. By the end of the fifteenth century they were virtually independent, and their right to this independence had been formally acknowledged by the rulers of the Holy Roman Empire. The formidable Swiss soldiers were by this time much in demand as mercenaries by all the monarchs of Europe.

In 1648, at the Peace of Westphalia, the confederation was recognized as the independent country of Switzerland—the only nation in Europe which has always been republican, and has never submitted to rule by any monarch, either native or foreign.

♦ The national state as the key political institution of modern times

The discovery of the New World, and the opening up of Asia, is as fitting a dividing line as any between the Middle Ages and the early modern era, which we are now about to discuss. Europe had been consolidated into several national states, under a form of government sometimes called the "new monarchy,"—a monarchy which was fully abreast of the times, and was in a strategic position to take advantage of the new opportunities, economic and political, which were opened up by the new discoveries. The old universal State, which had always been the ideal of the Middle Ages, was now, in reality, gone forever, or at least postponed for an unforeseeable future. As we shall see, however, the Holy Roman Empire had not yet fully abandoned its pretensions, and on at least two separate occasions came close to restoring some of its former glories.

The great political fact of the centuries since 1500 has been the rise and growth of the national state, an entity larger than the ancient city-states of Greece and Rome, but smaller than medieval Christendom. These national states have shown themselves capable of taking care of tremendous commercial and industrial expansion, and of ensuring certain basic rights, ultimately including self-government, for their particular nationals. In the process they have fought terrible internecine wars, and they have competed by war and diplomacy for the resources, not only of each other, but also of the distant lands which they have subjected to their control.

Thus an institution which grew out of the needs of men in the Middle Ages has been sanctified as the natural form of government among men, as the Roman Empire was once sanctified by Christians who had grown up

beneath its shadow. It remains to be seen whether the national state can survive the trials of the present epoch; or whether, as Toynbee has urged, it is already obsolete and will give way to some other equally "natural" form of government. But it cannot be denied that from the sixteenth to the twentieth century A.D., the national state was the predominant form of governmental organization; and this, too, we owe to our medieval forebears.

Suggestions for further reading

PAPERBACK BOOKS

- Coulton, G. G. *Medieval Panorama*. Meridian. Uneven work, should be judiciously skipped. Most of it very good, but covers only medieval England. Many quotations from sources.
- Froissart, Jean. *Chronicles of England, France, and Spain*. Everyman. Now out of print, this chronicle is a contemporary account of the first period of the Hundred Years' War.
- Kelly, Amy. *Eleanor of Aquitaine and the Four Kings*. Vintage. Exceptionally good popular account of the period covered by the life of the French queen who later became queen of England.
- Myrs, A. R. *England in the Late Middle Ages*. Penguin. Another useful volume in the Penguin History of England.
- Stenton, Doris M. *English Society in the Early Middle Ages*. Penguin. Good solid work in the Penguin History of England.
- Travelyan, G. M. *History of England*. 3 vols. Anchor. The first volume of this well-written history covers the Middle Ages. History from the "Whig" standpoint, especially good on social liberty.

CASEBOUND BOOKS

- Adams, G. B., and Schuyler, R. L. *Constitutional History of England*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1934. Standard text on English con-

stitutional history, good on the Middle Ages. The revision by the second listed author in 1934 brought the original classic up to date, though much specialized research in the years since has somewhat changed the general picture.

- Altamira, Rafael. *History of Spain: From the Beginnings to the Present Day*. Tr. by Muna Lee. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1949.

The standard history of Spain, by a Spaniard.

- Maitland, Frederic W. *The Constitutional History of England*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1908. Peculiarly organized and difficult to find one's way about in, but well worth the effort, because it introduces the student to one of the great legal historians of all time, and permits him to see, as it were, into his workshop.

- Muntz, Hope. *The Golden Warrior*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949. One of the very best of medieval novels. Solidly based on the available sources, it is moving, accurate, and well written in a simple style, using words almost all Anglo-Saxon in origin.

- Painter, Sidney. *The Reign of King John*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1949. Valuable monograph by a leading American medieval scholar on this crucially important period.

- Painter, Sidney. *The Rise of Feudal Monarchies*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951. Another useful monograph, giving much important information in a small compass.

- Perroy, E. *The Hundred Years' War*. Tr. by W. B. Wells. New York: Oxford University Press, 1951. A full political history of the relations between England and France during the period, and a fair-minded account of the work of Joan of Arc.

- Petit-Dutaillis, C. *Feudal Monarchy in France and England from the 10th to the 13th Century*. Tr. by E. D. Hunt. London: Kegan Paul & Co., 1936. Indispensable work by a great expert on the subject. The material on the French monarchy is not to be found in any other single book in English.

Medieval Culture

Up to this point in the book separate sections have been devoted to the culture of each of the peoples considered. No difficulty was experienced in following this procedure, which has become traditional. Clearly the procedure is justifiable when one can perceive, in the perspective of history, the total cultural achievement of a particular civilization. These earlier civilizations all have long ago come to an end, and their legacy has been absorbed by their successors.

The Middle Ages, on the other hand, is an arbitrary abstraction, and not a true civilization distinguishable from its predecessors and successors (as was noted in the introduction to this Part). It is merely the early period of our own Western civilization. The people of the Renaissance, who knew and admired classical antiquity, regarded themselves as "modern" in contrast to the "ancient" Greeks and Romans. The age of the Renaissance is now called "early modern," but the "Middle Ages" has persisted as a descriptive term applied to the period between the fall of the Roman Empire and the somewhat arbitrary date of 1500.

Nevertheless, although the achievements of the medieval people are the achievements of our own immediate ancestors, and although there is a recognizable continuity of culture in almost every field between the men of the Middle Ages and ourselves, there is something different about that time, even if we have difficulty in saying exactly what it is. The characteristic medieval civilization, moreover, did undoubtedly decline in the fourteenth and

fifteenth centuries from its high point in the thirteenth.

Perhaps medieval culture is best thought of as a prenational European culture, produced at a period when, despite the rise of vernacular languages, the vast bulk of literary work was written in the still universal language of the educated, Latin; when Europeans did not yet recognize that there would be no restoration of an empire like Rome; when the Church still did exist as a universal institution and the concept of Christendom had some reality. In the thirteenth century the German scholar Albertus Magnus had as a pupil Thomas Aquinas, who belonged to a noble Italian family. The greatest philosophers of the next century were William of Occam, an Englishman, and Duns Scotus, an Irishman (probably). Although these men were born in different European countries, their culture was in all essentials the same; whereas the manifestations of the Renaissance, a bare century after the life of Thomas Aquinas, were noticeably different in Italy and in the northern countries. An attempt will therefore be made to treat the Middle Ages as a whole in this chapter; but it will be the last such attempt to be made in this book. Later chapters will discuss movements, such as Romanticism, which affected all countries belonging to Western civilization, but the divergencies from one nation to another may also of necessity have to be considered.

It has already been noted that the men of the Renaissance looked upon their immediate

predecessors as barbarians. They believed themselves to be the heralds of a new era, and consistently derided the achievements of the medieval people. They pictured their forebears as living in total bondage to an authoritarian Church, unable and unwilling to think for themselves, with every slightest deviation from orthodoxy punishable by a horrible death at the hands of the Inquisition.

This stereotype of the Middle Ages was accepted for so many centuries, and is, even now, dying so hard, that we do not regard medieval times frequently enough as the formative period of our own age, nor examine closely enough the immense obstacles that had to be overcome by the barbarians in a society that had collapsed as completely as the old Greco-Roman civilization. It was centuries before the static manorial feudal society was undermined deeply enough for an urban society to develop, and, as we have seen, civilized arts have hitherto never appeared in a rural society. But the medieval people did finally develop an urban civilization and an urban culture, and the cities which they founded have continued into our own times without serious breaks, excepting a few affected by external causes such as the Black Death.

What should be studied therefore in medieval culture is the struggle of the people to absorb what was left of the heritage of older civilizations, and the new creative effort to strike out on a line of their own afterward—to emancipate themselves from the static conception of life natural to a rural existence, to discover the power of reason and free themselves from the bondage to authority, and to see how in doing this they made possible the enormous scientific and political advances which have been the main glory of Western civilization as a whole. We shall understand their achievement better if we emancipate ourselves from the outworn stereotype that medieval civilization began with the barbarian invasions and ended with the Renaissance, that it was an age of faith and acceptance of authority, that reason did not begin until at least the seventeenth century, and that the all-embracing Church stifled the efforts of men to improve their lot on earth by assuring them that the

next life alone was of importance. It is true enough that the last was the official teaching of the Church, but it is not true that the teaching stifled initiative and freedom of thought, nor that it succeeded in turning men exclusively to preparation for the hereafter.

The story of medieval culture is, in a sense, extraordinarily dramatic if viewed sympathetically, with a realization of the enormous obstacles to freedom of thought which were progressively overcome; if we try to see the objectives of medieval thinkers and scientists and writers, and realize how consistently they were striving to relate their actual experience to the picture of life on earth and in the hereafter presented to them by the conservative elements in their society. Progress in the Middle Ages was slow, and perhaps the total of its achievements was small in comparison with achievement in the centuries since. But preparatory and formative periods must necessarily last longer and show less spectacular results than the later flowering. It was many centuries after the Dorian invasions that the Greeks came to the height of their powers. There is no flower until the roots have taken hold; and the roots of Western civilization lie far back in the Middle Ages, when the struggle was being fought between reason and faith, between freedom and authority, between the miracle and the natural law, between the pull of the past and the urge toward the future.

❖ Contrast between early and later periods of Middle Ages

Medieval culture falls into two periods. The period that has sometimes been characterized as the Dark Ages is really entitled to the adjective. Outside the fold of the Church there was almost no education at all; and even within the Church only a very small percentage of men and women were literate. In some of the monasteries, manuscripts from the ancient world were diligently copied; but, as we know from the errors in copying, too often the contents were not understood. Charlemagne never learned to read or write; and when he wished

to make a modest beginning toward a revival of learning in his empire, the scholars that he found, though the best in Europe in his day, would never have been considered anything but mediocre in any more enlightened age. Outside Ireland, Greek had been forgotten. There is but one creative European thinker known in more than three centuries, and he was an Irishman; yet this dark time was also the period of the flowering of the Muslim civilization. When, in the late tenth century, Gerbert became known as the most learned man in the West, and was finally elected pope as Sylvester II, we are told that he had studied every branch of knowledge available in his day. But the sum total is pitiful indeed. Except for those few who could understand Arabic and had access to Muslim works, the only reading available was the Bible, some of the works of the Christian Fathers, a few inaccurate and highly simplified encyclopedias, and some elementary textbooks.

Then, almost suddenly, the Western mind seemed to awake and ask questions, and the Dark Ages were over. On the one side, it began to learn to reason, and to apply reason to what it had hitherto received as dogma, bestowed by authority; and, on the other side, certain individuals began to become aware of and interested in the wider world of Muslim culture, and at once began to contrast this knowledge with the abysmal ignorance of the West. Bringing back knowledge to their homelands, they stimulated others to the same quest. Then, as the Western mind began to sharpen its tools for reasoning, it began also to demand more sustenance. And to satisfy this hunger, one after another the works of Aristotle were translated—an enormous fund of knowledge, gradually assimilated over a period of centuries. Bewildered and impressed by this knowledge, the Westerners in their humility at first thought him almost superhuman, and with the attitude of faith and reverence customary to them they thought he had known everything, that all they had to do was to recover for themselves what he had known, and elaborate on it. Then came the realization that Aristotle too had made mistakes; his was a master mind, but not omniscient. So they understood that it was Aris-

totle's task to train them in method, but not to give them the finished answers. Not many men had understood this, perhaps, by the close of the Middle Ages; but it was nevertheless the work done by Aristotelians at the universities of Paris and Padua that, as is now known, prepared the way for Galileo, modern mechanics, and all modern science which is based on it—as it was the thorough reworking of Aristotle by St. Thomas Aquinas that was able to make the teachings of Christianity conform to the requirements of natural reason.

From what has been said above it will be seen that it is impossible to characterize medieval culture as being of such or such a kind, for it lacked uniformity. If we say the medievals lacked intellectual curiosity, as we said of the Romans, exceptions at once spring to the mind, and we can see that acceptance of the given world without questioning it was a passing phase. If we say that they were not interested in new knowledge so much as in pondering the old, reading new meanings into it without adding to it, then this attitude too disappeared as reason began to supplant blind faith. If we say they wanted to reconcile all knowledge with the teachings of Christianity, the suggestion of intellectual dishonesty implied in this statement is unfair. Thomas Aquinas undoubtedly believed in Christianity, but he knew that if it was true it *could* not conflict with what reason told him. He did not dishonestly shirk the difficulties, and he honestly tried to resolve them. He was not trying to explain away the findings of his reason in order to bolster an unsound theology. Indeed, he was extremely scrupulous in avoiding the temptation of trying to prove by reason things which he did not think could be proved by it. Naturally, as a medieval Christian, he believed in the creation of the world out of nothing by God; but he was careful to show that Aristotle had not believed in it, and that his reasoning was justified. The story of the Creation was one of the matters which could not be proved, and so must remain in the realm of faith.

Medieval thought, like all thought, was concerned with the problems of the time, and it reflects an honest and not unsuccessful

attempt to deal with them within the framework of its presuppositions and assumptions. But, more important, as these assumptions ceased to appear valid, new thinkers arose who grappled with new assumptions and new knowledge. This eagerness for new knowledge is the mark of a living culture, which, in this case, has continued to live and move forward, even into our own time. If the medieval answers no longer seem valid, this is because the compass of our knowledge has been so greatly extended. But it was the medievals who first in our civilization fought for the rights of reason; the medievals who trained us in logic and analysis and gave us our tools of inquiry; the medievals who formed the very language in which we continue to express ourselves and who gave the world the first great masterpieces in every Western European tongue. And since it was also the medievals who taught the world to use representative assemblies to limit the powers of monarchs, it is perhaps time that the word "medieval" cease to be used as a term of abuse for all that we like to think of as reactionary.

❖ Learning and education in the Dark Ages


READING MATERIAL OF THE DARK AGES

We have noted in an earlier chapter that Boethius, a scholar of the reign of Theodoric in Italy, feeling that Latin learning was about to be submerged in a sea of barbarism and that Greek would simply disappear from Western Europe, translated a number of the works of Aristotle into Latin, and wrote some simplified textbooks on a variety of subjects, including arithmetic and music. These books did indeed become a part of the staple intellectual fodder of subsequent generations. But the most widely read of all secular books in the early Middle Ages was undoubtedly the *Etymologies* of St. Isidore, seventh-century bishop of Seville. This was a kind of scrapbook of learning, much of it taken from authors no more reliable than Isidore himself, purporting to be a list of the derivations of words in general use, on which Isidore wasted

considerable ingenuity. The purpose of the good bishop, which was indeed to a large extent fulfilled in his book, was to preserve as much as possible of his own learning for posterity, while presenting it in a language which could be understood by posterity—which he confidently and correctly believed would be less learned and less well educated than he. Perhaps the most original work of this early period was the *Ecclesiastical History of England*, written by the Venerable Bede, an English monk. In this book Bede showed himself to be skilled in historical method, carefully checking his statements and explaining the nature of his sources. Bede also wrote a book on chronology, from which later was taken the method of dating years before and after the birth of Christ (B.C. and A.D.); though most modern scholars believe he made an error in his calculations by which Jesus was held to be born four years after he really was.

THE CAROLINGIAN RENAISSANCE

An important truth is concealed under the gaudiloquent term Renaissance, as applied to the age of Charlemagne, for by fostering education he made possible all later advances. In the Merovingian age learning had been seriously neglected. There had been a few writers of note, especially the historian Gregory of Tours, but literacy was becoming ever more rare, and what learning and literacy existed was confined to the clergy. What Charlemagne did was to obtain the services of the few scholars that were available to him and put all the resources of the monarchy to work in improving the education not only of the clergy but of as many laymen as could be accommodated in the schools. He desired at least one cathedral school for every diocese, and he placed the man who may be regarded as his minister of education, Alcuin of York, at the head of his palace school in his capital of Aachen. The curriculum was traditional and was to remain traditional throughout the Middle Ages. What was to be taught were the seven liberal arts, consisting of the *trivium* (grammar—that is, Latin grammar, rhetoric and logic) and the *quadrivium*



Example of the new manuscript writing which came into vogue during the Carolingian Renaissance and which is the precursor of our ordinary cursive writing. Previously all writing had been done in capital letters. From a late ninth-century manuscript, *Evangelia IV* (Switzerland?). (COURTESY THE PIERPONT MORGAN LIBRARY, Ms. 1, folio 29)

(arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music). At this early stage of European civilization few of these subjects were actually taught, and even those only in the most simplified form. In later centuries almost any subject that it was desired to teach could be compressed within the compass of the seven arts. Carolingian education, such as it was, consisted fundamentally of a training in literacy and the Latin language. Without these tools there could have been no progress. In the time of Charles there was also an important development in the art of writing. The script known as the Carolingian minuscule, from which came the "Roman" letters used in most European writing thereafter, replaced the "Gothic" script, except in Germany. From the Carolingian script came ultimately those letters which are commonly used today, and which were adopted by printers when printing was first brought into use in Europe.

In the course of the century following the death of Charlemagne the meager advances made in his reign were unable to survive the chaotic political conditions that prevailed in Europe, especially the destructive invasions of the Vikings. The favorite target for the depredations of the Vikings was the monasteries, where the manuscripts from earlier ages were so often preserved. Some culture was to be found at the court of Charles the Bald, grandson of Charlemagne, and the monarch patronized some court poets. The most important figure of this time, however, was the Irishman John Scotus Erigena, who produced the most original work of philosophy of the early Middle Ages. John was still acquainted with Greek and able to translate a work concerning the heavenly hierarchies, or *Intelligences*, written by a Neoplatonist, which was commented on in later years by Thomas Aquinas and many other medieval theologians. John, in his own

work, *De divisione naturae*, developed a complete system of Christian metaphysics patterned after Neoplatonism, a mystical pagan philosophy of the third century A.D., which could have been understood by few in the West in his time. The work was to enjoy some respect in the later Middle Ages, and became sufficiently influential to come for a period under the ban of the Church.

In the next century one name stands out, that of Gerbert of Aurillac, who became pope under the name of Sylvester II (999-1003), and who was in his own day reputed to have sold himself to the Devil in exchange for his learning. Skilled in mathematics and familiar with the Arabic numeral system, as well as with much of the Muslim science of his day, he taught some astronomy and constructed spheres to demonstrate the planets and constellations. Pupils taught by him continued to be interested in Muslim science, and he influenced scholars at the Cathedral School of Chartres to take up seriously for themselves the study of Latin pagan authors. But Gerbert was an isolated figure in his own time, as the legend of his pact with the Devil suggests, though his influence probably long outlasted his life and may have been influential in the growth of interest in the work being done by the Muslims.

♦ The triumph of reason in theology

As has been suggested earlier in this chapter, perhaps the most important contribution of the medieval thinkers to Western civilization was the reversal of the opinion held by Gregory I and by the African Fathers of the Church who preceded him, that faith is morally superior to reason, that there is no moral merit in believing what can be proved by reason, and that what God desires of man is faith, rather than knowledge. The human mind, according to these earlier thinkers, is a weak and imperfect instrument, created for man's undoing. Even in the high Middle Ages we find Pope Gregory IX (pope, 1227-1241) instructing the Dominicans not to pursue learning, for there is no merit in believing what can be shown by natural reason to be true. This formidable barrier to the pursuit of knowledge

by natural reason had to be breached before there could be any pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. It was the glory of medieval thinkers that they overcame this obstacle. The manner in which this was done deserves a section to itself even in a book which tries to cover the entire history of Western civilization in one volume, and even though other aspects of medieval thought and culture may have to be given less space than they would, in themselves, merit.

BERENGAR OF TOURS—REASON AND AUTHORITY

One of the first to announce boldly the rights of reason was Berengar of Tours in the eleventh century. Berengar had studied logic at Chartres and had come to the conclusion that it could not be ignored, even in theological discussion. Logic, he said, is nothing but the power of reasoning, and it was by virtue of his reason that man could be said to be made in the image of God. When authority and reason conflict, he added, then it is reason that must be followed. Armed with his new tool, he bravely attacked the doctrine of transubstantiation. There is no apparent difference to any of the senses in the bread and wine after the sacrament of the Eucharist, he said, and therefore no miracle has taken place. This was a remarkable use of logic, which incidentally begs all the questions involved in the difference between spiritual and physical substance and the adequacy of the senses to distinguish between them, and it was unlikely that Berengar would be permitted to announce such doctrines. He was commanded to recant or be declared a heretic. He recanted, but it was hardly a notable defeat for reason itself, for Berengar's use of it was scarcely convincing even to would-be skeptics.

ST. ANSELM OF BEC AND CANTERBURY (1034?-1109)—PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

Toward the end of the eleventh century it occurred to St. Anselm, not to question the existence of God, but to see whether it was possible by logical demonstration to prove this

existence, and so confound all atheists and unbelievers. He made his position quite clear by explaining that no Christian should doubt any revealed truth of his religion, but that this truth should be capable of being made intelligible to man. Some truths were above reason and should be accepted unconditionally; but without losing his faith a Christian might nevertheless seek to understand as far as his fallible reason could take him. Anselm and all medieval Christians believed that there could be no contradiction between reason and the truths of revelation; but the opening of the whole subject to discussion was a dangerous path, as was realized by some thinkers even in the eleventh century. For the time might come when an irreconcilable conflict might occur. What, then, was to be done? Abandon what reason seemed to demonstrate, or what the Christian revelation had taught for centuries? For Anselm faith came first ("I do not seek to understand in order that I may believe, but I believe in order that I may understand"); but this position was soon to be reversed by other Christians, as faithful and sincere as himself.

Using his logic, Anselm tried to prove the existence of God. His argument that every mind can conceive of the greatest possible being, and that this being, to be really greatest, must also have existence, which is known as the "ontological" argument for the existence of God, need not detain us. But it is of the utmost significance that at this moment in the eleventh century a Christian saint and archbishop should have thought it either possible or valuable to be able to prove the existence of God; and it shows that the era was passing in which it was morally superior to believe without seeking for proof.

ABELARD—"I SEEK TO UNDERSTAND IN ORDER THAT I MAY BELIEVE."

With the great teacher and critic Peter Abelard (1079-1142), the first phase of the struggle for the rights of reason was completed. A man of clear incisive thinking, potentially a skeptic though remaining formally true to his Christian faith, he made a

contribution of the utmost significance to medieval thought. Few men in the whole history of thought have been so influential as he, in spite of the fact that he was in no way a creative thinker. But his penetrating logic and clear exposition attracted thousands of students to his lectures, and started them working in a direction from which there was never to be any return.

Driven out of Paris after an unfortunate love affair with Héloïse, he escaped to a monastery for a while, then returned to teaching but got into trouble with the Church because of his divergent views on the Trinity. Even in a desolate rural retreat, students followed him. The significance of this extraordinary popularity was that he was teaching them to think, and to doubt. His most famous book, called *Sic et Non* (*Yes and No*), is typical of his method, and permits us to understand what his students found so fascinating. He thought it was the duty of a Christian to use his reason even on the substance of theology. He was the first to point out clearly that the Fathers of the Church, who were accepted as authorities, had themselves been in doubt, and that there were contradictory opinions on theological subjects even among these authorities. Abelard did not conclude that the Fathers did not know what they were talking about, but rather that there were reasonable grounds for doubting where the truth lay. What he proceeded to do, therefore, was to list a number of important theological questions, and then draw up the various opinions that the Fathers had held about them. Sometimes the contradictions could be reconciled, but more often the only thing to do was to accept the best authority. But, above all, the student must work out the answer for himself, for only by doubting could there be any inquiry, and only by inquiry could one come to truth.

This was already a reversal of the position taken by St. Anselm. Abelard wished to arrive at belief through the process of doubting and trying to understand. Faith no longer was primary, and indeed, implicitly, was an enemy to understanding. Abelard had firmly planted the seed of honest and disinterested inquiry, and suggested that the way to

resolve a problem was to think about it, not to see what had been thought about it by some great man in the past, whose opinion had afterward been accepted as authoritative by the Church. Only after one had tried to reason it out for oneself should one have recourse to some predecessor, whose other work had entitled him to be considered as an authority in theology.

REACTION OF THE CHURCH TO THE METHOD OF ABÉLARD

Abélard was unfortunate in being opposed, in his own generation, by so severe a critic and such a sworn foe of human reason as the mystic St. Bernard, of whom we have already spoken in an earlier chapter. Bernard at once saw the danger and pursued Abélard bitterly all his life. If human reason were to triumph, there would be no mystery left. "He thinks himself able by human reason to understand God, completely," Bernard charged. He accused Abélard of pride and arrogance in thinking that man with his puny mind could ever comprehend the mysteries of faith, and he did not hesitate to accuse him of heresy in questioning authority, and arriving at conclusions contrary to those held by the Church. By his influence he was able to have Abélard condemned to silence, although it is doubtful whether he could have sustained the conviction at Rome, whither Abélard was going to defend himself when he died.

But Bernard was already behind the times, and the victory lay with his opponent. One of Abélard's own pupils, Peter Lombard, bishop of Paris, using his master's method, became the teacher of generations of churchmen; his book of the *Sentences* became the standard text for theology for centuries and is still not altogether outmoded today. Fundamentally, any opponent of Abélard must take the untenable position that Christianity is contrary to reason. For if it is not contrary, then reason can only serve to support faith, and help to convert the doubting or the unbelievers.

Nevertheless, for centuries there was opposition to the use of even Peter Lombard's book. In the process of discussing theological

questions by the use of reason, there was a natural tendency to escape from essential Christianity as it was revealed in the Gospels. Well on into the thirteenth century we find complaints that theological students were wasting their time studying logic and learning to resolve knotty points of doctrine, rather than learning to preach the way of salvation and the teachings of Christ.

THE DEVELOPED SCHOLASTIC METHOD OF PETER LOMBARD

Systematic theology in the hands of Peter Lombard became, following his master Abélard, a discussion of important theological questions. The teacher would propound a question, as, for instance, whether God created the world out of nothing himself or through "intelligences." The discussion therefore always starts with *Utrum*—Whether. The following step is to take the authorities who have spoken in favor of the proposition—*Quod sic videtur*, For it seems so. The arguments will be listed clearly, and perhaps disposed of, at once, if there is an inherent contradiction. Then the arguments on the other side will be taken. *Sed contra*—But, on the other hand. Finally, the master will try to reconcile the difficulties in his own *Solutio*, which carries no authority beyond the weight of the particular master's name. These solutions are the master's *Sententiae* or Opinions (hence the title of Peter's book, the *Sentences*). It became the custom at the universities where theology was taught for every student to dispute publicly on these questions, and to give his opinions. Thus from many masters of theology in the thirteenth century we possess *Commentaries on the Sentences*, which are usually a publication of their opinions given on disputed questions during their period of study. They thus represent something close to the doctoral dissertations of our own day.

The method is intellectually of the utmost honesty, for no one was allowed to propound opinions in this public manner which relied on anything except the best that reason could offer. Though authorities were used, the master's solution had to be his own or at least one

that appealed to reason and itself reconciled the conflicting opinions. It was not, in the last analysis, the weight of authority that decided the question for the successors of Peter Lombard, but the best opinion available at the time; and this is how all questions are decided in a free world.

THE RECOVERY OF ARISTOTLE IN MUSLIM GUISE

While this new method in theology was being developed, Muslim Spain was gradually being reconquered. When Toledo was captured in the middle of the twelfth century, it was discovered that the Muslims had translated into Arabic many works of the great Greek philosophers that had hitherto been unknown to the West. In particular, the major works of Aristotle were available in Arabic, together with commentaries by Muslim philosophers. In view of the paucity of such materials in the West, the archbishop of Toledo authorized a number of translations, and for a time Toledo was the center of a considerable intellectual activity. Gérard of Cremona (died 1187) is said to have translated himself no fewer than seventy-three works from the Arabic. These new works rapidly became available in Christian centers of learning, especially in the schools that preceded the University of Paris, which was formally opened as a university in 1200.

Professors and students were evidently delighted to recover Aristotle almost in his entirety, a fact which in turn stimulated some to acquire more manuscripts of Aristotle from Constantinople. But the Church was not so content, especially when a number of teachers began to utter opinions that it deemed heretical, on the authority of Aristotle. In 1209 the archbishop of Sens, within whose archdiocese Paris was situated, condemned a number of opinions derived, as he believed, from Aristotle, and forbade public lecturing on his works in the natural sciences. The truth was not so much that Aristotle had made statements that were, or could be considered, heretical, but that his method lent itself to rational exposition. Aristotle had not believed in the

creation of the world; it is doubtful whether he believed in the immortality of the soul—not, at all events, in the sense in which it was believed by Christians. Gregory IX ordered his works to be expurgated, but the commission he appointed never seems to have completed its task—in any case an impossible one, since the secular and rational method, rather than any particular conclusions, was to blame. Anyone who used the Aristotelian method was likely to come to not dissimilar conclusions.

Aristotle was already suspect because his works had been translated by the Muslims, and the Muslims were suspected of having altered him to suit their own faith. But in 1230 Michael Scotus completed a translation of the great commentary on Aristotle by Averroës, the Spanish Muslim philosopher referred to briefly in Chapter 8, who had died as late as the end of the twelfth century. Averroës' work was scarcely known to the Muslims at all. The philosopher had indeed been persecuted by his co-religionists, and had defended himself by stating that there was a "double truth," one truth accessible to reason and another to faith, which might be contradictory to one another—or apparently so. Among other things Averroës had come to the conclusion that Aristotle had believed in collective and not individual immortality, that the "active intellect" of man, his immortal part, returned to the active intellect of the world, the world mind, after death. Such a doctrine, it may be imagined, was extremely painful to Christians, although it became popular with students in the universities of Paris and Padua, who may have preferred that there should be no individual immortal soul. So Averroës and his commentaries joined Aristotle as forbidden to good Christians.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ARISTOTELIANISM AS FOUNDATION OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY —ALBERTUS MAGNUS AND THOMAS AQUINAS

The ban on Aristotle seems to have been rather indifferently observed, and to have lapsed during the period when the papacy was quarreling with the emperor Frederic II, as recounted in Chapter 10. But Averroism, as

it came to be called—the doctrine of the double truth and of collective immortality—grew powerful, especially in the faculty of arts at Paris. Meanwhile the greatest scientist of the thirteenth century, Albertus Magnus, had conceived the idea that Aristotle could be used to aid the Christian faith rather than to subvert it. Though a self-taught man and not a renowned theologian, he wrote an exposition of Aristotle in which he attempted to show that Aristotle, rightly understood, would bring reason to bear on religion, and show that the basic doctrines of Christianity could in fact be *proved* by the use of natural reason. Albert's leading pupil, Thomas Aquinas, wrote a number of important works in which he used Aristotle's arguments and method to prove, as he believed, the existence of God, and the qualities of God. A work of impeccable logic if the basic premises are accepted, Thomas' *Summa theologiae* represents the high-water-mark of medieval scholarship. It is perhaps the supreme achievement in human thought of a purely rational nature, without reference to observable facts in the world, but spun entirely out of the unaided human reason.

Thomas held that the vast majority of religious truths could be discovered by man by means of reason. But there must, in his view, always remain some truths that could not be discovered in this way. It was impossible, for instance, for man to arrive at the mystery of the Holy Trinity for himself; such knowledge had to be revealed by God. But Thomas wished to grant as much as possible to the reason, and reason should also be used to try to make intelligible those things which had been revealed. Man could not, according to St. Thomas, arrive for certain by natural reason at the conclusion that the world had been created out of nothing by God; but once this had been revealed to him by the Scriptures, then it was possible and proper for man to try to understand for himself the means of creation, and to see that it was reasonable. So the triumph of reason was complete. Revelation was necessary as a supplement, and this required faith from man, which faith was at once to be supplemented by reason. Medieval thought had moved a very long way indeed

from St. Bernard in not much more than a century.

Thomas was not particularly successful in his own time. The quarrels in the University of Paris continued. Even a tremendous polemic written by Thomas in 1270 against Averroism did not convince its proponents. Finally the bishop of Paris, in 1277, drew up a huge list of errors which, he declared, must not be taught in Paris. Among these were some of Thomas' own doctrines as well as those of his Averroist opponents. The University of Oxford soon afterward followed the Parisian lead, and it was clear that the attack must have been authorized by Rome. It was also widely believed that the Franciscans, perennial rivals of the Dominicans, had used their influence to condemn the teachings of Thomas, the leading light of the Dominican Order, at the same time as the Averroist doctrines.

But Thomas, Albert, and the movement they represented were not without influence at Rome. Devoted Dominicans kept the ear of successive popes, evidently impressing on them how great an aid to faith the work of the two Dominican masters could be. In 1328 they succeeded in having Thomas Aquinas canonized as a saint. His works from that time on became authoritative, and Thomas himself acquired the name of Doctor Angelicus. Every article in his works is a miracle, declared the pope in his bull authorizing the canonization.

But the Franciscans, especially those at Oxford—who, as we shall see, early took an interest in science—were far from content; and two considerable theologians and philosophers, at the end of the thirteenth century and during the next, denied the whole possibility of attaining truth by the means advocated by St. Thomas Aquinas. Like most Franciscans, they believed in divine illumination of the human mind, and, following St. Augustine, insisted on the mind's incompetence, especially in the field of religion. Duns Scotus (died 1308) denied categorically that it was possible to prove the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and such truths of religion by reason. The only possible approach to the truths of religion was by faith and meditation. William of Occam (died 1349) took

substantially the same line, denying the ability of human reason in heavenly matters but emphasizing it in earthly things. William insisted that the great universal ideas and abstractions of Thomas had no real validity, and that ideas were only names which described objects of experience in a convenient way. Ideas therefore are applicable only to things of the sense world revealed by experience, and it is only in this realm that reason and its logic are competent. William's influence in his own century was considerable, and his followers, especially at the University of Paris, for a time became interested in a number of scientific questions. They hoped to find answers to these by reason, and they to some degree neglected theology.

It will be noted that these men denied the competence of logic and reason only in religion; they did not deny its competence altogether, as St. Bernard would have done, nor did they suggest that its use was likely to lead to the deadly sin of pride. The form of their criticism therefore is the surest sign that reason had at last emerged as the greatest of human faculties, limited indeed, but powerful as an instrument for discovering the truth about the created world. The way lay open for the scientific achievements of Western civilization.

❖ Medieval science


The medievals, as is well known, were not conspicuous for their scientific interest, and few discoveries in the scientific realm can be attributed to them. Indeed, there is a characteristic medieval attitude toward the realm of nature which militated against scientific discovery in our sense. This attitude it is essential to understand if one is to have a grasp of that abstraction known as the medieval mind. Greater attention will therefore be given to it here than would be warranted if we were interested solely in listing positive accomplishments. A similar procedure will be followed later in this book, since it is obviously impossible to list all the accomplishments of modern science.

Although there were several important

scientists who obtained a fair knowledge of Muslim science as early as the twelfth century, it may be safely said that there was no really important medieval science before the recovery of Aristotle, and that medieval scientific theory was always Aristotelian, though made as far as possible to accommodate itself to Christian theology. Most medieval scientists were, indeed, more addicted to theorizing than to practical experimentation, whereas modern science is distinguished by its very lack of a comprehensive general theory. We have minor limited theories in the special sciences, but none to cover the whole field of science. Vaguely, we believe that science ought to be useful to mankind in rather obvious ways, such as prolonging life, minimizing pain, increasing pleasure; and we believe, equally vaguely, that it is a good thing to have more knowledge and understanding about the world we live in.

The medievals started from the opposite standpoint. They believed they knew why we are on earth in the first place, the relationship of the soul to the body, the relationship of man to the universe, the purposes served by the animals and plants; they had all the answers to those questions which we think it illegitimate to ask because science is incompetent to deal with them. So-called laws of nature, discovered by induction, were not interesting to them because nature itself, as a conception, was unacceptable. God was the lawgiver, and laws of nature were God's laws, which were entirely under his control, and with which he could interfere as often as he wished. At any moment a miracle might happen which would invalidate a law. A relic of a saint, or a suitable prayer offered in the right quarters, might be able to cure a dangerous disease in a moment, or rain could appear out of a cloudless sky. What was the use of trying to discover the mundane causes of a disease or of studying the science of meteorology?

Every medieval scientist had to struggle with these commonly accepted assumptions of his age; hence it was a great step forward when Albertus Magnus proclaimed that God works through natural causes which can be investigated, implying that in the ordinary



*A sphere depicting the signs of the zodiac, the earth, the deferent and equant circles in which the sun and moon's epicycles move, and the epicycles of the planets. In the original, which is an illustration from the famous medieval textbook *The Sphere*, by John of Sacrobosco, the signs of the zodiac are upon alternating green and rose-red grounds in the outer circle. The sun and planets are shown in gold, and the moon in silver. (COURTESY THE PIERPONT MORGAN LIBRARY, Ms. 722, folio 18)*

course of affairs God does not interfere, but allowing him freedom to do so if he wishes. Adopting such an attitude, and performing serious investigation, it would not be too long before a scientist noticed the extreme rarity of miracles, and went ahead without paying too much attention to their possibility.

But it was not so easy to escape from the leading strings imposed by the more respectable philosophy and science of the Greeks and the Muslims. Astrology was not, to the

medievales, an unscientific aberration, as it is to modern scientists. It was based on the understanding (derived from Plato via Avicenna) that the relationship of man to the universe is as the microcosm (or little world) to the macrocosm (the great world). Man, in Plato's phrase, is a lesser world. Everything in the heavens is reflected in man. A planet seen in the heavens is also present in concentrated form in the organs of man—Saturn, for instance, in his spleen, and Venus in his kidneys.

The plant also is directly connected with the planets, the blue-colored flower with Saturn, the yellow with Jupiter, the red with Mars. Thus a knowledge of the heavens is essential for a true understanding of man himself, and is not just a separate science to be studied for its own sake. Astronomy might be a branch of mathematics, but it was also a part of psychology and medicine. A knowledge of the movements of the planets, and their position in the heavens, was therefore of the utmost importance for man, since, in the medieval phrase, superiors (in the heavens) ruled inferiors (on earth); and not only man but all his doings were subject to the decrees of the heavens, which themselves, according to those who remembered their Christianity, expressed the will of God (Neoplatonists and Avicenna had indeed speculated as to whether the stars were not, in fact, gods).

Moreover, every man at birth was an exact image of the cosmos at the moment of his birth; and if the cosmos could be read at that moment, then the physiology and psychology of the man could be exactly determined. Hence the importance of ascertaining the exact hour of birth and casting a horoscope. Up to this point medieval thinkers were in agreement. But there was considerable dispute on how all this affected the free will of man, and whether what was called judicial astrology was equally true and permissible. For it might also be possible to determine the path of life for man; and, as the heavens were perfect and unchangeable, this looked as if the path of man's life was likewise unchangeable and determined from his birth. After the great age of rationalism in the thirteenth century was over, judicial astrology, appealing to the superstitions of mankind then as now, became ever more popular. Philosophers produced a theory that the movements of the planets paralleled the life of man but did not determine it, thus saving free will; and horoscopes continued to be cast for centuries with only sporadic opposition, at one time being the major interest of the majority of scientists of the day, who, like Paracelsus, found as late as the sixteenth century that at the least the casting of horoscopes provided them with a living, allow-

ing them leisure to engage in other and more worth-while pursuits.

Biology was dominated throughout the medieval period by Aristotle, whose biological theories could be made to conform to the Christian idea of divine Providence. Aristotle had produced a very comprehensive set of observations, most of them extremely accurate. But he had not been content with this; he had also tied them together with a remarkable theory whose central observation was that "nature does nothing in vain." Nothing in the living world exists without a purpose that can be understood by the unaided human mind. The phenomena themselves needed to be investigated for the purpose of adding to human knowledge (Aristotle had begun his *Metaphysics* with the dictum that "all men by nature desire to know"), but once they had been investigated, they could be understood in terms of purposes. If it were seen that a mistletoe grew on an oak tree, then the *how* of this phenomenon did not need to be investigated, though of course it could be if desired. Aristotle himself might very well also have investigated how it is nourished and how it maintains itself, and what effect it has on the tree. But in order to understand the mistletoe, one need only ask why it is there. And the answer might be, in natural terms, that it relieves the tree of some of its evil humors, or alternatively, and more probably, that it sucks the life out of the tree; or, in human terms, it might exist as an example of the evils of parasitism, and thus serve man as a moral symbol. Or it might exist because mistletoe was necessary for man and the tree was as convenient a place as any for nature to put it. But of one thing the medieval man could be certain: It must serve some real purpose in the total economy of nature, which included man. Roger Bacon was once called upon to answer the question whether plants feel. In Aristotelian terms the answer, to us insoluble, was not difficult. The purpose served by feeling, he replied, is to enable one to move either toward or away from an object exciting it (sympathy and antipathy). A plant is stationary and cannot move. Therefore feeling would be unnecessary to a plant, and nature would

have given feeling to it in vain. But nature does nothing in vain. Therefore the plant cannot feel. Q.E.D.

It is clear that the supposed understanding of purposes in nature would conduce to reverence for the divine Providence which had ordered all things in this beneficent way; but it would not tend to encourage investigation of how they actually worked, and it would certainly inhibit our modern practice of manipulating natural things for human ends. As long as this attitude remained, there could be no practical or applied science.

But medieval practice in time became much better than its theory. We do not find any thinker in medieval times urging the usefulness of knowledge and encouraging scientists to investigate for the purpose of alleviating man's lot on earth, though Roger Bacon does emphasize usefulness of knowledge for theology and for helping kings to defeat their enemies. It was a later Bacon, Francis, who in the seventeenth century for the first time sounded the clarion call for scientific investigation to improve man's ordinary life. But we do find medieval scientists encouraging experiments, if only in the hopes of proving theories which they could never have proved since they were demonstrably false. We find a number of experiments being made, though as a rule in an unplanned manner. We find the spirit of criticism growing, and serious efforts to escape from the authority of Aristotle, and we find it gradually becoming natural not to take things for granted without testing by experience. We find, in short, the native curiosity of man escaping from the fetters imposed upon it by a premature belief that everything that was worth knowing was already known. It can hardly be claimed that the Middle Ages were among the great ages of science, but, as in other fields, they were preparing quietly and diligently for the future.

Among a host of names of medieval scientists only four will be discussed here—Robert Grosseteste, Albertus Magnus, Roger Bacon, and the emperor Frederic II. Robert Grosseteste (d. 1253), bishop of Lincoln in England, within whose diocese was the University of Oxford, taught at Oxford for several

years and lectured, especially to the Franciscans, on scientific subjects. Grosseteste in some ways was the most important of medieval scientists, in that he devoted much of his thought to the manner in which theory, observation, and experiment are related. He set forth clearly the procedures necessary for the disproving of hypotheses by logical analysis and experimentation, a very necessary task in the medieval world; and he outlined an experimental procedure which could take account of new facts and place them within a proper conceptual framework. Grosseteste was almost the first medieval thinker who perceived the importance of mathematics for providing a rational explanation of the universe. The Platonic strand of his thought is clearly visible in the importance he gives to mathematics, as also in his belief in divine illumination as the sole means for obtaining metaphysical certainty. Yet all his work demonstrates his thorough grasp of the most difficult of the logical works of Aristotle, especially the *Posterior Analytics*, on which he wrote a commentary. Grosseteste was especially interested in the phenomenon of light, which he spoke of as the "first corporeal form."

His work as a teacher proved to be extremely influential in the centuries that followed, especially among the Franciscans. Roger Bacon was thoroughly familiar with his works, though a comparison between the two men shows Grosseteste as the more scientific, in our sense, of the two. Bacon certainly owes his understanding of the role of experience and experiment in the attainment of knowledge to Grosseteste; but Grosseteste appears to have limited the role of divine illumination more strictly than his successor. From Grosseteste through Bacon and other thirteenth-century scientists and the Averroists at Padua there is a clear line of thought down to the great theoretical and experimental scientists of the seventeenth century on the relation between thought and experimentation, which became ultimately the scientific method of Western civilization. In the medieval period experimentation was a new thing, quite distinct from the scientific method of antiquity. Though we shall trace its growth in later chapters, it is

to the work of Robert Grosseteste above all that we must look if we wish to discover its origin in the Middle Ages.

Albert Magnus (1193?-1280) was a comprehensive investigator of nature, who understood the value of experiment even though he is not known to have conducted any advanced experiments of his own. His method was to be critical of everything he was told and to try to find the natural causes behind all phenomena. Aristotle, in the view of Albert, could be wrong; it was well to check what Aristotle had said, especially anything that looked like an old wives' tale. As mentioned already, much of Albert's work is related to his effort to show that Aristotle could be reconciled with Christianity. But in this work of reconciliation Albert constantly made digressions, and it is these digressions on his observations that constitute the main evidence for his scientific acumen and learning. He himself was a first-rate observer of plants, and he wrote a book on mineralogy; in both these fields he surpassed his master, who was not especially skilled in either science. It is evident that Albert, like most medieval scientists, tried to gain as comprehensive a view of nature as he could. Bacon criticizes Albert for his ignorance of mathematics and optics—a criticism which would be pointless in our time, when a botanist and mineralogist, and even a student of chemistry or alchemy such as Albert, would hardly be expected to know physics very thoroughly as well.

Roger Bacon (1214?-1292?) is best known for a famous compendium of scientific knowledge which he wrote for Pope Clement iv in the hopes of persuading the pope to take an interest in and to subsidize the study of science. It is a bad-tempered work, full of criticisms of other scientists for their failure to experiment and to check the popular superstitions of the day, for their failure to appreciate the work of the Muslims in science, and for their use of bad translations of Aristotle. Bacon's own viewpoint was both modern and typically medieval—modern in that he insisted that all theories should be tested by what he spoke of as the "science of experience," and medieval in that he believed that

all knowledge had been revealed to Seth, the son of Adam, then to Solomon, as recorded in the Bible; that it had been diluted in the process of being transmitted from these great men to the pygmies of his own time; and that a good moral character was the first prerequisite for receiving a revelation from God. Nevertheless, Bacon did a good deal of experimenting in optics, publicized the work of other investigators, and described many of the speculations and experiments of his own time. He is not now believed to have made any substantial discoveries of his own, although his alert mind and his undoubted scientific interest, combined with a talent for exposition, won him a reputation in later centuries as a magician, and, in very recent times, as the only true scientist of his age, far ahead of all others—a view which Bacon himself quite possibly shared. He gained little reputation while he was alive, and led an uncomfortable life as a Franciscan friar—probably as a result of his character and disposition rather than of any distaste or dislike for science by his order, still less as a result of any persecution for his unorthodox scientific views.

Frederic II (1194-1250) was a many-sided genius. We have already had occasion to note his long quarrel with the papacy, and have mentioned his predisposition to freethinking. This freethinking and skepticism he carried over into his scientific pursuits. He was frequently critical of Aristotle, especially of the intrusion of moral preconceptions into his observations. Many experiments are attributed to Frederic. He is said to have weighed a dying man before and after his death to see whether there was any measurable evidence for the existence of a soul that escaped at death; he was accused of having killed two men, one after exercise and one after rest, subsequently examining their intestines to see which had digested his food more thoroughly. The account of these experiments comes from his enemies; what we do know for certain is that he wrote a book *On the Art of Hunting with Birds*, which is one of the best works of falconry ever written, and contains very careful and accurate ornithological observations.

Frederic dissected birds himself and described his observations, and he used his royal resources to gather together information and specimens from beyond his own dominions. There is no sign anywhere in his book of any preoccupation with medieval scientific theory or any acceptance of unconfirmed statements or explanations. His book, even today, is entirely reliable as far as it goes. In this respect it is unique among medieval works known to us, although a small book on the magnet by Peter de Maricourt, a friend of Roger Bacon, comes close to meriting similar praise.

In the fourteenth century science made perhaps more progress than in the thirteenth, as it became more interested in the explanation of observed phenomena. For example, considerable attention was given at the University of Paris to a problem which arose out of the new use of gunpowder and projectiles. Aristotle's theory of motion (that all motion is communicated motion from an initial "mover") was soon seen to be unsatisfactory. It could not adequately explain why a projectile fired from a gun should move at a higher speed when fired than a few seconds later, nor why it should describe a parabola when falling to the earth. A scientist named Jean Buridan suggested the idea of "impetus," a step in the right direction, though the problem was not solved till Galileo solved it by a combination of theory and experiment with inclined planes. Nicholas of Oresme, a bishop, began to question the theory of the movement of the sun around the earth, accepted by nearly all medievales on the authority of the Hellenistic scientist Ptolemy. But, more important, Nicholas liked to use diagrams for the illustration of theological problems. In the process he hit upon the idea of coordinates and curves to show the relation between two variables, thus anticipating by centuries the invention of analytical geometry. At the University of Padua the Averroists, driven forth from Paris at the end of the thirteenth century after the condemnation of their philosophical findings, found a refuge under the protection of Venice. There, among much speculation on the immortality of the soul and similar dogmas, they

devoted themselves to mathematics, being interested, like the Parisians, especially in the study of acceleration. It was probably at Padua that the first serious work was done in the use of Arabic numerals, which had been introduced to the West as early as 1202 by Leonardo of Pisa, but had not at first attracted much attention. It was the work done at Padua over several centuries that prepared the ground for the great advances of Galileo, which ushered in the age of modern science.

♦ Medieval education

It has already been noted that as early as the time of Charlemagne the curriculum of the schools was restricted to the seven liberal arts. This curriculum was carried over into the medieval university, a direct forerunner of our own universities, which have preserved even to our own time many medieval customs. The leading medieval university, though not the oldest, was the University of Paris, which had a faculty of arts where students obtained the degree of master of arts, usually about the age of 21. They could then become teaching masters or continue with higher education. The most difficult degree, and the most sought after until at least the fourteenth century, was the doctorate in theology, which could not be granted before the age of 35 and required, as a rule, about fourteen years of rigorous study, mostly in logical analysis and disputing. Medieval education was not very strong in subject matter, but the trained master was thoroughly efficient in reasoning and argument, even if, from our point of view, much of his intellectual energy was spent in the art of making fine distinctions.

The University of Paris was controlled by its own faculty. Not so the University of Bologna, which had sprung up initially as a law school for the purpose of training students in the Roman law and the canon law, which was based upon the Roman. The university owed its beginning to a lawyer who rediscovered and reintroduced to the West the *Digest* of Justinian, upon which he offered comments (glosses) and changes to bring it into accord with European custom and law.

He retained those principles of Roman law that were manifestly superior to Germanic law, which was singularly deficient in what might be termed legal principles. Most of the students who went to Bologna desired to grasp as much Roman law as they could within the limited time they had available. Probably the majority were mature men, and they were seriously interested in gaining their education so that they could find or return to good jobs within the Church or in royal chanceries, where the Roman law (which, as will be remembered, naturally tended to exalt the power of the monarch over local customs and precedents) was held in high esteem. The professors were acceptable to the students only insofar as they delivered what the students felt they needed. The university was thus largely directed by the students, the consumers of education. It was the professors who had to band together to prevent themselves from being exploited by the students, who, on occasion, did not hesitate to fine them or cut their salaries.

Probably the oldest university in Europe, outside Spain (whose University of Cordova was organized on very different lines), was Salerno in Italy, originally a medical school. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the universities spread all over Europe. The color map in this chapter will give some indication of their distribution. The majority of the universities, including those of Oxford and Cambridge, were organized according to the Parisian model. The Parisian model was also used for those universities which sprang up beyond the seas, including those of the United States of America. But in a few instances where conditions were comparable to those of Bologna that model was also used with modifications.

❖ Medieval art

The greatest artistic glory of the Middle Ages in Europe is undoubtedly the Gothic cathedral, and the bulk of the small space we can devote to medieval art will be devoted to it. There was sculpture, mostly in the churches, since the portrayal of the human form was not forbidden to the Christian, as it was to

the Jew and the Muslim. The figures of saints had to follow an approved and customary style, but within this convention it was possible to give life and character to the figures. It was possible to decorate capitals and pillars with scenes from nature, closely observed and accurately rendered, as in the famous "vintage" capitals of the cathedral of Reims. But architecture, above all church building, overshadows all other medieval artistic achievements, although the development of church music runs it a close second.

THE ROMANESQUE

In the Dark Ages there was very little building beyond the mere provision of places of worship. The Germanic peoples had had no experience in building such edifices as churches, and skill and materials were lacking. Such building as there was consisted for the most part of wooden churches, easily destroyed by fire, and later churches built of stone but with wooden roofs, also easily destroyed by fire, as the Vikings proved. The plan of all medieval churches in early times was derived from the Roman basilica, or meeting place, modified to meet the needs of worshippers in a Christian church. The general plan was to have three aisles, the center aisle called the nave, separated from each other by arcades of arches, capitals, and columns. The walls were solid, and light was provided only by small windows set in a clerestory above the nave. At the end of the nave, where the Romans had usually built a semicircular apse in which the presiding officer had his seat, the Christians placed their altar. The apse, by religious custom, faced the East. In time it became necessary to enlarge this apse in order to contain the choir, and transepts were added by the side of the aisles, bringing the whole church into the form of a Latin cross.


The great difficulty to be overcome, as has been suggested, was the danger of fire on account of the wooden roof. The Romans had not been content with wooden roofs but built them of stone and concrete. The early medievales knew that the Romans had used vaults



Exterior of the Romanesque cathedral of St. Sernin at Toulouse. Note the heavy construction of the Romanesque used before the Gothic pointed arch had been invented to take the stress of the masonry.



Interior of Toulouse cathedral. Note the relative absence of light, and the rounded Romanesque arches.



Exterior of the Gothic cathedral of Notre Dame de Paris. Note the flying buttresses which distribute the weight of the roof, enabling the building to have many windows. The Gothic framework is little but a stone skeleton.

Interior of Notre Dame de Paris. Note the pointed arches and the abundance of light in contrast with St. Sernin at Toulouse.



of different kinds for their roofs, but for many centuries the Christians were unable to build vaults in such a way that the walls were strong enough to hold them. The thrust and weight of the Roman vaults necessitated very strong walls, and if the walls were very massive, then it was dangerous to pierce them for windows. We know of many early medieval buildings which indeed did collapse while the architects experimented with different kinds of vaults. Cross vaults were used for the smaller areas; while the nave itself had to be roofed, as a rule, with a massive barrel vault. But this doomed the church to shortage of light and only the smallest of windows, owing to the great weight of the roof. Moreover, the height of the church was severely limited by the weight to be supported.

This Romanesque style was capable of modification, therefore, but only within certain well-defined limits. Many of the problems were indeed solved, especially by the Norman builders of the eleventh century, but certain fundamental changes were necessary if a church was to be able to soar to heaven, and be filled with light, as the builders themselves would have wished. It should be emphasized that such changes as took place were figured out by the architects and craftsmen actually on the job. It was impossible in medieval times to work out in advance, as do modern architects, the theoretical stresses to which the various parts of the building would be submitted, and there was much trial and error before the immense difficulties were overcome.

But there was an enormous demand for churches. Every bishop desired to have a great church in his diocese, and an enthusiasm and local patriotism amounting almost to a mania set in during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The buildings were nearly always raised by cooperative labor, in which every person in the area joined, some yoking themselves to the cart which carried the materials needed for the church and pulling it, while priests chanted and prayed. Throughout the day psalms and canticles were sung, relics of the saints were brought along, and miracles were hourly expected. It was the same religious enthusiasm

that was responsible for the success of the First Crusade.

THE GOTHIC STYLE—POINTED ARCHES AND FLYING BUTTRESSES

The Gothic style, which solved the outstanding problems of the Romanesque, was developed almost entirely in northern France, though spreading into Germany and elsewhere afterward. The use of the pointed arch, which distributes the weight differently from the rounded arch and the vault, was the key to the new style. It was soon discovered that an entirely different system of ribbing and support was possible with the pointed arch, which took the weight off the walls and gave the builder freedom to alter the shape of his church as required. The developed Gothic church is nothing but a gigantic skeleton of wall buttresses within the church, flying buttresses outside it, piers and ribbing, all in perfect equilibrium; the walls themselves now cease to be of importance and can be made even of glass. And the best Gothic churches are indeed full of glass, stained glass colored and painted to show whatever scenes the artist wished. And usually over the portal was the great rose window, which was so designed that it lighted the church in a different way at the different hours of the day. Early stained glass was always in solid colors, set into lead frames as a kind of mosaic, with figures suggested by these frames and small, lightly penciled touches. Medieval stained glass was one of the age's greatest achievements, and has never been equaled, even in modern times, with all the advantages of modern technical inventions.

The Gothic church, with its soaring arches aspiring toward heaven, has often been compared with the logical structure of the great medieval *Summae*, those works in which medieval theologians attempted to set forth the whole plan of salvation, tied together by the Aristotelian syllogism; and the comparison is not inept, for the Gothic structures are faultlessly worked out, with perfect balance, each part dependent upon the other, and, in the best examples, free of any unnecessary decora-

tion or striving for effect. The façades of the cathedrals could be and were decorated, and it was here that the sculptor was given a chance to display his mastery—especially in and over the portals, where saints, devils, plants, and animals real and mythological could be shown, and even the Last Judgment. Inside the cathedrals, especially in the wonderful Cathedral of Chartres, the artist was free to fill the windows with scenes from the Old and New Testaments and stories from the lives of saints, with delicate pencil work touching up the solid-colored panes of glass. Even scenes of everyday life are depicted in these windows, scenes often provided by the particular guild represented. The last details of the work, whether inside and visible, or high up on the towers where no man could see them once they had been set in position, were almost invariably beautifully and honestly wrought. The medieval craftsman, like the Greek craftsman of the time of Phidias, would not have tolerated anything less than the best he could give in the service of his religion and art.

In a book of this kind it is not worth while to attempt the description of these Gothic masterpieces, since the bare words will do no justice to them, and mean little to those who have not viewed them. The accompanying pictures are inadequate, but they may suggest what the written word cannot, and the special features of the style can be picked out with the aid of the brief remarks printed under each picture. There is no perfect cathedral. Some cathedrals have features that seem to approach perfection, as the fan vaulting in Westminster Abbey, the façade and *chevet* of Notre Dame of Paris, the structural design of Amiens, the incomparable majesty of the site of Reims, and the interior of Chartres. But in every cathedral there are some dissident elements, the necessary consequence of the long time consumed in the building. The building of a cathedral might take fifty years. Yet the style was living, always growing and evolving, so that the builders who completed the edifice would be working in a different manner from their predecessors who had begun the work. The most familiar of these discords is the pair



Detail of the portal of Notre Dame de Paris.

of spires at Chartres, constructed nearly four centuries apart in time. The twelfth-century spire is simple and chaste, while the sixteenth-century one, a few feet higher, is elaborate and ornate, constructed at a time when Gothic was past its best, and structural simplicity had to some degree been sacrificed to exuberance of decoration—a tendency we have already noted in contrasting Hellenic and Hellenistic art in an earlier chapter.

The Gothic style continues to be a matter of delight and wonder to the modern architect, who marvels at the authority which the medieval architect was able to wield over his whole building, subordinating all decoration to the needs of the architecture itself, and who is constantly astonished at what his medieval forebears were able to accomplish with primitive tools, working in stone and with none of the aids he now considers essential. The artist appreciates the absolute integrity of his medieval ancestor, the truth that he built into his

works of stone, and the consummate skill with which he used what was available to him to create beauty—especially his use of natural light to shed color and light over the whole interior through the medium of his stained-glass windows. Even the modern religious skeptic is made to pause before this revelation in form of a faith that was as fully experienced by the medieval artist as it is alien to himself.

For medieval Gothic really is an expression, caught once and for all time, of a compelling vision whose essence is religious. The purpose of man's life on earth was to aspire toward Heaven. For a brief period medieval man really believed this. Man was a child of God, placed on earth in a particular position of honor or servitude which was none of his fault but merely God's will. He was taught not to envy the great man but to accept his lot, whatever it might be, knowing that after death he and the great man would be equal in the eyes of God and man. Only in the house of God on earth could he know himself as an equal. In the cathedral there was a place for him as there was a place, though a different one, for the noble and the bishop. Together they made up humanity as God had ordained it, and together their souls were lifted up toward the unseen God above. This was the symbolism of the Gothic—the ribs and the vaults and the pointed arches that gave the illusion of bright and aspiration toward the great world above, where saints and sinners, nobles and serfs, were together before the judgment seat of God, saved through the blood of Christ.

When for the first time in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries it was possible for the medieval man to gain a tiny surplus over and above his daily needs, a surplus of either goods or leisure, the first task, the very first task, that he set himself was the building of a church or cathedral. As the Egyptians in the early part of their civilization built pyramids for the ascent of their king-god to Heaven, as the Greeks in the halcyon early days of Pericles built their temples for the gods to live in and protect them by their presence, so the men of the Middle Ages, in the springtime of their religious fervor, built a cathedral—not for

their God to live in, for he was in Heaven, but for a place of assembly for themselves, the congregation of the faithful to worship their God and soar upward in their souls toward him.

It was no wonder that the ages of skeptical "enlightenment" that followed the great age of church building termed the architecture of medieval man Gothic, or barbarian. The vision was too great for them to comprehend. They pretended to feel at home with the classic and the simple, the art forms of this world, not the aspiration toward Heaven and the striving toward infinity that had been the glory of their rude ancestors. Not until the nineteenth century was the supreme achievement of medieval man appreciated; and now we can only visit and wonder, trying to encompass in our imagination what it was that this strange semibarbarian felt in his inner world that could drive him to such a frenzy of creation, to so many hundreds, even thousands, of magnificent buildings, while he lived his ordinary life in unrelieved squalor. The bishop who commanded the task was moved by rivalry with his fellow bishops; the bourgeois who paid out the small profits of his business was moved perhaps by civic pride. But what of the poor unnamed worker, he who dragged the cart, who climbed the scaffolding, who had nothing but his labor to give, for him did the task represent only a day's wage on a public works project? It is hard to think so. And it is certain that there will be no more Gothic cathedrals, that our poor imitations are at once seen as frauds—for even the ignoramus in all matters of art feels no doubt when he comes to distinguish the genuine Gothic from the spurious.

The church we build today is the expression of ourselves. It may have admirable qualities, but it is not an expression of that compelling religious emotion, disciplined by a clear and logical mind, that came to maturity in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries of our era and found its architectural expression in the Gothic cathedral and its literary masterpiece in the *Divine Comedy* of Dante. As the Egyptians after the Old Kingdom built

no more pyramids, save a few shoddy efforts by imperial imitators, so we shall build no more cathedrals. But for a few more years we may still hope to see those built by our ancestors, and, seeing them, pause for a few moments in respect for a vision we have lost.

♦ Medieval music

As the great medieval cathedral is not truly itself without the throng of worshippers within, so also is it to be recognized truly only when filled with song. And of course it is no accident that medieval music, which spread from cathedral and church into the outer world and ultimately gave birth to the secular instrumental music of our own day, was developed to its fullest within these cathedrals, especially in Notre Dame of Paris, which was famed in medieval times for the excellence of its music. And it is also no accident that the music thus developed fitted in perfectly with the architecture of the buildings themselves.

The voice is the first great musical instrument, and it was the use of the human voice in medieval services of worship that gave birth to the great advance of music in all its forms during the medieval age. Very early in the Middle Ages the voice was used to chant the words of the Latin Liturgy in unison, or what was called plain song. In plain song all the voices followed the melody without variation except according to the pitch of the voice, at intervals of a full octave. This Gregorian chant, so called after Pope Gregory I the Great, is still used in church worship, and never died out in spite of the many other forms of song that now supplement it. But by the ninth century other intervals than the octave were used, and the enormous possibilities inherent in these variations were increasingly realized in subsequent centuries. While one voice held the melody, another sang the same melody but at an interval of a fifth (beginnings of polyphony, or many sounds). Then other intervals were also found to add beauty and fullness to the total sound, and altogether different melodies were made to interweave with the

whole (the interweaving, note by note, of separate melodies with the basic one was called counterpoint). Finally, with the motet, even different words were sung at the same time as the basic melody, which was carried by one of the parts (hence the word *tenor*, the "holder" of the melody). Naturally, during the process of development, which occupied several centuries, a musical notation had to be adopted which was conventionalized into substantially the same notation that we use today.

The organ, which had originally been invented by the Greeks, and had been developed in the Byzantine Empire, was still rather a primitive instrument when introduced into the West in the ninth century. Thereafter it was continually developed into the complex instrument that it was by the end of the fourteenth century. The late medieval organ was able to perform the same kind of interweaving of sound that human voices had already been trained to make; and in later centuries of the modern era the various instruments likewise interweave to make the whole which we call the symphony (literally, "coordinated" sound as distinct from merely many sounds, *polyphony*).

♦ Medieval literature

In order to deal with the very large quantity of extant medieval literature in a short compass, it is necessary to be ruthlessly selective. We will therefore indicate the types of medieval literature, characterizing these very briefly, while devoting our small space to rather fuller discussions of a few acknowledged masterpieces which seem to the author to illustrate best the medieval attitude to life and the different strains of medieval thought and aspiration.

The most characteristic medieval works are written in the vernacular, and not in Latin, which, though it was still a living tongue in the Middle Ages, had to be learned, and was therefore not accessible to all. The amount of space devoted in this chapter to vernacular literature should not be taken as an indication

of the relative quantity of literature available in Latin and vernacular tongues.

LATIN LITERATURE

Medieval Latin went easily into poetry, and rhyming was usual. We have the stately hymns of the medieval church, many of which are still in use, either in Latin or in the vernacular. But we also have great quantities of lighthearted verse, much of it composed by students at the universities, singing cheerfully of love and the springtime and similar subjects. There is also much satire, especially on the manners and customs of the clergy. A whole series of these poems is given the name of Goliardic poems, probably from the frequent references to a certain Bishop Golias, a mythical character who was supposed to be the poets' patron.

As the Middle Ages drew on, Latin literature became more confined to the clergy and educated classes, and was the official medium of communication for those who had to appeal to a wider audience than the inhabitants of any single area in Europe. History, memoirs, philosophy, and religious and scientific work continued to be written, for the most part, in Latin, while each area began to develop literature in the vernacular tongues, the medium of expression in everyday life.

VERNACULAR LITERATURE

Heroic epic Most of the great civilizations known to us produced their first literature in the form of heroic epics, sung and recited perhaps for centuries before they were written down. Western civilization was no exception. All the Germanic peoples had their sagas, dating from very ancient times, long before the advent of Christianity. The content of these is pagan, the deeds of pagan warriors and their gods, though sometimes overlaid with Christian feeling of a later age. *Beowulf*, the great Anglo-Saxon poem, is of the former kind; other examples are the Norse and Icelandic sagas. On the other hand, the *Nibelungenlied*, transformed into an operatic

cycle by Richard Wagner in the nineteenth century, retains the pagan background, but even in the early Germanic version the ancient warrior ideals have been partly transformed by Christian tradition and chivalry.

Poetry of feudalism The early folk epics were succeeded in the eleventh century by at least three distinct types of poetry, composed for the entertainment of the feudal nobility and on subjects of the greatest appeal for them.

The first type is the *chanson de geste*, or tale of heroic deeds, for the most part of northern French origin and headed by a masterpiece, the *Song of Roland*, which concerns the heroic death of Count Roland, one of Charlemagne's knights, at the battle of Roncesvalles against the Muslims. Around the figure of Roland a whole cycle of songs sprang up, even in countries quite unconnected with the hero. The songs also tell of the marvelous deeds of Charlemagne himself and his other knights. No attempt is made to relate the poems to the actual time of Charlemagne, but all describe the feudal world of the era when they were written and recited.

In southern France there grew up a school of lyric poetry recited and sung by troubadour minstrels in the noble houses and castles of the area. The troubadours introduced the element of love into their songs, which were no longer simply a recital of heroic deeds. It was under their influence that the cult of romantic love, still with us, first entered the Western world, since the troubadour by convention addressed his songs to the great lady of the castle, whose charms he extolled endlessly, and for whose smile he was willing to endure any torture. The influence of the troubadours spread into Germany, where they were called *minnesingers* (*minne* = "love"). In the hands especially of Walther von der Vogelweide (1170?-1230?), the romantic theme is handled with great freshness and delicacy as well as greater depth than is usual in poetry of this type.

The third type of poetry is a combination of the *chanson de geste* with the chivalric ro-

mance. Instead of the ordinary feudal world of the warrior, we now find portrayed idealized kings and knights, as in the legends of King Arthur, originally of Celtic origin. These knights often perform deeds of heroism for the sake of fair ladies, rescuing them from enchanted castles and such. This world of perfect chivalry is best described in the poetry of Chrétien de Troyes (last half of the twelfth century).

As time went on, the Arthurian legends became suffused with Christian thought and feeling. The culmination of this process is to be found in the legendary search for the Holy Grail, the vessel in which the blood of Christ was caught, or, in another version, the vessel used for the Last Supper, or a magic stone. All were equally symbolic of Christian aspiration. The hero who alone can find the Grail is a Christian, not merely a feudal or chivalric hero, whose purity and chastity rather than his deeds as a warrior bring him to his goal. The *Parzival* of Wolfram von Eschenbach (1170?-1220?) is the most fully Christian account of the wanderings of the hero in search of the Grail, while the culmination of the Arthurian legend is to be found in the prose *Morte d'Arthur* of the Englishman Sir Thomas Malory in the fifteenth century.

It has been possible only to touch upon the varieties of medieval poetry sung and recited among the nobility, in part for reasons of space limitation, and in part because of the difficulty of making any adequate generalizations when the total is so large and of such varying quality. At their best the heroic sagas are almost, if not quite, the equal of the heroic sagas of earlier peoples; at its worst medieval epic is feeble and derivative, using stock stories from the decadent periods of Greek and Alexandrine literature. The Arthurian legends are ancient Celtic tales which have been transformed out of all recognition by sophisticated poets of a later age, writing for an aristocratic audience for whom they were quite consciously extolling the cult of chivalry.

The fantastic world depicted in these legends no doubt provided a welcome escape for their audience from the anarchic feudal world of their day. Yet it also bears a direct

relationship to it; it is a world less harsh, a world softened by the application of Christian ethical teachings. The poets have a secondary purpose beyond mere entertainment; their poems are truly didactic, not spontaneous and descriptive. The virtues they extol are not the heroic and martial virtues of an Achilles; courtesy and gentleness may be rewarded better than mere valor. In the Grail legends and especially in the poem *Parzival*, this tendency comes to full fruition and is entirely explicit. It is instructive to compare such a poem as *Parzival* with the earlier "wandering" epics of Gilgamesh (see Chapter 3) and the *Odyssey*, and to see revealed one aspect of the medieval mind and the medieval attitude to life. All these poems reflect the preoccupations of their time, as such poems always must. The Sumerian hero Gilgamesh searches for the plant of immortality, but having found it, he loses it again; the gods are arbitrary and unjust, they cheat mankind, and the hero has no recourse but to plunge himself back into life and build a city. Odysseus is stripped of his possessions and loses his companion in a shipwreck. He learns humility by hard experience, and through this experience he regains his lost rights as a king and vanquishes his enemies.

But *Parzival* in the poem of Wolfram begins as a fool and an ingrate; he leaves his mother without a thought, and she dies of grief. He kills a knight who turns out to be his kinsman, and is so unskilled he cannot even strip the dead knight of his armor. He early reaches the Grail Castle which he is destined some day to rule, but he does not ask the crucial question which would heal the wounded guardian of the Castle. In his subsequent loneliness and suffering he seems to deny even God. Yet this folly is also simplicity; it is culpable, but it can be redeemed and changed through the growth of wisdom. The poem is the story of how through the help of suffering he at last learns wisdom, and is permitted first to meet and become reconciled to his brother, the Oriental pagan prince Feirefiz, then finally to find again the Grail Castle with the help of sages who give him advice and warning. This time he asks the right question and achieves the Grail.

The poem does not seem to be allegorical in essence; it is not a *summa* of salvation like the *Divine Comedy* of Dante, to be described later. The Church plays almost no part in it. It seems to be the pursuit of the Christian ideal through life experience rather than through the mediation of the Church, and in this aspect it is significant. Parzival as a Christian prince is pursuing a Christian ideal. It is not his valor that triumphs. His first victory is not gained through valor, but through foolhardiness and good fortune, and he is defeated in combat by the heathen Feirefiz, who spares his life after Parzival's magic sword—the sword of his kinsman whom he killed so wantonly in his youth—has broken. In the end it is the purity and simplicity of his human heart, and his ability to learn wisdom, that make him worthy of the Grail. The wisdom he has learned and the reconciliation with, and ultimate conversion of, his heathen brother lead him to his goal. Thus this German poem already looks forward to a later age of religious thought than Dante's masterpiece, although it was written almost a century earlier; and it was no doubt this element in the poem that appealed to Richard Wagner. Though medieval in setting, *Parzival* transcends the medieval thought of the age when it was written. In the homelessness and loneliness and individual suffering of its hero, it seems to picture in advance the modern man, a prototype of Faust rather than of the medieval man who was led by Vergil and Beatrice on a spiritual journey to the contemplation of God.

Literature of the towns When we enter the world of the growing towns, the life of chivalry and courtesy is left behind, for these qualities are conspicuously missing in popular urban literature. The townsman preferred raw, earthy stories which were concerned with his own experience. He liked, in particular, animal stories and fables, above all the adventures of the cunning Reynard the Fox. The *fabliaux*, especially designed for the taste of townsmen, were undistinguished by literary graces of any kind, and their sense of humor appears to us as extremely primitive. The unfaithfulness, laziness, and untidiness of housewives were

pilloried, as were similar sins on the part of monks, friars, and secular clergy. Women and the clergy were the principal butts of the satire of the *fabliaux*, and the plots hold no surprise. In the same vein as the *fabliaux*, but at a far higher stage of literary accomplishment, were the fourteenth-century stories of the Italian Boccaccio (1313?–1375) in his *Decameron*. The English popular poet Chaucer (1343–1400), however, stands in a class by himself. The characters in the *Canterbury Tales* are no longer mere types; each is sharply differentiated with wit, humor, and sometimes profound insight. Most of Chaucer's plots, however, are closely related to those of the *fabliaux*.

It is useless to try to describe Chaucer intelligibly in a few sentences. Always when writing of him, one drops into quotations, the only way to convey his flavor. The *Canterbury Tales*, his masterpiece though by no means his only poem—he was skilled also as a translator—tells of a pilgrimage made by a group of assorted characters to the tomb of St. Thomas Becket. Each of the characters is introduced to us; his or her character is hit off with exquisite precision in a series of rhymed couplets, sometimes sympathetic, sometimes malicious. Then Chaucer allows each of them to tell a tale to while away time on the journey. No other work gives us so full a picture of the ordinary medieval man and woman. When we have taken the journey with them and listened to their tales, we feel that we have indeed met and talked for a time with fourteenth-century human beings; we feel we should recognize them if we met them in life. Though the Middle English of Chaucer is no longer comprehensible to most of us, it slips easily into modern English; and though he has not always been admired as much for his poetical and especially metrical skill as he is today, there has never been a time since his death in 1400 when he has not been read for his narrative ability, his unerring character painting, and the vitality and freshness of his picture of medieval man as he really was in the fourteenth century.

An earlier contemporary of Chaucer gives us the first piece of serious social criticism of Western civilization, the *Vision of Piers Plowman*, by one William Langland, of whom noth-

ing else is known. In this poem the poor peasant finds his voice. The poem, though couched in the form of an allegory, is a realistic description of the hard lot of the English poor in the fourteenth century—hardships which were later to lead to prolonged revolts, perhaps in part the result of this very poem.

Perhaps the most popular of all medieval poems was a composite work known as the *Romance of the Rose*. The first part is an allegory, written by William de Lorris (early thirteenth century). It is an ingenious love poem in the conventional style of courteous poetry, but no longer directed only to the noble classes, and clearly influenced by Christian tradition. It tells the story of a youth who is pierced by an arrow sped from the bow of the God of Love, whose heart leaves his own breast to be embodied in the Rose, which is surrounded by thorns and presents a difficult obstacle to be overcome. Jealousy, Reason, Danger, and other abstractions play their part in his efforts to reach the Rose, and after over four thousand lines, when William's poem breaks off, the unfortunate lover has still not attained his goal. It is at this point that a later writer, John de Meun (second half of the thirteenth century) takes up, and the poem ceases at once to be an idyllic dream and becomes a cynical satire on all contemporary institutions. Hypocrisy (the friars) is given a chance to speak; Reason and the other characters from the earlier poem flay superstition; Nature gives a discourse on medieval science and current history. In short, the poet is able to grasp the opportunity of the unfinished poem to give an invaluable account of medieval life. With the aid of Venus, the youth is able to gain his Rose; but this is only incidental to the satire, which has been called a "guidebook to the Middle Ages." It was, however, a guidebook in an entirely different sense from the greatest of medieval masterpieces. This work, which sums up knowledge and aspiration equally, welding the whole into a perfect synthesis, unique in history, entirely inimitable, and almost untranslatable, is the *Divine Comedy* of Dante.

The *Divine Comedy* was not the name Dante Alighieri (1265-1321) gave to his own

poem. He himself simply called it the *Comedy*, because it begins in sadness and ends in supreme happiness. But it was early given the epithet "Divine," which has now been incorporated in the title. No poem has ever deserved it more, both for its beauty and for the sublimity of the theme.

It is impossible to do justice to the poem in a short space; in fact, it cannot properly be described at all. It must be read and experienced, preferably in the original Italian, a language full of vowels and music which Dante himself helped to fix. The Tuscan dialect of the poet indeed became, through his work, the literary language of Italy, and it has in essentials changed very little to this day.

One aspect of the *Comedy* cannot be understood without knowledge of the poet's first work, the *Vita Nuova*, in which he tells how at the age of nine he saw Beatrice, who was herself only eight, and how thereafter she remained his ideal though he never knew her well and she married without being aware of his unspoken feelings. He tells us that he had determined to express one day his love for Beatrice in poetry. It is this human and yet unearthly love that in manhood transformed the poet's whole inner being, giving especially to the *Paradiso*, the third part of the *Comedy*, an extraordinary intensity of thought and emotion which is recognizably medieval and closely akin to the work of the medieval church builders. It is impossible to separate the poet's sublimated love for Beatrice from the Christian love which made it possible.

Beatrice is a guide to the poet in his journey through the realm of the spirit to the vision of God, a realm in which the planetary spheres are not only seen but experienced, in which thought is not only apprehended but actually perceived. Yet Beatrice is also a woman before whom Dante is tongue-tied, so that at one moment he is unable even to pronounce her name. And she represents also revelation in the sense in which Thomas Aquinas understood it, the visitor from the world of the spirit who adds to what he cannot find for himself. Vergil, the Roman poet, takes Dante as far as the summit of the Mount of Purgatory, but the pagan can go no further. Reason must be supplemented

by revelation. Vergil was first sent to Dante by Beatrice as he faced the gates of Hell and feared to enter—divine grace must aid the natural reason, which then, with the help of revelation, can ascend to the full contemplation of God.

So the poem is profoundly allegorical; and yet at the same time it is real. The journey may have been the ascent of a soul to salvation, but the poet feels and perceives as a human being. The sufferings of the damned are portrayed with gruesome realism, and Dante experiences all the shock and revulsion of a healthy mortal. When Vergil leaves, Dante grieves and wishes him back; he suffers the pangs of loneliness in a deserted Garden of Eden until he recognizes Beatrice, who comes riding to him in her chariot drawn by a gryphon. If the chariot is the Church and the gryphon is the animal symbol of Christ, this symbolism does not intrude. The symbolic or allegorical and the real are so wonderfully fused that the reader is caught up with his imagination into the experience, and need know nothing of the symbolism until he feels the need for it.

Finally, it may be added that the poem has certain important political meanings. Dante was through and through a political man; he played an important part in the affairs of his native Florence, and he was a leading figure in the city's government before being forced into exile by his political enemies. He was a partisan of the empire in the struggle between the empire and the papacy. In his work *De Monarchia* he makes clear the reasons for this partisanship. He believed that the spheres of Church and State should be separate, but that the State should be a true World State, such as had been known in the early centuries of the Christian era under the aegis of Rome. The political condition of man is a consequence of sin, and leads to ever more deadly sins. Dante's choice of characters for the dwellers in his three realms of Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise is undoubtedly to some degree determined by his political views. It is significant that the Byzantine emperor, Justinian, noted by historians for his universal law code and for his reconquest of Italy, is greatly exalted

in Dante's Paradise, and is seen by the poet as having been permitted by God "the glory of avenging his wrath by the living justice that inspires me"—a line hardly equaled for concentrated thought in all literature.

The poem begins on the night preceding Good Friday; during that night the moon is to be at the full. Throughout the next day and night the poet will make his horrifying journey through Hell (the *Inferno*). For twenty-four hours more he struggles to the foot of the Mount of Purgatory (the *Purgatorio*). Then for three days he is on the Mount and at last ascends to Paradise (the *Paradiso*), where there ceases to be any time. It remains the same day (Thursday) as Dante circles the earth in company with the heavenly planets until he is over Italy and the sun is setting in Jerusalem. The journey has taken exactly a week.

In Hell, accompanied by Vergil, he passes by all the various grades of sinners undergoing punishment, till he comes to Satan himself; then he is pulled past the center of gravity by his guide. The worst is over. Those whom he will meet hereafter are souls who are saved but are not yet ready for Heaven. On the Mount of Purgatory there are many terraces, each with its different sinners, and before he even reaches the terraces the poet sees others who have for some reason not yet begun to make the ascent, though in time they will be able to undertake it. In the *Purgatorio* the whole atmosphere is different from that of Hell, where all hope has been abandoned for eternity. Here in Purgatory one first comes to the realization that though the way is long, salvation is ahead. There is hope, indeed certainty, for the sinner in Purgatory. Then at last the Garden of Eden is reached. Vergil leaves the poet, and Beatrice comes for him as his new guide.

Light, music, joy, and love are the glories of Paradise, marvelously conveyed in the liquid Italian, with its many beautiful images; the planets dance and sing as they wheel in the Ptolemaic universe, so deeply experienced by Dante that it seems impossible to doubt that this is the way the universe is in the world of imagination. ("Like the clock that calls us to

prayer, in which one part draws and impels the other, chiming 'tin tin' so sweetly that the well-disposed spirit swells with love"—"Tin tin sonando con sì dolce nota Che il ben disposto spirto d'amor turge.") Here are the great saints, Bernard and Thomas Aquinas, Peter, and, at last, the Virgin Mary and a momentary vision of God, which, as soon as it is experienced, cannot be remembered save as an afterglow of something indescribable. But among the blessed this vision is always there. When Dante looks into the eyes of Beatrice, the Light is reflected there, and though he turns about to discover the source of the Light, it eludes him.

In all the great medieval thinkers there is nothing abstract or arid. The Latin of Thomas Aquinas, crystal-clear and sharp, bears the reader along with him to share his enthusiasm for the adventures of the mind, the logical thrust and counterthrust corresponding to the thrust and counterthrust of the piers and buttresses of the cathedral. So the reader is pulled onward toward the summit of the vision, the "intellectual contemplation of God" in which, as Thomas experiences it, there is nothing cold—the love of the heart leading to the understanding of the divine (as, also, in Plato's *Symposium*), the love that leads to this ascent having been implanted in man as grace, the gift of God. So also in Dante. "Luce intellettuale pien d'amore, Amore del vero pien di letizia, Letizia che trascende ogni dolore"—"Light of the mind, full of love, Love of the truth, full of joy, Joy that transcends every sorrow"—this is Dante's description of that love which draws mankind to the contemplation of God. Every word in the great poem is full of the profoundest thought, often untranslatable into languages other than Italian, in which feeling and thought are fused as in no other. It lacks the extreme clarity of the cold intellect which is the genius of the French language, and the Italian itself was never again used as it was by Dante, who found in it the perfect vehicle for his experience. The whole knowledge of the world of the senses and the world of the spirit as experienced by medieval man is in the *Divine Comedy*—the deadliness of sin and the eternal punishment that it entails, the great hope held out to man

by God and the means for its attainment, and at last a vision of eternal blessedness with the saints and heavenly hosts in the spaceless, timeless kingdom of heaven.

It is sometimes claimed that Dante is a Renaissance rather than a medieval writer. It will be clear from the above that the present writer has little sympathy with this point of view. Insofar as there is a characteristic way of looking at life that we may call medieval, insofar as there is a distinctive climate of ideas and beliefs that may be called medieval, the *Divine Comedy* was the very fullest and most far-ranging expression of medievalism, and the author makes no apology for including it in a chapter on medieval culture. It is true that Dante lived in a Florence where the Renaissance was already awaking, that his political preoccupations foreshadow those of the Renaissance, and that in some respects he greatly influenced his successors in the period of the Renaissance. But in all the essentials of his work he remains medieval, and for this reason he has been included in this chapter and excluded from Chapter 13, although Petrarch, who was seventeen when Dante died, is included in the later chapter and, in the opinion of this writer, clearly belongs there and not in the world of the Middle Ages.

Medieval drama In conclusion, a few words should be said on the medieval drama, which, though not one of the great dramas of the world, is nevertheless original and, in its way, characteristic of the Middle Ages. In early medieval times the drama consisted of the re-enacting of biblical scenes in the churches at times of festival. These re-enactments developed into the mystery play, which also used biblical subjects but combined them with legends and tales from the lives of the saints. Mystery plays, too, were performed in church, but quite early were presented in the vernacular since the purpose was to instruct the people. The performers were usually the clergy, though lay actors were also used. An outgrowth of the mystery play is the Passion play, which represented with deep sincerity the crucifixion of Christ. Some of the Passion plays still survive, played by village actors and joined in by the whole village community.

The Oberammergau Passion play, performed in the Bavarian village of that name every ten years, is the outstanding surviving example.

The miracle plays, which became popular by the twelfth century, usually represented some exceptional intervention of a saint or the Virgin Mary in the ordinary lives of men. Finally, with the growth of the towns, came the play we most associate with the Middle Ages, the morality play, originally of a religious nature. By far the best known of these morality plays is the famous *Everyman*, the story of the rich young man who was visited by Death and warned that he had only a few hours left to live, who first tried to bribe Death, and then to persuade his kinfolk and his friends to go with him. Refused by all, he had to die alone, with only his good deeds to help him to ultimate salvation, after repentance and absolution.

In concluding this chapter on medieval culture, it may be worth while to think briefly of the distance traversed by modern man since the Middle Ages, and try to imagine the beautiful simplicity of medieval belief—and also to consider Shakespeare, whose drama was, in a sense, not so far removed from *Everyman*. Shakespeare was still in the fullest sense a moralist. Yet he was deeply concerned with the individual and not the type—the character, deeds, and motives of man on earth, his relations with other human beings, and his actions in the face of his destiny. Such interests are our heritage from the Renaissance, to be discussed in the next chapter.

With the fading of the medieval concept of the universal man as a member of the universal Church and of Christendom, and of the conviction that all the answers to the questions man has to ask are already known, the adolescence of the human being was over.

Suggestions for further reading

PAPERBACK BOOKS

Adams, Henry. *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres*. Anchor. One of the best single volumes ever written on medieval culture; a synthesis of the medieval vision by a acion of a famous

American family, who did not delight in his own century.

Aquinas, St. Thomas. *Summa Contra Gentiles* (tr. as *On the Truth of the Catholic Faith*). 4 vols. Image. One of Thomas' two major *opera*, this one gives his proofs for the existence of God and is directed, as its title implies, primarily to unbelievers, as a polemic on behalf of Christianity.

Cawley, A. C., ed. *Everyman and Medieval Miracle Plays*. Everyman.

Chaucer, Geoffrey. *The Canterbury Tales*. Editions in modern English in Penguin and Rinehart series; an interlinear translation in Barron's Educational Series.

Crombie, A. C. *Medieval and Early Modern Science*. Anchor. By one of the best scholars in this field, an expert especially on Grosseteste.

Coulton, G. G. *Medieval Faith and Symbolism*. Pt. I of *Art and the Reformation*. Torch. (Illustrated). By a Protestant English medievalist.

Dante. *The Divine Comedy*. Tr. by H. R. Huse. Rinehart. One of the best modern translations.

Fremantle, Anne. *The Medieval Philosophers*. NAL. Good, simple, introduction to the subject.

Haskins, Charles Homer. *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century*. Meridian. Written to the thesis that the most important renaissance in Western civilization was that in the twelfth century, when the Western mind first was able to digest the work of the Muslims and strike out on its own.

Haskins, Charles Homer. *The Rise of Universities*. Cornell. This little book by a renowned American medievalist gives much information in a small compass.

Kempis, Thomas à. *The Imitation of Christ*. This devotional book—an expression of one kind of medieval mysticism, cultivated in particular by the Brethren of the Common Life—has been a best-seller since the fourteenth century, and has never been out of print since the invention of printing. Available in Image, Pocket Books, and Penguin.

Mall, Emile. *The Gothic Image: Religious Art in France of the Thirteenth Century*. Torch. (Illustrated).

Vignaux, Paul. *Philosophy in the Middle Ages*. Meridian. An introduction and interpretation. An up-to-date work—thorough, intelligent, and based on the latest material. Probably the best short work for the beginner.

Waddell, Helen. *Peter Abelard*. Compass. A fine evocative novel, which, written by a competent medieval scholar, succeeds in conveying a good

picture of twelfth-century medieval intellectual life and the environment in which such a man as Abelard functioned.

Waddell, Helen. *The Wandering Scholars*. Anchor. Small classic, slightly overwritten, on the medieval, especially goliardic, poets.

Wulf, Maurice de. *Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages*. Dover. A serious and interesting study by a noted Belgian historian of medieval philosophy, but should not be read by itself, since it is more a personal interpretation than a factual book on medieval philosophy. Should be supplemented, in particular, by Gilson.

CASEBOUND BOOKS

Artz, Frederick B. *The Mind of the Middle Ages*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953. An up-to-date survey, beginning with the Christian and Judaic background and giving adequate attention to Islam and Byzantine civilization. Especially notable for its extensive and valuable bibliography, which should be consulted for further works on the subjects handled in this chapter.

Butterfield, Herbert. *The Origins of Modern Science*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951. Interesting and provocative study of several problems considered by medieval, as well as more recent, scientists. Some of the material is also covered in Butterfield, *et al.*, *A Short History of Science* (Anchor).

Crombie, A. C. *Robert Grosseteste and the Beginnings of Experimental Science*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1953. Important scholarly work, perhaps the best single book on medieval science in English, and not confined to Grosseteste.

Crump and Jacob, eds. *The Legacy of the Middle Ages*. New York: Oxford University Press,

1926. See Chapter II. Very good on medieval arts and crafts.

Easton, Stewart C. *Roger Bacon and his Search for a Universal Science*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952. Chapter 9 is on medieval science in general, the remainder devoted to a reconstruction of Bacon's life from his works.

Eschenbach, Wolfram von. *Parzival*. Tr. by Edwin H. Zeydel and Bayard Q. Morgan. Durham, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1951. The only modern English translation available of this important epic.

Gilson, Etienne. *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940. Excellent introduction to the subject—interpretative and sympathetic.

Jones, C. W. *Medieval Literature in Translation*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., Inc., 1950. Well-chosen selections from medieval literature.


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V ♦ THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN WORLD

Engraving of Westminster by William Hollar dated 1649, the year of the execution of Charles I. The House of Commons met in Parliament House, the House of Lords in Westminster Hall.



Chronological Chart

IMPORTANT EVENTS 1414-1815

Council of Constance—end of Great Schism	1414-1418
Henry the Navigator begins to patronize Portuguese voyages	1418
Fall of Constantinople to Turks	1453
Discovery of America	1492
Voyage of Vasco da Gama to India	1497-1499
Ninety-five theses of Martin Luther	1517
Conquest of Mexico by Cortez	1519-1521
First circumnavigation of world by Magellan and his crew	1519-1522
Opening of Antwerp Bourse	1531
<i>Institutes of the Christian Religion</i> by Calvin	1536
Council of Trent	1545-1563
Religious Peace of Augsburg	1555
Establishment of Anglican Church in England	1563
Independence of Dutch Republic	1581
Spanish Armada	1588
Edict of Nantes	1598
Beginning of Romanov dynasty in Russia	1613
Thirty Years' War	1618-1648
Peace of Westphalia	1648
Execution of Charles I of England	1649
Restoration of Charles II	1660
Independent rule of Louis XIV in France	1661-1715
Siege of Vienna by Turks	1683
Revocation of Edict of Nantes	1685
Glorious Revolution in England	1688-1689
Reign of Peter the Great in Russia	1689-1725
War of the Spanish Succession	1701-1714
Reign of Frederick the Great of Prussia	1740-1786
Beginning of publication of French <i>Encyclopédie</i>	1751
Seven Years' War	1756-1763
First Partition of Poland	1772
American War of Independence	1775-1783
Beginning of French Revolution	1789
Execution of Louis XVI	1793
Fall of Robespierre	1794
Napoleon becomes emperor of the French	1804
Battle of Waterloo	1815

The Rise of Early Modern Individualism —New Ideals, New Worlds, New Faith

Early modern history is characterized by three major developments, all in some degree connected with the rise of individualism. By individualism is meant the seeking to escape from restrictions imposed by traditional authority, whether of church or society, and the urge to develop the potentialities of the individual man to the fullest degree compatible with the fact that he is a social being. It should not be thought that there was no individualism in earlier times. On the contrary, the Sophists in ancient Athens were especially strong advocates of escape from the bonds of tradition; and Aristotle, in particular, had urged in his *Ethics* the acceptance of the ideal of the pursuit of happiness, seen as the realization of the fullest potentialities of the human being. Hellenistic and Roman society engaged in the pursuit of individual gratification without benefit of much philosophy devoted to its justification.

But Christianity and the Catholic Church had stressed much more the social obligations of each human being. The individual Christian was a part of a much larger whole, Christendom, and every man, in theory, was his brother's keeper. Each Christian belonged to a great universal Church, which was far more than the sum of its members. Feudal society was shot through with mutual obligations—the lord had responsibilities to his vassals, as the vassals had their responsibility to him.

Even in the medieval town, guilds and leagues stressed the importance of mutual help and the interdependence of the members of society, while the Church attempted to enforce laws against usury and cornering the market, and promulgated the theory of the just price—all for the purpose of seeing that one member of society did not exploit another for the sake of his individual profit. It was a society of *status*, in which all men were equal before God—the high and the lowly, the rich and the poor. All men looked forward to their last end of salvation, and all had first to endure the Day of Judgment. It was a society ordered by God, who decreed that one man should be a king or noble and another a peasant or serf. It was the duty of each man to accept his lot and perform the obligations attached to it. It was not thought to be his task to pull himself out of the social situation to which he had been born; he was not expected to pursue wealth or high position; and there was no serious thought of anything called "progress," whether for the individual or for society. The incumbent of the highest position in the Church not without reason called himself "the servant of the servants of God."

It is not difficult to see the signs of a change in this attitude in the later Middle Ages. One may point to the Fourth Crusade, which was diverted to Constantinople by the persuasion of the Venetians in search of booty;

Chronological Chart

"Babylonian Captivity" of papacy	1305-1376	Voyage of Vasco da Gama to India	1497-1499
Giotto's frescoes at Padua	1305	Execution of Savonarola in Florence	1498
Petrarch crowned poet laureate at Rome	1347	Voyages of Amerigo Vespucci to South America (Amazon)	1499-1502
Golden Bull	1356	Voyage of Cabral to Brazil and India	1500-1501
The Great Schism	1378-1417	Guillaume Budé goes as ambassador to Venice	1501
Wyclif translates Bible into English	ca. 1378	Julius II, pope	1503-1513
Chaucer's <i>Canterbury Tales</i>	1388	First part of Cervantes' <i>Don Quixote</i>	1505
Council of Pisa	1409	Almeida governor of the Indies	1505-1509
Arrival of Manuel Chrysoloras in Italy	1393	Conquest by Spanish of Jamaica and Puerto Rico	1508-1511
Council of Constance	1414-1418	Battle of Diu: victory of Almeida over Muslims	1509
Return of Papacy to Rome	1417	Erasmus' <i>In Praise of Folly</i>	1509
Henry the Navigator begins to patronize Portuguese voyages	1418	"School of Athens" and "Disputa" of Raphael	1509-1511
Hussite Wars	1420-1433	Conquest of Malacca by Portuguese	1511
Opening of humanist school at Mantua by Vittorino de Feltre	1425	Conquest of Cuba by Spanish	1511
Masaccio's "Virgin Enthroned"	1426	Ponce de Leon discovers Florida	1512
Council of Basel	1431-1449	Balboa discovers Pacific Ocean	1513
Cape Bojador rounded by Gil Eannes	1433	Leo X, pope	1513-1521
Pontificate of Nicholas V (humanist)	1447-1455	Francis I, king of France	1515-1547
Fall of Constantinople to Turks	1453	Machiavelli's <i>The Prince</i>	1515
Rule of Lorenzo de Medici at Florence	1469-1492	Thomas More's <i>Utopia</i>	1516
Sixtus IV, pope	1471-1484	Concordat of Bologna between Francis I and papacy	1516
Establishment of Spanish Inquisition	1478	Publication of new Greek edition of New Testament by Erasmus	1516
Reign of John II of Portugal	1481-1495	Indulgence mission of Tetzel in Germany	1516
Botticelli's "Birth of Venus"	1485	Ninety-five Theses of Luther	1517
"The Last Supper" of da Vinci	1485-1498	Reign of Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor	1519-1556
Diaz rounds Cape of Good Hope	1487-1488	Beginning of work of Zwingli in Zurich	1519
Alexander VI, pope	1492-1503	Conquest of Mexico by Cortes	1519-1521
Discovery of America by Columbus	1492	Voyage of Magellan to Philippines, survivors circumnavigate world	1519-1522
Treaty of Tordesillas	1494	Dispute between Reuchlin and Pfefferkorn	1520
Treatise of Pacioli explaining double-entry bookkeeping	1494	Excommunication of Luther by Pope Leo X	1520
Invasion of Italy by Charles VIII	1494		
Sebastian Brant's <i>The Ship of Fools</i>	1494		
Voyages of Cabot brothers to North America (Cape Breton Island)	1497-1498		

Translation of Bible into French by Lefèvre d'Étaples	1523-1530	Excommunication of Queen Elizabeth I	1570
Peasants' War in Germany	1524-1525	Massacre of St. Bartholomew	1572
Foundation of Theatine Order	1524	Pacification of Ghent	1576
Foundation of Capuchin Order	1525-1528	Sack of Antwerp ("Spanish Fury")	1576
National Protestant Church established in Sweden	1527	Voyages of Froisher in search of northwest passage	1576-1578
Second Diet of Speyer: prohibition of spread of Lutheranism	1529	Circumnavigation of world by Drake	1577-1580
Opening of Antwerp Bourse	1531	Union of Crowns of Spain and Portugal	1580
Death of Zwingli in battle of Kappel	1531	Jesuit mission to England	1580
Conquest of Peru by Pizarro	1532-1533	Declaration of independence from Spain by United Provinces	1581
Marriage of Henry VIII of England to Anne Boleyn	1533	Founding of first colony of Virginia (Roanoke Island) by Walter Raleigh	1584
Organization of Society of Jesus by Ignatius Loyola	1534	Execution of Mary Queen of Scots	1587
Act of Supremacy (Henry VIII)	1534	Defeat of Spanish Armada by English	1588
Paul III, pope	1534-1549	Dutch expedition to East under Cornelius Houtman	1595-1597
Voyages of Jacques Cartier to North America	1534-1541	Edict of Nantes	1598
Calvin's <i>Institutes of the Christian Religion</i>	1536	Formation of English East India Company	1600
Dissolution of English monasteries	1536-1539	Formation of Dutch East India Company	1602
Establishment of Protestant Church in Denmark	1536	Founding of Jamestown colony in Virginia	1607
Promulgation of Six Articles by Henry VIII	1539	Founding of Quebec by Champlain	1608
Return of Calvin and Farel to Geneva	1541	Founding of Bank of Amsterdam	1609
Council of Trent	1545-1563	Voyage of <i>Mayflower</i> to Cape Cod	1620
Schmalkaldic War	1546-1547	Purchase of Manhattan Island by Dutch	1626
First English Book of Common Prayer	1549	Control of part of Brazil by Dutch Prince Maurice of Nassau	1637
Julius III, pope	1550-1555	Restoration of Portuguese independence	1640
Reign of Mary I of England	1553-1558	Capture of Malacca by Dutch from Portuguese	1641
Paul IV, pope: reform of Roman Curia	1555-1559	Founding of Montreal by De Maisonneuve	1642
Religious Peace of Augsburg	1555	Financial administration of Colbert	1661-1683
Return of John Knox to Scotland	1559	Founding of French East India Company	1664
Establishment of Anglican Church in England	1563	Last assembly of Hanseatic League	1669
Foundation of St. Augustine, Florida	1565	Founding of Bank of England	1694
Duke of Alba appointed governor of Netherlands	1567		
Escape of Mary Queen of Scots to England	1568		

one may point to the freethinking of the emperor Frederic II, even to the efforts of the journeyman to escape from the restrictions of the guild and set up in business for himself. But European man had to wait for the Renaissance before he was told by his intellectuals that his life on earth had an importance of its own, that he should fulfill himself on earth, even that he should let the hereafter take care of itself. This is the one justification for the continued use of the term "Renaissance" (meaning rebirth)—the rebirth of man as an earthly being. For the Renaissance was not a new beginning in the sense stressed by the men of the Renaissance themselves—that man for long centuries since the fall of Rome had been asleep and was now in the process of awakening to lusty life. Rather, it was an accentuation of existing tendencies under the influence of new leaders who had different aims and interests than most of their predecessors. There was an increased interest in the work of classical antiquity and a tendency to deride the Middle Ages as obscurantist, otherworldly, and barbaric. But the Renaissance was nothing essentially *new*. Medieval preoccupations were not suddenly abandoned and replaced by something else. The revival of learning after the long period of partial stagnation following the collapse of the Roman Empire had taken place several centuries before. But that secular and worldly interests gradually came to predominate over religious and otherworldly preoccupations cannot be denied—nor that the men of the Italian Renaissance were to a considerable degree responsible for the change of emphasis.

Capitalism, which had already made considerable headway in the later Middle Ages, made further advances in the early modern period, stimulated especially by the new sea trade with the East and the discovery of America, and by the increase in the supply of precious metals consequent upon the discoveries. This phase of commercial and economic development has sometimes been called a commercial revolution, though it too accentuated tendencies already apparent in the later Middle Ages. The great voyagers and pioneers in the opening up of America were self-reliant in-

dividuals of a kind not readily discernible in the Middle Ages, and they can certainly be regarded as types of the "Renaissance man." Even so, many of the adventurers had Christian aims in view, and the early Spanish rulers of America had the conversion of the Indians at heart even more than their exploitation, which in time came to take precedence over the religious motive.

The third manifestation of the spirit of individualism in this period is the breakaway from the universal Catholic Church of the Middle Ages. Although many of the Protestant churches proved to be at least as dogmatic and authoritarian as the Catholic Church had ever been, there can be no doubt that the appeal of the Protestant churches to individuals was primarily their insistence that each human being must find his own way to God. Luther stressed the reading of the Bible (by individuals), and to this end he translated it into his native tongue; he taught that each man was personally saved by his own faith and God's mercy, that there was no need for the Church as an intermediary between man and God, and that every man is "his own priest." Calvinism recognized the right of the godly, rather than the well-born, to be leaders in Church and State; it believed that the pursuit of moral excellence was possible for man without supernatural aid; and it was willing to resist to the end for the sake of individual conscience, to which each man was answerable.

Thus these three facets of early modern individualism—the rise of humanism, the growth of modern capitalism, and the Protestant Reformation—will be treated in the same chapter, with the stress laid upon their contribution to the outlook of this new period. The further evolution of the national state and its accommodation to the new conditions will be considered in the subsequent chapter. A third chapter, on the rise of modern science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and its effects on the intellectual and social life of these centuries, will complete this Part and bring us to the French Revolution and the opening of the modern age.

♦ The Renaissance in Italy

THE HUMANISTS

Although there is division of opinion among historians on almost everything else concerned with the Renaissance, including the question of whether there was a Renaissance at all, there is consensus that it started in Italy. It can never be determined with finality why a particular movement started in a particular place. All that the historian can do is to point to the fertility of the soil in which certain ideas may take root—if a seed is planted there. There is also no doubt that the Renaissance was almost exclusively an urban phenomenon. The medieval nobility had chivalry as its ideal; its pastimes were rudely physical, not to say rustic. Its primary interest was in fighting, not in books. The medieval noble, even in Italy, was rarely literate; even if he lived in a city he was likely to retain his feudal tastes. Most of the Renaissance leaders sprang from a bourgeois background, and had made enough money to be able to afford a life of some leisure and to indulge their taste for literature and the arts.

Northern Italy, by the high Middle Ages, had developed numerous centers of urban life. By the beginning of the fourteenth century the great majority of the cities had cast off feudal rule and were self-governing, unless they were under the domination of another city like themselves. Other cities existed in Europe, with almost as much self-government and almost as much freedom of opportunity for the intelligent and industrious. But the Renaissance did not arise in them, and they did not at once follow the lead given them by the Italians. Perhaps the sense of community was still too strong in these cities for individualism to become their ideal; at no time did individualism run as rampant beyond the Alps as in the Italian cities. Perhaps the solid German or Flemish burgher was more interested in business for its own sake, and preferred to spend all his energies in increasing his business rather than in spending the wealth that it brought him. Such national

characteristics are visible and persistent and not easily to be explained. But in any case the northern cities lacked a stimulus that was strong in Italy—the desire of the Italians to emulate and equal the achievements of their own personal ancestors.

Italy had never experienced the full pressure of the barbarian invasions at the end of the Roman Empire. Though Ostrogoths and Lombards ruled much of Italy, Italians—descended directly from the Romans—remained in the majority. So the Renaissance Italians believed themselves to be the direct inheritors of the Romans. Their language was the nearest of the European languages to Latin. It was not difficult for them to learn it, and many of the Latin classics were still easily available, even before the humanists began their search for manuscripts. Moreover, there were far more Roman remains in Italy than elsewhere. Thus it was that the Italians, seeking for new ideals suitable to the new situation, had no further to look for examples of secular living than their own Roman ancestors; and it is not surprising that the first stirrings of the Renaissance spirit found expression in the search for ancient manuscripts and the accumulation of libraries of works in the Latin language—not, of course, medieval Latin, which to a true humanist was a barbarous Germanized hodge-podge, but the stately periods of Cicero and the works of the Augustan age.

The consistent ideal of the Renaissance was humanism, which in its widest sense meant the cultivation of the human personality, the regarding of man as the earthly creature he apparently is, and not exclusively as a candidate for salvation. The Greeks in this sense were humanists, as were some of the better-educated Romans, such as Cicero, who had been permeated by Greek culture. It was, however, not unnatural for the men of the Renaissance to give humanism a more restricted meaning. They used it to mean especially the cultivation of the classics, or what are called the humanities. When one speaks therefore of the humanists as a class at this period, the reference is particularly to the scholars who cultivated the use of classical Latin and Greek, and

sought for ancient manuscripts in these languages.

Probably the earliest example of this type of humanist was Francesco Petrarca (usually called Petrarch, 1304-1374), a man of varied talents and complex character, who, without being a great genius, was to set the fashion for generations of later humanists, some of whom surpassed him in talent. He wrote some of the best love lyrics in the Italian tongue, but valued far more highly his often pedantic and uninspired Latin epics, because Latin was the language of his beloved Cicero. He was worried in later life about the salvation of his soul because he had loved Laura and addressed to her his exquisite lyrics. He searched for manuscripts, found one of Homer and adored it, but could not bring himself to learn Greek in order to read it. He climbed a minor mountain for the purpose of enjoying nature in the raw and himself expatiating upon that pleasure. He allowed himself to be crowned with laurel as a poet, and accepted with due humility this uncontested title given to him by a self-appointed group of unauthorized donors. But when all this is admitted, the Italian lyrics and odes remain; the self-advertisement did advertise to all that the profession of letters could lead to fame and was thus worthy of pursuit by others; he did initiate the search for manuscripts, and they were safer in the hands of humanists than in fourteenth-century monasteries. Moreover, there can be little doubt that the humanists appreciated them more than did the monks, and they made them available to others who would likewise appreciate them. And if Petrarch abstained from learning Greek himself, it is true that many of his successors followed his exhortations rather than his example.

In a sense Petrarch's life was an archetype of the lives of many of the later humanists in Italy. Many of them were poseurs, very much a self-conscious elite class, writing letters in polished if excessively rhetorical Latin to their opposite numbers, advertising their own excellence and eternally quarreling over trifles. As a self-constituted class of learned men they were often, too often perhaps, accepted at their own valuation. They were unable to hinder for

long the development of the vernacular, the language of the *Divine Comedy*; but they did succeed in making their contemporaries think of the still developing medieval Latin tongue as something barbarous and unfit for the lips of polite society. Thus they helped to kill off what might have become a real European language common to all the educated. By self-consciously and self-righteously adopting a dead language incapable of natural development, they showed themselves as reactionaries rather than innovators.

But by recovering the works of antiquity and by making them available outside the monasteries and the Church, they did set in motion other trends which did have a future. And many of the humanists became first-rate scholars and critics. Lorenzo Valla, by acute internal criticism, showed the famous Donation of Constantine (p. 186) to be a forgery. He and many others edited and improved the texts of the classics, which had often been corrupted by ignorant monks performing their daily task of copying without vital interest in what they were doing. Poggio Bracciolini was an indefatigable traveler, who spared no expense or pains in tracking down his manuscripts and who was rewarded most greatly by discovering what is still the only extant manuscript of Lucretius.

For a while Greek studies languished, but enthusiasm for all of antiquity ultimately overcame the natural difficulty of learning a foreign language in adulthood. Manuel Chrysoloras came from Constantinople, and the most eminent humanists sat at his feet; many of the second-generation humanists learned Greek well. Nevertheless, Greek was not studied as widely nor as carefully in Italy as in the north. There it became and remained the basis of the classical curriculum, taught at the schools and universities and, until very recently, regarded as a necessity for every well-educated man.

THE IDEAL OF THE "UNIVERSAL MAN" —THE RENAISSANCE PRINCE

Ultimately more important than the much publicized recovery of antiquity was the idea of the *uomo universale*, or universal man—the

man of versatility who was learned and skilled in all things to which he set his hand. Such a man was Leonardo da Vinci, painter, scientist, and inventor; or Lorenzo the Magnificent, the Medici prince of Florence, poet and literary artist, munificent patron of the arts, soldier, administrator, and businessman. In the great period of the Italian Renaissance few aspired to be specialists, with only one skill highly developed and the remainder left unused. The ideal expressed by a young noble, Pico della Mirandola who, if he had lived to maturity, might well have been among the great universal men of the Renaissance—was the ideal of all. In his *Oration on the Dignity of Man* he gave fine expression to the ideal of man's latent powers to create of himself what he would: "Restrained by no narrow bonds, according to thy own free will . . . thou, thy own free maker and molder, mayest fashion thyself in whatever manner thou likest best.

. . . To man, at his birth, the Father gave seeds of all variety and germs of every form of life."

Unquestionably this was a reaction against the medieval and Christian ideal—the monk whose task was to work and pray, the scholastic philosopher who concentrated his thought on a limited field of knowledge and added little to it from his experience, the feudal noble with his martial ideals and activities, and his total ignorance of almost everything that lay beyond them.

The Renaissance prince was in many respects the exemplar of the many-sided man: often self-made, sometimes a soldier of fortune, far from chivalric ideals, a patron of learning and the arts, a collector of books. Competing with other princes of the same type, avid for fame, and careless of means so long as they were successful, each wished his city to be the finest and the most beautiful. These men were the patrons of the arts which flourished in



Giuliano de' Medici by Raphael



Dirk Berck by Hans Holbein, The Younger

Two portraits of typical Renaissance noblemen who rose to their positions through successful commercial enterprise. Note how the Italian Medici is obviously now a noble, while the northerner looks what he is, a successful bourgeois merchant. (BOTH COURTESY THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART)

A school of the Italian Renaissance period. Note the "progressive" elements, far different from the medieval cathedral school—the open windows, the hand tools, and the animal—and the general informal atmosphere in spite of the notice behind the teacher which calls for silence. (COURTESY NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY)



Renaissance Italy more fully than in any other age or place, not excluding even fifth-century Athens. Art constitutes the special glory of the Italian Renaissance. In the north the Renaissance in its migration from Italy had far profounder and more widely diffused effects; but although in northern countries the arts did take on new life, nowhere was the growth comparable with that in Italy; and almost all northern art was indebted to Italy. In other fields Italy provided, on the whole, the stimulus, but no more.

RENAISSANCE EDUCATION

Before coming to the arts, however, a few words should be said on humanist education in Italy, and the effect of the Renaissance on the Church should also be considered. It was a relatively minor prince, Francesco Gonzaga, Marquis of Mantua, who had little money to spend on the arts, who won fame by the introduction of a new system of education into his principality. He invited Vittorino da Feltre, a distinguished humanist, to set up a school for the sons of the local nobility, but gave him a free hand to do as he wished. Vittorino did not, in fact, confine himself either to the nobility or to the male sex. On the contrary, he thought all classes and both sexes should have the benefit of education, and this edu-

cation should be neither vocational nor one-sidedly bookish. Greek, Latin, and Italian literature were to be studied as a matter of course, and moral training was not neglected. But, in addition, physical exercise, such as swimming and fencing, was required, and artistic education in such subjects as drawing and music. In short, Vittorino designed his education in part after what was known of the ancient Greek world, but with the clear purpose of preparing his charges for the kind of life most of them would be expected to lead after their schooling was over. Since the school was for resident pupils, and all class distinctions were obliterated by the use of a common dress and common food, it might have been doubted whether even fifteenth-century Italy was yet ready for such innovations. But the fact was that the school prospered and obtained a reputation in Italy second to none. Nobles vied for the privilege of having their children study with Vittorino. His educational ideas spread over Europe, and the English public school is a not too distant descendant of the education first made possible for a chosen few by the prince of Mantua.


THE CHURCH IN THE RENAISSANCE

The Conciliar Movement When we last considered the Church in Chapter 10, the

papacy had just been compelled for its own safety to accept the protection offered by the French king. Thus began the so-called Babylonian Captivity of the Church at Avignon, in southern France. It should not be thought that the Church necessarily lost much of its power during its sojourn in France. Its power over its own clergy, for example, was never higher than during the Avignon period, and Church finances were entirely reorganized and put on a more businesslike basis during the long pontificate of John XXII (1316-1334). A system was institutionalized under which the papacy received a share of the revenues of the bishoprics and even a share of the bishop's fees. Graft and simony were rife, and the clerics had little chance to escape the papal tax collectors, since the kings who might have protected them were given their share and had no objection to money received from the Church. In short, under the highly efficient and by no means captive lawyers who administered the papacy from Avignon, the Church became almost wholly captive to the commercial interests of the time, developing an absolutism which no secular state approached for many

centuries to come, taking care of the needs of its own clergy and bureaucrats, but too often ceasing to perform those essential services for which the money was paid.

During this period the papacy did not abate its pretensions, but was almost totally unable to impose its will on the monarchs. The latter, in their turn, gained support from non-clerical lawyers who attacked the papal claims asserting that the responsibilities of their masters were greater and more important than those of the Church. Meanwhile, the belief grew in Europe that the papacy was a tool of the French monarch, and that it was a disgrace that its headquarters should be anywhere but in the Eternal City of Rome. Since the first Avignon pope took the precaution to pack the College of Cardinals with Frenchmen, and they in turn chose only French popes, there seemed no likelihood of an early return. Nevertheless, one of the French popes, Gregory XI, was persuaded by a saintly nun, St. Catherine of Siena, to return to Rome in 1377. But he died there after only one year, leaving a vacancy which had to be filled by someone whom the French cardinals would approve.



The people and nobles of Rome were clamorous for an Italian after all these years, and the cardinals, who were holding their election in Rome, feared for their lives if they failed to obey. They therefore chose an Italian archbishop, Urban vi, who had no sympathy whatever, as it turned out, with the Avignon papacy, and wished to make sweeping reforms of the whole system. Thereupon the French cardinals retired to a safe post, declared the Italian's election had been carried out by intimidation, and proceeded to elect a Frenchman who went to Avignon with his cardinals and resumed work where it had been left off a year before.

So now there were two popes, and no one knew which was the true one; for it was clear that the cardinals had indeed been intimidated, though certainly not for the first time, and the action of the Italians seemed to many to have been the only way of breaking the French monopoly. Europe divided in its recognition. Germany was split between the emperor, who favored the Italian, and many of the princes and cities, which supported the Frenchman. France naturally supported Avignon, while England, constantly at war with France, equally naturally took the other side. The only thing that was certain was that the Great Schism, as it was called, was a scandal to every Christian, and that it must be put to an end as soon as possible.

For this purpose leading clerics in Christendom, led by the theologians of the powerful University of Paris, suggested that a council be called to try to arrange a compromise whereby only one of the popes should rule. In due course the Council of Pisa met in 1409, attended by leading clergymen, but could think of nothing better than to depose both popes and appoint a third. Of course, neither of the deposed popes agreed to this deposition, nor did their colleges of cardinals. Thus, in spite of the moral authority of the council, nothing was achieved save that there were now three popes. Furthermore, the pope just chosen by the Council of Pisa was a highly unsuitable candidate, known principally for the immorality of his private life.

At this point the secular rulers, who pos-

sessed more than moral authority, if they could come to an agreement, decided to take a hand, and the emperor Sigismund called a new Council at Constance in 1414, which deposed all three popes and chose another, who in fact returned to Rome and re-established the papacy there. It had been the intention of the men behind the Conciliar Movement, as it was called, to curb the absolute power of the popes, and to establish the authority of the councils above them. Thus Martin v, the new pope, who was not in sympathy with the aims of the Movement, had to tread very carefully, especially since he had agreed that he would in due time summon another council to look into the affairs of the papacy and the Church, with the aim of making a number of necessary reforms. Martin was able to prevent the first council from achieving much, and meanwhile had made a number of administrative reforms and improved his own position. Under Eugenius iv a major council was called at Basel in 1431 which lasted, including prorogations, until 1449. The popes were able to divide the council and postpone action so effectively that it finally broke up without achieving anything noteworthy. The monarchs who had initially taken an interest in its work finally returned to their own more pressing engagements, leaving the papacy still unreformed but still functioning. It was the last attempt to deprive the head of the Church of his monarchical and absolute powers, which were only strengthened by the Council of Trent, to be discussed at the end of this chapter.

Recrudescence of heresy—The Lollards

Meanwhile, it should be noted, there was a spectacular rise in anticlericalism everywhere. The Church had demonstrated its unwillingness to reform, and it appeared to many as an institution interested solely in the acquisition of wealth and power, further removed than it had ever been from the ideal of early Christianity still cherished by many. An English clergyman named John Wyclif, supported for most of his life by the English monarchy, after beginning by attacking the abuses of the Church, finally came to deny that the Catholic

Church was a true Church at all, and the Church became, for him as for the later John Calvin, the body of all those predestined to be saved. Each man, as in the teachings of Luther, could be his own priest. Wyclif rejected all the sacraments of the Church except marriage, and he attacked all the ceremonies and pomp of the Church as likely to lead man away from God. Inspired largely by his teachings, a group of preachers called Lollards spread anticlericalism and the return to a pure and simple religion throughout Europe, many perishing at the stake as heretics. Inspired also by Lollardism a movement arose in Bohemia under the leadership of John Hus, which gained many adherents. When Hus, offered a safeconduct by the emperor Sigismund to appear and justify his views before the Council of Constance, was condemned by that body and burned as a heretic, in company with his leading supporter, large numbers of Bohemians resorted to rebellion, and for many years a civil war raged in that country. It was not fully suppressed by the time of Luther, nor was the Church ever fully restored to its position until the country was conquered by the forces of the Counter Reformation in the Thirty Years' War in the seventeenth century.

The Renaissance papacy The papacy was therefore not yet reformed when the Renaissance burst upon Italy, and it was not possible for the Church to stand aside, even if it had wished, from a movement that was so all-pervasive in Italy. The papacy which returned to Italy after the Great Schism had to make full use of its powers as a temporal ruler and possessor of the Papal States to restore its position. In the process the pope became hardly distinguishable from a Renaissance prince, establishing absolute rule over states which had earlier been merely his feudal vassals, with rather vague feudal obligations to the pope as their suzerain. So once more the problem arose for the papacy—How could an institution based on spiritual supremacy act as a temporal power without losing its prestige as a spiritual organization? The choice was made to act as a temporal power. But that choice

probably made inevitable the Protestant Reformation, and it is certain that financial policies connected with the choice provided the occasion for the Lutheran revolt.

The papacy had one advantage over all secular states. It possessed a source of income denied to them, either money contributed by the faithful in exchange for gifts that only the Church could offer, or money accruing to it from benefices in its gift, now usually shared with the monarchs. There was also a considerable income from pilgrims, especially in jubilee years. On the other hand it had one great disadvantage in that the papal office could not run in any particular family. Several popes filled the high office of cardinal with their nephews and other relatives; but, even so, only rarely could they control the election of their successors. Moreover, they were already well advanced in age when they reached the papal chair, and could not act as vigorously as younger men—though some, like Julius II, were hardly inferior, even in this respect, to the greatest of secular princes. But when they decided to act as patrons of art and literature their resources could hardly be equaled. For almost a century, with a few exceptions, they built up Rome, supporting the humanist writers and translators of the classics. The noted humanist Nicholas V (1447-1455) invited numerous humanists to Rome, including even Lorenzo Valla, who had recently proved the Donation of Constantine to be a forgery. Nicholas began a great library, though it was dissipated after his death by a pope unsympathetic to humanism. Aeneas Silvius, another noted humanist, was pope from 1458 to 1464 under the title of Pius II, and he was able to set the tide once more in the direction of humanism, a tide which was seldom diverted afterward until the Reformation.

Sixtus IV (1471-1484), in his relatively long period as pope, entered boldly and openly into Italian affairs, acting more as head of the states of the Church than as head of the universal Church itself. Attempting to interfere in Florentine affairs, quarreling with the Medici, and trying to depose Lorenzo the Magnificent from his position as Florentine leader,

he was undoubtedly privy to the murder of Lorenzo's brother, nor did he scruple to use his spiritual powers for all they were still worth. He was at least partly successful in his schemes, and filled important positions in his principality with his relatives. His reign—and it is ironical that before his elevation to the papal see he had been a Franciscan friar—marks the definite secularization of the papacy. Yet, at the same time, he patronized writers, revived the Vatican library, built the Sistine Chapel and had it decorated by the greatest artists, and inaugurated a huge building program for the city of Rome. His example, good and bad, was followed by a whole series of popes, culminating in Alexander VI, Julius II, and Leo X, the Medici pope who had to face the Lutheran revolt. While the popes sought for glory, fame, power, and wealth as strongly as any secular prince, the papacy began to lose, for the last time before the Reformation, the spiritual allegiance of Christendom, and in lands outside Italy the sparks of revolt were kindled which needed only the defiant acts of a Luther to fan them into flame.

ARCHITECTURE—CONTRAST WITH GOTHIC AND DEBT TO ANTIQUITY

As we have seen, the great native artistic achievement of medieval Western civilization was the Gothic cathedral. Medieval sculpture and painting, though it has been much admired for the deep religious feeling it embodies, and for the way in which it so clearly fulfilled not only its religious but its architectural purpose, cannot be said to have struck out in a new direction. Medieval sculpture was largely a realistic copying from nature, usually with the greatest fidelity. This applies more to the sculptured human figures than to their surroundings. Painting, though sometimes stiff and formal when required for religious reasons, became far freer when it was used for illustration, as in so many beautifully illustrated medieval manuscripts. But during the Renaissance, sculpture and painting burst the bonds of tradition altogether and escaped beyond the confines even of their classical models.

The Gothic cathedral was an original

achievement because of the unique way in which the form was determined by the purpose of the whole, so that all details were subordinated to the central theme. Its great technical achievement was the ribbed structure, which made possible the unique use of light so necessary for the fulfillment of the religious purpose of the whole. It may be said, therefore, that the structure dominated the building and determined everything else in it. It was far otherwise with the Renaissance building, based on the much simpler Greek and Roman structures. Here the structure is of little importance and is largely concealed, whereas in the Gothic cathedral it is forced upon the attention. Simplicity and purity were insisted on by Renaissance architects, and yet the civilization of the Renaissance was neither pure nor simple, nor did the builders and their patrons have in mind anything so naïve as a simple dwelling place for a tutelary god or goddess—nor, in truth, did the Romans, whose works were so much more readily available to Renaissance architects than the works of the Greek originators.

The result was the same as in the case of the Roman imitators. The Renaissance architects, paid by their munificent patrons, at least one of whose motives was competition with their peers in other cities, had to compete; and there were few areas open to competition except decoration and size. The Greek style, originated for a particular purpose in ancient Greece, was incapable of any evolution into something different and truly original. Thus there is a certain monotony in the great public buildings of the Renaissance. Colonnades may be multiplied indefinitely; capitals may become more ornate and lavish—when there is no need for them, they may be inserted as decorations supporting nothing. Renaissance architects had great technical virtuosity; their relatively simple problems were solved with ample ease; and it is certainly possible to admire their work immoderately, especially the work of Bramante. But one cannot help feeling that they were following a dead end and that the coming of the Baroque, a style indigenous to Western civilization, allowed the artists of the post-Renaissance period a freedom that was much needed, in spite of the extra-

gances that were in most artists an inseparable part of this latter style. Since Gothic in the sixteenth century likewise reached its own dead end in the flamboyant Gothic, the way was open for a new style that combined elements of both Gothic and Renaissance, and yet in itself was distinctive and original. This new style, the Baroque, will be discussed briefly in Chapter 15.

SCULPTURE—MICHELANGELO

Medieval sculpture was, as has been said, strongly realistic, except in the portrayal of the human form, whose inherent beauty could not be stressed in that age of contempt for the body and all its attributes. Here, therefore, the recovery of interest in the ancient world acted as a real inspiration to the Renaissance sculptor. We have seen how in the Hellenistic world sculpture added a certain realism to the ideal figures of the classical Hellenic period, and the Romans continued the trend, especially in portrait sculpture. But this realism was lost in the Middle Ages, to be recovered now during the Renaissance. All the conditions were ripe for such a recovery. Much Roman sculpture was available in Italy; there was a revived interest in and appreciation of the human body; and ancient taboos which required that the human form should always be fully clothed lost their urgency. Moreover, patrons were numerous who desired that their own form and features should be perpetuated in bronze or stone as a contribution to their eternal fame. There was also opportunity for sculpture in the great Renaissance churches, which had plenty of space available for all forms of decoration. Funerary sculpture also tended to perpetuate the memory of the deceased.

Renaissance sculptors early revolted against simple realism; they fully appreciated how the Greeks had striven to represent the ideal form, while retaining a recognizable closeness to the original model. They tried for anatomical exactness and ideal beauty at the same time, and very many of them achieved outstanding success. Leonardo da Vinci has given us a personal account of his efforts to attain the

former, through innumerable drawings and painstaking anatomical observation. We know also how carefully he tried to model a horse for an equestrian statue of his patron so that it should be a truly perfect horse and not only a mount for its rider, and how many times he destroyed his imperfect efforts. But the greatest sculptor of them all, and in the opinion of many the greatest sculptor probably of all time, was Michelangelo Buonarroti (1475-1564), one of the universal geniuses of the Renaissance, as far removed from the artist specialist of our own times as Leonardo da Vinci himself. He was skilled in architecture, painting, and poetry as well as in sculpture, though always in his own mind primarily a sculptor—as may be agreed by those who have seen his magnificent, but still sculptural, paintings in the Sistine Chapel.

Michelangelo was hardly influenced in his mature work by any other sculptor, and unthinkable far removed from the Gothic world. If he had lived earlier it is still impossible to imagine Michelangelo helping to carve the portal of Chartres. An individualist to the core, conscious of his own uniqueness and genius, given to towering rages and impatient of all control, he yet had to submit to the whims of his patrons, at least one of whom, Pope Julius II, was as full of furious energy as Michelangelo himself. His technique learned early and fully a part of himself, he could do anything he chose with the utmost virtuosity. Already at the age of twenty-four he had completed a remarkable *Pietà*, which remains one of his best works. But as he grew older his individual thought began to dominate his work, and into it is incorporated the experience of a life which it is impertinent to call unhappy. In a trivial sense no doubt he was unhappy. But his very greatness derives from his inward understanding of the lot of man, its joys and sorrows, its exaltations and depressions. It was his life experience that alone made it possible for him to create those artistic forms for which humanity will be forever in his debt.

His great figures, "Day and Night," "Dawn and Sunset," "Moses," and "David," all are eloquent of his understanding of man as individual and universal type; all save the early

"David" are inexpressibly sad. When later, at the insistence of Julius and contrary to his own first wishes, he painted the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel—an almost superhuman feat that he accomplished in four years in spite of the complaints of the furiously impatient Julius that the work was going too slowly—he chose the story of Creation. Into this huge fresco, as also in the "Last Judgment" executed for a later pope, he poured all the artist's profound knowledge of man—his body, his soul, and his spirit.

Such was Michelangelo's energy, even in the last years of a prodigious life, that he was still able to answer the call of another pope to become the chief architect for the still unfinished St. Peter's; and it was his plan, modifying that of Bramante, that was finally carried out after his death.

PAINTING

Few will dispute that Renaissance painting is the chief of all the Renaissance claims to glory. In many ways it was a new art. Though there had been paintings in the ancient world, as far back in time indeed as Cro-Magnon man, and though Egyptians in their traditional way had succeeded superbly in what they undertook, the real problems recognized in the modern age had never been solved: how to compose a painting so that it is an artistic and satisfying whole as a picture, how to give the illusion of three dimensions in a two-dimensional medium (the problem of perspective), and how to deal with light and shadow. We have learned only recently how the Greeks handled these problems, and the earlier Cretans, whose work is known to us but was not known to the men of the Renaissance, showed no awareness of them. The Renaissance painters solved all these problems, and in the opinion of many their work has never been surpassed in the succeeding centuries in spite of (or, conceivably, because of) the manifold technical inventions since their day. Faced therefore with the unalterable fact that they had no models to follow, the Renaissance painters were forced to solve their problems

out of their own resources, as the medieval cathedral builders had solved theirs.

The greatest figure in early Renaissance painting, to whom all his successors owed a great debt, was Giotto, a Florentine artist contemporary with Dante (ca. 1265–1337), to whom indeed Dante himself pays tribute. In Giotto's day all art was still religious, and painting was under the influence of the Byzantine religious tradition. The painted medieval figures are, in their way, impressive, but there is little that is specifically human about them. No medieval Madonna can be imagined as a human mother with a human child. It was not, indeed, the artist's intention to draw any attention to their human nature, but rather to raise the soul of the beholder to meditate upon the mystery of Christ and the Virgin without possible distraction by the earthly beauty of womanhood or the beauty of the world in which they lived. With Giotto we already have a Madonna who is humanly tender, and a Child who is a real child. The stiff, hieratic forms of medieval and much of Byzantine art have taken on movement as well as human grace. The subjects and themes of Giotto are still altogether religious, as they were to remain to a large extent throughout the whole of the Italian Renaissance. But Giotto was able to win at least one important secular patron who commissioned a religious work for the benefit of the soul of his dead father, a desire soon to be replaced in the Italian cities with the desire for the perpetuation of the mortal likeness of the patron himself for the benefit of posterity.

Amongst the myriads of great and near-great painters who succeeded Giotto in Italy, only a few can be singled out here, either for their influence or for their supreme achievement. It should be understood that at this time no Italian painter worked in isolation. In the early Renaissance no painter confined himself to painting alone, but worked in sculpture, architecture when opportunity presented itself, but especially in the lesser arts, for the products of which there was constant demand among the bourgeoisie. Thus an ambitious painter would apprentice himself at an early age to one of the masters of his craft, and even




A detail from a fresco by Masaccio in the Church of Santa Maria del Carmine at Florence. The detail depicts the moment when the disciples are anxiously awaiting Christ's answer to the question of whether tribute money should be paid to Caesar.



Detail from the "Last Judgment": Christ and the Virgin Mary.

EXPLORATION

during the
15th - 17th CENTURIES






This wonderful Raphael painting, now in the Kaiser Friedrich Museum of Berlin, is usually called "The Holy Family with a Child Saint." The identity of the child on the right is not known. The child on the left is presumably John the Baptist. Painted about 1505.



Leonardo da Vinci's drawing of St. Anne and the Virgin, now in Burlington House, London.



"The Epiphany," from the workshop of Giotto, before 1337. Tempera on wood. (COURTESY OF THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, KENNEDY FUND, 1911)

in his later years he was not inclined to specialize in only one field. One of the results of the system was that any innovation in any of the fields would be quickly known and imitated. Moreover, part of the training consisted in visiting and studying the masterpieces of earlier artists, which were, of course, open to view in the churches and public buildings of the time. Later, when they were housed in private buildings, the owners asked nothing better than to have artists admire their possessions. Michelangelo was a simple apprentice when he caught the eye of Lorenzo the Magnificent, who saw him in the Medicean gardens admiring his statuary. This proved to be the beginning of Michelangelo's career, for Lorenzo shortly afterward asked to see his work and thereafter became his first patron.

So, when a great innovator such as Ma-

saccio (1401-1428?) for the first time succeeded in mastering the problem of perspective and the handling of groups without distortion or overcrowding, all later artists, including Leonardo da Vinci and Michelangelo, learned from his work, even though he himself died before he was thirty and barely had time to create a school of painters. Figures and landscapes were handled by Masaccio in a new manner, and his modified naturalism was imitated by a host of artists and became the prevailing mode.

Amongst the other great painters of this age only three can be dealt with here, and these far too briefly. Leonardo da Vinci did not devote himself exclusively, or even mainly, to painting. But the few paintings we have are all masterpieces. The "Last Supper" is a fresco that, even in Leonardo's lifetime, was already

ings were his own, and his minute and careful observation of plant forms was his own; but his speculations were no more necessarily original with him than those of Roger Bacon in the Middle Ages. Being interested in all things in heaven and earth, he made it his business to find out all that was known about all subjects that came to his attention; and, being a practical genius as well, he pondered how the knowledge available could be put to use, and how certain remarkable theories could be made practically useful. It is a mistake therefore to regard him, any more than Roger Bacon, as a lone genius working in solitude with a mind centuries ahead of his time. Leonardo was certainly aware of the work being done at Padua and elsewhere, and he knew of the experiments and speculations of his contemporaries. He also received support and encouragement from the Italian despots who wished to make use of his genius. Indeed, it was the practical interests of these men that provided them with what was probably their sole interest in science.

It seems true to say that the joy of the search for pure knowledge of the world had not yet communicated itself to the vast majority of the leading spirits of the Italian Renaissance, who lived most fully in the joys of aesthetic experience. In this respect they still fell behind the greatest of the Greeks. It was left for the northerners to take up more fully the quest for scientific knowledge, which will be discussed separately in Chapter 15.

❖ The expansion of the Renaissance beyond the Alps

We have already dealt with the question of why the Renaissance started in Italy and suggested a few reasons why it did not arise spontaneously in any other part of Europe. Material and social conditions, we found, were largely different; the peoples of northern Europe were not surrounded by the physical monuments of antiquity; and there was thus no natural stimulus to imitate the achievements of men who had not been their ancestors. Their own native Gothic had not yet exhausted its possibilities for growth. Nevertheless, when

travelers from the north visited Italy, it was impossible for most of them to refrain from admiring the vital culture of the Italian cities, so different from their own. This was particularly evident when the French king Charles VIII, with his army of twenty thousand, made his triumphal progress through Italy in 1494. However much the French may have despised the Italian inability to unite in defense of the country, they had only admiration for the great artistic and literary achievements of their enemies. Many were inclined to accept the Italian point of view that they themselves, conquerors as they were, were nevertheless cultural barbarians; and instead of merely resenting the fact they determined to remedy the defect by sitting at the feet of as many great Italians as they could persuade to come and live with them. Francis I of France made every effort to persuade artists to come to France, and was successful at last in persuading Leonardo da Vinci himself to come to Amboise for the last years of his life, even though, as far as is known, the visit proved to be unfruitful. Henry VIII of England, on the other hand, spent much energy in attempting to persuade such men as Raphael and Titian to come to England, with no success at all. What would these painters have done in such a provincial atmosphere? But all the northern Renaissance monarchs were able, when they tried, to persuade at least a few second- and third-rate Italians to go to their countries. Such was Italian prestige that any Italian was usually considered far better than the best available local talent.

In the field of scholarship the position was different. Italian humanists searching for manuscripts visited the old monasteries in northern Europe where they were to be found, and sometimes became acquainted with European scholars who knew medieval Latin and were willing to extend their knowledge to the classics, hitherto often imperfectly understood. It was possible to keep in touch with foreign scholars and humanists by correspondence, whereas in the field of art it was necessary to visit the actual works of art and receive visits from living artists. Moreover, though the universities throughout the Renaissance were

strongholds of conservatism, Aristotelianism, and traditional theology, there existed notable exceptions which did not remain aloof from Italian influence. Smaller schools existed which were willing to favor the new humanism. Above all, the great school of the Brethren of the Common Life at Deventer in Holland, where Erasmus studied, while it retained its original religious orientation, offered studies in classical Latin which inspired many of its pupils to go to Italy and drink at the pure fountain of antiquity. Returning with a knowledge of Latin and Greek and a new enthusiasm, many, such as Rudolf Agricola (1442-1485), were rewarded with university positions, enabling them to spread more widely what they had acquired.

In general, the new learning made its way slowly but with some sureness, gradually penetrating into the universities which were the main seats of learning in Germany, and into cultivated circles elsewhere. The learning, however, once it had been acquired, was taken far more seriously than in Italy. Northern Europeans continued to learn Greek for its own sake long after the fad had passed in Italy; and the humanities have remained a staple of European education ever since that time. The Renaissance spirit, then, was never the same elsewhere as in Italy. Occasional individuals became, as it were, Italianized; but for the most part, as in all diffusions of culture that we have studied, the native genius of the receiving peoples allowed the new culture to stimulate them to new efforts in keeping with their own culture and traditions. Thus German, Flemish, and French painting retain their own characteristics while making use of Italian technical inventions, and to a lesser degree adopting Italian idealism, which contrasted so strongly with late medieval naturalism. In England, on the contrary, where there was no important native tradition, all that could be done was to invite Italian painters to work in the country, while inferior artists tried to imitate the Italians directly. We shall therefore in this consideration of the expansion of the Renaissance beyond the Alps study the effects on the native tradition, country by country, trying to show what use was made by

native writers and artists of the lead offered by Italy. Erasmus, a man of the world and a true European, who can be said to belong to no country though he was born in Holland, will be treated separately, summing up as he does in his own person the whole of European humanism.

HUMANISM IN GERMANY

As has already been said, Germany took slowly to humanism, for the most part remaining content with the old traditional learning. The nobility continued to indulge its taste for martial exercises and was rarely interested in things of the mind. This condition of course was the result of the very slow decline of feudalism. Though the towns could well have supported a leisure class, prosperous merchants for the most part found their pleasure in growing more prosperous rather than turning to "idle" pursuits such as were the vogue in Italy.

Some of the universities, however, did depart from their traditional ways far enough to support German humanists such as Agricola, and gave them an opportunity to teach. Agricola himself taught for a time at the University of Heidelberg, whose patron, the Elector Palatine, was to some degree favorable to humanism; he knew Latin and Greek well enough to translate some Greek works into Latin, and his influence at the university bore some fruit. John Wimpheling (1450-1528) studied at Heidelberg and became competent in Greek, opening a Latin school in Strassburg in his later years. Wimpheling and his friend Sebastian Brant (1458-1521) not only used their humanism to defend classical learning against their entrenched opponents, but also attacked the morals and general behavior of the clergy. The *Ship of Fools*, an elaborate satire by Brant, won the author a considerable reputation throughout Europe.

But most famous of the early German humanists was John Reuchlin, who became proficient, not only in Latin and Greek, but also in Hebrew, which he learned particularly for the purpose of studying the Scriptures in the original, though he was also interested

in Jewish mystical writings. He had no difficulty in showing that much of the current interpretation of the Bible had no basis in the original scriptural text. This got him into trouble with the authorities, and a war of pamphlets ensued, culminating in the anonymous *Letters of Obscure Men*. One of the classic satires of the northern Renaissance, this pamphlet attacks wittily and vitriolically the old-fashioned theologians who were at the root of the dispute, together with many of the more superstitious customs of the Church. Reuchlin was finally summoned before the inquisitor-general: but though his chief polemic was finally condemned, in 1520, by Pope Leo X, there was nothing much that could be done about it by the Church. By that time the Lutheran revolt had already begun, and the papacy had its hands full with far more serious matters.

Thus German humanists, by attacking the old theological methods which took little account of the Bible, played their part in bringing about the Reformation, little though most of them would have approved of such a consummation of their efforts. As serious and studious men, they were, without doubt, more interested in making use of the classics than in enjoying them for their own sake. They had little or no interest in the supposed "way of life" of the ancient world, nor did they wish to imitate it.

HUMANISM IN FRANCE

Initial conservatism to the invasion of Italy in 1494 It was far otherwise with France. Humanism came very slowly to France also, and Italian influence even in art was negligible until the expedition of Charles VIII to Italy in 1494. But thereafter its influence was deeper than in any other country, and it lasted longer, merging at last almost insensibly into French seventeenth-century classicism. Before 1494 a few Italian humanists had visited France and an occasional French scholar had studied in Italy, but they had made little headway against entrenched custom and opposition. In architecture the French were still well content with their Gothic, which had reached its flam-

boyant stage. Chateaux and private and public buildings as well as churches were built in the Gothic style, with an occasional borrowing from antique models. The monarchy had been too busy consolidating its position, as described in an earlier chapter, to pay attention to frivolities—and in any case it is hard to imagine such a monarch as Louis XI wasting his money on anything so unrewarding as artistic or literary patronage.

Then, suddenly, France was a great power, secure in herself, incomparably the most important monarchy in Europe; and there was time and energy available to look for an Italian crown to which kings of France for some years had held title, though they had been unable to make good their claim against the Aragonese incumbent. So Charles VIII in 1494 led an expedition into Italy which, though partly successful in some of its objectives, achieved little of permanent value from a political point of view. But the expedition had given the French a glimpse of a way of life utterly different from their own, which they admired exceedingly. Successive expeditions served only to reinforce their admiration, until Francis I (1515-1547) and his sister Marguerite of Navarre (who wrote a book of short stories modeled after Boccaccio in form) gave a lead to the upper classes of France which altered the whole character of French culture, made the sixteenth one of her greatest centuries, and laid the foundation for her undisputed cultural leadership in the seventeenth and eighteenth.

Francis, influenced by his secretary, a learned humanist named Guillaume Budé, decided that it was his duty to patronize art and letters as the Renaissance despots patronized them in Italy with far fewer resources than he. He founded what is now the Collège de France, with teachers paid directly out of the royal treasury, where classical Latin and Greek, Hebrew, and even Arabic were to be taught, as well as philosophy and such practical sciences as mathematics and medicine. No doubt the project was designed to bypass the conservative Sorbonne. Budé also persuaded his royal master that there was glory to be won by collecting manuscripts of ancient texts and

founding a library at his palace of Fontainebleau, which should contain not only these texts but the finest books printed in Venice. Already before the reign of Francis, French printers had begun to issue Greek texts, but now the royal example handsomely rewarded their enterprise, especially since Marguerite, the king's sister, possessed a court of her own, no less learned than the king's. When the palace of Fontainebleau began to take on its new shape, with a troop of Italian artists filling the grounds with "classical" statuary, the volatile French people turned as feverishly to this life of antiquity as ever the Italians had done a century before. It was in this atmosphere that François Rabelais (ca. 1490-1553) began his work, filled with an overwhelming zest for life in all its aspects.

Rabelais did not write for the élite of the court, but for the ordinary bourgeois. "How," he once wrote in a letter to a friend, "can it be that in our wonderful century there are still some people so constructed that they cannot raise their eyes from the hellish darkness of their Gothic age to the bright flame of the sun?" Destined for the priesthood, and studying in a monastery which had been slightly infiltrated by the new humanist learning, Rabelais escaped from the monastery when his views were looked upon with disfavor by the authorities. After studying further in a second, more congenial, monastery, he finally quit and became a doctor. Occasionally practicing his profession, he preferred to enjoy himself and savor everything that life could offer. Out of this background came the story of the two giants, *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, a work unique in all literature, though it may reasonably be called the ancestor of the picaresque novel. Incredibly successful—Rabelais himself had no expectation that it would sell—it appealed to everyman. Part of it is autobiographical, recounting incidents from his own fabulous life. But the most important part is the uproarious satire on monks and their pedantic learning, and on the ascetic ideal for which, as an escaped monk himself, he had nothing but contempt. *Gargantua* in the story founds a monastery—needless to say, in good Renaissance architecture—which is the exact

antithesis of the monastic ideal. Everyone is to be free, all women are to be young and beautiful, the only rule is to do as you please and follow your instincts, for they are certain to be good. Here is the natural man of Renaissance France, the unabashed pagan, lacking the refinement of the Italians (or, indeed, of the later French), but far indeed also from the seriousness of the German humanists.

The individualist writer par excellence—Montaigne The greatest writer of the French Renaissance, who summed up the whole movement in his person, was Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592), a man of affairs who retired to his country estate in middle life to devote himself to writing. His *Essays*, which are saturated with knowledge of the classics, appeared in 1580. The literature of antiquity was by this time no longer a novelty, but accepted as part of the literary equipment of every educated man. At any moment Montaigne can choose apposite examples from antiquity to illustrate his ideas. His subject is man, and his source of information on this incomparably interesting subject is primarily himself. Detached but observant, gently skeptical but not disillusioned in the modern manner, his essays read today as well as when they were written. He is the supreme example in literature of the enlightened man who withdraws himself by choice from the world for the purpose of observing it more closely and making it possible for him to give it advice from his own ripe wisdom. Whereas his younger contemporary, Shakespeare, has a greater feeling for the tragedy of life, one feels that Montaigne is not unaware of this element, but that he still believes in the power of reason of the enlightened man to overcome it. He uses self-discipline to avoid being carried away by his own emotion. The few brief words in which he speaks of his loneliness on the death of a friend whom he had loved with all his being suggest that, from choice, he left much unsaid that was not necessary for the world to know, but that his personal experience went far deeper than he was willing to say. And his comment on the religious wars raging in his time, that it shows "a great self-love and presumption to consider

one's own opinion so highly that it is necessary to destroy public peace and introduce so many evils to establish them," goes right to the heart of the matter from the point of view of the enlightened man. No one can gainsay his comment; and yet has such enlightenment ever triumphed over the forces of unreason, the forces of tragedy and destiny and human wickedness of which Shakespeare was so conscious, and the understanding of which, in the last analysis, gives Shakespeare his superiority over the *Sieur de Montaigne*?

THE NEW LEARNING IN ENGLAND

Humanism and English bourgeois culture
In England the economic, social, and cultural conditions were not dissimilar to those of France. In the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, however, England had two major institutions of learning separate altogether from the great concentration of bourgeois wealth in the capital of London, whereas the University of Paris was centered in the capital itself. France, however, had far more important concentrations of wealth and potential cultural activity than England had outside London. However, it was a constant feature of English life that major political changes took place in England earlier than in France. The English feudal nobility had been largely destroyed by the Wars of the Roses at the close of the Middle Ages, and the position of the monarch was firmly established by the end of the fifteenth century. The French Renaissance monarchs, far from solving this problem, maintained a precarious coexistence with the nobility, whom they were unable to discipline until the advent of the Bourbons at the end of the Wars of Religion. The Tudor monarchy in England was able to establish itself firmly with the aid of the bourgeoisie; the remnants of the feudal nobility made the best of things, usually set up headquarters in London, and patronized the same kind of culture as the bourgeoisie, while continuing to draw their revenues from their provincial estates. It was also the policy of the Crown to draw eminent bourgeois into the royal service, elevating them into the nobility as partial reward. It

was this combination of noble and bourgeois patronage, especially in the city of London, that made possible the great Elizabethan Age of culture. Unlike the French Renaissance, whose mainstay was royal support, the English Renaissance flourished with relatively minor support from the monarchy.

The two great English universities held almost a monopoly of learning, and, since there was no comparable center in the capital, nobles and bourgeois studied there. In the early fifteenth century the faculties were still entrenched in the conservative tradition of learning, but this tradition did not have quite such a strangle hold as in Paris, its place of origin. Moreover, the system of virtual autonomy for the colleges of the university permitted competition between the colleges, and thus prevented a concerted university policy toward humanism such as prevailed at Paris. When dissatisfied scholars such as William Grocyn (1446?–1519) went to Italy to study and returned to their universities afterward, willing and eager to teach Greek, there was not very much difficulty in finding some college willing to try out something new. So Oxford, before the end of the fifteenth century, already offered some courses in classical Greek and Latin, and its example was soon followed by Cambridge.

The earlier English humanists were interested primarily in the reform of education and religion. Sir Thomas More, whose *Utopia* gave the word its modern meaning (Greek—"nowhere"), gently satirized society and the backward social system of his day. *Utopia* was a modern, forward-looking Renaissance city, tolerant, as More's contemporaries most decidedly were not, toward religion. But the English Renaissance did not enter into its period of greatness until the Elizabethan Compromise, dealt with later in this chapter, put a temporary end to the religious struggles of the Tudor dynasty.

The Elizabethan Age
Elizabethan England was far from viewing life in the Italian or French manner. Occasional Renaissance figures, such as Christopher Marlowe, appear like comets, full of a Rabelaisian zest for life, supremely creative. Marlowe, a poet and

dramatist and man of action, died in a tavern brawl at the age of twenty-nine. Other men of action, especially the sea-dogs and explorers of the age, such as Francis Drake and Walter Raleigh, suggest something of the Renaissance spirit and joy in life. But the two greatest poets of the reign, Edmund Spenser (1552?-1599) and William Shakespeare (1564-1616), are more serious. Spenser was a great artist in poetry, one of the greatest artists in the English language. In him classical learning had been fully assimilated, and it is used with the utmost naturalness even in his allegorical poem *The Faerie Queene* (written in honor and glorification of Queen Elizabeth), which uses a medieval form and a medieval theme, with pageants, tournaments, encounters between knights, and much of the paraphernalia of chivalry. His consciousness of form, the extreme care of his writing, and his experimentation with meter are remarkable for his age, and it is not surprising that he was not greatly appreciated in his own time and received scant reward from Elizabeth—though he was ultimately honored with burial in Westminster Abbey.

With William Shakespeare we reach the culmination of both the Elizabethan Age and English achievement. What Michelangelo was to Italy, Rembrandt to Holland, Montaigne to France and Cervantes to Spain in lesser degree, Shakespeare was to the English—their greatest man of genius, who belongs to the world as much as to his own country. He was not, in the sense of the Renaissance, a "universal man." He devoted his whole genius to poetry and drama. But for the understanding of man and his heights and depths he has had no equal. The work of Shakespeare is unique for its utter objectivity; no one can say that here, or there, is Shakespeare depicting himself (save, intentionally, in the figure of Prospero in the *Tempest*). His men and women live in and for themselves as full-scale human beings, acting out their tragic destiny in the tragedies—good men, moderate men, wicked men and women, but all equally human. Shakespeare was steeped in classical, especially Roman, learning, and he used many Roman themes; he imagined for himself the life of

Italian Renaissance cities, and laid several of his plays in them. But in everything that he wrote he utterly transformed his sources and made them his own by his genius. In him comes to fruition the Renaissance understanding of man as the many-dimensional being that he is. So today, and for many centuries to come, we may still drink at the well of Shakespeare, knowing that we in Western civilization have not surpassed him, have not learned everything he has to tell us and perhaps never will.

SPAIN

Spain has had a history that in many ways has kept her outside the main stream of Western culture. The expulsion of the Muslims from the Peninsula occupied so much of her energy during the Middle Ages and produced such a fervent and militant Christianity that there was little energy left for other pursuits. Thus the medieval spirit, even



Illustration for *Don Quixote* by the famous French historical painter, sculptor, and illustrator, Paul Gustave Doré (1832?-1883), showing Don Quixote and Sancho Panza (COURTESY NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY)

in accentuated form, long survived its disappearance elsewhere. There were few cities of importance where a secular culture could develop, and most Spanish scholars who became interested in Italian culture or classical letters stayed in Italy, or betook themselves, like the noted humanist Juan Vives (1492-1540), to more congenial centers elsewhere.

The greatest work of the Spanish Renaissance, fittingly enough, was an all-out attack on the chivalric ideal and on the mind that soaked up the chivalric romances of a culture now long outdated in the rest of Europe. Miguel de Cervantes (1547-1616) had lived an adventurous life, studying and working in Italy, a prisoner of war and slave in North Africa, always afflicted by poverty. The novel on which his reputation is based, the superb *Don Quixote de la Mancha*, has as a hero a chivalrous knight who pursues the fantastic adventures of a medieval knight in ordinary rural Spain of the late sixteenth century. His head is filled with romance, and it is implied that he is insane; it is the task of his down-to-earth squire, Sancho Panza, to look after him and see that he comes to no harm. Since he is far from successful in protecting his master, the book is full of pathos as well as comedy. It is clear that the author who chose this strange medium for the expression of his knowledge of life is inferior to few men in his understanding of man—the whole man, with his head in the stars and his feet on the earth—and in this he can hardly be compared with any save Shakespeare himself.

ERASMUS, THE "MAN OF THE WORLD"

We have left to the last in this study of humanism the great figure of Desiderius Erasmus (1469?-1536), because in his life and work he typifies and has always typified the ideal humanist, with all his strengths and weaknesses. He was no poet, nor was he a man of action. He was a man of words, and his tool was the pen; probably no pure writer in all history wielded such an influence as he. Occupied much of his life with translating classical works and the Bible into Latin, which was his



Engraving of Erasmus by Lucas Vorsterman, after a painting by Hans Holbein. (COURTESY ACHENBACH FOUNDATION)

preferred tongue even for conversation, and acting as editor to a Basel publisher, he was never wealthy and had no source of income beyond his work. But every humanist in Europe at least knew of him, and none would not have been proud to make his personal acquaintance. He had been welcomed at courts and private houses in many countries, and his correspondence, by far the most extensive of his day, was valued and quoted by all who received it.

Ordained a priest, Erasmus spent a great deal of his energy in attacking the abuses of the Church with his satirical pen, especially in his best-known work, *In Praise of Folly*. Luther felt that he should have been a supporter of the German Reformation, for how could Erasmus continue to favor a Church which was in truth all that he said it was? But Erasmus would not join the German, objecting to the violence that was characteristic of Luther's nature. Such passion must lead to the kind of attack on the Church that Erasmus, for all his satirical words, could never have approved. The papacy, on the other hand, sensing the

powerful support that the humanist could give it, offered him the hat of a cardinal. As firmly as he had rejected Luther, Erasmus, though old and in poverty, refused the gift.

Enlightened, steeped in antiquity and the Christianity of the New Testament as it appeared to him, Erasmus was the most tolerant of human beings, almost a grotesque figure in his age of violent and passionate men. Gently calling down a plague on both their houses, he remained to the end an independent individualist, as impressed by Socrates as by Jesus Christ, and sure that they were both human ideal examples worthy to be followed.

In Erasmus' own day he was greatly admired; he had an unequalled reputation; and whatever his contemporaries, Luther or the pope, may have felt, they came to him for assistance. It is doubtful whether any liberal has wielded so much influence since his day (for Voltaire, whom Erasmus resembles in so many ways, was in the last analysis a defender at least of his own privileges). Liberalism of Erasmus' uncompromising kind has always been a luxury. It is perhaps well for his own fame that he did in fact live in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; for in 1536, when he died, it was still not entirely necessary to take sides—as long as one lived in the free city of Basel, within the Swiss Confederation.


RENAISSANCE ART BEYOND THE ALPS

The Renaissance to the north of the Alps did not produce many great original masterpieces. It may be said that the artistic tradition of the Middle Ages was transformed only slowly, and then rather by the use of new Italian techniques than by a change of emphasis. The Flemish burghers, for example, had plenty of money to pay artists, but they preferred initially to pay for religious paintings. Especially the *Pietàs* appealed to the Flemish artists of the Renaissance period, and few have been so well able to express the extremes of sorrow as the Flemish painters of this time. Some wonderful religious masterpieces exist from this period, especially the deeply thoughtful altarpieces of John Van

Eyck at Ghent. Flemish painting never altogether abandoned its realism, in spite of the fact that many Flemish artists studied in Italy and brought back some Italian techniques.

In Germany the great names are Albrecht Dürer and Hans Holbein the Younger, both of whom studied in Italy. Dürer came close to being an *uomo universale*, drawing, painting, engraving, and writing, though he did not live the life of action demanded by the Italian prototype. He remains one of the greatest masters of copper engraving of all time. Holbein was driven out of Germany by the religious troubles following the Lutheran revolt. He then settled in England, where he painted the portraits of many notables, especially from the growing merchant class. England, however, had no indigenous painters of any great merit.

In Germany, the Low Countries, and England, Renaissance architecture had little influence until a later century. Gothic was still favored, and had moved over in most places to the late flamboyant Gothic, with its national variations. This was true also of France, which, for a considerable time after the Italian Renaissance, had been constructing buildings of a quite different nature. As already noted, Francis I was greatly impressed by Italian work and imported many Italian workmen into France. But the Italians were usually employed for decoration rather than for architecture. French architects were interested in what the Italians were doing but, perhaps from a kind of patriotism, did not wish to imitate them more than necessary. Thus arose a style which remained uniquely French, but was a kind of combination of Gothic and Italian Renaissance. The greatest French architect of the period, Philibert Delorme, made it his business to study carefully Roman remains in both Italy and France, as well as the architecture of the Italian Renaissance, and only after this careful study did he come to his conclusions, which he embodied in an influential book. He was always pondering the problem of how French needs could be met, how French materials could be used instead of Italian marble, whether a French order for architectural columns could be devised, and



One of Dürer's superb copper engravings showing St. Eustace, a second-century martyr, who had formerly been a lover of the chase but was converted to Christianity when he saw a stag with a cross between its horns. (COURTESY THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART)

"Diana and the Deer." Sculpture by Goujon, now in the Louvre. Formerly the property of Diane de Poitiers, mistress and political adviser of Henry II of France.



similar problems. Delorme insisted that the architect must be fully responsible for the ensemble of any work commissioned, since he disliked decoration for its own sake. He worked closely with the French sculptor Jean Goujon (1510-1566) whose ideas corresponded with many of his own, and who is noted for his "Diana and the Deer," now in the Louvre. This piece of sculpture is subtly different from anything made in Italy during the Renaissance, although the subject, like many used by the Italians, was drawn from antiquity.

SCIENCE

Science in the northern Renaissance was, on the whole, less advanced than in Italy, if one excepts the work in astronomy begun by Copernicus, a discussion of which will be reserved for Chapter 15. Paracelsus (Theophrastus Bombastus von Hohenheim, 1493-1541), though once thought a charlatan, is now considered a good observer and practical physician, with many interesting medical theories, not all of which have been disproved even now. Ambroise Paré (1517-1590), as surgeon to the French armies, learned much about the treatment of wounds. The Fleming Andreas

Vesalius, whose revolutionary *Seven Books on the Structure of the Human Body* may be said to have founded the modern science of anatomy, has already been mentioned. Though a Fleming, much of his working life was spent in Italy, and it was in Italy that he studied.

The Renaissance in the north, as has already been suggested in several places in this chapter, shades over into the Reformation, on which the teachings of the northern humanists had much influence. But before we come to the Reformation itself, some attention will be given to the new forces working in the economic life of Europe during the period, since an understanding of these forces will contribute to a better understanding of the underlying reasons behind the Reformation. The Reformation certainly cannot be explained by economic forces alone, but neither can it be fully explained without taking them into account.

❖ The growth of capitalism in the later Middle Ages

When we last considered the economic life of Europe in Chapter 9, most of our attention was concentrated on the economy typical of

medieval times. The subsistence economy of the manors, which had so little surplus that little was available for export, thus keeping the urban population small; the small-scale industry of the towns and the typical economic organization of the guilds; the still fairly small-scale commerce, consisting of luxuries from the East, which could find customers only among the relatively wealthy few—these activities were characteristic of the Middle Ages until well on into the thirteenth century. We also noted the way in which the Church, the leading maker of opinion in the Middle Ages, lent the weight of its influence to the notion that each man's task was to help his neighbor, that riches could be justified only if their possessor had a certain rank in society and a position to keep up, that such men had responsibilities and duties toward their dependents and the poor—in short, that the actual economic institutions of the Middle Ages were those approved by God and that they should not be wantonly changed. God willed that each man should serve in that station in life to which he had been born. The taking of money as interest, unfair trade practices which tended to increase prices—such things as these were condemned; the pursuit of wealth and profit for their own sake were likely to put obstacles in the way of salvation, for had not Christ said that it was easier for a camel to go through a needle's eye than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of Heaven?

Nevertheless, well before the end of the Middle Ages, such ideals as these were being discarded, and the seeking of profit was already becoming the dominant motive in the lives of many, especially the merchants of the Italian cities. The search for such profits through the use of privately owned resources may be called *capitalism*, and its roots lie far back in the Middle Ages. The Church and other molders of opinion in time came to accommodate themselves to the facts, in part because they too found good use for money and set out to acquire it. The earlier thought was that money was sterile; that it could not be used to make more money. But when it was seen that, if invested in productive enterprises, it could indeed make more money for

the benefit of all, and that payment for the use of money (interest) would alone persuade the owners of money to invest it, the earlier concept was gradually abandoned. Thereafter only the practice of lending money at interest for purposes of consumption was condemned, since such money could usually be repaid only at the cost of hardship, and lowered consumption at a later time. Moreover, since such consumer credit was largely in the hands of Jews, the Christians were no doubt the more ready to condemn it. In due course even this practice came to be condoned, condemnation being abandoned in favor of restrictions on the rate of interest—high rates of interest being termed usurious, and still subject to ecclesiastical sanctions.

No pronounced break can be discerned between the growing capitalistic practices of the later Middle Ages and those of modern times. The discovery of the Americas and the subsequent exploitation of American gold and silver mines removed one of the main obstacles to the growth of capitalism by supplying the European economy with enough universally acceptable money for its transactions, but the discoveries did not change the course of capitalistic development. The influx of gold and silver entailed major political as well as economic consequences in Europe, for example helping to make Spain, the chief recipient of the new wealth, for a time the most powerful nation in Europe. The secondary effects on all the European nations are incalculable. But what used to be called the commercial revolution is too strong a term for the economic changes of the early modern period. It is a strange revolution which overturns nothing and does not replace any existing methods or institutions, but merely accentuates tendencies already in operation. On the other hand, the Industrial Revolution, which will be dealt with in later chapters, was closer to being a true revolution, and its effects—for example automation, one of the greatest unsolved problems of the twentieth century—are with us yet.

It was, then, the search for profit that put an end to the static, stable society of the Middle Ages; and it was the merchants of the Italian cities who invented, in the Middle Ages,

almost all the commercial devices that made a profit-seeking society possible. Although the first systematic treatise on double-entry book-keeping appeared only in 1494, written by one Luca Pacioli, long before that date merchants had recognized that they were in business in order to show a balance on the right side of the ledger, and the days of casual business operations and immediate spending of profits for new purchases were already far back in the past. Only a few of these commercial devices can be dealt with here; but all originated in the Middle Ages, and only were developed further in more recent times.

Since the Italian merchants were engaged in trade with the East, and in exchanging Oriental and domestic goods with the rest of Europe, considerable sums of money were needed to finance the transactions. But money was scarce, and its shortage, and the inconvenience caused by it, no doubt stimulated Italian inventiveness. Little capital had been accumulated by the end of the twelfth century in the hands of any individual merchant. Yet voyages were expensive; if they were to be financed, the resources of many individual merchants must be pooled. Thus arose the practice of buying shares in a particular commercial venture and distributing the proceeds after its completion in proportion to the investment. Later it became common for one partner to put up the cost of the venture, and another to undertake the actual voyage. The "sleeping partner" might also bear the risk of the voyage, losing his whole investment if the vessel failed to return. This was a serious danger in early times, so that the sleeping partner's share of the profits was often much larger than that of the men who made the actual voyage. In the fourteenth century financiers began to assume the risk of loss in exchange for contributions made by the merchants engaged in the trade, but otherwise had no share in the proceeds. This, of course, was true insurance, known to the ancient Athenians but re-invented in the late Middle Ages, though not fully systematized before the sixteenth century.

Although voyages were one of the most expensive forms of commercial enterprise, need

often arose for the pooling of capital for all sorts of ventures. In the early modern period there arose a natural extension of the medieval system. This was the joint stock company, in which an individual who had only a relatively small capital available for investment could obtain a share in a company, and be paid in proportion to his share. In early times and in most countries, once the specific enterprise for which the money had been subscribed was completed, the capital contributed was returned together with the profit it had earned. But later the investor allowed his money to stay in the company, contenting himself with an annual *dividend*, which represented a proportion of what his investment had earned during the year. Such share- or stockholders had little or no say in the management of the company, which was looked after by specialists; but, as time went on, it became possible for a shareholder also to sell his share in the company for whatever it would fetch on the market.

The shortage of money and the difficulty of transporting it in payment of debts suggested the bill of exchange, which greatly facilitated the sale of merchandise, especially in foreign countries. The bill of exchange is simply an agreement to pay in a certain currency at a named date a specified sum of money. The merchant who gave the bill could then make arrangements that suited his own convenience to send the money to the specified place. If he had debtors in the foreign city, he could have them pay the bill; or he could at least shorten the journey for the bullion by sending it from some place where he had a debtor. As a natural evolution of the bill of exchange came the draft, which directed the merchant's debtor to pay to some third party a specified sum of money, and the acceptance, which made the draft negotiable since the acceptor had agreed to pay. When the Italian merchants developed a world-wide trade with correspondents and customers in all important cities, they seldom needed to send much cash. Transfers of actual bullion were only necessary to settle an unfavorable balance of trade, and before the final transfer was made a vast number of transactions might have taken place. Such devices at least in part com-

pensated for the chronic shortage of gold and silver.

In the early modern period the endorsing of a bill of exchange greatly increased its usefulness. The bill could be endorsed over to another man to whom the owner of the bill of exchange owed money, and thus the bill could pass from hand to hand, covering several transactions before the foreign drawer of the bill paid up on his original bill.

The promissory note, also introduced at this time, was the forerunner of the check. A merchant in ordering goods could give a promise to pay a stipulated sum of money on a certain date. If made out to a particular individual, the note could be endorsed to one of his creditors, and, again, many transactions could take place before the promissory note was presented for payment. When made out to bearer, even the endorsement was no longer necessary. If the note was drawn for a certain date in advance, then it could not be presented for payment before that time. Thus grew up the custom of discounting such notes in advance for a monetary consideration. Owners of money, if they trusted the credit of the original giver of the note, could then make a profit merely by using his money, without taking part in any commercial transaction whatsoever. This service was especially useful in international transactions, in which the banker who had discounted the notes could collect on all at the same time, often through an agent who represented him in the foreign city.

Even after the discoveries, when there was plenty of money available, these devices continued to facilitate trade; and of course, with suitable modifications, they are still in use today.

It will be understood from the above that the system of credit underlay the beginning of the capitalistic system as it underlies it still today. Possibilities of making profits were available to enterprising men as long as they could get access to money or credit, but for a long time they were confined to commercial activities. Industry, organized as it was in guilds, and with markets that could not easily be expanded, did not stand in need of much capital. Better distribution of goods could be

organized by the enterprising, and the small European surplus could be exchanged for goods from the East. With a few exceptions, therefore, the men who accumulated money were the merchants rather than the manufacturers. But the men who needed credit were not only the merchants but also the large spenders, especially the Church and the monarchs, whose income was not always very regular. It was large sums of money that they needed, not small loans for personal consumption. The Church and the monarchs, when they needed money, needed it in a hurry, and were willing to pay high prices for the accommodation.

Thus arose the early banks, which were usually organized by groups of merchants, or, even more frequently, by families of merchants, who had accumulated their money in other enterprises and were anxious to put it to work where it would earn good interest. The Church had large sources of income available, if not very regularly; but at any time, as in the thirteenth century, it might be called upon to finance an Italian war. It was then necessary to turn to the bankers in Italy for ready cash, or, as in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, to the great Fugger family of bankers in Augsburg, Germany. Representatives of the bankers in later times even accompanied the papal tax collectors or indulgence sellers to see that they received their share of the collections. The monarchs also were chronically in need of money, but their credit, on the whole, was less good than the credit of the Church, especially since too often they went to the bankers for loans only when they had been refused new taxes by their parliaments. The English king Edward III, unable to extract any more money from his subjects to pay for the Hundred Years' War, defaulted on his obligations to his Italian bankers, and involved them in a loss which bankrupted the house. It is therefore not surprising that kings were sometimes compelled to pay interest as high as forty per cent. Feudal lords sometimes needed loans to pay for their ransoms, and again the banks were ready, if the security and interest were good enough.

Deposit banks also arose in the Middle Ages. Some of the banking groups were very willing to pay interest of up to 10 percent if

they knew they could lend the money again at two or three times that rate. The Knights Templar, a crusading order which later went into business, became, as has already been noted, one of the largest banking groups in France, receiving deposits and paying interest on them. They grew so rich that they excited the cupidity of King Philip IV of France, who, with the consent of a subservient pope who dissolved the order, expropriated their resources for his own profit.

Municipal banks came into existence on a small scale in the Middle Ages, with the task of receiving deposits and facilitating the debt transactions of the cities. The governments of the cities attempted to supervise these banks, but were not conspicuously successful. Public banks of the modern type had to wait until the sixteenth century. Even then many of them were forbidden to make loans, and confined themselves to facilitating exchange and accepting deposits for safekeeping.


As the Middle Ages progressed, there was an increase in the manufacturing of some articles which entered into general intra-European trade, and the cities of northern Europe became much more active than they had been in the past. In particular, the wool trade of north-western Europe flourished, based on exports of raw wool from England and its manufacture into cloth in Flanders. For a time Bruges became the great capital of northern trade, and its merchants grew rich in trade and from financial transactions. Even so, the total amount of trade, both in Italy and in the north, was limited, and the merchants who engaged in trade became ever more effective at keeping it in their own hands. Thus arose the associations of merchants in various cities, which combined for the purpose of keeping the market, as far as possible, in their own hands. The Hanseatic League, a league of merchants in a number of northern towns, became very powerful, controlling for a period the government of their own towns and forcing concessions out of foreign rulers. The English merchants constantly complained to the king that the Hansa merchants were robbing them of business in their own cities; yet the foreign merchants made loans to the monarch and often controlled the

markets for the products of his people, so that he was compelled to make use of them. The Hanseatic League, which was at its most powerful in the fifteenth century, just before the discoveries, even made war on the Scandinavian countries and won, forcing the monarchs to make the usual trade concessions to them.

But as the fifteenth century drew to its close, the new maritime countries became ever more restive at the virtual monopoly of lucrative Oriental trade enjoyed by the Italians, especially the Venetians. Europe seemed to many to be held in a strait jacket, with money to spend, credit available, but far too few products to spend it on and those priced too high for all the potential consumers who might enjoy them. This is the commercial background for the great discoveries in America, the political and religious background for which will now be discussed.

♦ Portuguese and Spanish voyages of discovery

As we have seen in Chapter II, the kingdom of Portugal, and Aragon and Castile under the personal rule of Ferdinand and Isabella, were both united under strong monarchies at the end of the fifteenth century. Both countries had been won as a result of Crusades against the Muslims in Spain, and the crusading spirit remained strong in them. Both had good seaports, but Portugal, with a small and not very productive territory, was more inclined to turn toward the sea for a living; the more so in that she possessed Lisbon, one of the finest ports in Europe, directly facing on the Atlantic. Once Portugal had become fully independent in 1385, her rulers began to interest themselves in overseas trade and exploration. They were motivated only in part by commercial aims. Prince Henry the Navigator, son of John I who had won Portuguese independence, set up at Sagres a school for navigators where he assembled all the instruments used as aids in navigation and instructed his mariners in their use. To judge from the instructions he gave them, it was evidently his intention to try to conquer the African Moors



Portrait of Henry the Navigator, a miniature from a fifteenth-century manuscript.

in their own stronghold of Africa and join forces with a supposed Christian ruler in the interior of Africa whose name was Prester John. Thus the African explorations were a by-product of a new Crusade.

Although the Portuguese were later to drive the Muslims out of their territories in the neighborhood of the Red Sea, nothing was achieved against them during Henry's lifetime. But African exploration prospered under his leadership, and the Portuguese, in improved ships and with the aid of their new nautical lore, were finally able, after Henry's death, to pass the Cape of Good Hope and make their way to India (voyage of Vasco da Gama, 1498). Thereafter they opened up the all-sea route to India and the Far East, and created a monopoly for their trade in the whole of the East, effectively breaking the former Venetian monopoly of the much more expensive and

difficult land route. Lisbon became the center of European trade with the Far East.

But the Portuguese population was too small to handle the trade from Lisbon to the rest of Europe. Thus the Portuguese concentrated on maintaining their monopoly of the trade into Lisbon from Africa and the East, which they held for a century. Portugal herself was taken over in 1580 by the Spaniards, who thereafter neglected their Portuguese possessions in Asia. Though Portugal was for a short time very wealthy, the cost of obtaining and keeping her monopoly was too great for a small nation. She lost many of her men on the voyages and in the fighting against the Muslims and native peoples. Though she attempted to replace some of her losses by importing African Negro slaves into Portugal, the policy was not able to prevent her from losing her supremacy. She held on to many colonies in Africa and a

few outlying possessions, which, indeed, she still holds today. But thereafter the main component of her trade was the capture and export of slaves, which, though lucrative for a few, helped her economy little. When this trade was suppressed by the other European powers in the nineteenth century, the Portuguese colonies fell into a long depression, from which they are only beginning to emerge today.

Meanwhile the Genoese sailor, Christopher Columbus, had approached John II of Portugal with the proposition that the king should subsidize a voyage westward in the hope of reaching the Far East by this novel route. The monarch, however, rebuffed him, possibly because he expected his own sailors, who were already ensconced in the Azores, far to the west of the African continent on the way to Brazil, to make the voyage themselves—possibly also because he was sure that the world would not permit such a small nation to keep any territory thus acquired. At all events, John was in no need of the aid of an almost unknown sailor of fortune. So Columbus went to Spain, and finally persuaded Ferdinand and Isabella to provide him with the necessary ships and authority. Columbus, as all the world knows, was successful in reaching America, if not the Far East; and as a result of his voyages and others that followed, Spain took possession of most of the West Indies. Then, from their headquarters of Hispaniola (on the present island of Haiti and the Dominican Republic), Mexico and Peru were explored and conquered. Further progress was made during the next century, so that most of the southern part of the North American continent and a large part of the South American continent, with the notable exception of Brazil, became part of the Spanish possessions. Since both Spain and Portugal were far ahead of the other nations in exploration, and there was some question of how these great new territories should be divided, the pope was appealed to for a decision. In 1493 the Spanish pope (Alexander VI, Borgia) gave his decision, which created a line of demarcation between the two empires. All the territories east of the line fell to Portugal; all the territories west of the line, to Spain. The award was




Hernando Cortes, conqueror of Mexico, from a contemporary engraving.

embodied in the Treaty of Tordesillas, signed in 1494.

Under the award Portugal was entitled to what turned out to be the easternmost territory of the South American continent. This was promptly discovered (or rediscovered) in 1500 by the Portuguese captain Cabral, who was, rather surprisingly, on a voyage to India. Thus Brazil became Portuguese and remained so, in spite of seventeenth-century Dutch efforts to drive them out. For the next centuries Brazil was developed with the aid of Negro slave labor from Portuguese African colonies, and evangelized by Catholic missionaries.

The Spanish created a trade monopoly of their colonies and set up a colonial system which worked havoc on the native Indians. The monarchy, ever concerned with their conversion, often did its best to protect its Indian subjects, but on the whole with indifferent success. On the other hand, the colonies were a pronounced financial success until at least the mid-seventeenth century, owing to the exploitation of gold and silver mines with the aid of Negro and Indian labor. The old religions and

EUROPEAN COLONIZATION OF THE WORLD AROUND 1700




civilizations of the Incas and Aztecs (Peru and Mexico respectively) were destroyed and replaced by Spanish civilization and Catholicism, including the Inquisition.

The other European nations lagged behind the Spanish and the Portuguese, and in the first century following the discoveries were largely confined to exploring the territories left unexplored by the Spaniards. Numerous efforts were made to find the Northwest Passage to the East, but without success. Thus the French penetrated into Canada and thence into the central part of what is now the United States; the British colonized the eastern seaboard of the United States, and thence westward into the interior. The colonies that eventually arose from these explorations were largely colonies of settlement. Emigrants from the mother country made their permanent homes there, living mostly from agriculture since there were few mines to be exploited. Certain sections of the country, with plantation economies, used much slave labor imported from Africa, in this resembling Latin America. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the British, French, and Dutch

fought among themselves and with the Spaniards for the North American and West Indian territories, usually as a by-product of European wars. The British gained most from these wars, as will be noted in later chapters. But all the powers won some territories, which they retained as colonies until very recent times.

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISCOVERIES


The chief consequence of the explorations for the European economy in the early centuries was the influx of precious metals, although several agricultural items were introduced into the European economy for the first time, including chocolate (the very word for which is Aztec—*chocolatl*), tomatoes, potatoes, corn, and tobacco. Not until almost the eighteenth century did America become of much importance as an outlet for European products. The first immediate and natural economic consequence of the influx of precious metals was a rise in prices, very steep in Spain and less steep elsewhere. For a long time too much



money chased too few goods, resulting in an inflation which seriously damaged Spain economically, but indirectly aided the economies of other nations. Spanish industries had never been very strong; but the inflation made their costs excessive in relation to costs elsewhere. So the large Spanish consuming market, made up of the grandee class, which had money available from the colonies, preferred to buy in the rest of Europe. The exporting countries had to lower prices to meet competition among themselves. This was a hard blow to the Spanish economy, from which Spain has never recovered to this day; and although there were other factors, such as the landholding structure, contributing to her comparative lack of economic advance, it was the failure to support her industry and to use productively the immense stores of capital that came into the country that was the most important. The money that came into the country was for the most part squandered unproductively, especially the fifth share of all bullion that was the portion of the monarch himself. He used it to pay for his magnificent soldiery; the wars waged by him made Spain the greatest military power in Europe, but the wars themselves added nothing lasting to Spanish prosperity.

Lisbon was the busiest port in Europe for the greater part of the sixteenth century. But the bulk of the carrying trade from Lisbon was in Dutch hands. Antwerp ran Lisbon close, and surpassed her before the end of the century. Antwerp herself, however, was destroyed during the wars for Dutch independence, and lost the leadership to Amsterdam when the northern provinces escaped from Spanish control at the beginning of the seventeenth century. The Dutch learned to build the best commercial ships in Europe, even though they had to import the timber for them. They built ships not only for themselves but for foreign countries, sometimes undercutting home shipyards; and for most of the seventeenth century they had the most effective fleet in Europe.

Antwerp, as the great distributing center for the goods brought into Europe by the Portuguese, became the largest and most thriving commercial city in Europe. Gradually the Venetians and other Mediterranean powers lost their old supremacy to the countries with windows on the Atlantic. Though the Italian economy declined only slowly in an absolute sense, it declined heavily as far as its share of the total trade was concerned. But the Venetians, with their large accumulations of capital, were



The wharf of the German merchants in London in 1641, from an engraving by William Hollar.

still able to make much profit out of the enterprise of others. Venetian and other merchants would gather in the new *bourse* or stock exchange, in Antwerp, which was opened in 1531, to buy goods that might not be available for delivery in Antwerp or indeed in Europe. Every European trading country had its representatives there, and financial transactions of all kinds were handled. Goods could be bought at present prices for future delivery, although by the time they were delivered the price might have increased or decreased. Thus there were additional opportunities for speculative profit. A deadly medieval sin might be committed with impunity, and indeed very profitably, if a number of merchants got together to corner the market in a particular commodity, such as pepper, and held it for a price rise. The Antwerp stock exchange was a wonderful contribution to world commerce, but it was after Antwerp had been sacked and her prosperity ruined that Amsterdam founded the first large government-supported bank of deposit. Though the day of the private banker was far from over, and he still flourishes in some parts of the world today, the future was to lie with the big public banks of which the Bank of Amsterdam was the first conspicuous example.

MERCANTILE SYSTEM—PRACTICE AND THEORY

The national states and their monarchs benefited noticeably from the influx of precious metals. The Spanish king, of course, benefited directly from his fifth of the Spanish treasure. But the presence of so much money in Europe which could be spent on dynastic wars was a great temptation to all the kings, whose military enterprises were seriously hampered in the Middle Ages by their inability to pay their troops. But the new wealthy classes engaged in trade everywhere needed the monarch, who alone could guarantee their commerce, protect the sea routes, and try to assure the safe arrival of the merchant ships. In return, the bourgeois were ready to give higher taxes to the monarch, in the form of duties on goods and more direct taxes. It was believed for a long time that the foreign trade of the world

was limited, and that if one nation increased its commerce it could only be at the expense of another. The monarch was expected to give the commerce of his own country a hand, even if it meant war. The trouble from the point of view of the bourgeois, who might have approved wars against certain specified enemies, was that the monarch rarely chose his enemies from the same point of view. Another method of supporting home commerce was by ensuring that only ships of the home country could be used in transporting goods from, and sometimes even to, home ports. Thus navigation acts were passed by monarchs who listened to the views of their own merchants.

It became the accepted theory, in early modern times, that that country was wealthiest which had the largest amount of bullion. To obtain this result the country had to have what was known as a favorable balance of trade, gained through exporting more than was imported. The difference would be made up of gold and silver, used to settle the debt of the importing country. It was thought that every means should be used to ensure that as little bullion as possible left the country, whether to foreign shipowners or to foreign merchants. As a natural consequence of this theory it followed that it was in the nation's interest to support home industry to enable it to export as much merchandise as possible. Thus we find monarchs attempting to enforce standards of quality, and even setting up national factories when no private enterprise was available in a particular field. Subsidies would be paid, and other forms of aid given.

This policy of supporting national commercial and industrial interests by governmental means may be called mercantilism; though there are different definitions, most of them may be comprised in this one general statement. Although men like Jean Baptiste Colbert, finance minister of Louis XIV, wrote extensively about his own methods, mercantilism was never a fully developed economic theory about which agreement could be obtained. Mercantilism is rather an abstraction derived from two centuries of economic practices adopted to meet the specific needs of the time. It was an era when production increased very slowly, thus

lending credence to the theory that all trade was limited in quantity and the commerce of all could not grow together. The theory was important because it justified trade wars and restrictive policies against the trade of other nations; and there can be no doubt that it played straight into the hands of the monarchs who were, for whatever reason, intent on aggrandizing themselves. And this aggrandizement really had to be at the expense of other countries, since territory was indeed limited even if wealth could have been increased by improvements in production.

Before leaving the economic system as it existed in early modern times, some attention should be paid to the increase, small as it was, that occurred in production. During the later Middle Ages the manorial system was breaking down in most parts of Europe, in part as a result of the Black Death. This scourge, which is believed to have destroyed a full half of the population of Europe, was naturally responsible for a prolonged labor shortage. A free peasantry gradually came into being, though it continued to pay heavily for its right to use the land. The peasants had to pay most of their dues, whether rents or taxes, in the form of money; but when the land was at their own disposal and they had to show enough profit to pay all that they owed and provide subsistence for themselves, there was a strong incentive to increase production. With the growth of towns, an expanding market was at their disposal; and

with the money they earned from the sale of their produce, they could afford to buy some of the products made in the towns.

Not all the landowners were willing to turn the land over to their peasants in exchange for rent or a share of the crop. Many wished to make a more efficient use of their land, especially their demesne land; others were almost compelled to do so, for lack of a reliable labor supply. The medieval agricultural system was extremely inefficient. The peasant often had to work different strips of land, sometimes far distant from one another. Moreover, there was common land, not all of which was efficiently used by the peasants, and this land still belonged to the landowners even though in practice it had been used freely by the peasants for pasturing their stock. So the landowners, even in the Middle Ages, had begun to enclose their land when feasible and to pasture sheep on it, thus increasing the supply of wool available to be sold for money. These enclosures had wrought much hardship on some peasants, and there had been peasant revolts in many areas over the issue. When prices began to increase in the sixteenth century, the landowner often found that he was growing impoverished because many of his dues were fixed in money and it was difficult for him to raise them, and the lands he had were farmed too inefficiently to provide him with much income in spite of the rise in the prices of his products. In many parts of Europe, therefore, but especially in



Capture of a noble during the Peasants' Revolt in Germany. From an old engraving.



The "domestic system" in the seventeenth century, showing the division of labor within a family. The men have just returned from the fields, and the women are weaving flax for the market. An old French print.

England, the landlord used every means at his disposal to obtain more money from his tenants, and at the same time began to enclose land for the purpose of turning his holdings into well-run efficient farms, managed by himself or his agents with hired labor. Both methods had the result of increasing production of agricultural products for food as well as of wool for sale at home and abroad. The Tudor monarchy of England, always more conscious of trade matters than most monarchs, even tried to keep more money at home by manufacturing the wool in England instead of sending it to the wool towns of Flanders, where it had traditionally been made into cloth.

The consolidation of holdings led at a later date to many technical improvements in agriculture, which will be dealt with in a later chapter. But even in early modern times a larger supply of food for the cities was assured. At the same time the small farmer,

chronically short of money and sometimes deprived of part of his land, turned to other sources of income. The combination of all these conditions led to the "putting-out," or domestic, system of manufacture, under which the countrymen and their families produced textiles at home from material supplied by specialized middlemen or merchants who bought the products for sale. The capital was supplied by the merchants, and the labor by the farmers and part-time workers in villages and cities who wished to increase their income. This system led naturally to the central provision of the raw material and the assembling of workers under one roof. So we have the beginning of the factory system, to be dealt with in detail in Chapter 18. But in early modern times factories were rare, and the vast bulk of textile production was carried on in numerous peasant homes. Even today the system has not been altogether abandoned in some parts of Europe.

though the labor-saving machinery that was gradually invented put a premium on factory production, since only in factories could expensive machinery be installed and fully utilized.

Thus, gradually, over the centuries of early modern times, production in all areas was improved and a constantly if slowly rising population could be fed and clothed. The student should have the system in mind as he studies the religious, political, and scientific developments which accompanied the rise in production and consumption. The subject will be dealt with again in more detail when we come to consider the Industrial Revolution and the economic system which underlies the far different political developments of the last two centuries.

❖ The revolt against medieval Christianity—Individualism and freedom of choice in religion

BACKGROUND OF PROTESTANT REFORMATION

We have already had occasion to note the decline of the medieval Church, the difficulties it experienced with the rising national states, and the recrudescence of heresy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, followed by the Babylonian Captivity at Avignon and the Great Schism, which culminated in the Conciliar Movement. Limitations of space have prevented discussion of the violent anticlericalism that was rife during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the disgust of the poorer classes at the wealth and corruption of the monasteries, the growth of weird sects, the celebration of black masses, devil worship, and other strange manifestations of the collapse of medieval civilization. The failure of the Church to hold the respect and devotion of Christians in a century when the Black Death stalked through Europe may certainly, in large part, be attributed to the worldliness and neglect of its leaders. We have also noted earlier in this chapter the effect of the Renaissance on the papacy. There had been no lack of scattered voices calling for reform in the Church, especially by the northern humanists. But at the turn of the sixteenth

century the papacy was still supreme, and Roman Catholic Christianity was still the only form of Christian worship in Western Europe. The papacy, in spite of the fact that it found increasing difficulty in defending itself against reformers and heretics, still was not interested in reform. The popes preferred to act as Italian princes and Renaissance despots. At the end of the fifteenth century a Dominican friar named Savonarola had made himself master of Florence for a short time by eloquently preaching a puritanical reform. He had won the support of the people and a revolution had broken out, as a result of which the city had driven out its nobles and instituted a puritanical dictatorship under the direction of Savonarola. But the pope Alexander VI had excommunicated him, and the people had deserted him when he refused to attempt a miracle. The papal victory had proved easy after all. Savonarola had been hanged and his body burned (1498), and no one in Rome seemed to think that his movement had been significant. The old policy of suppressing opposition rather than instituting reform was still maintained in a century in which papal power over Christendom no longer depended solely on papal will but on favorable political factors as well.

Such political factors had hitherto favored the papacy. The policy of sharing Church monies and appointments with secular rulers seemed to have solved the problem of relations with the great European monarchies. After all, Charles VIII's invasion of Italy had done no apparent damage; he had entered Rome, and there was momentary danger; but he had departed peaceably. The year before Luther nailed his ninety-five theses to the church door at Wittenberg a treaty had been signed with Francis I of France (Concordat of Bologna, 1516) under which France had an almost independent Church, with the king as its head in everything but title. Though the terms were onerous for the papacy, they did at least ensure royal support. To offset its loss of some foreign funds, the Renaissance papacy had set itself to exploit more efficiently its lands in Italy. No pope seems to have imagined that the demand for reform would one day become overwhelming, or that some day secular rulers would arise who would not come to terms and would

not be satisfied with a division of the spoils—that heresies which, with secular support, had hitherto always been safely suppressed might one day find themselves supported and not suppressed, favored instead of being exterminated.

DECLINE OF CHURCH IN POPULAR ESTEEM

The weaknesses of a power based on spiritual, not political, sanctions have already been explored in connection with the medieval papacy. But the medieval papacy was able to vanquish the secular powers of the day precisely because it was able, from its abundant resources, to enlist the services of dedicated reformers (the Franciscans and Dominicans), who enabled it to recover from its political excesses, and because the papacy had not as yet fallen into moral decay. Moreover, in the thirteenth century the idea of a universal religion and a universal empire was still dominant in the minds of men; heretics were everywhere thought to be treasonous to Church and State alike—they were rending the seamless robe of Christ. Now in the sixteenth century the empire was a ghostly relic, national states and minor princes had divided its inheritance, popes had sojourned in France; at one time there had been three papal contenders at the same time, and all three had been deposed by a council. Though there was now one pope in Rome, the papal prestige had grievously decayed. And since the Church was obviously not entitled to the allegiance of Christendom for the moral example it set, it was not surprising that to some earnest souls it appeared to have outgrown its usefulness. Luther in 1517 had no idea of throwing off allegiance to Rome, still less of forming a separate schismatic Church; nevertheless by 1520 it had become clear to him that the Roman Church performed no useful function. An institution that had existed for fifteen hundred years, founded by Christ himself, had suddenly been revealed to him as decadent beyond repair.

OPPOSITION OF GERMAN RULERS TO PAPACY

Luther's views on the Church, however, would have meant little to mankind and he would have suffered the fate of earlier heretics,

if it had not been for the support of secular powers not available to his predecessors. His personality and the leadership that he gave to the revolt were of crucial importance to its success; but these would have been of no avail if he had not been supported by a substantial number of German princes, whose example was later followed by rulers of other territories never visited by Luther. It therefore is essential to give some consideration to German conditions in the early sixteenth century before studying the work and thought of Martin Luther himself.

Germany, as we have seen in Chapter 11, did not become a national state in the Middle Ages, though the German cities, many of them independent, were among the most prosperous in Europe. Outside the towns, however, feudal conditions prevailed. The Holy Roman emperor was, of course, the titular head of Germany, but he was only one of many German princes, and he had little power unless he happened to be the feudal lord of other territories outside his native Austria. In spite of their formal subordination to the emperor, the German princes were in fact independent. Thus they were able to defy the emperor and refuse to obey either his decrees or the decrees of the imperial diet in which they were represented. The elector Frederic the Wise of Saxony, who constituted himself the protector of Luther, could not be compelled to give up his prisoner except by force; and against imperial force it was always possible to muster allies who objected to the emperor's exercising his theoretical rights. Moreover, the German princes, though proud of their independence, were usually weak, both financially and militarily, since they had too few resources to draw upon. So they looked with extreme disfavor upon the loss of their hard-earned money into the coffers of a foreign power such as the papacy, whence it would never return to be spent in Germany.

The Church extracted money from the faithful in many different ways, and the bulk of the money thus taken found its way over the Alps to Italy, where the popes were in constant need of it for their building programs, especially the building of St. Peter's. In all Europe the Church owned land that

was free from taxation by the secular powers, and it claimed ecclesiastical jurisdiction for many offenses that the secular powers felt by right belonged to them. Clergymen were usually not subject to lay courts even for crimes that were civil in nature. All cases heard outside the country naturally cost money which was left in Rome. Income from Church benefices belonged partly to the papacy; the first year's total income (*annates*) belonged wholly to the pope. As if this were not enough, there was a regular scale of charges for various services which could be performed only by the pope, such as the granting of permission to marry within the canonically prohibited degrees. Further charges were made by the local clergy for administering church rites; and though the money for these at least might have been expected to remain in the country, in fact it often did not. The pope might have sold the Church office to the incumbent, and in that case the latter would have to pay out of the proceeds of his incumbency; thus that money too left the country. Finally there were direct sales to the people, for example of indulgences, which, being voluntary in nature, the princes could forbid only at the cost of a quarrel with the clergy.

Germany was in a worse position with regard to Church exactions than the powerful national states which had already, as we have seen, made private arrangements with the papacy to share the spoils. Small German princelings often did not carry much authority within their own states except over their feudal underlings. The great international Church was too big an opponent to tackle. Thus their grievances, frequently presented to the emperor at the diets but rarely heeded by him, were many and serious, and only by acting in unison could they hope to achieve much against the strongly entrenched Church. Such an opportunity, when it was presented in the form of Luther's defiance of the pope on religious grounds, was too good to miss; and when the Lutheran movement finally made possible the control of the religion of each state by its prince, with everything that had been in the hands of the Church now in their own, it is not surprising that they resisted forcibly all attempts to bring them and their subjects back into the Catholic fold.

The spark that ignited the dry tinder was provided by the entry into Germany of a supersalesman of indulgences named Tetzel, a Dominican friar. As explained in Chapter 10, an indulgence was granted only after confession and absolution, and without them was inefficacious. Moreover, the sum of money which obtained the indulgence was in the nature of a penalty for the sin committed, and the indulgence therefore was not, strictly speaking, bought. But the custom had grown up of permitting indulgences to be bought for the dead, so that they might escape the pains of purgatory. Church teachings on purgatory, however, were probably little understood at the time, and in the popular mind no doubt release from purgatory was often confused with salvation. It does not therefore require much imagination to see what could be done with the sale of indulgences by a man like Tetzel. It was said that as soon as the money tinkled in the box one more soul would fly out of purgatory, and it was no doubt hinted that salvation itself could be bought by these means instead of merely the lessening of the time spent in purgatory if the soul had already been saved. At all events Tetzel did a thriving business, and though the elector of Saxony forbade the sale of indulgences within his dominions, the faithful of Wittenberg did not have far to go before they were out of his territories and close to the precious "pardons" purveyed by the Dominican.

MARTIN LUTHER

The 95 Theses It was at this point that Martin Luther, an Augustinian monk, appeared on the scene and was catapulted into the leadership of the anticlerical forces. Though not a profound thinker or systematic theologian, he had for a long time wrestled with his conscience. Always deeply aware of his own sinfulness and beginning to doubt the efficacy of the Church—of whose pomp and worldliness he had become acutely conscious during a visit to Rome—for securing salvation, he was finally compelled by a personal experience to recognize that salvation is a gift of God's mercy, personal to each individual man. In his view no other man, much less an institution or its

sacraments or rituals, could cleanse any man from his sins. Man is utterly wicked, and needs a personal savior; indeed, if man does do good this is due only to the working of God within him, and the deeds are thus indirectly performed by God.

The doctrine of Purgatory, on which the indulgence was based, Luther was unable to find in the Bible, and he could not conceive how a soul could be spared the pains of Purgatory by the purchase of an indulgence. But the doctrine that man is justified by faith, which he found in the epistles of St. Paul, corresponded to his own experience. Through his faith he himself had found God and been assured of salvation. In his own words, it was as if he had "entered Paradise through wide open gates." The task of man, according to Luther, is to seek to understand. If he seeks with sufficient effort, then light will be granted to him by God, as God had granted it to Luther. The way to understand is through the Bible, which was inspired by God, and not through the teachings of the Fathers of the Church or theologians, who were but men. Still less could a pope be permitted to interpret the Scriptures with an authority binding on all Christians.

Once Luther had taken the step of criticizing the Church and generalizing from his own experience and from his own reading of St. Paul, he was driven with inexorable logic to criticize those other parts of the Church teachings which conflicted with his personal convictions. Having taken the lead, and being a man of the utmost firmness where his convictions were concerned, he remained at the head of the revolt he had started. In all the work of his life we find no effort to temporize; even those acts for which he has been condemned by posterity—his lack of sympathy with the Anabaptists and his antagonism toward the peasant revolts—are entirely consistent with his character and convictions. He was a staunch supporter of the secular power within its own realm and he had the utmost respect for its authority. He was no anarchist, like the early Anabaptists, nor was he in any way sympathetic with democracy. He believed in the necessity for a Church to help bring men to salvation and to express the bond among Christians in common worship; as might be

expected, in Lutheran churches emphasis was always given to teaching and congregational singing. He did not accept the possibility of the miraculous transubstantiation of the bread and wine in the Eucharist into the body and blood of Christ by the agency of the officiating priest, but on biblical authority he was willing to accept the fact of a change by which the body and blood of Christ *join with* the bread and wine (consubstantiation). Again, this is a direct intervention of God, and is in no sense a "sacrifice" as in the Roman transubstantiation. The sacraments are in no way efficacious for salvation, but serve to unite Christians in a mystical bond. Christ present with them, as Christ himself taught: "Where two or three are gathered together in my name I am in the midst of them."

It is entirely understandable that such a man as Luther should have felt deeply troubled when Tetzel came into Saxony selling his indulgences, and should finally have decided to take action. He therefore composed ninety-five theses and posted them on the door of the Wittenberg church (1517). They were printed at the same time and sent to friends in other cities, where they were widely distributed. The theses, which were formally addressed to Luther's own archbishop, who had been responsible for the visit of Tetzel, consisted of a series of topics which he offered for debate, concerning penitence and indulgences. The theses created a stir wherever they were read, and the matter came to the attention of the pope, who demanded that Luther's orthodoxy be examined by his order and he be made to retract. The following year the pope called upon the emperor Maximilian I to send Luther to Rome for trial, but this was refused. The case had already entered the realm of imperial politics.

Relations with secular powers—Emperors and princes The emperor did not allow cases which concerned Germans to be decided in Rome, and he did not propose to permit an exception for the Wittenberg theologian. He called upon Luther to defend himself at Augsburg, where he refused to recant before the papal legate. In 1519 Luther engaged in a debate at Leipzig with a papal theologian, who had little diffi-

culty in showing that his position was heretical. In the same year Charles v became emperor, a much more powerful monarch than his grandfather Maximilian had been, since the latter's marital policies had succeeded in placing Charles not only on the imperial throne but on the throne of Spain as well. The Spanish crown owned also the Netherlands. The new emperor was consequently so busy for the greater part of his life that he was unable to give the necessary attention to Luther. Sporadically, under papal pressure, he summoned Luther to diets, and he put the ban of the empire upon him. But Luther was protected by his own prince, the elector Frederick the Wise of Saxony, whom Charles did not wish to antagonize for various domestic reasons. Even at the diets to which the German princes went, Luther was never without sympathizers; and it seems probable that on occasions he had an actual majority on his side, although Charles wielded enough influence to ensure a vote against him.

Already as early as 1520 Pope Leo x condemned the teachings of Luther and ordered them to be burned. Luther burned the "execrable bull of Antichrist" in retaliation, whereupon the pope excommunicated him.

In the same year of 1520, recognizing that he had now gone too far for forgiveness, Luther took the offensive in a remarkable series of pamphlets in which he gathered together all the grievances he had against the Church and appealed directly to the only source of support he could hope for, the independent princes of Germany. The papacy, he declared in his *Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation*, had been taking upon itself the right to do what no human agency can do, setting itself up as intermediary between man and God, and had erected three "walls" which effectively immunized it against opposition. When pressed by the civil authority, the papacy claimed that spiritual authority was superior to civil and thus the civil had no jurisdiction over it, that only the pope could interpret the Scriptures, and that no one but a pope could call a council. Thus not even the united body of Christendom could serve to modify papal absolutism. These pretensions Luther vigorously opposed. All men, he said,

belong to the spiritual estate, not only ordained priests. Civil authority has the right and duty to preserve order in the realm, and if priests disturb it, they must be punished like anyone else. With regard to the second "wall," the Scriptures may be interpreted by anyone who possesses the Holy Spirit, not alone by popes, who are not conspicuous for their piety. As for the calling of a council, obviously it is the duty of all Christians to help reform the Church if it needs reform, and civil authorities are the best equipped to do so. If it should happen that the pope and the papal curia were most in need of reform, then papal power should not be able to prevent it.

In the other pamphlets of the year 1520 Luther attacked the entire sacramental system of the Church, providing enough ammunition for the all-out revolt that was to come. It was in the following year that Charles v had him condemned at the Diet of Worms, and the imperial ban was placed upon him. Frederick the Wise, the elector who had granted him a safe-conduct to the diet, then put him for safe-keeping in a castle at Wartburg. Here he spent his time translating the Bible into German. But he was not left without followers outside the castle. These men worked constantly, setting up first a reformed church at Wittenberg, while everywhere arose spontaneous movements to set up new churches, purged of everything in Catholic teaching and practice that was not to be found in the Bible. Luther himself was allowed to return to Wittenberg in 1522 and there joined his followers, writing for many years a stream of pamphlets on the basis of which more and more communities turned to Lutheranism, or Evangelicalism as it is more properly termed. Most of the earlier churches were formed in the big cities, since the princes hesitated to take steps that might isolate them from both the emperor and the Church until they were assured that their fellow princes were of the same mind and were willing to pursue the policy to the end.

FORMATION OF THE LUTHERAN CHURCHES— PEACE OF AUGSBURG

In the next few years the Lutherans in Germany grew strong enough to compel some

recognition of their right to set up separate Lutheran churches. When a diet held in 1529 forbade any further spread of Lutheranism, some Lutheran princes protested, thus earning for themselves the name of Protestants. Soon afterward Charles v, his hands free for a moment of more pressing problems—he had been fighting both Turks and French and could not afford to take a strong position in Germany as yet—summoned a diet to meet at Augsburg to see whether the differences between Catholics and Protestants could be reconciled. Here Philip Melancthon, a humanist and moderate Lutheran, drew up a “confession” which made some concessions to the Catholic point of view. But the majority of the diet was against the Protestants, and it seemed likely that the issue would have to be decided by war, since neither side was prepared to give in to the other. But Charles, once again, was called away, and a few more German states adopted Lutheranism. Even the pope, Paul iii, who realized that a Catholic reform would in any case have to be attempted, was willing to see whether he could come to an agreement with the Protestants. But when the latter demanded recognition of the doctrine of justification by faith, declared that the mass was inefficacious for salvation, and called upon the pope to abandon his claim to be head of the Church, it was clear that no compromise was possible.

In 1546, the year of Luther's death, the Protestant princes, who had formed a league known as the Schmalkaldic League, finally took to arms against the emperor. Although the war in general went in favor of the emperor, the cause of Protestantism was little damaged, and the emperor at last in 1555 agreed to what is known as the Religious Peace of Augsburg, under which each ruler was allowed to choose the religion for his people, as long as he chose either Lutheranism or Catholicism. The other sects of Protestantism, which will be dealt with later, were not included in this peace. The principle of *cuius regio eius religio* established in 1555 (the religion of a territory to be decided by that territory—in practice, of course, by its ruler) was not a principle of toleration, which had hardly been accepted by any in that age.

The Catholic Church had been compelled

to yield some of its authority to a schismatic church, but it had in no way changed its views on the necessity of one universal Church. As soon as it had the necessary power at its disposal, it attempted to reconvert, or even force back into the Catholic Church, those who had been converted to Lutheranism.

It should be understood that, from the point of view of the princes, Lutheranism might or might not be the religion of their people. This was of little moment to them. Although there were many genuine Protestants among them who shared the religious views of Luther, or at least some of them, the Lutheran churches which they established were national churches controlled by themselves. They were able to take possession of Church lands, and they were able to keep the money which had formerly been channeled off to Italy in their own countries. So when they backed and protected Luther himself, their motives may well have been mixed. Indeed, a few Lutheran princes fought on the side of Charles in the Schmalkaldic War, as a few Catholic princes fought on the Lutheran side, such anomalies being the result of political and economic considerations. The Peace of Augsburg required Protestant princes to return lands they had taken from the Church subsequent to 1552, but they were allowed to keep what had been sequestered earlier—converts of the past three years thus being compelled to return the lands. It was no doubt believed, and with some justice, by Charles that the prohibition on the taking of more Church lands would mean fewer new converts to Protestantism.

Luther himself later married a former nun, but continued to be active in the Church which usually bore his name for the rest of his life. The more extreme Protestants had little use for him after 1520 because he had cast in his lot too openly with the princes. He was unfortunate in that many people from the peasantry and lower classes took the religious revolution as a signal for the revolution against the feudal nobility which they themselves desired. A murderous peasants' war broke out in 1524, which Luther regarded as of the utmost danger for his infant Church. In the crisis, though he may have personally sympathized with the peasants, he urged the nobles

to put the rebellion down, using terms of the utmost violence to describe the peasants' behavior. He quarreled also with Ulrich Zwingli, a more moderate Swiss reformer, with whom he differed on doctrine. He quarreled with most of the humanists, who resented his authoritarianism and dogmatism—Erasmus in particular was as anticlerical as Luther, and had at first thought that the Lutheran movement would help reform the Catholic Church. But he was a tolerant human being, unlike the violent German, and before his death came to realize that Luther's theology was no less dogmatic than that of the Church. Moreover, he disapproved of Luther's insistence on the powerlessness of the human will and the uselessness of good deeds in achieving salvation. The Renaissance Church was far more liberal and tolerant than Luther's; so Erasmus and the humanists sadly returned to the Church in which they felt more at home, hoping that another reformer would arise within the Church who would lead it to the moderate reform that they advocated.

LUTHERANISM IN NORTHERN AND EASTERN EUROPE

The principle of *cuius regio eius religio*, rather naturally, proved highly acceptable to rulers in lands other than Germany. In Scandinavia the nobles were powerful and, together with the upper bourgeoisie, were the leaders in turning to the doctrines of the reformers. During the sixteenth century Sweden, under Danish rule since the fourteenth, was in the process of breaking away from Denmark. The Danish king, Christian II, backed by the Catholic hierarchy, refused to turn Protestant, while the Swedish pretender, Gustavus Vasa, early adopted Protestantism as part of his effort to win the crown against Christian. Ultimately Christian's successors, deciding that it was better to free themselves from a dependence on a hierarchy which they could not control, turned Protestant, all their subjects being compelled to follow their lead.

Norway, under the Danish crown, followed suit, while Gustavus Vasa was ultimately able to secure his throne as a Protestant. Finland,

under the Swedish crown, did likewise. In Poland, which was by the sixteenth century largely controlled by nobles rather than the king, the Protestant Reformation made many converts among the nobles and bourgeoisie, though hardly at all among the peasants. No Polish king was converted, but the monarchs were compelled by their powerful subjects to grant toleration to Protestants, who, however, could not agree amongst themselves and so were never able to make their power over the monarchy fully felt. In time the Jesuits were invited in by the Crown, and were able to reconvert the large majority of the people. Poland as a whole was lost to the Reformation and has remained Catholic to this day, with only a small Protestant minority.

In Bohemia, which, with its Hussite tradition, was well prepared for the reformers, there were a large number of separate Protestant sects, again preventing union against the Catholic monarchy. But toleration was granted in 1567 to the Lutherans and Calvinists. Their gains, however, were lost in the following century when Bohemia became part of the Catholic Hapsburg Empire, as will be described in the next chapter.

THE REFORMATION IN SWITZERLAND— ULRICH ZWINGLI

Before coming to the leading Protestant competitor of Lutheranism, the churches stemming from John Calvin, a few words should be said on the milder Reformed Church of Switzerland, whose founder Ulrich Zwingli (1484–1531) was originally a humanist. In his early life Zwingli became a priest, but as a humanist he was inclined to ridicule mildly what he thought of as the superstitions of his Church. Then suddenly, at the age of thirty-five, following a long period of illness, he began to preach against Catholicism, teaching ideas similar to those of Luther, including justification by faith. Living in the self-governing city of Zurich, capital of the canton of that name, he was summoned to justify his teachings by the town council, whom he succeeded in converting to his viewpoint. Several other Swiss cantons followed, and the move-

ment spread also to some of the southern German states. But when they attempted to proselytize in some of the solidly Catholic cantons, the latter appealed to Ferdinand of Austria, brother of Charles V, who had been entrusted with the emperor's duties in Switzerland. After some delay Ferdinand brought an army against the Protestants, and Zwingli was killed when he insisted on going out as chaplain with the Zurich forces. The Protestant cantons were able to maintain their religion, but the conversion of the Catholic cantons was halted. The religious division in Switzerland remains to this day.

Luther and Zwingli quarreled over the meaning of the mass—the first great quarrel within Protestantism. Luther, as we have seen, adopted the position known as consubstantiation, while Zwingli preferred to regard the Eucharist as a symbolic remembrance of the Last Supper of Christ on earth, a position generally adopted by the other Protestant branches. Zwingli, to Luther, was as much an enemy as the pope himself, and neither would give way. The Zwinglian movement is important in that if there had been no division and the two early reformers had agreed on doctrine, it is just possible that the Calvinist churches would not have separated themselves from Lutheranism, but all would have adopted the position taken by Zwingli. But Calvin, when he set up his church in Geneva, had no support from the Lutherans, at least in part because the Calvinists adopted substantially the Zwinglian doctrine regarding the Eucharist.

CALVINISM

General characteristics In contradistinction to Lutheranism, Calvinism, the second most important branch of Protestantism, owed its success in large measure to its freedom from domination by the existing state. It was far more successful in converting individual men and women than Lutheranism, and no Calvinist country ever was reconverted by the Counter Reformation and the Jesuits. The reason for this is that there was something in the teachings of Calvin that really convinced those who were predisposed to believe; and the conviction

led to action. Calvinists as a matter of course were militant; they felt they had a duty to convert, and their self-confidence, self-reliance, and willingness to endure martyrdom if necessary seem to have carried conviction, although the humanists regarded Calvinist doctrine as so manifestly contrary to reason that few were interested. Yet it was logical and convincing once the basic premises were accepted. Moreover, Calvin expounded his teachings in a thoroughly convincing manner, and it was difficult indeed to find flaws in his logic. There were probably also sound psychological reasons for the acceptance of Calvinism. The convinced Calvinist, by virtue of his very acceptance of Calvinism, could believe himself one of the elect, and thus know that he was saved. Such a conviction would effectively prevent any later apostasy, for with the loss of his beliefs he would at the same time lose his psychological security. Finally, it may be added that the bourgeois class to which Calvinism essentially appealed has always been inclined to suffer from self-righteousness, considering itself to be the only real producer and worker in the world's economy, and despising the lack of seriousness of the noble and the peasant. Thus, when it was offered a religion which approved, even glorified, its own natural tendencies, it accepted it with alacrity.

John Calvin (1509–1564) was born in northern France and received the education of a theologian in the Catholic Church, though he did not become a priest, and later turned to the study of law. He became prominent through his writing of a book, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, which in its many editions became the fundamental work of all the Calvinist (Reformed) churches. It is written in a very clear style, cogent and compelling, and it made Calvin's reputation. It is an altogether astonishing work to have been published only three years after his conversion to Protestantism (1536). Wandering through France and teaching, he was continually made to flee from one place to another until the town council of Geneva asked him to take up his residence there. Although he was expelled for a short time after his teachings had caused a riot, he was soon afterwards invited back by a new council.



John Calvin. From an old engraving.

Thereafter he was the virtual dictator of Geneva, which he remodeled as a theocracy, using severe penal laws against all dissenters and those who would have modified his authoritarian regime. He had no hesitation in using all his powers of compulsion to force outward conformity to his numerous edicts, and he broke the back of any incipient opposition by the use of the death penalty.

Doctrine of Calvin—Predestination In order to understand the kind of society that Calvin was trying to produce in Geneva, it is essential to understand his teachings and see wherein they differed from those of Luther. He owed almost all his thought to Luther, and to Luther's own teachers, St. Paul and St. Augustine, but his emphasis was different: and this difference in emphasis was enough to create an entirely different kind of church organization which, if Calvin's theology is accepted, was strictly logical. Calvin emphasized, above all, the fact that God had chosen certain men, and certain men only, for salvation. These men were *predestined* to be saved before ever they were born, and their good deeds on earth

were entirely irrelevant to their salvation. All the rest of mankind was predestined to damnation. Though the chosen person will naturally have faith, this faith itself is the result of God's grace bestowed on him through his having been chosen by God himself (cf. St. Augustine). God's justice would require that every man should be damned, but God's mercy ensures that a certain number will be saved, in order to exhibit his magnanimity (a possible interpretation of St. Paul to the Romans). Thus it may be said that only indirectly is there justification by faith, since faith is the result of God's election or choice; but it was certainly true for Calvin as for Luther that good works availed not at all. St. Paul, faced with this problem—that if man is justified by faith, then there is no reason for good works—had said that a man's faith should be shown by his works. This statement Calvin seized upon and utilized for all it was worth, and in fact based his entire theocratic state upon it.

For, he argued, a man who is saved will naturally do good works, whereas, conversely, a man who does not do good works is obviously damned. So, if any man in Geneva did not do good works, this showed he was not a member of the elect, and he must be made to do good by example and rigorous enforcement of the law, lest his wickedness lead other men astray. In spite of his good works a man might be damned, but it was sure that he was damned if he did *not* do them. It was the task of the Church, therefore, not only to provide spiritual sustenance with its ritual and sacraments, but to enforce godly behavior. And if one wished to know just what godly behavior was, the place to look was in the Bible, which was the inspired word of God, revealed by him just for this purpose. Everything not specifically permitted by the Bible was held to be sinful, and it was the task of the ruling body of the Church, which in practice meant Calvin himself during his lifetime, to interpret the Bible and make laws from it. These laws must be enforced with all the means available to the theocratic State. Thus the State, far from being supreme over the Church as in Lutheran lands, actually was the Church. In lands where, unlike at

Geneva, the State was distinct from the Church, it was the duty of the elect to try to dictate to the State and, if necessary, even rebel against it for the sake of their own consciences.

Consequences of Calvinist doctrine In Geneva all forms of frivolity and amusement save the most simple were condemned and forbidden. The Jewish Sabbath became the Calvinist Sunday, set aside for divine service and Bible reading. No gambling or dancing or unnecessary display was permitted. All forms of art were regarded as frivolous and tainted with "popery." If one prospered, one could not spend one's money because there was nothing worth while to spend it on; the only alternative was to accumulate it. For the first time the bourgeois class, hardworking and thrifty, had a religion which glorified its virtues and did not, like the medieval scholastics, condemn the accumulation of money as avaricious. But in other respects many of the medieval categories of sin were retained; idleness and sensuality were as deadly to Calvin as to any medieval moralist. But, more than this, it was claimed by the Calvinists that God showed his joy in his elect by allowing them to prosper; thus prosperity was an actual sign of godliness, that one was indeed a member of the elect. Hence the Puritan belief (not unknown in America) that God is with the rich; that the poor man is poor through his own fault, and God is not with him—poverty being a moral crime as well as a deserved misfortune.

Though Calvin was no democrat, and loathed and persecuted the Anabaptists—an extremist sect equally frowned on by Luther—most curiously his theological system led indirectly to democracy, while Lutheranism fastened the yoke of the State more firmly on the necks of believers. The Calvinist was taught to obey his conscience and the Bible. If the State gainsaid him, then it was his duty to oppose the State. A secular tyrant would be sure to have the hands of all the Calvinists in his kingdom against him, unless he were visibly one of the godly—in which case he would agree with them. The right to overthrow such tyrants was implicit in Calvinism even though

Calvin himself never stressed it. Indeed, such was his respect for authority that he did not permit the doctrine to be taught, in spite of the fact that it is implicit in the general teachings of the religion he founded. Later Calvinists showed no such compunction.

It should be understood that the choice of the elect—those predestined for salvation—was in the hands of God, not man. Thus no hereditary privilege would avail the ungodly man, and no obedience was due him. It was the elect who should dominate and, when possible, rule the State; and the elect might come from any class, but would demonstrate their election by their evident godliness. The elders of the Church, who supported Calvin in Geneva, John Knox in Scotland, and the Reformed Church in South Africa, had no prescriptive right to their position. They won it by their good works. So, in a curious sense, there was equality of opportunity, the first prerequisite of democracy, and there can be no doubt that the Puritan tradition deriving from Calvin was vastly efficacious in the New England colonies in building the democratic spirit and the resistance to English tyranny that finally resulted in the Declaration of Independence.

There have been differences of opinion on the character of Calvin, both in his own and in subsequent times. His friends and supporters found him a gentle and humane person, whereas his public acts suggest the reverse. A physician named Servetus, who was an amateur theologian and differed from Calvin on the nature of the Trinity, was burned by Calvin in Geneva, whither he had escaped in the hope of finding asylum from persecution by Catholics. In Calvin's day numerous laws were passed in Geneva regulating even minor matters, such as wearing apparel, and attempting to prevent all forms of conspicuous consumption. We know that the laws were enforced from the large number of trials instigated by the leaders of the city for infringement. But it is also true that Geneva was regarded by the godly as the finest place in the world to live. The moral tone of the city no doubt appealed to them, and they had no desire to engage in the forms of frivolity disapproved of by the leaders. Calvinist leaders

were trained at Geneva and went out from there as missionaries. Gradually, the ideal which may be called Puritan was evolved, which was probably less rigid than the code held by Calvin himself.

The ideal Puritan consulted his conscience in all matters, and though he could quote the Bible and read it diligently, he did not take all his precepts from it. He was self-reliant and self-confident, sure of his salvation. He was always tempted to be self-righteous too. He dressed plainly, was sober, chaste, and thrifty, and he worked hard. Usually he was dour and lacking in humor, but not necessarily. In spite of all its shortcomings Puritanism was an ideal, like the Spartan, that was not lacking in a certain moral grandeur. And there can be no doubt that the Puritan was an extremely valuable citizen at a time when there was a need for the accumulation of capital, and when, from an economic point of view, there was not much need for high consumption of luxuries, especially those imported from the Far East. The modern world owes a great deal to the Puritan. Without his self-reliance there might have been no English settlement of America; without his hatred of tyranny there might have been no democracy; and without his thrift there might have been no Industrial Revolution.

THE SPREAD OF CALVINISM

The Huguenots in France In France, where the Calvinists were called Huguenots, Protestantism became very quickly mingled with politics. The feudal nobility after the reign of Louis XI was anxious to recover some of its lost power, and many nobles did not hesitate to use the new religion for the purpose of organizing opposition to the monarchy. The later Valois kings, well content with the semi-independent Church that had been agreed to in the Concordat of Bologna of 1516, to which reference has already been made, had no intention of allowing themselves to be dictated to by Calvinists, and in this they had the support of the strongly Catholic noble families, especially the family of Guise, which for a

long time was the power behind the French throne. Thus for a large part of the latter half of the sixteenth century one faction of nobles, supported by considerable numbers of the bourgeoisie—especially in southern France, which had always had its share of heretics—became Protestant and fought against the kings and the other nobles, who were supported by the strongly conservative and clerical University of Paris. At one time in the course of this struggle a Protestant leader named Coligny obtained a considerable influence over the weak king Charles IX, whereupon the queen-mother, Catherine de Médicis, so played upon the king's fears that he finally signed a decree authorizing the massacre of all Protestants in his realm. In the massacre (1572) Coligny lost his life, but religious passions remained unabated. The Protestants survived, and, indeed, won new converts. Meanwhile the Valois line was dying out, and it began to appear that the next king would be the Protestant Henry of Bourbon, Prince of Navarre, who was the nearest relative of Henry III, the last Valois king. When Henry III was suddenly murdered, Henry of Navarre proclaimed himself king (1589).

But the civil and religious wars continued. Not until Henry decided to convert to Catholicism did the opposition acquiesce in his rule. To offset his conversion, he issued the Edict of Nantes (1598), which granted toleration to the Protestants, and gave them the privilege of keeping a number of fortified cities under their control for the protection of their religion. In 1628 Cardinal Richelieu, acting for the king Louis XIII, took away their special privileges, but allowed them to keep their religion. It remained for Louis XIV in 1685 to revoke the Edict of Nantes, thus driving the Huguenots, with their commercial and industrial abilities, out of France. Their expulsion had disastrous consequences for French commerce and industry, and resulted in great benefit for those countries which welcomed the Huguenots as refugees. But the Catholic religion was restored to its former supremacy, and today the Protestants are a very small minority in France.

The Presbyterian Church in Scotland The conversion of Scotland to Calvinism was mainly the work of a preacher named John Knox, a dour individual but a fiery preacher, who had been trained in Geneva. Lowland Scotland was convinced by his preaching, but Highland Scotland, even today, remains largely Catholic. Knox's success in creating the Presbyterian Church of Scotland as the established Church he owed largely to the follies of Mary, Queen of Scots, which allowed him to utilize Scottish nationalism for his ends.

Scotland for a long time had had close relations with France, and a French noblewoman had acted as the regent of Scotland until her death in 1560. The queen for whom she was regent was Mary, Queen of Scots, a young woman whose husband, the king of France, had died within a year of his mar-

riage. Returning to Scotland as an attractive young widow, Mary was faced by a Parliament dominated by John Knox, who, as a good Calvinist, had no desire to have a Catholic monarch on the throne.

Even so, Knox would not have been able to drive her out had she not ruined her reputation by apparent connivance at the murder of her new husband, Lord Darnley and her remarriage to his probable murderer, the Earl of Bothwell. Mary found her support from the opposition party had ebbed away and she fled to England, where she was later beheaded by Queen Elizabeth for plotting against her, or being the focus of plots made on her behalf. Knox was left supreme in Scotland, and the infant son of Mary and Darnley was brought up as a strict Presbyterian. When he grew up this young man, who was later to become king



Calvinists preaching outside Antwerp, 1566. Etching by unknown seventeenth century Dutch artist. Note that the ministers are protected by soldiers in the employ of the nobility.

of England as James I, was able to keep some control of the new Calvinist national Church (or Kirk). But the Church nevertheless remained extremely powerful, and no king could have ruled in Scotland without some support from it.

The Dutch Reformed Church—Struggle for independence from Spain. In the Netherlands, which will be dealt with again in the next chapter, Calvinism was successful in the north, in that part of the country which is now Holland, but after initial successes in the south was turned back largely by the arms of the strongly Catholic Spanish monarchy. The Netherlands had been inherited by Charles V, the Holy Roman emperor, who was, indeed,

brought up as a Fleming, unlike his son Philip II, who was brought up as a Spaniard. When Charles put Luther under the imperial ban, he naturally tried to have Lutheranism suppressed in his Low Country territories, which he ruled with more authority than he ruled the Germans. But in the Low Countries he came up against the cities, which had been accustomed to considerable control over their own affairs. The burghers did not wish to set up any kind of inquisition in their territories, and all the actions that Charles took against the Lutherans were over their protests. However, when the extremist Anabaptists engaged in rioting, they were willing to aid Charles in suppressing these disorders, which were mostly the work of the lower classes. Even so, the



edicts against heresy were enforced only sporadically in the Netherlands as long as Charles V was on the throne.

It was a different matter when the much more bigoted Catholic Philip II inherited the Low Countries. The burghers objected to Philip's exactions for his many wars, in which they were not interested and which were usually against their commercial interests. When he set up the Inquisition in their country to deal with Calvinism, which by this time was supplanting the older Lutheranism, they resisted, and ever more men and women were converted to Calvinism. It indeed became difficult to separate anti-Spanish feeling from religious interest; and Calvinism, which now preached the duty of Christians to resist tyranny, became a national religion in the north of the country. For a long time the northern

leaders continued to profess Catholicism, but when their grievances on other scores mounted and they engaged in a war of independence, virtually all the north became Protestant. Although the fortunes of war for a time made almost the whole country independent, in the end the Spanish counterattack under the Duke of Parma recovered the southern provinces. There the bulk of the people had either remained Catholic or, though converted to Protestantism, were willing to return to Catholicism. Today Belgium, the southern half of the former Spanish Netherlands, is largely Catholic in religion; whereas Holland, which became independent as the United Provinces in 1581 (an independence confirmed by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648), remains Calvinist today. The Protestants in the southern part of the country emigrated to the north in con-



Assassination of William the Silent. Etching by an unknown seventeenth century Dutch artist. (COURTESY ACHENRACH FOUNDATION)

siderable numbers during the last years of the war.

The United Provinces were formed under the leadership of William I, Prince of Orange (called William the Silent), at the Union of Utrecht, 1579. Although William the Silent was assassinated in return for a reward offered by Philip II, his heirs succeeded him as hereditary stadholders of the new Dutch nation.

Elsewhere in Europe Calvinism progressed slowly. Several of the German princedoms adopted Calvinism rather than Lutheranism, attempting to use the general principle of *cuius regio eius religio* to ensure that they were left alone by the militant Catholic Counter Reformation. This principle was accepted as applicable to Calvinists at the Peace of Westphalia, where also a date (1624) was agreed to as the cutoff date for the restoration of Church property. All lands sequestered after 1624 were to be restored to the Church; the Calvinist princes could retain what had been taken before.

THE REFORMATION IN ENGLAND

Henry VIII and the break with Rome We have already noted earlier that anticlericalism had been strong in England ever since the time when John gave England as a fief to the papacy in the early thirteenth century. We also noted briefly how the English monarchy protected Wyclif from persecution as a heretic by the Church. The English monarchs likewise refused to allow the Inquisition to be set up in their dominions. The English therefore had a heritage of opposition to the papacy, and it is not surprising that the English Reformation came about largely because of opposition to the papacy rather than from any profound conviction by the people that the reformed teachings were the true ones. This fact accounts for the ease with which the monarchs were able to make religious changes, and for the very considerable similarities between the Anglican religion and Catholicism. Only for a comparatively short time in the first sixty years of the seventeenth century was there a strong Calvinist movement in England, based upon real conviction. And the events of that period

showed that the Puritan Calvinists were only a small minority in the country, in spite of the fact that they were able, through a peculiar combination of circumstances, to rule the country for eleven years.

The occasion for the break with Rome was provided by the efforts of King Henry VIII (1509-1547) to have his marriage with the Spanish princess Catherine of Aragon annulled. The Tudor dynasty, of which Henry VIII was the second to occupy the throne, was by no means the closest to the old royal family, and on a strictly hereditary basis many persons could have been found to dispute the throne on good legal grounds with the Tudor family. So it was necessary for Henry to have a male heir in order to prevent any dispute between rival nobles and perhaps the recrudescence of civil war. But Catherine apparently could give Henry no heir, though she had a daughter, Mary, who could succeed. Henry pretended also, as grounds for petitioning the pope for an annulment, that he had always had it on his conscience that he had married his deceased brother's wife, in spite of having obtained permission from a previous pope to do so.

Cardinal Wolsey, papal legate, archbishop of York, and royal chancellor, was by far the most important man in the kingdom after Henry, and his closeness to the papacy should, in Henry's view, have been sufficient for him to win the annulment. Unfortunately for Henry and Wolsey, Catherine of Aragon was the aunt of Charles V, the emperor, and the emperor was present in person in Italy and was indeed in substantial control of the papacy at the time. Moreover, it did not fit in with Charles's plans to give any help to Wolsey, who was angling for the papacy himself. Lastly, Henry had already picked out the woman he wanted to marry, Anne Boleyn, one of the ladies-in-waiting to the queen. Wolsey failed to win the annulment, and was disgraced; Anne was importunate; and Henry decided to throw off the yoke of the papacy and to appoint a subservient churchman to the position of archbishop of Canterbury. This clergyman, Thomas Cranmer, was already a Lutheran and married, and as one of his first acts he announced solemnly that the king had never been right-

fully married and was therefore free to marry again. This Henry did, following it up with an insistence that Parliament should declare that no foreign power had jurisdiction over England. At the king's request, Parliament then decreed that there should be no more payment of annates or other monies to Rome, that it was high treason to question the legality of the king's marriage, and that the king was now supreme head of the Church of England. Prominent persons in the country were made to swear that they recognized the legality of the king's new position. The humanist Sir Thomas More, who had succeeded Wolsey as chancellor, refused to take the oath and was executed.

The next step was the dissolution of the monasteries, and their sale or bestowal into private hands, thus creating a class of persons who had a vested interest in the Reformation. This also was done through the agency of Parliament and a royal commission led by the king's secretary, Thomas Cromwell.

Meanwhile Henry, who still considered himself a Catholic in spite of the changes he had made in the Church, had been given no male heir by his new queen. When Anne fell out of favor also for other reasons, Henry had her tried for adultery and beheaded. He thereupon married his third wife, Jane Seymour, who did present him with a male heir, though she died in childbirth. Cromwell decided to turn Protestant and began to support the reformers, asking advice from Luther and Melancthon on how to set up an English Lutheran Church. The king took the advice in his own fashion, having the subservient Church promulgate a book of Articles of Faith and Ceremonies, which was substantially Lutheran in tone, though differing from Luther on the matter of salvation—which, according to these articles, was both by faith and by good works. Luther's own remarks about King Henry were hardly complimentary, as he regarded him simply as an autocrat who insisted that his subjects believe what he himself happened to find it politic to believe at the moment. In 1539 Henry issued Six Articles, which were condemned by the Protestants as quite contrary to their faith. The articles supported various

practices of the Catholic Church, such as the celebration of private masses and auricular confession. Moreover, they reaffirmed transubstantiation as well as the Real Presence, favored by Luther.

Though Henry considered himself a Catholic to the end of his reign, and in his later years had a number of Protestants executed, he nevertheless retained the married Lutheran Cranmer as archbishop of Canterbury, allowed the more fervent Lutheran bishop Latimer to retire without molestation, and supported the use of the English Bible, newly translated by Tyndale and Coverdale. So, though Protestants railed against him for being too Catholic, and Catholics condemned him for being too Protestant, there can be little doubt that by the end of his reign the ground was well prepared for Protestantism. The council that he provided for his young son, who was not yet of age when Henry died, was dominated by Protestants—a fact that can hardly have escaped Henry's notice.

Growth of Protestantism under Edward VI

In the reign of Edward VI. (1547-1553) the Protestant Reformation made great progress. Probably most of the converts were in the towns, especially in the south, but the support of the royal council and the Lord Protector, followed by that of the young king as he grew to manhood, permitted considerable advances to be made. The First Book of Common Prayer, a new liturgy for use in the churches, was followed by an Act of Uniformity making the use of the new prayer book compulsory. The year before Edward's death, when the council was wholly dominated by Protestants, a Second Book of Common Prayer was introduced and made compulsory, which removed most of the remaining vestiges of the Roman rite and showed marked Calvinist influence. There is great controversy as to how many of the people of England had really been converted to Protestantism by this time. Though it may be regarded as certain that they were not yet in a majority, the probability is that most of the more active and articulate Christians had been converted, especially in the east and south.



A contemporary engraving showing the burning of two obscure martyrs at Smithfield during the reign of Mary I.

Catholic reaction under Mary I When Edward died an effort was made by the Duke of Northumberland, leader of Edward's council, to install a Protestant pretender on the throne. But the effort collapsed and the Catholic eldest daughter of Henry VIII by Catherine of Aragon was proclaimed queen (Mary I, 1553-1558). At first she took no drastic steps to restore the old religion, but after her marriage to Philip, son of Charles V, who shortly thereafter became king of Spain, she influenced the choice of a Parliament favorable to Catholicism. She then proceeded to use all the force of the law to bring about the return of papal supremacy and the restoration of all Catholic teachings and celebrations, though she was unable to persuade Parliament to restore Church property that had been confiscated in the time of her father. There was one rebellion early in her reign, but otherwise the people accepted passively the more than three hundred burnings of heretics, high and low, that were initiated by her. Though she was un-

popular with the people, far more unpopular was her Spanish marriage, followed by the effort to make English policies subservient to Spanish interests. In this field she was unable to have her way, and Philip, disgusted, left England and his wife. She died shortly afterward. Thus Elizabeth I, daughter of Anne Boleyn and the last surviving child of Henry VIII, came to the throne (1558-1603).

The "Elizabethan Compromise" She was at once faced by the religious issue that was clamoring for a settlement. Elizabeth herself was a lukewarm Protestant, with a penchant for ceremony and a dislike for extremism in any form. She herself had managed to survive the reign of Mary, though always in grave danger, and before the end of the reign influential English opinion had condemned the burnings. Nevertheless it would not have been impossible for Elizabeth to have maintained Catholicism in the country, provided she had abjured the persecution of Protestants. Many

and rich favors were available to her if she joined the Catholic monarchs of the Continent, and almost certainly she could have obtained from the pope an arrangement similar to that won by Francis I at the Concordat of Bologna. But there was also to be considered the obvious distaste for papal supremacy which conflicted with English nationalism, together with the great advantages for an absolute monarchy which accrued from rulership over the Church and absolute control of churchmen. Therefore Elizabeth left the matter to Parliament, confident that Parliament would do just what she wanted, with or without her interference.

And so it happened. Parliament decided on a settlement that has since been called the Elizabethan Compromise, though in fact it was not in any real sense a compromise, except that the Anglican Church, established as the Church of England by the settlement, was far closer in most respects to Catholicism than was any reformed Church of the time. Elizabeth herself accepted the title of supreme Governor of the Church, which was acceptable to Calvinists who regarded her father's title of Head of the Church as an affront to God, who alone, in their opinion, could be the actual head of a Church. Moreover, she did not too seriously offend Catholic sensibilities. The Book of Common Prayer of 1552 was restored, with a few minor changes, and another Act of Uniformity was passed. No provisions were made for punishment for heresy, which ceased to be a crime unless it was accompanied by treason. The clergy were required to accept the position of the queen as governor, and as far as can be ascertained, only some 3 per cent refused. The episcopal system was maintained, and it may have seemed to many that there had been little real change in the religion despite the official establishment of Protestantism. In the early years of Elizabeth's reign very little attempt was made to enforce conformity in beliefs, and even the private celebration of mass by Catholics was winked at.

Organization of Elizabethan Church. Once Parliament had done its initial work Elizabeth took her position of Governor of the Church seriously and refused to allow Parliament to

do anything more in the matter of religion except by her special request. Religious matters were settled in the Church assembly, known as Convocation, which was made up exclusively of members of the clergy. This body during the course of Elizabeth's reign, in spite of her right of appointment of bishops, became tinged with Calvinism, and many times the queen had some difficulty in getting her way. The basic beliefs of the Anglican Church were embodied in the Thirty-nine Articles, passed by Convocation by the narrowest of majorities. Thus Elizabeth was faced by opponents of her religious policy both on the right and on the left, and she was forced to steer a very careful course between the two. On the whole, during her lifetime it must be said that she succeeded, though in the last years of her reign only her personal prestige and the uncompromising refusal of the Calvinists to have anything to do with the Catholics, whom they never hesitated to attack in the most vituperative language, managed to save her policy of moderation. The Calvinists were to make life very difficult for her successors.

Catholic efforts at restoration of the old religion. But the most open defiance of the queen came from the Catholics. In 1570 Pope Pius V gave up hope of converting her, and formally pronounced her excommunication. Many English Catholics had gone abroad rather than tolerate Protestantism as the established religion of their country. A special college was opened in Rome to train the most promising of these exiles, and another in Douai in northern France, where a Catholic version of the Bible was prepared in English. Already in the seventies some of these trainees appeared in England, ready to celebrate mass and teach the newly reformed Catholic religion. Parliament at once took cognizance of the danger by strengthening the treason laws. Then in 1580 an organized movement was launched by the Jesuits, and a pope is known to have given his approval to a plot to overthrow and even assassinate the English monarch. All these efforts were well known to the queen through spies, and the Protestants and the government were inflamed, not only with religious zeal



Mary Queen of Scots, probably painted by François Quesnel, supposedly during her captivity at Fotheringhay. If the date of 1586 is accepted and the painting is a true likeness, she must have preserved her famed beauty to the end. In 1586 she was forty-four years old. The painting is now in the Hermitage at Leningrad.

against the attempted reconquest of their country, but with patriotism. Although the Calvinists kept sniping at the queen and complaining bitterly in pamphlets and sermons against the continuing "popish" customs in the Church—the use of vestments, the episcopal system, the elaborate ritual—and although many times the matter was raised in Parliament, contrary to the queen's expressed wishes, they were entirely at one with her in willingness to enforce the treason laws to the letter. The number of Catholics put to death numbered fewer than a hundred, and a few incorrigibly outspoken Calvinists also lost their lives. All, however, were officially condemned for treason, and beheaded or hanged. The execution of Mary, Queen of Scots in 1587 put an end to the Catholic plots to place her on the throne, but other plots not connected with religion persisted till the end of Elizabeth's reign.

The total result of her reign in the field of religion will never be fully known. But it

is certain that Catholicism, identified as it was with foreign intervention, suffered a severe blow, and the Jesuit mission, though it may have comforted many Catholics and confirmed them in their faith, badly failed in its main purpose. In the forty-five years of her reign probably the vast majority of former Catholics, including all the lukewarm ones, became converted to the established Church. On the other hand there was a considerable growth of Calvinism, especially amongst the bourgeoisie and lesser landed gentry. These people resented in particular the remnants of "popery" in the Anglican Church and the position of the queen as its governor and real ruler. Being strong in Parliament, they wished to use it for the purpose of making reforms in the Church in accordance with their own ideas. They wanted a Christian state like that in Scotland, where civil power was forced to remain subordinate to the religious power wielded by the Presbyterian Church, and they wanted the government to interfere in the private lives of the people to ensure godly behavior. In England the Crown stood squarely in their path. The monarch was Governor of the Church; she had in her hands the appointments of the higher clergy; and through a special commission set up for the enforcing of Church discipline, the Court of High Commission, she was able to see that bishops and priests adhered to the Anglican forms and did no proselytizing for Calvinism. She continued to refuse permission to Parliament to discuss matters concerning the Church, which she reserved for herself; and when, all the same, on one or two occasions Parliament braved her displeasure and discussed them, she always had the last word with a royal veto of any measure it might pass.

When, therefore, James I, the next king of England, by his folly and pedantry played into their hands, the Puritans were able to gain enough support from fellow members of Parliament who did not share their religious convictions to begin a serious movement to make England into a Calvinist state. For a short while this was successful. But this discussion, bound up as it is with political as well as religious issues, will be left for the next chapter.

THE CATHOLIC REFORMATION OR
COUNTER REFORMATION*Spontaneous movements toward reform*

As we have already seen, there had been many movements for reform within the Church in all the countries of Christendom. But the papacy, in the hands of a number of indifferent and politically minded popes, lagged far behind the best Catholic opinion abroad, and for a long time the only method of dealing with Luther and his supporters seemed to be the time-honored method of suppression through the aid of the temporal powers which remained faithful to Catholicism. In its hour of need, however, as had happened in the thirteenth century, two important new religious orders were founded, the Capuchins and the Theatines, to be followed shortly afterward by the Jesuits, the greatest group of proselytizers ever known within the Church. Together these reformers created the atmosphere necessary for the thoroughgoing reform that was so long overdue, and the papacy itself, as in the eleventh century, was taken over by the reformers. The reformed papacy was the foundation for its modern counterpart, which has changed little in essentials since that time.

The Capuchins were an offshoot of the Franciscan Order, and were started, characteristically enough, by a friar who had visions directing him to return to the original spirit of St. Francis, but to wear a pointed cowl instead of the rounded cowl of the Franciscans. The movement attracted great numbers of Franciscans who had become disgusted with the part played by their order in secular affairs. It also appealed to other dedicated men who wished to engage in charitable and evangelizing work among the poor. These Capuchins were of great assistance to the more political work carried out by the Society of Jesus, especially attracting converts by their example.

More important politically, since it was they who took over the papacy and reformed it, were the Theatines, founded in 1524 by Pietro Carafa, then a bishop. These men were specially selected for their outstanding talents and desire for reform. Originally, a company

of reformers had met together to discuss and plan reform in Rome under the name of the Oratory of Divine Love. Among these men were many earnest souls who sought for a spiritualization of the Church, notably a young Spaniard named Juan de Valdes. But when Carafa organized them into the Theatine Order, he chose only those who wished for and were willing to work for the practical reform of the Church. Indeed, many of Valdes' disciples in later years were persecuted by Carafa for their heretical views, which too often favored a far less institutionalized religion than that provided by the Catholic Church.

It should be understood, therefore, that a Catholic Reformation might well have ultimately taken place without the Protestant Reformation. Thus it is not altogether fair to characterize the Catholic Reformation as a Counter Reformation, if by this term is understood only a reaction against Protestantism.

The reforming popes When Luther's movement began to grow, the emperor Charles V was most anxious to avoid a split in the Church, which meant a split in his own dominions. There was never any doubt that he must stand with the Catholics, but he first wanted to see whether there was any chance of accommodation with the Lutherans. He therefore used all his influence with the papacy to persuade some pope to call a council for the airing of the points at issue and for settling the controversy.

The first reforming pope was Paul III (1534-1549). He was anxious to reform abuses, and he set up a commission of cardinals to investigate what the abuses were and to make suggestions. But even he was very wary of a council, for no pope could forget how dangerous councils had proved to papal authority in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. He much preferred to investigate, and even try to reach some agreement with the Protestants directly. To this end one of the cardinals went over the Alps to confer with Protestant leaders in 1541, but found it impossible to reach any accord over fundamental disagreements in doctrine. This failure played into the hands of Carafa, who became the most

influential cardinal in Rome, backed as he was by his Theatine Order. Carafa had not the slightest intention of making any concession whatever in matters of doctrine, though he was entirely willing to reform the Church as thoroughly as would be required. Since the emperor also continued to insist on the council, Paul III finally decided to call one, after making sure that the Italians, appointees of the pope, would be in sufficient majority to prevent the council from behaving like some of its predecessors. Protestants were invited, but, knowing they would be in a minority and not wishing to associate themselves in any way with the decisions that would be taken, they declined.

This first Council of Trent (1545-1547) was faced with the question of whether it would make any concessions whatever to the Protestant point of view on dogma. Perhaps the most important question of all was whether the Bible should, as Protestants insisted, be regarded as the sole authority in matters of faith, or whether Church tradition was equally authoritative. And what translation of the Bible should be used? It was decided by the council that Church tradition had an equal authority on the grounds that the Holy Spirit was always present in the Church and that therefore it could not err. In spite of the weight of criticism offered by the humanists in a century of learning, it was also decided that the Vulgate version of the Bible, as translated by St. Jerome in the fourth century, was also inspired by the Holy Spirit and so was authoritative. Although the representatives of the emperor, who was himself unable to be present, tried to postpone discussion of the doctrine of justification by faith, in hopes that some concessions would be made to the Protestant position and thus halt the schism, the council, after considerable altercation, decided that the sacraments of the Church were necessary to salvation—a decision hardly likely to attract the Lutherans back to the fold.

After two years there had been very little attempt to reform any but minor abuses. When a plague broke out and it proved impossible to transfer the council elsewhere, it was adjourned.

The next pope, Julius III (1550-1555), still under pressure from the emperor, agreed to reconvene the council at Trent, and some progress was made in defining the Eucharist and the sacrament of penance. The council was adjourned, however, when Trent suddenly became a place of danger, war having broken out between the emperor and France.

Meanwhile the Inquisition, which had been dormant in Italy for a considerable time, was set up anew by Paul III. Its activities were carefully defined and its personnel strengthened by Julius III. The Society of Jesus had already embarked on its spectacular career. There was now no question that there was to be a reform in earnest, and in May, 1555, the formidable Carafa himself was elected pope as Paul IV. He called no council during his pontificate but devoted himself to the cause of the reform of the clergy in Italy with unflagging zeal. Most of his cardinals were appointed solely for the purpose of carrying out the reform. The Inquisition was made more powerful and all-embracing, and given the task also of enforcing certain kinds of discipline within the clergy itself. If a priest took money for dispensing the sacraments he could now be cited before the Inquisition, instead of being disciplined by his ordinary clerical superior. In 1557 Paul IV set up the Index of Forbidden Books, later to be administered by a group of clergy known as the Congregation of the Index, which exists today and still provides lists of books which good Catholics may not read.

The work of the Council of Trent. When Paul IV died in 1559 the old Renaissance papacy was gone forever. Though few of the later popes matched Paul IV in reforming zeal, it was now unthinkable that the reform should stop; and the cardinals agreed on a reformer of somewhat milder temper, who took the name of Pius IV (1559-1565). He reconvened the Council of Trent, which in the space of one year completed its work with the redefinition of Catholic dogma which has remained authoritative to this day. Substantially the Church had made no retreat of any kind. The old teachings, hallowed in the Middle Ages, remained,

but were now greatly clarified, and the old latitudinarianism so noticeable in the time of Thomas Aquinas was banished forever. Catholic dogma is as clear and rational, having regard to its premises, as the logical teachings of Calvin. Out of this Council of Trent came the so-called Tridentine Catechism, which was widely distributed as a means of teaching Catholics the truths of their religion, and in this it performed a function similar to that of the catechisms adopted by the Protestant churches for the education of their young.

In brief, the third session of the Council of Trent decided in the same sense as the first. The various divergences of doctrine insisted on by Luther were all condemned, and any persons holding them were anathema (cursed). Belief in Purgatory was retained; the worship of saints and the use of images and relics were permitted and approved. Justification only by faith was condemned, and the sacraments were declared to be necessary to salvation. Only the Church was permitted to interpret the Bible, and Church traditions were to be considered as authoritative as the Bible itself.

It should be understood that, from the point of view of the Church, nothing else was possible than this refusal to countenance any change in the basic teachings of the Church as they had been handed down by tradition; for this would have been to admit that in the past the Church had sometimes been mistaken. But the whole contention of the Church had always been that it was founded by Christ; that the authority of Peter, the first bishop of Rome, chosen by Christ himself for the founding of the Church, had been transmitted in a direct line through the whole series of popes. Even during the Great Schism there had been only one pope at a time who was canonically elected. At all times the Holy Spirit had been working through the Church, and thus in matters of faith and practice any decrees made by the pope in his capacity of supreme head of the Church had been dictated by the Holy Spirit working through him. Thus it was impossible for him to be in error, although the actual infallibility of the pope as a dogma to be held by all Catholics was not proclaimed until 1870.

The popes and the Church were entirely

willing to admit that in other respects the popes had not lived exemplary lives, and that the clergy had often been corrupt and worldly. These were sins committed as men, and in no way invalidated the sacraments they had administered during their priesthood, as the lives of the popes had not invalidated any pronouncements they had made in their capacity as pope. So the position adopted at the Council of Trent was entirely logical and in keeping with the basic religious position of the Church; it is not possible to think that it could have given way to the Protestants in any matter on which popes had already pronounced. There was thus no room for compromise, as there still is not. The Church might welcome back the schismatic Protestant churches into its fold; but necessarily it would have to be on terms set by the Church in all that concerns doctrine and practice.

It is worth while summing up the answers given by the Church at the Council of Trent and during the movement of reform, to see how well calculated they were to do exactly what was asked of them. If this is understood, the triumphant reconversion of so many countries by the Jesuits will not appear quite so remarkable. As against the Protestant doctrines, the Church reaffirmed its traditional beliefs in a clear and cogent manner. In the Tridentine Catechism these beliefs were made available to all the clergy, and through the clergy to all Catholics. The clergy in the future were to be trained in special seminaries, one of which must be set up by each bishop in his diocese. Thus in the future there would be no excuse for ignorance on the part of either priest or layman as to what the beliefs were to which he subscribed.

Index and Inquisition To prevent the Catholics from learning of alternative doctrines he was forbidden to read any heretical books, or books regarded as dangerous to faith or morals. The permanent Congregation of the Index was to see that the list was kept up to date. Though the books, of course, were still printed in Protestant countries, Catholic governments, especially the Spanish, instituted strict searches at the ports to see that no for-

bidden literature was imported, and in Catholic countries the forbidden books could not be sold openly.

Finally, if any still persisted in heresy, the Inquisition could and did deal with them, as long as the secular powers supported it. Thus heresy was to be driven back, while the missionary forces went forth to try to reconquer those who had fallen away. By far the most influential of these missionaries were the members of the Society of Jesus, popularly called the Jesuits.

The Society of Jesus The Society of Jesus was in origin an entirely independent order, as were so many orders in the Church. The particular task that it undertook in the sixteenth and following centuries was dictated by the needs of the time, but its origin resembled many of the orders, notably the thirteenth-century Dominicans and Franciscans, in that it was founded by a man who felt himself called by God as the leader of a chosen band to carry out a particular task with the utmost devotion. Pope Paul III, like his predecessor Inno-

cent III, was somewhat suspicious of such an excess of devotion, but finally confirmed the Society of Jesus in 1540, thus starting it on its remarkable way. Like the orders of the thirteenth century, once it had started it received every support from the papacy, to the jealousy of the older and less vital orders.

The founder of the Jesuits, Ignatius Loyola, was a Spaniard who had in early life been a soldier, and his order always retained the impress of his essentially military genius. Seriously wounded in a campaign and permanently crippled by inefficient surgery, knowing that his life as a soldier was over, he abandoned the chivalrous romances on which he had hitherto been nurtured when a Bible was put into his hands.

There followed a period of struggle comparable to that of Luther. Loyola also felt convinced of his damnation for the enormity of his sins. After trying every method he could think of for mortifying and humiliating himself, he at last received comfort and illumination, and recognized, like Luther, that he had been freed by the mercy of God. But, not being a theologian, this experience did not lead him to heretical doctrines, still less to the thought of salvation outside the Church. When the severe asceticism to which he had subjected himself yielded its fruit in the form of visions, described by Loyola with the utmost concreteness in his *Spiritual Exercises*, he concluded that the discipline of the will, which had led in his case to a mystical experience of God, was the true path to be followed by the devoted Christian. But he did not stop there. Being a soldier, and still having to an extreme degree the soldier's spirit of selfless devotion to a cause, his imagination told him that there was a need for such soldiers in the religious struggles that were rending the Christian world.

It can readily be seen how such a spirit could very easily have taken the other side, and how natural it was that he should have been called before the Spanish Inquisition three times to answer for his opinions, and it is not difficult to understand the suspicions of orthodox churchmen when they came in contact with him. His temperament and aristocratic



St. Ignatius Loyola, founder of the Society of Jesus, from an old print.

upbringing would have made it difficult to work with Calvinists; but there is much that is similar in the dedication, self-reliance, and tenacity shown by Loyola and the best of the Calvinists. Martyrdom would have held no terrors for him. His indomitable will led him, already in his thirties, to master foreign languages and theology, even though he had to "go to school with boys," and submit to the discipline imposed on boys in that age. And at last he was able to gather around himself a few dedicated spirits like himself and found the Company or Society of Jesus.

All the members of the society had to go through as much as they could stand of a rigorous training similar to that undergone by its founder, who wrote in the *Spiritual Exercises* the details of the training, the ascetic practices, the special meditations, and the prayers. The novitiate was long and in the early years only a comparatively small number, mostly Spaniards like Loyola himself, passed fully through it, to become "professed" members of the society. At this point they took the Four Vows, the fourth of which was absolute obedience in mind and will to their superiors. And the society as a whole took a vow of absolute obedience to the pope.

It is impossible to overestimate the value for the Catholic Church, in the process of reforming itself, of having at its disposal such a band of devoted helpers. Once the Church had accepted them, they were showered with aid and privileges. Naturally the Catholic rulers viewed them with some dismay. Here was an instrument for the recovery of papal domination, which had been thrown off with such difficulty in the previous centuries. Protestant rulers, of course, could only regard them as dangerous enemies. But the Jesuits preached among the people and lower clergy as well as among the more influential, dispelling their ignorance and inspiring a new spirit of devotion. A catechism was drawn up by a Dutch Jesuit, St. Peter Canisius, and widely used for the education of children, and key persons in every country were encouraged to use Jesuits as their confessors.

It was widely said that the Jesuits used the

secrets of the confessional to gain power and influence over individuals, and that they used the powers of absolution entrusted to them as priests to frighten or cajole penitent souls into political actions approved by them. It was said that they were masters of casuistry, able to argue that sins considered mortal were not really so; that they were willing to condone any crime; that not only were their own consciences elastic but they promoted the elasticity of the consciences of others, provided it served their political ends. Certainly they intrigued with rulers, going straight to the most influential persons, knowing well enough the power of rulers to coerce their subjects. Because no special habit was prescribed for them, no one even knew who they were; since they were unknown, all sorts of conspiracies were attributed to them. Unfavorable events, easily explicable by other means, were almost invariably laid at their door in Protestant countries. The "Jesuit menace" was as firmly believed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as ever the "Communist menace" in the twentieth.

It may be added that by setting up schools and colleges, providing the best education available in their day, and taking no money for their services, they prepared the way for the future. With a proper education they believed that their students would be forever afterward immune from heresy. And of course this too was held against them by their enemies.

The Jesuits with a reformed Church behind them, were the chief instrument in rolling back the tide of Protestantism. Their work was done through the confessional, through political intrigue when necessary, through their near monopoly of education, and through their well-organized missionary activities. Between them and the Inquisition, all incipient Protestantism in Spain and Italy was stamped out. South Germany, Hungary, Poland, Austria, and Belgium all returned to the faith of their fathers, although by the mid-sixteenth century Protestantism might well have been thought likely to conquer, even in these countries. And though in the eighteenth century ruler after ruler expelled them from his state, and for a short time the society itself was dissolved by the papacy,

by then their work had been done. The tide of Protestant reform had been turned. It was never to know again the success it had won in the century in which Luther and Calvin had worked.

SUMMARY—CONSEQUENCES OF THE REFORMATION

It is not easy to summarize the effects of the Protestant Reformation, not all of which were to be observed in the century of its introduction. In the economic realm the rising and ever growing bourgeoisie found in Calvinism a religious teaching which justified the bourgeois

virtues of thrift and hard work for profit, needed for the full development of capitalism.

In the political realm the national state was glorified by Lutheranism; princes gained power and prestige through their new control of a national Church. The papacy, even in Catholic countries, lost ground as a political force, since Catholic rulers, while remaining Catholic in religion, assumed many of the powers which accrued to Protestant rulers through the Reformation. As an international political organization the papacy was virtually dead by the end of the sixteenth century, though its religious reform prepared the ground for a new kind of papacy, working indirectly



through its reformed clergy and moral example rather than directly by political interference with secular powers.

In the cultural field literacy greatly increased through the Bible reading required by the Protestants. The new Protestant universities, such as the Dutch University of Leiden, and the Jesuit schools and colleges in Catholic countries made available a more modern education than that provided hitherto in a haphazard way by the Church. The Protestant contempt for most forms of art as "popery" put a halt to the religious pictures so characteristic of the Renaissance, while the new plain Protestant churches had no use for the elaborate architecture of the Gothic or Renaissance styles. Even the papacy, in its reformed period, no longer acted as patron of the arts, and indeed moved far toward the Protestant viewpoint on the lack of necessity for earthly display.

Finally, it may be added that the age of the Reformation was as intolerant as any age in history, and the intolerance was not confined to one side. However, indirectly, the persecutions of the age and the insistence on cruelly punishing men and women for their religious opinions led to a feeling of surfeit in later centuries, and to the thought that in a field where nothing can be proved and all is a matter of opinion, a man may hold whatever opinions he wishes, as long as they do not lead to the subversion of good order.

And, though Calvin himself may hardly have been a democrat, within Calvinism, as we have seen, there were the seeds of democracy. These could not flower in the age of the Reformation itself, but had to wait until all men were in fact more nearly equal than they were in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Suggestions for further reading

NOTE ON LITERATURE OF THE PERIOD: Especially recommended for the thought of the time are Castiglione's *The Book of the Courtier* (Anchor); Erasmus' *The Praise of Folly* (Ann Arbor); Montaigne's *Essays* (Penguin) and *Autobiography* (Vintage); Pico della Mirandola's *Oration on the Dignity of Man* (Gateway); Leonardo da Vinci's

The Art of Painting and Philosophical Diary (Wisdom) and his notebooks (Scribner); and the celebrated *Discourse on Free Will* between Erasmus and Luther (Ungar). Among works of the imagination, see especially Camoens' Portuguese heroic epic *The Lusiads* (Penguin); Cervantes' *Don Quixote* in the admirable Putnam translation (Viking); Rabelais' *Gargantua and Pantagruel* (Penguin); and Spenser's *Faerie Queene*, with introduction and notes by Leo Kirschbaum (Rinehart). For the color of the time, see Cellini's *Autobiography* (Bantam) and Vasari's *Lives of the Artists* (Noonday). Among notable modern biographies are those of Erasmus, by Stefan Zweig (Compass); Calvin, by Georgia Harkness (Apex) and James MacKinnon (Longman, Green); Luther, by Preserved Smith (Houghton Mifflin); Loyola, by Paul van Dyke (Scribner); Columbus, by Samuel Eliot Morison (NAL); Leonardo, by Kenneth Clark (Penguin); and Michelangelo, by Charles H. Morgan (Reynal).

PAPERBACK BOOKS

- Bainton, Roland H. *Here I Stand: A Life of Martin Luther*. Apex, Mentor. An effective synthesis of the Reformation, built around the person of the founder.
- Bannon, John F. *The Spanish Conquistadores: Men or Devils?* Rinehart Source Problems. The Black Legend dies hard. Here are the pros and cons.
- Berenson, Bernard. *Italian Painters of the Renaissance*. Meridian. (Illustrated). A classic, by the greatest of American art critics and connoisseurs.
- Brucker, Gene A. *Renaissance Italy: Was It the Birthplace of the Modern World?* Rinehart Source Problems.
- Burckhardt, Jacob. *The Civilization of The Renaissance*. Torch. 2 vols. The great nineteenth-century classic which was largely instrumental in creating the popular concept of the Renaissance. Many of Burckhardt's views are no longer considered acceptable, because of our greater present knowledge of the later Middle Ages, from which the Renaissance cannot be differentiated as strikingly as Burckhardt wished (see especially Ferguson, W. K.).
- Cassirer, E., Kristeller, O., and Randall, John H., Jr., eds. *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*. Phoenix. Selections by three modern philosophers. A comprehensive picture.

- Ferguson, Wallace K. *The Renaissance*. Berkshire Studies.
- Huizinga, Johan. *The Waning of the Middle Ages*. Anchor. Classic picture of the decline of medieval culture and the strange psychotic manifestations of the epoch. Mostly drawn from the Low Countries, but applicable in most of Europe outside Italy.
- Matthews, George T., ed. *News and Rumor in Renaissance Europe: The Fugger Newsletters*. Capricorn. Interesting sidelights on Renaissance Europe from the letters of the famous banking house.
- Mosse, George L. *Calvinism: Authoritarian or Democratic?* Rinehart Source Problems. Very well argued on both sides, with well-chosen extracts from the sources.
- Mosse, George L. *The Reformation*. Berkshire Studies. Excellent introduction.
- Pater, Walter. *The Renaissance*. NAL. Impressionistic essays by a master stylist of the nineteenth century.
- Roeder, Ralph. *The Man of the Renaissance*. Meridian. Analyzes several leading characters of the Renaissance to build up a picture of the whole.
- Ross, James B., and McLaughlin, Mary M., eds. *The Portable Renaissance Reader*. Viking Paperbound Portable. Probably the widest and most useful selection in a single volume.
- Santillana, Giorgio de, ed. *The Age of Adventure: The Renaissance Philosophers*. NAL. Excellent short introduction to the subject, consisting of extracts from the leading thinkers of the time.
- Sypher, Wylie. *Four Stages of Renaissance Style*. Anchor. Considers the various transformations of the Renaissance between 1400 and 1700; integrates fine arts and literature.
- Weber, Max. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Scribner's. The pioneer study on the relation between growing capitalism and Protestant (especially Calvinist) thought. Provocative, but no longer widely accepted. For a more popular account see Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (NAL).
- Brehner, John B. *The Explorers of North America, 1492-1806*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923. Useful information on individual explorers, suggesting something of the sweep of the whole colonization movement.
- Crow, John A. *The Epic of Latin America*. New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1952. Fair, comprehensive, well written and sympathetic, especially good on the part played by the religious orders and on the general nature of Spanish and Portuguese colonization.
- Ferguson, Wallace K. *The Renaissance in Historical Thought*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948. Perhaps the most useful book to read as a preliminary to further study. Contains extracts from both Burckhardt and the revisionists, and presents a clear picture of the nature of the Renaissance "problem."
- Grimm, Harold J. *The Reformation Era*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. Fair-minded and comprehensive text.
- Hamilton, Earl J. *American Treasure and the Price Revolution*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1934. Specialized but very useful study of the economic results of the age of discovery.
- Haydn, Hiram. *The Counter-Renaissance*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950. Acknowledges some element of newness in the Renaissance, but insists it was soon overwhelmed by anti-rationalism and anti-intellectual reaction. An interesting viewpoint.
- Holand, Hjalmar. *Explorations in America Before Columbus*. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1956. Dissenting view from the common belief that it was Columbus who "discovered" America, based on many years of research.
- Lucas, Henry S. *The Renaissance and the Reformation*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1934. Standard text, good as a work of reference, though better on the Reformation than on the Renaissance. Renaissance art is treated somewhat perfunctorily.
- Packard, Lawrence B. *The Commercial Revolution, 1400-1776*. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1927. Brief, clear study, especially good on the developed mercantilism of the age of Colbert. See also books by Heaton and Clough & Cole, listed under Chapter 9.
- Prescott, William H. *History of the Conquest of Mexico and History of the Conquest of Peru*. New York: The Modern Library, 1936. This famous nineteenth-century classic is now seriously out of date in view of later research, but remains a monument of American historical

CASEBOUND BOOKS

- Blunt, Anthony. *Art and Architecture in France, 1500-1700*. Penguin Art Books, 1954. Clear, informative, and to the point, distinguishing clearly between the native French artistic tradition and borrowings from the Italians. Well illustrated.

scholarship and is well worth reading for its own sake.

Sée, Henri. *Modern Capitalism, Its Origin and Evolution*. London: Noel Douglas, 1928. Clear and well-presented thesis and explanation, especially good on France.

Smith, Preserved. *The Age of the Reformation*. New York: Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1920. A mine of information, dramatic and highly readable, but Protestant sympathies too apparent.

Symonds, John Addington. *The Renaissance in Italy*. New York: The Modern Library, 1939. 2 vols. Originally seven volumes of brilliantly written essays. Still very much worth reading, though they adopt the same point of view as Burckhardt.

Williams, George H. and Mergal, A. M., eds. *The Radical Reformation*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1957. Book of unique documents relating to the Anabaptist and other radical cults.

The Evolution of the European State System to the French Revolution


In Chapter 11 we considered the medieval states of Europe in some detail, giving the largest coverage to England and France, minor attention to Spain and Portugal, and a few words to Switzerland. We also explained how Germany and Italy were unable to consolidate themselves as national states, in part because of the continuing universalist pretensions of the Holy Roman Empire, in part because of the continued city-state tradition of Italy and, to a lesser degree, of Germany. The national state, as the leading political institution of Europe, had therefore already made its appearance by the end of the Middle Ages, even though there were as yet few such states, and there was no concept of "nationalism" in the modern sense.

In the period of three centuries covered in this chapter we shall watch the continued development of the medieval national states, the creation of new national states in northern and eastern Europe, and the final thwarting of the ambitions of the Holy Roman Empire and its replacement by the Hapsburg empire. This latter was based upon the Hapsburg ancestral lands in Austria, but was far from coterminous with the later Austrian national state. The Hapsburg monarch, save for one reign during which there was no male available in the direct line of succession (1742-1745), retained the title of Holy Roman emperor, but after the middle of the seventeenth century the title was virtually an honorary one, conferring dignity but no power upon its holder. A former mar-

grave of Brandenburg, a major German state, became the king of Prussia; but Prussia was not a true national state. It was part of the German nation, but Germany did not become a national state until the nineteenth century. Italy likewise remained divided during the entire period covered by this chapter.

The national states of this period, with the exception of the Netherlands (temporarily) and Switzerland, were ruled by hereditary monarchs. Only in England did the monarch have to accept the limitation of his powers by a parliament, though in Poland the elected monarch was dominated by his feudal nobility. Elsewhere the monarch was absolute and could do more or less as he pleased. He could wage war at his pleasure; he managed foreign policy; he controlled the finances of his country. He was not compelled to consult the national interests of his realm. Most of these rulers were far more interested in personal aggrandizement and prestige and in the aggrandizement of their families than they were in the welfare of their country. Only in the eighteenth century did the idea begin to take root that a monarch should be "enlightened," that he had responsibilities as well as rights, and that it was his duty to care for the interests of his subjects. In the eighteenth century we see therefore the rise of the theory of enlightened despotism, together with some efforts by European monarchs to observe certain enlightened principles.

By the end of the eighteenth century it was



EUROPE AROUND 1500

 Hereditary Monarchy

Elective Kings.

★ Republics

code

1994

already becoming clear that the principle of absolutism, enlightened or tyrannous, was no longer acceptable to the middle classes, whose interests the monarch too rarely considered. His attitude toward those interests might be favorable or unfavorable according to his whim or his degree of enlightenment. The middle classes were helpless to influence their monarch as long as they were excluded from power and power rested in the monarch's hands alone. The French Revolution, at the end of the eighteenth century, toppled the old regime in France, and the wars of Napoleon spread the ideas of the Revolution to the rest of Europe, marking the beginning of the end of hereditary absolutism. This chapter will therefore conclude on the eve of the French Revolution, leaving the Revolution itself to Chapter 16. But major attention will be given in the last section of the chapter to the constitutional development of England, which demonstrated to the other European nations the way in which absolute monarchy could be converted into constitutional monarchy—and how the monarch himself, though losing his power, could retain his title.

❖ Contrast between medieval and early modern political thought

Before coming to the events of these centuries, it will be well to contrast briefly the concepts underlying the medieval state with those that have been developed in more recent centuries. The most important and tenacious thought in the early Middle Ages held that there ought to be both a spiritual and an earthly government for all Christendom—the first in the hands of the Church, headed by the pope, and the second in the hands of the emperor, whose government was termed Holy because the emperor derived his right to rule from God, and Roman because it was regarded as a successor to the Roman Empire, which had in fact exercised an imperial sway over the greater part of what was to become Christendom. But, as we have seen, the emperor was never able to wield the authority that theoretically belonged to him. A serious struggle had developed between the rival preten-

sions of Church and emperor, since the former demanded obedience from the emperor in realms which the latter deemed to be secular. This conflict of jurisdiction doomed the medieval empire, though the Holy Roman Empire continued to exist as an institution, shorn of its universal pretensions and usually with less power than an ordinary national state. It was, however, universally accepted that the emperor's power was not absolute, and that he, like any other ruler, had to rule in accordance with established customs and justice.

In the later Middle Ages a new institution began to gain ground—the national state, and medieval political theorists who were employed by national monarchs naturally attempted to transfer to their masters the attributes hitherto reserved to the emperor. The Church theory, on the other hand, remained basically that of St. Thomas Aquinas, who held, following Stoic thought as developed in Roman law, that there was a natural equality of men because all are endowed with the same reason and all are made in the image of God. Hence all men are entitled equally to justice. Rulers therefore, in medieval theory, were bound to administer equal justice in relation to their subjects. There is a natural law, to be discovered by the thinking mind, which rulers must obey, since they derive their power from God and are Christian kings.

It was, of course, understood in medieval thought that the Church had the duty to remind a monarch of his obligations, and certain popes had even attempted to depose monarchs and release their subjects from their allegiance when the obligations were not kept. The king's power was thus limited by natural law, and no medieval monarch would ever have denied that he had a moral responsibility to his people. He held his position by the grace of God; he was anointed in a religious ceremony; and at death he was a Christian man like anyone else, hoping for salvation. He might have a quarrel with his clergy or the papacy, but it would be a political quarrel, usually a result of political claims by the Church; and unless he had political grounds for supporting heretics, he would certainly consider it his duty to suppress heresy as severely as any pope or inquisitor.

With the coming of the Renaissance the

medieval concept of the position of the ruler changed radically. Naturally it was the practice that changed first, and theory followed haltingly behind. Too many Renaissance despots knew that they had acquired their princedom by their own individual efforts; and though they might wish the Church to sanctify their achievements and position, it was an *ex post facto* sanctification, a recognition of the accomplished fact. Moreover, they were, as individuals, proud that they had won their position, rather than humbly grateful for having inherited it. And having won it, there was no reason why they should not exploit it to the utmost of their ability. No natural rights of their subjects could possibly be binding on them, for they had never accepted such rights. If the subjects claimed them, then let them fight it out; and if the subjects won, then they had won their rights on the only battlefield that mattered, the battlefield of force matched against force.

Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) was the supreme exponent of this point of view. At one

time secretary of the Florentine republic, he was forced into retirement in 1513. It was then that he wrote the *Discourses on Livy*, in which his personal preference for a democratic republic is evident, and *The Prince*, which gives realistic and amoral advice on how to win and hold power. He had no illusions about the goodness of man; he saw clearly man's weaknesses, his love of power, his greed, and the thin veneer of his morality. Such weaknesses should be used by the prince to obtain and keep his power: it was, in Machiavelli's view, better for men to be well governed by a despot, however tyrannical, than insecure under a feeble republic. With clear eyes he saw the world of Italy around him; it was not his business to change it but to study it and formulate conclusions on the basis of his study. All despots since his day have, in a greater or lesser degree, followed his advice, with or without acknowledgment. Machiavellianism as a word has passed into the language as a synonym for political behavior without scruple and without morality.

Although legitimate kings, ruling by hereditary right, often acted in a Machiavellian manner, neither they nor their subjects were content with the relatively simple political thought of Machiavelli. What political thinkers had to do in the centuries that followed was to determine by what right the absolute monarch ruled, what limitations, if any, should be imposed upon the king's power, and whether his subjects had any rights of their own. The answers to such questions naturally varied according to not only the predilections of the thinkers but the political and social conditions of their particular countries.

Jean Bodin (1530-1596) was a Frenchman who lived through the civil wars of the sixteenth century, during which the power of the French monarch reached an all-time low. The French feudal lords vied for the control of the monarchy, to the disgust of those who, like the lawyer Bodin, desired a well-ordered state under the firm and legitimate control of someone whose authority was undisputed. Bodin therefore developed a theory of sovereignty under which the monarch's right to make and execute laws was unconditional. But in Bodin's view,



Niccolo Machiavelli, Secretary of the Republic of Florence until 1512, when he was driven into exile. During his exile he wrote his epoch-making work *The Prince*.

as in medieval thought, the monarch himself was bound by natural law. He must therefore respect property rights and any other agreements which he has made voluntarily with his subjects, including the ancient customs of the realm. Nevertheless, there was no legal way of compelling the king to do anything. Bodin's thought did not therefore solve the question of what to do if the king did not observe natural law.

James I (1566-1625), who inherited the English throne in 1603, took substantially the same position as Bodin, as might have been expected of a king who wrote a book (*The True Law of Free Monarchy*, 1598) on the theory of monarchy. According to James the monarchy is responsible only to God. All sovereignty rests in the king's person, and any institutions, such as the English Parliament, exists solely by his will. His ministers are bound to obey him; his judges must render judgment according to his desires; and he may discipline all his subjects as he wishes. His right to rule is conferred by God, since it is God who provides rulers with sons to inherit their thrones.

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) lived through the reigns of James I and his son Charles; he experienced the Commonwealth under Oliver Cromwell; and he lived into the period of the Restoration under Charles II. His most influential political work, *Leviathan*, was written during the reign of Charles I and published in 1651, two years after that monarch's execution. Hobbes held that all men are actuated by self-interest, and that it is in the interest of all that there should be an established law and order in a country. Indeed, the life of primitive man had been "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" for lack of any properly established and competent government. Such a government must be in a position to curb the antisocial part of man's nature. Hobbes therefore invented, or developed, a potent myth which was to be used and modified by many later thinkers; the myth of the social contract. At some time, Hobbes explained, the people banded together and chose one man, to whom they yielded all the rights they possessed in exchange for the essentials of government,

which they could not do without. This social contract was not reciprocal, in Hobbes's view, but unilateral: The people had forever yielded up their rights in exchange for protection, but the monarch had agreed to nothing save that he would protect them. Any strong government which provided protection for the people had earned the right to rule them. It was possible to defend Cromwell's government or the government of Charles I; but since the latter had proved ineffective and had in fact been overthrown, the right passed to Cromwell and his army, who could do what Charles had been unable to do. Hobbes recognized no indefeasible right of any particular monarch or any particular family to rule; his sole criterion was the effectiveness of the rule. He assumed the necessity for an absolutist form of government, basing this necessity upon the unchanging nature of man in society.

In France the absolute monarchy of the seventeenth century found its eloquent apologist in Bishop Bossuet (1627-1704), who held that all power comes from God, and that the king's will cannot therefore be questioned. But the king must act in accordance with divine justice, which it is his task to administer on earth. The king must be the supreme legislator in his realm, but his laws should be in accordance with divine law; he does not have to submit in any way to limitations imposed on him by other bodies in his realm. Bossuet, of course, simply assumed that the king would obey divine dictates; no provision was made in his thought for compelling him to do so.

This problem, however, was not one to be simply ignored in countries where there had been successful rebellions against tyrannous rule, especially when such rebellions were influenced by later Calvinist thought on the duty of good Christians to overthrow ungodly tyrants. The Netherlands, for example, had successfully revolted against the tyrannous monarch Philip II of Spain. In the Netherlands a genuine confederation of cities had banded together to defend their liberties and their Calvinist religion against the intolerance and the armies of Philip. Johannes Althusius, whose most important work appeared in 1603, a few years after the proclamation of the in-

dependence of the United Provinces of the Netherlands, believed that all power rested with the people, though through their leaders they might yield it to a sovereign for the purpose of carrying out their wishes. If these wishes were not carried out, power naturally reverted to the people, and state notables were entitled to take it from the unworthy sovereign. Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), another moderate Dutch Calvinist, took substantially the same view as Althusius, but his importance lies rather in the contributions he made to the theory of international law. Grotius revived once more the medieval concept of natural law. But he systematized it more fully than any of his predecessors, and developed it with the practical aim in view of persuading all nations to adopt an enforceable code which should govern international relations in the future.

Late in the seventeenth century John Locke (1632-1704) took up where Hobbes left off. Political conditions in England had by now radically changed. The monarchy had been restored under Charles II (1660-1685), but it was clearly no longer as absolute as before. At any time, however, the kings might use the power they still had to restore the absolutism of James I and Charles I, and trample on the rights that had been granted to the people, for which they had fought a civil war. Locke went into exile in 1675 when his political patron, an opponent of Charles, fell from power. During the years that followed—the exact years of his writing are not known—Locke wrote his treatises on civil government, which were of enormous influence in the centuries that followed. The *Second Treatise on Civil Government* was published in 1690, after James II had been compelled to abdicate by a Parliament which claimed that he had illegally "dispensed with" the laws. What Locke did was to provide a variant of the Hobbes myth. He acknowledged the fact of the social contract, but claimed that the contract involved mutual obligations, under which both sides were equally obligated. The monarch was entitled to expect that the people would act as loyal subjects and perform their duties. If they did not, he was entitled to use force against them.

But, on the other side, the people also had the right of rebellion and the right to choose another monarch who was ready to perform his side of the contract. The long list of the crimes of George III which appears in the Declaration of Independence is merely intended to provide the evidence that George had not performed his side of the bargain, and to justify the rebellion of the American colonists, whose fundamental rights had not been respected.


From these few examples of political thought in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it may be seen that this thought largely followed actual political developments, and on occasion justified them. The political thought of the Age of Enlightenment was perhaps somewhat less tied to the political life of the time, and tried to base itself on both the needs of the future and on scientific principles. This thought will be discussed in Chapter 15, where it will be considered among the other consequences of the scientific revolution. We now turn to the political history of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, taking up the various states of Europe in turn.

❖ Holy Roman Empire

THE EMPIRE AS A HAPSBURG PRESERVE

For centuries the Ottoman Turks constituted a threat to Europe, particularly to the Hapsburg emperors, who bore the primary responsibility for keeping them from penetrating into Europe. In 1526 the Ottoman sultan Suleiman the Magnificent won a great victory over an allied Christian army at Mohacs, in Hungary, which gave him a foothold in Central Europe. Three years later he besieged Vienna, but was driven back, contenting himself with annexing part of Hungary. In the following century the Ottoman power gradually declined, the Christians winning a great naval victory at Lepanto in 1571—a victory which severely damaged the Turkish reputation for invincibility. Not until 1683 was there another major Turkish attack on Central Europe. Vienna was again besieged, but was relieved by the Polish king Jan Sobieski. The

THE EXPANSION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 1481-1683



Chronological Chart

The Holy Roman Empire

Reign of Maximilian I	1493-1519	Entry of Christian IV of Denmark into war	1625
Reign of Charles V	1519-1556	Siege of Stralsund by Wallenstein	1628
Victory of Charles V over Francis I of France at battle of Pavia	1525	Issue of <i>Edict of Restitution</i> of Church lands by Ferdinand	1629
Sack of Rome by Charles's troops	1527	Treaty of Lübeck—retirement of Christian from war	1629
Turkish siege of Vienna	1529	Entry of Gustavus II Adolphus into war	1630
Schmalkaldic War	1546-1547	Battle of Lützen—death of Gustavus Adolphus	1632
Religious Peace of Augsburg	1555	Peace of Prague	1635
Abdication of Charles V	1556	Reign of Ferdinand III	1637-1657
Reign of Ferdinand I	1556-1564	Peace of Westphalia	1648
Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis	1559	Reign of Leopold I	1658-1705
Formation of Protestant (Evangelical) Union	1608	Liberation of Hungary from Turks	1682-1699
Formation of Catholic League	1609	Siege of Vienna by Turks	1683
Issue of <i>Letters of Majesty</i> by Emperor Rudolf II	1609	War of Polish Succession	1733-1735
Reign of Matthias	1612-1619	War of Austrian Succession	1740-1748
Defenestration of Prague	1618	Reign of Maria Theresa over Hapsburg dominions	1740-1780
Thirty Years' War	1618-1648	Francis I, emperor	1745-1765
Reign of Ferdinand II	1619-1637	Joseph II, emperor	1780-1790
Frederick V (the Winter King) accepts throne of Bohemia	1619	Leopold II, emperor	1790-1792
Battle of the White Mountain	1620	Francis II, last Holy Roman Emperor	1792-1806

Christians then made a counterattack which recovered Hungary, speeding the decline of Turkish power. In the nineteenth century Turkey became the "sick man of Europe," losing most of her European empire.

The ever-present Turkish menace, though it may have been overestimated by the Christian powers, was a constant calculation in their military plans. If they had not remained alert, the Turks would certainly have conquered more of Central Europe, with incalculable consequences for all Western civilization. The development of Russia had, after all, been retarded for two centuries by her enforced submission to and partial occupation by the Mongols in the thirteenth century.

The Holy Roman emperor, during the period discussed in this chapter, was the only monarch in Europe who could lay claim to that title. Although, as we have seen, the imperial title was almost a family possession of the head of the Hapsburg family, it was still an elected position. The emperor was elected by a procedure laid down in the fourteenth century (Golden Bull, 1356), under which seven named electors chose him. Three of the electors were Catholic archbishops; three were German princes; and the seventh was the king of Bohemia, himself an elected monarch chosen by the Bohemian Diet.

In 1519 Charles I of Spain, grandson of the previous emperor Maximilian, was elected

Holy Roman emperor, in spite of competition from the kings of England and France. Even before he had become king of Spain, Charles had inherited the Netherlands and other minor territories. Thus, when he became emperor with the title of Charles V, he ruled in his own right much of Europe, but was engaged in almost constant wars to retain his vast possessions. On the whole his wars were successful, and he lost little during his reign. His brother Ferdinand governed most of Charles's eastern possessions and succeeded him as emperor in 1556, when Charles abdicated. Charles had already granted Spain, the Spanish Netherlands, and the old possessions of the house of Aragon to his son Philip, who became Philip II of Spain. Hence there were now two branches of the Hapsburg family, each occupying a royal throne.

Much of the history of the next century is filled with wars resulting from the imbalance of power created by the alliance between the two Hapsburgs. French rulers always felt themselves threatened. Despite the fact that the French kings were as Catholic as the Hapsburgs, the former played little part in the counteroffensive launched by the Hapsburgs to restore Protestant countries to Catholicism. Indeed, the French sometimes aided and abetted the Protestants. The French monarchs had many conflicts of interest with the Hapsburgs, and it was seldom that they were not engaged in active war with either the Spanish or the imperial Hapsburgs, or both.

After the uneasy religious peace of Augsburg (1555), the imperial Hapsburgs concentrated on ruling their own territories in Central and Eastern Europe and defending themselves against the Turks. These territories included the kingdom of Bohemia, whose crown had been held by the Hapsburgs since 1526. But Bohemia had largely been converted to Protestantism, a conversion which was greatly resented by the Catholic Hapsburg emperors. By the beginning of the sixteenth century they were still unable to take any effective action against the Bohemians, who could refuse to elect a Hapsburg as their king, and thus deprive him of the electoral vote of Bohemia in an imperial election. Indeed, in 1609 the em-


peror Rudolf II was obliged to confirm the traditional rights and privileges of the Bohemians, and swear to honor them.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

In 1619, both the post of emperor and the throne of Bohemia fell vacant, and there was no obvious Hapsburg candidate for the positions. Moreover, the three German princes who had the electoral vote were Protestants (two Calvinists, one Lutheran). In an imperial election it was therefore almost certain that the king of Bohemia would have the deciding vote, since the three Catholic archbishops would presumably vote for a Catholic candidate. The most eligible candidate from the Hapsburg family was Ferdinand, archduke of Styria, an Austrian province. But he was a strong Catholic, much influenced by the Jesuits and the Counter-Reformation; and he made no secret of the fact that he intended to reconvert the Bohemians, if necessary by force.

The Bohemians were thus in an unenviable position. Ferdinand had a considerable army available, and no Protestant powers seemed to be in a position to help their co-religionists. The English king, James I, whose daughter was married to the elector of the Palatinate (Rhineland), would perhaps have liked to give aid to the Bohemians. But he could not extract money from his Parliament, which had no interest in foreign wars unless they helped English trade interests. The Dutch were expecting at any moment an invasion from Belgium by the Spanish Hapsburgs, bent on reconquest of their old possessions and on the reconversion of the Calvinist Netherlanders. The Bohemians therefore had no option but to choose Ferdinand as their king, thus ensuring also his subsequent election as emperor. Their only hope was that he would continue to abide by the promises of Rudolf II, and preserve their traditional rights, including the right to choose their religion.

But Ferdinand had no intention of honoring the agreement. When his commissioners in Bohemia proceeded to behave in what the Bohemians regarded as an intolerably autocratic manner, two of them were thrown out of a



EUROPE
AT BEGINNING
OF THE
30 YEARS WAR
—1618—

underlining indicates Electorates

Spanish Hapsburg Possessions

0 50 100 150
Miles

FRANCE

TURKISH
HUNGARY

AUSTRIAN DOMINIONS
AUSTRIA
BOHEMIA
SAXONY
BRANDENBURG
HOLSTEIN
SILEZIA
MORAVIA
BAYARIA
MUNICH
NÜRNBERG
NORDLINGEN
SWISS CONFEDERATION
VENETIAN REPUBLIC
D. OF SAVOY
D. OF MILAN
PRINC. OF PIEMONTE

Val Teline —
Disputed between
Spanish Hapsburgs
and Girones

Campaign of
Gustavus
Adolphus
1630-32

Campaign of
Christian IV
1626

White Mt. • Prague

Cologne

Mainz

Nördlingen

Bavaria

Munich

Nürnberg

Upper Palatinate

Lützen

Breitenfeld

Magdeburg

Brandenburg

Holstein

Stralsund

Elbe R.

Weser R.

Rhine R.

Danube R.

Spain

Italy


window in Prague, whence they fell upon a dunghill, their dignity, if not their persons, severely wounded. This so-called Defenestration of Prague of 1618 marks the beginning of the Thirty Years' War. The Bohemians deposed Ferdinand from his position as king of Bohemia, but he refused to accept his deposition and used his electoral vote as king to have himself elected emperor. Though the Bohemians protested that Ferdinand was not legally entitled to cast a vote for himself as emperor, since he was no longer king of Bohemia, there was nothing practical that they could do about it. All they could do was choose themselves another king if they could find any candidate willing to take on the new emperor Ferdinand and his armies. Eventually they settled on Frederick, the Calvinist elector who had married the English king's daughter. But Frederick proved powerless to help. He and the Bohemians were crushed by Ferdinand and his ally, the duke of Bavaria, a Catholic German prince who coveted the electoral vote

which he did not as yet possess (Battle of the White Mountain, 1620). Frederick, who was thereafter known as the Winter King, since he had ruled Bohemia for just one winter, was driven from his Rhineland principedom and his electoral vote given to the duke of Bavaria.

Now in secure possession of Bohemia, Ferdinand acted according to expectations. The Bohemian people were forcibly reconverted to Catholicism, and the elective monarchy was declared abolished. Bohemia became a hereditary kingdom like the rest of the Hapsburg possessions. But the Protestant princes of Germany were by now thoroughly alarmed. The Catholic emperor and the Catholic duke of Bavaria were evidently determined to put an end to the religious Peace of Augsburg, and it was necessary for the Protestants to secure foreign aid wherever it could be found. Fortunately for them, Cardinal Richelieu of France was sympathetic to any plea for aid that might help reduce the power of the Hapsburgs, who were now allies. Unwilling at first



Portraits of Frederick V, Elector Palatine, known as Frederick the Winter King, and his wife Elizabeth, daughter of James I of England. Frederick's acceptance of the crown of Bohemia touched off the Thirty Years' War. Portraits by Anthony van Dyck.



to take on the Spanish soldiery, he was willing to subsidize anyone who would fight the Hapsburgs. Although a cardinal of the Catholic Church, he was well aware that the struggle involved more than religion.

For the next thirty years, war was constantly waged back and forth across the lands of Germany. First, Christian IV of Denmark intervened on behalf of the Protestants. He was defeated by an inspired leader of professional troops, Albrecht von Wallenstein, who had been hired by Ferdinand. When Christian had been disposed of, the Lutheran Swedish monarch, Gustavus Adolphus, who had been busy building an empire in the Baltic, took a hand, aided with subsidies provided by Richelieu. Gustavus won a number of notable victories, but was killed in battle in 1632. Thereafter the emperor signed a peace with the Protestant princes of Germany which was satisfactory to them. But the French and the Swedes were far from satisfied. France sought a Rhine frontier at the expense of the Spanish Hapsburgs, and she wished to break the power

of the emperor once and for all. The Swedes, devoutly Protestant, wished to stem the Catholic Reformation and to add to their empire at imperial expense.

So the war was resumed, and the French—after a slow start under inexperienced generals—began to wear down the imperial and Spanish forces. The German Protestant princes, scenting victory, joined the French and forced the emperor to sign the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Under this Peace the emperor lost all his rights and possessions west of Bohemia. Thereafter the emperors concentrated on their eastern territories. After the Turks had been driven from Vienna in 1683, the emperors conquered most of Hungary, Transylvania, and Croatia. They reconverted the Hungarians, many of whom had adopted Protestantism, to Catholicism by methods similar to those used in Bohemia. Their new empire was more solidly Hapsburg than the old Holy Roman Empire had been, even though it was an empire composed of several different nationalities. Though the emperor retained his old title and

was formally elected by an enlarged electoral college, and though he had some influence in Germany, his power was really based on his eastern possessions. At the end of the seventeenth century an effort was made by the imperial Hapsburgs to add the crown of Spain and the Spanish Netherlands to their own. For this purpose they engaged in the War of the Spanish Succession, but without success. The crown went to a Bourbon prince, though the Hapsburgs won the former Spanish Netherlands as a consolation award for their loss.

THE EMPIRE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

In the middle of the eighteenth century the direct Hapsburg male line died out, leaving an heiress, Maria Theresa, to inherit the crown of Austria. As a woman, however, she could not hold the imperial title. Most of the other European rulers thought it was an auspicious moment to intervene, and the duke of Bavaria obtained the imperial crown for three years (1742-1745), becoming the only non-Hapsburg to become emperor in several centuries. But Maria Theresa's husband, himself not born a Hapsburg, was elected emperor in 1745, and the title thereafter passed to his sons, who were Hapsburgs on their mother's side. Maria Theresa managed to retain her throne of Austria after waging two major wars, though she lost Silesia to the energetic and ambitious Prussian king, Frederick the Great, whose power and influence were greatly increased by his new possession.

Maria Theresa and her son, Joseph II, seriously attempted to modernize the empire, creating a customs union between the various territories, abolishing serfdom, and organizing a civil service of officials drawn from all parts of the empire. Joseph, much influenced by the Enlightenment, determined to run his country efficiently, in the interests of all his people, and to abolish special privilege, fell afoul of all the conservative forces in his dominion, who resented his autocratic methods and his trampling on their privileges, especially those of the nobility and clergy. Though some of his reforms were not overturned after his death, he must be regarded as an unsuccessful if en-

lightened despot, one of the most distinguished of his species.

Austria did not become a true national state in the eighteenth century. It remained a ramshackle empire, never fully accepted by its subject nationalities, who were ethnically and linguistically different from the dominant Germans. On the other hand, as will be seen in a later chapter, because of her non-German imperial appendages, Austria was not accepted by the other Germans, most of whom were Protestants, as a truly German country. Thus, in the nineteenth century, the leadership of Germany fell to Prussia rather than to Austria. When Germany was united in an empire under Prussian leadership in 1871, Austria, still possessing her eastern dependencies, became simply a Dual Monarchy (Austria-Hungary), even though its ruler continued to bear the title of emperor. Austria did not become a part of Germany until the regime of Adolf Hitler. By that time the last Hapsburg monarch had long ago disappeared from the scene.

❖ The Iberian peninsula

PORTUGAL

We have already considered at some length the history of Portugal in the early modern period. We have seen that her population was too small and her native resources too few to permit her to hold the Eastern trade against the more powerful states of England and Holland. Too many men were lost in the East, and Negroes had to be imported to take care of home agriculture. Finally, a half-mad king, Sebastian (1557-1578), insisted on making an attempt to conquer North Africa for the Christian faith, and was killed in battle. His brother Henry, who succeeded him, reigned for only two years, leaving no heir of the old house of Aviz save Philip II, king of Spain. (Philip's mother, Isabella of Portugal, had married the emperor Charles V.) Thus the crown of Portugal fell into Spanish hands, although Philip had to make good his claim by force of arms.

In 1640, when the Spanish monarchy was on the decline, Portugal made a successful bid

Chronological Chart

Spain and Portugal

Reign of Charles I of Spain (Charles V of the Empire)	1516-1556
Wars with France	1521-1529, 1535-1538, 1542-1544, 1551-1559
Reign of Philip II	1556-1598
Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis with France	1559
Beginning of struggle in Netherlands	1567
Victory of Don John of Austria (natural brother of Philip) against Turks	1571
Succession of Philip to Portuguese throne	1580
Defeat of Spanish Armada by English	1588
Intervention of Philip in efforts to exclude Henry IV from French throne	1589-1598
Reign of Philip III	1598-1621
Reign of Philip IV	1621-1665
Independence of Portuguese crown	1640
Peace of the Pyrenees	1659
Reign of Charles II (the Sufferer)	1665-1700
Reign of Philip V (Bourbon)	1700-1746
War of the Spanish Succession	1701-1715
Treaty of Utrecht—Philip recognized as king	1713
War with England (Jenkins' Ear)	1739-1741
War of the Austrian Succession —Spanish Bourbons gain Italian duchies	1740-1748
Reign of Charles III (enlightened despot)	1759-1788
Loss of Florida, cession of Louisiana by France	1763
Expulsion of Jesuits	1767
Spain joins France in War of American Independence	1779

to rid herself of Spanish domination, and the family of Braganza was given the crown. Though Spain tried to recover it, she was unsuccessful, and thereafter Portugal was a national state, supported by an alliance with England, but no longer able to play any effective part in the affairs of Europe. For a brief time in the eighteenth century Portugal was ruled by an enlightened despot, the marquis of Pombal, who was granted almost complete power by his king, Joseph. Pombal was a fine organizer and a strong exponent of absolutism. During his regime the Jesuits were expelled from Portugal and from the Portuguese colonies, and serious efforts were made to prevent the accumulation of more property by the Church. A wine monopoly was created, and efforts were made to improve Portuguese commerce by making the country less dependent upon the English. Pombal ruthlessly suppressed all opposition, including a rebellion by the nobles. He also rebuilt much of Lisbon after a disastrous earthquake had destroyed the city in 1755. However, as soon as Joseph was dead, his successor Maria I reversed much of Pombal's policy. As so often happened in the eighteenth century, the monarch felt herself to be more at one with her nobles than with her people.

THE SPANISH MONARCHY

As we have seen, in 1556, the nonimperial branch of the house of Hapsburg fell heir to the Spanish crown, which included rule over the extensive Spanish overseas territories, the Netherlands, and much of Italy. Philip II had one consistent policy throughout his long reign (1556-1598): to check the Protestant Reformation by all means at his disposal. His desire to keep his inherited lands and support his fellow Hapsburg on the imperial throne were secondary in his mind. He could almost certainly have kept the Netherlands in his empire if he had not forced the religious issue. His constant interference in the French civil and religious wars to back the extremist Catholic factions was very costly, and could serve no useful material ends; and though his support of the Inquisition in Spain against Protestants



This absurd painting is said to have been done by Titian under protest. A minor artist named Sanchez Coello had executed a sketch, showing Philip II of Spain offering his infant son to heaven, which so pleased the monarch that he determined to have the final painting done by the greatest artist of his time, who was, of course, Titian. The latter suggested that Coello should complete the job but Philip was adamant, so Titian obliged, with the result shown above. The coloring is excellent in the original, but the unnatural position of the angel and the way in which Philip is apparently prepared to give his son a push suggest Titian's distaste for the whole project. The captive Muslim at the bottom left appears to have no relation to the rest of the painting. Philip presumably wanted value for his money and felt it necessary to include a reference to his half-brother's victory over the Turks, whether it had any relevance or not.

was popular among his subjects, it damaged the Spanish economy and embittered the Protestants everywhere. His efforts to destroy the English Reformation, first by marrying Mary Tudor and supporting the restoration of Catholicism, and then by constantly intriguing against Elizabeth, culminated in a damaging

war which cost him the loss of his greatest naval expedition, the Spanish Armada. Although in the English War he was also defending the Spanish monopoly of trade with America, he could have defended this more easily without trying to unseat Elizabeth from her throne and thus arousing English national



The Spanish Armada of 1588, before its destruction by the English "sea dogs" and the "Protestant wind." Etching by Jan Luyken. From a book of Dutch historical prints—hence the line in the center of the picture. (COURTESY ACHENBACH FOUNDATION)

and patriotic feeling against him. He warred constantly throughout his reign; and though the fine Spanish infantry won him many victories, it was at the cost of far more than even sixteenth-century Spanish resources could afford.

Philip was chronically short of money in spite of his huge monetary income. His soldiers were badly paid, and their pay too often was uncertain. It was an unpaid and leaderless soldiery that sacked Antwerp, the richest city in his dominions, in 1576; and it was the heavy taxes that he tried to place on the Netherlands to pay for his unpopular wars that first united the country against him, before the religious issue had become acute. His Italian territories were ground down by taxation, and even his homeland of Spain had to submit to a 10 per cent sales tax when he found he could not collect the other taxes against the solid opposi-

tion of Church and nobility. In spite of the fact that he was the most powerful and the most feared monarch in Europe, Philip's reign must nevertheless be considered ultimately unsuccessful. He bequeathed to his successors an impressive facade of power, colonies that for some decades yet were to bring in substantial quantities of bullion, a currently exhausted treasury dependent on the next treasure ship from the Indies, and a heritage of still unfinished wars.

In the reign of Philip III (1598-1621) religious bigotry again struck a damaging blow to Spain. Jews and Moors had already been driven out more than a century before, impoverishing the economy of the country. In 1609 it was the turn of the Moriscos, descendants of Spanish Muslims who had converted to Christianity. The king, the people, and the Church doubted the genuineness of their con-



The "Spanish Fury" at Antwerp in 1576. The artist is unknown, but the engraving is probably contemporary with the event.

version, and they were expelled from the country. Probably more than 300,000 were compelled to leave in the years 1609-1611. Since the Moriscos were some of the hardest working and most industrious people on the peninsula, Spain never recovered from this blow. Although Philip put an end to some of the wars of his father, his desire to aid the Austrian Hapsburgs in the Thirty Years' War, and his sympathy for the Catholic cause defended so stubbornly by Ferdinand, involved Spain in the war. Philip IV was at war with France for almost the whole of his long reign (1621-1665). In the course of the century much of the Spanish Netherlands was lost to France, and the independence of the United Provinces was recognized, though the Spanish colonial empire was retained with relatively few losses. The early part of the century was the golden age of Spanish culture; but politically and militarily the country declined until

the death of the last Spanish Hapsburg in 1700.

The War of the Spanish Succession, which followed the death of Charles II, was eventually decided, as far as Spain was concerned, by the accession of a French Bourbon to the Spanish throne, and his descendants occupied it through the eighteenth century. In the same war Spain was shorn of most of her European possessions, though allowed to keep her colonies. Under the Bourbon monarchy there was a considerable improvement in administration, the monarchs making use of French innovations in government. The power of the nobles was restricted in favor of the king, and Charles III, one of the enlightened despots, restricted the power of the Church and the papacy, finally expelling the Jesuits in 1767. Spain was also kept relatively free of involvement in continental wars, and the budget was occasionally balanced. But the Spanish economy was

too far decayed to make a recovery; the landholding structure of the country was antiquated; and the Church did not relax much of its strangle hold over the land and resources of the state. Spain had forever ceased to be a great power in Europe, and she was soon also to lose her colonies, as will be described in a later chapter.

❖ Scandinavia

SWEDEN

We have referred briefly to the important intervention of Sweden in the Thirty Years' War. It remains to say a few words about the new Swedish national state. At the beginning of the sixteenth century Sweden was under the Danish crown, but had resented the fact and was only looking for an opportunity to cast off the Danish yoke. The opportunity presented itself during the Reformation when a Danish Catholic king murdered a large number of Swedish nobles. Thereafter the nobles met and chose Gustavus I Vasa as king (1523-1560) with the enthusiastic support of the Swedish peasantry, who followed him in a war of independence against Denmark. During his long reign a Lutheran national Church was established, and Gustavus consolidated his authority over the whole country. In the process he had to crush various revolts, especially from the Catholic clergy and Catholics who refused to accept Lutheranism. He founded Sweden as a modern state, and established the throne as hereditary within his family.

In the reign of his successor, Eric, the conquest of Livonia was begun, with the intention of extending Swedish territories in the Baltic. Finland, always a Swedish rather than a Danish appendage, followed Sweden in the break from Denmark. Eric's brother John, however, married a Polish princess, whose son inherited the Swedish crown. The Swedes refused to tolerate his Catholic religion and deposed him in favor of Charles IX. This involved Charles and his successors in long wars with Poland, which lasted for some sixty years. Charles was succeeded by his son, Gustavus II, known as

Chronological Chart

Sweden

Union of Kalmar (three Scandinavian crowns)	1387
Gustavus I Vasa, king of Sweden	1523-1560
Hanseatic trade monopoly ended	1537
Reign of Eric XIV	1560-1568
Reign of Sigismund III (also king of Poland 1587-1632)	1592-1590
Swedish intervention in Russian "Time of Troubles"	1604-1613
Reign of Gustavus II Adolphus	1611-1632
Treaty of Stolbovo—acquisition of Karelia and Ingria	1617
Wars with Poland—occupation of all Livonia	1621-1629
Intervention of Gustavus II in Thirty Years' War	1630-1632
Death of Gustavus at battle of Lützen	1632
Reign of Christina—rule by Chancellor Oxenstierna	1632-1654
Peace of Westphalia	1648
Reign of Charles X	1654-1660
First Northern War	1655-1660
Peace of Oliva	1660
Reign of Charles XII	1697-1718
Great Northern War	1700-1721
Battle of Narva—defeat of Russians	1700
Charles XII of Sweden at war with Poland and Saxony	1701-1708
Battle of Poltava—decisive victory of Russians over Swedes	1709
Exile of Charles XII in Turkey	1709-1713
Peace of Nystadt with Russia	1721
Renewal of wars with Russia	1741-1743
Reign of Gustavus III (enlightened despot)	1771-1792
War with Russia—final loss of Finland and Carelia	1788-1790
Marshal Bernadotte becomes regent, later king, of Sweden	1810

Adolphus, whom we have noted already as the great Protestant leader in the Thirty Years' War, known to his contemporaries as the Lion of the North. Before he entered the Thirty Years' War he consolidated his position at home, suppressed the feudal nobility, and prepared a most efficient war machine, with the best artillery in Europe and the most highly trained army. With this army he gained several successes at the expense of Poland, and, aided by French diplomacy, was able to win a number of Baltic ports and to make a temporary peace. Then, fortified by a considerable subsidy from Richelieu, the French minister who wished to support the tottering Protestant cause against the Hapsburg emperor, he entered the war, only to die on the battlefield. Though his ministers, ruling for the infant Queen Christina, continued the war, they did not meet much success until the French declared their entry into the war. Then they shared in the successes and were able to add western Pomerania to their possessions at the Peace of Westphalia.

During the period of the wars Count Oxenstierna was the virtual ruler of the country. A financial genius and able administrator, he was able to make Sweden into one of the most efficient states in Europe. He did not enter wars lightly and advised against Gustavus' entry into the Thirty Years' War. But he did plan and execute a small war with Denmark (1643-1645), which added several Danish provinces to Sweden, where they remained after the ensuing peace. Charles x (1654-1660) spent almost all his reign fighting, mostly against the Poles and the Danes, though he also carried out a campaign in Russia. On his sudden death in 1660 the Peace of Oliva was signed with the Poles, who recognized Swedish possession of northern Livonia, while the treaty of Copenhagen recognized finally Swedish possession of the provinces taken from Denmark. Thus Sweden in 1660 had become a fully developed national state, with considerable territories around the Baltic Sea.

At the end of the century Sweden, under Charles xn, expanded again. The young king won a number of impressive victories, and utterly defeated the Russia of Peter the Great

in 1700 at the battle of Narva. But Swedish resources were overextended, and Peter was able to turn the tables in 1709 at the battle of Poltava, after he had drawn the Swedish monarch far into Russia. By the treaties of Stockholm and Nystadt, in 1720 and 1721, Sweden lost almost all her empire except Finland, which was lost during the Napoleonic wars. For part of the eighteenth century the Swedish king was absolute, but for most of the period he had to struggle with the nobility for power. Finally, in 1809, the despotic monarch Gustavus iv was compelled to abdicate in favor of his uncle, who, being childless, adopted Charles Bernadotte, one of Napoleon's marshals, as his heir. In due course Bernadotte became king. His descendants still sit on Sweden's throne.

DENMARK AND NORWAY

When Sweden seceded from the Scandinavian union in the early sixteenth century Norway, a poor and backward country, re-

Chronological Chart

Denmark and Norway

Union of Kalmar	1387
Reign of Christian ii	1513-1523
Separation of Sweden under Gustavus Vasa	1520
Reign of Christian iii	1534-1558
Establishment of Danish national Protestant Church	1536
Reign of Christian iv	1588-1648
Wars with Sweden	1611-1613, 1643-1645
Intervention of Christian iv in Thirty Years' War	1625-1629
Reign of Frederick iii	1648-1670
Peace with Sweden	1660
Reign of Christian vii (enlightened despot)	1766-1808
Loss of Norway to Sweden (result of having sided with France)	1815

mained united with Denmark. Sweden made no attempt to break up this union, although in one of her wars with Denmark she sheared off a couple of Norwegian provinces. But Denmark, as we have seen, continued to contest Scandinavian supremacy with Sweden, not losing it definitively until 1660. Christian III (1534-1559) established Lutheranism in Denmark and Norway in 1536, and threw off the last vestiges of Hanseatic control of his sea trade. Christian IV (1588-1648) who, as we have seen, was worsted in the Thirty Years' War, spent his time more fruitfully at home, except when he was drawn into a war with Sweden which cost him several provinces. His state, during his long reign, was consolidated into an effective national unity, while his immediate successors finally put an end to the rebellions of the turbulent Danish nobility, and created what was close to being an absolutist monarchy. Thereafter Denmark played but a small part in European affairs, though again becoming involved in wars with the expanding power of Sweden. She lost Norway at the Congress of Vienna, as a punishment for having sided with Napoleon.

❖ Brandenburg-Prussia

CONSOLIDATION OF KINGDOM OF PRUSSIA

The double title is given to this territory because until 1618 they were two separate entities, although both were ruled by princes of the house of Hohenzollern. The margrave of Brandenburg was one of the electors of the Holy Roman Empire, and his lands were not of special importance. The duchy of Prussia (or what is now East Prussia) has been mentioned in an earlier chapter as having been Christianized by the Teutonic Knights. In the early fifteenth century the Grand Master of the Teutonic Knights, Albert of Brandenburg, secularized his territory, which became a fief of the Polish crown. In 1618 Brandenburg and Prussia were united by inheritance, and thereafter the new state of Prussia began its meteoric rise. The basic work was done by Frederick William, known as the Great Elector, who

Chronological Chart

Brandenburg-Prussia

Union of Brandenburg and Prussia by inheritance	1618
Rule of Frederick William, the Great Elector	1640-1688
Frederick III, elector of Brandenburg, assumes title of king	1701
Reign of Frederick William I	1713-1740
Reign of Frederick II, the Great	1740-1786
Cession of most of Silesia by Austria	1742
Frederick begins Seven Years' War	1756
Russia concludes separate peace	1762
Treaty of Hubertsburg, Frederick retains Silesia	1763
Reign of Frederick William II	1786-1797

ruled the electorate from 1640 to 1688. The rise of Prussia is a very special case of a national state¹ arising from unpromising beginnings through the carefully planned policy of extremely able rulers.

Prussia, as we may now call it, possessed a few territories in western Germany which still belonged officially to the Holy Roman Empire, but like other German territories was practically free after the Peace of Westphalia. These states made contributions to the Prussian army but otherwise there was little contact between the divided lands. Frederick took some part in the Thirty Years' War, and was able to gain some territory in the treaty, but it was, like the rest of East Prussia, a poor and barren territory. Nor was Brandenburg itself much better. Moreover, the whole of Brandenburg and Prussia together was almost surrounded

¹ Strictly speaking, Prussia was never a "national" state. The "nation" was Germany; but Prussia was a functioning state before Germany was united. As we shall see in Chapter 17, Prussia formed the nucleus of the Germany which was finally united in 1871.



by the ramshackle kingdom of Poland. It was therefore the elector's task to rid himself of Polish suzerainty, and if possible at some later time, when he was strong enough, to take western Pomerania for himself and so unify his territories in the east.

The policy the elector adopted—and it remained a continuing Prussian policy—was to build an efficient army which could be used for defense and diplomacy, but, if possible, was never used for fighting, since he could not in such a poor territory afford any appreciable losses. His diplomacy was simple enough—threaten the use of the army and thus obtain whatever he wanted. He and his successors centralized the state, developed a professional corps of administrators, and put as many as possible of the lesser nobility into uniform as officers. Thus arose the famous *Junker*, or professional military class, made up of landowners. To pay for this extravagance the elector and his successors continually kept a paternal eye on everything in their state, setting up industries out of state funds when necessary, doing on a tiny scale what Colbert was doing for France.

By the end of the century the policy had proved so successful that Polish suzerainty had been thrown off, and the elector was about to become king. The state had a sound little

army perfectly trained, ready for exercising pressure. The Hapsburg emperor needed the use of this army. The price demanded by the elector was the title of king for himself and his heirs, which, if granted, would make Prussia the only non-Hapsburg kingdom within the empire. Since the emperor accepted the terms, the elector Frederick II became Frederick I, king of Prussia, in 1701, and his title was acknowledged by the other European powers at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession. Frederick I was succeeded a few years later by Frederick William I (1713-1740), a martinet and disciplinarian whose hobby was the Prussian army and whose avocation was thrift. The curious result of this combination was that Frederick William organized a remarkably efficient and well-trained small army which he preferred not to use, and he left the army and a full treasury to his successor, Frederick II, the Great (1740-1786), who had no objections to using both for his glory and profit.

THE REIGN OF FREDERICK THE GREAT

Early in his reign he won Silesia from Austria, which through many wars he managed to retain. A thoroughly enlightened monarch in the sense that he was well educated, literate,

skeptical, and an efficient administrator, he was much admired by his contemporaries, even by his military opponents. This admiration was to stand him in good stead when Peter III of Russia, who admired him immeasurably, on inheriting his throne withdrew from a war which the Russians were winning rather than subject Frederick to the humiliation of a defeat at his hands. Under Frederick's rule Prussia became a modern state. Though the state was based on the army, whose officers became a favored class—almost a state within the state—it was effectively served by the civil administration, which itself was kept under semi-military discipline, obedient and devoted to the monarch.

In the later years of his reign Frederick joined with Russia and Austria in the first partition of Poland (1772), and his successor Frederick William II completed the process of partition in two further stages (1793 and 1795), in the last taking as prize the Polish capital of Warsaw. Nevertheless, as we shall see, Prussia was no match for Napoleon, who robbed her of much of the proceeds of the partitions, including Warsaw. This city became the capital of the ephemeral duchy of Warsaw (1806), only to fall to the Russians at the Congress of Vienna. By the end of the eighteenth century, however, Prussia was by far the largest of the German states, if the Austrian empire is excluded. She remained the largest until she swallowed up the other German states, still excluding Austria, in 1871.

❖ Poland

Up to this point little attention has been paid to Poland, a Slavic country whose rulers accepted Christianity in the tenth century, but which was not fully converted until the fourteenth century. In 1386 the duke of Lithuania, a pagan country to the east of Poland, married the heiress to the Polish crown. Lithuania soon afterward was converted, and for two centuries Poland and Lithuania comprised a huge country stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. In 1569 the countries were united formally in the Union of Lublin, with a territory that

Chronological Chart

Poland — Lithuania

Reign of Sigismund II—last of Jagiellon monarchs	1548–1572
Union of Lublin	1569
Election of Henry of Valois to kingship (Henry III of France)	1573
Stephen Batory defeats Russia in Livonian Wars	1579–1582
Intervention of Poland in Russian "Time of Troubles" under Sigismund III	1609–1618
Renunciation of claim to Russian throne by Vladislav IV	1634
Wars with Sweden	1655–1660
Peace of Oliva	1660
Reign of John III Sobieski	1674–1696
Raising of siege of Vienna by John III	1683
Expulsion of Augustus II from Polish throne by Charles XII of Sweden	1704
Restoration of Augustus II after battle of Poltava	1709
Death of Augustus, war of the Polish Succession	1733
Reign of Augustus III	1734–1763
Reign of Stanislas Poniatowski	1764–1795
First Partition of Poland	1772
Reforms of Polish diet	1773
New constitution	1791
Second Partition	1793
Uprising of Kosciuszko	1794
Third Partition—extinction of kingdom of Poland	1795

rivalled in size the Holy Roman Empire. It had a few important cities and centers of culture which traded with the West, and a small middle class, among which could be distinguished considerable numbers of Jews who had been welcomed in Poland-Lithuania when expelled from other countries. During the later Middle Ages the country, under the rule of the Jagiello dynasty, was among the most pros-

perous and developed in Europe. It possessed many centers of learning, including the University of Cracow, made famous by the researches of the Pole Nicholas Copernicus.

But in the sixteenth century and later the huge sprawling territory, made up of people who spoke many different languages, proved far too large to be governed effectively. Power fell into the hands of nobles and landed gentry who were able to make life impossible for any monarch, however personally capable he might be. This class was not a tiny minority, as in some other states, since there was no wide social gap between nobility and gentry. Poland was thus in essence a feudal country at a time when the rest of Europe was emerging from feudalism, and increasing numbers of the peasants were in fact reduced to serfdom.

Governmental institutions characteristic of irresponsible decentralized rule were conspicuous in Poland. There were large numbers of regional diets, composed of nobles and gentry, which were naturally controlled by the more powerful nobles, and there was a central diet which carried irresponsibility to an extreme, even for a feudal state. Any member of the diet had a free veto on the action of the diet. Since no central action was probable, local groups had the right to join together for various purposes and to take up arms, including the forcing through of their program vetoed at the diet. It goes without saying that no king could hope to function effectively in this atmosphere, nor did the Polish magnates often agree to the exercise of royal authority by one of their numbers. Moreover, the nobles took advantage of the Reformation to weaken the one support that monarchies had found in other states; large numbers of them accepted Lutheranism and other Protestant sects, and as a consequence were able to expropriate Church lands. It was therefore probably a matter of indifference to them when the Jesuits reconverted most of Poland to Catholicism in the following century. The lands stayed secularized.


This effective control of the country by the nobility and gentry did not prevent Poland from trying to keep her territories intact, and even expanding when possible; for

the nobility, like all feudal lords, had no objection to fighting, and were even willing to follow the leadership of their elected kings for this purpose. They engaged in long wars with Sweden and Russia over the possession of Livonia, and they maintained their suzerainty over Prussia until the latter became too well unified and too powerful to submit to it any longer (under the Great Elector, 1660). But in the late seventeenth century Poland lost the eastern Ukraine to Russia, and though a native king, Jan Sobieski, gained undying glory by rescuing Vienna from the last Turkish invasion, it did neither him nor his country any good. The next king chosen by the Polish diet was the duke of Saxony, who ceased to pursue a Polish national policy.

Throughout the eighteenth century, after a severe defeat by Charles XII of Sweden, Poland gradually lost all semblance of a truly national state. The free veto made the position of the elected monarch impossible. For most of the century the elector of Saxony was the



Thaddeus Kosciuszko, Polish patriot, leader of the 1794 rebellion. (COURTESY PRINTS DIVISION, NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY)



titular king, but in fact it was the members of the nobility who divided the rule of the country among themselves. Toward the end of the century Russia, under Catherine the Great, engaged in intrigues and intervened in the royal succession. Indeed, it seemed certain that the expansionist Russia of Catherine would simply take over the country unless she were stopped by the other European powers. It was Frederick the Great who first put forward the solution that was ultimately adopted—partition. The first partition was carried out by Russia, Austria, and Prussia in 1772, without serious resistance.

Then a miracle happened. The Poles, with their truncated state, made an astonishing comeback under the leadership of Thaddeus Kosciuszko. A new constitution was proclaimed, the free veto abolished, and the monarchy made hereditary. Many of the nobles freed their serfs. But Catherine was not prepared to let the Poles have their free state; and though the Austrians and Prussians at first accepted the reform program, they could not afford to

back Poland against Russia, and especially not when the French Revolution broke out and France declared war on both Prussia and Austria. So Prussia made a deal with the Russians and a second partition took place (1793), leaving only a small enclave to the Poles. The following year the Poles revolted in desperation, but after a brave defense were crushed by the Russians. The final partition took place in 1795, Austria now receiving her share of the remnants as well as Prussia and Russia, and though for a brief time during the Napoleonic period there was an independent duchy of Warsaw under a German duke, the duchy finally was granted to Russia by the Congress of Vienna.

◆ Russia

RISE OF THE DUCHY OF MOSCOW


We now come to the three major powers which became strong national states before the French Revolution, and have persisted as

such to the present. France and Russia are examples of absolute, and Britain of constitutional, monarchy.

Russia, the largest of the Slavic countries, was converted to Orthodox Christianity at the end of the tenth century. The conversion of the people was slow, but the rise of the country was rapid, Kiev for a time being second only to Constantinople in all of Europe as a trading center. The grand duchy of Kiev, originally founded by Vikings trading through Russia with Constantinople, was still a large and prosperous state at the end of the twelfth century. But in the early thirteenth century Kiev

was destroyed, and the greater part of what is now modern European Russia was conquered by invading Mongols, who compelled the various feudal rulers of Russia to pay them tribute for nearly two centuries.

Thus Russia experienced an entirely different development from the rest of Europe. During the Mongol regime the grand duchy of Moscow became the leading power in Russia, its dukes acting as tax collectors for the Mongols, but attempting to build up enough strength to expel them and throw off their rule altogether. The expulsion of the Mongols was not finally accomplished until the early fif-



teenth century. Later in the century Ivan III, the Great, now freed from the Mongols, united the greater part of modern European Russia under his rule, and married the niece of the last emperor of Constantinople. Then he proclaimed himself successor of Constantinople, which had recently fallen to the Turks, and thus protector of all Orthodox Christians everywhere, and sovereign of all Russia. He was, in fact, the effective ruler of the largest Christian territory in Europe, though the great state of Poland-Lithuania, which was his neighbor to the west, was in that century not very much smaller, and far better developed than his.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF OLD RUSSIA

However, though Ivan was the titular overlord of all Russia, this did not mean that the princes and nobles (boyars) of Russia in any way accepted his right to rule over them with authority. On the contrary, they regarded themselves as entirely independent, possessing ancient traditional rights which they were willing to defend against any encroachment by the duke of Moscow. When they finally decided to recognize the suzerainty of the duke, this in no way implied that he had any absolute authority over them. In this respect their position was analogous to that of feudal vassals in the West. The peasantry also possessed certain rights against their lords. They were personally free, and owed only specified taxes, paid mostly in kind, to their lords; in this respect their position in medieval times was superior to that of their counterparts in the West.

All this changed with the continued growth of the power of the duke over the boyars. The means used by the dukes (called tsars from the time of Ivan IV) were, in a broad sense, the development and support of a new class of landowners who did not belong to the old nobility, who were ennobled, if at all, by the tsar, and who held their lands directly from him. These lands they held only for their lifetime, and they could be passed on to their sons only if the latter continued to give service to

Chronological Chart

Russia

Reign of Ivan III (the Great)	1462-1505
Reign of Ivan IV (the Terrible)	1533-1584
Assumption of personal power and title of tsar by Ivan	1547
Convocation of first <i>zemsky sobor</i>	1549
"Time of Troubles"—conflicts over succession	1604-1613
Reign of Michael Romanov	1613-1645
Pioneers reach Pacific	1637
Reign of Alexis	1645-1676
Peasant revolt of Stenka Razin	1670-1671
Ivan V and Peter I co-tsars—regency of Sophia	1682-1689
Personal rule of Peter the Great	1689-1725
European journey of Peter	1697-1698
Revolt and suppression of <i>streltsy</i>	1698
Great Northern War	1700-1721
Battle of Narva—defeat of Russians	1700
Foundation of St. Petersburg	1703
Battle of Poltava—decisive victory of Russians over Swedes	1709
Peace of Nystadt with Sweden	1721
Reign of Elizabeth, daughter of Peter the Great	1741-1762
Seven Years' War, Russian victories against Frederick the Great	1756-1762
Peter III makes peace with Frederick	1762
Reign of Catherine II, the Great	1762-1796
First Partition of Poland	1772
Annexation of Crimea	1783
Second Partition of Poland	1793
Third Partition of Poland	1795
Reign of Alexander I	1801-1825

the monarchs. This class is usually called the gentry. The tsars, by virtue of the hold they had over the gentry, were able to use them to good effect to weaken and ultimately destroy the power of the old hereditary boyar nobility. In the process the peasants lost their freedom and became serfs through legislation by the

tsar, who needed them not only for taxes but for service in his armies, and thus was as anxious as their local masters to have them stay on the land. It was also to the interest of both boyars and gentry that the peasants, who of course were the backbone of the economy, should be made to work to the utmost, and that they should not be permitted to escape their service to the state and to themselves. In this the interests of the tsar and the landowners coincided. The tiny middle class, which alone might have wished to aid the peasants (as, for instance, in ancient Greece), was far too small to exercise any real influence on policy.

In early times there had been various assemblies, and the rudiments of democratic institutions. There had been one assembly in which even the peasants had been allowed to participate. The ancient Hanseatic republic of

Novgorod had possessed several institutions which might have grown toward democracy. But with the conquest and sack of Novgorod by Ivan III, these disappeared. All that remained was the boyars' council, or *duma*, which was sometimes summoned by the duke when he needed it, but was itself unable to force participation in governmental affairs. The initiative for calling it always rested in the hands of the duke, unless the latter happened to be a minor or in some way incapacitated.

Over against this incipient feudal structure, not dissimilar to that in the West, was the Byzantine tradition inherited by the duke or tsar. The tsars held their own position by strict heredity. Although traditionally the assembly had hailed the duke on his accession, the office had in fact never been elective, and the tsar had no intention of allowing it to become elective. On the contrary, like any



An early Russian church in the Ukraine dating from about 1654; note oriental and Byzantine influence.

Roman emperor, he believed that he held his power only from God. Moreover, he was the real controller of the Orthodox Church. The metropolitan of Moscow was in theory subordinate to the patriarch in Constantinople. But Russians—clergy, government, and people alike—regarded the Russian Church as far superior to the Greek Church in Constantinople, whose patriarch after 1453 was allowed to hold his office only by courtesy of the Turks who ruled his city. When Constantinople fell to the Turks, Moscow called itself the "Third Rome." The tsar's influence was paramount in the selection of the metropolitan, and thus the Church, as in Constantinople, was almost an appendage of the state, even though a number of distinguished prelates had great influence with some tsars and occasionally stood up to them. The tsar could always force the deposition of recalcitrant Church leaders. This Russian "Caesaro-papism" was thus very similar to that of the Byzantine Empire, and there can be no doubt that the tsar's position was greatly strengthened by his religious status, and by the duty of the people to give him implicit obedience, as preached by the Church.

With an independent and autocratic tsar believing in his Byzantine heritage and his right to rule as an undisputed autocrat, on the one side, and, on the other side, an old nobility, with an independence of several centuries' standing, suspicious of all attempts by the tsar to increase his power, the stage was clearly set for a struggle between these two competitors. It came in the reign of Ivan IV, known as the Dread or Terrible; but the ground had been well prepared during the long reigns of his father and grandfather. They had added much to the domain of the duchy of Moscow, and in the process had reduced the power of the old independent lords while gaining the allegiance of new landowners, who owed their position to the conquest made with their aid by the dukes.

THE REIGN OF IVAN IV (1533-1584)

When Ivan's father Vassily III died, the new monarch was a young child. The necessary regency gave the boyars a chance to exercise some authority. But they used the

opportunity mainly in fighting and intriguing against each other for the control of the regent, Ivan's mother, to the detriment of good government. The experience of this period no doubt greatly influenced Ivan against boyar rule. At the age of sixteen he declared himself of age, and announced that he intended to assume the burden of personal rule with the title of tsar. The divided boyars accepted the position, and Ivan proceeded to institute a series of reforms.

The real government was carried on by the tsar, with the aid of an efficient council of personally chosen advisers. But he called together fairly frequently a kind of national assembly, known as the *zemsky sobor*, in which were represented the boyars and gentry, together with a number of merchants and other members of the middle class. Ivan asked advice of this assembly, and allowed it to debate and decide matters of policy. It should be understood, however, that the initiative for calling the *sobor* rested with himself, and without Ivan it could not function. He also determined its composition. In line with this policy of spreading responsibility among the better-qualified persons in his country, he allowed local officials and tax collectors to be elected, instead of using noble governors selected by himself. In all these reforms his purpose was to assure for himself competent and loyal officials rather than hereditary ones whose loyalty to him was doubtful.

As a help toward his consistent plan for dispossessing the hereditary nobility of its power, he organized a fairly large body of permanent troops, stationed either near Moscow or in key positions in the country (the *streltsy*). He also organized on a more efficient basis a corps of officers who were given lands which they could not pass on to their sons. These men, dependent upon himself, belonged to the gentry rather than the boyar class. The *zemsky sobor* gave formal approval to the changes, in spite of the fact that boyars were included in this body. The boyars, however, would hardly have been likely to approve these changes, had they known what use would be made of them.

When Ivan had been some thirty years on the throne, a boyar general went over to the

side of the enemy during a war. Ivan used this as an excuse to put into effect measures against the whole boyar class. He was aided in this by the outright defiance of the boyar in question, who claimed that all boyars were entitled to transfer their allegiance to any authority they wished. This was a part of their traditional rights. Ivan, on the other hand, took the position that the tsar was an autocrat to whom all owed allegiance, who could not be questioned, and who held his power only from God. He proceeded to organize a picked body of men called the *oprichnina*, who were subject only to himself. This was an élite corps of armed guards, wearing a distinctive uniform, and living apart under the tsar's special protection. The *oprichnina*, naturally, did not contain more than a handful of boyars. It was made up almost entirely of the lower gentry with a sprinkling of foreigners. On Ivan's orders the *oprichnina* instituted a reign of terror, which was forever afterward to be associated with his name. Innumerable atrocities were committed, and almost open war was waged upon the boyars. Members of the corps were, in many instances, permitted to keep the estates of the boyars whom they had killed. Finally the terror was called off, but it had done its work. The tsar had broken the power of the boyar aristocracy for good, though certain boyar families were still able to cause difficulties for the monarchy during the ensuing period, known as the "time of troubles." During this latter period there was virtual anarchy, accompanied by foreign intervention, until a zemsky sobor was called which gave the crown to the first of the Romanovs, a youth of sixteen named Michael, whose descendants sat on the Russian throne until the Revolution of 1917.

THE EARLY ROMANOVS

Michael (1613-1645) and his successor, Alexis (1645-1676), were compelled by the logic of their position to maintain an antiboyar position. Engaged for much of their long reigns in foreign wars, they found it necessary to keep in being armies of whose loyalty they could be assured. This meant reliance on the gentry, who were tied to themselves, rather

than on the more independent boyars. The peasants gradually sank to the position of serfs, or even slaves. The rule of the period can best be characterized as rule by monarch and gentry, based on the subjection and near-slavery of the peasant class, on which the whole government and economy were based. It is therefore not surprising that peasant revolts were common, though always ruthlessly suppressed. The monarchs, however, who recognized their country's backwardness in comparison with the West, invited foreigners, especially technicians, to Russia, and encouraged foreign merchants to settle in Moscow. The fact that these men commanded much higher salaries and a better standard of living than native Russians caused much discontent among the latter. They were unable to recognize that no one would have come to live in their backward country and provincial capital, which lacked all the amenities of foreign capitals, without such incentive. By the end of the reign of Alexis the rulers were virtually absolute, but the government and army remained inefficient by contemporary Western standards. The army was no match for the much smaller armies of the Western powers, as was demonstrated in the early years of Peter the Great.

REIGN OF PETER THE GREAT

Peter I, the Great (1682-1725), son of Alexis by a second wife, did not succeed to undisputed rule over Russia for thirteen years after the death of his father, though he was co-ruler from 1682.

Peter was a man of extraordinary capacity and energy, ruthless and efficient, driving all his servants to the utmost and himself doing more than any of them. He was also flexible and intelligent. But above all he was an improviser and opportunist of genius, with an unequalled capacity for quick decision. His willingness to acquire knowledge wherever it was to be won made him into the real founder of modern Russia.

He recognized at once, through defeats suffered at the hands of Western powers, that Russia was so backward that she could not hope to catch up with the West by the slow



Portrait of Peter the Great attributed to Aert de Gelder, now in the Rijksmuseum at Amsterdam.

processes of natural growth. The West must be pillaged for its ideas which, in the West, had been developed over long periods of time. These ideas must then be put to use in Russia by all the means available to an autocrat. Leaving the government in the hands of subordinates, he set out himself with an embassy, traveling incognito to all the countries in Europe from which he hoped to learn. He examined their techniques, especially those likely to be of use to him in his wars; he examined their machines, for the understanding of which he had a natural talent that he used to the full. He hired foreign technicians whose task it would be to train the Russians, while, for the moment, he used the technicians themselves to modernize the country for immediate practical purposes. By such processes he built himself an army and a navy which were able to defeat the great power of Sweden, and force the Swedes to a humiliating peace which greatly enlarged the Russian state and gave it access to the Baltic.

For many years Peter was occupied with

his army and the war with Sweden. During this period he laid a heavy hand upon his people for the purpose of recruiting enough troops and training them in modern warfare. No longer was it left to the landowners to enlist their serfs in the army. Imperial governors and agents recruited them; and though there were many desertions, punished by fearful penalties, the armies were finally raised and they won their victories. The officer class was made entirely dependent on the tsar. All nobles had been liable for military service in the past. Now, however, they lost all hereditary right to promotion. They were to hold rank entirely in accordance with their ability. A man not previously a noble was ennobled at once on receiving his commission from the tsar. Such recruits into the officer class were, as a rule, members of the gentry rather than boyars, so that the distinction between the old nobility and the new was lost altogether. All were thus bound to the tsar, dependent entirely upon him.

Everyone in the country was by law made liable for state service. The tsar could even

force his people to go to school and learn what he considered necessary. Many were even compelled to go abroad to study. State service, in Peter's eyes, meant not only service in the army but service in industry if necessary. Important industries were started under the spur of the tsar, always with the expressed intention of somehow, by forced growth, catching up with the West.

Peter set up several new institutions for the purpose of increasing efficiency. Regulations were drafted by a professional body called the Senate, completely under the control of the tsar, who kept watch over them to see that they were not idle. He set up various specialized departments of state, some of which included foreigners. These departments had collective rather than individual responsibility. No one in the state was ever permitted much degree of initiative if Peter could prevent it. He was himself the source of all initiative and authority, and he made every effort to supervise the

work of his servants as well as issuing instructions. For the purpose of checking up on the work of his servants, he set up a system of spies and informers to see that corruption was stamped out. Endless laws were passed to try to prevent it, but they had no more success than such laws usually have. Opportunities for corruption were numerous, for vast numbers of indirect taxes were imposed, as well as a poll tax, based on a census taken by the tsar with his usual pitiless efficiency.

The whole effectiveness of the system depended upon the ability of the tsar. Though special tasks were distributed locally throughout the country, responsibility was not really shared. At its basis was force rather than consent. Peter was hated as few men have ever been, though he could not but command respect and obedience. Peasants and religious men called him the antichrist, and he was regarded by them with a superstitious awe. Nevertheless, in spite of constant small and hopeless revolts,



A scene from the center of St. Petersburg, founded on the banks of the Neva in 1703 by Peter the Great. Its name was changed to Petrograd in 1914 and, after the death of Lenin in 1924, to Leningrad. Its proximity to the Finnish frontier has influenced Russian military and foreign policy since the time of Peter.

there was never any widespread organized revolt against him, and he cannot be regarded except as a highly successful monarch who achieved the ends he set for himself, with very few failures debited against him.

The reader will recognize the similarity of the system of Peter the Great to that of the later Roman and Byzantine empires. The incentive was the same. By all means, the army had to be built up and made capable of resistance to invasion and, if possible, of expansion into new areas. The state had the first call on the services of every man; compulsion was used when found to be necessary. Governmental institutions were changed by the ruler in every case to fit the needs of the state. The Russia of Peter the Great was as nearly totalitarian a state in the modern sense as any known until the twentieth century.

Peter's principal task, as he early recognized, was to break the power of Sweden in the Baltic; and though he found himself faced by Charles XII of Sweden, one of the greatest warriors of all time, and suffered a very severe defeat at the Battle of Narva in 1700, thereafter he was able to draw the Swedish monarch deep into Russia and destroy him there. The Peace of Nystadt (1721), which ended the war, reduced Sweden to a second-class power and greatly enlarged the Baltic regions under Russian control. Meanwhile, Peter had been developing what he called his "window on the West," the great port of St. Petersburg, which became his capital.


St. Petersburg was a monument both to Peter's power and to his westernizing policy. Filled with factories, docks, and military supply centers, and protected by a nearby fortress at Kronstadt, it was from the beginning thronged with foreigners and under foreign influence. Nobles were expected to build their town houses there, and in time tended to become westernized themselves; sometimes they even used their native language as second to French. But though some became at least superficially westernized, and though Russian rulers, at least through the eighteenth century, looked westward rather than eastward, and accepted the new city as their capital, the great masses of Russians became ever more alienated from

a Western civilization in which they shared almost not at all.

RUSSIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY— CATHERINE THE GREAT

As we have already noted, in discussing the Roman Empire, the gravest difficulty for the hereditary autocratic system of government is the inability of any monarch to ensure that his son, if any, will inherit his capacities. Peter's own son Alexis became a focus of opposition to him during his lifetime, whether Alexis desired it or not; Peter had him tortured and killed in his own presence. His second wife, a peasant woman from one of the Baltic provinces, ultimately succeeded him, then an assorted group of incompetents, until his daughter Elizabeth managed to hold the crown for twenty years. During this period the "service nobles" and the imperial bureaucracy—those who had been required to serve Peter in whatever capacity he wished—were the real rulers of the country, as customary when the monarch is weak. The old nobility, the boyars, controlled one of the rulers for a few years, but were soon dispossessed by the more powerful service nobility. The nobility naturally were freed of their more onerous obligations during the period, and were able to clamp their rule more tightly over the peasantry, who could be bought and sold with or without land, and became thus indistinguishable from slaves. The process of westernization, however, continued. France exercised a strong influence on the Russian upper classes, as she did in Prussia. The French language became the accepted language of the court and nobility. Many of the nobles employed hundreds of serfs as domestic servants; some of them were said to have lost the ability to speak the same language as their serfs. Among themselves they conversed exclusively in French. Foreigners were to be found everywhere. They were disliked by the lesser nobility, and naturally by the peasants, who were inclined to blame them at least as much as the upper nobles for their plight.

The army, however, continued to be successful, and was slowly building Russia into a great power, exercising considerable influence



in European affairs. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Russians expanded as far as the Pacific, the colonization for the most part being carried on by Cossacks who accepted the authority of the tsar in Moscow at least formally, as long as he did not interfere too much with what they were doing. Siberia was to a large extent unpopulated before the Cossacks came in; even until the early part of the twentieth century it was mostly a home for exiles. It was not thoroughly developed from an economic point of view until the present Russian regime.

As we have already noted, Russia would

have completed the rout of Frederick the Great in 1762 if the new tsar, Peter III, had not at that moment inherited the throne from his mother, Elizabeth. Peter so much admired Prussia and Frederick the Great that he could not bear to defeat them. So he withdrew his army and made peace, to the disgust of the army and court. When he proceeded to try to make some military reforms in his guard troops in the direction of Prussianizing them, they revolted. Peter was assassinated, to be succeeded by his estranged wife, a minor German princess who was probably privy to his murder. However this may be, it was she who

profited from his death and reigned as Catherine II, the Great, for thirty-four years (1762-1796). Brilliantly successful in her foreign policy, which culminated in the Russian absorption of the greater part of Poland through three successive partitions, Catherine appears to have wished to make reforms at home but was unable to make much headway. Posing as an enlightened despot, and as a philosopher, friend, and benefactress of the noted French *philosophes*, the best that may be said for her is that she did not make the position of the serfs much worse—not an easy task in any case—and she made the system of government considerably more efficient. Early in her reign she attempted to improve the legal system of the country and instructed a large and fairly representative Legislative Commission in the principles it should follow in suggesting reforms. But when the members of the commission did not agree among themselves, Catherine did not insist upon recommendations, and sent the commissioners home. Enough had been done for honor.

In essentials Catherine returned to the system of Peter the Great, but without the personal arbitrariness of that monarch. Being a woman, and lacking both Peter's nerve and his style, together with his utter disregard for every convention and every inherited right, Catherine contented herself with using the service nobility she had inherited, and with improving the system, such as it was, of local government. When a huge peasant revolt in 1773, which was only with great difficulty suppressed, demonstrated the need for improved local administration, she created more manageable units of government, and subjected them to closer supervision by her officials than had been customary in the past. The nobles were now legally permitted to sell their serfs and were given almost absolute power over them; but the nobles themselves were held responsible to the central government for the management of their territories.

When the French Revolution broke out toward the end of the reign of Catherine, she wholeheartedly disapproved of it, and was greatly disappointed in the outcome of a century of enlightenment. She herself had come

to the conclusion that, in her country at least, only an absolute autocrat could govern effectively, and her government was far better than the government of nobles that was the only alternative. In this it must be agreed that she was right. Although her grandson Alexander I, in whose education she took a great interest, was able to win a reputation for liberalism abroad, especially when he granted his new kingdom of Poland an advanced constitution, at home he barely deviated from the autocratic principles of his predecessor. Russia had to wait for another half a century before the serfs were emancipated, and even that belated act of charity may well have indirectly cost Alexander II his life.

❖ France

We now come to the two nations who were the most important and influential in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, France and England. Italy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and perhaps Spain in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, overshadowed these rising nations; but no one can question the ascendancy of France in the seventeenth, especially during the long reign of Louis XIV. In the eighteenth century France was still the cultural leader of Europe, but many French intellectual leaders in the eighteenth century were attracted by England's science and political thought, and above all by her government and political practice, which to many seemed very enlightened in comparison with the decaying French absolutism of the age. Although Britain had to wait until the nineteenth century for the full fruition of her genius, already in the eighteenth century her coming greatness was foreshadowed. In all the wars she fought with her continental neighbors during the century she emerged with increased prestige and credit (with, of course, the outstanding exception of the American War of Independence, which was also a Franco-British war) as well as territorial gains. In these two sections we shall therefore study the basis for French absolutism and consider its strengths and weaknesses, leaving French cul-

tural and intellectual achievements for the next chapter; the section devoted to the Puritan political revolution in England will be somewhat longer and more detailed, since it was this revolution itself that beyond any doubt played a major part in later British ascendancy.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BOURBON MONARCHY UNDER HENRY IV (1589-1610)

When we last considered the history of France, the country had been undergoing a civil war which lasted for much of the sixteenth century, a war which unleashed religious passions, and for this reason could not be confined simply to French participants. The Spanish army was still in France when the Protestant Henry of Navarre won the crown in 1589, little though Philip III of Spain could afford to keep it there. When Henry embraced Catholicism, the major reason for Spanish intervention was removed, and Henry was able

to make peace and get himself accepted as king. Shortly afterward he issued the Edict of Nantes (1598), granting the Huguenots a number of fortified cities, freedom of public worship wherever Protestant religion had previously been accepted, and freedom of private worship for everyone. Special provision was made for Protestant judges, and subsidies were even granted for Protestant schools.

This statesmanlike act, bitterly resented by the Catholic die-hards, was the beginning of the recovery of France. Henry set to work to try to heal the wounds inflicted by the civil wars. He chose as his minister of finance a dour Protestant, who was created duke of Sully and given a free hand in reforming the royal finances and the tax system—though Henry visited him regularly while he was doing his accounts, and, according to his minister, made numerous intelligent suggestions. As much by his free and open personality and his thorough understanding of his people as by the financial



Contemporary painting, by Gilles van Coninxloo, of Henry IV of France at the siege of Chartres. The character of the swashbuckling Henry has been perfectly caught by the artist, who died three years before Henry did and who must have known him from life.

Chronological Chart

France

Reign of Francis I	1515-1547	War of Devolution	1667-1668
Wars with Spain and Holy Roman Empire (see under Spain)		Dutch War	1672-1678
Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis	1559	Marriage of Louis to Madame de Maintenon	1684
Religious wars	1562-1598	Revocation of Edict of Nantes	1685
Massacre of St. Bartholomew	1572	War of League of Augsburg	1688-1697
Assassination of Duke of Guise and King Henry III	1589	Negotiations for division of Spanish inheritance	1698-1700
Reign of Henry IV	1589-1610	Death of Charles II of Spain	1700
Edict of Nantes and end of civil and religious wars	1598	War of Spanish Succession	1701-1714
Reign of Louis XIII	1610-1643	Suppression of Port-Royal by papal bull	1704
Meeting of States-General	1614	Peace of Utrecht	1713
Richelieu, chief minister of Louis XIII	1624-1643	Treaties of Rastatt and Baden with Emperor Charles VI	1714
Capture of La Rochelle from Huguenots	1628	Death of Louis XIV	1715
Entry of France in Thirty Years' War	1639	Reign of Louis XV	1715-1774
Reign of Louis XIV	1643-1715	War of the Polish Succession	1733-1738
Ascendancy of Mazarin	1643-1661	War of the Austrian Succession	1740-1748
Fronde	1648-1653	Seven Years' War	1756-1763
Peace of Westphalia	1648	Fall of Quebec to British	1759
Death of Mazarin and assumption of personal rule by Louis	1661	Incorporation of Lorraine	1766
Building of Versailles	1661-1682	Incorporation of Corsica	1768
Financial administration of Colbert	1662-1683	Abolition of parlements (Maupéou)	1771
		Reign of Louis XVI	1774-1792
		Intervention in American War of Independence	1778-1783

acumen of Sully, France suddenly became the prosperous land that she always could have been. The nobles were for the present completely subdued, while the towns prospered; and the peasantry, at last able to exercise their special talents without fear of having their land fought over and their crops stolen, appreciative of Henry's pledge to pursue a policy which would allow a "chicken in every pot," worked hard and made Henry into their ideal king—and he is so regarded to this day.

For the rest, Henry was no great innovator. The trappings of the *ancien régime* of France were maintained, along with its officials who

purchased their posts and were paid out of the proceeds; with its tax system, under which private enterprise collected the taxes and remitted the proceeds to the king after subtraction of its percentage; and with its collectors of direct land taxes, who also took their share. But the administration was greatly improved, and Sully was able to put aside more than a million livres every year against probable future wars. Royal officials, superprefects known as *intendants*, also made their appearance in this reign, charged with the task of looking after the king's interests in the provinces. Sully meanwhile used some of his hard-

earned money to improve roads, and insisted that local landowners do their share of road and bridge repairing. Another minister, Barthélemy De Laffemas, preached a mercantile theory long before Colbert, and was able to set up a number of new industries and entice skilled artisans from abroad. But the great blessing of the reign was peace. The prosperity that followed it and left a surplus even in the royal treasury owed little, perhaps, to an improvement in institutions. Yet France was once again, at the death of Henry IV—murdered by a Catholic fanatic in 1610—a strong national state. The work of Richelieu in the following reign, in making France powerful abroad as well as at home, owed much to the patient labor of Henry and Sully.

LOUIS XIII AND CARDINAL RICHELIEU


The murder of Henry threatened again to plunge France into the anarchy and corruption from which she had so recently been rescued. Indeed, for a few years, while Henry's widow Marie de Médicis acted as regent for her young son, Louis XIII, the country was again troubled by rebellious nobles and by a recrudescence of the religious passion that had been only temporarily quieted. Then Louis came of age and brought to his aid Cardinal Richelieu, a strong, effective authoritarian who ruled for the rest of the reign of Louis, supported by the monarch, whom he kept constantly informed, but who allowed his powerful minister a free hand.

Two problems faced Richelieu if he were to establish the full authority of his master in France, and incidentally secure his own position. The special privileges granted by Henry to the Huguenots must be annulled, for private armies and divided governmental jurisdiction could not be tolerated by a monarch who hoped to be absolute. The feudal nobility likewise had not abandoned its private armies, nor yet fully accepted the authority of the monarch.

Richelieu's chief claim to fame as pillar of French absolutism rests on his handling of these problems. He was not hostile to the Protestant religion as such. Indeed, in spite of his position as cardinal of the Catholic Church, his policy was never dictated by clerical inter-

ests, but by single-minded devotion to France and the monarchy. However, many of the Protestant leaders were nobles, and he recognized that it might yet happen again that the nobles would be able to use religion to disrupt the country. Thus he struck at both, even while recognizing the value to France of the purely religious provisions of the Edict of Nantes, which permitted Huguenots partial religious freedom. There were many rebellions in the reign of Louis, quite possibly encouraged indirectly by the astute cardinal, who always seemed to be ready to meet them. The lords were compelled to pull down their castles and disband their private armies, while the Huguenot strongholds were reduced by the king's troops. Secure at home, though hated greatly by his enemies, the cardinal turned to the rectification of French frontiers and the aggrandizement of France abroad. We have already noticed the part played by the French in the Thirty Years' War, which for Richelieu and his successor, Cardinal Mazarin, meant the destruction of Hapsburg power and the prevention of a united front against France by the Spanish and Austrian Hapsburgs. In this policy the two cardinals were completely successful, and by 1648, after the Peace of Westphalia, France had the largest and best-trained army in Europe, and substantially her present boundaries, with a few exceptions, such as Alsace and Franche-Comté—the latter under the Spanish crown, the former still an imperial possession.

The wars fought by Richelieu were expensive and naturally unpopular with those who had to pay for them. As always in France it was difficult indeed to extract the money; but the money was there if the administrative system was efficient enough to enforce its collection. Richelieu's administrative reforms, which included the regularization and strengthening of the system of *intendants*, begun by Sully, may be regarded as by-products of his desire to strengthen the authority of the king and to obtain enough money to pay for his financial intervention in the Thirty Years' War, and for the military contributions that settled the war in France's favor when money alone had been used as far as it would go.



FAILURE OF EFFORTS TO CURB
ABSOLUTISM—THE FRONDE

When Richelieu died a few months before his master, he had already trained another cardinal, an Italian named Mazarin, to take his place during the minority of the young king Louis XIV. Mazarin ensured his position by endearing himself to the Queen Regent, and together they ruled France until the death of Mazarin in 1661, at which time Louis XIV himself took complete charge of the government. Mazarin was more unpopular than Richelieu, since, unlike his teacher, he was far from incorruptible, and he filled many high places in the state with his numerous relatives. He also appeared to be more vulnerable, since he was supported only by a regent, and by a king who seemed to take little interest in public

affairs, not, like Richelieu, by a king who wholeheartedly approved of his minister's policy. Moreover, after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, even though the war with Spain had not yet finished, there were important generals to be reckoned with, any of whom might be able to overthrow Mazarin if he tried hard enough. Nevertheless, Mazarin survived, in spite of the opposition of the remaining nobility, which had not been sufficiently chastened by Richelieu, and of the people and middle classes, who found their spokesman in the powerful Parlement de Paris, the chief law-court in France.

During the minority of Louis XIV two rebellions broke out, known collectively as the Fronde. But they were so ill managed and devoid of constructive ideas that Mazarin was able to surmount them, although for a short time he was compelled to go into exile with his

young king. The nobles disgraced themselves by aimless fighting, much of it among themselves, and the most popular general committed treason by joining the Spaniards; meanwhile the Parlement de Paris gave verbal support to the uprising without making sure of the sympathy of the army. The Parlement de Paris, though it held a position of great influence and antiquity, lacked effective powers. The king was the legislator, not the Parlement. But it was one of the tasks of the Parlement to register the king's decrees after he had made them, and this registration gave full legal effect to them. By the same token, it could refuse to register the decrees. Such refusal, however, was of no practical effect, since the king could compel the Parlement to register his decrees at a special session known as the *lit de justice*. With or without registration, the king was always in a position to make his decrees effective, even if not legally valid. Marshal Turenne, the leading military man, a Protestant who had briefly joined the rebels, disgusted with the futility of the rebellion threw in his lot with the government, and Mazarin was restored. There can be no doubt that the young Louis XIV, during whose minority the Fronde took place, must have recognized from this experience how essential royal absolutism had become and how hopeless was any rebellion against it. The possible adversaries of his absolute rule were disunited and had no positive program. During the long reign of Louis he never had anything similar to contend with, and he spoke and acted as if he were the sole master of France.

LOUIS XIV—THE "SUN-KING"

The Court and Palace Louis XIV himself was at all times in his reign the center of his government. He presided over meetings of his council; he made all appointments. His decrees were registered by the Parlement de Paris as a matter of course, since, as we have seen, if the Parlement resisted, he had the last word always at his disposal. Louis was one of the hardest workers of all kings in history. He was neither especially able nor attractive, yet he had a very high sense of his own dig-

nity; he looked the part of a king and played it to perfection. As an autocrat he was not an unreasonable or arbitrary one, though in his later years he performed many arbitrary acts which he had been persuaded were for the good of his kingdom or dynasty. He regarded himself as so far above ordinary men that there was no need to take vengeance on any of them or to allow himself to be ruffled by their feeble opposition. He was content with banishing from his august presence courtiers who offended him; to the old rebels of the Fronde he was gracious and forgiving; as soon as it was politically safe to do so, he extended his royal pardon to them.

Since there was no real competitor for his power in the realm of France, and France herself was so strong that she was able to fight any wars engaged in by Louis almost entirely outside her own borders, Louis rather naturally had an extremely exalted opinion of himself, and there can be no doubt that he genuinely believed in the divine right of kings as applied to himself.

To illustrate his semidivine position as effectively as possible, Louis surrounded himself with the most elaborate system of etiquette ever devised in the Western world, an etiquette scarcely to be paralleled even in Constantinople. Every act that he performed had to be according to a solemn ritual that appears in this democratic age and country to be somewhat ridiculous. When he arose in the morning the great nobles regarded it as an honor to be present at the ceremony (the *lever*), and as a grave dishonor if they were excluded. Each noble had a particular task assigned to him, such as holding the sleeve of his master's shirt while the royal hand was thrust into it. More ceremonies accompanied every necessary act of the king's life. Only a monarch of the greatest hardihood could stand such a strain, and Louis' successors were not men enough for the job. Louis presided over all his council meetings and made it his business to know everything that was being done in his name as far as he possibly could. He was determined that the life of France should indeed revolve around him, as in theory it should. Only a man of great application and remarkable physical en-

durance could have solemnly gone through the palace ritual every day of his reign—but Louis achieved it, and the rest of Europe, outside England, did its best to imitate it. It was perhaps fortunate that a sense of the ridiculous was not included amongst Louis' more sterling qualities; if he possessed it, no one during a long reign was ever allowed to suspect it.

For the proper diffusion of the light radiated by the Sun King the largest palace in the world was built, to the sorrow of the financial minister Colbert, but to the undoubted glorification of the monarch—not only in France, but in every country of Europe. This palace of Versailles, which may still be seen today by the curious, and is admired by some, was able to accommodate some ten thousand persons. It was not only the court of the king but also the working quarters of the royal household and the seat of government.

The exterior is built in the style of the late French Renaissance, and resembles St. Peter's in Rome for the magnificence of its layout and symmetry. The gardens, tended by scores of highly expert gardeners, were geometrical, in accordance with the growing French taste for order and reasonableness. The hedges were clipped and formal; nothing was permitted to be out of place, and the long walks of the great park were designed with the greatest care and regard for the particular kind of vista desired by the designers. The exterior has been partly spoiled by later efforts at "improvement," especially those of Louis Philippe, a post-Revolutionary monarch. Nevertheless, the great park of Versailles, with its statues and its fountains, must have been a great marvel in its day. Even while Louis reigned, however, the interior was discovered to be damp and uncomfortable to live in. It was made endurable only by the magnificence of the great salons, and especially the enormous hall of mirrors, the contemplation of which may in some degree have compensated for the boredom and material discomfort unavoidably attached to the task of being a good courtier, or even, be it said, a good king.

Government and administration. Louis XIV was in no sense an innovator in government.

His greatest claim to fame as a ruler attaches to his ability to make the best use of what he had inherited as his governmental structure, and to his selection of ministers to do his will. He ruled through several councils of state, which gradually developed almost into modern specialized departments. These councils were kept very small, and the councilors met with the king frequently to concert policy. From the councils went forth instructions to the king's servants in the provinces, primarily the intendants, who had a few assistants in some of the larger centers of administrative jurisdiction (called *généralités*). The king also had a high court, which in many ways acted like the English Court of Star Chamber, to be discussed later in this chapter. It dealt with special royal cases and in some respects acted as the equivalent of a court of appeal, in which the king's justice prevailed over any local decision.

The army, previously recruited almost entirely by private enterprise, was fully subject to the king for the first time in French history. The system of commissioning officers to recruit and train troops was maintained, but now the officers were closely checked to see whether they really had the troops under their command that they claimed. Since they were now equipped from royal warehouses and arsenals, the nobility could no longer use their retainers as private armies. Without proper equipment, they could not hope to stand against the royal hosts. A real minister of war was responsible for the training of the army, and new practices of drill and training were adopted.

The French military system was undoubtedly responsible for the successes of Louis in his wars, often against numerically superior forces but without unified training and only a slightly unified command. For communication, the ministers of Louis organized an efficient postal system. This also had previously been handled by many different organizations, with many tolls to pay before a letter reached its destination. Now the contract was let out, but to only one semi-official corporation. Letters were carried for a single charge, with any customs surtaxes to be paid at the destination.

The efficient centralization of the government did not mean that at once all the liberties

of French subjects were lost. Indeed, for the most part, they were not lost at all, since the king in all probability would never interfere with them. By far the larger number of official positions was still bought and paid for. These positions were regarded as property, to be bequeathed to one's family after death. The holders did not earn any regular salary, as indeed even the ministers of the Crown, who were directly employed by the king, did not. They obtained their income from the exercise of their functions, as for instance when fines were assessed and paid. Naturally, there was a definite value in such positions. Their incomes could be calculated, so that to regard them as valuable property was hardly inaccurate. The officials would have fought bitterly against the monarch if he had in any way tried to deprive them of their jobs, which were indeed in many cases far from sinecures. Louis' administration preferred to take away occasional tasks from these men and give them to the intendants and their staff.

Thus the absolutism of Louis, though in theory complete, in practice was modified considerably by ancient vested interests which it was not worth while disturbing. The nobility were almost entirely exempt from taxation, and Louis frequently handed out immunities to his favorites, again to the distress of his finance minister, who was looking for ways to persuade the nobles to make some contribution to the expenses of government. In the vast number of legal cases ancient precedents were followed and administered, not by royal appointees but by men who had bought or inherited their positions and knew what the ancient customs of the kingdom were. In this respect they were similar to the English common lawyers, and were at least as much devoted to ancient tradition. So the monarchy was to a large degree only superficially modernized. Not until the eighteenth century did the vested rights of the ancient institutions come up against the royal power, when the latter was compelled by circumstances to try to improve the administration and to modernize it.

In the age of Louis XIV everything seemed good under the façade. The tremendous efforts of the finance minister Colbert to improve the

sources of income of the people, and thus increase the base for taxation, were to a large degree successful. When the king wished to exercise power there was no one who could effectively say him nay. It should be understood that his absolutism was not based on the army, as in modern dictatorships, although the army was used to suppress a number of minor uprisings, especially among the peasantry, and to aid in collecting taxes and keeping order. There can be little doubt that the government really did rest upon the consent of the various classes of the people. Generally speaking, the peasants were content as long as the monarch was Catholic and legitimate. The bourgeoisie had not yet become politically conscious, as in England, and respected any government that could provide protection after the long civil wars and did not conspicuously mismanage the state. The nobles had had their teeth drawn by Richelieu. Most of them were content to exchange their position of independence for one of dependence on the Crown, which in turn was willing to keep them as courtiers and pay them pensions. It was a poor substitute, but in the reign of Louis XIV the moral decay of the noble class was not yet as visible as it became in the reigns of his successors.

Religious policy of Louis Ever since the reign of Francis I (1515-1547) the French Church had been virtually controlled by the king, and the French clergy was at all times a willing instrument for the furtherance of royal policy. Nevertheless, much had happened since the time of Francis I, and the Catholic Reformation papacy was anxious to recover the ground lost in previous centuries to the national states. It had met considerable success in countries other than France. But Louis was determined to yield nothing of his absolute powers, nor share them with the pope, however willing he might be to execute papal policy of which he approved. He had no intention of losing his hold on the French clergy, and in this he was, of course, backed by the clergy, who were his own appointees. He was willing to grant the pope authority in the field of faith and morals but nothing more.

In dealing with Protestantism and other

beliefs that smacked of heresy, however, Louis was severe—more severe, indeed, in the persecution of Huguenots than the papacy itself approved. Pope Innocent XI asked him to stay his hand and did not even approve of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes.

The most troublesome group to the Church and to Louis were the Jansenists, who possessed a large monastery at Port-Royal, and conducted a number of schools in competition with the numerous Jesuit foundations. The Jansenists, named after a certain Cornelius Jansen, one-time professor at Louvain and bishop of Ypres, were in doctrine not very far from the Calvinists, believing in a modified form of predestination and staying extremely close to the teachings of St. Augustine as they interpreted them. In morality they were distinctly Puritan. It was extremely difficult to attack them, since they gained a great deal of support from the austere moral lives they lived and from their evident sincerity; and they were quite content to remain within the Church. Politics also became strongly interwoven with any action taken against them, since their implacable enemies were the Jesuits, and the latter, as instruments of papal policy against the Gallican Church, were highly unpopular with the king and the ordinary clergy. Nevertheless, the center of Port-Royal was closed once early in the reign of Louis, since he suspected the Jansenists of sympathy with the Frondeurs, and it was clear that their emphasis on predestination was too close to Calvinism. Later in the century, after the pope had accepted a milder interpretation of their doctrine, it was reopened, only to be suppressed again when Père Quesnel published a French New Testament with Jansenist commentary.

Behind the Jansenist controversy was the much larger question of the relation between Church and State in France, which has always been a thorny one. Not only in France but in all the Catholic countries of Europe there has been constant controversy over the role of the papacy in Church affairs. Few Catholic monarchs—even the most devout, such as Philip II of Spain—have been willing to concede control over such a powerful institution as the Church to a foreigner, for the monarchs wished to be

able to make use of the Church for their own national or dynastic aims. The Gallican Church of France was only the most vocal of the national churches, and for centuries supported the theoretical superiority of a council to the pope. The Jansenists, who like the Gallicans were good Catholics, in spite of the fact that they held doctrines not accepted by the majority of their coreligionists, provided Gallicanism with powerful support, especially in the eighteenth century. They too were antipapal for obvious reasons; they had taken the lead against the expansionism of the Jesuits, who were regarded as the militant arm of the papacy. Thus many of the French clergy and laymen who opposed some of the pretensions of the papacy adopted some of the teachings of Jansenism; and it was these men who provided much of the leadership of the anticlerical movement that became so strong in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, not only in France but elsewhere. A number of episcopal sees in Holland, for example, remained Jansenist in spite of the ban on Jansenism pronounced at the beginning of the eighteenth century by the pope. They merely threw off allegiance to Rome while continuing to call themselves Catholics.

Only when Pope Pius IX proclaimed the dogma of papal infallibility in 1870 was the controversy laid to rest within the Church. At that time those Catholics who had previously combated papal superiority were compelled to make the choice of accepting it or leaving the Church. And it was significant that the leader of these German Catholics who did indeed leave the Church, calling themselves the Old Catholics, was consecrated bishop by a Dutch Jansenist, whose forebears had already repudiated papal leadership in the eighteenth century.

But, important though Jansenism was within the Church, far more important in its immediate effects on France was the exodus of the Huguenots after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The revocation was undoubtedly due in the main to the efforts of the clergy. Every year for decades, whenever the clergy met to vote taxes to the king, they petitioned him for the revocation or forced conversion of the remaining Huguenots, who must have numbered in the early part of Louis' reign at least a

million, concentrated in a few important centers, especially in Languedoc and Normandy. As a rule the Huguenots were peaceful citizens; they had taken no part in the Fronde. But they were still a standing reproach to the Catholic clergy, who were entirely unable to convert them.

Louis tightened his regulations against them, and some indeed did convert. In due course Louis was informed that most of them had been converted and all that was necessary now was to revoke the "temporary measure" which had granted them toleration and had been adopted only for political reasons. So Louis, either believing or wishing to believe the misinformation, and sure that he was striking a blow for the true religion, in 1685 revoked the Edict of Nantes.

It might have been possible for the Huguenots to emigrate, but this was not permitted. French policy was strongly against all emigration except to French lands overseas, and it was known that much of French prosperity would depart with the Huguenots, as well as the trade secrets and skills that they had acquired. The French army was therefore stationed at the frontiers to prevent their escape, and when they returned they were forcibly converted to Catholicism. Hundreds of thousands nevertheless succeeded in leaving, without their possessions but determined not to abandon their religion. What was France's loss was the gain of every Protestant country. Over forty thousand were welcomed in Brandenburg-Prussia alone, bringing an industry to that backward state that altogether changed the character of the economy. England and Holland and the German Protestant princes all opened their doors, as did even the Dutch in South Africa and the American Colonies.

The French economy can be said never to have fully recovered from the expulsion of the Huguenots. It was without question the most senseless of all Louis' acts, and the most damaging to his country. Whole industries had been in the hands of Huguenots, and the industries just ceased to exist after the expulsion, while it took the remaining Catholics many decades to rebuild the industries which had been ruined by the departure of so many

skilled workers. On the other hand, every country which welcomed these seventeenth-century "displaced persons" profited by it, and were enabled to compete better with the French industry which had been growing so quickly up to that time. It was fortunate indeed for Colbert that he had been in his grave two years when the edict was revoked—for it is sure that Louis would not have listened to him. When his salvation was involved, Louis was hardly the man to be swayed by mere commercial considerations.

Economic and financial policy—Colbert
We have already dealt briefly with the work of the great French finance minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert, who was a faithful servant of Louis until his death in 1683. We have seen by what means Colbert built up French industry, completing the work of his great predecessors of the reign of Henry IV. It was Colbert's belief that France should be the greatest industrial country of Europe and should have a very fair proportion of European trade. It would then be possible to provide the king with enough money for his uses without having to raise the rate of taxation, and without having to fall back constantly upon the peasants, who



Jean Baptiste Colbert, finance minister of Louis XIV. Line engraving by Robert Nanteuil, 1676.

were taxed heavily enough. Agriculture could and must be improved, especially by the use of new agricultural methods already in use in Holland; but the main source of income must be the towns, of which there were more in France than in any other country. Impediments to trade within the country should be lessened, and the collection of the taxes greatly improved by superior administration.

None of Colbert's predecessors had put all these policies into effect at the same time, and the result was astonishing. France became by far the richest country in Europe, surpassing even the United Provinces (Holland), which no doubt had a greater wealth per capita, but which, with a far smaller population, could not equal France in national income. A great effort was made to get rid of the numerous hindrances to trade, such as excessive customs barriers and interference by the nobility with the free flow of traffic. The greater part of the country for the first time became a customs-free area, within which trade could flow freely. A canal was dug from the Bay of Biscay to the Mediterranean. This huge engineering project vastly improved the flow of trade between the different areas of France, while the roads, which had been improving throughout the century, were now made into the best in Europe.

France is a potentially rich country. Her lands are the most fertile in Europe, and her people are among the most thrifty and industrious. But, with rare exceptions in her history, she has been ill served by her governments, which have either been too extravagant, or unable to provide effective internal security. For a brief while under Colbert she was better served than at almost any other time in her history. This resulted in prosperity, even for the peasant, for a time, while the bourgeoisie flourished for considerably longer. And Louis was able to build Versailles and carry out his wars. If he overextended himself at the end and had to use the worst methods of his predecessors and contemporaries to raise money, it was assuredly not the fault of Colbert, who had been long dead. Louis approved of the constant wars which added to his glory and power; there is no reason to believe that he

regarded Colbert as anything but a useful instrument to help him win his wars, or that he really understood anything of his great minister's work.

The Wars of Louis XIV The idea of the balance of power has been briefly noted earlier. We have seen how the French under Richelieu had struggled hard and effectively to prevent the union of the Spanish and Austrian Hapsburgs, which union would have put them within striking distance of dominating Europe. Charles V, as we have seen, achieved a similar position by means of Hapsburg marriage alliances in the sixteenth century. The French king Francis I had been forced to spend almost all his life fighting Charles, while Richelieu in the following century had spent considerable blood and treasure in trying to prevent a military union between the two Hapsburg powers by way of Italy. Now, however, in the time of Louis XIV, with the Hapsburg power broken by the treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees, France herself was close to being in a position to dominate Europe and too strong to be defeated by any but a very strong combination of powers. Thus all the rulers who understood, however vaguely, the concept of the balance of power could not help but regard France as the natural enemy.

The situation during the entire personal reign of Louis XIV was greatly complicated by the fact that on the throne of Spain was a mentally unbalanced and impotent king who was certain never to produce an heir and who might die at any moment, leaving the huge Spanish possessions in the Netherlands, Italy, and America to some other ruler. Austria was not so far fallen into decay that the Hapsburg emperor, with the Spanish empire under his control, could not recover his former power; while the danger to Europe from French rule over the Spanish empire was even more obvious. Both France and Austria, as we shall see, possessed princes who might be considered legitimate heirs for the Spanish inheritance.

England did not feel herself especially threatened by the early wars in which Louis engaged. Her interests were different from those of her continental contemporaries. She

was anxious not to see the Spanish Netherlands (Belgium) in French hands, but she was also engaged in a constant trade rivalry with the Dutch. Thus for different reasons it was possible to fight against either the Dutch or the French, but she had to have a good sense of timing to know which was the right enemy to fight at a given moment, while it was also possible to be neutral as long as the French made no attempt to take the Spanish Netherlands. But the Dutch were constantly threatened by the French. A rich and prosperous country, but without great reserves of soldiers, was obviously a standing invitation to

an enemy; and though she expected to be able to hold her own against most navies that could be brought against her, she simply did not have enough troops to defend herself by land without alliances. When we consider that she was a Protestant country with a Catholic country to her immediate south and a militantly Catholic country beyond that, her reasons for feeling insecure are easily understood.

On the other hand, in fairness to Louis, it should be remembered that the northern French frontier was not as yet fixed and accepted. The Spanish Netherlands had no particular reason for belonging to Spain, which



was a decadent country with nothing left but a strong military tradition, and there were various imperial towns and duchies on the borders of France which had obviously little chance of remaining independent during the current expansion of national states and the incessant rivalry between them. Franche-Comté (Burgundy) was not yet in France, nor was much of what is today northern France. Alsace and Lorraine were partly under French control but far from definitively incorporated within her boundaries. The only defensible natural frontier for France was the Rhine, but to obtain this, much of the Spanish Netherlands would have to be incorporated. There was still no national German state. The Holy Roman Empire's natural interests were in Austria, and it seemed no doubt unreasonable, in a day of growing national states, for this international power to own scattered territories far from its true homeland, even though these territories now enjoyed substantial independence. Much of Louis' fighting should therefore be considered in the light of the need for a defensible northern frontier and for the incorporation within France—which was capable of administering them—of all the small independent territories that, if not taken, would only fall to some other power with no more right to them than France.

The details of the various wars need not concern us here. In the so-called War of Devolution (1667-1668) Louis found himself faced by a coalition of English, Dutch, and Swedes after he had invaded the Spanish Netherlands, and withdrew gracefully, after obtaining permission to keep a few important towns which are now in northern France. The Dutch War (1672-1678) brought Louis and his army right into Holland, whose leader, William of Orange, was able to defend his country only by opening the dikes. Louis won Franche-Comté and a few more towns by the treaty that ended this war. The third war, the War of the League of Augsburg (1688-1697), found Louis opposed by a great alliance led by the redoubtable William of Orange, who became also king of England in 1689. Though the French at one time had made considerable conquests in

this war, they were finally worn down, and had to agree to a peace, under which they were permitted to keep Alsace.

The last war, the War of the Spanish Succession, was the hardest fought and the longest in duration. The occasion was provided by the long-delayed and long-expected death of the last Spanish Hapsburg to occupy the throne of Spain. The Holy Roman emperor and the French king each had candidates available from his own family; but the war had to be fought by many other powers because the prize of victory would be the Spanish colonies, with all their wealth, and the other European powers could not permit France to disturb the balance of power by acquiring them. Only if the Bourbon who inherited the Spanish throne could be forever excluded from holding the French throne also could the powers permit the Spanish crown to fall into the hands of a Bourbon. Nor, though the Hapsburgs were not as dangerous to the balance of power as the French, could the Hapsburg candidate be allowed to occupy both thrones.

In the end Louis and his armies were exhausted and had to resort to desperate measures; but though he was almost at the end of what he could mobilize in 1709, the English withdrew from the alliance against Louis in 1711, leaving the emperor too weak to carry on with what was left to him. The war was therefore brought to an end by the Peace of Utrecht (1713) and other minor treaties. The Bourbon kept the Spanish throne which had been willed to him and which he had occupied during the war, but the Spanish Netherlands became Austrian. The French lost many of their colonial possessions, which had been taken by the English during the war, and it was agreed that the Spanish Bourbon could not occupy the French throne, nor could any of his successors. Thus Louis' reign came to a somewhat inglorious end, even though what he had won in earlier wars was not taken from him at the Peace of Utrecht. The cost of the wars had been enormous, especially the War of the Spanish Succession, for which the price had to be paid, at least in part, in the eighteenth century by Louis' successors.



THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY—THE AGE OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN FRANCE

Louis XV—efforts at governmental and administrative reforms Louis XIV, who died in 1715, left to his great-grandson Louis XV, who was only five years old, a kingdom that was still the most powerful in Europe. Its institutions were still functioning and intact, but its financial and social structures were no longer suited for the modern world. During the early years of the new reign there was a mood of reaction against the absolutism of Louis XIV. The old nobility recovered some of its power and privileges during the regency, but when Louis came of age the monarch asserted himself and the old absolutism was restored. Un-

fortunately Louis himself was personally indolent and easily bored. Although many excellent and needed reforms were started in his reign, he did not push them through to completion, with the exception of his last series of reforms, which were quickly undone by his successor. Nevertheless, in Europe France was at the height of her influence; everything that was French, except perhaps the governmental system, was imitated. Paris was in all respects the capital of Europe, the only Western capital Europe has yet known.

For the privileged classes life has probably never been sweeter than it was in the reign of Louis XV, which was the great age of French cuisine and French aristocratic manners. The furniture and decoration of the French noble

and bourgeois houses have been unequalled in Western culture. There was nothing of the heaviness and what one can only call the stuffiness of the reign of the Sun King, still less of the tasteless opulence of the Victorian age of England. Above all, for the French themselves, it was almost a century of peace, with no sound of marching feet on French soil; in spite of the vagaries of government it was an age also of constant and increasing prosperity for the great majority of Frenchmen, not excluding even the peasants. Of the wars fought by Louis xv only the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) was costly in men and prestige, and even that was costly in Europe only because of the sudden defection of Peter III of Russia, which has already been noted. The war was almost won, and Frederick the Great, having lost half his territory, was nearing his last gasp. If the war in Europe had been won, there would have been no great loss of prestige, even if it was too late for France to recoup her losses in America. In spite of the Seven Years' War France was able to win Lorraine, hitherto an imperial enclave surrounded by French territory, and Corsica was obtained from the Genoese by agreement during the reign of Louis xv.

The façade of absolutism showed serious fissures during his reign, in spite of the efforts of Louis and his ministers. In some respects the system of government was improved. The king's councils and the seventy-two "masters of requests" became an efficient bureaucracy of dedicated civil servants, most of whom kept one position or another in the bureaucracy for their lifetime. The *intendants* in the *généralités* had almost as long a tenure of their offices, not infrequently staying in one administrative area for as long as twenty years. These men were the real rulers of the country and made the decisions. Only the most difficult jobs, such as that of controller general, and the job of chancellor or chief minister, changed frequently, especially when these ministers tried some reform which the monarch was not prepared to push through to the end against the opposition it aroused. It is from the regime of Louis xv that many of the administrative

improvements credited to Napoleon in reality stem; and it is from the eighteenth century that the tradition of running the country through senior civil servants dates—a tradition not yet dead, as the political history of the twentieth century demonstrates. Governments may change at the top, but the dedicated bureaucrats carry on the government.

Financial policy. For the regime of Louis xv was in truth not unlike that of modern France in certain essential respects. The country was making rapid progress, but the government constantly gave the not unwarranted impression of feebleness and drift; and it was impossible for the government to make much progress in face of the entrenched interests who fought consistently against any kind of reform, however meager. The entrenched interests in the eighteenth century were the old aristocrats, the newer nobility of the robe, who controlled the parlements, and the Church. These men had become accustomed to paying little or no taxes, allowing the *taille* and the multitude of indirect taxes to fall upon the poor, especially the peasants. The indirect taxes hardly hurt the pocketbooks of the upper classes at all. The Church paid an inconsiderable sum as a free gift every five years; but since it owned perhaps a tenth of all the land in France, this was scarcely adequate. The tax in fact was usually passed on to the parish priests.

Louis xiv, during the War of the Spanish Succession, had imposed a special tax of one tenth, but it had never been fully collected and lapsed after the war. In 1748 Louis xv decided to impose a tax of one twentieth on all income derived from lands, industrial and commercial and private loans, and revenues from the holdings of those offices which were regarded as property and therefore bought and sold. Louis' controller-general, Machault, attempted to put the tax into effect, with results that would have made the bravest minister quail. There was a concerted howl from all the classes affected by the tax (which, be it noted, did not apply to wage-earners, salaried officials, or even to income gained from work-

ing the land). The Parlement de Paris refused to register the decrees; the provincial parlements remonstrated; and finally the parlements went on strike and refused to administer justice, their primary function. They declared that the tax was contrary to the laws and customs of France; that they had not been consulted, although they had the right to be consulted in such an important matter. In short, they pretended to be as sovereign as the English Parliament, with which they frequently compared themselves—although in fact they were a totally unrepresentative oligarchy of persons who had either bought their positions or inherited them. It is possible that, if the French financial structure had been strengthened by this income tax which fell upon the rich rather than upon the poor, the government of Louis XVI would never have gone bankrupt and the Revolution might have been postponed, perhaps indefinitely. But Louis XV finally gave up the struggle. The privileged classes of the eighteenth century had won a notable victory.

Failure of the reform program—the inevitability of revolution But the Seven Years' War was costly, and the country was still in need of a better-assured income. In 1768 the now aging Louis, no longer so careful of his popularity, which was in any case dwindling, decided to push through the necessary reforms at all cost. His chancellor Maupeou and controller-general Terray were assured of his support when they struck. The Parlement de Paris and all the old parlements were abolished, and replaced by new ones. In future no one could buy his office; the entire judiciary system was reformed from top to bottom; and no fees were to be taken for administering justice. The Parlement de Paris was made up of members of the permanent bureaucracy and trained lawyers, headed by the greatest jurist of the century, and the others were staffed by paid professionals. This done, Terray went to work, revived the tax of the twentieth, and abolished a number of exemptions. The new Parlement de Paris dutifully registered the decrees. Even Voltaire, sworn foe of the French administration, praised these measures. But it was all

wasted time and trouble. Louis XV died in 1774, and Louis XVI, faced with the customary serried ranks of the opposition, restored the old parlements and dismissed the new, thus making the revolution probably inevitable.

The effort has been discussed in such detail since it is symptomatic of the weakness of absolute monarchy and in particular of the old regime in France. The parlements were certainly not representative of anyone but their class; but it is also true that the king's council was made up of paid servants of the king, who were responsible to him alone. No legitimate democratic institutions had been created that were representative, and the parlements and estates were at least speaking for some part of the people. The monarch and his ministers might have a good idea of what the people wanted, a far better idea indeed than the entrenched interests. But they could not know, for want of institutions through which public opinion could be gauged. Though *philosophes* might applaud, even they were not public opinion; and they were in the eighteenth century powerless to mobilize effective public support. So the enlightened monarch had no alternative but to consult advisers of his choice or his own sense of what was good for his people. The only other possibility, the only move forward, was to consult the people and let them both choose and bear the responsibility for their actions. That was to be the path to which the French Revolution was to point, and after much travail the way was found—although opinions may differ as to its efficacy, particularly in France. But it was in England that the method was found which by slow stages would evolve into democracy, and without a major revolution. To the English developments we now turn.

❖ England

THE TUDOR MONARCHY

The roles of monarch and Parliament In 1485, as we have seen, the Wars of the Roses came to an end with the victory of Henry Tudor, who then became king under the name

Chronological Chart

England

Reign of Henry VII	1485-1509	Conversion of James, Duke of York, to Catholicism	1668
Establishment of Court of Star Chamber	1487	Treaty of Dover	1670
Reign of Henry VIII	1509-1547	Test Act	1673
Chancellorship of Cardinal Wolsey	1515-1529	Marriage of Mary, daughter of James, duke of York, to William of Orange	1677
Reign of Elizabeth I	1558-1603	Popish Plot	1678
Renunciation of claims to Calais, last French territory in English possession	1564	Personal rule of Charles II without Parliament	1681-1685
Defeat of Spanish Armada	1588	Rye House Plot	1683
Reign of James I of England	1603-1625	Reign of James II	1685-1689
Intervention of James in Thirty Years' War	1621	Monmouth Rebellion	1685
Mission of Charles, Prince of Wales, and Buckingham to Spain	1623	Declaration of Indulgence	1687
Reign of Charles I	1625-1649	Birth of heir to throne	1688
Petition of Right	1628	Invasion of William of Orange and flight of James II	1688
Dissolution of Parliament and beginning of Charles's personal rule	1629	Reign of William III	1689-1702
Land appointed archbishop of Canterbury	1633	Bill of Rights	1689
Introduction of Book of Common Prayer into Scotland	1637	Defeat of James II in Ireland at Battle of the Boyne by William	1690
Invasion of England by Scots	1639	Act of Settlement	1701
Short Parliament	1640 (Apr.-May)	Reign of Anne	1702-1714
Summoning of Long Parliament	1640 (Nov.)	Union of England and Scotland	1707
Execution of Strafford by bill of attainder	1641	Accession of George I, Elector of Hanover, to English throne	1714
Grand Remonstrance	1641	First Jacobite rising in Scotland	1715
Civil wars	1641-1649	Administration of Walpole	1721-1742
Execution of Charles I	1649	Second Jacobite Rebellion	1745-1746
Commonwealth and Protectorate	1649-1660	War with France (Seven Years' War)	1755-1763
Thomas Hobbes' <i>Leviathan</i>	1651	Ministry of Pitt and Newcastle	1757-1761
Dissolution of Rump Parliament	1653	Reign of George III	1760-1820
Barebones Parliament summoned and dismissed	1653	Treaty of Paris (great colonial gains)	1763
<i>Instrument of Government</i> —Cromwell becomes Protector	1653	Wilkes affair	1763-1782
<i>Humble Petition and Advice</i>	1656	Ministry of Lord North (King's Friends)	1770-1782
Death of Cromwell	1658	War of American Independence	1775-1783
Restoration of Charles II	1660	Ministry of William Pitt	1783-1801
Clarendon Code	1661-1665	War with France	1793-1801
		Legislative Union with Ireland	1801
		Renewal of war with France	1803
		Battle of Waterloo	1815

of Henry VII (1485-1509). He was far from being the legitimate heir to the throne, and in fact owed any legitimacy he had as monarch to the fact that he was accepted by Parliament. His descendants were somewhat more legitimate as monarchs, since Henry married Elizabeth of York, whose title was much better than his own. Although the Tudors modernized the monarchy and their rule is often known as Tudor absolutism, in fact they knew very well the limitations on their power imposed by the existence of Parliament. They never opposed Parliament directly, preferring to make use of it when they needed it, and finding means to bypass it when they believed it would oppose their wishes.

In England, as we have seen, the king possessed a considerable income of his own, and was expected to provide for the ordinary expenses of government out of it. In addition, Parliament granted to each king for life certain monies as a matter of course. Such monies, which included "tunnage and poundage," the king had the facilities to collect, and Parliament had not. The grant to the king was therefore only a formality; and physically the king could have collected it without the approval of Parliament, as Charles I did collect it in the seventeenth century. But if the king had extraordinary expenses, as he always had, for example, in time of war, it was necessary for him to call Parliament and ask it to grant him a "subsidy." If Parliament refused, the king could not collect the money without considerable difficulty, since the machinery for collection was not under his control. On the other hand, the king was the chief executive, and foreign policy was conducted by him and not by Parliament. Thus the king might involve the country in war, yet be unable to wage it without the approval and financial support of Parliament. This was an intolerable position for a stubborn monarch who believed, like the Stuarts, in his divine right to rule; but the Tudors did not find it unduly hampering. What they had to do was to persuade Parliament that the proposed war was in the interests of the people, or at least of the classes represented in Parliament, and use their prestige to obtain approval for their policies. Even

a little judicious intimidation might be helpful as long as it was not carried to such extremes that the majority in Parliament felt that its collective privileges were being overridden.

Parliament also had the right to be consulted on legislation and have its views listened to and its petitions acted upon. The king, however, could legislate by decree, and Parliament had to accept such legislation even when it disliked it; all it could do was to wait until the king next called Parliament and needed money. Then it could refuse to vote supplies until the king listened to and acted on its grievances. Parliament could not summon itself into being; only the king could do that. He did so only when he needed it, which might be for the voting of supplies or for passing some legislation by which the king wished to demonstrate that his people approved of it. Parliament thus had very limited powers and limited duties; but it was independent of the king except insofar as the king, through his instructions to the sheriffs and the manipulation of parliamentary constituencies, could influence the election of members favorable to him. Even so, once they had been elected, they could act independently, since the king could not dismiss them. He could only dissolve Parliament and call for another election.

The law-courts Also independent of the king were the common-law courts which administered the laws that had been passed by Parliamentary statute, and the customary unwritten law built up by precedent. But the judges in these courts were appointed by the king and held office only during his pleasure. If he did not like the judges' decisions, he could dismiss them and substitute more pliant men. But the king could not command any particular decision to be made in any case that interested him. In criminal cases the juries gave their decisions, and the king could only pardon the convicted criminal. He could not overturn the conviction. Not until certain criminal cases were handed over to the royal courts by Parliamentary statute in 1487 did the king have the power to convict offenders, or to intimidate his subjects by the threat of criminal prosecution. In addition to this Court

of Star Chamber, set up in 1487, the king had certain royal courts (known as prerogative courts) where, as also in the Court of Star Chamber, largely Roman law prevailed and torture was permissible. When these were used for tyrannical purposes by the Stuarts, it became part of the Parliamentary program of reform to take away these courts from the king; when the Parliament succeeded in curbing the royal power by civil war and revolution, the kings lost these courts and also the right to dismiss the judges of the common-law courts. Thereafter the judges held their office during good behavior, as they do today.

The King's Council In spite of these two independent and semi-independent institutions, it was in Tudor times the monarch who governed, not the Parliament. He did this with the advice of his appointed Council, which was wholly under his control and had no powers save those which the monarch delegated to it. The members could, of course, be dismissed at a moment's notice. The heads of the various departments of state, such as the treasurer and chancellor, were all members of the Council. The Council had committees which investigated and made recommendations to the king and were sometimes empowered to act on their own. The Court of Star Chamber was one such committee, as were the other prerogative courts. Members of the Council were authorized by the king to see that his will was made known to his subjects, and to take steps to see that he was obeyed. They could also receive petitions to be conveyed to the king. Thus it was to the Council, which was always in session, rather than to the Parliament that ordinary petitions were sent. When Parliament was in session the king sent one of his Council members to inform it of his will. Thus bills were always introduced in Parliament when the king wanted them. Finally, mention should be made of the local officials called "justices of the peace," who were known as the Tudor "maids of all work," since ever more tasks were imposed on them. They had to administer justice in minor cases, fix wages, and administer the poor laws. These justices were appointed by the king and were responsible

to king and Council, and not to Parliament. Thus we see that the king had all but a few powers in his hands for effective government; but the powers not in his hands, as the Stuarts were to discover, were sufficient to limit the monarchy, and in a trial of strength it was Parliament and not the king who emerged triumphant in the seventeenth century.

If the principles of Tudor government are understood, the details need not greatly concern us. Henry VII was early faced with several important rebellions. He put them down without too much difficulty and executed very few of the participants, since he preferred to break their power with heavy fines that not only impoverished them but filled his treasury. He also had Parliament pass a law forbidding the lords to maintain private retainers who could at their will become private armies, endangering the peace of the realm (Statute of Livery and Maintenance). This law could be enforced through the Court of Star Chamber, established by Parliament as we have seen. The Court, contrary to public opinion—which usually knows only of its abuse by the Stuarts—was not an instrument of tyranny when it was set up, although obviously it could be bent to that purpose. The local courts at the time were intimidated by the great nobles, and no convictions could be secured against them. By transferring jurisdiction to the Council, with the authority of the king behind it, convictions could now be secured, and for a long time the Court was very popular with the people. The traditional legal safeguards, however, did not have to be observed; not only was torture permitted, but evidence against one's self was especially the object of the whole process, as in inquisitorial trials by the Church. When the Court was abolished by the Long Parliament in 1641, it had long outlived its usefulness.

To fill his treasury, Henry used all the methods available to him in this early commercial age. He asked for gifts from merchants, which they felt it wise to grant (benevolences). He compelled loans which were supposed to be repaid with interest, though it cannot be said that the expectation of repayment was the first consideration for the creditor. He made regulations calling for

finer when royal land had been encroached upon, and compelled some restitution. He granted monopolies for manufacture of a particular product, or for trade in a particular area. But the neatest trick of all—if it was a trick, which we shall never know—was the profitable use to which he put the desire of Parliament for a war with France. Henry did not approve of wars, since they might deliver him into the hands of Parliament, and in any case he had no particular quarrel with Charles VIII of France. Nevertheless, he accepted Parliament's proffered subsidy, equipped an army, and landed in France. Without fighting a battle, he allowed himself to be bought off for a large sum by the French king. Thus Henry pocketed both the Parliamentary subsidy and the French king's bribe, all for the cost of equipping and transporting an army to France, which was never called upon to fight. Henry died the richest monarch in Europe and left his young son

Henry VIII a full treasury, along with a policy for dealing with Parliament that avoided trouble and allowed the monarch a wonderfully free hand in spite of all constitutional safeguards.

Reign of Henry VIII Henry VIII (1509–1547) had little or no understanding of finance, and probably despised his father's parsimony. He was a typical Renaissance monarch, anxious for glory, supremely egotistic, and without moral scruple. But he did understand and even improve upon Henry VII's use of Parliament, and he made as much use of his Council as ever his father did. He was an excellent judge of character, and knew very well the kind of person he needed for a particular purpose. Unfortunately for his ministers, he could not be content with merely dismissing them when their policy failed to meet with his approval; he insisted also on beheading them. In the early part of his reign he left



Portrait of Henry VIII of England by Hans Holbein, the Younger.

governmental matters to his chancellor, the papal legate, Cardinal Wolsey. Wolsey fell from power when Henry wished for an annulment of his marriage and Wolsey could not obtain it for him. On his way to the king for almost certain execution, Wolsey died, and Thomas Cromwell became Henry's chief secretary.

The purpose for which Cromwell was to be used was the nationalization of the Church, which was carried out by means of the Reformation Parliament. Henry thus made use of Parliament to demonstrate to all that the English people were behind his policy. It was not necessary to pack the Parliament. All that had to be done was for Cromwell to manage it, informing the members what the king's will was, and drum up some national feeling against the Roman foreigner. There is no doubt the people felt very badly about the casting off of Catherine of Aragon, and the raising of Anne Boleyn to the throne. But when the matter was put the way it was, they acquiesced. Then came the turn of the monasteries, handled first by a Crown commission, which investigated the state of the monasteries and made recommendations that they, or a large number of them, should be dispossessed. Thereupon Parliament proceeded to dispossess them. Henry's father would have made sure to use them for the benefit of the Crown, and probably would have kept many of them as Crown possessions. But Henry VIII sold them in a buyer's market, and he was soon short of money again. This time he debased the currency.

The later Tudors—Attitude of Elizabeth toward Parliament Henry's other difficulties were concerned with begetting a male heir and thus ensuring the succession to his family. Though he had a daughter (Mary) by his first wife and another (Elizabeth) by his second, he did not obtain a male heir (Edward) until his third wife, Elizabeth, according to Catholics, was not legitimate; while Protestants who professed to believe that Henry's first marriage had been null and void from the beginning would equally regard Mary as illegitimate.

Since both of Henry's earlier wives were dead by the time of Henry's death, Edward was certainly legitimate, but he was a sickly child and not likely to live very long. Henry asked Parliament for the right to regulate the succession himself, thus giving Parliament the color of a right to regulate the royal succession, which it used to full effect in later times. When the right had been granted, Henry cut the knot and declared both his daughters legitimate. Edward inherited the throne (1547-1553) and died early; Mary inherited it next, putting down a Protestant rebellion which supported Lady Jane Grey for the throne (Lady Jane had some claim to it if both Mary and Elizabeth were illegitimate).

Mary's chief aim was to restore Catholicism, for which purpose she needed a Parliament which was willing to restore the old religion by act of Parliament. All that she herself could do she did when she had the Protestant archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Cranmer, burned, and appointed a Catholic in his place, at the same time filling the bishoprics and her Council with good Catholics. Parliament she was able to control, in part by using her influence to see that Catholics were elected. The Parliament thus chosen passed the reunion with Rome. Soon afterward Mary, who had not been able to present her husband Philip II of Spain with an heir, died (1558), thus leaving her Protestant sister to inherit the throne.

Elizabeth, as we have seen, produced a religious compromise. We have also noted her difficulties with the Catholic Reformation, and her wars with Spain. These latter were popular with those classes represented in Parliament, and she had little difficulty in obtaining subsidies from them. She did not call Parliament very often in her long reign (1558-1603). She rarely needed it for legislation, and tried to be as economical in her wars as possible; indeed, some of them showed an actual profit for the Crown, since the queen was entitled to her share of booty won by her "gentlemen adventurers." Her contributions to Protestants abroad were notably meager.

Elizabeth was a true granddaughter of Henry VII. But Parliament was extremely in-

terested in keeping the throne out of the hands of foreigners and, when called into session, earnestly besought her to take a husband and beget an heir. But Elizabeth had a more delicate task to perform than Parliament ever understood. She was trying to use the fact that she was still marriageable in her relations with foreign powers, and Parliament's flat-footed meddling produced a number of tart retorts from the queen.

Elizabeth also refused to abate any part of what she considered the prerogatives of the Crown. This in particular applied to the discussions Parliament insisted on having, and the petitions it insisted on presenting with regard to Church policy. Elizabeth was supreme governor of the Church, and this, to her, meant that all matters pertaining to the Church were to be settled by her as governor, working through the Court of High Commission, authorized by the Act of Supremacy that made her governor. For internal matters the Church convocation should be used. Religious matters were therefore no affair of Parliament. This was not the opinion of the Calvinists or Puritans in Parliament, who railed against "popery" and used the utmost freedom of speech against the queen. When Elizabeth imprisoned one for speaking out in this manner in Parliament, and Parliament complained that this infringed upon traditional English liberties, Elizabeth promptly withdrew. This was typical of her policy. She knew exactly how far she could go, and if she recognized that Parliament was really adamant in a matter on which it was traditionally entitled to speak, she gave way with the utmost graciousness. In the matter of monopolies, which Parliament complained were damaging to business, she even agreed to the Parliamentary point of view in such a manner as to suggest that she would have refrained from granting them of her own accord. This Elizabethan policy was undoubtedly all that prevented an open struggle over religion, which was thus postponed for the reign of her successor. If she had lived another few years, it is doubtful whether even she could have held back the tide of Puritanism.

So the storm clouds gathered for her successor, but Elizabeth herself died, beloved by her people, the first monarch who had at all times put the interests of England as she perceived them above any personal interests. Her policy, in an age when religious wars raged on the Continent and when absolutism was ascendant everywhere but in Holland, held her people together, avoided civil war, raised her country to a prestige as yet unequaled, and maintained intact the ancient liberties of the people. This was no mean achievement in the sixteenth century.

THE BEGINNING OF THE PURITAN REVOLUTION

James I—conflict between royal pretensions and Parliamentary privileges The uneasy peace between monarch and Parliament did not endure far into the reign of the first Stuart, James I (1603-1625). James, who had been for many years king of Scotland before he succeeded to the English crown, had an antipathy to parliamentary institutions which stemmed from his experience with Scottish elders in his native country. He had with difficulty, by shrewd manipulation of opposing forces, managed to gain some ascendancy over Scotland, and evidently looked forward to his reign in England as what he fondly hoped would be that of an absolute monarch. Before coming to England he had published his book setting forth his ideas on the divine right of kings, and it was his view that the English Parliament existed only by favor of the monarch. This view, needless to say, Parliament did not share. It regarded itself as one of the fundamental institutions of the realm as much as the monarchy itself. James also believed that he was above the law, and that his title as head of the judiciary was a real one. Parliament in his view should legislate in accordance with his wishes, and otherwise not legislate at all. It had no privileges beyond those he conferred on it, and he could withdraw them as easily as his predecessors had conferred them. Finally, he thought that his title as supreme governor of the Church meant what it said,



James I of England was personally extravagant, dressed richly, and spent much money on his favorites. But he could never compensate for his lack of personal dignity and his ungainly appearance, in this respect such a contrast to his Tudor predecessors. This portrait by an unknown artist of the Italian school suggests why.

and that he could use his power over the Church to interfere even in matters of theology and religious observance.

The Stuart Parliament was made up of the House of Commons and the House of Lords. The House of Lords contained the upper clergy and the hereditary nobility, as in the Middle Ages. The latter represented overwhelmingly the great landed interests, and could in ordinary circumstances be relied upon to support the Crown. But by the seventeenth century the House of Commons was more important than the Lords, since it had to initiate money bills, and thus was the prime mover in granting the king his subsidies. The House of Commons was predominantly Anglican (Church of England), as was the House of Lords, but it also had an increasingly large number of

Calvinists (called Puritans in England), who belonged to either the Presbyterian Church (which in Scotland was the established Church), or to any of a number of Protestant sects. These sects were known collectively as Independents. Both Houses also had some Catholics among their number, more in the Lords than in the Commons. The House of Commons was made up, for the most part, of landed gentlemen, though some of the larger cities, especially London, were represented by merchants, lawyers, and others of the middle classes. A considerable number of landed gentlemen were Puritans, including, from 1628, Oliver Cromwell, leader of the rebellion against Charles I.

James made a bad impression as early as his first procession through the country to

London for his coronation, when he ordered a thief to be hanged without trial. There was no doubt that the thief was guilty, but it was the place of the courts, not the king, to condemn him. James soon embroiled himself with the Puritans, who petitioned him to abrogate some of the "popish" practices of the Anglican Church, including a mass not greatly different from that of the Catholics, and the system of bishops, likewise inherited from Catholicism. At a conference James lost his temper, crying out "no bishop, no king," and threatening to "harry" the Puritans "out of the land" if they did not conform. Some of them, indeed, left of their own accord, both then and later in the reign, including the Pilgrims of the *Mayflower*.

This was only the beginning. In succession James tried to impose upon Parliament his own rules for who should be allowed to sit in Parliament—of which Parliament thought itself the only fit judge—increased the customs duties without authorization from Parliament, and imprisoned four members of Parliament who had discussed grievances against the king before voting subsidies. Rather than submit to such behavior, the king sent Parliament home, and proceeded to use the time-honored methods of the reign of Henry VII to raise money without its consent. He was far from being an economical man; he liked display and he enjoyed rewarding his favorites, and unlike Elizabeth, he had a married establishment to support. But in his defense it should be noted that the king's revenues were now much smaller in relation to his expenses than in the past. There had been a continuous price increase throughout the sixteenth century, and most of his revenues were fixed rather than on a percentage basis. It was therefore not at all unreasonable that he should try to increase his income; in fact, the idea that the "king should live of his own" was seriously outdated. It was truly unfortunate for James that he had a Parliament which could and did insist on having its grievances attended to before it would vote subsidies; and James, unlike his fellow monarchs on the Continent, had to listen to them and at least promise to do something about them.

It was a war, as might be expected, which forced James to recall Parliament, which by this time had accumulated a host of grievances in connection with his efforts to raise money without its consent. It will be recalled that James's daughter was married to the Elector Palatine of Germany, and the elector had been seriously defeated by the emperor at the Battle of the White Mountain. The emperor and his allies had then turned upon the elector in his home territories and driven him out, thus leaving the English electress and her husband without a country. The English Protestants were inclined to regard the Thirty Years' War as an effort by the Catholic powers to suppress Protestantism. Many Protestants, therefore, both in and out of Parliament, urged James to support his daughter—perhaps somewhat disingenuously, since they also wanted James to call Parliament. James himself had hitherto been successful in keeping out of war, and had the reputation of a pacifist; but he certainly thought this war would be acceptable to Parliament. When, however, he did call it in 1621, he was disappointed. It voted far too little for his needs, and also proceeded to tell him how he should fight the war—an undoubted infringement on the royal prerogative. James, indeed had a remarkable plan to help his daughter and son-in-law, which was nothing less than to marry his son Charles to a Spanish princess, hoping thereby to prevent the Spanish Hapsburgs from aiding the Austrian branch of the family. But James had no idea how much the English of all classes hated the Spaniards. So Parliament, being still in session, gave the king some gratuitous advice on how to conduct his marital alliances, whereupon the king tore the offending pages containing the Parliamentary remonstrance from the record. He then sent the Parliament home, after imprisoning some of its members.

Unable to go to war with such a small subsidy, James went ahead with his proposed Spanish alliance, only to be rebuffed by the Spaniards themselves, the infanta refusing to marry a Protestant. The ill success of this move had the unexpected effect of precipitating a popular war with Spain, for which Parliament was willing to make more substantial provision.

It did, however, extract a promise from James to cease granting monopolies except for patents on new inventions, and impeached one of the king's ministers for malfeasance in office.³ Just before his death in 1625, James dissolved Parliament once more.

James had been able to keep his country out of war for almost the whole of his reign, but at the cost of a very considerable loss in English prestige, which had never been so low on the Continent as when he refused to aid his son-in-law and his co-religionists. In his struggles with Parliament he had not been too severely beaten. He had secured the right to increase customs duties, but at the cost of having to forego monopolies. He had maintained the Anglican religion and the laws against Catholics and dissenters, but at the cost of a considerable emigration to Holland and America. Parliament had set a precedent for impeaching the king's ministers, but since the ministers had in fact been guilty and given a fair trial, James could not with propriety have defended them. Though he may have had suspicions as to where the process would lead, he could not have known for certain that Parliament, in the reign of his successor, would impeach ministers for doing what they had been instructed to do by the king, and without any malfeasance. The House had debated more or less as it wished when called into session, and the king's gesture of imprisoning members for their freedom of speech had remained an empty gesture, as had his tearing out of the Parliamentary record. In his own view, James had never given way on a matter of principle; he had maintained his position that Parliament

had no rights but only privileges granted by the Crown.

So it must be admitted that James had held up the tide of resistance as long as he reigned. But he had neither suppressed nor in any way tamed the Puritans in Parliament, who had in fact, through resistance to James, learned more of what they really wanted, and realized that it was in essence a constitutional struggle. Already by the accession of Charles I it is certain that many Parliamentary leaders understood the implications of what they were doing, and that they understood and appreciated the tactics they could use to bring about their ends. All this knowledge was to bear fruit in the reign of Charles, when what had begun as a mere struggle for certain fundamental rights and a share in certain functions of government was to end in a revolution which cost the life of Charles, and in an experiment in republican government unique in English history.

Charles I—failure of attempt to establish absolutism When Charles I (1625-1649) came to the throne he was already saddled with a war for which he had insufficient funds, but he at once offended Parliament by marrying a French Catholic wife. Moreover, he continued to keep in command of the armed forces the incompetent Duke of Buckingham, a nobleman who had shared in Charles's abortive efforts to win a Spanish bride. When Charles proceeded to appoint a number of High Churchmen (clerics who were the furthest removed from Puritan notions of religious worship) to office in the Anglican Church, the Puritans began to fear that Charles would consistently favor "popery"; and by this time the Parliamentary majority was Puritan. Nevertheless, it was a serious attack on the king when Parliament refused to grant him the right to tonnage and poundage for more than a year, since all his predecessors had been granted these for life as a matter of course.

It was clear that Parliament was now ready to take on the king and ensure its right to some control over foreign policy in spite of the king's exclusive authority in this field. Parliament objected to royal incompetence in war, and it was afraid that the king would involve

³ Impeachment was a process developed during the medieval period by which the House of Commons could bring a minister up on charges before the House of Lords, which then acted as a court of justice. Impeachment is to be sharply distinguished from a "bill of attainder," under which Lord Strafford was executed in the reign of Charles I. This bill is simply an act of Parliament, which condemns a man to death. Like other acts of Parliament it has to be passed by both Houses and signed by the king. The king does not play any part in the impeachment process, though of course he may pardon the defendant after conviction.

the country in a policy of which it disapproved; and it did not propose to allow this to happen. In fact Charles, with far too few funds at his disposal, continued the Spanish war and was defeated; by further incompetence he became involved in a war with France. To meet such extra expenses without Parliamentary aid, he resorted to direct means to collect money, to all of which Parliament objected. Since his early efforts were in vain, he was compelled to call Parliament, which refused to grant any money until the king had accepted a petition known as the Petition of Right (1628). This important statement of principle made very clear where the taxing powers of the realm resided—namely, in Parliament. The king promised not to perform various acts to which Parliament objected, but he could not be held to his promises unless Parliament were in session and the king had need of it. If it were in session, the king could only try to intimidate it; he could not prevent it from voicing grievances and sending him more petitions. Thus, though the Petition of Right has been called the "Magna Carta of the middle class," it was of no more effect than the Magna Carta of the barons in 1215. It was of value only if the king intended to keep to its provisions; and if he did so intend, the Petition of Right was unnecessary.

The crisis which had been impending for the four years of the reign of Charles came to a head in 1629, when Parliament, called into session to vote subsidies, refused to do so. Instead, it proceeded to take cognizance of the fact that Charles was not abiding by the Petition of Right; he was continuing to imprison men for not paying taxes, and he was continuing also to collect taxes "illegally." Then Parliament began to debate the condition of the Church, and prepared resolutions on religion and taxation which it was known the king would not approve. The king sent instructions to adjourn Parliament, but his messenger was prevented by force from speaking the necessary words. The resolutions were then passed, and Parliament voted its own adjournment. All that Charles could do was to dissolve Parliament, imprison some members, and try to get along without it.

The only way in which it was possible for Charles to rule without calling Parliament was to make himself independent of all financial aid and live exclusively on the resources available to him in his personal capacity as monarch, plus whatever he could collect through using to the full all means available to him as chief executive. He could control his prerogative courts, and he could hope to control the common-law courts through intimidation of the judges. He controlled the customs houses, and there was no difficulty in collecting customs duties. But he could not be sure of controlling local authorities, such as justices of the peace, since these were, as a rule, members of Parliament also, and would probably resist. He had also to contract his expenditure, since it would clearly be impossible to raise the large sums of money necessary for extraordinary expenditure. Obviously, he must keep out of war.

What therefore ensued was a trial of strength between Charles and the taxpayers to see whether the latter would resist, and if so, whether they would submit to intimidation by the courts. It was quite possible that Charles might win this struggle if the people gradually grew accustomed to paying taxes voluntarily to the king, and permitted him to decree what should be paid rather than paying only what had been agreed to by Parliament. It should be emphasized that the king did not have at his disposal any system like that of the French, whereby representatives of the central authority could collect taxes directly. Nor was there a body of private enterprise collectors who collected taxes on a commission basis, remitting a portion to the monarch, such as had existed under the Roman Republic and still existed in France. Charles had no large body of government officials at his disposal. The entire English system had been based, as are modern systems, on the voluntary payment of taxes calculated according to property valuation, with the courts in the background to enforce payment if it was not made voluntarily. It was English resistance to paying taxes in any other way, plus the fact that Charles allowed himself to drift into war, that caused the failure of his effort at absolutism.

Even the resistance might in time have been broken had he been able to avoid war; as it was, the resistance had not yet been broken when war with the Scots ultimately doomed him to failure before he had time to overcome the resistance.

Charles and his advisers, however, made a very good attempt, and in fact succeeded in putting the royal finances in better order than they had been since the beginning of the century. There was no foreign policy worthy of the name, and all the military commitments made in the first years of the reign were liquidated. Administration was greatly improved, and the yield from feudal dues which belonged to the king in his private capacity was more than doubled. Heavy fines were inflicted for encroachment on royal lands; the king's right of wardship over minors was strictly enforced through a special court; the usual recourse was made to forced loans; the crown jewels were pawned; and ever more monopolies were sold. For the most part these exactions did not drive the merchants to open resistance, in spite of the fact that Parliament in its last session had resolved that any who paid taxes not authorized by it were to be regarded as enemies of the country. Parliament, now prorogued indefinitely, held no terrors for them, while the king's power was close to them, and there was no doubt at all that he could punish severely any who refused.

It should be understood that few Englishmen had yet accepted the thought that they were engaged in a revolution. They had been accustomed to obeying the king, and taxation in any case fell largely upon the shoulders of the educated and influential few. For the common man, the authoritarian regime of Charles was probably far from unacceptable. There was less corruption than usual. The king's representatives, as an incidental part of their work, actually forced better observance of such legislation as helped the poor—for instance, the famous Poor Law of Elizabeth, which provided for outdoor relief paid for by the local parish. It was the minority of the bourgeoisie who were affected by the exactions, who recognized the dangers of arbitrary government, and who desired a share in deciding how the

money they provided should be spent. They composed the hard core of the opposition; and since they had been deprived of a privileged platform where they could state their grievances, they now were forced to resist as individuals. This, as always, proved difficult in the face of the power wielded by the king. It should also be added that it was not entirely certain, except in the minds of the resisting minority, that the king was not in the right. In the past, kings had raised money by executive decree. There was much difference of opinion on the actual extent of the king's powers, and it should not therefore be thought that all the judges who gave decisions in his favor were actually intimidated into doing so.

With all Charles's efforts, he was not able to collect enough money, except for the ordinary purposes of government. He was anxious to play at least some part in international affairs, which required, at the minimum, a navy. When he tried to collect "ship money" from all the English cities, and not only the maritime cities which had been accustomed to paying it, he met with stubborn opposition and was compelled to use his Court of Star Chamber to deal with recalcitrants. Thus Charles came closer to outright tyranny. But his religious policy was regarded much more seriously by his subjects even than his efforts to collect money without the approval of Parliament. His archbishop of Canterbury, from 1633, was a High Churchman named Laud, who was determined to make the Anglican religion the only form of worship in the country. To Puritans a High Churchman was little better than a Catholic; and it must be admitted that Laud went about his task of making Puritans conform to his regulations on the details of worship with much enthusiasm. He was able to compel observance of his regulations by means of the king's prerogative courts, the religious Court of High Commission, and, of course, the Star Chamber. In addition to Laud, Charles also had at his disposal a strong and capable minister in the person of Thomas Wentworth, earl of Strafford, who was his representative first in the north and then in Ireland. Strafford's policy was what he called "thorough."

The Scottish war—dismantling of apparatus of royal absolutism. Charles might have survived if Laud had not decided that the Scottish Kirk should be made to conform to English religious practice. He introduced into Scotland the English Book of Common Prayer, with very slight variations, and decreed that it must be used in all Scottish churches hereafter. The order carried with it the threat of all the instruments for enforcement used so freely by the archbishop in England.

The Scots were outraged. It was true that Charles was also king of Scotland in his own right, but the Scots did not regard themselves as under the rule of England, and especially not in ecclesiastical matters. A large body of Scots thereupon swore to a Solemn League and Covenant never to submit to English domination in ecclesiastical matters, and flew to arms. They invited back from the Continent a number of experienced and efficient military leaders, who had been engaged in professional fighting on behalf of foreign potentates. This army swept up to the English border, which was poorly defended, and Charles had a war on his hands with the traditional enemy of England (1639). He had no army at his disposal for England's defense. He tried to raise an army by all the old methods, including levy, that had not been used for hundreds of years. But the army thus raised was helpless against the fanatically determined Scots, who demanded that the general assembly of the Scottish Kirk should be recognized as supreme over the bishops, thus virtually making the Presbyterian Church of Scotland an independent body. Rather than agree to this, which implied the failure of his entire ecclesiastical program in Scotland, Charles decided to call a Parliament. In taking this step, he probably thought that the English would be willing to fight the Scots on patriotic grounds, as they had always been willing to in the past.

He could not have been more mistaken. It is possible that Charles might have had the majority of the people on his side if the election had been under universal franchise. But the members of Parliament elected under the existing propertied franchise were precisely those who objected most to the personal rule

of Charles, and it now included a majority of non-Anglicans, even though these men were split themselves into different dissenting groups. All that the new Parliament was willing to grant was some money for the purpose of making peace with the Scots, and it insisted on the redressing of a long list of grievances first. Charles in disgust and fury dissolved the Parliament (Short Parliament, 1640) and determined to try to fight the Scots with the resources available to him. The Scots, however, swept into England, making light of the few feeble troops that Charles could raise, and demanded an indemnity for their expenses before they would leave. Thus Charles now had an invading army within the boundaries of his country, and he had no alternative to calling Parliament again and accepting its terms. Moreover, the Scottish army and the Parliamentary majority were in sympathy with one another (Long Parliament, 1640-1660).

The terms were severe. The entire apparatus of tyranny had to be dismantled, and Charles had no option but to agree. The prerogative courts were abolished, leaving only the common-law courts to function, although the matter of the appointment of common-law judges was not settled at this time. The powers of the king's Council were drastically reduced, and all its branches abolished. Strafford and Laud were impeached on the grounds that they had subverted "the fundamental laws of the realm" and thus were guilty of treason. But it was not found possible to convince the House of Lords that carrying out the commands of the king was treason, and at length they were put to death by bills of attainder. The king had no recourse but to sign the bill against Strafford. Laud was not put to death till 1643, by which time the civil war was in progress and the king's signature was unnecessary.

Parliament ensured its own existence by passing a Triennial Act, providing for a meeting at least once in three years. If the king did not call it, then writs for an election could be issued without his signature. After being called, Parliament could not be prorogued or dissolved without its own consent within fifty days of its meeting. Each Parliament, however, would last only three years, though the Long

Parliament itself, by another statute, could not be dissolved or prorogued save by its own consent. By other acts the king was forbidden by clear statute to collect customs duties without the consent of Parliament, and various other methods of raising money that had been used by the Tudors and Stuarts were abolished. All these bills were duly signed by the king, while the Scottish army remained threatening in the north and various mobs in London were calling for the king's blood. Then Parliament decided to accept the terms of the Scots without troubling to negotiate. The Scottish Kirk was to be virtually independent, and its general assembly was to be supreme over the bishops, as asked for in the previous year.

No sooner had the Scots put forward their demands than Parliament began to lose its cohesiveness. The Anglicans, even if they did not sympathize with the more extreme measures of Archbishop Laud, did not wish to see the Scottish Church separated from their own. On the other hand, the Presbyterian group in the Parliament was entirely in sympathy with the Scottish demands, and would have liked to see a Presbyterian Church set up in England. The Independents were not interested in anything save that the country should be governed in a godly manner by godly people; they were increasingly becoming attracted to republicanism and the abolition of the kingship. If Charles had had a better understanding of his Parliament, he might well have played one faction against another to his own advantage. He could have done little with the republicans, but both of the other major groups needed a king for the fulfillment of their plans. Many of the more moderate Presbyterians also recognized that a Presbyterian Church could not be established in England without civil war, and were willing to settle for toleration rather than the establishment of their religion. Unfortunately, the most effective Parliamentary leader, John Pym, a moderate Presbyterian, died in 1643, and thereafter the leadership of the Parliamentary side fell into extremist hands.

In 1641, when Parliament had succeeded in destroying the basis for the king's power, a small majority in that body passed what it called a Grand Remonstrance, in which de-

mands were made of the king that he could not possibly grant unless he were to abdicate almost all the power he still possessed. This Remonstrance was passed by a coalition of Independents and more extreme Presbyterians against the opposition of the Anglicans and other moderates. The smallness of the majority ought to have convinced the king that the tide was turning in his favor and that most of the members of Parliament were satisfied with what they had done already. But Charles took the incredibly stupid step of trying to arrest some of the members who had voted for the Grand Remonstrance, whereupon they escaped into the city of London, which refused to give them up. This incident, and a request by the king for an army to put down a rebellion that had broken out in Ireland—a request that was refused by Parliament—precipitated the civil war, which by this time had become inevitable. The king and the Parliament both began to raise troops (called Cavaliers and Roundheads), and Parliament voted for war against the king by a much larger majority than it had



A satire on the religious differences between the Puritan sects at the time of the Civil War. The satire appears on playing cards in use among the Cavaliers.

voted for the Grand Remonstrance; evidently many of its more moderate members felt that if the king won the war, the great earlier reforms of the Long Parliament would be abrogated and absolute rule re-established.

THE CIVIL WAR—EXECUTION OF CHARLES I

The war had two phases. In the first phase a Parliamentary majority made common cause with the Scots at the price of establishing the Presbyterian Church in England. The Parliamentary military genius, Oliver Cromwell, formed a new model army, initially known as Cromwell's Ironsides, and won the battles of Marston Moor and Naseby. In the latter battle Charles was made a prisoner of the Scots. At this point difficulties arose among the Parliamentary leadership. Cromwell, backed by the best army and by radical groups of all kinds, including the Independents in religion, and

increasingly attracted to republicanism, did not wish to have the Presbyterian Church established in England. Parliament was content with the war as it had gone so far, and since Charles was apparently willing to become head of a Presbyterian Church, proposed to disband the army.

At this point Cromwell took matters into his own hands. In a sudden foray he captured the king and began to negotiate with him, hoping that he would agree to a constitutional monarchy in which he would be largely a figurehead. Charles, however, did not take the negotiations seriously, knowing that if he could escape he could count on the support of the original Cavaliers, the Presbyterians in Parliament, and the Scots. Even though the Cavaliers had little sympathy with the Presbyterians, their loyalty to the person of Charles would never have permitted them to aid Cromwell. As it happened he did succeed in escaping and





Seventeenth-century engraving of the trial of Charles I. As the royalist engraver was at pains to point out, only a small minority of the House of Commons was willing to condemn the king, for which act several paid with their lives upon the restoration of Charles II. (COURTESY NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY)

joining the Scots, but Cromwell's army was too much for them all. It defeated the Scots at Preston and captured the king. Cromwell then sent a colonel to purge Parliament of the king's supporters, including the Presbyterians, and with the remainder (called the Rump) he had the king condemned to death and executed. There was, in his view, no other choice, since the king had demonstrated his untrustworthiness.

THE COMMONWEALTH AND PROTECTORATE (1649-1660)

There followed the period known as the Commonwealth and Protectorate. Cromwell was execrated by all the monarchs on the Continent, but they were compelled to acknowledge his effectiveness. The years of his rule saw the

suppression of the Irish rebellion, which had been smoldering for many years, and victories against the Dutch. But it was a military dictatorship hardly disguised, and there can be no doubt at all that in spite of his successful efforts to foster English commerce, Cromwell's rule was thoroughly unpopular with the people. He tried for a time to use Parliamentary forms, with a Parliament subservient to him. But the godly men who were chosen all wished to return to civilian rule, and called upon Cromwell to disband his army—a price that he could not pay, since without the army he would have been powerless. In the end he ruled through several major-generals, and himself became Lord Protector of the realm, a title that was to pass to his descendants. But when he died in 1658 his son had no desire to assume the posi-

tion he had inherited. There was a quarrel between his generals, finally settled by General Monck, who invited the son of Charles I back from his exile on the Continent. Amid great rejoicing, Charles II became king in 1660, after proclaiming an amnesty that applied to all but a few of the "regicides."

THE RESTORATION—EFFORTS OF CHARLES II TO RESTORE ROYAL SUPREMACY

The constitutional position of the king had changed fundamentally during the preceding reigns. Charles knew who was ultimately master of the country, and, having no desire, as he put it, to "go on his travels" again, he knew that he would have to proceed with guile if he were to restore any power to the monarchy. He was quite willing to deceive Parliament when he could, managing it by all means at his disposal. Since he was the only astute politician among the Stuarts, he on the whole succeeded very well, in spite of some reverses when he went too far, and left a much stronger throne to his brother James II.

At the beginning of his reign (1660-1685) there was such a strong anti-Puritan reaction, after eleven years of Puritan rule, that Charles's first Parliament was overwhelmingly Cavalier. It passed a series of anti-Puritan laws that destroyed the Presbyterian Church as an organized body, but could not stamp out other forms of Puritanism, which were not so dependent as Presbyterianism on organization. As time went on and Charles lost much of his initial popularity, being suspected of too great an interest in Catholicism, the complexion of Parliament changed, and became less Cavalier. The Catholic Reformation was still strong on the Continent, and Jesuits were suspected of trying to convert England to Catholicism by sinister means, in part through the agency of the king and his Catholic queen.

Favorable though the Cavalier Parliament was to Charles, it refused to grant him enough money to carry out an effective foreign policy. It kept him chronically starved for funds throughout his reign until the last few years, although it gave him many new taxes in ex-

change for his relinquishing his last rights as feudal suzerain. Thus Charles was tempted by a subsidy offered him by Louis XIV to engage in a war that was flagrantly contrary to English interests. It is probable also that the hand and money of Louis were behind Charles's devious religious policy, since it was revealed later that Charles was in fact himself a secret Catholic.

When Charles, fortified by his subsidy, declared war, as was still his prerogative, and followed this with a Declaration of Indulgence, which granted toleration to Catholics and dissenters alike, Parliament retorted by passing a Test Act, under which all holders of office had to take communion according to the Anglican rites (1673). Among other things this act—which Charles had to sign, since he could not wage war without some subsidies from Parliament in addition to his contribution from Louis—revealed that James, the heir to the throne, was an open Catholic—indeed, a recent convert. Thereafter an important party in Parliament, the beginning of the Whig party, made it its business to try to persuade Parliament and the king to exclude James from the succession. A government party, the Tory party, was likewise formed, made up of men who preferred a Catholic succession to the revival of Puritanism and opposition to the king. These men were mostly High Church Anglicans, many of them appointed to their sees and pulpits by Charles. They preached the doctrine of passive obedience to the monarch and "nonresistance," a doctrine not far removed from the divine right of Charles's grandfather.

The Whigs in the late 1670's took the offensive in and out of Parliament. James, duke of York and heir to the throne, was the target of thousands of exclusionist pamphlets, and Parliament attempted to exclude him by law from the throne. In 1678 a "popish plot" was revealed. A certain Titus Oates made it known that the Jesuits had been plotting against Charles, with the intention of putting James, the Catholic, on the throne. He was willing to give the names of the conspirators to Parliament. There followed a hysterical few years during which names rolled out of Titus Oates' capacious memory. Those named were tried in

the courts, and many were put to death. Charles bided his time until the country was sick of the slaughter and Oates began to make allusions to the Queen. Then he sent for the informer and put him to the torture, whereupon he denied that there had ever been a plot. Charles then dissolved Parliament, which by this time possessed a Whig majority, and boasted openly that he would never call it again. He was fortified in this resolution by the tide of popular opinion, which was now running in his favor, and by the promise of Louis to continue his subsidy. In the current state of the war Louis was content with English neutrality, and no longer required direct participation by the English.

Free of Parliament, Charles proceeded to use his Tory Council to inquire into the electoral system and the franchise, with the result that virtually only those constituencies that regularly returned Tory members would in future be represented in Parliament. Charles's hand was also strengthened by the discovery of another "plot," real or fictitious (the Rye House Plot), in which important Whig leaders were involved. Many therefore fled the country. Charles died in 1685, never having permitted Parliament to maneuver him into a position where he would have had to sign the Exclusion Bill, which would have prevented James from inheriting the throne.

THE "GLORIOUS REVOLUTION"


James then proceeded to throw away all that his brother had accumulated for him. He had a subservient Tory Parliament guaranteed for as long as he wanted, provided he did not offend its susceptibilities too outrageously. He was naturally on good terms with his fellow Catholic monarch in France, and could rely on his support in a pinch. His only difficulty was that the heir to the throne was his own Protestant daughter Mary, who was the wife of William of Orange, stadtholder of Holland, with whom Louis XIV was at war. But James himself had a new Catholic wife, who might be expected in due course to present him with a son. Under the English laws of succe-

sion, a son would inherit the throne before Mary and her Protestant husband.

James was determined to restore Catholicism, and this was his undoing. Early in his reign he had been able to suppress a rebellion led by one of the illegitimate sons of Charles II, and had kept mobilized the army which had been recruited for the purpose of suppressing the rebellion. His picked Parliament had not stinted him for funds even to pay this army. So he thought the time was ripe to restore the old religion. But he had reckoned without the unpopularity of Louis XIV, who had recently revoked the Edict of Nantes and was engaged in a war with the apparent intention of suppressing Protestantism everywhere. The English were determined to give no support to Louis. James proceeded to issue a Declaration of Indulgence, granting toleration to Catholics, contrary to the Test Act of 1673. Finally, he appointed a Catholic to be archbishop of Canterbury, thus losing his support even in the Tory Parliament. James went even further and began to replace his army officers with loyal Catholics, and he replaced much of the rank and file of the army with Irish Catholics imported for the occasion.

Even so, it is possible that the English would have refrained from a further rebellion and possible civil war had it not been for the birth of a boy to Mary of Modena, the Catholic wife of James II, which presented the English with the prospect of a monarchy that would remain Catholic for the indefinite future. A number of English members of Parliament from both Tory and Whig parties accordingly visited William of Orange and offered him the crown. William, not interested in England but very much interested in having English assistance in his war against Louis XIV, accepted, on condition that he would be king and not merely the husband and consort of his wife Mary.

When William's fleet appeared, James called for support but found none. No substantial opinion in England favored James and his Catholic policy, and he was compelled to flee—first to Ireland, where he had supporters among the Catholics, and then to France. Sup-



Contemporary print showing the embarkation of William of Orange, later William III, for England. William was able to take the crown from James II without the use of this fleet, since James fell into despair when deserted by his own troops and fled abroad.

ported by Irish and Scottish Catholics, his son James, known as the Old Pretender, grew up to contest the crown again when it was bestowed by the British Parliament outside the Stuart family, as also did his son, Bonnie Prince Charlie, known as the Young Pretender. Neither was successful.

WILLIAM III—KING BY CHOICE OF PARLIAMENT

William III ruled England as king by the grace of Parliament, which, during the course of his reign (1689-1702), passed the Act of Settlement, under which no Catholic could ever succeed to the throne. If Anne, the younger of the two Protestant daughters of James II, had no children, the crown was to pass to the elector of Hanover in Germany, a descendant of the daughter of James I who had married the Elector Palatine, as described earlier in this chapter. This settlement was agreed to by William, but the decision was Parliament's.

Parliament in the first year of William and Mary's reign passed a Bill of Rights, the nearest to a written constitution that the English

possess to this day. It was a statement of practices which would henceforth be considered illegal. These were, for the most part, acts of which James had been guilty, such as pretending to be able to suspend or "dispense with the laws," setting up a prerogative court for the trial of ecclesiastical offenses, levying money without Parliamentary authority, and maintaining a standing army without authority in time of peace. The other clauses, several of which were later incorporated into the United States Constitution, concerned the right of subjects to bear arms, to petition the king, to speak freely in Parliament, and to have free elections. No part of the English Bill of Rights has ever been repealed, and its acceptance for almost three centuries makes it exceedingly unlikely that it ever will be, although in theory Parliament could still repeal or change it.

The Bill of Rights was quickly followed in the same year (1689) with an Act of Toleration, under which full liberty of worship was permitted, though the Test Act remained in force until a quarter way through the nineteenth century, thus preventing Catholics from holding office under the Crown.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CABINET
GOVERNMENT—THE FULLY
CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY

In the reign of William and his successor Anne the first tentative steps were taken to establish the form of government that was later to be known as cabinet government. It was not a planned development but arose from the actual practice of the monarchs in dealing with a Parliament that had established its supremacy over them. The king, though forbidden many things, was still the chief executive, and he still initiated policy with the aid of his advisers, the privy council. He possessed a veto; he could dissolve Parliament and call for new elections, though he was compelled by statute to call Parliament and dissolve it at least once in three years. He had the full choice of all his ministers, who were responsible to him and could be dismissed only by him, though Parliament could impeach them if they had committed acts which might reasonably be expected to secure convictions in the House of Lords.

Nevertheless, the king needed some support in Parliament if he was to carry on his government. After various experiments William and his successor, Anne (1702-1714) discovered that it was the wisest policy to choose as ministers—that is, as members of their Council—men who could persuade Parliament to grant their requests. Although there were as yet no political parties worthy of the name, there were the Whig and Tory factions, whose members usually voted for their respective leaders in Parliament; and the king, if he wished to obtain the supplies he needed from Parliament, required the support of that leader who could command the majority of the votes in Parliament. It was possible for the kings to exercise much influence, both in the election of members of Parliament and through the use of patronage. But not even the last two monarchs of the Stuart line could have been sure of war supplies if they had insisted on choosing ministers who were unacceptable to the Parliamentary majority.

Thus the factions grew into parties, recog-

nizably different from one another, holding together in Parliament, and presenting themselves for election under party labels. The king's council became the cabinet, in theory chosen by the king, but unable to function effectively without the help of a Parliamentary majority. When the House of Hanover succeeded to the throne in 1714, the first two monarchs were more interested in their German electorate than in their English and Scottish kingdoms, which had been united in 1707 in a permanent union (Great Britain). They were content to allow their leading minister ("prime" minister) to choose his own assistant ministers, whom they themselves then formally invested. So the "king's ministers" were still his, as in the days of the king's council, but in fact responsible to the prime minister.

Parliament did not understand for a long time what was happening. When it did, it suddenly discovered that there was no further need for impeachment of the king's ministers. If Parliament merely voted against the majority party, government by it would be impossible and the ministers would have to resign. Thus the king would change them as a matter of course. The king also found that he no longer needed his veto—Anne was the last monarch to exercise it. If Parliament passed laws of which he disapproved, he could dissolve it without using the veto. But if the country in the ensuing elections backed up the party whose bill had been objected to, the king would have to give way. Thus the right of dissolution became the equivalent of a suspensory veto. This is still the way in which the English discover the will of the country in legislative matters, though now it is the cabinet which must advise the dissolution.

Through revolution and adjustment, the seventeenth century in England thus saw the establishment of a truly limited monarchy. The king and his ministers remained the executive, subject to a very real control by the legislative power, with an independent judiciary to enforce the laws of the realm by which, it was acknowledged, the whole people, including the monarch, were bound. Though there were still laws on the books against dissenters and Catho-

lica, and the Church of England was the only established Church, a substantial measure of toleration for individual religious opinion had been attained. As yet there was no democracy, though democratic forms were retained which had been originally the work of the limited medieval monarchy.

The constitutional struggle, however, was not quite over. Although George I (1714-1727) and George II (1727-1760) allowed their ministers to rule without too much interference from them, this was not true of George III (1760-1820). George III in the early years of his long reign wanted to rule, and believed that he had found the means of accomplishing his aims in the use of royal patronage to secure the election of Parliamentary representatives who would support his policy, or else cast their votes in favor of his policy after being elected. Thus on several occasions he chose as prime minister a man who did not command a majority in the House of Commons, but who formed a cabinet of men chosen by the king. Thus, in effect, the king was attempting to be his own prime minister. Such a government was that of Lord North, under whose cabinet of men known as "the king's friends" the American Colonies revolted against English rule. Lord North's government was, however, so spectacularly unsuccessful that even royal bribes and patronage could not secure a Parliamentary majority for his policy. Parliament finally passed a resolution to the effect that the king's power "had increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished," whereupon George gave way, and shortly afterward became intermittently insane. None of his successors tried a similar policy again, and patronage thereafter was dispensed by the king in accordance with the advice of his ministers, as it is today. In the early twentieth century King Edward VII informed a foreign inquirer who asked for his opinion that an English king has no opinion beyond that of his ministers.

Thus the revolution had been accomplished, and the English king had become a constitutional monarch. England was still not a democracy, but there were no further major constitutional changes—and no more revolutions, for none were necessary. Development has been

continuous, but it has been development and not radical change. In time the example set by England was followed elsewhere, because it seemed that in England constitutional problems had really been solved. A position, largely honorific, had even been found for the monarch. When, in the nineteenth century, thrones were tottering and monarchs faced either abdication, followed by a republic, or the honorable position of a constitutional monarch, many opted for the English system and survived.

Both democracy of the American type and constitutional monarchy of the Scandinavian type have stemmed from the English example, worked out almost fully during the Puritan Revolution. It was no mean achievement for the Puritans, who most certainly did not know what they were doing for posterity.

❖ European expansion to the end of the eighteenth century

It remains to discuss briefly the expansion of the European powers overseas during the period covered by this chapter, and thus lay the foundation for a fuller discussion of European imperialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which will appear in Chapter 21.

As we have seen, the Spaniards were able to keep most of their possessions in the New World and the Philippine islands until the beginning of the nineteenth century. Their possession of Florida and West Florida was confirmed in the treaty that ended the American War of Independence. West Florida was an undefined territory to the west of the American Colonies, including the mouth of the Mississippi and the unexplored territory beyond. But in the early seventeenth century we noted that while she ruled Portugal, Spain lost most of Portugal's eastern possessions to the Dutch. The Dutch, in the seventeenth century, in addition to acquiring a number of West Indian islands and a foothold on the South American coast, built their great empire in the Far East and settled the southern tip of Africa, always in rivalry with the English, but protected in the seventeenth century by their superior navy.

The British and the French disputed constantly the possession of North America and the West Indies, and for a time in the eighteenth century the French also disputed British possession of India. On the whole, it is true to say that it was the French crown rather than French trading interests that defended French possessions, and with some exceptions most of the land taken by the French was very sparsely inhabited by French immigrants. The great exception, of course, was French Canada, peopled largely by Norman peasants who multiplied in their new home but were always somewhat neglected by the European French. Thus the great French leaders were military men from the homeland, and the wars were fought with regard to strategic necessities rather than in support of such people as had settled there.

Colbert, the great finance minister of Louis XIV. supported French expansion and exploration in America, as had Cardinal Richelieu before him. Though Colbert had seen some possible profit in the enterprises and had supported in particular the exploitation of the West Indian islands for the growing of sugar, in which much French money was invested, Richelieu had been more interested in the prestige France would gain from successful exploration. French possessions on the mainland of North America were only of intermittent interest to French rulers, and attracted little capital. As a by-product of the various wars between the English and the French in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the country was fought over by English and French troops, with the permanent settlers in North America playing a relatively restricted part. Indeed, even in the eighteenth century the settlers of British stock were inclined to leave all defense to the English from the mainland and to regular troops, while they themselves undertook the burden of defending their own lands against the Indians, whom they had dispossessed and continued to dispossess, as necessary for their own expansion. Only with difficulty could the English persuade the colonists to pay their share of the wars.

The numerous wars between the British and French in Europe proved very costly to the

French. Even when they won a few battles they did not benefit greatly from them. The English commercial classes who largely controlled Parliament were willing to pay for the wars on American soil, especially when the West Indies, which produced so much sugar for the home market, were endangered. West Indian planters, indeed, sat in the British Parliament and could speak up directly for aid. The French king, on the contrary, had to find the money for the wars from an already overburdened budget. He was always very heavily engaged on the Continent, which was naturally of primary interest to him and his ministers, whereas the British made limited contributions, as a rule, to the continental wars, leaving themselves free to undertake extensive expeditions in the New World. As a maritime power England could also handle wars in America more easily than the French, who often had to build navies specially for the purpose of fighting in America. It is not therefore surprising that the French were unable to meet the competition of a much smaller and less populous but more specialized nation, such as England. When they did bestir themselves, the French strategic plans were usually better than those of the English, and their armies were better trained. This, however, usually meant that they performed many military feats and won many battles, without having the staying power to win the war. Lastly, the English constantly kept their eyes on the expansion of their colonial domains, and were willing in the peace treaties that ended the wars to trade off continental gains for more durable colonial acquisitions.


The same considerations apply to the rivalry between the English and French in Asia. For a time in the early eighteenth century the brilliant French governor, Dupleix, was able, with rather meager resources, to build himself an empire which was far larger at the time than that possessed by the British. Both powers were attempting to take advantage of the breakup of the Mogul Empire in India, ruling parts of India as the successors of the Mogul rulers. But, again, the French at home failed to back up Dupleix, whereas the Englishman, Robert Clive, was able to count on support from home and on the resources of the British

East India Company. During the Seven Years' War, with the full support of Parliament—then dominated by William Pitt the Elder—Clive was able to break the influence of the French for good, confining French possessions to a few relatively unimportant trading settlements.

In North America immigrants had been entering the country from England since the early seventeenth century. With the permission, if not the encouragement, of the king, the first Puritan settlements were founded in Massachusetts. Gradually, the east coast was settled as far as Georgia, many of the settlements being founded by groups of immigrants actively sponsored by Charles II. The colonists were granted their own colonial legislatures, and, in spite of many initial hardships, they prospered. By the eighteenth century they were strong enough to feel that the rule imposed on them by England, and the trade restrictions imposed by the Eng-

lish on all their colonies, were irksome. They resented the occasional high-handedness of the British officials and governors, even while they recognized that England was their chief bulwark of defense against the French to the west.

It seems likely that the Seven Years' War, which ended in 1763 with the cession of all French possessions on the mainland of North America to the British, relieved a substantial number of the colonists from the fear they had previously had of envelopment by the French. When the British placed a number of taxes on them for the purpose of making them pay some of the costs of the recent war and of their present defense, the colonists raised the cry of "no taxation without representation"—to which the British retorted, with some truth, that they had as much representation as anyone in England. By this they meant not that the English people were represented by a few propertied men elected by a restricted elec-



BRITISH NORTH AMERICA AFTER THE PEACE OF PARIS (1763)

torate, but that the colonists were defended in Parliament by several eloquent spokesmen for their interests. But these men were in opposition during the North administration, which, as noted earlier, was dominated by King George III himself. At all events, the colonial leaders were able to stir up a considerable opposition to the new taxes, and representatives of all the Colonies gathered in Philadelphia, where they formed a Continental Congress. Opposition was also strong in Boston, which had been hard hit by the taxes. New York, however, the center of the major commercial interests of the country, had little sympathy for the anti-British movement. New Yorkers were loath to disrupt their valuable trade with the home country.

In 1775 the various issues came to a head, and there was sporadic violence. This persuaded the British that the colonists must be taught a lesson, and that all disloyalty to the Crown must be ruthlessly suppressed. The Americans retorted with a Declaration of Independence (1776), in which the authors cited a long list of grievances against the "tyrannous" government of George III and declared that the Colonies were henceforth independent. The colonials were badly prepared for war, but much of the campaign was badly mismanaged on the British side. When General Burgoyne was trapped at Saratoga in 1777, the efforts of Benjamin Franklin, the ambassador of the Colonies in Paris, at last bore fruit, and the French entered the war on the side of the new United States. The Spanish joined with the French shortly afterwards. This intervention slowly turned the tide, the French navy under de Grasse effectively preventing the British from carrying out their strategic plans, which depended on command of the sea. The American army under General George Washington, after incredible hardships, was finally welded into a fighting force, and in 1783, at the treaty of Versailles, the independence of the United States was recognized. Since the French fleet had been badly beaten by the British in the West Indies in 1782, the French did not gain much from the treaty, but Spain was able to have her possessions in America confirmed, as already noted.

Canada, however, remained securely in British hands. This fact can be attributed mainly to the manner in which the British had handled the French Canadian after the Seven Years' War. By permitting him the free exercise of his Catholic religion—a privilege which might well have been denied by the Puritans of New England—and his French language, the British ensured that there would be little sympathy for the stand of the Colonies, even among the people they had so recently defeated. The French Canadians indeed felt themselves more threatened by the United States than by the British, and they could rely little on the French in their homeland. In short, they had accepted the position as it was after the Seven Years' War; and when the British passed the Quebec Act of 1774, which guaranteed them their rights, they had no further reason to feel any sympathy with the movement for separation. On the other hand, outside the old colony of Nova Scotia, peopled largely by New Englanders but incapable of defending itself against British naval might, which remained determinedly neutral during the War of Independence, there were few immigrants of British ancestry in the country. Almost all of these had arrived after 1763, and had to consolidate their position against the French, for which they needed the help of the mother country. Only after the War did the ethnic composition of the country markedly change, with the influx of "loyalists" (later known as United Empire Loyalists) who had refused to live in the United States after independence.

At the end of the eighteenth century Britain was in possession of eastern Canada, a majority of the West Indian islands, and an extensive empire in the East, together with scattered possessions elsewhere, including the fortress of Gibraltar. The Dutch had a prosperous empire in the East which they exploited with some efficiency and much ruthlessness. They also had a few West Indian islands, Dutch Guiana on the northeast coast of South America, and the Cape of Good Hope at the tip of Africa. Spain still had Central and South America, several important West Indian Islands, and much of North America, though her grip on all these territories was loosening. Portugal had a few

remnants of her once extensive empire, including two large colonies in Africa, exploited for their slaves; Brazil; and a few outposts in the East.

The ground was thus prepared for the great expansion of Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries under the impact of the Industrial Revolution.

❖ Summary and conclusion—the failure of enlightened despotism

We have now traced the evolution of the European state system in the centuries prior to the French Revolution, and we have considered the expansion of European states and the beginning of the spread of Western civilization outside the borders of Europe. During these centuries the system of absolute monarchy had become well entrenched in almost all European states. The elective monarchy, inherited from the Germanic barbarians, was almost at an end, having been replaced by the hereditary system of the ancient world.

But the chief difficulty of the hereditary system, already glaringly visible in the Roman Empire, had been in no way overcome. In spite of improvements in administration and the growth of bureaucracies, the personality and ability of the monarchs remained of crucial importance for the well-being of their countries. The eighteenth-century experiment in enlightened despotism had demonstrated both the relative scarcity of enlightenment among monarchs and the unwillingness of many of the privileged classes to yield any of their privileges, even in the cause of improved administration and efficiency. The less privileged classes, especially the bourgeoisie in the more developed nations, were unwilling to leave the protection of their interests to the sole care of the monarchs, still less to the privileged nobility. They were increasingly beginning to demand some share in the governing of their countries. Although the Russian monarchy, in the absence of any significant Russian middle class, was still secure, the country was now fully exposed to influences from the more advanced West. She could not expect to remain immune from the Western virus much longer.

The pilot experiment in constitutional monarchy was already available for examination. Throughout the eighteenth century numerous political thinkers and publicists had visited England, and had seen for themselves that the British Parliament and not the monarch did indeed rule the country. Returning to their own countries, many of them sang the praises of the British system, and inquired aloud whether some such system would not be possible at home. But, perhaps even more important, in the last quarter of the eighteenth century the American colonists had shown that it was possible for ordinary plain men, none of them boasting titles of nobility, to defeat a monarch and his armies, and to set up for themselves a new kind of state, thought out and organized on principles laid down by the most enlightened political thinkers of the day.

By 1789 France—the most advanced country in Europe, the unquestioned cultural leader of the Western world—was rapidly descending into bankruptcy under institutions that were patently no longer adequate for her needs. But the spark ignited by the French Revolution found dry tinder elsewhere; when Napoleon spread its message abroad by the might of his armies, he ushered in the modern world.

Suggestions for further reading

NOTE ON LITERATURE RELATING TO THE PERIOD: Especially recommended for the thought of the time are Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, Hobbes' *Leviathan*, Locke's treatises on government, and Machiavelli's *The Prince*; for London life see the journalistic essays of Addison and Steele and Pepys' *Diary* (all these works are available in various inexpensive editions). Two later novels give vivid pictures: Sir Walter Scott's *Kenilworth*, about Elizabeth and the Earl of Leicester (1821, many editions); and Zofia Kossak's *The Meek Shall Inherit*, about seventeenth-century Poland (1948, Roy). Notable among modern biographies are Catherine Bowen's *The Lion and the Throne*, about Chief Justice Coke (Little, Brown); John Buchan's *Oliver Cromwell* (Houghton Mifflin); J. E. Neale's *Queen Elizabeth I* (Anchor); Ferdinand Schervill's *The Great Elector* (Chicago); Benedict Sumner's *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* (Macmillan); Evelyn Waugh's

Edmund Campion, about the Elizabethan Catholic leader (Image); and Cicily Wedgwood's *The King's Peace*, about the rule of Charles I (Macmillan) and her *Richelieu and the French Monarchy* (Macmillan) and *William the Silent* (Yale).

PAPERBACK BOOKS

Becker, Carl. *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers*. Yale. Provocative account of enlightened despotism and the philosophers.

Bindoff, S. T. *Tudor England*. Penguin. Informative, reliable, well-written account, with many interesting sidelights on the period.

Elton, G. R. *The Tudor Revolution in Government*. Cambridge. Important modern work containing most recent interpretation of the task performed by the Tudors. Good on the strengths and weaknesses of the system.

Ford, Boris, ed. *The Age of Shakespeare*. Penguin. A volume of the Pelican History of Literature series, it gives a good general picture of the age.

Gooch, G. P. *English Democratic Ideas in the Seventeenth-Century*. Torch.

Hackett, Francis. *Henry the Eighth*. Bantam. Lively biography. The original title was *The Personal Life of Henry the Eighth*.

Haller, William. *The Rise of Puritanism*. Torch. Mainly drawn from the preachings of Puritans, the book demonstrates very well their attitude to life and the different varieties of Puritanism.

Lewis, W. H. *The Splendid Century: Life in the France of Louis XIV.* Anchor. Picture of society of the period.

Nef, John U. *Industry and Government in France and England, 1540-1640*. Compass. Authoritative work, casting useful sidelights especially on the governmental system of the *ancien régime* in France.

Pares, Bernard. *Russia*. NAL. Not strong on analysis, but interesting and informative, with much colorful detail. By a lover of Russia who was not a professional historian.

Turberville, A. S. *English Men and Manners in the Eighteenth-Century*. Galaxy.

CASEBOUND BOOKS

Adams, George B. *Constitutional History of England*. Rev. by R. L. Schuyler. New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1936. Classic exposition, good on the Stuarts but rather thin on the Tudors.

Barracough, Geoffrey. *The Origins of Modern Germany*. Oxford: Basil, Blackwell and Mott,

1946. Rather brief but well thought out and lucid.

Bruun, Geoffrey. *The Enlightened Despots*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1929. Brief study, but informative and useful as far as it goes.

Buffinton, Arthur H. *The Second Hundred Years' War, 1689-1815*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1929. Brief account of the rivalry between the two countries and the many encounters between them in the search for empire.

Butterfield, Herbert. *George III, Lord North and the People*. London: G. Bell & Sons, Ltd., 1949. Careful study by an eminent historian of the government of the King's Friends, revealing the English background of the American War of Independence.

Chrimes, S. B. *English Constitutional History*. London: Home University Library, 1948. Succinct account by one of the foremost modern scholars of English government and administration. Especially good on the Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century developments.

Firth, Charles H. *Oliver Cromwell and the Rule of the Puritans in England*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934. This book, originally published as early as 1900, is still accurate and very readable, by one of the greatest Cromwellian scholars of his day.

Gershoy, Leo. *From Despotism to Revolution, 1763-1789*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944. Useful general account.

Haller, William. *Liberty and Reformation in the Puritan Revolution*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. Full of useful and interesting information, a more complete and readable work than the earlier *Rise of Puritanism*.

Kerner, Robert. *Bohemia in the Eighteenth-Century*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932. Good on the enlightened despot, Leopold II.

Kliuchevski, V. O. *A History of Russia*. London: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1911-1931. 5 vols. The best of all histories of Russia and not difficult to read, though long and detailed. Vol. 4 is devoted to Peter the Great.

Lord, Robert. *The Second Partition of Poland: A Study of Diplomatic History*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1915. Important study, a model of its kind.

McElwee, William. *The Reign of Charles V, 1516-1558*. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1936. Deals effectively with political and religious developments of the reign.

- Mattingly, Garrett. *The Armada*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959. Excellent picture of relations between England and Spain in the sixteenth century as well as a stirring account of the Armada.
- Mazour, Anatole C. *Russia, Past and Present*. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1951. Good up-to-date history, especially good on structure of Russian institutions.
- Motley, John L. *Rise of the Dutch Republic*. Oxford Classics; Everyman. 3 vols. Famous nineteenth-century classic, written with vigor and verve. Sympathetic to William the Silent, and critical of Philip.
- Namier, L. B. *England in the Age of the American Revolution*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930. Important new interpretation of the period, to be contrasted especially with Butterfield.
- Nussbaum, Arthur. *A Concise History of the Law of Nations*. Rev. ed. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954. Excellent account of the foundation of international law, with some attention to the early theorists.
- Ogg, David. *Europe in the Seventeenth Century*. 2d ed. London: A. and C. Black, Ltd., 1931. Clear and useful work dealing with the countries of Europe separately and relating each to the other.
- Ritcheson, Charles R. *British Politics and the American Revolution*. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954. Useful study of the relation of the Revolution to British affairs, using the work of Namier and others to throw special light on the subject.
- Sabine, George H. *A History of Political Theory*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1937. A great deal of this text is excellent; it is recommended here especially for its study of the political thinkers dealt with in this chapter.
- Smith, Preserved. *Age of the Reformation*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1920. Has a spirited account of the Dutch struggle for independence.
- Trevelyan, George M. *The English Revolution 1688-1689*. London: Home University Library, 1938. A readable brief account by a master of historical prose.
- Vernadsky, G. *A History of Russia*. 4th ed., rev. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954. Sometimes overly technical, but good standard history.
- Wedgwood, Cicely. *The Thirty Years' War*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939. Extremely successful in compressing into a manageable compass not only the war but the relations between the various smaller German states and the Holy Roman Empire.

Science and Culture to the French Revolution

It may reasonably be said that the entire direction of the striving of modern Western man was laid down in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Whereas the Renaissance had drawn man's attention to the potentialities of life on earth, the Reformation had stressed (among many other things) the authority of the individual conscience above that of an authoritarian Church. The Reformation had at the same time unleashed such religious conflict in Europe between Catholics and Protestants, and between different branches of Protestantism, that religion itself had grievously suffered. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries took up again the heritage of the Renaissance, and they converted the still predominantly Christian humanism of the earlier epoch into a wholly secular form of humanism based upon the supposed findings of science and an exaltation of the human faculty of reason. Indeed, the period has sometimes been called the Age of Reason. Unfair though this distinction may be to the medieval rationalists, it is not altogether a misnomer, since the latter never regarded reason, however effectively they used it, as anything more than complementary to faith. Though modern man since the eighteenth century has tended to recognize, more than did his forebears, the part that emotions play in life, the intellect has nevertheless continued to be the tool with which he hopes to unlock the secrets of the world and of man. And though at times some men of science have cried out that there are some things we shall never know, and have either lived with their

forever invincible ignorance or fallen back upon faith, it remains true that the fundamental urge in Western civilization and in modern man has been to strive on ever farther and faster toward the frontiers of knowledge.

Oswald Spengler, in his important work *The Decline of the West*, characterizes Western man as "Faustian," after the protagonist of Goethe's great drama. Faust is the prototype of the eternally striving man, seeking to drain to the last drop all human experience, touching the heights and plumbing the depths, careless of salvation in another world and undeterred by fears of damnation. Spengler contrasts this man with the "Apollonian" man, the prototype of Greek civilization, who did not aspire to the heights or the depths, and who, indeed, felt that the gods punished man for usurping prerogatives that belonged to the gods alone. Whereas Apollonian man brought down his gods to dwell with him in his closed temples, Faustian man has built his churches reaching toward heaven, soaring into the infinite. The contrast is instructive, and Spengler's insight was an important one. For Western man is indeed in this respect unique. The civilization he has built is dynamic and vital, endlessly looking for something new; believing, for the first time in the history of civilization, in progress; full of tension, its executives dying in their prime from high blood pressure; expansionist, carelessly spending itself and its resources in pursuit of goals it cannot even take the time or the trouble to formulate.

So we find exemplified, in these early centuries of the preparation of Western man for his task, the tendency to extremes. On the one hand, we find a preoccupation with the world of sense, followed by the too easy acceptance of the data of the sense world as being all that exists. This, indeed, is as far as the intellect can go. It is competent to understand only the world of sense, to perceive the logical connection between ideas and the relations between material causes and effects. On the other hand, to balance this preoccupation, there appears in the great Western artists the search for means of expression never before known—musical sounds and harmonies never before experienced by man, visions of what never was by land or sea. Already, in the painters of the seventeenth century, there is a new and original use of space and groupings, new use of light and shadow, and, with Rembrandt, there is the effort to see and convey to canvas the very soul of the human being—that inner vision hidden from scientists and inaccessible to the intellect.

Thus, though the bulk of this chapter must be devoted to the achievements of science and the thinking that derived from them, attention

will be given first to those artists who represent the other polarity of striving.

❖ The Baroque

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

An aspect of the striving Western spirit is that form of art known as the Baroque, which at one time was regarded as the flamboyant period of Renaissance art, as flamboyant Gothic is the last form of the Gothic. But it is now generally thought of as an art form of its own, characteristically Western, and owing little but its subject matter to the Renaissance. It is true that it is marked by exuberance and some flamboyance, and it lacks the restraint of the best Greek art. The revival of interest in classical Greek art in the second half of the eighteenth century, especially in Germany, brought Baroque into disrepute in that country, where its many virtues had ceased to be appreciated, and it was as misunderstood as was Gothic art by the Renaissance humanists.

The word *Baroque* is always recognized as applicable to painting and music. But it is



Interior of the Cathedral of Salzburg, Austria (early seventeenth century). The cathedral, made of local rose-colored marble, is regarded as the purest Italian Baroque structure north of the Alps. (COURTESY AUSTRIAN STATE TOURIST DEPARTMENT)

often used also to cover a particular style of activity, not only in art but in literature and even in life—even though it is difficult, if not impossible, to give a strict definition of what Baroque actually is. It is more easily characterized than defined. A widely used and respectable encyclopaedia refers to the life of John Barrymore, the actor, as Baroque; Milton's *Paradise Lost* is a perfectly Baroque poem, whose central figure of Satan is a Baroque personage par excellence, even though he is a fallen angel and not a human being. No one, on the other hand, could possibly mistake the figure of Parzival in the medieval epic described in Chapter 12 for a Baroque character. The Baroque ideal had not yet been born in the thirteenth century.

In all Baroque there is a striving toward the infinite, not to be confused with an attainable ideal, even one so remote as the Holy Grail. There is likewise a tension, as of vigor imperfectly disciplined, which may find manifestation in exuberance of decoration, and seems to be striving to burst the bonds of form imposed by the material with which it has to work. Only for a brief period and among a few artists can it be said that the vigor was fully disciplined. This great age was the classical age in France, during the reign of Louis XIV, even though many of the achievements of this age are pure Baroque, undisciplined by reason—as for instance much of the palace of Versailles.

L'ESPRIT CLASSIQUE IN FRANCE

The French classical spirit can best be described as the attempt to discipline natural vigor by the human reason. The effort may sometimes appear to impose too rigid a form upon material unsuited for the imposition of arbitrary rules, material that should be allowed a freer expression. But when reason, within the artist himself, has already imposed its discipline, and from the fusion of reason and feeling emerges the finished work of art, with form and content inseparable from one another so that the reader or viewer says at once that no other was possible, then the work may be said to be in tune with the classical

spirit. This spirit was therefore an ideal only, and far from being expressed in all the works of the classical age in France or elsewhere. The minor artists and writers were inclined to treat the canons of good form as laid down by the critics—and by Aristotle in his ancient work on the *Poetics*—as immutable laws, and to compress their work into them.

This, however, is not true of the three great masters of classical French drama. Pierre Corneille (1600-1684) is the most Baroque of these men in the sense in which the word is used in this chapter. His characters are more idealized than those of his two peers—sometimes to excess. In this idealization he imitates the older Greek tragedy. His figures are painted as human idealism would have them rather than as human realism and respect for truth would see them. His heroes are more than life-size; they must always undergo hardship before they win love; they renounce early joys for the sake of their ideals. The best plays of Corneille are noble and inspiring, and order and clarity are already present; though in some of his later works idealism, as so often, descends to preaching, and melodrama and pathos take the place of tragedy.

Order, clarity, and truth are never absent from the work of Racine, nor from that of Molière (1622-1673), who was perhaps the greatest of the world's writers of comedy. Both writers, unlike Corneille, were realists. Racine, with tenderness and compassion and profound psychological insight, records the lives of men and women, whereas Molière, sometimes savagely satirical, usually overlays his satire with gentle wit and humor. In Molière's greatest comedy, *Tartuffe*, he points inexorably to the fact that man is but man, limited by his humanity, and unable to transcend his limitations through a superimposed idealism. In spite of all his efforts of will to make himself other than he is. Such efforts transform the character of Orgon from a mild and respectable natural goodness into its very opposite; whereas Racine in *Phèdre* perceives the tragedy of passion which cannot be overcome by reason or will and must lead inevitably to disaster. It is instructive indeed to contrast Racine's treatment of this theme and Euripides' in his *Hippolytus*, and

thus perceive the differences between human reason as it was understood by two men, and to contrast likewise their views on the realm to be ascribed to divine authority in the world.

Although there are many other great writers of the classical age—among them La Bruyère, whose *Characters*, with their close observation of man, are unsurpassed in their field; La Rochefoucauld, who in his *Maxims* observed the follies and weaknesses of men, and expressed them with a brilliant clarity; La Fontaine, with his pointed and pungent *Fables*; and Mme. de Sévigné, whose letters are still read for their exquisite urbanity and concealed artistry—these men and women achieved exactly what they set out to do and in the form best fitted to the content: none of them is in any sense Baroque. The only other Baroque writer of the very first rank is John Milton, the English Puritan (1608–1674),

THE BAROQUE POET PAR EXCELLENCE


—JOHN MILTON

Like so many others of the great artists of this period, Milton suffered from an incurable affliction. "Ere half my days" he be-

came partially blind, and then totally so. A Puritan supporter of Cromwell, he turned to poetry at an early age, though devoting himself when necessary to public activities on behalf of the Protectorate regime. Among his prose writings is to be found what is perhaps the most eloquent defense of freedom of the press ever written, the *Areopagitica*, directed against the censorship imposed by the Roundheads. His sonnets are generally recognized as the finest in the English language, with the possible exception of the very different ones of Shakespeare—profoundly thoughtful, often full of beautiful images, and yet withal musical. But it is the masterpiece of his last blind years for which he is best known, *Paradise Lost*. Full of classical learning and allusion, which are almost always subordinated to the essentials of his theme and kept under control, the poem is the greatest epic in the English language, indeed one of the very few epics which is still readable. Though the concern of the epic is to justify the ways of God to man, and it thus attempts to come to grips with the problem of evil in the world, it is most notable that in spite of the poet's own intention it is the fallen angel Satan, cast out of Heaven, who



"Blind Orion" by Nicolas Poussin. (COURTESY OF THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART)



"St. Jerome" by El Greco. (COURTESY OF THE FRICK COLLECTION)

is the true hero, Satan is the Prometheus of Aeschylus transferred into the seventeenth-century Western world, unbowed by affliction, proud and forever unwilling to acknowledge the justice, though he may submit to the power, of God. Beside the figure of Satan all else in the poem fades into relative insignificance. Though Milton with his mind disapproves of Satan, has compassion for Adam and Eve cast out of Paradise, and recognizes (in the sequel, *Paradise Regained*) the deed of Christ, it is with Satan that he unconsciously identifies himself. Thus Milton ultimately portrays Western man in his Baroque aspect as eloquently as Goethe; but by a peculiar irony Milton's hero, who is a superhuman being and not a man, is in his poem a man as well as a symbol, whereas Goethe's Faust is symbol rather than man.

BAROQUE PAINTING

As an art form Baroque originated in Italy and was taken over by other European nations. Much of St. Peter's in Rome is wholly Baroque in style—not only the great colonnades and the imaginative use of space, but the often exuberant decoration, especially the tremendous canopy above the altar known as the *baldachin*, all the work of Giovanni Bernini (1598-1680). The interior of the palace of

Versailles, much of it carried out by Italians, and some elements of the exterior and design are also Baroque, in spite of the formal gardens and supposedly classical inspiration. Numerous churches in Germany and Austria are Baroque, though perhaps the most interesting examples are in Mexico, where Spanish Baroque was influenced by native Indian tradition to create something unique in the West.

Among Baroque painters should be considered the two greatest painters of the classical age in France, Nicholas Poussin (1593-1665) and Claude Gellée (or Lorrain, 1600-1682), though there is a subtle difference in the work of these men and that of the other more fully Baroque painters, such as Rubens.

Poussin was certainly influenced by the many years he spent in Rome, the center of Baroque at the time. He not only painted a number of magnificent battle scenes, but even in his famed landscapes there is an idealization characteristic of Baroque, and a kind of tension which communicates itself to the beholder, in spite of the way in which Poussin has undoubtedly succeeded in establishing order and harmony in his often huge canvases. The luminous landscapes of Gellée have sometimes been considered to reflect nothing of the still turbulent age in which he was living, but their ideal quality is claimed for the Baroque, as is also their sense of unity. What must cer-



"The Virgin and Child" by Rubens. (COURTESY OF THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, THE MICHAEL FRIEDSAM COLLECTION, 1931)

tainly be said, however, is that in both Poussin and Gellée the mind has indeed triumphed over the emotions, and what is shown in the paintings is the result of a conscious effort to attain an inner serenity, even though Baroque exuberance and vitality may lie not far below.

Of the Baroque painters elsewhere, three deserve attention. The Cretan known as El Greco, born Kyriakos Theotokopoulos (1561-1614), spent most of his mature life in Spain where his work influenced other painters less Baroque than he, such as Diego Velasquez. El Greco can hardly be said to have been influenced by Italian Baroque, since it had barely started by the time he left Italy, but his canvases are full of an exalted mysticism, which makes use of distortion to achieve its effects, and a strange use of contrasting colors in which grey predominates to suggest the unearthly. Filled with the spirit of the Catholic Reformation, as is much of Italian Baroque, El Greco painted ascetic cardinals and nobles of the decadent Spanish nobility, many of whom had entered the Church; and numerous religious paintings including the baptism, crucifixion, and resurrection of Christ in the Prado, in Madrid. In spite of the nature of his subjects it is always possible to discern the tremendous vitality and vigor of the artist, and the striv-

ing to escape the bonds of his earthly nature characteristic of the highest form of Baroque.

Peter Paul Rubens (1577-1640) is the name which at once comes to mind when one thinks of Flemish Baroque art. His lush canvases, with their wide expanses of nude flesh, glorified the buxom charms of Flemish bourgeois beauties. Their vigor is unbounded, and Rubens is said to have painted more than two thousand canvases in a life of unequalled productivity. He excelled at the large monumental painting, including murals. His religious paintings, replete with well-nourished cherubs and sensuous virgins, serve to express the lusty sensuousness of the painter rather than conduce to any kind of religious awe or veneration. Even the elementary student of art need only glimpse a Raphael Madonna and then a Rubens so-called Madonna to feel at once the difference between the religious spirit of a Raphael and the Baroque taste of a Rubens.

Rembrandt van Rijn (1606-1669) must also be classified as Baroque; but, unlike some other Baroque painters, he has evidently transcended his medium and subjected his vitality to the discipline of his questing and deeply religious spirit. Unpopular in his day, and unable to make a living from his painting, Rembrandt is now regarded as among the few



Self-portrait by Rembrandt, (COURTESY OF THE MELLON COLLECTION, NATIONAL GALLERY OF ART)

of the very highest rank in Western art. His use of light and shade, and above all the use of the color brown in all its shades and variations, convey to the viewer an experience that is not offered by any other painter. Rembrandt has tried to penetrate the soul that lies behind the appearance both in his paintings of ordinary people and in his numerous self-portraits. His religious and secular paintings alike have a quality not to be found in the paintings of the men of the High Renaissance. Compare once more the Mona Lisa with a Rembrandt self-portrait or the portrait of a Capuchin monk, and you will see that Rembrandt has been striving to portray the universal human being behind the particular person painted.

In the religious paintings Rembrandt has deeply imagined the character of the men he has chosen for portrayal, and again, in a manner different from Leonardo's disciples in the Last Supper, Leonardo has perceived, whereas Rembrandt has experienced imaginatively within his own being. The magnificent "St. Paul" is saying, "Though I speak with the tongue of angels . . . though I give my body to be burned and have not love, I am as sounding brass and tinkling cymbals." In the "David Playing to Saul" the old king's evil spirits, his weariness of the world, and the freshness of young David and his ethereal message from another world are beautifully caught; while in the "Daniel's Vision" there is Daniel with the angel behind him filling the spiritual eyes

of the seer, who glimpses the rams beyond the dark abyss. Both suggest the urge of the painter to penetrate beyond the bounds of the earthly, which is characteristic of the Baroque in its maturest expression.

BAROQUE MUSIC

Baroque music, like Baroque art, originated in Italy but came to its fullest expression elsewhere. In music this was certainly in Germany, though the characteristic musical forms—the recitative and opera, the cantata, the concerto, and the overture—were Italian in origin. But it is to Germany that we must turn for the great musicians of the mature Baroque, above all in Johann Sebastian Bach (1685-1750). Organist and composer, he was not in his own day regarded as the superb musician he has been acknowledged to be in recent years. His life was comparatively uneventful. Born into a family with musical talent, he became organist and, in later years, cantor at Leipzig. He played and composed for the organ, harpsichord, and clavichord. Although his chorales and masses are deeply religious in feeling and are among the finest ever composed, his greatest field of virtuosity was the fugue, a composition made up of many voices, independent of one another, yet fusing into a harmonious whole. They are difficult to play well, but those musicians, and there are many, who play Bach almost exclusively find that in his work there



"St. Paul" by Rembrandt. (COURTESY WIDENER COLLECTION, NATIONAL GALLERY OF ART)

is no limit to the feeling that may be expressed through this form. The player must submit to the discipline imposed by the form and tempo of Bach's music, and bow always to the will of the composer. Bach does not lend himself to the type of improvisation possible with music which does not have such a strict form. But as with the French classical spirit at its best, it must be recognized that form and feeling in Bach are perfectly fused, the form and the con-

tent inseparable from one another as they were in the composer himself. This is Baroque at its most mature.

George Frederick Handel (1685-1759) has always been more popular than Bach. An Englishman by adoption though German by birth, he was visiting in England when his patron, the elector George of Hanover, became king of England, and Handel stayed in that country for the rest of his life. A virtuoso on

"David playing to Saul" by Rembrandt. (COURTESY MAURITSHUIS, THE HAGUE)



the organ, he composed forty-six operas, most of which are now neglected, though containing much of his finest music. He also wrote many oratorios, but it is to the *Messiah* that he owes most of his fame. The familiar elaborations in the *Messiah* are characteristically Baroque. Indeed, these elaborations have not unfrequently been subjected to parody at the hands of the irreverent.

The Baroque in its technical sense shades over into the Rococo, a delicate eighteenth-century development which, especially in France, makes use of the most fanciful decoration and elaboration, a fitting expression of the aristocratic luxury of the period. Sometimes, notably in Italy, Germany (especially southern Germany), and above all Austria, it is difficult to distinguish Rococo from the late Baroque. It may be said that in the Rococo all rules are abandoned, and the free play of fancy is permitted. It has lost touch with that other aspect of the Baroque noted in this chapter, and exaggerates the exuberance and fancifulness; and it is taste, or the purely aesthetic sense,



Elegant example of Rococo furniture from the age of Louis XV. (COURTESY OF THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, GIFT OF J. PIERPONT MORGAN, 1906)



"Mezzetin" by the French painter Watteau (1684-1721), a typical painting of the Rococo period. (COURTESY METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, MINSKY FUND, 1934)

that determines the limits of the permissible. Especially notable in the field of the Rococo is the furniture of the age of Louis XV in France and all interior decoration of that period. Chippendale English furniture also shows its influence.

Musically, the Rococo may be found in the sonatas of Domenico Scarlatti (1683-1757) but also in Haydn (1732-1809) and his pupil Mozart. Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart (1756-1791) was the pure genius of the great age of music we call classical, the Raphael of music, who composed effortlessly from an early age, with the most prodigious output of any composer who lived so few years on earth—in this also like Raphael. He was expert in every form of music known to his time—concerto, symphony, opera, and even the simpler forms such as the sonata. Already before he was seven years old he was composing charac-

teristically Mozartian melodies that he later incorporated in other works. The beautiful Second Sonata was composed when he was only eighteen, but he was already playing himself in public at the age of seven. The words used by all his contemporaries to describe his own playing were charm and elegance. These remain today the qualities for which most pianists value him, although in his concertos, symphonies and operas, especially *The Magic Flute*, there is a profundity of feeling as well as the invariable melodiousness for which he has never been equaled.

But with the last of the greats of German eighteenth-century music—space forbids mention of the other composers of this great age of German music—Ludwig van Beethoven (1770–1827), we are in a different world. It is a world of profound struggle against every ill to which man is heir, a life full of heart-break and the hardest burden of all for a musician to bear—deafness. In the early Beethoven we can see traces of Mozart and even of the Rococo. Then, suddenly, the work becomes characteristically Beethoven and could have been composed by no other. There are the long years of hardship, the estrangement of his beloved nephew, for whose custody he fought; then the retreat into silence. The slow emergence from the silence and the depths begins with the tremendous and almost unplayable “Hammerklavier” sonata, which, with its longest slow movement in musical history and its profound sadness, heralded the new Beethoven of the last years, the Ninth Symphony and the last quartets. Beethoven had now penetrated to the pure spiritual world and brought his music down from heaven. In his earthly life he could no longer hear what he had composed. But no one has ever doubted that these compositions are the most sublime of all his works. What Beethoven achieved was the scaling of those heights which are the goal of Western man, the polarizing of those intellectual faculties that direct his gaze to the material. Beethoven is for the healing of mankind; and if one meditates on the Saul and David of Rembrandt’s vision, one may come to recognize that what Rembrandt pictures in oils, Beethoven came nearest to achieving.

Though future Western music, partly under the influence of technical invention, was to move away from the unique Beethoven, few have had any doubt that with him music reached a height and a depth which no other has yet equaled.

❖ The Neoclassical revival

The age of the Baroque and Rococo was gradually superseded during the eighteenth century by a Neoclassical revival, especially in Germany, the home of the later Baroque. This revival was in part occasioned by the increased interest in classical antiquity that accompanied the general thirst for knowledge characteristic of the eighteenth-century *philosophes*. But in the field of art the man who was more responsible than anyone else for this trend was Johann J. Winckelmann (1717–1768), a German art critic who became enamored of classical art—not only Roman, but also Greek. Though he had seen little enough of the latter, he admired especially its clarity and simplicity. His *History of the Art of Antiquity* was a book that appealed greatly to the Germans of his day and, through them, to a Europe that had grown weary of the exaggerations in the Baroque and found the elegance and decoration of the Rococo somewhat frivolous and not to its taste. It is from Winckelmann and his disciples, especially Lessing, and to some degree Goethe, that the picture of Greek art as pure, noble, and chaste (and the Greeks themselves as ideal models of such virtues) has filtered down to those of us, in particular, who refuse to imagine Greek statuary in its original colors, as distinct from the white marble that has survived. However, it should be said that in the early years of the revival Greek art and thought were still not fully distinguished from their Roman imitations. Roman antiquity, as in the days of the Renaissance, appealed to the Italians and the French, in particular, and interest in Greece was slow to arise among the Latin peoples. But in time enthusiasm for Greek antiquity began to supersede interest in Rome, and the correct distinctions were made between Greece and



One of the best known examples of the Neoclassical style in the United States, The University of Virginia, designed by Thomas Jefferson. (COURTESY THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA)

Rome. Though interest in Roman antiquity never quite died out, British and German critics especially began to regard Roman work as too often derivative and overelaborate. Paradoxically, the discovery of the buried ruins of Pompeii and Herculaneum, in southern Italy in 1748, increased the enthusiasm for all things Greek, since these cities, though in Italy, were peopled by Greeks and were more influenced by Greek culture than by Roman. Many of the discoveries were authentically Greek, though belonging to a later period of Hellenistic art, and aroused interest in searching for their earlier models. It was in 1762 that the Parthenon ruins were surveyed and measured by two Englishmen, and in 1764 that Winckelmann's influential book appeared. Though in itself largely inspired by Roman antiquity, the book had the effect, in the later eighteenth century, of turning the attention of Europeans to the Greek originals.

The Germans, undergoing at the time their first great culturally creative period since the Middle Ages, began to fancy themselves as

reborn Athenians, with Athenian and not Roman virtues—which they were willing to leave to the Italians and other Latins. The Neoclassicism of the eighteenth century persisted through the architecturally imitative nineteenth century, side by side with neo-Gothic and various eclectic modes. Nowhere has this influence been stronger than in America, where the classical colonnade and classical columns were *de rigueur* for more than a century, whether on simple new England private residences, on public buildings in New York, or on stately mansions in the South. But most of the great nineteenth-century Europeans in fields other than architecture also thoroughly assimilated the classical Greek tradition, which became for the first time truly the heritage of Western man. Goethe, who discovered classical art in the middle of his life, describes the unforgettable impression it made on him; but though the classical influence is unmistakable in much that he did later, especially in the second part of *Faust*, it does not crowd out his native genius. Goethe cannot be considered

solely a Neoclassicist, like some of the earlier and less gifted disciples of Winckelmann or those architects who called no building happy unless it had its quota of "Greek" columns, supporting nothing but suggestive of who knows what classical "simplicity."

It is time now to turn to the other pole, the pole of the intellect and the growth of the understanding of the given, the natural world, which remains the glory of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and thus needs a far more detailed treatment than was possible for the cultural achievements of this period.

❖ The modern view of the world—contrast with earlier attitudes

If it were required to characterize the modern attitude to the world of nature in such a way as to point the contrast between this attitude and that of earlier times, one sentence would seem to suffice. Modern man, one must say, has emancipated himself from the world of nature. He no longer looks upon it as a world to be admired and revered, but as one to be manipulated for his own use; and the world of nature has shown itself to be amenable to such manipulation.

This development is new in the history of mankind. There had been science in ancient times; Hellenistic science, indeed, had been far more objective than any science that followed, and had few preconceptions such as those which vitiated too much of medieval science. But the Greek search was exclusively for knowledge as something worthy to be sought for its own sake. "All men by nature desire to know," Aristotle had said, thus giving expression to the Greek view that man as a thinking being should develop his powers of thought by exercising it on the world of nature. But, though modern science was pioneered by men who sought only to know and to understand, it was seen by publicists of science, foremost amongst them Francis, Lord Bacon of Verulam (1561-1626), that this knowledge could and should be made useful for mankind. This was the crucial step that differentiates modern

from Greek science: to perceive that scientific knowledge is an instrument to bend nature to human purposes—that knowledge, in short, is power. This it is that has led to the modern world as we know it.

To be able to use the world of nature, it is necessary that knowledge of it be exact and accurate. This knowledge must be independent of man's subjective feelings. In ordinary conversation one may speak of something as being hot or cold, light or heavy; but the expression is scientifically meaningless, since all that such a remark states is that to our sense perception the object has such or such a quality. Almost all ancient and medieval science was based on such qualitative descriptions, with which nothing can be done.

Modern science is based upon the quantitative, upon the ability to weigh and measure exactly. Its descriptions are objective; we do not have different opinions about weights and measurements. All men will agree on the matter, and the reference will be to some objective standard. If the heat of an object is raised or lowered then it will, subjectively, be hotter or colder to the sense of touch. But the information is useless unless the degree of added or lowered heat can be measured and repeated at will. Exact measurements can make the heat subject to control. Ancient and medieval science looked upon the qualities of objects as residing in some way in them. Aristotle spoke of potentiality and actuality; he speculated about what a thing could become because of its potentialities. Modern science has found this conception to be irrelevant, and has relegated such descriptions to the realm of the philosopher. What the scientist wishes to do is to determine what causes changes in nature, and his concept of cause is that which he can apply that will repeat the change, or that without which the change will not take place. This requires the measurement of the change by objective criteria—not merely observing it through the fallible human senses.

Traditional medieval science had reached a dead end. Nothing more could be gained by it except more observations and more aesthetic appreciation of the marvels of the universe. Somehow the world must be made

amenable to more exact methods of observation. *How* change took place must be perceived rather than simply the change itself.

The great scientists of the early modern period built, of course, upon the work of their predecessors. Observations in all fields were available to them; and in some centers of study, such as the Italian University of Padua, discontent had been expressed regarding the traditional theories, which did not seem to fit the observed facts. But when great men such as Kepler (1571-1630), Galileo (1564-1642), Descartes (1596-1650), and Newton (1642-1727) used their new mathematical tools to explain the *how* of the universe, they were well aware of the significance of what they were doing. All recognized that they had stumbled upon a new method which was radically different from those used by their predecessors. The world, to them, seemed to be opening up its secrets; and all used their imaginations to speculate upon what would be revealed to them next. A tremendous field of study had suddenly become manifest to them—first the world, and then the whole universe, all comprehensible to man if the right method were used. The world was capable of being understood, not merely admired; and, as Bacon insisted, if it could be understood, the knowledge could be turned to the uses of man.

♦ The scientific revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries

TRIAL AND ERROR VERSUS EXACT MATHEMATICAL KNOWLEDGE

There can be little doubt that practical needs already felt in the Middle Ages acted as a stimulus to study. The gunner working with the new artillery could not be satisfied with the weapons at his disposal, nor could the navigator be happy with his instruments. It was possible to go on indefinitely trying to improve the explosive material at the gunner's disposal by mere trial and error, possible even to improve gun sights and see at what angle the gun should be pointed for maximum

effect. But progress would be extraordinarily slow while each minor change was put into operation and its effects observed by experience. On the other hand, if the angle of the trajectory could be measured accurately—if, without trial and error and without experiment, it could be known in advance how far a cannon ball would carry for a particular kind of gun with a particular explosive charge—then all that would be needed would be to make the necessary calculations *in advance*, construct a gun according to the specifications indicated, and see whether it performed as predicted. Trial and error would be reduced to a minimum.

For centuries, of course—from the time, indeed, of Cro-Magnon man and his bow and arrow—there had been trial and error, and the results had been transmitted by practical men to future generations. Cro-Magnon man did not feel the need for a theory of motion. He knew from experience how far his arrow would carry when sped from his bow. Nor, no doubt, did the late medieval gunner know anything about Aristotelian theories of motion, and would have cared nothing for them if he had known. But the time was at hand when the university scholars were to feel the need for observing how guns actually worked in order to test their theories of motion, and ceased to be content with studying and teaching the theories they had received from their predecessors and taken on trust.

It was an important moment in the history of the world when it was perceived by men of learning that their theories had to conform to the facts of the practical world or be abandoned. This truth was accepted only slowly by the medieval scientist and scholar, accustomed to taking his facts on authority, whether they were facts of science or facts of religion. The customary method was to hold the received theory as true; then, if some discrepancy were discovered, to explain the discrepancy away. This was called "saving the phenomena." Only slowly did men come to recognize that the Greeks, on whose scientific theories all their own theories were based, had themselves observed the phenomena and devised theories to fit them. If they had observed faultily, then

the theories based on their observations would necessarily collapse with them.

The recognition of the relation between theory and fact was the beginning of the partnership between the scientist and the engineer which is the basis of modern scientific progress. The scientist plans an experiment in little, which the engineer will later carry out on a large scale, when the results of the scientific experiments have been confirmed by constant repetition. Thus trial and error as a method disappeared from fields where there is a substantial body of approved theory and where planned experiments are possible. Only in fields such as medicine and some branches of biology, where theory is primitive and experiment difficult, does trial and error survive as an acceptable method. Its disappearance is due to the triumph of the mathematical and quantitative method of studying the universe, which first arose in early modern times.

MOTION IN THE WORLD

Early theories One of the first things to be noted about the world as visible phenomenon is the prevalence of movement in it. Everything is observed either at rest or in motion. For practical purposes, such as those of the gunner, knowledge of the way in which movement takes place—how movement is to be calculated—is clearly essential. The monk contemplating the heavens is also aware of the fact that the heavenly bodies appear to move. Why should they move? the medieval and ancient scientist asked. Why should they not stand still? What purpose did the movement fulfill?

It was one of the most fundamental assumptions of the ancient and medieval world that a "natural" condition of an object was to be at rest; only if some force were applied was this natural inertia disturbed. Some force was therefore needed to explain the movement of the heavenly bodies, comparable with the force which it was believed was needed to explain the movement of earthly objects. It was believed that all motion was communicated from one body to another, and a hypothesis had been handed down from the classical

world, and elaborated by medieval thinkers, to the effect that the movement of the heavenly bodies was to be accounted for by communicated motion from a postulated prime mover, which was identified by Aristotle and Aquinas as God. Each of the known planets had its orbit of movement, which had to be imagined as an actual crystalline translucent sphere which received its motion from the next contiguous sphere, the whole receiving motion from the *primum mobile*, the dwelling place of God, eloquently described by Dante. Only the earth was at rest, in the lowest place in the universe—unless one accepted Hell as a definite place, in which case Hell was lower even than the earth. The earth was not an exalted place, but the lowest—and "low" was used in a qualitative as well as merely descriptive sense. It was not like one of the perfect unchangeable planets wheeling around it in a perfect circular movement, but was a corrupt, changing, degenerate body, corrupted indeed by the sin of Adam, and made capable of redemption only by the deed of Christ. If the difficulty of accepting the Copernican theory of the position of the earth in the hierarchy of planets is to be fully appreciated, it is essential to understand how closely this conception of the motionless earth was bound up with the prevalent theory of motion.

It was, then, the nature of all movement to cease as soon as the motion communicated to it ceased. At that moment all objects sought their "natural" place. Not all objects, however, fell to the earth, because the earth was not the natural resting place of all things. On the contrary, only two of the four elements tended toward the earth—water and earth. It was a property (quality) of all earthly and watery objects to tend toward the earth, where, having found their natural resting place, they rested. This quality was called "gravity" or heaviness, while fire and air possessed "levity," or lightness, and tended upward.

It was, of course, recognized that objects could be diverted from their natural position by the exercise of an "unnatural" force. Thus a cannon ball could be fired from a gun, and as long as the initial force was acting upon it, it could be propelled away from its natural

direction—which, since the cannon ball is earthly and metallic, would be downward. On the other hand, as soon as the force ceased to act, the cannon ball would drop straight to its natural resting place, the earth. If the force tailed off and did not cease at once, it could gradually drop toward the earth, moving on a little and tending downward a little, in the curve that observation showed it did take. The theory of communicated motion, however, had great difficulty in explaining the phenomenon, since there seemed no reason why the motion should ever cease to be communicated, and why the cannon ball should not sail on forever. The theory required a medium through which the motion had to be communicated. If this were the air particles which pushed the cannon ball on its way, air particles would always be available to communicate the motion. But manifestly cannon balls did not sail on forever; and although the theory had been accepted as true without question for hundreds of years, a number of scientists at the University of Paris in the late Middle Ages did come to believe that the phenomena were not “saved” or explained by the theory. It seemed to them that in some way the explosion that set off the movement gave an “impetus” to it, which was in time expended, enabling the cannon ball to seek its last resting place. Though this theory raised as many problems as it solved, it was significant in showing that the late medieval mind was indeed beginning to inquire into the theories of motion received from Aristotle, and to modify them when required by the phenomena.

The medieval theory of impetus But perhaps the most disturbing phenomenon that urgently demanded explanation was acceleration. Impetus, the large send-off, as it were, from the gun, could account for acceleration and deceleration in the firing of a projectile. But how account for the acceleration of an object dropped from a height toward the earth? There seemed to be no new motion communicated to it on the way. As long as it was not observed that there was such an acceleration, the problem naturally did not arise. But when the acceleration was noticed by, among others,

Aristotelian scientists at the University of Padua, then it became obvious that it could in no way be due to the initial force. One could throw a ball downward toward the earth from a tower, but the impetus thus given quickly expended itself, while the acceleration followed the same pattern as if there had been no initial impetus at all. It might be thought that a ball seeking its natural resting place might go faster as it neared its goal (like a horse seeking its feed pail), but the inquiring minds at Padua during the Renaissance were not content with this simple explanation. It is true that the learned Paduan scholars for a long time preferred to describe the phenomenon of acceleration rather than explain it, using ever more difficult terms for it, thus exciting the derision of such humanists as Erasmus. Was it uniformly difform, difformly uniform, or even uniformly uniformly difform? Did it take place in accordance with regular and discoverable laws, did it take place in spurts, did it tail off?

The idea of “laws” of motion—Galileo—The world subject to law From this kind of speculation, however, it is not too great a leap to the thought that the answer could be found only by making accurate measurements, seeing how fast the ball actually moved when falling toward the earth, and then considering what were the possible hypotheses to explain it. Nevertheless, it was a crucial step to decide that the movement could not be *random*, that it must fall according to definite laws. The ball could not fall as it liked; if it were deflected from its course, as for instance if the wind caught it, then the wind movement must also be measurable, and the amount of deflection calculated. In the absence of such deflection, the acceleration must be in proportion either to its weight, the distance, or the time traveled.

Galileo, who studied at the University of Padua, was well aware of what his predecessors and contemporaries had done. But it is his distinctive achievement that he saw, so clearly the nature of the problem, recognized that the necessary mathematics had to be worked out, and realized that a theory would

have to be devised which could be proved true by experiment. When he built his inclined plane, measured the time which was occupied by the falling of the ball, and discovered that the acceleration was in proportion to the time during which the ball had fallen, then he discovered a valid law, which could be put into mathematical form as a universal phenomenon applicable to all falling bodies. But even more important than this achievement was the *discovery*, now no longer a mere assumption, that there were real *laws* of motion from which one could predict, thus establishing the fact of mechanical laws that required no unverifiable assumptions such as "natural place" or "inherent tendencies."

From this it was no huge leap to the thought of Descartes (1596-1650), that the world itself was a vast machine; of Hobbes (1588-1679), that the human being himself is a machine, with his sensations governed, like the world, by laws of motion; of the eighteenth-century physiocrats, that there are economic laws that may be discovered, in every way analogous to mechanical laws; of Newton, that not only the world is a machine, but that the heavens themselves are all obedient to the laws of universal gravitation. So the stage was set for the eighteenth-century belief that it was the proper task of scientific man to discover the laws applicable in each special field of inquiry, and for the nineteenth- and twentieth-century understanding that, as long as the laws are grasped, the world can be manipulated to suit man's convenience.

MOTION IN THE UNIVERSE

The Copernican theory It has already been mentioned that the traditional medieval theory to account for the movements of the planets called for motion communicated from the First Mover. This idea stemmed from Aristotle. But the accepted astronomy of the Middle Ages was taken not from Aristotle but from the work of Claudius Ptolemy, an Alexandrian astronomer of the second century A.D., whose work had been known in medieval Europe since the thirteenth century. Since it was obvious to Ptolemy that the planets did not move

in simple concentric circles around the earth, he, following earlier Hellenistic scientists, especially Hipparchus, had devised a system which was highly complex, but accounted for the fact that sometimes certain planets appeared to be moving in a retrograde direction. The large concentric circles (called *deferents*) were there, but they did not correspond to the actual movements of the planets. The planets themselves moved in smaller circles (*epicycles*), whose centers were on the *deferents*.³ Thus it was assumed that the larger spheres circled the earth, carrying the planets, which were moving in their epicycles, along with them. To account for such phenomena as the precession of the equinoxes, new additional hypotheses had to be made and more epicycles added, until there were some eighty epicycles. The details of the Ptolemaic scheme need not concern us; but the important thing to be understood is that, cumbersome though the scheme was, it did satisfactorily explain almost all the phenomena that could be observed, or had been observed, by the naked eye until the time of Tycho Brahe (1546-1601). It was possible to predict by using the scheme, and that was all that could be asked of it at the time. There were some substantially accurate astronomical tables available, based on the Ptolemaic system. It took great hardihood to question it in view of the fact that it undoubtedly "saved" what phenomena there were in a most satisfactory manner.

But Nicolas Copernicus, a Polish astronomer and mathematician (1473-1543) was offended by the cumbersome nature of the system. He wondered why the universe had to follow such a strange and intricate system of movements. Were there *really* eighty epicycles, or was this only a device to account for the observed movements, an intellectually contrived device but not necessarily true in actual fact? As a mathematician rather than an observer, he asked himself whether there might not be a simpler explanation of the phenomena. So, according to his own account, he began reading

³ The illustration on page 287 from a medieval textbook gives a graphic picture of the Ptolemaic system.



Nicolaus Copernicus Mathematicus.

Nicolas Copernicus, from an old engraving.

the works of the Hellenistic scientists and those who had written about them, and discovered that these ancients had not all been of the same mind. On the contrary, there were divergent opinions even in Alexandria. One opinion, that of Aristarchus, had held that the sun was the center of the universe rather than the earth; but it had given rise to so many difficulties that he had obtained few converts to his theory. It seemed to Copernicus, as to all mathematicians, that the Ptolemaic solution was inelegant: it could not be the simplest explanation. And for him, as for all mathematicians, the simplest explanation was necessarily the best, unless it could be definitely disproved.

It is impossible, of course, to say from observation whether the sun moves around the earth or the earth moves around the sun. From the earth it looks as if it were the sun that moved around the earth, but the least thought will show that this is an earthly prejudice, and one cannot say that it is true. If one imagines oneself upon the sun, then it is clear

that the earth would appear to circle around the sun. So Copernicus was prepared to discount earthly prejudice and imagine that the earth moved around the sun, as Aristarchus had suggested. If the earth and the other planets moved round the sun, and it was the sun that was stationary and not the earth, what would the consequences be? Would it simplify the cumbrous scheme of Ptolemy? In working out the consequences, Copernicus discovered that the number of epicycles would be reduced to thirty-four. Therefore the hypothesis was justified in that it provided a more elegant solution of the problem.

But it was still not very elegant. The epicycles could not be abandoned. They remained, fewer in number but still undoubtedly necessary. For Copernicus was unable to abandon, as did later astronomers, the idea of circular movement as the most perfect of all movements and therefore fitted to the heavenly incorruptible worlds. It is difficult for us now to appreciate the hold this idea of circular movement had upon medieval men. It seemed quite obvious to them that if a body were to return in due time to its starting point, then it must observe the most economical manner of reaching it—and this could only be a circle. All other movement was unnatural and irregular, and could not be expected of the "perfect" heavenly bodies. Thus in the work of Copernicus, in spite of his mathematical genius and the courage with which he undertook to put forward a proposition that appeared to be contrary to observation and traditional opinion and entailed many strange and inexplicable features, there remains the preference for the qualitative and aesthetic judgment that we have noted as characteristically medieval. The heavens were perfect. They moved in perfect circles, and were incorruptible and not subject to change. When Kepler, a greater mathematician, who had access to a huge collection of observations not available to Copernicus, sought to discover the "harmonies" in the universe, he found himself forced to abandon the circular movement in favor of what was demanded by his mathematical calculations. He was coerced by the evident facts, rather than keeping his a priori as-

sumptions held on aesthetic grounds—and in this showed himself to be a true scientist. With Copernicus the scientific spirit is stirring; with Kepler it has settled on the path which modern science had to follow if it was to be a method for truly understanding the world.

Opponents and supporters of the Copernican theory It should not be thought that the objections to the Copernican hypothesis were primarily religious. Objection to the idea that the earth moved did not spring from churchmen until a much later date. The objections in the sixteenth century, subsequent to the death of Copernicus in 1543, were based at least as much on properly scientific grounds as on the natural conservatism of scholars. Under the Copernican theory the stars would have to be much farther from the earth than anyone was willing to admit possible, and the universe would have to be much larger than hitherto imagined. It was thought that if the earth moved, when it seemed to be so solidly at rest, objects would fly off the earth; and pieces of the earth itself would fly off into space. If objects were dropped from a height, then they ought not to fall directly to the ground, as they obviously did, but should land some distance from where they had been dropped. Some mathematicians were inclined to approve of the theory; but to those who accepted the Aristotelian physics it seemed especially difficult to accept the idea of the sluggish earth moving itself around for no reason that Copernicus could explain, except that a sphere "naturally" tends to turn in a circular movement, while the light crystalline heavens, airy and weightless, could be moved almost by a breath communicated from the *primum mobile*. The acceptance of the theory therefore had to wait until far better evidence could be produced for its truth, a theory of motion totally different from that of Aristotle, and an abandonment of qualitative distinctions between heavenly and earthly matter. These were not fully provided until the time of Isaac Newton, at the end of the seventeenth century.

One Copernican enthusiast, however, should be mentioned, since it was he who in large part brought down the wrath of the

Church upon the theory. This was Giordano Bruno (1543-1600), a mystical philosopher rather than a scientist, who was fascinated by the panorama of the heavenly bodies wheeling in infinite space, each perhaps inhabited, each believing itself to be the center of the universe, when really there is no center. Man is but a tiny drop in the infinite universe; the sun itself is only one of millions of suns. How ridiculous, mused Bruno, to imagine that the world is made for man, that man on the tiny planet of earth can be the special care of God the Creator of the universe, that the act of redemption by the death and resurrection of the only Son of God should be enacted on this tiny planet, so insignificant in the total universe. Perhaps, he speculated, the same act of redemption is even now being performed on other planets for other creatures of God. Or perhaps God himself is really in all things; perhaps he is not personal but is manifest in every form of life.

It is not surprising that the Church found itself in disagreement with this pantheistic philosophy which made nonsense of its teachings. Though Bruno had committed many offenses against the Church, for any one of which he might have been condemned to death, and it cannot be said with certainty that he was a martyr of science, there is no doubt that he was condemned by the Inquisition to be burned as a heretic, and was put to death in 1600. His teachings can hardly have endeared the Copernican theory to the Church. But it remains true that it was not until many years later that Galileo was forced to recant his belief that the earth moved, and that for several years after the condemnation of Bruno, Galileo was supported by the pope, who apparently found nothing contrary to Scripture in his theory. And though the Congregation of the Index existed by the middle of the sixteenth century, the treatises of Copernicus were not put on the index of forbidden books until after the quarrel of Galileo with the pope, which will be dealt with briefly later in the chapter.

Tycho Brahe—Provision of adequate empirical data Three years after the death of Copernicus the man was born who, through his observations, was to provide enough material

for the acceptance of the Copernican theory by the vast majority of seventeenth-century astronomers. Without such observations it was not possible to make astronomy into the empirical science that Kepler always thought it to be; nor would the discrepancies in the Ptolemaic system ever have become so clear. The Ptolemaic system worked fairly well and "saved" most of the phenomena known to Copernicus. But it could not save enough of the phenomena observed by Tycho Brahe (1546-1601) to be satisfying to the generation of astronomers which followed him. Brahe was a Danish astronomer who built an observatory for the primary purpose of observing the movements of the heavenly bodies at all times and all seasons of the year. Thus it became possible for later workers to confirm their mathematical calculations, while at the same time they were provided with enough material to discover the mechanical laws according to which the planets moved. By pure mathematics Kepler could never have arrived at his laws, nor would it ever have occurred to him to imagine that the planets moved in elliptical orbits; and if he had, he would not have been able to prove it with the data available to Copernicus. Thus the work of the indefatigable observer was shown by the work of Tycho Brahe to occupy a crucial position in the history of science, even though Brahe himself did not accept the Copernican theory, preferring an intermediate position between Ptolemy and Copernicus. From his observations he concluded that the sun moved around the earth, while the other planets moved around the sun.

Johannes Kepler—The three laws of planetary motion In many ways the work of Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) is the most interesting of these early modern astronomers to study, because he occupies a position midway between the medieval and the modern outlook, and represents in his own person the change from an aesthetic appreciation of the universe to a passion for understanding the mechanism that underlies it. However, he had not the smallest interest in making use of the knowledge that he acquired; his sole delight was in discovering what he called the "harmonies of

the universe," and the discovery in itself satisfied him fully. There was nothing of the engineer or technician in his make-up.

From his early youth he had access to all the work of Tycho Brahe, some of which he edited; and he recognized at once what a field of exploration lay open to him with the aid of the huge mass of observations accumulated by his teacher and predecessor. He also possessed a thorough training in the mathematics of his day, which enabled him to discover some of the fundamental "laws" of the universe and express them in mathematical (geometrical) form. From the beginning, like Copernicus, he assumed that the universe was subject to mathematical interpretation and that the simplest explanation of the mechanism must be true. Indeed, he even went so far as to insist that the universe is made in the way that it is because it is mathematically harmonious. The universe had to be made in this manner by God because God, as Plato had said, always "geometrizes." The harmony in the universe is there because it is an expression of the divine mind. The human mind has been made by God to comprehend the world of mathematics and to understand quantities, as distinct from qualities; and it is the task of this human mind to discover, as it were, the mind of God in the harmonies of the divinely created universe. The harmony is basic and fundamental, and it is in a real sense the *cause* of the universe being the way it is.

Feeling this way about the universe, it was natural for Kepler to prefer the Copernican system to the disorderly system of Ptolemy, with its excrescences such as equants and epicycles. But Kepler also had a great aesthetic enthusiasm for the glorious sun, so much more glorious than the wretched corruptible earth; and it therefore seemed only to be expected of God that the planets should be made to revolve about their most exalted member, rather than about their least exalted. So, from the beginning, Kepler assumed that the main tenet of the Copernican theory was true. What was necessary for him was to show from the observations of Brahe that it was true, and to reveal the manner of its working. He did not, like Newton, feel called upon to ex-

plain why the planets moved as they did. He did not use the new laws of motion being enunciated by his contemporary, Galileo, with whom he was in correspondence. In all his work his chief desire was to show the mathematical harmonies to be observed in planetary motion, but not to explain them. They are just there—a picture of the mathematical harmony in the mind of God. Thus one “harmony” is as interesting to him as another. An entirely useless and only vaguely approximate discovery was more aesthetically satisfying to him than his famous three laws, which provided Newton with the basis for his laws of gravitation. But Kepler never cheated. He had, as he thought, discovered a magnificent harmony concerning the orbit of Mars that he was on the point of publishing, when he found a discrepancy of eight minutes between his theoretically constructed orbit and the actual orbit as observed by Brahe. So, in a properly scientific manner, having after long effort failed to explain the discrepancy and “save” Brahe’s phenomenon, he abandoned the theory.

For a long time he refused to abandon the circular movement that had spoiled the system of Copernicus. Yet try as he would, he could not get rid of the offending epicycles without abandoning circular movement. At last he began to try other forms of movement, until he hit upon elliptical movement. Suddenly, the problem was solved, and the way lay open for Newton to show that the movement *had* to be elliptical as a consequence of the universal laws of gravitation.

Kepler became known to history, not for the many harmonies that he discovered, but for the three *laws* that bear his name, which he would never have selected himself as his title to fame. The first law states that the orbit of each planet is an ellipse, with the center of the sun one of its foci. The second law states that the line joining the center of each planet with the center of the sun (radius vector) moves over equal areas of the ellipse in equal times, while the third states that the square of the time required for the completion of the planet’s journey around the sun (period of the planet) is proportional to the cube of its mean distance from the sun. If Isaac Newton had

had to work out these laws for himself and had not been able to use them as formulated by Kepler, he might not have reached his law of gravitation; but having formulated the law of gravitation, Newton then found it possible to deduce the laws of Kepler from it.

Galileo and the telescope When Tycho Brahe had completed his work, almost all the useful observations to be made with the then known instruments had been made. But the key advance, made already in Kepler’s lifetime, that was to open up the observational field of astronomy beyond anything Brahe had imagined, was of course the telescope. This was probably invented in Holland, by an obscure maker of spectacles and optical instruments, who made no use of the invention. But the principles involved in making it became known to Galileo Galilei (1564–1642), whose imaginative mind and mechanical skill immediately seized upon the idea. He succeeded in making a telescope which magnified distant objects more than thirty times. Thereafter, for the rest of his life, he continued to make telescopes.



Two of Galileo's telescopes, preserved in Florence.



Portrait of Galileo in his old age by Justus Sustermans. The old astronomer, mathematician, and physicist is holding a telescope of his own invention.

although astronomical observation was but one of his own many interests.

By means of the telescope he was able to explode a number of erroneous Aristotelian notions, which naturally excited much opposition against himself in some university circles, as well as later within the Church. He was, for instance, able to observe the satellites of Jupiter, which demonstrated plainly that not all heavenly objects circled the earth. The planets, and especially the moon, were now seen to be in no way perfect or unchangeable, but, like everything else, subject to change and "corruption." The moon, he declared, had a rough mountainous surface and seemed in no way to differ from the earth as far as its physical constitution was concerned. Even the glorious sun itself was found to undergo change; it was possible to observe "spots" on its surface. It was not, of course, possible to prove the Copernican theory by observation, but what Galileo had done was to show that many of the objections made to it by Aristotelian conservatives were quite invalid, and as time went on less and less was to be said

for the old theory. Not until Newton was the Copernican theory fully accepted by scientists and philosophers, and not until 1835 was the work of Copernicus removed from the Catholic Index.

Clerical opponents of Galileo Galileo himself had a difficult time with the Church. As we have seen, Giordano Bruno was burned for heresy in 1600, and at least a part of his heresy was his deductions from the Copernican system. It is possible that Galileo himself might never have incurred the displeasure of the papacy, since, in general, the Catholic Church did not adhere to the literal interpretation of Biblical texts which was prevalent among Protestants of the seventeenth century; and the Bible in any case had not been extremely specific on the matter. But Galileo was an extremely choleric character, who did not suffer fools gladly. He was constantly under attack from university professors who continued to adhere to Aristotelian teachings, which Galileo, quite correctly in many cases, believed he had fully disproved. Yet the professors went on repeating their errors, finally rousing Galileo to such wrath that he published a highly sarcastic work entitled *A Dialogue on the Two Chief Systems of the World* (1632), in which one of the characters is presented as something of a buffoon because he defends the Ptolemaic and Aristotelian systems. This book infuriated Pope Urban VIII, who was persuaded by the Aristotelians that Simplicio in the *Dialogue* was intended to be himself. Galileo was summoned before the Inquisition and made to recant. Thereafter he was imprisoned for a time, but then allowed his personal freedom under close supervision. On the whole, it seems probable that the Church objected more to Galileo's discovery that the heavens were corruptible and subject to change than to his insistence that the earth moved. The movement of the earth was of no special interest to the Church. The earth was known to be a body of no special consequence as a planet, and it held no exalted position in the universe, whether it moved or not. But the heavens were in every way different from the earth, and God had his dwelling place in their far dis-

tances. It was both heretical and extremely derogatory to heavenly dignity to claim that the heavens could be in any way similar to the lowly earth.

Isaac Newton Before the work of Newton was possible two further advances were necessary, which need not detain us long here. The other work of Descartes will be handled in a later section of this chapter; it need only be mentioned here that Descartes' great mathematical contribution of analytical geometry provided a tool for the mathematical representation of the geometry of the universe, and enabled mathematical problems to be solved without the geometrical constructions that had previously been necessary. Christian Huyghens (1629-1695), a Dutch mathematician and physicist, in a work published in 1673, showed that a force in a spherical body must act as if all force were concentrated in its center. It is not, however, certain that Newton had not solved this problem before Huyghens, though he had not published his results. It is, of course, a key concept for the mathematical demonstration of universal gravitation.

Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727), working on the discoveries of his predecessors, especially Kepler in the field of pure astronomy and Galileo in the field of physics, crowned the edifice of astronomy that had been in the process of being constructed since Copernicus. Galileo had left the theory of motion in an unfinished condition. He had seen that motion must conform to definite mechanical laws and, through theory and experiment, had suggested the lines on which these laws must be framed. But some of his observations had been faulty—he never did discover the true speed of falling bodies—and his laws had not been properly formulated. Newton, after considerable thought and experimentation, was able to give the correct laws which hold good for what is now called Newtonian space (to be distinguished from the new concept of space-time associated with the name of Einstein). These laws are: that every body perseveres in its state of rest or uniform motion in a straight line, except insofar as it is compelled to change that state by forces imposed from without; that change

of motion is proportional to the moving force impressed, and takes place in the direction of the straight line in which such force is impressed; that reaction is always equal and opposite to action.

Descartes had provided Newton with a tool the importance of which can hardly be overestimated, in the form of analytical geometry. But another tool was also needed to give proper mathematical representation to a force, something which changes movement and is not merely an algebraic picture of a geometrical fact. This Newton provided for himself by the invention of calculus, although it had been invented, apparently quite independently, by Leibniz (1646-1716) in Germany. Knowing how movement takes place and able to represent it in effective algebraic form, Newton was now able to arrive at and prove his universal gravitational theory.

It is said (by Voltaire) that Newton first gave full attention to the problem of gravity by wondering idly from how far an apple would fall to the earth. Would it fall to the earth if it were originally as high as the moon? It was already known—Newton himself had deduced it from Kepler's third planetary law, as he himself tells us—that a force decreases as the square of the distance increases, and that the force needed to keep the planets in their orbits could be calculated with some exactness. The question then came whether it was possible to use the knowledge of the gravitational pull of the earth to find whether the earth attracted the moon in such a way as to deflect it from its orbit by an observable amount. In other words, if Newton could calculate from his knowledge of planetary movements and earthly gravitational pull that the moon, subject to the same pull, would be deflected by a certain amount, and if he could then show that the moon did indeed move from its orbit by this particular amount, then his theory would be proved, and universal gravitation established.

Although Newton at the early age of twenty-three was, as he tells us, "in the prime of my age for invention, and minded mathematics and philosophy more than at any time since," and had already perceived the essentials

of his theory, he could not as yet prove it. He especially needed to be certain of the truth contained in Huyghens' theory, mentioned above. But in 1685 he was persuaded to return to his calculations and was now able to prove in a manner which has never been disputed that the sun, moon, earth, and planets could indeed be taken as massive points for purposes of calculation, whatever their actual size; and from this he was able to demonstrate that the moon was indeed deflected from its orbit by exactly the amount calculated in advance. From this he was then able to demonstrate why the observed movement of the planets must be elliptical, through the influence of gravitation. All this was written up in his epoch-making book, *Principia Mathematica*, in 1687.

The universe as a machine—The scientific method So, for the first time, a great scientific synthesis was created which showed that all the known heavenly bodies followed exact laws. The universe, from the time of Newton onward, was thus assumed to be a mechanism which worked in accordance with exact and determinable laws capable of being expressed mathematically. The far-reaching effects of this new concept in fields other than mechanics and astronomy will be dealt with in a later section of this chapter. Meanwhile, it may be noted from the description of his work above that Newton also made use of what has since come to be called *the scientific method*. A problem needs to be solved. The scientist brings to bear on it, in his mind, all the previous work known on the subject, including of course its mathematics. Then deductions are made from the material, in the form "if such and such is the case, then such and such will follow." At a certain point observation is necessary to see if such and such does in fact follow. This observation may be in the form of a planned experiment, or, as in the case of Newton, or of the confirmation of Einstein's hypothesis in 1919, attention may be focused on some event in the heavens. If the result is found to conform to the prediction ("then such and such will follow"), the theory is presumed to be true, unless and until later deductions are shown to

be unconfirmed by experiment, thus calling for some modification in the theory. It will be seen that in this method both theoretical considerations and experimentation have their part; but it is a definite part. Trial and error had been finally discredited as a method.

It may be added that the work of Newton was in part made possible by the gradual development of the community of science. In the seventeenth century scientists were no longer condemned to work in isolation from others working on similar problems. Not only were the universities beginning to throw off the shackles of scholasticism and Aristotelianism, and welcoming men who could teach the new science, but a number of academies were founded for the sole purpose of the advancement of science. Galileo had belonged to the *Accademia dei Lincei*, a Roman scientific center founded in the early seventeenth century, while Richelieu founded the French *Académie des sciences*, which, however, became really effective only when Louis XIV gave it his patronage, at the instigation of Colbert. The most important of all was, perhaps, the English Royal Society, founded in 1645, which soon began to publish *Proceedings*, and arrange for the printing of scientific papers. The French published regularly from 1665 a *Journal des sçavants*. This was a good beginning; but for the most part scientists still largely informed one another of their work through correspondence, giving rise to such disputes as that between Leibniz and Newton on which of them held priority in the invention of calculus. Newton also, as we have seen, does not seem to have had access to Huyghens' important work in time to use it. He therefore claimed independent discovery, while admitting that the Dutchman probably made his discovery first.

DESCARTES AND CARTESIANISM

Dichotomy between mind and matter. We have traced in some detail the development of astronomy from Copernicus to Newton with two purposes in mind. One was to illustrate the development of science and scientific method during a century and a half. The second was to examine how the concept of a world-

machine, ruled by mechanical laws expressed in mathematical terms, came to replace the older concept of a world ruled by final rather than efficient causes, a world in which one looked for purposes (*why*) rather than trying to discover the means (*how*) by which things took place. Implied in the work of many of these men, especially Galileo and Newton, was both a new method for discovering the truth and the reduction of man himself to the position of an onlooker, whose natural perceptions through his senses had no relevance to real truth, and were indeed certain to be faulty.

Aristotle's world conception had rested upon the validity of sense perceptions and common sense. His ideas of potentiality and actuality had been based essentially on his concept of the human being as a growing and developing being moving toward his fulfillment, and this perception he had transferred into the world. As in all the ancient world conceptions man had been a microcosm, a picture of the great macrocosm without. Even the stars were connected with man, and the planets ruled his various bodily organs. But in the new world that was being unfolded by the astronomers and the physicists, man had no place; and the study of man was entirely irrelevant to the study of the universe. Man's puny purposes could no longer be used as analogies for the purposes of the world and the universe; indeed, the world did not seem to be going anywhere; it had no purpose at all, but was there just to be studied. It was a static universe, built like a clock or any other mechanism. Movement went on indefinitely in accordance with inexorable and unchangeable laws. No force, no communicated motion, was needed. No being had to make an effort to make it go; it went of itself.

The scientist and philosopher who perceived these facts most clearly in the seventeenth century was René Descartes (1596-1650), and since his influence rivaled even that of Newton in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and since his method became the accepted one in so many fields of inquiry that he had not touched himself, an effort should be made to understand his outlook and the facts and ideas on which it was based.

At an early age Descartes studied mathematics, and before he was twenty-five he knew as much mathematics as anyone in the world of his day could teach him. He remained throughout his life primarily a mathematician; although he turned his mathematics to the study of physical phenomena, he was not really interested in the phenomena themselves, and he experimented only when it was absolutely necessary to confirm a theory.

The mathematical method of understanding the universe. At the age of twenty-three, he tells us, he had a vision, an intense mystical experience which revealed to him that mathematics was the sole key for understanding the universe. This vision led him to concentrate his attention on the expression of all the truths of the universe in mathematical terms. Since he was above all things a geometer, and since the world as perceived was geometrical, what was needed was to express the geometrical facts in a shorthand form in which the numbers, and the letters which represented numbers, could be used instead of the actual figures perceived in the universe. It is possible to construct an equation ($ax + by + c = 0$) which will be true for *all* straight lines. The physical straight line has never been seen and never will be, but this does not alter the truth of the equation. There is a full correspondence between the equation and the ideal straight line, and it was obvious to Descartes that everything in the outer world could be expressed in his algebraic formulas. Even motion itself, he reasoned, ought to be observable as a dimension of matter, although he did not pursue this line of thought far enough to make it acceptable to fellow thinkers; and he himself was to say that with *only* extension (best considered as matter in space according to some kind of configuration) and motion, he could create a universe.

To Descartes, observing and thinking about the world, the one essential factor in all phenomena was that they could be measured. Objects may be lighter or darker, smoother or rougher. Such differences are merely qualitative, and it is meaningless to talk about them unless one says by how much they are lighter

or darker. And in the end one must come down to the fact that the explanation will involve matter in motion. No object in the world has any inherent qualities. Descartes will not even admit the existence of gravity as inherent in objects. Gravity is to be explained as part of motion, which creates vortices in which planets and earthly bodies alike are carried around in accordance with the laws of motion, on an impalpable material that Descartes calls prime matter or ether. So Descartes explicitly rejected the Copernican theory in favor of a theory of vortices, although he could find no experimental evidence for them, and their existence in fact was shown by Newton to be contrary to Kepler's laws.

The world was therefore regarded by Descartes as a highly complicated machine. There was nothing in it which did not obey mathematical laws, and nothing in it that was not ultimately to be reduced to extension and motion. How then can we account for the fact that man does perceive qualities and qualitative differences between objects? How is color to be accounted for as an experience, even if the mind does know that it is ultimately merely matter in motion?

Epistemological implications—What does man really know? Here Descartes was forced to face the great unsolved problem. Galileo had already shown that the evidence of the senses could not be trusted, as in the fact that the senses suggest that the sun moves round the earth while reason tells us that the earth moves round the sun. And Galileo had been ready to differentiate between real and primary qualities which actually did exist in the objects, and secondary qualities which were not real and could not be demonstrated and therefore might be quite false. Descartes goes all the way and says that the secondary qualities perceived by the senses exist in man himself, and not in the objects; only those qualities which are susceptible of mathematical treatment are, in fact, real. There is a causal relationship between the objects and the observer; certain kinds of matter in motion will give the impression to the observer that they are white or blue or hard or soft.

Descartes offers the example of a sword which cuts the skin. The person whose skin is cut experiences pain, but he does not experience the primary qualities of the sword, namely its motion or configuration. This person, with his mind and his thinking and his feeling, is altogether cut off from the real world, a different being altogether, unextended in space and without motion. The realm of thought is on one side of the abyss, and the real extended world on the other. And yet it is the extended world that causes sensation in the thinking being, and the thinking being who alone can know the reality of the world, and its extension and motion. How to bridge that gap has been the most outstanding problem in philosophy since the time of Descartes. Platonic and Aristotelian answers did not solve the problem, for in the ancient world it had never been posed in this uncompromising manner. In a world of common sense ruled by the naïve man it would never have been broached, for the naïve man thinks what he sees and experiences is real, and is induced by the objects, which are just as they appear to be. But Descartes had come to the conclusion, through his thinking mind, that the world was not as it appears to be, but, on the contrary, what the mind knows it to be. Such knowledge is superior to the defective evidence of the senses.

Cartesian methodology—"Clear and distinct ideas" So Descartes wrote his famous and influential little preface to his mathematical works, which he called a *Discourse on Method*. In this work he explains how he came to the conclusion from experience that evidence from the senses is untrustworthy, so that he had to decide for himself what then could be trusted. And he proceeded to doubt methodically all that he had been taught and all that he had learned, and was able successfully to doubt everything away. But one residual core of consciousness remained. He could not doubt that he was doubting, that he was thinking. So he made his fundamental statement, the first thing which could not be doubted: "*Cogito, ergo sum*"—I think, therefore I am. Someone must be thinking, and it must therefore be himself; he existed. And he came to ponder

other things that could not be doubted, finding in his mind that the idea of God was there; so, like Anselm before him, using an ontological argument, he came to the conclusion that God had put that idea in his mind, therefore God existed. Proceeding further he came to the conclusion that there were other ideas in his mind, clear and distinct ideas, as he called them, which could not be doubted, certain truths that were of a mathematical nature. It surely was not possible to doubt the axioms of geometry, for example, that two things equal to the same thing are equal to one another. He therefore concluded that he had now found a true method, that of methodic and purposeful doubt. Everything which is not clear and distinct in the mind is not true, and everything that is clear and distinct must be true. He was back where he started. The equation for the straight line is true, even though the straight line is not to be found in nature. Thought and reasoning alone can give truth and certitude. That two and two make four is a necessity of the human mind. It corresponds to the facts in the world of extension, but it is not derived from them.

His method, like that of the scholastics, is deductive in nature. The basic axioms which cannot be doubted, the clear and distinct ideas, are the primary data. From the existence of God it was possible to deduce facts about God and the created world which likewise could not be doubted, even though not all would necessarily agree with the particular deductions made by Descartes, and might attribute his choice of deductions to personal predilection rather than to strict logic. As the social and economic philosophers who followed his method chose their axioms in a somewhat arbitrary manner and then drew conclusions from them which pleased them, so did other philosophers dispute Descartes' axioms and their conclusions. But the method itself was to prove extraordinarily enticing in all forms of inquiry, social as well as physical. When John Locke declared the basic axiom of human psychology to be that the mind at birth is a *tabula rasa*, an empty slate, and offered as a necessary deduction the omnipotence of environment, he was thinking like a true Cartesian. And when

Thomas Jefferson declared that all men have been endowed by the Creator with certain "unalienable" rights, he was again stating an axiom derived not from experience but from the rational mind, stating a proposition which could not be doubted, a clear and distinct idea.

THE PROGRESS OF EMPIRICAL SCIENCE

Francis Bacon and the search for facts—The inductive method "One method of delivery alone remains to us; which is simply this: we must lead men to the particulars themselves, and their series and order; while men on their side must force themselves for awhile to lay their notions by and begin to familiarize themselves with facts."²

Francis Bacon, writer of the lines above, was a scientific publicist who was unwearied in his demand for an advancement in useful learning. An influential man of affairs, and lord chancellor of England until convicted for taking bribes, Bacon was also by avocation a student of science, and a thinker rather than an experimenter. He was a severe and penetrating critic of the science of his own and earlier ages, but, unlike most critics, he also strove to construct and lay down the lines on which he believed science should progress. Though some men, especially in England, were influenced by him in their own work in the seventeenth century, it was not until the eighteenth that he really came into his own. The shadow of Descartes hovered over almost all the seventeenth.

Bacon attacked the Aristotelian system and helped to give it the *coup de grâce*. But it was already crumbling in his time under the impact of Galileo and the theoretical physicists and astronomers. More interesting to us is his attack on the mathematical science of his own day. He complained that it was not useful, nor verified by experiment, and grossly premature. He never tires of criticizing the excessive generality of the conclusions of the physicists. Certainly, he says, the Copernican system is mathematically consistent and maybe it is true.

² Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum*, Aphorism 36.

But does it fit all the known and observable facts? Is it not an "anticipation of nature," a premature hypothesis? He himself, as he admits, has offered far more hypotheses than are justifiable, because it is the fashionable thing to do and he would be thought a coward if he did not. The mathematical method, he says, while it offers explanations which the mind may accept, is singularly useless; it cannot be used for the benefit of man. On the whole it is almost as much "contentious learning" as the Aristotelian system. Thousands of inconvenient facts can be offered by any observer which suggest that its findings are not even true.

What Bacon suggests, therefore, is what he thinks of as a totally new method, and the only one that offers knowledge that is both true and useful. This is the method that he calls induction—the observation of the particular facts and the derivation of general laws from the facts. Keep the hypotheses to a minimum, and let the facts suggest the hypotheses. This is what is now called the "natural history" method of inquiry, and it has a recognized place in science when suitably modified. It is not improbable that Bacon was right, given the state of science of his own day. His method, when so little of the physical phenomena of the world was actually known and when more careful observation of *how* things behaved was essential—Bacon was at least as anxious to eliminate the Aristotelian *why* as any contemporary physicist—was likely to lead not only to more useful knowledge but actually to more correct knowledge. He was perhaps inclined to minimize the importance of the hypothesis as a guide for the proper choice and planning of experiments, and he has been laughed at for the triviality of the experiments he sometimes suggested. It is also true that he did not appreciate the tremendous urge for understanding of the *whole* that inspired such a man as Descartes. He was not a metaphysician, interested in ultimates; he was content that science should move on a less exalted plane, and understand thoroughly the small particulars rather than the large generalities. Both, of course, are necessary for the true progress of science, and both paths were followed in the seven-

teenth and eighteenth centuries. We shall first trace briefly the development of the most empirical of sciences, anatomy and medicine, and then the development of chemistry, a science which, after being set on the right path in the seventeenth century by Robert Boyle, a man who combined elements of Cartesianism and Baconianism in his own person, fell victim to a false theory which held back its advance for much of the following century. After giving some attention to the other empirical sciences, we shall then consider at greater length the prodigious influence of the new scientific outlook on other realms of thought, and a few manifestations of an anti-scientific reaction, before summarizing the achievements of the period and attempting to characterize the eighteenth century outlook as a whole on the eve of the French Revolution.

THE ADVANCE OF MEDICINE AND ANATOMY

Traditional theories of Galen For obvious reasons medical science has, from earliest times, been the most hedged around by superstitions and preconceived notions. Thus any advances in human physiology have always been made in the teeth of entrenched opposition, both from conservative medical men and from theorists of all kinds, their preconceptions derived from religious, astrological, and other irrelevant fields of inquiry. Medieval medical science, however, was dependent upon the teachings of the second century A.D. Greek doctor Galen to a degree that can hardly be comprehended now, and his theories absolutely dominated the entire field of medical inquiry. Platonists and Pythagoreans at least provided some competition for Aristotle in the field of physical theory, but Galen had the medical field to himself. It was known that Galen had carried out dissections and that his own writings were a synthesis of all earlier Greek thought, with a number of important contributions of his own. But it remains difficult for us to comprehend why he was regarded as such an indisputable authority, even in an age given to reliance upon authority of the past. Theoretical medical instruction, even at universities like Padua, modern in other respects, was

largely a commentary on Galen; and such experiments as were carried out were devised largely as illustrations of his theories rather than as efforts to discover new information.

Galen, of course, had been occupied with the question of how the human being is nourished as a result of the intake of food, and it was obvious to him that in some manner the blood performed this service. Through his dissections of human beings and animals he had carefully examined the heart and perceived that the arteries and veins contained different kinds of blood. He had then arrived at his theory, based in part on observation—a theory which for over fifteen hundred years had been believed to account for the facts which he wished to explain. The liver, he said, was the source of blood. Through the liver's activity part of the blood is filled with "natural spirits" and then carried through the veins to the rest of the body, thus nourishing it. But the rest of the blood flows through the veins to the heart, where it seeps from right to left through the septum which divides the heart in two. Here it is mixed with air which comes from the lungs, adding to itself new "spirits" which are known as "vital spirits." This superior form of blood now ebbs and flows through the body by means of the arteries, thus enabling the organs of the body to perform their proper functions. The arterial blood which flows to the brain there generates "animal spirits," which spirits, now unmixed with blood, flow along the nerves to enable the human being to carry out movements. Thus venous blood flows from the liver to the heart, and arterial blood to the rest of the body, with an ebb-and-flow movement from the heart.

Vesalius, founder of modern anatomy It will be noticed at once that the various "spirits" are hypotheses which cannot ever be verified by experiment. They must be accepted on faith. But there are two physiological facts which Galen assumes; these had not been observed but were capable of being observed if they were indeed present. Blood was assumed to seep through the nonporous septum, and air was assumed to be pumped from the lungs to the heart in spite of the presence of blood in



Illustration from the first edition of Vesalius' book on anatomy which appeared in 1543.

the passage through which the air must pass. The Flemish anatomist Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564), already briefly mentioned, who performed many dissections and founded modern descriptive anatomy, hit upon the key difficulty of blood seepage through the septum, but, still obsessed with Galen's general theory and unwilling to abandon all its consequences, contented himself with stating that it showed the wonderful power of God that he could make the blood flow through a septum that was not porous. Probably he did not believe that God did perform this miracle, but, unwilling to abandon the rest of the Galenic theory, he did not wish, or did not dare, to go further than merely cast doubts upon the matter of the septum. Indeed he was already criticized severely enough by his contemporaries and had to resign his professorship at Padua and go into private practice as a physician.

Vesalius had not recognized the second difficulty, but it had occurred to Leonardo da Vinci many years before his time to see whether he could indeed force air into the heart by means of a pump. He was unsuccessful, but it is likely that his experiment was not generally known in university circles. This particular difficulty, in any case, was cleared up shortly after the death of Vesalius, when the pulmonary circulation was discovered. Through further research at Padua the valves of the veins were found, though again their function was improperly explained. Everyone, it seemed, wished somehow to retain the Galenic theory in spite of the by now really indisputable disproof of all that could be experimentally disproved.

William Harvey and the circulation of the blood Physiology was in this state when William Harvey (1578-1657) studied at the University of Padua, returning later to practice in England as royal physician. His key

work, *Exercitatio de Motu Cordis et Sanguinis*, published in 1628, is a classic of clear scientific exposition. He explains how he looked at the facts available and engaged in "repeated vivisections" and dissections, looking for more important and crucial facts. Without any question of a doubt, the facts appeared to reveal two things with the utmost clarity, that there was only one kind of blood, and that it circulated. How, he asked, could the liver produce so much blood, when it was visible that the heart threw out as much blood in an hour as the weight of a man? Following the progress of the blood, Harvey suddenly saw each separate fact fall into place, and the revolution in physiology was completed. Thereafter the discovery of lacteal and lymphatic vessels was not long delayed, and Malpighi, with the aid of the newly invented microscope, published in 1661 his discovery of the capillary system. Others also made extensive use of the microscope in the following century to provide a much more accurate picture of the human




Illustration from the first edition of William Harvey's fundamental work on the circulation of the blood (1628). The pictures show the location of the arterial and venous pathways for the blood in the human arm.

organism than had hitherto been available, although medicine did not keep pace with anatomical knowledge.

No speculations or hypotheses beyond the minimum had been needed for Harvey's work. The readiness to believe the evidence and abandon previous erroneous theory had indeed been required, and found difficult of achievement. But it had at last been done. The circulation of the blood had been seen to be a simple mechanical process, requiring no knowledge of the laws of motion or mathematics. And from the beginning it was "useful" knowledge. The Baconian method had been justified, though Bacon did not live to see it; nor, probably, did Harvey know that he was following it.

ROBERT BOYLE, THE FATHER OF CHEMISTRY

Criticism of Cartesianism The man whom we shall study here was a convinced Baconian who had nevertheless read and been much impressed by the philosophy of Descartes. Robert Boyle (1627-1691) is, of course, known as the father of chemistry and the author of Boyle's Law. His book, *The Sceptical Chemist*, showed by careful reasoning and descriptions of experiments he had made that the old theory of the four elements, or the alternative theory of some of the alchemists that salt, sulphur, and mercury were the "true principles of things," were neither of them tenable in the light of experimental knowledge. He preferred to distinguish real substances which could not be considered compounds of other substances as being what he called "elements" or "principles." He pointed out that the supposed element fire had different effects according to the degree of heat of the fire, and that it did not always resolve compounds into their constituent parts. In all this he was one of the great pioneers of chemistry; but it is rather for his scientific thought that he will be considered here, representing, as he does, a continuing trend of thought which is neither exclusively empirical nor exclusively theoretical and mathematical. Clearly a religious man and a believing Christian, Boyle was not willing to abandon God as a final cause or the first efficient cause; yet he felt the strength of the

Cartesian thought that the world is a great machine, and he could not find anything in his experiments that would prove the contrary. He was also unwilling to leave man out of the picture as completely as Descartes. Obviously, as he says, "there are de facto in the world certain sensible and rational beings called men," and these beings perceive the secondary qualities. This is a fact and cannot be neglected in building a total theory.

Boyle accepts the Cartesian viewpoint that the primary qualities of all things are to be understood by mathematics, so far as that understanding goes. The world is a mechanism, and sensible objects can be reduced in the mind to atoms in motion (an idea that had recently come to the fore again through the work of Cassendi, who revived with modifications the atomic ideas held in the ancient world). Nevertheless, though the mind knows this, the actual diversity of sense phenomena must be taken as a fact also; even local motion itself is diverse. Boyle agrees that, according to what human reasoning can tell us, the diversity of phenomena is in fact due to the configuration of their constituent corpuscles. So much for what the human mind can tell us. But though the ultimate reality may be as agreed, the task of the scientist is to examine the diversity and account for it, working with experiments and induction in the Baconian manner. It is not always useful and necessary to deal with primary causes, which lie behind the secondary causes. Investigation of the secondary causes can lead to some useful results. Only by such methods had he been able to reach useful conclusions in the field of chemistry.

With regard to Descartes' argument that the secondary qualities cannot be known to have a definite existence apart from the person perceiving them, Boyle was ready to agree that the body itself belongs to the mechanical world and is thus, like everything else, merely matter in motion, moving according to mechanical laws. But the human being also has a soul, not to be thought of as existing in any particular place, not extended in space and not subject to mechanical laws nor to be explained by them. "I see no necessity," he says, "that

intelligibility to a human understanding should be necessary to the truth or existence of a thing, any more than that visibility to a human eye should be necessary to the existence of an atom, or of a corpuscle of air, or of the effluvia of a loadstone." The laws of mathematics as expounded by Descartes and acceptable to the human mind are acceptable in their proper sphere. But in the field of the unextended, in which nothing could be discovered by mathematical means, Boyle is willing to accept the teachings of the Christian religion, and is ready to accept the fact that God created the world and man and is still interested in the activities of man and active in the world. God could also create and possibly has created other worlds, serving other purposes for beings other than man. Unlike Descartes, Boyle makes no attempt to prove the existence of God.

So Boyle, faced with the Cartesian dualism, agrees with Descartes' fundamental proposition that there is a dichotomy between man and the world; but, unlike Descartes, he does not find this to be an insurmountable problem, because he is not willing to push his thought to its logical extremes. God is the author and first efficient cause of the world, and everything that happens in it is by his "general concurrence." It is a fact that man perceives the world and that the secondary qualities are known to him through his senses. The fact does not have to be explained, since man is obviously capable of such perception. Man knows with his mind that behind the secondary qualities are primary qualities, matter and motion, and this happens to be intelligible to him through his mathematical mind. But all things do not have to be intelligible to him; the mathematical mind cannot perceive an entity which has no extension and does not occupy space, such as the human soul. In this field it is good, says Boyle, to admit our ignorance and rely upon faith.

St. Thomas Aquinas would not have felt himself out of place in this thought. Again, the world is to be understood by reason, and what lies beyond reason is in the realm of faith. All that science had added was a more profound and ever-increasing knowledge of the phenomena. There was no reason why this

should induce religious skepticism or a thoroughgoing materialism.

Eighteenth-century chemistry—The phlogiston theory. The further progress of chemistry was held up during the eighteenth century by what is known as the phlogiston theory—that heat is a substance, capable of being weighed and measured, and that fire is a substance released during the process of combustion. The theory is to be traced to a German chemist, Georg Stahl (1660–1734), who spoke of phlogiston as a substance which is given off from a body when it is burned. The odd thing about the theory is that the body nevertheless increases in weight rather than decreasing as it is burned. But when this was recognized, it did not lead to abandonment of the theory. On the contrary, new hypotheses were devised to "save the phenomena," such as that the hypothetical phlogiston possessed a "negative weight" or levity, and as the substance lost weight through the departure of the phlogiston, this was canceled out by another operation incidental to it, perhaps the taking in of some other substance from the air.

The theory was very generally accepted in the second half of the eighteenth century, even while a number of important empirical discoveries were made in the field of gases, such as the discovery of carbon dioxide by Joseph Black (1728–1799), the isolation of oxygen by Joseph Priestley (1733–1804), and of hydrogen by Henry Cavendish (1731–1810), who also discovered the composition of water. But all these men still accepted the phlogiston theory and regarded oxygen as "dephlogisticated air" until Antoine Lavoisier (1743–1794), by a series of crucial experiments combined with clear thinking, utterly destroyed the phlogiston theory by showing that burning and breathing are both processes of oxidation (1775) and that the constituent parts of water are gases which have a definite weight (1783). Even then Priestley, a cantankerous amateur who was a theologian by profession and a scientist by avocation, insisted on trying to defend the phlogiston theory against all the evidence until his death in 1804 (*Doctrine of Phlogiston Established and the Composition of Water*

Refuted, 1800). Lavoisier, working with others in the years before the French Revolution (to which he fell a victim in 1794), invented what was virtually a new language in chemistry, in which for the first time the elements and compounds were properly distinguished. Such a work was an essential prerequisite for the advance of chemistry as a science.

ZOOLOGY AND BOTANY

The great medieval work of Albertus Magnus and others had been lost in the early modern period and had to be taken up again on a new basis in the seventeenth century. The great pioneer in observing the distinguishing traits in plants and animals, and thus ultimately in their classification, was John Ray (1627-1705), but Carl von Linné (Linnaeus, 1707-1778), son of a Swedish clergyman, has gained most of the credit for the achievement, since his system of naming the plants by both species and genus became the basis for the modern nomenclature. Georges, Comte de Buffon (1707-1788), wrote an enormous forty-four volume work on natural history, which attempted to synthesize the knowledge of plants, animals, and men available in his time from the use of the microscope. It is one of the most fascinating works ever written on the subject as well as being cast in an impeccably lucid style, as befitting the man who coined the apothegm "le style, c'est l'homme" (the style is the man). Though much criticized in his time for his numerous speculations, including suggestions that man and animal might derive from a common source, Buffon was in fact striving with inadequate data at his disposal to perform the task for the living world that Newton had done for the inorganic. Man, in Buffon's view, was a part of nature, and over long periods of time—Buffon would have no truck with the notion, standard in his time, that the earth was only some six thousand years old—the earth itself had changed and different species had been able to survive. It was Buffon's view that all living objects were made up of individual particles, each a miniature picture of the whole. Much of the Darwinian

theory is anticipated by Buffon, though he lacked the specific information available by 1859, when Darwin wrote his *Origin of Species*. But it is highly instructive to contrast Buffon's work with that of, say, the Elder Pliny. Such a comparison reveals the immense gulf between the knowledge available to antiquity and the knowledge available at the end of the eighteenth century, as also the difference between the type of mind and the intellectual equipment at the end of the eighteenth century and in the first century A.D.

GEOLOGY AND ASTRONOMY

Two important theories propounded at the end of the eighteenth century, although incapable of proof, provide the basis for the nineteenth- and twentieth-century belief that man is able to comprehend the universe he lives in. The first is the fundamental theory of geology, which stems from the famous paper of James Hutton (1726-1797), entitled *Theory of the Earth*, in which the "uniformitarian" theory was propounded. This theory holds that processes still continuing in the earth, such as erosion by wind and sea and the stratification of the rocks, have always operated on a time scale which is constant. The other theory, that of Pierre Laplace (following an earlier suggestion of Immanuel Kant), was published in 1796 in his book *Exposition du Système du Monde*, and holds that the solar system evolved from a rotating mass of incandescent gases, or primal nebula. Although Hutton's theory came later to be the basis for all modern geology, and ages for the earth are always computed in accordance with his assumption, Laplace's theory has since been very considerably modified. The details of the theory, however, are not important for our purpose. Its importance lies in the final abandonment of the necessity for the "hypothesis of God," as Laplace is said to have expressed it to Napoleon. Laplace himself performed a considerable amount of experimental work and pointed out a few minor errors in the work of Newton. But he regarded Newton as the greatest genius of all time—for it fell to Newton alone to be the interpreter

of nature's laws, which have always been present in the world but were discovered only by him. Or, as Pope put it earlier:

"Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night;
God said, Let Newton be! and all was
Light."

♦ Consequences of the scientific revolution

THE POPULARIZATION OF SCIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE

The salons In the century following Newton and Descartes, new scientific ideas percolated down into the thinking of ordinary men. In the eighteenth century, especially in France, polite society took up the study of science together with its implications in every realm of thought, as a new fad. In the salons of fashionable women, everyone made it his business to be well informed, and the new ideas were aired there. The most gifted popularizer was Bernard de Fontenelle (1657-1757), whose book *Plurality of Worlds* (1686) first introduced in a palatable manner all the new speculations in science, even before the publication of the *Principia* of Newton (1687). Full of wit as well as information, Fontenelle, who was secretary of the Académie des Sciences for nearly fifty years, was familiar with everything that science was accomplishing in his day, but was also able to make it clear and comprehensible, as he insisted, to women and children. In his day the exclusive salons of Paris first became interested in science. It was in the salon of Mme. du Deffand in the eighteenth century that Montesquieu made his reputation. Everyone who had anything to contribute, even the outlandish Rousseau, was accepted and lionized by the ladies of fashion. It was in the salons also that the leaders of the "enlightenment" became acquainted with one another. The eighteenth century was an age when the world of the educated was completely cosmopolitan. Paris was the center of European culture and was the natural heart of the movement; but writers and thinkers in

all parts of Europe were assured of a welcome there. Not all books could be published as freely in France as elsewhere, since the authorities occasionally intervened, under the prodding of the clergy, to suppress this or that work. They were, however, unable to prevent the clandestine circulation of works printed secretly in France or abroad.

Compilations of learning—The Encyclopédie It was an age of intellectual excitement. For a while there were writers and thinkers who looked dimly upon their own age, and a great quarrel arose among the Ancients and the Moderns (known in England as the Battle of the Books) as to whether or not the Greeks and Romans should be looked back on with reverence as superior to the men of the eighteenth century in the art of living and in their learning. But by general opinion the Moderns were awarded the victory, and the Ancients relegated to their historical niche as having been excellent for their time, though now easily surpassed. So there arose a craze for collecting together, in the form of dictionaries and encyclopaedias, all the knowledge that was available, and for synthesizing whole fields of knowledge. We have already noticed Buffon's attempt to synthesize the existing knowledge of the natural world. Much earlier came Pierre Bayle's *Historical and Critical Dictionary* (1697), which takes the form of biographies of important historical individuals. This was a highly skeptical work, full of curious pieces of information, but it exercised a considerable influence in the following century. It was followed in the mid-eighteenth century by an enormous project edited by Denis Diderot with the aid of the leading *philosophes* (eighteenth-century intellectuals) of his time. In the end there were twenty-eight volumes and seven supplementary volumes, most of them sold clandestinely, since the emphasis of the work was strongly anticlerical. It poked fun not only at many Christian ideas but at all the knowledge accepted by conservatives in all realms of inquiry, thus attracting to itself the displeasure of the authorities.

Although there are a few exceptions, al-



Line engraving by Pierre-Louis Baguoy, after a drawing by Nicolas Monsiaux, of Voltaire and Frederick the Great. The French philosophe was a welcome visitor at Frederick's court as conversationalist and as the King's mentor in French until he became bored with his royal patron and quit to return to his own creative work. (COURTESY ACHENBACH FOUNDATION)

most all the articles adopt the scientific determinism of the period. There were certainly too few experts in these fields to be able to create an encyclopaedia of the modern kind, and indeed this was not the intention of the editors and contributors, who were primarily interested in spreading their point of view. All the philosophes wrote articles in fields with which they were imperfectly acquainted, and in some others the knowledge itself was scant. Voltaire, apart from his work with the *Encyclopédie*, produced dictionaries, histories, and essays of his own, all of which are elegantly written, full of wit and curious learning, and skeptical of all knowledge before the seventeenth century. He was particularly hard on the Church, which he regarded as the chief enemy of enlightenment, an "infamous thing" which must be crushed—though he was merely politely incredulous of Christianity itself.

We shall now take up the different fields of thought, and trace the influence of the scientific ideas of the period upon their development. By intention, relatively few of the individual thinkers are discussed by name, in order to give the student an idea of the trend of thinking and to keep his eye on the source of ideas in the science of the times. He may thus be able to avoid losing sight of the way

in which one idea quite naturally arose out of the other in an age when the knowledge and thought of one man was so quickly available to another.

EFFECTS ON RELIGION

Attempt to discover a religion of reason—Skepticism. In the field of religion it is obvious that the traditional teachings of Christianity could only with great difficulty be squared with the idea of a universe subject to mechanical causation. Furthermore, Christianity was certainly not a "clear and distinct idea" in the Cartesian sense; it was also questionable whether God himself, at all events the God of Christians and Jews, was a reasonable idea.

At first, with Newton, many of the thinkers believed that a First Cause was necessary—some superclockmaker who made the clock in the first place and then left it to its own devices. Newton himself inclined to the idea that once in a while the clock had to be repaired by the clockmaker. But in any case all men for a time seemed to agree that the mechanism of the world, which was seen to be so perfectly regulated, needed some explanation. Why should it be there in the first place? So

the argument from design, which Thomas Aquinas had relegated to fifth place among the proofs for the existence of God, became the most popular. The men who held this idea were called Deists, although there were several different kinds of deism. Some thinkers, like Boyle, were inclined to accept the fact of revelation, that God had revealed to men through the Scriptures various things about the world, and the Scriptures were believed to be true because they were attested to by miracles. This brought up the pertinent question as to how miracles were attested, a matter dealt with by David Hume in a devastating manner.

The question of the future life naturally came up for criticism. Was it reasonable, was it a clear and distinct idea? It fitted in with man's ideas of justice, everyone was agreed. But did this prove that it was really so? Having created the human soul, why should God destroy it? Why did Christ come to earth? Was it reasonable that he should redeem the world by his death and resurrection? Surely this proposition at least could be accepted only on faith and not on reason. Well, said some, it was certainly necessary for human beings to have a good example set them and it would be only reasonable of God to send his son, a perfect man, as a perfect example, and to explain to man how God wished to be worshiped. For Voltaire it seemed necessary that there should be a God as a judge and enforcer of morality, especially for the lower classes, who otherwise would never behave themselves.

But the struggle to find a universally acceptable religion based on what was reasonable, a religion that could be called "natural," was not easily abandoned. A book whose title is self-explanatory, *Christianity as Old as the Creation* (Matthew Tindal, 1730), attempted to fill the gap and was widely read, but it carried no conviction to those who were not convinced already. What had happened was that suddenly man was faced with a world which he believed he could understand—a world that was simply a mechanism, that might always have existed and so needed not even a First Cause to explain. The world would go on just as well if man were not there. Under

Cartesian thought he was nothing but an on-looker, no longer a part of the world process, no longer a microcosmic picture of the great macrocosm that was the universe. But one thing man did possess—his power of reasoning, and this had unlocked for him the keys to the mechanical functioning of the universe. Descartes had shown that the human mind really knew, it was not deceived, while the senses could always be deceived. In his *Discourse on Method* he had stated that an idea which is clear and distinct and cannot be doubted must be true, like the mathematical axioms. Descartes himself had not doubted the existence of God, which to him was truly the most clear and distinct of ideas. But it was not necessary for his successors to follow him in this. Indeed, at the end of the eighteenth century Baron d'Holbach was stating with impeccable logic that there was no need to use the word God for what was, after all, nothing but Nature. Nature did exist, this was the datum of experience. Why not accept it and not try to account for its existence? Everything predicated of God by the Deists could be predicated equally of Nature, without calling upon the notion of an extraneous God to account for it. Holbach was the first of the true scientific atheists; and though not many may have been willing to follow his lead in his own or in subsequent times, the trend of eighteenth-century thought was fittingly completed in him. No one could refute his arguments, which are not to be refuted by the type of thought employed in this period.

Reaction against rationalism and skepticism—Kant, Rousseau, Wesley It is therefore not surprising that some men in the eighteenth century turned toward religion based on simple revelation and faith, and remained utterly impervious to the reasoning of the philosophes. The philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) was not against reason as such, and indeed his most influential book, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, is one of the most thoroughgoing attempts ever made to analyze the process of thinking and observation. But he found himself compelled to the conclusion that the things-in-themselves (*noumena*) can never be known,

and exercise only a causal effect on the observer. There is the observer, and the representation of the object in the observer's mind. Beyond these two is the outside world, which creates the particular form of the representation but can never be known directly. We thus remain in total ignorance of the real phenomena of the world, and our "pure reason" is aware only of the mental representation of an object. But we also possess a "practical reason," which dictates to the self the principles of morality. Conscience, or what Kant calls the "categorical imperative," is born with the human being, and it must be obeyed.

It is said that Kant kept a picture of Rousseau in his study, and the reason is not far to seek. Rousseau was the apostle of intuition, as we shall see. Man, according to Rousseau, is born free, but is everywhere found in chains. If the artificial bonds of society are loosed, then the "*moi*," the self, will be freed; and this self is good. Thus, from a different standpoint, Rousseau arrived at the same position as Kant, that the self and its intuition rather than the intellect should be trusted in the realm of the human will. Rousseau believed in the possibility of a natural religion that would be common to all men. In the fourth book of his *Emile*, his book of instructions for bringing up children in a "natural" manner, he has the Vicar Savoyard discourse on this religion to his charge. Though the proofs for the existence of God are purloined from St. Thomas Aquinas, and form its rational basis, it is to be a religion of the heart and not of the mind.

The great eighteenth-century evangelist John Wesley (1703-1791) likewise paid little or no attention to the religious notions of the Age of Reason. Converted first to Moravianism in 1738, Wesley soon led an evangelical movement in the Anglican Church, from which he was ultimately to break away with his followers. He believed in and preached the fall of man, the central doctrine of the Redemption and Atonement, and the need for every man to have faith. His movement, preached especially in America and England, was later called Methodism, since its adherents preached the one method to salvation as expounded by

Wesley. Methodism remains today one of the most potent and influential branches of Protestantism, and is always marked by the desire to convert and change men's lives rather than by appeals to their reason; its theology remains traditional and makes no concessions to the ideas of the Enlightenment or of subsequent religious criticism.

STUDY OF SOCIETY BY MATHEMATICAL METHOD—"SOCIAL PHYSICS"

Sensationalism of Thomas Hobbes But in realms other than religion the Cartesian-Newtonian revolution held out tremendous possibilities, above all in the study of man and society. The method had been suggested by Descartes. Seek out in every field the clear and distinct ideas that cannot be doubted. Then draw out by deduction all the consequences of the ideas, which will therefore, as in mathematics, be as true as the original axiom. Search for a "social physics," a science as accurate and convincing as physics itself.

But before coming to the Cartesians, attention should first be paid to Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), who did his work before much of the work of Descartes was published and before Newton was born. Hobbes was a student rather of Galileo, and when in later life he came to know the work of Descartes, he severely criticized him. From Galileo he accepted the idea of a mechanical universe, ruled by laws of motion. For Hobbes the only reality was material, and the human being was a part of the material reality; everything in the universe, including man, consisted of matter in motion, and matter was, in the last analysis, particles. When we have an idea, all we are doing is becoming aware of the matter in motion in our mind, this matter being what Hobbes calls "the stuff of knowledge."

In Hobbes's scheme there is no need for a Cartesian dualism, since everything in the mind and outside it is equally particles in motion. Sense images are motions in the brain, while reason is the grouping and regrouping of the particles of sense in a particular manner. How we become aware of this organic motion within us Hobbes, however, does not explain,

so that the problem of how one knows that one is thinking—the primary awareness of a self, which Descartes did recognize, feeling that it had to be explained—is never dealt with. The secondary qualities of objects, he recognized, were not really in them but in the perceiving being; but this caused him no trouble since even within this perceiving being there was only matter in motion. The primary qualities residing in objects were to be reduced to particles which have diverse effects upon the human being, in accordance with their particular form of motion, thus *causing* in him certain other forms of motion which are to be distinguished from the real primary qualities. Thus the particular configuration of the matter without, and its form of motion, affect the perceiving human being always in a particular way, thus enabling him to say to himself that something is light, noisy, or of a certain color.

In developing his theory, which is usually called "sensationalism" and is, of course, based on an extreme form of mechanical materialism, Hobbes goes on to classify different kinds of bodies (natural, human, and artificial) and different kinds of motion, such as "natural" motion when bodies are left to themselves, and "compound" motion when bodies are influenced by other bodies. In this way, when dealing with the human body, he can speak of the "natural" motion of his body as being sense, memory, and imagination, while "compound" motion is reasoning. But it is all determined in a perfectly mechanical manner, and it is the geographical closeness of certain impressions (particles of knowledge) in the mind that causes even such remarkable human abilities as imagination and reasoning. A necessary logical consequence of the scheme would be that it is possible, by self-observation, to discover what all men think, since similar sense impressions received into the mind would result in similar imaginations and similar reasoning.

John Locke—The mind as blank slate

This latter thought foreshadows the very influential psychological ideas of John Locke (1632-1704), who was also notable for his contributions to political science. By the time

Locke was working and writing his *Essay on the Human Understanding* (1690), it had become the fashion to search for clear and distinct ideas which could not be doubted, and to work by strict deduction from valid premises. Voltaire, indeed, was to remark later that for a nonmathematician Locke had a perfect command of the mathematical method. "No one has proved better than he that one can have the geometrical spirit without the aid of geometry." The first proceeding, of course, was to examine the object, in this case man. One should come to some truth that could not be doubted, and then proceed to draw from this and other truths all the consequences that could be drawn by strict logic. Locke also, as did many of the psychological thinkers of the eighteenth century, proceeded to make further deductions as to the nature of the society demanded by such a being as the man whose nature he had analyzed. The method, of course, is the exact reverse of the painstaking methods of modern sociologists, who carefully study what actually does go on in society rather than making deductions from the nature of man.

Locke's fundamental idea, which he derived from self-observation, is that the mind of man at birth is a blank slate or *tabula rasa*. With this, of course, Hobbes would have agreed. As Hobbes had said (and Aristotle indeed before him), "there is no conception in a man's mind, which hath not at first been begotten upon the organs of sense." Locke then goes on to make his natural first deduction, that the mind is furnished entirely by experience, from which comes all our knowledge. All the materials which make possible human understanding are provided by observation, or through the internal reflections of the mind working upon the data thus supplied. It will be noticed that Locke has retreated somewhat from the extreme position taken by Hobbes, that there is not really a reflecting self but only mechanical causation in the mind. But, though this is a clear and distinct idea with him, and therefore primary, Locke does not feel it necessary to explain how it can come about that there is a reflecting self at all.

EFFECT ON EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT

Locke's work was very widely accepted in the eighteenth century, and gave rise to many important by-products, especially in the field of education. Although one of the greatest educational theorists, the Czech Amos Comenius (1592-1670), wrote his *Great Didactic* under the influence of the new scientific ideas, his main work appeared many years before Locke had produced his theory of the human mind. Comenius, however, had come to the conclusion that all men had potentialities for learning and that the mind was infinitely malleable. His astonishingly progressive system, which included the use of pictures and new methods of instruction, the system of monitors and study groups led by fellow students to offset the shortage of skilled teachers, his thought that there should be free and compulsory education for all, lies outside the scope of this book. His ideas made their way only slowly into the thinking and practice of the West, whereas the philosophies, such as *Helvétius* (1715-1771), more in the swim of public opinion, strongly emphasized the importance of education without having many new ideas on how to educate.

Helvétius argued that "the inequality of minds is the effect of a known cause, and this cause is the difference of education." He believed that genius was common, indeed could be developed in all those who were provided with a proper education, but that current circumstances were not such as to favor its development, nor had they ever been in the past. Thus he became a tireless propagandist for the improvement of the environment of all men, since environment was omnipotent and heredity negligible. It was left, however, to an early nineteenth-century social reformer, Charles Fourier (1772-1837), to draw the full conclusion from the Lockean premises, that with a proper education there could be thirty million Newtons and thirty million Shakespeares. Why not? If there are no innate ideas, and no inherent potentialities peculiar to the person—if environment is all that molds the human being—it would follow that in theory the same environment should produce the same

genius. It can hardly be denied that, practicable or not, the conclusion follows from the premises.

POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

We have already considered the political thought of the seventeenth century at the beginning of Chapter 14 and given some attention to the work of Hobbes and Locke. It should be noted here that the writings of Locke, and the English Revolution itself, exercised a tremendous influence on continental thought, especially in France. Many of the most widely read French writers had either visited England or studied English institutions, and the English monarchs were particularly generous in granting pensions to foreigners who decided to settle in England. The continental philosophes, however, were not especially interested in seeing their monarchical institutions overthrown, since they feared that these would be replaced by something even less desirable. But they were interested in having their rights recognized. So they used the English experience and Locke's ideas sparingly and selectively. The theory of natural rights was used not only to justify middle-class refusal of any reforms that infringed their supposed rights, but also, as we shall see, as a basis for an offensive by the physiocrats against the mercantilist economic practices of the monarchs.

Locke's work gave an impetus to political thought on the Continent even when his own findings were not followed. Baron Montesquieu (1689-1755) was a Baconian and Aristotelian, rather than in any sense a Cartesian—in this running counter to the tendency of his time. Following the example of Aristotle, he made it his business to inquire into how governments had functioned in the past and under what types of constitution, for the purpose of making practical suggestions as to how they could be made to function better. After first publishing a book on the "grandeur and decadence of the Romans," in which he concluded that it was the expansionism of the Roman Republic that destroyed its relatively free political life and paved the way for one-man rule, he then

proceeded to gather together all his political ideas in an original masterpiece, the *Spirit of the Laws* (1748). This is a collection of pungent observations on all forms of government, those of which he had read and those of which he had first-hand knowledge. The judgments are always well thought out; and there are many which have stood the test of later experience remarkably well. Indeed, the *Spirit of the Laws* became a kind of textbook for all the political thinkers of his century, and provided the material for practical men engaged in the task of improving or inventing constitutions. Even today his work is of considerable interest, as is that of his nineteenth-century counterpart, Alexis de Tocqueville. It is, however, a peculiar fact that Montesquieu did not study the English constitution very thoroughly, and failed to understand the actual supremacy of the British Parliament. Like many others before and since, Montesquieu was deceived by the political fictions of the English, which he took for facts. He did not realize that these fictions preserved the form of the old institutions, but that they were no longer in operation, having been superseded by truly Parliamentary rule. Thus he wrote of a nonexistent "separation of powers," an error which had profound consequences for the United States, whose Fathers of the Constitution used Montesquieu's observations on the English system instead of observing it for themselves.

It was Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) who produced the version of the social contract which was to have the greatest influence in subsequent times. We have already noted Rousseau as an intuitionist, a man who believed that the "natural" human being was good, but that his innate goodness had been marred by society and its "unnatural" institutions. This, indeed, was the burden of Rousseau's earlier works. But his thinking was so unsystematic, and his logical capacity so little developed, that we cannot even say that he had changed his mind by the time he came to write his *Social Contract* in 1762, since within this small treatise there remain contradictions that cannot be resolved. Men who used Rousseau's writings during the French Revolution could almost always find something to suit their pur-

poses, but their opponents might well be able to find something also to suit theirs. Society, for example, had corrupted man, who is, as Rousseau states forthrightly, "everywhere found in chains." Yet society is not only necessary, it is legitimate, and even good. Men gain from being in society, and would lose everything if they had to live in isolation. Society "substituted justice for instinct," and lent morality to man's actions, as well as making him "an intelligent being" and a true man.

Every society has a moral purpose: to ensure the welfare of the society as a whole and of all the individuals in it. This would be clear enough if Rousseau did not then proceed to play down the importance of government, whose task was not to legislate for the welfare of its members according to its best lights, but to act as the expression of, and servant of, the General Will. This General Will is the most difficult concept in Rousseau's political and social thought. Rousseau regarded it as what actually *was* best for a community, which might not be known consciously by any single member of the community. Yet it was in some way known to the collectivity, to the whole, as distinct from the parts. Hence it could be called a "will," a purpose, the collective aim of the whole community.

It is evident, then, that the crucial element in Rousseau's thought must be the means by which the General Will can be known. Rousseau did not approve of majority rule since, in his view, men vote for their own interests. Men were not sufficiently enlightened to vote only for what they conceived to be the General Will, in defiance of their interests, though this was in theory possible. It seems clear that Rousseau thought it might become necessary for the minority which really did know the General Will to attempt to purify and convert the ignorant majority. But how does the minority know the General Will? Obviously it cannot know it simply by virtue of the fact that it happens to be a minority. Those who know the General Will, one is forced to conclude, must be like the philosopher-kings of Plato, though Rousseau does not go so far as to say so. They just have an intuitive knowledge of it, and other people must recognize the fact. So when

Robespierre claimed that the will of the Jacobins was the General Will, and that their weapon of terrorism was essential for the performance of their task, "the despotism of liberty against tyranny," he was drawing the necessary conclusions from Rousseau's thought. No one could gainsay his right to speak with authority, for every man's authority was as good as another's.

Yet Rousseau also insists that each man is free. He has not surrendered his rights to a government, as in the thought of Hobbes and Locke. True freedom, according to Rousseau, consists in binding oneself voluntarily to the acceptance of the General Will. "Each man, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone and remain as free as before." His "social contract" consists essentially in this. All the human beings in a society have agreed and continue to agree to surrender their individual will to the General Will of the community. It was not a historical contract made once and for all, but a contract renewed every day, in the here and now.

Why, it may legitimately be asked, did the thought of Rousseau exercise the influence it did in the decades that followed? If it was so unclear, and rested on an unfathomable abstraction, how could it influence men? In part, of course, because each man could choose what he pleased from Rousseau's inchoate thoughts. But more important, surely, was the manner in which Rousseau gave expression to the deepest desire of men that they should live in a true moral community, a community that existed nowhere on earth, but was believed to have existed in the ancient city-state. And important, too, was his notion that it was truly the people of a community, and not its leaders only, who had the right to rule. Rousseau's thought, unlike that of any of his predecessors, was democratic. If it could justify also the "people's democratic republics" of the twentieth century, and has in fact been used to justify them, this may be because ideal political theories have never been found compatible with the practice of political freedom. Rousseau had "a feeling" for democracy, and a personal sympathy for the sufferings of others. He longed to live in a true community, which would give him a sense of

belonging. But when he came to express his feelings in intelligible thought, he was overwhelmed by the contradictions inherent in the subject, and failed to do more than offer a number of stimulating but unconnected ideas. These ideas could be taken up and used by others, who lacked his feeling for democracy, and who did not hesitate to pervert them to their own ends. Robespierre, his most eminent disciple, was himself caught within the contradictions. The result was the Reign of Terror, and the effort to establish the "Republic of Virtue." Rousseau would personally have regarded both with horror if he had lived to experience them. But it cannot be denied that they were a fruit of his *Social Contract*.

The political ideas of the Enlightenment were accompanied in England, in particular, by less radical political and social ideas, based on empirical observation. The school of thought known as Utilitarianism especially deserves mention, since its views came to fruition and resulted in many reforms during the nineteenth century. But, since these views had only limited influence in the eighteenth century, they will be left to a later chapter, where they can be studied in conjunction with their effects.

ECONOMIC IDEAS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

The Physiocrats. We have already noted the concept of a "social physics" that is as old as Hobbes. This concept was carried over into the realm of economic thought by an influential group of middle-class thinkers who wished to return to what they thought of as a "natural" economy. Although it may be argued that these concepts were little but the prejudices of an influential merchant class, it was claimed for them by their proponents that they were rooted in the facts of nature, and as immutable as nature itself. It was clear to them, as to John Locke, that there are three natural rights: property, security, and liberty. Governments exist to secure these; but when they are secured, the duties of the monarch or other government thereupon cease, and they must not try to interfere with the free working of economic life. They must "let alone," or, in the French expression, "*laissez faire*." As one of its theo-

rists stated it, "The most useful work any legislative body can do is to abolish useless laws." The enlightened self-interest of producers and consumers will see to it that the economy functions effectively under such absence of regulation.

The Physiocrats—the title chosen by these men suggests rule in accordance with nature—being for the most part French, based their strictures on governmental interference on their experience of the French economy of the eighteenth century. Economic activity in France was still hedged about by many restrictions of an irrational nature that had survived from the feudal age, and by heavy taxation which served no very useful social purpose. The Industrial Revolution, which was already making headway in England, was being hampered by out-of-date institutions in France, and by various indirect taxes which restricted consumption. The French Physiocrats therefore called for a single tax on land, as Henry George was to do later in the United States, and the abolition of all other taxes. On the other hand, in England, where the mercantile class already had much influence, the leading economic theorist, Adam Smith, preferred an income tax to a tax on land, recognizing that the wealth of the country was to be found in trade and commerce as much as in agriculture. Adam Smith was more concerned than the Frenchmen with the inequality between the position enjoyed by the masters and the workers, which was only too visible in England. Nevertheless, since he also believed in the same "natural laws" of the economy as the French, his views on the helplessness of the worker in face of entrenched economic power were conveniently forgotten by those who quoted him.

Malthusianism At the end of the eighteenth century English thinkers observing their Industrial Revolution could not fail to be struck by the widespread poverty of the working classes, and several proceeded to propound further natural laws about the inevitability of poverty. A clergyman named Thomas Malthus published *An Essay on the Principles of Population* in 1798, in which he claimed that food supply increased only in arithmetical progression as the population increased, while the

population itself increased in geometrical progression. Thus the only hope for mankind was to allow natural causes to prevent population increases; otherwise, all would be condemned equally to grinding poverty. Later thinkers naturally regarded this as a good theoretical justification for keeping down the population of classes other than their own, lest they should press too hard on the available means of subsistence. David Ricardo (1772–1823), for example, put forward an Iron Law of Wages, which expressed the view that poverty was permanent and justifiable in the light of what Malthus had revealed.

HISTORY AS SEEN BY THE ENLIGHTENED MAN—GIBBON

The thought of the Enlightenment should not be concluded without reference to its greatest historian, the Englishman Edward Gibbon (1737–1794), who sums up in his own person so much of the outlook of his period. His masterpiece, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, although an excellent narrative history based on careful reading of the literary sources available to him, and written in a pungent style reminiscent of Tacitus, betrays on every page Gibbon's prejudices and the excessive optimism he shared with other enlightened men of his time. He regards the fall of the empire as due to the "triumph of barbarism and religion." He never tires of pointing out the irrationality of the behavior of men in the past—their wars that might have been avoided by the application of reason, and the "superstitions" (including Christianity) that ruled them. It has been noted in Chapter 5 that Gibbon considered the age of the Good Emperors as the happiest in the history of the human race; but an exception should be made for his own time, when men, in Gibbon's view, could look forward confidently to an unbroken peace, since the system of the balance of power had made great wars forever afterward unthinkable. Gibbon's condescending attitude toward the "generality of mankind" was shared by almost all the thinkers of the Enlightenment. But the age of the Common Man was about to be ushered in with the French Revolution, which Gibbon lived to see, though he was not

to see the age of Napoleon and the failure of his magnificent prediction. Yet it is still good to read his history to savor the optimism of an age gone forever, and to share with him the belief in the triumph and supremacy of reason.

❖ **Summary and conclusion—
Achievements of the Enlightenment
and the transition to Romanticism**

Jean Jacques Rousseau bridges the world of the Enlightenment and the nineteenth century, with its early romanticism and its later realism. An emotionalist himself, he succeeded by his genius in justifying the emotion which all men experienced, even while they forbade it to exercise control over their actions. His concept of the natural man, completed by the concept of the "noble savage," whose natural impulses had not yet been subordinated to the dictates of society—a savage who never existed in real life but whose existence was passionately believed by Rousseau's contemporaries and successors—gave rise to a new ideal in the West: the ideal of the free, spontaneous man, full of sensibility, who followed his inclinations, who was good, and whose society would be good since it was made up of good men. When Rousseau told mothers to nurse their babies, they obeyed him. Queen Marie Antoinette installed cows on her rococo estate at Trianon and milked them herself. Chateaubriand went to America, fully intending to live with the Indians (and write about them). When they did not come up to his expectations, he still wrote about them as if they had. Thus the reaction to the eighteenth-century excess of reasonableness was already apparent before Voltaire, its high priest, was in his grave.

But the accomplishments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were genuine, and we should not be too hard on the somewhat simple ideas that were currently accepted as truth. Most of the thinkers believed in a universe about which before very long everything would be known, as from the time of Newton it was believed that everything of importance in physics was already known. The tremendous empirical work of later centuries had yet to be

embarked upon in full seriousness. A few facts were known, and at once the mind of that age leaped to speedy generalizations and speedy conclusions. It was much more pleasant to speculate than to do hard and unrewarding research. If Locke altogether neglected the possible effects of heredity, it was because no one had as yet done any research on the subject. If the nature of the atom was altogether different from what Galileo and Gassendi had imagined it to be, these men had not as yet the tools to discover what the atom really was, still less the elementary particles of which it was composed. What these men did was very considerable. They directed attention to subjects that had seldom been seriously considered before, and they abandoned the old prejudices that had stood in the way of new knowledge. Social scientists such as John Locke and Helvétius believed that society could and should be changed, and they came to believe in education as one of the principal means for the attainment of this end.

For the first time since antiquity there was a widespread desire for new knowledge in every field, and scientists became aware of what other scientists were doing, thus stimulating invention and new hypotheses. It was now possible for new knowledge to be incorporated within the total framework of science, and inventions could be used as soon as they were devised, for they had been invented to fill a particular need. And with the perfection of the Newtonian method for increasing knowledge—the use of hypothesis and planned experimentation to prove it—a tool had been invented which might prevent forever the constant production of unverifiable *a priori* ideas.

The constant ferment of ideas stimulated in the eighteenth century by the scientific discoveries of the seventeenth was to continue throughout the centuries that followed, even though we no longer think that everything will soon be known and we have lost their easy optimism. If eighteenth-century thinkers were too one-sided, yet their thoughts soared. They had vision and optimism, and they believed in the mind and its potentialities. It is doubtful indeed whether many of them would trade their century for ours.

Suggestions for further reading

NOTE ON LITERATURE OF THE PERIOD: Especially recommended for the thought of the time are Comenius' writings on education (International Documents Service), Descartes' *Discourse on Method* (Liberal Arts Press), Galileo's *Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences* (Dover), selections from Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (Viking), Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Gateway), Malthus' *Population: The First Essay* (Ann Arbor), Newton's *Opticks* (Dover), Pascal's *Thoughts* (Everyman), Rousseau's *The Social Contract* (Gateway), selections from Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* (Gateway), Voltaire's *Candide* (Penguin, Bantam, Viking), and *The Age of Enlightenment*, ed. by Isaiah Berlin (Mentor). For the color of the time, see Horace Walpole's *Selected Letters* (Everyman), which reveal much about life in eighteenth-century England. A notable modern biography is *The Crime of Galileo*, by Georgio de Santillana (Phoenix).

PAPERBACK BOOKS

- Bacharach, A. L., ed. *The Music Masters*. Vol. 1: 16th Century to Beethoven. Penguin. Useful and informative, by different authors.
- Bredvold, Louis I. *The Intellectual Milieu of John Dryden*. Ann Arbor. Presents a striking picture of the impact of science and skepticism on eighteenth-century England.
- Burt, E. A. *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science*. Anchor. A pioneer study (1923), still unsurpassed, of the type of thinking engaged in by early modern science. Contains many apt quotations.
- Butler, E. M. *The Tyranny of Greece Over Germany*. Beacon. Valuable account of the neo-classical movement.
- Butterfield, Herbert, et al. *Short History of Science*. Anchor.
- Cassirer, Ernst. *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*. Beacon. A good study by a modern philosopher.
- Dampier, William C. *A Shorter History of Science*. Meridian.

Einstein, Alfred. *A Short History of Music*. Vintage. By one of the best of modern music critics, an authority on Bach.

Höfding, Harald. *A History of Modern Philosophy*. Dover. 2 vols. Probably the best and most objective of the histories of modern philosophy available in English.

Kuhn, Thomas S. *The Copernican Revolution*. Modern Library paperback.

Northrop, F. C. S. *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities*. Meridian. Valuable comparison in the early chapters between the various possible scientific methods and the problems that arise from their use.

Whitehead, Alfred North. *Science and the Modern World*. NAL. The chapter called "Century of Genius" should be studied.

Wolf, A. *A History of Science, Technology and Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*. Torch. A very full, informative work, slightly pedestrian in style, and somewhat overly technical for the average reader.

CASEBOUND BOOKS

- Friedrich, Carl J. *The Age of the Baroque, 1610-1660*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952. Valuable insights into the Baroque period, with especially good sections on Baroque art and its place in the development of Western man.
- Guérard, Albert. *The Life and Death of an Ideal: France in the Classical Age*. New York: G. Braziller, 1956. Slightly uneven, but a good explanation of the classic ideal and how far it was fulfilled in the reign of Louis XIV.
- Nussbaum, Frederick L. *The Triumph of Science and Reason*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953. Excellent survey of the period, with attention to the rise of science and the growth of the scientific outlook.
- Randall, John H., Jr. *The Making of the Modern Mind*. 2d ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1940. A generally very successful survey of intellectual history from the Middle Ages to the present. The sections on science itself are not as good as those on its influence on the thinking of others.

The Breakdown of the Old Regime— The French Revolution and Napoleon


♦ Background of the French Revolution

INFLUENCE OF AMERICA

In Chapter 14 a few brief remarks were devoted to the American War of Independence and to its influence on French political thinkers. It had this influence because the American War of Independence was also a revolution. It overthrew a regime that was considered despotic, and replaced it by a government that had been agreed upon by the leaders of the country. These leaders, who had themselves been elected, had given very full consideration to what kind of a government was needed by the new nation now that it had cast off the rule of a constitutional and hereditary monarchy. The Fathers of the American Constitution were well educated men, many of them thoroughly versed in the political theories of the Enlightenment. They knew of the mythical "social contracts" of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, and their Declaration of Independence had been solidly based on the theories of John Locke and his views on the natural rights of men, including the right to overthrow a ruler who did not secure them for his people. The decisions made at the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia did indeed form a social contract, which was by no means mythical.

The influence of such a real-life example of how peoples may change their government

by violence, and yet not show themselves wild men afterward when they sat down to devise a new form of government suited to their needs, was not lost on the peoples of Europe, and especially not on the French, who had participated in the war on the side of the Americans. It is true that the regime of Louis XVI had entered the war for the sole purpose of making life difficult for the traditional enemy, and from no love of the principles of John Locke or the republicanism of the colonists. But some leading Frenchmen had approved the stand of the Americans on ideological grounds. Even before the French entry into the war, the Marquis de Lafayette had fought on the American side against the English and gained much glory from his participation. Thereafter his views were listened to with respect in France. Enlightened Frenchmen were inclined to look with more disapproval than ever on their own unenlightened regime after they had seen that it was possible to replace a reactionary monarchy with a government whose foundations were solidly based on the best thought of the Enlightenment. Moreover, it was no doubt quite clear to politically minded middle-class Frenchmen that it was their opposite numbers in America who were henceforth to rule the new Republic, that Church and State had been effectively separated. The English aristocrats who had held power before the Revolution had been sent packing back to their home country,



(COURTESY PRINTS DIVISION, NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY)

after having been soundly defeated in war by leaders who held no title and commanded a simple citizen army. There can, indeed, be little doubt, on the evidence, that the successful American Revolution and the promulgation and acceptance of a new and agreed constitution played an important part in preparing opinion in France for a revolution of its own.

But French participation in the American war had an even more important secondary

effect in France. The burden of additional war expenses, added to an already huge debt, made it impossible for the French government to avoid bankruptcy. It was this bankruptcy, and the inability of the government to find enough money from its existing tax system to meet service on the national debt and its annual expenditures, that compelled it to call the States-General; and it was the calling of the States-General that directly and inevitably led

to the French Revolution, even though the Revolution itself could have followed a different course. It is therefore necessary to consider in some detail the economic and fiscal background for the Revolution, even at the cost of recapitulating some of the material already covered in previous chapters.

ECONOMIC CONDITION OF FRANCE IN 1789

France in 1789 had the largest population of any Western European nation and some of the most fertile land, and was both potentially and actually the richest country in Europe. The eighteenth century had for most classes been a prosperous one. Commerce was flourishing, and though industry in the second half of the century had been falling behind that of England, the total production was still ahead of that of the English. There was no serfdom in France of the kind prevalent elsewhere on the Continent; nor did France suffer from a landholding system which made small peasant proprietorship difficult, as in England. There was thus no question of any inability on the part of the French to pay their way, or even to meet the expenses of the royal wars. It was only the government that went bankrupt, not the nation, and the bankruptcy was solely the result of the inefficient tax system and the virtual immunity from taxation enjoyed by the nobility and clergy and by a considerable section of the upper bourgeoisie.

As we have seen, the major direct tax was the *taille*, which fell most heavily on the small man, and on those members of the middle class who had not been able to acquire an immunity. There were numerous indirect taxes, which were collected by tax farmers. This system, at least as old as the Roman Republic, saved the government from the expense and difficulty of organizing a civil service of its own. The tax farmers were granted the authority to collect the taxes by the government, and permitted to retain an agreed percentage. It was not easy to check on the tax collectors, but it was possible; as many finance ministers in the past had demonstrated. Though corruption existed, this was not the main problem. The trouble was that

the tax farmers could be persuaded or coerced by the monarch into giving him advances when he was faced by extraordinary expenses. Such advances were naturally secured upon the proceeds of future collections; but interest rates were high, thus adding to the costs of government, and there might be years when almost all the money expected from the indirect taxes had been spent in advance. If the expenditure had been for war purposes, as was usual, then no new income could be expected as it would have been if the money had been spent productively. By 1788 service on the debt amounted to well over half the annual income of the government.

The only hope for the government was therefore to find new sources of income; but whenever it made the attempt it was faced with united opposition from all those classes which expected to be hit by the new taxes. We have already noted the efforts of Louis xv to impose new taxes on the privileged classes, and how he replaced the parlements by nominees of his own. But, as already noted, Louis xvi in the early years of his reign reversed the policy of his predecessor, leaving the privileged classes in even firmer control of the purse strings than before. As the financial situation of the government grew worse, and especially after the expenses incurred by French participation in the American War of Independence, even Louis recognized that drastic measures would have to be attempted, and every finance minister in the second decade of his reign made the attempt. But each effort collapsed against the firm opposition of the beneficiaries of the system, who were powerful enough to block reform even though they had no alternative solution to suggest.

GRIEVANCES OF THE DIFFERENT CLASSES

Every class in French society had its grievances against the regime. Even the nobility and upper clergy, who made up a bare 2 per cent of the population, privileged though they were, recognized the insecurity of their position. They resented the power of the king's ministers, and would have preferred a system of government under which they could control the king more

effectively in their own interests. Though they were strong in the parlements, the parlements could be abolished by the king, as Louis xv had demonstrated; though the Parlement de Paris had the right to refuse to register the king's decrees, he could compel the registration if he summoned a *lit de justice*. It would have been convenient for the privileged classes if they could have controlled the power of the king through more effective institutions, such as had been devised in England. In 1789 the upper clergy was made up exclusively of nobles, who were to a greater or lesser degree identified with the interests of the nobility. But the minor clergy and parish priests had grievances against their superiors; as we have seen, it was they who found the greater part of the occasional contribution made by the Church to the royal treasury. The parish priests, as had been true from the Middle Ages, were in little better position than the peasants among whom they worked, and it was natural for them to identify themselves with peasant interests.

The upper bourgeoisie were often beneficiaries of the existing system, but it was not possible for them to approve it. They could see their class ruling on the other side of the English Channel, and naturally coveted a similar role for themselves in their own country. They were well aware that it was their class, with its visible wealth, that paid for most of the nation's expenses; they were well acquainted with the American cry of "no taxation without representation," and knew that they had even less representation than the American colonists. They objected very strongly to the privileged position of the nobility. The nobles, unlike themselves, contributed little or nothing to the well-being of the state. They insisted on maintaining ancient feudal rights which interfered seriously with the free movement of trade within the country, and added greatly to the cost of goods destined for export which had to be sold in a competitive market. Moreover, the nobles practiced often extreme forms of social discrimination against the bourgeois, whose wealth they resented. They were able to avenge affronts to their dignity by the use of *lettres de cachet* from the king, which gave them

the authority to imprison or exile lesser citizens without any form of trial. Voltaire in his youth had been imprisoned in the Bastille by a *lettre de cachet*, and escaped from confinement only by agreeing to go into exile.

By 1789 all French peasants were personally free in status. The majority owned land or rented it, either for money or in exchange for a share of their crops. A minority of landless peasants existed, who had the right to hire themselves out to any employer who needed them. But the land worked by the peasants was encumbered by many vestiges of the feudal and manorial systems, such as the *banalités*, and occasionally even by *corvée*. The landowning peasants had to pay certain fees to their former manorial lords, who also continued to administer justice in minor cases—to the financial detriment of the peasants. The lord, however, no longer performed any services whatever for the peasant. What had formerly been the lord's mill or the lord's oven, which the peasant was compelled to use, was now a village property, but the lord had to be paid for its use, and the peasant was forbidden to make use of any alternative facility. As we have seen, it was the peasant who had to pay the greater part of the *taille*. What he had left after the exactions of king and lord was often barely enough for himself and his family. Nevertheless, his resentment was directed against the lords rather than against the monarch; he was, as a rule, intensely loyal both to the king and to the Church.

Under the old regime it was the urban worker who was the worst off. Inflation of prices was constant through the eighteenth century, but, as usual, wages did not rise in proportion, and he was forbidden to engage in any cooperative action to raise them. Although probably the majority of workers in 1789 were engaged in manufacturing on their own account, and selling the resultant product for what it would fetch in the local market, there was a strong and vocal minority of wage earners, many of whom were concentrated in Paris and thus able to play a part in the Revolution out of proportion to their numbers in the country as a whole. These workers were

Chronological Chart

Accession of Louis XVI	1774	Napoleon's "whiff of grapeshot"	1795 (Oct. 5)
Dismissal of Necker	1781	Dissolution of the Convention	(Oct. 26)
Ministry of Calonne	1783-1787	The Directory	1795-1799
Summoning of Assembly of Notables	1787	Napoleon's Italian campaign	1796-1797
Ministry of Lomenie de Brienne	1787-1788	Treaty of Campoformio	1797
Recall of Necker	1788	Egyptian expedition of Napoleon	1798-1799
Meeting of States-General	1789 (May 5)	Constitution of the Year VIII—Napoleon as First Consul	1799
Tennis Court Oath	(June 20)	Battles of Marengo and Hohenlinden—victories over Austria	1800
Fall of the Bastille	(July 14)	Concordat of Napoleon with papacy	1801
Surrender of feudal rights by nobles	(Aug. 4)	Treaty of Amiens	1802 (Mar. 27)
Declaration of the Rights of Man	(Aug. 27)	Napoleon becomes consul for life	(Aug. 2)
Acceptance of constitutional monarchy by Louis XVI	1790	Napoleon emperor of the French	1804-1814
Flight of the King	1791 (June 20-June 25)	Code Napoleon	1804
Constitution of 1791 accepted by Louis	(Sept. 14)	Coalition of England, Austria, Russia, and Sweden against France and Spain	1805
Legislative Assembly	1791-1792 (Oct.-Sept.)	Battles of Trafalgar and Austerlitz	1805 (Oct. 21 and Dec. 2)
Declaration of Pillnitz	1791 (Aug. 27)	Organization of Confederation of the Rhine	1806 (July 12)
War between French and Austria and Prussia	1792-1797	End of Holy Roman Empire	(Aug. 6)
Manifesto of Duke of Brunswick	1792 (July 11)	Battles of Jena and Auerstadt—victories of Napoleon over Prussia	(Oct. 14)
Storming of the Tuilleries	(Aug. 10)	Berlin Decree (Continental System)	(Nov. 21)
National Convention	1792-1795	Battle of Friedland (victory over Russia)	1807 (June 14)
France declared a Republic	1792 (Sept. 21)	Treaties of Tilsit	(July 7-July 9)
Execution of Louis XVI	1793 (Jan. 21)	Orders-in-Council—British counterblockade	(Nov.)
France declares war against Britain, Holland, and Spain	(Feb. 1)	Peninsular War in Spain and Portugal	1808-1814
Organization of Committee of Public Safety	(Apr. 6)	Battle of Wagram—defeat of Austria	1809
Arrest of Girondins	(June 2)	Marriage of Napoleon to Archduchess Marie Louise	1810
Reign of Terror	1793-1794		
Decree of <i>levée en masse</i>	1793 (Aug. 23)		
Fall of Robespierre	1794 (July 27)		
Return of Girondists to Convention	1794 (Dec. 8)		
Constitution of the Year III (1795)	1795 (Aug. 22)		

Russian campaign of Napoleon	1812-1813	The Hundred Days	1815 (Mar. 1-June 22)
Battle of Leipzig—defeat of Napoleon	1813	Battle of Waterloo	1815 (June 18)
Abdication of Napoleon	1814 (Apr. 11)	Second Abdication of Napoleon	(June 22)
First (lenient) Treaty of Paris	(May 30)	The Holy Alliance	(Sept. 26)
Congress of Vienna	1814-1815	Second Peace of Paris	(Nov. 20)

the first to be affected by a rise in prices. When prices rose again in the uncertainty of the first year of the Revolution, when a runaway inflation reduced the value of money to almost nothing and peasants ceased to bring their produce to market, the condition of the urban workers became worse than it had ever been, with consequences for the progress of the Revolution that will be easily appreciated.


Finally, a few words should be said of the intellectuals, the philosophes whose writings have been briefly discussed in the last chapter. Very few of these men foresaw or favored a revolution. The Physiocrats desired a more rational system of government, less governmental interference with the free movement of commerce, and a share in government for their own class. Others had criticized the lack of enlightenment on the part of their rulers, but usually concentrated their attacks on specific abuses. Nevertheless, the running criticism of the old regime must have had its effect on the thinking and reading public. In particular, Rousseau's arguments in favor of popular rule were widely known and used by the revolutionaries, especially by the Jacobins. Already before 1789 numbers of men had begun to meet in small groups to discuss reforms; but most of the political clubs which played such a large part in the Revolution were not organized until after it had begun, at a time when it had become clear that much planning as well as direction and leadership would be needed. Decisions had to be made on constitutional changes, on the form of government, on the franchise, and on similar matters. It was therefore no accident that much of the leadership was provided by lawyers, as it was in America; and lawyers, quite naturally, formed the bulk of the representation of the third estate in the first meeting of the States-General.

THE CALLING OF THE STATES-GENERAL

The very year of his accession, Louis XVI restored the parlements and at the same time appointed a leading economist and Physiocrat, Turgot, to be his chief minister. Turgot, as expected, produced a reform program. It crashed against the opposition of the parlements and the privileged classes, and Turgot was forced to resign two years later. Shortly afterward Louis became involved in the American War of Independence, and his financial situation became even more acute than before. Jacques Necker, a Swiss banker, followed as minister but was in turn dropped when his program met with the usual opposition. Necker, however, was more interested in following conservative financial measures than in increasing taxes. He was therefore more unpopular with the king than with the taxpayers. In 1783 Louis chose Charles Calonne as minister. The new minister instituted a program of public works, which was more calculated to win popularity, and perhaps to restore confidence, as he hoped, than to improve the financial position of the government. But French bankers objected to the program, compelling Calonne to devote his attention once more to a reform of the tax system. In 1787 the king, at his request, convened an "assembly of notables" for the purpose of winning some support for his new proposals, which would have involved the reduction of some of their privileges. Since they also included some concessions in the direction of representative institutions, Calonne hoped that their approval might be won. He was seriously mistaken. Indeed, the opposition toward him was so bitter that he felt it safer to flee to England when the king dismissed him from office (1787).

Louis then turned to Loménie de Brienne,

LES ÉTATS GÉNÉRAUX



COSTUMES DES DÉPUTÉS

Steel engraving showing the costumes of the members of the three estates, clergy on the left, nobility center, and third estate right. (COURTESY BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE, PARIS)

a Catholic archbishop, who attempted a program similar to that of Calonne. He was no more successful in having it accepted by the classes affected by the proposed changes in taxation. By this time both nobility and bourgeoisie were demanding the resurrection of the ancient States-General, which had not met since 1614, but which in earlier times had been occasionally called when the king was in need of money, especially during the Hundred Years' War. Though the king resisted the demand to the end, since it was obvious to everyone that the States-General would insist on having its supposed grievances redressed, and though Louis used the device of the *lit de justice* to have his decrees registered, all his efforts failed. In 1788 he recalled the least unpopular of his

recent ministers, Jacques Necker, and set a date for the assembling of the States-General for May, 1789.

This appeared to be a triumph for the opposition to the king and his ministers. But in fact each estate hoped for different results from the meeting. The first estate, the clergy, was to some degree divided. The upper clergy was not interested in reform, whereas the parish priests, some of whom were summoned to sit with their estate, had, as already noted, many grievances. The nobles, who made up the second estate, though anxious to curb the power of the king, had no intention of permitting the third estate to become the king's successors. The third estate, which comprised all the other people in the realm, was, of course led by the

middle classes, who were an object of contempt to the nobles. Obviously it would be the nobles themselves who would be required to make the most concessions. Many of them were not unprepared to make some concessions, but not if it meant the relinquishing of their privileged position to the bourgeoisie. They firmly intended to use the meeting of the States-General, for which they too had pressed, for the purpose of replacing the king's power by their own.

Clearly much depended on the procedures to be adopted by the States-General, the method used for choosing representatives, and the number allotted to each estate. It was decided that the third estate should have six hundred representatives, the first and second three hundred each, in spite of the disparity in size between the three estates in the country. Louis and the members of the first and second estates intended to have all voting done by estates, thus ensuring a permanent majority of two estates to one. The third estate had no intention of permitting any such procedure. Its members wished to have their numbers count for their full worth. Since most of the members of the third estate were from the middle class—the professional classes, especially lawyers, being very heavily represented—they could be expected to poll their full vote of nearly six hundred. If the estates sat together, they might hope to attract at least some members of the lower clergy, and an occasional reforming nobleman, to join them even against their class, and thus win a majority of the voting members.


Louis himself was uncertain how to behave. He lacked resolution and he lacked a firm policy. Moreover his wife, Marie Antoinette, who exercised considerable influence over him, very much disliked the bourgeoisie and had always objected to the entire procedure of calling the States-General. As it turned out, Louis had many opportunities in the next years to retain important powers for himself as a constitutional monarch. But his vacillation and feebleness were in the end to cost him both his and his wife's lives, and turn the Revolution itself into paths that it need never have taken if Louis, recognizing the signs of the times, had contented himself with a position not unlike that of his brother monarch in England.

❖ First phase of the Revolution

THE STATES-GENERAL BECOMES A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

At first Louis attempted to follow the advice of the nobility and have the estates meet and vote separately. The third estate members, led by a "renegade" nobleman, the Marquis de Mirabeau, insisted on the fact that they and they alone represented the country at large, whereas the two senior estates represented only a privileged class. They seceded from the meeting and constituted themselves a National Assembly, swearing an oath (Tennis Court Oath, June 20, 1789) that they would not disperse until they had agreed on a constitution and had it accepted by the king. Louis vacillated. At first he wished to dismiss the States-General, or, failing that, to insist on his original plan of voting by estates. But the resolution displayed by the third estate apparently intimidated him, and he did not have enough troops available to him in Paris to be sure of success if he attempted to use force against the Assembly. He therefore bowed to the storm, and permitted the States-General to meet as a National Assembly, meanwhile ordering his troops to assemble at Versailles, where the States-General was meeting.

At this point the citizens of Paris, a few miles from Versailles, decided to take a hand. Driven to desperation by a series of bad harvests and the shortage of food in the city, and alarmed by the mobilization of the troops, they began to prepare for armed resistance. On July 14, 1789 a mob marched on the Bastille, the royal prison. When the guard fired on them, the irate citizens stormed the fortress and released the few prisoners who had been confined there. Still the king hesitated to use his troops, who remained loyal to him, though in arrears of pay. Most of them were foreigners, and he did not wish to use them against Frenchmen. Instead he accepted the situation, and ordered the nobles and clergy to sit in the National Assembly as individual members. A National Guard, made up of bourgeois, was established, led by the Marquis de Lafayette. The king's troops were dismissed. The Assembly then set



Storming of the Bastille, July 14, 1789. Etching by Pierre-Gabriel Bethault from a Prieur drawing made about 1800. (COURTESY ACHENBACH FOUNDATION)

to work to draw up a new constitution and a plan for reform. It is therefore not to be wondered at that Bastille Day is still celebrated by the republicans of present France as the day that brought on the Revolution—little though the mob knew what it was inaugurating, and however little importance the fall of the Bastille had as an event in itself.

Meanwhile the peasants, who had been led to believe that their bonds would be loosened, some of them alarmed by all kinds of rumors of the breakdown of law and order in the country, took to arms themselves, and engaged in a general attack on the visible property of their lords. The movement, known at the time as the Great Fear, played a powerful part in the deliberations of the nobility in the National Assembly. On the night of August 4 a number of nobles announced that they were abandoning their residual feudal rights and dues on their

lands. The announcement proved contagious, and in a spirit of great emotion it was declared by resolution that feudalism had been abolished. Although in fact in later years many of the peasants were required to pay compensation, most of them obtained their lands, if they did not already own them, at greatly reduced prices, and the compensation for the feudal dues abolished in 1789 was rarely high enough to present any great financial burden. Not all the peasants profited from the events; but it may be stated that most of the peasants had now obtained what they wanted from the Revolution, and thereafter they were rarely in sympathy with the aims of the revolutionists.

Later in August the National Assembly promulgated the Declaration of the Rights of Man, which defined the "natural rights" of man according to the principles of the Enlightenment, spoke of law as the expression of the

"General Will," in accordance with the principles of Rousseau, and declared that the only sovereign of a nation is the people itself. Then it proceeded to try to work out a constitution, which, following the American example, would be a written one. Meanwhile many of the leading nobles, realizing that the bourgeoisie and the lower classes had won the first round of the Revolution, and that the victory could now be reversed only by force of arms, had already left the country. Their one hope was to rouse the other monarchs of Europe to the danger in which they themselves stood if the Revolution in France were to succeed in toppling the king from his throne, or even in compelling him to accept limitations on his absolutism. Their contentions were given added force when a mob in October 1789 marched on Versailles, captured the king and queen and brought them to Paris, and installed them in the Palace of the Tuileries. Shortly afterward the National Assembly also began to meet in Paris, where it was much more open to intimidation from the radical Paris masses than it had been in the Baroque palace of Louis XIV at Versailles.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1791

The most controversial measures of the Assembly were those concerned with the form of the constitution and the reform of the Church. As mentioned in earlier chapters, the Gallican Church had always been more or less independent of the papacy. But the National (or Constituent) Assembly wished to go further and make it totally dependent on the State. Not only had most of the leadership of the Church in the last century fallen into the hands of the nobility, but the Church was obviously wealthier than it needed to be, having regard to the services it rendered. Moreover, it owned too much property on which it paid no taxes. It was therefore the most obvious source of wealth available for expropriation by a government which was still as bankrupt as at the beginning of the Revolution. The National Assembly decided to expropriate the Church and issue new money on the security of Church lands, which were thereupon put up for sale. All priests were to become servants of the

State and were to be paid salaries. They were elected to their offices. New money was issued, called *assignats*, which for a time relieved the financial difficulties of the government.

The decision caused considerable confusion among the clergy. Although the financial provisions of what was called the Civil Constitution of the Clergy were, on the whole, not ungenerous, the provisions for the appointment of priests and bishops caused many misgivings among both the clergy and the laity. It was one thing to have the clergy chosen by a divine-right monarch, but quite another for them to be chosen by property-holding electors, most of whom were bourgeois. Though a majority of the clergy, especially the lower clergy, accepted the new situation and were prepared to work with the new constitution, others appealed to the pope, as did the Assembly itself. The pope, after long consideration, responded not only by refusing to accept the constitution but by condemning the entire Revolution.

This condemnation hopelessly split both the clergy and the laity. The Assembly accepted the challenge, and commanded all priests to swear an oath of allegiance to the State. About half the priests, but very few bishops, agreed to swear. The nonjuring or "refractory" clergy, having nowhere else to turn, looked to Rome for support in their quarrel, thus giving the papacy an authority in France that it had not possessed for centuries. The refractory clergy, though henceforth holding their positions illegally and driven underground, continued to command much support, especially among the peasants and the more conservative workers and their wives, who provided for their maintenance by voluntary contributions. They were widely regarded as the only true Catholics, since men disowned by the papacy could hardly be real priests. The refractory clergy and the peasants in later years formed the backbone of a counterrevolutionary movement called the Vendée.

The leading layman to refuse the services of the "constitutional" clergy was the king himself, who had been unable to prevent the establishment of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, but who believed his soul would be endangered if he gave it even nominal support

once the pope had condemned it. His example was followed by the royalists in the population. The counterrevolutionaries thus fought for their faith and their king at the same time, giving the revolutionary struggle a religious aspect that it had not at first presented. There can also be no doubt that the choice imposed upon both the clergy and their parishioners during the Revolution drew the attention of many persons of all classes to religion, even though their enthusiasm had become lukewarm during the preceding centuries.


The principles of the new constitution that was to replace the absolute monarchy were finally decided upon in 1791. Unfortunately for the chances of its success, Louis XVI, egged on by his wife and by the counterrevolutionaries, led by his brother, made an attempt to flee France in June of that year, but was recaptured and returned to Paris. It therefore became evident to the assemblymen and to the people of France and foreign countries that the king could be credited with no intention of trying to implement the new constitution. Foreigners naturally concluded that he was a prisoner and that the constitution had been wished upon him, that his consent had been compelled. From the time of his recapture various foreign princes realized that his life was in danger, and some began to think seriously of intervention. It did not apparently occur to many that any such intervention would be certain to cost the life of the king whom they hoped to rescue by their efforts.

THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY—BEGINNING OF THE WAR

The constitution finally agreed upon called for a Legislative Assembly, made up only of men who had had no part in framing the constitution. Its members were to be elected under a severely restricted franchise, and through electoral colleges. The king was to have a suspensory veto on legislation. The constitution came into effect in September, 1791, one month after a declaration had been made by the Austrian Hapsburg emperor and the king of Prussia (Declaration of Pillnitz) that if the other powers in Europe would join

them, they would take steps to restore law and order in France. The declaration had the effect of irritating the revolutionaries in France and giving more power to the extremists, who were as yet far from being in the majority, while at the same time doing nothing practical to build a coalition which could in fact take any active steps in France at all. It was, of course, natural enough for the monarchs in Europe to feel themselves threatened by the French developments; indeed, many of them had to face minor revolts and strikes in their own countries. Nevertheless, the means chosen to make their views known goaded the French ultimately into declaring war themselves. Led by such men as Danton and Robespierre, the Jacobin club in Paris, which had always been radical, obtained more popular support than ever, even though it was composed of elements which were far from united among themselves. What may be termed the right-wing members of the club were called Girondins, from the region around Bordeaux from which several of their leaders came. The Jacobins were very well aware of the international aspects of their Revolution. They were anxious to spread "liberty, equality, and fraternity" among all peoples who continued to groan under absolute rule. They had no objections to a war if the Revolution in France were ever to be endangered; abroad, it would be a war of liberation, in which they would be joined by the downtrodden in foreign countries. Nevertheless, those men who were in power in the Legislative Assembly were relatively moderate bourgeois, as was to be expected under the existing propertied franchise. Many of them were also quite inexperienced, since they had not taken an active part in the work of the National Assembly, and had not experienced its heroic ardors.

The old and experienced Hapsburg emperor Leopold II, brother of the French queen, who had issued the relatively moderate Declaration of Pillnitz, died early in 1792, to be replaced by his son Francis, who had fewer inhibitions about intervention and clearly showed his intentions. The Girondins who controlled the Legislative Assembly felt that war was inevitable, and they had no great objection to it, believing that Europe was ripe for revo-



Steel engraving showing the execution of royalists by the guillotine in 1792.

lution under French leadership. Though they had little idea of how such a war was to be waged, they had a sovereign contempt for the Austrian and Prussian armies, and wished to put an end, once and for all, to the agitation of the émigrés who were behind the interventionist powers. The Assembly therefore declared war in April, 1792.

The war, thus improvidently begun, had the effect of playing into the hands of the extremists. Recruits ready to fight in the war poured into Paris, but they distrusted the Assembly elected by the bourgeois; and the conditions they found in Paris were far from what they had expected. The millennium did not as yet appear in sight, and meanwhile the prices of food continued to rise and bread was in short supply. In a sudden revolt in August, 1792 the Parisians set up a revolutionary government, massacred a number of persons who had been held in prison as counterrevolutionaries, and attempted to capture the king and queen. The royal couple fled to the Assembly, which imprisoned them to await trial. Then the Assembly voted itself out of existence and called for new elections to a National Conven-

tion, to be chosen by universal manhood suffrage. The chief task of the Convention would be the framing of a republican constitution to replace the short-lived constitutional monarchy set up in 1791.

❖ The second phase of the Revolution—the First Republic

NATIONAL CONVENTION—THE GIRONDIN RULE

Meanwhile the Central European powers were marching their armies toward Paris, and the scratch armies of the French were unable to cope with them. There can be little doubt that the Prussian and Austrian armies would have been able to take Paris if they had paid full attention to the war with France. But at the moment their major interest was in the imminent second partition of Poland, an event that saved France. As it happened, at the battle of Valmy in September, 1792 the French general Dumouriez was able to hold the enemy, though without any conspicuous fighting on



*Parisians offering their valuables to the National Convention to be used in the war effort.
From a steel engraving dated 1793.*

either side, and Paris was saved. On the same day as the battle of Valmy, the National Convention met for the first time. Soon afterward it put the king on trial and by a very small majority condemned him to the guillotine, although the monarch was found guilty of treason almost unanimously.

If the crime of treason must have the overthrow of the monarch as its objective, then of course Louis could not be guilty. If the crime was treason against the government of the day and the security of the state, then there can be little doubt that in 1792 Louis was conspiring to overthrow the Revolution and re-establish the old regime, with the aid of the émigré nobles and such other foreign powers as could be induced to join them. There can be no doubt that he was unwilling to play his part in the constitutional monarchy that had been wished upon him. Without his acquiescence and indeed active support, the bourgeois rule that had been the aim of the National and Legislative Assemblies could not come about. Thus the Revolution took its course, and ever more extreme men

took the lead. After the death of the king, all those who had voted for the execution would forever be branded, like Cromwell and his Rump Parliament in the seventeenth century, as regicides. They could look for no mercy either from a restored monarchy or from foreign interventionists, all of whom, including the English—whose revolution and execution of a king were now nearly a century and a half in the past—professed to regard with abhorrence such a bloody end imposed upon a crowned head.

The revolutionary leadership was now in the hands of two groups of Jacobins and the even more extreme Commune, or municipal government of Paris. The right-wing Girondins were still conservative in comparison with the left wing, and had for the most part voted against the execution of the king. In their view the Revolution had gone far enough. It was time to put an end to it, and make sure of the bourgeois rule that they desired even at the cost of abandoning their revolutionary aims abroad. The remaining Jacobins, among whom

were the most important leaders, desired a revolution to be spread in Europe through the medium of war, and, in varying degrees, to create a true social revolution at home. The working-class leaders of the Commune were strongly antibourgeois, regarding the middle classes as hardly better than the nobles and criticizing them for making profits out of the war. They gave their support only to the more extreme of the Jacobins. The strength of the Girondins was centered in the provinces rather than in Paris. But the Convention met in Paris (passing some 11,000 laws during its period of life), and the working classes were able to exercise constant pressure on its members.

Though the Girondins would perhaps have commanded a majority in the whole country—although this is doubtful, since at times there may have been as many counterrevolutionaries as there were men and women in favor of the Revolution, if not more—they were clearly at a disadvantage in Paris, and were constantly subject to intimidation. It was therefore only a matter of time before they too would be denounced as counterrevolutionaries. Though the Girondins formed the first republican government, they were unable to make a success of the war effort, and finally the Girondin general Dumouriez, victor of Valmy, deserted to the Austrians. In June, 1793 the Jacobins and leaders of the Commune turned on the leading Girondins and arrested them. Those who could escape made their way to the provinces to stir up revolt against the Jacobins and their allies; the rest were guillotined. This event marks the beginning of the so-called Reign of Terror, inaugurated by the Jacobins, whose leader was Maximilien Robespierre.

THE REIGN OF TERROR

The Convention, now dominated by the Jacobins, set up a Committee of Public Safety and a Revolutionary Tribunal, the former with the main purpose of prosecuting the war, the latter with the task of liquidating the counter-revolution. Robespierre was the acknowledged leader of the Committee. Other important members were Lazare Carnot, who was given the name of "organizer of victory," earned by his

reorganization of the system of supply and recruitment, and Georges Danton, who was a member of the first Committee but was dropped later. Danton was an eloquent revolutionary, who for a long time disputed power with Robespierre. In both the Committee and the Convention there was far from unanimity on the policies to be pursued. The members soon divided into moderates and extremists, while there was constant pressure from the various revolutionary movements, especially in Paris, which were represented in neither body.

It must be said for the Committee of Public Safety that it was generally effective and performed its function with considerable ability. The three fundamental laws which it put into effect were the Law of Suspects, under which counterrevolutionaries of all classes—many were peasants who were in open revolt in the provinces against conscription and the Civil Constitution of the Clergy—were tried and put to death, often without adequate evidence, on the denunciation of leading revolutionaries; the Law of Maximum, which set up price controls, enforced fairly effectively by the new bureaucracy set up in the provinces by the Committee; and the *levée en masse*, which was of such importance in the future history of Europe that it requires a separate analysis.

LEVÉE EN MASSE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

Until the French Revolution all European wars had been fought with mercenary and professional armies, paid for by the government. When the war was finished, terms of peace were agreed upon. "I have lost a battle. I will pay with a province," an Austrian monarch had once remarked, and this was the customary attitude of rulers. In the eighteenth century theorists had believed it possible that some day wars would be fought without casualties. The armies of one power would attempt to outmaneuver those of another; then, at the proper moment, the general would present an ultimatum, which would be accepted by his opposite number since the latter would recognize that if he fought he would be defeated. Frederick the Great is reported to have said

that he would never dare to impose conscription, because he would be faced with wholesale desertions.

The *levée en masse* imposed by the Committee of Public Safety on France during the Revolution was the first modern example of conscription of the manpower of any European nation. It was made possible by the fact that, for the first time, the people of a nation identified itself with the war aims of its leaders, as the peoples had never identified themselves with the wars of the kings. It made, on the whole, relatively little difference to the inhabitants of a country whether they were ruled by one king or another. The Austrian Netherlands (Belgium of today) had formerly belonged to Spain; after 1815 they would be briefly ruled by the Dutch. Italian statelets were ruled in turn by French, Spanish, and Austrian princes. Inhabitants of such states had, as a rule, little sense of nationality; it would have been impossible for their rulers to have compelled them to fight on their behalf. But the French conscription law found a ready, if not universal, response. Even though punishments were prescribed for refusal to fight, the law could not have been enforced if France had not become by this time a true nation, fighting a national war.

An important consequence of the notion of a nation-in-arms, fighting a national war, had already been pointed out by Mirabeau before his death in 1791. It would be far more difficult to make peace than before. The nation itself was involved in defeat, and would not be ready to accept the loss of power and prestige that accompanied it as long as more men could be enrolled and more resources thrown into action in the hope of turning the tide. So, was born the idea of a national war, and, with the *levée en masse*, the means were made available for waging it. In our day it is regarded as a matter of course that conscription should be imposed at once by the national government in time of war. Limited wars have passed into the discard, unless, like the Korean War they can be explained as a limited police action. There were many, even during the Korean War, who urged that it should be fought like a

national war, involving the total resources and manpower of the nation.

The result for France, whose example was not immediately followed by her enemies, was that she had a reserve of manpower in arms that was not matched by any other contemporary nation, nor indeed by all the armies together that opposed her. Thus the Committee of Public Safety had at its disposal, as soon as the problem of supply was solved, armies far greater than any it would be likely to meet; and Napoleon used the weapon forged by his predecessors to conquer the greater part of Europe and keep it in subjection. Almost never did the army under his command fail to outnumber the army opposed to him, yet his was not the only French army in action at any time: there were always others engaged in active warfare or in occupation duties. Europe would never be the same again. Prussia was already to follow the French example before the Napoleonic wars were over; and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 was a war of the same type as the Napoleonic. There was to be no return to the eighteenth-century concept of a limited war save for casual expeditions and obviously limited enterprises.

THE REPUBLIC OF VIRTUE—FALL OF ROBESPIERRE

Under the spur of the Committee of Public Safety and with the aid of the organizational genius of Carnot, the French armies were gradually licked into shape and began to expand beyond French borders. Belgium and Holland were occupied; the Spaniards, who had entered the war after the execution of Louis XVI, were defeated. Prussia and Spain sued for peace before the end of 1794. Britain, which had entered the war against France as soon as the French had occupied Belgium, met with no success against French arms on the Continent; and though the port of Toulon in southern France was surrendered by royalists to the British navy in 1793, the city was soon recaptured, and the Toulon royalists massacred.

The Committee, however, was plagued with internal dissension. Robespierre wished to

establish a "republic of virtue." Though Christianity was not to be abolished, it would no longer be the religion of all the people. It was to be a new age in all respects. Either the Goddess Reason or an unnamed Supreme Being was to be worshipped. Christian holy days were to be abolished, and a ten-day week substituted for the old seven-day week with its religious Sunday. The date of the establishment of the republic was hereafter to be known as the Year I. But not all the revolutionaries were interested in any such measures, nor was the Convention, which had to pass the laws, united.

Dissension arose in the Committee, as in all such revolutionary groups, more from the clash of personalities and the internal struggle for power than over principles. First the extremists on the left were liquidated through the guillotine. Then there arose a struggle between the slightly more moderate members of the Committee and the more extreme group led by Robespierre. Robespierre won this contest, and Danton, the leading member of his opposition, was guillotined. But by this time the Convention to whom the Committee was at least nominally responsible, had become seriously alarmed, and its members began to fear that it might be their turn next if Robespierre were not stopped. When the latter made a speech in which he let it be known that he had a new list of victims ready for the following meeting, a number of Convention members denounced Robespierre first and were able to obtain a vote for his arrest. The next day (July 3, 1794) he was guillotined.

THERMIDORIAN REACTION—THE DIRECTORY

There followed what is known as the Thermidorian Reaction, after the name of the revolutionary month of Thermidor. The Girondins, who had been biding their time until the Terror was over, began to make themselves felt again. All the more conservative elements in the country thought that the Terror had gone far enough and ought to be abolished. The powers of the Committee of Public Safety were curtailed, and though the Paris mob organized an insurrection the army obeyed the orders of the

Convention and suppressed it. The bourgeois now recovered full control of the Convention. Instead of putting into effect a radical constitution which had been drawn up two years previously, they decided to write yet another one, far more conservative than its predecessor. This Constitution of the Year III (1795) provided for an executive body of five directors and a bicameral legislature elected by a more restricted franchise than any that had so far been tried. The two chambers received their names, appropriately enough, from antiquity. The upper house, the Council of Elders, was derived from Sparta, and the lower house, the Council of Five Hundred, from Athens. The Convention, when it finally dissolved itself, made sure by appropriate legislation that most of its members would belong to one or the other of the two chambers.

The Directory thus set up was expected, like any good business management, to liquidate the Revolution, retaining its gains and cutting its losses. But it was not permitted to take office without opposition. A group of royalist dissidents who objected to the new constitution set in motion an armed insurrection, whereupon the outgoing Convention called upon Napoleon Bonaparte to suppress it. Napoleon, an officer who had distinguished himself in action against the British in Toulon, was nothing loth. Dispersing the rebels with a "whiff of grapeshot," he acquired a credit with the incoming directors which, as all the world knows, he was able to turn to good account.

Opinions have varied about the Directory phase of the French Revolution. On the one hand it is clear that the directors were personally corrupt, and the period (1795-1799) during which they ruled was one of often sordid corruption. The armies had been so successful in recent times that they had become a power in the land, and the civil government could exist only by courtesy of the army leader who was in a position to lend it aid. Neither the directors nor the bicameral legislature had been chosen by any substantial body of electors, and the constitution had been so arranged that the legislators of the Convention still dominated the new houses. Such mandate as they

possessed was certainly to put an end to the excesses of the Revolution without liquidating its gains. The Directory no longer had at its disposal the machinery of the Terror, yet without the Terror it had no means of restoring and keeping law and order. It could not have enforced price control even if it had wished to; it was at the head of a France which still possessed no sound currency and no credit. Frenchmen had ceased to obey the government unless compelled; large parts of the country were still in rebellion.

It is clear that the country was ripe for military rule unless the old machinery of absolutism, under a legitimate ruler who would be obeyed just because he was a legitimate king, were to be restored. The directors in fact sounded out the latter possibility. Louis XVIII, as he was to be called when he did receive back his throne in 1814, made his terms too high to be acceptable. He was unwilling to permit the social gains of the Revolution to be maintained, and wished to bring back the émigré nobility and restore it to its pristine authority and social position. Thus there was only one other possibility, rule by a military leader, since it was clear that the constitution under which France was then operating could not last long.

This truth was demonstrated clearly in 1797, when free elections were permitted. The voters showed beyond any doubt that they had no use for the regime. There was a wholesale repudiation at the polls of those who had sat in the Convention, and since the directors were dependent for their own position on choice by the members of the two Councils, it was clear that they too would have to go. They therefore appealed to the nearest and most hopeful general, Napoleon, who had been waging war successfully in Italy. Napoleon sent an assistant with some troops, and the recent elections were nullified. Two years later he himself conspired with a recently chosen director and intimidated the legislature into changing the constitution once more, leaving room for himself as First Consul (of three). Thus military rule was fastened upon the people, as had been predicted by the Anglo-

Irish political philosopher Edmund Burke as early as 1790, when the Revolution was barely a year old.

In the four years of its life the Directory, in spite of the insecurity of its own position, made some constructive efforts to fulfill its mandate. Once the mechanism of price control, enforced by the Terror, was removed, prices soared again. The assignats sank to almost zero, causing great hardship and adding to the unpopularity of the Directory. A new paper money (*mandats*) issued by the Directory, secured on the land confiscated by the State, proved no more acceptable, and its value rapidly depreciated. However, loot sent from Italy by Napoleon, although no doubt some of it stuck to the fingers of the directors, eased the financial shortage, and toward the end of its regime the Directory made some significant economies, repudiated two thirds of the national debt, and issued a new currency based on gold. In spite of the fact that this reform put an end to the inflation and was outstandingly successful, the directors received little credit for their enterprise. All credit was taken by Napoleon, to whose more stable regime fell the task of completing the reform initiated by the Directory.

The directors carried on the social and educational policies of the Convention as best they could, even though they had to cope with revolts from the right and the left. Abroad, they set up republics in many of the conquered territories, which were given handsome new names during the Directorate. Holland became the Batavian Republic; the area around Genoa became the Ligurian Republic; and a Cisalpine Republic was formed by Napoleon. Switzerland became the Helvetic Republic. All accepted the general principles of the French Revolution, including the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and were closely allied with France. Even though they were not in fact independent of France, these republics were freer than they were under Napoleon, who preferred to set the members of his not very able family on the thrones of the new countries after some consolidation of their territories; or gave them to more able generals,

who proved to be politically unreliable and released themselves from Napoleonic tutelage when opportunity offered.

Meanwhile Napoleon was making a name for himself and rapidly showing himself to be the most effective and imaginative of the generals available to the Directory. Given command in Italy, he thoroughly defeated the Austrians and compelled them to accept the Treaty of Campo Formio in 1797, which was negotiated by Napoleon on his own authority and merely approved by the Directory, which had little alternative. Austria, under the treaty, ceded Belgium to France, and secretly promised her the left bank of the Rhine. The latter did not belong, except in name, to the Holy Roman emperor, and was occupied by German princes. Since the promise was hardly likely to appeal to the other Germans, it was kept secret from those affected. Austria was granted Venetia, which had been overrun by Napoleon's armies and its ancient republican institutions destroyed. From some of the rest of his conquered territories in Italy the ephemeral Cisalpine Republic was created.

Thus the Directory, which had not proved very successful in its wars except those won by Napoleon, was able by 1797 to make peace with all its military adversaries except England—undoubtedly one of the aims for which it had been chosen. Nevertheless, many of the deputies, especially those on the left, wished to continue the war, in which so many had a vested interest. The revolutionary principles were far from accepted in Europe as a whole, and the acceptance of these principles throughout Europe was a war aim of many of the old revolutionaries. The war also was profitable to many individuals, including some of the directors. Peace negotiations were entered into with Britain, which was in no position to carry on the war by herself. But they never came to fruition, and Napoleon, looking for new fields to conquer after Campo Formio, was granted a command against England. After briefly considering an invasion, he decided it was better to take on England in an unexpected quarter by interfering with her possessions in the East, and establishing some kind of a base

for further attack on India by capturing Egypt, then a Turkish possession.

Meanwhile Britain was able to create another coalition against French expansion and escape from her rather terrifying isolation of 1797. The British fleet under Admiral Horatio Nelson defeated the French fleet close to the mouth of the Nile, making Napoleon's position in Egypt, where he had won some easy victories, untenable. Deserting his soldiers, who were allowed to do what they could for themselves, Napoleon returned to France. There he gave lectures in Egyptian archaeology—one of his officers had discovered the Rosetta Stone while in Egypt—and waited for his opportunity.

It is doubtful whether either the Directors or the populace had any idea of what he had actually accomplished or failed to accomplish in Egypt, or of the significance of the naval defeat of France. Napoleon still seemed the heroic and invincible soldier, a successor of Alexander both in his military genius and in his scientific interests; and the Abbé Sieyès, the director who supported the coup by which Napoleon became First Consul, was probably as ignorant as any of the others. As it happened, during the coup itself Napoleon behaved with something less than perfect *sangfroid*—he fainted at the critical moment—and it was only the presence of mind of his brother, who was never promoted to any position of importance thereafter, which saved the day. The last phase of the French Republic was thus ushered in on a somewhat comic note—a note which was not to be conspicuous during the years of Napoleon's rule.

SUMMARY—THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE REVOLUTION TO 1799

Before coming to the period of the ascendancy of Napoleon, it may be worth while to summarize the results of the Revolution up to the year 1799, when Napoleon became First Consul. First, and perhaps most important, the entire apparatus of feudalism as it had continued to exist until 1789 had been destroyed. The peasants had taken possession of the land

they cultivated, either after paying some slight compensation or for free. The noble classes had lost all the privileges they had enjoyed by virtue of their noble status. Every profession and trade was now open to those who could enter it. A system of public schools had been established to replace the previous religious monopoly. Citizens had equality before the law, and jury trials became the rule in most criminal cases. Guilds had been abolished and the internal toll system had disappeared, together with the royal system of tax farms. Although universal adult suffrage had been the rule for a period, it had by 1799 been replaced by property restrictions. A large start had been made toward codifying the numerous laws and even reconciling the Roman and Teutonic systems of law that had been operative in different parts of the country. The financial problems of the country had not been solved, but the way was open to their solution, and the enormous debt that had accumulated under the monarchy had been simply repudiated—a solution that would have been impossible for the monarchy itself.

On the other side of the ledger, the country was still engaged in war, which, though profitable to some, was responsible for a huge number of casualties. The wars themselves were not costly to France in money. The Directory had seen to that. All the new republics contributed heavily to the French treasury, and the armies were supported by the population of those territories occupied by them. Nevertheless the country was war-weary, and longed for a period of peace—provided peace could be bought without too much sacrifice of the gains of war. The Church problem was not settled. Refractory priests still officiated, and in recent years had gained support from returning émigrés, royalists, and many others who were opposed to the Revolution. The rebellion in the Vendée periodically broke out again; it could only with difficulty be kept under control, and was never fully suppressed. The upper middle class remained the leading beneficiary of the Revolution in spite of all the changes which had taken place; little had been done for the lower classes, whose condition was in

very few respects superior to what it had been in 1789. Probably only the right to equality before the law, which had never been theirs before, was a true revolutionary gain for these classes. Neither the directors nor Napoleon gave them any significant help, and even the earlier revolutionaries had only sporadically made attempts to improve their lot. Their efforts to help themselves by direct action had invariably resulted in failure and the execution of their leaders. On the other hand, the army offered a means for advancement for all classes. Once the monopoly of the nobles on all higher ranks in the army had been broken, the way was open for advancement by merit. This policy was followed by the revolutionary leaders for want of an alternative, and it was maintained by Napoleon.

❖ The Napoleonic regime

THE CONSULATE—ESTABLISHMENT OF STABLE GOVERNMENT

When Napoleon became First Consul in 1799 he was only thirty years of age. He was not the only candidate for the role of military savior of the directors. Two men had been approached before him, but had declined the honor. But there can be little doubt that he was in fact the best equipped. He possessed, in addition to his military abilities, a remarkably agile mind and a retentive memory, a power of quick decision, a forceful personality, and an absence of significant scruples, all of which enabled him to take advantage to the full of the opportunity he was offered. He was soon able to sidetrack those who had put him into office, who had no doubt hoped to use him. His prestige, won by victories gained as First Consul, combined with the fact that he was able to give the influential classes what they wanted, secured for him an extension of his tenure as consul to ten years, then for life (1802). Finally he was able to assume the title of "Emperor of the French," and the pope came to France to crown him personally. The new empire was to be hereditary and the crown would descend to his son, if he had one. All

these changes were agreed to by huge majorities in referendums held for the purpose.

Napoleon became First Consul by virtue of a new constitution, the Constitution of the Year VIII, written largely by the Abbé Sieyès, after careful study of the institutions of the Roman Republic as popularized by Montesquieu. At the top were the three consuls, who were named by a Senate. (The Senate itself had already been named by Sieyès and his friends, and their choice of consuls was a part of the arrangement.) The First Consul chose for himself a Council of State. There were two legislative organs, the Tribunate and the Legislative Body. The Legislative Body could debate laws but not pass them (like the Roman Senate); the Tribunate could pass or reject laws but not debate them (like the *Comitia Tributa* in Rome). All laws had to be proposed by the First Consul and his Council of State, but the Senate passed on their constitutionality (compare the role of consul and tribunes in Rome). Of course there could be no direct democracy, with all men voting for the laws, as in ancient Rome, since representative government had been invented in the meantime. Instead, the principle of universal manhood suffrage was retained from the French Revolution, but it was made of no significance. The ordinary voter could choose only a list of eligibles from his district; the latter would choose other eligibles from the department; and the departmental eligibles chose national eligibles. From these the Senate or, in fact, Napoleon himself chose the members of both legislative bodies. Napoleon in any case dispensed with the first elections, since he did not think there was enough time to go through the long process of finding eligibles.

Until he had consolidated his position fully, which occupied a few years, there was some opposition to Napoleon from the legislature. But he handled all such signs of independence in an authoritative manner. Ultimately he obtained the right to revise the constitution as long as the Senate approved, and then he obtained the right to nominate the members of the Senate. The assemblies therefore became of no significance, and universal

manhood suffrage was retained for display purposes only. In his later years Napoleon could do as he wished, but the body with which he chose to work was his nominated Senate.

When Napoleon became First Consul it was clear to him at once that certain objectives must be pursued. The most important was to obtain a good peace and put an end to the war in order to give him time to set the domestic affairs of the country in order. Next in importance, and a prerequisite for acceptance in the country, was to put an end to the internal religious strife. After these things had been accomplished, the gains of the Revolution must be consolidated in a permanent law code, and the finances of the country must be put on a secure basis. All these aims he accomplished, putting his incomparable energy to work to compel all those who worked with him to do their part with a minimum of delay.

DOMESTIC ACHIEVEMENTS OF NAPOLEON

The first great achievement on the home front was the Concordat with Rome (1801). Under the arrangements which he negotiated with the pope, Catholicism was declared to be the religion of the three consuls and of the majority of the French people. Napoleon was to have the choice of the bishops, and they were to be consecrated by the pope (compare the Concordat of Worms, 1122). The Church was to be disestablished, and the salaries of the clergy were to be paid by the State. The pope agreed to accept the confiscation of Church properties, and to restore the refractory clergy to their duty. Obviously the Concordat was a gain for the Church insofar as it was restored to some authority in France, and it relieved the purchasers of Church lands from the fear of being made to return them—an impossibly difficult procedure after so many years. But in other respects it was a triumph for the State and for Napoleon, who now had to contend only with the anticlerical revolutionaries. He was able to pacify these to some degree by a series of Organic Laws, which provided for the payment of Protestant pastors, granted freedom of private worship and re-

ligion to all (including the right to be without religion), while at the same time assuming for the State certain rights to police even the Catholic religion, including the right to exclude papal bulls from the country. Partly mollified, the legislative assemblies ratified the Concordat and voted the additional laws in 1802.

Napoleon found that much of the financial work that was needed for the stabilization of the currency had already been accomplished by the Directory. The part of the national debt that had not been repudiated was consolidated; expenses in the early years of the Consulate were much reduced; and Napoleon put tax collecting on a more efficient basis. The intendants of the old regime were restored, with the new name of prefect. Such reforms had always formed part of the policy of the more effective kings. However, the founding of the Bank of France in 1801 greatly aided the recovery, and was also able to assist Napoleon when in later years he was in need of money.

Napoleon himself always believed that his greatest domestic achievement was the law code that bears his name, the Code Napoléon. He was himself personally responsible for the fact that the Code, on which lawyers had been working through the Revolution, was finally issued. Napoleon saw to it that the lawyers when necessary adopted the common-sense view, and often prevented them from bogging down in legal disputes on technical matters. The Code indeed enshrined many of the revolutionary reforms. All citizens henceforth were to be equal in the eyes of the law, and every man could choose his own profession. Primogeniture and the entailing of estates were abolished; civil marriage and divorce were affirmed as individual rights; the State was the supreme authority in religious and educational matters; but each individual had the right to freedom of conscience. Thus the civil liberties of the citizen were affirmed.

The Code confirmed the rights and security of property, but the working classes gained little. Collective bargaining was forbidden, and the employer's word was given more weight than the employee's in any dispute over wages. The worker had to carry an employment

card, which listed his jobs and made black-listing simple. Extensive rights were given to fathers over their children and to husbands over their wives and their wives' estates. The Code took a step backward by re-establishing slavery, which had been abolished during the Revolution, in the colonies. Much of the Code therefore reflects the interest of Napoleon in securing the support of the middle classes.

Finally, it should be added that Napoleon in his later years instituted a strict censorship, and kept an efficient secret police. In his penal code, issued in 1810, punishments for crimes against property were made more severe, and some forms of judicial torture, always present in codes derived from Roman law, were re-introduced after having been abolished during the Revolution.

WARS OF NAPOLEON

Conquest of Western and Central Europe


When Napoleon became consul, France was still at war with an extensive coalition, and had lost prestige over the Egyptian fiasco. Egypt fell to Britain in 1801, but by that time Napoleon had defeated Austria in northern Italy at the battle of Marengo, and General Moreau inflicted another defeat on her at Hohenlinden (1800). Thereafter Austria was made to sign an unfavorable peace, and Napoleon by skillful diplomacy was able to buy off or wheedle from the coalition all the allies of Britain. Britain, again alone, sued for peace, which was signed at Amiens in 1802. Egypt was granted to the French, together with some minor concessions. Thus Napoleon by March, 1802 had consolidated his position abroad and at home. Yet his position was far from secure, since it was certain that the British would not for long accept such an unfavorable balance of power on the Continent, and Austria was only licking her wounds. The Treaty of Amiens in fact was never fulfilled completely by either France or Britain; and though Napoleon need not have made an issue of it, he did so, and plunged France into the great Napoleonic imperial adventure. He had the best army in Europe, more than a match, as he thought, for any land coali-

tion that could be brought against him; and though his navy was manifestly inferior to that of Britain, he did not think it impossible that Britain could be brought to defeat by blockade and even, perhaps, by invasion, in spite of Britain's naval superiority. The French fleet was not negligible, and it might yet be made powerful enough to defeat the British.

Napoleon attempted the most difficult feat first. While Britain was building the Third Coalition—for which she proposed to be the paymaster—to offset her military weakness, Napoleon assembled an invading army at Boulogne, with which he could almost surely have conquered England had he ever been able to cross the Channel. But every maneuver was detected by the vigilant British navy, and nothing was accomplished. Meanwhile, the assault on Austria was being prepared at the same time. In October, 1805 an Austrian army was forced to surrender at Ulm by one of the French generals, but the very next day (October 21) the French fleet off the coast of Spain, which had entered the war on the side of the French, was annihilated by the British

fleet, which under Nelson had made a surprise sortie from the Channel. Thereafter England was safe from invasion, and Napoleon concentrated on defeating his continental enemies.

Stupidity and distrust among the allies opposed to Napoleon ensured that they would be defeated one by one, whereas together they might have been a match even for Napoleon and the incomparable French army. The Austrians were defeated at Austerlitz in 1805 and made to sign a humiliating peace under which recently acquired Venetia was ceded. Prussia was defeated at Jena in 1806, and Napoleon occupied Berlin. The following year he imposed terms on Prussia which left her little more than a French puppet. Western Prussia was shorn from the rest of Prussia and given to Napoleon's brother Jerome to rule as the kingdom of Westphalia. All Prussia's gains from the partitions of Poland were taken from her, and a new duchy of Warsaw was created. Meanwhile, Napoleon defeated the Russians at Friedland in 1807, and Tsar Alexander I was compelled likewise to make terms with the conqueror. The terms, however, were not un-



Contemporary etching showing Napoleon and Alexander I of Russia embracing at Tilsit in 1807. (COURTESY ACHENRACH FOUNDATION)

favorable, since Napoleon at this stage preferred Russia as an ally, as long as Alexander loyally took his part in the last great offensive, the Continental Blockade, which was intended to bring Britain to her knees by cutting off her trade with Europe.

The Continental Blockade The blockade was announced in November, 1806 and extended by two decrees of the following year. The entire Continent was to be closed to British goods, and all trade between Britain and the continental countries was forbidden. British property on the Continent was confiscated. The decrees were made applicable not only to France and her allies, but to neutrals, who were compelled to observe the decrees on pain of being regarded and treated as enemies. Britain naturally retaliated with her own Orders-in-Council of 1807, which forbade neutrals to trade with France and her allies. With her command of the sea, it was much easier for Britain to maintain the blockade than for France, which had to police the entire coastline of Europe. Furthermore, British goods were much cheaper than any produced on the Continent, owing to the superior development of British industry (to be dealt with in the chapter on the Industrial Revolution), and it was not possible for French industry to take up the slack and service all Europe, interesting though the prospect was to French industrialists. Indeed, France herself could not do entirely without some British products, and Napoleon was compelled to make certain exceptions to his regulations. The result was widespread smuggling and very great discontent with France on the Continent, whereas Britain, though seriously affected, had other sources of supply, especially in North and South America. Napoleon, constantly compelled to take further military steps to close the gaps in the system, was driven to ever more dangerous military adventures. Britain, too, was compelled to take steps against those countries that still had useful navies, and against neutrals, such as the United States. Her policy resulted in the entry of Denmark into the French system after Britain had bombarded Copenhagen in 1807 and seized the Danish

fleet, and in the War of 1812 with the United States.

Napoleon's interference in Spain was the beginning of his downfall. By diplomacy, trickery, and threats, he obtained the Spanish crown for his brother Joseph. By itself this might not have been fatal; but the attempt to spread the principles of the Revolution to a country so attached to the Church and so riddled with privilege gave rise to sporadic revolts and an incessant drain upon Napoleon's military resources. Portugal's rulers also were driven into exile, as Napoleon spread his Continental System through to the Atlantic and attempted to close Portuguese ports. The British sent what aid they could to the peninsula, and for five years continued to send troops and supplies, forcing Napoleon himself to take the field in 1808. Although the fortunes of war swung now to one side, now to the other, by the time of Napoleon's defeat in Russia in 1812-1813, Portugal and Spain were in British hands, and the British general, the Duke of Wellington, led his troops into France in 1813.

EFFORT OF NAPOLEON TO LEGITIMIZE HIS RULE—MARRIAGE WITH HAPSBURG PRINCESS

Meanwhile, in 1809, Austria renewed the war, and after winning a victory (one of the first signs of Napoleon's increasing weakness) at Aspern in May, she was badly defeated at Wagram in October of the same year. Napoleon was still invincible in Central Europe, and in spite of the running sore in the Iberian peninsula and the failure to make much impression on British power, to many he seemed to be at the height of his authority and influence. It was time for him to give thought to the succession. He had no son, and a wife, Josephine, who, though her connections had been useful to Napoleon in earlier days, would never present him with an heir. Even if she had been able to do so, such an heir could not have been of value to her husband in his present designs.

For Napoleon was, after all, an adventurer, scion of the petty Corsican nobility, but necessarily regarded as an upstart by the legitimate monarchs of Europe. He owed his position to



The marriage of Napoleon to Marie Louise, archduchess of Austria. (COURTESY MUSÉE NATIONAL, VERSAILLES)


his own abilities, and to his acceptance by the French people, as manifested in plebiscites. No monarchy in Europe, not even the British, would ever allow that such acceptance constituted a claim to legitimacy. Legitimacy was conferred by birth alone, and for all his reign Napoleon, in spite of his coronation in the presence of the pope, would be regarded as a usurper, and his sons after him. But if he were to have a son by a royal princess, at least that son would be half royal by birth. It was the most that Napoleon could hope for. After having his marriage to Josephine annulled, he took steps to obtain for himself such a royal princess, and found one with the bluest blood in all Europe, Marie Louise, the nineteen-year-old daughter of the Hapsburg emperor, whose father Napoleon had just defeated. The emperor had little choice but to agree to the marriage, and in due course Marie Louise did

indeed present her husband with a male heir, whom his father made king of Rome as soon as he was born.¹ The marriage, it may be added, was greatly resented by Alexander I of Russia, who regarded it in part as directed against himself, though he had himself rebuffed earlier attempts made by the French to secure his consent to a marriage between Napoleon and his sister.

THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN AND THE DOWNFALL OF NAPOLEON

Although Napoleon was supreme in Europe from 1809 to 1812, and had only the war with

¹ When Napoleon abdicated in 1814, his son in theory became emperor, and is known to Bonapartists as Napoleon II, though, like Louis XVII, he never ruled.



Britain and in the Iberian peninsula to contend with, the Continental System was not making much progress. Although it did damage British trade, it showed no signs of bringing the country to defeat, and gaping holes were also developing. Russia withdrew from it in 1810. Alexander I of Russia was also seriously worried by Napoleon's activity in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which he was constantly enlarging. It was, nevertheless, Napoleon's own decision to invade Russia in 1812 with an army made up of troops collected from all over Europe, fortified by the French veterans who could have defeated any army they had to meet. But Alexander's generals did not propose to fight head on. One murderous skirmish at Borodino was the only battle they permitted. Napoleon took Moscow, but it was set afire by the retreating Russians, and the emperor was compelled to retreat himself. His army was destroyed by winter and by punishing attacks from the Russian cavalry. The emperor finally left the army and returned to France, only just in time to gather together enough forces to make some resistance to the armies

of all the European powers—which, of course, took advantage of Napoleon's defeat to turn against him, not excluding his own father-in-law. In 1813 the emperor was completely defeated at the battle of Leipzig. Wellington thereupon rolled up Spain, and invaded France over the Pyrenees. The joint armies captured Paris in March, 1814, and Napoleon abdicated a few days later in favor of his son. He was exiled to Elba with a pension, while the powers gathered in Vienna to debate what was to be done with France. The deliberations of this Congress will be considered in the next chapter.

It only remains to record here that Louis XVIII was restored to his throne after undertaking to grant a constitution and accept the bulk of the reforms of the Revolution and the Napoleonic regime. But Napoleon escaped from Elba, and France, already weary of the restoration and yearning for the glories of the Napoleonic era, rose almost to a man and welcomed him—thus upsetting all the arguments of the French negotiators at Vienna to the effect that France had learned her lesson and would be good in future. The anti-Napoleonic



Engraving by Thomas Burke from a bust of the Duke of Wellington at the time of the battle of Waterloo. (COURTESY ACHENBACH FOUNDATION)

coalition was at once revived. Though Napoleon won some minor victories, his army was defeated by the coalition, led by Wellington for the British and Blücher for the Prussians, at Waterloo (1815). This time Napoleon was exiled to St. Helena, a remote island in the southern Atlantic. There he died six years later, after dictating his memoirs and producing various apologies for his regime, which show a remarkable capacity for clear thinking mingled with self-delusion.

CHARACTER AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF NAPOLEON

In France We have already noted to what extent Napoleon fulfilled the hopes raised by the Revolution in France. In brief, it may be said that he granted certain personal liberties, subject only to the higher needs of the State—which in Napoleon's time meant a censorship and a secret police, but need not involve such interference with civil liberties under a subsequent regime. He likewise granted equality of opportunity and status. Such fraternal elements as

were sporadically fostered by the Revolution were never conspicuous under the rule of Napoleon. The influential bourgeois had no more interest in the welfare of the workers than had been customary; but at least it was no longer impossible for workers and peasants to become bourgeois themselves. Napoleon had instituted new orders of nobility and conferred titles on those who conspicuously aided him, especially generals; he also instituted the Legion of Honor, an award of merit which endured and became highly sought after even in later republican regimes. Napoleon's educational reforms included a state university and an efficient high school (lycée) system, which in his day was intended to turn out civil servants, needed in ever greater numbers under his rule. His system, of course, survived, and could be used by other regimes than his.

Napoleon was one of the greatest users of other people's ideas in history, and all of them he turned effectively to his own use. His quick intelligence enabled him to see just how any idea or institution could be converted to his profit, and his unequaled energy and will power enabled him to cut all corners when he believed it to be in his own interests and in the interests of his regime. In spite of his own efforts to discover it in the solitude of St. Helena, few others have ever been able to discern any spark of idealism in his make-up; nor any sign of moral scruple. As a military man he had the use of the best, and by far the largest, army in Europe, and he made effective use of it, especially by cultivating speed of maneuver and "getting there first with the most men." He left as little as possible to chance. Nevertheless, when outnumbered, as in the last years and in the Hundred Days after the escape from Elba, he fought some of his most brilliant campaigns. He was beloved by his troops, for he had the magnetism of the born leader; and though his lack of generosity showed in his hesitancy to grant credit to his generals and marshals for their victories, and he thus incurred the enmity of some, the political needs of a military adventurer may be sufficient explanation for this unvarying insistence on taking personal credit for everything that he considered creditable achieved under his rule.

In Europe In France the legacy of Napoleon, as distinct from the legacy of the French Revolution, was a patriotism and a nationalism that have been too intimately connected with military achievements to be wholly healthy, and it would appear that the association between victory and national grandeur is still not obsolete. In Prussia from 1810 onwards, under the spur of the military defeat by Napoleon, there was a rise of patriotism which at first had many beneficial effects. Serfdom was abolished, and a number of urgent civil reforms were put into operation. Before the Napoleonic regime was at an end, Prussia had adopted conscription. Prussians were tired of defeat and tired of being regarded as eminent only in philosophy. The political system inaugurated by Napoleon to replace the defunct Holy Roman Empire was eventually to result in the unification of a German nation, as described in the next chapter—an event that seemed hopeless as long as the old imperial system survived, in however feeble a form. The influence of the Napoleonic dream of empire on Germans is difficult to evaluate; Germany was more heavily populated than France, and possessed superior resources for an industrial age. Once Germany was unified into a modern industrial nation, the background for possible expansion was present, whether or not Napoleon had ever ruled much of Europe in an earlier age.

The countries ruled by Napoleon were all to a greater or lesser degree disturbed by French revolutionary ideas, even though they had been imposed upon them by a despot. As the nineteenth century was to show, it was impossible for them ever to submit to a wholly unenlightened or inefficient despotism again, nor could they permit their monarchs to rule without some participation in government by the middle classes, not even in priest- and noble-ridden Spain. Latin Americans, as we shall see, used the period of Napoleon to begin their liberation from the Spanish yoke. Russia's ruler, at first pro-French, and not even anti-Napoleon until he was compelled to defend himself against attack, granted liberal constitutions to Poland and Finland, which he had won through the wars, and contemplated re-

forms in Russia herself until he fell under other influences than French and turned away from his liberalism. Britain, although the wars were a severe strain on her resources and at times there was much distress in the country, and although she engaged in an unprofitable and unwanted war with the United States, emerged with a much stronger industrial establishment than before the war, having been compelled to produce herself much that she had hitherto imported. There was no visible sign that she had been much affected by the revolutionary ideas of France or Napoleon. Her people had simply regarded him as an ogre bent on their destruction. Patriotism had naturally increased through the wars; but since Britain had been successful in defeating Napoleon, few thought much was wrong with the system of government under which this had been achieved.

So the world moved on into the nineteenth century; and the powers were compelled to repair the damage inflicted by Napoleon and the French Revolution as best they could. The next five chapters will be devoted to the nineteenth century, including its vital changes in the economy of Europe. Economic change up to this point has been merely alluded to, but it was increasing in tempo throughout the Napoleonic wars and comprises what we call the Industrial Revolution.

Suggestions for further reading

PAPERBACK BOOKS

- Burke, Edward. *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. Gateway, Liberal Arts Press, Rinehart. Disillusioned account, with important fulfilled prophecies, by the great Anglo-Irish conservative and traditionalist whose work was influential in turning Britain against the Revolution.
- Dickens, Charles. *A Tale of Two Cities*. Modern Library paperback. Famous popular novel, often the first book to excite interest in the Revolution; vivid, colorful, and sometimes moving.
- Dowd, David L. *Napoleon: Was He the Heir of the Revolution?* Rinehart Source Problems. A very valuable small collection of documents and extracts from modern historians.

Gershoy, Leo. *The French Revolution, 1789-1799*. Berkshire Studies. Lively and informative on the actual events of the Revolution, but the author does not attempt much analysis in this book.

Gershoy, Leo. *The Era of the French Revolution: Ten Years That Shook the World*. Anvil. Later thoughts by the same author, bolstered by documents.

Lefebvre, Georges. *The Coming of the French Revolution*. Vintage. Probably the best of all analyses of the forces that brought on the French Revolution. Fair-minded, accurate, and comprehensive.

Ludwig, Emil. *Napoleon*. Pocket Books. One of this prolific biographer's better works, but still needs to be supplemented by other, more analytical works.

Tocqueville, Alexis de. *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*. Anchor. One of the best accounts available of the fall of the old regime and its weaknesses, as observed by a liberal aristocrat who admired many features of democracy as he found it in America.

CASEBOUND BOOKS

Brinton, Crane. *A Decade of Revolution*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1934. Full and interesting account of the Revolution, including the era of the Directory.

Brinton, Crane. *The Lives of Talleyrand*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1936. Interesting, often amusing and ironical account of the metamorphoses of Napoleon's leading diplomat.

Braun, Geoffrey. *Europe and the French Imperium*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1938. Another good volume in the Rise of Modern Europe series, covering the Napoleonic Empire. Espe-

cially good on the influence of the Revolution in Europe.

Carlyle, Thomas. *The French Revolution*. Modern Library Giant. Monumental romantic account, to be treated with caution as history, but of great interest in itself.

Geyl, Pieter. *Napoleon: For and Against*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949. Extremely interesting study by a Dutchman of what French historians have thought about Napoleon since the battle of Waterloo.

Hyslop, Beatrice. *French Nationalism in 1789 According to the General Cahiers*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1934. A famous monograph of considerable general interest, containing information drawn from the lists of grievances made up for the benefit of the king and the States-General.

Paine, Thomas. *The Rights of Man*. Modern Library Giant. An answer to Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France*.


Palmer, Robert R. *The Age of the Democratic Revolution, 1760-1800*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959. Excellent new study of all the revolutions of this period, including the ferment of ideas that lay behind them.

Thompson, James M. *The French Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945. Well-written and full account of the Revolution, concluding with the year 1795.

Thompson, James M. *Napoleon Bonaparte*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1952. The most comprehensive of recent biographies, informative and accurate, with sound judgments, by the greatest English scholar of the period.

Tolstoy, Leo. *War and Peace*. Classic novel (available in many editions) of enormous size and scope, suggesting Napoleon's irresponsibility and denigrating his military genius. Presents a powerful picture of the invasion of Russia.

VI ♦ THE NINETEENTH CENTURY



The Rocket, famous locomotive constructed in England by George Stephenson in 1830.

Chronological Chart

IMPORTANT EVENTS 1815-1914

Congress of Vienna	1814-1815
Greek War of Independence	1821-1829
Decembrist uprising in Russia	1825
July Revolution in France (revolutions in Belgium and Poland)	1830
First Reform Bill in England	1832
Abolition of slavery in British Empire	1833
Organization of <i>Zollverein</i>	1834
First Opium War in China	1839-1840
Repeal of Corn Laws (free trade) in England	1846
United States-Mexican War	1846-1848
Year of Revolutions	1848-1849
Refusal of German crown by Frederick William IV	1849
Napoleon III becomes emperor of France	1852
Crimean War	1853-1856
Visit of Commodore Perry to Japan	1853-1854
Franco-Italian war with Austria	1859
Proclamation of kingdom of Italy	1861
United States Civil War	1861-1865
Emancipation of Russian serfs	1861
Austro-Prussian (Seven Weeks') War	1866
Second Reform Bill in England	1867
British North America Act (Dominion of Canada)	1867
Opening of Suez Canal	1869
Franco-Prussian War	1870-1871
Unification of Italy	1870
Unification of Germany	1871
Paris Commune	1871
Constitutional laws of the Third Republic (France)	1875
Russo-Turkish War	1877-1878
Congress of Berlin	1878
British occupation of Egypt	1882
French protectorate in Indo-China	1883
Dismissal of Bismarck	1890
Battle of Adowa—Italian defeat by Abyssinians	1896
Fashoda Crisis	1898
Spanish-American War	1898
Boer War	1899-1902
Boxer Rebellion in China	1900-1901
<i>Entente Cordiale</i>	1904
Russo-Japanese War	1904-1905
First Russian Revolution	1905
Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria	1908
Young Turk revolution	1908
Rejection of Lloyd George budget by House of Lords	1909
Parliament Act—Reform of House of Lords	1911
First Balkan War	1912-1913
Murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand	1914 (June)
Beginning of World War I	1914 (July-Aug.)

Introduction: Nationalism, Liberalism, Democracy

Since Europe as a whole entered the industrial age during the nineteenth century, the reader should recognize that underlying all the events of the period is the Industrial Revolution, which had begun at least as early as the middle of the eighteenth century, if not earlier, but which did not get into its stride until the middle of the nineteenth. All phases of the Industrial Revolution will be treated in Chapter 18, and an understanding of this material will be taken for granted throughout the remainder of the book. The Industrial Revolution has by no means yet run its course. Although the major Western nations now have mature economies, the other nations of the world are still in the process of absorbing the industrial "gifts" of the West. Many of their economies are in a relatively primitive stage, and the revolutionary potentialities of industrialism are only now beginning to be realized. Some aspects of this world movement will be considered in the last chapter of Part VI, devoted to the expansion of Europe.

♦ Nationalism

In Chapter 17 we shall consider nineteenth-century nationalism. We have already spoken of nationalism as a kind of substitute religion, and we may define it in general terms as the emotional identification of the individual with his nation and his fellow nationals. It is a serious

question whether nationalism is a natural emotion or is artificially induced. The desire to feel oneself as part of a community is surely a natural one, and stems from the natural *esprit de corps* of a family. But it is disputable whether the transfer of such a sense of identification to the larger unit of the modern nation-state is a natural and necessary one. When a man begins to feel that his compatriot, whatever his personal characteristics, is someone whom he is bound to defend against any foreigner, however sympathetic the latter may be as a person—when he comes to regard the culture of his own country as superior to that of any foreigner, he ceases to be able to look upon his own culture dispassionately and objectively, and the stage is set for irrational and nationalistic action. Nationalistic emotions are all too easy to arouse. It may be necessary to arouse them when there is a war to be waged against the foreigner; but it is doubtful whether they are helpful in the construction of a world community in which peace and not war is to be the order of the day. It may be, however, that nationalism is a necessary phase through which a nation must pass before any serious thought can be given to the formation of a larger community, based on a less exclusive and divisive loyalty.

NATIONALISM IN THE ANCIENT WORLD

Nationalism is not new in history, although it has taken different forms in different epochs.

Various types of political units have called forth the sense of identification of which we have spoken. The ancient Egyptians regarded the Babylonians as unfortunate because they did not have a divine personage to rule them, and because they had rain instead of an inundation to water their land. The Egyptians did not hesitate to speak of Asiatics as "miserable" because the gods had not favored them as they had favored the Egyptians. The ancient Hebrews looked down upon other peoples for a similar reason. God had revealed himself to the Hebrews, but not to foreign idol-worshippers. God had chosen them alone, of all the peoples of the earth, and had given them special tasks and special responsibilities. The Greek city-states had been fiercely patriotic, regarding their own way of life as the only one suitable for men. The Persians, in the Greek view, were barbarians, with an imperial government suitable only for people who were of a slavish disposition.

With the Romans, a subtle change took place in ancient nationalism. Roman civilization, in the view of thinking Romans, was superior to that of others, and the Romans themselves were of higher moral caliber than their opponents. But they were willing to share their civilization with others. Only those beyond the pale of that civilization, with its common citizenship and common law, were barbarians. They were barbarians not because they were not Roman but because they were not civilized. So, with the Romans, the political unit became much larger than the nation; and there was no reason, in principle, why all the peoples of the earth should not have become Roman citizens by the simple process of accepting Roman civilization and the law and order that accompanied it. There is little evidence of Italian nationalism in the Roman Empire; before its first century was over, non-Italians had already held the position of Roman emperor.

BEGINNINGS OF NATIONALISM IN WESTERN EUROPE

The Christian Church grew up in the shadow of the Roman Empire. It too was a universal institution, aspiring to convert all the peoples of the earth. No one, in principle, was

outside the pale. This ideal persisted into the Middle Ages. Though the Christians fought the Muslims under the banner of their religion, it was in no sense a national war that they fought—although the Christians without doubt identified themselves with their fellow-Christians in opposition to the non-Christian enemy. But in the later Middle Ages the sense of nationality for the first time becomes visible in Western civilization, side by side with the universalist ideal implicit in Christianity. Joan of Arc appealed to all true Frenchmen to unite to drive out the foreign English. It no longer seemed natural that an English king should rule parts of France. In the Elizabethan Age in England, the fires of patriotism were aroused in the wars against Spain, especially when England was endangered by the Spanish Armada. A patriotic spirit breathes through all the plays of Shakespeare. In the same period the Portuguese were compelled to submit to rule by the Spanish monarchy. They regarded this rule as foreign, and therefore intolerable. Holland also discovered her nationality when compelled to fight a war of independence against the Spaniards.

In all these instances a common factor may be discerned. The sense of nationality was aroused through a war, and it served as a cohesive element to draw the people together in face of a common enemy, who could be considered foreign and who was usually possessed of dangerously superior resources. Nationalism could therefore be thought of as a potent, if not too secret, weapon. Charles VII and Joan of Arc were manifestly inferior in arms and manpower to the English and Burgundians. Elizabeth fought against the greatest land power in Europe, with little but her small navy and her fortitude to defend her. If England had been successfully invaded, she would almost certainly have been defeated. The Portuguese and the Dutch had the same great enemy to contend with. Poland, until the late eighteenth century, did not find it at all strange to choose her ruler from among foreign princes. But when the country was rudely partitioned toward the end of the eighteenth century, the Poles discovered a national identity and engaged in one of the most potent independence movements of the last two centuries.

ANTINATIONALIST TENDENCIES IN EARLY
MODERN TIMES

Against these examples of small countries which gained a sense of nationality from their defensive wars should be placed the European examples of countries which had no pronounced sense of nationality by the end of the eighteenth century. After the late medieval unification of most of modern France, the sense of nationality seems to have become weaker. Louis XIV was more of a dynast than a French nationalist. He was interested in extending his power and the power of his family, especially against the great Hapsburg family in Central Europe. He fought the most costly of his wars for the purpose of winning the throne of Spain for a member of his family, in competition with a Hapsburg candidate. The war did not, and was not expected to, serve the national interests of France. French culture, it is true, had spread all over Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But there was no French cultural imperialism. French culture had been freely accepted, but it had not been spread, as in modern times, by governmental or national agencies.

Austria was a multinational, multiracial empire ruled by the Hapsburgs. In Germany there were ancestral memories of a German nation, but the territory of Germany was split up into hundreds of small princedoms, some of them little larger than an ancient city-state. The territories of the king of Prussia were not even contiguous. He ruled areas in western Germany which had nothing in common with the old margraviate of Brandenburg-Prussia but their language. The territories had been won in warfare, or inherited by the Hohenzollern monarch and his noble predecessors. Moreover, the language was shared with Austria and other lands ruled by the Hapsburg emperor.

Italy likewise was made up of small states, almost all ruled by foreigners. Their rule was resented, not because they were foreigners, but because too few of them were enlightened. There was still a lively tradition of urban civic patriotism in Italy, and the individual cities possessed much freedom even when they were part of a larger state ruled by a foreign prince. But there

had always been many Italians, from Dante onward, who had cherished the ideal of Italian national unity. This ideal had never wholly died in spite of the fact that the actual political condition of Italy did not encourage the hope that it would ever be realized. Lastly, it may be said that the Russian intelligentsia in the eighteenth century was notably anti-Russian. They regarded their native country as barbarous and uncivilized in comparison with France. Many of them refused to speak their native tongue.

At the end of the eighteenth century it would therefore have been by no means obvious to an outside observer that it was the destiny of Europe to be split into national states, with boundaries decided on a linguistic and cultural basis. Indeed, such an eventuality would have seemed wildly improbable in view of the polyglot nature of the majority of European states. It took the French Revolution and the wars of Napoleon to give a new impetus to nationalism, thus once again illustrating the truth that the experience of fighting against a common enemy who could be regarded as an oppressor is the greatest spur to nationalism.

EFFECT OF NAPOLEONIC WARS ON
NATIONALISM

If the professional armies of the Hapsburg, Hohenzollern, and other rulers had been merely defeated in battle by superior forces, and the rulers had then made their peace with Napoleon on the basis of some concession of territory, there might have been no nationalistic aftermath. The war would have differed in no essential respect from earlier wars. But these armies were defeated by a conscript army of men who were themselves imbued with revolutionary and patriotic ardor; and Napoleon had no intention of making the same kind of peace as his predecessors. On the contrary, he proposed to make radical changes in the map of Europe. He created a new kingdom from the western territories of Prussia, which he gave to one of his brothers. He replaced the legitimate king of Spain by another brother; a third brother became for a time the king of Holland. Napoleon imposed terms on the other monarchs, rather

than negotiating with them. Thus he humiliated his enemies while he defeated them, arousing in many of the peoples of the conquered countries the feeling that they, too, as well as their rulers, had been humiliated. The triumphal entry of Napoleon into Berlin, and his subsequent imposition of a harsh treaty by which Prussia lost almost half her territories, provided a fertile soil for the growth of Prussian national feeling, even though Prussia herself was not a nation but a disconnected group of states. Prussian intellectuals and patriots were able to play upon this feeling of collective humiliation and arouse hatred against France as the enemy of all Prussians—a hatred that became noticeable in the later stages of the war with Napoleon, and in the attitude of Prussian leaders during the peace settlement at the Congress of Vienna. Furthermore, Prussia was able, in the last years of the war, to impose conscription on her people.

Diplomats at the Congress of Vienna, however, were inclined to disregard the growth of nationalism, perhaps believing that it would die down once a general peace settlement had been negotiated. On this assumption they made no attempt to take nationalism into account in the negotiations, for which the Congress has been much criticized by subsequent writers who have, in the light of hindsight, regarded the growth of nationalism as natural and inevitable. The Congress instead proceeded to reward and compensate the various rulers with alien territories, as had been the practice in past centuries. Events proved them to have been sadly mistaken. Throughout the century nationalist movements thrived, most of them nourished by a common resistance to foreign rule. Greeks and Serbs, who had always resented their position of inferiority, which was in part due to the religious differences between themselves and their masters in the Turkish Empire, used the new nationalism as a weapon to win their independence. Their example was followed by all the other Christian peoples in the empire. In the twentieth century the non-Turkish Arabs took the same path. In Latin America, resentment against absentee rule by Spain gave birth to independence movements. Spanish rule, which had been endured for several centuries, suddenly began to seem intolerable to the Creole leaders. Even

though the actual nations which resulted from the break with Spain were as much the result of chance and the abilities of different leaders as of any incipient nationalism on the continent, the impetus toward "liberation" was provided by the antforeign feeling aroused by the liberators.

The subject peoples of the Hapsburg empire at first demanded only the right to have their own national culture recognized and to be given some share in the governing of their own territories. In face of the opposition of the Hapsburgs, their demands increased, and they showed themselves willing to fight for their nationhood. Catholic Belgium, ruled for centuries by Hapsburgs, Spanish or Austrian, found it intolerable in the nineteenth century to be forced under the rule of the Calvinist Dutch, and broke away into independence at the first possible moment.

❖ **Liberalism: bourgeois and democratic**

Nationalism was not, however, the only impulse behind the European independence movement. Though liberal opinions were noticeably scarce in many of the countries which sought independence, in others there was a marked influence of what, for want of a better word, may be called liberalism. The word, with its Latin root of *liber* (=free) included both freedom from foreign domination and freedom from the despotic rule even of indigenous rulers. In its latter aspect liberalism stemmed from the American and French Revolutions rather than from the Napoleonic wars themselves, although the wars, as we have seen, tended to spread liberal ideas outside their country of origin. The French Revolution had overthrown an absolute monarchy; the American Revolution had asserted the right of a people to rule itself through representative institutions, as well as to free itself from the supposed tyranny of George III and the English. On the whole, liberals everywhere approved of the efforts of suppressed peoples to throw off the yoke of their masters, and during the course of the century they gave much aid and comfort to the peoples struggling for their independence. But in their domestic aims a distinction should be made between the

middle-class liberals and the lower-class liberals, who had quite different programs of reform, as they had in most respects different interests to serve.

The middle-class liberals, represented by the Whigs and later the Liberal party in England, were mostly drawn from the professional and commercial classes. They objected to governmental interference with trade, and favored keeping restrictions on free trade to a minimum. Such men wished to play their full part in government and resented rule by traditional authorities, whether Church, nobility, or monarchy. In short, what they wanted was constitutional government, such as had by the beginning of the nineteenth century come into existence in the United States and Great Britain. But they were in no sense favorable to the aspirations of the lower classes, rural or urban. The means by which they proposed to establish their own supremacy was the propertied franchise, which would automatically prevent the lower classes, who held little or no property, from having any effective influence in the representative institutions that the middle classes hoped to extract from the monarchy.

We therefore propose to make a distinction between the "democratic" movement and the liberal movement in the nineteenth century. The democrats believed in universal manhood suffrage and rule by the entire people through their representatives. Since they were in a majority in the state, the granting of universal suffrage would give them an opportunity to rule through representatives acceptable to themselves. The democratic movement was represented in England by some of the Radicals, then by the Chartists. It finally found its means of political expression in the Labor party. In France the situation was more complicated, as we shall see, since the peasants tended to vote conservatively, thus separating themselves from the more radical but less numerous urban workers. The democratic movement began to make headway in England after the middle of the nineteenth century, and in the United States during the presidency of Andrew Jackson (1829-1837), a backwoods general from Tennessee. In France,

and elsewhere in Europe, democracy moved forward rapidly only toward the end of the century.

Where the middle class was small, it was difficult to wrest even small constitutional advances from the monarchy; but, even so, constitutions were granted before the end of the century in every state but Russia. All gave the middle classes some substantial share in the government. It should be noted, however, that there was no necessary connection between constitutional middle-class government and the winning of independence. Most of the nations that won independence exchanged a foreign for an indigenous despotism. In these countries constitutional government followed the later development of a middle class. If, as in Belgium, the middle class was already substantial, no problem was involved. Parliamentary institutions were established immediately. On the other hand, in Latin America it was several generations before any liberal advances were made, and dictatorship based on the army was everywhere the rule.

The first three chapters on the nineteenth century should be read as a whole. The material in each of these chapters has a bearing on that of the others, and any particular arrangement is necessarily arbitrary. The Industrial Revolution, however, has perhaps a greater connection with the growth of liberalism and democracy than it has with nationalism; and it is in the democratic countries that its earlier phases took place. We shall therefore devote Chapter 17 to the progress of nationalism in the nineteenth century, and follow this with an account of the Industrial Revolution, including its effects upon social thought, in Chapter 18. We shall return to the growth of liberalism and democracy in Chapter 19. This chapter will be followed by a chapter on nineteenth-century culture as a whole, and Part VI will then be brought to a conclusion by a discussion of colonial expansion on the part of the nations whose domestic progress we shall by that time have considered. Part VII, devoted to the twentieth century, will begin with a discussion of the immediate background of the World War I, whose antecedents lie within the century of comparative peace that preceded it.

Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century

❖ The peace settlements

TREATY OF PARIS (1814)


When Napoleon abdicated for the first time in April, 1814 the first concern of the victorious coalition was to settle the immediate future. France had been defeated, but she was still dangerous; moreover, the coalition powers were at odds among themselves on every point except their opposition to French imperialism. Before a permanent peace settlement could be made which would restore some measure of stability to Europe and liquidate the ephemeral arrangements of Napoleon, it was clearly necessary to arrange for some form of government for France. Although some European leaders were willing to see Napoleon's son on the throne, provided France were otherwise prevented from disturbing the peace and returning to her imperial dream, it was quickly recognized that the best chance for a stable regime was the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in the person of the brother of the late king Louis XVI. But it was also recognized that a harsh peace would alienate the French middle classes as well as the more radical elements, and the new king Louis XVIII would at once be associated with defeat and humiliation.

Very sensibly, therefore, the powers quickly made a peace that was acceptable to the great majority of articulate Frenchmen, and Louis himself granted a charter which converted him into a constitutional monarch with two legislative bodies, as in England—a Chamber of Depu-

ties and a House of Peers, the former elected by a restricted property franchise and the latter hereditary. The peace allowed the French to keep Belgium, and imposed no indemnity, though the other conquests of Napoleon were naturally taken from France, as indeed the French expected. Even a Napoleonic marshal, who had been made king of Naples by Napoleon, was allowed to keep his throne. These matters having been settled in a treaty signed at Paris in May, 1814, representatives of various European powers congregated at Vienna to decide the future of the rest of Europe.

CONGRESS OF VIENNA (1814-1815)

The first phase, to the escape of Napoleon from Elba Although the French representative, Talleyrand, was initially slighted at the Congress of Vienna, it was soon found impossible for the other powers to act without at least the concurrence of France; and since Talleyrand was an extremely talented and experienced diplomat who had already served Napoleon in that capacity, he was in fact able to exercise a very considerable influence in the Congress, shrewdly offering expedients which divided his recent adversaries. Though it is too much to say that he dominated the Congress—which was attended by such powerful figures as Alexander I of Russia; Clemenz von Metternich, the conservative foreign minister of Austria; and Lord Castlereagh, the foreign minister of Britain—the last two of whom had very definite ideas of what they wished to see emerge from the Congress—



Congress of Vienna as painted by the French portrait painter Isabey. Metternich is addressing the assembly. (COURTESY BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE, PARIS)

Talleyrand proved the most fertile in ideas and had the greatest understanding of his opponents. In consequence, he was never without support for his views, which, as an experienced diplomat, he advanced in quarters where he believed they would do most good. He was thus often able to have them accepted as the policy of the Congress.

Before Napoleon escaped from Elba the Congress was able to come to certain agreements. The consensus among all the plenipotentiaries was that the recent wars had been caused by the liberal ideas of the French Revolution, which had profoundly disturbed previously accepted monarchical institutions. It was not believed that these revolutionary ideas represented any "wave of the future"; rather, it was thought that the peoples now would settle down again under the regimes to which they were accustomed. Perhaps the absolute hereditary monarchy would show itself more enlightened than

it had been in the eighteenth century; because Louis XVI had fallen into bankruptcy, it was not necessarily true that the absolute monarchy as an institution had failed irrevocably, and must be replaced. The notion that sovereignty rests with the people had been propounded by some political thinkers; others had disagreed with them, and the notion was not necessarily true. The French Revolution had led, probably inevitably, to Napoleon, as Burke had predicted; the true enemy was therefore revolution, to which the proper answer was the strengthening of the monarchy, not its abandonment.

Noting that these were the ideas held and the explanation given for the twenty-five years of revolutionary change in Europe, and perfectly well aware that such ideas were a convenient rationalization for the desire of the distinguished plenipotentiaries to return to the old order which had served them so well in the past, Talleyrand played with considerable virtuosity

on the hopes and fears of the Congress for the purpose of obtaining a mild peace. He was quite willing to throw the blame for recent disorders on the French Revolution and on the imperial ambitions of Napoleon, and in the process to absolve the French people from complicity. There had, of course, been a few firebrands, but most of these had met their just end on the guillotine. Before Napoleon came to power, the reaction in France had already set in; but Napoleon had skillfully played upon the desire of the French people for glory, and had compelled them to follow him against their true interests. The people, Talleyrand assured the Congress, were now willing to accept the Bourbons back. But the French must not be faced with indemnities, loss of territory, and similar punitive measures, or they would always associate Louis XVIII with defeat rather than with the restoration of the legitimate monarch, who was entitled of right to their loyalty.

The principle adopted for the French political settlement, *legitimacy*, was found to be of wider application once Talleyrand had explained it. Not only in France but elsewhere in Europe, if legitimate monarchs who had a hereditary title to their thrones were restored, then the same loyalty that Talleyrand had promised for France ought to be forthcoming. Since this notion fitted admirably the conservative predilections of the aristocratic assemblage at Vienna, it was adopted; and it was decided that all the hereditary rulers expelled by Napoleon and replaced by his brothers should be brought back from their exile, without regard to the personal merit of each. The sole criterion was to be their legitimacy.

The second phase—Hardening of attitude toward France—The territorial settlements But before the details of the settlement had been decided upon, and while the haggling over the boundaries and possessions of each monarchy was still in progress, Napoleon escaped from Elba. The coalition sprang to arms, and in due course the emperor was defeated at Waterloo and exiled to St. Helena, a less attractive and accessible spot than Elba. But his escape, and the welcome he received from the French people, very greatly altered the attitude of the Congress

toward France, and its readiness to listen to the dulcet tones of Talleyrand. France indeed became a "guilty" nation; and although Talleyrand was able to prevent the harsh peace demanded, in particular, by the Prussians, the terms were more severe than those previously agreed upon. The Prussians, indeed, by virtue of their recent efforts at Waterloo, exercised far more influence at the renewed meetings of the Congress than they had in 1814; and Prussia was especially bitter against France. France lost Belgium—as Britain had been trying to insist she should in the earlier negotiations—and her Rhine frontier. She had to submit to a fairly heavy indemnity, and to an occupation army until the indemnity was paid. She even had to restore the works of art pilfered by Napoleon from Italy, which a sympathetic Congress, in which Italy had little influence, had been willing for her to keep. She was, in short, reduced to the frontiers of 1792 before the outbreak of war.

It is sometimes said that the second principle adopted by the Congress was the principle of *compensation*. Though it is true that when a Congress power gave up territory or claims previously held, it was in general compensated by gains elsewhere, such had always been the practice in any European peace treaty. At the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, for example, Austria received the Spanish Netherlands in exchange for relinquishing her claim to the Spanish throne. The Congress of Vienna was compelled to redraw the map of Europe in some manner, since the eggs had been scrambled by Napoleon. The particular territorial settlement that it chose stemmed from the negotiators' intention to restore the balance of power, as far as this could be negotiated. The Congress paid no attention to the wishes of the people, whom it did not feel called upon to consult, even if it had been possible to consult them. It made no concessions to the rising nationalism of the times. The settlement, in short, was based upon eighteenth-century notions, because it was believed that these standards and principles had not yet outlived their usefulness. The Congress of Vienna succeeded in obtaining a peace without major wars for a century, and with fewer minor wars than in any other century in the history of Western man. Though some of these wars,



notably those for the independence of Italy, may be directly attributed to the Vienna settlement and to the award of northern Italy to Austria, no alternative Italian government was available in 1815, nor did one seem to be in prospect. The Holy Roman emperor had ruled much of this area for centuries.

The settlement granted Lombardy and Venetia to Austria, Poland and Finland to the Russian tsar as personal possessions, and Belgium to the new kingdom of Holland, ruled by a member of the Orange family, formerly hereditary stadtholders of that country. The hereditary monarchs of Spain and Portugal were restored to their thrones; the kingdom of Naples, held until 1815, as noted earlier, by a Napoleonic marshal (who lost his kingdom and his life for supporting Napoleon after his escape from Elba), was given to the hereditary monarch of Sicily, whose kingdom was now called the Two Sicilies. The pope received back the Papal States. The German Confederation of the Rhine, set up by Napoleon, was broken up, and Prussia restored to her prewar boundaries with a few additions. But all the German states, in-

cluding Prussia, were brought into a new federation dominated by Austria, which was also a member. This federation, however, though useful for certain limited purposes, was unable to act effectively, since each state had a veto. Finally the British, as usual, added to their colonial empire, taking Ceylon and the Cape of Good Hope from the Dutch, and various islands in the West Indies from both France and Spain. Britain also obtained Malta, taken earlier in the war, and the Ionian Islands off the Greek coast. The war left Britain as the undisputed ruler of by far the largest colonial empire in the world, since, as we shall see, the Spanish colonies were well on the road to independence in 1815.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR ENFORCEMENT—THE HOLY ALLIANCE AND THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

Tsar Alexander, who had recently fallen under the influence of an extremely pious woman, the Baroness Krudener, and who wished to emphasize the religious nature of the peace he was sponsoring, proposed an alliance be-

Chronological Chart

Congress of Vienna	1815	Full establishment of <i>Zollverein</i>	1834
Proclamation of independence of United Principalities of Argentina	1816	Proclamation of <i>Statuto</i> by Charles Albert of Piedmont	1848 (Mar.)
Proclamation of independence of Paraguay and Chile	1818	First Italian War of Inde- pendence against Austria	1848-1849
Bolívar becomes president of Great Colombia	1818	Beginning of Frankfurt Assembly	1848 (May)
Beginning of the German <i>Zollverein</i>	1819	Flight of Metternich and beginning of Hungarian Revolution	1848 (Mar.)
Revolution in Spain, later suppressed by French	1820	First Pan-Slav Congress in Prague	1848 (June)
Revolution in Naples, suppressed by Austrians	1820	Abdication of Emperor Ferdinand I of Austria	1848 (Dec.)
Proclamation of Mexican independence	1821	Proclamation of independence of Hungary	1849 (Apr.)
Proclamation of independence of Peru by San Martín	1821	Refusal of German crown by Frederick William IV	1849 (Apr.)
Greek War of Independence	1821-1829	Suppression of Hungarian revolution by Russians	1849 (June-Aug.)
Congress of Verona	1822	"Humiliation of Olmutz"	1849 (Nov.)
Independence of Brazil under Pedro I as emperor	1822	Cavour becomes prime minister of Piedmont	1852
Iturbide becomes emperor of Mexico	1822	Crimean War	1853-1856
Establishment of Republic of Mexico	1824	Formation of United Provinces of Moldavia-Wallachia	1858
Proclamation of United Prov- inces of Central America	1824	Franco-Italian War with Austria	1859
Decembrist uprising in Russia	1825	Sicilian expedition of Garibaldi	1860
Battle of Navarino—defeat of Turks by Greeks and allies	1827	Proclamation of kingdom of Italy	1861
Independence of Uruguay	1828	Emancipation of Russian serfs	1861
Serbian autonomy granted by Turks	1829	Second Polish Revolution	1863-1864
Creation of Republic of Ecuador	1830	Schleswig-Holstein War	1863-1864
July Revolution in France	1830 (July)	Austro-Prussian (Seven Weeks') War	1866
Belgian rebellion against Holland	1830 (Aug.)	Cession of Venetia to Italy	1866
Polish revolt—suppressed by Tsar Nicholas I	1830-1831	Formation of North German Confederation	1867
Assassination of Capo d'Istria of Greece	1831	Formation of Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary	1867
Founding of Young Italy by Mazzini	1831	Opening of Suez Canal	1869
		Annexation of Rome by Italy	1870
		Franco-Prussian War	1870-1871

Proclamation of William I as German emperor	1871	Murder of Tsar Alexander II of Russia	1881
Russo-Turkish War	1875-1878	Carol I, prince of Rumania, becomes king	1881
Proclamation of Turkish constitution by Abdul Hamid II	1876	Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg becomes king of Bulgaria	1887
Treaty of San Stefano between Russia and Turkey	1878	Dismissal of Bismarck by Kaiser William II	1890
Congress of Berlin—recognition of independence of Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania, and a small Bulgaria	1878	Revival and growth of Young Turk movement	1896-1908
		Russo-Japanese War	1904-1905
		Deposition of Sultan Abdul Hamid II	1908

tween the monarchs of Europe, to be called the Holy Alliance, under which they were to promise to uphold Christian principles of peace and good will. Even the Muslim sultan of Turkey was asked to join, but neither he nor the British did so. The British, however, agreed to enter a rather more mundane alliance, known initially as the Quintuple Alliance (Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, Russia), to maintain the peace settlement; but, as customary, they reserved the right to determine whether their own interests were sufficiently endangered by any breach of the peace that occurred. In due course the British withdrew from the alliance, which thereafter was called the Quadruple Alliance. The Congress was far from unconcerned with enforcing the peace it had imposed. Provision was made for the calling of new congresses for mutual consultation in the event of a disturbance of the peace. The powers who agreed to act on behalf of the Congress gradually came to be known as the Concert of Europe.

As in our own day, the powers were greatly interested in the determination of exactly what constituted aggression and called for intervention by the Concert. When the Spanish and Neapolitan peoples rose against their unenlightened monarchs and compelled them to grant constitutions, a congress was called at Troppau to consider the situation (1820). Tsar Alexander and Metternich (now Prince Metternich) decided that internal revolutions called for intervention by the powers on the grounds that they were likely to lead, as had the French Revolu-

tion, to international war and the disturbance of the general peace of Europe. France and Britain would not accept the intervention proposed at Troppau, which was intended to restore the Bourbon monarch in Naples. The intervention was therefore carried out by Austria. In 1822, however, France was authorized to intervene in Spain to bolster the Spanish monarchy. The move was successful, and the Bourbon monarchy in Spain withdrew the constitution and instituted a regime of oppression.

GRADUAL BREAKDOWN OF THE VIENNA SETTLEMENTS TO 1848

In the 1820's Greece revolted against the Ottoman Empire. The sultan, of course, was a legitimate monarch, and might perhaps have claimed to be covered by the Vienna decisions. But the British were interested in weakening the power of the sultan as were the French. They therefore gave some aid to the Greeks, who succeeded in winning their independence and having it recognized. France herself, occasionally a champion of the principles of Vienna, was the scene of a revolution against Charles X, the last Bourbon to occupy the French throne (1830). The revolutionary movement spread, following the French example. Austria had to meet uprisings in her Italian territories and could take no active steps to preserve the system elsewhere. Russia wished to intervene in Belgium, but was unable to do so; the new tsar Nicholas I was, however, successful in suppress-

ing a serious revolt in his own territory of Poland. Thus in 1830 neither Austria, jestingly referred to as the "fire brigade of Europe," nor the Romanov autocrat in St. Petersburg, was able to intervene effectively to maintain the Vienna settlement which they had sponsored, and for whose enforcement they were primarily responsible.

In 1847-1848, when a new round of revolutions began, again sparked by France, Metternich himself was toppled from his position and forced into exile. Only Russia was able to intervene effectively on that occasion, restoring Hungary to the Austrian monarchy by suppressing the revolts in that country. Thus fortified, Austria was able to return to her absolutist traditions and suppress the other riots against her rule, both at home and in Italy. But the system was dead. Russia could not be accepted alone as the arbiter of Europe. Indeed, later in the century Russian interference in Europe was responsible for the only international war of substance fought during the century. Under the Treaty of Paris, which closed the Crimean War in 1856, the "Metternich system" was finally laid to rest in a Europe which was in full political evolution, and in which two new national states, Germany and Italy, were soon to emerge. All these events will be dealt with in more detail in the remainder of this chapter and in Chapter 19.

♦ The achievement of national independence by subject states

In the rest of this chapter we shall first consider the countries which were able to achieve national independence from their former rulers, giving also, where necessary, a brief description of the development of the countries from whose rule they escaped. This section will be followed by a description of Germany and Italy, the two major states which unified themselves during the course of the century. The chapter will conclude with an account of the countries where the independence movements of minorities failed to achieve their goals, and the limited successes gained by them will be evaluated.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF BELGIUM FROM HOLLAND

The Congress of Vienna, as already noted, awarded the former Austrian Netherlands to Holland, which was converted into a kingdom, ruled by William I of Orange. The union was desirable from an economic point of view to the peoples concerned, since Belgium possessed more industry than Holland, which, in turn, had a well-developed agriculture and an important merchant marine. Indeed, the economies of the two countries are still so complementary that modern Belgium and Holland established a customs union with the Duchy of Luxembourg after World War II, and have taken the lead in all efforts to set up a European common market. There were, however, serious linguistic and religious differences between the Belgians and the Dutch, the Belgians being more influenced by French culture, many of them having French as their first language, whereas the Dutch were more influenced by German culture. Even those Belgians who spoke Flemish as their first language were anxious to keep it distinct from Dutch, in spite of its similarity to the Dutch language. But, most serious of all, the great majority of Belgians were Catholics, and had indeed preferred to remain under Spanish rule at the end of the sixteenth century rather than merge with the Calvinist Dutch.

When, therefore, William I insisted on appointing Dutchmen to high office in Belgium, and tried to impose Dutch as the official language of the kingdom, the Belgians asked for regional autonomy. When this was refused, and William began to crush the incipient revolt, the Belgians in 1830 proclaimed their independence. Although Nicholas I of Russia was anxious to uphold William by force, no one else supported him, and the Belgians were allowed to keep their independence under a constitutional monarchy. They chose as king Leopold I of Saxe-Coburg, a minor German prince, who was at the time a British subject. The British and French played an important part in the settlement. The British were satisfied as long as Belgium was not in French hands, and a treaty was arranged by which Belgium should be per-

manently neutral and forbidden to make alliances. In exchange, her territory was declared inviolable and guaranteed by Britain, France, and other powers, including Prussia. It was this "scrap of paper" that was torn up by the Germans when they invaded Belgium in 1914, and thus compelled the British to intervene. The Dutch were unwilling to accept the arrangement for some years, and indeed again invaded Belgium in 1832. But they withdrew in the face of intervention by the British and the French. Thus one more sovereign nation had been added to the number of European states at minimal cost to its inhabitants.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE BALKAN STATES FROM TURKEY

Turkey—sick man of Europe Before coming to the century-long movement which succeeded in dismembering Turkey for the benefit of her Christian minorities and the European powers, a brief account should be given of the nineteenth-century developments in the Turkish (or Ottoman) Empire itself. Throughout the period Turkey was in the process of disintegration. Known as the "sick man of Europe," she still possessed at the beginning of the century extensive territories both in Europe and in Asia and North Africa. The interest of the Western powers in seeing Turkey alive was at least as much commercial as strategic. On the one hand, there was general fear of Russian domination of Turkey, which would disturb the balance of power too greatly in favor of Russia; and, on the other hand, there was a system known as the *capitulations*, under which most of the European powers were granted special trading privileges in Turkey. Turkey was heavily in debt to Western capital; indeed, in the middle of the nineteenth century the state was actually bankrupt, enormous Turkish loans having been floated in Western Europe. She did not even control her own customs duties, which had been granted as security to foreign capital. Throughout the century her European provinces, as we shall see, attained their independence piecemeal, through rebellions often supported by Western powers.

The rulers of Turkey did not stand idly by while this happened. In mid-century, in part under Western inspiration, a serious effort at reform was made. This reform would have granted religious and political equality to the various peoples of the empire. But few of the sultan's Christian subjects desired any such goal. They wished to follow Greece and Serbia into full autonomy and eventual independence. Nor did the Turkish religious leaders approve of the reform, which would have cost Islam its preferred position. Lastly, the European powers were not at all interested in the perpetuation of a reformed Ottoman Empire. It was much more profitable to attempt to carve out ever larger spheres of influence for themselves, and they had no wish to deal with a strong and revitalized empire. The Turkish government, faced with such serried ranks of opponents and the inertia of centuries, soon gave up the unequal struggle.

Nevertheless the reformers fought on, and for a time were able to compel the throne to listen to them. A constitution was granted in 1876. But the new sultan, Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909), after living with the constitution for a year, decided to abrogate it. He then instituted a regime of reaction and suppression unequalled even in Russia. The remnant of the reformers, most of whom were compelled to live in exile, nevertheless continued their movement, and they became known as the Young Turks. Their program was now both liberal and nationalist. They were determined to make Turkey into a modern nation, which would retain as many of its minorities as it could. As a secular state, it could survive if the Christians within its borders could only be persuaded to accept it. But the Christians desired nothing but to be free from the Turks altogether.

The Young Turks, who had gained much influence in the army, fomented a successful revolution in 1908, and compelled the uncooperative sultan to abdicate a year later. Thereafter they controlled the government, but the rebellions with which they were faced soon modified their liberalism. Nevertheless, the secular state achieved by Turkey after World War I under Mustapha Kemal was an outgrowth of their work.

The achievement of Greek independence Greece was the first to obtain her freedom from Turkey. All the Balkan states which were under Turkish rule had for centuries been governed by the Greeks in Turkish employ, who were called Phanariots. These men, as a rule, were detested by the subject peoples even more than the Turks themselves. Nevertheless, the original leader of the Greek revolt was a Phanariot named Alexander Ypsilanti, whose father had been driven into exile by the Turks and who had himself risen to the rank of general in the Russian army, in which country father and son had taken refuge. It was therefore something of a mistake for Alexander Ypsilanti to make his first effort toward attaining independence for the Greeks by trying to arouse disaffection in the provinces which were later to be called Rumania. He had little success, since it was well known that he was a member of the Phanariot ruling class. The Rumanians had no interest in escaping from the Turks only to be ruled by the Greeks, who were just as alien to them, even if they were Christians. Although Tsar Alexander had initially encouraged the revolt of Ypsilanti, at Metternich's suggestion he later disowned it, and it was easily suppressed by the Turks.

Nevertheless the movement was not a total failure, for the Greeks themselves shortly afterward proclaimed the independence of their homeland, and were supported by an overwhelming popular opinion in Europe. Financial contributions and volunteers followed, including the poet Lord Byron. The Greeks chose a president, Johannes Capo d'Istria, and Britain, France, and Russia called on the Turks to grant independence to the Greeks. A joint naval force of these three powers defeated the Turkish navy at the battle of Navarino in 1827, and the Russians sent an army into the peninsula. In 1829 Turkey bowed to the inevitable and allowed Greece to become a self-governing principality, and in 1832 she became fully independent. Capo d'Istria (who was regarded as too pro-Russian) having been assassinated the previous year, and the Greeks being unable to overcome their factionalism and agree upon a successor, a Bavarian prince was chosen as constitutional monarch. The Bavarian was deposed

in 1862, and a Danish prince substituted, who ruled until 1913 as George I of Greece. The present royal family of Greece is descended from him.

Rumania When Turkey recognized the independence of Greece, she was also compelled to recognize Russian interests in the two principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, later to be united in the nation-state of Rumania. Russia had occupied these territories during the Greek War of Independence, and Turkish suzerainty thereafter became purely nominal. The Rumanians in 1848 rose against the oppressive Russian regime, and though the Russians were able to suppress the initial revolt, the Austrians took the provinces during the Crimean War. After the war they were returned to Turkish rather than Russian suzerainty. A German Hohenzollern prince became the ruler of the now united provinces in 1866, under the name of Carol I. At the same time he granted a constitution. In the next Russo-Turkish war (1877-1878), already referred to, Carol joined the Russians and benefited from the Russian victory, his principality becoming a sovereign state at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. His principality became the kingdom of Rumania in 1881.

Serbia Serbia, an ancient kingdom and empire, had been greatly oppressed by the rule of the Turks and the Greek Phanariots, and there had been many efforts to obtain independence in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries. But no effort had met with success, and there was constant internecine war also between the various Serbian families who hoped to rule an independent Serbia. When Greece became independent, a prince named Milosh was recognized as a semi-independent prince by the Turks; but the feuds within the country persisted, which the few remaining Turkish troops made little effort to quell. The last Turkish soldiers left in 1867. After the Serbians had supported the Russians in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 (and, incidentally, been defeated in the fighting they had engaged in themselves), the independence of the country was recognized at the Congress of

Berlin of 1878. In 1882 Prince Milan Obrenovitch became king. In 1889, shortly before his death, he granted a liberal constitution.

Bulgaria Bulgaria, closer to the Turkish center of government, found it more difficult to free herself from Turkish rule than the other states referred to above; but a severe rebellion broke out in 1875, which the Turks repressed with extreme harshness (the "Bulgarian atrocities"), leading to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. Tsar Alexander II, who had intervened on behalf of the Bulgarians, defeated the Turks and, at the Treaty of San Stefano, created a large Bulgaria as an autonomous principality. This new state, however, was unacceptable to the major powers, who recognized her autonomous status while cutting down her territory. In 1881 a German prince was called to the throne. He added another province of Turkey to his domain but was later forced to abdicate, to be succeeded by Ferdinand, a prince of the German house of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. Ferdinand proclaimed full independence from Turkey in 1908 and himself tsar of Bulgaria. In World War I Bulgaria fought on the side of the Central Powers, and was thus an ally of Turkey, her former master.

INDEPENDENCE OF LATIN AMERICA FROM SPAIN, PORTUGAL, AND FRANCE

The Spanish colonies at the beginning of the nineteenth century At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Spanish empire in America stretched from Cape Horn far into the continental United States of the present day. Only Portuguese Brazil and a few unimportant enclaves belonged to the other European powers. Much of this huge empire was still unexplored, and other sections very sparsely developed, but the total population was far greater than that of British North America. The Spanish regime had brought Christian culture to Latin America, and the Church in earlier centuries had been an important civilizing influence. But the empire reflected the cultural stagnation and general unprogressive outlook of the motherland in recent centuries. The social structure was as rigid

as that of Spain. The Church had become entrenched and monolithic, uninterested in its civilizing mission and extremely wealthy. The large landholders piled up excessive riches, and the Spaniards from the homeland monopolized the top governmental positions in the empire. Moreover, the Spaniards until the late eighteenth century had adopted a mercantilist policy in their colonies, and refused to permit any direct trade with outsiders. Local industries were kept very small, and all imports of major industrial products were channeled through Spain. In the 1760's a Spanish visitor-general for the colonies named José de Galvez had recommended the abandonment of this policy and a series of fundamental reforms. When the king agreed to these reforms, Galvez was given primary responsibility for seeing that they were carried out, a responsibility he took very seriously.

By the end of the century, therefore, some improvements had been made, but the hour was growing late. Many of the Creoles, the native-born aristocracy, were less interested in reforming the existing system than in winning independence from the mother country, which was so much smaller and less populous than her colonies.

Francisco de Miranda, "the precursor"

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Spanish colonies were still ruled by viceroys appointed by the Spanish monarchy. A Venezuelan of pure Spanish (Basque) ancestry, Francisco de Miranda, spent much of his life in Europe trying to win support from every European power for the liberation of the Spanish colonies. He sought support from such diverse personalities as Catherine the Great, the Jacobin leaders in France, and the English prime minister William Pitt. To the latter he even went so far as to promise special trading privileges little short of a monopoly in exchange for support. But circumstances simply did not favor Miranda's mission until the regime of Napoleon. With some slight support from United States sources he was able to mount an expedition in 1806, but it was easily defeated by the Spaniards as soon as they were able to bring sufficient force to bear upon it. He was to know

a brief year of power again from 1811 to 1812, when he was given command of the armed forces of Venezuela, where a general congress had declared the independence of the country in 1811. But after he had capitulated to the Spaniards in July, 1812, he was abandoned by the other revolutionaries, including Simón Bolívar, and ended his days in a Spanish prison. Bolívar was able to profit by his abandonment, or betrayal, of Miranda, since he was permitted by the Spanish authorities to go abroad, where he continued to organize the independence movement. Ultimately he was to succeed in the enterprise in which Miranda "the precursor" had failed.

General characteristics of the independence movements. It should be understood that the liberal ideas of the French Revolution had little direct effect on the leaders of the independence movements in the Spanish colonies, with the possible exception of the two priests who began the Mexican move for independence, Hidalgo and Morelos. The Spanish regime had not been such as to encourage any reading of the French philosophes or any later revolutionary literature. All the leaders of the Latin American movements, other than these two priests, were military men, most of whom, indeed, had had experience in the Spanish armies. Most were either Creoles or mestizos—the former Spanish, or Spanish with some slight admixture of Indian blood, the latter the product of more recent unions between Spaniards and Indians. The almost white Creoles were the aristocracy of Latin America, holders of high office under the Spaniards and contemptuous of the Indians, Negroes, and mestizos. They had taken over all the prejudices of their own masters and were unaffected by liberal notions, firmly convinced that absolute rule was a necessity in their countries. But some of them resented the rule of the all-white Spaniards, not because these were aliens so much as because they regarded themselves as fully the equal of the Spaniards. The Creoles were in no sense an oppressed class, but many of them were ambitious to become the successors of the Spaniards.

The wars of independence were therefore

marked, as the history of Latin America has been almost to this day, by personal feuds between different leaders whose ambitions conflicted; the leader who survived could hope for no loyalty from those whom he had supplanted. They could unite against Spain and obtain support from the Indians and mestizos only as long as they were fighting for independence from Spain. Immediately afterward they quarreled among themselves; indeed, the Spaniards were able to hold on as long as they did precisely because their enemies were so often divided. The Indians and others who supported them in the wars, led on by promises which were invariably unfulfilled, found that victory meant only a change of masters from the Spaniards to the Creoles. It is no accident that the liberal reformers in these countries have almost invariably been Indians rather than Creoles, although the Creoles and the mestizos have often supplied strong autocratic governments, the best of which have also been paternalistic.

The career of Simón Bolívar, "the Liberator" The occasion for the wars of independ-



Simón Bolívar, the Liberator (1733-1830). (COURTESY PRINTS DIVISION, NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY)

ence was provided by the dethronement of Ferdinand VII by Napoleon in 1808. The great majority of the Creoles sympathized with the dethroned monarch, and certainly had no use for the French. They remained loyal to the Spanish crown, and waited for the defeat of Napoleon and the restoration of Ferdinand to his throne. But some of the Creoles had been waiting for the opportunity, and many of them admired Napoleon personally. They formed juntas and recruited troops, and, as we have seen, Miranda and Bolívar had been temporarily successful in Venezuela. By 1813 Bolívar was

back in New Granada (the present Colombia), where he issued a famous manifesto declaring his revolutionary aims. He was accepted as military leader by the junta that had already been established there. Joined by Negroes and mulattoes fired with the promise of liberty, he made a lightning military campaign into Venezuela and captured Caracas at a time when the Spaniards could not afford the troops to defend it. Hailed as "Liberator" by the Venezuelans, who suggested he become their chief, Bolívar allowed himself to be persuaded. But the Spaniards were not yet defeated, and in due



course they drove him out. Escaping by sea to New Granada, he was no more successful there. Most of the territory remained in the hands of the royalists, and the republican leaders were not willing to yield to Bolívar. So he went into exile again, with a considerable reputation but without any effective means of fighting the Spaniards.

At this moment Ferdinand was restored to his throne and at once determined to restore the colonies to their obedience. From this time on, therefore, the Spanish officials and generals in the colonies were no longer compelled to fight only with their own resources. But the repression visited upon the rebels by the Spanish armies sent out by Ferdinand roused anti-Spanish feeling, hitherto not very widespread. When, therefore, Bolívar reappeared on the mainland after almost three years, he found several groups of last-ditch resisters who were determined to drive the Spaniards out. By virtue of his military genius and the force of his personality, Bolívar was able to weld together effective armies, with which he won notable victories. He was finally chosen president of the state of Greater Colombia, which comprised Venezuela and the present Colombia. After an astonishing march over the frigid Andes to take the Spaniards in the rear with the aid of Antonio de Sucre, the one general who was always loyal to him, he took Ecuador and Peru and created the new state of Bolivia. In Peru he met José de San Martín, liberator of the Argentine and Chile, who was engaged at the time in liberating Peru. San Martín, after a brief interview with Bolívar, retired, leaving Peru to his fellow liberator.

Establishment of Colombia and Venezuela

Meanwhile, however, Bolívar had lost much of his support in his home territories of Colombia and Venezuela and had to return to save his position, at the cost of relinquishing Peru and Bolivia to other revolutionaries. He ruled in Colombia and Venezuela for a few years in an autocratic manner, alienating many of his supporters; only with difficulty did he escape an attempted assassination. He remained in office for his appointed term, but refused to be re-elected. Already seriously ill, he went into exile

and died in 1830. Sucre, who was appointed president at Bolívar's request, was assassinated soon afterward. Thereafter Venezuela separated itself from Colombia, and was ruled for many years by one of Bolívar's dissident generals.

Argentina and Chile The other great liberator, José de San Martín, began his drive from Buenos Aires in the Argentine, which had been briefly occupied by the British during the Napoleonic wars. In 1810 a junta was formed which proclaimed the independence of the Argentine, and a drive was made to the north in an attempt to unite as much as possible of the former Spanish territories under one rule. The campaign was taken over in 1814 by José de San Martín, who, though a native Argentine, had been fighting in the Spanish army in Europe. A skilled general, he was granted command of the campaign of liberation by the Argentine junta, and recognized at once that the liberation of the southern half of the continent must be achieved by the west coast rather than directly, as had been attempted by his predecessor.

The revolution had already been proclaimed in Chile, but there was constant strife between the would-be rulers. San Martín was aided in the conquest of Chile by Bernardo O'Higgins, the son of an Irishman who had risen to the position of viceroy of Peru under the Spanish. O'Higgins had been compelled to flee to the Argentine after being defeated by the Spanish in Chile. San Martín refused the governorship of Chile and continued north toward Peru, where he captured Lima; but after his interview with Bolívar, as already noted, he returned southward, leaving Peru to Bolívar. Shortly afterward he resigned his commands and went to live in Europe for the rest of his life. Uninterested in politics, San Martín was the only liberator who would accept no civil position in any of the countries he aided; when he died in 1850, he had outlived all of them but José Antonio Páez, early companion of Bolívar, and first president of Venezuela.

Uruguay and Paraguay Uruguay, under the leadership of José Artigas, proclaimed her independence in 1811, but her future was al-

ways uncertain because the Portuguese from Brazil disputed the small country with Argentina. In 1820 the Portuguese drove Artigas from the country, and for a period they controlled it. But with some aid from the British, the Portuguese and the Argentines finally decided that Uruguay would best serve the interests of all if she were left as a buffer state between Argentina and Brazil.

In Paraguay the revolution was proclaimed in 1811; and once the Argentine drive had been repelled, the country became independent under a strong leader, Gaspar Francia. Paraguay was the only country in South America where one leader was able to establish himself in power without serious competition.

The Spaniards, it may be said, resisted to the last the efforts of the peoples of Latin America to obtain their independence. They gave ground slowly and bitterly; and not until after the decisive defeat at Ayacucho, Peru in 1824 did they give up what had by that time become only a toehold on the continent.

Mexico The other great empire, the viceroyalty of Mexico, was lost by Spain somewhat earlier. The revolution was proclaimed by Miguel Hidalgo in 1810. This parish priest had been deeply distressed by the condition of the poorer classes in Mexico, especially the Indians, and had already tried to institute some reforms in his parish against the opposition of the Spaniards, including his superiors in the Church. His proclamation of independence was a "cry" (the Cry of Dolores) for social justice as well as independence, and a huge motley army assembled under his leadership.

This initial revolt, however, was hardly supported at all by the wealthier Creoles, and Spain had no difficulty in suppressing it and executing Hidalgo. José Morelos, another priest, continued the war with greater success. Independence was proclaimed again by a Congress of 1813, which chose Morelos as general. But he was defeated at Valladolid later in the year by a Spanish general, Augustin de Iturbide, condemned by the Inquisition, and shot in the back. In 1821, however, the same general Iturbide decided to throw in his lot with the revolutionaries.

The Spanish were unable to recover from this defection, and allowed Iturbide to make terms. Mexico was to be a constitutional monarchy. Since no prince could be found to accept the title Iturbide himself became for a year emperor of Mexico, which at the time included those states that are now part of Central America. But, since the other leaders were unwilling to accept the "imperial" rule, the revolution continued. After a year Iturbide's supporters left him and he went into exile, from which he returned only to be shot. In 1829 the Spaniards again invaded Mexico, and again were defeated. Thereafter they agreed to abide by the treaty they had already made in 1821, which recognized the independence of Mexico. The other Central American republics were formed after the collapse of the empire of Iturbide, and for a number of years were united in a loose federation. When this broke up they became the small, fiercely independent republics they continue to be today.

Brazil Brazil had a happier experience in winning her independence from Portugal. The Portuguese king had exiled himself in Brazil during the Napoleonic wars, taking his family with him. This move made the monarchy very unpopular in Portugal, but correspondingly much more popular in Brazil than it had ever been. Brazil now appeared to the inhabitants to be the true center of the Portuguese empire. When the monarch was finally persuaded to return to Portugal in 1821, he left his son Pedro as regent of Brazil. The next year Pedro proclaimed Brazil as a separate empire, with himself as emperor. Though he himself was not popular and ultimately abdicated in favor of his son, this son, Pedro II, was popular and was a relatively enlightened ruler. He held the throne for most of the nineteenth century. In his old age he was overthrown by a revolution that pensioned him off (1889); but the transition from colony to empire had been achieved almost without bloodshed, and Brazil was spared the destructive wars of independence that afflicted the rest of the continent.

The Negro republic of Haiti It only remains to discuss briefly the one independence



Street scene in Rio de Janeiro in the 1830's. The picture gives an excellent idea of the mixed population of the city, generally typical of the Latin America of the day, though there might not have been so many Negroes in some of the other states. (COURTESY PHELPS STOKES COLLECTION, NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY)

movement in the Americas that was a direct result of the French Revolution. The relatively large and extremely fertile island of Santo Domingo in the West Indies was half French and half Spanish at the outbreak of the French Revolution. It had become the home of many wealthy French and Spanish planters, who were a small minority in a huge Negro and mulatto population. When the news of the fall of the Bastille reached Haiti, the western half of the island, there was an immediate rising of the free mulattoes, who were, however, not joined by the Negro slaves. The rising was put down and the leader executed. But present at the execution was a remarkable Negro named Toussaint, who, with other slaves, took to the mountains and raised and trained an army of considerable proportions, which then proceeded to meet the French in open combat and van-

quish them. The French gave Toussaint the surname of l'Ouverture—the Opener, who opened up their ranks when he fought. Meanwhile, in 1795, the Spanish half of the island was ceded to France.

After defeating the French in several battles, Toussaint suggested that they should cease fighting one another and join in expelling the English and Spanish from their footholds in the islands. The Directory, now in power in France, accepted the offer and made Toussaint general and co-governor with their own French general on the island. Soon afterward the general quit the island and Toussaint l'Ouverture became governor; a new constitution was drawn up in the expectation that he would soon become king. The English and Spanish were duly driven out of the island by Toussaint and his armies, in cooperation with the French. Then

Napoleon replaced the Directory, and Toussaint asked for recognition of his position, writing at the head of his letter, "the first of the Blacks to the first of the Whites." Napoleon replied that he could be lieutenant-general under a French captain-general; but at the same time he took the precaution of sending the captain-general to the island with considerable forces. The captain-general in question was his own brother-in-law, Leclerc, married to Pauline Bonaparte. Toussaint, alarmed by the troops, took to the hills, and the French found themselves with the revolt still on their hands. They suffered several defeats, and were finally compelled to come to terms with the Negro leader. Soon afterward the French treacherously captured him when he came peacefully to a conference with Leclerc, and sent him to France, where he died in prison.

But Toussaint's work was carried on by other Negroes whom he had trained, and the French were ultimately expelled from the island altogether. The former Spanish half was ceded back to the Spaniards in 1840; but the Haitian Negroes would not restore it until 1844, in which year it became the Dominican Republic. The western half, Haiti, remains a Negro republic to this day.

♦ Unification of divided states— Italy and Germany

The countries we have discussed so far were controlled in their entirety by foreign rulers, and the independence movements could therefore be carried out by a relatively homogeneous people under the spur of nationalism. The two nations we are about to discuss were ancient nations with a long history, but neither had ever been a national state under a single government, except for two very brief periods. More than two thousand years ago Italy had been united under Rome, but at that early epoch (after the defeat of Pyrrhus, see p. 95) southern Italy was Greek-speaking and regarded the Romans as alien conquerors. Moreover, the Romans quickly expanded beyond Italy, which became merely the center of an empire. Subsequently, Italy as united for a few decades

under the Ostrogothic king Theodoric (A.D. 493-526). Germany had never been united under a single ruler who ruled only Germany. The German emperors had always ruled territories far beyond the borders of Germany, and lesser German kings and princes had ruled only some parts of the country. Austria had for a long time been ruled by German-speaking Hapsburgs, and Austria was clearly a part of the German "nation." A unified German national state ought certainly to have included Austria, but political considerations made this impossible even in the nineteenth century, as we shall see.

There was thus no special reason why Italy and Germany should have become national states in the modern era. Parts of Italy, it is true, were ruled by foreigners. But if the foreigners had been expelled by local uprisings, the result might well have been a series of new, small, self-governing states, in some cases not much smaller than other European states. In Germany small principedoms, and larger duchies and kingdoms, were already ruled by native princes, most of whom were loath to give up their position as local autocrats. They were willing to make the necessary economic accommodations with their neighbors, but that was the limit of the concessions they were willing to make voluntarily.

The spread of a nationalistic ideology was therefore of primary importance in these countries, though it was much more important in Italy than in Germany. The *idea* that Italy and Germany should be nations was one that appealed to many of the people of these countries. It was able, especially in Italy, to arouse a revolutionary and patriotic fervor which succeeded in overriding the local patriotism (particularism) of the smaller units. Only through unity could the Italians and Germans hope to be considered as citizens of a great power, capable of playing an effective part in international affairs; only through unity could the economic resources of these countries be harnessed to the service and glorification of the nation. In both countries one of the independent rulers of a part of the national territory was able to give leadership to the entire country, and become ruler of the whole after unification.

In Italy the king of Piedmont and Sardinia was a relatively small ruler, and much of the work of unification was done by men who were not originally his subjects. In Germany the king of Prussia was the leader of by far the most powerful of the German states; and it was at least as much the pressure of his ministers, especially Otto von Bismarck, as the desire of other Germans to be united that eventually brought the Germans together into an empire under the rule of the former Prussian king.

THE UNIFICATION OF ITALY

Growth of nationalism after the Napoleonic wars Italy at the time of the French Revolution was barely even a geographic expression. For centuries it had been divided into principalities and duchies, at different times ruled by French, Austrians, and Spaniards. There was little or no sense of unity even in the north, and the south had few connections of any kind with the north, ruled as it was by its Spanish Bourbon dynasty. Solidly athwart the peninsula were the Papal States, relics of the eighth-century donation of Pepin, clung to by the papacy throughout the Middle Ages and early modern times, though somewhat varying in territorial extent according to the political vicissitudes of each era. All the Italian states were ruled by petty despots, of whom only Leopold, the Hapsburg ruler of Tuscany in the eighteenth century, had a claim to be considered enlightened. Though a shining exception to the general rule of misgovernment, the influence of Tuscany was slight elsewhere. Papal despotism differed in few respects from secular despotism. Many ancient feudal customs existed in all parts of Italy, especially in the south, where the peasant was ground down by merciless taxation.

The French Revolution and the wars of Napoleon had probably a greater influence in Italy than anywhere else outside France. The republics set up in Italy by the Directory, through the agency of Napoleon, gave the Italians their first taste of popular and semipopular government and parliamentary institutions. Napoleon himself, in later years, even though he put an end to the republics, gave the Italians who were ruled by his family the benefits of

French administration and the Code Napoléon, as well as abolishing ancient feudal rights and privileges. The Italians, however, were not grateful for French intervention, even though it was accompanied by improvements. On the contrary, it had a result similar to that in Germany. The Italians not only resented the looting of their cities by the French and the taxation they imposed, but they disliked intensely the domination by alien Frenchmen, in spite of the fact that they had been accustomed to foreign princes for centuries. No educated Italian could possibly be unaware of the ancient glories of his people or of the importance of his language and cultural achievements, which in the past had given the lead to all Europe; and it made the Italian more ashamed of his political and military weakness than even the French had been ashamed of their unenlightened government in 1789. This is the background for the movement which began under the Napoleonic regime and persisted through the nineteenth century, until national independence was achieved in 1870.

The Italian independence movement, known as the *Risorgimento*, the reawakening or resurgence, was always self-consciously nationalistic. Every Italian intellectual and propagandist played upon the theme of nationhood; and though they differed on the means of attaining it and the kind of government they wished to set up after independence, there could be no doubt of the end—the unification into a single state of all those who spoke Italian as their mother tongue and had inherited Italian traditions.

At first it was impossible to take any effective political action, and, even before the fall of Napoleon, the patriots formed themselves into secret revolutionary and sometimes terrorist groups. The Congress of Vienna gave Lombardy and Venetia to Austria, and restored the old independent duchies in north central Italy. Worst of all, the Napoleonic kingdom of Naples became once more a part of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies under a reactionary Bourbon monarch. There seemed nothing for patriotic Italians to do save conspire against these regimes, and try to get rid of them by force. Among the revolutionary groups which sprang up during this period the most important was the Carbonari, which boasted many thousands

of adherents and was responsible for numerous small outbreaks and terroristic attacks.

The revolutionary movements were accompanied by serious campaigns both to awaken Italian patriotism at home and to win foreign interest and support. The great leader of the *Risorgimento* during the first half of the century was Giuseppe Mazzini, a revolutionary writer who favored a republic for Italy and was reluctant to accept any other kind of regime. It was Mazzini more than anyone else who made the Western world aware of patriotism as a primary emotion, natural and worthy of respect, endowing it with a sacred quality hitherto reserved for religious belief. The organization founded by him, called Young Italy, had its counterparts in all European countries where oppressed nationalities were striving for liberation; thus Young Poland, Young Hungary, and even Young Europe came into existence under the inspiration of Mazzini. Most of his life he spent in exile abroad, either in England or in Switzerland; but his works were read widely in spite of censorship. As an active revolutionary, Mazzini was born too early to be fully effective. Circumstances were too unpropitious for any direct action against the powerful military forces that the foreigners, and even the pope, could bring to bear against disturbers of their regimes. But anyone who, influenced by Mazzini's idealism, supported Italian freedom from foreign domination could come to feel that he was striking a blow for the liberal and Romantic ideal. Like the Greek independence movement, the Italian movement, largely through the efforts of such men as Mazzini, was able to enlist the good will of liberals everywhere.

Efforts at direct action to 1848. Until 1848 little progress was made toward liberation, in spite of many efforts. In 1820 there was an abortive rising against the Bourbon monarch in Naples, which extracted a constitution from the frightened ruler. But, as we have seen, the Austrian "fire brigade" put out the conflagration, and the king withdrew the constitution and put into effect a worse system of suppression than before. The leaders of the uprising were executed, and thousands were imprisoned. In 1821 the king of Sardinia, facing demands for

a constitution, abdicated in favor of his brother. The latter solicited the support of Austria, as did three of the independent princes in north central Italy who were also faced by uprisings. Metternich, true to the principles adopted in Vienna in 1815, in each case sent help. In 1830 there were a few abortive efforts at revolution, but all met with dismal failure. It was not until a legitimate monarch took a hand in the movement that any substantial progress was made. This monarch was Charles Albert, king of Sardinia since 1831, who was the first of his branch of the House of Savoy to attain the throne. The kingdom he inherited comprised the rather desolate and mountainous island of Sardinia, the ancestral lands of the House of Savoy in northwest Italy, and Piedmont, a fertile area surrounding the upper Po valley, whose capital and most important city was Turin. The monarch himself lived in Turin, and in spite of his title he was regarded as a mainland prince, not very much different from his fellow-princes in Italy. But he had a royal title, and after the Napoleonic wars he acquired the important seaport of Genoa, so that his resources were on the whole much greater than those available to other Italian princes in his day.

Assumption of leadership by the House of Savoy. Charles Albert was sympathetic to the *Risorgimento*, but as a realist he recognized that he could not pose as a liberal reformer without making Austria suspicious, and incurring her probable enmity. He knew that he was incapable of making any serious resistance to Austria if he should engage in hostilities. Nevertheless, his actions during the revolutions of 1848 were to catapult him and his dynasty into leadership of the Italian liberation movement. Seeing that Austria was engulfed by revolution herself, Charles Albert took the step of invading Austrian territory in northern Italy, with the aid of volunteers from other parts of Italy. His armies soon overran Lombardy and began to threaten Venetia. At the same time he granted a fairly liberal constitution known as *Il Statuto*, which became the fundamental constitution of the later kingdom of Italy. Though it turned out that Austria was only temporarily unable to take effective military action and utterly de-

feated Charles Albert in the following year, the monarch nevertheless refused the Austrian suggestion that he abrogate his new constitution. After his defeat he abdicated his throne, and his successor, his son Victor Emmanuel II, likewise refused to accept the Austrian suggestion, even though it would have meant more favorable peace terms for him.

Meanwhile other revolutions were taking place in Italy, with far more power behind them than in the earlier years of the century, even though all were ultimately doomed to fail. An uprising in Rome forced Pope Pius IX to flee from his city, and a republic was proclaimed in Rome under the leadership of Mazzini. The following year Mazzini was joined by Giuseppe Garibaldi, an Italian patriot and soldier of fortune. But the republic could not survive against the attacks of French troops sent by the new president of France, Louis Napoleon, who was shortly to become emperor of the French. Napoleon had sent his troops as part of his policy of gaining Catholic support in France, which he needed in order to be able to capture undisputed rule in that country. The French army, after restoring the pope to his position, maintained him in power for the next twenty years, thus making the Papal States the last section of Italy to form part of the new Italian nation. In Naples the reactionary monarch, Ferdinand II, was compelled to grant a constitution, but abrogated it as soon as he had sufficiently recovered his position to be able to do so.

In spite of the failure of all the uprisings it was clear to most Italian patriots that one thing had been gained. A monarch had taken the leadership of the Italian liberation movement and had not withdrawn his liberal constitution even when under severe pressure. Thus the movement now had a champion who, by virtue of his position, might hope to win the ends for which these patriots were striving. Mazzini, however, could not adopt this view. He continued to support the idea of an eventual republic, and wished to have nothing to do with any monarch, however constitutional. He continued to call for, and tried to organize, uprisings which were suppressed with monotonous regularity, thus losing him some of the support he had hitherto enjoyed. Garibaldi, on the other

hand, whose military prowess had helped the abortive Roman republic to survive until the arrival of the troops of Napoleon, decided to support a constitutional monarchy under the Sardinian king, and gave invaluable assistance to it.

The real maker of Italy, however, was probably the chief minister of the Sardinian king, Camillo, Count of Cavour. It was largely his influence that had persuaded Charles Albert to grant his constitution and make war on Austria. He was now to guide the diplomacy of the Sardinian kingdom and use its meager resources to the full in achieving his aim of uniting Italy under the House of Savoy. The resources were feeble enough in 1849. Though there was an army, it was small and unlikely to achieve victories in a war with either Austria or France unless it were supported by powerful allies. While England might be considered as generally favorable to Italian aspirations, she could not be expected to give much material aid unless the balance of power were seriously disturbed in Europe; and the balance of power did not seem likely to be involved by a minor war between Austria and Sardinia. The only power with an army that might be useful to Cavour was the France of Napoleon III. But since Napoleon was engaged in backing the pope, who was one of Sardinia's potential enemies, he did not appear to be a likely prospect for aid, especially since he had no apparent quarrel with Austria. Yet Napoleon was the only prospect there was, for the present; and the one hope lay in the fact that Napoleon was an imperialist and interventionist by nature and inclination, anxious to win easy triumphs abroad. He also had a reputation for being favorable to liberal ideas when they were not directed against himself.

In 1856 Cavour attempted to draw the attention of Europe to Italy by participating in the Crimean War and the peace treaty which followed it. Though he made few material gains from this intervention, it is possible that it was of some value insofar as it reminded the world that a sovereign Sardinian monarchy did exist. Later, by various means, Cavour was able to play upon Napoleon's ambitions, and also promised him Nice and Savoy, ancient possessions of the royal house of Sardinia, in exchange for

a defensive alliance. If Austria attacked Piedmont, then Napoleon would come to her defense. There only remained to provoke the war with Austria by stimulating a few uprisings in Austrian territories in Italy. This did not prove very difficult, and in 1859 Austria duly obliged by invading Piedmont.

The wars of liberation The combined armies of France and the kingdom of Sardinia defeated Austria severely; Lombardy was captured and the allies were on the point of invading Venetia when Napoleon made a separate peace with Austria. What had happened was a quite predictable repetition of 1848. The duchies in north central Italy had risen against their rulers and clamored for the right to become a part of the kingdom of Sardinia. But this would have meant a large Italian kingdom stretching right down to and threatening the Papal States, which were still under the protection of Napoleon. This the emperor could not countenance. Cavour lost his customary coolness, urged his master to continue the war by himself, and resigned when Victor Emmanuel, who had a more realistic appreciation of Italian military weakness, refused. He agreed to return to office in the following year in time to take part in the glorious events of 1860, and turn them to the benefit of his master.


The price agreed upon with Napoleon was paid, and to this day Nice and Savoy are a part of France. Formal plebiscites were held to justify the cession—the results no doubt having been suitably arranged for in advance by the authorities. The three north central duchies also held plebiscites and joined Sardinia. Lombardy was ceded by Austria, which therefore retained only Venetia and adjoining mountain areas to the south of the Alps. Sardinian armies began to pick off the Papal States against feeble opposition, leaving the pope only Rome and the adjoining province of Latium, which were still protected by French troops. But the most remarkable Italian victory of all was achieved by Giuseppe Garibaldi and his thousand Redshirts.

Garibaldi had had a remarkable career. He had fought in all the Italian wars of liberation, and had taken part in most of Mazzini's ventures. For long periods of his life he had been compelled to live in exile, and had even played



Garibaldi, from a lithograph by Adolphe Pinçon from one of the earliest photographs. This one was taken in July, 1860, at a time when Garibaldi was engaged in his most famous campaign, against the kingdom of Naples (COURTESY PRINTS DIVISION, NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY)

a leading part in the Uruguayan civil war. Although he had for many years been a republican, he was at last convinced that only under the leadership of the House of Savoy could Italy be unified. Nevertheless he was far from approving, perhaps even understanding, much of Cavour's policy, and he particularly resented the cession of Nice and Savoy to Napoleon. He therefore quarreled frequently with Cavour and was often reduced to leading expeditions entirely on his own responsibility, which might or might not be in accord with Cavour's plans. The Sicilian expedition of the Redshirts was evidently supported by Cavour, and some kind of agreement had been arrived at between the two men; but probably neither of them had foreseen just how successful the expedition was to be, nor the political problems that would be involved in Garibaldi's easy victory. For Garibaldi not only took Sicily with little difficulty, he also invaded



ITALIAN UNIFICATION, 1859-1870

southern Italy and toppled the kingdom of Naples. The Bourbon monarch could put into the field a large army, probably twice as large as Garibaldi's. But it was ill-led and mutinous, whereas Garibaldi's was filled with patriotic fervor. After his army had been defeated at the battle of Voltorno (1860), Francis II of Naples and the Two Sicilies abdicated.

This for Cavour was the most dangerous moment. The people of southern Italy were acclaiming Garibaldi and urging him to rule them.

Victor Emmanuel, however, led an army at once to Naples, where he confidently confronted Garibaldi, who accepted the situation. The two victors rose in triumph through the streets of Naples. Shortly afterward, the Sardinian parliament voted for the annexation of all the new territories acquired by the monarch, provided that plebiscites approved the change. All voted to join Italy, which was now proclaimed the Kingdom of Italy.

There remained only Rome to add to the

kingdom. Rome was now protected not only by French troops, but by a Catholic volunteer army drawn from several Catholic states. Pope Pius IX denounced the new kingdom as "forgetful of religious principles," and its king as a usurper. Cavour, who had died in 1861, was not available to settle the matter with his customary diplomacy. Garibaldi was unwilling to delay and took direct action. He had to be stopped by an Italian army from marching on Rome. Nevertheless, events speedily played into the hands of the new kingdom. In 1866 Prussia involved Austria in the Seven Weeks War and Italy joined her, according to a treaty signed with Prussia in secret a few years before. Although the Austrians defeated the Italians, they themselves were overwhelmed by the Prussians and forced to cede Venetia to Italy. Once more Garibaldi tried to take Rome but this time was defeated by French and papal forces. In 1870 Prussia enticed Napoleon into making war on her, and his losses were so severe that he had to withdraw his garrison from Rome. The official Italian army then marched on Rome and captured it without difficulty. Events had so ripened that there could be no foreign intervention to save the city beyond verbal protests. The inevitable plebiscite was then held, and the Romans voted by a large majority to join Italy. The following year Rome became once more the Italian capital. The pope declared himself to be a prisoner and refused to recognize the regime, although the Italians left him in undisturbed possession of the Vatican. The conflict was not brought to an end until 1929, when Mussolini's government signed a concordat with the papacy. The pope had at last recognized the existence of the Italian kingdom, and the Donation of Pepin was no more.

UNIFICATION OF GERMANY

Germany at the death of Napoleon Outside of Russia, Germany had always been potentially the largest and most powerful state on the continent of Europe, but France had always been militarily the stronger since she was a unified nation. It was the disunity of Germany that left continental leadership to France. The reasons for this disunity have already been

touched upon, especially the existence of the Holy Roman Empire and the proliferation of small states which had existed from the days of feudalism. The Holy Roman Empire had turned eastward, as we have seen, during the Thirty Years' War. It had become a preserve of the Hapsburg family, whose ancestral domains were Austrian, and whose power rested mainly on the possession of these lands. Austria herself was German-speaking, but the territories ruled outside Austria by the Austrian emperor were Slavic and Magyar, and few of their inhabitants could even speak German. So it happened that the Holy Roman emperor was the titular suzerain of independent German states which provided all but one of the electors for the empire, but he actually ruled effectively over a state most of whose inhabitants were not German. The emperor himself was the head of the leading noble house and felt himself to be the first German in the world; and lesser German princes were accustomed to accord him this honor. Even when the emperor abdicated his title of Holy Roman emperor in 1806 and called himself only the emperor of Austria, the majority of Germans regarded his rank as the highest in Europe and himself as the natural leader of Germany.

But, as we have seen, the emperor was already, by the end of the eighteenth century, being challenged by the upstart kingdom of Prussia, which had become a kingdom only at the beginning of the century. During that century and in the Napoleonic wars Prussia had generally come off the best in encounters between the two powers. Both had alike been defeated by Napoleon; but Prussia, being smaller and weaker, had both suffered more at the hands of Napoleon and recovered earlier, though her influence at the Congress of Vienna was far less than that of Austria. Nevertheless, her territories were enlarged by the Congress, and included a part of Saxony and the valuable Rhineland provinces, which were later to become the basis for the tremendous expansion after unification. They were still separated from the main body of the country by a series of independent German states, especially the kingdom of Hanover, which belonged to the ruling English king till 1837. In that year Victoria

inherited the English throne but, being a woman, was unable to inherit Hanover.

Napoleon had abolished many of the smaller states in Germany when he set up the Confederation of the Rhine, but there was still a considerable number of them in 1815. Many of them were very small indeed, including certain free cities that had once been Hanseatic towns of importance. Each of the states had its own prince, who might be nothing more than a knight, and each prince was sovereign in his domain. He held his little court and had his own officials. These small German states had indeed greatly helped the German cultural renaissance of the eighteenth century. Goethe had been the chief minister of the duke of Saxe-Weimar; Bach had been court musician to the duke of Saxony. The German philosophers and thinkers of the period had by no means all been inhabitants of the larger states; indeed, the lesser princes often felt it to be their duty to patronize their more gifted subjects and grant them positions and pensions that enabled them to exercise their talents. In short, the small principalities developed a character of their own which was uniquely German, but which, based as it was on old solid Lutheran virtues, the continuing docility of the peasantry, and the absence of any large middle-class population, was no longer suited to the nineteenth-century world. In southern Germany there were, however, three much larger states, one ruled by a grand duke (Baden) and two by kings (Bavaria and Württemberg). These areas were predominantly Catholic, and for religious and other reasons felt they had little in common with upstart Protestant Prussia and the other Protestant princedoms. They felt much closer to Catholic Austria, and their culture and way of life was in some respects closer to that of Austria than to the rest of Germany. It was difficult to arouse any German national feeling in these southern states, and they resisted the unification movement almost to the last, fighting on the side of Austria in the Austro-Prussian War. Their idea of a united Germany would necessarily have included Austria, which it was the consistent policy of Prussia to exclude; and their votes were always available in the Diet of the German Confederation against Prussia.

The Diet of the German Confederation, which had succeeded the Confederation of the Rhine set up by Napoleon, differed in no significant respects from the old imperial diets of the Holy Roman Empire. The Diet was called only when Austria, who was the leading member, wished, and it had no real powers. It was useful only as a forum for the airing of the views of the rulers, and for demonstrating to the world that all the German states were behind a policy agreed to by the leading princes—including the all-German war on Denmark in 1864, when the interests of German-speaking peoples were supposed to be threatened by Danish policy. The Diet could also be used by Austria to demonstrate her disapproval of German policies, and she was assured of a built-in majority for her views. The Diet had no democratic elements in it; the rulers sent their nominees to the meetings as in the days of the empire.

Economic union—The Zollverein Far more important than the Diet was an organization that had come into existence by Prussian initiative, from which Austria was excluded by the carefully planned maneuvers of the Prussians. This organization, called the *Zollverein*, or customs union, provided the economic counterpart to the political work of Bismarck. If there had been no *Zollverein*, it is indeed doubtful whether even Bismarck could have achieved what he did in the 1860's. The *Zollverein* accustomed the smaller German states to working with Prussia, and it provided Prussia with sufficient resources to carry out an active policy, even to wage war on such a country as France. The customs barriers, instead of being at the borders of each state, were now on the borders of all the states whose territories adjoined the borders of foreign countries; the internal communications between the two divided parts of Prussia were so greatly improved that her economy grew manifold between 1834 and 1871.

Obviously a customs union would have been of general benefit to the country, if it had been a country. But Germany was not yet a country, and the princes who controlled its component parts relied upon their customs duties for much of their income. Although Prussia and the other states of the *Zollverein* might guarantee to the

princes an income from tariffs against foreigners equivalent to what they lost by agreeing to forego their domestic interstate tariffs, it did not at first sight appear likely that there would be enough money from purely external tariffs to make up to the princes for their losses. The skill of Prussia's finance ministers, who undertook the negotiations in the special Zollverein parliament, was especially demonstrated in the handling of this problem. They had to avoid even the appearance of exercising pressure on the small states, and could appeal only to self-interest; nevertheless they were uniformly successful, helped by the undoubted increase in prosperity of those states which had already joined. However, they experienced some difficulty in those states which feared the political implications of the Zollverein and the increasing power it appeared to give Prussia, and occasionally the mailed fist had to appear. The finance ministers were aided in their task by the probity and incorruptibility of Prussian officialdom, which made any cheating on the allocation of shares unthinkable.

The kingdom of Prussia at the end of the Napoleonic wars was an extraordinary entity. The Hohenzollern rulers had acquired by one means or another an astonishing number of territories which stretched from the east Prussian ancestral domain of Königsberg to the Rhineland and the borders of Holland. In these territories there was no uniform administration, there were internal tariff barriers, and many relics of the feudal system. Indeed, there were more than sixty separate tariff administrations, and the cost of transporting goods from one section of the country to another was often prohibitive. It was both simpler and cheaper for the inhabitants of the Rhineland to purchase their requirements abroad.

In 1818 Prussia decided to put her own house in order, by abolishing the last feudal vestiges, and organizing an internal customs union. She also unified the administration of the eastern and western sectors of the country. A few smaller states joined the customs union. This was followed by the establishment of a formal Zollverein, with its own institutions, to which a considerable number of the smaller states adhered (1834). It was so successful that

a competitive zollverein was organized by Hanover, which did not wish to enter a system dominated by Prussia, and was at the time still ruled by the British monarch. Hanover was inclined to follow British commercial policy which increasingly favored low tariffs for the benefit of British industry.

When the initial members had joined the Zollverein organized by Prussia, there began the ticklish task of trying to increase the membership. In order to avoid any appearance of domination by Prussia, each state was given the right to veto the entry of any other—a right once exercised by one of the smaller states against one of the biggest, thereby delaying the entry of the latter for a full year, by which time arrangements had been made under which the former would withdraw her veto. To overcome the reluctance of the princes to give up their tariffs, Prussia made it her task to guarantee at least as much income to the ruler as before; and it was Prussia who invariably made the commercial concessions necessary to overcome the last misgivings, using her control of the Prussian market to grant concessions even against the apparent interest of her own merchants. Nevertheless, if any small state was particularly obdurate, and her territories blocked free movement between member states, it was not unknown that new means of communication would be created which would avoid the use of the territories of the recalcitrant, thus seriously damaging her commerce. The result was a very considerable increase in internal trade within Germany and a rising prosperity, which enabled many Germans to import foreign products that would have been prohibitively expensive in former times. This meant the increase of the total German income from customs duties, which was then available for division among the separate states. Since the latter thus discovered that they had not lost so much after all, their resistance to pressure to join the Zollverein was weakened. By the time of the Austro-Prussian War of 1866–1867, almost all the German states, including the southerners who had been most vehement against the Zollverein in the beginning, were members.

But not, of course, Austria herself. There were compelling economic reasons why Austria

should not join the union. Austria had her own large free-trade market in her own empire, for which she and the former kingdom of Bohemia did most of the manufacturing. She was therefore not very anxious to have the benefit of the German common market for her manufactures. The German states, for their part, were anxious to keep the Zollverein to themselves, and not have all the non-German Austrian provinces in it. The importation of cheap grain from Hungary would have had serious effects on agriculture in several German states, which could not have been offset by any possible export of industrial products. When in 1863 Austria, fearing the political power that had been built up for Prussia by the economic success of the Zollverein, wished to join, she was turned down, in spite of support from her friends in the south. To the very end she never entered the Zollverein.

The revolutions of 1848—The Frankfurt Assembly Although the Zollverein was preparing the ground for unification, little political progress was made until after the revolutions of 1848. Some of the smaller German states had been granted constitutions in accordance with the increasingly liberal ideas of the age; but the influence of Metternich and the Hapsburgs was still strong in German-speaking countries, and a number of decrees against freedom of speech, issued in 1819 (Carlsbad Decrees), were still in force. Prussia was dominated by its king, its army, and its civil service, and none of these wished to allow any parliament the right of voting on the budgets which provided their salaries. Though businessmen were increasing in numbers and importance in the Germany of the Zollverein, they had as yet little power. And though many of them were affected by mildly liberal ideas, they were fearful of the lower classes, among whom the movement known as socialism was growing (see Chapter 18). In 1848 two radicals, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, published the *Communist Manifesto*, which was not likely to meet much sympathy among the wealthy.

In 1848-1849 there were uprisings of varying importance in the majority of German states. Many of them succeeded in extracting constitutions, some of which survived. Frederick

William IV, King of Prussia, himself became alarmed and granted a constitution, though he made it less liberal than he had promised in 1848. He did not withdraw it in 1850, although by then he had recovered enough power to be able to do so. Under this Prussian constitution, which lasted throughout the German empire, the vote was weighted in the lower house according to the wealth of the voter, so that the majority was always made up of men approved by the wealthy. Every man, however, had at least one vote. Like the imperial constitution that was granted in 1871, it was admirably designed for its purpose. The monarch had a veto in the Prussian legislature, as had the nominated upper house, and he appointed and dismissed all officials, including the cabinet and prime minister. The government set up under this constitution resembles very closely the governments in British colonies, where the legislature is expected to discuss and agree to laws and expenditures, but the executive is nevertheless in a position to rule without its aid if it proves unwilling to carry out his wishes. The system often results in a constant struggle between the elected legislature and the hereditary and appointed executives. The sole weapon in the hands of the legislature is the mobilizing of public opinion and the use of the legislative forum to press protests against the executive.

The middle-class liberals who were behind so many of the revolutionary movements in the German states in 1848 were also anxious to create a German nation. For many years there had been efforts among German intellectuals to stimulate German pride and imbue the people with a sense of their Germanism—something very different, in their view, from the local patriotism of the small states, which was fostered by their very smallness. The philosopher George Friedrich Hegel had written of history as a process requiring a national state for its fulfillment, and his ideas were very influential in intellectual circles during the early part of the century.

Other Germans were convinced that it was German disunity that had prevented them from enjoying the "place in the sun" to which they believed they were by right entitled. Yet it was not clear to them how they could unite without



1848, revolution in Berlin. (COURTESY BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE, PARIS)

being dominated either by the Hapsburg rulers of Austria or by the Junkers, the landholding aristocrats of Prussia. But the nettle had to be grasped, and the revolutions of 1848 seemed to provide the opportunity. A number of German notables therefore assembled in Frankfurt and demanded an election to choose representatives for the purpose of writing a constitution for all Germany—some of them no doubt having in

mind the momentous results of a similar convention held in France in 1789.

The German state governments, alarmed by the revolutions, and in some cases no longer in full control of their states, gave their cooperation to the elections, and an elected body, more than half lawyers, duly assembled and tried to work out a constitution for a united Germany. The assembly, however, was in fact powerless

to do anything but talk and write; and the times were so dangerous that on two occasions the representatives had to call upon the Prussian army for protection. At last they completed a constitution to their liking, which called for a hereditary monarch as chief of state. This position they offered to the king of Prussia.

But Frederick William, however much he may have desired to become king of a united Germany, dared not accept the offer. Austria was still too large and powerful to be antagonized, and it was certain that Austria had no desire to see a large German state as her neighbor. The Austrian emperor had only with great difficulty, and with the aid of the troops of Tsar Nicholas of Russia, managed to restore order in his dominions against revolutionaries filled with liberal and radical ideas, and against nationalist uprisings in the non-German parts of his territories. Opposition could also be expected from the Prussian Junkers, who distrusted west-German businessmen and lawyers and preferred controlling their own state of Prussia to being swamped by non-Prussians, whom they could not control. Frederick William himself felt sure that if he accepted a crown from a constitutional convention of doubtful status, he would antagonize his brother princes who alone, both in his view and in theirs, were entitled to offer it. He therefore informed the convention, in his best Prussian manner, that he had no interest in "picking up a crown from the gutter." As it turned out, when the princes in 1861 were ready to offer the crown to his successor, the opposition of Austria was sufficient to persuade the Prussian king that it was too dangerous to accept the crown even from the respectable hands of his peers ("humiliation of Olmutz," 1863). So, as Bismarck was later to express it, Germany eventually had to be unified by "blood and iron": the blood of Austrians, Frenchmen, and Germans, and the iron of the Prussian industrialists in the hands of the Prussian army.

Most of the members of the Frankfurt Assembly, seeing that their labors had been in vain, since there was no other candidate in sight, returned home. A small minority of radicals stayed on in the hope that something could be retrieved by more direct action; they were dispersed by Russian troops. But, as noted

earlier, the Prussians had at least won a constitution for themselves, which, even under the weighted vote, was predominantly liberal in outlook. The work with the Zollverein was continued, and the central and southern German states, as well as Hanover, agreed to join—all except two medium-sized states. In 1861 Frederick William died, to be succeeded by William I. William was above all things a soldier, and desired to increase his army and improve its training and equipment. But at once he came up against his parliament, which wished, like the English Parliaments of Stuart times, to control the monarch through the power of the purse—above all controlling his foreign policy by denying him the funds with which to wage his wars.

Policy of Bismarck—The Schleswig-Holstein question The Prussian Landtag, however, was not in the position of seventeenth-century English Parliaments. The king had always been accustomed to taxing; all taxing powers were in his hands; and he did not propose to relinquish them to a parliament. So he appointed a strong-minded Junker as his prime minister, gave him his full confidence, and ruled without the co-operation of the Landtag. The result was a prolonged squabble between the minister and the Landtag, from which the minister, backed by the monarch, emerged victorious. Enamored of a constitution that gave so much power to the executive, Bismarck, who remained prime minister of Prussia but took on the duties of imperial chancellor after 1871, wrote a similar constitution for imperial Germany. But, as he was to find in his old age, it was essential for the chancellor to retain the confidence of the monarch. When Kaiser William II dropped Bismarck in 1890 and decided to rule as well as reign, there was no constitutional power that could compel him to do otherwise.

Bismarck was an experienced diplomat and one of the most skilled opportunists the world has yet seen, with a thorough knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of his opponents and of the power structure of Europe. Although it is extremely unlikely that he was as prescient as he claimed when he had been rewarded with success, it is nevertheless true that he both

created opportunities for his *realpolitik*, as he called it, and took superb advantage of those that offered themselves. Coming to power just after the humiliation of Olmutz, he recognized Austria as the most dangerous enemy of German unification and knew that she would have to be forced to acquiesce in it, if necessary by force of arms.


The opportunity arose for the first move when the Danish king proposed to incorporate into his kingdom the two duchies of Schleswig-Holstein, which were his personal possessions but were peopled by more Germans than Danes. According to German opinion, the duchies did not belong to Denmark but to the Danish king, who had no right to absorb them into his kingdom. The question of the duchies was raised in the Diet of the German Confederation, which authorized Austria and Prussia to take them from Denmark. A brief war achieved the German aims, but one of the duchies was given to Austria to administer, the other to Prussia. This delightful arrangement, which was accepted without suspicion by Austria, meant that the Austrians had to administer a territory to which they had no access save through lands controlled by Prussia. Bismarck had no difficulty in making considerable trouble for the Austrian officials, who complained bitterly of their treatment to the Diet.

Meanwhile, Bismarck had made himself thoroughly unpopular among the Prussians by collecting taxes for the army over the objections of the Landtag; and though some German nationalists approved of enlarging the army and of the uses to which it would probably be put. Bismarck did not proclaim his intentions from the housetops. Indeed, he paid a visit to the French emperor Napoleon III at Biarritz in France, and made vague promises of additional territories for the French—probably including the duchy of Luxembourg, which was in the Zollverein but might perhaps be released to France. Napoleon evidently agreed to remain neutral in an eventual war between Prussia and Austria, with whom he was in any case on bad terms since his intervention in Italy. The king of Sardinia was only too anxious to be allowed to take part in the planned expedition, for which assistance he would be rewarded with Venetia.

He too signed a secret treaty of aid. Everything having been neatly prepared, Bismarck was ready to take on the Diet.

The Austro-Prussian War, 1866-1867. All went as he had almost certainly planned. Austria and her perennial allies in southern Germany were rough with Bismarck in the Diet and commanded him to desist from his provocative acts in Schleswig-Holstein. It appeared to the complainants that he was proposing to squeeze Austria out and annex the duchies to Prussia; Bismarck did not seriously dispute the contention. Indeed, he went further and suggested a complete reorganization of the German federation. This was too much for the delegates of many of the states. When Austria called for allies for the chastisement of Prussia, Hanover and Saxony, as well as the three Catholic southern German states and several other smaller ones, agreed to join her. Only William I was doubtful of the necessity for war and of the strength of the still untried Prussian army. But he allowed himself to be overborne, and the war was on. The Prussian army astonished the world by utterly defeating Austria at the battle of Sadowa (1866), then turned on the German allies of Austria and destroyed them also. The war was to be known as the Seven Weeks War, one of the shortest and most decisive in history.

Prussia contented herself with annexing Hanover outright, together with a few minor states, which gave her full access from one part of her territory to the other. Then she signed a lenient peace treaty with Austria, although Austria, according to plan, lost Venetia to Italy. The German Confederation was replaced by a North German Federation, with a constitution not unlike that of Prussia. This constitution, with minor modifications, was to carry over to the German Empire, and will therefore be described later in this section. The southern German states, now cut off from Austria, would henceforth be harmless; and as Bismarck was anxious to obtain their consent to unification, he treated them with consideration also. He apologized to the Landtag for his high-handed actions over the budget, and was forgiven by an overwhelming vote, which at the same time legalized the illegal collections in the past.



The war, though initially unpopular, had appealed greatly to German national feeling. All the northern states were proud of the achievements of the German army; even the states which had been defeated by it shared this pride to some degree. It was clear that unification was in the air, but it would certainly be an unequal alliance. Prussia was incomparably the largest and most powerful state in Germany, and in fact was in process of swallowing the others rather than uniting freely with them. The dissident states, therefore, were still unwilling to be swallowed. They had their own traditions; two of

them, like Prussia, were kingdoms; and all were largely Catholic. It should not have been impossible to conciliate their rulers by leaving them some power and prestige, as was ultimately done in the constitution of imperial Germany. But Bismarck played it differently. He continued to use his diplomatic talents on the international stage, and was able to tempt Napoleon III into attacking Prussia. This brought the southern states into the war against France, and unification and empire were achieved to the accompaniment of a rousing victory over a foreign enemy. Bismarck himself claimed that the war

had been arranged for the express purpose of bringing the southern states into his union; but it would seem more probable that this was an incidental bonus. Bismarck had an army, as had been demonstrated in 1866, that was probably a match even for the French; there were old scores to be settled with the French; and it should be made known to the world that Germany was now the greatest power in Europe, with all the prestige and influence that went with such a position.

Victory over France—Establishment of the German Empire The cause of the war with France was trivial. The incompetent queen of Spain had been deposed and the Spanish parliament asked a Hohenzollern prince, cousin of William I of Prussia, to accept the throne. Napoleon was disturbed at the increasing power of the Hohenzollern house, which had already in recent years supplied a king to Rumania. He had recently suffered several diplomatic defeats, and was in need of a victory to bolster his sagging prestige at home. Perhaps also memories of the old Hapsburg alliance between Spain and Austria gave him nightmares, even though times had greatly changed, and rulers no longer found it so easy to take their peoples into wars. Napoleon therefore chose to regard the Spanish offer as a matter of importance, and decided that in no circumstances should the Hohenzollern prince be permitted to take the throne. William of Prussia himself was not especially anxious for his cousin to accept the offer, and the prince refused three times. Nothing, therefore, would have come of the matter if the Spaniards had not made the offer yet a fourth time (perhaps at the suggestion of Bismarck), and if Napoleon had not instructed the French ambassador to call upon William and insist both on the refusal of the offer by the Prussian monarch, and on an undertaking that never would a Hohenzollern be permitted to take the Spanish throne. This unreasonable undertaking William refused to make, and so informed the French ambassador with dignity and courtesy. He then sent a telegram from Ems, the place where he was staying, informing his minister of what had happened.

Bismarck then proceeded to edit and publish the telegram in such a way that it appeared both William and the French envoy had been insulted. The French, in a nationalist frenzy at least as great as the German, clamored for their monarch to teach the Prussians a lesson, and it was the French ultimately who declared war. Opinion in Europe was overwhelmingly on the Prussian side and against the emperor who bore the name of Napoleon, who had spent so much of his reign intervening in affairs which did not concern him and were far from being dictated by French national interests. The Germans were ready to the "last button on the last soldier's tunic"; they provided the world with the first example of a German *blitzkrieg*. All the German states took part in the war and France was severely defeated, the emperor being taken prisoner and forced to abdicate. Paris resisted, and sustained a siege of several months. On its final capitulation, the Germans insisted on the concession of Alsace and Lorraine and on the payment of a huge war indemnity. Meanwhile, at Versailles, the Prussian king was proclaimed German emperor, and Germany was at last united. Bismarck had evidently given much thought to the kind of constitution that would provide him with a position fitted for his talents and for the role he expected to play. Under the constitution of imperial Germany he became chancellor, a position that he held for twenty years with, on the whole, considerable distinction in spite of some failures.

The constitution of imperial Germany The Prussian constitution already described was maintained in force in Prussia, with a Landtag elected primarily by the moneyed classes. Prussia remained under the control of the monarch, who was still king of Prussia as well as emperor (*kaiser*) of Germany. The upper house of the German Empire was called the *Bundesrat*. Its members were nominated by the hereditary princes of the separate German states. Prussia nominated not enough members to control the *Bundesrat*, but enough to prevent all constitutional changes. Most of the legislation for the empire originated in the *Bundesrat* rather than in the lower house, called the *Reichstag*, which

for the Reichstag, in spite of its inherent limitations, had gained in both prestige and authority during the years of its operation.

❖ Failure to achieve national independence

THE AUSTRIAN MINORITIES

The minorities in the major European countries shared in the upsurge of nationalism during the nineteenth century, but many found themselves faced by opposition too strong for them to overcome. They were thus compelled to wait for independence until the defeat of the European empires and the disintegration of the tsarist regime in World War I. The weakness of the Ottoman Empire enabled the Christian minorities to escape from Turkish rule, as we have seen. But the Hapsburg and tsarist empires remained strong enough in the nineteenth century to keep their minorities under control. Indeed, Austria added some new ones, acquired during the breakup of Turkey, but she had to grant autonomy within the empire to the Magyars, the dominant people in Hungary, who thereafter joined her in keeping the remaining minorities in subjection.

Within Austria there were many minorities, ruled by the ancient Hapsburg dynasty and by a German-speaking ruling class which itself was a minority, like all the peoples in the empire. Within the entire country there was no group that was evidently entitled to rule because of its predominance in numbers. It was a Hapsburg domain, and it was the Hapsburg dynasty that held it together. The country was divided into two roughly equal halves, Austria proper and Hungary. Within the Austrian half was the ancient kingdom of Bohemia, formerly, as noted earlier, an independent kingdom forming part of the Holy Roman Empire, which had been conquered by the Hapsburgs in the Thirty Years' War. Its population was mixed, but the majority was Czech; it had, however, a substantial minority of Germans, who held most of the important positions in the state. The Czechs were culturally and technically the most advanced of the Slavic peoples.

Most of the minorities were in the Hungarian part of the empire. Here the majority was Magyar; but there were many Slavic peoples in the territory, for the most part culturally less advanced than the Magyars. Among these the Croats were the most advanced, but there were Slovaks, Slovenes, and Ruthenians, as well as some non-Slavic Rumanians. Finally, the empire contained also the province of Galicia, inhabited by Poles and with a considerable Jewish minority. This territory had been taken from the old kingdom of Poland during the eighteenth century as the Austrian share of the partition.

Czechs and Poles The minorities were far from united in opposition to the Austrian Hapsburgs, whose rule was rarely oppressive and at least served to maintain law and order and protect one minority from another. Even Austrian rule in Italy was in many respects more enlightened than the rule of native Italians in the non-Austrian parts of Italy. When the Poles in Galicia revolted against Austrian rule in 1846, it was only the upper and middle classes that took part in the revolt. The lower classes regarded the Polish aristocracy rather than the Austrians as their enemies, and they aided the Austrians in suppressing the revolt, in the process winning some advantages for themselves at the expense of their social superiors.

Although the nationalist spirit did not pass these peoples by, it took a form different from the political nationalism of such a country as Italy. What the Czech and other nationalists in the empire desired was the privilege of maintaining their own ancient culture and the use of their own language. They were Slavs, and their cultural connections were with the other Slavic countries—even though few, if any, would have preferred living under the rule of the most powerful Slavic country, Russia, to the far less oppressive rule of Austria. Thus pan-Slavism, which was an important movement during the nineteenth century, was cultural rather than political. Its outstanding leader in the first half of the century, the Czech Frantisek Palacký, who wrote a detailed history of Bohemia, was interested in spreading the knowl-

edge of his people in foreign countries and drawing attention to its long and distinguished history, in forming cultural connections with other Slavic peoples, and in obtaining certain privileges for his people within the Hapsburg empire. When the Austrians called a Constituent Assembly in 1848 to consider political reforms in the empire, Palacký, as a Czech representative, fought for provincial self-government, in which he was naturally opposed by the Germans of Bohemia. He did not feel it at all incongruous to preside over a pan-Slavic congress held in the same year at Prague, the Bohemian capital, since the pan-Slavs of that epoch were interested in purely cultural aims.


The 1846 revolt of the upper and middle classes in Galicia had been suppressed, as already noted. The ancient Polish city of Cracow, which had been left as an independent republic by the Congress of Vienna, was then annexed by Austria. In 1848, when Austria was in difficulties in all part of her empire, the Poles, not only in Galicia but in the Prussian part of the former Polish kingdom, revolted against their rulers, but again were suppressed. Russian Poland, which had revolted in 1831 and thereafter been kept in firm subjection, was unable to give the Prussian and Austrian Poles any assistance in 1848. In 1863 Russian Poland made a further attempt, with a like absence of success. All the Polish minorities had to wait until 1918 before they were united in a national state, this time with many minorities subjected to them.

Magyar nationalism—Establishment of the Dual Monarchy In Hungary the Magyars felt themselves in no way inferior to the Germans who were dominant in the Austrian Hapsburg empire as a whole. They remembered their long history as an independent kingdom before the first Hapsburg had sat on a throne. They were proud of their non-Slavic and non-German language and its extensive literature. To them the Germans were not bringers of law and order but alien conquerors. The Turkish rule in Hungary, from which the Hapsburgs had rescued them, lay far back in the past. They had a wholehearted contempt for the Slavs in

their part of the empire, whom they regarded as barbarians whose way of life was abhorrent to them. The Magyars therefore strove for national independence, and the anti-Austrian movement in Hungary was fiercely nationalist.

Though the lower classes in Hungary were no doubt as anti-aristocratic as elsewhere, they did not follow the example of their peers in Galicia and defend the Austrian regime. But among the Magyar leaders there was considerable difference of opinion as to what it was possible to achieve. The most famous Magyar nationalist, Louis Kossuth, desired independence and was prepared to settle for nothing less. But his compatriot Francis Deak was ready to accept compromises with the Austrians as long as substantial self-government was achieved. Kossuth remains the great Magyar hero, but it was the policies of Deak that triumphed.

In 1848 a great Magyar rebellion broke out, under the leadership of Kossuth, and in the following year he became president of an independent Hungarian republic. But when Tsar Nicholas I of Russia offered his services to the Hapsburgs and his offer was accepted, the revolt was crushed by the Russian armies and the republic destroyed. Kossuth went into exile, and for a time the condition of Hungary was much worse than before. But Deak remained and negotiated with the Hapsburgs, who were not strong enough to maintain an authoritarian regime in their empire without support from the Magyars. This Deak and the new emperor Francis Joseph I recognized, and some amelioration of the Hungarian lot had already been achieved by the time of the Austro-Prussian war. When Austria was defeated in this war she recognized fully that power had to be shared with the Magyars, and a compromise was worked out, called the *Ausgleich* (1867), under which Hapsburg rule was converted into a Dual Monarchy. Francis Joseph was recognized as emperor of Austria and king of Hungary. Budapest became the second capital of the new Austro-Hungarian empire, and the Magyars were granted full self-government in Hungary. Only a few restrictions remained and a few common institutions, which detracted little from it. Thereafter the Magyars ruled as a dominant



minority in Hungary, leaving the German Austrians in substantially the same position in the Austrian part of the empire.

The Czechs had to be content with representation in the Austrian parliament, even though Francis Joseph and his advisers for a time toyed with the notion that Bohemia should be granted a position similar to that of Hungary. This notion, however, did not survive the opposition of the Germans in Bohemia, who had no wish to be subjected to the Czechs, as they were in 1918 when Czechoslovakia became an independent nation. Meanwhile the other minorities obtained little advantage from the changes, even though they obtained some representation in the parliaments of the empire. The Croats, in particular, resented Magyar rule, which was more oppressive than the relatively mild rule of Austria, and began to look to the other Slavic peoples for aid. The kingdom of Yugoslavia, established in 1918, was the result of pan-Slavic nationalism. But the Croats were to find that domination by Slavic Serbs belonging to a different religion was little improvement over domination by Magyars, and no improvement at all over Hapsburg rule of the first half of the nineteenth century.


TSARIST RUSSIA AND HER MINORITIES

Russia, bulwark of autocracy Throughout the greater part of the nineteenth century tsarist Russia was apparently as strong as at any time in her history. There was little sign of any willingness to deviate from absolutist traditions, still less to grant any measure of autonomy to her minorities, with the single exception of the grand duchy of Finland. Alexander I (1801-1825) was a believer in liberal ideas for much of his reign, but in later life he grew to recognize the dangers of revolution in Europe, including his own Russian stronghold. Immediately after his death there was an effort by the so-called Decembrists to put on the throne as a constitutional monarch Alexander's brother Constantine, who had previously renounced his claim to the throne. The designated heir, a younger brother, who ruled as Nicholas I (1825-1855), immediately suppressed the uprising, despite its substantial support among army of-

ficers. Thereafter Nicholas crushed every liberal movement in his country, establishing a rigorous censorship and a system of secret police to search out any dangerous ideas. He ruled effectively, albeit absolutely, and died while engaged in the Crimean War, which was to put an end to Russian expansion.

Nicholas' son, Alexander II (1855-1881), was a man of a very different temper. He recognized that his country was still backward as compared with other European countries, and especially backward in still maintaining serfs, barely to be distinguished from slaves. Influenced to some degree by the opinions of his own educated minority and by foreign criticism of his state, he emancipated the serfs by decree in 1861, and attempted to establish legal reforms on the western model; in addition, he allowed the first elections for district councils—thus beginning a long overdue decentralization in Russia.

Alexander never had any intention of devolving any of his own powers on his people, and indeed at times was severe in suppressing opinions he considered subversive. The move toward decentralization was rather an administrative improvement. The reforms did not go far enough for the intellectuals, many of whom looked to revolution rather than to peaceful reforms. Although Alexander was in general supported by the more moderate liberals, his life was constantly in danger from the extremists, who after several attempts were at last able to assassinate him in 1881. Meanwhile, before his death, he had again made war on decaying Turkey (after attempting to gain European support for his venture), compelling her to make a humiliating treaty which would have driven her almost out of Europe (Treaty of San Stefano, 1878). The great powers, however, would not permit such a disturbance of the balance of power, and in a new Congress held at Berlin in 1878 they limited Russian gains and maintained Turkey in Europe. By the end of the century Russia had made no further movements away from absolutism. Alexander III (1881-1894) and Nicholas II (1894-1917) suppressed all new liberal manifestations in Russia. Not until Russia was defeated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was Nicholas II



Siberian gold mine at the time of Tsar Alexander III.

compelled to grant a constitution, as will be seen in Chapter 23.

The Russian minorities The tsar of Russia ruled over many minorities in the nineteenth century. Not only did he rule over the greater part of the former kingdom of Poland, but he ruled also Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, all of which were to become independent states at the end of World War I. Much of this territory had formed at one time part of the Swedish empire, but with the decline of Sweden (dealt with in Chapter 14) had fallen into Russian hands. Lithuania had been part of the great medieval kingdom of Poland-Lithuania, and had fallen to Russia during the partitions of Poland. Latvia and Estonia were largely ruled by nobles of German as well as Swedish origin, known collectively as Balts. Since the Russians left the Baltish aristocracy almost full independence in their territories, there was little effort on the part of the latter to revolt against the tsar, who protected their privileges. This, however, was not true of the peasantry and some middle-class intellectuals, the former grievously oppressed by their aristocratic landowners. The

Letts and Estonians had their own language, even though German was the official language until the latter part of the nineteenth century. The people and language were neither Slavic nor German, but were closely allied ethnically and linguistically with the Finns. Throughout the nineteenth century there was a growth of cultural nationalism in both these countries, laying the basis for the foundation of their national states after World War I. But it was not until the troubles in Russia in 1905 that there was much political nationalism, and even then the uprisings were in part directed against the German landholding aristocracy.

In Finland, acquired by the Russians from Sweden at the Treaty of Nystadt in 1721, the regime was far different from that of the rest of Russia. The country was a possession of the Russian crown, and was legally a grand duchy, with the Russian tsar as grand duke. It was granted a constitution before the end of the Napoleonic wars, and the constitution was maintained by the tsar even while he was engaged in suppressing liberties elsewhere in his realm. There was a strong Finnish cultural nationalism during the nineteenth century. The movement,

however, was directed not against the Russians but against the Swedes, who had ruled the country for so long and who supplied the greater part of the Finnish aristocracy. The Finns recognized the reality of Russian power and were willing to come to terms with it, as long as the Russians recognized in turn the difference of the Finns from the Slavic peoples of their empire and made no attempt to impose their authoritarian system on them. Not until the end of the nineteenth century did the Russians attempt to impose a stricter rule on the Finns, who fought back in 1905 with a serious general strike. During the Bolshevik revolution the Finns took the opportunity of establishing their independence as a nation.

The Poles, as already noted, were returned to Russian rule after the Napoleonic wars, but in the form of personal rule by the tsar as king. Tsar Alexander I experimented with constitutional government, but his successor Nicholas I abrogated the Polish constitution after a revolt in 1830 and suppressed the universities of Warsaw and Vilna, which were strongholds of Polish and Lithuanian nationalism. The Poles had indeed only themselves to blame for their loss, since they had been demanding the restoration of much of their ancient kingdom, a prospect which their Russian overlords were hardly likely to relish. Thereafter, though Polish nationalism grew in intensity and Polish exiles everywhere in Europe drew attention to their plight, they made little headway. A revolt in 1863, as already noted, was suppressed with ease by Alexander II, who might have been prepared to make concessions if they had not been demanded with so much violence. Meanwhile, in Poland, a separate Lithuanian nationalism arose, which distinguished itself from Polish aspirations in spite of the extreme difficulty of separating, even in the mind, those parts of Poland which were truly Lithuanian. This nationalism was also recognized in 1918 with the establishment of a separate Lithuanian national state, whose boundaries were not recognized for many years by Poland. Poland, indeed, captured the Lithuanian capital of Vilna by force in 1920, and incorporated it in her new republic.

Thus the twentieth century gave formal recognition to the nationalist movements of

nineteenth-century Europe, thereby in turn creating new minorities as well as a number of too often unstable governments. Today Finland and Poland survive, both to some degree by courtesy of the U.S.S.R. Czechoslovakia and Hungary exist, also by courtesy of the U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia as a genuinely national state, if under Communist rule. The still smaller states have been incorporated into the U.S.S.R. All retain their cultural nationalism; but as political entities they are dependent on their ability to live with the greater powers and remain in some degree and in different ways useful to them.

♦ **Summary and conclusion: nationalism in the modern world**

It is impossible to overestimate the influence of nineteenth-century nationalism, a Western invention that has now been exported throughout the entire world, with effects that will be considered in the rest of this book. When President Woodrow Wilson in 1918 proclaimed the rights of all peoples to self-determination, he was taking for granted that the demands of minorities for their own nation-states were justified, whatever the practical difficulties of establishing them might be. The analogy between the individual self of man, who at least is indivisible and can strive toward personal freedom, and the supposed "self" of a linguistic, cultural, or racial group was taken for far more than an analogy. It came to be believed that if any such group expressed its collective will to become a nation by plebiscite or other means, that demand was in principle justified. Only practical considerations of overwhelming weight should stand in the way of its realization.

But such practical considerations remain extremely formidable. How small can such a group be? Does the resulting nation have to be economically viable? What about the minorities living in a country? Must they be physically removed to another territory, where they are in a majority, or separated off from the main body of the state to which they were formerly attached and permitted to form a state of their own?

Today Africa is the greatest new center of

nationalism. Nationalism has been used to drive out the colonial powers, but the separate colonies were created by the powers out of considerations unrelated to the homogeneity of the peoples inhabiting them. The African ethnic unit is the tribe. Are all tribes entitled to become nations? Or must the political units created by the colonial powers become the new nations? If the latter, then it is the primary task of the new governments to suppress tribalism, as some African national governments are indeed attempting to do.

These are but a few of the questions that arise from the export of nationalism beyond the boundaries of Europe. And in Europe itself the problem is by no means solved; nor would it be solved if the U.S.S.R. were to relinquish her hold on the non-Russian peoples she has subjected. The historian and political scientist cannot help thinking that the final answer has not yet been given—that nationalism is at least as divisive and disrupting as it is unifying, even though it may serve a temporary purpose in helping subject peoples to escape from the rule of foreign despots. But a principle which unifies and does not divide, which recognizes all human beings as equals, entitled to rights as individuals but not necessarily to rule by members of their own cultural and linguistic group—such a principle is vitally necessary, but does not yet appear to be even hovering on the horizon. If the world and humanity are to survive, then a principle which transcends nationalism, even while it recognizes the value of human diversity and gives it its due—but no more than its due—must be devised by human beings.

Suggestions for further reading

PAPERBACK BOOKS

- Albrecht-Carrié, René. *History of Europe, 1500–1848, and History of Europe after 1815*. Littlefield, Adams.
 Bruun, Geoffrey. *Revolution and Reaction, 1848–1852: A Mid-Century Watershed*. Anvil. Succinct and interesting, with documents.
 Jelavitch, Charles and Barbara. *The Habsburg Monarchy: Toward a Multinational Empire or National States?* Rinehart Source Problems. Excellent selection of pertinent documents.

- Karpovitch, Michael. *Imperial Russia, 1801–1917*. Berkshire Studies. Valuable brief account.
 May, Arthur. *The Age of Metternich*. Berkshire Studies. Useful brief introduction.

CASEBOUND BOOKS

- Artz, Frederick B. *Reaction and Revolution, 1814–1832*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1934. Analyzes effectively the reconstruction of Europe after the Napoleonic wars.
 Binkley, Robert C. *Realism and Nationalism, 1852–1871*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1935. Excellent work of synthesis, dealing with events of this crucial period from many perspectives, including the Industrial Revolution and the spread of realism in literature.
 Darmstaedter, Fredrick. *Bismarck and the Creation of the Second Reich*. London: Methuen & Co., 1948. Perhaps the best of the recent studies of Bismarck.
 Gewehr, W. M. *The Rise of Nationalism in the Balkans, 1800–1930*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1931. A valuable short study.
 Hayes, Carlton J. H. *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948. Reprint of a work originally published in 1931, this book is one of the best introductions to the subject and has worn extremely well.
 Henderson, William Otto. *The Zollverein*. 2d ed. London: F. Cass, 1959. This book, originally published in 1939, is crucial to the understanding of the economic underpinnings of German unity.
 Herring, Hubert C. *History of Latin America*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1955. More readable than Wilgus, it is not quite so informative, but presents a striking and colorful picture of the continent.
 Holborn, Hajo. *The Political Collapse of Europe*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1951. Valuable discussion and interpretation of the changes in the European balance of power since 1815. Thoughtful and interesting.
 Kissinger, Henry A. *A World Restored*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957. Interpretive discussion of the Congress of Vienna and subsequent congresses from the standpoint of the crucial importance of having a legitimate order in Europe.
 Mazour, Anatole. *The First Russian Revolution: The December Movement, Its Origins, Development and Significance*. Berkeley: University of

- California Press, 1937. For a more general account, see the same author's text recommended under Chapter 14.
- Mendenhall, T., *et al.* *The Quest for a Principle of Authority in Europe, 1715 to the Present*. New York: Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1948. Valuable study of fundamental problems considered in this chapter.
- Nicolson, Harold. *The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity, 1812-1822*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946. Sprightly and colorful account, but also a serious contribution to the reappraisal of the Congress in the light of modern failures to maintain peace.
- Robertson, Priscilla. *Revolutions of 1848*. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1952. Interesting and well-written account, largely from the point of view of the people involved in the revolutions. Discusses intelligently connections between the various revolutions, while the social background explains such special features as the remarkable ferocity of the revolution in Prussia.
- Shafer, Boyd C. *Nationalism: Myth and Reality*. Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1955. A good modern statement, thoughtful and pointed.
- Strode, Hudson. *Timeless Mexico*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1944. One of the best histories of Mexico. Begins with the conquest of Cortez.
- Taylor, A. J. P. *The Hapsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918*. London: Hamish Hamilton, Ltd., 1943; rev. 1948. Informative and analytical.
- Trevelyan, George. *Garibaldi*. New York: Longmans, Green & Company, repub. 1948-9, 3 vols. Early works by the noted English historian, full of color and information, and, as always, beautifully written. Liberal point of view.
- Veit, Valentine. *The German People: Their History and Civilization from the Holy Roman Empire to the Third Reich*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1946. Excellent on Germany in the nineteenth century.
- Wilgus, A. Curtis. *The Development of Hispanic America*. New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1941. Useful survey, very well informed and comprehensive.

The Industrial Revolution and Its Consequences

❖ Was there an industrial "revolution"?

In Chapter 13, it may be recalled, we hesitated to speak of the economy following the great discoveries as a "commercial revolution," in spite of the antiquity of the term. Economic institutions had not been fundamentally changed. An increasing number of people became interested in making money, and the amount of specie available in Europe was vastly increased. But the system of early modern capitalism evolved from late medieval capitalism in a normal manner. The lives of relatively few men and women were changed.

It could equally well be said that the factory system of the Industrial Revolution did not suddenly displace the domestic or putting-out system; that coal had for a long time gradually been replacing water and wind as a source of energy; that the steam engine of James Watt was only an improvement in detail over Newcomen's steam engine, which had been in use from the beginning of the eighteenth century; and that capital had been slowly accumulating for generations and had always been put to effective use as soon as it was available. Thus, it might be argued, there was no real Industrial Revolution, only a gradual growth of the economy of Western Europe, of which the so-called Industrial Revolution is but one phase. When, it may also be asked, was the Industrial Revolution supposed to end, and when did it begin? Is it not still in process?

While admitting the force of such argu-

ments, it may surely be urged that there has been an extraordinary change in the tempo of industrialization since, say, the middle of the eighteenth century, and that the consequences for the whole of mankind have been more momentous than any conceivable political revolution. There are few men and women in the world whose lives have been untouched by it, and there will be fewer still by the end of the twentieth century. Political revolutions have followed in its wake, and they are still far from being at an end. Only the Neolithic Revolution, which marked the beginning of true history, has had greater consequences. But it remains difficult to answer when, if ever, the Industrial Revolution came to an end, even if one may suggest a period during which it may be said to have begun. Indeed, it is still continuing, and at an increasing tempo. The best that the historian can do is point to phases marked by certain crucial developments, even though there is no general agreement on how to choose these phases. Arbitrarily, one might suggest that the development of an efficient steam engine by James Watt in 1765 is as good a point to begin as any, just as the most recent phase may well have begun with the first successful exploding of an atomic bomb. One might choose as an intermediate date of critical importance the perfection of the Gilchrist-Thomas process for the manufacture of steel (1878), or the manufacture of the first carbon filament lamp by Thomas Edison in 1883. All such efforts to discover phases have an arbitrariness about them, and the present historian has little option

but to select phases which represent to him an intensification of the revolution, and especially of its social consequences in the countries it penetrated most deeply. For the first phase the emphasis will be almost exclusively on Great Britain, which was without doubt the industrial pioneer in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, although the British were by no means the only inventors. For later phases more attention will be paid to other industrial countries, especially the United States, which pioneered in using the mass production techniques characteristic of the modern period.

❖ Problems presented by the increase of population

Ever since the Black Death in the fourteenth century the population of Europe has been increasing. By the eighteenth century the increase clearly presented a challenge to European skill and inventiveness, which, if it had not been met by a creative response, would have doomed Europe to eventual strangulation. When population increases, only two possibilities are open. Either the food supply must be increased to feed the extra mouths, or the population must decrease through famine, war, or other causes until the existing resources are sufficient to feed it. We have already noted, in Chapter 15, how the English clergyman Thomas Malthus became alarmed at the increase of population in England and declared that widespread starvation would result from the fact that population increased in geometrical progression, whereas foodstuffs increased only in arithmetical progression. What Malthus did not see was that Britain in a century and a half would become a country which imported three fourths of her food, and yet could continue to live, and indeed improve her standard of living, by importing from countries with a surplus of food. He did not sense the possibility that by specializing in manufacturing Britain could pay for her food imports and still have something to spare by exporting the products of her industry. Britain, in short, experienced, as did the rest of industrial Europe, both an agricultural and an industrial revolution. But it is essential to understand that an

agricultural revolution, by itself, would not have solved the problem. The leaders of the undeveloped countries today understand this fact very well. Hence their insistence on the need of their countries to industrialize—a development which creates further serious economic problems for the rest of the industrialized world, which wishes to sell its products to them.

In a rural economy with an increasing population and a backward agricultural technology, the workers, for want of an alternative, continue to labor on the land. But it is not always possible to increase agricultural output merely by an increased expenditure of labor. It is more likely that the output will remain virtually stationary. Since there are more mouths to feed, the standard of living will decrease for all. In India in recent centuries the increase of population has had this calamitous result, whereas in earlier times, when the death rate was higher, pilgrims and travelers to India frequently noted the prosperity and well-being of the people, even in rural areas. Elsewhere the increase has resulted in a growing demand for more land. But if the land is worked by the same primitive methods as before, and especially if marginal land is brought under cultivation, the problem is in no way solved. Its solution is merely postponed, while the new land is being brought under cultivation.

If, on the other hand, the surplus population leaves the rural sector of the economy and tries to make a living in the city, the problem of unemployment and underemployment is transferred to the city, unless there is a great increase in manufacture. If there is a marked improvement in agricultural methods, then it is possible that the problem of feeding the surplus population will be solved. But scientific agriculture uses fewer, not more laborers on the land. Industrialization therefore remains a necessity if there is not to be widespread urban unemployment.

In eighteenth-century Europe two revolutions took place. When new methods of agriculture were introduced, and new mechanical inventions were put to use in rural areas, the surplus population turned to the cities for its livelihood. In time, in spite of temporary dislocations, work was found for these workers in

industry. No industrial revolution could have succeeded without the concomitant advances in agriculture, since there would have been no surplus food available to feed the new industrial population. An agricultural revolution by itself would have created widespread underemployment and unemployment in the cities. It should therefore be understood, when studying the rest of this chapter, that the two revolutions proceeded together, and there is no clearcut distinction in time between them. Indeed, in industrial countries today both revolutions continue, and as yet no end is to be seen for either of them.

♦ The agricultural revolution

CONSOLIDATION OF AGRICULTURAL UNITS

In eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England it is probably true that technical inventions in agriculture were less important as a factor in solving the agricultural problem than the consolidation of agricultural estates into more economical units. Reference has already been made in an earlier chapter to the decay of the medieval manorial system in early modern times under the impact of the enclosure movement. The manorial village produced only a small surplus for sale in the market. Much of the land was waste and insufficiently used. The small cultivator usually worked strips of land separated from one another, requiring him to spend too much time in unproductive walking, and he would have been unable to make efficient use of a horse or an ox even if he had been able to afford their upkeep. We have seen how the landowners, anxious to make money from the sale of wool, enclosed as much of their manorial land as was feasible and turned it into sheep runs. By the eighteenth century enclosures were being made more often for the purpose of improving agricultural production for food rather than wool. In the nineteenth century, when wool began to be imported cheaply from the Antipodes, almost all enclosures were made, and were permitted by Parliament, for the sake of increasing the production of food.

In contrast to France, there was an increasing tendency to farm large acreages. The small farmer of earlier times often preferred to

sell his freehold and become a larger farmer by renting his land from a big landowner, who, in turn, preferred to rent his land for a substantial sum of money. A small farmer who did not wish to rent might well find himself frozen out of his land by act of Parliament, or compelled to sell for a relatively small sum. By the late nineteenth century the process of consolidation had progressed so far that it became the norm for English farms to be large and relatively efficient, and it was estimated that half the land in the country was owned by 2,250 landowners, although the bulk of this land was worked not by the owners but by tenants. Thus English agriculture became what it has largely remained, a rural industry, employing landless laborers who work for wages and obey the instructions of owners or managers. This development has resulted in a greatly increased efficiency and a far higher production than would have been possible under the old subsistence farming. It made possible the spread of efficient farm methods and management, the early introduction of new tools, and later of machinery and fertilizer. In England, unlike most agricultural countries, little resistance was offered to new methods, for there were no real peasants. The landowners and farm managers adopted business methods themselves, and by the force of their example persuaded others to do the same.

IMPROVED AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES

Although Jethro Tull, who invented in the early eighteenth century a horse-drawn hoe and a seed drill, is usually credited with being one of the great agricultural pioneers, the new type of farming sponsored by him in a best-selling book was not very new and was rejected by many as damaging to the land. More lasting and valuable was the general improvement in farming carried out in the county of Norfolk, and associated with the name of Viscount (Turnip) Townshend, its chief publicizer. The system, known as the Norfolk system, was based on a scientific knowledge of the rotation of crops, especially the introduction of turnips into the rotation, the use of nitrogen-fixing leguminous plants, and the extensive use of marls and

manures. These innovations finally did away with the three-field system inherited from the Middle Ages, under which one field in three was left fallow every year. The system required the use of livestock to eat the turnips, and clover (leguminous crop) for hay, thus increasing the English supply of meat. Livestock was greatly improved by selective breeding, a development influenced by Robert Bakewell, a Leicestershire farmer who, without any knowledge of the principles involved, chose desirable characteristics in his male and female animals and mated them, quickly succeeding in improving the breed and culling out the unprofitable animals.

Before the end of the eighteenth century a steel plow had been invented, and in the early nineteenth century inventions of new machines for farming followed one another rapidly, many of them contributed by the young United States, whose extensive lands and favorable homesteading laws provided the incentive for the discovery of any device that would save scarce labor and permit the effective cultivation of huge acreages. It may be added that improved agricultural methods were not confined to Britain, and many ideas were taken from continental practice by the British, especially from the Netherlands and parts of France. Most of the earlier mechanical inventions, however, were British. The unique combination of improved methods and machines was imitated widely abroad, and it was customary, in the early nineteenth century, for would-be progressive farmers to visit England and return to their own countries to publicize the new methods among their own people. As time went on, most of the old hand tools gave way to horse-drawn machines, and finally, in the twentieth century, to tractors. These permitted huge areas to be brought under cultivation, and gradually displaced first the horses and oxen and finally most of the laborers from the farm. Thus the latter were freed to join the workers in urban industry.

Agricultural chemistry—Von Liebig. Perhaps the most crucial invention of all was the work of the German chemist Justus von Liebig, who discovered about 1840 the chemical compo-

sition of plants by reducing them to ash and analyzing the ash. He also did important work in tracing the nutrition process in plants. Although he was able, with the techniques available to him, only to point to the major chemical constituents of potash, nitrogen, and phosphorus, and it was left to later investigators to discover the importance of the mineral trace elements and the crucial role of humus in plant nutrition (the latter had of course always been known but never clearly understood), the work of von Liebig provided the basis for modern agriculture. It made possible a tremendous increase in yields through the use of chemical fertilizer, especially in lands which did not lend themselves to intensive cultivation along traditional lines. Moreover, with the development of monoculture, which permits the extensive use of specialized machinery, and with the gradual replacement of the horse by the tractor in the twentieth century, yields would rapidly have dropped if chemical fertilizer had not taken the place of the organic manures previously used. There would have been no possibility of feeding the vast urban population in industrial countries if methods had not been devised to increase the food supply, with an ever smaller population actively employed on the land.

Britain, unlike the undeveloped nations of the present time, was fortunate in that both the improvement of agricultural methods and the growth of industry took place slowly. She was able to adjust herself and her institutions gradually, without the dislocations experienced in countries outside Western civilization, in which, with rare exceptions, the entire economy of the country and its social system have been based on agriculture. Her favorable situation enabled her to gain a head start in the process of industrialization, and she had the advantage of export markets less readily available to latecomers in the race. Thus, although her economic situation in the long run was such that she could not hope to retain her early lead, she did experience a full century of prosperity, and during this period every invention could be put to immediate use, either in agriculture or in industry, without causing any major social strains beyond those natural in a period of economic growth.

❖ The industrial revolution—early period

INCENTIVES TO INDUSTRIALIZATION

The market When Britain started to industrialize, there was a serious shortage of manufactured products at prices sufficiently low to be bought by any but the well-to-do. The increase in the quantity of goods turned out by the new machinery, at far lower prices than had been feasible under the old system, immediately created new markets both at home and abroad. This was especially demonstrated during the Napoleonic wars. When Napoleon imposed his continental blockade, shutting off British exports from all the countries he controlled, the French manufacturers were totally unable to take advantage of the new European market. The peoples and governments of continental Europe insisted on continuing to import from Britain, where goods were cheaper. When they organized widespread smuggling, even Napoleon recognized that he could not forbid all imports and expect to enforce his prohibition. Before the end of the war he had permitted limited importation of certain specified products. Britain indeed increased her sales to the continent of Europe during the war, as well as creating new markets in the Americas. The urban workers in British industry, though still extremely poor and ill paid, nevertheless earned a money wage higher than under the previous domestic system. Indeed, it was for the sake of improved income that they agreed to work in the factories. From the beginning they were able to buy some of the textiles they now made in the factories. As their wages rose during the century, they were increasingly able to purchase some of the general products of the new industry. Thus industrialization tended to create its own new markets—a process that was spectacularly demonstrated by Henry Ford in a later era, when his workers drove up to his factories in mass-produced Ford automobiles.

The accumulation of capital for investment

By the eighteenth century in England much capital had been accumulated that could be put


to work in profitable enterprises. Interest rates were low for most of the century, and there was a shortage of ways in which money could be put to good use. In the early modern period, as we have seen, money could be made in commerce and trade, but the openings were limited for want of goods to transport. The domestic or putting-out system in the textile industry tied up appreciable amounts of capital, but there was a limit to expansion in this field since most of the workers were already as fully occupied as they could be, unless they could be persuaded to become full-time specialists, devoting their entire work week to the production of textiles. Expenses were high for the entrepreneur, who had to distribute the raw material and collect the finished product in two separate journeys, and who was not paid until he could sell the finished product. The output of the home workers was limited by their hand methods. They could afford only the simplest tools and machines, the spinning wheel and the hand loom. Many of the entrepreneurs had acquired some wealth, but they knew better than anyone else how inefficiently their capital was employed. Like any merchant, they were anxious to use it more profitably, to produce more goods and lower the costs of production if a way could be found.

The large landowners grew wealthy from their ownership of rents, and many earned money also from the exploitation of the mineral deposits under their land, especially coal. Their money was available for profitable enterprises other than improving the yield from agriculture and increasing their holdings of land. British lords, though it was socially disreputable for them to enter directly into trading and industrial operations, could lend their money in such a way that it would yield a financial profit. In the eighteenth century the duke of Bridgewater, a coal owner, became the greatest financial supporter of improved transportation in England, and he is especially noted for his canals. The duke of Newcastle was the greatest coal owner in the country, and many times over a millionaire.

In addition to these sources of outside capital it was also possible for the small busi-

nessman to accumulate capital by the simple process of spending little, and plowing back all his profits into his business. The social structure of Britain peculiarly favored such accumulation since the small businessman, who might be a skilled worker endowed with the spirit of enterprise, belonged to the social class which spent little. He was far beneath the upper bourgeois and the noble lord, by whom he would be looked on as a parvenu and upstart if he spent money on the kind of luxuries that appealed to his betters. He could enjoy a modest comfort in his home, but he would hardly dare to engage in what Thorstein Veblen later called "conspicuous

consumption." Thus the most natural thing for him to do with his money was to use it to expand his business, and let his son aspire to a higher social station with the aid of the money that he would bequeath to him. Probably only in the third generation would any descendant of his aspire to higher education, with the social prestige that accompanied it in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A very few of these men—Arkwright was one of them—purchased land and set themselves up as landowners. For the most part they barely altered their old standard of living, and made no attempt to rise out of their social class, contenting themselves with the



Model of Newcomen's steam engine in the Hunterian Museum of the University of Glasgow, where Watt worked and invented improvements to the engine which may be fairly said to have ushered in the age of steam.

satisfaction of owning and operating a successful and expanding business.

Availability of technical knowledge There would have been no industrial revolution without the necessary technical knowledge and ability, and the possibility of spreading the knowledge throughout the country. Since the seventeenth century there had been a prodigious growth in science. Scientific societies were interested in practical as well as theoretical science, and their members had access to all the latest information. But, by the middle of the eighteenth century, science was not yet much studied in the universities. The English universities, in particular, were very conservative and still devoted themselves largely to traditional subjects. This was less true of the Scottish universities. Both Edinburgh and Glasgow gave much attention to science and the principles of engineering. Indeed, the invention of the first effective steam engine came as a result of the interest of the University of Glasgow in the principles involved in an earlier steam engine, which was demonstrated to students at the university. The demonstration model needed repair, and the university called in an instrument maker to do the job. The result was that the instrument maker, James Watt, noted at first hand the weakness in this model and set himself to devise a more efficient engine. In his work he was aided by the university scientists.

But, in the early period of the Industrial Revolution, the majority of technical improvements came from men who were engaged in working with machines and who tried to improve them in the interests of greater efficiency. The English law was highly favorable to inventors. Patents were granted by the government, which granted monopolies to the inventors and effectively prevented competition for a stated period. The inventor was not compelled to license his invention; as a rule, once he had been granted a patent he made it his business to find some capitalist who would assume the financial risk of exploiting it. Both were then protected for the life of the patent. But sometimes the inventor was prevented from making as much progress as he could have wished by the existence of another patent that he could have

used in the improvement of his own inventions. James Watt's patents prevented others from making similar steam engines in his day, but he himself was also hindered by other patents owned by competitors. Only when the patents had expired or been revoked, as sometimes happened, by Parliament, could the pool of knowledge be enlarged. Richard Arkwright, who was at least as much a businessman as an inventor, took out several patents for machines which he had perfected, but which relied heavily on inventions made by others which had not been patented. After he had enjoyed a monopoly for a considerable period Parliament revoked his patents, thereby opening up the field to others.

Some inventors, however, scorned to take out patents, relying upon their own ingenuity to keep ahead of competition. Josiah Wedgwood, the great potter, refused to be ridden by "fears of other people copying my works." Manufacturers sometimes banded together to buy up patents in their field and share them among themselves. Sir Humphry Davy, who invented a miners' safety lamp, refused to patent it on the ground that its use would save men's lives. Even when a patent granted a monopoly to a particular inventor, it was at least possible for other manufacturers to buy their machines from him; and the possession of the patent meant that the inventor had at his disposal a valuable piece of property which made it easy for him to obtain capital for its exploitation. In the early Industrial Revolution every manufacturer was well aware of what machines were available and what had been invented by others. There was no textile manufacturer who was unaware of the possibility of using power looms as soon as they were available. If he continued to use the hand loom, it was entirely by his own choice.

Encouragement by the state The state had every reason to approve of this particular "revolution." Its needs were insatiable in war. As a relatively small country, Britain could not put into the field as many troops as her continental rivals. But she could supply her allies, who did the bulk of the fighting, with money and the armaments and clothing that money could buy. Britain fought the Seven Years War (1756-1763) in the middle of the century, and gave

financial aid to Frederick the Great, her continental ally. At the end of the century she had to fight the French revolutionary armies and later the armies of Napoleon. As Napoleon recognized, it was the industry of Britain, that "nation of shopkeepers," which defeated him in the end as much as the wide-open spaces of Russia.


Virtually isolated at times during the wars, Britain would have experienced the greatest difficulty in winning them without her growing industry. In 1797 she was truly isolated and experienced severe economic and financial difficulties. The Bank of England had to suspend gold payments, since the government had borrowed more money than it was able to repay from taxes. But once the war was over and the immediate depression that followed the war had passed, British industry was in a very strong position, and the government recognized fully how much the country owed to its industry. Thereafter, through the nineteenth century, every aid and encouragement was given to industry, and the interests of manufacturers were always taken into consideration. When they desired free trade and the abolition of the navigation laws, the government complied with their wishes. Subject only to humanitarian interests, for which there were spokesmen outside industry who were represented in Parliament, the government of Britain in the nineteenth century was largely run in the interests of the middle classes, manufacturers and traders, and all the laws favored their steady expansion.

KEYS TO INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS

The steam engine Underlying all the other industrial accomplishments of the period was the more efficient use of wind and water, followed by the use of steam. The principle of the water wheel had been known for centuries, as had that of the windmill. But as long as industry had to rely on water and wind, industry had to be located where these were available. The direct force of wind could be used only where energy did not have to be continuous and constant. The use of water for driving machines required the factory to be located close to a river or stream. Steam engines could, on the

contrary, be used wherever there was fuel, and the fuel could be brought to the factory by land or water transportation. It was thus more economical to locate a factory close to the source of fuel, but not absolutely essential as long as the cost of transportation could be included in the price of the product. British industry therefore naturally came to be located in the general area where fuel was available, but it did not have to be in the same towns as the coal mines. North and central England therefore became the main industrial areas, leaving the more rural south and east, which were far from the mines, to continue growing their former agricultural products. London became the center of specialized manufacturing and the locus of all the commercial and financial services that were needed to make the most effective use of the industries of the north.

A steam engine had been invented as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century by an ironmonger named Thomas Newcomen. It made use of steam to drive a piston within a cylinder. The piston, in turn, was attached to a beam connected with an atmospheric water pump. The contraption was used to pump water from the coal mines. But too much fuel was used in the double process of driving the piston up by steam and then letting it cool and fall back again. The waste of fuel was not troublesome as long as the machine was used solely in the mines, where fuel was easily and cheaply available. But it could not be used elsewhere until some process had been invented which would not waste the steam. This was the work of James Watt, who invented a separate condenser which could be kept cool while the cylinder itself would be kept hot. The immediate result of his invention (1765) was a saving of about three quarters of the cost of fuel. For many years Watt strove to improve his engine and develop new and improved models for other uses. The financial resources of his backers were severely strained by his efforts, but at last, after many years, the partnership began to prosper and supply steam engines to the whole country, protected by Watt's patents. From here it was a relatively small step to Robert Fulton's steam engine in a Hudson river craft (1807), George Stephenson's steam locomotive (1814), and



Two spinning machines invented by Richard Arkwright. There is a six-year interval between the two models (1769, 1775).

their numerous descendants, improved by the inventions of hundreds of other men, French and American as well as English.

The textile industry The major manufacturing industry of Britain throughout the eighteenth century, as it is in almost all economically underdeveloped countries in our own time, was the textile industry. Here the crucial invention was the flying shuttle, invented by John Kay in 1733. This device saved the weaver from having to throw the shuttle from side to side by hand, a necessity which had greatly limited the work he could do in a day. But the thread used by the weaver had to be produced more cheaply and efficiently if the weaver were to benefit fully from this improvement. The spinning jenny, invented by James Hargreaves about 1765, permitted many threads to be spun at once; in 1769 and 1775 Richard Arkwright invented, or at least patented, a water frame and carding machine, which permitted power other than human

to be used for making thread; and in 1784 Edmund Cartwright, a clergyman, invented a power loom, which could be powered by horses, water power, or steam. These inventions, with numerous other improvements, formed the basis for the textile industry of modern times even though electricity has almost wholly replaced the older forms of power.

The demand for cotton to feed the new English mills and take advantage of the possibilities of power weaving led directly to the key American invention of the cotton gin by Eli Whitney (1793). The gin could clean so much more cotton in a day than had been possible by hand picking that it had untold consequences, social as well as economic, in the country of its origin. Cotton, especially the American short-staple cotton which was most suitable for the gin, suddenly became a crop that yielded tremendous profits. In 1810 almost sixty times as much cotton was grown in America as had been grown a bare twenty years before, and Negro

slavery had taken a new lease on life in America. Thereafter the British were assured of adequate raw material for their looms.

Metallurgy—from cast and wrought iron to steel By the beginning of the nineteenth century the most important problems in the leading manufacturing industry were on the way to solution, and the major source of energy for the century had already been harnessed to man's use. Coal was now used for the making of steam, and steam was to be the prime mover in industry until its partial replacement by oil and electricity in modern times. But the science of metallurgy had not yet solved its key problem, how to make use of iron in its most effective form. For many centuries iron had been used for numerous purposes, but as a material it had so many defects that its uses were limited until these defects could be eradicated. In the Middle Ages a method had been devised for smelting some of the impurities from the iron ore, and cast iron had resulted. Previously only beaten, or wrought, iron had been technically possible. Until the eighteenth century only charcoal could be used for smelting the iron. Coal in its natural state made a fire that was not hot enough to smelt out most of the impurities, and it added other impurities, especially sulphur. The supply of charcoal in England was severely limited by the fact that there were few native resources of wood, and most of the charcoal used had to be imported.

Early in the nineteenth century came the crucial invention. An ironmonger named Abraham Darby reduced coal to coke by burning off the gas and using a very high chimney. Thereafter cast iron could be effectively made, but two other major inventions were necessary to perfect wrought iron—a new style of furnace, which prevented contact between the ore and the fuel, and a high-speed steam hammer. The iron thereafter was stirred or “puddled” when it came from the furnace. This removed some of the impurities in the ore, and more impurities were removed by the hammering.

Steel, however, remained difficult and expensive to make. To the wrought iron had to be added specific amounts of carbon, which was expensive as a raw material and involved

a second process. This problem was in fact not solved until the middle of the nineteenth century, with the Bessemer process (1856), which produced by a new method a heat blast far higher than any hitherto known and was able partly to eliminate the iron-ore impurities, especially the phosphates. But the Bessemer process remained only fairly satisfactory for ores which contained a large percentage of phosphates. The problem was now fully solved until two further inventions had been made. The first, the Siemens-Martin method (1866), involved the use of an “open hearth,” and was an entirely new method of making steel. Though the process took far longer than the Bessemer method and required a huge expenditure of roke, which was economical only if very large quantities of steel were to be made, all the impurities in the ore could be burned off by the method. The second invention was made by two English chemists, Gilchrist and Thomas, whose chemical knowledge suggested to them that the offending phosphorus could be persuaded to combine with magnesium limestone, with which the blast furnace could be lined (1878). Although the lining of the furnaces had to be replaced from time to time under the Gilchrist-Thomas process, the lining itself could be put to good use afterward, especially in the preparation of phosphate fertilizer. The two methods of Siemens-Martin and Gilchrist-Thomas remain the fundamental processes for making steel, though greatly refined in subsequent years.

The Western world now had its key material, and entered into the age of steel. Though steel itself has been purified and refined with other metals for every kind of specialized use, and though other metals have been brought into use which have lightness, ductility, and other virtues denied to steel, it will surely be long before steel ceases to be the metal most used in Western civilization.

Transportation It may safely be said that without the improvement of transportation no industrial revolution would have been possible. Every new industry required contributions from other industries. Machines had to be transported from one part of the country to another; fuel and raw materials had to be used in areas far

from their place of origin. Iron ore and coal were rarely to be found in juxtaposition. Both were heavy, but more coal was used than iron ore, and it therefore became customary to transport the ore to the coal, whenever possible by boat—as the ore of the Mesabi range in Minnesota is carried by Great Lakes steamers to the coal fields of Pennsylvania and elsewhere, and ore from Newfoundland is transported by boat to the easternmost tip of Cape Breton Island in Nova Scotia, where the oldest coal fields of Canada are. The Welsh mines supply the fuel for ore brought into the country from abroad through the ports of Cardiff and Swansea.

Long before the rise of the steel industry the transportation of coal to the cities which consumed it presented many problems. From the middle of the eighteenth century there was a prodigious growth of canal building, initiated by the successful enterprise of the duke of Bridgewater, who hired an engineer named James Brindley in 1761 to construct a canal from his collieries at Worsley in Lancashire to the growing city of Manchester. The canal, which was only a few miles long, nevertheless greatly reduced the price of coal in Manchester. The coal could be loaded directly into flat barges which could be pulled by a single horse, or even by a man who walked along the tow-path, which was constructed by the side of the canal. The Bridgewater canal, as it is still called, is notable for the fact that it carried water in an aqueduct over a river. Thus there were no technical obstacles to joining all the major rivers in England by canal. Britain soon had a network of canals in all parts of the country, as the industrial areas of the United States also had by the early nineteenth century.

But canal transport was slow and suited only for carrying heavy and bulky materials; in any case it had to be supplemented by roads for delivery to the customer's door. By the middle of the eighteenth century the English roads were still suited only for pack horses and very primitive wheeled transport. The engineering of roads and bridges in Britain was greatly improved by Thomas Telford, and their surfacing both by Telford and by John McAdam, whose name has passed into the language for the surfacing which he designed. The roads thereupon became usable

by horse-drawn wagons and coaches, making the transportation even of heavy goods possible from canalbank or seaport to the purchasers' warehouses.

Most important of all nineteenth-century improvements in transportation was the steam train, which revolutionized the economy of every Western country and, later, of those countries opened up by Westerners. Parallel with the steam train came the steamboat, even though the flying clippers, which used wind for motive power across the Atlantic, continued to be profitable for a long time owing to their low cost of operation. Even by the end of the century there was far more world tonnage in sail than in steam. The key invention for the satisfactory operation of the steamship was the screw propeller (1836), which displaced the earlier paddle wheel for long voyages. Thus communications by the mid-nineteenth century had been revolutionized, laying the groundwork for both domestic and foreign trade. In Canada and the United States the new transportation permitted colonization and settlement by immigrants from Europe, who poured into the Americas from about 1840 until the first World War in ever increasing numbers. In several years between 1900 and the war more than a million immigrants entered the United States. Few of these would have been able to make the journey if there had been no cheap transatlantic transport; and few of the earlier immigrants would have been able to cross the continent without the transcontinental railroads.


SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE EARLY INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

Growth of towns The early Industrial Revolution brought in its train numerous problems, not all of which have even yet been solved. Here we shall deal only with those effects of the Revolution which were already conspicuous before the middle of the nineteenth century, leaving the continuing effects for the end of our discussion of the Industrial Revolution as a whole. In the early years the major social change was the growth of towns and cities at the expense of the countryside. The reader should be careful not to idealize the life of the rural


worker in the days before the Industrial Revolution. Economic necessity drove him as inexorably as it drove the early urban factory worker. In the country he was seriously underemployed, and he lived in an economy where money had become a necessity, even though some of his wants could be supplied from the small plot of land which he almost certainly rented and did not own. To supplement his tiny income, he and his family worked in the manufacture of textiles. The putter-out, who provided the worker with his raw material and paid for the finished product, was a hard taskmaster. The worker had no redress if he received too little for his product, for he had no other market. He and his family were compelled to work long hours for their subsistence, even if the number of hours was more under his control than in a factory. Rural housing was usually atrocious—dark, insanitary, and ill-lighted—as rural life itself, for the landless worker, had for centuries been boring, ill-paid, with few amenities or means of entertainment. The communal life of the medieval manor was centuries in the past by the time of the Industrial Revolution. Even the drab, hideous towns of the early Industrial Revolution, with their dark back-to-back houses and their

cobbled streets, appeared as an improvement to the workers who left their rural cottages to find employment in the factories. Although these factories had themselves few amenities, the owners had at least to provide conditions under which prolonged work was possible.

It should be emphasized that the vast majority of the early factory workers chose their new occupation willingly, and were not at first driven to it by economic necessity. When, however, the putter-out found that he could compete with the factories only by cutting the price he paid to the domestic worker to such an extent that the latter could no longer make ends meet, then the domestic system was indeed doomed, in spite of futile efforts on the part of domestic workers to hold up the use of machines by destroying them. The displaced worker found in the towns such amenities as the public house, where he could buy a cheap glass of beer and enjoy the warmth of companionship. Wages were as low in the factories as the employer could keep them, but the earnings of the whole family were as a rule higher than they had been in the country. But now the worker had to buy his food instead of raising it, and at times, as in the famine years of the 1840's, before the



Girl working in English coal mine in early nineteenth century. This picture, a woodcut, was part of the official report of the Commission on Mines and Manufactures of 1842, presented to the British Parliament. (COURTESY JOHN W. DODDS, STANFORD UNIVERSITY)



A man hewing coal, woodcut from the same report.

protective duties on foreign grain were repealed, he suffered grave hardship. When the British Parliament investigated conditions in the factories in the 1840's, the representatives were shocked and Parliament passed legislation in 1847 which limited the hours of work. But conditions were already improving as a result of efforts by the workers themselves through the action of trade unions, which had been legal since 1825—although the terms under which they had received legal recognition were such as virtually to prevent effective strike action.

It was in the mines rather than in the factories that the investigators found the worst abuses. Until legislation forbade it, children were employed underground from the age of six; girls worked alongside men in circumstances which deeply shocked the members of Parliament. The mines were dangerous and the work hard and backbreaking. Children crawled along the narrow passages between the coal seams pushing coal wagons; women carried baskets of coal on their shoulders; and, in spite of various inventions that had minimized the risks, explosions were common. Miners, nevertheless, developed an attachment to their dangerous calling that was unique in Britain. Sons followed their fathers into the pits, and few thought of leaving for easier work. Constant legislation throughout the nineteenth century

and efforts by the unions succeeded in making improvements in the mines, but mining remained one of the prices to be paid for industrial progress.

Role of the skilled worker. With the gradual mechanization of industry it might be thought that the skilled worker would have found his skill superfluous. Until the coming of mass production, this in fact was far from being true. The nature of the skills changed—as indeed they changed even during the era of mass production—but new jobs were constantly being created as industry expanded. Some skilled workers rose out of their social class by founding plants of their own or entering into partnerships with businessmen who had capital but no skill. Many of the new tasks could be performed by women and children with little or no skill, and there was thus an increasing demand for unskilled labor. But the man who acquired skill could still command a much higher wage than the unskilled, and his services were always in demand. In the early years there was great demand in European countries for skilled English workers who teach them how to use the new machines. For a time the government forbade emigration, but later came to realize that the British industrial lead was so commanding that it need fear little from foreign competition in

export markets. Thereafter the laws were relaxed, and the British manufacturer was glad of the opportunity to sell his machines abroad.

Changes in financial organization. The demand for capital and the desire of investors to buy themselves into a business without risking their whole fortune led to the revival of the joint stock company with limited liability, which had been illegal for over a century, ever since an orgy of speculation in the early 1700's. Although partnerships, in which each partner was liable for the debts of the concern, were more common than companies, the tendency was toward the corporate form with its manifold advantages in the raising of capital for large-scale profitable expansion.

The London Stock Exchange was founded in 1802. This institution, which quoted prices of stocks for the convenience of investors, permitted the holder of stocks to dispose of his holdings without personally having to find a buyer. There was a considerable growth of specialized banking institutions, which, among other tasks, mobilized capital for the benefit of the industrialists and lent it out at interest, or themselves invested in the stocks of commercial companies. Other banks provided short-term loans, which were self-liquidating, for companies and individuals who needed accommodation for specific purposes. In the latter part of the century private banking began to disappear in England, to be replaced by the enormous banks of the twentieth century, each with thousands of branches throughout the country. This tendency, however, was not followed by the United States until very recent times.

INFLUENCE OF INDUSTRY ON GOVERNMENT

Responsiveness to pressure from business. The large industrialists exercised indirectly an important influence on the political life of the country. Although members of the manufacturing class seldom sat in Parliament themselves, and left their interests to be handled by the old ruling class, their needs were made known to the legislators in the customary manner. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the manufac-

turers pressed for the repeal of the Corn Laws, an aim which was finally achieved in 1846. Their purpose in pressing for repeal was to ensure cheap food for their workers, thus freeing the latter from the necessity of spending the bulk of their earnings on food. All tariffs were soon afterward taken off; the navigation laws were repealed; and Britain embarked on a policy of full free trade, uncomfortable though the prospect was for the agricultural interests. To replace the lost revenue, income tax was re-instituted in 1841—it had been briefly in operation during the Napoleonic wars—as a straight percentage of earnings. The rate was graduated under the Lloyd George budget of 1909. Thereafter the rich paid at a higher rate than the poor.

Free trade policy and its consequences. The free trade policy initiated by the nineteenth-century British was backed by a strong political movement, but it was based on a clear understanding of the trade position of the country at the time. British industry was far ahead of that of the rest of the world. There was no shortage of markets for British goods at prices which comfortably undercut any foreign products in the fields in which Britain specialized, primarily cotton textiles and machinery. Britain also had at her disposal the enormous market of India, which consumed vast quantities of cheap Lancashire cotton products.

Much of Britain's success was due to the understanding of her traders and economists that it would be impossible for her to continue to sell goods if she refused to buy. In general, she needed to buy little save food and raw materials, but she was quite ready to buy specialized machinery and luxury specialties. As a rule, most foreign products in her own fields of specialization were too expensive, and, since there was little danger of large imports, she did not need tariff protection. But her purchases of food and raw materials meant that the less developed food-growing countries abroad had money to buy industrial goods from her, and the United States, which was a growing industrial country but also exported food, also had plenty of sterling to finance purchases in Brit-

ain. When a country simply did not have the money to buy British machinery, Britain engaged in overseas investment, not only in her colonies, but in all countries which were willing to buy. She was repaid either by the payment of interest on foreign loans or by dividends from companies founded abroad with British capital. Thus Britain, by the latter part of the nineteenth century, had built up an apparently impregnable economic position. She had a visible adverse balance of trade, but her shipping and insurance income, together with returns from invested capital, were easily enough to cover the deficit, with many millions of pounds to spare.

Ephemeral nature of British industrial supremacy Nevertheless, in retrospect, the first three quarters of the nineteenth century can be seen to have been but a temporary phase. Britain's strong economic position was not based on the possession of abundant resources, nor on skills peculiar to the British. Coal was being used at an alarming rate, and the best seams were being consumed first, leaving high-cost production for the future, when the mines were so deep that they lost their competitive position in world trade. Britain's iron ore was not unlimited, and she lacked oil, water power, and timber as well as food. Other countries had more abundant resources once they were put to efficient use, and there was nothing to prevent them from acquiring British skills. Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, Britain was already feeling the wind of competition. Joseph Chamberlain, always the best spokesman for industrial interests, devoted the later part of his life to the attempt to persuade his countrymen to adopt tariff reform, or protection. Germany, the United States, and France industrialized behind tariff walls, even though for a short time they tried free trade at the insistence of Britain. Their home products might be more expensive to produce, but the price was equalized by the tariffs. They bought from Britain only when it was necessary for them to do so, and the British deficit in visible trade began to grow toward the end of the century. But until the first World War income from investments and services still

covered the deficit handsomely. Only after the war, when so many of her investments had to be liquidated, did Britain turn belatedly to protection. Nevertheless protection was extended to very few products before 1932, at which time Britain, in the throes of the Great Depression, had no alternative.

It was difficult for the British to realize that what had worked in their great Victorian Age and made Britain the most prosperous and successful country in the world was now outmoded. Even though she needed imported foodstuffs more than ever before, she could not afford to allow cheap Japanese and German goods to undercut her own products in her own home market, and it was not always true that, as the advertisers insisted, "British means best." In actual fact much of her machinery, built to last indefinitely, was often outmoded by the new machines built by her competitors. But it was difficult to make the decision to scrap machines which still had many years of useful life left in them. The number of customers who continued to re-order, because they had always used British products and had confidence in them, diminished every year. Even before World War I Germany was making severe inroads, not only into markets hitherto the preserve of the British, but into the home market of Britain herself. The Germans, starting late, were blessed with new machinery, and they had a spirit of enterprise which was beginning to falter in late-nineteenth-century Britain. German trade representatives studied the markets and German manufacturers produced to fit their needs instead of manufacturing whatever they wished, relying on advertising to create the need afterward. The first World War gave Britain a breathing space, since German industry had been largely destroyed and her markets taken from her by the war. But, as we shall see, Britain did not take full advantage of the time she was allowed; and there were other industrial nations ready to enter the market and give her severe competition.

It may, indeed, be said that it was not until very recent years that the British truly moved out of the Victorian Age, and put aside forever the traditions that had grown up during that

unique period in their history. The Victorian Age was one of solid comfort and prosperity for the middle classes, and a rising standard of living even for the workers. The British believed, correctly, that prosperity had been built on the edifice of free trade, and on the skill and reliability of her manufacturers and workers. But it had been built also on a virtual industrial monopoly, on skills that could be imitated, on experience that could be duplicated, and on investments which could never be replaced in a competitive world once they had been lost. In spite of Britain's possession of colonies which continued to provide fields for investment, markets, and raw materials, her leadership in industry was bound to pass in time to those countries with greater resources and a greater home market, where costs of production would be lower because of the ability to make profitable use of high-priced machines. By World War I Britain's percentage of the export trade of the world had decreased so that it was only slightly higher than that of Germany and the United States (13.9, 13.3, 13.1 respectively). Though Germany was to fall back again after the war, the United States, which had exported in 1914 almost as much food as industrial products, easily overtook Britain, retaining the lead she had won during the war itself. And it was methods developed in the United States and to some degree in Germany that were to dominate the economies of the world in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution, to which we shall now give our attention.

❖ Industrial revolution—later phase

GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES


It was made clear at the beginning of this chapter that the terms "early" and "later" phases of the Industrial Revolution are used primarily for the purpose of convenience, and that there is no clear dividing line between the two. The later phase, as the author sees it, is notable for three major changes: the employment of new sources of energy, such as gas, electricity, and oil; the ever increasing use made

of science, especially for the creation of materials that do not appear in nature; and new methods of production, especially what is called "mass production," involving the use of machines to make ever more complex tools, and the manufacture of interchangeable parts which are joined together in an "assembly line" to make the finished product.

This second phase had important consequences in all industrial countries. The expense of the new machines ensured that only those who had access to large concentrations of capital could enter the field of big business. Though small and medium-sized business has survived in certain areas, in many others big business has dominated the market. The huge market that is necessary for the economic use of the new techniques has had to be created both at home and abroad. The power of big business attracted into existence the countervailing power of the big union—and big government followed not far behind. The increased consumption made possible by the production of standardized goods at low prices gave rise to new problems of distribution, and the displacement of men by machines gave birth to serious temporary dislocations. Mass hiring and mass firing in accordance with the necessities of the market tended to lower the standing of even the skilled worker in his own eyes, since his skill could not always guarantee him a job. The two great world wars of the twentieth century have shown that the possession of industrial resources has become the only passport to victory, and a sizable proportion of the national income of every industrial country is now devoted to armaments. The power and influence of national governments have naturally increased in view of the key part they play in the organization of national security.

Obviously, all these consequences of the Industrial Revolution cannot be dealt with here in detail. Only a few indications will be given of the general scope and direction of these effects, most of which are familiar enough to every reader.

The key inventions may be passed over briefly. Electricity had been known in the eighteenth century, and an electric battery had



The first controlled and sustained power-driven flight of an airplane, made by the Wright brothers at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, in December, 1903. (COURTESY INSTITUTE OF THE AERONAUTICAL SCIENCES, NEW YORK)

been made as early as 1800 by Alessandro Volta. But it had few practical uses until Michael Faraday discovered, in the early nineteenth century, how to generate electricity in adequate volume. Even so the dynamo, which made possible the use of electric motors, did not appear until 1867. Thomas Edison perfected both the electric generator and "electric light" later in the century. Further problems arose when it was desired to transmit electricity over long distances, and such inventions as the transformer speedily followed. The first Niagara Falls plant for making electricity through use of waterpower was completed just before the end of the century, but most of the electricity in the world is still made in steam plants which utilize coal.

Toward the end of the century a process was invented which utilized coal dust in the making of gas; since that time gas and elec-

tricity have continued to compete for domestic use in most countries on fairly equal terms. Petroleum was first used to make kerosene for lighting purposes. This process required little refining, and the oil by-products were used for lubrication. When the internal combustion engine was invented (Nicolaus Otto, 1867; Gottfried Daimler, 1883), and the automobile began its prodigious growth, gasoline, a further refinement of petroleum, became the preferred fuel. As time went on, the superiority of oil to coal in the bunkering of ships, and its ever new uses for the many varieties of the internal combustion engine, made it into one of the most important of the world's strategic resources. The chemical industry began to create new substances not found in nature, from the simple and inflammable celluloid and the synthetic resin bakelite (invented by Leo Baekeland in 1909), to the numerous so-called plastics in use today.

MASS PRODUCTION—SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT AND THE INTERCHANGEABLE PART

In retrospect it appears that of greater significance than any invention was the concentrated thought that was given to the improvement of industrial organization. The pioneer in this work was the American Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856-1915), who perceived that if the workers engaged in making a product specialized in a particular operation and performed only this limited operation, leaving others to perform similarly limited operations, a great saving of labor would result. In the textile industry, with which he was at first especially concerned, he suggested that workers be paid by the piece, and not by the hour or the day, thus giving efficient workers an incentive to produce more of their specialty. It was no great leap from this to the notion of an assembly line which moved while the workers stayed in one place, each tending his particular small job throughout the day. When Henry Ford in 1913 began to produce automobiles by this method, he was able to cut the cost of production by a full two thirds, forcing his competitors to follow his example if they were to stay in business.

This method of "mass production" is based on the notion of the complete standardization of every part. The part may be made by machines designed to produce just this part and no other, and every part will be exactly the same as every other made by the same machine. Every example of the part is therefore interchangeable with the others made by the same machine. Although the process was not entirely new, its systematic use in large industry was revolutionary. Not all industries could make profitable use of mass production. But some use was made by all efficient industries of Taylor's principles of scientific management, and throughout the twentieth century the trend toward specialization has continued.

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF MASS PRODUCTION

Necessity for secure home market To utilize the methods of mass production it is essen-

tial to have mass consumption. Henry Ford, by increasing the wages of his workers to the then unheard-of figure of five dollars per day, dramatized his hope, soon to be fulfilled, that his employees would be able to save enough money to buy a Ford car (not an impossible dream when the cars were sold at \$290). The possession of a large home market gave a great competitive advantage to those countries which were well populated and industrialized, as long as the bulk of the country's production could be consumed in this market. For this there were two essential requisites—enough money to buy the goods produced, and knowledge on the part of the consumer of what was available for purchase. The first need could be met by high wages, the second by advertising, which stimulated the desire to buy at the same time that it made known the fact that a particular product was on the market ready for customers.

In the area of mass consumption the United States had a great advantage over Britain, who lacked a large home market and thus had to concentrate much of her manufacturing capacity on producing goods for export. Export sales are far less predictable than domestic sales, and foreign competition makes export sales always more difficult and usually less profitable. Britain therefore has always been faced with the problem whether it is worth while to install expensive machinery when there is no certainty that there will be enough sales to pay for it. The United States, on the contrary, has always been able to concentrate on her huge home market: and in spite of high labor costs the extensive use of machines has usually brought the cost of goods produced on a mass basis down to a level where they can compete on fairly equal terms in the open export market. The United States, however, has always been compelled to advertise very heavily to sell her goods at home, and manufacturers have quickly become aware that high wages put the worker in a position where he can also be a big consumer. In other industrial countries the worker has had to fight more aggressively for increases in wages. Only in very recent times, and with the extension of consumer credit—a field in which America also blazed the way—has the worker been able to buy to any considerable

extent the goods he has played such a large part in producing.

It remains true, however, that there is an enormous pressure on the manufacturer in all industrialized countries to find new markets for his goods. His capital investment is so heavy that he cannot afford to keep his machines idle. He also often cannot afford not to install expensive machines, since he would then be unable to meet the prices of those of his competitors who have installed them. The purpose of the machine and the mass production of goods is to lower the unit cost. But if he does not sell enough units, then this cost necessarily increases. A half-used machine is an expense he cannot afford. He cannot permit foreign products to compete in his home market, since they would tend to rob him of essential sales which are needed to keep his machines busy—hence his insistence on tariffs in all fields where foreign goods are competitive in price, or, in their absence, his demand for open or hidden subsidies.

The business cycle Nevertheless, from time to time the market becomes saturated, and even after eating up the consumers' surplus for the near future through easy credit terms, the manufacturer still finds himself unable to sell. For whatever reason this occurs—and there are hundreds of theories to account for the so-called business cycle—the effects are obvious enough. He is forced to lay off his workers, who thereupon become unable to buy his products, thus increasing the "recession" and converting it into a true "depression." The simplest way to overcome this is for the government to step in with extensive orders; but in a depression the tax receipts of the government are also reduced. Since the modern world economy is based on interdependence, the export markets are very soon affected by a depression, which cannot be confined to a single country. It is thus impossible for export markets to take up the slack. The countries producing raw materials find that their products are no longer in demand, and their prices consequently fall. They are therefore unable to purchase the manufactured goods of the industrial countries which supply them.

It is a melancholy fact that the easiest way

to create exports is by giving the goods away without payment. When the goods are those customarily purchased and paid for, the usual suppliers are ruined, since they are deprived of their former export markets. Only war materials are not paid for, and yet are consumed abroad at a tremendous rate. From a purely economic point of view a bomb dropped abroad is an export of some metallic products which are not paid for by the receiving party but by the people of the exporting nation through their taxes, and through tax burdens in the form of interest paid by succeeding generations. This specialized export market has the further advantage that it is practically unlimited; it offends no one but the enemy nation of the moment; and public opinion in the producing country thoroughly supports the general principle of such "gifts," transforming the largest exporters into patriots. None of the industrial countries fully recovered from the Great Depression of the 1930's until they began to produce goods for war. The fact, however, was noted by the industrial nations, and it was widely recognized that one of the tasks of government was to use whatever means were available to take up the economic slack during recessions, by monetary and other policies attempting to stimulate the return of confidence and to start the wheels of business rolling again. Because both wars and depressions give rise to a backlog of unfulfilled demands for goods, the basis is laid for renewed economic growth.

Finance capitalism and the "managerial revolution" It has already been noted that the constant growth in the use of machinery, and especially mass production, has made it increasingly difficult for an individual businessman to accumulate enough capital to own a large business on his own account. It is no longer as easy as in the first half of the nineteenth century for a man to put aside enough profits to finance his own expansion. Even those manufacturers who have started successful small businesses at some time in their career find themselves in need of far more capital than they can raise themselves. It is at this point that the professional accumulators of capital play an important part. Sometimes the banks and finance companies buy a

share in the business, which may include some control of its policies. In other cases the hitherto private company appeals to the public to buy its stocks, and it becomes a public corporation, with the original owner perhaps continuing to own the majority of the voting stock, and with it control of the corporation. Sometimes the stock is so widely held that a comparatively small percentage held by a single stockholder is, for practical purposes, enough to control the business. Ownership therefore becomes divorced from management, and the professional class of managers, who may be only minor stockholders, run the corporation. The numerous actual owners of the stocks are sleeping partners only, and their compensation for the use of their money by the corporation is the regular dividend voted by the board of directors. They can exercise their right of ownership only in exceptional circumstances, as, for instance, when some large stockholder attempts to organize their voting power to expel the existing management with which he is dissatisfied. Hence the effort on the part of managers to keep the stockholders content by making high enough profits to enable them to pay regular and satisfactory dividends, and to keep the price of their stocks on the open market at a profitable height.

Countervailing power—Rise of the big labor unions. Both management and workers in big business are wholly dependent on whether they can sell their products; and in the twentieth century it is not always possible, as we have seen, to sell the product at a profitable price. This inability may be due only in a minor degree to the unsatisfactory nature of the product itself, or even to the lack of pulling power of the corporation's advertising. Although management in some industries has at its disposal various techniques—many of them forbidden by law in some countries—for sharing the market with their competitors and "administering" prices, so that there is enough profit on a smaller turnover to meet all expenses and pay dividends, it remains true that business is to a large degree subject to forces and conditions beyond its control. This is even more true of the workers, whose specialized skills, however effective, may

suddenly no longer be in demand. As specialists, it is difficult for them to transfer their work elsewhere; even if they could, they are probably making regular payments on their house and numerous appliances as well as on furniture, and to abandon these possessions would be a severe hardship.

The result has been the constant growth of trade or labor unions, whose primary task is to put pressure on management. In recent times large unions have refused to work at all unless fortified by contracts signed with the management. Such contracts attempt to guarantee employment at stated wages over considerable periods of time. The craft unions, which play an effective part in smaller businesses and in the more highly skilled craft trades, were unable to put sufficient pressure on big business. Thus in many countries, especially in the period between the two world wars, there was a growth of "vertical" union organization, under which all the workers in a particular industry were organized into a major union. These so-called "industrial" unions, which came to wield a very great strength in some countries, were more successful than the craft unions in dealing with big business, and represented a considerable force in their own right, with which management found it expedient to deal—often, be it said, to the disadvantage of the consumer.

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

Improved standard of living for masses. The chief social effect of the new phase of the Industrial Revolution was the general improvement of the standard of living of the poorer classes, insofar as this standard consists of the increased consumption of manufactured goods and scientifically produced foodstuffs. Although the degree of this improvement has varied widely in different industrial countries, and has been most spectacular in the United States, the improvement was visible in all industrial countries. Even in industrial countries, however, it did not spread to all groups of citizens. There have always been isolated pockets of depression—for example, in the coal industry in Britain

and, to a lesser degree, in the United States, and in sectors of agriculture. But the great majority of people in all industrial countries has benefited.

Parallel with increased consumption of goods has gone increased consumption of services. In some countries, such as the United States, the public sector, paid for by taxes, has not increased as greatly as the services, useful as well as purely ornamental, provided by private enterprise in response to stimulated demand. In Britain the reverse is true, since it came gradually to be realized that it was the government's task to equalize as far as possible the services that could be paid for by the richest and poorest of its citizens. National health services, national broadcasting services, and other amenities were provided, while utilities used by all the people—such as railroads, gas, light, and power—were gradually taken over by most European governments and deficits made up from taxes.

The standardization of the citizen. The citizen, whose hours of labor were gradually reduced as the machines took over most of the hard work formerly done by him, found himself faced by the problem of what to do with his new leisure time. Thus arose an enormous demand for entertainment and, to a lesser degree, for education, which has been satisfied in different ways in the different industrial countries. The entertainment fare offered by commercial and governmental sources has necessarily tended to increase the standardization of the citizens, who consume standardized products and are entertained by standardized movies and radio and television programs, which, to succeed, must appeal to as many people as possible. The process of standardization has to a considerable degree alienated many of the more individualistic artists and writers from their society, which great numbers of them look upon with disgust. The literary artist cannot be sure of the success of his product unless it can be made "popular." Books that show a profit for the manufacturer must be sold to a wide market; experimental movies are generally unprofitable; the necessity to simplify for the mass market

has seriously handicapped the serious thinker, whose comprehension of the world is not necessarily a simplified one.

Leisure and its problems. The average man has ceased to find confidence in his vocational skill, and his work, often monotonous, is unable to satisfy his creative capacities. He is inclined to perform his daily stint for the sake of receiving his wages. Thereafter his time is "his own," and it is the private rather than the vocational part of his life that is most important to him. It is this facet of his life that the entertainment industry endeavors to satisfy, as do numerous other industries catering to suppressed creative urges—the hobby and do-it-yourself industries, the vendors of cookbooks, and the garden supply industry for those who have their own gardens.

The powerlessness of modern man in face of his world has called forth many and varied efforts to deal with it, some constructive, some escapist. For those who escape into pure fantasy there are the psychologists and professional therapists; for those who find satisfaction in group activity and organizations there are numerous causes to be supported; for those who seek to find a meaning in life there are the religions, traditional and new, and the metaphysical cults, which have all grown rapidly during the twentieth century; and for those who find satisfaction in the power and effectiveness of their nation and its "victories" in the competitive struggle for existence, there are all degrees of nationalism—and nineteenth-century imperialism was, as we shall see, at least in part an outgrowth of psychological needs. The persistence and intensification of all these tendencies remain predictable in a world of still increasing standardization.

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION—ECONOMIC NATIONALISM

The political consequences of the latest phase of the Industrial Revolution have already been hinted at. The nations which are short of resources and lack access to capital for industrialization within their own borders envy the

better-endowed nations and are covetous of their resources. The countries which are already industrialized have won power and prestige commensurate with their ability to make munitions and put well-equipped armies into the field. Those countries which have huge populations but little industry strive to use their manpower to compensate for their shortage of skills, capital, and resources. Thus there is a well-recognized division of the world into the have and the have-not countries.

The government of each modern nation is generally expected to support the industry of its people and to strengthen its position in a dangerous and competitive world. Since every nation wishes to industrialize, it cannot afford to accept foreign manufactures in areas where it is striving to build its own industry. A country with a textile industry cannot afford to have that industry ruined by imports from better-equipped nations. Its one recourse is to protect its own budding industry by tariffs, quotas, and the like. It thus constricts the market for the exports of other countries to the degree to which it establishes its own. It may be appreciated that in a dangerous world no nation cares to become dependent on foreign countries for munitions and military equipment, since in time of war it might find itself unable to obtain materials necessary for its survival. So uneconomic heavy industries are built up in as many countries as have the minimum of necessary raw materials within their borders.

Today national power is to a large degree a function of national industry. Although it is still possible for a poor country to exercise moral pressure, and to some degree use for its own benefit the competing power blocs of the United States and the Soviet Union, the actual power of such a country is limited by the strength of its own economy and the extent of its resources, and by the strength of the allies it can acquire. In a very real sense these small nations are pawns in power politics rather than prime movers—kings, queens, or castles. But these latest consequences of the Industrial Revolution will be discussed further in Chapter 26, devoted to the post-1945 world. In the rest of this chapter reactions to the Industrial Revolution will be considered, especially the new

thinking that tried to give the emerging masses a say in public affairs somehow proportionate to their numbers. Much of this thought was frankly revolutionary, and its effects are still with us.

❖ Political and social thought in the industrial age

The Industrial Revolution naturally called for much new thought on social as well as political and economic issues. No nation had a social or political structure suited to the new economic realities; the legal framework had been inherited from the long-past feudal period and had been modified piecemeal, in response to pressure from the interested classes. The English political system was transformed during the nineteenth century by the dominant middle class, and later by the working classes, who won full franchise for themselves by the end of the century. Similar changes took place in other European countries. Behind these political changes was an increasing body of more or less systematic thought which tried to take account of the realities brought into being by the Industrial Revolution, and to resolve the problems created by industrialization.

Most of nineteenth-century social thought was concerned above all with the new role of the state in society. It was clear to all that the state was an entity not to be ignored. It was the fountainhead of power, and it could indisputably coerce its citizens and compel them to adopt one policy or another; such a policy could be beneficial or harmful to one section of society according as one section or another controlled it. Although some thinkers believed the state to be an unmitigated evil and wished to abolish it, and others thought it should interfere as little as possible in social and economic life, all agreed that it was a factor to be reckoned with. Much thought, of course, had been given in earlier centuries to the role of the state and the task of the ruler. But in the new industrial age these questions assumed greater urgency. It was manifest that the state, as the focus of power, was in a position to do something about the problems of industrial society

whereas the individual was not, except as he could, in association with others, put pressure on the government of his state to do as he wished.

UTILITARIANISM AND SOCIAL REFORM IN ENGLAND

The eighteenth-century enlightenment had been interested primarily in the natural rights of men, and was inclined to regard such rights as either inherent in the nature of the world or sanctified by God. Although there had been many who had urged different kinds of social reform, there was, by the time of the French Revolution, no systematic body of thought capable of being applied to the new problems of the industrial age. The nearest approach to such a body of thought was being provided, as might have been expected, in England, under the inspiration of Jeremy Bentham, most of whose work came to fruition only in the last years of his long life (1748-1832) and in the generations that followed him.

All his life Bentham carried on a ceaseless fight against the irrational mass of customs and precedents that constituted the English law in his day. Early in his career he produced an extensive criticism of Blackstone's commentaries on the English law. The burden of his criticism was that the laws of England had been designed for certain social circumstances which had now changed. There was nothing sacred, or indeed especially admirable, about these laws, which were indeed for the most part irrational as well as outmoded. Blackstone's admiration for them was altogether misplaced, Bentham then proceeded to suggest changes that ought to be made on the basis of a new principle, the principle of *utility*—whether the laws were useful for the majority of the human beings who lived under them. He proposed to apply this yardstick to all existing and future legislation, and suggested that a calculus of pleasure and pain should be set up. A law, to be useful for society, should give a maximum of pleasure to the largest number of people, and a minimum of pain to the smallest. Even what had been thought of as natural rights should be considered as rights conferred by society, social rather than natural

rights, which society could and should abrogate if they were found to be inimical to the interests of the majority.

Bentham and his many followers in nineteenth-century England were of course unable to establish any exact calculus of pleasure and pain. But the general principle that legislation should be socially useful was gradually adopted as self-evident, though opinion naturally differed as to the social utility of any particular piece of legislation. The English radicals of the early nineteenth century, who will be considered further in the next chapter, were strongly influenced by the thought of the Utilitarians, as they were called; and it cannot be denied that the theory, unsystematic as it was, and usable by any group of reformers to justify even the abrogation of minority safeguards, paved the way for a much-needed modernization of the English law. It led also to the concentration of attention on specific and concrete problems rather than on purely abstract speculations concerning the nature and role of government. Moreover it underpinned the new notion that it was the primary task of government to ensure the welfare of as many of its citizens as possible.

THE SAINT-SIMONIANS AND CHRISTIAN SOCIALISTS

Contemporary with the English Bentham was the French nobleman Claude Henri, Comte de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), who, himself ahead of his time and not very influential in his own day, gave his name to a whole group of reformers known as the Saint-Simonians. Saint-Simon was extraordinarily sensitive to the changes that were likely to be brought about in society by the Industrial Revolution, which in his day had scarcely begun. He foresaw that the old aristocracy to which he belonged would no longer provide men of importance in the new era. Indeed, the future would belong to the men who could control industrial enterprises and accumulations of capital, and to the men who could convert their knowledge into power. Saint-Simon was so convinced of his own ideas that he abandoned his title during the French Revolution and backed the revolutionaries to the best of his ability. He foresaw that the Industrial

Revolution would entail an even greater exploitation of men by other men than had been customary in the past. These insights led Saint-Simon to advocate increased interference by the state for the benefit of the economically weak, and to demand that the state should supervise production and distribution of the new industrial goods. Moreover, it should give its support to cooperative societies, of which the first had yet to be formed; should abolish inheritance by private persons; and should itself become the sole legatee of private fortunes. The state should use the capital thus acquired to encourage and, when necessary, establish cooperatives. This program, in Saint-Simon's view, would be "practical Christianity."

It is not surprising that Saint-Simonianism was dubbed Utopianism, after Sir Thomas More's sixteenth-century classic which had described an ideal society that existed "nowhere" (the Greek meaning of *utopia*). But many of Saint-Simon's ideas were fastened upon by other thinkers who were equally horrified by the conditions in industry, and equally anxious to encourage cooperation rather than exploitation. Thus Charles Fourier (1772-1837) worked out a plan for cooperative living in small communities, which he hoped would lead to a transformation of society. Unhappily, the communities which were set up under his inspiration in fact all failed to live up to their promise. Robert Owen (1771-1858), a Scottish industrialist, improved conditions in his own factories and found that his innovations led in practice to greater output and profit; but when he branched into the formation of cooperatives—and, indeed, of communistic self-contained colonies—he met with no more success than had Fourier. These late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century ideas thus provided a body of inspirational thought on which others could draw, but they were not destined in themselves to bear much fruit in practical life.

The English reformers are an exception to this rule, since they were able to use Parliamentary institutions to obtain needed legislation. In this work they were joined by humanitarians, such as Lord Shaftesbury, and by others who called themselves Christian Socialists. These

latter, for humanitarian reasons, tried to improve the lot of the poor by practical means, such as the founding of settlement houses and workingmen's colleges. They also supported labor unions, and pressed for political reform and legislative action—in which they were at one with the Parliamentary radicals.

THE "SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM" OF KARL MARX

Far more important and influential than any Utopian Socialist, and far better informed on the economic and social realities of his day—yet basing his thought squarely on that of his predecessors—was the great synthesist and original thinker Karl Marx, whose theories were destined to be taken up by men of action, and whose analyses have affected, for good or ill, everyone who has called himself a socialist since his day. Such men have often rejected almost all his conclusions, and adopted as their own not one single plan of action advocated by Marx in the course of his works; but they have, both consciously and unconsciously, been affected by his thought. Marx called his socialism "scientific," and it was he who insisted more than anyone else on the "utopian" nature of the thought of his predecessors. By "scientific" he meant that it was based on the facts of history, as interpreted by himself, and he called for social action that would be in harmony with the trend of history and not arbitrarily conceived in accordance with the dictates of human wishes, desires, and aspirations. He believed his work to be thoroughly "objective," like natural science, in the sense that it was depersonalized and had in it nothing of his own personal prejudices. Others who studied in the same way as he could not fail, in his view, to come to the same conclusions. Like scientific theories that could be verified by experiment, his theories could likewise be subjected to empirical verification. The strength and persistence of Marxism in a radically changed world a century after he wrote has been due, above all, to its supposed ability to predict and to its supposed scientific truth. Such a theory obviously requires careful analysis in an age when eternal verities are hard to come by—and the potency of its appeal should

be appreciated even while it is shown in what respects it has failed to predict accurately.

Theoretical basis of Marxism—Debt to Hegel

If the basic thought of Marx is to be grasped, it is essential to recognize the manner in which it rests upon the early nineteenth-century philosophy of George Wilhelm Hegel, the most influential German philosopher of the period. It was Hegel's contention that there is, in the affairs of men, a real "historical necessity," as he called it. Forms of political, social, and economic change are striving to come to expression in life, and must ultimately come to expression because they are historically necessary. This, in Hegel's formulation, is the Idea striving to express itself. All change represents, as it were, a further incarnation of the Idea. Men cannot prevent the Idea from manifesting itself; they can only cooperate with it and thus be in the forefront of the stream of history. For Hegel, faced with a divided Germany in dire need of unification, the coming German monarchy was the most perfect expression of the Idea. The Idea cannot be grasped by the analytical faculties of man, called by Hegel the understanding (*Verstand*), but only by reason or intuition (*Vernunft*), a higher faculty in man than mere understanding or intellect. This faculty enables man to grasp by a flash of intuition the manner in which events are working, and makes possible the prediction of the next stage of the manifestation of the Idea on earth.

Hegel himself believed he had discovered the key to the means by which one stage of social life moved forward to another higher stage, and propounded the notion that this process occurred through the conflict of opposites (a Greek idea implicit especially in Empedocles and Heraclitus—what Empedocles had called Love and Strife), which harmonized themselves through the conflict, thereby setting in motion a new conflict. He called the two opposites *thesis* and *antithesis*, each thesis bringing into operation its antithesis. The resolution was made in a *synthesis* of the two, which thereupon became the new thesis, in turn bringing about its own antithesis. This procedure Hegel called the *dialectic*, believing that the method was implicit

in the Socratic system described by Plato in his Dialogues. But for Hegel the process led to an ever more perfect manifestation of the Idea; thus the method could be called dialectical idealism.

What Marx did was to select those parts of Hegel's scheme which appeared to fit in with his own very thorough and careful study of the social, political, and economic facts of his era, and in the later part of his life he claimed that he had stood Hegel right side up. The sole reality in human existence, according to Marx, was the "prevailing mode of economic production and exchange." The ideas held by men were not divine or superearthly, as Hegel held; on the contrary, they were determined by the prejudices of their economic class. If the economic facts are known, the thoughts of men are predictable. There is indeed, according to Marx, a historical necessity, and the dialectic is certainly the method of discovering it. All history is the history of class struggle, and this struggle and its different phases represent the thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The rise of the bourgeoisie was a historical necessity, for the bourgeoisie has a part to play in history—namely, the destruction of the outdated feudal system. But the bourgeoisie digs its own grave because it brings into existence its own antithesis, the proletariat, whose triumph involves the destruction of the bourgeoisie and the advent of a classless society—the withering away of all forms characteristic of bourgeois rule, including the state.

The Marxian system is therefore called dialectical materialism, against Hegel's dialectical idealism, and Marx characterized Hegel's notion of the Idea as "abstract thinking" and "simple mystification," since Hegel preferred to couch his philosophy in abstract terms rather than complete his insights with a proper appreciation of the actual facts of life as Marx had observed and studied them. It was difficult for a disciple of Hegel to discover how the Idea was striving to manifest itself and thus cooperate with it. There was no such difficulty for a follower of Marx, who could see for himself from the facts of history just how the dialectic had worked in the past and how the bourgeoisie had destroyed the ancient feudal forms and substituted capi-

talism as its economic method. There was no difficulty and much satisfaction to be gained from predicting the next stage, when the bourgeoisie would fall into the pit it had dug for itself by bringing into being the urban masses and the workers who would themselves come to control society (the dictatorship of the proletariat). Moreover, the bourgeoisie would succeed only too well in its economic tasks, but by its own success would bring about its own downfall, since there were internal defects or "contradictions" in the capitalist system. Since Marxism predicted the destruction of the ruling bourgeoisie, it became a revolutionary creed. Marxists were trained to believe that the forces of history were fighting on their side, and they had only to cooperate with them to win the victory.

Underestimation of the strength of nationalism A further crucial point of contrast between the political thought of Marx and Hegel needs to be considered. Hegel had regarded the national state as the highest manifestation of the Idea on earth, as was natural for a German in his time. Marx, on the contrary, regarded the state as the natural means through which the bourgeoisie asserted its supremacy. Since Marx regarded the struggle between whole classes as a historical necessity, he underestimated the force of nationalism. Viewing it as a temporary phenomenon characteristic of the phase of bourgeois supremacy, he believed that the working classes of all countries, once they had become class-conscious, would unite to overthrow the bourgeoisie of all countries, who themselves constituted a class and would likewise unite to defend their interests. The unity of both classes, the international bourgeoisie and the international proletariat, would transcend national boundaries.

So it happened that when Marx and his friend and financial backer, Friedrich Engels, took positive action to set in motion the historically "necessary" revolution, they appealed to all working men and women everywhere, and from the beginning the movement was international rather than national. Indeed, as we shall see, the greatest ideological enemy of international socialism and communism was found to be nationalism, which was always characterized

by Marx as simply "bourgeois nationalism." The epic struggle between Stalin and Trotsky in Russia, where a proletarian revolution had already been put in motion, was concerned with the question of whether socialism could be established in one country first and later spread to the others by force of example, or whether it must be international from the beginning and could succeed only insofar as it obtained the adherence and support of the proletariat everywhere.

Marxism as program for social action and state control The perception by Marx of the eternal class struggle as a historical necessity had evidently been formed on the basis of his observation of the nineteenth-century conflict between employers and their workers, with the scales weighted in favor of the employers. Marx, leaning upon the views of the classical economists, especially David Ricardo, whose "iron law of wages"—that competition for jobs necessarily drives the wages of the worker down—was an important element in this thinking, propounded in a new form the medieval theory of surplus value. In all products, he proclaimed, labor constituted the only true value. But the total wage bill is much less than the price of the products in the market. The remainder is "surplus value," which is unjustly withheld from the workers who have created it. This is the toll levied upon the worker by the bourgeoisie capitalist because he owns the means of production. It is essential, therefore, that the means of production should be owned by society as a whole and not by private individuals. "Dispossess the possessors" became a fighting slogan of all Marxists.

Production for the benefit of society (the earlier meaning of socialism) thus came to entail nationalization by the State, the organized body of society. This had not been the intention of Marx. But since ownership had to be exercised by someone, this task was ultimately to fall to State bureaucrats, even though in theory the means of production belonged to the people. Other branches and offshoots of the socialist movement, such as syndicalism and anarchism, believe that the workers themselves should organize to take over and manage industry; this

was, indeed, attempted in the earliest phase of the Russian Revolution of 1917. In practice the State, which wielded power, was unwilling to permit the resulting inefficiency and finally took control itself. In parliamentary democracies, such as Britain, some State control was exercised in the management of nationalized industry through inherited political institutions.

Marx as a prophet The ideas of Marx, as has been suggested, were rooted in the social and economic conditions of his day, and his work represents one of the greatest of nineteenth-century attempts at synthesis. It is shot through with important insights, and every social and economic thinker since his day has been compelled to take notice of it. In the study of history, in particular, economic and social realities have since his day won far more consideration than in earlier times, when the particular means of production of a society was given scant consideration in comparison with the deeds of monarchs and the intrigues of courts. But on the whole, in the century since Marx, his view of history and his belief in the inevitability of socialism have been disproved by actual events, understandable as his predictions were in the mid-nineteenth century. Above all, the rigidity of the distinction between classes has been shown to be untrue. In capitalist societies, especially in the United States, there has been a constant movement from the proletariat into the bourgeoisie, so that today it is difficult to say who belongs to which class. Marx predicted that the lowest strata of the bourgeoisie would either sink into the working classes, or would play the role of lackeys for the bourgeoisie and become more reactionary than that class. This latter prediction was accurate for the rise of the Nazi movement in Germany, but it is not a necessary feature of society. For capitalism and the rule of the bourgeoisie have shown themselves, in the past century, far more capable of change than Marx had foreseen—so much so that capitalism has transformed itself, and few economies today bear much resemblance to their nineteenth-century counterparts.

The capitalist system has not only shown itself capable of providing an ever higher standard of living and ever more material products

for the workers to consume; it has also, through the intervention of the State, provided numerous social services paid for by the proceeds of taxation—services which nineteenth-century Socialists believed would be provided only when the people themselves owned the means of production. In other words, the bourgeoisie, by permitting the workers to share, however unequally, in the proceeds of their enterprise, have not only reconciled most workers to their lot and undermined their class solidarity, but in the process have converted nineteenth-century capitalism into a mixed economy. This development, totally unforeseen by Marx, leaves socialist movements of the present time little to plead for but more rewards and services of the same nature, and a vague moral appeal for a more equitable distribution than has been conceded in most countries by the ruling bourgeoisie.

The socialism or communism of Soviet Russia (originally the words were interchangeable) is based on State ownership of the means of production and the abolition of those profits which form the main incentive of capitalists. But though it has appealed to the solidarity of the working class and insisted that some time the proletariat would destroy the bourgeoisie, as predicted by Marx, in fact the Soviet system bears little resemblance to socialism as propounded by Marx himself. It is, indeed, increasingly difficult to fit it within the ideological framework provided by him. This does not prevent the Soviet system from having a potent appeal, especially in countries which have not yet undergone their "bourgeois revolution." But the appeal is rather on the grounds of its efficiency and ability to solve the economic problems of these countries than on the grounds of its "historic necessity."

Marxism and the European Socialist parties

The new socialist movement, strengthened by the theoretical structure of Marxism and fortified by the positive action of Marx, Engels, and others, soon absorbed most of the earlier forms of socialism. The moderates who looked toward social reform and modifications in the existing system without revolution for the most part worked within the framework of relatively small

national groups and parties. Ferdinand Lassalle, a Socialist who desired State intervention on behalf of the workers and who founded the German Social Democratic party, did not live to see his party taken over by the Marxists. He was killed in 1864 in a duel at the age of thirty-nine, and his successors as party leaders were unable to resist the rising tide of Marxism. Until very recently the venerable Social Democratic party in Germany paid at least lip service to Marxian principles, even though in practice it accepted the framework of the national state. This party always looked forward to a cooperative commonwealth which would replace the bourgeois capitalist state; but it also put forward minimal demands as a working program of reforms. Bismarck tried to suppress the party by legislation but succeeded only in driving it underground until his fall from power. Thereafter it rapidly became the leading political party in the German Empire, and held more seats in the Reichstag than any other.

The largest of the French Socialist parties was Marxist until the first World War, though, as customary in France, there were several schisms in the party. In later years the only fully Marxian party was the powerful Communist party of France, though the other Socialist parties retained some elements of Marxism. In Italy the Socialist party was likewise strong, though syndicalism, which retained its revolutionary fervor after the Socialists had become relatively respectable and had been joined by many bourgeois reformers, was also strong among the working classes. Syndicalism believed in direct action by the workers to establish rule by themselves and entailed the destruction of bourgeois capitalism and its institutions.

The Socialist Internationals Already during the lifetime of Marx and Engels an effort had been made to persuade the workers of all countries to unite in a program in the interest of their class. Thus in 1864 the First International was established with frankly revolutionary aims. Although moderate workingmen as well as anarchists and syndicalists took a part in the early congresses of the First International, the revolutionary Marxists captured control without much difficulty. But the organization,

after the expulsion of dissident elements, was too weak to achieve much. The first International petered out in the early 1870's, to be replaced in 1889 by a Second International. But since this was made up of the existing Socialist parties in the various European countries, it had necessarily to be more moderate than its predecessor. Conditions varied so much in the different countries, that few were able to adopt and proclaim the full Marxist program and theoretical structure.

Early in the twentieth century a number of theoretical Marxists became aware that the predictions of the master did not seem likely to be fulfilled in the near future. They were ready to accept the consequences of this fact by revising Marxist theory as well as practice. Whenever this "revisionism" appeared it was met by outraged opposition from the orthodox Marxists, and schisms developed in the socialist ranks everywhere. The break was nowhere more virulent than in Russia, where the orthodox Marxists, the Bolsheviks, waged constant war on the Mensheviks, who adopted the Marxian creed but wished to proceed gradually, and on the other lesser Socialist parties. These believed only in ultimate Marxian goals achieved through State action, and not in overthrowing the State itself in favor of a dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus socialism became gradually a different creed from communism, which adopted the revolutionary implications of Marxism. Socialism accepted the existing framework but believed in much that Marx had taught, looking forward not to the abolition but to the socialization of private property and to the nationalization of as much of industry as seemed feasible within the given governmental structure.

The non-Marxian Socialist movement This tactical flexibility characteristic of modern socialism was always true of the movement in Britain, where the working classes have found their means of political expression through the labor unions, and where support has been forthcoming from intellectuals who were not of the working classes but who felt that the political and economic structure of the country should be reformed for the benefit of the worker. In the 1880's the Fabian Society was founded,

which strove to educate the people slowly (Q. Fabius Maximus, after whom the organization was named, was a Roman general who held Hannibal at bay by delaying tactics) to the need for social reform. Bernard Shaw, H. G. Wells, and the two reformers Sidney and Beatrice Webb belonged to the group, which still leads in social thinking and continues to publish pamphlets suggesting new goals to be pursued by reformers. Although most of the Fabians were socialists, few were Marxian socialists, and none accepted Marx's most extreme doctrines and program. An early social democratic party in England which was Marxian made few converts among the workers and gradually faded away, leaving the way open for a genuine working-class movement which looked to the achievement of power through the ordinary processes of government. The Labor party, which was initially an organization of trade unions, cooperative societies, and socialist groups and did not include individual members, became quickly effective in English political life and since 1923 has always constituted either the Government party or the Opposition. The conservatism of the trade unions, the majority of whose members have never been socialist, ensured the respectability and relative conservatism of the party. Not until after many of the more moderate Labor party leaders decided to form a coalition with the Conservatives in 1931 to combat the Great Depression did the leadership fall into the hands of true socialists, with a program for the nationalization of industry. Even so the policy of the Labor party was still far from Marxian, the full Marxian program being taken over, as elsewhere, by the tiny British Communist party.

In the British Dominions the important Labor parties of New Zealand and Australia, which held power quite early in the twentieth century, enacted many socialist reforms and pioneered social legislation, following the tradition of the British Labor party rather than the Social Democratic parties of the Continent. Scandinavia and Finland have been ruled since World War I more by Social Democratic (socialist) parties than by any others. But this has meant an effort by the State to control the excesses of private enterprise and to take over

private enterprise only when it seemed that it could achieve social purposes better than private industry itself. These countries have mixed economies; and in all of them the cooperative movement is strong and is encouraged by the State as an alternative to both State control and unfettered private enterprise. In the United States, though socialist parties have long existed, they have never won much public support. Both major parties at different times have adopted social reform as part of their own programs and have enacted it into law. In Latin America, only Uruguay has seen much systematically applied socialism in accordance with theoretical socialist principles.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION—THE NATIONAL STATE AND WORLD ECONOMY

The Industrial Revolution represents an irreversible change in the history of Western man. There can be little doubt that the problem of production is in principle solved. The world could easily, within a very short time, produce enough goods to satisfy all reasonable human needs. The resources and technique, however, are available to the world as a whole, not to each country according to the present national divisions of the world's territory. Every nation wishes to industrialize to solve its own economic and social problems, and to obtain the standard of living to which the peoples of the world have now come to believe they are entitled as a matter of right. It is therefore obvious to the rational man that the resources and techniques available to the most advanced industrial nations should be shared with the others, who are either less well endowed by nature or who started the industrial process much later than they.

But the means by which this sharing can be accomplished are by no means obvious, and the archaic political structure of the world makes the process exceedingly difficult. The advanced industrial nations themselves are faced with severe problems, which are as yet far from solution and may be incapable of solution within the political framework inherited from the past. The continuing Industrial Revolution requires a constant growth of output and consumption,

and this, in the case of all fully developed industrial nations, entails in turn a constantly increasing export trade. This export trade is limited by the ability of the less developed countries to pay for imports. They can pay for imports only by industrializing themselves; but this means, in the initial stages, a tariff wall against competitive imports. Furthermore, within the industrial countries there are cycles of contraction and expansion which invariably have their effects on the countries that buy from and sell to them. The reasons for such cycles are still imperfectly understood, and the means for dealing with them are no less imperfect; they might be totally efficacious if another depression like that of the 1930's were to strike the world economy.

In spite of the problems involved, no one today suggests that the Industrial Revolution should be halted, nor that there should be a truce to inventions. The promise of world plenty and the satisfaction of all reasonable wants is so tempting that everyone wants to share in it; how they are to do so may well be the crucial problem for the rest of this century and even for several centuries to come—provided the tensions produced do not result in a war which will destroy the industrial civilization of Western man, and compel the survivors to start again with a new political and social structure that may be able to solve the problems better than ours.

Suggestions for further reading

PAPERBACK BOOKS

- Berlin, Isaiah. *Karl Marx: His Life and Environment*. Galaxy. By one of the best-informed historians of Marxism. Somewhat hostile to Marx, but relatively fair-minded in view of the customary approach in western countries.
- Fremantle, Anne. *Little Band of Prophets*. NAL. Useful study of the Fabians, with bibliography of their works.
- Hayek, F. A. *The Road to Serfdom*. Phoenix. Argues eloquently against socialism, democracy, and the welfare state.
- Mannheim, Karl. *Ideology and Utopia*. Harvard. Thought-provoking classic.

Marx, Karl, and Engels, Friedrich. *The Communist Manifesto*. Gateway.

Marx, Karl, and Engels, Friedrich. *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*. Ed. by Lewis S. Feuer. Anchor. An adequate selection for those who do not wish to attempt the formidable originals, especially Karl Marx, *Capital* (Modern Library Giant).

Mill, John Stuart. *Utilitarianism*. Liberal Arts Press. By the mid-nineteenth-century Utilitarian on his predecessors, their theories, and his own. A strong defense of the pleasure principle of Utilitarianism as the foundation of justice and freedom.

Stace, W. T. *The Philosophy of Hegel*. Dover. Extremely valuable work, much clearer than Hegel's own writings, but still difficult and requiring hard study.

Usher, A. P. *A History of Mechanical Inventions*. Beacon. Already recommended for the medieval period, the book is invaluable for the Industrial Revolution, and is less confined than some accounts to the developments in England.

Wilson, Edmund. *To the Finland Station*. Anchor. An interesting and well-written account of radical and socialist movements from the French to the Russian revolutions.

CASEBOUND BOOKS

Ashton, T. S. *The Industrial Revolution, 1760-1830*. London: Home University Library, 1948. Excellent survey, based on the newest interpretations.

Clough, Shepard B. *The Economic Development of Western Civilization*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1959. The earlier part of this book is not substantially different from the *Economic History of Europe*, recommended in Chapter 9, although much shorter; but the later part, especially on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, is much improved, and is excellent on the period covered by this chapter.

Cole, G. D. H. *Socialist Thought*. New York: St. Martin's Press. 5 vols. Vol. 1: *The Forerunners, 1789-1850* (1953); vol. 2: *Marxism and Anarchism* (1954). Comprehensive works by the most important English interpreter of socialism of recent times.

Hammond, J. L. and B. *The Rise of British Industry*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1937. Relatively short and useful survey

by the two social historians who elsewhere adopt a very severely critical attitude toward the early Industrial Revolution and its effects on English workers.

Hayek, F. A., ed. *Capitalism and the Historians*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954. Several writers discuss the anti-capitalist views of most historians; two further essays, one by T. S. Ashton, present the revisionist view regarding the well-being of the early industrial workers.

Hayes, Carlton J. H. *A Generation of Materialism*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1941. Provocative and interesting work, hostile to many features of modern society but well informed, and especially interesting on the social consequences of industrialism.

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Democracy. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942. A classic account of the three systems and their theoretical basis.

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Liberalism and Democracy in the Nineteenth Century

In the introduction to Part VI, we spoke of the three major political movements of the nineteenth century—nationalism, liberalism, and radicalism or democracy, and in Chapter 17 we dealt with nationalism and the independence movements that sprang from it. The present chapter will discuss the achievements of liberalism and the growth of democracy.

Such liberalism as there was in the disunited and subject states dealt with in Chapter 17 necessarily had to take second place to nationalism while independence or unity was being attained.

As might be expected, therefore, it is in the older nations that liberalism can best be seen at work—modifying the institutions, making the legislature more representative, taking power away when necessary from the monarch or aristocracy, trying to improve the lot of the people by appropriate legislation. The three nations where liberalism flourished most were, of course, France, Great Britain, and the United States, and it is therefore to these three countries that most of this chapter will be devoted.

At the end of the nineteenth century there were still only two republics in Christian Europe, the tiny confederation of Switzerland and the Third Republic of France. Yet there was only one absolute monarch, the tsar of Russia, and even he had to grant a constitution in 1905, though his power was limited only slightly by it. The system developed empirically

by the British in the seventeenth century, under which the monarch reigns but does not rule, had been widely adopted. To be sure, limited monarchy had different forms, which left varying degrees of power to the monarchs, ranging from considerable in Germany to almost none in Britain. Even in France, which since 1871 had been a republic, the elected president was far more like a constitutional monarch than he was like the president of the United States, who shares power with the legislature. Indeed, the French presidency had already been subjected to conventions similar to those of the British monarchy. Though in theory he possessed the power to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies with the consent of the Senate and call for new elections, a French president's single attempt to make use of this power had created such difficulties that it fell into disuse thereafter.

Although the constitutional changes in Europe for the most part followed the British model, ironically it was the French whose efforts to change their regime provided the example for similar efforts in other European countries. It was the French also who experienced the greatest difficulty in finding a constitution acceptable to the French people. Even today it is doubtful whether the constitution of the Fifth Republic will long outlast its founder, General de Gaulle, for whose peculiar talents it was tailored. On the other hand, the British constitution has evolved slowly and organically; as

in the United States, there have been no further revolutions after the first. Both countries in modern times have used the institutions they inherited, transforming rather than overturning them. In spite of the fundamental differences between the written constitution of the United States and the unwritten conventions and organic laws that make up the British constitution, each commands a very wide degree of acceptance amongst the peoples governed by it, and each, in spite of an occasional glaring failure, is venerated as if it had been directly transmitted from on high.

❖ French constitutional development in the nineteenth century

ATTITUDE OF DIFFERENT SOCIAL CLASSES TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT

There was, and to some degree still is, wide disagreement among the different social classes in France as to what kind of government is desirable. This difference reflects the social structure of France, unique among the major countries of Europe. In France for centuries there has been a stable, conservative, and usually religious class of peasants and small farmers whose interests are bounded by the local small town, and which actively distrusts radical Paris. Even the bourgeoisie for the most part has its roots in the countryside or the small town, and not in the large towns or in the capital. This was of course more marked in the nineteenth than it is in the twentieth century; but it is still more characteristic of France than of any other industrial country.

The peasantry, though its interests were limited, was far from being uncivilized or even illiterate; its most vivid recollections of the French Revolution included the ending of feudalism, which it largely approved, the civil Constitution of the Clergy, the collapse of the value of money, the Terror and the peasants' own counterrevolution of the Vendée, and the great wars, fought outside the soil of France, especially the victories of Napoleon. With the exception of the ending of feudalism and the possible exception of the wars, all these events

were regarded as wrong by the peasantry. Conscription, though resented, especially in the time of the Convention, had nevertheless resulted in the widening of horizons—and the memory of Napoleon, the great conqueror of Europe, was cherished by many, for the peasant partook of French patriotism, with its desire for grandeur, even more fully than did most republicans. The peasants also remembered that Napoleon had come to an agreement with the Church, under which their priests and their religion had been restored. These men had no desire for rule by the bourgeoisie, whose interests were not theirs; still less were they interested in the radical republicanism of the workers in the great cities.

Whenever the peasants were given the opportunity to vote, they voted either for the local man whom they knew, who frequently turned out to be a conservative, or for what appeared to them to be the more conservative side. Although in certain regions of France some peasants were strongly anticlerical, most of them were at least in favor of the monarchy. When, for example, the Directory granted universal manhood suffrage, they astonished the government by providing it with a royalist legislature, which had to be dispersed by the famous "whiff of grapeshot." In 1848 they voted for a moderate assembly, and again in 1849 for a royalist assembly, in spite of the fact that just a few months before they had chosen Louis Napoleon as president. What in both cases the peasant was doing was choosing the men he knew. All knew the name of Napoleon, although they had no idea of what he stood for. They might be in equal ignorance of the views of their local representative, nor had they, as a rule, any means of knowing whether he was for or against the policies of Napoleon. In 1871, when Napoleon III was in exile, they knew that he had just been defeated, and they had no desire as yet for a republic. So they voted for monarchists, who they hoped would restore a Bourbon or an Orléanist to the throne. Not until this last hope was dimmed, and the republicans put on a strong campaign among the peasants to convert them to republicanism, did they acquiesce in the indefinite postponement of a royal restoration.

Throughout the century the radical repub-

Chronological Chart

<i>France</i>		<i>Britain and Dominions</i>	
Reign of Louis xviii	1814-1824	First boatload of convicts landed at Botany Bay, Australia	1788
Reign of Charles x	1824-1830	Canada Act—division into Upper and Lower Canada	1791
"July Revolution"—abdication of Charles x	1830	Reform of English criminal code	1822
Reign of Louis Philippe ("July monarchy")	1830-1848	Repeal of Test Act	1828
Abdication of Louis Philippe—establishment of Second Republic	1848 (Feb. 24)	Catholic Emancipation Act	1829
Establishment of National Workshops	(Feb. 28)	First Reform Bill	1832
Insurrection suppressed by Cavaignac	(June 23-26)	Abolition of slavery in empire	1833
Louis Napoleon becomes president of Republic	(Dec. 20)	Reign of Queen Victoria	1837-1901
Despatch of French troops to Rome	1849	Rebellion in Upper and Lower Canada	1837
Education and electoral laws	1850	Durham Report (Canada)	1839
Coup d'état of Napoleon	1851	First colonists in New Zealand	1840
New constitution—Napoleon iii, emperor of the French	1852	Reunification of Upper and Lower Canada	1840
War with Piedmont against Austria	1859	Repeal of the Corn Laws	1846
Annexation of Savoy and Nice	1860	Australian Colonies Act—self-government	1850
Intervention in Mexico	1861-1867	Responsible self-government in New Zealand	1852-1856
Liberalization of Napoleonic regime	1868-1870	Responsible self-government in Newfoundland	1855
Franco-Prussian War	1870-1871	Second Reform Bill	1867
Capitulation of Napoleon at Sedan	1870	British North America Act—creation of dominion of Canada	1867
Monarchist victory in elections	1871 (Feb.)	First Gladstone administration	1868-1874
Paris Commune	(Mar.-May)	Disestablishment of Irish (Episcopal) Church	1869
MacMahon becomes president	1873	Forster Education Act (compulsory education at local option)	1870
Constitutional laws of the Third Republic	1875	Ballot Act (secret voting) in England	1872
Principle of ministerial responsibility accepted by MacMahon	1877	Administration of Disraeli	1874-1880
Boulangier crisis	1886-1889	Purchase of Suez Canal shares by Disraeli for government	1875
Dreyfus Affair	1894-1906	Foundation of Fabian Society	1883
Separation of Church and State	1905	Third Reform Bill	1884
		Defeat of first Irish Home Rule Bill of Gladstone	1886

Foundation of Independent Labor party	1893
Boer War	1899-1900
Reign of Edward VII	1901-1910
Australia becomes federal commonwealth	1901
Trades Disputes Act—fully legalized union activity	1906
New Zealand becomes dominion in British Empire	1907
Administration of Herbert Asquith	1908-1916
Old-age pensions granted at age of 70	1909
Lloyd George budget rejected by House of Lords	1909
Parliament Act—reform of House of Lords	1911
Entry of Britain into World War I	1914 (Aug. 4)
Irish Home Rule Bill (excluding Ulster) passed	(Sept.)

United States

Constitutional Convention	1787
Presidency of George Washington	1789-1797
Bill of Rights (first ten amendments) passed by Congress	1789
Presidency of Jefferson	1801-1809
War of 1812 with England	1812-1814
Presidency of Andrew Jackson	1829-1837
Annexation of Texas	1845
Mexican War	1846-1848
Presidency of Lincoln	1861-1865
Civil War	1861-1865
Assassination of Lincoln	1865
Spanish-American War	1898
Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt	1901-1909
Presidency of Woodrow Wilson	1913-1921

licans of the working classes had no chance of reforming the constitution in such a way that they could win power. Universal suffrage meant a royalist or Bonapartist majority; a limited property franchise meant rule by a bourgeois government. A plebiscite, the instrument used by Napoleon III and, he it said, by General de Gaulle, differed only in its simplicity from the election of deputies by universal manhood suffrage, and it still gave the workers no chance of making their views predominant. They were therefore in a condition of permanent political frustration. Only by violent methods could they hope to control even Paris, since under a centralized administrative system the central government controls local appointments. Paris could not be ruled by the working classes, as would be possible in a great English city with an elected municipal government. It was not until the 1880's that France had a similar elected municipal governmental system, and even then the powers of the municipal government were strictly limited. All that the Parisian workers could therefore do was to overthrow a government by direct action; this they did in 1830 and again in 1848. In 1871 the workers set up a Commune, which was suppressed by the army, obedient to orders of an assembly elected by universal suffrage and representing all France. No other outcome was possible. Today the majority of the French workers give their adherence to the Communist party, which has no chance of ruling France and forming a government on the basis of free elections under universal franchise. The class cleavages in France still have not been healed; no constitution can be devised that will solve the problem, whose solution must be sought elsewhere than in legal instruments.

The nineteenth-century political and constitutional history of France can be understood only if the fundamental class cleavages and the predominance of Paris in the life of the nation are understood. The bourgeoisie, save for the period of the Second Empire and for the brief reign of Charles X (1824-1830), were in undisputed control of the country. Even during the Second Empire they wielded more influence than any other group. There were many liberals among them, and under the Third Republic the

government was in many respects the most liberal, as it was the most democratic in Europe. But it was a conservative and not a radical liberalism and democracy: the rights of property, as in contemporary England, were sacrosanct, and the government mainly served the interests of the monied classes. The franc was the soundest money in the world, and the country, by virtue of its balanced economy, suffered least of any from cyclical depressions. In France the value of money fluctuated less than in any other major country—in spite of, or perhaps because of, the fact that its industrial production was lower than in Germany, Britain, or the United States.

THE END OF THE BOURBON MONARCHY (1814-1830)

Louis XVIII (1814-1824), on coming to the throne, "granted" a constitution to his subjects under which the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of the legislature) was elected by approximately 100,000 voters, respectable men of property. The king and his parliament generally saw eye to eye on most matters, and the monarch had no desire to quarrel with it, recognizing that it would be unwise for him to attempt to undo the past. His brother Charles X (1824-1830), however, had no such compunctions. He was a believer in the divine rights of kings—he even revived the ancient custom of laying his royal hands on the scrofulous to cure them of the disease known as "the king's evil"—and in the property rights of the dispossessed aristocrats, whom he persuaded his parliament to compensate. He had no intention of allowing his power to be limited by the legislature; and when, as the result of his unpopular policies, even the propertied electorate chose deputies who opposed him, government rapidly became impossible. The king was criticized in the press and proposed to institute censorship. He appointed ministers in whom the Chamber of Deputies had no confidence and who could not command a majority in it. He used his only power over the Chamber to try to obtain a majority favorable to him; that is, he dissolved it. But the resulting new Chamber was even more liberal than the old. Charles therefore pro-

posed to change the electoral basis to ensure the election only of his own partisans, the ultra-royalists, known as *Ultras*.

But Charles did not have at his disposal the powers enjoyed by the English Charles II during the Restoration; even the French army, which might have been loyal to the king, was away fighting in Algeria. The National Guard, made up of propertied persons who kept their arms at home in readiness for a call to service, was not sympathetic, and Charles had dissolved the Guard, at least in theory, a few years previously. In July, 1830 the Paris workers, led this time by the opposition bourgeois deputies, rose in rebellion and Charles went into exile. At this moment the aged Marquis de Lafayette, still revered as a revolutionary hero, presented to the people his own choice, Louis Philippe, the head of the Orléanist branch of the Bourbon family and cousin of the late king. Wrapping him in the tricolor flag of the Revolution, Lafayette had him acclaimed by the people, and the choice was later confirmed by the deputies. Louis Philippe, was willing, unlike his cousin, to accept the tricolor as the national flag, and he called himself king of the French rather than king of France, a distinction that stemmed from Napoleon, who, it will be remembered, styled himself emperor of the French.

THE "JULY MONARCHY" (1830-1848)

Although the July Revolution set off a train of minor revolutions in Europe, as we have seen, in France itself little was changed, save that Louis Philippe was a fully constitutional monarch; the franchise was doubled by lowering the property restrictions; and the *Ultras* had lost their influence in parliament with the loss of their influence on the Crown. Louis was very careful to offer as unrevolutionary an appearance as he could. He dressed in a business suit and carried an umbrella to please the bourgeoisie; he avoided foreign wars, calling himself the "Napoleon of Peace," and in a mild way used his influence to help the lot of industrial workers by such measures as the prohibition of child labor under the age of eight. At the end of his reign, when a succession of bad harvests and the only severe industrial depression that



Louis Philippe, the "bourgeois monarch" parades his bourgeois status (left); in royal attire (right). (COURTESY PRINTS DIVISION, NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY)


France had to undergo during the century were arousing a revolutionary ferment, especially in Paris, he tried to do more. But it was by then too late.

During the entire reign of Louis Philippe the government was in the hands of the upper bourgeoisie, under a succession of chief ministers. The French people were bored with Louis and his rule. There was no grandeur; prosperity was mostly for the few; and at the end there was near-destitution for many of the workers. When Louis Philippe was requested to enlarge the franchise to give some political power to others than the rich, he was wont to reply, "Get rich yourselves and then you can have your vote." The liberals demanded a wider franchise and a more popular government, but Louis resisted their demands for all his reign, though at the end he was on the point of granting it. The Paris workers, many of whom had been affected by the new socialist opinions—

especially by those of Louis Blanc, who had a program for "national workshops" to relieve unemployment—joined with the liberals in the desire to get rid of the do-nothing government. They were, as so often, ready to man the barricades. A demonstration ended in the killing of some twenty persons in February, 1848. Louis, uncertain of the loyalty of the National Guard, abdicated and followed his predecessor to England.

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1848

This time the demand was for a republic. There was no acceptable monarch available from the Bourbon family, and no confidence on the part of the workers or of liberal intellectuals in the monarchy itself as an institution. Even though there was an effort to have the grandson of Louis Philippe accepted as king by the Chamber of Deputies, there was no longer any



Paris street demonstration. The drawing from L'Illustration, contemporary Parisian magazine, shows Louis Blanc, member of the provisional government of 1848, addressing the people. The flags are those of the workingmen's clubs.

confidence in that body either. The workers and moderate republicans accepted a provisional government of eleven men until a constituent assembly could be elected by universal manhood suffrage to write a constitution. The government was headed by the poet Alphonse de Lamartine, and one of its members was Louis Blanc. National workshops were set up and wages of two francs a day were given to all those who worked on what were virtually relief projects. One franc a day was given to the unemployed. The election for a constituent assembly took place in April, but the legislators elected outside Paris were very moderate men, of whom probably less than a majority favored a republic. The Parisian workers were shocked by the election results and, perhaps for the first time, recognized their helplessness. One of the assembly's first acts was to suppress the national workshops, which appeared to the legislators to be not only expensive but subversive and revolutionary.

In June the workers again took to the barricades, but found all the forces of law and order arrayed against them. General de Cavaignac led the counterrevolution, with the regular army increased by recruits from the

provinces and supported by the bourgeois National Guard, which now had little sympathy with the workers. At the cost of many thousands of lives the rebellion was crushed. The new constitution called for a régime not unlike that of the Consulate of Napoleon I, with some elements borrowed from the United States. There was to be a president and an Assembly, both elected under universal suffrage; but the more important powers rested with the president, including control of the police and the army. To prevent the president from becoming a dictator, he was forbidden to succeed himself after his four years of office. His cabinet, as in the United States, would be responsible to the president, and its members might or might not belong to the single legislative chamber, the Assembly. It was thought that the constitution would be in accord with Montesquieu's notions of the separation of powers. In fact it proved to be closer to the constitutions of the republics of Latin America than to that of the United States; and it resulted in the presidential dictatorship so common in those republics. But since the first and only president of France under the Second Republic bore the name of Napoleon, and since the

republic had as yet had little time to acquire any sanctity. Louis Napoleon, nephew of Napoleon I, found little difficulty in converting his title into the more sacred one of emperor of the French, thus obviating the necessity of holding any further presidential elections.

THE SECOND REPUBLIC—LOUIS NAPOLEON AS PRESIDENT

Louis Napoleon was elected, of course, because of his name. He himself was not well known in France, and his career would, quite possibly, not have inspired confidence among the electors who voted for him in such substantial numbers. He had already tried to overthrow Louis Philippe on two occasions by ill-timed and ill-planned conspiracies, and only two years before he became president he had escaped from a not very secure jail in which his predecessor had confined him. He was thought by some to be a socialist, and he was at one time a member of the Carbonari in Italy. But qualifications were not necessary in the first presidential election of the new republic. Louis Napoleon's competitors were the poet Lamartine, former president of the provisional government; General Cavaignac, who had just suppressed the Parisian uprisings and was the effective leader of the provisional government and its minister of war; a Radical Democrat; and a Socialist. They were no match for Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte—prince by virtue of having been born (or at least registered) as the son of the erstwhile king of Holland, the brother of Napoleon I, and his queen, the daughter of Napoleon I's empress Josephine by her first marriage. General Cavaignac garnered more than a million votes but was snowed under by Napoleon's five million. The others were also-rans, Lamartine earning a bare eight thousand votes.

The magic of the name and of the Napoleonic legend that had been growing in the past thirty years, nurtured by Napoleon I's own efforts before his death in 1821 on the island of St. Helena, brought Louis Napoleon to power. But his hitherto concealed abilities were real. He had imagination and a flair for public relations, qualities that were rare in the France

of his day but very useful in an age of growing prosperity and industrialization. He was also a skilled political manipulator. The legislature elected under universal suffrage was, as noted earlier, royalist in complexion. In his successful efforts to undermine it Napoleon showed himself to be a true political virtuoso. He encouraged it to pass unpopular laws which appealed to some sections of the electorate but not to the majority. He aided and abetted the legislature when it proposed to take away the vote from the workers. This vote was of little use to the workers save as a symbol of their right to be represented. But taking it away was a provocative act and discredited the legislators in their eyes. Napoleon himself was not blamed by them, since his part in the matter was not understood. As his term in office neared its end he carried out a coup that was bloodless except in Paris. He dismissed the Assembly, which was by this time generally unpopular. The Assembly and its supporters throughout the country did not submit tamely, and indeed many thousands were thrown into jail. But Napoleon effectively controlled the army. Finally, he proclaimed himself emperor of the French and called upon the people, after the manner of his uncle, to vindicate his actions by plebiscite. This they did by a topheavy majority in 1852.

THE SECOND EMPIRE (1852-1870)

Domestic Policy of Napoleon III. Napoleon III, as he called himself out of deference to the long-dead son of his uncle by Marie Louise of Austria (who had in fact never reigned as Napoleon II), alternately pleased and displeased various groups of his subjects. He gained the good will of the Catholics by saving the pope from losing his territories to Italian nationalists, and later annoyed the same Catholics by helping the same nationalists to a victory over Austria which gave the French a taste of glory, and the pope a strong and justified sense of insecurity. He aided the workers by some social legislation and he rebuilt much of Paris. He negotiated a trade treaty with the British, establishing free trade between the two nations, thereby terrifying many of the French

industrialists—who, however, soon forgave him when they found they were well able to compete with the British and actually increased their profits. He was financially unorthodox and never troubled to balance his budgets; but the increase of the national debt hurt no one at the time and pleased those who bought government bonds. Though he incurred the undying enmity of the greatest writer of France, Victor Hugo, who fulminated against him from the security of the Channel Islands, his regime was in fact neither especially oppressive, in spite of his censorship and police, nor was it ever seriously unpopular until the end.

Foreign policy What destroyed Napoleon was his foreign policy and his neglect of the national interests of France in pursuit of the Napoleonic dream of glory, and his chronic inability to perceive the probable results of his actions and policies. Bismarck outwitted him with ease, and his contempt for Austria as an outmoded and reactionary regime misled his judgment. He gained little from the Crimean War, and though he won Nice and Savoy from his participation in the Italian campaign, his premature withdrawal antagonized both Austria, his enemy, and Italy, his ally. He intervened in Mexico while the United States was engaged in civil war and set up an Austrian archduke as emperor, apparently without realizing that the United States would never tolerate a French protectorate in Mexico once she was free to take action. When the United States demanded that he withdraw French troops, he had no option but to agree, leaving the archduke Maximilian to die before a Mexican firing squad. In the Austro-Prussian War it was clearly in the French national interest to back Austria and the German Catholic states against Prussia, as the Austrian ambassador so eloquently warned him. But he was bemused by Bismarck's promises of compensation for his neutrality—promises which Bismarck in fact publicized to discredit the emperor later. Thus in 1870 France was left alone without allies, and with the public opinion of Europe against her.

Though Napoleon for the greater part of his reign made little use of his legislature, which

was purely advisory in spite of being elected by universal suffrage, the late sixties saw him trying to become a truly constitutional ruler. He granted real powers to the legislature and chose a real chief minister, who would be responsible to the country's elected representatives as well as to the Crown. But war came before the government had had a chance to prove itself; and Napoleon and his government went down in defeat before the Prussians. Out of the defeat came the Third French Republic—the Republic which had no full written constitution and survived for seventy years, fought one successful world war, but collapsed under the hammer blows of the second.

THE THIRD REPUBLIC

Early efforts to restore monarchy After the collapse of the main French armies in the Franco-Prussian War the Germans marched on Paris and besieged it. Efforts were then made by patriots to save Paris by diversionary military movements and to carry on with the struggle from centers outside Paris. These efforts, however, were doomed to failure. Meanwhile other Frenchmen were suing for peace. Bismarck reasonably refused to make terms with any French government unless it had a mandate from the French people and was a legitimate government. Adolphe Thiers, an elder statesman and former journalist who had been a deputy under the Bourbon monarchy and a minister under the July monarchy, took charge of the situation and organized the elections under universal manhood suffrage, which resulted in a royalist majority and a relatively small minority of republicans.

There can be no doubt that the monarchy would have been restored in 1871 if the royalists could have agreed on a candidate. The Bourbon monarchists desired the succession of the elderly and childless Comte de Chambord, grandson of Charles X, while the Orléanists wanted the young grandson of Louis Philippe, the Count of Paris, who had fought in the American Civil War. Clearly a compromise was in order—and after much negotiation it was accepted that Chambord should take the crown, to be succeeded by

the Count of Paris, who would then in any case become the head of the Bourbon house. When this solution was finally agreed upon by the Orléanists, the Count de Chambord made such difficult terms, including the restoration of the Bourbon flag as the flag of France, that they could not go along with him. There was therefore nothing left but to wait for Chambord to die. When this event occurred in 1833 it was too late; the tide of royalism had ebbed and the republic was firmly established.

Adolphe Thiers would probably have accepted the succession of either monarch, but there was no time to wait for agreements to be patched up. The Germans were surrounding Paris, and terms had to be made. The Assembly therefore elected him as a provisional president to make terms. This he did. The terms were hard—a heavy indemnity and the loss of Alsace and Lorraine; but he had little choice save to accept. Thereafter he made it his business to raise the indemnity, which was paid off in record time, so high did the financial credit of France still stand. The German army of occupation withdrew, and the French tried to set their constitutional house in order.

Meanwhile the Parisians, furious with the results of the election, refused to accept the authority of the Assembly. They proclaimed their own Commune, which was ruthlessly suppressed by the army, obeying the orders of the Assembly in Versailles while the Germans looked on from a distance of a few miles. Many thousands were killed in the civil war and many more were executed. The Paris workers were even more completely alienated from the mainstream of French society than before.

During the years of the presidency of Thiers, while efforts were being made to write a constitution, republicanism gained ground. Republicans, especially Léon Gambetta, were canvassing the people in the countryside, and their efforts bore fruit in the many by-elections to fill vacancies in the Assembly. Thus the royalists saw their majority being slowly whittled away without the restoration of the monarchy, either Bourbon or Orléanist. When Chambord refused to take the crown on the terms agreed to by the monarchist deputies of both parties,

the deputies used their majority to oust Thiers and install a respected monarchist as president, with the understanding that he would keep the seat warm for Chambord.

Meanwhile France still had no permanent constitution. Various laws were passed, many of them by small majorities, until the crucial law itself (Wallon Amendment of 1875) established a republic with a president who should hold office for seven years. This law was passed by a majority of one vote. Thereafter President MacMahon attempted to work with various blocs in the Chamber of Deputies, using his influence to prepare the way for a restoration of the monarchy. But when he dissolved the Chamber and called for new elections, the monarchists were seen to have lost their majority. This, however, did not prevent the president from appointing a royalist government, which could not command a majority in the Chamber. Unable to carry on the government by such means, MacMahon eventually had to bow to the will of the Chamber and appoint a republican government, however distasteful it was to him (May 1877). Thereafter the republic was secure. There were no more monarchist majorities in the Chamber during the life of the Third Republic.

Constitutional (organic) laws of the Third Republic: The constitutional laws of the Third Republic established a president who held office for seven years, and whose power was limited both by law and by convention to virtually that of a constitutional monarch. The legislature was composed of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies, but the laws did not specify the powers of the Senate. These powers were later accepted as a result of precedent. The Senate, originally made up of life appointees, was later elected indirectly on a staggered basis.

The two major bodies of the Third Republic were the Chamber of Deputies, elected for four years by universal manhood suffrage, and the cabinet (or Council of Government) chosen by the political leader entrusted by the president with the task of constituting a government. The cabinet, to rule effectively, had necessarily to command the confidence of the Chamber. The parliamentary system of the Third Republic was

therefore based on the English model. But there was one crucial difference—in France there have never been political parties strong enough to rule without the aid of any other party. Instead of government by a disciplined party, with the leader of the party as prime minister, in France all governments were coalitions of several parties, some of which might be very small indeed. It was sometimes possible in France, as in Germany during the Weimar Republic, to have a prime minister who had almost no party following but who could command the confidence of the Chamber and who sometimes, because of his very lack of party affiliations, was able to persuade party leaders to join with him in the government. Thus cabinets were notoriously unstable, since one of the constituent parties might desert it on a particular issue, often the budget. Yet government itself was not necessarily unstable. A new bloc would be formed under a new, or sometimes under the same prime minister; few of the cabinet ministers would be changed. Moreover the civil service, which ran the administration, did not change with the government; and even the prefects, who could be dismissed by the government, usually remained in office through successive administrations.

The French government was more influenced by changing public opinion and, in this sense, was more democratic than the British. If the government lost support in the country, this fact would probably be reflected at once in the loss of some of its support in the Chamber, and a vote of no confidence would result. A new government would then be formed, but without a general election until the full four years of the life of the Chamber had been completed. A British government would continue in office as long as the party in power could exercise discipline over its members in the House of Commons. It was therefore given a chance to weather the storm and improve its position in the country before the next election.

The political history of the Third Republic need not detain us here. There was constant strife between the more radical republicans and the right-wing deputies over the position of the Church in French life. The anticlerical republicans were able to obtain the abrogation of the

Concordat of 1801 and the final separation of Church and State, as well as the suppression of schools run by the clergy in favor of free public education. Trade unions were legalized, and social legislation was passed comparable to that in other contemporary industrial countries of Europe.

♦ Great Britain

THE REFORM BILLS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL DEMOCRACY

Political-social structure of the early nineteenth century. Britain had emerged from the Napoleonic Wars with her political institutions intact, but there was great discontent among the middle and lower classes over the virtual monopoly of government by the landed aristocracy. Although some of the very rich had been able to win certain privileges for themselves during the eighteenth century, the ordinary propertied man of the middle classes, even if he had a vote, still could not make effective use of it. This was due to the extreme inequity of the apportionment of seats in the House of Commons, which had been inherited from the seventeenth century and little changed in the eighteenth. In spite of the great increase in the population of the towns as a result of the growing Industrial Revolution, many of the towns had no representation whatever in Parliament. This did not mean that the genuinely rural areas had any better representation, as they still have in many parts of the United States. The English counties were better represented than the towns, but not enough to give them control of the government. The government was dominated rather by individual aristocrats through the system of borough representation, there being about four borough representatives to every one county (rural) representative.

Although some of the boroughs possessed a reasonable number of voters, even under the restricted property franchise, well over half of them had so few voters—or, in the case of some boroughs, no genuine voters at all—that their representatives were virtually nominated by the aristocrats who were the chief landowners in

the area. In the eighteenth century ownership of such "rotten" or "pocket" boroughs changed hands by purchase, giving various rich and noble lords in fact the right to nominate members to Parliament. One famous borough was an uninhabited green hill near Salisbury, which returned two members to Parliament; another had for many years been under the sea, though the family of its former owner continued to choose members to sit for the constituency. The system at the beginning of the nineteenth century bears many resemblances to the electoral system of the Roman Republic prior to the Gracchan revolution, when senators controlled Roman elections through their clients in the rural tribal units.

The electoral system did not necessarily mean that the House of Commons was an irresponsible body, any more than the Roman Senate in pre-Gracchan days was irresponsible. Corruption had been common in the eighteenth century, and there was much trafficking in influence, as there had been in republican Rome. But, again as in Rome, a ruling class had developed in England whose avocation was the government of the country. Government was shared among certain noble families, belonging in England either to the Whig or the Tory party, so that neither was excluded from the responsibility or the spoils of government. The members nominated by the aristocrats were as a rule granted full freedom to vote as they pleased within limits, and some noblemen exercised their right to nominate with discretion, and were glad to share the prestige won by their nominees. The two most distinguished statesmen of the second half of the eighteenth century, William Pitt, father and son, both sat for rotten boroughs, and both entered Parliament at an earlier age than would have been possible if they had had to stand for election in a constituency where voters had to be consulted. It was thought in the eighteenth century—and indeed the tradition is still not altogether lost in England—that each representative in Parliament represented the interests of the entire country, and not of his particular constituents. He was therefore free to think, speak, and vote as he wished, without pressure from the voters in his area, and often without pressure from the man who had nomi-

nated him, unless he acted flagrantly contrary to the latter's interests.

The system, of course, was completely undemocratic; but it had produced governments which were able to defeat Napoleon, and in 1815 enjoyed much prestige from this indisputable fact. But the middle classes, in England as in France, saw no reason why they, who contributed so much to the wealth of the country, should not be able to rule at least as well as the aristocrats; and many of the aristocrats themselves—especially in the Whig party, which had been out of office for almost the whole of the past thirty years—were inclined to agree that it was time for the richest and most respectable members of the middle class to share power with them, especially if this would mean a long-overdue Whig victory. Neither the aristocrats nor the middle class thought it at all proper to share any power at all with the lower classes. The industrial magnates of the upper middle class could imagine nothing more subversive of good order than giving the vote to the workers; while the rural landowners, large and small, regarded the agricultural laborer as forever totally unfit to exercise the franchise. In England, unlike France, there were no peasants who owned property and could be relied upon to vote in a conservative manner. On the contrary, the English agricultural proletariat was at least as extremist in such political views as it had as any urban worker. As late as the 1830's there was an agricultural uprising which had to be suppressed by the hanging and transportation which was customarily meted out by rural justices in such cases. The small farmer in England was always an employer of labor, if only in a minor degree. He belonged to the middle class and was socially far above the landless worker who tilled his lands.

Composition of political parties It is essential to have some grasp of the social structure of England, which was so different from the structure in continental countries, if the progress of democratic reform in the nineteenth century is to be appreciated. The landowning aristocrats composed a small minority in the country. Beneath them was the landowning or land-leasing gentry (squirearchy), who had been accustomed

to filling the governmental positions to which they were nominated by the aristocracy, and who packed the benches in the House of Commons. The House of Lords contained the hereditary peers and the upper clergy of the Anglican Church; though there were some peers in the House of Commons, they were either not peers in their own right (younger sons of peers, or elder sons waiting to inherit the family title), or were Scottish or Irish peers elected for English constituencies. The House of Lords was the stronghold of the landowning aristocracy and would remain so during the nineteenth century. But the gentry in the House of Commons did not identify themselves wholly with aristocratic interests. When the middle classes won the vote for themselves and the gentry had to win election rather than merely accepting nomination, they showed themselves responsive to the needs and desires of the middle class.

During the nineteenth century the gentry might belong to either political party. The Tory, soon to be called the Conservative party was predominantly the vehicle for the landowning interests, leaving the Whig party, soon to be called the Liberal party, to become the spokesman for the middle, and later for the lower classes. A country squire might have excellent reasons for not backing the large landowners and their party, in spite of his community of interest with them in certain areas. The industrial magnates of the middle classes usually belonged to the Whig party, as did the professional middle classes. But sometimes they joined the Tories, and bored from within, forming the liberal element in the Tory party. This was especially true in the earlier years of the nineteenth century, when such men as Sir Robert Peel, Huskisson, and Canning were in the Tory party and liberalized many elements of Tory policy. But in general it must be said that it was the middle classes that dominated the Whig party, even though the Whig seats in Parliament might be filled with country gentry elected largely by the middle class.

The lower middle class and the workers were enfranchised only in 1867. Naturally, through the nineteenth century, they agitated for electoral reform and for legislation in their interests. When they obtained electoral reform



Caricature of Gladstone, four times British prime minister, by Harry Furniss. (COURTESY MUSEUM OF FINE ARTS, BOSTON)

they were able to transform the Liberal party and make it into a party of genuine reform under the leadership of Gladstone. Before the Second Reform Bill of 1867 their interests in Parliament were represented by a small but influential group of Radicals, who did not form any definite party of their own but worked with either the Whigs or the Tories according to the political needs of the moment. Intellectuals, humanitarians, libertarians, and social reformers all may be numbered with the Radicals. Their hard work, and the full preparation of their briefs, gave them an influence in Parliament and the country out of proportion to their numbers. At different times they espoused different causes, and spent much energy in preparing the public through their press, especially Cobbett's *Register* in the early part of the century, to back their various projects. In Parliament usually one or the other of the parties would adopt some part of their program, if only for political reasons. There were never very many Radicals sitting in Parliament at any given time, but there were always some who could introduce bills and speak eloquently on their behalf. Their speeches would often be

backed by demonstrations by the disenfranchised workers, as well as by some elements in the press; and though the demonstrations sometimes frightened the more conservative elements in the House of Commons and in the country, the existence of the House of Commons and of workers' spokesmen in it was a very important element in preventing the urban proletariat in England from following the path of the urban proletariat in France.

The rural proletariat in England, on the other hand (a very minor class in France), remained without the vote until 1884, when it was granted to them by the Liberal government of Gladstone. Even so, it was of relatively little use to the farm laborers, who were outnumbered in their rural constituencies. Attempts were made to organize the agricultural workers, but without much success. The general decline of agriculture in England in the latter part of the nineteenth century forced many laborers into the towns, where they became a part of the urban proletariat and shared their fortunes. When agriculture revived during the world wars because the British were compelled to grow instead of importing their food, the supply of laborers was so small that they were able to improve their lot without the help of legislation. Those who have remained in the countryside rarely identify themselves with the urban workers, and as a political class they have become negligible.

Movements toward electoral reform—First Reform Bill (1832) There were many economic, political, and social problems demanding solution at the end of the Napoleonic wars, when the customary postwar depression set in. The Tory party, which was in power, managed to survive under the old system for more than a decade, aided by the more liberal elements in the party. But it was clear that the crucial issue was Parliamentary reform, second to which was the removal of the political disabilities of religious minorities which still existed from the seventeenth century. On the latter issue the country and the parties were divided, but in 1828 the Tory government of the Duke of Wellington finally removed the disabilities on Catholics. This move was not especially crucial for

England, where Catholics were by now relatively few. But it was of great importance for Ireland, the southern part of which was almost exclusively Catholic. Ireland had been united with England in 1800 and sent members to the British Parliament. Even though, according to the prevailing system, almost all these members were nominated by the English aristocracy, it was evident that sooner or later the electoral system would have to be reformed, and then the Irish vote might help remove some of the other disabilities from which the Irish suffered.

Opinion in England in 1830 was overwhelmingly in favor of electoral reform, even though there were differences of opinion as to how much reform should be permitted. Yet Parliament was still, at the beginning of the year, controlled by Tories led by the Duke of Wellington, even though he no longer commanded a secure majority owing to his attitude on Catholic emancipation. When he was defeated and his government resigned, the Whigs decided that at last their opportunity had come. Earl Grey, the leader of the party, put himself at the head of the reform movement, the workers and Radicals organized demonstrations. Throughout the country many of the members who sat for rotten boroughs recognized that their day was over, and voters hitherto obedient to the command of their landlords likewise saw the writing on the wall. The result was a slight majority for reform, even though the election had been held under the old system. But it was not enough to pass a Reform Bill safely through the House of Commons. There was also the House of Lords to be reckoned with; and the House of Lords, led by the Duke of Wellington, believed that the Reform Bill would mean the end of "civilization as we know it." The Duke, indeed, had already, when in office, stated it as his opinion that the electoral system was so perfect as it was that no human mind could hope to better it.

There was a new king, William IV, on the throne (1830-1837), who held the key to the situation. It was the king's prerogative to create peers, and no one could prevent him. But no one could compel him to exercise his prerogative, either. The House of Lords in the 1830's had an absolute veto on all bills passed by the House of Commons. It had been established in the

reign of Charles II that the House of Lords could not amend money bills, though it could, as far as was known, throw them out altogether. Other than this its power was absolute. But its composition was limited to the hereditary peers, and their number could be increased.

Earl Grey's government passed the bill through the Commons with a majority of one, and it was defeated in committee shortly afterwards on an amendment. Grey resigned and a new election was held. This time there could be no mistake; the unreformed House of Commons had rejected the bill, contrary to the obvious wishes of the people. The system itself was on trial, and the members knew it. Many of them this time deserted their masters; nominees for the rotten boroughs prepared to vote for the bill once they reached Parliament. Monster demonstrations were organized, and the Whigs won. This time they had a safe majority for the bill. It was promptly passed and sent to the Lords, which, in spite of the demonstrations and many absences, rejected the bill. Grey tried again during the next session of Parliament, but was again rebuffed by the Lords. This time he appealed to the king to create new lords, but William, who himself disliked many features of the bill, was not ready to accept the advice of his minister. Thereupon Grey resigned, and William was forced to ask the Duke of Wellington to form a government. This of course he was quite unable to do, since the Commons majority was now safely Whig. When he reported his failure to the king, William was compelled to turn again to Grey, since he had no expectation that a new election, which it was in his power to call, would have any result other than a majority for the bill. He gave Grey written assurance that if the Lords again rejected the bill, he would create the necessary peers. The bill was again passed in the Commons and sent to the Lords, which this time passed it. It was then signed by the king and became law.

The First Reform Bill of 1832 marks the true beginning of popular rule in England. The bill itself abolished the rotten borough system and carried out an extensive redistricting. It also doubled the franchise, which remained confined to fairly large property holders. But the bill is more important for the general principle

that it established; that the king had to accept the advice of his ministers when it had been demonstrated in a general election that the voters were behind the ministry, and that henceforward his personal opinion of a measure would no longer guide his conduct. The bill also established the supremacy of the elected House of Commons over the hereditary House of Lords. Although the Lords did not legally lose their veto power and see this power converted into a merely suspensory veto until 1911, it was now clear that they could in fact only delay, not prevent, the passage of a bill desired by the House of Commons and by the country. It was popular pressure that had forced the bill through, pressure to which the Whigs had shown themselves responsive; henceforward the popular will would elect the governments pledged to policies approved by the people. Nothing now would prevent the elected governments from carrying out such policies, even though legitimate means had not yet been provided for demonstrating fully the popular will.

Political competition and social and economic reform During the period between the first and second reform bills (1832-1867), Parliament, now much more responsive to the will of the middle class, had a few important achievements to its credit, though British prosperity rather than British governmental action was responsible for such improvement as there was in the lot of the still disenfranchised workers. This was also the heyday of the influence of the Radicals, who were often able to swing Parliament toward social reform through judicious pressure on the two political parties, which until 1846 were fairly equally matched. These parties were themselves in a state of flux, each being composed, like parties in the United States, of liberal and conservative elements. Not until after the Second Reform Bill was there a clear difference between the two parties, and it was not until late in the century that internal discipline within the parties became strong enough to prevent defections during the life of a particular Parliament.

The Tory party, which was the preferred party of the landowners and represented the agricultural interests, had no objection to scor-

ing off the Whig magnates by supporting bills for the benefit of the working classes. Most of the humanitarian bills which tempered the evil social effects of the Industrial Revolution came from the Tory side. The long-overdue reform of the criminal code, the establishment of a civilian police system, the abolition of the more savage penalties of the old criminal law, were Tory reforms, supported by the Radicals; so also was the gradual legalization of trade unions. On the other hand, it was the Whigs who pressed for economic reforms, especially free trade and the abolition of the old Navigation Laws, and it was also the Whigs who emancipated the slaves in 1833. The Tory landowners fought hard against the abolition of the protective duties on imported grain, which supported the relatively inefficient landowners and farmers at the expense of the workers who had to buy the grain. Abolition of the duties was favored by the industrialists, who wished to export their products in exchange for cheap food—an arrangement which would allow the workers to buy some of their manufactures without having to spend all their money on food. Ironically, it was a Tory government under Sir Robert Peel that, faced by a widespread famine and actual shortage of food (1846), repealed the duties on grain; even so, the issue so divided the Tories that they were out of power for twenty years, while Disraeli, who had replaced Peel as leader, was rebuilding the party and modernizing it. Neither party favored the agitation of the workers for their Charter, a six-point political reform program, which called among other things for universal manhood suffrage, the secret ballot, and pay for Parliamentary members—all of which, if granted, would have hastened the rise of the working class to political power. But the Chartist agitation, accompanied by "monster petitions" and demonstrations, undoubtedly hastened the passing of other bills for the advantage of the workers, which the legislators hoped would reconcile them to the lack of political reform.

Second and Third Reform Bills (1867–1884) Nevertheless, by the late 1860's, it was clear that the franchise would soon have to be extended. Parliament was in the hands of new

leaders with modernized parties, and neither was anxious to appear indifferent to the workers' demands, especially in view of the possibility that reform would be granted in spite of their objections, and that they would consequently be repudiated by the new voters in the subsequent election. The Liberal party, as it was now called, led by William Gladstone, prepared a new Reform Bill, giving the vote to a substantial number of workers. But the Conservatives actually took over the bill and liberalized it even beyond the desire of most of the Liberals. Once they had passed it, however (1867), the newly enfranchised workers proceeded to vote for Gladstone's Liberal party. During Gladstone's ministry free primary education was introduced and the religious monopoly of education broken. The universities, hitherto exclusive preserves of the Anglican Church, were opened to members of all religious groups; the army was modernized and the purchase of commissions was abolished. A later Gladstone government also carried out a thorough redistricting of Parliamentary constituencies, and pushed through the Third Reform Bill which enfranchised virtually all the men in the country, leaving only the women to receive the vote in 1918 and 1928.

The Disraeli Conservative government of 1874 to 1880 made progress in the fields neglected by the Liberals, especially public sanitation; it also aided the trade unions. As the century neared its end imperial problems came increasingly to the fore, and in this field the Conservatives held popular support rather than the Liberals. Many Liberals disliked the idea of a colonial empire (Little Englanders), and could only with difficulty be persuaded to take the necessary steps to protect the British Empire. The larger industrial magnates by this time had moved into the Conservative fold, leaving the Liberal party to be supported by the remainder of the middle class and by the newly enfranchised workers, whose numbers were increased in 1884 by the Third Reform Bill.

THE IRISH QUESTION

Gladstone, though by far the best known and the most durable of the English political leaders, especially after the death of Disraeli in

1881, became embroiled in the Irish question, which was to haunt British politics for the next fifty years. This, together with his somewhat negative attitude toward British imperialism, lost him and his party much support and prevented the Liberals from achieving more domestic reforms. Gladstone was able to remove many of the economic complaints of the Irish, and he disestablished the Anglican Church in Ireland. He helped curb the unfair privileges of absentee landlords. Before long he also recognized the strength of the Irish movement for home rule, led by Charles Stuart Parnell. But his own party was split on home rule; both the Conservatives and the House of Lords were adamantly against it, as was also the majority in northern Ireland, which had no desire to be ruled by the Catholic south. In 1886 a bill introduced by him, which would have given a certain measure of home rule to the Irish, though retaining many powers in the hands of the British Parliament, failed to pass; in 1893 a slightly less liberal version of the bill passed the Commons but was defeated in the Lords. The failure of these bills prevented the Liberal party from making any effective use of the few occasions when they were in power during the rest of the century.

LIBERAL ASCENDANCY IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY—ERA OF REFORM

The second Boer War of 1900–1901, though in the heat of victory the Conservatives were able to win a general election, soured many of the British people toward the imperial policy they had for so long backed wholeheartedly. The last Conservative government of the era passed a reform which greatly increased and expanded public education, but the government collapsed on the issue of reinstituting protective tariffs, for which few, even among the industrialists, were ready. It was feared especially by the consuming classes, who now exercised a decisive influence on the government.

By 1906 there was a tremendous backlog of reforms which seemed overdue to the voters, and a reorganized Liberal party was ready to give them a full measure of reform. In this aim it was aided both by a young Labor party, which had grown up in the last part of the

nineteenth century, influenced and to a large degree controlled by the trade union movement, and by the Irish Nationalists, who hoped that a Liberal government would grant them their long-deferred home rule. In any case they were opposed to the Conservatives on every issue. The top-heavy majority for the Liberals and their allies resulted in a new wave of social reform, sparked by Lloyd George, chancellor of the exchequer in the Asquith government of 1908–1916. The government also passed a Home Rule Bill, but there was so much opposition to its terms in northern Ireland that in fact it was never enacted into law, and the First World War postponed the issue for several more years.

OPPOSITION AND REFORM OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS

The Asquith government put through compulsory health insurance, old age pensions, workmen's compensation acts, and other reforms. But when it came to the alteration in the basis of taxation that was the heart of the chancellor's program, it encountered the opposition of the House of Lords, which objected above all to the proposed tax on unearned increment and the increase of land values. It was this unearned increment which had enabled the landowning peers to retain their standard of living and social position in an age when land was no longer the major source of wealth. The House of Lords, unable to amend the bill, rejected it altogether, thus causing an acute constitutional crisis. The Government argued that the rejection of the budget by the upper house granted it the right to bring all government to a standstill, since all taxes for the year's operations were voted in the budget. The only legal way the House of Commons could carry on the business of the country was to amend the budget so that it passed the House of Lords—a right the Lords did not possess. The only alternative was to hold a general election and have the resulting Government introduce a new budget. This second course meant that the House of Lords would gain the right to dissolve Parliament.

Clearly it was intolerable for a hereditary peerage to have such powers, and it became

necessary for the Government to take on the task of defining more clearly and limiting more definitely the powers of the House of Lords, a task which had been neglected since the First Reform Bill. Since the House of Lords had never vetoed any measure of a Conservative government, it was obvious to all that the scales were weighted unfairly against Liberals, even though it might be argued that the country needed an extra measure of protection against all reforming and liberal measures. Moreover, the hereditary peerage evidently did not consider itself bound by the popular will as expressed in elections.

When the budget was rejected, the House of Commons declared the action to be a breach of the constitution, and a general election was held. The Liberals retained their majority, but, as customary with governments in power, it lost some seats, and had to rely on the votes of the Labor party and the Irish Nationalists. These latter backed the Government fully on the issue, so that the electorate as a whole was clearly in favor of constitutional reform. The Lords, knowing what was in store for them, gave way and passed the budget. At this moment King Edward VII died, and efforts were made by the leaders of the Commons and the Lords to come to private agreement about the reform of the Lords. When agreement was found to be impossible, Prime Minister Asquith approached King George V, asking for assurance that he would create the number of new peers necessary to pass the projected reform of the Lords. At the same time he advised the monarch to dissolve Parliament and order new elections in order to test the feeling of the country once more in regard to constitutional reform. King George gave the necessary undertaking and the election was held, with a result similar to that of the previous year. The new House of Commons then passed the bill to restrict the powers of the House of Lords. The Lords, faced with the horrendous possibility of being compelled to absorb four hundred new Liberal peers, gave way and passed the bill by a small majority, with considerable numbers abstaining. Thus the House of Lords was left with a suspensory veto which would last for two successive sessions of the Commons, and money bills became law at

the end of one month whether passed by the Lords or not.

The principle had thus been established that the hereditary peerage could not stand indefinitely in the way of the democratically expressed will of the people, though it could still compel governments to think a second and a third time. It was also supposed that it was now a settled convention that constitutional reform required a prior election to allow the will of the people to be expressed. The Labor government of Clement Attlee, however, disregarded this convention in 1947 and, without calling an election first—which it well knew it might have lost on this issue—once more curtailed the suspensory veto of the House of Lords. It took this step because it wished to pass a bill nationalizing the steel industry without being compelled to call an election. The veto in the form in which it existed from 1911 to 1947 would have made such an election necessary if the House of Lords had vetoed the bill, as was expected.

The succeeding conservative governments repealed the Nationalization Act, but allowed the change in the veto to stand. No agreement has ever been reached on a better method of choosing the upper house in Britain. There are now some life-peers, but otherwise, with few exceptions, the House of Lords remains as it was at the time of Edward I (1272–1307).

BRITISH DEMOCRACY AT THE TURN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

By the time of the First World War universal suffrage had been established in Britain save for the women's vote, which was granted after the war. The Liberal party, though still in office, was soon to be supplanted by the Labor party as the leading opposition to the Conservatives. The working class was already beginning to identify itself with the Labor party and, as will be noted briefly in the next chapter, was equipping itself with socialist ideas. A system under which the will of the people, as expressed in elections, could be converted into legislation had been devised through the customary empirical methods of the British. There were many illogicalities in the system, but there was also a high degree of flexibility. The aristocracy had

learned to live with the constitution and the changing times and adapt itself to them. The middle and upper classes still possessed a strangle hold on the administration and the civil service, through the educational system and various social privileges which they alone enjoyed. But even this could be changed in time by means of the substantial political power which was now in the hands of the masses, ready to be used when the time for it came. There has been no major constitutional change in Britain since World War I—only the gradual education of the British people to use the constitution they have inherited for the ends they desire.

❖ The British overseas democracies

The British overseas adopted political institutions similar to those they had known in the mother country. The American Colonies, as we have seen in Chapter 14, revolted against Britain in the last quarter of the eighteenth century at a time when Britain was still ruled by an aristocratic oligarchy. Since the American colonists had no love for the system whose deficiencies were in part responsible for their revolt, their subsequent constitutional development followed a different path from that of the British, as we shall see later in this chapter. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, however, which were largely peopled during the period when Britain was becoming a parliamentary democracy, free from the grievances against the British that had led the Americans to revolt, became parliamentary democracies themselves. Local conditions, however, dictated a federal form of government in Canada and Australia, and for a time made it seem desirable for New Zealand as well.

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN CANADA

Aftermath of American War of Independence After the American War of Independence some sixty thousand American colonists who wished to remain loyal to the British connection made their permanent homes in Canada, being granted the name of United Empire Loyalists. All had fought on the "Tory" side,

and continued to regard the United States with aversion, and had no desire to share her independent status. The influx of these men and women of British stock into Canada totally changed the ethnic and political character of the Canadian mainland, which had formerly been entirely French, save for the handful of British officials who had governed there since the conquest in 1759. The Maritime Provinces (Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island) had been mostly British in composition ever since the expulsion of the French Acadians in the middle of the eighteenth century, and their commercial connections were with New England. But though their loyalty to Britain was doubtful during the American war, the influx of United Empire Loyalists after the war ensured their continued connection with Britain.

After the War of Independence the British were faced with the problem of how to govern Canada in such a way that she did not follow the American path. The French Catholics, cut off from France by the Revolution of which they did not approve, were not tempted to join with the Protestant Americans either during or after the war. Since the British agreed to allow them to keep their own language and laws, they were content to stay under British rule. There was no demand in French Canada for political institutions on the British model. On the other hand, the British Loyalists who had just come from America were accustomed to representative institutions, and did not wish to be ruled directly by Britain without having any say in their government. To solve the problem the British left the Maritime Provinces as they were with their representative governments, and divided mainland Canada in 1791 into two provinces of Upper and Lower Canada, the former inhabited mainly by the British immigrants, the latter initially overwhelmingly French but with a growing number of British engaged in commerce and industry in the cities.

The old unsatisfactory form of government, including an elected legislature and an appointed executive, controlled by the mother country, was transferred from America with few changes. The British set up in each province a representative lower house, which had a majority of elected members, and an executive

council controlled by the home country through appointed officials. Since the lower house was the legislature and enjoyed partial control of finance, and the officials might find themselves deadlocked with the colonists and unable to carry on the government, the governor-general of Canada and the lieutenant-governors of the two provinces were granted the right to overrule the lower house and legislate when necessary by decree. The system worked badly in both provinces, though it was not seriously troublesome for several decades. When, however, the French Canadians discovered that the constitution gave them the means of expressing their disapproval of the constant immigration of British, which diminished their population margin in the country, they began to take an interest in political affairs and to embarrass the government. In Upper Canada there was a constant struggle between the new immigrants and the old United Empire Loyalists, who had a virtual strangle hold on all important governmental positions and dominated the lower house. Both French and British colonists were in constant disagreement with the not very able governors, who tried to work with the political leaders to accomplish their tasks in harmony, but who were, for this reason, accused of and indeed guilty of favoritism. Their position was an impossible one, and the British themselves, ignorant of the country and resentful at being compelled to do something about it, usually let matters drift.

The Durham Report (1839) In 1837 small rebellions broke out in both provinces which were suppressed without difficulty. But the British government, instead of being content with the suppression, suddenly recognized that there must be a serious problem and sent out Lord Durham, a Radical, as governor-general with instructions to report on the situation and recommend changes. Durham of course realized that the trouble was due to the existence of two irresponsible bodies: the executive, responsible to an ignorant British government, and the legislature, which could talk at will but had no power of decision. He therefore recommended unification of the two provinces with a central legislature and an executive responsible to it,

though with certain powers and certain fields of action reserved to the governor-general.

The Durham Report of 1839 was epoch-making in that it recognized as applicable to British communities overseas a principle that had been accepted in Britain over the centuries—namely, that the executive should be responsible to the local legislature and not to some outside authority, whether a king or anyone else. The British had kept their king but taken away his powers, giving them to the cabinet which was responsible to Parliament. Now, in Canada, the way was open to convert the position of the governor-general into that of the king's representative, and to set up a local cabinet responsible to the legislature. In the years following the Durham Report, which was accepted in principle by the British government, the Canadians achieved responsible government. The governors-general came to understand that it would be best for them not to use their reserve powers, but to insist on responsibility on the part of the local government. When the latter got itself into difficulties, the governor-general refused to bail it out.

British North America Act (1867) For reasons peculiar to the Canada of that day, the new government did not work well. French Canada resented the heavy British immigration. Even though the former Lower Canada (now Quebec province), overwhelmingly French in population, was granted equality of representation with English-speaking Upper Canada, it did not accept gracefully the fact that the French had now become a minority in their own country. The British, however, made no further attempt to impose a solution, leaving it to the Canadians themselves to find a way to solve the problem. The Canadian answer was to put forward the idea of a federal state, which was accepted by both French and English-speaking delegates. They drew up a federal constitution, which was approved by the British and passed in 1867 (British North America Act). Under what the Canadians call "Confederation" each province was permitted complete autonomy in local affairs, thus giving Quebec the right to be ruled by French Canadians as long as they remained in a majority in that province. The

federal government at Ottawa was granted all the powers not specifically allotted to the provinces. Although the British retained a few residual rights, they were not used and caused no lasting difficulties. The Maritime Provinces, which had first considered a federation among themselves, decided to join with mainland Canada on condition that a railroad was built to connect them. Thus Canada became a "dominion"—a self-governing unit in the British Empire under parliamentary institutions which differed in no important particular from those in Britain. Later the British Empire was converted into a Commonwealth, and Canada pursued her own path toward full democracy parallel with the British movement in the same direction.

AUSTRALIA

Australia was originally colonized by the British at the end of the eighteenth century as a penal settlement. For many years New South Wales, the first section to be colonized, was inhabited almost entirely by convicts and by officials who governed them. The earliest free settlers were a privileged class and permitted to utilize the services of the convicts. But in time the free population grew and the convict system was largely confined to Tasmania (originally Van Diemen's Land) and New South Wales. Later Western Australia, which could not attract enough immigrants because of its isolation, also accepted some shiploads of convicts. The other states had few convicts and, from the beginning, were colonized by free settlers. In the mid-nineteenth century the Australians rebelled against receiving any more convicts, and the British at last abolished the system. The discovery of gold in the 1850's was responsible for the doubling of the population within ten years, and demands for responsible self-government were met with a favorable response from the British, who had now the experience of Canada to guide them. The separate colonies were granted responsible government in 1852 (Western Australia in 1870), with a system exactly like that in Canada.

Australia, however, had a curious political history, which differed from that of Britain by reason of the composition of the population.

Until very recent times the population was overwhelmingly British, but the majority of the British immigrants were persons who were dissatisfied with the mother country and its institutions, and most were from the working classes. Considerable numbers had been Chartists in England and renewed their agitation for universal manhood suffrage when they reached Australia. They were able to obtain this for themselves in 1860, a quarter of a century before the British themselves. The Australians were the world pioneers in the secret ballot (1856), which was for a long time known as the Australian ballot. South Australia granted the vote to women as early as 1894. The other leading plank in the Chartist platform, payment of members of Parliament, was also first accepted in Australia in the 1870's. Public free compulsory and secular education was inaugurated in Victoria in the early 1870's; and the lower-class orientation of the Australian governments led to the early rise of labor parties and much pioneering social legislation.

In 1900 the separate states of Australia entered into a federation, known as the Commonwealth of Australia, in part from fear of German expansion in the Far East, and in part from the desire of the other states to control the entry of Polynesian and Asiatic workers into the country, a practice which had recently been adopted by the sugar growers in Queensland. The Australian representatives themselves decided on the form of their new federal constitution, which was then set up by the British Parliament. Britain, of course, had retained legal responsibility for the country until that time.

NEW ZEALAND

New Zealand was peopled overwhelmingly by British immigrants and remains to this day more than 90 percent British in ancestry and culture. Large-scale settlement was hindered by the presence of the Maori inhabitants, who were early converted to Christianity but had to suffer much from settler encroachment on their land. In the mid-nineteenth century this encroachment resulted in a series of wars, from which the Maoris recovered only slowly. The country was settled in part by the efforts of a commer-

cial company, and in part by religious and lay organizations. By 1850 there were some 172,000 British settlers in the country who demanded responsible government. This the British were not prepared to grant in view of the unsolved Maori problem and the desire of the settlers for the Maori lands. Nevertheless, they granted representative government in 1852—an elected legislature and an appointed executive responsible to Britain. At once an outcry arose from the legislature, as customary, demanding responsible government, which the British were compelled to grant in 1856, though retaining control of native (Maori) affairs. This arrangement did not prevent the Maori wars, which were waged until 1870. Thereafter the Maoris were treated with some consideration and granted certain limited political rights.

Although there were some members of the British upper classes in New Zealand, on the whole the population was similar to that of Australia, and indeed there was much immigration between the two territories. But New Zealand, living almost exclusively from the sale of primary products and dependent upon their price, early learned to use the power and resources of the State to assist her population. The government of Richard Seddon (1893–1906) was epoch-making in social legislation. New Zealand had free compulsory primary education from 1877. In the 1890's she introduced compulsory arbitration in labor disputes, inaugurated a national health service, noncontributory old-age pensions, women's suffrage, and other important reforms. New Zealand became the model of the welfare state in the twentieth century, and the tradition has been maintained to the present time.

New Zealand became a dominion in 1907. At one time there were provincial councils with substantial powers, but these were abolished in the 1870's. Thereafter it was clear that New Zealand would become a unitary state. She could have federated with Australia in 1900, but such a future was unthinkable to Seddon, who, like his fellow New Zealanders, preferred direct relations with Britain. New Zealand was the last of the British dominions to accept the independent status granted to all the dominions in 1931 by the Statute of Westminster.

❖ The United States in the nineteenth century

THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

Flexibility and rigidity The constitutional development of the United States after the War of Independence followed a different direction from that in Britain. The Founding Fathers who wrote the American Constitution were familiar with British eighteenth-century practice and seventeenth-century theory, and also with French political theory, especially the *Spirit of the Laws* of Montesquieu. But necessarily they were also aware of the political and social realities of their own country. It was clear by 1787 that the Articles of Confederation, which in 1781 had set up a loose union of states for the purpose of fighting the war with the British, were manifestly unsuited for the peace. The representatives therefore tried again, setting up a federal state in a world in which no true federation yet existed, and there was no model to copy.

The system devised in Philadelphia in 1787 included the "separation of powers," a system that Montesquieu erroneously believed to have existed in Britain, and an elaborate series of checks and balances which were designed to prevent the recrudescence of that tyranny which the Americans believed they had fought the war with Britain to abolish. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, three separate but related branches of government were created: an executive, consisting of the president, who possessed extensive powers, including the right to veto acts of the legislature; a bicameral legislature (Congress), and a Supreme Court. The president, unlike the British prime minister, was not responsible to the legislature, although at first he was elected by it. In due time the president was permitted to choose a cabinet of officials who were responsible to him and not to Congress, but they had to be confirmed in office by the Senate, the upper house of Congress. The judges of the Supreme Court were chosen by the president and confirmed in office by the Senate. Thereafter they could not be removed from office save by impeachment—a British check on the executive that had long ago been abandoned in its country of origin. Likewise,

the president himself could be removed when in office only by impeachment.

The federal government was an additional governmental superstructure which did not disturb the sovereignty of the states except in the fields specifically allotted to it. Each of the original thirteen states had its own constitution and its own laws. When more sovereign states were added during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as more of the country came under American control, the states wrote new constitutions for themselves.

However arbitrarily the boundaries of the states had originally been decided, by 1787 these states had acquired a local patriotism, and any tampering with their sovereign rights would have prevented ratification of the Constitution. The states, large and small alike, were granted two seats in the Senate, initially chosen by the state legislatures. In the lower house of Congress, the House of Representatives, seats were allotted roughly proportionate to the population of each state, with provision made for altering the number to take account of population changes in later years. In some lightly populated states today, such as Vermont and Nevada, there are too few inhabitants to justify the granting of more than one seat in the House of Representatives, although these states continue to send two Senators each to Washington.

The state laws and constitutions vary so widely that it is difficult to generalize on the degree of liberalism and democracy attained by the United States as a whole in the nineteenth century, and there can be little doubt that the influence of the United States on the evolution of democracy in other countries has been kept to a minimum by its federal structure. The United States, moreover, too frequently may be judged abroad by the behavior of certain states with antiquated institutions and customs, rather than by that prevalent in the more liberal and modern states. The federal Constitution looks unworkable, but, contrary to what theory might suggest, it has worked, and is now the oldest written constitution in the world. It has been amended very rarely, so difficult is the procedure for amendment and so great the veneration with which it is regarded. But it has been

interpreted flexibly to fit the changing times, and it has had the supreme virtue of satisfying both local particularism and national patriotism, permitting the states, as a rule, to pursue their own ends virtually without interference from the center. During the nineteenth-century expansion the difficulties involved in integrating new and undeveloped territories within the governmental framework of a comparatively old and settled civilization might well have proved insuperable. But since the territories, on attaining statehood, could write their own constitutions and frame their own laws suited to their needs, they could develop at their own pace and retain their characteristic social structure without having to fit themselves into any pre-existing structure developed by others. Many of the states adopted in their own constitutions the safeguards against arbitrary behavior by governments which had been forbidden by the first ten amendments to the federal Constitution. These amendments, known as the Bill of Rights, were adapted from the English Bill of Rights of 1689.

Against such virtues, the colossal cost of government and overlapping services, the arbitrariness of state boundaries, the enormous disparity in population and resources between the different states, the state constitutions, written in the days when most Americans lived in rural areas and too often rendered virtually unchangeable because the present rural population would have to agree to redistricting, and thus to the loss of their own power and influence, may seem a small price to pay—even though some of the states in the second half of the twentieth century still bear an uncomfortable resemblance to the rotten and pocket boroughs of pre-Reform Bill England.

The history of the United States has from the beginning been beset by sectionalism, as was probably inevitable in such a huge country. The economic and social interests of one part of the country have conflicted constantly with those of other parts, necessitating compromises which satisfy no one but represent the greatest common measure of what can be achieved. United States legislation has therefore necessarily been conservative in trend; and it has not been possible for the majority will of all the

people to prevail as a matter of course, as in the parliamentary democracies, or even as a general rule. The United States still lacks national health insurance; she lacks the power to enforce the full civil rights of Negroes throughout the country; and she required a national emergency before finding it possible to set up a scheme of unemployment insurance, although such schemes had been operative in Europe and in the Antipodes for a full generation. The social benefits ensured to the people by her sister federal government in Canada are still, in the United States, the concern of the separate states, which, being controlled with few exceptions by rural interests, are hesitant to vote taxes whose proceeds would be spent for the benefit of city folk. Though the federal government in the twentieth century has been enabled to take many important measures by virtue of its right to legislate in the field of interstate commerce, liberally interpreted by recent Supreme Courts—measures which it could not take during the nineteenth century, when the Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution differently—it still remains far from being as sovereign as any of the parliamentary governments, unitary or federal, that have been discussed earlier in this chapter.

Checks and balances—their influence on democracy The Fathers of the Constitution without doubt were not democrats and scarcely influenced at all by Rousseau. The franchise, which in 1787 was, as everywhere in Europe, restricted to property holders, was soon liberalized. Universal manhood suffrage was already in operation in some states by 1787; it was almost universal in the United States early in the nineteenth century. But the federal governmental structure and the system of checks and balances prevented it from being used by the masses for class legislation on their own behalf. The president, in the course of the nineteenth century, came to be elected by the people. But the election was not direct. He was not chosen by the majority vote of all the people, but by the majority vote of electors chosen by the voters in each state. Each state was allotted a certain number of electoral votes, so that an

overwhelming majority of votes cast in one state would not give the presidential candidate any more votes than the number allotted to it. A very small majority in another state would likewise give him the total number of electoral votes in that state. Moreover, the president could totally change his policy when in office, and fulfill none of his campaign promises, without being subjected to any disciplining by the electors until his full four years had been completed; though either house of Congress might change its political complexion during his term of office, he could usually veto their bills with impunity since a two-thirds majority in both houses was needed to override his veto. Conversely, Congress could refuse to pass the legislation he needed to fulfill his program, and content itself with granting the minimum required for carrying on the business of the nation.

The two houses of Congress were equally competent to introduce legislation and all bills had to be passed by both, with the exception, derived from British practice that money bills had to be initiated in the lower house. But since a senator was elected for six years, there was no way in which the ordinary voter could compel him to fulfill his promises once he had been elected. All that the voter could do was refuse to re-elect him when his term of office ran out. A senator's constituents were only the voters in his particular state, and it was often the effectiveness of his political organization and of his party that determined his re-election rather than his personal views on public issues. His views, moreover, had to be acceptable only to the voters in his own state, and there was seldom any reason for him to bow to public opinion elsewhere in the country. Thus, when public opinion in the country changed, it was very difficult for the change to be reflected in legislation. Local rather than national issues dominated the elections, and the senator might expect several more years to pass before he could be held accountable for his votes. Even in the House of Representatives, which was elected for only two years at a time, the effectiveness of a representative was customarily reckoned by what he could achieve for his particular constituency—some

important public building, some enterprise that would give employment, or some position in the federal government given to political leaders in the constituency.

The power and influence of senators, and to a lesser degree of representatives, were determined not by the importance of the states for which they sat nor by the number of voters who had voted for them, but by the length of time they had served in Congress and only to a relatively slight extent by their actual ability. Thus those states which gave their adherence consistently to one party rather than the other would be represented by the same senator and representative year after year, enabling them to build up seniority more easily than Congressmen who had to contest elections in states where the strength of the parties was more equally divided. As it happened, most of these one-party states were small, but their political views were accorded more weight by the system than they would have had in a democratic political system.

It has already been noted that the state governments, which had much influence on the lives of ordinary people, since it was they who controlled such matters as education, criminal law and the administration of justice, housing, and everything that was not specifically granted to the federal government, were largely controlled by rural interests, making direct pressure by the voters for interests other than those of the farmers difficult. The municipalities, whose governments could be influenced more easily by the voters than any other, were often unable to rule themselves effectively, since they possessed only such legislative and taxing powers as were conferred upon them by the state government. In rural townships, especially in New England, the direct democracy of the colonial town meeting sometimes survived. But voters were very few in number, and the town meeting had extremely limited tasks to perform, although the acute political analyst De Tocqueville paid special tribute to them in the early part of the nineteenth century.

Necessity for two-party system The governmental system of the United States almost

compels the presence of two and not more than two political parties, both of which are likely to have liberal and conservative wings. If there are three parties vying for the presidency, the president is likely to represent considerably less than a majority of the voters. The organization of Congress is such that there must be a majority and a minority party; if there are any independents or third-party stragglers, they must be adopted by one party or the other. But third parties have historically sometimes been effective in forcing their policy upon one or the other of the two major parties. The Progressive party in the early twentieth century was able to split off some supporters from the main body of the Republican party, but as a result handed the election to the Democratic candidate, who was elected by a minority of the people. Toward the end of the nineteenth century a powerful Populist party was able to compel the Democratic party to accept its own leader, William Bryan, as the Democratic presidential candidate, and to adopt most of the Populist program as its own. But Bryan lost the election. In many states Farmer parties have been able to defeat the two major parties and elect their candidates to state office. But winning control of a state is a very different matter from winning the presidency. No third- or splinter-party candidate has ever come within measurable distance of being elected president.

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES

Government in the United States remains a government by men and by political organizations and pressure groups. It is only mildly responsive to the people in whose name it rules, who are prevented by conventions, rules, and institutions from making their collective will felt as it is in countries with a more flexible system of government. But it is also true that in a very broad way and through other institutions for mobilizing public opinion, the people can make their will felt. No government entirely contrary to the will of the people could long survive, since the individual citizen is free to express his distaste for his representative and his actions as soon as the latter presents himself



Westward trek by covered wagon in the United States in the second half of the century.
(COURTESY PRINTS DIVISION, NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY)

for re-election. This is the ultimate value that his vote has for him; and it remains true that the Constitution has thus far enabled him to prevent that tyranny which it was designed to banish forever from his soil.

What was achieved in America during the nineteenth century, and what made it a country of refuge for all those who were dissatisfied with European society, was a remarkable social equality and personal liberty, as already noted by De Tocqueville. This was far different indeed from the system in Europe. Each man in America was a citizen; he had his vote, even if it was not especially useful to him; he had a remarkable spirit of enterprise and belief in progress, both for himself and for his country. It meant little to speak to the average American about classes—the terms *bourgeois* and *democratic liberalism* lack meaning in the American context—for his society was one of the utmost social mobility. As there was no aristocracy in America, so there was no bourgeoisie. There were small retail traders who hoped to become big businessmen, small manufacturers who hoped to become big industrialists—and both not seldom achieved their ambitions. There were no peasants, only small farmers who hoped to become big farmers.

The American West was gradually opened up, first by the settlement of the Louisiana Purchase, bought from Napoleon, who had recently won it from Spain but could not hope to keep it; then of Texas and the Far West, taken from Mexico; and finally of the Oregon Territory, won from the British by negotiation. The more enterprising Americans trekked westward in search of fortune and settled the country, adding new states to the nation. The East prospered by supplying this great market with manufactured goods and numerous services, especially in the field of finance. But in the South there was a different kind of social structure, much more like that of England; and the immigrants who poured into the United States from the 1840's onward rarely settled in the South. Here there was a plantation system specialized for the growing of cotton, and here the laborers were Negro slaves.

THE CIVIL WAR

With the great growth of the cotton export industry in the first half of the nineteenth century, the peculiar southern institution of slavery, which at the time of federation appeared to be on the way out, took a new lease on life, in

spite of the abolition of the slave trade by the European powers and the emancipation of slaves in the British territories in 1833. If slaves could not be imported, it was still possible to breed from existing stock, and this the southerners did. Attached to their way of life, they were convinced that their prosperity could be maintained only through the slave system. Elsewhere in the country there was wide indifference to what the southerners did about their slaves, although there were many individuals throughout the North who campaigned for abolition on moral grounds. There was virtual unanimity in the North and West that they did not wish to have the slave system introduced into their states. Free white labor was the main-spring of their economies, and that was the way they wanted it. There would be no shortage of white labor as long as the Europeans permitted America to be peopled by their surplus. These men would soon learn to be as good citizens as their predecessors. They would help build a free nation, the richest in the world, and the largest consuming market under one flag.

But the southern states were unwilling to be dictated to by the northerners on the matter of slavery or anything else, and they were afraid that sooner or later the abolitionists would have their way. New states were being created that forbade slavery within their borders, and these free states would soon outnumber them overwhelmingly. Sectionalist to the core, and with many other grievances against the northerners—whose economic interests differed from theirs, especially in the matter of protective tariffs—they were willing to secede rather than see their southern interests subordinated to those of the northerners. The Constitution had made no mention of possible secession, but the southern leaders chose to regard it as permissible. What the states had granted when they ratified the federal Constitution they could also take away. So they seceded and formed the Confederate States. The rest of the country, under the presidency of Abraham Lincoln, fought them for four terrible years to preserve the Union. In the course of the war the slaves were emancipated by federal proclamation.

Soon after his re-election to the presidency Lincoln was assassinated, and the new president

was unable to pursue the conciliatory policy toward the southerners that Lincoln had favored. An anti-southern Congress, bitter toward the South, instituted a program under which the southerners lost their civic rights, and were unable to exercise the vote even in their own states. Crucial amendments to the Constitution were forced through and ratified by states which were no longer controlled by the majority of their citizens, but largely by illiterate Negroes, renegade southerners, and predatory northerners. Nevertheless the amendments, which granted the federal government the right to enforce certain safeguards in the federal Bill of Rights even in the sovereign states of the Union, greatly strengthened the position of the federal government. Negroes also, by the amendments, became full citizens of the United States. Nevertheless, they were never accepted in the South as full citizens; nor have they been integrated into southern society to this day. Although in the North they were allowed to exercise the vote, social and economic discrimination has persisted and remains an unsolved problem.

FREE PUBLIC EDUCATION AND ITS IMPORTANCE—

The great unifying element in the nineteenth century—in addition to the Civil War, which showed that most of the country was willing to fight to preserve the Union—was the system of free state education, which in due time became compulsory as well as free in every state. The first-generation immigrant, who often never learned to speak English and knew little of America save his job, was succeeded by his son, who had learned English at his school, whatever language he might continue to speak at home. Here he also learned some of the duties of citizenship and the ideals of "Americanism," which were impressed upon him by all means available to the teacher, including numerous ritual observances.

American nationalism is highly self-conscious and to some degree artificial. The composition of the people is more mixed than that of any other country. Thus a sense of American nationality had to be created, and was required to replace the nationality brought

by the immigrant from his ancestral home.¹ At any time between 1840 and 1914 more than half the population was either first- or second-generation American. In ten separate years between 1900 and 1914 the immigration figure was over a million. America was the land of opportunity and the land of freedom for the European, who found opportunity too restricted at home. Different European ethnic groups predominated among the immigrants at different periods. The Irish and Germans came in the 1850's, Slavs and Italians much later. All had to be cooked in the vast melting pot, to emerge as Americans. Thus they owed nothing to tradition, and everything to education and experience; and it was this gigantic enterprise and the unlimited possibilities for economic and social advancement that created modern America—which by 1914 was already one of the leading industrial nations of the world and obviously destined to outstrip all her competitors.

♦ Democracy in other countries

We have already dealt in Chapter 17 with some of the stirrings of democracy and liberalism in several of those countries which achieved statehood or received constitutions in the nineteenth century. It remains only to consider these, as well as the other European countries not considered in Chapter 17, from the standpoint of their liberal institutions.

ITALY

In Italy after unification the government resembled the French system of the Third Republic—many parties, and governments unable to rule effectively without making parliamentary alliances with others. Much of the country was extremely poor and overpopulated; backward southern Italy had to be aided by the more industrialized north, and it was clear that the democratic government of the last quarter of the century was incapable of dealing effectively with its problems. Socialism and syndicalism

were strong in the country but clearly could not hope to obtain enough electoral strength to be given the opportunity of ruling, especially after the turn of the twentieth century when industrial unrest was rife throughout Italy. The ineffectiveness of Italian democratic rule was an important factor in the rise of fascism in Italy after the war.

SPAIN

In Spain constitutional struggles persisted throughout the nineteenth century. The Bourbon monarchy was initially weak and tyrannical, and was further bedeviled by disagreements over the succession. For a period in the 1870's the monarchy was replaced by a republic; but it was short-lived and the Bourbon monarchy was restored in 1875. The new king, Alfonso XII, granted responsible constitutional government, but no party was capable of ruling without some aid from others, and for a long time the leaders of the two major parties rotated in office with no discernible change in policy. Efforts were made to curb the influence of the Church and of the landowners who were the real powers in the state, but with indifferent success. The middle classes were too small and too weak to be able to govern the country or change the social structure, which was the main hindrance to social and political progress. The constitutional monarchy survived the war, but was accompanied by a relatively mild military dictatorship after it. Only when the dictator, General Primo de Rivera, fell in 1931 was the monarchy replaced by a republican regime (see Chapter 24) and a serious effort at reform made by the middle and lower classes.

PORTUGAL

Portugal was granted a constitution by her monarch in 1852, but the government had to resort to a system similar to that in Spain, known as "rotativism," under which the two major parties alternated in power. Toward the end of the century republican sentiment grew, and the monarch Charles (Carlos) I in 1906 appointed a dictator and suppressed the ineffective parliament. He and his elder son were

¹ By contrast the 1960 census shows that only 5% of the present population is foreign born.

murdered in 1908. In 1910 the nominal king Manoel II was exiled, and a republic established. The change of regime cured none of the ills of the country and solved none of its economic problems, which resembled those of Spain. In 1926 the regime was replaced by a dictatorship, which has been in power ever since.

SCANDINAVIA

In Scandinavia democracy fared better. Under the Vienna settlement Norway was separated from Denmark and placed under the Swedish crown, receiving from Sweden its own separate constitution and parliament, called the Storting, and a semiresponsible government subject to a veto by the Swedish monarch. This veto was frequently used until late in the nineteenth century. Then the Storting succeeded in extracting from the monarch an undertaking not to use the veto. It followed this up by voting overwhelmingly for separation from Sweden, which was finally granted in 1905. Norway chose a king for herself from the Danish royal family.

In Sweden the efforts by parliament to obtain greater responsibility were constantly thwarted during the nineteenth century by the monarch and the cabinet, which was responsible to him and not to the parliament. Fully responsible government and universal manhood suffrage were finally conceded in 1909.

Denmark had a constitutional government from 1848, but the franchise was restricted to property owners until 1866. After the loss of the war with Germany and Austria over Schleswig-Holstein, this restriction was lifted, and thereafter full democracy was established.

All the Scandinavian countries had governments controlled by the middle class until the granting of universal suffrage, including women's suffrage in Norway and Denmark, just before World War I. Thereafter all the governments were left of center, and concentrated on attempts to obtain better working conditions and welfare benefits for the people through the exercise of governmental power. The governments have been relatively stable, and no serious constitutional problems have arisen. The English parliamentary system has

been used, with modifications to suit the conditions of the particular country.

HOLLAND

After the separation of Belgium, Holland had to submit for a few more years to the authoritarian rule of William I. After his forced abdication in 1840 his successor, William II, granted a liberal constitution under which the middle classes ruled until the wide extension of the franchise in 1896. Thereafter the country followed substantially the same course as Scandinavia, though the possession of a large colonial empire made the government more responsive to business interests and somewhat less concerned with social betterment by governmental action than Scandinavia.

BELGIUM

In independent Belgium, as in France, there were several parties, and usually the government was a coalition. As in other Catholic countries there was much agitation regarding secular and religious education, and as in France anti-clerical parties often controlled parliament. The influence of the king was still strong until the death of Leopold II, who had ruled for forty-five years (1835-1909); not until the reign of Albert I was the franchise extended to all males, and even then not until after a punishing general strike in 1913. Thereafter democratic government in Belgium functioned fairly well, though almost all the governments were coalitions.

SWITZERLAND

The small mountain country of Switzerland was formerly a confederation of cantons, each with almost complete autonomy, though there have been federal organs since the Napoleonic wars. In 1848 a number of Catholic cantons, fearful of the anti-Catholic and secular orientation of the federal Diet, seceded, but were easily defeated by the federal government. The center was then strengthened, but the cantons are still in practice little affected by the federal government. Both the cantons and the central government make use of the initiative and referendum,

under which laws may be proposed by a specified number of voters and the legislature is then bound to consider them (initiative). The legislature may not pass a bill if petitioned by the voters for a referendum. The government is then required to consult the opinion of the voters before passing the legislation. In practice this has made for conservatism on the part of legislators rather than radicalism on the part of voters. Many picturesque survivals of primitive democracy persist in Switzerland, including in many cantons the public assent of the voters at periodical meetings to the laws made in their name.

GERMANY

The constitution of the German Empire has been considered in some detail in the last chapter. It remains only to note that there was a consistent growth in liberal and social-democratic sentiment in the Reichstag in the last part of the nineteenth century. Bismarck attempted to suppress the Socialists with legislation directed against them, but succeeded only in driving the party underground; and though the Reichstag had limited powers, it was able to influence public opinion through its debates, and occasionally to modify the policies of the kaiser. In particular, the Reichstag majority was able to put some brakes on the rising German militarism of the early twentieth century. But when war became imminent it withdrew its opposition to the chancellor and the kaiser and passed the military budgets, to the disgust of all foreign Socialists. Social reforms were introduced by Bismarck and continued in later regimes as a means of attracting the workers away from socialism. Imperial Germany, indeed, pioneered in such measures as health insurance, accident insurance, and old age pensions. Curiously enough, these laws were passed by the more conservative of the many parties in the state, and opposed by the left-wing groups, who were interested more in establishing socialism than in making the workers more satisfied with their lot under a capitalist regime. The measures were widely imitated abroad, even though elsewhere they were introduced under far different auspices.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Finally, mention should be made of Austria. Austria, as we have seen, was a multiracial state, and constant difficulties arose after the granting of a constitution because the parties tended to be organized along racial lines. In the hopes of encouraging parties based on issues rather than nationality, the government granted universal manhood suffrage in 1907. But since just at this time Austria was engaged in activities, especially in the Balkans, which tended to divide the people along the lines of their racial sympathies, it is not surprising that the move was only moderately successful. In Hungary the Magyars were attempting to establish Magyar supremacy, and had no interest in granting concessions in the direction of wider suffrage; the Magyar landowners controlled the political institutions of the state, and preferred to keep it that way.

❖ Conclusion—Europe on the eve of World War I

We have now completed our study of nineteenth-century nationalism and liberalism, and considered their economic underpinnings. It was a century which opened with Europe at war; but once the war was over it was a century of peaceful development, marked only by a few minor wars, in none of which the majority of European nations participated. When we again take up the political history of Europe in Chapter 22, the picture will have changed, and for the rest of this book interstate antagonisms and the danger of war will always be in the forefront of our attention.

A century of liberalism had resulted in fully democratic regimes in many countries, and it was the great democracies that won the First World War, not the autocracies and semi-autocracies. At the end of the war it was thought, and not only by President Wilson, that the world had been made "safe for democracy," and it was widely held that it was the democratic institutions of the Allied powers that had made victory possible. Hence the great upsurge in democracy that marked the first postwar

years, when it was believed that the entire world would soon be set on a democratic path.

But, as it happened, this period marked the apogee of democratic institutions. The slow but persistent growth of democracy in the nineteenth and the first quarter of the twentieth century came to an end. Now, in the second half of the twentieth century, democracy is on the defensive and its gains are few. Even though many newly independent states choose to adopt democratic forms as they begin their careers of independence, events appear to have a tendency to catch up with them, and one by one the democratic institutions are discarded or replaced in favor of a more or less disguised autocracy. But the Industrial Revolution still gathers momentum, still seeking the proper forms for its full development. In a world in which all nations seek to industrialize themselves and enjoy the fruits of Western technological achievements, the victory has not yet been decided in favor of autocracy or democracy. Both autocratic and democratic states have shown themselves able to take advantage of Western technology. Whether they can also co-exist in the same world without destroying one another remains for the future to decide.

Suggestions for further reading

PAPERBACK BOOKS

- Billington, R. A. *American History Before 1877*. Littlefield, Adams.
- Boorstin, Daniel J. *The Genius of American Politics*. Phoenix. A sophisticated discussion of how the American system works—not always as might be expected from its institutional forms. Perhaps a little too uncritical of weaknesses and inclined to ascribe successes to inherent virtues rather than to human efforts to overcome the system's defects.
- Bryce, James. *The American Commonwealth*. Capricorn. 2 vols. Shrewd insights from an English mid-nineteenth-century expert on government.
- Cecil, Lord David. *Melbourne*. Universal. An excellent biography of the young Queen Victoria's favorite prime minister, which also gives a valuable picture of the age.
- Cobban, Alfred. *A History of Modern France*. Penguin.

Cunliffe, Marcus. *The Nation Takes Shape, 1789–1837*. Chicago. History of American Civilization. Brief and helpful account of the early days of American independence.

Halévy, Elie. *The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism*. Beacon. Thorough account of the ideology of early-nineteenth-century English reformers.

Handlin, Oscar. *The Uprooted*. Universal. An informative and sympathetic account of the peoples who emigrated to America in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Hofstadter, Richard. *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It*. Vintage. An interesting reappraisal of a number of American presidents, showing in particular the different ways in which presidential leadership can be and has been exercised.

Ruggiero, G. de. *The History of European Liberalism*. Beacon. The classic account, thoughtful and full of important insights, comparing liberalism as it appeared in the different European countries.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. *The Age of Jackson* (abr.). NAL. Interesting and stimulating re-evaluation of the period.

Schuyler, Robert L., and Weston, Corinne C. *British Constitutional History since 1832*. Anvil. By the leading American authority, with pertinent documents.

Thomson, David. *England in the Nineteenth Century*. Penguin. A very useful short history, with due attention to social change.

Tocqueville, Alexis de. *Democracy in America*. Vintage. 2 vols. Remarks on America of the age of Jackson, by an observant and keenly analytical Frenchman. A classic account, valuable especially today when so many of the author's prophecies have been fulfilled.

CASEBOUND BOOKS

- Brogan, Denis W. *France Under the Republic: The Development of Modern France (1870–1939)*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1940. Informative, interesting, and well written, but stronger as narrative than as general analysis.
- Burt, Alfred P. *The Evolution of the British Empire and Commonwealth from the American Revolution*. Boston: D. C. Heath & Company, 1956. Perhaps the best general text on the evolution of the Commonwealth, especially good on analysis of political institutions.
- Ensor, Robert. *England, 1870–1914*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1949. One of the latest vol-

- umes in the Oxford History of England series. Like all the others, it is solid and informative, especially on domestic affairs.
- Guérard, Albert. *Napoleon III: An Interpretation*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1914. Thoughtful, and rather sympathetic to Napoleon and his aspirations.
- Hacker, Louis M. *The Triumph of American Capitalism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1947. An economic historian's view of America to 1900, with attention to how economics have always affected American politics.
- Hammond, John and Barbara. *The Age of the Chartists, 1832-1854: A Study of Discontent*. London: Longmans, Green & Company, 1930. Like every work of these two social historians, this is written with sympathy for the working classes, and is inclined to understress the general progress of the times and to overstress the unhappy lot of the workers.
- Kelly, Alfred H., and Harbison, Winfred A. *The American Constitution: Its Origins and Development*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1948. 2 vols. Probably the best general book from which to study what it is, how it works, and how it has changed in the 150 years since its acceptance.
- Laski, Harold J. *The Rise of European Liberalism: The Philosophy of a Business Civilization*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947. Regards liberalism as initially a revolutionary philosophy, later prostituted to the service of business.
- Strachey, Lytton. *Eminent Victorians*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1918, 1933. Ironical and witty.
- Woodward, Ernest L. *The Age of Reform (1815-1870)*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1938. A full study.
- Young, G. M. *Victorian England: Portrait of an Age*. 2d ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953. Good picture of the general solidity of the age.

Romanticism and Realism of the Nineteenth Century

❖ General characteristics of romanticism

CONTRAST WITH THE AGE OF REASON

It was suggested in Chapter 15 that there is a characteristic Western attitude toward the world which was not a feature of earlier civilizations. We characterized this attitude as an aspiration and yearning toward the infinite, and as discontent with the given world. This yearning has manifested itself in the belief in progress, the attempt to push back ever farther the boundaries of knowledge and to use this knowledge for the material benefit of mankind. Whereas the classical civilization of the Greeks contented itself with exploring the secure little Mediterranean world known to it, hugged the coast with its ships, built temples for its gods to live in, and looked back to a golden age of history, Western man set out boldly across the ocean, learned to fly in the air and now attempts to scale the frontiers of outer space, builds Gothic cathedrals soaring to heaven, and strives toward a utopia in the far distant future to be attained by his own efforts. The Age of the Enlightenment, discussed in Chapter 15, glorified form and order and the rational mind; its ideal science was mathematics; it rejoiced in the static splendor of the Newtonian universe and sought to discover the immutable laws of nature and nature's god. The revival of Greek

classicism that marked the eighteenth century was a fitting culmination to the Age of Reason.

Yet, as we have seen, before the end of the century there had been a revival of fundamentalist religion based on faith and emotion rather than reason. Rousseau, emphasizing the primacy of feeling over reason, of intuition over thought, and in his insistence on the "natural man," untrammelled by artificial rules, had apparently touched some chord in his contemporaries which vibrated in harmony with his teaching. His works were enormously successful, and his precepts for "natural living" were followed with enthusiasm. It is clear that the Age of Reason had run its course, and the time was now ripe for a reaction against rationalism—a new phase of the same anti-classical movement we have already noted in the Baroque. This movement may be given the general name of romanticism, applied initially to the literature of the period as Baroque was applied to the art of the seventeenth century, but capable of the same extension of meaning to a wider group of phenomena. Romanticism, like Baroque, was a response to the same human need—a need for release from confinement within a set of classical canons, a need to give sustenance to other capacities in man beyond his mind, and an appetite for fuller and wider experience than can be provided by the mind alone. That romanticism met with such success and appealed to far more men and women than had the

rationalism of the eighteenth century is no doubt due to the fact that even the man who lacks a trained mind, and rarely indulges in sustained thought, possesses emotions. He enjoys the experience provided for him by his senses without effort on his part. He was able to appreciate the literature and poetry of feeling where he had not been able to appreciate or understand the work of the Encyclopedists. It was no doubt good for the ordinary man to hear from Rousseau that his day dreaming was admirable and in no way worthy of blame, and he was as willing as Rousseau to dignify his customary jumping to conclusions with the name of intuition.

Thus romanticism was in one aspect a revolt against reason, a facet of that anti-intellectualism which has always flourished among those who do not care to exercise their intellect. But it was also, in another aspect, an attempt to balance the excessive rationalism of the period with a greater appreciation of the individual human being in all his diversity. As against the sometimes excessive simplicity and clarity of the thought and expression of the Enlightenment, the romantics stressed the mystery and profundity and complexity of man and nature, often cloaking their thought in purposeful obscurity so that they would appeal, not to the understanding, but to the feeling. It is no accident that the greatest literary achievement of the era of romanticism was poetry, which had not greatly flourished in the more prosaic eighteenth century. Few of the eighteenth-century writers had been in any way preoccupied with themselves—the great exception, of course, being Rousseau, who was truly interested in little else. All the romantic writers were deeply interested in themselves, their reactions to the world, the effect of the world upon them, and their innermost feelings, which they were willing to bare to the world. It is difficult to imagine Voltaire undertaking to examine his own motives, or even to personify himself in fiction. When Voltaire set out to create a character it was as a clotheshorse on which to drape his ideas. Such a figure is *Candide*, whom no one could mistake for a real person. But the romantics often chose a particular character whom they could endow with their own sentiments as

well as ideas, projecting themselves onto their own canvas. Such figures as Wilhelm Meister of Goethe, René of Chateaubriand, Olympio of Victor Hugo, Childe Harold of Byron, and numerous others were but the personification of the authors—once more in this imitating Rousseau, whose novel *La Nouvelle Héloïse* pictured a *ménage à trois*, an idealized (and sentimentalized) evocation of a period in the life of the author.

PREFERRED THEMES

Romanticism was deeply interested in the strange and the unknown, not excluding death itself. Suicide became a theme of choice in both novels and poetry, especially suicide for the sake of unrequited love, a theme that would have elicited a belly laugh from Voltaire. Goethe (1749–1805) in his early manhood wrote the most convincing novel of this type in his *Sorrows of Werther*, which had unfortunate consequences in Germany when life began too earnestly to imitate art. Goethe was heartily ashamed of its success in his later life. In fact, Goethe wrote this type of romanticism out of his system in this novel, and his later picture of himself in *Wilhelm Meister* is as a man of thought rather than one of feeling and sentiment. Sir Walter Scott (1771–1832), with his *Waverley* novels, revived an interest in the historical past, which was to persist throughout the romantic era. Victor Hugo (1802–1885), the greatest of French romanticists, loved to use sonorous words that intoxicated both reader and writer. He described with a wealth of color strange places he had never seen and past ages which could be painted with vivid imaginative strokes; he personified places he knew well, such as the Cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris, but succeeded in enveloping them in grandeur and mystery. Almost singlehanded he restored to the West the appreciation of the unclassical Gothic cathedral, the finest artistic expression of the yearning of Western man for the infinite, its mingling of gloom and light making a potent appeal to the soul of the Romantic, who viewed life itself as a similar intermingling.

The romanticist was tolerant in a manner different from the toleration or indifference of

the Enlightenment. While ready to ascribe to thought its due, he recognized that man was a being also of feeling and not in full command of his destiny. He was therefore ready to make allowances for the frailty of human nature because of its complexity and because of the forces of light and darkness struggling for possession of man's soul. He appreciated the diversity of man and nature and did not wish all men to be shaped from the same mold.

Yet it must also be admitted that there is something faintly ridiculous about the excesses of the romantic, which have always lent themselves to parody. The exclamation points and the adjectives quickly pale. The drama almost invariably becomes melodrama. Too often the saint is too saintly, the hero overly heroic, and the heroine absurdly pure and beautiful; one misses the restraints of the classical style and the dictates imposed by a proper sense of form. Sentiment, in the hands of all but the greatest, tends to lapse into sentimentality; if feeling was absent it could be, and was, manufactured. The primacy granted to the emotions too often meant that self-discipline was abandoned in favor of self-indulgence.

Nevertheless it is clear that as a whole the Enlightenment had become desiccated, and the springs of creativity were drying up. Holbach's *Système de nature* was all system and no nature, as Goethe and his friends insisted. A new impulse was needed, and romanticism provided it, for life had departed from the Age of Reason at the same time as God. The romantic saw nature as beautiful and extolled it in innumerable verses; beauty was to be found in everything, even in the disordered lushness of a tropical forest—and not only in the formal mathematical perfection of a French garden. Imagination as well as intellect could reveal the truth. The Gothic cathedral was as much to be admired as a Greek temple or a Renaissance colonnade. The Middle Ages were not wholly dark; feudalism and chivalry were not without their appeal. They did not need to be decently obscured from view in the light of a new day. The barbarian who succeeded to the Roman Empire was the herald of the future and not only the destroyer of a civilization he did not understand or appreciate—indeed the barbarian,

with his martial virtues, deserved to triumph over the effete Romans. Romanticism in its way possessed something of the Renaissance spirit. There can be no doubt that it breathed a new spirit into European culture; and though Europe quickly tired of its excesses, and the growing industrial civilization with its scientific materialism was able to laugh it to scorn as daydreaming in a world of tangible realities, it has remained ever since as a substratum of the Western soul, insistently reminding man that there is mystery as well as discoverable law in the universe, joy and beauty as well as a weekly pay envelope and the factory system, and that man may discover a world within him which he creates for himself—even while he busies himself in changing the outer world in accordance with laws he did not make and cannot change. Or, as Keats, one of the greatest of the Romantic poets, put it, "I believe only in the holiness of the heart's thoughts and the truth of imagination."

THE HERITAGE OF GERMAN IDEALISM

The romantic movement had one of its ancestors, as already noted, in Rousseau. Another ancestor was Kant, whose *Critique of Pure Reason* ended in the finding that reason could not reveal to man any indisputable truth about the world he lived in, and that the reality of things-in-themselves must be forever unknowable. Thus Kant fell back on the intuition of the inner self, practical reason and the categorical imperative—even though this imperative, for Kant himself, was dictated by reason.

Rousseau's thought was influential in Germany in Rousseau's own lifetime, more influential even than in France. In Germany its appearance coincided with a strong impulse toward escape from the fetters of the dominant French culture and its Cartesian rationalism and classicism, and toward the assertion of self-consciously German ideals. But it was by no means only a nationalistic movement—indeed, at its beginning, there was no German nation or state, nor was there any movement toward unification as yet in existence. Only later, under the impact of the humiliation of Germany by Napoleon, did German philosophical idealism

turn toward the excessive glorification of Germanism and the political demand for a unified nation-state.

Germany, which in recent centuries had lagged behind the other European nations, probably largely as the result of the Thirty Years' War, suddenly entered upon a cultural renaissance which was to make her in the early nineteenth century almost as influential in European culture as France had been in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This renaissance was manifested especially in three areas, in poetry and literature, in philosophy, and in music. In poetry and literature it took the form of a revolt against the aridity of eighteenth-century rationalism. A literary movement of the last two decades of the century was known as *Sturm und Drang* (storm and stress), after a drama of that name. Its two great leaders were Goethe and Schiller (1759–1805), but these were supported by a host of lesser men. As in romanticism, into which the movement merged, there was an emphasis on the elements of the human being that, although not rational, were held to be as legitimate a part of his makeup as his mind. The Germans, unlike the Anglo-Saxons, who have always had trouble with the words *soul* and *spirit* since they do not represent material entities, had no difficulty in recognizing this nonphysical part of the human being. The great poets of this age, like the men of the Italian Renaissance, exulted in the diversity of the human being and his infinite potentialities, and they felt the world to be a field of action for the exercise of the human will. They were young, and they felt that French rationalism was senile and decrepit, bloodless and dried up. Nature to them was not only something to be analyzed into such abstractions as matter and motion but a living being, full of mystery and beauty; religion was not a matter of what seemed reasonable, but a living force in the lives of men, appealing to their hearts and emotions rather than their minds.

Unlike the thinkers of the Renaissance, who with Italian exuberance had been prepared simply to enjoy the world and experience its beauty, the serious German idealists could not be content with sensuous experience; they could not live as if Descartes and Kant had never

posed the question of the relation of mind and matter (nature). If, as Kant had apparently proved, the mind can never know the realities of the world, how does the human being know the world and what is his task in it? The answer given, in the most general terms, was that the Divine Spirit or Absolute is present or immanent in the world of nature as it is in man (compare Neoplatonism). Each thinker, of course, had a different notion of how the divine expresses itself. For Friedrich Schelling (1775–1854) nature was the earthly manifestation of the Divine Mind. Hegel, as was noted in Chapter 18, discovered the workings of the Absolute in the stream of history. Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) believed that the human ego was but a part of the Divine Ego. By virtue of the spark of divinity within the human ego, which he also calls will, man can and should struggle with the evil in the world and defeat it, rising to ever greater moral heights as he vanquishes the adversary. The world, according to Fichte, is a field for moral struggle, and man in truth creates his own moral universe. Friedrich von Schlegel (1772–1829) stressed, as had Schiller and Goethe, the intrinsic value of diversity, the enormous potentialities of life, and the value even of illusion and error as contributors to the richness of life. Suffering was not to be shunned or regretted—as much as, or even more than, pleasure and joy it was an inescapable and enriching aspect of life. No experience should be rejected. Man had been endowed by God with just those powers that enabled him to extract the fruitful essence from all varieties of experience.

All the philosophies of this age stressed the dynamic nature of the world, the changing and becoming elements in the world rather than the beautiful and mathematical precision of the Newtonian universe. The Newtonian and Deist analogy of the jeweler and the watch was outmoded. In some philosophies the Divine or Absolute itself grew and suffered with the world. Man shared with God in this process; man's ideal, as in the philosophy of Aristotle, was to realize as many aspects of his being as could be achieved within a lifetime. By striving to fulfill all his potentialities, he fanned into flame the divine spark that was in him—and thus

fulfilled the purposes of God. It is evident how well such philosophies fitted in with certain aspects of Romanticism.

It can readily be seen that the reaction of the German idealists and romantics to the French Revolution and Napoleon would be ambivalent. On the one hand, there was a tendency toward political conservatism, which arose from the belief that what has grown organically is especially worthy of admiration and should not be disturbed by revolutionary interference. This point of view was represented in the philosophy of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), who was the first to put forward the idea that each people had its own special *genius* (*Volksgeist*), which flowered slowly. The folk traditions of a people were rooted deeply in the subconscious. The genius of each people was different; the German *Volksgeist* differed from the French. It should therefore free itself from French influence so that it might express itself in its own way and contribute to the culture of the world. Neither the French nor the German genius was superior; both played their part and made their contribution, but neither should seek to dominate the other.

Yet it could not be denied, on the other hand, that a revolution is a dynamic expression of the will of the people and must be allowed to come to fulfillment. Moreover, within a revolution the individual can express himself more fully and make use of his diversified talents, rising from obscurity to a position of leadership. Even war has its romantic aspect. As a general rule, then, the early romantic movement approved of the French Revolution as long as it was a revolution confined to France, and even Napoleon was approved of for a period before he began to try to subject all Europe to his sway. After the turn of the nineteenth century those who had experienced Napoleon's regime had little use for him; foreigners who had suffered from his expansion regarded him as an oppressor, and ceased to admire his heroism and dynamism. Fichte was a follower of Herder, admiring and appreciating the German *Volksgeist* and desiring only that its contribution to European culture should be recognized. His attitude changed after the defeat of Prussia at the

battle of Jena in 1806. Thereafter he regarded Napoleon as the man who had humiliated all Germans. He insisted that the German *Volksgeist* was not only different from but superior to that of the French, was purer and freer, as it was more natural and less overlaid by intellectualism. Someday, Fichte believed, the Germans would have the opportunity to demonstrate this superiority through the medium of a national state. Thus Fichte in the nineteenth century became the great prophet of German national unity.

❖ Manifestations of romanticism

In this book it has been thought preferable to devote more space to the general principles of romanticism than to the details of the school and to the manifestations of romanticism in the different realms of culture. Here we shall therefore mention only a few typical figures and their work, devoting the last part of this section to Johann Wolfgang Goethe, who was one of the initial leaders of the school but who, in the course of a long life, freed himself from its excesses and became in his own person almost a fulfillment of the romantic ideal in its most constructive aspects.

ROMANTICISM IN LITERATURE

Romanticism in literature, as will be readily understood, involved the renewal of interest in Shakespeare, who had been largely neglected in the eighteenth century and was regarded as crude and barbarous by the French *philosophes*. A superb German translation by August Wilhelm von Schlegel popularized Shakespeare in Germany to such an extent that Germans have been known to claim him for their own. In the middle of the nineteenth century Victor Hugo's son Charles translated Shakespeare into French, replacing the feeble earlier version, but the Elizabethan playwright was never as popular in France as in Germany. An astonishing feat of a Scottish poet named James Macpherson (1736-1796), who passed off his own romantic poems of ancient Ireland as the work of a

third-century bard named Ossian, suggests the prestige of the old and primitive (the work of the "natural man" of Rousseau) in the early years of romanticism. Ossian was read everywhere, and none doubted his genuineness until after the death of Macpherson, the "discoverer." The medieval revival is well exemplified also in the novels of Sir Walter Scott, most of whose Waverley novels had a medieval Scottish or English setting.

A quartet of English poets who differed greatly among themselves nevertheless can be regarded as representatives of one aspect or another of romanticism. Lord Byron (1788–1824) was a romantic figure in his lifetime, as was the Childe Harold of his chief poem. Byron was in constant rebellion against his class and society, and died while taking part in the Greek War of Independence. The poems of Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792–1822) are either beautiful lyrics on themes drawn from nature or passionate poems of protest, breathing the spirit of anarchy and rebellion. John Keats (1795–1821), another supreme writer of lyric poetry, preferred a more classical form, but much of his best poetry is also devoted to nature. Both Shelley and Keats died young. Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834) was both poet and

philosopher. He is best known for his "Rime of the Ancient Mariner," with its wonderful symbol of the albatross, its suggestion of hidden meanings, and its feeling for the supernatural. Coleridge also meditated deeply on the nature and source of the poet's imagination and inspiration. William Wordsworth (1770–1850) began as a romantic poet, but as he grew older ever more intellectualization appeared in his poems. Many are profoundly thoughtful, so that within him Romanticism, as in Goethe, has been transcended.

The great figure of Victor Hugo (1802–1885) dominated nineteenth-century France. His astonishing output was always romantic to the end of his life, long after romanticism had disappeared elsewhere in France. Hugo's sonorous poems, often couched in difficult language, are not as well known in English-speaking countries as are his more famous novels, especially *The Hunchback of Notre Dame* and *Les Misérables*. The philosophy implicit in all his works is the great struggle between good and evil for the human soul. Even the fight that he waged with Napoleon from his exile in Jersey was viewed as a phase of this struggle. In his later life this philosophy embarrassed his often skeptical critics, who had long ceased to



Dove cottage, home of Wordsworth in the English Lake District.

perceive the struggle in such magnificently romantic terms. Many of his poems are concerned with the Middle Ages and earlier times, even the remote prehistoric epochs which fascinated him.

Alphonse de Lamartine (1790-1869), already mentioned as the poet who assumed leadership of France after the fall of the July monarchy, belongs to the other stream of romanticism. His beautiful lyric poems are suffused with melancholy; and he had difficulty in appreciating the work of his overpowering contemporary, although in 1848 they were political allies. Lamartine's charming little novel *Graziella*, the story of a brief love affair between a French student in Italy and a lovely Italian girl, is exquisite in its sensibility, but totally foreign to the genius of Victor Hugo. Giacomo Leopardi (1798-1837) was the leading romantic poet in Italy, representing the preoccupation with sadness and death characteristic of yet another phase of Romanticism. All his work, which included numerous patriotic poems, is deeply pessimistic. Another Italian, Alessandro Manzoni (1785-1873), wrote perhaps the most popular of all historical novels, *I promessi sposi* (*The Betrothed*), which deals with sixteenth-century Milan and is closely modeled on Sir Walter Scott's equally famous *Waverley* novels.

ROMANTICISM IN THE FINE ARTS AND MUSIC

In painting, the romanticism of the early nineteenth century was shown in the tendency toward large canvases, full of movement and energy. Most noted of this school is Ferdinand Delacroix. On the other hand, romanticism was also to be seen in the changed style of landscape painting, intended to appeal to the emotions and emphasize the spiritual element in nature. Two of the greatest Romantic landscapists were the Englishmen Constable and Turner, whose canvases even today are widely regarded as among the most beautiful ever painted.

In architecture the nineteenth-century style was in general eclectic, nothing basically new in architecture appearing until the end of the century. But romanticism had its effect in stimulating a renewed interest in medieval Gothic and a wide imitation of the Gothic style, with

modern structural improvements. This revival may be seen in academic buildings in the United States, for example Yale University and The City College of New York, as well as in numerous churches, such as the still unfinished Episcopal Cathedral of St. John the Divine and the Catholic Cathedral of St. Patrick in New York.

Music, as might be imagined, was the art most directly affected by romanticism. Music is created by human feeling and appeals directly to the emotions. We have already dealt with the music of the great eighteenth-century masters, and Beethoven may be classed in many ways as a romantic composer. But better representatives of pure romanticism, the music of unmixed feeling, are Franz Schubert, Robert Schumann, Felix Mendelssohn, and Frederic Chopin. Little need be said here of the familiar works of these composers. It may, however, be noted that Chopin was a Polish patriot as well as a composer of numerous romantic works for the piano. He lived an almost archetypal life of a certain kind of romantic, including a protracted and tempestuous love affair with the French novelist George Sand (Aurore Dupin) and a slow and early death from tuberculosis.

This brief sketch of a few figures of the romantic movement obviously cannot be inclusive. Only a few names have been mentioned in order to illustrate the range and extent of the movement. This section will, however, conclude with a slightly more extensive account of a man who began as one of the greatest romantics but then demonstrated in his life and work the way in which its faults could be transcended. Goethe never became a realist, a naturalist, a pessimist, or an escapist; he did not hesitate to take issue with Newton for his theory of color, which he characterized as one-sided and materialistic, and he would certainly have laughed at Darwin had he lived to read the *Origin of Species*; it may even be imagined that he would have challenged the all-conquering Freudians of the twentieth century.

GOETHE—THE FULFILLMENT OF THE ROMANTIC IDEAL

It has already been noted that Goethe in his youth wrote the *Sorrows of Werther*, a romantic



Goethe, at 68, from a portrait by Ferdinand Jagemann.

novel of tragic love based on his own experience, and he was active in the *Sturm und Drang* movement. Whatever its effects on others, *Werther* undoubtedly had a therapeutic effect on its author; this type of romanticism never again appeared in his life or work. It has often been remarked that Goethe's life, demonstrating all the human being's potentialities for growth, is in some respects even more significant than his poetry. Although without doubt he was the finest lyrical poet Germany has ever known, he was also a statesman of considerable stature, an amateur scientist, a master of many sports, and one of Germany's greatest novelists. It is also clear from his numerous letters and from the conversations recorded by Eckermann that over his long life he acquired considerable wisdom. He was thoroughly familiar with all that was going on in his lifetime in esthetics, literature, and politics. His achievements as a scientist have, however, seldom been rated very highly, since science has followed a path different from the one suggested by him; it remains possible, in the opinion of some who are well qualified to speak, that his method may yet come to be recognized as a fruitful one, especially in the life sciences. Goethe himself regarded his scien-

tific work as at least the equal of his poetry; posterity up to this time has not accorded him such recognition. The unique drama of *Faust*, his major poetic work, which he finished only within a year of his death, has been always acclaimed as one of the greatest, if not the greatest, literary work of Western civilization. His theory of the metamorphosis of plants and his discovery of the intermaxillary jawbone are granted to him as major accomplishments; but the method by which he discovered them has usually been dismissed as the intuition of a poet and an observer and lover of nature—a personal gift of his own rather than a method capable of being learned by others and used for practical purposes.

Goethe believed that it was possible to develop the imaginative faculty of the human being in such a way that the ordinary processes of trial and error could be eliminated. The intermaxillary jawbone was predicted by Goethe because he grasped imaginatively the structure of the head, concluding that there must be such a bone if the other parts of the head were to form a harmonious and functioning whole. On the basis of his prediction, efforts were made by others to see whether the bone was in fact there. This process led to the discovery of the bone, whose presence had been unsuspected before. Goethe discovered the law for the metamorphosis of plants by the same method of extremely close and careful observation of changes, followed by a prediction of changes which had not yet been observed, in order to provide the link between one observed phase and another. In the process of studying plants he "imagined" to himself an *Urpflanz*, or archetypal plant, which he told Schiller he had already perceived in his imagination, and from which all visible plants were derived (compare the Platonic Idea). Since this *Urpflanz* had been seen by no one else he was unable to convince anyone, not even Schiller, of the truth of his vision, though he claimed that much of his undoubted understanding of plant morphology was due to this insight. In the controversy over his theory of color with his contemporary Newtonians, Goethe insisted that color could not be fully expressed simply as a mathematical abstraction, and he objected very strongly to

treating color theory as exclusively a part of mathematical physics. Color, according to the physicist, is dependent upon the wave length of light, and is not in itself a reality. Goethe took issue with this point of view in an enormous book on the theory of color (*Farbenlehren*), ignoring the experimental evidence for the wave lengths. It remains possible that there may yet be some truth in Goethe's observations, and recent investigations into the nature of light have suggested that the last word has not been said.

Goethe's interest in science cannot in fact be separated from his poetic genius. His absorbing interest in the entire world of nature and art is reflected in *Faust*. Taking the old medieval legend of Dr. Faustus, who sold his soul to the Devil in exchange for youth and knowledge, Goethe transformed this theme into a poetic drama in which Faust wins ultimate salvation in spite of the promise of his soul to Mephistopheles. In the much shorter first part of *Faust*, the protagonist is on the point of suicide when he hears the sound of the Easter bells. He has come to the end of his quest for knowledge and can go no further. He is an old man and all his knowledge has availed him nothing. Then Mephistopheles comes to him and offers him youth and knowledge. Faust accepts and there follow the seduction of the pure young maiden Gretchen and the killing of her brother Valentine, who tries to interfere with Faust's designs upon his sister. This is the part of *Faust* that was made into the famous opera by Gounod and is the part of the work most widely known. But the second part, which occupied Goethe for several decades, is written on an entirely different level. His own search for knowledge and understanding of nature, his love for the classical world and for the traditional folk mysteries of Germany, are all woven together. In this part Faust meets Helen, the ideal of classical beauty, and by her has a son who dies because he cannot attach himself to the earth—unlike Faust himself, who seeks to understand and work on the earth, determined to benefit his people. Even at the last, blind and old, he plans new ventures. No human being is free, he comes to realize, unless he earns his freedom anew every day. He has already long before told

Mephistopheles that he may have his soul if ever he comes to say to the passing moment, "Ah, linger on, thou art so fair." But he does not utter the words until he is on the point of death, when he cannot bear to leave the earth, the scene of his work, where there is so much remaining to be done. He dies, and Mephistopheles claims his soul. But the heavenly hierarchies proclaim him saved—for he has made the fullest use of the time that has been granted to him. He has redeemed himself through action.

This drama, as was noted earlier, is the picture of Western man, ceaselessly striving, restlessly searching. What Goethe has done is to capture the modern age within a single protean figure, who is not quite an individual human being—one does not meet Fausts in everyday life—not a character such as one meets in Shakespeare, but the ideal of romanticism itself, without its defects. Faust was a being who realized to the full all the potentialities of man, but did not weep for himself and yet also did not live by reason alone. He kept death at bay to the last, and by implication joined the immortals because he continued to strive and refused ever to admit defeat. It is an ideal unthinkable in any but our Western civilization; and it is a sad comment on the work and ideal of Goethe that the age that followed him not only retreated into specialization, but even looked askance upon the many-sided man as not quite serious—and certainly not worthy of the esteem it has bestowed upon the specialist.

❖ Consequences of romantic movement

Romanticism, seen in its essential aspect as the effort to restore belief in the importance and value of faculties other than the intellect, has succeeded in laying its impress on the whole subsequent history and culture of Western man. It can hardly be denied that today sufficient attention is given to the irrational in man. Indeed, it would not be too much to say that the pendulum has never swung back in the direction of rationalism. The evolutionary theory of Darwin postulates the descent of man from the animal world. Its corollary—that man is

only an animal, plus a mind which has evolved like everything else in nature—has tended to depreciate the mind of man in comparison with the parts of his nature that he holds in common with other animals. The psychology of Freud and his successors has stressed the irrational and subconscious elements in man, sometimes almost to the exclusion of mind as an important factor in his being. The sociologists who study man in society likewise are inclined to suggest that man's thinking can never be free, but is the result of his environment. Thus the negative element in romanticism, which depreciated the importance of man's mind, has persisted to the present, while its more positive element, which stressed the sublimity and grandeur and diversity of both man and the world, has to a large degree been eroded. Thus today we have neither eighteenth-century rationalism and optimism nor the dynamism and lyricism of the romantic era. We have not yet come to the new insights and new impulses that can give Western man the spiritual stimulus he so sorely needs if his civilization is not to relapse into the decadence predicted for it by its prophets of doom.

♦ Transition to realism and naturalism

The romantic movement had already passed its zenith by the middle of the nineteenth century—and though, as we have just said, romanticism has persisted as part of the makeup of Western man to this day, often unperceived, the literary movement as such had ceased to attract. When a new drama of Victor Hugo, entitled *Les Burgraves*, was produced in 1843, the author expected a battle royal, as over his earlier *Hernani*, which had ushered in the romantic drama in France not so many years before. He therefore called upon a friend, who had hitherto provided him with a cheering claque for the *première*, to perform his usual service. But the friend was unable to oblige. It was not, he explained, that there was no more youth available for such tasks. Rather, romanticism had ceased to be in the vanguard. The audience found the play boring, and it was a complete failure.

The excesses of romanticism, especially its raw and excessively direct appeal to the emotions, had finally wearied its devotees; former romantic writers were often disgusted with themselves, and especially with the illusions which they had fostered and often come to believe in themselves. Real life was found to be far from life as it had been depicted by the romantics. Love was less often a matter of high passion than of sexual attraction followed by humdrum resignation. Ordinary men and women did not occupy pedestals; they were rarely angels or saints. They lived in an industrial world and had a hard job to pay their way. Moreover, science appeared to be making it clear that man was primarily, if not exclusively, an animal, and that his soul and spirit were simply the projection of man's hopes, whose existence was incapable of verification. Curiously enough, the new writers were willing to admit the existence of mind, even though this was incapable of definition, much less verification. Especially after the publication of the epoch-making *Origin of Species* by Charles Darwin in 1859, man, including his mind, could be seen in their proper perspective as products of evolution. The world itself increasingly seemed to be a planet devoid of even mind, a great mechanism doomed to destruction like the other planets, and destined under the second law of thermodynamics to an eventual death by heat. The grounds for belief in individual human immortality seemed to have been destroyed by the advance of science.

Romanticism in its pristine optimistic form therefore became somewhat ridiculous. Industrial society and the advance of scientific materialism combined to lay romanticism to rest. Realism and naturalism, two movements not easily distinguished from one another, became fashionable instead. Both were characterized by the attempt to base literature and philosophy on the realities of the world of man and nature as apparently revealed by science, and to free themselves from the illusions fostered by romanticism. Moreover, they wished to describe the world as it was, rather than as the romantics would have had it be. It is true that the romantic element remained, especially in the pessimism of such men as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, but even in other men it was tem-

pered at least by the desire to avoid excessive illusionary optimism. Before dealing with the cultural world of naturalism and pessimism, however, we shall first consider the world of nineteenth-century science, since it seems clear that its great advances in this period condition much of the later part of the century and have continued to influence philosophy and art to this day.

❖ Nineteenth-century science and philosophy

THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION

Pre-Darwinian naturalists The key science of the nineteenth century was not mathematical physics or chemistry and the inorganic sciences, but biology. It is not that biology had so many nineteenth-century achievements to its credit, although it did indeed make notable progress, but rather that it produced a synthesis that was found convincing by many intellectuals; and simplifications of this synthesis became the common property not only of the intellectuals but of the great majority of the thinking people of Western civilization. Specialists in other fields began to apply the teachings of evolution to their own specialties, as in the eighteenth century they had tried to apply the "geometrical method" to philosophy and social science. In a word, the notion of evolution became fashionable; and anyone who hoped to be taken seriously had to apply its apparent principles—the struggle for existence, the survival of the fittest, and "natural selection"—even to such diverse subjects as history, literature, and political science. The theory of evolution will therefore hold pride of place in this section. It will be followed by an attempt to picture the beliefs of nineteenth-century man concerning the nature of the universe, the physical world, and man. In the last chapter of this book the twentieth-century changes in this world picture will be summarized, together with the effect these changes have had on contemporary culture and thought.

The theory of evolution is, of course, an ancient one. It was suggested by several Greek thinkers, and by Lucretius, the Roman scientific poet. It was implicit in much thought of more

recent times. In its essentials it means only that from the beginning of the world there has been change and constant adaptation of all organisms to their changing environment. Until the nineteenth century there had not been enough empirical evidence available on the actual facts of change, nor was it known that some species which had existed in the past had evidently died out and others apparently come into existence. The facts of paleontology and the fossil record, when available, had not been fully interpreted; nor was very much known of the great changes of the physical structure of the world until the beginning of modern geology in the eighteenth century. Under the influence of the Old Testament it was quite generally believed, without the application of much critical thought to the matter, that each species had been specially created and was immutable; that it had been named by Adam, the first man; and that there was no special point in inquiring further.

But some early nineteenth-century naturalists, especially Buffon and Lamarck, had been giving thought to whether all species were in fact immutable. If they were not, then what caused new ones to appear? Behind this speculation was the tremendously important question of how living matter arose from nonliving—the origin, indeed, not only of the separate species, but of life itself. Such thought as there had been on this question usually assumed spontaneous generation, presumably under the influence of God, who also created the human soul as soon as the act of conception had been completed, or at some later stage in the development of the embryo. The thought of serious pre-Darwinian naturalists of the century customarily held that in some way or another the environment affected the species, not only the individual which had to live in changed environmental conditions. In other words, it seemed likely that changes resulting from events in the life of an organism could be transmitted directly to its offspring by means of some mechanism that had not yet been discovered. Jean Baptiste Lamarck (1744–1829), a French naturalist contemporary with Buffon, recognized that the changed environment probably compelled certain species to adapt themselves, as for instance the ancestors of the giraffe, who had to stretch ever higher for

their food. Out of this need arose the new species of giraffe that was born with a neck adequate to its purpose. Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), a naturalist and philosopher, had also written of what he called “survival of the fittest” as the fundamental principle of evolution.

“*The Origin of Species*” It was the destiny of Charles Darwin (1809–1882) to provide a unifying theory for the evidence that he and his predecessors had accumulated. A voyage to South America as a naturalist gave him a tremendous amount of information, which he carefully collated before arriving at his theory. He was, indeed, almost ready to publish, and had indicated the outlines of his theory in private correspondence as well as entering it in his notebooks, when another naturalist, Alfred Wallace, published a paper which adumbrated the essentials of the Darwinian theory. Darwin therefore hesitated no longer but in 1859 published his *Origin of Species*. Later he completed his theory with an account of the origin

of man, which was implicit but not fully worked out in his earlier book (*Descent of Man*, 1871).

Darwin, according to his own account, had been led to his theory by reading the Reverend Thomas Malthus’ *Essay on Population*. This work had brought forcibly to his attention the fact that there was indeed a struggle for existence among human beings, and that natural catastrophes, illness, and scarcity of food had hitherto been able to keep the world population from outrunning its resources. This notion Darwin immediately started to apply in his mind to all organisms, and he constantly had the hypothesis at hand when studying the world of nature. He concluded that all organisms were engaged in this struggle for existence, and only those survived that had proved themselves capable of adaptation in a changed environment. Spencer’s “survival of the fittest” was therefore a correct notion.

Darwin laid much stress on “natural selection,” including sexual selection. The fittest organism would naturally be inclined to mate with a like organism, thus propagating the species of the fitter. In time the new organism, better adapted to its environment, would displace the organism that had not similarly evolved, and the latter would die out. Thus the whole evolutionary process was from the lower or less well adapted to the higher or better adapted. The Western notion of progress was therefore rooted deeply in the facts of the natural world. Man himself had clearly evolved from the “lower animals,” and his mind had enabled him to survive in a world peopled by dangerous but more specialized animals, who could not adapt themselves to other modes of existence. Man was the crown of creation because of his possession of a versatile mind, and would remain at the head of the organic world until presumably some other animals evolved a mind for themselves—their mind, such as it was, being at present of a lower order than man’s. Darwin himself was unable to provide evidence of the mechanism by which evolution to higher forms took place. He himself inclined to the view that acquired characteristics could be inherited.



Charles Darwin, scientist of the century. (BROWN BROTHERS)

The genetic theory It remains only to say that scientists bent every effort to discover the

mechanism of evolution and to show that what Darwin had suggested was true. The physical laws of inheritance, formulated by the monk Gregor Mendel (1822-1884) in the mid-nineteenth century but not known to the scientific world for more than thirty years, were in fact available in Darwin's day but not recovered until after his death. There have been constant refinements since Mendel's time, including the postulation of the chromosomes and genes as the vehicles for inheritance, and the mathematical calculation of the position, number, and influence of the genes.

August Weismann (1834-1914), after many years of painstaking experimentation, came to the conclusion that acquired characteristics could not be transmitted through the genetic mechanism. The genes can indeed be modified, but not by anything that happens during the lifetime of their bearer. Cats and mice whose tails are cut off in life invariably have fully tailed offspring, through as many generations as can be counted. The Darwinian theory has therefore been modified to take account of the new evidence. Almost all biologists today believe that change in the genetic structure is usually a matter of chance, but that a genetic mutation causes a new species to appear which may, as Darwin suggested, be better fitted to survive. Thereafter natural selection takes over. Few mutations are beneficial, and the vast majority do not survive; but those that do are the ancestors of new and better-adapted species. Man can, by various mechanical means, create mutations; but these are no more beneficial than the natural ones. When, however, a beneficial mutation does appear, man can aid it to survive by selective breeding. This possibility, together with the understanding of the physical basis of heredity, has provided most of the experimental evidence for the Darwinian theory, which, with its modifications, continues to hold the field today.

Consequences of the theory of evolution—“Darwinism” Upon this substructure of biological evolutionary theory has been built up, over the past century, the very widely held belief that the principle of evolution is able to account for the entire organic world as it ap-

pears today. Whereas the existence of the physical world has resulted from changes in the universe outside the earth, and geological changes in the earth's structure have been the consequence of its composition and structure at the beginning, scientists as a rule are simply content to say that after tremendous periods of geological time, life appeared. There is no satisfactory explanation for the mechanism of this appearance, since experiments have not yet been able to duplicate the feat. Conditions on earth, however, were suitable for the survival of life once it had appeared. Thereafter all living creatures evolved by the process of natural selection to the condition in which we find them today. There is no need for the hypothesis of Divine Mind or any purpose in evolution. On the other hand, it was quite possible for a believer in a Divine Creator to accept the fact of evolution, merely adding that this was the means used by the Creator to people the world with the species he desired. It was therefore possible for a man to abandon the nonessential notion of special creation, putting back the act of creation itself to the beginning of the world—perhaps to the first creation of life, if he did not believe that life simply evolved from dead matter. Such a man could also easily abandon the scientific notion of natural selection, and substitute the continuous concurrence or wish of God as an adequate explanation for the survival of a new species.

But the tranquil acceptance (with minor modifications) of Darwinism by religious men was far from being true of the period of Darwin himself and the years that followed his *Origin of Species*. Some men were at once convinced of the essential truth of the theory and constituted themselves its public defenders. Against these were arrayed serried ranks of churchmen and lay believers of the literal truth of Scripture. There had been no such controversies over the scientific theories of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, although they had called in question many beliefs derived from Scripture and, as many thought, demoted man's habitat, the earth, from its position of dignity in the universe and made God's special interest in the earth unlikely. But the Darwinian theory, in suggesting that man had evolved from lower

forms of life, touched man deeply in his *amour-propre*. Darwin's defenders were early accused of claiming that man was descended from the ape, although in fact it was soon recognized that at most man and ape were descended from a common ancestor, a missing link, which was sought high and low by anthropologists and archaeologists in the fossil record. More heat than light was naturally generated in the controversy, which was not laid to rest for many decades. In the state of Tennessee, as late as the 1920's, a school teacher was condemned for teaching Darwinism contrary to the revelations of Scripture.

Among the ordinary laymen and nonscientific thinkers the "survival of the fittest" became a slogan of very wide application, and often became metamorphosed into the "survival of the strongest," giving some pseudoscientific support to advocates of imperialism and war. History was interpreted in the light of evolutionary theory, with the result that the existing nations, which had succeeded in surviving, were regarded as more fit to survive than those ancient civilizations which had disappeared; and the characteristics of the survivors were examined to see just what the qualities were that were the most conducive to survival. The new historical method began to look at all human institutions in the light of evolution, moving away from the earlier notion of perfection and finality and the quest for the perfect form of government, the archetypal Idea of Plato. They now studied how institutions grew, whether they served their purpose, and why they ceased to do so and lost their "survival value." The circularity of the new arguments was pointed out by Earl Balfour, British statesman and philosopher, with his remark that the theory of evolution simply states that what is fit survives, from which the theorists deduce that what survives is fit. No further deductions can be made from this conclusion. Evolutionary theory was likewise applied to the development of historical religions and to the growth of moral ideals—leading, indeed, to the ironical finding in the twentieth century which is the reverse of the notion of the survival of the strongest. The anthropologist Ashley Montague has concluded that the gentler virtues of cooperation have a superior survival value, con-

firmed the Christian thesis that he who takes the sword shall perish by the sword.

The theory of evolution was, as noted earlier in the chapter, only one, if the most important, of the elements that went to form the nineteenth-century picture of man and his world. The rest of the picture will now be considered before we come to a fuller discussion of the effects of this total picture upon the philosophy and culture of the century.

THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE

The Laplace hypothesis Nineteenth-century man's understanding of the origin of the solar system remained dominated by the nebular hypothesis of Kant as modified by Laplace at the end of the eighteenth century. According to this hypothesis a gaseous nebula at one time filled the whole space occupied by the orbit of Neptune, the most distant of our planets. The nebula rotated, but contracted under the influence of its own gravitation, throwing off rings of matter which condensed into the planets and their satellites, ultimately leaving only the sun as the central mass around which the planets rotated. The theory is still believed as possibly true of more distant systems than our solar system. But it cannot be true of the solar system itself, because a rotating mass of gas sufficient to supply the matter for the solar system would not in fact throw off rings of a size capable of forming planets. The rings would simply dissipate themselves in space. However, the spiral nebulae observed in outer space, supposedly millions of times larger than the postulated primal nebula of our solar system, might throw off other bodies. As the nineteenth century grew to appreciate the size and distances of the bodies beyond the solar system, the theory of Laplace was gradually abandoned by leading scientists, though no effective substitute was devised to take its place until the present century.

Spectrum analysis The immense distances of the stars and their magnitude and composition are determined by the process of spectrum analysis, a nineteenth-century technique which is based on the study of wave lengths of observed light and the frequency of the lines into

which the light is refracted. The distance of the stars from the earth was calculated by triangulation, after the observation of their very slight movement in relation to that of the earth. The enormous distances are expressed in light years, calculated from the number of years it would take the light of the star to reach the earth at the known speed of light. The substance and composition of the stars are calculated on the basis of the various physical laws known for earth.

Laws of thermodynamics Fundamental to all knowledge of the earth and the universe are the two basic laws of thermodynamics, both formulated in the nineteenth century. The first law states that although energy can be changed in form it can be neither created nor destroyed (the conservation of energy); the second law states that energy is gradually becoming less available and will ultimately reach a state of equilibrium when no further change is possible (law of increase of entropy). This process is apparently irreversible, and as assured as the march of time. The end, sometimes called a heat-death, is inevitable—a notion that gave some scientific philosophers, such as Bertrand Russell, a satisfactory scientific basis for their pessimism and despair, which could be met only with Promethean defiance. The laws themselves, however, have been somewhat modified in the twentieth century, and it is recognized that they are not necessarily applicable to the whole universe, even though some remarkable predictions have been fulfilled on earth, as will be noted in Chapter 27. It need hardly be pointed out to the reader of the second half of the twentieth century how much they are likely to be modified in the new space age, and how assumptions about the uniformity of natural laws throughout the universe are already beginning to present problems and difficulties that may take generations to resolve. Our knowledge of the universe is based on a few key techniques and assumptions. Should any of these prove to be inapplicable or untrue, then our understanding of the processes outside the earth will be so severely shaken that it will have to be radically reconstructed.

THE NATURE OF THE WORLD

The atomic theory Man's knowledge of the world he inhabits underwent a remarkable enlargement as a result of nineteenth-century theory and experiment. Until the last few years of the nineteenth century it was believed that matter was solid. The nineteenth century had, however, contributed to the clarification of the notion of the atomic structure of matter—a notion that, as we have seen, originated in ancient Greece, when the atom was postulated as the small indivisible unit that formed the building blocks of material substance. The idea had been frequently revived in subsequent centuries but was put on a scientific basis in the early nineteenth century. John Dalton showed that there exist elementary and compound substances. The elementary, indivisible substances vary in weight according to the particular substance. In the nineteenth century ninety-two of these elements were known, and a table was devised by Mendeleev showing the atomic weights of all substances, and suggesting that new substances would be found to fill in the blanks in his table.

It was of course well known that matter could be found in three states: gaseous, solid, and liquid. It was now proposed by several scientists, who each contributed some part of the theory, that these three states could be explained by postulation of an entity known as a molecule, larger than an atom but still extremely small, which was separated from other molecules in the substance, so that no form of matter was quite as solid and homogeneous as it appeared. The molecules were always in a state of motion, and their motion could be changed by pressure or heat. As the motion increases, the substance expands; when it decreases, the substance contracts. High pressure on a gas forces the molecules close together so that their motion decreases; whereas heat has the opposite effect, causing the molecules to vibrate more rapidly and at a greater distance from one another. The theory explained the observed facts very satisfactorily, and the molecule joined the atom as a physical component of matter. At the end of the nineteenth century J. J. Thomson, Rutherford, and others, in trying to explain the X-rays

which had recently been discovered by Roentgen, postulated the existence of a far smaller entity than an atom: an electric charge which was called an electron, and which could not, as was soon found, be considered truly a material substance at all. Thomson, however, named it a corpuscle, and it is still, with its sister entities—the proton, neutron, positron, and others—known as an "elementary particle." Thus matter began to seem even more mysterious than before, and ever less material and solid, in spite of the mounting evidence that the particles were not simply figments of the scientific imagination. But this phase of the development of physics, falling as it does almost entirely within the twentieth century, will be left for the last chapter.

Theories of light The other great nineteenth-century theories which began to shake the belief of scientists and laymen that the world was comprehensible and in any way to be pictured in terms of what was actually observable were concerned with light. Newton, it will be recalled, thought of light as made up of corpuscles. Already in the time of Newton, Huyghens had held that light was a wave. In the nineteenth century scientific opinion went against the Newtonian theory, and the wave theory of light held the field, mainly as the result of the very careful experiments of Augustin Fresnel in the early part of the century. The wave theory, however, required a medium—light had to be a wave of *something*, like all other known waves. Hence was postulated the ether, the most recent of the postulated entities to be definitely abandoned.

In the twentieth century, light is believed by many to be both corpuscular and wave, though Einstein showed that the concept of an ether was unnecessary. In the later part of the nineteenth century James Clark Maxwell (1831–1879), a profound student of electricity and magnetism who had provided the mathematical basis for much of Faraday's work, concluded that visible light was of electromagnetic origin, occurring in waves of clearly limited length. His field equations showed that the velocity of the waves depended on the electric and mag-

netic properties of the medium. Maxwell's work, not accepted at once in Europe, was given great importance by the discovery of the Herzian waves, which were neither ether waves nor light waves. But none of this work truly demonstrated the exact nature of light. All that could be said at the end of the century was that it was a form of energy. Even now what light actually is remains unknown, though its properties have been very fully investigated and new theories suggested to explain them.

Thus, by the end of a great century of theory and experimental investigation, which prepared the way for the extraordinary expansion of scientific technology in the twentieth century, it was clear only that all the dictates of common sense and ordinary observation that had been the staple diet of previous centuries were on the way out—that the world for the layman was becoming increasingly incomprehensible. Nevertheless, science appeared to work, whether or not it was true—a paradox which was to lead to a new theory of knowledge which will be discussed in a later section of this chapter.

THE NATURE OF MAN

Physical and cultural anthropology The Darwinian theory, the increasing interest in technology, and the ability to manipulate the external world for the apparent benefit of man gave rise to renewed interest in the study of man himself. The new science of anthropology, the study of man in the widest sense, was a nineteenth-century discipline which soon became subdivided into separate compartments of investigation. The physical anthropologists wished to do for man what Linnaeus had done for the plant world. They began to make physical measurements of his cranium and of the rest of his body, and to determine from these data his "race," his bodily type, and other characteristics held in common with considerable numbers of his fellow human beings. The science was empirical in that it was based on observation and quantitative analysis. But it soon developed, in the hands of some of its practitioners, into an attempt to determine the

superiority or inferiority of certain types, giving rise to a number of extremely dubious hypotheses regarding the correlation between certain physical traits and mental and spiritual characteristics. The cultural anthropologists began to study early prehistoric societies, and societies considered, from the Western point of view, as primitive. The eighteenth-century "noble savage" was now examined with care to see whether he was in fact noble, and if so, in what sense. His manners, customs, and social behavior were scrupulously classified, and in time the information was used to obtain a better empirical knowledge of the way in which all societies function, thus becoming a part of the new nineteenth-century discipline of sociology, founded and named, as we shall see, by Auguste Comte.

The human mind—Psychology and psychoanalysis Parallel with the interest in the behavior of man in society, and at all stages of investigation closely related to this study, was an interest in the examination of man himself. But the study of man in the second half of the nineteenth century and in the twentieth century bears little resemblance to the rationalist psychology of the Enlightenment. In the psychology of Hobbes and his eighteenth-century successors, the primacy of the mind over the emotions was to a large degree taken for granted. Even Hobbes, who was under no illusions concerning the need for curbing destructive tendencies in the human makeup, believed that such control was possible as well as desirable. Such an assumption had likewise been made by Plato: whose Charioteer, representing Reason, was able, though with difficulty, to keep under control the two horses of Desire and Will. But in the nineteenth century, in part under the influence of the Darwinian belief that man was descended from the animal and differed from the animal only by virtue of his superior mind and consciousness, more attention than before was devoted to the instinctual animal heritage of man. The efficacy of reason to deal with this heritage was likewise called into question. Moreover, the effort to discover mechanisms (or, in Aristotelian terminology, the preoccupation with efficient causation) in the physical sciences had

its effects in psychology. If a man did in fact think, what was the mechanism by which he thought, why did his thoughts take the form they did, what was the influence of his emotions upon his thoughts, why were his emotions of the kind they were observed to be? Furthermore, could emotions and thoughts, like the inorganic world, be controlled in a scientific manner?

In the later nineteenth century a great deal of work was done in observing the functioning of the emotions and thinking, the formation of habits, the nature of the self as it appeared to operate in the world. Observation was supplemented by efforts at experimentation, though, since so little was known about the extraordinarily complex nature of the human being, it was difficult to devise controlled experiments that could yield significant information. William James's *Principles of Psychology* (1890) was the fullest synthesis of this material, though its theoretical underpinning was not very strong. In the early twentieth century Ivan Pavlov's experiments with dogs, his discovery of the "conditioned reflex," and the behaviorist psychology which was based upon the Pavlovian (and Hobbesian) concept of the human being as a mechanism, added much information on how habits could be formed. Some practical results were thus obtained for the use of those who wished to influence human behavior for their profit. This psychology will be referred to again briefly in the last chapter, devoted to the twentieth century.

Meanwhile, a very different method of approaching the problem was being developed in the later years of the nineteenth century by Sigmund Freud; and although the fruits of his research and theorizing have been seen in the twentieth rather than in the nineteenth century, so much of Freud's thought belongs to the general intellectual presuppositions of his time that it will be outlined here. Freud postulated the existence of an unconscious or subconscious, which was needed to account for a number of observable phenomena in the human makeup. This unconscious, like Kant's thing-in-itself, could never be directly observed, but bore a causal relationship to observable phenomena. Freud, in his work with hysterical patients, discovered that certain memories were apparently

completely lost but could be recovered under hypnosis. Moreover, the content of many dreams appeared also to be making use of ancient memories, even though the form they took was usually symbolic and needed an interpreter to show the connection between the forgotten experience and the present mental and emotional condition of the dreamer. It was Freud's view that such memories and the emotional reaction of the patient to them had been "repressed" by the patient, but continued nevertheless to affect him. Often the patient had a profound sense of guilt resulting from his repressions, which influenced fundamentally all his subsequent emotions and, consequently, his actions. In the manner of the nineteenth century, Freud pictured the unconscious as filled with "energy," which, he held, should have been used for rational action but too rarely was.

In Freud's view, as developed in many directions in the course of a long life, the human being is in a state of constant struggle against the instinctual part of his being, which urges a particular course of action, and the demands of his moral nature. Such demands are the result of social influences which have been "internalized" as his personal code of ethics. A profound disequilibrium exists between his desires and his socially formed conscience. Freud divides the human personality, as did Plato, into three parts. The "id" is the repository of his instincts. These, according to Freud, though not to many of those who originally worked with him, are primarily sexual in nature. The "ego" includes his reason or intellect. It is very weak in comparison with the id and the superego, but it is the most individualized part of man's nature, his only "true" self. Lastly, there is the "superego," which acts as a stern taskmaster, controlling the impulses from the id, but often at the same time creating an unbearable tension. The superego starts to function in infancy, in the form of the authority of the parent, and is represented in later life by the dictates of all forms of authority, including that of religion. Clearly, Freud's Jewish heritage influenced his notion of God as the stern judge. The best hope for men, according to Freud, is to canalize the great drives of the id, and use its energy for creative and artistic purposes—a process known as sublimation

—rather than giving way to the impulses of the id, which will result only in further conflict with the demands of the superego and in an ever increasing sense of guilt.

There are numerous other facets of the thought of Freud, but the above presents the central picture of man as an almost impotent being—a conception not far removed from that of Schopenhauer, to be discussed later. It should, however, be added that the psychoanalytic technique developed by Freud was intended, by the process of free association and the interpretation of dreams, to bring the unconscious memories into the light of consciousness, where they could be recognized by the ego for what they were. Thus the sense of guilt could be overcome by a fuller understanding of its universality and of its basis in the fundamental conflict between the instincts and the superego. Reason, however weak, must at least try to understand, and, it was hoped, become stronger and more competent to direct the patient's life thereafter.

The body—Bacterial theory of disease

Parallel with the study of the mind and soul of man was the continued study of his body. This study in the nineteenth century, and generally today, was almost wholly an empirical science and lacked any kind of theory concerning the relation between the observed physical processes and the mind or soul. Freud, however, had demonstrated certain interconnections between mental and physical processes, giving rise in the 1930's to a psychosomatic medicine which recognized that some illnesses were the result of mental states. It attempted, with some success, to alleviate anxieties and effect a cure by such means rather than by attacking the physical symptoms directly.

From the point of view of therapy, there were marked advantages in viewing the physical organism as normally "healthy," and disease as an abnormal condition brought about by definite causes which could be traced and remedied. Such an approach led to far more effective treatment than, for instance, medieval medicine, which considered the human being as part of a much wider total environment which included the starry world, and when it prescribed treatment for him, took account of such factors as

his personality and temperament. What modern medicine has tried with immense success to do has been to describe a particular disease and find its immediate causes, then treat those causes, allowing the organism thereafter to heal itself. The great contribution of the nineteenth century was the bacterial theory of disease. This theory views the human body as a battleground for microorganisms, bacteria and the much smaller viruses, which are at all times ready to multiply and pour their toxic products into the blood stream, overpowering the defenses of the tiny organisms (*corpuscles*) whose task it is to ingest the bacteria and thus pass them innocuously out of the system. After much experimental work, especially with animals, it was found feasible to aid the helpful organisms and destroy the dangerous ones by administering various drugs, by inoculation, vaccination, and other means. To do this effectively it was necessary first to determine how the disease was transmitted, and what the specific bacterial agent or virus was. Then the agent could be prevented from breeding in his own habitat, in which case it would never enter the human system; or, as with pasteurization, it could be destroyed before it had a chance to enter it. For example, the malarial parasite is prevented from breeding by various means, such as the covering of its breeding places with a light film of oil.

When the discovery was made that if a person has recovered from a particular disease, he becomes either permanently or temporarily *immune* to the same disease, a new type of therapy was adopted. The patient was given (as early as the late eighteenth century in cases of smallpox) a very light form of the disease, from which he recovered without difficulty. This, as a rule, was achieved by infecting an animal with the disease, and drawing from its body a serum or vaccine, which could then be used on human beings.

Throughout the nineteenth century numerous diseases were studied, their agents discovered, and effective means gradually evolved to fight the disease. The great pioneer was the French chemist Louis Pasteur (1822-1895), who used vaccines against anthrax and hydrophobia (or rabies). His study of bacteria made the older notion of spontaneous generation un-

tenable, since he was able to demonstrate that microorganisms invariably breed from other microorganisms. There was therefore no need for the hypothesis that any such microorganisms arose *de novo*. Pasteur's views were at first greeted with skepticism, but his practical demonstrations could not be gainsaid; his work, as far as it goes, has fully stood the test of time. Almost as important work was done by Robert Koch (1843-1910) in Germany in the discovery of other bacterial agents.

Armed with these new tools, surgery became far more effective. Anesthesia came into use early in the century, making possible operations which without it would have resulted in death from shock and pain; and the new bacterial discoveries drew attention to the need for cleanliness and sanitation, which lessened the chance of infection from microorganisms. Surgical techniques have constantly improved as the knowledge of how the human organism functions has increased. Surgery has been aided, of course, by X-rays, which permit the interior of the organism to be examined—often, though not always, obviating the necessity for an exploratory examination into the body by the surgeon. Medicine and surgery, however, remained an outstanding example of the way in which practice has been able to make immense progress, still very largely on the basis of trial and error, without any very greatly improved knowledge of the actual functioning of the human organism as a whole, and without any clear concept of the truly healthy human being—who, after all, does not appear in nature.

EFFECT OF SCIENCE ON PHILOSOPHY

Pragmatism and positivism It may be that the success of medicine on the basis of less than adequate knowledge of the human organism, and the general practical effectiveness of science, played their part in the development of a new theory of knowledge, suggested in the nineteenth century by Charles Peirce (1839-1914) and William James (1842-1910), but developed more fully in the twentieth century by John Dewey, who called it instrumentalism. Various implications of the theory were developed in a different direction in the form of logical

positivism or logical empiricism, which will be alluded to briefly in the last chapter.

This new theory of knowledge, called pragmatism by William James, was a reaction in particular against idealistic thought, with its vagueness and apparent uselessness in practical life. Peirce held that our concepts must have a practical bearing if they are to be meaningful, and that the concept of the effect is the whole meaning of the original concept. This reasoning led to the notion that the validity of a concept or idea must be measured by its consequences—in exactly the same way as the deductions from a mathematical equation must be found to conform with reality and be subjected to verification if the initial equation is to be considered true. Pragmatism therefore asserted that the truth of a proposition is to be measured by its correspondence to the results of experimentation. Truth itself is ultimately to be measured by whether the deductions from it can be verified by experimentation or observation. Even if this condition is fulfilled, it is still only temporarily true, since one of its consequences might ultimately be found not to work in practice. Truth is therefore relative. Moreover, if the proposition is in principle unverifiable, as for instance most of the propositions of religion, it should be abandoned as meaningless. According to this philosophy, there should be no reasoning on a priori grounds if the reasoning can never lead to any possible verification by experience. Pragmatism is thus a philosophy which attempts to make the new scientific method, which proposes tentative hypotheses whose consequences can be verified by experience, into the only method of arriving at knowledge. It was thus a suitable philosophy for the age of scientific materialism which resulted from the great nineteenth-century advances in the exact sciences.

Auguste Comte (1798–1857) earlier in the century had been equally impressed by the scientific advances of his age and had put forward the notion in his *Cours de philosophie positive* that the intellectual development of man shows three stages: theological, metaphysical, and positive. During the first stage explanations for earthly phenomena are couched in terms of the supernatural; during the second they take the form of abstract but unverifiable ideas.

Only in the third stage are truly scientific explanations put forward which can, in principle at least, be verified by experiment. The sciences themselves can also be classified in order of increasing complexity, each more complex science depending upon the findings and techniques of the less complex, culminating in the enormously complex study of society to which Comte gave the name of sociology—which in his view should be thoroughly practical as well as theoretical, and should result in a scientific organization of society.

These two philosophies have been mentioned here as the most typical of those nineteenth-century philosophies that were based on the effort to come to terms with the new science. Other philosophies of the century, which were more in the nature of reactions against the apparent findings of science, will be discussed in the next section.

❖ Naturalism and pessimism

THE ENTHRONEMENT AND DETHRONEMENT OF MAN

Ever since the work of Descartes and Newton in the seventeenth century many thinking men in the West had recognized that it was extremely difficult to avoid the conclusion that no purpose could be discerned in the universe, and that man was a being of little importance in it. To many it seemed that only the thought that the world had a beginning in time, which could be attributed to a Supreme Being, was worth salvaging from the wreckage of the great scheme of salvation that had been universally accepted as recently as the Middle Ages. But in the nineteenth century, with the demonstration that mechanical causation was a sufficient explanation for so many natural phenomena, and that this causation could be discovered and put to work for the benefit of man, it began to appear to very considerable numbers of Western men that this was the only kind of causation that existed in the universe. Newton had inferred from the mechanism of the universe that a God had devised it; but this notion had been largely abandoned even before the end of the eighteenth

century. In the nineteenth century there was far more evidence, as it seemed, for the scientific view of the world, and ever more mechanical laws were being discovered. In particular, the second law of thermodynamics seemed to set a term to the duration of the earth. The churches might assert that the soul was immortal, or that there was a resurrection of the body after death; but there was no way to verify this assertion. Nothing appeared to be immortal; there were no conceivable mechanical laws that might explain how the body could be resurrected or how the soul could survive. It was difficult to conceive of a soul that possessed no material substance. If it did have a material substance, then it would be subject to the mechanical laws of the universe and it should be possible to investigate it.

Even if one allowed oneself to entertain such an unverifiable hypothesis as the existence of the soul, and the further hypothesis that it survived the death of the body it had inhabited, how likely did this hypothesis seem? The old eighteenth-century Deistic argument, that if God were just he would have created a soul and provided an afterlife to compensate for the obvious injustice of this one, seemed somewhat ridiculous to intellectuals of the nineteenth century. They regarded such a notion as an anthropomorphic human wish that had crept into the religion, not only of Western man but of most other societies affected by the same human recognition of earthly injustice. The dreams and wishes of men had little to do with the inexorable facts of the universe, and they were easily explicable from what could be observed of man. It was agreed, of course, that man differed from animals in having a higher degree of consciousness and being aware of his human condition. But, according to the Darwinian theory, this was the result of a simple accident, of a mutation that had won out in the struggle for existence. If mind and consciousness had been the result of pure chance, what reason was there to believe in a God, still less in a God that had any interest in this particular mutation? It seemed to many that the very consciousness possessed by man was something to be regretted, because it made him aware of his humble position in the universe and led him to harbor hopes

which would certainly never be realized. Besides, he was obsessed with anxieties and fears because there were certain things which he would never know, yet persisted in wanting to know.

In the nineteenth-century world, which in so many respects resembled the late Hellenistic world, the two major Hellenistic philosophies of Stoicism and Epicurism re-emerged in modern dress. Indeed, the resemblance of these modern trends to their Hellenistic prototypes is striking, and almost all modern philosophies of action can be broadly termed either Stoic or Epicurean. On the one hand there were those who, like Bertrand Russell in his youth, faced the uncaring world "on the firm foundation of unyielding despair," and on the other there were such optimists as Herbert Spencer, who believed that in the course of time, through social discipline, "sympathetic pleasures will be spontaneously pursued to the fullest extent advantageous to each and all." The poet Alfred Lord Tennyson (1809-1892), deeply affected by the death of a friend, and finding it impossible to believe in immortality, could only hope against hope that "somehow good will be the final goal of ill," though he felt he was but an "infant crying in the night." Yet the same poet, in a different mood and in the later years of his life, was able to convince himself that "through the ages one increasing purpose runs" when he "dip into the future far as human eye could see, saw the vision of the world and all the wonder that would be."

This ambivalence is typical of the nineteenth century. On the one hand there was a glorious future beckoning to man through the use of science and the infinite improvement of his earthly condition. But the individual man had but one life to live, and after that annihilation and silence; no God cared about him or for him; there was no great Friend above to comfort or console him or promise him salvation. Man was now alone in the universe with his own consciousness and in the company of his fellow men. According to his temperament, he could endure his condition or he could enjoy it. But if there was any purpose in the universe and in his own existence, it was withheld from his knowledge; if, in spite of science, he con-

tinued to believe, there was no lack of voices telling him that his faith was a personal human frailty which, if he had been truly courageous and independent, he would have long ago seen for what it was and abandoned.

RELIGIOUS SKEPTICISM

This point of view was adopted by two of the greatest French writers of the century, Ernest Renan and Anatole France (1823–1892) (1844–1924). Renan was a highly cultivated and learned man, whose works include studies of medieval Christian and Muslim philosophies and histories of the Hebrews and of Christianity. His most widely read work was the first volume of his history of Christianity, called the *Life of Jesus*. Renan could see only the man Jesus, whose life and work he interpreted in the light of his own skepticism. Jesus, in Renan's view, was a most appealing person but deluded, and his whole life was nothing but a beautiful poem. In his attitude toward Jesus, Renan followed in the footsteps of a German theologian, David Friedrich Strauss (1808–1874), who had made a devastating attack on the historicity of the Bible and treated the Gospel stories as simply mythology, built around the figure of Jesus, into whose mouth had been put many important truths of a universal nature. For Strauss, as for Renan, there was nothing divine about Jesus. Anatole France, on the other hand, whose forte was satire, gave attention to the lives of saints and holy men as they had been reported by history, showing that these men were in truth far from saintly if observed from a modern point of view.

Both Renan and France were extremely accomplished, lucid writers who adopted a somewhat aloof attitude toward the credulity and folly of mankind. All his life Renan maintained this attitude, but Anatole France emerged from his tower to defend Captain Dreyfus against charges of treason based on tainted evidence, and thereafter devoted his talents to trying to improve social conditions in his country—in spite of his belief in the incurable folly of man, and of his skepticism concerning man's ability to profit from any improvement in his social condition.

PHILOSOPHIES OF DESPAIR AND SELF-ASSERTION

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) It is a far cry from these two skeptical Epicureans, who found themselves able to come to terms with science by retreating to a safe distance from it, to the two great philosophers of pessimism, Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche, who faced the nineteenth-century world with open eyes and fullest involvement, but could find nothing in it to admire and were unwilling to pretend to themselves that the world was other than it was. But the two philosophers, though alike in their view of the world, differed fundamentally on the question on what man could do about it. Schopenhauer saw the cosmos as an eternally but aimlessly striving Will. The instinctual urges of the human being, the growth and reproduction of plants, and even gravitational attraction and electromagnetic fields, all are manifestations of this restless Will. All is blind impulse and striving, but there is no goal, no end for the human being any more than for the animal or the crystal. The intellect is merely man's guide to the cosmos, but it cannot change it in any important respect. Man's sole recourse, as in the Oriental philosophy which Schopenhauer studied, lies in the renunciation of all desires.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) Nietzsche, in a sense, picked up where Schopenhauer ended. The key to all his later work may be found in his early book, *The Birth of Tragedy*, in which he passionately attacked Socrates and Euripides as responsible for the intrusion of intellect into tragedy. Early tragedy had been fed by strong emotions arising from the subconscious depths of mankind. Rationalism had destroyed man's ability to touch these depths. At all times in his life Nietzsche's philosophy was purposefully anti-intellectual, stressing the instincts and the will as the primal forces of man which are destroyed by the analytical mind. This mind lacks a true understanding of the nature of man and of the world. The mystery and grandeur of life are unseen by the intellect, which desiccates all it touches and paralyzes the will.

Nietzsche glorified the will and the struggle.

He preached the superman, "which shall have risen superior to the common run of humanity by the force of his will, creating indeed a new race in his own person. Power is good and weakness is evil; courage to strive and win through is the supreme virtue." Nietzsche himself did not hesitate to take the final step of denouncing Christianity as a religion fit only for slaves, taking his stand boldly with the Antichrist. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that he himself viewed the struggle solely as an internal one. He had nothing but contempt for warlords and captains of industry, and he had no more use for patriotism than for democracy. Always struggling against illness and incipient insanity, which finally overtook him, he answered the doctrine of evolution, in which he believed insofar as it taught him that man had reached his present state by victory in the struggle for existence, by saying that man must now take in hand his own evolution and, by sheer force of will, rise superior to his heritage. "You have travelled the way from worm to man and much of you is still worm." His answer to science was that it is the artist and prophet—and the child—who have access to the true springs of human life, and not the man of cool reason and analytical judgment. So the pessimism which Nietzsche learned from Schopenhauer and which, in Schopenhauer, led to renunciation becomes finally transmuted into a passionate affirmation of its opposite, a truly Hegelian antithesis which has yet to achieve its synthesis in any subsequent philosopher.

Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) The Danish religious philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, as antirationalist as the two thinkers just discussed, had little influence in his own century, coming to general attention only in the twentieth century as a forerunner of existentialism. Faced with the world as it was then being made by science, and with man's apparently lowly place in such a world, Kierkegaard insists on the primary importance of the individual as the only true reality. Scientists may speak of objectivity and try to attain it, but in the end they, like all human beings, must make decisions; these are made not by the reason but by

the passions and feeling. They are the only truly ethical acts, and it is the will and not the reason which determines them. It does not matter, for Kierkegaard, what the world is or its nature; for this is entirely irrelevant to man. There is no truth except what is accepted by the human being as a personally willed act of his own. Kierkegaard defines truth as an "objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation process of the most passionate inwardness," or, in less formidable language, all knowledge is ultimately faith. The knowledge of God is therefore to be arrived at solely by faith, and reason has no share in it. It is deeply ironical that Kierkegaard came into conflict with the Lutheran Church of Denmark, since no modern thinker has come closer to the thought of Luther himself than Kierkegaard.

With Kierkegaard, the whole apparatus of modern science is cast aside. The great questions it posed are not questions for Kierkegaard. The whole duty of man and the whole meaning of life are comprised in the ethical decisions which man has to make throughout his life, and which Kierkegaard himself approached "with fear and trembling". He was quite willing, in his own life as well as in his thought, to abandon all pleasure and court the pain that was the necessary lot of the striving man; the certainties of faith were wholly adequate to sustain him, since they constituted the eternal truth. Compared with them, temporal existence lacked all value.

POETRY OF PESSIMISM

The manifestations of naturalism and pessimism of the later part of the nineteenth century can be indicated only briefly here. In poetry we have already noted the ambivalent attitude of Tennyson toward the new science and its implications. His slightly younger contemporary, Matthew Arnold (1822-1888), likewise regretted the lost age of a faith which he could no longer share. The life of man appeared to Arnold to be meaningless in its new scientific context. Few men leave any mark on the world. They spend their lives "striving blindly, achieving nothing," and when they die "no one knows who or what they have been." Most men are

like waves which break in mid-ocean, "foam for a moment, and are gone." There is a constant struggle between man and nature, which can "never be his friend." Nevertheless, man in the world of nature has his task—to rise superior to her, and to take up where she ends, even when he is doomed to do no more than create a ripple in the uncaring sea around him. Aside from his pessimism, however, Matthew Arnold was a proponent of as complete an objectivity as possible—a facet of his work which appears in his critical studies, which, in his lifetime, were held in higher esteem than his poetry.

Arthur Hugh Clough (1819–1861), another English poet of the century, faced with the world revealed by science, recognized the duty of man to seek truth, whatever its consequences for the seeker. Only in the struggle to find it could man play his proper part in the world. The struggle in itself was worth while and gave significance to man, even though the results had to be endured with stoicism. In French poetry, as in French fiction (as we shall see when studying Flaubert), the tendency was to accept the scientific world picture, but to retreat from it into the one area where man was king, the world of art. Charles Marie Leconte de Lisle (1818–1894) pictured the giant condor on his mountain, remote from human destinies, as the image of man, with only death awaiting him when his course of life was run. Yet it remained the task of man to strive for perfection of form in all that he did. He himself was deeply pessimistic and awaited death with tranquillity, returning in his art to the ideals of antiquity. In this he was followed by José Maria de Heredia (1842–1905), a Cuban who lived in France and wrote in French, and who composed some of the most perfect French poetry—each sonnet perfect in form, each word carefully chosen for its image and the sensory effects it produced. These two poets were leaders of the Parnassian school, which interested itself in subjects as far removed from the contemporary world as possible in order that they could be treated with utter detachment. Members of this school strove to achieve perfection of form within the established framework of French poetry. Partly in reaction

to this work, ultimately emerged the symbolist school, which will be treated in the next section.

REALISM AND PESSIMISM IN FICTION

In fiction the social realities of the industrial age came to their fullest expression. The English novelist Charles Dickens (1812–1870) described the world as he saw it, but usually with geniality and humor, whereas the novels of William Makepeace Thackeray (1811–1863) were more satirical in vein. Neither shows much sign of being a thwarted romantic. This, however, cannot be said of the reputed realist French writer Gustave Flaubert (1821–1880), whose satire *Bouvard et Pecuchet*, written late in his life and never finished, is the key to his better-known work, and shows how imperfectly his study of science and his pursuit of scientific perfection in his writings had been able to satisfy his human yearnings. His most famous novel, *Madame Bovary*, purports to be an attack on the romantic ideal and the romantic delusions of his heroine. Pitilessly, Flaubert shows how her illusions lead to her own destruction; yet they are described with a kind of tenderness which was perhaps barely recognized by the author, who so fiercely wished to be tough-minded. The same theme fills his *Sentimental Education*, in which his hero forms a picture of what true love should be, and fixes his ideal upon a heroine whom he cannot for many years win for his own. When at last they are both free to marry, he refuses her, for fear of the disillusionment that he is now convinced awaits him. He has learned painfully through life that the romantic vision of his youth has no basis in the real world. Flaubert wrote much about "art for art's sake" and his novels are among the most polished in French literature; like the Parnassians, Flaubert attempted to insulate himself from the world of reality. It may be noted that many years earlier the French novelist Honoré de Balzac (1799–1850), who is often considered a romantic writer, and whose work has many romantic elements in it, usually wrote realistically of every phase of life. But there is also a tendency in his great work, the *Comédie Humaine*, to stress the feebleness and failure

of all human ideals in the face of contemporary reality, in this suggesting, as in the case of Flaubert, the thwarted romantic.

Not so with Émile Zola (1840-1902), who wrote much later in the century. His novels were veritable "slices of life," descriptive in form and thoroughly "researched," with little attention to form but filled with a passion for social justice. Zola wished his work to be as scientifically accurate as research could make it; but his characters, unlike those of Flaubert and Balzac, tend to become simple puppets playing their destined part in the social milieu which is Zola's primary interest. In this concern Zola was followed by the early twentieth-century American novelist Theodore Dreiser, whose ponderous style resembles that of Zola, and whose realistic descriptions of actual life are likewise far more interesting than the characters he portrays. Indeed, Dreiser constantly stops to state his own view of his characters, who often do not appear from his descriptions of them in action to be as he imagines them to be. With the English novelist and poet Thomas Hardy there is again an exact realism; but Hardy's revolt against life as he saw it is far more conspicuous. Like Schopenhauer, he perceives the world as the working of a great mindless Will, and human beings as caught in the toils of a destiny they did not make and cannot control.

It was left, however, to the Russian novelists to write what are widely considered the most significant novels of the nineteenth century. In Russia religious feeling could not be so easily banished as in Western Europe, and the great Russian works of the period do not deny Christianity and religion, but are afflicted by the powerlessness of man, and the limits to his free will in an alien world. Fyodor Dostoevski (1821-1881) is an antirationalist, believing in the instinctive wisdom of the human heart and intuition. Many of his heroes are indeed portrayed as incapable of functioning effectively in the earthly world, but they are complex human beings seeking for the truth and seeking to understand the human condition. Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910), in his most famous early novel, *War and Peace*, shows Napoleon as unable to result of chance and historical necessity—while



Count Leo Tolstoy, from a portrait by Ilya Repin.
(COURTESY PRINTS DIVISION, NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY)


the lesser characters play their part in the drama, pitiable, loving, with their own dignity, but utterly powerless to influence their lot. In later life Tolstoy came to recognize the Christian ethic of absolute nonresistance to evil as the only ethic worthy of man. Both these great novelists are preoccupied with the human condition, and the characters in their novels are drawn with both sympathy and imaginative involvement; the world revealed by science hovers closely but does not dominate their work. For them, man remains pre-eminently and self-evidently a moral being. The universe is the universe; no implications for man can be drawn from its nature. Society, on the other hand, is man's milieu, the field for his activity. Thus the Russian novelists see man always as a social being pitted against the evil in the world and society.

and struggling toward his own moral integrity. But they have no interest in the manifestations of society apart from man. Thus they stand in complete contrast to such novelists as Zola and Dreiser, who are faithful portraitists of society but in the process of this portrayal lose their perception of man himself.

REALISTIC DRAMA

Ibsen, Chekhov, Strindberg In drama, the scientific view of the world and of man was not especially visible, since its discussion did not lend itself to dramatic presentation. Nineteenth-century serious drama is therefore more concerned with the social problems of the industrial age and man's position in an epoch when his individuality tended to be overwhelmed by the pressures of civilization and conformity. The giant of nineteenth-century drama is undoubtedly Henrik Ibsen (1828–1906), a Norwegian who spent much of his life in Germany. The recurring theme in Ibsen's

plays is the effort of man to find his true self and achieve a role worthy of his dignity as a human being. Many of his plays are therefore fierce indictments of society as he finds it, while at the same time he strives to discover how human beings can live together in dignity and freedom. In *An Enemy of the People*, the very name of the play bespeaking Ibsen's anger, a doctor who tries to close down an insanitary health resort is run out of town as an enemy of the people by those whom he has tried to help, but whose material interests they believe he has damaged. In *A Doll's House* he pits a loving wife, who has committed a crime against society by forging a check for the sake of her husband's health, against a stuffily self-righteous husband who repudiates her act and refuses to recognize the love that had inspired it. The wife realizes that he does not acknowledge her right to make her own free decisions, and has always treated her as a coddled child in a doll's house; rather than accept her status as a docile and unthinking inferior whose whole task is to be a



A set from a 1902 production of Ibsen's A Doll's House in New York. (COURTESY HARVARD COLLEGE LIBRARY)

wife and mother, she leaves him. Her first duty as she sees it is toward herself, and her task to try to become a fully human being.

The Russian Anton Chekhov (1860-1904), in his many dramas and short stories, likewise uses the theme of the essential loneliness of the human being, but the Swedish dramatist August Strindberg's own life (1849-1912) was so tortured, especially by his inability to reach any kind of tranquillity with any of his three wives, that his plays, which are often full of horror and cruelty though shot through with intuitive psychological insights, do not often come within the framework of naturalism. Yet he too, like Ibsen, recognizes that the conditions of society have made women into slaves and robbed them of their dignity as human beings. He himself suffered from the results of this slavery too much to be either sympathetic or understanding toward women; and he is usually regarded (as indeed was Euripides, perhaps for the same reason) as one of the most extreme misogynists in world literature. The German Gerhard Hauptmann (1862-1946), like Ibsen a poet as well as a dramatist, felt deeply the lot of the workers in the new society. His most famous play, *The Weavers*, is a stark tragedy of the insurrection of the Silesian weavers in the first half of the century. Hauptmann was sensitive to the suffering of the downtrodden members of society, recognizing them as human beings capable of rising above the hardships of their lot to heights of heroism and self-sacrifice at least equal to those of their social superiors.

George Bernard Shaw In a different category are the unique plays of the Irishman George Bernard Shaw (1856-1950), whose life stretched into the second half of the twentieth century but whose greatest period of creativity lay in the last decade of the nineteenth and the first of the twentieth. Shaw was always the iconoclast, always the *enfant terrible*, whose plays were wordy, witty, and pointed, full of social thought yet determined never to be quite serious. In all his long life of writing it is doubtful that he ever created a human being in his full dimensions; often his characters appear as merely Shavian mouthpieces. Learned in the facts of science, the teachings of religion, and in all the

political movements of his day—he himself was one of the founders of the Fabian Society—he chose to poke fun at them all, although he was at his most serious, and perhaps his least profound, when discussing social problems. Thus the real man behind the plays, including the prefaces, remains hidden under the torrent of words. It is difficult indeed to say what his attitude toward his world was, and to discover his philosophy. It can only be said that he was against pretense, sham, and illogicality in whatever form he found them; but that the positive content of his thought will certainly never be known—and that this is the way Shaw himself undoubtedly preferred it.

REALISM IN THE FINE ARTS

In the fine arts two figures stand out as realists, though, as we shall see, in the later



"John the Baptist Preaching," by Rodin. (COLLECTION, THE MUSEUM OF MODERN ART, NEW YORK, MRS. SIMON GUGGENHEIM FUND)

part of the century art was seeking new forms of expression and did not rest long in the realm of naturalism. Honoré Daumier (1809-1879) was noted especially for his merciless cartoons of the bourgeois upstarts of his day, though throughout his work there is also an almost tender touch for the less successful members of a competitive society. Auguste Rodin (1840-1917), probably the greatest sculptor in many centuries, wished to portray in bronze and stone not only the exterior of his human subjects, in which task he excelled, but also the interior man. In this he resembles Rembrandt among the painters, as he resembles him also in his complete mastery of his chosen medium. In his most famous sculpture, "The Thinker," whose original is in Paris but which is represented everywhere in numerous copies, there is an unmistakable suggestion of the descent of man from his animal ancestors, although thought, which gives the sculpture its name, clearly distinguishes man from these ancestors.

SCIENTIFIC HISTORY

Finally, a word should be said of the influence of science upon the writing of history. Two somewhat contrasting figures out of many hundreds will be chosen as representative of their particular outlook. The Frenchman Hippolyte Taine (1828-1893) was so greatly impressed by Darwinism and the mechanistic science of his day that he came to the deterministic conclusion that men were the products of heredity (race) and environment, and that history had gone off on the wrong track by confining its studies too exclusively to great men and important events. For him social history was the most important kind—an insight which in other hands bore much good fruit. He himself wished always to examine the external influences upon men which compelled them to act as they did, and his history, both of literature and of his own country, is full of dogmatic formulas and systems into which all his figures are compelled to fit.

The German historian Otto von Ranke (1795-1886), on the other hand, was obsessed with the notion of history as simply the true record of what happened, and he regarded the

discovery of the facts as an exact science to which meticulous care should be devoted. This for him was scientific history, to be distinguished from the *faibles convenues* that, according to him, usually pass for history. Social history for Ranke had much less importance than the deeds of kings and their ministers. But these deeds should be checked and counterchecked for accuracy, and when the historian had the facts at his disposal, he should try to keep his judgments as far as possible out of his work, aiming at the rigorous objectivity of science. In such an enterprise he was, of course, as unsuccessful as other writers of history, for no historian can avoid the task at least of selecting what he thinks is significant. But Ranke's influence was enormous, and his many students in the years since his day have attempted to avoid at all costs historical errors, even if they have not fully followed him in his hopeless quest for scientific objectivity.

❖ Countermovements to naturalism

RELIGIOUS REVIVAL

It can be said with some conviction, on the basis of twentieth-century evidence, that the doctrines which may be summed up under the general heading of scientific materialism have proved to be unsatisfactory to the human heart, which appears to need sustenance more in accord with human ideals and aspirations. If indeed the human being were exclusively a creature of intellect and will, he might have been content only to understand the material workings of the universe, and to manipulate the material world to satisfy the needs of his body. But in fact he has found that the total needs of his being are not satisfied with these things, and that his life of feeling remains unappeased. Some men clearly are oppressed by the thought that man is a very small and insignificant entity in the universe, that he is the product of evolution, like the plants and animals, and that there is, in the words of Laplace, no need for the hypothesis of God. Nevertheless, for some inscrutable reason, these arguments leave him unimpressed. The vast majority of

mankind, even in Western civilization, continues stubbornly to believe in a God, and considerable numbers still believe, however vaguely, in the traditional Christian doctrine. The chief threat to religion comes not from the militant atheists and unbelievers, nor from the scientists, but from what the scientists and technologists have achieved in the material realm, by providing man with goods and services which focus his interests on material things. Even so, he may continue to think of his religion on Sunday, and it remains as a background to his ordinary life. He has not so much abandoned it as relegated it to a minor place in his thoughts and interests.

It is, however, an observable fact that in the twentieth century there is a far greater interest in religion than there was in the heyday of the nineteenth, suggesting that the tide has turned away from materialism. This development may be accounted for, at least in part, by the experience of an insecure world in the twentieth century—the two global wars and the Great Depression—which caused many men to ask themselves again the great unanswerable questions: Why is there evil in the world? If there is a God, why does he permit it? Is there an afterlife where evil deeds will be compensated and good deeds rewarded? Yet it remains true that most of the religious changes that have endured, and especially the new religious sects, originated in the nineteenth century and will therefore be studied here, although their period of growth lies rather in the twentieth.

It was perhaps inevitable that the new world presented by science, and the loss of importance and dignity of the individual in industrial society, should call forth a reaction against the notion that man was part animal, part machine, wholly explicable in material terms. Such a notion conflicted too seriously with man's own subjective idea of himself as a being capable of apprehending the mystery of the universe through feeling, if not through thought; aware of a higher power than himself in the universe; able to rise to heights of self-sacrifice against his own apparent material interests—even though he could also descend to depths of evil unplumbed by the animals, who were ruled simply by their own nature and to whom evil

could not be imputed. In short, man persisted in seeing himself as half devil, half angel, rather than half animal, half machine.

"Higher criticism" of the Bible The traditional religions had never wavered in their inclination to accept man's subjective idea of himself as true. In the eighteenth century, as we have seen, Protestant theologians as well as laymen had tried to come to terms with the science of the day and attempted to make their religion conform to reason. Basing their beliefs on the Bible, which was fully available to the layman and in the main could be interpreted as they saw fit by both clergy and laymen, they were more vulnerable to the sharp criticisms directed against them by intellectuals than were the Catholics. In the nineteenth century, when the Bible itself was attacked by the "higher criticism," which demonstrated apparent contradictions between different passages and evolved the notion of separate documents written at different times and compiled at a later date by theologians and patriarchs, it seemed difficult to hold to the traditional belief that the Bible was "verbally inspired" or dictated by God. Anthropologists pointed out the similarity between Hebrew ideas and customs and those of other peoples at a similar stage of development. A new idea of inspiration was thus put forward, which suggested that the most deeply religious parts of the Bible were indeed written under the influence of "inspiration," which was regarded as the best thought of which a most earnest and religious man was capable, perhaps influenced in part by God. This notion enabled the theologians to pick and choose the passages they would accept, and it was possible to abandon as uninspired what did not appeal to them. This tendency was particularly noticeable in the Anglican Church, whose clergy were well-educated men, familiar with work being done by such critics as David Friedrich Strauss and in their own universities.

The Oxford Movement But a countermovement was also under way in the early part of the nineteenth century. The Oxford or Tractarian Movement, founded in 1833, emphasized

the importance of ritual and the form of worship, and in many of its teachings came close to that of Catholicism, though it could never accept the authority of the pope. The movement, which is usually known today as Anglo-Catholicism, even instituted sisterhoods and brotherhoods after the manner of the Catholic Church. It tried to make the Anglican Church into a living church, far removed from its historical origins as a Church established by the State as part of a quarrel with Rome. It frequently came into conflict with both the State and the liberal or modernist clergy, but remained within the State Church as the so-called High Church branch, to be distinguished from the Broad and Low Church movements. Many of the adherents of the Oxford Movement found themselves impelled toward Catholicism, and ultimately unable to accept High Church Anglicanism as a middle road between historical Protestantism and Catholicism. Thus they went the whole way and allowed themselves to be converted to Catholicism. Among these was one of its greatest leaders, John Henry Newman, who in his later life was made a cardinal of the Catholic Church.

Movements within Catholicism Catholicism itself adopted the position that it had already taken in the sixteenth century at the Council of Trent: that the new teachings of science and secularism called for no modification in Catholic doctrine. Never having accepted the Bible as the sole source of Christian belief, it was less affected than Protestantism by biblical criticism, but stood fast on its basic dogmas, which had been inherited from the past. Pope Pius ix indeed issued in 1864 a *Syllabus of Errors*, in which he declared a considerable number of widely held beliefs in the mid-nineteenth century to be in error, including some that sprang from modern liberalism and others that were concerned with the respective roles of State and Church in society. A few years later he followed this up with the proclamation, as a dogma to be held by all Catholics, that the pope when speaking *ex cathedra* on questions regarding faith and morals was infallible (1870). His successor, Leo xiii (1878-1903), recognized fully that the Church had social duties to per-

form within the secular State. In a famous encyclical, known as *Rerum Novarum*, he emphasized the duty of Christians to give all support to movements to better the lot of the working man within the framework of the system of private property, and gave his sanction to Catholic trade unions. Leo also gave attention to the rational foundations of Catholicism, and declared that in the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas could be found all that was necessary for the full understanding of Catholic teachings. He encouraged the study of Thomas, which was thereupon revived, especially at the Jesuit University of Louvain.

Under the long and enlightened pontificate of Leo xiii, a number of Catholic intellectuals began to give serious thought to the liberalization of some elements of Catholic doctrine, and suggested some relaxation of the absolute authority claimed and held by the papacy. The movement, however, came to an untimely end when Leo's successor, Pius x, fearing that if it were allowed full rein the entire authority of the Church might well be undermined, suppressed the movement and excommunicated two of its leading supporters. Thereafter Catholicism, firm on its traditional foundations, continued to increase its membership. It appealed particularly to those men and women who felt that a principle of authority was necessary in any religious organization, and who agreed with St. Thomas that there were permanent bounds set to the ability of the human reason to attain truth; that where reason acknowledged itself impotent, the realm of faith began.

Evangelical Christianity Meanwhile, the branches of Christianity which paid less attention to the demands of reason, regarding religion as an appeal to human feeling and preaching the gospel of salvation in its most simple and emotional form, continued to make progress. The leaders of the evangelical movement (evangelical in that it preached the Gospel or "Evangel"), associated in particular with John Wesley and the Methodist Church, took issue at once with the Darwinian theory, recognizing it to be a danger to their exalted opinion of man as the specially favored child of God.

Too often they discussed the question with more heat than light, and their arguments left the Darwinians totally unconvinced. But they probably lost few adherents, since their appeal was to faith and not to reason; and men and women in the darkness of the industrial age needed a faith to live by, even if only a humanitarian faith in the improvement of earthly conditions.

Rise of humanitarian religions Several new churches, only lightly connected with traditional Christianity, also flourished. These churches, which made humanitarianism their real gospel, were especially prevalent in America. The Unitarian Church, which denied the divinity of Christ but accepted God the Father as the divine power behind the universe, was organized early in the nineteenth century, though its religious views had been held by some sects since the Protestant Reformation. It appealed to many liberals and reformers who could not accept traditional Christianity or the authority of the no longer "inspired" Bible. These men and women stressed ethics and the love of humanity "in the spirit of Jesus." The American Ethical Cultural Society, founded in 1876 by Felix Adler, had similar aims, and did much pioneering work in education. It differed from Unitarianism in that it had no theological tenets at all, but was devoted solely to the effort to lead a good life in the service of humanity. The Ethical Culture Society provided a haven not only for former Christians who could no longer accept the Christian teachings as inspired or divine, but also for Jews who had turned away from their traditional religion.

NEW RELIGIOUS STRIVINGS

Denial of reality of matter and evil The insistence by scientific thought that man was simply an animal and that mind had been developed quite late in the course of evolution by natural selection called forth a radical response from some thinkers, who claimed, on the contrary, that mind was pre-eminent, and that matter was either an expression of mind (Unity), that it was able to overcome matter and attain all good through its constructive use

(New Thought), or that it was an illusion (Christian Science). All these movements arose out of faith healing, which became popular in the nineteenth century, and all continued on into the twentieth century. But none of the others was as successful and influential as Christian Science, founded by Mary Baker Eddy, and still based on her teachings, which are read in the Christian Science churches every week alongside those of the great original Healer, Jesus Christ. Evil and disease, to a Christian Scientist, are equally unreal, and the recognition of this illusion is the proper task of the human being. By denying the reality of everything that proceeds from matter, spirit can enter and transform the human being and fill him with health, joy, and love, instead of sickness, misery, and hate.

The Mormons Throughout the nineteenth century many new religions were founded, usually as the result of new revelations received by individual men who were able to attract followers to themselves. As a rule the adherents believed themselves to be an elect, who would alone be saved in the Second Coming of Jesus Christ, which was believed to be imminent. There can be no doubt that the religions provided their adherents with a sense of community and dedication which was rapidly being lost in the industrial age. Most famous and successful of these religious sects is the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, whose members are usually called Mormons after the Book of Mormon, a collection of writings (golden tablets) said to have been discovered by Joseph Smith, the founder, after it had been revealed to him where they were hidden. The Book of Mormon purports to tell the history of the wanderings of the peoples of Palestine in America. Its discovery was followed by other revelations regarding the practices and doctrines to be observed and believed by the faithful. The Mormons were persecuted for much of the nineteenth century, in part because of their practice of polygamy, but finally settled down in Utah, where they prospered greatly owing to their strong sense of community and cohesion. In the twentieth century this religion has spread throughout the

world through the efforts of dedicated evangelists.

Millennialist sects The Seventh-day Adventists, following the early nineteenth-century prophecies by William Miller, originally believed that the Second Coming would occur in the 1840's. When this did not come about, the adherents continued to believe in the imminence of the Second Coming, but the date was thereafter unspecified. The seventh day (Saturday) was adopted as the Sabbath in accordance with Old Testament teaching, and it was thought that there would be no resurrection for the wicked. This sect, which later divided into several distinct churches owing to differences of opinion on the genuineness of certain new revelations, has a world-wide missionary organization, and holds itself aloof from all Christian churches which have not received special revelation.

The group known in the nineteenth century as Bible Students (or Russellites) and in this century (from 1931) as Jehovah's Witnesses accepted the whole Bible as inspired. Charles Russell, its founder, drew from it a series of prophecies regarding the Second Coming, which he and the Witnesses believed to be already in process. It is the task of the Witnesses to preach to all mankind so they may be spared from the coming disaster of Armageddon, after which there will be a further period of a thousand years during which other sinners will have a last chance of repentance.

Spiritualism In a different category from these religious movements was increased interest in what came to be called spiritualism, which held not only that the soul survived after death but that the dead person could communicate with the living by various means, including the tapping out of messages in séances and speaking through the mouths of mediums, persons who could put themselves into trances at will and allow themselves to be "possessed" by the dead. Many eminent persons were greatly impressed by these and various other psychic phenomena. Included in this group was the English physicist Sir Oliver Lodge, who wished to find visible

proof of the immortality of the soul and verify the hypothesis by means acceptable to science.

Theosophy Finally, the movement known as Theosophy should be mentioned, which followed the teachings of Helena Blavatsky. Blavatsky, who was herself a noted medium, claimed to have received revelations from the spirit world which she wrote down in several books, the most complete of which was the *Secret Doctrine*. This book contained a great deal of material which had long been known in the Orient, and the leaders of the Theosophical Society were all greatly attracted to Oriental thought. The headquarters of the Society, indeed, was in India. For the first time the world conception of Hinduism, one of the major doctrines of the Orient, was brought to the West. Although Theosophy recognized Christ as one of the great Masters, the movement was in no sense Christian, and many of its adherents felt themselves closer to Buddhism, whose ethics Theosophy largely adopted, than to Christianity.

LITERATURE AND THE ARTS

Symbolism in poetry In realms other than religion there were many efforts to escape the general trend toward naturalism and find new modes of artistic expression. Of these only three of the most significant will be dealt with here. The nineteenth-century symbolist school of poetry, originally only in France, revolted against the rigidity of form of the Parnassians and was wholly out of sympathy with such romantics in the grand style as Victor Hugo, although there were elements of romanticism in their own work. It seemed to many, at the end of the nineteenth century, that the real world of science and industry held no place for the artist, with his sensitivity of feeling and his imagination. The symbolists recognized only the imagination as having true reality, and in their poetry, which was written in free verse and without any compulsion to follow the accepted forms, they strove to communicate with the reader solely through his imagination. The poetry was elusive, full of images, and greatly influenced by music; it seldom had any intrinsic

relation with the outside world, only with an inner world which to many critics appeared to be a sick and diseased one.

The forerunner of the symbolist school was Charles Baudelaire (1821-1867), whose one book of poems, *Les fleurs du mal*, was regarded by the symbolists as the greatest work in all French poetry, unhappy and indeed despairing as it was, and in its time condemned for its apparent obscenity. The youthful poem of Arthur Rimbaud (1854-1891), *Une saison en enfer*, was the outpouring of a youth who could not come to terms with the world, but lived solely in his world of dreams. In later life he repudiated his poetry and tried to build up a career for himself as merchant and diplomatic

agent, in spite of the vogue to which his poems had given impetus. Paul Verlaine (1844-1896), whose many poems are the most lyrically beautiful of the school, lived a life of poverty and degradation, including some years in prison. All his life he looked at the world with a child's eyes—fearless, honest, and totally naïve. Only Stephen Mallarmé (1842-1898), who held down an academic position as a professor of English—the intellectual of the symbolist movement—lived a comparatively normal life. His poetry, though more self-consciously symbolist than that of any of the others, is not usually thought to be the equal of that of his "abnormal" confreres. But it was he who was responsible for the elevation of symbolism into a school, through his

Portrait of Emile Zola, the French novelist, by Manet. Another of Manet's works, "Olympia," appears as a reproduction on the wall of Zola's room. Original in the Louvre.





"Madame Charpentier and her Children," by Renoir. (COURTESY THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART)

writings and his weekly conferences of poets who came to hear him discourse on the subject closest to his heart.

PAINTING—IMPRESSIONISM AND POSTIMPRESSIONISM

In painting the great movement of the late nineteenth century away from naturalism was known at first as impressionism, creating a revolution in painting which was not to be undone; for the "postimpressionists" who followed, although they disapproved of many of their predecessors and became more subjective themselves, never returned to the closer representation and classical canons of the past. Impressionism broke with strict representational art, and attempted to suggest rather than represent the object painted, creating light effects by the use of broken and contrasted colors. In

general, the artist of this school regarded it as his task to paint the "impression" of the object—what the eye sees at a glance rather than what is seen to be there after close examination. The innovations made by the impressionists were originally greeted with derision, but gradually the critics as well as more traditional painters began to realize the way in which art was being liberated from the limitations of form. Edouard Manet (1832–1883), the founder of the school, and Claude Monet (1840–1926) both received some recognition before they died, as did Jean Renoir (1841–1919)—who, however, had never been a full impressionist painter, paying greater attention to form than his contemporaries.

Postimpressionism produced three giants in the persons of Paul Cézanne, Paul Gauguin, and Vincent van Gogh, three of the greatest masters of color in the history of painting. Cézanne (1839–1906) strove for a depth in his



"The Starry Night," by Van Gogh. (COLLECTION, THE MUSEUM OF MODERN ART, NEW YORK. ACQUIRED THROUGH THE LILLIE P. BLISS REQUEST)

paintings which was missing in the impressionists; and distorted in order to give the appearance of solidity. Gauguin (1848-1903), an eccentric businessman who started to paint late in life, eventually retiring to Tahiti, used color with extraordinary vividness, and broke altogether with representational painting. He did not paint even the impression of the object as seen at first glance, but only the impression created by it within his own being. Vincent van Gogh (1853-1890) without doubt was the most daring of all the painters of the period, or perhaps of any other period. Though broken in health and confined at times to an asylum, he continued to paint until in a fit of despair he took his own life. Confronted with any large exhibition of his paintings, the viewer is overwhelmed by the vivid coloring, the masses of color squeezed out of his paint tube—by the olive trees that are archetypal olive trees, unlike any appearing in nature but nevertheless un-

mistakably olive trees to anyone who has wandered over the Van Gogh country in Provence. It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that he saw the object he painted not from the outside, with his external eyes, but from within, with the eyes of imagination. His frenzy for creation was without question too intense for his weakened body and mind; but his finest paintings nevertheless are executed with the utmost authority, and the technique he used, which has never been successfully imitated, was the only one that he could have used to express the splendor of his vision.

MUSICAL INNOVATIONS—DEBUSSY AND WAGNER

In music, impressionism left its mark on Claude Debussy (1862-1918), whose sensuous music, often without noticeable melody, is perfectly directed—also like symbolist poetry—to

creating impressions in the listener. Here too the old canons of form were relaxed in favor of a greater freedom to make use of dissonance and tones that had never yet been heard in European music. But long before Debussy, in the mid-nineteenth century, another great innovator had cast his spell upon the century. Richard Wagner (1813–1883) is too often classed as a romantic, but he lacked in particular the exclusive appeal to the feelings which is characteristic of the romantics and his use of the ancient German sagas for the themes of his operas, though in accord with the practices of many romantic writers, was chosen by Wagner, not because it was the vogue in his day, which it was not, but because it is clear that he truly experienced in his imagination the ancient German legends of gods and heroes. When he wrote about his work, which was not rarely, he spoke of his thought that there should be a close connection between music and words, that both should be equally experienced by the composer, and that the opera should not, as in most operas of his time, be dominated by the music, which too often accompanied the most trivial of libretti. In all Wagner's later work the music does indeed appear to be the only music possible for his themes. If there was a twilight of the gods and a ride of the Valkyrie, then this was the music to which the Valkyrie rode, and to this music the ancient German gods sank to rest. Once more it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Wagner indeed listened with an inner ear, as Van Gogh perceived with an inner eye; and both are without peers and without imitators—though the German composer Richard Strauss (1864–1949) learned from Wagner that music could give a new dimension to poetry, and thus brought the tone-poem into being.

Finally, a word should be said of Anton Bruckner (1824–1896), whose work is only in very recent years beginning to receive the recognition it deserves. Using all the resources of the greatly enlarged orchestra of the nineteenth century, Bruckner composed some of the most deeply spiritual of all the symphonies of Western civilization. He himself dedicated one of his symphonies to God, and the dedication is not a pretentious one; all Bruckner's music is suffused with religious feeling. In it there is no deeply

human struggle, as with Beethoven; no winning through to serenity after suffering—only the serenity of the man who received abundantly of the gift of inspiration and had the genius to translate it into music for the enrichment of mankind.

❖ Summary and conclusion

The nineteenth century was the last age of physical security experienced by Western man. From the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815 to the outbreak of the first World War in 1914 there were no major wars, and the minor wars were all fought with definite and limited aims. No cloud appeared on the horizon to shake the confidence of Western man that his political and economic systems were the most effective the world had yet seen, or that he could increase indefinitely his knowledge of the material world and how to convert it to his own use. It was a world in which Western man could believe fully in progress, for it was everywhere in evidence around him. The few dissident voices were regarded as those of eccentrics and misfits, who would be ill at ease in any social system; if they were unhappy it was their own fault rather than the fault of society.

It would have been difficult indeed in 1900 to predict the widespread loss of confidence that has characterized the first sixty years of the twentieth century—the doubts concerning the efficacy of Western economic and political systems; the disillusionment with Western social systems, especially on the part of intellectuals; the slow but growing revolt against materialism as a philosophy fit for man; the return to religion. Science has continued to make tremendous strides, but scientists have ceased to believe that all will soon be known. The exploration of the subatomic world has created doubts as to whether there are any immutable laws of the universe, and whether there is any secure knowledge to be won concerning the true nature of things. The social scientist has begun to wonder whether Western social, political, and economic systems, based on middle-class values, are destined to endure in a world no longer dominated by the West: the moral philosopher wonders whether there is any enduring or universal scheme of

values by which all men can live, and whether it is possible for man to live a full life without an ideal worthy of man.

But these things, at the close of the Victorian age, were still "clouds no bigger than a man's hand." As Western man moved into the twentieth century, his castle still seemed secure; though war clouds threatened, it still seemed unlikely that they would erupt in storm, and in any case they could hardly threaten his well-built and still expanding civilization. To quote Herbert Spencer, prophet of Victorian optimism, again: "Progress is not an accident but a necessity. . . . The ultimate development of the ideal man is certain. . . . Always towards perfection is the mighty movement—towards a complete development and a more mixed good."

Let that be the epitaph for the nineteenth century, and its quotation in the second half of the twentieth stand as an ironic commentary upon it.

Suggestions for further reading

NOTE ON LITERATURE OF THE PERIOD: For the continental thought of the time, see especially the collection of Freud's lectures entitled *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis* (PermaBooks); both parts of Goethe's *Faust*, of which the best translation is G. M. Priest's (Knopf); Kierkegaard's *Fear and Trembling* (Anchor); Nietzsche's most celebrated works (Gateway, Anchor); Renan's *Life of Jesus* (Modern Library); Rousseau's *Confessions* (Penguin); and the social encyclopaedia of Pope Leo XIII, edited by Etienne Gilson under the title *The Church Speaks to the Modern World* (Image). For English thought, see the essays of Matthew Arnold (Rinehart, Viking); the works of Darwin (NAL, Ungar, Premier); and the major writings of Cardinal Newman (Image, Rinehart, Riverside). For the United States, see the writings of Charles Sanders Peirce, the forerunner of pragmatism (Dover, Anchor); William James' *Pragmatism* (Meridian); and the collection entitled *American Thought: Civil War to World War I*, edited by Perry Miller (Rinehart).

PAPERBACK BOOKS

Abrams, M. H. *The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition*. Norton.

Babbitt, Irving. *Rousseau and Romanticism*. Meridian. Critical but well informed.

Brockway, Wallace. *Men of Music*. Simon & Schuster. Critical biographies of composers.

Clark, Elmer T. *The Small Sects in America*. Apex.

Clive, Geoffrey. *Romantic Enlightenment: Ambiguity and Paradox in the Western Mind*. Meridian. Original study, with somewhat the outlook of Kierkegaard—not the last word on the subject, but stimulating and provocative.

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The Expansion of Europe in the Nineteenth Century

❖ Attitude of European powers toward colonies in the early nineteenth century

We have already noted in earlier chapters how the European nations competed and fought one another for the control of non-European countries. From this competition Britain emerged as the leading colonial power. The Spaniards, after holding their colonies for three centuries, lost almost all of them in the early years of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, some territories, peopled almost exclusively by non-Europeans, remained under the control of one European power or another. Among these were the subcontinent of India, ruled by the British, and the large commercial empire of the Dutch in the Far East. Both these empires were profitable to their European rulers as a source of raw materials, and, increasingly, as consumers of European manufactured goods. The smaller colonies, of which there were many scattered throughout the world, were less profitable to the mother countries, though European capitalists held important and profitable investments in most of them. These profits were made possible largely by the exploitation of very cheap labor, and by the slave trade, which made most of this labor available.

In the early part of the nineteenth century the European powers, with the exception of the Portuguese, came to the conclusion that the slave trade was morally unjustifiable, and took steps to abolish it. The Portuguese initially

refused to join the other powers in abolishing it because their colonies had been left largely undeveloped, and they preferred to make profits almost exclusively from the slave trade. For a period in the nineteenth century they therefore resisted the efforts of the British and French to suppress the trade, but in time they too acquiesced. In 1833 the British emancipated all the slaves in their territories.

Abolition and emancipation, however, created an economic chaos in the smaller British colonies, especially in the sugar islands of the West Indies; and though indentured labor from China and India took up the slack in some areas, notably in Trinidad and British Guiana and Mauritius, which had only recently fallen into British hands, the economies were slow to recover. Many of the planters who had hitherto exercised much influence in the British Parliament left the colonies and returned home. It was therefore understandable that during much of the first half of the nineteenth century public and official opinion was on the whole against the possession of colonies, which were a grievous financial burden on the taxpayers.

❖ Motives for nineteenth-century expansion

EFFECTS OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

Increased demand for raw materials Nevertheless, there were other forces at work which favored not only the retention but the expansion

of empire. It was these forces which, during the course of the century, overwhelmed the opposition and persuaded every major European power that colonies were not only economically profitable but essential to the national interest. First, and surely the most important, was the impetus to economic expansion given by the Industrial Revolution. The industrial establishment was in constant need of an ever increasing supply of raw material; and as it expanded it had need of new and different kinds of materials. Until the invention of the internal combustion engine there was but small need for rubber and oil. In a Europe where few people washed regularly, there was small demand for copra, the chief raw material in most soaps; chocolate was in small demand until its low cost and availability brought it within the range of the working class. Nevertheless, it was the presence of raw materials that alone had made the colonies of the earlier centuries profitable. It is also true that the industrial establishments needed an ever increasing consumer market. But colonies did not, in the nineteenth century, provide—and on the whole have never succeeded in providing—a worth-while market for manufactured goods. The persons engaged in producing raw materials for a competitive market rarely have accumulated enough money to buy them, and the major sales are made to the other industrial nations of the West.

Availability of money for colonial investment There is, however, an exception to this observation—the sale by the industrial nations of heavy industrial equipment paid for over a long period by small installments. These, of course, are not as a rule sold to the inhabitants of a colony, but to a European corporation which makes use of the equipment to facilitate its export of raw materials. Or, the purchaser may be the European government that rules the colony. The interest paid on the credit extended is therefore considered as interest on the investment. Such capital investments by the mother country or its capitalists were a great economic boon to the heavy industry of the country involved. Much capital was available for these investments in the later part of the nineteenth century, which on the whole paid better dividends than investment at home. The European

empires also provided many opportunities for jobs for the surplus educated population. Their salaries were with very rare exceptions paid for out of the proceeds of colonial taxes, and therefore met by the colonial subjects, who were engaged in producing the raw materials for export.

RELIGIOUS AND HUMANITARIAN MOTIVES

In addition to the economic incentives to expansion, there is no doubt that the religious, humanitarian impulses of nineteenth-century Europe played their part. Although various Catholic orders had been engaged in missionary work for centuries, it was not until the eighteenth century that Protestants began to enter wholeheartedly into this field, especially the evangelical denominations. In their view it was their religious duty to rescue pagan peoples, and even Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists from their ignorance, and teach them what they believed to be the only true religion, thus giving them an opportunity to win salvation. Numerous societies, both Catholic and Protestant, sprang up to carry the message of Christianity abroad. The missionaries, often in danger of their lives, went to as many countries as they were permitted to enter. Naturally such permission was most often granted when their own country ruled the territory. If they did not rule it when the missionaries entered it, their governments might have to take steps to see that they were not molested, or avenge their deaths if they were killed while engaged in their task of evangelization. In the nineteenth century no nation could afford to appear lax in its duty to protect its nationals. Such a nation would have lost immeasurable prestige in a nationalistic world, and clamor from its own nationals at home would, in democratic countries, have compelled it to take decisive action, even if apparently against its national interests.

CONSIDERATIONS OF PRESTIGE

There can be little doubt that in a Europe where nationalism was constantly increasing, and fast becoming little short of a substitute for religion, considerations of prestige were paramount. Empire and colonies were symbols of

Chronological Chart

Acquisition of Sierra Leone by British for freed slaves	1787	Explorations of Savorgnan de Brazza in Congo	1875
Rule of Mohammed Ali in Egypt	1805-1848	Founding of Congo Association by Leopold II of Belgium	1876
Abolition of slave trade in British Empire	1807	Anglo-French condominium in Egypt	1876
Cession of Cape of Good Hope to British by Dutch	1814	British annexation of Transvaal	1877
Egyptian conquest of Sudan	1820-1822	Foundation of United African Company for British trade in Nigeria	1879
Foundation of Liberia for freed American slaves	1822	First Boer War	1880-1881
Capture of Algiers by French	1830	French protectorate over Tunisia	1881
Abolition of slavery in British Empire	1833	Italian occupation of Assab (Eritrea)	1882
Great Trek of Boers	1835-1837	British occupation of Egypt—abolition of condominium	1882
First Opium War in China	1839-1842	Rule of Baring (Lord Cromer) in Egypt	1883-1907
Natal becomes British colony	1843	Revolt of Mahdi in Sudan	1883
Establishment of Republic of Liberia	1847	French protectorate in Indo-China	1883
First African journey of Livingstone	1849	Karl Peters begins treaty-making in East Africa	1884
Taiping Rebellion in China	1850-1864	Fall of Khartoum to Mahdi	1885
Independence of Transvaal recognized by Britain	1852	Berlin Conference on the Congo	1885
Visit of Commodore Perry to Japan, opening of two ports	1853-1854	Formation of Indian National Congress	1885
Governorship of General Faidherbe, French expansion in West Africa	1854-1865	Discovery of gold in Transvaal	1886
Organization of South African Republic	1856	Annexation of Upper Burma by British	1886
Indian Mutiny of sepoy troops in British service	1857-1858	Agreements between Rhodes and Lobengula	1888
End of British East India Company rule	1858	Constitutional government in Japan on Western model	1889
Anglo-French occupation of Peking, burning of Summer Palace	1860	Acquisition of Italian Somaliland	1889
Meiji period in Japan—Western reforms	1868-1912	Agreement between British and Germans on East Africa	1890
International financial control of Tunisia	1869	Anglo-Portuguese agreements on Africa	1891
Opening of Suez Canal	1869	British protectorate of Uganda	1893
Livingstone "found" by Stanley	1871	French protectorate of Laos	1893
Purchase of Suez Canal shares by Disraeli	1875	Conquest of Madagascar by French	1894-1896
		Sino-Japanese War	1894-1895
		British organization of East African protectorate (Kenya)	1895

Fourth (last) Ashanti War— Gold Coast becomes British protectorate	1895-1896	Entente Cordiale	1904
Jameson Raid in South Africa	1895-1896	Russo-Japanese War	1904-1905
Reconquest of Sudan by Kitchener	1896-1898	Visit of Kaiser William II to Tangier	1905
Italian defeat by Abyssinians at Adowa—recognition of Abyssinian (Ethiopian) independence	1896	Algeciras Conference	1906
Spanish-American War—cession of Philippines to United States	1898	Belgian government takes over Congo from Leopold II	1908
Scramble for Chinese concessions by European powers	1898	Annexation of Korea by Japan	1910
Annexation of Hawaii by United States	1898	Outbreak of Chinese Revolution	1911
Fashoda crisis	1898-1899	Agadir incident	1911
British takeover of Nigeria from Royal Niger Company	1899	French protectorate over Morocco	1912
Second Boer War	1899-1902	Conquest of Tripoli by Italians from Turks	1912
United States proclamation of "Open Door" policy	1899	Japanese declaration of war on Germany	1914 (Aug. 23)
Boxer Rebellion in China	1900-1901	Government of India Act— provincial self-government	1935
British conquest of northern Nigeria	1900-1903	Independence of India and Pakistan	1947
Anglo-Japanese alliance	1902	Independence of Burma and Ceylon	1948
		Independence of Ghana and Malaya	1957
		Constitutional referendum in French colonies—independence of Guinea	1958

prestige in the later nineteenth century. Bismarck at first eschewed the idea of colonies for Germany, being content to build up the newly united country. He was content to leave such enterprises to the French, who, he hoped, would become so heavily involved with their colonies that they would forget the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. But even he was compelled by the pressure of events to attempt to win at least a few colonies. Kaiser William II was, on the contrary, a thoroughgoing colonialist, who never ceased to demand a "place in the sun" for Germany. Britain, France, Germany, Leopold II of Belgium, and even Portugal became involved in struggles for colonies in Africa; Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and even Japan squabbled over the spoils of the East. However economically valueless and however expensive for the mother country the colonies might be, the European nations, as Premier Jules Ferry of France once insisted, would in their own opinion have sunk

to the rank of second-class powers if they had not competed.

Strategic considerations also played their part. In days when the steamship used coal and needed frequent bunkering, ports had to be controlled where such facilities were available; the sea lanes had to be patrolled to ensure freedom of commerce, necessitating both naval and military bases. Britain, as a relatively small nation, regarded her trade route to India as of the utmost importance. In the event of an intra-European war, all the colonies could naturally be regarded as legitimate prizes of war, and interference with foreign trade as a means of defeating the enemy—especially such an enemy as Britain, who was compelled to live from her foreign trade. Thus some territories were taken and fortified solely for their strategic value.

All these considerations, then, weighed heavily with the European powers in the second half of the nineteenth century. The "Little Eng-

landers" and the Bismarcks found themselves outnumbered by the imperialists, whose raucous "patriotic" appeals found a ready audience not only among the middle classes, who might hope to profit from it, but also among the workers, to whom the strength of "their" nation compensated for their increasing individual powerlessness in an industrial age. The popular press, and popular poets such as Rudyard Kipling, impressed upon them that they were hearing the "white man's burden," that they had a duty to impose Western civilization upon the "lesser breeds without the law," and redeem them from savagery. When, at the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria, the pageant of empire was displayed before them in all its glory—including Indian maharajas on elephants and Pygmies with blowpipes—they were content, if they thought about it, that their taxes had been well spent,

❖ Existing empires in the East

BRITISH INDIA

By the beginning of the nineteenth century the British and French struggle in India had been decided in favor of the British, but the country was less than half conquered. The British East India Company, which had ruled the country until 1784, had to submit to governmental power in the form of a governor-general and secretary of state appointed by the British government; and though the governor-general was in theory still the servant of the company, which paid his salary, in fact the British East India Company's position was slowly weakening. Its monopolistic trade operations were suspended in 1833, and the subcontinent was taken over altogether by the British government in 1858. Thereafter India was a possession of the British Crown, represented in India by a local all-powerful viceroy.

During the first half of the nineteenth century the whole of India was conquered, and its rulers made to submit to the suzerainty of the British. Soon afterward the hitherto independent kingdom of Burma was added to the empire. This full conquest was probably necessary from the British point of view, since rebellions by the more warlike peoples were constant, and

there was no way for them to rule unless they were prepared, like the residual Indian princes, to submit in all important matters to British direction. The country was therefore administered by British senior officials with Indians in subordinate positions, aided by a British-officered army composed largely of Indian troops.

In 1857 these troops, called sepoys, revolted against the British and their officers, and were able to capture the old capital, Delhi, and put the last heir of the Moguls on the throne. But the rebellion, or mutiny, was local, even though fairly widespread, and the rebels were unable to rouse the whole country. Many sepoys from other parts of India remained loyal to their paymasters. With the aid of these and with reinforcements from Britain, the British were able to suppress what the Indians have since learned to call the first war of independence—though in fact there was as yet little national feeling which could be aroused, and at the time no alternative government was feasible. There was certainly much latent anti-British feeling, as was evidenced by the atrocities of the mutiny, but no organization that could take advantage of it.

When the mutiny had been suppressed, the last remnants of British East India Company rule were abolished, and in 1877 Disraeli, the British prime minister, had the title of empress of India conferred upon Queen Victoria. Soon afterward a number of British-educated Indians, feeling that Britain ultimately should be willing to relinquish control of India to the Indians, founded the Indian National Congress, which used all means at its disposal to foster latent Indian nationalism. India had many grievances, both economic and political, and educated Indians resented especially the manner in which Indian nationals were systematically excluded from all higher governmental positions—in the interest, as the British, with not quite perfect tact, expressed it, of efficient administration. Nevertheless, a few reforms were granted from time to time. Some Indians, especially chosen by the British for their "loyalty" to themselves, were allowed into the viceroy's councils, and their advice was listened to and occasionally acted upon. It was not until the end of World War I, however, that the British gave any official encouragement to Indian aspirations toward



Mohandas Gandhi (1869-1948), architect of Indian independence. (COURTESY PRINTS DIVISION, NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY)

independence. Thereafter agitation for independence greatly increased. It was finally granted after World War II, thus starting the rapid devolution of the British Empire which has been so conspicuous in recent history.

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

Further to the East the Dutch, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, possessed an extensive empire, consisting of a number of thickly populated islands, which today form the Republic of Indonesia. Originally founded and administered for nearly three centuries by the Dutch East India Company, the territory was taken over by the Dutch government from the corrupt and almost bankrupt company at the end of the eighteenth century. Thereafter the country was more efficiently controlled, and in the first half of the nineteenth century Netherlands New Guinea was added to the empire. The small Dutch nation, with such a huge and rich territory to administer, engaged in no further expansion in the nineteenth century. Independence was granted after World War II, following a nationalist rebellion which was resisted by the

Dutch for a time, but finally proved too difficult for a small country to subdue.

❖ The opening of the Far East

CHINA

Difficulties of trade with China The Western nations early in the nineteenth century began to turn their attention to the greatest country in the Far East, the empire of China, which had for two centuries been ruled by an alien dynasty, the Manchus. This dynasty had initially been strong and prosperous and not unacceptable to the people of China, who were not nationalist so much as they were traditionalist. The Manchus had in the main respected ancient Chinese customs and had not monopolized all the high offices of state. In the early nineteenth century, however, it was clear that their control was slipping, and there were many minor and local revolts against the regime. The Westerners, whose sole interest in the country was trade, did not wish to help in overthrowing the dynasty and interfere in Chinese internal affairs, of which as a rule they were but dimly aware. They were interested rather in persuading the Chinese to allow them to trade more freely within the country. But there was an almost insuperable difficulty to extensive trade, in that the Chinese Empire was in all important respects totally self-sufficient. The country was mainly agricultural, and the general population extremely poor. The upper classes, who had money to spend, were content with Chinese manufactures, which they regarded with some justice as qualitatively superior to anything available from the West. It was therefore necessary for the Westerners to pay for their purchases largely in coined silver, which was always acceptable in China, but not in such great supply in the West that it could be lost forever with equanimity in China.

The foreign merchants were allowed to live in special areas set aside for their use in the southern city of Canton. But here they were subjected to many inconveniences and insults from local Chinese officials, who also demanded and received their share of the profits of trade. Nevertheless, the British East India Company,

which held a monopoly of British trade in China, was quite willing to pay whatever was necessary and swallow the insults to its employees, since the Chinese tea they bought was a monopoly in its hands and tea always fetched an extremely profitable price when resold in England. But the company was still hopeful that some improvement could be gained from the emperor himself. To this end the British sent an official ambassador to the emperor as early as the reign of George III, but he made no progress. The emperor persisted in regarding the embassy as a belated token of submission, since it was the Chinese view that the emperor was lord of the whole earth. He demanded that the ambassador perform the customary ritual act of abasement before the throne, known as *ko-tow* or *kow-tow*, which was refused by the ambassador and by all his successors. Since the emperor had nothing to lose and had no desire for trade with the West, he was willing to maintain his position indefinitely.

The First Opium War In the later part of the eighteenth century the British East India Company discovered that there was one product for which the Chinese were willing to trade, thus saving it from having to find bullion for its purchases. This was opium, of which the Company had ample supplies, since it was grown in India. The Cantonese merchants organized its distribution in China and the addicts, even among the poorest classes, were willing to pay a high price for it. The new trade flourished until 1800, when the emperor took notice of the increasing addiction of his people and forbade the importation of opium. For many years neither the Chinese nor Western merchants paid much attention to this decree, and the emperor took no steps to enforce it. The Cantonese merchants, however, increased their share of the proceeds, since they were now engaged in an illegal enterprise, and the Westerners, including Dutch, Americans, and Portuguese, organized large-scale smuggling from the numerous islands near the Chinese coast.

Meanwhile the British again tried to persuade the emperor to receive an embassy and open up his country to more trade with the West, but met with no greater success than be-

fore. Finally the emperor sent a special commissioner, an incorruptible official named Lin, to put an end to the opium traffic. He carried out his task with efficiency and succeeded in imposing the imperial will upon the local Chinese officials and merchants. The foreigners were compelled to destroy the opium, but they balked at the suggestion that Western smugglers should be tried by Chinese courts. When the Chinese attempted to seize some British sailors they were fired upon by the British warships, whereupon the British were ordered out of Canton. This was too much for the British government, which was well aware of the military weakness of the Chinese. Reinforcements, military and naval, were sent for from India, and a combined force captured a number of Chinese ports and sailed up the Yang-tse, making for Nanking. The Chinese had only fixed gun emplacements of a type obsolete in Europe for centuries, and were unable to do any damage to the ships. Nanking was therefore captured without difficulty, and the emperor finally agreed in 1842 to pay an indemnity and open five of his ports to foreign trade, granting concessions in each to the merchants and permitting them to be tried in their own courts (*extraterritoriality*). The uninhabited island of Hong-Kong was ceded to the British.

European concessions in China Other Western nations hastened to take advantage of the treaty and were granted similar concessions. This initial victory was exploited with increasing aggressiveness throughout the century. Opium imports were tripled in the next few years. A Chinese rebellion against the Manchus raged for many years (Taiping Rebellion), but was finally put down with the aid of the Westerners. Concession after concession was extracted from the emperor; all the Western powers, later joined by the empire of Japan, which was itself in the process of modernization along Western lines, took their share in it. In the second half of the century they were in full control of whole provinces as well as cities, and China had been compelled to adopt a uniform import duty of five percent. The customs service was administered by foreigners, honestly enough. However, the low tariff brought so little income to the

Chinese government that it had to have recourse to loans secured on other taxes—thus giving the Westerners the excuse for further interference in the internal affairs of the country to collect their debts. The Japanese fought a major war with the dying Manchu empire, the Sino-Japanese War of 1895–96, and, after their victory, extracted more territorial concessions from China than the West was prepared to permit. Threatened by the Western powers, Japan had to disgorge some of her gains. But soon afterwards, following another victory over the Russians, she was permitted to keep what she had previously extracted—among other territories, Formosa, Korea, and the Liaotung Peninsula, including Darien and Port Arthur.

Boxer Rebellion and the fall of the Manchu dynasty Anti-Western feeling grew in the country, but the Manchus belatedly decided that the only way to restore their position was to follow the example of Japan and modernize. The

effort, however, produced a further rebellion against both the Manchus and the Westerners, known to the latter as the Boxer Rebellion (from the secret society, the Order of the Harmonious Fist, which was responsible for it). This rebellion, like the earlier ones, was suppressed by the West. The Chinese were once more compelled to pay an indemnity, thus in effect themselves paying for the expenses of the aggression committed against them. In part as a result of a diplomatic note from the United States, an Open Door policy for trade by all the Western powers was agreed to by the Western nations. In 1911 the Manchu dynasty was finally overthrown by a revolution led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the army. This was followed by a prolonged civil war, which produced such economic chaos that the various concessions ceased to be of much value to the West. Moreover, the Western nations were at war among themselves after 1914.

Thus the efforts of a century by Westerners and by Japan succeeded only in destroying the



Himeji Castle, near Kobe, a sixteenth century Japanese fortress (1581), made of Japanese materials and in Japanese style but influenced by European notions of defense taken from the Portuguese who had visited the islands earlier in the century. (COURTESY JAPAN TRAVEL BUREAU)

dynasty which had granted the concessions, plunging China into a chaotic condition from which she never fully recovered, and which laid her open to the depredations of the non-Western power whose vital interests were most closely concerned. The West taught Japan that when governments are weak, one-sided concessions can be extracted with impunity by a power that has superior arms. If the Western nations have had to suffer at the hands of Japan in the twentieth century, it was they who first showed the way in the nineteenth.

OPENING OF JAPAN AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Japan until the middle of the nineteenth century had been able to maintain her seclusion. The titular ruler, the mikado, was regarded as a god but took no part in the affairs of the country, which were managed by an official known as the shogun, the hereditary head of a clan. Society was feudal, and a warrior caste dominated the country. Foreigners were rigidly excluded from trade and settlement. This condition could not endure during the European expansion of the nineteenth century.

It was an American, Commodore Matthew Perry, who was the first to demand some minor concessions, especially the right to provision ships in Japanese ports. Trade concessions followed soon afterward, compelled by Western arms. A conspiracy against the shogunate was successful in 1868, and the mikado was brought out of seclusion to be the official ruler of the country, with the Western title of emperor. The new policy, adopted with the full support of the Japanese middle class—which had been increasing in power and prosperity even before the advent of Perry—and largely initiated by former feudal warriors and landowners called the samurai, was to use all that the West could teach of technology, organization, and government.


In 1889 Japan was granted a constitution by the emperor, modeled on that of Prussia, by which the emperor retained powers as effective as those of the German kaiser. The army was reorganized, mainly along German lines, since this was the period of greatest German prestige in Europe. A small but efficient navy was built, largely under British influence.

The special concessions to foreigners were abolished by the beginning of the nineteenth century. In 1895–96 Japan, as we have seen, waged war on China, but was not yet strong enough to face the united Western powers, who compelled her to relinquish some of her territorial gains. In 1902 Japan gained some recognition and prestige in the West by entering upon a naval alliance with Britain. In 1904–05 she fought Russia over their respective shares of influence in Manchuria, the most northerly Chinese province; to the surprise of the world she defeated Russia both by land and by sea. By the time of World War I Japan was recognized as one of the major powers. She entered the war on the side of the Allies, though her interests in China conflicted with theirs, and the Allies again forced her to abandon some of the concessions she extracted from a prostrate China in 1915. At the end of the war, however, she was rewarded by receiving as mandates some German islands in the Pacific, which she fortified, to the later distress of her former allies.

Thus European imperialism in the nineteenth century had the effect, in Japan, of creating a first-class power whose interests rarely coincided with those of the West. The achievement, however, though it was initially forced upon the Japanese by the West, was her own, and was made possible only by the Japanese spirit of discipline and willingness to learn. If the result was unexpected and if the West, especially in the 1930's and 1940's, most certainly wished it undone, the Japanese achievement remains an enduring example of how it is possible for a unified nation to transform itself into a model industrial country on the Western pattern. The result was achieved within the space of little more than half a century by essentially private, not State, enterprise—a lesson which may yet be of more value to the world and considered more worthy of imitation than it has hitherto been.

EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM IN OTHER FAR EASTERN COUNTRIES

During the period of the destruction of the old regime in China, all the Chinese peripheral possessions, which acknowledged, however



vaguely, the suzerainty of the Manchu emperors, were shorn away from the empire by the Western powers. Burma was taken outright by the British, and Tibet was made into a virtual British protectorate separated from China; the French, toward the end of the nineteenth century, took Annam and Tonkin (French Indochina); while the Japanese, as we have seen, took Korea, Formosa, and the Liaotung Peninsula.

Early in the nineteenth century Britain held

the major ports of the Malayan Peninsula. In the 1880's she extended her rule into the interior by means of treaties with the sultans of the different states. Thus British and French territories surrounded the little kingdom of Siam (today called Thailand), which both were anxious to acquire. However, two great Siamese monarchs, who ruled in the second half of the century, were equal to the challenge, deftly playing off one power against the other, while at the same time bringing in foreign advisers

from all the European countries, including the Scandinavian kingdoms, which had no aggressive intentions in the East. With their aid the Siamese modernized their country to some degree. The result was that Siam was able to maintain her independence, though at the cost of the two provinces of Laos and Cambodia, which she lost to France, and several Malayan sultanates, which she lost to the British. Since these territories were only nominally her vassals, and she had exercised no effective control over them, her feat in maintaining her independence in an imperialist world should not be underestimated.

CONSEQUENCES OF EUROPEAN PENETRATION OF THE FAR EAST

For the Orientals Western supremacy was clearly only a temporary phase in world history, and it is certain that sooner or later Western inventive techniques, which of course will long survive Western world domination, would have become available to and adopted by the East. Chinese culture was too ancient and too firmly entrenched for Western innovations to uproot; in fact, Western thought has in general had little influence even to the present time, and, when accepted, has been totally transformed by Chinese native thought. Moreover, it is certain that the Manchu dynasty would soon have been destroyed even without Western interference; Western influence may indeed have prolonged its death throes.

China learned little that was valuable from the West. Missionaries brought Western education, along with Christianity, to a small if significant minority; Chinese studied extensively abroad, especially in America. But many earnest Chinese who had become Christians in China were shocked to see that Christianity in the West was, unlike their native Confucianism, not a code of behavior to be followed in daily life. In comparison with the painfully acquired understanding that power and acquisitiveness respected neither an ancient culture—the greatest treasury of Chinese art and culture, the Summer Palace at Peking, was destroyed for the sole purpose of teaching the Chinese to respect Western power—nor the desire of the people and their rulers to work out their own destiny, any

individual benefits gained from Western contact were small indeed. The Chinese were in no way prepared by their exploiters, as were some of the colonies ruled directly by Western nations, for Western forms of government, nor were they allowed to become accustomed to Western forms of administration and justice, which are perhaps the most valuable of Western cultural exports. So today, when the Chinese are being taught once again that all Westerners are unrepentant imperialists, the seed cannot help falling on well-prepared ground—ground plowed deeply by the traders and the imperial armies that followed in their wake. Though the Japanese met the challenge in a different way from the Chinese, and were in due course able to turn the tables neatly on the Westerners, what they learned from the West, along with its techniques, was a lesson that differed in no important respect from that learned by the Chinese. In a hard world, ruled by Western power and acquisitiveness, the Japanese recognized that they must surrender or compete. They chose to try to beat the Westerners at their own game, with consequences that the West has had cause to regret.

For the Europeans For the West itself such material benefits as were gained were ephemeral. Individual merchants and the industries supplying them profited. The small nineteenth-century wars were inexpensive—and in any case were in large measure paid for by the Chinese. Chinese and Japanese art was appreciated in the West, and for a time their literature and philosophy influenced some Western thinkers. But any small gains were insignificant when laid against the losses in the twentieth century: the political weakness of the Chinese, following a century of exploitation and Western interference, and Japanese imperialism, learned from the West.

The balance sheet of Western imperialism in the East is therefore heavily inked with red. In Africa and in the countries ruled as colonies by the Western powers until the second half of the twentieth century, the record is less one-sided. The African record as a whole will be considered in this chapter, in spite of the fact that the colonial system developed by the West-

tern powers belongs for the most part to the twentieth century. The final devolution of the system and the achievement of independence by the African countries will be dealt with in Chapter 26 to complete the story.

❖ The partition of Africa

AFRICA AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

For a proper understanding of European imperialism in Africa, it is essential to recognize that the continent is neither racially nor culturally homogeneous. The North African coast, from Morocco to Egypt, is populated by non-Negroes—Arabs, Berbers, and other groups—who are united primarily by their Islamic religion. In spite of their adherence to Islam, and in spite of the fact that all the North African countries have an extensive hinterland populated by nomadic and agricultural tribes who rarely see the Mediterranean, they are essentially Mediterranean countries, and all except Egypt are divided from what is today known as sub-Saharan Africa by the Sahara desert.

For centuries Islam has been expanding south of the Sahara and has made numerous Negro converts. Islam has also been spread by Nilotic peoples who are dark but not Negro, who have frequently intermarried with Negroes. The northern areas of all the West African states are inhabited by Nilotic Muslims as well as by Negroes, and when the Europeans conquered West Africa they frequently had to compel the Muslim and Nilotic rulers of Negro peoples to the south to come to terms with them. The Muslim-dominated states were far from being disorganized and savage when the Europeans entered. On the contrary, they often had well-organized chiefly systems, headed by emirs. It was therefore often convenient for the imperialists to make treaties with the Muslim northerners, under which they permitted the emirs to continue their rule in exchange for the recognition of European suzerainty.


In East Africa, on the other hand, where there was no Sahara, the Egyptians had penetrated far to the south along the Nile into the

Sudan, and the Sudanese, save for the Negroes in the extreme south, had adopted Islam. In the coastal areas Arabic influence was paramount until the Arab rulers were dispossessed by the British. The sultan of Zanzibar was the richest of these potentates. In the nineteenth century he was in effective control of the coastal cities of Mombasa and Dar-es-salaam, and in less effective control of the entire coastal strip. Arabic influence and the Islamic religion had not penetrated far inland; but it was into these East African territories—the present Nyasaland, Tanganyika, and Kenya—that Arab merchants raided through three quarters of the nineteenth century for Negro slaves, most of whom they sold to their fellow Arabs or across the Indian Ocean. This open trade did not cease until the sultan of Zanzibar finally agreed, under British pressure, to close the Zanzibar slave market in 1873.

Below the Sahara on the west was the Bantu Negro people, belonging to thousands of different tribes. The Bantus had been the major source of slaves sold across the Atlantic. Until 1807, when Britain abolished the slave trade and took steps to see that other nations followed her lead, the Europeans had coastal strongholds in all the countries of West Africa, and used them as headquarters for the slave trade. After 1807 more serious efforts were made to find other trade products, mostly palm nuts and oil, and gradually some of the Europeans sold their outposts to the British and French, though Spain and Portugal held on to small territories through the century.

The hinterlands of these African countries were virtually unknown to the Europeans, and it was these areas which could be considered barbarous in the Western sense. Cannibalism, human sacrifice, and other practices abhorrent to the Europeans were widespread, though there was a well-developed social system suited to the people, and the economic systems were not ill-adapted to the usually difficult climate. Diseases of all kinds were rife, and the death rate extremely high.

The countries as a whole, with certain notable exceptions, were very lightly populated. The political systems were far from rudimentary, the positions of chief and subchief being best



developed in the Muslim areas but common elsewhere. In some areas there were even kings and paramount chiefs exercising authority over minor chiefs. The chiefs had important ceremonial duties to perform throughout Bantu Africa. But tribal raids were frequent, and the resulting loss of life, together with the endemic diseases and dangers from wild animals, served to keep the population down.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century only Portugal, among the European powers, had any effective control inland, or much acquaintance with the peoples of the interior. Even Portuguese knowledge and control were not very profound, but the city of Luanda in Angola was a substantial European center, with some of the amenities of European life—though based, of course, on the slave trade. South of the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique stretched the still sparsely inhabited lands which were later to become Southwest Africa and the Union of South Africa. There had been a European settlement at the Cape of Good Hope for more than two centuries, and the settlers had spread out to parts of what is today Cape Province. Dutch and French Calvinists by religion, and ruled by the Dutch until the Napoleonic wars, many had intermarried with the

African native Hottentots, a non-Bantu people, many of whom they had enslaved. The Bantu were not yet in this part of Africa in any numbers; it was only in the nineteenth century that they drove southward, to create the problem of race relations in South Africa which is familiar to everyone today.

NORTH AFRICA—THE INHERITANCE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

European imperialism in North Africa was largely a by-product of the decay of the Ottoman Empire, and the struggle between the different European powers over who should succeed to the Ottoman estate. But this issue was greatly complicated in the second half of the century, when the Suez Canal was constructed, and it became a vital matter, especially to Britain, to see that Egypt was in friendly and trustworthy hands, and to British and French bond and shareholders that they should receive the revenues from the Canal to which they were entitled. The interests of the peoples of North Africa were little taken into account, even though there can be no doubt that at least Algeria, under French control, and Egypt and the Sudan, under British control, benefited very substantially from the occupation by the Europeans.

Algeria The first to be conquered was Algeria, which had for many years been a nest of pirates, and totally out of the control of its nominal suzerain in Constantinople. The local ruler, the dey of Algiers, was likewise unable to prevent the raids on shipping and on peaceful coastal cities. France at first tried to persuade the other European powers affected to join with her. Unsuccessful in this, the last Bourbon monarch, Charles X, launched an expedition which was followed by others under Louis Philippe. The coast having been cleared, the French proceeded inland, and did not quit until the whole country had been subdued. Thereafter considerable numbers of colonists emigrated from the mother country, the coastal areas being very thoroughly developed by French capital.

Though the colonists appropriated the best land to themselves, and though the French monopolized the administration, the country

nevertheless became so prosperous that the Muslim population greatly increased. The territory was formally made into a part of France and subjected to exactly the same administration as the metropolis. This was the only major European adventure in North Africa in the first half of the nineteenth century.

EGYPT AND THE SUEZ CANAL

Egypt, as will be recalled, had been partly occupied by Napoleon at the end of the eighteenth century. After Napoleon had abandoned Egypt, his British supplanters were defeated by an Albanian officer in Turkish employ, usually called Mehemet Ali, himself recognized as pasha of Egypt by the sultan. Thereafter he ruled for more than forty years, greatly expanding Egyptian territories and conquering the Sudan. He was usually supported by the French and at odds with the British; his relations with Turkey were mostly nominal. At the time of his death Egypt was virtually independent of Turkey, and a canal through the Isthmus of Suez had already been mooted. The British regarded the project as too expensive and did not encourage it. The French capitalists, on the other hand, were enthusiastic, and the French consul in Egypt, Ferdinand de Lesseps, obtained a concession to build it from Pasha Said in 1854. The initial capital was subscribed mostly by the French, but expenses were far higher than expected and ever more money was borrowed for the company by the new Pasha Ismail, who had inherited the rule of Egypt in 1863. Ismail, who was granted the title of khedive (or viceroy) by his Turkish overlord soon after his accession, was a determined modernizer; the international financiers were anxious to oblige with money, and foreign adventurers flocked to offer their services to him. The French rebuilt Alexandria and much of Cairo for him.

When the Canal was opened safely in 1869, Ismail could not repay his debts. In the 1870's there was a severe depression and the prices of Egypt's primary products, especially cotton, dropped catastrophically. Ismail, desperately short of cash, but unwilling to curtail his enormous private and public expenditures, was

compelled to sell his shares in the Canal for what he could obtain. The British prime minister, Disraeli, heard that the shares were available and on his own authority bought them on behalf of the British government—a fateful purchase that certainly changed the course of history, for Ismail had intended to sell his shares in Paris, not in London. Added to their existing holding, the French would have had considerably more than a controlling interest, and even though the French shares were in private hands, the government would surely have protected their interests. But after Disraeli's purchase the British government became the most important single shareholder and exercised a dominant influence thereafter, just as she was already the largest user of the Canal.

The khedive, in selling his shares, also agreed to accept financial supervision from the bondholders and other creditors of the State. However, finding the control too onerous, he tried to oust them, whereupon the khedive's overlord in Turkey was appealed to by the British, French, and German governments, and Ismail was deposed. He retired peaceably, but in Egypt itself there was a reaction to foreign control of the government similar to the one we have already described in China. The Egyptians resented the rule of the dynasty of Mehemet Ali, which was not Egyptian; they resented the Westernization of the country and the presence of numerous foreign residents, and especially the high-handedness of the Western imperialists. They had had to foot the bill for modernization, from which they had gained little. A revolt broke out in 1882 against both the new khedive and the foreigners, and a number of the latter were murdered. The British and French, acting together, sent a naval force, but it was insufficient; the French government of the day refused to support stronger and more expensive measures. The British therefore acted alone to put down the rebellion, restoring the unpopular khedive. Thereafter they occupied and managed the country. The Turkish suzerain and the French accepted the accomplished fact, and in due course the sultan was paid an annual sum of money equivalent to what he was supposed to have drawn from Egypt (but rarely in fact

touched). The French creditors retained considerable say over Egyptian expenditures, and so were pacified.

Conquest of the Sudan Meanwhile the Sudan, oppressed by Egyptian officials, revolted under a religious leader known as the Mahdi; neither the Egyptians, just in the process of submitting to British authority, nor the British themselves were in a position to fight effectively the "holy war" proclaimed by the Mahdi. A British army, hastily assembled, was penned into Khartoum, which was captured by the Mahdi shortly afterward (January, 1885). Not until 1898 were the British able to defeat the Mahdi and reconquer the Sudan on behalf of their clients, the Egyptians. Thereafter British administrative talent was able to give the Sudan efficient government, and bring order out of the chaos created by the misrule of the Mahdi.

There can be little doubt that British administration of Egypt and the Sudan was beneficial to the people. But British officials replaced the Egyptians in all higher positions in the country—no doubt in the interests of efficiency, but galling to Egyptian pride. When the British after World War I granted self-government to the Egyptians under a native king, and eventually relinquished their protectorate, the Egyptians had a far better material heritage than before, but had hardly been adequately prepared for the role that would be required of them under independence.

The French in Tunisia The French had been unwilling to take strong measures in Egypt in the 1880's in part because they already had their hands full in Tunisia. French and other European capitalists had lent money to the bey of Tunis as freely as to the pashas and khedives of Egypt. The bey was likewise unable to pay interest on his debts. A Franco-Italian commission was agreed to by the bey, but this proved, as in Egypt, a prelude to stronger intervention. There was considerable rivalry, however, between the French and the Italians. There were far more Italians resident in the territory, but France was both militarily and diplomatically stronger than Italy. France obtained an agreement from England and Germany at the Con-

gress of Berlin in 1878 to her plan for annexing Tunisia—the British being compensated for the agreement by the cession of Cyprus, for which island they continued to pay an annual sum to the sultan in Constantinople until World War I. In 1881 the French invaded Tunisia from Algeria on the pretext that tribes were raiding over the border. They established a protectorate, keeping the bey as the nominal ruler.

Italians in the Horn of Africa The Italians, without diplomatic support and militarily impotent, could do nothing but acquiesce; but in pursuit of some imperial spoils for themselves they took possession of two barren territories on the borders of the Red Sea, peopled mostly by nomads. From there, they prepared to invade the ancient Coptic Christian kingdom of Ethiopia. The French, however, advised the Ethiopian monarch Menelik, and trained his army, which defeated the Italians at the battle of Adowa in 1896. Italy retained Eritrea and Somaliland, the barren territories already referred to, and turned her attention elsewhere. Finally, in 1911, she declared war against the helpless Turks, who gave up their last North African territory of Tripolitania (Libya) almost without a struggle.

French conquest of Morocco Meanwhile the French, in possession of Tunis and Algeria, desired to round off their North African possessions by taking Morocco. Indeed, it was this French enterprise that stimulated Italy, largely for purposes of prestige, to seize Tripolitania, rather than allow herself to fall hopelessly behind in the colonial race. The French, however, discovered that it was by no means an easy task to take Morocco. They first found themselves in trouble with the German kaiser William II, who had been frozen out of North Africa altogether, and had managed to acquire far less than he felt should have been Germany's share in sub-Saharan Africa. But after 1904, when French and British colonial and other interests had been settled, the French could rely on British diplomatic support against Germany. A German intervention in Morocco, which seemed at the time to bring Europe to the brink of war, was headed off by giving the kaiser some territory in Equatorial Africa, Spain's aspirations were met by

the promise of a share in the spoils of Morocco. The French, having by diplomatic means at last obtained a free hand for themselves in Morocco, compelled the sultan in 1912 to accept a French protectorate, though the country was not fully subjugated until after World War I. The Spanish received their share, as agreed.

CONSEQUENCES OF CONQUESTS FOR NORTH AFRICA

In North Africa the countries taken by the European imperialists benefited materially from their occupation by the technically more advanced Europeans, but at a cost of permanent indebtedness to the European capitalists, and an economic dependence on the Europeans that remains partially intact even now, when all the countries except Algeria have become politically independent. The British and French, and to a lesser degree the Italians, created an important infrastructure consisting of railroads, roads, and other material improvements, which would of course be inherited by the North Africans once they obtained independence. A considerable number of the Africans were educated in the metropolitan country and acquired a European language in addition to their own. But the highest political and administrative positions were reserved to themselves by the Europeans, and the African economies were geared to supplying the raw materials and foodstuffs needed by the metropolitan country. Local industry was never encouraged even when it was not forbidden. Such African industry as there was remained in the hands of the colonists and nationals of the metropolitan country. Thus, when the countries became independent after World War II, they remained, with the possible exception of Egypt, to a large degree under the economic domination of their former conquerors.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA—THE SLAVE TRADE AND THE MISSIONARY INTEREST

It should be understood that sub-Saharan Africa was not all opened up by the Europeans at the same time, nor were the reasons behind the expansion always the same. In the first half of the nineteenth century, as has been noted

earlier, the British people and government were inclined to think that colonies were an expense and a nuisance. But the missionary and philanthropic interest was strong in Parliament, and constantly urged both the full and complete abolition of the slave trade and the emancipation of slaves, while insisting that it was a moral duty to redeem the Africans from heathenism and convert them to Christianity. There was never any question of the absolute nature of this duty in the minds of the evangelical leaders, and it never occurred to them that there might be values in the African social and religious system which were worth preserving. This typically Western sense of mission and confidence of superiority was universal among the Western peoples, and was held especially strongly by the British. Moreover, the only information about Africans available to Parliament was supplied by the missionaries; opposition to their point of view, being based solely on the expense and trouble involved in following their suggestions, could be and was overridden by pressure from philanthropists outside Parliament and by oratory within.

Since most of the slaves who were taken across the Atlantic and sold in America had originally come from West Africa, it was West Africa on which the philanthropists first focused their attention. They had already committed the British government to intervention long before there was any substantial movement of traders to the area. Individual traders, and the large trading companies committed by their shareholders to the commercial development of the countries allotted to them, did not follow until many years later. On the other hand Central Africa, the real "dark continent," inhabited by more primitive peoples than was West Africa, was opened up by the explorations of David Livingstone, who began as a medical missionary and ended as a simple explorer. In this huge territory missionaries therefore led the way; but since the explorations took place in the second half of the century, when commercial interests were far better organized and anxious to find new sources of raw materials, traders from the first accompanied the missionaries who succeeded Livingstone. Many of the latter, indeed, protested strongly against the activities of the

commercial interests, and often tried to protect their African charges from exploitation. But the traders were by this time far stronger in Parliament than the philanthropists; and the people had begun to be proud of their imperialists, whose activities bolstered their sense of national superiority. The sole success of the philanthropists in this age was the dubious one of persuading their countrymen that imperialism had a moral and not solely a material purpose. As long as the British could feel they were bringing Christianity to the Africans and redeeming them from their former barbarism, they could close their ears to all talk of exploitation of the Africans by their nationals.

In East Africa again the situation was somewhat different. Here for the greater part of the century Arab slavers, as noted earlier, were at work in spite of European efforts at suppression, and Arab influence was still so strong in the coastal areas that the Europeans were not able to obtain a foothold until late in the century, after Arab power had been gradually whittled away. Although isolated missionaries, both Catholic and Protestant, had been at work for many years, they had not been given any substantial support by their home governments. Only after the Arabs had been ousted, in the last three decades of the century, did the Europeans have a free hand. By that time imperialism was in full flood, and it was the merchants and trading companies, both British and German, that led the way in the partition of this part of Africa, to be followed very soon afterward by their governments. The missions were made use of by the governments rather than putting pressure on the governments to take stronger action; and it was in East Africa that there was most opposition from the missions to the policies of the trading interests and their governments.

WEST AFRICA

Countries settled by former slaves Already, before the end of the eighteenth century, an association had been formed by Samuel Wilberforce, the leading British abolitionist and philanthropist, for the purpose of returning freed slaves to Africa. The association, in pursuit of

this policy, founded the city of Freetown in Sierra Leone, which at first met with almost insuperable difficulties. The earliest colonists were mostly American Negroes who had fought on the British side in the American War of Independence, and who were rewarded with freedom by the British. When the British abolished the slave trade in 1807, it became customary to try to intercept slavers and return their cargo of slaves to Africa. Other freed slaves were also brought in from the West Indies, where there was a surplus of slave labor. Few of these returned slaves were fit for difficult pioneer work in Africa, and progress in Freetown was very slow. Soon the association was compelled to ask for annexation by the British government, which reluctantly agreed under missionary pressure. Similar settlements were also founded in Liberia (1822) by the American Colonization Society, and in Libreville in Gabon by the French (1849). Liberia, unlike the others, was from the beginning an independent Negro republic, though under the special protection of the United States.

Gradual conquest of colonial hinterlands For much of the early part of the nineteenth century it was doubtful whether the British and French would remain in their small enclaves on the West African coast now that the profits from the slave trade were no longer available. But some efforts were made to obtain other products for use in European trade, which in time met with enough success to justify the expense of maintaining the colonies. But the new policy required more attention to the hinterlands of the coastal settlements than had the slave trade, which was handled simply by payments in trade goods to the chiefs who supplied the slaves. Gradually up-country trading posts were organized and missions established, and these were used as beachheads when the metropolitan countries in the later part of the century became seriously interested in the exploitation of African raw materials.

Though the governors appointed by Britain and France usually obtained little support from home, they used their own initiative in dealing with native peoples who opposed them, and the governments were often compelled by public

opinion at home and by their natural reluctance to disown the acts committed by their governors to grant them military aid. The French governors of Senegal proved themselves especially adept at training native African troops who often fought colonial wars far from home, about which their governments heard only long afterwards. Once the era of the small trader was over, the British usually chartered companies which were granted monopolies for the export of raw materials and for the import of such trade goods as were necessary to secure them. These companies usually got into difficulties and needed protection, which they were not in any position to supply themselves for lack of resources. Ultimately, in all cases, the British were obliged to buy out the companies and make the countries into colonies. By such means they obtained the most populous country in West Africa, Nigeria, and the best source of cocoa, the Gold Coast. They also converted Sierra Leone into a colony, and joined to it their most ancient possession, the Gambia, a narrow enclave within French territory which, like Sierra Leone, was never prosperous, and indeed quite incapable of paying its way. But they did not care, and still do not care, to yield it either to the French or to the republic of Senegal, which has succeeded to the French heritage.

Competition for colonies among European powers The French, meanwhile, had found themselves constantly thwarted by the British, who were able to take most of the valuable and populous lands in West Africa. They contented themselves with mopping up the rest in the later part of the century, even trying to cut a swath right through Africa, mostly by military means, to the Red Sea. In 1898 the French Major Marchand was confronted by the British General Kitchener at a small swamp in the south of the Sudan. Kitchener, fresh from his victory over the Mahdi at Omdurman, was in no mood to permit the French any rights of prior occupation. He had no intention of allowing the French to cut their swath through Africa from west to east; the British still hoped to cut through from Egypt to South Africa, and perhaps build a railroad from Cairo to the Cape. To Europe it seemed that war was imminent be-

tween Britain and France. But the French finally yielded, thus giving up their dream of cutting the African continent in half. Thereafter the British and French governments decided to bury the hatchet, and accommodations were arrived at in both Europe and Africa which culminated in the arrangement known as the Entente Cordiale, which will be discussed in the next chapter. The boundaries of the West African colonies that belonged to the British and French were settled by the home governments, and there have been no changes in these quite arbitrary frontiers to this day. Germany received Togoland and the Cameroons as consolation awards, and the Portuguese were permitted to retain their small territory of Portuguese Guinea. The lion's share of the remainder of the territory, much of it arid desert, went to France, while the richest and most populous countries went to Britain.

CENTRAL AFRICA

Journeys of Livingstone and Stanley Unlike West Africa, Central Africa was hardly known to the Europeans by the mid-nineteenth century. Various explorers had made journeys into the interior and written of their exploits, but it was David Livingstone, the Scottish missionary and explorer, who first attracted the attention of the world by his voyages. Traveling unarmed and alone save for his African porters, he was the first European to look upon the Victoria Falls, and in three journeys he covered on foot and by boat almost the whole area between the Atlantic and Indian oceans, including a visit to the Portuguese city of Luanda—which confirmed him in the belief that the Portuguese, in spite of prohibition by the Portuguese government, were still active in the slave trade. Livingstone, in the writings published in the intervals between his journeys, constantly urged efforts by the European governments to suppress the slave trade, whether Portuguese, Arab, or native African, and emphasized the need for missionary work. His writings excited the interest of capitalists as well as missionaries, especially after H. M. Stanley, a British-born American journalist, mounted an expedition financed by a New York newspaper and "found" Livingstone, who had not been heard from in many

years but was in no sense lost. When Stanley had spread his tale in his newspaper, the Belgian king Leopold II hired him to do some exploring. Stanley was able to obtain enough concessions from African chiefs to persuade his employer to form a company for the export of ivory and wild rubber from the Congo.

Partition of Central Africa—Rhodesia and the Congo In due course Leopold was authorized by a congress of the major European powers held in Berlin in 1885 to set up the Congo Free State or Congo Independent State. This was to be the personal possession of the monarch, and the price exacted by the powers was a relatively low one. The whole Congo basin was to be opened to all European nations who wished to trade there, and a uniform tariff was to be imposed. By this time the partition of Africa was in full swing. Savorgnan de Brazza, an Italian in French employ, was largely responsible for the founding of what later became French Equatorial Africa, whose capital, Brazzaville, is named after him. His technique was similar to that of Stanley—exploration followed by treaties with the African chiefs, who agreed to cede their territories. Germans, with the private acquiescence if not the active encouragement of Bismarck, were active in the southwest, where they ultimately won the colony known as German South West Africa. The Portuguese were likewise striving to join their ancient eastern and western possessions of Angola and Mozambique. Again these various claims were decided without resorting to intra-European war. The Portuguese were not strong enough to achieve their ends in the face of so much competition. But the competing powers were unable to decide how to divide the Portuguese territories, and were therefore willing to let Portugal keep them. By a treaty signed in 1891, the British guaranteed the integrity of the existing colonies of Portugal, and with this she had to be content.

The British, during this period, did not build their empire exclusively from their European homeland. As has been noted already, they had acquired the southernmost tip of Africa from the Dutch in the Napoleonic wars. In the later part of the century Cecil Rhodes, a mil-


lionaire industrialist and politician, sent out his agents to deal with Lobengula, king of the Matabele, who had recently acquired an empire of his own in Central Africa in what is now known as Rhodesia. The king granted a limited concession to the agent of Rhodes, on the strength of which Rhodes formed the British South Africa Company. When its employees found that Lobengula seriously intended that the concession should be limited, they took active steps to expand it. The Matabele War which followed was short and sharp, and thereafter the concession was complete. The British company took over the late king's territories, selling out only after World War I to the British government.

EAST AFRICA—COMPETITION BETWEEN BRITAIN AND GERMANY

In East Africa in the later years of the nineteenth century the British, who had been working quietly through the titular owner of the territory, the sultan of Zanzibar, suddenly found they had been outmaneuvered by a German agent named Karl Peters, who had been approaching the East African chiefs directly. These men were quite ignorant of the fact that they were supposed to be vassals of the sultan of Zanzibar, and had calmly granted concessions to the German agent. In the diplomatic negotiations between Britain and Germany which followed, the British had to be content with British East Africa (Kenya), and a protectorate over Nyasaland and Uganda. In the latter country Peters' prior agreement with the kabaka (king) of Buganda was set aside in favor of the British. Germany gained the huge territory now known as Tanganyika, which fell to the British as a mandate after World War I.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE PARTITION FOR AFRICANS

Arbitrary nature of boundaries The partition of Africa was carried out, on the whole, without much fighting. The European powers refrained from actual hostilities with one another, since the home countries were not prepared for a major war among themselves over



colonial possessions. The Africans in some areas fought bravely against the technologically superior Europeans. Sometimes they rose against their own chiefs who had betrayed them; sometimes they rose in rebellion after the Europeans had taken possession. At the end of the century only Ethiopia and Liberia in all Africa were independent under African rule. The rest of Africa was divided into colonies

with purely artificial boundaries, ruled by one European nation or another in accordance with decisions made in European chancelleries, and without regard to African wishes or tribal affiliations. Major tribes were sometimes split into two or more parts, each in the colony of a different European power. But for nearly a century Africans themselves could do nothing about it, while they were being instructed, willy-nilly, in

European methods and practices. Today the arbitrary nature of boundaries remains as one of the more difficult problems inherited by the newly independent African states.

Labor policies of European powers. In the early years of the colonial system, while the predatory commercial instincts of the Europeans were paramount, the Africans suffered severely, especially in territories such as the Congo, where wild rubber was the main export product. All the powers resorted to one method or another of forced labor. The British instituted a tax which the Africans were compelled to pay in money; and money could be obtained only by working directly or indirectly for the European. The British colonies were expected to be financially self-supporting, which meant that the high salaries of British civil servants and governors had to be found out of the proceeds of taxation. Though the tax fell upon the European companies active in the colonies as well as upon the Africans, in the end it was the Africans who paid, since it was their low wages that made the work of the companies profitable enough to pay the taxes.

The French government at the beginning of the nineteenth century likewise passed a law that the colonies were to be self-supporting. But this was a virtual impossibility in such poor colonies, and in practice France usually had to make up considerable deficits in the colonial budgets. In addition to taxation of the Africans on lines similar to those introduced by the British, the French instituted direct forced labor, or *corvée*, for public works and a few other limited purposes. The Belgian king, who was the personal owner of the state that was later to become the Belgian Congo, won by far the most unsavory reputation in Africa for his undoubted condonation of the most severe methods of forced labor, for which he was castigated in the European and American press. When he died he left the Congo as a bequest to the Belgian government and people. The Belgian government quietly reversed most of his policies, while continuing in public to applaud his initiative and echoing his high-sounding statements on the sacred trust being exercised in Africa by the

Europeans. The Portuguese, persuading themselves that labor was a social duty for the African as for the European, took steps to see that those who did not work voluntarily were compelled to work for at least half the year. The system is in effect to this day in what are now called the Portuguese Overseas Provinces.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE BOER WAR AND THE UNION

Before coming to a fuller consideration of the effects of the partition of Africa on the Africans, some attention should be given to South Africa. The British acquisition of the Cape was greatly resented by the earlier European settlers, who had established a way of life to their taste. The vast majority of Boers were slave-holding farmers who had no desire to give up their slaves or to submit to British rule. A considerable number of them decided in 1835-36 to leave for greener pastures. They therefore started what is known as the Great Trek into the interior. Here they met with the descending Bantu peoples, whom they excluded from the land they conquered, penning those who did not work for them into reservations. The Voortrekkers founded the states of Transvaal and Orange, which they retained, and Natal, which was soon taken from them and annexed by the British, who were already ensconced in the coastal areas of the province. Meanwhile the British established relatively good relations with the remaining Boers in Cape Colony, where the numbers of British and Boers were more nearly equal. The British were in an actual majority in Natal. The Africans were treated as inferiors by both groups of white South Africans, restrictions were placed on their movements, and they were forbidden to own land save for the communal lands established as native reserves. By various forms of discriminatory legislation African wages were kept down, while at the same time a constant flow of Africans from the reserves was made available for the European farms and industries. Contracts were also entered into with the Portuguese, by which the latter supplied labor to the South Africans in exchange for the South

African agreement to ship their products through the Portuguese port of Lourenço Marques.

In the 1860's diamonds were discovered in the Orange Free State, and later gold in the Transvaal. This spelled the end of independence for the Boers in these two independent Boer republics. The British and other Europeans flocked to the finds, and soon demanded some share in the government to enable them to get rid of some of the restrictions placed upon them by the Boers. The Boers stubbornly refused to make any concessions to these immigrants, whom they called *Uitlanders*, and the British recognized that sooner or later war was inevitable. When they brought in troops and refused to withdraw them, the Transvaal and Orange Free State declared war, with the sympathy, but without the aid, of the other European powers (1899). Britain had some difficulty in winning the war against the guerrilla and commando tactics adopted by the Boers, and suffered a sharp loss of prestige. But in the end the war was won, and a few years later (1910) Britain granted full self-government to the newly formed Union of South Africa. In this union the Boers or *Afrikaners* still possessed a majority of the whole white population; but except for a brief period the governments until after World War II were led by *Afrikaners* who wished to maintain British-*Afrikaner* unity in face of the exploited Bantu, who outnumbered the whites by 3 to 1. Today the ruling party is almost wholly *Afrikaner*; and since the form of government is a union and not a federation, it is able to enforce its policy upon the whole nation.

CONSEQUENCES OF EUROPEAN RULE

IN AFRICA ON AFRICAN TRADITIONAL SOCIETY

It was of course inevitable that some day the tide of European expansion would overpower Africa and that it would have a revolutionary effect on cultures that were technologically backward. Now that in the 1960's the new African nations are achieving their independence and their imperial masters are withdrawing, it may be worth while attempting to measure the European achievement of the period of less than a

century during which they ruled the continent as absolute masters, and to draw up a balance sheet of profit and loss even though this requires a consideration of twentieth-century history that more properly belongs in a later chapter.

European penetration quickly undermined the basis on which African society had been organized. The land in most African territories had been held in common by the whole tribe, and although the chief was responsible for its allocation, he did not himself own it. It was therefore improper for him to have granted any rights to the Europeans which had the effect of alienating the lands from his people. Moreover, his own position was not wholly a secular one but had religious duties attached to it, as in ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia; and he could in most areas be deposed or even killed if he did not discharge his duties with responsibility toward his people. The colonial powers, however, made use of the chiefs for their own purposes, holding them responsible to themselves but authorizing them to maintain law and order among the Africans, and usually using them to collect the new taxes from the peasants. The chiefs were paid salaries or allowed to keep a share of the taxes. Thus a feudal order was more or less unconsciously created by the Europeans, instead of the former communal society, and it created a reservoir of ill-will toward the chiefs which found expression later, when the colonial hand was withdrawn.

The undoubted benefits brought by Western medicine and sanitation had the effect of increasing the population, and creating pressures on the limited supply of land, which in some areas had already been taken up by the Europeans who had settled in the territories most congenial to them. Landless Africans, and Africans who did not learn to grow enough surplus to pay their taxes, went to work for wages on European or sometimes on Asian farms, or in the cities that were built by their colonial masters, thus further breaking down the traditional society. On European farms they were paid low wages, which they could eke out with subsistence crops on land allotted them by the European purchasers; in the cities they were treated as racial inferiors by the Europeans,

prohibited from using the same facilities, and given little in the way of housing until many years had elapsed. The African centers in the cities, naturally enough, became breeding grounds for crime, reinforcing the European opinion that the Africans were racially inferior to themselves and needed a strong master to keep them in order.

The economy was run wholly in the interest of the Europeans. Although the Europeans provided their colonists with enough transportation to carry the raw materials to the coast, the freight rates were rigged to the advantage of the exporters and to the disadvantage of the importers. The entire export and import business was in the hands of Europeans and Asians, as were also the facilities for credit. The importers of textiles and other products for African use could of course include the higher freight rates in their selling price. Everything that was produced by African labor was sold at a low price; everything bought by the Africans was expensive. There was virtually no intra-

African trade; everything was sold abroad. Until late in the twentieth century no country had any industry, since such industry would have competed with European industries. When at length some new factories were established, it was by foreign capital, since the Africans had no opportunity to accumulate it. A partial exception to this rule was the Belgian Congo, where by set policy the Belgians tried in fairly recent years to create an African commercial class, and made liberal credit available to the African entrepreneurs in small industry. Elsewhere the Indians, Chinese, and Levantines handled almost all the retailing and set up the small businesses which catered exclusively to the Africans and were too minuscule to interest the Europeans.

The total result was that by the time independence was approaching, the Africans had a fairly substantial transportation system at their disposal, and in time they could hope to accumulate some capital and prevent all profits from being sent abroad. But they were in dire need of



Leopoldville, capital of former Belgian Congo, a modern city built to further a thriving European commerce.



Proud father and children in front of his house, a government project, part of the native Cité Leo II in Leopoldville. (PHOTO BY THE AUTHOR)

industrial capital, and many improvements in the infrastructure were still needed. The cities had become in large part westernized, and naturally gave political leadership to the more conservative countryside. In the country most farmers had become accustomed to a money economy, but in other respects few problems had been solved. Only in recent years have the Africans had any technical agricultural training. Many elements of the old social and religious system survived the colonial occupation, but almost everywhere its basis had been undermined. Rural Africa has a slight veneer of westernization as the result of the occupation, but almost all its problems remain to be solved by the newly independent states.

AFRICAN PREPAREDNESS FOR INDEPENDENCE—DIFFERENT POLICIES OF COLONIAL POWERS

Each colonial country imposed its own educational system upon the Africans. For a long time primary education was entirely in the

hands of the missions, and even today public education is almost negligible. Education therefore as a rule involves conversion to Christianity, which made the remainder of the process of westernization much easier, but created a social rift between Christians and pagans. Secondary education was neglected for a long time but made possible for a select few. The British and French permitted graduates of their secondary schools to go to their own universities or to America, where they studied the traditional British, French, and American curriculums. When university colleges were set up in Africa itself, no noticeable changes were made. Little thought was given to the suitability of such education for African conditions; but the African products of the system became, with few exceptions, its devotees. They were extremely sensitive to any suggestion that what was good for their masters was not good for them. Since the higher posts in the colonial administration were closed to the Africans, however well educated, until very recent times, most of the uni-



School in Cité Leo II, Leopoldville. (PHOTO BY THE AUTHOR)



Campus of Achimota College, Accra, the Gold Coast, now University College of Ghana. (PHOTO BY THE AUTHOR)

versity graduates entered the professions and, in more recent years, became politicians.

The French until after World War II adopted a policy of assimilation, aimed at making good Frenchmen out of the few educated Africans. The policy was remarkably successful in creating expert French linguists, since most of the chosen Africans had had even their secondary education in France. Since after World War II the French admitted the Africans to their own Chamber and Senate, where they quickly picked up French politics and were at liberty to join the Opposition or unite in an African bloc to support African interests, many of them became expert politicians and did not lose the support of their constituents. Although for a long time the French used administrative persuasion (and occasionally rigged elections) to obtain candidates favorable to themselves, they had no guarantee that the candidates would support French interests after election. Thus, by and large, many of the French elite have continued to hold the confidence of their people and are now in high office even after independence.

The British, on the other hand, preferred to nominate conservative Africans to their councils and later used the device of property and educational qualifications to ensure that the elected members would be conservative. When the Africans eventually obtained universal suffrage, all these men were regarded as stooges of the colonial power and, with very rare exceptions, were defeated in the elections. The British thereafter were compelled to work with popular Africans, many of whom had spent some time in jail for "sedition." The educated middle class for a long time to come would be excluded from the government, a loss which the African countries could ill afford.

The Belgians preferred to grant no political rights to either European immigrants or Africans, and to rule from Brussels through their governors-general. They did not encourage African students to study abroad, since they wished to wait until they were ready to give positions in government service to the graduates. When at last they opened two universities, it was too late. The tide of independence had caught them up before there was more than a handful of graduates, though the widespread

primary education provided by Belgian missions was responsible for a literary rate higher than any other in Africa.

The result of the educational and political work of the Europeans was the creation of a small elite class in both British and French countries, quantitatively larger but qualitatively weaker in British than in French territories. The British Africans had been shut off from social contact with their masters until they were close to independence, but they had acquired some experience in parliamentary institutions both in Britain and in Africa. These institutions exactly paralleled the British Parliament, not excluding the medieval ceremonial. The French had for many years granted the Africans complete social equality and admitted Africans to their own assemblies, so that the Africans freely chose, when given the opportunity, to write their own constitutions and to set up assemblies and similar procedures in their own countries. Whether either of these systems can long survive independence remains to be seen.

All the colonial powers in some measure endowed their charges with systems of justice similar to those obtaining in their own countries, though maintaining local African courts with African procedures in minor matters, subject to appeal to their own courts. But the British did not dare permit a jury system, nor did they grant anything similar to their own Bill of Rights to the Africans. They permitted themselves to detain without trial in times of emergency, and often enacted laws which gave very wide discretion to British magistrates. But British procedures and ceremonials were adopted, including the judges' wigs, and African barristers were encouraged to practice before the courts. The result has been that the ordinary uneducated African has no conception of what goes on when he is arraigned for trial and no confidence whatsoever in British justice, while the ceremonial remains totally alien to him; whereas the African professional lawyers greatly admire the system and wish to preserve it into the days of independence.

Much the same can be said about the systems of justice set up by the other colonial powers, though they lack the incomprehensible ceremonial of the British. There are far fewer French African lawyers, and no Belgian or



Meeting of the parliament of Ghana soon after independence. Note the British parliamentary symbols and insignia, including the Speaker's wig. Prime Minister Nkrumah is addressing the House, which is divided between the government side, opposite Nkrumah, and the Opposition, on the same side as Nkrumah. When Ghana became a republic in 1960, some of the British insignia, including the Queen's throne, disappeared. (COURTESY GHANA INFORMATION SERVICES)

Portuguese Africans have yet been trained for the law, except insofar as they studied it on their own initiative. There is thus no vested interest in these systems on the part of Africans themselves, and it is doubtful that they will be maintained long after independence. African customary law is, on the other hand, understood by every African, and in some countries codification is in progress. It seems likely that the European influence will in time be seen to have been ephemeral, and none of it may well survive.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION— INFLUENCE OF EUROPE ON AFRICA

It may therefore be said in summary that the Europeans exploited African labor unmercifully in the early years and more moderately in

recent times, when the concept of trusteeship took hold among the European administrators and it was recognized that they might wish to retain some good will on the part of the Africans after independence. They provided a more or less substantial infrastructure, which will remain to be used by the Africans in their own interests. They set up an educational system based on Western values and standards and using Western curriculums, which created a partially Westernized elite; and in recent years they set up technical colleges which will be of undoubted benefit to the Africans. They endowed their charges with Western political institutions and educated a small number in their use. Without doubt these institutions will be greatly modified, and it may well be that the one-party state will be the norm, since the delicate role of an official

Opposition is understood neither by the Government party nor by the Opposition itself. But the Africans, many of whom a century ago were technologically in the Stone Age, and whose society was traditional and conservative and unable to take its place in a world dominated by Western ideas, have been compelled, for good or ill, by European colonialism to take their place in this modern world. It cannot be denied that the colonial powers have spread little more than a veneer of Western civilization over these societies. If nothing else, they have taught their charges nationalism; and it may be that the Westernized leaders, with the immediate ideal of nationhood in front of them as well as the more distant ideal of a United States of Africa to work toward, will yet prove more than worthy pupils of their Western masters, who ruled them for too short a time to complete the revolution they started.

Suggestions for further reading


PAPERBACK BOOKS

- Adam, Thomas R. *Government and Politics in Africa South of the Sahara*. Random House. Excellent brief account of the situation in 1958; not concerned with earlier periods of colonialism.
- Adam, Thomas R. *Modern Colonialism: Institutions and Policies*. Random House. Very short, but useful as far as it goes, attempting comparisons between the different systems.
- Dean, Vera M. *The Nature of the Non-Western World*. NAL. A valuable general introduction to the subject of the non-European peoples and how they live.
- Goldberg, Harvey. *French Colonialism: Progress or Poverty*. Rinehart Source Problems. Short collection of primary materials.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal. *Toward Freedom*. Beacon.
- Richmond, Anthony H. *The Color Problem*. Penguin. A useful account of the human relations between whites and nonwhites in colonial countries.
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- Easton, Stewart C. *The Twilight of European Colonialism*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, Inc., 1960. A political analysis of the situation in early 1960, with factual material on the policies of the four major European colonial powers and the forms of government under which independence is being achieved.
- Fairbank, John K. *The United States and China*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948. A useful introductory account.
- Furnivall, John S. *Colonial Policy and Practice*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1948. A comparative study of Burma and the Netherlands East Indies, by a former British colonial administrator now permanently residing in independent Burma. By far the best study of colonial administration available.
- Hobson, John. *Imperialism: A Study*. 5th ed. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1952. The classic attack on imperialism.
- Langer, William. *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1935. The most thorough and detailed of all accounts of this period, objective and informative.
- Moon, Parker T. *Imperialism and World Politics*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926. Still useful on the period prior to the twentieth century.
- Power, Thomas F. *Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism*. New York, King's Crown Press, 1944. A valuable analysis of the reasons for this renaissance in the late nineteenth century, and why France considered colonies essential.
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- Strauss, William. *Joseph Chamberlain and the Theory of Imperialism*. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942. A competent appraisal.

CASEBOUND BOOKS

- Collis, Maurice. *Foreign Mud: Being an Account of the Opium Imbroglio in Canton in the 1830's and the Anglo-Chinese War that Fol-*

- Thornton, A. P. *The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959. On the whole, a sympathetic account. Mostly on the modern period.



United Nations Headquarters in New York. (COURTESY UNITED NATIONS)

VII ♦ THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The Epoch of World War I

❖ Underlying unsolved problems at the opening of the twentieth century

By 1914 the Western world had known more than forty years of peace. There had been no intra-European war between major nations since 1871, although there had been small brush-fire wars in the Balkans. Russia had attacked and defeated Turkey in the 1870's but had been compelled to restore the greater part of her conquests; in turn, Russia had been defeated by the Japanese in 1904-1905. But these minor conflagrations had not seemed likely to spread, and the influence of the major powers had been used to dictate the terms on which these wars were concluded.

Yet the peace had been an uneasy one. It was understood by all that there were numerous unsolved problems in Europe, which could at any time endanger the peace. The problems were being dealt with haphazardly, or their settlement was simply postponed in the vague hope that they would vanish. The consequences of failure to solve them were not as visible to the statesmen at the time as they are visible to the historian writing fifty years later. Few efforts were therefore made to grapple seriously with them on a long-term basis; nor were they understood by the peacemakers when the war was over. Our impression of the period is of the loss of initiative on the part of the major nations, a preoccupation with details, and the constant recourse to expedients rather than to policies. As each new crisis came up it was surmounted by whatever means were available and

at hand; but the underlying sickness of the Western world and its sovereign nation-states lay unperceived.

In this chapter, therefore, which deals with the whole epoch of World War I, we shall attempt first to describe the unsolved problems, and then to discuss the preliminaries to the war, the war itself, and the terms of the peace treaty. In the last section we shall return to the problems and consider how the war and the peace treaties contributed to the solution of the problems, in what way they aggravated them, and in what way they produced at least a partial solution. Since the problems to some degree remain with us today in the 1960's, they will naturally be touched upon again in the course of the remainder of the book.

THE UNLIMITED SOVEREIGNTY OF THE MODERN NATION-STATE

Europe, as we know, was an agglomeration of sovereign nation-states. They had come into existence at different times and with different historical antecedents; but all had been growing increasingly nationalistic in feeling, especially during the past century, and the ordinary citizen was increasingly inclined to identify himself with his nation. If his nation had, for instance, been compelled to accept a diplomatic rebuff, he himself felt aggrieved, and his own personal self-confidence was undermined to the degree to which he identified himself with his own nation.

Since the government of each nation re-

garded itself as completely sovereign, its sole business was to consult what it considered to be the national interest. Sometimes it might have to submit its policies to the scrutiny of its parliament; but most governments did not consult their parliaments unless they were compelled to do so. They did not often take their parliaments into consultation voluntarily, and even when they did, they could rely on the "patriotism" of the elected representatives not to criticize their policies too severely but to back them on patriotic grounds rather than exhibit a national disunity to foreigners. Thus the governments were allowed what was virtually a free hand in their diplomacy; and there was no effective way of preventing errors of judgments on the part of fallible individuals from resulting in consequences which had not been foreseen and which might be exceedingly dangerous for the country concerned.

This is not to suggest that the decisions made by an elected majority in a national parliament, after full public discussion on the basis of full information provided by the government, would necessarily have resulted in better judgments. The reverse is just as likely to be true, since, for political reasons, the elected representatives have to take public opinion into account; and this opinion may be inflamed by the sensational press, interested in selling newspapers and well aware of the ease with which patriotic emotions and xenophobia may be stimulated. But it remains true that in each country the possibility of involving the nation in war was in the hands of a very few individuals who could speak and act in the knowledge that the whole weight of their nation's resources and military might lay behind their words and actions. In that age of completely sovereign states, each with its own concept of its own national interests, with no institutional safeguards built into the system, no supranational forum to which appeal could be made for discussion and perhaps settlement of a dispute, it is clear that there would always be a danger of misjudgment and of taking a false step which might lead almost immediately to war. In looking back upon the war of 1914-1918 it now seems evident that it did not have to break out at that moment in the summer of

1914; the immediate disputes were not such as could be settled only by war. From the murder of the Austrian archduke Francis Ferdinand to the outbreak of general war there was an interval of less than six weeks. In those six weeks certain steps were taken which resulted in a general war that was desired by none of the governments involved, although each was prepared to undertake it if compelled by the pressure of events to do so. The failure of the collective wisdom and foresight of the responsible officials must always stand as an indictment of the system that permitted it, as well as of the individuals involved.


The second World War, on the other hand, could not possibly have been avoided, in view of the intention of one of the governments, the National Socialist government of Germany, to launch an invasion which could be stopped only by countervailing armed might; but, ironically, the Western peoples had learned from the first World War a horror of war and a conviction of its futility as a means of settling problems. Because they did not recognize that some wars settle some problems, some wars are inevitable and some not, and that sometimes in the present state of Western institutions wars truly cannot be avoided, they delayed too long in determining that this particular war of the 1930's and 1940's would have to be risked if it were not to be launched against them.

DISEQUILIBRIUM OF THE BALANCE OF POWER

In the Europe of the early 1900's there were a few major powers competent to wage war, as well as a number of minor powers whose assistance might be helpful in a general war but which could not launch a war on their own account. These minor powers could be coerced into keeping the peace by any single one of the major powers; if they refused to be coerced, they could be overwhelmed without difficulty. They were dangerous to the peace of the world only if they were allied to one of the greater powers. The aim of European statesmen for centuries had been to ensure that if their nations fought it would be with the aid of allies, and that as far as possible their allies would be stronger than those of the allied nation arrayed

against them, Britain alone, by long-standing policy, had kept out of continental alliances, but was prepared to cast her weight on the side of the weaker of the two groupings in order to prevent any group from dominating the Continent. When France was the strongest power on the Continent, Britain for centuries had always been on the other side. The other continental countries preferred to be in a state of constant readiness, with a full knowledge of who their allies would be if war should break out. The line-up of the continental powers within these alliances changed frequently; but, such as they were, at any one time they were defined by clear treaties of alliance—and in those far-off days treaties, both secret and open, were believed to be inviolable.

After the Franco-Prussian War and the unification of Germany, the balance of power in Europe was obviously changed. The new imperial Germany was the greatest power on the Continent, but it had not yet been decided by the other powers just what place she was to fill. France, shorn of her two provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, was far weaker than she had been for centuries. The seventeenth-century France of Louis XIV, who had been strong enough to fight for years without allies, was far in the past. If Britain would not join France in a definite alliance, then France had to ally herself with either Austria or Russia, or, of course, both. If France were allied with both, then Germany would not be strong enough to match this alliance, and in her isolated position



in central Europe would feel herself "encircled." But the alliance of Germany and Austria against France and Russia, with Britain standing aside to redress the balance when necessary, was a reasonably even balance at that period, the greater manpower of Russia being balanced by the industrial establishment and superior military training of Germany. Though such calculations assumed that Austria, a multi-racial empire with many dissident minorities, and Russia, a ramshackle empire seething with internal discontent, were as strong as they appeared to be, the balance of power in those years was not so far out of line as it was in the 1920's and 1930's, when the evident inferiority of one side was an actual incitement to war. As long as the national state remains, a balance of power is essential for the maintenance of peace, whether sanctified by formal alliances or not.

ECONOMIC NATIONALISM

More serious, but of far less immediate importance, was the problem of economic nationalism in an interdependent world. Some attention has already been given to this problem in Chapter 18. By the end of the nineteenth century each European economy save the British had established its system of tariffs behind which it attempted to build a heavy industry, whose products, though not competitive in world markets, could be sold at home. Such markets were thus automatically closed against imports from other countries, which were then compelled to seek markets elsewhere. In this international competition Germany was by far the most formidable competitor. In 1871 her industries were still relatively small; but for this very reason when she did begin to industrialize she had the benefits of all the latest inventions. Her machinery, unlike the British, was new, and her products at least as cheap as or cheaper than the British or French and of at least comparable quality. Moreover, knowing herself to be a competitor in markets long held by others, she made efforts, long unmatched by the British, to find out what was needed in foreign markets. Her commercial attachés in foreign capitals relayed business information to the German government; armies of salesmen were recruited

to inform foreigners what Germany had available, and offered to supply what was not yet produced. The British continued for too long to rely upon their reputation for reliability and did not change styles often enough to meet competition. Thus German exports were increasing rapidly; and though British trade also continued to increase in absolute figures, her percentage of world trade fell year by year.

On the other hand, Britain had an empire under her control; and although she did not close her markets to foreign imports, enough of the trade and credit facilities were in the hands of British nationals for it to be extremely difficult for any foreigner to intrude. The few German colonies provided slender opportunities for German trade, as they were some of the least developed territories in the world. Germany was therefore especially anxious to share in the trade of the semi-developed territories of North Africa, but found herself systematically excluded from both investment and trade in these countries. She therefore turned at last to Turkey and the Middle East, and obtained a contract to build a railroad from Berlin to Bagdad. Here she came up against entrenched British and even Russian interests, so that she and her rulers felt frustrated at every turn. She always found the older countries, which had been at the game longer, standing in her way, causing great resentment which prepared the ground for an eventual war. Conversely, Britain in particular resented the success of German enterprise, and may well have been not too unhappy to think that a war would destroy German industry and trade, since the superior British fleet would cut her off from all her recently acquired markets. Lastly it may be mentioned that international financiers were in a position to engage in activities which often went counter to the governmental policy of their countries, whose leaders, though ready to support the general interests of their citizens, were not prepared to endanger the peace by taking provocative action in the sole interests of a very small group of monied men. The differences between Britain and France in Egypt and between France and Italy in Tunisia, referred to in the last chapter, were primarily differences between financiers on both sides rather than

strictly intergovernmental quarrels. On the other hand there were at all times numbers of English businessmen and financiers who believed in reaching accommodations with Germany in a businesslike manner, and who viewed with alarm the deteriorating relations of the last few prewar years. Such men had no desire to see German trade and industry destroyed, but preferred to share by agreement in their prosperity.

None of these unresolved economic problems would in themselves have precipitated a war, nor did they do so. In so far as they contributed to the rise of competitive imperialism, they added to the general sense of insecurity and fear, even though it seems probable that the major powers would not have allowed themselves to be drawn into actual hostilities over their imperial aims; in so far as these economic problems made war seem desirable to certain influential interests in the major nations, they prepared the groundwork for the coming war, especially by the calculated manipulation of public opinion and the fanning of patriotic and nationalistic emotions.

THE SUCCESSOR STATES TO EUROPEAN TURKEY

Pan-Slavism The primary danger to the European system was the result of the presence in Europe of a declining empire and the ensuing quarrels among the states as to which should be the inheritors and in what proportion. The Turkish or Ottoman Empire, as was recorded in Chapter 17, was gradually being shorn of its European provinces. Greece, as we have seen, became independent in the early part of the nineteenth century; Serbia became autonomous shortly afterwards and fully independent in 1882 under a king. Other countries were created in the later years of the century. But the other European nations had divergent interests in the Balkan peninsula. On the one hand Russia wished to inherit the largest share and insure for herself an outlet to more open seas through the ancient Hellespont, called in modern times the Dardanelles. Her aim was above all to control and perhaps win for herself the Ottoman capital of Constantinople and throw the Straits open to Russian commerce without danger of interference by Turkey. On the other hand,

the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, which had within its territories many millions of Slavs, did not care to see so many Slavs independent to the south of the Hapsburg possessions. The Slavs in the empire were treated as inferiors, especially by the Magyar overlords of Hungary; a major Slavic state in the Balkans would undoubtedly exercise an attraction for the Austrian and Hungarian Slavic minorities. Austria, therefore, could have accepted with good grace a few peaceful and contented Slavic states to the south of her borders; what she could not endure was a vocal expansionist state, making pan-Slavic propaganda for Slavic unification. Yet this was what she found herself faced with after 1903 when a militant ruler, Peter I, became king of Serbia. Her policy was always directed thereafter to keeping Serbia as weak as possible. But Russia, the largest Slavic state, had constituted herself as a supporter of Serbia. Russia, therefore, was also a potential enemy, although Austria could never be certain whether Russia would actually give military support to Serbia if Serbia were attacked by her and taught a lesson. The European powers other than Austria much preferred keeping Turkey intact to allowing Russia to inherit any part of her or even win preponderant influence in the Balkans. For much of the century Britain and France, in particular, were willing to fight to prevent the Russians from extending their influence at the expense of Turkey. But it was impossible for democracies to give full support to such a monarch as the Turkish sultan Abdul Hamid, whose massacres of Bulgarians and Armenians shocked Europe. So in the last years of the century it was German influence that began to dominate in Turkey to the virtual exclusion of the other European nations. This meant that the other nations became more favorable to Russia; and since Russia at this time ceased to be a danger in the Balkans except to Austria it was possible for France to enter into a military alliance with her, which was eventually to bring her into the world war.

The Balkan question In the Balkans the nationalism of the new Slavic countries came up against the multinational empire of Austria; this nationalism was noisy and obstreperous and deeply offensive to the ancient and long-

civilized Hapsburg monarchy. It greatly irritated the Austrian rulers that such a country as Serbia should be their neighbor. They constantly complained of provocative words and acts, and were determined that the Serbs should be granted nothing to feed their national egoism. The Serbs, on the other hand, felt they had little to lose. Unaccustomed to the ways of European diplomacy and the civilities of discourse between European governments, they seemed unable to appreciate the danger of provoking a major power such as Austria; in any case pan-Slavism and Serbian nationalism were forces that could not be easily controlled by a new and young government. The Serbs were also had neighbors to the Bulgars, who obtained their independence from Turkey later than they. No one knew how large the eventual Bulgarian cut of the Turkish Empire would be. Boundaries were extremely fluid. Moreover, the Macedonians, who did not feel themselves to be Greeks, and certainly not Serbs or Bulgars, saw no reason why they should not have a state to themselves, while states were being created.

Interests of major powers in Balkans
Clearly such a situation was one that required a very careful diplomatic handling. If the great powers were to impose a lasting settlement, they would also have to enforce it; for none of the new states would voluntarily accept less than they hoped to win for themselves. But the great powers could not agree among themselves. German influence was strong in Turkey. Russia backed the Serbs, Austria wanted some territory for herself if only to stop it from falling into Serbian hands. Though there had been situations of almost comparable complexity and apparent intractability that had been settled among the major powers in recent European history, none had involved the new and heady wine of small-country nationalism; and it was the Balkans in fact that provided the spark that set off the general war—a war that was not localized and could not be localized because of the system of alliances and the loss of prestige that would have been suffered had the alliances not been honored. After the war the effort was made to settle the question of how many new national states should be created by calling into service the notion of "self-determination." But the settle-

ment created at least as many new problems as it solved. It was of course overthrown during the second World War, and is presently replaced by the new Russian imperial structure, which has permitted limited self-government to most of the post-1918 new states, and absorbed some of the remainder.

It was by no means only in the Balkans that the new nationalism found political expression in the demand for new national states. Ancient Poland was still divided between Germany and Russia. The Baltic peoples desired their own states, as of course, did the Slavic minorities in the Hapsburg dominions. Moreover, Italy was not satisfied with her boundaries of 1871 and wished to have Nice and Savoy, which had been granted to Napoleon III in exchange for his help in the wars of liberation, returned to her; she also claimed lands inhabited by Italians but still under the control of Austria (Trentino, Trieste, and Fiume). But none of these claims was urgent in 1914. The Turkish Empire was breaking up, and new states were in the process of being formed. The other claims were upon lands still securely held by great powers which obviously could not be dislodged without a major war.

❖ The approach of the war

BISMARCK'S TREATY SYSTEM

During the first nineteen years after the foundation of the German Empire, Prince Otto von Bismarck was in full control of German diplomacy. He had a very clear picture of what was necessary for German security, and made the greatest effort to establish alliances which would ensure that Germany would be neither isolated nor encircled. Obviously there would be a danger from France for many years to come, since the French had a long military tradition and would never forgive the rape of Alsace and Lorraine. It was therefore necessary always to keep France from risking war with Germany by depriving her of allies. The allies of worth would of course be the major powers—Britain, Austria, and Russia. Bismarck did not feel that the Italians were of much account, although Italian aid might be helpful if never decisive.

Chronological Chart

Proclamation of German Empire—Bismarck as imperial chancellor	1871
Formation of Three Emperors' League	1873
Russo-Turkish War	1877-1878
Treaty of San Stefano	1878
Congress of Berlin	1878
Austro-German alliance	1879
Three Emperors' League becomes formal alliance	1881
Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria, Italy)	1882
Russo-German Reinsurance Treaty (secret), replacing Three Emperors' Alliance	1887
Dismissal of Bismarck by Kaiser William II	1890
Military convention between France and Russia	1893-1894
William II's telegram to President Kruger	1896
Fashoda crisis between Britain and France	1898
Anglo-Japanese alliance	1902
Russo-Japanese War	1904-1905
Anglo-French entente (Entente Cordiale)	1904
Tangier crisis—William II's visit to Tangiers	1905
Algiciras Conference	1906
Anglo-Russian entente	1907
Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina	1908
Agadir incident	1911
Outbreak of war between Italy and Turkey	1911
First Balkan War (Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece versus Turkey)	1912-1913
Second Balkan War (Bulgaria versus Serbia and Greece, later Rumania and Turkey)	1913 (June-July)
Assassination of Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand	1914 (June 28)
Austrian 48-hour ultimatum to Serbia	(July 23)
Austrian declaration of war on Serbia	(July 28)
General mobilization of Russia	(July 29-30)
German 12-hour ultimatum to Russia	(July 31)
General mobilization by Austria	(July 31)
French and German mobilizations	(Aug. 1)
German declaration of war on Russia	(Aug. 1)
German declaration of war on France—invasion of Belgium	(Aug. 3)
British declaration of war on Germany	(Aug. 4)
Austrian declaration of war on Russia	(Aug. 6)
Serbian declaration of war on Germany	(Aug. 6)
Battles of Tannenberg and Masurian Lakes (German victories over Russia)	(Aug.-Sept.)
Battle of the Marne (furthest German advance before 1918)	(Sept. 5-Sept. 12)
Turkey enters war	(Nov.)
German announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare	1915 (Feb.)
Secret treaty of London between Italy and Allies	(Apr.)
Sinking of <i>Lusitania</i>	(May)
Italian declaration of war on Austria (on Germany, August 1916)	(May)
German assurance no liners to be sunk without warning	(Sept.)
Austro-German major invasion of Serbia—Bulgaria joins Central Powers	(Oct.)
Destruction of Serbian and Montenegrin states	(Nov.-Dec.)
Lloyd George becomes prime minister of Britain	(Dec.)

Battles of Verdun	1916 (Feb.-Dec.)
Naval Battle of Jutland	(May 31, June 1)
Battle of the Somme	(July-Nov.)
Rumania enters war	(Aug.)
Total defeat of Rumania by	1917 (Jan.)
German resumption of submarine warfare	(Jan.)
United States declaration of war against Germany— high point of success of submarine warfare	(Apr.)
Caporetto campaign—Austro-German defeat of Italians	(Oct.-Dec.)
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia	(Nov.)
Fourteen Points of President Wilson	1918 (Jan.)
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Germany and Russia	(Mar.)
Great German offensive in West	(Mar. 21)
Appointment of General Foch as supreme Allied commander	(Apr.)
Treaty of Bucharest between Germany and Rumania	(May)
Furthest German advance in West	(June 6)
Counterattack by Foch, including American troops	(July 18)
Declaration of Independence by Czechoslovakia	(Oct. 21)
Battle of Vittorio Veneto—victory of Italians over Austrians	(Oct. 24-Nov. 4)
Armistice between Allies and Austria-Hungary	(Nov. 3)
Proclamation of Republic of Poland	(Nov. 3)
Abdication of Kaiser William II	(Nov. 7)
Armistice between Allies and Germans	(Nov. 11)
Proclamation of Austrian Republic	(Nov. 13)
Proclamation of kingdom of Yugoslavia	(Nov. 24)
Beginning of Peace Conference in Paris	1919 (Jan. 18)
Signature of Versailles Treaty with Germans	(June 28)
Signature of Treaty of San Germain with Austria	(Sept. 10)
Signature of Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria	(Nov. 27)
Birth of League of Nations	1920 (Jan. 10)
Final rejection of Versailles Treaty by United States Senate	(Mar.)
Signature of Treaty of Trianon with Hungary	(June 4)
Signature of Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey	(Aug. 20)
United States congressional resolution declares war with Germany at an end	1921 (July)

Britain could be kept from joining with France by embroiling the two powers in competition for colonies, which were of minor interest to himself. Hence Bismarck's encouragement to France to engage in distant imperial adventures. He was also originally anxious not to provoke Britain by engaging in colonial competition or by building a navy. Austrian and German interests clashed little, now that Germany was united; and an enduring alliance was not too difficult to arrange (1879). Three years later, Italy, wishing to have diplomatic support in her intended colonial adventures in North Africa, and still resenting France's intervention in Tunisia, joined the two Teutonic powers, thus making the Triple Alliance. But this alignment was still unsatisfactory to Bismarck, who needed to neu-

tralize Russia. This was not so easy since Austrian and Russian interests clashed in the Balkans. A weak alliance known as the Three Emperors' League (Germany, Austria, and Russia) lapsed in 1887, but Bismarck was able to sign a separate Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, recognizing Russian interests in the Balkans. But Austria was not a party to this treaty, and obviously she might cause complications if hostilities broke out in the Balkans.

WELTPOLITIK OF KAISER WILLIAM II

While Bismarck was in power, French diplomats were unable to secure for France any worthwhile alliances. Obviously the one hope was Russia, whom the French cultivated. But

the French money invested in Russia and the frequent friendly visits did not bear any fruit until after William II became German kaiser and retired Bismarck two years afterwards (1890). William was determined to give Germany the "place in the sun" to which he felt her to be entitled. Thereafter Germany began to terrify all the European powers by her high-handed, often arrogant *Weltpolitik*, which was everywhere singularly unsuccessful. Bismarck in his later years of power had at least accepted the colonial territories won by Karl Peters in Africa, but had always shown himself ready to negotiate reasonable and friendly settlements, and had offered the facilities of Berlin in 1878 and 1885 for conferences. The kaiser, however, seemed to many to be mainly interested in "rattling his sabre," often contrary to Germany's apparent national interests. He began to build a navy, and to interfere actively in North Africa, thereby bringing Britain into European affairs from which Bismarck had managed to keep her. William abandoned the Russian alliance, such as it was, thus pushing Russia into the waiting arms of France. He sent a famous telegram to President Kruger of the Transvaal, congratulating him on his success in repelling a raid into his territories by a band of British South African adventurers.

Such deeds of derring-do finally persuaded the British, who had felt themselves seriously isolated during the Boer War, that it was necessary for them to have a friend in Europe who could be relied on to be on the opposite side from Germany in the event of a general war. Although they did not enter into a formal alliance with France, they entered into conversations and agreed upon solutions for all their outstanding problems, including spheres of influence in North Africa and the delimitation of boundaries in sub-Saharan Africa (*Entente Cordiale*, 1904). Thereafter France could always rely on British diplomatic support against the kaiser, and the latter in spite of his threatening gestures made no further progress.

MURDER OF ARCHDUKE FRANCIS FERDINAND

This, then, was the situation in Europe when the Balkan "powder keg" exploded. In

1908 Austria had annexed outright Bosnia and Herzegovina, two Turkish provinces that she had protected since 1878 and that the Serbs had hoped would some day fall to them. Two Balkan wars had already been fought in 1912 and 1913, but the frontiers of the new states were still unacceptable to the losers, and Austrian influence had shut off Serbia from access to the sea by creating the new state of Albania, which contained ports coveted by her. Arms manufacturers had for years been active in selling war materials to the different Balkan states, by playing on the fears each state had of the aggressive intentions of its neighbors. Numerous secret societies were active in the Balkans, most of them engaged in terrorism. Thus when Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian throne, and his wife visited the Bosnian capital of Serajevo and both were assassinated, it was not unnatural for the Austrians to decide to settle the question once and for all and put an end to the machinations and anti-Austrian propaganda of the Serbs. Although the murder was committed by a Serb living in Bosnia, it is true that the Serbian government was not directly responsible for the assassination. Nevertheless, the organization which was behind the murder (the Black Hand) appeared to have operated from Serbian territory, and at least one high Serbian official had known of the plot. It cannot be denied that anti-Austrianism had been inflamed for years in the country. The Austrians felt that if Serbia were not stopped, their own empire was in danger of being broken up by the clamoring Slavic minorities. They therefore took a strong line, dispatching an ultimatum to the Serbs, whose acceptance would have made Serbia virtually an Austrian protectorate.

Efforts to avoid general war The Serbs accepted all the demands but one. The Austrians, however, without even waiting for the ultimatum to expire and for possible second thoughts by the Serbs, invaded the country. Without doubt Austria hoped to localize the conflict, deal with the Serbs in a quick and decisive campaign, and then confront Europe with an accomplished fact. She had already been given a blank check by Germany, which promised to back her action in the Balkans. The decision for a local or a gen-

eral war therefore fell to the Russians, whose understanding with Serbia did not amount to an alliance which bound her to intervene in her favor in the particular circumstances. The Russian military leaders, however, were anxious for a war, and prevailed on the vacillating tsar to agree to mobilization. The German kaiser did not dare to leave his own army immobilized on the eastern frontier. Although he pleaded with Tsar Nicholas to rescind the order and the tsar momentarily agreed to do so, this turned out to be impossible. The Russian mobilization continued, and Germany had no option but to follow the Russian lead. She declared war on her August 1, 1914. France, intent on honoring her agreement with Russia, mobilized also, and Germany declared war on her on August 3.

Meanwhile, no one knew for certain what Britain would do. The Germans were not sure that she would join France. If they had known, it is possible that they would have refrained from their declaration of war on Russia and would have attempted to temporize. In fact, if the Germans did not know, they should have known that Britain could not possibly retain neutrality in view of her heavy moral commitments to France, which had already been translated into a division of naval responsibilities in different areas of the world; in any case it was certain that Britain would never have permitted Germany to conquer Belgium, whose guaranteed neutrality since 1839 was a constant of British foreign policy, and whose violation would upset the balance of power irrevocably. So when Germany, in pursuit of her strategic plan of attack on France, invaded Belgium, the British declared war. Italy did not regard herself as compelled by the Triple Alliance to join Germany and Austria, since the treaty was not operative if it involved war with Britain. In fact she entered the war on the Allied side the following year after negotiating a new agreement on advantageous terms, including promises of a share of Austrian and Turkish territories. Turkey joined Germany and Austria (known as the Central Powers) at once, choosing the side which was opposed to her major enemy, Russia. Not long afterward she was joined by Bulgaria, who wished to share in the spoils of Serbia. In the Far East, Japan declared war at once on Ger-

many, intending to take the German possessions in the Pacific and German concessions in China. It is probable that she also hoped that Holland would join the Central Powers, thus giving her an opportunity to seize the Dutch empire in the East.

♦ The war

ALIGNMENT OF POWERS

Thus the alignment of first- and second-class powers at war by 1915 was as follows: on the Allied side, Britain and the British dominions and colonies which were in 1914 considered automatically to be at war if the mother country were involved; France, Russia, Japan, Italy and Serbia; on the side of the Central Powers, Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria. In terms of simple manpower the Allies outnumbered the Central Powers by a little over 2 to 1, not including Japan, which fought only by sea. In troops mobilized the proportion was a little below 2 to 1. But the Allied preponderance was largely supplied by Russia, whose loyalty to the cause became increasingly doubtful as the war progressed, and most of whose troops had had little training. The German army was by far the largest and most effective single force on land, as the British navy was at sea.

FAILURE OF GERMAN DRIVE ON PARIS

The strategy of the German general staff was the same in 1914 as in 1870 and in 1940—to take Paris by a lightning breakthrough and if possible knock France out of the war before British strength could be mobilized. The British had only a small regular army of a few divisions available for operation on the Continent, and they clearly could not prevent the attack on Paris. But the Germans also had to face an attack from the east. When the Russian mobilization proceeded successfully and the Russians invaded Germany, the full strength of the German army could not be used against France. The margin of success might well have depended on the forces that had to be maintained in the east; and though the Russians suffered a costly



Types of German war prisoners in World War I. (BROWN BROTHERS)

defeat at Tannenberg before the end of August 1914, the German army in the west was not able to reach Paris, and the war on the western front settled down into an unending trench warfare which was extremely costly, since both sides in turn launched offensives which resulted in enormous casualties to both sides, but were indecisive. In 1918 when the Germans launched their last great offensive the lines held by both sides were not greatly different from those of 1914.

BLOCKADE AND COUNTERBLOCKADE

Since the war was evidently to be a long one, a premium was put upon the ability to wear down the other side by methods of attrition. Here the Allies had the advantage in that they had and kept command of the sea. The German fleet at the battle of Jutland, 1916, destroyed more British ships than it lost, but it was still unable to escape into the open and was thus

virtually useless—unlike the submarines, which could and did prey upon Allied neutral shipping but could not destroy the British fleet. In 1915 the British sent an expedition to the Dardanelles in the hopes of invading Europe through a defeated Turkey. But the attack was never pressed to a successful conclusion, in part because of divided Allied counsels. Aside from this costly failure and peripheral attacks on German colonies, the Germans and Austrians could not be attacked directly. Although the Allied navies blockaded Germany as best they could, the Central Powers were never brought close to defeat by the blockade; by the use of what amounted to military dictatorship, all German economic life was regimented, food rationed, industry converted to the needs of war, and substitute materials produced to take the place of what could no longer be imported. On the other hand, Germany made a punishing counterattack on Britain through the use of submarines. Britain



Krupp armament works at Essen, Germany, at the time of World War I. These works provided the war material that enabled Germany to fight for four years against superior numbers. (BROWN BROTHERS)

was highly vulnerable to blockade since she had to import so much of her food. But submarine attacks could not be pressed to their fullest in the early years of the war, since much of the food and raw materials imported by Britain was carried in neutral ships, and the United States complained bitterly that the seas were by previous international law declared to be free for the carriage of "noncontraband" goods for civilian consumption. The submarine commander, of course, had no knowledge of what a ship contained, and torpedoed whatever could be seen in his periscope. Nevertheless, after the sinking of the *Lusitania*, a passenger ship with more than a hundred Americans aboard, Germany abated her submarine attack in response to protests of the United States, whom she was at that time anxious to keep out of the war.

GERMAN SUCCESSES IN THE EAST

Instead she turned to military operations in the east, where a more mobile warfare was possible than in the west. She rolled up Eastern

Europe, knocking out Rumania, which had recently entered the war, and obtaining access to Rumanian oil supplies. In 1917 the Austrians, fortified by some German troops, defeated the Italians decisively at Caporetto, and in February of the same year the Russians began their revolution, which resulted first in the abdication of Tsar Nicholas and later in the Bolshhevik revolution which took Russia out of the war. It was clear at the beginning of 1917 that the Russian armies were crumbling from within in spite of occasional victories, especially against the Austrians; but it was also clear that the war could not be finished without a victory on the western front, and this seemed as far away as ever.

ENTRY OF UNITED STATES INTO THE WAR—DEFEAT OF GERMANY

In early 1917, therefore, Germany took the decision to return to unrestricted submarine warfare in the hope of beating Britain. Her leaders believed that it was now too late for the United States to intervene effectively in the west

with enough troops to turn the tide before a final western offensive could be launched by Germany; it was also not quite certain that the United States would do more than protest. The submarine warfare for a few months had such success that the British were reduced to dire straits. But the convoy, the answer to submarine warfare, was on the way, and came into operation later in the year. In April 1917 the United States entered the war. Thereafter for the Germans it was a question of time. Russia, as expected, left the war and made a separate peace in March 1918, thus freeing the entire German army for an assault in the west. This came in May 1918, but by this time there were contingents of American troops in Europe, fresh and ready to meet the German attack. More than three million Americans were in fact mobilized and trained before the end of the war. The Allies under a new commander-in-chief, Marshal Foch, held the Germans to small and inconsequential gains. When the attack had spent itself the Allies launched a counterattack which began to push the Germans back along the whole front. Before the retreat had reached the German border, the Germans sued for peace on the basis of Fourteen Points enunciated by President Woodrow Wilson of the United States, and an armistice was agreed to on November 11, 1918.

❖ The peace settlements

DIFFICULTY OF MAKING PEACE

The war-heated atmosphere During the course of the war every country had engaged in propaganda to build up the morale of its people and to persuade them that it was fighting a just and necessary war. Since in fact all the nations had been pushed into the war without any particular aims but to preserve the threatened status quo, their "war aims" had to be manufactured by the participants as the war was in progress and as certain ends began to appear desirable. These aims, as customary in wars, were not so satisfying to the belligerents as the feeling that the enemy was grasping, brutal, subhuman, and deserving of the utmost execration; whereas they themselves were fighting with clean hands in the interests of justice and morality and for the preservation of "civilization." Na-

tions whose populations had been subsisting on such a diet for more than four years were not in the most suitable mood for the drafting of a sane and just peace treaty.

Conflict between promises During the course of the war numerous promises had been made for the purpose of creating trouble for the enemy by sowing discontent in the armies, especially those of the multi-racial powers like Austria. The dissident Slavs in the Austrian Empire had been promised self-determination and independence; the Poles had been promised that their ancient nation would be restored with unspecified boundaries. The Turkish provinces had been promised their independence, including the Arabs who had revolted in the later stages of the war, and under British leadership had lopped off their territories from Turkey. A promise had even been made to the Zionist leaders of Jewry that they would be granted a national home in Palestine for their people—in spite of other promises made to the Arabs that Palestine would be an Arab state. Finally, the powers had entered into treaties with discontented lesser nations as inducements in persuading them to enter the war on the Allied side. Fortunately the Russian revolutionary government, which had been promised among other prizes the Turkish capital of Constantinople, had repudiated the treaty so that it did not have to be fulfilled. The new revolutionary Russian government had signed a separate treaty with Germany, and could therefore be left out of the peace conference. But Italy had been promised much Austrian and Hungarian territory, and Rumania had been granted slices of Turkey. These promissory notes had now fallen due with the defeat of the Central Powers. According to all previous conceptions of the sanctity of treaties, they should have been honored by the contracting powers. But many of them caused acute embarrassment to the signatories and filled the President of the United States with a pious horror.

THE FOURTEEN POINTS

For Wilson's aims were entirely different. He had seen the war as a great crusade to make the world "safe for democracy." It was to be a

war to "end war." There was to be an end to secret treaties and alliances, and all peoples were to have the right to decide their own destinies. In January 1918, Wilson had formulated fourteen points which, after discussion with the Allies, were accepted as the basis for peace when the war was won.

The first point called for the abolition of secret diplomacy—or in Wilsonian terminology, the acceptance of the formula of "open covenants openly arrived at"; the second, for the freedom of the seas in war or peace; the third, for equality of trade conditions; the fourth, for reduction of armaments; the fifth, for the adjustment of colonial claims in the interest of the nations. Points six through thirteen were concerned with the restoration of the political status quo for the Allied nations, and the creation of new states on the basis of nationality and the right to self-determination. The last point called for the establishment of a League of Nations. The British could not accept the freedom of the seas in time of war, since their ability to use their navy as a means for blockading the enemy was essential to the security of a maritime nation. The reference to freedom of the seas in wartime was therefore deleted. The French wished also to include German payment for war damage, but this was left for the peacemakers to decide and was not included in the Fourteen Points. The Fourteen Points then became the Allied "war aims."


CRITICISM OF THE FOURTEEN POINTS

The abstract general principles embodied in the first five points are of course unexceptionable in theory, but they had little relation to the realities of the situation either in 1918 or indeed at the conclusion of any other war in the history of nations. They were not concerned with the conditions that made peace possible so much as with the immediate causes of the recent war, as Wilson viewed them; and it may be argued that what he regarded as causes were simply symptoms of the underlying dislocations in European life. Wilson thought that secret alliances and secret diplomacy had been responsible for the war. It would seem that he did not give any careful thought to the alternative—that in an era of open diplomacy, when foreign policy was

discussed in the press, and on the street, there would be a constant tendency to oversimplify the issues for the benefit of the literate but not necessarily instructed masses. Statesmen might well be compelled by public opinion to strike attitudes rather than to negotiate seriously on issues vital to the national interest. Had the secret alliances really been instrumental in bringing about the war, or were they not attempts to rectify the disturbance in the balance of power resulting from the emergence of imperial Germany? Any informed man knew what were the alignments among the powers, and the secrecy of the details of the promises made in the treaties was surely unimportant. The only doubt in the minds of any of the great powers of 1914 was of the British intentions; but Britain did not go to war because of secret treaties. She went to war because her security was too greatly threatened by the advance of Germany and the danger to France.

In peacetime there was no problem about the freedom of the seas. In wartime certain powers, especially Britain, could not observe any restriction. Equality of trade conditions was a vague point and meant nothing unless it was spelled out. If it meant no trade discrimination against any nation in any circumstances, it is very doubtful if it could have been accepted. Reduction of armaments required an alternative security system which would make armaments unnecessary. No nation would keep armaments if it did not believe them necessary; if it did believe them necessary in the interests of national security, they must be retained. There is no hint in the Fourteen Points of any understanding of the essentials of national interests, which in a world of nation-states could not be simply forgotten. A responsible government in such a world *must* consider national interests; and in the Wilsonian scheme there were to be more nation-states than ever, each determined to survive, each trying to run a national economy, each afraid of being reabsorbed by one of the greater powers.

Wilson spoke for the idealism (and illusionism) of the world, which wanted to believe that the world had indeed been made "safe for democracy." When he visited Europe on a triumphal tour, he was received as the world's savior. Candles were burned for him by the



The Big Four at Versailles. Left to right, Lloyd George, British prime minister; Orlando, Italian prime minister; French Premier Clemenceau; and President Wilson. (BROWN BROTHERS)

pious, his name was on everyone's lips, his picture in every house. His eloquent words touched the hearts of the common men in every country, his high moral principles elevated them. He was known, as his country was known, for having no claims to make on the nations of Europe and the world (save for the repayment of debts incurred in winning the war). The United States wanted no territory and no compensation; her moral influence and the influence of her president were unequalled and beyond question. But the world was not as Wilson saw it; and it was not, as he sometimes implied, due to the iniquity of European statesmen that his views could not command their adherence and that the peace was far from the one he had envisaged when he crossed the Atlantic.

THE DICTATION OF THE PEACE TERMS

The peace was in fact dictated by the victors. Although the German army had persuaded

the kaiser to replace the military dictatorship of the war years with a democratically elected government, hoping to avoid the loss of prestige that it would incur by losing the war, the Allies were not mollified. Nor did the abdication of the kaiser himself help. The German democratic government was representative of the German people, but this fact, in the Allied view, did not entitle it to any special consideration. The German people were as guilty as the kaiser and the army, as had been drilled into Allied ears by four years of war propaganda. In this respect the Congress of Paris adopted a far different attitude from that adopted by the Congress of Vienna of 1815, when the victorious powers recognized that the new Bourbon government in France must be given some consideration if it were to be enabled to survive. In justification of the victors, it should be said that the German army had already dictated even more punitive terms in the two treaties signed with Russia and Rumania, so that it could be surmised what kind

of peace they would have imposed on the Allies if the latter had lost the war. Nevertheless, the peace terms dictated to the losers were far more severe than had been imposed on any other losers after any previous European war, even though no doubt they might have been more severe still, and would have been if the French had had their way. The German democratic government was compelled to sign the treaty, as Germany was still blockaded from the time of the armistice to the signing of the peace treaty. Neither Germany nor the other Central European nations who fought on her side was given any option; not a clause was altered by negotiation between the victors and the vanquished.

Under the treaty of Versailles, the Rhineland was demilitarized and was to be occupied by Allied troops for fifteen years. A corridor between western Germany and East Prussia was granted to the new state of Poland to give her access to the sea. The old German seaport of Danzig was put under international control under the League of Nations. Some territory was given to Belgium to "rectify" Belgian frontiers. Of course, Germany lost Alsace and Lorraine to France, and another German area, the Saar, was

given to the French to administer for a number of years. Upper Silesia, an industrial area developed by Germans who were responsible for its prosperity, went to the Poles after a disputed plebiscite. If a viable Poland were to be created these clauses were perhaps defensible, although they certainly created numerous new problems. A colossal indemnity was imposed that could in no circumstances be paid, although it was now called "reparations," and was supposed to be in payment of war damages inflicted by the Germans.

Now of course the Germans had inflicted war damage, as every nation does when it is at war. It may also be argued with some justification that the Germans had inflicted unnecessary war damage, especially during the retreat of the last months of the war. Reparations of some kind would therefore not have been improper for the Allies to demand; and it is possible that if some attempt had been made in 1919 to determine a reasonably equitable sum, and if the Germans had been permitted to negotiate with the victors on the figure, this particular part of the treaty might have been accepted by the losers. But as a kind of justification for the



demand for reparations, the Allies then laid the whole blame for the war upon the Germans and their allies. Undoubtedly Austria was guilty of having launched the first aggression against Serbia. But Germany was not responsible for this aggression. Perhaps she ought to have refused Austria her "blank check," and tried to exercise more restraint on her than she did. But without doubt the kaiser did attempt to prevent the war from becoming general, although his attempts came to nothing. The support of Austria was a matter of policy, perhaps unwise but hardly criminal in the circumstances. In any case, the German people found the so-called war guilt clause in the treaty of Versailles (Article 231) deeply humiliating and unjust, especially when it was lifted from its context in the treaty and magnified by German orators.

The German government, as it turned out, could find no responsible person to sign the treaty. Nevertheless, it had to be signed since Germany was to be under blockade until the treaty was agreed to. Eventually two unknown men agreed to sign it, and then they disappeared promptly from public life. It has been said that the odium for signing the treaty was fixed by later German propagandists so securely on the Social Democratic party that the latter never recovered its prestige, nor did it ever again win the number of votes it commanded at the first election. If this assertion is valid, then the peace-makers were far from free of responsibility for the rise of totalitarianism in Germany. In any case, it is not difficult to understand why the British in the 1930's felt so much sympathy for Hitler's attacks on the treaty that they did not feel able to defend it *à l'outrance*, in spite of their distaste for the scurrility of his language.

TREATIES WITH THE OTHER CENTRAL POWERS

The treaties with Austria and Hungary reduced Austria to a small state consisting only of German-speaking Austria, and not all of that, for the new state of Czechoslovakia contained an important German-speaking minority, the Sudeten Germans, who were to provide Hitler with an opportunity to humiliate the British and French at Munich in 1938. Hungary like-

wise was reduced to a small Magyar-speaking "kingdom," her eastern provinces going to Rumania and her southern to the new state of Yugoslavia. Most of the inhabitants of the eastern provinces (Transylvania) were indeed Rumanian, so that the transfer was proper under the principle of self-determination. But in addition, because Rumania had been on the victorious side during the war, she was enlarged by the addition of Bessarabia from Russia, few of whose inhabitants were Rumanian. The new Slavic state of Yugoslavia, built around the nucleus of Serbia, was created out of the Austro-Hungarian southern provinces; it was ruled by a Serbian monarch and dominated largely by the Serbs, who were of a different language and religion from the Croats, taken from the old Hungary. Bulgaria, on the side of the Central Powers, was greatly reduced in size, part going to Yugoslavia, part to Greece, which had also participated in the war on the Allied side. Turkey was left with only Istanbul (the former Constantinople) in Europe and a small European hinterland, eastern Thrace being taken by Greece. Eastern Poland and three new Baltic states were taken from Russia—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The former Russian duchy of Finland became independent. The Russians were not consulted on the settlement, but at the time they were in no position to prevent it. Italy was granted most of what she had been promised at the Treaty of London in 1915, but was dissatisfied that she did not win it all. Soon afterward she took some more by unilateral action and was allowed to keep it.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE TREATY

New minority problems President Wilson had had little option but to accept these settlements, even when he felt them to be the result of predatory European impulses; but his influence was important in the decision to create new nations which the Europeans, left to themselves, would certainly not have made in such numbers. The Wilsonian principle of self-determination clearly implied the creation of such new, and as it proved, ephemeral national entities as Estonia and Latvia. Difficulty arose from the fact that few of the new nations could be homogeneous

in the existing conditions of the European population. In most of the states, as we shall see, a new minority problem was created; and these minorities were as a rule far more disaffected toward the new state than they had been to the old established Hapsburg empire, to which the peoples, with the exception of those dominated by the Hungarian feudal nobility, had grown accustomed, if not wholly resigned. With few exceptions the new states had a degree of culture or experience in no way comparable with those of old Austria; and though some earnest attempts were made by the new rulers to deal equitably with their minorities, the latter could not be expected to be loyal to their new state, and it was thus safer to keep key positions in the hands of the ruling majority. The problem was never solved during the period between the wars, and a gifted demagogue like Hitler had little difficulty in arousing their animosity against their rulers and magnifying their grievances.

Lack of viability of the new states of Austria and Hungary Not only were Austria and Hungary reduced to military impotence, but the two imperial capitals of Vienna and Budapest were monstrosities as capitals of two such truncated national entities. Vienna had almost one third of the whole population of new Austria. It is not surprising that it was the failure of an Austrian bank that triggered the Great Depression, or that Vienna was the scene of the first foreign adventure of the Germany of Adolf Hitler. Hungary was largely an agricultural country, in spite of Budapest, and could have had a stable regime if she had adjusted herself promptly to her new station in life, and if the aristocratic landowners in the country had been willing to permit a social revolution. But the Allies did nothing to make Hungary into a less feudal regime than she was, and she continued to be ruled by the aristocratic landlords as before. Possibly both Austria and Hungary could have survived as fairly viable economic entities in spite of their loss of territory. But for Austria, in particular, it was extremely difficult, and the first requisite was acceptance of her new humble position in Europe. Such an adjustment could hardly be expected after such a sudden fall from grandeur, especially when the former adminis-

trative and professional classes in Vienna found that there was suddenly no longer a demand for their services.

WILSON AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Wilson was willing to make many concessions to win agreement to his most cherished proposal, the League of Nations. Discussion of its constitution and working will be postponed to Chapter 24, but it should be noted here that the primary purpose of the League was to bring all the nations, great and small, together to guarantee the peace. Though this was its purpose, and in small disputes not involving great powers it had some successes, the unspoken assumption was that the existing status of the nations of Europe, including all the new and untried ones, should be guaranteed permanence by the League, since aggression by any state was outlawed and subjected to sanctions, economic and military. There was no provision for peaceful change without agreement by both parties. If any nation refused to agree to change, its opponent could not compel it by the well-tried processes of centuries without bringing down upon itself the whole weight of the League and its sanctions. This was to freeze a momentary status, decided in many cases by unequal bargaining and resented by the loser, into a permanent mold. The Congress of Vienna of 1815 and the United Nations of 1945 found themselves in the same predicament, as do all bodies which attempt to enforce peace by making war on aggressors. For history does not stand still, whatever the peacemakers may wish.

It should be added that the United States Senate, in spite of the efforts and pleas of President Wilson, did not ratify the treaty of Versailles, which contained the clause regarding the League of Nations; nor did the United States join the League, preferring to sign a separate peace with Germany. The majority of the Senate believed that the people of the United States were not yet ready to undertake European commitments, and in particular many of its leaders felt that the peace treaties would lead to intervention by the United States to preserve the rearrangement of the map of Europe, about which they had many misgivings. They believed that the

United States could exercise a greater influence by preserving her freedom to take action in specific cases rather than by committing herself automatically to such action by treaty. The argument that the presence of the United States was essential for the proper functioning of the League, and that her refusal to join would deprive Europe of her counsels and moderating influence, did not at that time weigh as heavily with the Senate majority as the fear of automatic commitment to action in European affairs; and what chance there might have been of ratification was not aided by the tactlessness and uncompromising attitude adopted by President Wilson in his relations with senatorial leaders.

RELEVANCE OF TREATIES TO EUROPEAN PROBLEMS

"Collective security" versus balance of power

It is now time to return to the problems requiring solution in prewar Europe, outlined in the early part of this chapter, and to consider the question of how the war and the peace treaties aided in their solution. The balance of power in Europe was changed by the elimination of Germany from the rank of the world powers. Germany was forbidden to rearm or to institute conscription. Austria and Hungary had likewise been eliminated by partitioning the old empire and replacing it with smaller states, none of which could hope to become major powers. Czechoslovakia and Poland were the only new states with much industrial potential; but at most they would be valuable as allies of a major power. Russia was in the throes of a revolution, and could for the moment be counted out. Britain and France were therefore left as the only powers with any war potential, with Italy a poor third. Thus there was no balance of power left at all.

The entire military force of Europe was in the hands of the winners. The peacemakers, in fact, had decided to abandon the concept of the balance of power, preferring to institute "collective security" through the League of Nations. But the whole system was predicated upon the assumption that the greatest industrial power on

the continent of Europe could be kept permanently disarmed, in spite of the fact that she still had her industrial establishment virtually untouched, and on the assumption that the new Soviet Russia could be disregarded. While France paid lip-service to the prevalent notion that there would in future be no balance of power system, she nevertheless did not fully trust the alternative arrangements. As soon as possible she therefore negotiated alliances with the small powers of Czechoslovakia and Poland, and later with Soviet Russia, thus bringing all the significant military potential of Europe into her orbit.

Germany, in spite of the prohibition on her rearmament, evaded the rearmament clauses of the treaty as much as she could during the 1920's. After the advent of Hitler to power she rearmed openly. Although France was willing to take action to prevent it, the British would not back her efforts. Thereafter Germany set about creating a new balance of power system in her own favor. Italy, and later Japan, came into her orbit. Finally she signed a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union—in the best nineteenth-century manner, seducing in this way a partner from the opposing alliance. Indeed, this gave the German-dominated group an overwhelming military preponderance over the old allies who had not paid similar attention to their own preparedness. The result was that France was defeated and Britain besieged, a predicament from which they were rescued only by the German invasion of Russia and the entry of the United States into the war. The United States and Russia proved able in concert to turn the tide, since they commanded far greater forces than were available to the Axis. After World War II, the system of alliances was revived, and a reasonable balance was struck, in spite of the security system of the United Nations. But for a short time between the two world wars the illusion was held that the balance of power system was outmoded, and for this period it was thought that the nations of the world would live peacefully forever after. This illusion may not be unconnected with the fact that the period between the two wars was shorter than between any other major wars in history.

Economic dislocation—Reparations and war debts The war broke up the Austrian Empire and put an end to the already partly partitioned Turkish Empire. Both these territories had been large free-trade areas. The new nations, each starting from scratch, had to try to build up viable economies; all wished in some measure to industrialize. Pitted against the economies of the exporting industrial nations, these new fragile national economies could not survive without tariffs. All were chronically short of capital, and all were compelled to restrict imports. This made difficulties for the exporting nations, although there was a backlog of unsatisfied demand for goods, as a result of the war; and in some countries, especially in France, there was much physical damage to repair. Furthermore, the United States had come of age as an industrial power, and desired to export, while importing as few goods as possible. None of the impediments to trade that had existed before the war had been removed. With so many new nations in the new Europe and with the disappearance of the empires, there were smaller areas now available for free trading. Austria and Hungary had tariffs against one another on agricultural and industrial goods; Czechoslovakia had tariffs against them both. The victorious powers forbade a customs union between even Germany and Austria, lest it lead to a political union.

Germany, it will be recalled, was made to pay reparations. These reparations were originally set at an impossibly high figure; but even when they had been scaled down by later agreements, it was possible to pay any sum only by the shipment of goods abroad, once the reserves of bullion had been expended. During the period of reconstruction France was willing to accept some payments in kind, especially of coal from the Ruhr district of western Germany; but at other times she demanded payment in money. Britain at the end of the war was a creditor to her allies, but a debtor to the United States. She therefore proposed that all debts should be canceled. On the refusal of the United States to come to any such agreement, Britain nevertheless declared that debts to her should be paid only in the amounts she had herself to pay back to the United States. This, however, meant that

France, Belgium, and other countries had to pay at least a proportion of the sums they had borrowed from Britain as well as what they had borrowed from the United States. They looked to Germany to provide such sums from reparations.

Germany had, of course, no desire to pay any reparations at all. She had not agreed freely to pay them, and the new German government made no effort to adjust the tax structure of the country to enable it to pay any sums abroad. The tax structure had been inequitable under the German Empire, and it was little improved in the postwar years. Nevertheless, it is true that even if she had possessed the will to pay, the treaty had placed her in an impossible position. She was unable to earn from exports a sum even remotely approaching the amount required to be paid by her as reparations. The markets were simply not available to her, in part because of the restrictions laid down by the new nations on all imports, and in part because Germany had so recently been their enemy. Ultimately, after Germany had undergone a disastrous inflation, the reparations were scaled down; thereafter the United States began to regard Germany as a suitable field for her investments, and most of the foreign currency paid as reparations was supplied by the United States, and ultimately returned to her. When the investments ceased in the Great Depression, Germany refused to pay any more. For a short time Britain made token payments to the United States, and even these then ceased. Only Finland continued to pay her small contribution, thus earning great credit in the United States and exempting her alone from the provisions of the United States Act of Congress, which compelled all debtor nations to pay cash for their armaments, with which to meet the Hitler menace during the last years before World War II.

It will be clear from the account above that the world trading conditions were hardly improved by the war or by the peace. For a time Britain was relieved of German competition until German industry began to revive in the mid-1920's under the impact of foreign investment. During the early years after the war the former German export markets turned to Brit-

ish, French, and United States products; but it was only a temporary surcease. There was no effort to create new areas of wide free trade to replace the old areas; there were more artificial trade barriers in the new Europe than in the old. The United States was a great new competitor in the shrinking world markets, and the United States did not fully appreciate her position as a creditor nation, as Britain had done in the nineteenth century. The United States herself was a large producer of food and raw

materials, and therefore, like China before the nineteenth century, needed relatively little from abroad; she also increased her tariffs in order to minimize any industrial competition from abroad. Added to the fact that she required payments for goods that had been long ago unproductively expended, and therefore represented no current source of income, there is no mystery about the dollar shortage that has existed ever since World War I. The only economic alternative, since she had no immediate war to prepare



for, was to invest money abroad and receive back again at least some of it as payment for war debts.

Problems posed by the new nations But even if the security system of the League was no substitute for alliances, and the economic conditions in Europe were in no way improved, surely on the credit side should be placed the creation of new nations—free, self-governing, self-respecting nations—liberated from their imperial servitude. Here it is necessary to make distinctions between some nations which achieved remarkable success in their new status, even though they were not permitted to enjoy their independence for very long, and those nations which were far from homogeneous, possessed many minorities, and proved unable to solve their minority problems within the new framework. The small Baltic countries of Finland, Estonia and Latvia, after great difficulties, established their new states on a satisfactory basis. Land reforms were instituted and peasant proprietorship became the firm basis of their economies. The governments were democratic in form and substance; and there can be little doubt that all three countries would have survived as small free states if the Russians had not incorporated Estonia and Latvia into the Soviet Union by force. Finland was saved by her geographical situation and by her determined resistance to the Russian armies in 1940; she had to submit to the loss of some territory to the Soviet Union and thereafter to accommodate some of her policies to the desires of the Soviet government. But she remained a democracy of the Scandinavian type. Estonia and Latvia, hard hit by the Depression, and to some degree influenced by Germany, abandoned parliamentary democracy in 1934 and established strong executive governments under relatively benevolent dictators. Under this rule they were both well on the way to recovery from the Depression by the time of the second World War. The restoration of democracy had already been promised for Estonia. It is certainly significant that these three countries were racially and linguistically almost homogeneous.

The other Baltic country, Lithuania, was unable to establish a democracy on a firm basis,

She was ruled by strong men from 1926 to the end of her independence, and was plagued first by interference from Poland, who captured and incorporated Vilna, her capital, into Poland, while she herself took Memel, formerly part of East Prussia, but internationalized, like Danzig, by the treaty of Versailles. Although this small country enjoyed some economic prosperity between the two wars, the uncertainty about her frontiers and her disputes with Poland were due to the impossibility of applying the principle of self-determination strictly to the new nation. Any solution was bound to be arbitrary; and there would always be a dissident minority of non-Lithuanians. It was impossible to unscramble the Polish and Lithuanian peoples to the satisfaction of all—to assign the Poles to Poland, and the Lithuanians to the new and tiny Lithuania.

Poland had many minorities—Jews, Hungarians, Austrians and Germans. It was scarcely less of a multi-racial empire than the old Austria-Hungary. The German and Russian overlords had gone, but the old feudal class of Poland, the landowners and army officers, remained the true masters of the country. Though attempts were made to improve the social and economic structure, they amounted to little. The country was ruled between the two wars either by a dictator or by a clique of army officers. The minorities undoubtedly had fewer rights and were treated with less consideration than the minorities of the old Austrian empire. It was the presence of the German minority especially that gave Hitler a chance to interfere in the affairs of the country, and in due time provided the occasion for his military intervention, followed by a new partition in which Germany and Russia shared the spoils.

Czechoslovakia, inheriting many of the most advanced areas of the former Austria, and much of Austrian industry, was able to build a flourishing economy, which was able to survive even the Great Depression without a substantial impairment of the functioning democratic institutions. But Czechoslovakia had, as noted already, its Sudeten-German minority as well as Slovak and Ruthenian minorities. The Czechs remained the leading people, and largely controlled the government; they also staffed the higher admin-

istrative positions. It was not too difficult for the Germans to promote secessionist movements not only among the Sudeten Germans but among the Slovaks. Nevertheless, it seems true that the Czechoslovakian state, in part by reason of its viable economy, was the most successful of the multi-racial states created by the peace treaties; and the supposed ill treatment of the minorities, claimed by the Germans as a reason for intervention on their behalf, was almost entirely a myth. In so far as there was any basis of truth in the German charge of discrimination within the state in favor of the Czechs, the discriminatory policy was forced on the government because it could not rely on the loyalty of the minorities to the new state.

Yugoslavia was in many respects similar to Czechoslovakia in that it contained several minorities and was ruled largely by the predominant Serbs. But the resemblance stops there. Though some agrarian reforms were carried out, industry was embryonic, and the government was always authoritarian. Rumania likewise possessed dissident minorities, and the government was always carried on by either a minority party dictatorship, or by one-man strong-armed rule. Some democratic forms were observed in both countries, but neither can be regarded as a democratic country any more than Bulgaria. It cannot be said that any of these countries showed signs of becoming effective new nations, accepted by all their inhabitants, administering growing economies, or making themselves capable of survival in a westernized Europe. It must also be doubted whether any of them, with the possible exception of Yugoslavia, were in any important sense freer, more secure, or more self-respecting as nations than they would have been if they had been granted a limited self-government in a genuinely multi-racial state, in which their voice would have been heard but in which no linguistic or racial group would have been in a position to dominate the others.

Seeds for future wars Even if it be granted that the experiment in self-determination as a solution for the problems of Europe was worth trying, it cannot be denied that in the settlement was the seed for future wars. The German and Hungarian propaganda, which strove to accentu-

ate the dissatisfaction of racial minorities, fell on fruitful ground in many countries; but it did not create the problem, however much it exaggerated it. Democratic government, set up, however briefly, by all the new nations, demonstrated quickly the enormous difficulty of such a form of government, especially when there had been no experience of previous self-government. All the new governments needed in fact strong executives, capable of handling the numerous difficulties encountered in the setting up of a new nation. It was not found feasible to obtain these strong executives through democratic and parliamentary means. The emphasis given to the setting up of democratic governments by the peacemakers therefore appears to be one more instance of failure to understand the conditions confronting them in 1919.

SUMMARY

Failure to achieve conditions for prolonged peace To sum up, therefore, it may be said that the peacemakers were plagued by illusionism, fostered especially by President Wilson; by a failure to appreciate the causes of the war and thus a failure to grapple with the real problems which needed solution; by a preoccupation with political solutions to the exclusion of attempts to solve the more deep-seated economic dislocations caused by the still growing Industrial Revolution, and its spread to the less developed countries in Europe. They took the easy way in fostering the nationalism of small peoples without making any provision for, or giving any encouragement to, movements looking to wider economic union. But above all, they did not see that for the winning of a lasting peace, conditions in which peace is likely and desirable must be established; and it made that peace even more improbable by assuming that the temporary conditions of the period immediately following a victorious war could be made permanent by artificial means.

At the end of World War II it was still thought that the defeated enemy could be kept impotent by similar means; but the lesson was learned more quickly than after World War I, when, before long, Germany and Japan were being strengthened as allies of one half of the

victorious alliance against the other half. A large economic and political union was made, against the will of one half of the alliance. Nationalism was suppressed by force in all the new nations created after World War I save only Finland, which had settled down into the comity of the West, and Yugoslavia, which escaped from the thrall of the Soviet Union under an authoritarian and communistic government. But meanwhile the nations of the West were moving toward economic unity among themselves by different paths; and the idea of limited political sovereignty was gaining ground in Europe.

Comparison and contrast with Congress of Vienna If we look back to the Congress of Vienna in 1815, we may see that the arrangements made by that Congress for maintaining peace and limiting war worked fairly well for a limited period. They were well conceived simply as a method of policing the peace, but they did not take account of changing conditions in Europe; nor did the peacemakers have any understanding of liberalism and nationalism, which were to dominate nineteenth century politics. At the Congress of Paris in 1919, the right of all peoples to have separate nations of their own was taken for granted, and democratic liberalism was encouraged as obviously the most successful form of government, since the victorious powers were ruled under democratic systems. Provision for keeping the peace was placed in the hands of the victorious powers, with the concurrence of minor nations who at most could make token contributions. What the peacemakers did not see was that through the Industrial Revolution the world had now become economically interdependent, and full nationalism was no longer possible without disrupting the free exchange of goods and the distribution of the plenty made possible by the Industrial Revolution; nor did they see that the social revolution made necessary by the economic advances could not be carried out in politically backward countries through democratic governments derived from Western experience.

Finally, unlike the Congress of Vienna, they did not recognize that to make the peace acceptable to the defeated enemy some concession should be made, and the enemy should take

some part in the peace negotiations. On the contrary, the victors preferred to impose a huge indemnity that made economic recovery impossible and would therefore be repudiated at the earliest feasible opportunity; they compelled the enemy alone to confess to a guilt which was, at least in part, shared by the victors. If Europe and the world had to endure the regime of Adolf Hitler, some of the responsibility rests with the peacemakers at Paris; in this at least they lacked the sense of reality that informed the men of Vienna—and it may be remembered that it was not the defeated France that disturbed the peace of Europe in the half-century that followed the Congress of Vienna.

Suggestions for further reading

PAPERBACK BOOKS

- Farmer, Frances, ed. *The Wilson Reader*. Oceana. Selections from the speeches and writings of the wartime president.
- Graves, Robert. *Goodbye to All That*. Anchor. One of the best English personal accounts of World War I by a man who became a renowned poet and scholar.
- Remarque, Erich Maria. *All Quiet on the Western Front*. Crest. Famous German realistic novel of the war.
- Snyder, L. L. *The World in the Twentieth Century* (Anvil) and *Fifty Major Documents of the Twentieth Century* (Anvil).

CASEBOUND BOOKS

- Bailey, Thomas A. *Wilson and the Peacemakers*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947. Serious effort to discover what went wrong with the peacemaking. Severe, but not unduly so, on Wilson, and fair to Lodge, but not to the extent of saying that he was right. Valuable as corrective to the popular idea of Wilson as hero and Lodge as villain.
- Churchill, Winston S. *The World Crisis*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1923-1929. 5 vols. Although long and detailed, its verve and vitality make it much easier reading than other less well written works. Churchill, however, should never be read by himself, as his opinions are strong and always disputed by many.
- Cobban, Alfred. *National Self-Determination*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945. Useful

- discussion of the European settlement and the new nations.
- Crutwell, Charles. *A History of the Great War, 1914-1918*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1934.
- Dos Passos, John. *U. S. A.* New York: Modern Library, n.d. Impressionistic stream-of-consciousness novel which succeeds very well in conveying the impact of the war on many Americans.
- Fay, Sidney B. *Origins of the World War*. 2d ed. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1943. Still the most comprehensive and objective study of the long-range as well as the immediate causes.
- Gathorne-Hardy, Geoffrey. *The Fourteen Points and the Treaty of Versailles*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1940.
- Hemingway, Ernest. *A Farewell to Arms*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953. The best, or almost the best, of American novels on World War I. Especially successful in its creation of atmosphere.
- Keynes, John Maynard. *The Economic Consequence of the Peace*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1920. Famous and influential book by a participant at the Peace Conference, attacking the peace for its neglect of economic factors and the excessive reparations demanded. See also Mantoux.
- Liddell Hart, Basil H. *The War in Outline, 1914-1918*. London: Faber & Faber, Ltd., 1938. The most convenient study, by a well-known British military expert.
- Mantoux, Etienne. *The Carthaginian Peace; or, The Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952. An all-out attack on Keynes' view of the Versailles Treaty, and the effects of the too-general acceptance of this view.
- Nicolson, Harold. *Peacemaking, 1919*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1939. Performs the same kind of service for the Versailles Treaty as for Congress of Vienna, but Nicolson was a young man in 1919, and present at this conference. Good first-hand description.
- Sontag, Raymond. *European Diplomatic History, 1871-1932*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1933. Excellent relatively short account, perhaps the best available for the general reader.
- Walters, F. P. *A History of the League of Nations*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1952. 2 vols. Fullest and most comprehensive account.

The Rise of Twentieth-Century Totalitarianism

❖ The Long Armistice—Competition between democracy and totalitarianism

The next two chapters cover the period between the two world wars. This period is in a sense a unity, a time often known as the Long Armistice, during which the nations of the world strove in their different ways to solve the new problems of the industrial age within their inherited political framework. The first half of the period was marked by an evanescent and uneven prosperity, and the second was dominated by a world-wide economic crisis known as the Great Depression. The Depression affected profoundly every nation except the new Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR), which was struggling with its internal problems and had by its own choice kept itself aloof from the world economy. As mentioned in the last chapter, none of the new nations save Czechoslovakia was able to retain its democratic institutions, and the old established democracies weathered the Depression only with great difficulty. France, whose democratic institutions were the least securely founded, modified her democracy to meet the crisis before the second World War. The other democratic nations were strong enough to survive at the cost of several internal crises, but their economies did not recover until the war—which strained all their resources but was at least able to supply the market for industrial goods that was not available in peacetime.

Until World War I the democracies ap-

peared to represent the "wave of the future." After the war, as we have seen, all new countries adopted a democratic form of government, since it appeared to have demonstrated its superiority in the war. The democracies had led the way in the imperialist expansion of Europe in the nineteenth century and introduced the world to industrialism and the material benefits of the capitalistic system. From the time of the Great Depression, however, the democracies have been on the defensive. Their capitalistic system did not emerge too well from the Depression, and few nations believed any longer that a system of untrammelled free enterprise would solve their problems. Moreover, severe competition was now to be provided for them by a different kind of system best called totalitarianism, under which a strong government planned the economy and attempted to do all those things which were done in democratic countries by free enterprise—the latter a rather relative term since in most countries the state exercised some degree of influence and control over the economy and at the very least attempted to compensate for some of its inequities.

The Soviet Union in due course was to emerge as the focus of attraction for those who were dissatisfied with the capitalistic system of the democracies. But in the inter-war period, she was involved in so many internal difficulties that she exercised little influence abroad; and it was not as yet known for certain whether her system would work. Only a relatively few individuals in the democratic countries believed in the superiority of the Soviet system during

Chronological Chart

Russo-Japanese War	1904-1905
Bloody Sunday in St. Petersburg	1905 (Jan. 23)
October manifesto of Tsar Nicholas	(Oct. 30)
Workers' insurrection in St. Petersburg	(Dec. 22-Jan. 1)
Meeting of first Duma	1906 (May)
Agrarian reform of Stolypin	(Nov.)
Second Duma	1907 (Mar.-June)
Third Duma (severely restricted franchise)	1907-1912
Assassination of Stolypin	1911
Fourth Duma	1912-1916
German declaration of war on Russia	1914 (Aug. 1)
Assumption of supreme command by tsar—influence of Rasputin	1915 (Sept.)
Assassination of Rasputin	1916 (Dec.)
Provisional government of Prince Lvov	1917 (Mar. 12)
Abdication of Tsar Nicholas	(Mar. 15)
Arrival of Lenin in Petrograd	(Apr. 16)
Failure of Bolshevik coup—escape of Lenin	(July 16-18)
Kerensky becomes Russian prime minister	(July 20)
Kornilov counterrevolution	(Sept. 9-14)
Bolshevik Revolution	(Nov. 16)
Dispersal of constituent assembly in Petrograd	(Nov. 25)
Period of War Communism in Russia	1917-1921
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk	1918 (Mar. 3)
Civil war and Allied intervention in Russia	1918-1920
Murder of Tsar Nicholas and family	1918 (July 16)
Abdication of Kaiser William II—proclamation of German Republic	(Nov. 9)
Formation of German government of Socialists and Independents	(Nov. 10)
Armistice between Germans and Allies	(Nov. 11)
Meeting of first National Assembly at Weimar	1919 (Feb. 6)
Signing of peace treaty at Versailles	(June 28)
Lifting of Allied blockade of Germany	(July 12)
Seizure of Fiume by D'Annunzio	(Sept. 12)
Failure of Kapp Putsch in Germany	1920 (Mar.)
Russian War with Poland	(Apr.-Sept.)
D'Annunzio forced out of Fiume by Italian government	(Dec.)
Mutiny of Russian sailors at Kronstadt	1921 (Feb.-Mar.)
New Economic Policy in Russia	1921-1927
Fall of Giolitti government in Italy	(June)
Fascist disorders in Italy	1922 (Mar.-Aug.)
Treaty of Rapallo between Russia and Germany	(Apr.)
Beginning of collapse of German mark	(Aug.)
Fascist "March on Rome"—Mussolini forms government	(Oct.)
Grant of dictatorial powers to Mussolini	(Nov.)
Organization of Union of Socialist Soviet Republics	(Dec.)
French and Belgians occupy Ruhr	1923 (Jan.)
Italian bombardment of Corfu	(Aug.-Sept.)
"Beer-hall Putsch" in Munich—Hitler sentenced to jail	(Nov.)
Stresemann becomes German foreign minister	(Dec.)
Death of Lenin	1924 (Jan.)
Murder of anti-fascist deputy Matteotti	(June)
Dawes Plan accepted by Germany	(Aug.)
Hindenburg elected German president	1925 (Apr.)
Treaties of Locarno	(Oct.)
Overthrow of Portuguese government by army	1926 (May)
Victory of Stalin over Trotsky and his supporters	(July-Oct.)

Admission of Germany to League of Nations	(Sept.)
General Carmona becomes president of Portugal	1927 (Apr.)
Banishment of Trotsky	1927 (Dec.)
Socialist majority in German elections—Hermann Muller chancellor	1928 (May-June)
Salazar becomes Portuguese finance minister	(May)
First Five-Year Plan in Russia	(Oct.)
Lateran treaties between Italy and Vatican	1929 (Feb.)
Stock market crash in United States	(Oct.)
Acceptance of Young plan by Germany	1929 (Dec.)
Evacuation of Rhineland by Allies	1929-1930
Economic depression in West	1930-1935
Bruening becomes chancellor of Germany	1930 (Mar.)
Nazis win 107 seats in German elections	(Sept.)
Hindenburg begins to rule by decree	1930
Failure of Austrian Credit-Anstalt	1931 (May)
Severe famine in Russia	1932-1933
Re-election of President Hindenburg	1932 (Mar.)
Von Papen becomes German chancellor	(May)
Nazis win 230 seats in Reichstag	(July)
Salazar becomes prime minister of Portugal (in effect dictator)	(July)
Hitler becomes chancellor of Germany	1933 (Jan.)
New authoritarian constitution in Portugal	(Feb.)
Reichstag fire—suppression of Communists	(Feb.)
Withdrawal of Germany from League of Nations	(Oct.)
Recognition of Soviet Union by United States	(Nov.)
Purge of Nazi party by Hitler	1934 (June)
Nazi Putsch in Austria—murder of Chancellor Dollfuss	(July)
Assassination of Kirov and purge of Old Bolsheviks	1934-1936
Hitler assumes presidency of German Reich	1934 (Aug.)
Russia joins League of Nations	(Sept.)
Saar plebiscite	1935 (Jan.)
Hitler denunciation of disarmament clauses of Versailles treaty	(Mar.)
Conference of Stresa	(Apr.)
Franco-Russian alliance	(May)
Anglo-German naval agreement	(June)
Italian invasion of Ethiopia	(Oct.)
Voting of League sanctions against Italians	(Nov.)
Denunciation of Locarno treaties by Germany and remilitarization of Rhineland	1936 (Mar.)
Italian annexation of Ethiopia	(May)
Discontinuation of League sanctions against Italy	(July)
Outbreak of Spanish Civil War	(July)
Rome-Berlin Axis	(Oct.)
Anti-Comintern Pact (Germany, Italy, Japan)	(Nov.)
Adoption of new constitution in Russia	(Dec.)
New purges in Russia—Radek, Marshal Tukhachevski, etc.	1937-1938
Withdrawal of Italy from League of Nations	1937 (Dec.)
Reorganization of German army under Nazi control	1938 (Feb.)
German annexation of Austria	(Mar.)
Munich pact	(Sept.)
German occupation of remainder of Czechoslovakia	1939 (Mar.)
German annexation of Memel	(Mar.)
Italian conquest of Albania	(Apr.)
Military alliance between Germany and Italy	(May)
Dismissal of Foreign Minister Litvinov of Russia	(May)
Nonaggression agreement between Germany and Russia	(Aug.)
German invasion of Poland	(Sept. 1)
Declaration of war by Britain and France on Germany	(Sept. 3)

this period, most of them influenced by disgust at the weaknesses in their own systems, as demonstrated by the Depression. After World War II, when the Soviet Union became the strongest power in the world outside the United States, most of the citizens of the democracies were moved not so much by the fear that the Soviet system would prove superior to theirs as by the new aggressiveness of the Soviet Union, which compelled the other countries to maintain a posture of constant defense. This was coupled by a fear in some that in the long run the Soviet system would exercise an attraction for the relatively backward countries superior to that of the capitalistic democracies, and that it had certain advantages over the democracies in its ability to direct the energies of its people to certain well-defined aims which boded no good to the democracies.

In the 1930's, however, it was not Soviet Russia that constituted a clear danger to the Western democracies but the aggressive totalitarian states of central Europe, especially National Socialist Germany. The democracies were kept constantly on the defensive, never knowing where their enemies would strike next. Each move in the 1930's was made in answer to a move made by the totalitarians, as most moves in foreign policy in the 1950's were made with an eye to their effect on the competition with the Soviet Union. The world initiative passed from the Western democracies to the autocracies in the 1930's, where it has remained to the present time. Though Germany, Italy, and Japan were defeated in the second World War, it was only after a mobilization of tremendous resources by the much more numerous democracies, and with the aid of the Soviet Union. The Allied victory in World War II could not therefore be regarded as a clearcut verdict in favor of the democracies. Without the successes of the Soviet armies in holding the Germans' attack—though aided, it is true, by considerable material from the West—it is doubtful that the war would have been won by the West and certainly not by 1945. If the autocracies had joined forces instead of fighting one another, it is not certain that the war would have been won at all by the two embattled democracies of Britain and the United States, whose manpower and resources

would have been decisively outmatched by those of the autocracies.

The two chapters devoted to the inter-war period will therefore be devoted to the rise of the totalitarian states and to the ebbing of democratic initiative in Britain, France, and the United States under the impact of totalitarianism. The last section of the second of these chapters will compare the two systems and study their impact on one another, the failure of the European security system, and the drift toward war. Certain parts of the present chapter may not be fully grasped until events in the democracies have also been studied in Chapter 24.

♦ Russia

SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF RUSSIA AT THE TURN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The Tsarist government In the later part of the nineteenth century Russia appeared to be following the development of the nations of western Europe, but with a considerable time lag. Once the serfs had been emancipated in 1861 it became clear that Russia would come within the orbit of Western civilization and follow the path blazed by the other Western capitalist nations. From the 1880's, foreign capital flowed into the country to develop new industries, the debts being serviced by the export of agricultural produce. But as the general economic condition of the country improved, and the process of modernization began gradually to take hold, the backward political and social condition of Russia became more evident, especially to the middle class. In this respect the situation bears a marked resemblance to that of France at the end of the eighteenth century.

The government remained totally absolute. The only elected bodies in the country were the *zemstsovs*, local organizations at the equivalent of the county level. Since these were elected by a restricted propertied franchise they were dominated by local landowners. At the center was the absolute tsar, supported by a bureaucracy appointed by him, which was often scandalously corrupt, by an army officered

largely by the aristocracy, and by a secret police, whose primary task was to discover subversion against the tsar and state. Since Tsar Nicholas II was one of the more feeble members of his family, which had been on the throne since the seventeenth century, the government was usually inefficient as well as corrupt and insufficiently supervised by the monarch.

Middle class and intellectuals The Russian middle class was still small but increasing in numbers, and as elsewhere, it desired some share in the government of the state. Of the small number of intellectuals, many of them educated abroad and familiar with the governments of foreign nations, some backed the middle class but others despaired of winning their ends in face of the obstinate resistance of the tsar, who made no secret of the fact that he considered autocracy the highest form of government and that he regarded constitutional monarchy and democracy with contempt. Many Russian intellectuals therefore turned toward socialism, especially the Marxian variety, and were at most mildly interested in extracting a constitution from the tsar as a transitional stage in the establishment of a socialist republic.

Peasants and workers The Russian peasant was technically backward, and his yields, even when he was a small landed proprietor, were very low by European standards. About half the country under cultivation was in the hands of communal groups known as the *mir*. Under the *mir* system the land was held in common by the community as in the medieval West. Methods of cultivation were not necessarily more primitive than among the small landowners, some of whom showed considerable enterprise in improving and enlarging their holdings. These were the kulaks, later to be liquidated by the Soviet government. Both the *mir* and the small landowners were in constant need of more land, which was not available to them since so much land still remained unproductively in the hands of the large landowners, who used it for hunting and similar pursuits, or let it lie idle. All the peasant class had to pay high taxes, many of the peasants being still saddled also with debts dating from the time of emancipation,

when, it will be remembered, they were made to pay for the lands they cultivated. Upon the back of the peasant fell most of the cost of the modernization of the country, since Russia was still trying to build her industry and had few manufactured products to export.

The working class suffered from conditions comparable to those of the early Industrial Revolution elsewhere. They were forbidden by law to strike or to organize into trade unions, even though in fact they sometimes engaged in illegal strikes, which invariably brought reprisals upon them.

Formation of political parties Thus at the turn of the century all groups in the country save the small ruling class favored by the tsar had grievances and had no legal means of expressing them. All attempts at extralegal action were suppressed by the tsar and his police. Nevertheless, a group of politically conscious landowners and liberal democrats from the middle class organized a party, known as Cadet, to press for constitutional government by whatever legal means were available to them. Shortly afterward a socialist party was formed, made up of peasants, workers and intellectuals, modeled on foreign Social Democratic parties. But like other socialist parties, it split into Marxian and non-Marxian groups, the Marxists themselves then dividing further in 1903 into a majority and a minority. The Bolsheviks, who were at that time in a majority (the word itself means a majority), were anxious to overthrow the state and replace the tsarist government through revolution by a dictatorship of the proletariat. The Mensheviks, on the other hand, believed in working more slowly for the same ends and were willing to work with non-Marxists for the purpose. They believed that a bourgeois government would have to be established first, and that this stage, predicted by Marx, would then lead on to the full proletarian revolution. By far the largest group in the new party were the Social Revolutionaries, who were backed overwhelmingly by the numerically powerful peasantry. They remained the largest socialist group until they were outmaneuvered by the Bolsheviks and forcibly compelled to accept their dictation in 1917. This, then, was the

situation when the Russians became involved in war with Japan.

REVOLUTION OF 1905

The war itself was an outgrowth of Japanese and Russian rivalry in China, and details need not be discussed here. The Japanese won two crucial battles, one by land, and one by sea; whereupon Theodore Roosevelt, president of the United States, offered his mediation. Though Russia lost some territory won in recent years from the Chinese, her territorial loss was far overshadowed by the immense loss in prestige. Japan, only fifty years before virtually unknown to the Western world, had been strong enough to defeat the most populous of European nations, a nation, moreover, which was the last

stronghold of absolute monarchy and the only European state where there was not even a semblance of constitutional limitation on the power of the monarch. Thus it was the tsar and his regime that had to bear the full brunt of criticism for the bungling of the war. Yet, even so, it is possible that nothing would have happened if the tsarist troops had not fired on a huge but peaceable demonstration led by a priest, which had assembled before the tsar's palace to petition him for a redress of grievances. When several hundred demonstrators were shot down, it was widely recognized that little but repression could be hoped for from the government. All the numerous groups that had been demanding change were thus suddenly presented with an issue upon which they could join. They therefore began to demand reforms



Barricade on a Moscow Street during the 1905 Russian Revolution. From a painting by I. Vladimirov. (SOVFOTO)

with an ever increasing urgency, while uprisings occurred throughout the country. The disorder culminated in a general strike organized by the St. Petersburg Soviet, or Worker's Council, led by the revolutionary parties.

BEGINNING OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT

Summoning of the Duma The tsar, who had promised an unacceptably small measure of reform in March 1905, issued a manifesto in which he promised to call a Duma, or parliament, which was to share power with himself. The October manifesto was welcomed by the more moderate parties but rejected by the three socialist parties. The collapse of the united opposition encouraged the tsar to grant less than he had promised. By this time he had signed the Treaty of Portsmouth, putting an end to the Russo-Japanese War, and confident of the loyalty of the returned troops, he appointed an upper house drawn mainly from the nobility, and gave the lower house or Duma far less than the people had been led to expect. In spite of the fact that the franchise had been weighted in favor of the landowners and upper bourgeoisie, the elections nevertheless revealed that the tsar commanded very little support in the country, and the great majority of the representatives were people from whom he could expect little support. This did not prevent him from choosing ministers acceptable only to himself, with the result that the newly elected Duma was consistently hostile to them. A dissolution—which infuriated the liberals but which only confirmed the opinion of the revolutionary parties which had never trusted the tsar and had not accepted his constitution—was followed by another election, with results no less unfavorable to the tsar. Tsar Nicholas, his patience exhausted by such ingratitude, and still determined to have a Duma that supported his policies, thereupon changed the basis for the franchise so that only the nobility and upper bourgeoisie could vote. At last he was able to obtain a Duma more or less to his liking, but of course it in no way satisfied the aspirations of the intellectuals, liberals, or socialists. Yet after all, a constitution had been won; and when the tsarist regime collapsed

during the first World War, the Duma was able to accept the abdication of the tsar and supply an alternative government to that of the supreme autocrat.

The Stolypin regime Meanwhile the tsar and his ministers had recognized that some reforms were essential, especially in the rural areas. Decrees had been issued which favored individual peasant proprietorship at the expense of the communal *mirs*. The program met with much success among the peasants, large numbers of whom took advantage of the facilities offered, though naturally the more conservative of the landowners, who had the ear of the tsar and were powerful in the Duma, objected strenuously. The tsar, however, continued to give support, though reluctantly, to his chief minister, Peter Stolypin, until the latter was assassinated in 1911. Neither the Cadets nor the revolutionary parties had been won over by the reform. The former wanted a truly constitutional government, and the latter, who hoped for peasant support in the coming revolution, did not wish to see them too well satisfied with their land. Fortunately for the revolutionaries there was still far too little land to go around, and the Social Revolutionary party, made up primarily of peasants, was able to make capital out of the shortage, while denouncing the Stolypin reforms as an attempt to buy them off with inadequate concessions. But it remains possible that if there had been no war, the agrarian changes sponsored by Stolypin, pursued to their conclusion in spite of the widespread opposition to them, even from within his own government, would have headed off the revolution, which could never have been carried out by the small working class by itself.

THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION

Character of the Revolution But the war, with its tremendous Russian losses and mismanagement by the government, provided the occasion for revolution—a revolution which, taken over as it was by convinced Marxists, was different in its results from any that had preceded it in history. The Marxists, led by "Nikolai" Lenin and a tough core of determined

revolutionaries, succeeded in imposing a new system upon the Russian state, which with relatively few changes has persisted to this day. Clearly there was nothing predetermined about the form taken by this revolution. The revolutionary situation was provided by the war. The bourgeois government that tried to function after the disintegration of the tsarist government was unable to establish its authority over the troops and was overthrown by the extremists, who managed to cling to power while they organized a new revolutionary army, and gradually reduced the country to obedience. The terror they established was far more thoroughgoing than that of the Jacobins in 1793, and succeeded in liquidating the majority of the not very large bourgeois class, in addition to the old nobility. When the revolutionaries, once peace had been obtained, realized that they could not impose their radical solution entirely by force, they adopted a policy of flexibility, permitting some of the customary incentives of bourgeois society. But they were able to retain such a firm hold on the government that they were later able to put an end to the degree of freedom they had permitted in the few years during which the economy had been recovering. Exercising an iron control over all aspects of Russian life, the government was then able to establish a totalitarian system, under which a new type of society and socio-economic organization was created, which, in spite of superficial resemblances to earlier forms of autocracy, was by virtue of its modernity and the effectiveness of its discipline something altogether new. This is the system which now competes for the leadership of Western civilization and of the entire world of new nations which have been only lightly touched by Western expansionism. It is a competition of which the result is not yet known. But it is essential to understand the main elements in the system and to appreciate its strengths and weaknesses, as well as to know, in however brief an outline, how it came into being.

Formation of the provisional government

During the war Tsar Nicholas conceived it to be his duty to fight personally at the front as commander-in-chief of the army. Since he was

a far from effective commander, the army did not prosper. He left behind in control of the government his wife, a German woman who was widely suspected of pro-German sympathies, and who was under the spell of a disreputable former monk named Rasputin, who was utterly incompetent but who made her decisions for her. Revolutionary agents in the army found it easy to spread defeatism in the ranks. Few soldiers felt any personal involvement in the war at any time; when the officer corps was decimated and ever more recruits called to the colors, it became ever more difficult to maintain discipline in face of the appalling losses, which not only seemed to be, but actually were, the result of mismanagement. The middle classes and landowners, ashamed of the incompetence and failures of their government, blamed the tsar; though they believed the war should be continued, they wished to assume responsibility for its prosecution themselves. Some of the revolutionaries who were more patriotic than revolutionary also wished to see the war prosecuted more effectively. On the other hand, the extremist revolutionaries, especially the Bolsheviks, were anxious only to take advantage of the war to create the long-awaited revolution.

The first move in the revolution was the assassination of Rasputin at the end of December 1916 by a group of nobles. This paralyzed whatever initiative remained in the government of the tsarina. The Duma, meeting in February 1917, called for true constitutional government. When the tsar was unwilling to grant this and dissolved it, a Duma committee demanded his abdication. Nicholas, seeing everything in disorder around him and unable even to exact obedience from his troops, abdicated on March 17, 1917, in favor of his brother, who refused to accept the position. This left the Duma as the residuary legatee of the monarchy. Since there was now no head of government, the Duma proceeded to set up a provisional government pending the election of a constituent assembly to write a republican constitution.

Meanwhile the revolutionary parties were taking matters into their own hands. The Soviet of Petrograd (formerly St. Petersburg, the name having been changed in 1914 to eliminate the Germanic sound of the old capital) was fanning

the revolutionary flames in the capital, calling upon the soldiers to desert and the workers to cease working. A similar Soviet was functioning in Moscow. Control of these soviets was far more important to the revolutionaries than control of the provisional government, which was hardly more competent than its tsarist predecessor and could not establish control over the armed forces. It had no program available for such an emergency as it faced; but above all it wanted to continue the war—a policy utterly at variance with the will of the workers and peasants who would be called upon to continue the fighting. Leaders of the socialist parties other than the Bolsheviks, however, gave some lukewarm support to the idea of continued war, thus providing the Bolsheviks with the most popular issue of the day. The dedicated Bolsheviks, many of whom had just emerged from tsarist prisons by order of the provisional government, managed ultimately to win control of the soviets, though they were initially a minority in them. Their slogan of "bread, land, and peace," all of which were desperately needed, gained them much support among workers and peasants.

In April 1917, Lenin was shipped into Russia in a sealed train by the Germans, who hoped that he would make Russia incapable

of further resistance to the German armies. Lenin quickly established his ascendancy over the Bolsheviks and proceeded to make a strong attempt to convert his minority in the soviets into a majority. Meanwhile the provisional government under a liberal, Prince Lvov, was not meeting much success in view of the war-weariness of the people. It was also faced with opposition from some of the leaders of the army, who resented the forced abdication of the tsar and were not prepared to obey anyone else. As the year drew on, some of the liberals in the provisional government, feeling their lack of support, decided that the best hope lay in winning the adherence of the more moderate socialists. The socialist leader, Alexander Kerensky, was therefore first given the department of justice and finally the premiership. At the moment of the change-over to Kerensky's leadership, the Bolsheviks engineered an abortive uprising in Petrograd which the government was strong enough to suppress. Lenin escaped to Finland, and Leon Trotsky, his chief supporter (formerly a Menshevik), was imprisoned. But Kerensky and his government had no real support. The army was severely defeated in July, and a general named Kornilov, after defying Kerensky and being dismissed, attempted a

Trotsky speaking in Red Square, Moscow.



counterrevolution. He was ignominiously halted in his advance toward the capital when the railroad workers refused to transport him.

Capture of the Revolution by the Bolsheviks

All these events played into the hands of Lenin and the Bolsheviks, who knew their own minds and had a determined will to power conspicuously missing in all those who were currently having power thrust upon them. It was the workers, not Kerensky, who had defeated Kornilov; and in spite of the failure of the July uprising, more of the workers and soldiers came to recognize that only the Bolsheviks could lead them to the attractive goals of bread, land, and peace. The other socialist party members in the Soviets began to turn to the Bolsheviks, who at last ceased to be the numerically weakest party in them. Lenin quietly returned from Finland to take charge and at once planned an armed uprising in Petrograd. By this time there was real hunger in the city, and the time had come for extreme action; and although Lenin was opposed to the last even by some of the Bolsheviks, he was able to have his way. In the night of November 6-7, the Bolsheviks, now in full control of the Petrograd Soviet, supported by the Baltic fleet and such troops as there were in the city, took over the capital. Kerensky, finding no loyal troops to defend him, fled abroad. In the major cities of Russia the Soviets likewise within a few days assumed power. Lenin became the chief of a new Council of People's Commissars.

Two months later the long-promised Constituent Assembly was elected under universal manhood suffrage. But, as might have been expected, the peasant majority voted for the peasant Social Revolutionary party, and the Bolsheviks, though making a good showing in the cities, gained only some nine million votes. But the Bolsheviks had no intention of establishing a democratic government unless they were in a full position to control it. After trying vainly to obtain a majority in the Assembly, they dissolved it by force and set up the "dictatorship of the proletariat," in whose name they professed to speak. The first stage of the revolution was then over. The Bolsheviks were in control at the center, the other parties were

disorganized, the bourgeoisie and nobility were afraid for their lives and properties. Most of them either left the country for distant places or retired into exile in neighboring countries in order to organize a counterrevolution against the Bolsheviks.

U.S.S.R.—THE FIRST YEARS

"War Communism" and the defeat of the counterrevolution The system organized by the Communist party, as it was called after March 1918, is usually known as "war communism." In fact it was a hodge-podge of *ad hoc* policies, generally, in so far as they were true policies at all, in line with Communist and Marxian theory. Many of the largest industrial establishments in the country were nationalized and administered, first by committees of workers, then, when these proved inefficient, by officials appointed by the party. During the years 1918 to 1921, when the

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A cartoonist portrays the dangerous position of Trotsky at the time of the negotiation of the German-Soviet treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Copyright New York Post, Inc. 1918. (COURTESY NEW YORK POST CORPORATION)



new government was beset by civil wars and foreign intervention for the purpose of restoring the old system, everything was subordinated to the urgent need for food and supplies. These were ruthlessly requisitioned by the government and its troops, causing an unceasing struggle between the peasants who were substantial enough to have a surplus and the government, supported by the city workers who needed to be fed. In March 1918, the Soviet government concluded a separate peace with the Germans on very unfavorable terms dictated by the Germans, which included the loss of the Ukraine, Poland, Finland, and the Baltic provinces. But Lenin had no choice but to accept. Far more dangerous to the government at that moment were the numerous counterrevolutionary armies, which, unlike the Germans, could have overthrown the government if they had succeeded. But they were never able to

unite either in a concerted military effort or in a program to replace the Soviet government. Their determination to restore the property of émigrés and reinstitute the most reactionary features of the tsarist regime alienated their potential supporters in every area they captured. The result was that the new Red Army, which was organized by Trotsky, was able to defeat the counterrevolutionary armies one by one, as well as keeping at bay the ill-managed foreign expeditions which attempted to interfere after the Germans had been defeated. The Red Army was able also to reconquer the Ukraine, but otherwise had for the time to submit to the truncation of Russian territories in the west.

Within Russia the chief instrument for strengthening of government power was the Cheka, the political police, which instituted a reign of terror much more ruthless than the Jacobin terror of 1793–1794. The terror was

primarily directed against those whom the regime called "counterrevolutionaries, saboteurs, and speculators." Since the bourgeoisie was automatically suspect, and the Cheka was not inclined to make fine distinctions between various forms of criminality, a considerable percentage of the former bourgeoisie and large landowners was liquidated. By systematic application of the terror, the bourgeoisie and the nobility disappeared from the country, to be replaced only by "comrades" and workers, of whom no doubt some were bourgeois in disguise. Internal class struggles among the peasants were encouraged, the very small landowners and the landless being the natural allies of the Communist government. The larger landholding peasants were thus driven to sympathize with and perhaps join the counterrevolutionary movements and thus became fair targets for the Cheka if they survived. By 1921 famine as well as systematic liquidation had taken such a severe toll of the bourgeois and richer peasants that the Soviet government, fortified by its military victories, was able to relax the pressure and take more serious steps to rebuild the economy, and set up a more permanent system of government than the rough and ready rule by local soviets that had hitherto served the rulers. During the period of war communism it may be noted that Communist practice had served to bolster Marxian theory, since the government had performed the task of digging graves for the bourgeoisie that under Marxian theory the bourgeoisie should have dug for themselves.

The Government of the USSR In 1921 began the policy known in Russian history as NEP (New Economic Policy), and a new constitution was proclaimed in 1922. The government of the Soviet Union has changed little in substance since that time, although it has changed in form and name, especially under the constitution of 1936. From the beginning to the present day it has remained a dictatorship by the Communist party, the only political party permitted in the country. It is thus an oligarchy, which at times has meant personal dictatorship by the man who controlled the machinery of the Communist party. A similar rule by party

dictatorship was initiated in Italy and Germany in the inter-war period, where the Fascist and National Socialist parties performed roles analogous to that of the Communist party in Russia. But in both Italy and Germany the personal ascendancy of Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler was as undisputed as the ascendancy of Josef Stalin in Russia during the period when he controlled the party.

This type of regime should be distinguished from the strong-man rule of individual dictators which rests on control of the army, as in Latin America and in Portugal and Spain. In Russia, Italy, and Germany, the army remained as subservient to the civil power as in the democratic nations; and it was quite possible for the dictators in these countries to dismiss any army leaders at will and control military policy. These civilian dictators who donned army uniforms and directed strategy during the war controlled their countries through the apparatus of the party, which they kept at all times obedient to their will.

The Russian state, in form, is a union of autonomous republics, each component republic possessing its own institutions and, in theory, the right to secede from the Union. Within these republics there are different nationality groups, which are given official representation in the Council of Nationalities. The many nationalities of the country are thus given official sanction, and their separate cultural traits have usually, but not always, been approved and fostered by the government. In this sense the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) is a multinational state, and may be thought to have solved the problem of nationalism which so plagued the Austrian multinational empire before the first World War. In addition to the Council of Nationalities, which constitutes the upper house of the Soviet Union, there is a lower house known as the Council of the Union, elected since 1936 by universal suffrage, one member for each 300,000 inhabitants. These two councils together constitute the Supreme Soviet. A joint session of both councils choose a Council of People's Commissars (later the Council of Ministers), which is the equivalent of a cabinet and is presided over by the equivalent of a prime minister. Thus the forms of a

democratic state are preserved, but the substance is missing, for the entire slate of representatives and ministers has to be selected either from the Communist party or from classes approved by it. No opposing party has ever been permitted. Under the constitution of 1922 only members of the urban or working classes had the vote, and greater weight was given to the urban vote. The elections under the 1922 constitution were indirect. The voters chose the local soviets in villages and towns, these soviets then chose provincial soviets; and the latter the Supreme Soviet. Direct voting by ballot, introduced in 1936, was simply a formal concession to democratic procedure, and had no practical consequences. The local soviets, however, retained considerable authority locally; and although the members cannot function without Communist party support or act in any way contrary to party policy, by no means all of the members of these local soviets are party members.

Organization of the Communist party The organization of the Communist party is not unlike that of the Soviets. The local unit is the cell, which is set up in factories and offices as well as in the villages. There are also intermediate hierarchies between the cell and the powerful Central Committee. Although the cells provide the human material for the dominant committees at the summit of the Communist hierarchy, and promotions are made from the ranks, from the beginning the Communist Party Central Committee and its subcommittees have dominated the party, the initial members of the Central Committee being those men who had carried out the revolution. The Central Committee, relatively small and compact but too large to function as an executive body (usually between sixty and eighty members), chooses an executive secretariat headed by a general secretary and at least two important subcommittees or bureaus, the Orgburo, concerned with the organization of the party, and the Politburo. The Politburo, now called the Praesidium, is concerned solely with party policy and has remained the more important. The Praesidium, in deciding on party policy, communicates its wishes to the Central Committee, and the latter to the

cells. Thus all party members are committed to carrying out the policy decided by the oligarchy, and all the important members of the Supreme Soviet, as party members, are likewise committed to the policy before they are elected. Discussion is no doubt free in the Praesidium, as it is in the Central Committee of the party. But once a policy has been adopted by the party (the "party line"), all members are committed to it, and severe sanctions can be used against deviationists. Those who differ too publicly from the views of the leaders may also find later that their stand has been noticed and promotions are withheld from them, although nothing worse may happen to them.

The party has at its disposal the political police, now known as the MVD, which is fully competent to deal with individual deviationists, and the controlled press, which may prepare the way for sanctions by denunciations of the offender as a counterrevolutionary, saboteur, foreign agent, tool of reactionary fascism, or some other less picturesque form of life. The police, naturally, are at the orders of the executive of the party. The general secretary of the party, who is always a member of the Praesidium, is the most important party official. Control of the party machinery by Stalin as general secretary enabled him to become the absolute dictator that he was, and this is the basis of the power now exercised by Khrushchev, although he has also assumed the title of prime minister. Yet it may well be true that Khrushchev does not possess as firm a control of the party machinery as Stalin, and that he could not act as absolute dictator in the same manner as his predecessor who had the formidable apparatus of the secret police at his full disposal. If the other members of the Praesidium, or even a substantial majority of the Central Committee, were united against Khrushchev, they might well be able to dethrone him, in the same way that the National Convention was able to strip Robespierre of his power and execute him.

The New Economic Policy (1921-1928) The new policy in the economic field adopted by the Soviet government in 1921 was inaugurated by Lenin over the opposition of many leading Communists. But it proved able to re-

store in considerable measure the Russian economy. Private trade and private small-scale industry were permitted, and the peasants were allowed to sell their products in the open market, as in tsarist days. The Soviet government during the period of 1921-1928 preferred to use the weapon of discriminatory taxation, differential freight rates and similar economic weapons against privately owned enterprises rather than expropriating them. Large-scale industrial enterprise remained, however, under the control of the government. But industrial goods were in short supply, and the peasants continued to withhold produce when they found they could buy so little with their profits. The government even attempted by subsidies and special concessions to persuade the peasants to sell more. There can be no doubt that these seven years, which saw the death of Lenin and the rise to power of Stalin, were the only years in post-revolutionary Russia during which there was any measurable degree of economic freedom, and it is also true that the economy improved; agricultural production reached almost the level of 1913. It was not, however, good enough for the Soviet leaders, who had engaged in a unique experiment and had demanded enormous sacrifices from their people which had as yet borne little fruit. Other nations had greatly increased production over that of the prewar years, and the degree of industrialization achieved in Russia was not demonstrably greater than might have been won if the old prewar economic system had been restored. The landowners had been dispossessed, and the peasants now controlled the land; there were no large industrial enterprises in the hands of private persons. But the Marxist program was far from fulfilled; and the Soviet system could make little appeal to the world as yet as an example to be followed. It could appeal only on ideological grounds to those who longed for the destruction of the capitalistic system because of the inequality of its rewards.

"SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY"

The First Five-Year Plan A momentous decision was then taken. The idea of a world revolution, which, it had been hoped, would

follow the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia, was abandoned in favor of "socialism in one country." The Soviet government, now led by Josef Stalin, decided to compel the rapid industrialization of the economy by diverting all available resources to the task and to convert agriculture into a rural industry under the control of the state. The means adopted for the latter was the institution of compulsory collective and state farms, which, unlike the individual peasant farm, could use agricultural machinery provided by the new heavy industry. Under the collective system the whole agricultural production would be made available to the state. Private enterprise, both in the towns and country, could be made to disappear by withholding raw material and machines. The state planners and bureaucrats, working with the aid of the Communist party and the political police, proposed to substitute state officials for private enterprisers in every sector of the economy. Thus the first five-year plan was drawn up, with targets of production in every sector, which had to be fulfilled under threat of the direst sanctions.

There followed four years of appalling difficulty and hardship for the Russians. The peasants, especially those who had prospered under the NEP system, desperately resisted forcible collectivization and the loss of the land for which they had struggled so long. Rather than submit, many of them destroyed their crops and livestock. The government agents had to use force to take over the farms, and those who submitted were usually reluctant to work for the collectives as they had worked for themselves. There was more widespread famine and destitution, especially in the Ukraine. But the policy was pursued ruthlessly. The kulaks were killed or exiled. The promised machinery was often simply not available in spite of all the efforts of the state factories to produce them. But gradually the economy was transformed; and though the first five-year plan was not completely fulfilled in some sectors, it came close to fulfillment. In all the years since that time, there have been five- or four-year plans in operation. Targets are set, and every conceivable effort is made by the management to meet them. Piece work, almost abandoned in the West, was



A collective farm in Siberia, 1954. (SOVFOTO)

introduced on a large scale; "shock" workers were given visible rewards and honors. In the collective farms the peasant was allowed to cultivate a small piece of land in addition to his work on the collective, and to sell his products for money. The state concentrated its attention on heavy industry and capital goods, determined to "overtake and surpass" America. For a time foreign technicians were imported to impart their knowledge to the Russians, but always there was a shortage of consumer goods. These were regarded by the government as expendable at a time when the country was trying to build up its heavy industry, and especially when, as in the late 1930's, it felt itself endangered by the expansionism of National Socialist Germany.

Comparison with capitalistic system From an economic point of view it is clear that Russian communism at no time has approached the theoretical communist ideal. Indeed it has found it necessary to devise incentives not greatly dissimilar to those of the capitalist world—piece work, higher salaries for persons engaged in work regarded as especially useful by the gov-

ernment, status symbols, such as automobiles and better housing, for government officials. The main difference between the Soviet and capitalist incentives is that the government, rather than private persons and the working of the market economy, decides in what areas the incentives shall be offered and the higher wages and salaries granted. The government decides which tasks are more socially useful, and these may vary at different times. When trained intellectuals are in short supply the professors, the scientists, and writers may be paid higher salaries; when there is need to persuade workers to higher industrial production, the fastest and most efficient workers may be granted special bonuses. From one point of view this system may be socialism, in that social needs, as seen by the rulers, are given priority over private consumption at the choice of the individuals; from another point of view the system is one of state capitalism, for the state is the only capitalist, and it uses capitalistic methods to obtain its results. The state makes all the profit from industrial enterprises and chooses how much to reinvest in the production of further capital

goods, rather than leaving the choice to the individual concerns—who would make their decisions on the basis of their estimate of future profits to be gained from the enterprise.

The Soviet state prefers to leave very little indeed to private choice. Its bureaucrats plan production on the basis of the estimated needs of the state and of private individuals. The latter have no say in the matter, but must take what is allotted to them. Above all, therefore, the Soviet Union is a bureaucratic state, all the major economic decisions being made by state officials. There can be no doubt that there is a far greater waste of materials in capitalistic states, in which millions of economic decisions are made every minute, few of which can be predicted accurately in advance. Whether it can be as efficient as a capitalistic state, whether omniscient bureaucrats can take the place of individuals making decisions on the basis of their own best estimate of what is profitable and what is likely to be in demand, is a question not yet resolved. There is no doubt that the Soviet system is gradually becoming more efficient, and it may well be that the younger generations of Soviet planners who have been born to the system and trained in it, have learned enough to be able to work it competently. The Russians started so much later that they could not yet have caught up with the capitalistic countries under any system. Whether they can do so in the future may depend almost as much on the response the capitalistic countries make to the challenge presented by an alternative system as it does upon the Soviet Union itself.


FOREIGN POLICY—COOPERATION WITH THE WEST (1934-1939)

Between the two wars the Soviet Union tried to keep as free as possible from entanglement in the politics of the West, save for intermittent efforts to foster their professed ultimate aim of world revolution. For a long time the West tried to insulate itself likewise from contacts with the Russian revolutionaries, whose global activities it feared, and looked with favor upon the insulating countries which cut them off from the Soviet Union. Indeed the West called them col-

lectively the *cordon sanitaire*. The Russians therefore concentrated most of their early efforts in the Far East, where they attempted to bring China into the Communist fold. When Chiang Kai-shek came to power, he preferred to try to create a strong nationalist and modernized China with some ties to the West, which was better able to give him what he needed. Meanwhile Japan was increasing her power and had to be prevented from encroaching on the Russian Far Eastern territories as well as from obtaining too preponderant an influence in China. The danger from her, however, was not immediate, and at all times the Soviet Union felt able to cope with it. But this was not true of National Socialist Germany, which was, at least in words, uncompromisingly anti-Communist and anti-Russian. The Nazis had indeed taken over supreme power in the state by exploiting a Communist menace.

The Soviet Union, therefore, seeing that she needed allies and realizing that she could win them only in the West, decided to support the League policy of "collective security," and in 1934 she joined the League of Nations, which Japan and Germany had recently left. In 1935 she signed defensive treaties with France and Czechoslovakia. In the following years Communist parties in foreign countries were instructed to cooperate with left-wing governments and no longer to remain aloof from the domestic concerns of these countries. But Russia was never regarded very highly or taken very seriously by the Western powers that controlled the League. When the leaders of Britain and France signed the Munich pact with Germany and Italy for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, Russia was not consulted. The Soviet system was thought of as incurably inefficient and Western powers were unwilling to trust a professedly Communist government that was supposedly bent on their destruction.

Attempted cooperation with Germany (1939-1941) The Soviet Union, therefore, decided after Munich that the best plan for Russian national interests was to come to terms with Germany and buy time and any other concessions the Germans were willing to offer. While pretending to negotiate with the British and



French, the Russians signed a nonaggression pact with Germany, and after war had broken out they joined the Germans in a partition of Poland. A few months afterwards the Russians engaged in a war with Finland which was won only with considerable difficulty. Meanwhile they recaptured the former Baltic provinces of Russia by agreement with Germany. The Finnish war had, however, revealed such glaring deficiencies in the Russian army system that a thorough overhaul of the army was perceived to be necessary. This overhaul was not complete when Germany turned on the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941 and when the other enemies of Germany found themselves willy-nilly allies of the country they had feared so long.

Solidarity of the Russian people in the war
There is much that still remains mysterious about the absolute rule of Stalin within Russia in the 1930's. Stalin has at various times and in various countries (not excluding his own) been depicted as a suspicious tyrant bent on eliminating all possible sources of opposition

both to him and his policies. There is no doubt very much truth in this picture. He brooked no opposition and he allowed no one but himself to determine Soviet policy. It was also he who compressed every item of Soviet policy into the framework of the theoretical Marxism that remained the official philosophy of the state. In the mid-1930's he instituted "purge trials" of old Bolsheviks and others, including prominent army officers who were accused of crimes which it was difficult to believe they had committed. Yet the great majority of the accused made public confessions of their guilt. It may have been that if there were plots against the regime, Stalin was taking advantage of them to liquidate all his enemies and potential competitors at the same time. It could even be that there was some plotting with Germany for the purpose of ousting the much-hated despot, and that from the point of view of the national interest some men had to be disposed of who might have used the coming war to their advantage in their designs. However this may be, Russian armies during World War II had to suffer none of



Stalin as Santa Claus before a lavish display of Soviet toys, 1937. (SOVfoto)

the treason and near treason that was so widespread in World War I; and in spite of overwhelming reverses in the first two years of their war, the Russians were able to fight back in later years and achieve, even under Stalin, the victory denied them in 1918, and take the commanding position in the world they have maintained ever since.

♦ Italy

NEED FOR REFORM AFTER THE WAR

Italy was the second state in Europe to accept totalitarianism, but unlike Russia, she had no social or economic revolution. The dictatorship of Benito Mussolini, which lasted for more than twenty years, did not result from a *coup d'état*, since he came into office quite legally, nor did it rely upon military support from the army; it merely used the power inherent in the

cabinet of an ordinary democratic state, aided by the king, to overthrow the democratic form of government in the state and replace it by one-party government directed by the party leader. Mussolini was aided to power by his bands of *squadristi*, which amounted to a small, black-shirted, private army. But this private army could easily have been suppressed by the regular troops of the preceding government if that government had indeed determined to suppress it and had been supported by the king.

Ever since unification and independence as a national state, Italy had been plagued by corrupt governments. None of the many political parties had been strong enough to command a majority in the parliament, and the prime ministers, chosen by the king, had always been compelled to buy the support of other party leaders by promises of jobs, many of which were sinecures. The elections were notoriously dishonest, votes being openly bought and sold, when the elections themselves were not fixed by the party in power. The resulting governments had not in all cases been inefficient, but they were always unstable; and no serious, positive program had ever been put through to meet the crying need of reform.

Italy had desperate social and economic problems requiring solution. The south had never recovered from the long rule of the Spaniards. Great landowners possessed most of the land in the south and still ruled in an almost feudal manner an enormous rural proletariat, which had no alternative employment and was chronically underemployed. The few southern towns and cities lacked employment opportunities, since there was little industry. The northern section of the country, the old kingdom of Piedmont, on the other hand, was quite prosperous. Here was almost all the industry of the country, much of which was as efficient and enterprising as any in Europe. Moreover, the valley of the Po was a rich agricultural area. Central Italy was somewhere between the two extremes, both economically and geographically. There were some prosperous cities and pockets of good agricultural land; but much of it was hardly less depressed than in the south. A permanent threat to the economy and a cause of chronic unemployment and underemployment was the ever

increasing overpopulation, a problem that in the years before the war was in part alleviated by huge emigration to America. The country, which was short of industrial resources, was able to pay its way and to balance its excess of imports over exports only through remittances from Italians who lived abroad.

THE RISE OF FASCISM

General characteristics of fascism Clearly there was a need for reform, even for heroic measures. But the measures were not those advocated by the strident nationalism of the war years and the first years of the peace. It was always easy to demand more territory or call for the "return" of lands that were inhabited by Italians. The Treaty of London of 1915 had been a shameless bargaining of Italian lives for more territory; only when Italy's high demands had been agreed to by the Allies did she enter the war. But the peace treaties gave her far less than had been promised; and the territories she did win were already well populated and could absorb few except the inevitable officials.

After the war there was a widespread feeling that Italy had been cheated, a feeling magnified by the anti-government press. Moreover, the left-wing Socialists and Communists in the northern areas were determined to extract concessions from the government and their employers by direct action. The socialist political parties were on the increase, as was also a new Catholic party, with a program of reform based upon the social ideas of the Catholic Church. A wave of strikes had caused several changes in government, and though the resulting new governments differed little from the old, the strikes were nevertheless being settled one by one, and by 1921 some prosperity was beginning to return, at least in the north. The situation, however, remained explosive, and it was made to order for an inspired demagogue ready and able to take advantage of it.

Benito Mussolini started his career as a Socialist and syndicalist. In the early part of the war he had also been a pacifist. Later he supported Italian intervention in the war, in which he himself fought and was wounded. By the time of the peace he had become an ardent national-



Italian boys making ready for the day of destiny. (BROWN BROTHERS)

ist and supporter of war and had abandoned his socialist principles in favor of a vague right-wing ideology which he called fascism. This ideology was impossible to formulate clearly, since in essence it was nothing but an opportunistic adaptation to the circumstances of the times. The government was unpopular and could not get things done, for reasons inherent in the Italian democratic system. Fascism therefore became antidemocratic and authoritarian, and adopted the principle that all policy ought to flow from a single authoritarian ruler, whom the people would follow because, being ignorant and largely illiterate, they wished to be told what to do by someone who knew. Italians were discontented because they did not command the prestige in the world that they felt they deserved. They had been treated by the other peacemakers in a cavalier fashion; and though they had won a great victory over the Austrians during the last days of the war, it had not expunged the memory of Caporetto in 1917, in which battle the Italians had been overwhelmingly defeated by the Central Powers. So fascism became stridently nationalistic and militaristic, determined to compensate for actual weaknesses and failures by noisy sounds of aggressiveness and war. This policy had the virtue in Fascist eyes of directing

attention away from the real evils which would have required effort and sacrifice to overcome, toward the imagined iniquities perpetrated on Italians by foreigners.

Fascism needs to be distinguished sharply from communism in that the latter had a real program and required real sacrifices, which were imposed by a ruthless dictatorship. In Italy there never was any worth-while program directed to the needs of the times. The Fascist dictatorship operated in the interests of the ruling classes, who initially subsidized the Fascist party and movement and always profited from it. Such sacrifices as were demanded were made only by the poor—the workers and peasants who had to pay the bill for the ostentatious military trappings of the regime and for the huge Fascist bureaucracy, which performed few useful functions and whose main task was its own perpetuation. When Mussolini first began to announce his program after the war he was looked upon with contempt by the Socialists and by the Catholic Populist party, both of which were interested in improving the lot of the workers through ordinary parliamentary means. They did not take Mussolini seriously. The numerically much fewer Communists, bent on revolution of a different kind, took him more seriously; they



*Mussolini leading the
"March on Rome," 1922.
(BROWN BROTHERS)*

had little choice since their meetings were constantly broken up by Fascist bands. The Communists had some strength in the labor unions, although such strength could not easily be transformed into parliamentary seats. But the richer classes, especially the industrialists, early saw in the Fascist movement a tool by which they might intimidate the workers and head off the reforms demanded by the two progressive parties. They may have regarded Mussolini and his toughs with private disdain, but they felt they would be useful to them; and there is no doubt that much of the money that reached the party coffers came from these classes. But even more than with money they supported Mussolini by their influence, which was considerable and reached into the highest circles in the nation. Thus the Fascists were treated with great consideration by the police. It was seldom that their meetings were broken up. When they engaged in fights with Communists, any intervention the police made was in favor of the Fascists.

The March on Rome In 1921 a general election was held, in which the Fascists won a bare thirty-five seats out of several hundred; but this did not daunt their ardor. On the contrary, it spurred them to greater efforts to create the appearance of the breakdown of government. Finally, late in 1922, Mussolini called for a "march on Rome" to take over the government, which had been unable to obtain the king's consent to the declaration of martial law and was undoubtedly tottering. The "march" was in fact no march at all. It was mostly a concerted rush of Fascists by suburban trains and other conventional transportation to the capital. But it had its effect. Mussolini was called upon by King Victor Emmanuel II to take over the government as prime minister, with the parliamentary support of all his thirty-five deputies. It did not matter that he had little parliamentary support. He did not need it as long as he had control over the strings of government, especially the police—who would henceforth encourage openly the Fascist hands, which soon became officially the Fascist militia. Though the other parties resisted briefly, they were unable to unite against Mussolini, nor did they possess any effective weapons. Mussolini, with the support of

the king, controlled the executive, and legislated when he needed to by decree or by intimidating the deputies by very direct means, including beatings of the recalcitrant and the administration of castor oil. Soon afterward, to make his position doubly secure, and with the ostensible purpose of creating an effective government in spite of the multiplication of parties, Mussolini intimidated the deputies into agreeing that the party which won the most seats in an election should be deemed to have two thirds of the seats. In fact this refinement was not necessary, since in the ensuing election the Fascists won more than half the seats—or so the government, which controlled the ballot boxes, announced.

The Fascist party and government The Fascist party became the only legal party in the state, and a slate of party members was the only one submitted to the electors, who could either vote for or against the list—a device adopted from Soviet Russia. Within the next few years the administration was taken over fully by the party. All appointments were made only with the approval of the central government. Each city had its Fascist mayor and council. The judges who insisted on maintaining the old system of trial in accordance with the law were intimidated or dismissed. Mussolini announced the existence of a new kind of justice, "Fascist justice," which was superior to all other known forms and in accord with the higher interests of the people.

The party was securely in the hands of Mussolini himself, who was known as the leader, Il Duce. He appointed the Secretariat and the Fascist Grand Council, which was his chief advisory body. The council did not possess any power of its own, but its discussions and debates were valuable to the government insofar as they suggested policies and projects for the Duce, kept him informed about the state of the nation, and provided him with material for his frequent harangues to the people. The Fascist Grand Council was composed of leading party members throughout the country and was recruited via well-defined stages from the lower rungs of the Fascist hierarchy.

The Fascist regime spoke much of its philosophy and displayed remarkable virtuosity in

devising grandiose political and economic structures, which seldom functioned, if they existed at all. But they were spoken of as if they were the real foundations of the state. It was widely believed abroad and even at home that Italy was a "corporative" state, built in general accordance with the Catholic notion of class cooperation. The "corporations" were indeed set up, but they performed no visibly useful function. All that they achieved could have been done equally well without the aid of the corporative façade. At the level of the ordinary business establishment, representatives of the workers, compulsorily organized into unions, met with their employers and supposedly discussed wages and other working conditions. Strikes were forbidden, and also, for good measure, lockouts. But in addition to the workers and the employers a local party representative sat in at all conferences, and he was able to compel acceptance of his terms. In practice, he and the employer ganged up on the worker.

Above the local worker-management committees, known as syndicates, there were further groups of syndicates, and above these were the great federations of syndicates, known as corporations. One such corporation was set up for each of twenty-two different occupations. In each corporation and syndicate the proceeding was the same: the Fascist party functionary arbitrated in favor of a settlement, which was almost invariably in favor of the employer. This system was supposedly the fulfillment of the workers' desire for syndicalism and equal rights with management. But the Fascists knew very well to whom they were beholden for their position; and though occasionally, especially in the 1930's, they coerced the employers as well as the workers into policies favored by the state, as a general rule the interests of the party and of the employers were identical. The employers wished to keep their workers disciplined, resigned to a low wage, and unable either to strike or to quit, while at the same time they wished to employ only as many men as they needed, and be entirely free to hire and fire in accordance with market conditions. The party members wished only to have their share of the proceeds and to keep themselves in power. They were not in the least interested in improving the lot of the work-

ers at the expense of good relations with their ultimate paymasters.

The Fascists boasted loudly of the industrial peace they had ensured, and claimed they had solved the major problem that affected democratic nations. No newspaper could gainsay them, for journalists were expected to "serve the interests of the nation." Production figures, however, remained unimpressive, and Italy partook only slightly of the almost universal economic boom of the 1920's. What was achieved was far better discipline and an end of the riotous individualism characteristic of prewar Italy. Order was maintained under threat of severe sanctions. Overt opposition in any field was severely repressed, and within the Fascist party itself any breath of disapproval of Il Duce was regarded as little short of treason; if it led to nothing worse, it cut off forever any hope of advancement within the ranks of government, which remained a Fascist monopoly throughout the whole period of the dictatorship.

Personally a vain man, Mussolini liked to receive credit from foreigners for his enlightened policies and for the visibly better-scrubbed look that Italy now presented to her tourists. He fancied the Italians as resurrected Romans of antiquity, and the great Roman ruins as the work of ancient Italians. He restored many antiquities and created huge public works in the old Roman style, including the draining of the Pontine marshes. This latter work was of some use, although it helped only an infinitesimal percentage of Italy's surplus population and at a cost which the country's economy could ill afford. When the Great Depression hit Italy, it became difficult to balance international accounts, and unemployment rose spectacularly. Mussolini's only answer was to enroll the unemployed in the armed forces and to give florid public speeches on the glory of Italy and her need for living space and colonies. But up to the middle 1930's he had been very circumspect in his foreign policy, and generally cooperated with Britain and France.

FOREIGN POLICY

Initial opposition to Hitler When Hitler rose to power in Germany, Mussolini was flat-

tered that Hitler was imitating his leadership system and that the German dictator acknowledged himself his pupil. But he did not trust Hitler at all and made every effort to prevent his expansion beyond the borders of the truncated Germany of the treaty of Versailles. When Hitler attempted a *coup d'état* in Austria in 1934, Italian troops and threats played an important part in thwarting him, and it was Italy that provided most of the guidance for the semi-Fascist movement that stayed in power in Austria during the greater part of the decade. As late as 1935 Italy provided the meeting place for a conference (Stresa) which discussed what to do about German armament in contravention of the treaty. It was in no way Italy's fault that the conference could come to no agreement capable of implementation.

Invasion of Ethiopia and subsequent cooperation with Hitler But the situation wholly changed in 1936, when Mussolini decided that the time had come to undertake a project that had failed in 1896—the conquest of Ethiopia, which the League of Nations attempted to take action to prevent. Although the relatively mild sanctions applied by the League did not deter Mussolini from the conquest, which was achieved within a few months, he greatly resented the interference by Britain and France with his designs, and turned toward the Germany of Hitler as a more congenial partner than the countries that had made up the anti-Italian majority in the League. Thus in October 1936, the so-called Axis was formed, in which it should have been clear that Italy was doomed to be the junior partner. Only a month later Japan joined the Axis powers in an "Anti-Comintern" pact. Mussolini, indeed, could retain his apparent position of importance only by cooperating enthusiastically in Hitler's projects and occasionally bailing him out.

In early 1938 Italy was compelled to give Germany a free hand in Austria, thus destroying Italian influence in that country; and in other respects Mussolini soon found he had lost the initiative to Hitler. The Munich Conference of 1938 was held at Mussolini's request, and he was thus enabled to act as peacemaker. When Hitler gobbled up the last of Czechoslovakia in

1939, Mussolini seized Albania, which had already for a long time been a virtual Italian protectorate. A month later he signed a binding treaty with Germany, known as the Pact of Steel. Though he did not enter the war at once on Germany's side, this abstention was in accordance with German policy. At the end of 1940 Mussolini invaded Greece but was driven back with considerable losses and a total destruction of Italian prestige. From this adventure he had himself to be bailed out by Hitler, and thereafter until the fall of the regime Italy remained tied to the chariot wheels of Germany.

❖ Germany

THE WEIMAR ERA

Attitude of Germans toward defeat We have already noted in the last chapter how the Germans after World War I were required to sign the treaty of Versailles, which was regarded by all patriotic Germans as a peace dictated by the victors, and a betrayal of the principles laid down in the Fourteen Points and accepted in Germany. The Germans, whose territory had never been invaded, and who in fact never knew during the war itself how complete was their defeat, actually expected to be granted a reasonable peace, without major loss of territory. The reparations they had been compelled to pay they regarded as an intolerable imposition to be avoided if possible by patriotic Germans; the war-guilt clause was regarded not only as a travesty of the real facts but a deep insult to German honor. Thus the treaty of Versailles cast its shadow over the whole inter-war period, and great numbers of Germans waited only for the moment when it could be broken.

The military, of course, knew the facts, but it was not in the interests of the exclusive aristocratic class of German officers ever to admit it. When they saw they could not win the war, they called upon the despised civilian parties to rescue them; and it was the civilians who had to sign the hated peace treaty and try to restore the country. Among the parties the Social Democratic party was by far the largest and most influential, as it had been in the years just pre-

ceding the war. But it had ceased to be a dynamic entity. Its revolutionary *élan* had long ago disappeared, and the task of rebuilding Germany after a destructive war and a dictated peace treaty was too great for any party without the united support of the whole nation. This the Social Democratic party was never able to win. A Catholic Center party, the next largest in the state, was unwilling to support it. Both remained minority parties under the Weimar Constitution, as did the Nationalist right-wing party, supported by industrialists and business interests as well as by the more political elements in the army.

The Weimar Constitution The Weimar Constitution was in most respects a very liberal document. Numerous clauses stated the general desire of the people for social justice, and civil liberties were strongly entrenched in it. Though the state remained a federal one and the separate states had their own governments as before, the lower house of the parliament, the Reichstag, had far more power than before, and the chancellor was now responsible to it and not to the president. But the system of proportional representation under which each party which garnered sufficient votes throughout the country was entitled to a proportional number of seats, condemned the new republic to a multiplication of parties and an unending procession of coalition governments, as in the Latin democratic countries. If the parties had agreed on fundamental principles, differing only on minor points, the coalitions would have had enough stability to run the country effectively. But this condition obtained only for a short time in the late 1920's. The right-wing parties detested and feared the Social Democrats, a detestation that was reciprocated. The Communist party had no interest in preserving democracy, and the right-wing parties, especially the National Socialist party, had little more. There were far too few Germans who felt that their government represented them, and Germany had not yet enough experience in democratic procedures and democratic give-and-take to feel a vital interest in maintaining democracy and republican institutions.

The constitution makers had recognized the possible danger of the breakdown of government

and had inserted a provision—Article 48—permitting the president to rule by decree in times of emergency. Article 48 was later to become notorious during the Great Depression, when President Hindenburg used it for several years to keep the party of his choice in power, in spite of the fact that it had little or no support in the Reichstag.

The inflation and its consequences The first great crisis arose in 1923, when the French and Belgians invaded the Ruhr to exact reparation payments that were not being made. The German government could not refuse to back the many workers who refused to work for the foreigners; but the method it chose both to aid the strikers and to carry on its business when its credit was at an all-time low proved disastrous. There was a runaway inflation, and the value of the mark sank to almost nothing. It cost billions of marks to buy one loaf of bread if the bread was available at any price at all. The result was that all who owed money were able to pay off their debts in worthless currency, whereas all who were owed money or who had



Germans during the 1923 inflation calculate whether they have enough marks at the day's rate of exchange to buy bread. (UNITED PRESS)

accumulated any savings found them wiped out. The industrialists and landowners profited greatly by acquiring full ownership over their properties free of debt. The workers who had no savings were hard pressed for a time but on the whole lost little. Those who had access to foreign currency were able to use it to acquire other properties for virtually nothing when the owners had to sell in order to be able to eat. But the formerly substantial middle classes who owned bonds and a regular income from investments were simply cleaned out.

It is impossible to overestimate the importance of the uncontrolled inflation as a psychological preparation for what came later. The middle classes could no longer believe in everything they had once thought to be ordered and secure. A lifetime of saving and building for economic security was wasted. The solid conservative burgher suddenly found himself helpless against economic forces over which he had no control whatever; thereafter he was reckless and ready to follow any man who promised him alternative means of ensuring his security. He had nothing more to lose, and anything might prove better. Although economic conditions improved for a number of years, and there was a febrile brittle prosperity at the end of the 20's, the wound had penetrated deeply. Few believed the prosperity would ever last; when the boom finally collapsed the corroding cynicism of the inflation years quickly returned. The Nazi movement always looked to the middle class for its support, especially the ill-educated lower middle class, which was ready to believe even the lies and doctrines of racial superiority propagated by the Nazis. This middle class also was ready to believe the Jews had been responsible for the inflation, since a few Jews with international capital had acquired property during the period—as had, of course, far more non-Jews. It was, however, good to have a scapegoat who could be named and pointed to, and who could be used to direct blame away from where it belonged. Although, in a sense, the loss of the war and the special circumstances of the postwar era in Germany were more responsible for the rise of Hitler than any group in the state, the financial and industrial interests, with their short-sighted and antisocial policies, and,

on occasion, the cowardice and self-seeking of the parties must also bear a major share of such responsibility as can be imputed to individuals.

First appearance of Adolf Hitler—Beer-Hall Putsch (1923) In 1923 Adolf Hitler first came to public notice. After the war numerous small parties had been formed, most of which disappeared quickly. But Hitler's National Socialist party, which originally had tried to appeal to workers and arose out of a workers' party, survived, even though it had few adherents. It had always been looked upon with favor by other antigovernment groups, including some of the military, who admired its notions of German racial superiority and anti-Semitism, as well as its uncompromising opposition to democratic government. The successful war general Ludendorff, dreaming of the great days of the war and resenting deeply the clause in the peace treaty by which Germany was limited to an army of 100,000 men, lent some prestige to the movement, in spite of his obvious imbalance. At a moment of crisis in 1923 Hitler with his band of dedicated followers called for an uprising to overthrow the local Bavarian state government. The movement had no chance whatever of success, and was easily suppressed, and Hitler himself was condemned to a mild imprisonment, during which he wrote his political credo, *Mein Kampf*, a blueprint for what, contrary to all expectations in the late 1920's, was ultimately to become the program for the Nazi party and the German national government. When the country appeared to be recovering, Hitler was released by the government.

Brief period of amity with Western powers Meanwhile the inflation had been brought to an end with American aid. Reparations were scaled down under the Dawes Plan, and foreign money, especially American, began to regard Germany as a profitable field for industrial investment of surplus capital. The influx of dollars enabled the reparation payments to be made without too much difficulty, and much remained for domestic use. Germany began to make a spectacular recovery. Blessed with a modern new industrial plant she began to eat into Britain's export trade; in international affairs Gustav Strese-

mann, the German minister of foreign affairs, adopted a new policy of accepting the treaty of Versailles and trying to live with its provisions. In 1925 he signed the Locarno Pact, which seemed to herald the approach of a new era of international amity. Germany agreed also to play her part in maintaining the League system of mutual security, and in 1927 she became a member of the League of Nations. Meanwhile under an earlier treaty with the Soviet Union (treaty of Rapallo, 1922), many German ex-officers were employed in Russia as technical advisers, and other Germans received training in the Russian armies, thus forming the nucleus of a new German army, ready for the time when the Allied powers should have gained enough confidence in German pacific intentions to be willing to relax the military provisions of the treaty of Versailles.

Rise of Hitler to power Then suddenly the Great Depression struck, and Germany, whose economy was the most vulnerable among the industrial nations, was the hardest hit. Unemployment soared to astronomical heights, and Germany soon proclaimed herself unable to meet her reparations payments. The government dared not resort again to inflation. Thus the only remedy available was severe deflation, the cutting of wages and salaries, import restrictions and similar measures. As always, such a policy was extremely unpopular and presented an opportunity for the revolutionary parties. The Communists won numerous recruits amongst the working classes, while the discontented middle class increasingly turned toward National Socialism, which had been almost impotent in the years of prosperity. Both Communists and Nazis were uninterested in parliamentary government. Communist and Nazi deputies in the Reichstag were unwilling to join with the other parties to form coalition governments and consistently voted against whatever government was in office. Parliamentary government therefore became impossible, and Field Marshal Hindenburg, a Junker aristocrat who had been elected president in 1925, was compelled to use Article 48 of the Constitution and rule by decree. Heinrich Brüning, the Catholic Center party leader, was appointed chancellor; but only on rare occasions was he ever able to obtain a parliamentary

majority for his measures. The Nazis organized an irregular army of brown-shirted young men, and the Communists retaliated in kind. Hitler's appeals to the people became ever more strident. With a shrewd mixture of promises to end unemployment and diatribes against communism and socialism and trade unions, he began to win increasing support. In the election of July 1932 he had by far the largest party in the Reichstag, but Hindenburg would not make him chancellor. When Brüning could no longer serve his purpose, Hindenburg appointed a personal friend, Franz von Papen, to the chancellorship, who had almost no support at all in the Reichstag, and continued to rule by decree. But the economic situation showed as yet no signs of improving.

At last even the German farmers, hitherto opponents of Hitler, joined him. The Ottawa Agreements of 1932, under which Britain had at last agreed to put a tariff on agricultural products, had had the side effect of causing the Danes to flood Germany with the products they could no longer sell to Britain. At this juncture, the number of Nazi deputies reached 230, the highest number ever attained under free elections; and although Hitler failed to unseat Hindenburg in a bid for the presidency, he made a respectable showing. Under the regime of von Papen and of General von Schleicher, who followed him, many of the industrialists and army officers who had always been somewhat sympathetic to Hitler decided that he should at last be given the chancellorship—but under conditions that would leave them in control through the small right-wing Nationalist party. They were able to persuade the senile Hindenburg that the move was necessary, in spite of the president's distaste for the plebeian and vulgar Hitler. In fact, the move might have been avoided, since in the last months of 1932 the economy showed a slight upturn, and the increasing disgust of the German people at the behavior of Hitler's storm troopers translated itself into a loss of strength in the election of October 1932. But the party remained by far the strongest in the state, and there can be no doubt that the Nationalists grossly underestimated the man who was to be their protégé. In March 1933, Hindenburg invited Hitler to become chancellor, with von Papen as his vice-



President Hindenburg at the age of 86, not long before his death. Hitler, Himmler, and Goering, who follow the president, are already in power in Germany. (BROWN BROTHERS)

chancellor. Up to this point the rise of Hitler to power had been quite legal; and in fact it was the legally correct procedure for Hindenburg at long last to choose as chancellor the leader of the largest party in the Reichstag.

NATIONAL-SOCIALIST GERMANY

Establishment of a totalitarian state Once in power and in control of the Prussian police

through his henchman Hermann Goering, Hitler elbowed his way to supreme control of the state within the space of a few brief months. The Communists, his proclaimed enemies, were dealt with by the police and the storm troopers. A fire which destroyed the Reichstag building, and which, whether or not it was set by the Nazis was brilliantly exploited by them, was blamed on the Communists. Many of them were arrested, and the remainder excluded from the Reichstag.

Without this opposition, and with the aid of his Nationalist allies, Hitler was able to coerce the Reichstag into passing an enabling act, which allowed him to take all measures necessary for restoring the state and the economy without further consultation. Thereafter it was only a matter of time for him to take full control. The other parties, not excluding the Nationalists, were in due course dissolved, to the accompaniment of a barrage of propaganda from Paul Goebbels, Hitler's "minister of popular enlightenment." Severe measures were instituted against the Jews and Communists, and against anyone else named by the Nazis as an enemy of the state. The myth of Aryan superiority was propagated in every speech by Hitler, who, following Italian precedent, was styled the Fuehrer, or leader, by his ministers. An official philosophy which proclaimed this racial superiority became required teaching in all the schools. In 1934 Hitler disposed of his more disreputable assistants on his road to power and disbanded the storm troopers, thus purging the party of all potential opposition. He was now strong enough to appoint a Nazi sympathizer as chief of staff of the army. When Hindenburg died in the same year, Hitler was himself elected president, thus concentrating all the power of the state in his hands.

Even so, it is doubtful if Hitler could have maintained his position if his foreign policies had not been so outstandingly successful, and if his domestic policies, simple though they were, had not solved the problem of unemployment and satisfied the influential classes, especially the industrialists and the army. The industrialists got what they wanted, an authoritarian regime which imposed discipline on the workers and enabled themselves to make profits; the military won the gradual scrapping of the Versailles Treaty and the removal of the restrictions on German rearmament written into the treaty. Furthermore nationalist Germans were uplifted by the manner in which the restrictions were removed. There was no negotiation, no visible regard for the feelings of foreigners—only unilateral action and the threat of force. The success of this threat displayed to the world what a determined people and government could do, and demonstrated the obvious fact that Germany

alone was vital and dynamic, while the foreigners were decadent and clearly destined to bow to the superiority of the Germans.

The Nazi rise to power was aptly called by Hermann Rauschning the "revolution of nihilism"; for in fact nazism was as barren of ideas as was Italian fascism. Unemployment was reduced to a minimum by great programs of public works followed by conscription and rearmament; and the power of the government was ruthlessly used to direct labor into channels that were regarded as socially useful. The domestic program was paid for by an imaginative credit policy directed by Hjalmar Schacht, president of the Reichsbank, and by strict rationing of consumer goods and reduction of unnecessary consumption. Special bonuses were paid to farmers to persuade them to make the country more nearly self-sufficient in food. Decrees were issued that all land was to be brought into production or forfeited. Imports were cut to an absolute minimum, and substitute raw materials were created by the efficient German chemical industry. When the rearmament program went into high gear in the later years of the regime the slogan was coined by Goering: "guns instead of butter."

In spite of its material achievements there was not one single generous or humane idea within the Nazi philosophy. Its impetus was national aggressiveness, the determination to demonstrate German racial superiority. Minorities, especially the Jewish minority, which had been fully assimilated and was barely conscious of its Judaism, were ruthlessly persecuted, as were dissenters and opponents of the regime. The terror, administered by the secret police, or Gestapo, was never far away, and it attempted to keep card files with proper German efficiency on every citizen of the country. The ritual and pageantry of nazism served the sole purpose of glorifying the regime and the German people. Under the so-called "strength through joy" program some Germans were given paid vacations and pleasure trips at public expense. But few benefited from it, and those few took their vacations in a glare of publicity that may have been detrimental not only to their joy but to their strength.

The Nazi party members, unlike their Italian



Anti-semitism in Germany—a Jewish optician's store with swastika and the word "Jude" (Jew). (BROWN BROTHERS)

counterparts, preferred not to take any direct responsibility for industry. Instead, the industrial leaders were kept under control by being made to work for the ends decreed by the state on pain of dispossession. Since they continued to receive profits, and since in general the tax laws favored big, rather than small, industry, they were not discontent, even though all initiative in the management of their business was taken from them. Small businesses were continually swallowed up by their larger competitors, since the great cartels, to which German industry had always been inclined, were more useful to the government as partners than small businesses. As in the Soviet Union, direction was supplied from above by the top Nazi hierarchy. But there can be little doubt that the large majority of docile Germans, who had never been accustomed to freedom as it is known in the

democracies, were content with their order and security; and many neither understood nor desired freedom. During the entire Nazi regime prior to the second World War the government certainly commanded the assent of most of its people—even if it could not have achieved in a free vote the overwhelming majority revealed by the plebiscites, by which Hitler took the pulse of his people throughout his reign. The surviving members of the minority were naturally not consulted.

Economic imperialism—The "Schacht plan"

In the later years of the regime when the rearmament program was causing serious shortages, Germany, under the direction of Schacht, invented a novel method for obtaining both the raw materials and foreign currency she needed on her own terms. The method also constituted

a new venture in economic imperialism and brought several Eastern European countries into the German economic orbit as virtual satellites. The Depression was still far from over, and the Eastern countries were unable to sell their produce to nations which bristled with tariffs and quotas and were loath to expend any foreign currency for imports that could be dispensed with. In such circumstances an offer by Germany to buy the whole or a substantial part of their crop at prices above the world level seemed like a godsend. But Germany paid in "blocked" marks, which could be exchanged only for German goods. The deal was usually financed by the government of the country in question, which would be repaid only when the Germans themselves paid the debt. This they did not do during the first year of the agreement, refusing to release the blocked marks except in exchange for a further deal on similar terms. The creditor government was thus helpless in the hands of its debtor—an unusual reversal of the customary position. When the marks were at last unblocked, the foreigners could buy only those German products which were available—surplus machinery and outdated arms, supplemented by (no doubt much-needed) aspirin and harmonicas. Many of these surplus German products had thus to be sold abroad for what they would fetch. Meanwhile old markets had been lost, and the creditor countries had to continue their unprofitable business with Germany on pain of losing the only market they now had.

FOREIGN POLICY

General characteristics The foreign policy of the Third Reich, as it was called (the first being the Holy Roman Empire and the second Imperial Germany), was brilliant in an utterly unprincipled manner that was new to Europe, but it unfortunately set the tone for much subsequent history and was an example to the post-war Russians. Adolf Hitler had an extraordinary understanding of the weaknesses of everyone with whom he came in contact and of the way the stupidities and fears of each nation could be played upon for his profit. A man of no scruples whatever, possessed of a single-minded

devotion to the aggrandizement of his country, and aided by a few men of considerable ability and a like absence of scruple, he succeeded in molding all Europe to his will until at Munich in 1938 he stood on the summit, the opposition routed and Europe at his feet. If at that moment he had consolidated what he had won and not driven Britain and France beyond their formidable powers of endurance by a naked aggression and a breaking of his most recent agreement a bare six months after it had been signed, he might yet have conquered Europe by means short of war. But his own temperament, which ached for violence and was not content with diplomatic victories simply by threat of violence, together with the dynamic expansionism of his movement, led him finally into war and to the destruction of nazism by the very violence it had sought.

Systematic destruction of Versailles Treaty

The international consequences of Hitler's victories on the road to Munich will be discussed again in the next chapter. It is sufficient here to note the successive stages, each involving a calculated risk justified by success, and each building up further the myth of the dictator's infallible intuition. As early as 1933 he withdrew from the League of Nations, since Germany was not regarded, in his view, as having equal rights with foreign nations as long as German territory was in the hands of others. The following year a coup was attempted in Austria by native Nazis, but Austria was able to stave it off, with the support of Mussolini, who was not yet in the German camp. The Nazis, however, remained powerful in Austria, whose leaders were never strong enough to suppress the movement. In 1935 the Saar, a rich territory administered by the French on behalf of the League of Nations, voted to join Germany when its international status expired. In the same year, contrary to the Versailles Treaty, Hitler instituted conscription, calculating that no one would attempt to stop him by force. Also in the same year by a shrewd maneuver he inveigled the British government into accepting German naval rearmament by promising to retain permanent inferiority to the British. The latter, happy to think that the German fleet



would never approach their own, conveniently forgot that Germany was not entitled by the treaty of Versailles to have any fleet at all. Late in 1935 Mussolini invaded Ethiopia, a venture which drew him into the German orbit, as described earlier in the chapter. This was followed by the alliance known as the Axis and by the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan.

Meanwhile the most dangerous step of all had been taken by Hitler—a step that could have been stopped by military force. In March 1936, German troops occupied the Rhineland, demilitarized by the Versailles Treaty and evacuated by the Allies after the Locarno Pact. The British made it clear that they would not stop the Germans by force. The French, who might have been willing to march if the British had joined them, dared not take unilateral action, against which the government had been advised by its generals.

Hitler offered Britain and France nonaggression treaties in exchange and proclaimed himself a lover of peace. There is no doubt that France at little or no cost to herself could have forced German withdrawal, and Hitler had in fact acted against the advice of his own generals, who knew that their army could not resist the French. But Hitler had been right, not they; and his prestige soared. In March 1938, Hitler

turned his attention to Austria, ruled by an anti-Nazi semidictatorship ever since the failure of the 1934 coup. After a partially successful effort to intimidate the Austrian chancellor, his troops marched into Austria and conquered the country without resistance. This action was ratified by a plebiscite under Nazi direction. The powers had long recognized that they could no longer intervene in such a matter. Why should they strain at a gnat after swallowing the camel piecemeal? In any case the plebiscite demonstrated that the Austrians had enjoyed self-determination in choosing to unite with Germany.

The Munich crisis Finally Hitler turned to Czechoslovakia, where large numbers of Germans lived in the Sudeten area. Suddenly these Germans, many of whom were Nazis and who had formed a Nazi party, became aware that they had been suffering from "inhuman atrocities" at the hands of the majority Czechs, and demanded self-determination after the Austrian model. Hitler backed their demands. The Czechs were willing to fight for their independence and the integrity of their state, as Hitler soon discovered. But by astutely playing upon the fears of the British and French of a general war, he was able to persuade the British to put pressure

upon the French to refrain from honoring their alliance with the Czechs. Tensions were deliberately heightened till the British began digging trenches in Hyde Park in central London, and even Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain realized that Hitler was "no gentleman" and could not be trusted. At this point Mussolini suggested a conference, which was agreed to and held in Munich. While the Czechs waited outside the door of the conference room the Big Four decided on their fate. Czechoslovakia was partitioned and robbed of her one secure military line of defense.

It was Hitler's last victory by diplomacy. Within five and a half years the Versailles Treaty had been scrapped, the German army was now almost if not quite strong enough to take on the British and French armies together, and the German air force was unquestionably superior. Austria had been incorporated within the German Reich, as had the Sudetenland. There remained the Polish corridor to be joined to the Reich, and then Germany would be restored to her prewar frontiers, with Austria and the Sudetenland added from the former Austro-Hungarian empire. It was an astonishing achievement, and to the "Aryan Germans," who under Hitler's leadership could now truly believe themselves to be a master race, it was no doubt worth all that it had cost.

♦ Portugal

There remains only to deal briefly with a third state ruled by a dictator, very different from the flamboyant dictatorships of Hitler and Mussolini. The small state of Portugal had never been able to establish an effective government since the abdication of her last king, Manoel II in 1910. In spite of, or perhaps because of, a liberal democratic constitution, her economic and political problems seemed insoluble until an army coup in 1926 led by General Carmona installed at the head of the government a professor of economics named Oliveira Salazar. Salazar's regime has persisted to this day. By a very careful economic policy, fortified by Catholic social theory and practice, Portugal has restored her finances and made some slight

economic progress. No opposition to Salazar has been permitted, and the country has been run without benefit of political parties, its rule resting on the support of the army, which, however, Salazar has kept out of politics. The regime is also looked upon with favor by the Catholic Church, whose influence is all-pervasive in Portuguese life, although it is not a state church. Under the Portuguese dictatorship employers and workers were organized into guilds, supervised by the benevolent eye of the dictator. Thus, though private enterprise works under conditions that give it perfect security against demands by its employees and an almost guaranteed low margin of profit, it is not encouraged by the system to display any great initiative. Throughout the whole rule of Salazar Portugal has borne a somewhat medieval appearance, each man working in the state of life to which it has pleased God to call him, peasants working uncomplainingly for low wages, employers caring for the needs of their employees, and both accepting the kindly ministrations of the Church and the benevolent despot at the head of the government. This, at all events, is the picture offered to the world by Salazar, and it is without doubt the appearance presented by Portuguese life. But treason trials are increasing, and when elections are held and the censorship relaxed for the occasion, the usually silent anti-government forces rise for a moment to the surface. It is possible that for a time longer Portugal can stay out of the modern world and remain insulated from world problems. But it is unlikely that the authoritarian regime will long outlast the rule of Salazar and his incomparable prestige, won by his orderly and economical government over more than three decades.

♦ Summary

In this chapter we have studied four authoritarian regimes, of which two still survive. A fifth, that of Franco's Spain, will be considered briefly in the next chapter. By the second World War there were few democratic regimes remaining in Europe, and the fine hopes with which democracy had been launched in so many countries after World War I were seriously

dimmed. Even France among the democracies had already toyed with an authoritarian solution to her problems. The prestige of Britain and France after Munich was at a low ebb, the United States was regarded little more highly, having withdrawn into isolation; after her efforts to restrain Japan had met with little success she had made no further effort to exercise leadership in Europe. The world of the future seemed to belong to the dictators. Totalitarianism seemed to be dynamic and energetic, although raucous and aggressive; and there was no lack of would-be imitators even in the democratic countries. Sometimes, viewing events with hindsight, it seems that war was inevitable, that the dictators must one day overreach themselves and plunge the world into war as Hitler did; it is difficult indeed to see how the forces they had unchained could have been bridled. But the historian may wonder what would have happened if the still powerful democratic nations had not been directly attacked in their most vital interests, and how much further the democratic nations would have permitted their power to be eroded. We must therefore now turn to the ebbing of democratic initiative in the inter-war period, to which the next chapter will be devoted.

Suggestions for further reading

PAPERBACK BOOKS

- Arendt, Hannah. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. Meridian. A thoughtful study by a political philosopher.
- Bauer, Raymond A., et al. *How the Soviet System Works: Cultural, Psychological, and Social Themes*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956. Consists of the data derived from questions and interviews by the Harvard project.
- Brinton, Crane. *The Anatomy of Revolution*. Vintage. Compares the Russian with the French and English revolutions.
- Bullock, Alan. *Hitler, A Study in Tyranny*. Bantam. Abridgment of the best biography of Hitler.
- Hook, Sidney. *The Hero in History*. Beacon. An interesting study of whether men have been influential in molding history or have been

merely the instruments of destiny. The book is recommended here for its study of Lenin as one of the very few—perhaps there are no others—who truly changed the course of history by his own will.

- Koestler, Arthur. *Darkness at Noon*. NAL. One of the very best novels of Russia, by an ex-Communist, describing better than any factual account the kind of pressures to which a dedicated Russian Communist may be subjected.
- McNeal, Robert H. *The Russian Revolution: Why Did the Bolsheviks Win?* Rinehart Source Problems. Collection of eyewitness accounts.
- Rauch, George von. *A History of Soviet Russia*. 2d rev. ed. Praeger Paperbacks.
- Raymond, Ellsworth. *Soviet Economic Progress: Because of or in Spite of the Government?* Rinehart Source Problems. Useful facts, figures, and comments.
- Rostow, W. W., et al. *The Dynamics of Soviet Society*. NAL. A group of scholars try to discover reasons for Russian behavior. Edited by an expert political economist.
- Salvadori, Massimo. *The Rise of Modern Communism*. Berkshire. A brief (118-page) study.
- Sethe, Paul. *A Short History of Russia*. Gateway. A little too brief, but very fair on the modern period. A useful introduction to the subject.
- Shub, David. *Lenin* (abridged). NAL. Perhaps the best of the biographies of Lenin.
- Trotsky, Leon. *The Russian Revolution* (abridged). Anchor. The original 3-volume work was vital and polemic, and though naturally somewhat one-sided, not so much so as might have been expected. Essential for anyone interested in the events of the Bolshevik era.
- Trotsky, Leon. *Stalin*. Universal. Hardly an objective account; interesting for its revelation of the author.
- Wolfe, Bertram D. *Three Who Made A Revolution*. Beacon. This portrait of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin is fast becoming a classic.

CASEBOUND BOOKS

- Deutscher, Isaac. *The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879-1921* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954) and *Stalin: A Political Biography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948). Two of the best available biographies; more sympathetic to Trotsky than to his supplanter.
- Fromm, Erich. *Escape from Freedom*. New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1941. An interesting

- attempt by a practicing psychoanalyst to discover why the Germans submitted so tamely to the destruction of their freedom.
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The Ebbing of Democratic Initiative and the Drift toward War

♦ Great Britain—victory without reward

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POSITION IN THE POSTWAR WORLD

Social stability If we were to attempt to give a single cause to the manifold troubles of Great Britain in the years between the wars, the cause would certainly be her failure to adjust her thinking and her policies to the new situation resulting from the war. Britain was an old and settled nation, with a class structure inherited from the past. She had never known a social revolution, but had developed organically, changing very little in the process; and that change had come slowly, almost imperceptibly. Nevertheless she had risen to a position of world leadership in the nineteenth century and possessed a huge overseas empire. It was difficult indeed for her to realize that the world had changed radically and nothing would ever be the same again, and that new policies would be needed to meet the competition of younger nations, which in time might even come to be not only larger but more powerful than she. Her leadership in future would have to be earned and could no longer be taken for granted.

Her political institutions had stood the strain of the recent war and had proved flexible enough to permit of a virtual cabinet dictator-

ship which had led the nation to victory. Her parliamentary system of government, with all its traditions and amenities, and its general spirit of decency and tolerance, was thoroughly understood and accepted by her people. It has never been in the slightest danger from the end of World War I to the present time. The system of universal suffrage, finally completed in 1928, with the lowering of the age limit for women voters to the same age as for men (the "flapper" vote), was taken in stride, and caused no complications. The social system with its low degree of mobility between the classes has been relatively little disturbed within the last forty years, and very little indeed in the inter-war period. But it should be noted that the British policy of delaying conscription during the war had the effect of decimating the old upper classes, which provided a disproportionate number of recruits, especially officers, under the volunteer system. The great holocaust of the Battle of the Somme (1916) killed off great numbers of the men who would have been expected to supply initiative in the postwar years. Nevertheless, the remaining members of the ruling classes continued to rule and the lower classes to accept their rule, the vast majority of the latter having no aspirations that would take them out of their class, where they felt at home.

Temperamental conservatism This extraordinary stability, however, almost unique in the

Chronological Chart

Coalition Government of Lloyd George	1919-1922
Partition of Ireland	1919 (Dec.)
Resignation of Clemenceau	1920 (Jan.)
Three-month coal strike in Britain	1921
Presidency of Warren Harding	1921-1923
Washington Naval Conference	1921-1922
British treaty with Ireland—formation of dominion of Irish Free State	1921
End of British protectorate over Egypt	1922
Franco-Belgian invasion of Ruhr	1923
Refunding of war debts owed to United States by Allies	1923
Presidency of Calvin Coolidge	1923-1929
First Labor Government of Ramsay Macdonald	1924 (Jan.-Nov.)
French alliance with Czechoslovakia	1924 (Jan.)
Conservative Government of Stanley Baldwin	1924-1929
Locarno treaties	1925
National Union Governments of Raymond Poincaré (France)	1926-1929
General strike in Britain	1926 (May)
Devaluation and stabilization of the franc	1928
Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact	1928
Second Labor Government in Britain	1929-1931
Presidency of Herbert Hoover	1929-1933
Stock market crash in United States	1929 (Oct.)
Hawley-Smoot tariff	1930
Great Depression	1930-1935
Failure of Austrian Credit-Anstalt	1931 (May)
One-year moratorium on war debts and reparations	1931 (June)
Formation of coalition government by Ramsay Macdonald	1931 (Aug.)
Gold standard abandoned by Britain	1931 (Sept.)
Japanese occupation of Mukden in Manchuria	1931 (Sept.)
Statute of Westminster—complete independence of dominions under British crown	1931
Free trade abandoned by Britain	1932 (Feb.)
Ottawa Conference—imperial preferences	1932 (July-Aug.)
Lytton Report	1932 (Oct.)
European governments in default on United States debts	1932 (Dec.)
Disarmament conferences	1932-1933
Hitler becomes chancellor of Germany	1933 (Jan.)
Franklin D. Roosevelt becomes president of United States	1933 (Jan.)
New Deal legislation in United States	1933-1936
Japanese withdrawal from League of Nations	1933 (Mar.)
Failure of World Economic Conference	1933 (June-July)
German withdrawal from League of Nations	1933 (Oct.)
Stavisky riots in France	1934 (Feb.)
Russia joins League of Nations	1934 (Sept.)
Assassination of French foreign minister Louis Barthou and King Alexander of Yugoslavia	1934 (Oct.)
German denunciation of disarmament clauses of Versailles Treaty	1935 (Mar.)
Conference of Stresa	(Apr.)
Franco-Russian alliance	(May)
Anglo-German naval agreement	(June)
Stanley Baldwin becomes prime minister	(June)
Government of India Act (provincial autonomy)	(Aug.)

Social Security legislation in United States	1935 (Aug.)
Italian invasion of Ethiopia	(Oct.)
League sanctions on Italy	(Nov.)
United States Neutrality Acts	1935-1937
German reoccupation of Rhineland	1936 (Mar.)
Italian annexation of Ethiopia	(May)
Popular Front Government in France	(June)
Beginning of Civil War in Spain	(July)
Anglo-Egyptian treaty—withdrawal of all British forces except 10,000 guarding Canal	(Aug.)
Rome-Berlin Axis	(Oct.)
Anti-Comintern pact (Germany, Italy, Japan)	(Nov.)
Neville Chamberlain becomes prime minister—beginning of policy of taking positive steps toward peace (appeasement)	1937 (May)
Further devaluation of the franc	(Oct.)
Resignation of Anthony Eden as foreign minister	1938 (Feb.)
Annexation of Austria by Germany	(Mar.)
Daladier becomes prime minister of France	(Apr.)
Runciman mission to Czechoslovakia	(Aug.)
First Chamberlain-Hitler conference at Berchtesgaden	(Sept. 15)
Agreement of Czechs to Hitler's terms	(Sept. 21)
Second Chamberlain-Hitler conference at Godesberg	(Sept. 22-23)
Pact of Munich—dismemberment of Czechoslovakia	(Sept. 29)
Polish occupation of Teschen	(Oct. 2)
Autonomy of Slovakia	(Oct. 6)
Capture of Barcelona by General Franco	1939 (Jan.)
Destruction of Czechoslovak state	(Mar. 10-16)
Surrender of Madrid—end of Spanish Civil War	(Mar. 28)
Anglo-French pledge to Poland	(Mar. 31)
Anglo-French discussions with Russia	(Apr.-Aug.)
Anglo-Turkish mutual assistance pact	(May 12)
Military alliance between Italy and Germany	(May 22)
Franco-Turkish treaty	(June 23)
Beginning of Danzig crisis	(Aug. 20)
German-Russian nonaggression pact	(Aug. 23)
German attack on Poland	(Sept. 1)
Declaration of war on Germany by Britain and France	(Sept. 3)
United States proclamation of neutrality	(Sept. 5)

world, carried with it a temperamental conservatism, even among the lower classes. Thus there was a disinclination to try new measures and a preference for restoring old ways rather than marching forward to new ones which might be called for by the new times. A nostalgia for the old stable pound sterling caused, for example, a return to the gold standard without devaluation, in spite of the fact that such a measure was contrary to British economic needs in 1925; deflation is always regarded as preferable to even a mild inflation; when the balance of international trade becomes unfavorable, the first thought is to cut imports rather than to expand exports by energetic, even ruthless, means.

When industrial costs are too high to meet competition, the first preference is for cutting costs including wages, rather than to make energetic efforts to expand production and sales and thus cut costs more painlessly. In war, as in economics, the tendency is to endure hardships and austerity, to defend to the last rather than boldly to undertake new initiatives and catch the competition of the enemy off guard. It is no accident that Dunkirk, objectively the culmination of a long series of retreats and defeats, from which the British managed by brilliant improvisation to extricate themselves, should be regarded as one of the most glorious episodes of British military annals; nor that the most popu-

lar British song of World War II should have been "There'll always be an England"!

Economic changes wrought by the war The situation at the end of the war may not necessarily have demanded heroic measures, but it did call for recognition of the new world in which Britain had to live. In the nineteenth century she had renounced forever the possibility of having a favorable visible balance of trade. The deficit, as we have seen, was made up by services performed for foreigners, especially shipping, insurance, and the provision of financial facilities, together with income from investments abroad, an income which was more than sufficient to right the balance. But during the war Britain had been compelled to liquidate a large percentage of these investments, thereby lowering her income from that source; and although it was expected that her war debts would be paid from reparations, she had to face a permanent loss of income from foreign investments unless she could replace them with new. This, however, was difficult in the postwar world. The surplus income from her exports, which had previously been used for investment, depended, of course, on her being able to make those exports; and conditions for the export trade were no longer favorable. The United States had greatly increased her production during the war, and her business methods were far more enterprising; though Germany had been eliminated as a competitor, she was also lost as a possible market. India and Japan, whose manufacturing facilities had been greatly expanded during the war, were able to produce at a far lower cost than Britain, thus seriously cutting into Britain's export trade in textiles with India.

Worst of all, Britain's capital plant had worn down during the war and it too needed new investment; manufacturers were disinclined to spend money on the investment in new machinery if they could not be sure of a new market to compensate them for the expenditure—especially not if the old machinery, which had been built to last for a great many years, was still capable of further use. Britain, lacking the huge home market of the United States, in part because of her relatively small population and

in part because low wages and social custom made it difficult for her workers to buy, was at a natural competitive disadvantage with America. The only way she could hope to compete was by keeping her costs down—and this of course meant primarily keeping her wages low. Finally, important changes in consumption habits had taken place in the world. Oil was on the way to ousting coal as the preferred fuel for hunkering ships, as electricity was on the way to ousting both gas and coal for domestic purposes. Britain lacked both oil and hydroelectric potential; and though she had enough coal for the manufacturing of electricity, the export market in coal was drastically reduced. New and severe competition was provided by the young republic of Poland for the remaining export markets for coal. Britain's coal industry was old. The mines were becoming ever deeper, and many were poorly managed. In addition there was a regular surcharge on the already high cost of coal in the form of royalty payments to the owners of the land above the mines.

Whether the government in the postwar years was a Liberal and Conservative coalition, a Labor and Liberal coalition, or purely Conservative, it did little to aid British industry. Though the Conservatives were willing and anxious to place tariffs on foreign imports, especially on goods that competed with British manufactured products, the voters were evidently not ready for them. When the Conservative party proposed tariffs, it lost the ensuing election. Thereafter it took more courage than the Conservatives had to reintroduce the issue. Not until the Great Depression brought it forcibly to public attention was the nineteenth-century policy of *laissez faire* at last abandoned—although tariffs on a few products had been introduced during and immediately after the war, and had survived the peace.

Labor unrest The British economy of the 1920's was therefore in a state of almost unrelieved semi-depression. The number of the unemployed never fell below a million and was often much higher. Unemployment insurance and public assistance (known as the "dole") protected the unemployed workers, but at the cost of a very high rate of income tax which



Unemployment in Britain in the inter-war period. (UNDERWOOD AND UNDERWOOD)

bore down hard on the whole economy. In particular the miners were very hard hit. The demand for their product had grievously contracted, and mining was a way of life which the workers in the industry were reluctant to leave, even if opportunities elsewhere had been available. Strikes were numerous in the years following the war in all industries, but they were endemic in the mining industry, culminating in the great general strike of 1926, sparked by the miners, but supported by a sympathy strike called by the Trades' Union Congress. The general strike was broken by united efforts of the middle and upper classes to keep a minimum of services running; but the miners still persisted with their strike for months afterward, until finally impending destitution compelled them to come to terms. The strike was followed by legislation forbidding sympathy strikes and intimidation by the unions, but nothing was solved.

There was a slow upturn in the economy for a few years in Britain as in the rest of Europe. Then the Great Depression hit, and slowly and reluctantly efforts were made to deal with it which had some partial success.

THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Financial crisis of 1931 In 1929 a Labor-Liberal coalition was in office under Ramsay Macdonald, and for the first time the Conservative party did not have the majority of seats in Parliament. The first victim of the Depression was British exports, which had always been difficult to sell, especially since the restoration of the gold standard in 1925. Foreign countries, desperate for foreign exchange to finance their imports, took to the practice of "dumping" (selling goods abroad below cost and making up

the difference by subsidies to export industries), inflation, and strict control of imports. Britain without tariffs was helpless against such practices. Japanese manufactured goods appeared in the British market, sometimes at no more than one fourth of the price of comparable British goods. Coal mining again went into a steep decline and the adverse trade balance grew by leaps and bounds. A Labor government could not afford to allow the unemployed to starve. The unemployment insurance fund was bankrupt, since so many men had exhausted their limited insurance benefits. The dole was a drain on government finances which represented a pure loss. The Conservatives called for drastic economies, including reduction of wages and salaries, and a "means test" to determine whether all family help had been exhausted before the dole was paid to the unemployed. Gold reserves fell drastically, not only because of the unfavorable balance of trade, but because investors were withdrawing their money from English securities and investing, as they hoped, more safely abroad. The government borrowed from France and the United States, but the proceeds were quickly spent.

Formation of National Government Finally these creditors demanded the reorganization of British finances and in particular the pruning of unemployment compensation. The cabinet split on the issue, Ramsay MacDonald and his chancellor of the exchequer siding with the economizers. MacDonald resigned his office and was at once reappointed as the head of an overwhelmingly Conservative coalition government, called a "National" government. The new government was soon endorsed by a large majority by the electorate, and a policy of drastic economies and deflation was enforced. Cuts were made in the salaries of public officials and industrial workers in spite of the opposition of Labor members of Parliament and the labor unions. The pound was not saved, however, by these means. Britain went off the gold standard late in 1931. General protective tariffs were instituted the following year, coupled with a system of imperial preference under which Commonwealth nations were granted a preferential rate.

The slow economic recovery which followed

cannot be credited to any major extent to the policies of the government. The long overdue devaluation of the pound made British exports somewhat more competitive, at least until other nations followed suit. New light industries, often very efficient, sprang up behind the tariff walls. But the industrial north was little better off than before. Manufacturers in heavy industry took advantage of the tariffs to consolidate their industries and raise prices and profits. This kind of consolidation was especially true in steel, to the detriment of those enterprising industries, like the manufacture of automobiles, which used much steel. In the hopelessly depressed areas, efforts were made to establish new trading estates for light industry, but they never got off the ground. Not until after 1935, when armament orders began to come in, did the number of unemployed lessen; but it always remained above a million until the war.

FOREIGN POLICY—APPEASEMENT

In foreign policy the British government gave little leadership to Europe. It was always aware of the profound distaste for war that had taken hold of the people, which manifested itself in the 1930's in frequent peace movements and peace crusades, as well as in decisions by university students that never in any circumstances would they fight again "either for king or country." First it was hoped that "collective security" through the League of Nations would take the place in the future of any possible wars between nations, thus limiting the commitment of each individual state. Then when that appeared to be doomed to failure in the absence of the will for collective action, the government decided on what came to be called "appeasement" of the dictators, which involved the acceptance of the fundamental justice of their claims to "greater living space" and the injustice of the peace treaties by which it was then thought they had been deprived of it. The British were very slow to believe that dictators were irrational men who regarded the British concessions made in the name of appeasement as weakness. The British were even able to bring themselves to the point of believing Hitler when he said he had "no further territorial demands"; every time that Hitler brought forth a new out-



Negotiating the Munich Pact—Mussolini, Hitler, Chamberlain, and an interpreter (Daladier is not shown). (BROWN BROTHERS)

rageous demand, they considered it seriously, and asked themselves whether there was a case in justice why he should have it. They usually came up with the conclusion that indeed he had at least a shadow of a right to it; and if he wanted it enough, why surely it would be for the good of all that he should have it. A British-led commission was even sent to Czechoslovakia to look into the question of Czech "atrocities," and of whether the Sudeten leaders were truly German and wanted to join the Third Reich. Prime Minister Chamberlain's first disillusioning shock came at Godesberg in September 1938, when he found that Hitler had suddenly raised the ante, and wanted more than he would have been willing to settle for a few weeks before. But this obstacle was soon overcome when Hitler agreed to a little less at Munich in October. Chamberlain then returned to Britain, telling the people that he believed he had won "peace for our time."

Only in March 1939, when Hitler cynically broke the Munich agreement, was Chamberlain finally disillusioned with him. Then he gave a unilateral promise of aid to threatened and

indefensible Poland, tried to negotiate with Russia, and gave the fullest of guarantees to France. Only then did the British seriously start to rearm. It was almost, but not quite, too late. Chamberlain, having believed almost to the end that Hitler was an aggressive businessman of the type he had occasionally encountered in British business circles, was replaced in April 1940 by Winston Churchill, who had constantly attacked the policy of appeasement, sometimes almost alone; but Churchill was now to rescue his country from the "years that the locust had eaten."

❖ The British Empire— Beginnings of devolution

INDEPENDENCE OF SOUTHERN IRELAND

During the inter-war period Britain was compelled to give some thought to Ireland and India. We have seen how the Irish problem intruded into English politics in the nineteenth century. Southern Ireland was restive during the war itself, and after the war a strong independ-

ence party known as Sinn Fein ("We alone") was determined to fight the English if necessary. But Northern Ireland, peopled largely by Protestants, mostly of Scottish ancestry, was not prepared to accept the status of a minority. After a serious civil war marked by atrocities on both sides, the British agreed to partition the country, Northern Ireland (six of the nine counties of the old province of Ulster) retaining a close connection with the British, including representation in the British Parliament. It also had a parliament of its own. Thereafter Southern Ireland became the state of Eire, and gradually dropped the remaining ties with the British. It is now a totally independent republic, though the North, to the disgust of the southern Irish (and, be it said, of Irish Americans), has retained its connection with Britain, and there is no sign that the majority of its population has any desire to relinquish it.

INDIA

India, another appendage of Britain, had necessarily been brought into the war by her British masters. But the British during the course of the war had promised that some day the subcontinent should have responsible government, though still within the empire. This promise was honored after the war by the beginning of reforms (Montague-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919), which gave Indians some say in their government, though executive powers continued to rest in British hands. The difficulty of granting further installments of responsibility lay, in British opinion, in the inability of Muslims and Hindus to cooperate, and the divergent aims of the two major organized groups. The British professed to fear civil war if they withdrew their guiding hand. The Indians claim, however, that the British magnified these differences in order to avoid having to grant self-government; and they succeeded so well in driving a wedge between the two groups that the bloodshed so long predicted did in fact break out when the country was ultimately partitioned.

However this may be—and it should be noted that at all times there was a substantial Muslim minority in the Indian National Congress which apparently felt at home there—the

British were reluctant to grant more responsible self-government; and when they did grant a fair measure of self-government in the provinces in 1935 (Government of India Act of 1935), the Congress leaders for a time refused to give any cooperation. Mohandas Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and others fomented and engaged in civil disobedience, spending extensive periods in jail as a consequence. But their influence steadily grew, and it became increasingly clear that India would before long have to be given complete independence if the terms could be arranged. During the war Congress leaders refused their support to their masters and some even proposed to welcome the Japanese. Gandhi and Nehru were once more jailed, and the British had to assume the whole burden of government again. After the war the Muslim and Hindu leaders, under threat of withdrawal by the British, agreed to partition and to the full independence of both sectors.

THE MIDDLE EAST

After the First World War Britain was granted several former German colonies and territories formerly in the Turkish Empire, to be held as mandates under the League of Nations. The League of Nations, however, exercised little influence in the territories, which were treated by the various mandatory powers in exactly the same way as their own colonies. The colonies in Africa and undeveloped colonies elsewhere made little or no constitutional progress during these years; nor was economic progress much more marked. It was far different in the Middle Eastern mandates. Britain allowed her mandate of Iraq to become independent under an Arab princeling, son of the sherif of Mecca, who took the title of king. Britain, however, continued to dominate the administration of the new kingdom, which was rich in oil, for many years, in spite of the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations as an independent state.

PALESTINIAN MANDATE—JEWISH NATIONAL HOME

Palestine, likewise mandated to Britain, had problems which were unique in the world. The

population had until the end of the war been overwhelmingly Arab, but during the war, as noted in Chapter 22, contradictory promises had been made regarding its future. On the one hand the Jews had been promised a national home in Palestine, and on the other the Arabs were led to expect independence and statehood. During the 1920's the Jewish population constantly increased through immigration, and the Arabs saw ever less chance of being able to achieve independence as a national state under their own rule. The Jews were more efficient and better organized. Moreover, they had access to foreign funds, and it appeared to the Arabs (though not to the Jews) that the mandatory power favored Jewish aspirations. In fact, Britain administered the mandate without special regard for the interests of either. The British wished fervently that they had never accepted the mandate at all, but, seeing no way out of their dilemma, they adopted a purely empirical policy of meeting each crisis as it arose. The persecution of Jews inaugurated by Hitler increased the number of refugees who wanted to immigrate into Palestine, while at the same time Hitler stirred up anti-Semitism among the Arabs, who indeed needed little encouragement in this. Other Arab states supported the Palestinian Arabs and inveighed against Jewish immigration. The British under pressure suggested partition, which was rejected by the Arabs. Finally they stopped Jewish immigration altogether. Eventually, of course, partition was proposed after the war under the same threat of withdrawal that the British had made to India. Though the state of Israel now exists it has been recognized by none of the Arab states; and the problem remains one that has hitherto defied permanent solution.

Statute of Westminster (1931) Finally, mention should be made of the British dominions, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa, all with parliamentary governments on the British model. By the Statute of Westminster of 1931 juridical status was given to the existing *de facto* independence of all these states within what was termed the British Commonwealth of Nations (the word British was later dropped). The dominions retained their common crown, and in

some cases the appeal to the British Privy Council was kept by the wish of the dominions themselves as the final court of appeal in constitutional matters. The king was henceforth to be represented by a governor-general chosen by the consent of the dominion ministers. No practical change was made by the Statute of Westminster, since the countries had long enjoyed full self-government; but a number of legal questions were clarified, as for example the right of the dominions to remain neutral in case of a war which involved the mother country.

❖ France

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POSITION IN THE POSTWAR WORLD

France presented many important contrasts with Great Britain in the postwar period; and it was not until after the rise of Hitler that her foreign policy became subordinated to that of Britain, which at that time became clearly the senior partner. Many of the contrasts are to be explained by French history, especially by the heritage of the Revolution. Though republican government had finally been accepted by 1914 and there was no significant movement at any time to restore the monarchy, the political system was anything but stable, even though the influence of permanent civil servants who did not change with the governments made it much more stable than it appeared. But France was socially at least as stable and conservative as Britain, with the single exception noted in earlier chapters. The working classes had never been truly integrated into French life, and their unions, small though they were, were far more radical than in Britain. France, however, unlike Britain, was not truly an industrial nation. A third of the population of the whole country was engaged in agriculture, much of it extremely backward and inefficient; unlike their British counterparts the French farmers were still peasants, and extremely conservative. Even in the inter-war years these peasants could be counted upon, save in exceptional circumstances, to vote for predominantly conservative parties which had no more interest in improving the lot of the workingmen than had the small class of

rich industrialists. By far the greater part of French manufacturing industry was in the hands of small entrepreneurs or families. Large-scale enterprises remained few, though the acquisition of Alsace and Lorraine after the war considerably increased their number. These provinces, whose resources had been developed under nearly fifty years of far more energetic German management, were indeed, with the Saar, the mainstay of French heavy industry during the period.

France was a country that was nearly self-sufficient in agriculture and in some years had an export surplus. Though she lacked some important raw materials, especially oil, her export of luxury and quality goods and her extensive tourist trade were in ordinary times enough to pay for the necessary minimum of imports. High tariffs compelled her citizens to buy such industrial products as they needed from domestic industry. But it was a low-consumption economy and the standard of living was lower than in any of the other fully industrialized nations. She suffered relatively little from unemployment, and for some years even the Depression had few noticeable effects on the country. But when the effects were finally felt and France's few indispensable exports dropped off drastically, in part because of an unenlightened financial policy, she was slower to recover. Even the armaments boom in the last years of the thirties did not help her much, for her factories were incapable of much expansion without more capital investment and more industrial enterprise than she was able to elicit from her citizens.

For French economy and society were largely stagnant—chronically stagnant rather than depressed by unusual circumstances. This may have been in part the result of a declining birthrate, but also the result of the huge human losses she sustained during World War I, much higher than those of any other nation save Germany and Russia. The material losses in northern France were great, but in a sudden burst of energy these were made good, paid for to some extent by the German reparations, and to a greater extent by domestic and foreign borrowing which remained a charge on the economy. New factories arose, by no means all

of them larger or more modern than their predecessors; for conservative Frenchmen often wanted to have exactly the same kind of business establishment as that to which they had become accustomed in the prewar years. Then when reconstruction was finished their owners returned to the same business practices as in the past.

ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT—THE LATE 1920's —DEVALUATION

The enormous expense of the expedition into the Ruhr for the purpose of compelling the Germans to pay reparations, coupled with the floating of reconstruction loans, caused the value of the franc to fall. It was saved from complete collapse in good time by Raymond Poincaré, a conservative prime minister who increased taxes, cut down social reforms attempted by his predecessor, and, by reducing expenses, made the budget balance. Then the franc was devalued and firmly based on gold. This feat was regarded at the time as a miracle; but of course it was a triumph of orthodox finance, and paid for, as usual, by the poorer classes. The postwar French governments were no more able than in the past to collect income taxes fairly from the great numbers of persons in agriculture or industry whose profits were assessed by themselves. Indirect taxes and income taxes on the salary and wage earners remained the mainstay of government finances, as in the past. It increased the usual disgust of the workers with the government, since it was widely believed that the previous inflation had been caused by the bankers, who had undermined confidence in the franc by converting their French holdings into foreign currencies.

Confidence returned, however, and France entered into a period of as real prosperity as she had ever known. In the boom years her quality products were in demand, and after the devaluation of the franc their price was competitive, especially when her competitor was Britain, which, as we have seen, delayed her own devaluation until 1931. Large numbers of American tourists also helped her tourist industry prosper. Gold reserves were built up, and high French tariffs, both on food and manufac-

tured products, enabled France to counteract the economic consequences of her own relative inefficiency. But once her competitors had themselves left the gold standard, her exports were hard hit, and the economy gradually sank into a condition of stagnation while the economies of other nations were improving. In all the years since the war very few changes had taken place that could be regarded as permanent economic improvements. Although the rest of the world had been moving, however slowly, ahead, France was hardly more industrialized than in 1914.

POLITICAL INSTABILITY

The Stavisky riots The instability of the pre-1933 governments had not greatly affected French life. The political system was the same as that described in Chapter 19. All governments were coalitions, mostly with a right-wing tendency. They had sinned more by omission than by commission. The richer classes and the industrialists, and even the peasants, had in general been content with the governments, whereas the workers had expected nothing and gained little from them. But when the effects of the Depression were finally felt in France, all classes found a scapegoat in the governments, especially in the entire governmental system of the Third Republic. Although French governments were not especially corrupt, there is no doubt that individual politicians served their own interests and the interests of certain well-heeled private groups which needed protection for their maneuvers. Thus, when the so-called Stavisky scandals broke in 1934, there were already organized rightist parties looking toward the destruction of the republic and the substitution of a Fascist dictatorship on the Italian or German model. On the left the Communists were likewise increasing in numbers and power. The scandal itself was of a kind familiar in France. A financier named Serge Stavisky had engaged in the sale of bonds which were insufficiently secured by the municipal pawnshop of a small provincial town. He apparently had been protected from prosecution by a number of deputies and a cabinet minister. When Stavisky was reported to have committed suicide, it was

widely believed that he had been compelled to do so by highly placed persons who were involved in his crime, or that his death was no suicide. Fascist groups exploited the scandal in their press and attempted to march on the Chamber of Deputies.

The attempt was foiled by the police after bloody fighting involving heavy casualties on both sides, including a score of dead. Under pressure from the street, the government resigned and was replaced by one farther to the right. But a few days later the workers called a general strike, more as a demonstration of their strength and as a warning to all would-be Fascists that they would have to deal with them if they tried to overthrow the Republic, than for any immediate ends. The success of the strike gave the workers a boost in morale. The Communists, as well as the Socialists, participated in it and thereafter cemented the relationship between them. The Communists, evidently under orders from Moscow to do everything they could to impede the Fascist movements, which presented a danger to the Soviet Union, threw their electoral strength for the first time to the Socialists. By the time of the next general election of 1936 a positive program of reforms had been agreed upon, and the support of enough anti-government peasants had been secured to enable the Popular Front, as it was called, to win an absolute majority of the seats in the Chamber. For the first time a government was in power that could carry through a reform program. The Socialist leader Léon Blum became prime minister, presiding over a cabinet of which the Communists refused to form a part.

The Popular Front government But the economy of the country, unlike that of the United States, could not be cured by reform measures which included social security, a shorter working week, collective bargaining, and control by the government of the Bank of France. All the reforms cost money, and there was no incentive to persuade the industrialists to expand. On the contrary, the costs of production were greatly increased by all the measures of the Blum government. The industrialists, and all the conservatives, resisted the full implementation of the reforms as far as they could, while

attempting to discredit the government as being Communist-inspired and Communist-led. The Fascist leagues were kept under control, but they were not as great a danger to the experiment as the far from powerless leaders in finance and industry. Again there was a flight from the franc; investors exchanged French securities for foreign currency. Government expenses increased to such an extent that the budget was seriously unbalanced. Finally Léon Blum, after losing some of his more moderate allies in the Chamber, was forced to resign. Subsequent governments, mostly of the center but with right-wing support, were compelled to abolish or modify such luxuries as the forty-hour week at a time when they were rather frantically trying to rearm in face of the obvious danger of war with Germany. When the workers objected, the government was given emergency powers to mobilize labor; and for most of 1938 and 1939 the governments ruled by decree, a power conferred upon them by the deputies, who had virtually abdicated their responsibilities in the face of the dangers of social revolution and war. The domestic strife of the years from 1936 to 1939 explains why Prime Minister Daladier, against his own better judgment, agreed to be led by Chamberlain to acquiesce in the policy of appeasement. He and the other French ministers dared not risk a policy involving the danger of a war that would have revealed the utter disunity of France and that might well have caused another outbreak of violent class struggle of the kind that brought Hitler to power in Germany.

FOREIGN POLICY

Problem of keeping Germany under control The foreign policy of France through the whole inter-war period was dominated by the need to find means to keep Germany, which was much more populous and potentially stronger than herself, from trying to gain her revenge and take back at least Alsace-Lorraine. Two ways were open to her: to build such a strong alliance against Germany that the latter would hesitate to accept the odds, or to keep her down by force. By maintaining an artificial military superiority, France could then prevent Germany

from taking full advantage of her greater manpower and superior industry.

In the first years after the war while Germany was disarmed, France was clearly safe from German aggression. But when she tried to insist on her full rights under the treaty of Versailles, she was at once faced by the difficulty that Britain was anxious to cut down on her own military expenses on the Continent—expenses which she could ill afford—and to limit her commitments. Britain no longer felt herself directly threatened by Germany; unlike France she was protected by the still unviolated English Channel. She berated France for being revengeful and unwilling, like herself, to forgive and forget. Britain wanted to restore normal trade relations with Germany, and even invested considerable sums of money in Germany after 1924. It was essential for France to have Britain's support in any venture. But Britain refused to support the Ruhr war and, indeed, severely criticized it. Belgian aid was far from enough to compensate. The Locarno Pact of 1925, under which Germany agreed to accept the boundaries imposed on her by the treaty of Versailles and the demilitarization of the Rhineland, was treated by the French as a sign that Germany under Foreign Minister Stresemann was anxious to live at peace with the victorious powers and make the best of the treaty. France lost nothing by signing the pact, since it did not commit her to any disarmament, which she had constantly opposed throughout many years of negotiations. Again, she had no objection to signing the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), sponsored by Frank Kellogg, the United States secretary of state, and the French internationalist foreign minister Aristide Briand. The pact condemned "recourse to war for the solution of international controversies." No means for enforcement of the pact were included. Several times the French suggested an international police force to maintain peace, but they obtained little support.

When Hitler rose to power in Germany and reinstituted conscription, France could only protest and try to build an alliance against him. France had already entered into alliances with the small countries which had profited by the war, and which therefore felt endangered by any German expansion. These alliances France

now tried to strengthen. In addition, she negotiated with the Soviet Union for a new alliance, which culminated in a treaty signed in 1935. She also tried to woo Mussolini, and to prevent him from joining his ideological counterpart in Germany. This last effort, which had never been very successful, collapsed in 1935 when France was compelled, though with the utmost reluctance, to condemn Italy's aggression in Ethiopia and to vote for economic sanctions.

Subservience to British policy But none of these efforts could compensate for the undoubted coolness in her relations with Britain. Disapproving wholeheartedly of Britain's policy of appeasement toward Hitler, and utterly disbelieving in Hitler's professed pacific intentions, she nevertheless could not convert British ministers to her point of view. The British preferred to trust in the collective security enforced by the League of Nations, although they did not care to grant in fact any means of enforcing it; they preferred to believe in the good intentions of the Germans, and they even criticized the French as the real disturbers of the peace and deprecated their antique system of alliances, especially that with the Soviet Union. We have noted earlier how the British refused to stop Hitler by force from marching into the Rhineland in 1936, and how the French government, on the advice of its generals, abstained from unilateral action.

This was the turning point. Thereafter France was tied to Neville Chamberlain's umbrella. She could not act by herself. All she could do was to build her defenses and strengthen them, including the famous Maginot Line, supposed to be impregnable, but which the Germans turned without difficulty when war came. In the Spanish Civil War she agreed to nonintervention; in 1938, in spite of her alliance with the Soviet Union, she did not dare to back her ally Czechoslovakia against Hitler without British support. There was no way for the Russians to give direct aid to Czechoslovakia without marching through Poland or Rumania, which refused to permit it. So in the end the alliances proved to be worthless; honor was lost since France agreed to the Munich pact rather than fulfill the terms of her treaty with

Czechoslovakia; and the Maginot Line was vulnerable. Her diplomacy having failed, and her country torn by internal dissensions, she was in no condition to stand up to Hitler and his *Wehrmacht*. So France had to submit to defeat and occupation, and a regime which under Pétain and Laval accepted the bitter reality, taking and executing orders from her new German masters.

❖ French Empire

NORTH AFRICA

After the war the French received the mandates of Syria and Lebanon in the Near East and the larger portion of the German colonies of Togoland and the Cameroons in Africa. They experienced many difficulties in the Middle Eastern mandates, largely because of French unwillingness during this period to allow any real self-government to the territories. The facade of self-government was granted, but French officials continued to rule in accordance with policy laid down by Paris. Morocco was finally subjugated after many years of fighting, and the money that was poured into all the African countries was spent on modernization, especially on roads and a very fair communications system. French settlers, however, took more advantage of the new facilities than the local inhabitants. The Muslim elite was educated in France and treated exactly like Frenchmen, and there grew up in the mandates a middle class that was often well educated, sometimes wealthy, but dependent upon the French. But it was a very small class and little was done for the poor. Moreover the French monopolized all the higher official positions.

Afrique noire—POLICY OF ASSIMILATION

In Black Africa under French rule the same policy was adopted. Again a small class of Africans was educated in France; and these Africans, unlike the Africans from British territories, were accepted as social equals by the metropolitan French and were even given the vote if they became French citizens. The official

policy was that of assimilation, to make the Africans into good Frenchmen. It was successful with a few, who were indeed to some degree alienated thereby from their own people in the process. The remainder of the Africans, who were not yet civilized, had few benefits from the regime except insofar as it maintained law and order. Education for the masses was neglected, and all government was in the hands of the considerable number of French officials who occupied all the important posts in the country. There was no thought in French territories that the Africans would ever be ripe for self-government. One small exception, however, might be noted. As a heritage of the French Revolution, four communes in Senegal had a limited self-government, and all persons born in them were automatically French citizens. An African deputy sat in the French Chamber as early as 1914, elected by his fellow Africans. As we will see in Chapter 26, this system was greatly enlarged after World War II, when a solid bloc of native Africans sat in the French Chamber and Senate and some entered the French cabinet.

❖ United States

RELUCTANCE TO ASSUME LEADERSHIP

Attitude of superiority toward Europe The United States emerged from the war with a greatly expanded industrial plant; and in the process of acting as the arsenal for the Allies she had become for the first time a creditor instead of a debtor nation. In the United States, protected from the physical destruction of the war, the Industrial Revolution had begun to fulfill some of its obvious potentialities. High wages and mass production techniques had finally brought a rise in the standard of living to the working and middle classes, with some notable exceptions. In the boom years following the war, the United States was able to take full advantage of the fact that she had a huge home market ready to be exploited behind high tariff walls. In these years she was full of confidence in her expanding economy and invented numerous devices by which her people could consume

more than they could pay for out of current income. Fortunes were made in industry and business; the class structure was by far the most mobile in the world, and it was not uncommon for poverty-stricken immigrants to rise to be captains of industry and fill the highest positions in the universities and professions. Under presidents and congresses which believed that the "business of America is business," and that the least government, save for the protection of business, was the best for all, the United States knew a decade of prosperity that had never been approached elsewhere. Many of her leading citizens firmly believed that such prosperity was the consequence of her democratic institutions, her federal form of government, and the system of free enterprise, and that other governments which were without such advantages, which paid low wages, interfered with industry, and laid many taxes on their subjects, and which, moreover, constantly quarreled with one another and would not abandon their armaments, were hopelessly unenlightened, if not outright criminal. Thus the United States tended to regard herself not only as more successful but in some degree morally superior to the rest of the world, an attitude that was not greatly appreciated by the Europeans. Though many of them no doubt envied the successful Americans, far from admitting any moral superiority or even superior acumen, they ascribed her success to good fortune and to her exploitation of the advantages that had accrued to her from her late entry into the war and her position as chief supplier to the Allies.

Refusal to participate in international security We have already noted that the United States Senate refused to ratify the treaty of Versailles and thus did not enter the League of Nations. The European powers, which had accepted the League at the insistence of President Woodrow Wilson, assumed that disinterested America, with no overwhelming European commitments to one power or another, would be able to throw her weight against treaty-breakers and thus maintain the peace settlement. Whether or not the United States was wise not to guarantee this particular settlement, there is no doubt that the League without her was predictably con-

verted into an alignment of victorious powers against their competitors the "have-nots," but without an impartial arbiter. The United States also refused to join the Permanent Court of Justice, in spite of the insistence of all her presidents, for fear that it would detract from her sovereignty. Thus the United States withdrew from Europe into isolationism, only trying occasionally to use the League when her own interests were involved, as when the Japanese invaded Manchuria—a deed of less than critical importance to the European powers. The United States also sponsored the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, described earlier, which gave verbal expression to the United States desire, held in common with others, for peace.

Failure to understand role of creditor We have noted also the United States' insistence on being repaid the debts incurred by the Allies in the common war effort. The Americans regarded this as a purely business transaction that should be honored like all other debts. Here her lack of experience in international finance showed most markedly. Some of the nations would have been glad to pay in the only form in which it was possible for them—namely, in goods. But the United States increased her tariffs in 1922 and again raised them to a prohibitive level in 1930 under the Hawley-Smoot Act. On the one hand, therefore, the United States insisted her debtors pay at least a percentage of the debt; but on the other hand she would not accept manufactured goods or agricultural products, since this would damage her own industry. The debtors therefore had to pay in gold or dollars bought with gold; and gold could be obtained only by earning a trade surplus in the contracted postwar markets. The United States, except for a few years following 1930, in which year she proclaimed a temporary moratorium on war debts, insisted on this payment, whatever the economic difficulties of the debtor country, on pain of receiving no more current credits. The mood of Congress in the matter was shown when it prohibited the extending of credits to all defaulting debtor nations.

Nevertheless, American industrialists were anxious to sell in export markets, and farmers

who could not sell all their products at home wished to dispose of their surplus abroad. As it happened, there was little help available for farmers, who were in a state of chronic depression even during the boom years. But American industrialists and financiers devised the wonderful plan of foreign investments, lending money abroad for the purpose of buying American goods—the equivalent of the domestic time-payment system. But the money thus invested was of course not money permanently sunk in the borrowing country; it could be repatriated at any time if the investors lost confidence. Thus when it became more profitable to invest at home, some of the money was brought back, thus lowering the value of the foreign stocks and upsetting the foreign economy. When the Depression hit the United States from 1929 onwards, all new foreign investments quickly dried up, and there was wholesale repatriation of funds already invested, which greatly contributed to the spread of the Depression.

Much of the money invested in Germany ultimately returned to the United States in the form of repayment of war debts, and the rest was repudiated by Hitler. Thus the American exports were in point of true fact given away—the only possibility for a country that refused to accept worth-while quantities of other countries' products and manufactures. When this was understood, the Americans, especially large numbers of congressmen, became badly disillusioned about their efforts in Europe, and decided that that ungrateful continent should be left to its own devices and the United States should go it alone. In three successive years Neutrality Acts were passed by Congress (1935–1937), by which it was hoped the United States would avoid becoming entangled in European affairs. Although the United States was eventually to be forced into the war, there can be little doubt that the isolationist policies of the inter-war years made it more difficult for her and her allies to win; and if she had taken her responsibilities as a great power more seriously, even Hitler might have hesitated longer before unleashing his global war, and Japan might not have had the temerity to engage an adversary of nearly three times her population and many times her industrial strength.

THE GREAT DEPRESSION

The stock market crash (1929) In 1929, after many years of prosperity, the United States suffered a crisis of confidence. Stock prices were obviously overvalued, and many thousands of investors had bought stocks on margin, beyond their conceivable ability to pay the full paper price of their purchases. They had "bought" in the expectation of a rise in prices, whereupon they could settle and pocket the difference. But the paper prices were far too high in relation to the earnings of the stocks, and everyone knew it. Suddenly the prices began to fall, and once they did, all the margin buyers were caught without the money to make good their losses and pay for their stocks. Frantic to salvage what they could, they sold at once, thereby depressing

the price still further. The new poverty, even bankruptcy, of so many people, destroyed the confidence of Americans in their economy, and they at once began to retrench and to postpone all further purchases.

The New Deal American industry had been geared to the ever expanding domestic market, but now it was compelled to cut back production, which entailed layoffs and a subsequent cutting down of purchasing power. Without a social security system such as Europeans had enjoyed for several decades, the United States was compelled to try to feed the unemployed from grossly insufficient private resources. Even so, much more might have been done, if the United States presidency had not been in the hands of Herbert Hoover, who for



The Great Depression in the United States. "Bonus Army" leaves St. Louis for a march on Washington in 1932 to win bonuses for their previous war service. The "army" was dispersed by troops after reaching Washington. (BROWN BROTHERS)

long refused to recognize the gravity of the situation and to realize that heroic measures were needed. When Franklin D. Roosevelt became president in 1933, with a huge Democratic majority in both Houses of Congress, he exuded an air of confidence. A great many measures were taken, many of them improvised and impermanent, which were collectively known, in Roosevelt's term, as the New Deal.

In the following decade the United States came to recognize that government, as in European experience, had certain tasks to perform even in economic matters. Make-work projects aided the unemployed, a huge project known as Tennessee Valley Authority provided electricity and flood control over a wide area, agriculture was protected and subsidized, a comprehensive social security system was inaugurated, labor unions were encouraged by favorable legislation, and the stock exchange was regulated. Thus, the United States abandoned forever the system under which the government protected business interests, but in all other respects left the economy totally free and unregulated. Belatedly she entered the modern world, with its partly free, partly regulated economies and comprehensive governmental intervention for the benefit of the classes least able to protect themselves in a wholly free-enterprise system. By the end of the decade, the United States was still not fully out of the doldrums. Unemployment was still almost ten million. But confidence in the economy as a whole had been restored, even among the businessmen who most criticized the New Deal.

Democracy had survived, the nation was ready to undertake new enterprises and, if legislative barriers could be removed, to become once again the arsenal of her European allies if it should be necessary. Though hundreds of thousands of farmers had left the land forever, those who remained were able to produce enough for home consumption. Since they now received some aid from the government they were also able to recapture some of their export trade. There can be no doubt that the United States was by far the most powerful industrial nation in the world in 1939—and Americans remained as sure as ever that it was their

democracy and system of government that had earned her supremacy.

FOREIGN POLICY—ISOLATIONISM

In foreign policy the United States paid little attention to Europe until the aggressions of the European dictators forced themselves upon the notice of the administration. Little understanding was displayed by the members of Congress, with few exceptions, preoccupied as they were with domestic issues. But President Roosevelt had recognized the danger in the late 1930's, and tried to prepare public opinion for a possible European war. Occasionally he had urged moderation on the dictators without noticeable effect. The United States had also refused to recognize the Japanese conquest of Manchuria. But nothing very practical was done until the war had begun in Europe and Roosevelt, instilling a greater sense of urgency into his speeches, was at last able to persuade Congress of what he considered to be the true interests of the United States.

COLONIAL POLICY—PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

The United States possessed one distant colony of importance, the Philippine Islands, taken from the Spanish at the close of the nineteenth century. As early as 1916 the Philippines had been promised ultimate independence, but a commission subsequently reported they were not yet ready. Early in the Roosevelt administration a considerable measure of responsible government was granted, though United States economic interests remained extremely powerful. The constitution granted was very similar to that of the United States itself. When the Philippines were captured and occupied by the Japanese, the Filipinos for the most part looked to and worked for an American victory and full independence as soon as the victory was achieved. In July 1946, independence was granted, and the United States set an example to the rest of the world by the manner in which she divested herself of her only major colony, thus beginning the retreat from empire that will be more fully discussed in Chapter 26.

❖ Failure of collective security in the face of totalitarian initiative

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Constitution and purposes Having now presented a brief account of the major national states in the period between the two wars, we must now consider as a whole the failure of these states to establish a system of security for preventing future wars, and we must examine the drift toward a new war which proved to be both more lethal and more disruptive of the old world order than World War I. Such an examination calls for a discussion of the international organization whose primary function was intended to be the prevention of war—the League of Nations.

The League of Nations was exactly what its name implies. It was not a world parliament, and though it did proclaim itself to be an organization for the purpose of fostering world cooperation in the numerous ways in which such cooperation is necessary and desirable, this purpose was always secondary to the primary purpose of maintaining peace. It was formed by the national states, major and minor; and it differed from earlier organizations such as the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe and the Holy Alliance, in that every nation, large or small, was represented by its delegates, chosen by the national governments. Each nation was granted one vote, and the delegates were responsible to their governments, not to their peoples.

The purposes of the League were spelled out in the Covenant, which was a contract to which all the member nations subscribed. The preamble to the Covenant stated forthrightly that the object of the League was "to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war. . . ." The articles of the Covenant stated the nature and extent of these obligations and how they were to be translated into action. Perhaps the essence of the Covenant was in Article 10, which stated that the members "undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of

all members of the League"; and although Article 11 went on to declare that the League should also take cognizance of wars and threats of war which involved nonmembers, it was clear that less could be expected from those nations that had not voluntarily accepted the obligations. Against nonmembers the League was compelled to use coercion, for it could not use the moral pressure to live up to their obligations which it could exercise against members.

The principal organs of the League were the Council and the Assembly. The Council was made up of the great powers of the day as permanent members, and a number of nonpermanent members chosen by the Assembly. The four original nonpermanent members of the Council later increased to ten. When action was to be taken by the Council under the articles which required the compulsory arbitration of disputes, or when economic sanctions had to be imposed upon a nation that had already resorted to war, the action taken had to be recommended by the Council unanimously—although with the crucial provision (changed in the United Nations' Charter), that if a member nation was involved in the dispute, such nation should not be permitted to vote on the issue. The Council, however, could only recommend the use of military sanctions and could not require them to be used; it was left to each nation to make the final decision as to what forces, if any, it should use. A later interpretation of this important article (16) declared that each nation would decide for itself whether it was to go to war with the offender. All matters which the Council felt to be solely within the domestic jurisdiction of a party to the dispute were excluded by the Covenant from consideration by the League.

The Assembly of the League had a rather nebulous function. It voted on the nonpermanent members of the Council, and it elected new members to the League; it could also investigate disputes referred to it by the Council. If disputes were so referred, it could take the same action as the Council, but only if the Council members in the Assembly approved. It could therefore never overrule the views of the Council. Nevertheless, because it was called into at least one regular session every year, it could, like the

United Nations, act as a forum for debate; and small nations not in the Council therefore had an opportunity to criticize the Council members and influence them in the direction they wished. Finally, a permanent Secretariat was set up, but the work given to it was far more restricted than in the United Nations. There were few of those specialized agencies which, under the regime of the United Nations, have proved so valuable as a means for bringing together men and women from different countries in the pursuit of undisputed, if limited, aims. One task of the Secretariat was to register treaties; and only treaties thus registered were considered to be binding. The purpose of this provision was to prevent the signing of binding secret treaties, according to Wilson's famous dictum of "open covenants openly arrived at."

Preservation of full national sovereignty

The League very carefully safeguarded the full sovereignty of each individual nation, large or small. No nation was coerced into doing anything that its government might not approve; but it was at least possible, if not probable, that a unanimous condemnation of an aggressor could be made, a feat which is impossible under the United Nations if one of the permanent members of the Security Council is involved. But the weakness of the League as an instrument for enforcing action against a violator of the Covenant lay in the voluntary nature of the commitment to impose sanctions on the aggressor. No nation was compelled to accept the recommendations of the League, and any military force which was used in fulfillment of the League's recommendations would be decided upon by the nation in question; and the troops would be commanded by that nation, and not by the League—thus demonstrating the fact once more that it was indeed a League of Nations, not a supranational power in its own right. If sanctions were imposed by members of the League, these members would in effect be in a military alliance against the aggressor, which was not greatly different from the situation prevailing in the past.

The French, ever alert to the needs of what they considered to be their security, proposed

the establishment of an international military force that would be always ready to fight and that would be equipped with special weapons of a kind denied to the regular armies of national states, thus providing the League with a strong striking arm which the French were willing to see at its disposal. Since the French were themselves anxious to keep the status quo, they knew they would never be involved in an aggressive war—except perhaps with nonsovereign nations, or in areas which could be regarded as within their own domestic jurisdiction. It was therefore to their benefit to have such a supranational force in being, which would in practice fight for their national interests against any nation who dared to disturb the new international settlements agreed to in the peace treaties. No other nation, however, was willing to support the French proposals, not even those small nations who had benefited the most from the peace treaties.

The provisions for maintaining the peace through the League should not necessarily be criticized because they made the enforcement of sanctions against an aggressor so difficult and unlikely. But these provisions present most clearly the difficulties of maintaining peace in a world of national states, each determined to be fully sovereign in its own sphere. In 1919 the new national states, though militarily weak, wished to enjoy the full sovereignty and power of decision that had long been enjoyed by the settled nations. When they recognized themselves to be in danger, as in the late 1930's, some of them were willing to pay the price of allowing a concert of nations to make decisions which would ordinarily have been taken by their own governments. But such cooperation depended upon their willingness to accept the status quo. Thus if they had hoped to obtain any benefits from an alliance with an aggressor, it is doubtful indeed that they would have been willing to give up their own freedom of action and permit the concert to make their decisions in important matters for them.

This is, of course, the crucial question in any international concert, whether the League of Nations or the United Nations. Are any sovereign nations and their governments willing to

allow other sovereign nations (whose own national interests must also be consulted in the decisions *they* make) to make decisions for them in areas which they consider vitally important? Are they willing to solve disputes on the basis, not necessarily of justice, but of what a majority of national governments think ought to be done? When coerced by major powers, small nations have no recourse but to accept the arbitration because it is backed by irresistible force. Conversely, are major nations willing to accept the arbitration of smaller nations and major nations, acting in concert, if they feel that they are strong enough to resist the combination? Or, to press the question to an extreme, would major nations, each with one vote, be willing to have solutions imposed upon them solely by minor nations, who could not back their decisions by force? This situation could not have arisen in the League of Nations with its rule of unanimity in the Council; but it could if the United Nations General Assembly were to assume the functions of the Security Council and bypass the veto of the great powers in that body.

As preserver of the status quo The League of Nations was set up to maintain the European system imposed by the peace treaties; there was no reason to suppose that this was the final world order, perfectly just and perfectly equitable and fair to all, which ought to command the adherence of all present and future nations. But sanctions were to be taken against all those who forcibly disturbed this order. If the undertakings of the members were to be honored, and all members could count on it, where was the incentive for any nation to accept any modification of its present status? Such a nation could go to the League as soon as it was threatened and complain about the threat—which would be true only if the threatening nation put any impetus behind its threats. Thus those nations which were dissatisfied with their lot necessarily were frustrated by the League, which was bound in advance not to listen to their pleas, but to back the satisfied nation whose territory was being threatened. In short, the League was placed in the position from the beginning of affirming a temporary world order as settled for

all time, and therefore it was condemned to settling only minor problems involving no great power. Such problems in the prewar order would have been settled without the League machinery by the major nations acting in concert.

Successes of the League Too much was asked of the League when it was called upon to resist aggression in a world of persisting sovereign states. But for a few years it was successful in providing a means by which relatively small problems could be settled, and it provided a forum for the discussion of disputes before they reached the point of endangering the peace. This was a beginning that would have been thought promising if too much had not been expected of the League in major matters. The League also furthered the practice of international cooperation in noncontroversial areas such as the control of narcotics. It convened many economic conferences, which were, however, successful only insofar as agreement could be maintained among the major powers. In this field the League had no power of coercion, and even without its machinery economic conferences of a similar kind would certainly have been called. The practice of international cooperation in these noncontroversial areas has been carried forward very greatly under the United Nations, no doubt because the League of Nations had already provided an example.

In 1921, a quarrel between Sweden and Finland was settled when the League Council suggested a solution that was accepted by both parties. A Greco-Turkish war in 1922 was brought to an end, as in prewar days, by pressure from the great powers working outside the League framework; but the League undertook to complete the job by supervising the transfer of populations that followed the war. In 1923, Italy, a major power, with a permanent seat on the Council, bombarded and occupied the Greek island of Corfu as a reprisal for the murder of Italian officials engaged in the delimitation of an international boundary. The diplomats persuaded the Italians to evacuate the island on payment of an indemnity by the Greeks. All these disputes might well have been handled by the League, since they were evidently capable of



League of Nations Council meeting after Italian delegates had walked out, following condemnation of their aggression in Ethiopia in 1935. Pierre Laval, who had wished to settle the matter by negotiation, is to be seen opposite the camera resting his head on his left hand. (BROWN BROTHERS)

solution. But the major powers had not yet become accustomed to delegating such matters to the League. The League did, however, solve a boundary dispute in 1926 between Britain, the new state of Iraq, and Turkey. In this case the nations involved had bound themselves in advance to accept League arbitration. The League Council also settled a frontier dispute between Greece and Bulgaria which had resulted in armed hostilities. The fact that the League showed itself able to settle those with which it was entrusted increased its prestige and would in time have accustomed the major powers who really determined the decisions as before to make use of the League machinery.

Inability to deal with major power aggression But when the League was faced with a

challenge from Japan, a major power with a permanent seat on the Council, it accomplished little. A commission was sent by the League to inquire whether aggression had been committed by Japan against China, whose province of Manchuria she had invaded. When the commission reported against Japan, the latter left the League, but nothing meanwhile had been done against her. The great crisis of the League system came with the invasion of Ethiopia, a League member, by Italy in 1935. Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia appealed his case to the League. The Council was divided, Britain and France initially preferring not to take action. The case was then debated in the Assembly, with the small nations in particular demanding action. Meanwhile British public opinion had shown itself overwhelmingly in favor of strong action,

and Britain thereafter took the lead in the Council and called for sanctions against Italy. Sanctions were agreed to both by the Council and the Assembly; but they were limited and did not include the export of coal, steel, or oil, the latter in fact indispensable to Italian victory. A few small countries did not apply sanctions, but the sanctions were effective as far as they went. However, when Mussolini threatened war if an embargo were placed on oil, the great powers could not be persuaded to take further action. The British and French foreign ministers, Sir Samuel Hoare and Pierre Laval, engineered a deal to give Italy part of her demands in Ethiopia, but they and their deal were repudiated later by their governments. Meanwhile Mussolini brought the war to a speedy end and, as we have seen, made an alliance with Germany to escape the isolation of his country.

The double significance of this attempt should not be overlooked, and the failure of the League should not be magnified. It is true that the League proved itself unwilling to coerce a power which was still thought of as a major one and which was certainly bellicose enough to be able to intimidate the major powers. But in the circumstances of the day it was clear that Britain and France, faced by the growing power of Germany, needed to keep the friendship of Italy as a counterweight to the rising Germany; in the pre-League days the Hoare-Laval pact would have been a suitable means for satisfying Italy without totally destroying Ethiopia. Italy would probably have accepted the pact in order to keep her friendship with Britain and France. But because the League was in operation and public opinion was aroused, Britain and France were compelled to act against what their governments conceived to be their national interests and drove Mussolini into Hitler's arms; and, ironically enough, Ethiopia was totally conquered, instead of being merely partitioned. The formation of the Axis was not predetermined, nor was it ever in the interests of Italy, as we have shown.

It is therefore arguable that the League's interference created a more dangerous situation for both larger and smaller nations than before, and that even if the oil sanctions had succeeded in curbing Mussolini's aggression, the price

paid might have been too high. But the League's action did show that any aggressor in the future would have to face considerable inconveniences and moral condemnation by world opinion, since his action would be called into question on the world's stage. The action taken by the League over Ethiopia was thus a dress rehearsal for the condemnation of the major powers of Britain and France in the Suez crisis of 1956 by their fellow Security Council members, the United States and the USSR. The moral opprobrium of the world called down upon these countries was perhaps as influential in persuading them to withdraw as the threats of the Soviet Union. Possibly the League in 1935 gave the world an important demonstration of how a world organization is able to act effectively in disputes involving major powers—even though in the present conditions of national sovereignty it can not coerce them by the use or threat of force. Unfortunately Germany and Italy were not deterred by any fear of condemnation by their fellow nations in the 1930's, as the Soviet Union was not deterred from her actions in Hungary in 1956.

Failure to secure disarmament It need hardly be added that the League of Nations was also incompetent to arrange for disarmament, a task laid upon it by the Covenant. All it could do was to register the few treaties that were signed by the great powers, especially the Washington Naval Agreement of 1925 between the United States, Britain and Japan, which stated the proportion of naval vessels each could have. In the 1930's, when the Disarmament Conference was finally convened, none of the major powers dared to limit their armaments in face of the danger presented by Hitler. Obviously any large measure of disarmament will be the consequence of improving the conditions of security, and it must be universal; the scales can not be weighted in favor of a nation which does not choose to agree. Such conditions were hardly present in Europe of the 1930's.

THE APPROACH OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The have and have-not nations We come now to the investigation of the increasing mo-

mentum which drove the world toward its second world war in less than a generation. In the 1930's there were three major powers that were demanding a change of the state system in their favor. Germany under Hitler was demanding with increasing stridency what she called her *Lebensraum*, or living space. She had laid claim not only to lands lost under the treaty of Versailles but to all lands predominantly occupied by Germans. Thus she wanted the return of the Polish Corridor and full sovereignty over the Rhineland and the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia. For good measure she demanded also the return of the colonies she had lost after World War I and a share of the colonies controlled by Britain and France. Italy demanded colonies and, as we have seen, added Ethiopia to her empire. She desired more of the Dalmatian coast from Yugoslavia and full control of Albania, with perhaps some of the Greek hinterland of that country, and for good measure, the "return" of Nice and Savoy from France (traded to Napoleon by the kingdom of Sardinia in the wars of liberation) and the island of Corsica to add to her own territory of Sardinia.

Japan in the Far East was in an even more demanding mood, which is easily explicable by her circumstances. She was a highly industrialized country with a growing population which she could not feed herself. She lacked any natural market for her manufactures except in China, which she had already tried to dismember. China was no longer now a prey to the Western powers and ripe for spoliation as in the nineteenth century. She had her own Nationalist government ruled by Chiang Kai-shek, who was bent on preserving the integrity of his country. In the Far East, Japan was surrounded by territories controlled by the Western powers—India, Malaya, and Burma, which were in British hands, Indo-China, which was French, the East Indies, which were Dutch, and the Philippine Islands, which were American. All these territories in the 1930's discriminated against Japanese exports and showed no disposition to favor her proposals for an East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, which would be economically dominated by herself. She felt herself to be the natural source of supply for the manufactured goods which she alone in the Far East could make and

export in significant quantity. Finding herself unable to expand, she first invaded China and sheared off the northernmost province of Manchuria, setting up a puppet regime under a Chinese ruler from the old Manchu ruling house of China. A few years later she moved further into China, but was met with prolonged and stubborn resistance which tied up most of her available military force. She did not expand further until the third year of the second World War.

These, then, were the major have-not nations, to which should be added the disgruntled smaller defeated nations of World War I—Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, all of which coveted parts of their former territories and had never willingly accepted the boundaries imposed upon them by the peace treaties. Finally, there was the USSR, which made no open demands but had certainly not abandoned forever the former tsarist possessions. On the other side were the "have" nations, Britain and France, and the smaller nations of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, which knew they were threatened by German and Italian expansionism. All these smaller countries were endangered by the fact that they had within their borders dissident ethnic minorities who could be relied upon to make trouble in the event of a general war, and all wished to head it off if they could. Not all, however, took the steps most likely to ensure peace. Poland, in particular, relied far too long on German promises and on a non-aggression treaty signed with Hitler. But Poland was in an especially difficult position since she shared a common border with the Soviet Union, which likewise desired a portion of her territory that she had won in the eighteenth century.

We have already noted how Hitler was able to break with impunity the restrictions placed upon Germany by the treaty of Versailles. By 1936 conscription was already in force and Germany was openly rearming. The British and French were hesitant to follow his lead. Indeed, the British Conservative party won an election in 1935 on a program of rearmament, but only enough rearmament to satisfy the requirements for the fulfillment of their obligations under the League. They were still hoping against all the evidence that Hitler would stay his hand or turn it against others, either the Soviet Union, against



whom he constantly inveighed, or against smaller nations whose territories could be truncated in order to satisfy his appetite for *Lebensraum*. We have also noted how Hitler was able to march his troops into the Rhineland without molestation, and how Italy and Japan became his allies in 1936. In the same year a civil war broke out in Spain, which raged with increasing fury and varying fortunes until 1939.

The Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) The Spanish Civil War requires some attention here in view of its importance in preparing the psychological background for World War II. After the first World War Spain had been no more able to solve her pressing social and economic problems than had Italy or Portugal. The government was corrupt and impotent; even the army was unable to make headway in its chronic war for the subjugation of those parts of Morocco allotted to Spain by agreement with France at the turn of the century. Spain was the victim of an appalling landholding system, similar to that of southern Italy. The Church, the

great landholding grandees, and the few industrialists were engaged in a constant effort to maintain their ancient privileges in the face of poverty-stricken and rebellious peasants and an equally revolutionary proletariat. Moreover, there were many separatist movements, especially in Catalonia, which wished to sever ties with the inefficient and reactionary central government.

In 1923, with the consent of the army, General Primo de Rivera was installed as virtual dictator by the king, and constitutional rule was suspended. The general instituted some reforms but could not touch the power of the great vested interests. He resigned in 1930 and died shortly afterwards. Alfonso XIII tried to find other leaders to carry on the government, but despairing of success, he decided to restore the constitution. In spite of the limited franchise, the ensuing elections, as in Russia in 1905, showed that the vast majority of the voters had no further use for the monarchy. Alfonso thereupon abdicated, leaving the responsibility in the hands of the Cortes, which proceeded to write

a new constitution, disestablishing the Church and expropriating the large landowners. But the republicans were divided into so many parties, and it was so difficult to put through the necessary laws implementing the constitution, that precious and irreplaceable time was lost. The right-wing parties were able to recover their strength and initiative before much had been accomplished.

The divisions in the Cortes compelled the holding of another general election in 1933. This time the election went in favor of the right wing, which under Gil Robles undid the whole program of reform. The years from 1933 to 1936 were filled with efforts to suppress the revolutionary movements by legal means and government-backed force. By 1936 the left-wing republican parties were ready to unite in a Popular Front as in contemporary France, and they won the election of that year, thus forming

the new legal government. But the right-wing parties, now backed by definitely Fascist groups, were unwilling to accept the results of the election. They were supported by the military, whose power had been curbed under the first republican government but who had recovered much of it under the conservatives. A military junta was formed which with the aid of Moorish troops from Morocco invaded the country. The government was in no position to resist the disciplined troops, even though it retained possession of most of the small Spanish fleet. However, after it had armed the workers and such peasants as remained loyal, it was able to halt the advances of the insurgents, now led by General Francisco Franco.

It is difficult to re-imagine now the passionate controversy this civil war gave rise to in the democratic countries. Little was known previously of Spain, still less of Spanish politics and



the domestic situation. But it could not be denied that a democratic government which had just won an election had been set upon by obviously Fascist forces for the purpose of preventing the democratic government from putting into effect the long overdue social revolution. This was the way in which the vast majority of the people in Britain and France, and indeed in the United States, saw the war; and thousands of them volunteered to join the Loyalist forces. Here was a chance to escape from the deadening inertia imposed upon them by their appeasing governments, to strike a blow for democracy before it was eroded everywhere. But the governments saw the war in no such light. The dictators of Germany and Italy saw it as a chance to equate democracy with communism and to crush it; the Soviet Union looked upon it not only as part of the "Fascist" conspiracy, but as the beginning of a truly proletarian revolution, which, if it succeeded, would deliver Spain into her hands as the first great outpost for her system. The British and French, fearful that the war would become general if both they and the Fascist powers intervened, drew up a nonintervention pact which included the United

States—and for good measure the Fascist powers and the Soviet Union too. All signed. The democratic countries therefore placed an embargo on all shipments of arms to Spain; but Hitler, Mussolini, and the Soviet Union intervened both with arms and with troops, the latter mostly supplied by Mussolini.

This policy of the democratic countries played directly into the hands of Germany and Italy. The Soviet Union and the Communist parties in the democratic countries did their utmost to organize volunteers; but the Soviet Union was too far away to supply much material, and it could send no troops until the war was almost over. Mussolini, on the other hand, was close by and supplied both troops and material. Hitler supplied mainly air support for General Franco. Germany and Italy were therefore actively engaged in the war, testing their war potential, and finally ensuring the victory for Franco. Britain, France, and the United States did nothing. As the war continued the power on the Loyalist side gradually slipped into the hands of the Communists, who had been few in number at the outbreak. The democratic Spanish leaders were killed or went into exile,



Pablo Picasso's impression of Guernica, a town bombed almost out of existence by the German air force during the Spanish Civil War. (COLLECTION, THE MUSEUM OF MODERN ART, NEW YORK)

and by late in 1939 Franco was able to mount an offensive which carried him to victory. Hitler was more than ever sure that the democracies would do nothing to stop him; and another Fascist dictator, backed by a Fascist party known as the Falange, but not dependent on it so much as on the army, had come to power, deeply in the debt of his Fascist and Nazi allies.

From Munich to the invasion of Poland
In 1938 Hitler, as we have seen, swallowed Austria, and turned on Czechoslovakia, much of which was granted to him at Munich in October of the same year. The rest of the country was now indefensible. But Hitler had not yet come to the end of his demands. It is now known that he fully intended in 1938 to conquer Czechoslovakia by force of arms if she had not been delivered to him without fighting; and that the further progress of his conquests had already been planned. Nothing that the Western powers could have done would have deterred him; but if he had had to fight a Czechoslovakia with her defenses in good order and backed by faithful allies, the course of conquest would have been very different from what it was. Moreover the Western powers did not make as much use of the time they had bought at Munich as Hitler did to strengthen his own forces. Britain and France were still not resigned to the fact that Hitler would have to be stopped by force, and there was also a slight hope that he would turn not against them but against the Soviet Union, which Hitler had always proclaimed to be his chief enemy and against which his most virulent verbal attacks had been directed. Not until the final absorption of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 did they recognize the truth and seek for allies in the coming war. Poland, it was clear, would be next. If there had been any doubts about this Hitler himself dispelled them by beginning his usual preliminary propaganda campaign and by demanding both the restoration to Germany of the "free city" of Danzig, a city under League administration, and a channel through the Polish Corridor to Danzig and East Prussia. Britain and France therefore issued their unilateral guarantees to Poland, which they extended later to Greece, Rumania, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Switzerland. The guar-

antee, however, was virtually useless unless the one uncommitted power, the Soviet Union, could be brought into an alliance against Germany.

But the Soviet Union, which had offered her help in the Czechoslovakian crisis and had expressed her willingness to live up to her treaties with France and Czechoslovakia, was by now thoroughly disillusioned by the Western powers, and recognized the failure of the policy of alignment with them against the Axis. In addition, Stalin suspected them of the intention of trying to persuade Germany to turn to the east rather than against themselves. The disillusionment of the Soviet Union was symbolized by the replacement of her pro-Western foreign minister, Maxim Litvinov by Vyacheslav Molotov, who could be trusted by Stalin to carry out a total reversal of policy. Stalin seems to have already made up his mind to come to terms with Hitler, if only to buy time for his own rearmament. Hitler also could help him win the lost tsarist territories. Nevertheless, he entered into formal negotiations with the West.

The British, in their new mood, were unwilling to permit the Baltic countries to enter into the Soviet sphere of influence, which was one of the concessions demanded by Stalin; and their whole attitude towards the negotiations with the Soviet Union, which they could barely conceal, was that they were performing a distasteful chore and that a Communist power could not possibly be trusted. Since the British and French had nothing to offer but their alliance, which, if it was honored, and the Soviet Union were not left in the lurch, would probably mean an early war with Germany, Stalin preferred to come to an agreement with the Germans. This agreement was quickly negotiated publicly as a nonaggression pact, but there were secret clauses which were suspected at the time and are now known to have existed. These secret agreements defined the respective spheres of influence of the two powers as soon as Germany had conquered Poland.

Meanwhile, although Germany had denounced her long-standing nonaggression pact with Poland and was already making demands for Danzig and complaining of Polish atrocities toward her German minorities, the country most threatened refused to make any attempt to come

to terms with the Soviet Union. The Polish leaders understood very well that once the Soviet Union was permitted into their country, she would be difficult, if not impossible, to dislodge. It was therefore a choice between Nazi or Russian occupation, or both. They would not even permit the British and French to offer to the Soviet Union a free passage through their country for the purpose of fighting Germany. Since the British and French themselves could give no direct aid to Poland, any alliance they made with the Soviet Union would have been of no immediate help to the Poles, if the Russians were refused access to the common enemy. So Poland prepared her defenses as best she could, with no prospect of military aid from anyone. Hitler was obviously poised to strike with or without any pretext. Finally on September 1, 1939, he struck.

The French and British fulfilled their guarantees and declared war on Germany. Within a few days the British dominions did the same, with the exception of Eire. But until the German invasion of Norway in April 1940, these few countries with Poland, which was soon defeated and partitioned and thus knocked out of the war, faced the Nazis alone. Italy did not join in the shooting war until the fall of France was imminent. General Franco successfully kept his strife-torn country out of the general war until the end.

Thus began the second World War, the most extensive and most costly war that the world has yet seen.

Suggestions for further reading

PAPERBACK BOOKS

- Allen, Frederick Lewis. *Only Yesterday*. Bantam. Fine social picture of the United States in the 1920's.
- Bailey, Sydney D. *British Parliamentary Democracy*. Houghton Mifflin Paperbacks. A good standard account of the modern British system.
- Fallada, Hans. *Little Man, What Now?* Ungar. One of the best European novels of the Depression. (German).
- Hofstadter, Richard. *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It*. Knopf. See Chapter 19.

Kennan, George F. *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*. NAL. Thoughtful and provocative attack on the basis of American diplomatic policy, and especially its "moralistic" trend. Should be read especially with Niebuhr's *The Irony of American History*.

Knapton, Ernest J. *France Since Versailles*. Berkshire. Short factual study, a useful introduction to the subject.

Leuchtenburg, William E. *The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-1932*. University of Chicago Paperbacks. Valuable picture of the Harding-Coolidge-Hoover era, brought to an end by the Great Depression.

Luethy, Herbert. *France Against Herself*. Meridian. Thoughtful and well-documented book on modern France and her difficulties, by a Swiss.

Orwell, George. *Homage to Catalonia*. Beacon. Moving account of one aspect of the Spanish Civil War.

Perkins, Dexter. *The New Age of Franklin Roosevelt, 1932-1945*. University of Chicago Paperbacks. Useful survey, rather favorable to the New Deal.

Steinbeck, John. *The Grapes of Wrath*. Compass. Unforgettable novel of the Depression as it affected rural America.

CASEBOUND BOOKS

Brenan, Gerald. *Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Civil War*. 2d ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1950. Thoughtful and careful analysis.

Carr, Edward H. *Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*. 2d ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1946.

Gedye, G. E. R. *Betrayal in Central Europe*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939. A foreign correspondent's passionate denunciation of the policy of appeasement, and especially of the Czechoslovak betrayal.

Graves, Robert, and Hodge, Alan. *The Long Weekend: A Social History of Great Britain, 1918-1939*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941. Social history of great importance for the understanding of Britain during the period.

Hemingway, Ernest. *For Whom the Bell Tolls*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940. Fine novel, from a typical Hemingwayan point of view, about the Spanish Civil War.

Laski, Harold J. *Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*. New York: Viking Press, Inc.,

1947. Thoughtful and perceptive study by the outstanding Socialist thinker and teacher.
- Mitchell, Broadus. *Depression Decade: From New Era Through New Deal, 1929-1941*. New York: Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1947.
- Neumann, Sigmund. *The Future in Perspective*. New York: G. B. Putnam's Sons, 1946. Serious study of the inter-war period. An early postwar attempt to draw the appropriate lessons.
- Niebuhr, Reinhold. *The Irony of American History*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952. Criticism of American policy as overly optimistic in a dangerous world, of the American tendency to ascribe moral excellence to America alone and to criticize others in the light of American moral standards.
- Ortega y Gasset, José. *The Revolt of the Masses*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1932. Stimulating and influential study of the "paralysis of the European soul."
- Soule, George. *Prosperity Decade: From War to Depression, 1917-1929*. New York: Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1947.
- West, Rebecca. *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*. New York: Viking Press, Inc., 1943. One of the great books of this century. Passionate, perceptive, sensitive, it is in form a story of a voyage through space and time in Yugoslavia; but in the process it becomes a picture of contrasts between the Western world and Yugoslavia, soon to be a victim of Western policies. As history, to be treated with some caution.

The Global War and the Foundation of the United Nations

❖ The primary cause of the war

"MASTER RACE" PSYCHOLOGY OF HITLER AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE

The war which was launched on September 1, 1939 was in many respects not only the most extensive of all wars yet fought in history, but also one of the most senseless. Although the Far Eastern half of the war had clearly definable causes which can be grasped by the human reason—Japan did, indeed, need markets and raw materials, and an imperialistic expansion was one possible way of winning them—the same is not true of the European half. In waging the war the Japanese may have used certain techniques borrowed from Hitler, such as notions of a master race, brutal suppression of the conquered peoples, torture, and others, but they were not Japan's reason for war. In a very real sense, however, the notion of a master race lay behind the war launched by Hitler.

Germany had certain recognizable grievances, and it is possible to point to certain limited objectives that could have been attained by war—although there is no reason why they should not have been won by more of the same successful threats that Hitler had utilized up to 1939. But, as is now known, there were never any true war aims in the undoubtedly warped mind of Adolf Hitler. When he had subjugated almost the whole of continental Europe, he had

no idea what he wanted to do with it. He did not even possess an exportable ideology which he hoped to impose upon men's minds. He had risen to absolute control of a large industrial state with a (fairly recent) military tradition and a capacity for waging war imaginatively and with the aid of modern techniques; and, possessing the power, he simply decided to use it—not for any purpose he or anyone else could consider noble or even national, but solely as a demonstration of his power.

It is abundantly clear that Hitler himself was a madman, with an erratic but limited genius that could lead him just as readily to make spectacular mistakes as to devise master-strokes which won him his ends against the advice of all his subordinate experts. In time of peace he was rewarded by constant successes. But in war, resources and experience counted for more than even the most penetrating intuition; and self-confidence could not take the place of sound judgment. He could no longer threaten or bluff his enemies once they had finally taken the field against him. Every victory he won during the war was gained by simple military might. Although it was Hitler who chose the moment for the invasion of France against the advice of his generals, it was the strategy and tactics of the army that won the victory. Although he took over the duties of supreme commander only late in 1941, it was he who chose the campaign from the beginning and

directed the over-all strategy until the very end; and until the very end when he committed suicide in Berlin his orders were obeyed. He never lost control of his fighting machine or of the Combat Security Police (*Waffen S.S.*), which saw to it that the army and people remained loyal and obedient.

Yet the Germans and occasional traitors in the conquered countries who were the instruments of his will had nothing moral to sustain them, nothing, indeed, that can be thought of as an acceptable human aim. The Germans were to be the "master race," ruling the world by power and fear; the other peoples classed as Nordic by Hitler might be German helpers, entitled to crumbs from the table of the masters. Other "races" were degenerate or mongrelized or subhuman, the Jews lowest of all and the Slavs next to the lowest. Thus at least six million Jews, perhaps many more, were exterminated or allowed to die of starvation, most of them in concentration camps, solely because they were ethnically Jewish, members of the Jewish "race," not necessarily adherents of the religion of Judaism. Slavs were not so extensively exterminated; as "natural" slaves by birth, they were enslaved and subjected to the most atrocious forms of tortures to make them work for their masters. They were constantly spoken of as "animals" and "subhuman." Such measures were not taken in order to keep the people cowed and keep them from rebelling against their new rulers. Ruthless measures enough were taken for this purpose with such people as the Norwegians, who as Nordics were only slightly "racially inferior" to the Germans, and even with Germans themselves who were suspected of treason to the regime. Hitler had no appreciation whatever of the fact that he could not win any acceptance for his rule among the peoples he conquered, nor that his policies made it inevitable that they should resist him and plot with whatever means they possessed to overthrow his rule. He did not care to be accepted, and he despised all collaborators even while he used them, discarding them when they had served his purpose. Thus it was impossible for his conquests to endure. They lasted only as long as he had the power to coerce, and not a moment longer.

How, then, was it possible for Hitler and his regime to survive so long? The truth seems to be that in some way he was able to fulfill some deep need in the German people he ruled, or at least in enough of them to win some measure of popular acceptance for what he said and did. Even when the strength of the whole apparatus of tyranny and propaganda that he constructed is taken into full account, this acceptance, and indeed enthusiasm—even if only in a minority—must be postulated, and it therefore becomes necessary to ask what it was that he appealed to in his people and why. And were the Germans unique in their responsiveness to that appeal? Although these questions can perhaps be answered only through a knowledge of abnormal psychology, the historian who looks for the causes of wars and revolutions must at least make the attempt; and if he cannot answer them, nevertheless he must raise the questions in the reader's mind.

The history of the German people can give a partial and incomplete answer. Germany reached nationhood late—as did Italy, her Axis partner. She achieved this nationhood through two successful wars. The first World War, into which she entered at the height of her success, which she did not believe she could lose, and, indeed, did not think she had lost until the treaty of Versailles, was a severe shock. The Allied blockade, maintained until she signed the peace treaty, the deep humiliation of the invasion of the Ruhr, and the inflation—each of these in turn contributed to her feeling of desperation and powerlessness. Then for a brief period the Germans knew an economic recovery, during which they were accepted by the world which had treated them as an enemy; but it did not heal the wound. Prosperity was evanescent, and they could not trust it to continue. The Depression hit them—and for all their hard work and effectiveness, again they were helpless, until a man came along who told them they were a master race, that what they had come to doubt, namely, that they could by their own efforts achieve the impossible, was true. When he gave them a scapegoat, told them that they had not even been defeated in World War I, but stabbed in the back by the Jews who had stayed at home, that the Jews had caused the

Chronological Chart

German invasion of Poland	1939 (Sept. 1)
Division of Poland between Germany and Russia	(Sept. 29)
Amendment of United States Neutrality Acts to permit cash sales of arms	(Nov. 3)
Russo-Finnish War	(Nov. 30-Mar. 12, 1940)
Expulsion of Soviet Union from League of Nations	(Dec. 14)
German invasion of Norway	1940 (Apr. 9)
End of organized Norwegian resistance	(Apr. 30)
German invasion of Holland and Belgium	(May 10)
Winston Churchill becomes prime minister of Britain	(May 10)
Evacuation of British troops from Dunkerque	(May 28)
Italian declaration of war on Britain and France	(June 10)
German occupation of Paris	(June 13)
Russian forces into Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania	(June 15-17)
Armistice between France and Germany	(June 22)
Declaration of continued resistance by Gen. de Gaulle	(June 23)
Russian occupation of Bessarabia	(June 28)
British destruction of bulk of French fleet at Oran	(July 3)
Establishment of Pétain regime at Vichy	(July 9)
Heavy German bombing of Britain (Battle of Britain)	(Aug.-June, 1941)
Agreement between Britain and United States for exchange of destroyers for bases	(Sept. 2)
Adoption of selective service (conscription) by United States	(Sept. 16)
Japanese invasion of French Indo-China	(Sept. 23)
Free French failure to capture Dakar	(Sept. 23-25)
Three-power pact between Axis powers and Japan	(Sept. 27)
Italian invasion of Greece	(Oct. 28)
First British drive into Libya	(Dec.-Jan., 1941)
Lend-Lease Act	1941 (Mar. 11)
German Invasion of Yugoslavia	(Mar. 27)
Counterattack in North Africa by Axis under Rommel	(Apr.-May)
Neutrality treaty between Russians and Japanese	(Apr. 13)
German occupation of Athens	(Apr. 27)
German occupation of Crete	(May 31)
German invasion of Russia	(June 22)
Atlantic Charter	(Aug. 14)
Russian counterattack	(Dec. 1)
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor	(Dec. 7)
United States declaration of war on Japan	(Dec. 8)
German and Italian declarations of war on United States	(Dec. 9)
Sinking of British battleships <i>Repulse</i> and <i>Prince of Wales</i> by Japanese	(Dec. 10)
Second British drive into Libya	(Dec. 11)
Japanese capture of Manila	1942 (Jan. 2)
Fall of Singapore	(Feb. 15)
Japanese conquest of Java	(Mar. 9)
Fall of Corregidor	(May 6)
Battle of Coral Sea—Allied naval victory over Japanese	(May 7)
Second Rommel drive as far as El Alamein	(May-June)
Naval victory of Midway	(June 4-7)
German drive into Caucasus	(July 2)
Beginning of United States counterattack in Pacific (Solomon Islands)	(Aug. 7)

Beginning of siege of Stalingrad	1942 (Aug. 22)
Final British drive in North Africa—expulsion of Axis troops	(Oct.–Nov.)
Landing of United States forces in North Africa	(Nov. 8)
German forces invade unoccupied France	(Nov. 11)
Casablanca Conference between Roosevelt and Churchill—agreement on demand for unconditional surrender	1943 (Jan. 14–24)
End of Axis resistance in North Africa	(May 12)
Invasion of Sicily by Allied forces under Gen. Eisenhower	(July 10–Aug. 18)
Resignation and arrest of Mussolini	(July 26)
Quebec Conference between Roosevelt and Churchill	(Aug. 11–24)
Invasion of Italian mainland	(Sept. 2)
Surrender of Italy by Badoglio	(Sept. 9)
Rescue of Mussolini by Germans	(Sept. 12)
Teheran Conference between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin	(Nov. 28–Jan. 12, 1944)
Anglo-American occupation of Rome	1944 (June 4)
Allied invasion of Normandy	(June 6)
Ousting of Germans from Russia	(July 24)
Landing of Allied troops on Mediterranean coast	(Aug. 15)
Russian occupation of Bucharest	(Aug. 23)
Liberation of Paris	(Aug. 24)
Halting of Allied invasion on German borders	(Sept. 15)
Crushing of Polish resistance in Warsaw by Germans	(Oct. 2)
Dumbarton Oaks Conference on plans for United Nations	(Oct. 9)
Occupation of Athens by Allied troops	(Oct. 13)
Occupation of Belgrade by Russians and Yugoslavs	(Oct. 19)
Landing of United States troops on Leyte	(Oct. 20)
Decisive United States naval victory over Japanese (Battle of Philippine Sea)	(Oct. 21–22)
Battle of the Bulge—failure of German counterattack in Belgium	(Dec. 16–25)
Russian drive into Poland	1945 (Jan. 12)
Yalta Conference of Big Three	(Feb. 7–12)
Allied offensive into Germany	(Feb. 8)
Denunciation by Soviet Union of nonaggression treaty with Japan	(Apr. 5)
Western Allies reach Elbe	(Apr. 11)
Death of President Roosevelt—Harry Truman becomes president	(Apr. 12)
Invasion and conquest of Okinawa	(Apr.–June)
San Francisco Conference on United Nations	(Apr. 25–June 26)
Execution of Mussolini by anti-Fascist Italians	(Apr. 28)
Russian entry into Berlin—reported death of Hitler	(May 1)
Unconditional surrender of Germany	(May 7)
Potsdam Conference of Big Three	(July 17–Aug. 2)
Victory of Labor party in British elections—Churchill replaced by Attlee	(July 26)
Atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima	(Aug. 6)
Russian declaration of war on Japan—invasion of Manchuria	(Aug. 8)
Second atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki	(Aug. 9)
Unconditional surrender of Japan	(Aug. 14)
United Nations formally established after ratification by 29 member nations	(Oct. 24)
First session of United Nations General Assembly	1946 (Jan. 10)

inflation and profited by it, they believed it. Not at first, for Hitler was a laughable figure, as far removed as might be from their idea of a Nordic superman. But he delivered the goods, what he had promised them came true, and they grew to idolize him. When he told them the world belonged to them and it was their task to rule it, that he and they, in Nietzsche's words, were "beyond good and evil," they identified themselves with him. All other peoples were inferior, all potentially their enemies; so be it, the Germans were destined to triumph. Neither they nor their Fuehrer needed a new world order. They needed only to triumph.

COTHRIBUTORY CAUSE—APPEASEMENT OF HITLER

This dark aberration in the history of mankind was, on the German side, the result of the abdication of the moral will of the German people and the submission of their individual moral selves to their leader. As for the British and French, however, their temporary lack of fortitude provided Hitler with the means to impress upon his people that he was indeed a superman with whom they could identify themselves; and in truth the policy of appeasement, with its own moral and intellectual deficiencies, made the war possible. The war marked the end of the hegemony of the European nations in world affairs; if ever they were to be able to exercise a world leadership in the future it would only be as a European community, speaking with one voice and acting with one will. The United States, a transatlantic power, and the USSR, a power half Asiatic, were to inherit the positions hitherto occupied by the European nations, at least for a season.

❖ The war

BLITZKRIEG IN POLAND

The first phase of the war was completed on schedule; all organized resistance was crushed within less than a month. The Soviet Union occupied the eastern section of Poland, in ac-

cordance with her treaty with Germany, and the Nazis the western sector. The Poles were treated by the Nazis with no consideration whatever, since the Polish people were Slavs. Throughout the war German *Gauleiters*, or governors, compelled the Poles to labor for them and killed those who resisted. The more than three million Jews in the country were exterminated. A few Polish leaders managed to escape to England, where they set up a Polish government-in-exile, recognized in Britain as the legal government of Poland; many Polish volunteers thereafter fought in the British armed forces. The Soviet Union compelled the war-born countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to join her as Soviet republics within the Russian "federal" system, and made demands on Finland for the cession of bases and some territory. On the refusal of the Finns the Russians launched an attack which was met by spirited resistance; whereupon the League of Nations, in the one and only time they took such action, expelled the Soviet Union as an aggressor. When the Russians finally brought up extensive reinforcements, they broke through the Finnish defenses and imposed a peace on the Finns which gave them somewhat more than they had demanded earlier. When Germany went to war later with the Soviet Union, the Finns, who had been deeply embittered by the Russian war, joined the Germans, only to be defeated with them in 1945.

Meanwhile, Hitler was making ready for an attack on the West. Both sides took almost no action during the fall and winter of 1939, facing each other in their prepared positions. In Britain and France there was little sign of great urgency, and life went on without much change, almost as if the countries were not at war. There still lingered a faint hope that, with the conquest of Poland by Germany, the war had been concluded, and that somehow they would be spared the ravages of a general war, since the defenses of both sides—the Maginot Line of the French and the West Wall or Siegfried Line of the Germans—would prove impregnable and too costly for either side to mount an offensive. Little significance, it seemed, was given to the *Blitzkrieg* technique by which Poland had been



Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and Field Marshal Keitel welcome Russian foreign minister Molotov to Berlin in November, 1940. (UNITED STATES ARMY PHOTO)


conquered, and the British and French apparently did not think it would be applied to them.

FALL OF FRANCE

But Hitler was not thinking in terms of the first World War. Suddenly in April, 1940, he struck at Norway by means of an extraordinary operation, partly naval, partly land, which was an outstanding success. In spite of their superior sea power, the British were unable to give significant aid to the Norwegians. Norway, together with Denmark, which had submitted without fighting, was occupied by the Germans, who set up a puppet regime in Norway under a traitor named Vidkun Quisling, whose name thereafter was to signify one who collaborated with the Nazis against his own country. A few weeks later Hitler struck at the West in the Netherlands and Belgium, which were quickly knocked out of the war and occupied. The Maginot Line was bypassed, since it had never been extended to the sea; the French had relied on the neutrality or aid of the Belgians and Dutch. Armored columns, aided by tremendous air

power, including dive-bombers, cut through the disorganized Allied resistance, and drove a wedge through France to the sea, dividing the French army in half and bottling up the British, Belgian, and part of the French armies. The whole movement was executed so speedily that the Germans themselves were surprised; and instead of cutting off the Allied armies in the north and destroying them, they divided their own forces, leaving behind insufficient troops and air-power to finish them off. The British were able to use their air and naval power to protect the coast at Dunkirk and, by a remarkable feat of mobilizing every kind of water craft available in the country, to rescue more than three hundred thousand men who had been trapped in the area, although they were compelled to leave all their war material behind.

Meanwhile, the rest of the German army marched on Paris and captured it. An armistice was imposed on the French under which northern France was occupied and southern France was allowed to remain under the rule of a legally established collaborating government, with headquarters at Vichy in occupied France.



led by the aged Marshal Pétain. In the last days of the French war the Italians intervened in the south on the German side, and were given some of the Axis chores to perform in their area. A French acting brigadier-general, Charles de Gaulle, escaped to England and proclaimed himself the leader of a French government-in-exile. He was recognized by the British, who refused to have any dealings with Pétain or with Pierre Laval, his chief henchman. In spite of enormous difficulties, de Gaulle's Free French movement was able to act as a focus of resistance to the Vichy regime, and during the ensuing years numerous refugees from France, including some of her ablest young political leaders, joined him. French Equatorial Africa soon declared for de Gaulle, and in time small armies of shock troops trained in England were able to take a small part in British offensives wherever they were launched, including North Africa.

THE VICHY REGIME IN FRANCE— PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE

Unoccupied France in time settled down under the Vichy government. The purpose of Pétain and Laval was to modify German demands and, by giving a minimal aid to Germany, to help their own people to survive. Having seen what the Germans could do to the territories they occupied they believed it was possible to save the French under their care from a similar fate. Laval, in particular, believed the Germans would win the war, and that it was better for the French to collaborate with them and try to rescue something from the wreckage rather than to be treated as a conquered people. By this means also they hoped to save North Africa from German occupation, and indeed did so, thereby incidentally making feasible the Anglo-American expedition of 1942. Pétain and Laval were therefore espe-



cially bitter against de Gaulle, who "compromised" them with the Germans. The policy, however, was doomed to divide France still further. The Germans despised their Vichy puppet and increasingly made demands which placed the French rulers in the position of virtually being at war with their own people. They were never able to temper the German demands enough to make them acceptable; but as they were compelled to carry them out, they became little more than the lackeys of the enemy and bore all the responsibility for their atrocious deeds in the eyes of their own people and of the world.

Nevertheless, it is possible that one important service was performed by the Vichy regime for the Allied cause. Hitler was never able to persuade General Franco to enter the war on his side at the time he desired Franco's support and when he still appeared likely to win the war. Franco was able to take the risk of not joining him because unoccupied France was still present as a buffer between him and the Germans, and he calculated that Germany did not wish to occupy it yet and threaten him directly. When the Germans finally occupied southern France in 1943 it was already clear that Hitler could no longer win the war. If Hitler's forces had been

already at the Pyrenees when the Fuehrer tried to persuade Franco to enter the war, Franco might have been faced with the direct choice of joining the Germans or resisting them. In such a dilemma he might well have chosen the former alternative.

BATTLE OF BRITAIN

After the conquest of France, Hitler was faced with the question of whether to attempt to knock Britain out of the war or to turn against Russia, as he purposed to do in due time. Unfortunately for him, his air force had been designed for the support of ground troops and not for strategic bombing; in spite of what he knew to be the relatively feeble defenses of Britain against invasion, he did not have the naval forces or even the landing craft necessary for an invasion by sea. The British fleet was far too strong for him to tackle directly, and he had not yet knocked out the British air force, which, small though it was, had been designed for defense. In the end, after a few futile efforts to build a suitable invading force which were invariably brought to nothing by the British air and naval arms, he decided on an attempt to destroy British morale by bombing. Although

he inflicted great damage, Britain, under the leadership of Winston Churchill (who had replaced Neville Chamberlain after the Norwegian debacle), was able to take such toll of the German bombers, which were insufficiently protected by fighters, that at last the Fuehrer was compelled to call off the major air offensive and leave Britain undefeated.

CONQUEST OF THE BALKANS

Late in 1940 Mussolini invaded Greece but was uniformly unsuccessful. Early in 1941 Hitler had to rescue him from the consequences of his own folly. Hitler's attempts to persuade the Yugoslavs to join him had failed, but similar negotiations with Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania had succeeded, and he invaded the Balkan peninsula, driving through Greece and forcing the British expeditionary force, which had been sent in fulfillment of the British guarantee to the Greeks, to escape to Crete. Hitler pursued the remnants of the force to that island, and in a brilliant but costly paratroop invasion captured it. The Germans were now in control of the entire continent of Europe save only Russia, Sweden, the Iberian peninsula, and tiny, ever-neutral, Switzerland.

Throughout 1940 Hitler had attempted negotiations with the Soviet Union on the basis of division of the spoils of the world. But the Russians were more interested in German intentions nearer home, on which they were unable to attain any satisfactory guarantees. There were numerous conflicts of interest between the powers in the Balkans, always regarded by Russia as her own sphere of influence; and although she had been permitted to annex part of Rumania (Bessarabia) under the secret arrangements of 1939, she had been frozen out of the rest of the Balkans by the German conquests.

UNITED STATES PREPARES FOR WAR

Nevertheless Stalin could not believe, in spite of all indications and of warnings from the British, whom he distrusted profoundly, that Germany would invade the Soviet Union; he remained convinced of this until the Germans actually struck in June 1941. The Soviet armies

were only partially mobilized and were unprepared to make a strong initial resistance; they were therefore compelled to trade land for time. No policy had been concerted with Britain or the United States. The United States had, however, been gearing herself for war for some time even though she had not yet entered it.

There was no doubt at all where the sympathies of the United States lay, nor of the profound detestation the overwhelming majority of her people had for Hitler. Thus it was not difficult for President Roosevelt to persuade his people to abandon the Neutrality Acts of the 1930's, and to institute conscription ("selective service") against the eventuality of American participation in the war. As soon as he was legally able, he traded fifty overage destroyers to the British in exchange for bases in British-controlled territories in the Western hemisphere; he also convoyed ships with American supplies part way across the Atlantic. Finally Congress passed a Lend-Lease Act in 1941, which allowed the British to purchase American supplies in exchange for either bases or the eventual provision of services and supplies for American armed forces. The United States therefore showed that she had learned the lesson of the inter-war period that war debts cannot be repaid in peacetime without damage to the economies of both the debtor and creditor nations. After World War II there were therefore no inter-Allied debts to be repaid. Thus by mid-1941 the United States was engaged in helping Britain by "all means short of war" and was already on the way to becoming what Roosevelt called the "arsenal of democracy."

NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS

Before considering the second phase of the war, the phase which saw the entry of Russia and Japan, thus making it truly global, brief note should be taken of an area in the war which might have proved close to decisive if the Germans had given it their full attention and not been so heavily occupied elsewhere. Soon after the Italians entered the war, they invaded Egypt from their North African colony of Cyrenaica. They were held a short distance inside Egypt in spite of the numerical superiority

of their troops. In the fall of 1940 the British under General Archibald Wavell counterattacked and drove the Italians with heavy loss right across North Africa into Tripoli. Thus once again the Germans had to help out their partner with troops, most of whom had to be dispatched by air, since the British, having severely damaged the Italian fleet, had still not lost control of the western Mediterranean. The German general, Erwin Rommel, commanding a mixed German and Italian force, drove back the British in the spring of 1941, but could not penetrate into Egypt. If he had been able to drive through and capture the Suez Canal, the Mediterranean would finally have become an Axis lake, and the Germans could have gone further into the Middle East and perhaps taken possession of the greatest sources of oil in the world. When the British mounted another offensive later, they were driven far back into Egypt, holding firm only at El Alamein, within striking distance of Alexandria and the Canal. Here, however, Rommel was finally halted. Late in 1942 the British under General Montgomery, with the aid of heavy reinforcements, drove the Germans and Italians so far to the west that their remnants were mopped up by the Anglo-American forces which had just captured former French North Africa.

INVASION OF RUSSIA


At the time of the invasion of Russia, therefore, Germany was apparently triumphant everywhere, though she had not yet been able to conquer Britain, which was still under desultory attack by air but otherwise not endangered at home by Nazi action. The Germans had not as yet engaged in extensive submarine warfare, since they needed to make sure of their land empire before the United States entered the war; and they were fairly certain that the United States would react to all-out submarine warfare against American vessels as she had reacted in World War I. But the Soviet Union blocked the German path to world conquest. Hitler, as is known now, had long before decided on an attack on the Soviet Union; and though he had difficulty in persuading his generals to engage in what would of course be

a two-front war, it was always his belief that the Soviet army was ill-prepared and inefficient, and could be defeated by a German blitzkrieg. The war in his view would be a short one, brought to a quick end by military defeat, loss of all the industrial equipment of European Russia, and probably a rising of the Russian people against the Soviet regime. But, as it turned out, the Russian armies had time to transfer much of their industrial equipment beyond the Urals into Asia, and the people were far more moved by Russian patriotism and hatred for the Nazis than they were by any latent anti-Communist sentiment. Hitler's armies were unable to take either Moscow or Leningrad in the first year of the war, and they were badly prepared for the Russian winter; they were even compelled to retreat some distance from their furthest point of advance before the hardier and better-clad Russian troops.

This winter, in fact, marked the turning point of the war. If Hitler had been able to take the two capitals and put an end to organized resistance by the Russian armies in 1941, he might have destroyed the regime and dictated a peace. But once the Russian defenses had held in that year, there was no real chance of final defeat. The Nazis returned to the attack the following year and made huge advances in the south; but they never came any nearer to Moscow and Leningrad. The immense superiority of Russian manpower was bound to have its effects sooner or later. As it happened, the Germans were unable to take Stalingrad, and Hitler's insistence on no retreat cost him his best troops. But even if he had taken Stalingrad in 1942 and won the oil of the Caucasus, he could not have reached much further, in view of his long lines of communication, the Russian scorched-earth policy, and the attacks on the western sector of his empire, especially now that the United States had at last entered the war.

JAPANESE ATTACKS ON THE FAR EAST— UNITED STATES ENTERS THE WAR

The Japanese had taken advantage of European and American preoccupation in the West to consolidate their own position in the Far East. After the fall of France, the Vichy government,



unable to defend French Indo-China, had bowed to a Japanese ultimatum. Thailand was occupied soon afterward. The United States was deeply disturbed by the continued advance of Japan in China and demanded to know the full Japanese intentions. Protected by a formal treaty with Germany (1940), and a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union (1941), it was clear to the dictatorial government of General Hideki Tojo that Japan would never have such an opportunity again to conquer her proposed East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. She was now therefore prepared to risk war with the United States. In December 1941, while a façade of conversations with the United States was being maintained, Japan struck at the United States fleet in Hawaii by air and inflicted such damage that for a period she enjoyed freedom of movement in the western Pacific and immense superiority both on the sea and in the air.

Her troops invaded Malaya in a perfectly timed and executed amphibian operation and took the British base of Singapore from the landward side, a side from which attack had never

been expected and which was vulnerable. Quickly the Netherland East Indies, Burma, the Philippine Islands, and Western New Guinea followed. The United States fleet was able to prevent Japan from making further progress eastward, but Japanese troops, supported by air and naval units, were able to destroy the United States garrisons in the Philippines and the British and Dutch garrisons elsewhere. She completed the defeat of the British by sinking by torpedo from the air two great battleships on which they had relied for the defense of Malaya. Thus the Japanese quickly built themselves an ephemeral empire in the East, which could be reconquered only slowly when the United States was able to deploy her full strength. Meanwhile Hitler and Mussolini had come to the aid of their oriental ally and had declared war against the United States.

ITALY DRIVEN FROM THE WAR


The United States on entering the war had extended the Lend-Lease Act to the Soviet

Union; and though Stalin did not supply the services called for in the Act, and was therefore committed to repayment after the war, he received supplies from the beginning. Britain also had recognized the Soviet Union as an ally as soon as she had been attacked by Hitler. It was difficult to give much aid to Russia, especially in 1942, when the German submarines were at their most dangerous, but large quantities of goods were sent and arrived safely, especially trucks and other means for transportation; without doubt they greatly helped the Russian defense and subsequent offensives. Nevertheless, Stalin was not satisfied and constantly demanded a "second front" in Europe, which the Western Allies felt themselves incapable of providing until far more troops and material were available. But late in 1942 an expedition was mounted

in North Africa which gave the United States troops battle experience and was strategically useful. The Vichy government in Africa was ousted, North Africa itself was secured, and shortly afterward Sicily was captured. When the Allies invaded Italy, King Victor Emmanuel belatedly dismissed Mussolini, who was rescued by the Germans and ensconced in northern Italy, whereupon the new Italian government made a separate peace with the Allies. The latter were, however, unable to reach Rome. Hitler at once reinforced the faltering Italian army in northern and central Italy, and the Allies were unable to make further headway. The Italian front, nevertheless, was very costly to the Germans who had to send frequent reinforcements of troops needed elsewhere. By the end of 1943 the Russians were driving the Germans back almost out of Russia.



United States troops landing in Normandy on D-day, June 6, 1944. (UNITED STATES ARMY PHOTO)



At last, in June 1944, the joint Anglo-American-Free-French expedition was ready for the invasion of the Continent, which had been called by Hitler *Festung Europa* (Fortress Europe).

INVASION OF EUROPE FROM THE WEST— END OF THE GERMAN WAR

In spite of the formidable defense-works erected by the Germans, the invasion was successful. Paris was liberated, and Belgium and the Netherlands cleared of German troops. An invasion from the Mediterranean also rolled up the rest of France. In the winter, Hitler demanded the launching of a costly German counterattack, known as the Battle of the Bulge, but it failed. The following year the Allies completed the job while the Russians invaded from the east. Hitler and some of his chief henchmen committed suicide at the end of April 1945, and a few days later a German admiral proclaimed the unconditional surrender that had been demanded by the Allies. The war in the West was over.

CONQUEST OF JAPAN—THE ATOMIC BOMB

Meanwhile the Americans had been making steady progress in the Pacific, capturing each fortified island as they reached it, and finally defeating and virtually wiping out the Japanese fleet. The immense superiority of United States air power was able to keep the greatly reduced Japanese air force from interfering while the various pieces of the Japanese empire were recovered and the Japanese garrisons destroyed. Although the Chinese had made only limited gains on the mainland during the period when they had been allies of the West, it was certain that they would be greatly helped by an invasion of Japan, which would then be compelled to bring back her troops from China to defend her homeland. But it was thought by the West that, in spite of the tremendous losses inflicted by the United States strategic bombing of Japanese cities, the Japanese would resist to the last. At a conference at Yalta, arrangements were made for the Russians to invade also from the west and recapture Manchuria.



United States marines storming the Japanese-held island of Tarawa, November, 1943.
(DEFENSE DEPARTMENT PHOTO)


When Germany had been defeated and Japan stood alone, the new United States president, Harry Truman, met with Stalin and Churchill at Potsdam and issued an ultimatum to Japan. But, as is now known, the Japanese did not fully understand the terms and tried to temporize. The Japanese government was indeed in a state of indecision, which was interpreted by the victorious powers as rejection of the ultimatum. The Japanese had no idea of what the United States intended to do and were in complete ignorance of the new weapon in store for them. So the United States dropped an atomic bomb upon the Japanese city of Hiroshima, causing indescribable havoc. A few days later she dropped another bomb on the city of Nagasaki, and the war was over. The Japanese emperor accepted the unconditional surrender

demanded by the victors on September 2, 1945. Meanwhile the Russians had invaded Manchuria according to the agreement reached with the Allies at Yalta. After the surrender the Japanese withdrew from China and their older possessions of Korea and Formosa. The war was now over on both fronts.


❖ The postwar settlements

DISAGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

During the war itself everything had been subordinated to victory and the forcing of unconditional surrender upon the enemy; almost nothing had been decided of what was to be done with the Germans after the surrender. It



The Big Three at Potsdam, August, 1945. Prime Minister Attlee, who had recently replaced Winston Churchill; President Truman, who had recently succeeded Roosevelt; and Stalin. (BROWN BROTHERS)



was of course obvious, and had been made increasingly obvious during the course of the war, that the Western powers and the USSR were uneasy allies, and that the peacetime interests of these powers rarely if ever would be likely to coincide. Though Winston Churchill from time to time had urged consideration of these differences, President Roosevelt had continued to hope that Russian good will and gratitude for wartime aid would be reflected in Russian peacetime policies. The conferences called during the war had therefore resolved themselves into general statements of principle on which all could agree without committing themselves to anything very definite; discussions of immediate strategy, including what steps were to be expected of each power in the months ahead; and the acceptance by Britain and the United States of some of the Russian demands for annexation of German territory after the war.

Roosevelt and Churchill, only two months after the entry of the Russians into the war and before the United States was officially at war (August, 1941), agreed upon a general statement of a new world order they hoped to see after the war, couched in ideal terms, but without any specific statement—as was indeed hardly possible at that stage of the war—of how the ideals were to be implemented. The Atlantic Charter, however, stood as the ideal of the West, to be placed beside the visible bankruptcy of German thought on the new world order that Hitler wished to see. At the Teheran Conference of 1943, when the tide had turned, Britain and the United States agreed to the Russian demand for part of East Prussia. At the Yalta Conference held in February, 1945, the Russian troops were already deep into Germany and Poland, and had set up a provisional government at Lublin in competition with the Polish government-in-exile in London. The most that the British and the Americans could do was to try to win some concessions for the government they backed and to temper the Russian demands for their part of prewar Poland that they had occupied since 1939. The Russians were quite adamant in their determination to keep eastern Poland, in exchange for which Poland should be given German territory as far west as the rivers Neisse and Oder, less than two hundred

miles east of Berlin. At Yalta no conclusions were reached on the matter, but at Potsdam later in 1945 the Russian proposals were agreed to, though with the understanding that the arrangements were only temporary, pending the decisions of an eventual peace conference.

This area, unlike the rest of Poland, could perhaps have been forcibly kept from Russian hands; and it has been argued since that the Allied troops ought to have taken it first and kept it from Russian (nominally Polish) control. But at Yalta the Soviet Union was still an ally, Soviet aid in the Far East was believed to be necessary, and Soviet cooperation in the United Nations, which was in the process of formation, was vital. Against this was the fear of the spread of communism, a danger which was real enough, though Communist propaganda had not been much in evidence during the recent years of the war, having been largely replaced by old-fashioned patriotism. At all events, Britain and the United States agreed to the new Poland, and a formula for participation of members of the London government in a new democratic Poland was accepted. The latter agreement proved worthless, and after a brief period during which the London prime minister was vice-premier in Poland, the country was organized under Soviet protection with a fully Communist government. Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary, which had already been freed by the Soviet armies from German domination, were likewise organized as Communist states. Yugoslavia, however, which had been freed largely by native Communist partisans, with some Western and considerable Russian help at the end, set up a native Communist state under the partisan leader Marshal Tito. From this country the Russians withdrew when the liberation from Germany was completed.

THE GERMAN-AUSTRIAN FOUR POWER ZONES

In the West it was decided to divide both Germany and Austria into occupation zones, the Russians taking the east, the British the north-west, and the Americans the south, with the French administering also a smaller zone in the extreme southwest. Berlin, as the capital and biggest city, was to be under a four-power

occupation, but each power was in full control of its own zone. In due course every country which had been occupied by Soviet armies became a Soviet satellite nation, with nominal independence, with the sole exception of the Soviet zone of Austria, which was evacuated in 1955 after having been pillaged and denuded of much of her capital equipment as reparations by the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia was evacuated because it already possessed a native Communist government. Czechoslovakia was also a partial exception. Here the Russians were in possession only of a part of the country, the remainder being in British and American hands. A small section of the country was annexed by the Soviet Union at once, but she withdrew the remainder of her army at the same time that the Western powers withdrew theirs, trusting to native Communists to stage a *coup d'état* when necessary and to call on the neighboring Russians for aid if required. By that time no American or British forces would be in a position to intervene. This was done in 1948, marking the beginning of the so-called Cold War, to be discussed in the next chapter.

THE FAR EASTERN SETTLEMENT— MACARTHUR REGIME

In the Far East the United States was given complete control of Japan, aided only by a few assistants from other powers that had taken part in the war. General Douglas MacArthur, in command of the forces of occupation, ruled the country by absolute authority for six years, during which an attempt was made to change the entire social structure of the country by destroying the old feudal institutions and the large concentrations of industrial wealth and power, thus preparing the country for democratic government. The occupation was terminated by a treaty in 1951, under which American troops were henceforward to protect the country, and Japan herself entered into a free alliance with the United States. The neighboring Japanese islands, especially Okinawa, won at such cost during the later days of the war, became a United Nations trust territory under United States administration, and Okinawa was fortified. Thus Japan became in fact

a Far Eastern United States military outpost against any possible expansionist tendencies of Russia and, later, of Communist China; but Japan was permitted self-government, and a limited right to military forces for her own protection.

♦ The United Nations

ORGANIZATION AND PURPOSE

As the end of the war approached it was recognized by all the Allied powers (whose number had been greatly increased through the adherence of many nations which could not hope to play an effective part in victory) that the League of Nations, which had been moribund since the beginning of the war, should be replaced by a new organization with similar purposes, but free from the defects which had been observed in the earlier body. In 1945 representatives of fifty-one nations then at war with the Axis met in February 1945 in San Francisco to approve a draft constitution that had been drawn up at Dunbarton Oaks the preceding year. Although neither Winston Churchill nor Josef Stalin had originally had in mind the organization that was approved, they preferred at San Francisco to make amendments to the draft and accept the kind of organization favored by the Americans and by most of the British government, aside from Churchill.

The United Nations, as the new organization was called (the Europeans usually adding the word "organization" to its title), after the name President Roosevelt had given to the Allies during the war, remained a league of nations as before. None of the major participants was ready to yield sovereignty, as Churchill was willing to do. Each nation was given one vote in the General Assembly. The Soviet Union bargained for three votes and obtained them by the device of calling two of its constituent republics, Byelo-Russia and Ukraine, sovereign states; but even three votes were far from enough to give her much say in an organization made up of more than fifty nations, the great majority of them small and militarily powerless. Indeed, the Soviet Union and the other great powers had to safeguard themselves by obtain-

ing a special position in the Security Council, successor of the old League Council, and by granting that body the sole right to take decisive action for the preservation of peace, the major function of the organization.

The Security Council The Security Council was made up of five permanent members—the United States, USSR, Britain, France, and, by American insistence, China—and six non-permanent members chosen by the General Assembly. All of the permanent members had to be in agreement before action could be taken. This meant in effect that the five powers had a veto on action by the Council. The veto was intended by the powers other than the Soviet Union to be applicable only to matters of substance and not of procedure, for example, whether or not to consider a particular problem and whether a particular case fell within the domestic jurisdiction of a nation; and it is so stated in the Charter. The Soviet Union, which always intended that the veto should apply to all matters, has in practice insisted on allowing few matters to be considered as merely procedural, and thus has exercised her veto whenever she so wished; the other powers have acquiesced and hitherto permitted the veto to stand.

Significance of the veto Behind this procedure of the Security Council lies the inescapable fact that only the United States and the USSR are now truly great powers, and neither would in any circumstances permit the other powers to use the security provisions of the United Nations organization against them. Both powers insisted on the veto provision of the Charter. Without it there can be no doubt that neither the United States nor the USSR would have joined the organization; and the USSR on the many occasions when she has disapproved a proposed action of the Council and interposed her veto might well have chosen on such occasion to leave the United Nations altogether, as Italy, Japan, and Germany left the League in the inter-war years. That this would have been a disaster to the United Nations as a world organization can hardly be doubted, since it would have ceased to exercise an influence

upon the USSR thereafter, and all her satellites and sympathizers would have quit at the same time. The USSR would simply have regarded the United Nations as an alliance specifically directed against herself. Indeed, the chief military action carried out under the auspices of the United Nations was agreed to in the temporary absence of the USSR from the Council table (the Korean War), and this particular action lacked in the minds of many the full moral authority of the United Nations, which was exercised against the British, French, and Israelis in 1956, and against the Belgians in the Congo in 1960.

The veto provision symbolizes the true situation in the United Nations—that the organization cannot preserve peace between the two great powers whose interests most frequently clash and which ever since the war have been in almost constant dispute; but it can coerce smaller powers if the permanent members of the Council are in agreement, or if any of them abstain from voting and permit the proposed action to be taken. It was never intended by the major powers that they should be able to coerce one another, still less that the minor powers and all the new nations which have from time to time been admitted should be able to coerce them—as was indeed rendered quite impossible by their military impotence. It was intended that action should be taken only when there was agreement—hence the term “the principle of unanimity” is better chosen than the term the “veto,” which does not appear in the Charter—and such occasions have arisen and continue to arise. Thus the true power situation is accurately portrayed in the composition and procedure of the Security Council, and the great powers remain not subject to coercion by lesser powers, as they intend to remain as long as they are sovereign nations. The balance of power, which has remained the real safeguard for the security of sovereign nations, cannot be destroyed simply by the building of a new league of nations.

The General Assembly—Uniting for Peace Resolution (1950) But, curiously enough, the second reality in the modern world—and this is a reality that is of recent origin but slowly

becoming potent—is also well represented in the functioning of the United Nations. This is the reality of the moral force exercised by the delegates of the United Nations, even those of the smaller powers. Since the Security Council has so often been unable to act or even discuss matters considered of vital importance by the smaller nations, the General Assembly, in which there is no veto, and where resolutions are carried by a simple majority or by two thirds of the votes of all the nations, large and small, in that body, has taken over some of the tasks of the Security Council, with or without its permission. The means by which this was achieved was a "Uniting for Peace" resolution introduced by the United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson and passed overwhelmingly by the General Assembly in 1950. It is, quite frankly, an attempt to bypass the Security Council, and permits the General Assembly to discuss and vote upon resolutions which the Security Council then cannot excuse itself from considering. The General Assembly cannot force the Security Council to take action; but by debating the entire issue it can exercise very serious moral force upon the Council. It can also authorize commissions and other bodies to investigate, again with or without the approval of the Security Council. Thus the permanent members of the Security Council are faced with the necessity of vetoing action against the opinion of the majority of their fellow members of the United Nations, usually an overwhelming majority. The USSR could prevent military action or sanctions from being imposed upon her during the Hungarian rebellion of 1956 by exercising her veto in the Security Council. But she could not prevent the United Nations General Assembly from discussing the matter and drawing the attention of the world to it, nor from engaging in cooperative action to relieve the victims of the rebellion.

Such an evolution of the League of Nations was already foreshadowed in 1936, with the condemnation of Italy: it remains the greatest work for peace that can be done by any international organization as long as sovereign nations continue to exist; and even though it may appear ridiculous that small nations should have votes in the General Assembly out of all propor-

tion to their influence and power in the world, and that all the greater nations should engage in intensive lobbying to win votes for their resolutions and line up the so-called uncommitted nations, and though the resulting resolutions usually can achieve nothing constructive, it is nonetheless true that all the nations, even the greatest, dislike to be condemned in the United Nations—even though they are well aware that many delegates have neither understood nor listened carefully to their point of view. So, gradually, progress is made, and the world organization of the United Nations evolves.

Specialized agencies Perhaps more important in the long run was the experience gained by all the powers and their delegates in working together in the Economic and Social Council set up by the Charter with broad humanitarian aims, which works through a number of permanent commissions. Although the Council has to deal with controversial matters, it has performed many important tasks, including the statement of those rights to which all people on the globe are entitled—even though many nations have not in practice granted them, including some signatories to the Declaration. In the work of the specialized agencies of the United Nations there is even less occasion for controversy. Among these are the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization, whose members, appointed by their governments, are usually experts. The value of the work done by these specialized agencies is inestimable; but apart from the work itself it has given the appointees of all countries experience in working together on a human basis without taking nationality into consideration. Citizens of the smaller nations have discovered in these agencies a field for their work which is sometimes unavailable to them in their own home countries.

Trusteeship Council Finally, a major organization of the United Nations that should be considered is the Trusteeship Council, which is not responsible to the General Assembly but functions by virtue of the Charter itself as an independent body, although final decisions re-

garding the territories it supervises have to be taken by the General Assembly. The Trusteeship Council is composed of the nations administering trust territories and an equal number of "nonadministering" nations, among whom are all the permanent members of the Security Council who do not administer colonies. To this body was given the supervision of all the former League of Nations mandates which were entrusted to them—in practice all except the former German Southwest Africa, which the Union of South Africa refused to transfer to the United Nations—together with any new territories placed at the disposal of the United Nations. Into this last category fell the former Italian Somaliland, which was conquered by the British in the course of the war. No other colony was handed over to the United Nations to become a trust territory. The administering powers undertook certain obligations including the preparation of the colony for self-government and independence. The United Nations trust territories thus provided a yardstick by which the progress of the other colonies toward independence could be measured, even though the latter did not come under the authority of the United Nations. On several occasions in the history of the Trusteeship Council the administering and nonadministering powers divided equally, and no action was taken; but usually, even in controversial matters, one of the administering powers would join the opposition, and thus enable action to be taken.

The Trusteeship Council was responsible for considering petitions submitted by the inhabitants of the trust territories and taking such action as was open to it. It sent periodical visits of inspection to the territory, and had the task of recommending the termination of the trust agreement to the General Assembly when it believed the time was ripe for it. But the General Assembly, whose majority increasingly came to consist of former colonial territories, and anti-colonial small powers, set up its own committee (Fourth Committee) to deal with matters affecting the trust territories, and it set up a committee to receive reports from those colonial powers which decided to give them (for information only) on colonies which had not been converted into trust territories. The inhab-

itants of the trust territories found in the Fourth Committee a more willing ear than was usually available in the Trusteeship Council; and although the Fourth Committee could not dictate to the Trusteeship Council, once more it could exercise moral suasion, and on some occasions its parent body made conditions for the termination of the trust agreement that were contrary to those proposed by the Trusteeship Council. It is doubtful whether any trust territories under the United Nations won their independence any earlier than they would have done if they had been colonies. No final arrangements, for example, had yet been made for the independence of the Belgian trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi when the neighboring colony of the Congo became independent in June, 1960. But there can be little doubt that the trusteeship system of the United Nations did help to make the colonial powers, anxious to receive the approval of their fellow nations, more aware of their responsibilities. It may even be said that the presence of the Soviet delegate in the Trusteeship Council was beneficial to the territories. He was ever quick to criticize, often most unfairly; but he also pointed out with some justice the banality of some of the reports submitted by the colonial powers, and always managed to discover any discrepancy between promises and fulfillment.

Thus the war ended with the nucleus of an organization that could grow into an effective force for world betterment in many areas, and perhaps for peace. Even though the problems facing the world were scarcely more manageable than before the war, and the antagonism between the two surviving great powers made any lasting understanding unlikely while the two countries maintained their opposing systems and philosophies, at least the foundations had been laid on the basis of which a new world order could some day be built.

Suggestions for further reading

PAPERBACK BOOKS

- Cohen, Benjamin. *The United Nations*. Economica. By the Chilean former under-secretary of the United Nations. Well informed and guardedly optimistic.

- Coyle, David Cushman. *The United Nations and How It Works*. NAL. A very fair introduction to the subject.
- Crankshaw, Edward. *Gestapo: Instrument of Tyranny*. Pyramid. An informative account of the German secret police, especially during the war.
- Frank, Anne. *The Diary of a Young Girl*. Pocket Books. Revealing and moving diary of a young Jewish girl who, with her family, hid from the Nazis for several years before finally falling victim to the Gestapo.
- Hersey, John. *Hiroshima (1946)*. Bantam. The earliest American report on what happened after the fall of the bomb. Stark and moving.
- Kogon, Eugen. *Theory and Practice of Hell*. Berkley. A calm description of the Nazi concentration camps and the system behind them. By a Christian survivor of Buchenwald.
- Lengyel, Olga. *Hitler's Ovens*. Avon. The horror-laden story of Auschwitz, by a survivor.
- Liddel Hart, Basil H. *The German Generals Talk*. Berkley. By the noted British military analyst. The second thoughts of a number of surviving German generals.
- Taylor, Robert Louis. *Winston Churchill*. Pocket Books. Admiring, but reasonably objective. One of the best biographies of its Protean subject.

CASEBOUND BOOKS

- Aron, Robert. *History of Vichy*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958. A fair and objective account, sympathetic to the difficulties of Pétain and Laval, while in no way defending their errors of judgment.
- Borsody, Stephen. *The Triumph of Tyranny: The Nazi and Soviet Conquest of Central Europe*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960. Concise, clear account, thoughtful and, on the whole, much more than customarily objective. Makes important distinctions between the two conquests.
- Churchill, Winston S. *The Second World War*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948-1953. Substantial history by a principal participant, documented but, naturally, hardly objective.
- DeGaulle, Charles André. *War Memoirs*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1959. Written in a style of classic austerity, defending the General's policy as the only one capable of restoring French prestige in the eyes of the world, but revealing at the same time why he was found so irritating by his allies.
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. *Crusade in Europe*. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1948. As the leading American general saw the war.
- Feis, Herbert. *Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought*. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1957. Unbiased and informative. A full-scale study of the relations between the three men during the war.
- Feis, Herbert. *Road to Pearl Harbor: The Coming of the War Between the United States and Japan*. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1950. A solid, well-documented account.
- Liebling, A. J., ed. *The Republic of Silence*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1947. Source material, well chosen and edited, on the French Resistance movement.
- Snyder, Louis L. *The War: A Concise History (1939-1945)*. New York: Julian Messner, 1960. A lucid and lively, but accurate, history in one volume. Probably the best for those who desire a continuous, readable narrative and who want to know just what happened on every front.
- Wilmot, Chester. *The Struggle for Europe: History of World War II*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952. A good account by a leading journalist, critical of Allied strategy which left Eastern Europe to the Russians.

Power and Influence in the Postwar World— The Cold War

In this, the only chapter to be devoted exclusively to the postwar world, no attempt will be made to present a consecutive history of the period, which will of course be familiar at least in its outlines to every reader. Instead the power structure of the world will be analyzed as it has revealed itself up to the time of writing, with special reference to the changes that have resulted from the second World War. This procedure obviates the necessity of providing details of events whose significance it is still too early to assess. If, for example, this book had been written in 1957 or 1958, it might have been thought necessary to stress the failure of Western Germany to solve the problem of unemployment and to raise the relatively low standard of living, by contrast with the comparative success of the British and French in solving these particular problems. By mid-1960, however, the position of Western Germany had radically changed. There was already a shortage of labor, and the standard of living and wages of the workers were beginning to rise. This fact will entail certain economic consequences which in mid-1960 can only be predicted. By 1980 it will be possible to see these changes as part of a continuing process and to determine whether or not there is any permanent significance in them.

On the other hand, the role of Western Germany in the power structure of the world will change only if there should be a reunifica-

tion of East and West Germany; and this contingency now appears unlikely in view of the roles assigned to the two sectors of divided Germany by the great powers of East and West. These roles are dictated by the necessities of the so-called Cold War, which is likely to be with us for a long time. Even in the perspective of history the Cold War will certainly be seen as the dominant feature of the early postwar period. The material for this chapter has therefore been selected with a view to its bearing on the progress of this struggle, rather than for its inherent interest or importance, which it is as yet too early to assess. If the Cold War becomes hot, or if its coldness melts between the time of writing and the time of reading, the reader will still be able to place the matters dealt with in this chapter in some perspective and to see for himself how they eventually turned to the advantage or disadvantage of the West.

❖ Contrasts between the two great powers, United States and USSR

After the war, when much of Europe and Japan was in ruins and there was a huge job of physical, political, and moral reconstruction facing the whole world, one reality stood out most clearly. There were only two great powers left in the world, the United States of America

and the USSR. Both had been victorious in the war. Both occupied huge land masses and had populations more than three times the size of any western European power; both had large industrial establishments, though that of the United States was far larger and more efficient than that of the USSR. The Soviet Union, whose territory had been fought over during the war, needed many years for reconstruction before it could be in a position to compete with the United States, but it possessed the necessary resources and manpower; and it seemed likely, if given the required time, to prove a formidable competitor, especially in those fields of activity in which its government was especially interested, and to which it allocated the bulk of technicians and resources.

The United States, of course, still believed in the system of private enterprise and private ownership of the means of production, which had stood the nation in such good stead hitherto. During the war this system had proved itself able to meet the tremendous challenge with great credit, in spite of temporary government controls and bureaucratic planning in respect to the allocation of scarce resources, the rationing of consumer goods, and the general direction of the entire economy for the purpose of winning the war. At the end of the war the new plant was in operation and needed only to be converted to peacetime use; there was no physical reconstruction to be undertaken—only the filling of the enormous backlog of demand by civilians for those goods of which they had been deprived during the war. The United States alone among the nations was able to export goods in large quantities at once, both for sale to those who were in a position to buy them and for aid in reconstruction.

The USSR also had fought the war and produced the material for victory under a system barely modified at all from that of the prewar years. The system described in Chapter 23 did not need to be modified in any important respect for the purpose of waging war. The government merely had to specialize in the production of war material and the equipment of its armies, and to postpone the long-hoped-for increase in consumer goods which, it may

be supposed, would some day have been produced under the Soviet system if there had been no war. Such an increase had to be postponed for many years, while European Russia was recovering from the devastation wrought by the German armies, and while the government was deciding that the international position of the country permitted a reduction of her military expenditures.

DEMOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNITED STATES

The United States, basing its policies on eighteenth-century liberal thought, regarded the state as the sum total of all the human beings who comprised it; governments were instituted among men to preserve for individual men the "right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." In general, the national doctrine has always held that that government is best which governs the least and interferes as little as possible with the private lives of its citizens. Characteristically, in the United States it is the "people" in whose name a criminal is tried, and the case appears in official records as "the people" *versus* the particular offender. Although in the twentieth century ever more tasks have been granted to the state by the people acting through their representatives, increasing the power of the state has never been widely approved. In the complex modern world, however, the state must be empowered to act because individuals cannot or will not combine and carry out the necessary tasks on a voluntary basis. In 1929, for instance, there was no system of social security, and all relief of the victims of the Depression had to be administered by private voluntary agencies, except insofar as local or state governments were granted the power by the elected representatives of the people. But the state has always of necessity been granted the task of maintaining the security of the people either against outside nations or against disturbers of the local peace.

The United States has been very slow in coming to the conclusion that there are certain sectors of the economy where the state should not only intervene to preserve the balance be-

tween such separate power systems within the society as the managers and owners of industrial enterprises and organized labor, but should actually take over certain enterprises that have been managed by private persons for their own profit. The general view in the United States is that such profits are legitimate and provide an incentive to founding such enterprises, and that the government will be better occupied in seeing that they are not detrimental to society as a whole than in trying to do the job itself. The fact that the government does not always protect society enough is an argument only for better regulation, not for the substitution of state for private enterprise. The United States is thus a country where as much as possible is left to the private initiative of the individuals; and in this sense it is a free economy, and a free enterprise society.

Further, it is believed in the United States that there should be the greatest possible free discussion of every aspect of society, both in the press and in private groups organized for public discussion. Hence the Constitution protects the freedom of the press and of assembly. It is hoped that this free discussion will tend to keep government officials aware of public opinion, will serve to correct any abuses of power they might commit, and will also draw attention to other areas in which improvement might be desirable. The greatest pressure may be put upon industrialists by the simple process of exercising the free choice of the people not to buy their merchandise; most of the economy is therefore self-regulating. Finally, it may be said that though education is provided both by the state and by private organizations, each individual in the country is entitled to choose his own area of vocational specialty. He may choose to become an engineer or a scientist or a businessman or a painter, writer, or musician, just as he wishes. All that the government can do is to indicate the fields in which opportunity is available and training desirable, leaving to the self-regulating economy to provide openings in the various fields of activity. The student, it is presumed, will not choose to enter an occupation whose rewards are insufficient for his needs or where lucrative openings are not available.

THE TOTALITARIAN PHILOSOPHY OF THE USSR

In the USSR, an almost completely antithetical political and economic philosophy is held; and it is held as a matter of official belief. No opinion is tolerated except the official teachings of Marx and Lenin as interpreted by the current rulers. Without going further into this philosophy, which was discussed in Chapter 18, it may be said here that the state, in practice, if not entirely in theory, does not exist for the benefit of the people. On the contrary the primary duty of the people is to support the state. The government may accept private criticism from those qualified to criticize, but no one has the right to criticize it. The press exists for the primary purpose of making known the will of the government and influencing the people to acquiesce in and support, if possible with enthusiasm, the government's aims. The government therefore plans all economic goals and determines how they can be attained. All the enterprises in the country are either managed by nominees of the government or by cooperative organizations sponsored and directed by the government. Resources, technical and material, are allocated by the government, which also controls the educational system, in such a way that the required manpower it anticipates will be available. The government also allocates the resources necessary for the production of consumer goods, which, if they are not available, simply do not appear in the government-controlled retail outlets. The Soviet system is therefore clearly not a free one. All that is free is the choice of the consumer to spend his money on one or another of the limited items made available for him to purchase; but in all the other areas of choice available in the United States, the Soviet citizen's choice is severely limited.

These two systems are now engaged in a struggle for the adherence of the minds and wills of the peoples of the world. Each of the two nations thinks its system is superior to that of the other, and possibly the more successful nations in the world of the future will combine certain elements of each. It is also

possible that both the United States and the USSR will in time come to modify their philosophies, which at present represent the two extremes of political and economic thought in the twentieth century.

ATTITUDE OF UNITED STATES AND USSR TOWARD OTHER NATIONS

The United States, in principle, respects the freedom and integrity of all other nations, whose peoples, she believes, should have the same right as her own people to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. She believes such freedom is probable only under a democratic system of government. She therefore favors a democratic system, as a matter of general principle, but in particular cases has shown a preference for strong dictatorships ranged on her side in the Cold War above unstable or weak governments likely to favor the enemy, even if such governments are more representative of the people than the dictatorships. In recent years when it has begun to appear that the whole world is taking sides and that there may be a shooting war in which allies of any political persuasion will be valuable, she has in some degree compromised her preference for democracy and has allowed herself to be drawn into incongruous alliances, such as that with totalitarian Spain. Such alliances have called seriously into question the United States' moral position as the champion of what she calls the "free world," since it has sometimes appeared that any nation which is sufficiently bellicose toward the USSR is acceptable as an ally of her own.

The United States has also been charged, sometimes justly, with exerting undue pressure on nations that try to stay neutral in the Cold War. In the current era of national independence movements and social revolutions, which are supported or opposed by the Soviet Union for its own ends, the United States has to try to discriminate between those reflecting the popular will and those engineered by Moscow—a delicate task in which mistakes are unavoidable. But on balance, in spite of some aberrations, it must be acknowledged that her preferred policy is to let all other nations alone, to do business with them when possible, to help

them stand on their own feet, and to give them such aid as she can afford. She applies pressure in support of nations that have fallen under domination by her rival—pressure dictated, in part, by her desire to bring as many nations as possible into her own power orbit and out of the orbit of the USSR, and only in part by altruism.

The USSR, in contrast, has both a desire to expand at the expense of other nations and a messianic desire to spread the doctrine of "communism" (still so called) and world revolution. This goal has been maintained since the Bolshevik revolution, and was abandoned (or played down) only for a few years during and immediately after the war. There can be little doubt that friendly relations could have been kept between the USSR and the United States after the war if the Soviet Union had been willing to build up her own country and let other nations alone. But we have seen that either for reasons of her own security against what she conceived of as potential enemies (and not without reason, at least in the case of Germany) or because of her desire to expand her sphere of influence into the West, she has set up a system of "satellite" states, all ruled by Communist governments, which manifestly do not rest upon the free consent of their peoples. Moreover, she tried to use Communist parties in the Western nations for the purpose of overthrowing their democratically constituted new postwar governments. No country has been taken over as yet by such native Communist parties by any means other than armed rebellion, with the partial exception of Czechoslovakia. The Chinese Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek was overthrown by a native Communist party and army, which received some technical support in its last years from the Soviet Union. North Korea and North Vietnam received aid from Communist China in their military rebellions, but the latter at least was always directed by a native Communist, Ho Chi Minh. Czechoslovakia was added to the Soviet satellite system, as we have seen, through the control of the key ministries in the government by Communists, who ultimately staged a successful *coup d'état*—which was made possible, however, only because of the proximity of the Soviet

armies. Nevertheless, every free nation is on guard against the efforts of native Communists to overthrow their government; there is no doubt that the Soviet government sponsors and subsidizes such parties and that their aim is to establish Communist governments on the Russian model, which will subsequently enter the Soviet orbit or cooperate fully with Soviet expansionary aims.

The new and underdeveloped nations are in constant danger from Soviet expansionism. The USSR is willing to give technical aid and funds to these new nations, not for the purpose of assisting the countries to stand on their own feet as independent free nations, but for the purpose of making them dependent upon her and keeping them out of the orbit of the West. Unfortunately she has little interest in seeing them as stable nations, paying their way, economically viable and self-respecting. It is to her interest, as she conceives it, that the countries should be as unstable as possible, preferably torn by strife and civil discord. This situation makes it possible for a Communist party to step in as the group that can preserve order. Where there is an outdated feudal society, or exploitation of the poorer classes by the richer, there the Communists thrive, for they can appeal to the dispossessed and the discontented. They can promise a new society, built like their own; and as it is not widely known exactly what the Soviet system actually is, the promise is tempting to many—especially to those who expect to wield power under the new order. Soviet propaganda and Soviet power are therefore consistently directed towards exploiting every situation that seems to offer any opportunity to intervene to further the cause of revolution and to lessen the influence of the United States and the West. She is tireless in seeking every occasion to misconstrue the intentions and inveigh against what she calls the imperialism, colonialism, and warmongering of the West; but her solicitude for the "victims" of the West remains purely verbal.

One 1960 example is instructive. When Belgium granted independence to the former colony of the Congo, the political leaders of the colony had had little political experience and had not had time to establish their ascendancy

in the country. The small Congolese army had only Belgian officers, who were expected to remain after independence till their Congolese successors were able to fill their positions. A few days after independence the Congolese soldiers rebelled against their officers, and the inexperienced politicians sided with them, demanding that all Belgian officers leave the country. This created a chaotic situation, and the United Nations Security Council undertook to police the country with United Nations troops. In the richest province of Katanga the provincial government, elected under universal suffrage a few months before on a program of cooperation with the Belgians, called upon the Belgians for help in the emergency. When they provided it, the provincial government was quickly able to restore order in the province. When the Congolese prime minister demanded the departure of the Belgians from Katanga also, the issue was again taken to the Security Council.

Obviously the situation required very delicate handling, and the resolution that was finally passed, with the Soviet Union also voting for it, called upon the Belgians to withdraw, but left it to the Secretary General of the United Nations to decide how it was to be done—obviously by negotiating with all the interested parties. But the Soviet Union had first put forward a resolution that the United Nations force be instructed to fight their way into the province if necessary and expel the Belgians, and that the Secretary General report back in three days to the effect that he had obeyed the Council. Such a procedure would have deeply humiliated the Belgians and probably compelled both them and the province to resist. It prejudged the issue between the province and the central government, and assumed that the latter had all the right on its side. The Soviet Union delegate even stated that if the United Nations faltered in its duty, the Soviet Union herself would provide the troops and see that the Belgians were expelled. Obviously the Soviet Union desired to obtain the full propaganda benefit to be won from adopting an uncompromising anti-colonial policy, but the action she demanded was not one likely to preserve the peace or to further future cooperation between the province and the central government. On

Chronological Chart

Unconditional surrender of Japan	1945 (Sept. 14)
Execution of Pierre Laval	(Oct. 9)
Nürnberg trials of war criminals	(Nov. 20–Sept. 30, 1946)
Execution of Gen. Mihailovitch of Yugoslavia	1946 (Mar. 10)
Withdrawal of Russian troops from Iran	(Apr. 5)
Civil war in Greece	1946–1949
Communists win 114 of 300 seats in Czechoslovak parliament, Gottwald becomes premier	1946 (May 26)
National health service and other welfare acts (Britain)	(May–July)
Italy becomes republic	(June 2)
New constitution in France—formation of French Union	(Oct. 13)
New constitution in Japan	(Nov. 3)
Signing of peace treaties between Allies and Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland	1947 (Feb. 10)
Announcement of Truman Doctrine	(Mar. 12)
Exclusion of Communists from French Government	(May 9)
Announcement of Marshall Plan	(June 5)
Czechoslovak acceptance (later, rejection) of Marshall Plan aid	(July 7)
Independence of India and Pakistan	(Aug. 15)
Organization of COMINFORM by Russia and satellites	(Oct. 5)
Flight of Mikolajczyk, Peasant party leader of Poland and deputy prime minister	(Oct. 24)
Kashmir admitted into Indian state—beginning of dispute with Pakistan	(Oct. 26)
Benelux customs union inaugurated	(Nov. 1)
Partition of Palestine voted by U.N. General Assembly	(Nov. 29)
Abdication of King Michael of Rumania under Communist pressure	(Dec. 30)
Independence of Union of Burma	1948 (Jan. 4)
Ceylon becomes self-governing dominion	(Feb. 4)
Communist coup in Czechoslovakia	(Feb. 25)
Foreign Assistance (Marshall) Bill signed into law	(Mar. 31)
Rumania opts for Soviet-style constitution	(Apr. 13)
Christian Democratic absolute majority in Italian elections	(Apr. 18)
Expulsion of Yugoslavia from COMINFORM	(June 28)
Soviet blockade of Berlin—beginning of airlift	(July 24)
Formation of North China People's Government	(Sept. 1)
Re-election of President Truman	(Nov. 2)
Arrest of Cardinal Mindszenty of Hungary	(Dec. 27)
Announcement of President Truman's Point Four proposals	1949 (Jan. 20)
Signing of North Atlantic Treaty (NATO)	(Apr. 4)
Council of Europe	(May 5)
Proclamation of basic law for Federal Republic of (West) Germany	(May 8)
Lifting of Berlin blockade	(May 12)
Proclamation of Republic of Israel	(May 14)
War between Israel and Arab League states	(May 15–July, 1949)
Konrad Adenauer becomes chancellor of (West) Germany	(Sept. 12)
Devaluation of British pound	(Sept. 18)

Proclamation of People's Republic of China	1949 (Oct. 1)
Establishment of German Democratic Republic under Soviet auspices	(Oct. 7)
Withdrawal of Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan	(Dec. 8)
Independence of United States of Indonesia	(Dec. 27)
British recognition of Chinese Communist regime	1950 (Jan. 6)
Russian boycott of United Nations over China	(Jan. 13)
Invasion of South by North Korea	(June 25)
United States military intervention in Korea—Security Council request to United Nations to aid South Korea	(June 27)
Furthest advance of North Koreans	(Sept. 5)
Counterattack by United Nations	(Sept. 13)
Decision to include West Germany in European defense force	(Sept. 19)
Uniting for Peace resolution passed by United Nations General Assembly	(Nov. 4)
Substantial intervention in Korea by Chinese forces	(Nov. 26)
Signing of Schuman Plan for European Coal and Steel Community	1951 (Mar. 19)
General MacArthur relieved of commands by President Truman	(Apr. 11)
Beginning of armistice negotiations in Korea	(July 5)
Signing of peace treaty with Japan by 48 nations, not including Soviet Union	(Sept. 8)
Victory of Conservative party in British elections	(Oct. 25)
Signing of European Defense Community draft treaty	1952 (May 9)
Schuman plan comes into operation	(Aug. 10)
General Naguib becomes premier of Egypt	(Sept. 7)
Proclamation of state of emergency in Kenya	(Oct. 20)
Successful test of first hydrogen bomb by United States	(Nov. 1)
Election of General Eisenhower as president	(Nov. 4)
Death of Josef Stalin	1953 (Mar. 5)
Election of Dag Hammarskjöld as United Nations secretary-general	(Apr. 7)
Riot of workers in East Berlin	(June 17)
Signing of armistice in Korea	(July 27)
Proclamation of Dulles' policy of "massive retaliation"	1954 (Jan. 12)
Gamal Nasser succeeds Naguib as premier of Egypt	(Feb. 25)
Fall of Dienbienphu	(May 7)
Mendès-France Government in France	(June 18–Feb. 5, 1955)
Truce agreements in Geneva on partition of Indo-China	(June 21)
Rejection of EDC plan by French Assembly	(Aug. 30)
Formation of SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization)	(Sept. 8)
Signing of Western European Union treaty (substitute for EDC)	(Oct. 23)
Ratification of Western European Union treaty (Germany in NATO)	(Dec. 30)
Resignation of Malenkov—replacement by Khrushchev and Bulganin	1955 (Feb. 8)
Anthony Eden becomes British prime minister	(Apr. 6)
Opening of Bandoeng Conference	(Apr. 18)
Beginning of serious anti-French fighting in Algeria	(Aug. 20)
Agreement by United States and Britain to aid in financing Aswan Dam	(Dec. 17)

Twentieth Party Congress in Soviet Union— repudiation of Stalinism	1956 (Feb. 16)
Recognition of Tunisian independence by France	(Mar. 17)
End of British occupation of Suez Canal Zone	(June 13)
Approval of President Nasser and his constitution in Egyptian elections	(June 24)
Riots in Poznan, Poland	(June 28)
United States withdrawal of offer to help with Aswan Dam	(July 19)
Nationalization of Suez Canal by President Nasser	(July 26)
Gomulka reinstated as leader of Polish Communist party	(Oct. 21)
Intervention of Soviet forces to suppress Hungarian rioting	(Oct. 24)
Invasion of Sinai peninsula by Israelis	1956 (Oct. 29)
Russian crushing of Hungarian revolt	(Nov. 4)
British and French landing in Egypt	(Nov. 5)
Cease-fire in Egypt	(Nov. 7)
Granting of more independence to Poland by Soviet Union	(Nov. 18)
President Eisenhower's request for authority to use troops in Middle East ("Eisenhower Doctrine")	1957 (Jan. 5)
Resignation of Eden—replacement by Macmillan	(Jan. 9)
Agreement on European Common Market and Euratom	(Feb. 20)
Independence of Ghana	(Mar. 6)
Khrushchev opponents ousted from Central Committee of Communist party	(July 3)
Independence of Malaya	(Aug. 31)
Soviet "Sputnik"	(Oct. 4)
European Common Market begins to function	1958 (Jan. 16)
Formation of United Arab Republic (union of Egypt and Syria)	(Feb. 1)
Army coup in Algeria—call for de Gaulle to take power	(May 13)
Special powers to de Gaulle	(June 3)
Revolution in Iraq—proclamation of republic (el-Kassem)	(July 14)
United States marines to Lebanon to aid President Chamoun	(July 15)
British paratroopers to Jordan to aid King Hussein	(July 17)
Government in exile established by Algerian rebels	(Sept. 19)
Referendum in France—acceptance of French Community and new constitution by all except Guinea	(Sept. 28)
Guinea becomes independent nation	(Sept. 29)
Soviet Union announces aid to build Aswan Dam	(Oct. 23)
Last United States troops leave Lebanon	(Oct. 25)
British paratroopers leave Jordan	(Oct. 29)
Beginning of nine-month Berlin crisis	1958 (Nov.)
Election of de Gaulle as president of French Republic	(Dec.)
Fidel Castro's troops drive into Havana	1959 (Jan. 1)
Riots in Leopoldville (Belgian Congo)	(Jan. 5)
Announcement of constitutional reforms for Congo	(Jan. 13)
Khrushchev visit to United States	(Sept. 15–28)
De Gaulle's proposals for Algerian settlement	(Sept. 16)
Demand by Republic of Mali for independence from France and transformation of French Community	(Sept. 28)
Completion of draft treaty for free trade area in Europe (Outer Seven)	(Nov. 5)

Ending of seven-year state of emergency in Kenya	1960 (Jan. 12)
Conference on Congo in Brussels	(Jan. 20)
Subduing of European revolt in Algeria	(Jan. 22-Feb. 1)
Guinea withdrawal from franc zone—acceptance of large credit from Russia	(Mar. 1-3)
French agreement to Mali independence	(Mar. 31)
U-2 incident	(May 5)
Collapse of summit conference in Paris	(May 16-17)
Japanese demonstrations against planned visit of Eisenhower	(June 3-16)
Cancellation of Eisenhower's visit to Japan	(June 16)
Independence of Belgian Congo	(June 30)
Seizure of last two foreign-owned sugar refineries by Cuban government	(July 1)
French conditions for peace talks rejected by Algerian provisional government	(July 4)
Congolese army mutiny against Belgian officers	(July 6)
United States cutting of Cuban sugar quota—beginning of economic sanctions	(July 6)
Russian announcement of shooting down RB-47	(July 11)
Sending of troops to Congo authorized by Security Council	(July 14)
Independence for remaining autonomous French African states	(Aug.-Oct.)
Dissolution of Republic of Mali	(Aug. 20)
OAS condemnation of intervention of "extra-continental powers" in Latin America	(Aug. 28)
Deposition of Congolese Prime Minister Lumumba by President Kasavubu	(Sept. 5)
Assumption of power by Congolese army chief of staff	(Sept. 12)
Meeting of General Assembly of United Nations—Congolese and Cuban crises	(Sept. 22-26)
Independence of Nigeria	(Oct. 1)
Severance of United States trade with Cuba	(Oct. 20)
Election of John F. Kennedy as President of the United States	(Nov. 8)

the contrary, it would have embittered the relations between them, and jeopardized any friendly relations between the Belgians and the people they had ruled for the previous eighty years. If, in the process, the central government had become dependent on the Soviet Union and regarded her as its savior, that would have been a clear gain for the Soviet Union, won at little cost to herself. But it may be doubted whether it would have been in the ultimate interests of the new nation.

When the aims of the two great powers are seen in contrast, it is evident that the power which wishes other nations to be free, self-respecting, and self-governing, and thus to help

themselves, would be at a disadvantage in comparison with the expanding and aggressive power. Save in exceptional circumstances, as for example when initiative could be taken by the United States to help the shattered economies of Europe in 1947, the initiative would always rest with the aggressor, as it rested with Hitler in the prewar years. And the Soviets used far subtler weapons than Hitler. The United States had constantly to try to "contain" the Soviet Union, to say "thus far and no further," to maintain a posture of immediate readiness to defend herself and the rest of a world that desired to be independent. She could offer aid, but could not compel it to be accepted and used.

Sometimes she was placed in a somewhat humiliating, even ridiculous position, because she had not guessed where the Soviet Union would strike next and because she was compelled to protect a regime of which she could not approve. She had to be patient and to give as few grounds for interference as possible. She had to endure verbal insults and anti-American propaganda that rarely ceased, countering as best she could with statements as to her conception of the true position—all the time looking to see whether there were any initiative she could take which could command the assent and cooperation of the uncommitted world.

At their best, the governments of the United States understood the kind of policy required of them, and it must be said that she exercised her leadership against the obviously aggressive power far more efficiently than the European powers exercised their leadership against Hitler and Mussolini in the inter-war years. But the sound of saber-rattling could often be heard in the land. Patience wore thin too often, and dire threats were uttered in high places, not only in the superpatriotic press. It was not always recognized that anticommunism and containment, however necessary in the postwar world as a *sine qua non* for the survival of the Western heritage against an attack that never slept, were in themselves sterile policies. But the best thought of the United States always hoped that sooner or later the moment would come when the initiative could again be grasped; and that when it presented itself all the resources of the nation would be pledged to put it into effect.

❖ U.S. foreign policy—Containment of USSR and reconstruction in Europe

The first step taken by the United States after the war was the recognition by President Truman and the Congress that isolation was no longer a possible policy. Senator Arthur Vandenberg, the Republican chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations—though a former isolationist—was as convinced as the President that the United States must stand with Western Europe in correcting the

balance of power. In Europe the balance clearly had shifted in favor of the Soviet Union. With this aim the United States entered the United Nations, and for several years foreign policy was kept on a bipartisan basis.

By March 1947 it had become clear that the Soviet Union was communizing the governments in the countries left under her control by the Potsdam agreements. In particular, Russia and Communist Yugoslavia were aiding the Communist parties in Greece, which, it had been tacitly agreed, was to fall within the British sphere of influence. But the British were in great difficulties themselves and had neither money nor resources available to help the hard-pressed Greek constitutional forces. President Truman therefore appealed to Congress for funds to aid Greece and Turkey. When this had been approved he enunciated the doctrine called by his name, which stated that "totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples by direct and indirect aggression undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States." The United States thus undertook the task of preventing the further expansion of Soviet Russia and communism. This policy of "containment" was almost immediately effective in Greece, and it may well have halted further initiatives by the Soviet Union of a similar kind elsewhere. The United States was thereafter clearly the champion of the Western world, and was ready to accept the responsibilities which had been largely in British hands in the nineteenth century, but which Britain could no longer undertake in the changed circumstances of the mid-twentieth.

THE MARSHALL PLAN FOR AID TO EUROPE

The next great United States initiative was not long in coming. In the two years after the war Europe had been unable to make any really substantial progress in her efforts to recover and reconstruct her economy. Refugees were constantly pouring into the West, especially into West Germany, from the Soviet satellite countries, and they could not be profitably absorbed. The economies and finances of all European countries were shaky; and though

some huge loans had already been granted by the United States immediately after the war, there was such a dollar shortage in Europe that the necessary raw materials and fuel needed for reconstruction simply could not be imported. The United States therefore announced through the Secretary of State, General George Marshall, that she would grant a specified sum of money each year for reconstruction in foreign countries. The foreign governments would then put aside in their own currency an equivalent amount (counterpart funds), which could be spent only with American approval. The recipient countries had also to determine among themselves what proportion of the funds each should receive—and this proportion likewise had to be approved by American authorities. The money was offered to all European countries, former enemies and Communists as well as friendly nations.

Although it is clear, of course, that the so-called Marshall Plan would benefit United States industry and agriculture by making possible exports which could otherwise never have been paid for, nothing can detract from the generosity of the offer—demonstrating once again how far the United States had moved from the haphazard and dangerous investments in Europe in the 1920's, which, as we have noted earlier, were never repaid, because repayment was not possible as long as the United States insisted on keeping her high tariffs. The United States now exported her vitally needed goods but demanded no repayment; by insisting on the counterpart funds she was able to keep some control over the use made by the recipients of the funds they received from the sale of United States goods and to take steps to see that they were actually used for reconstruction. At the same time efforts were made constantly during the postwar years to reduce tariffs in areas where competition would not be too dangerous to United States industry, so that in time the competitors whom she raised up by Marshall Plan funds would be able to compete in her own home markets. Thus the United States undertook her responsibilities as a creditor nation in her own way, resolving the knotty problem, which was none of her own making, of how, as a country producing a surplus of both agricultural and

industrial goods, she could also engage in reciprocal trade abroad. While the problem has not yet been solved in the years since the ending of the Marshall Plan, the United States has become a much larger importer of raw materials used in industry than ever before and has been able to absorb considerable quantities of manufactured and specialty goods made by cheaper labor abroad. She has also been willing to import luxury goods made by higher standards of craftsmanship than has been possible in her own country, dominated as it is by the standardization characteristic of American industry. It may be added that after the Korean war, when the United States was engaged in a substantial rearmament program, she had great need of raw materials from abroad. The demand for such materials has continued to increase in the years since.

In spite of the encouragement given by the United States to the Communist countries to participate in the program, the Soviet Union forbade the Soviet bloc to receive any aid under the plan. Poland and Czechoslovakia, which had initially accepted with alacrity and gratitude, were reluctantly compelled to acquiesce in the Soviet ruling. It need hardly be said that the United States gesture was attacked as a new form of dollar diplomacy and evidence of United States imperialism.

THE BERLIN AIRLIFT AND NATO

After the incorporation of Czechoslovakia into the Soviet bloc in 1948, the Soviet Union attempted to make the Western position in Berlin untenable by cutting off land communications with the West across the intervening Russian-controlled zone. This she was able to accomplish without difficulty. But she could not prevent supplies from reaching beleaguered West Berlin by air without actually shooting down United States planes, a provocation which she did not care to risk. The United States therefore organized a gigantic airlift, which was completely successful. The following year the Soviet Union had to acknowledge defeat and open land communications rather than submit to the continuing loss of prestige involved in allowing such a spectacular operation to con-

tinue without her being able to do anything about it.

It was by this time clear both to the United States and to her allies in Europe that the United Nations was not as yet sufficiently powerful to be able to undertake to keep the peace in the event of a Soviet aggression. The veto of the Soviet Union in the Security Council prevented any major action on the part of the United States or of Europe. The United States therefore took the initiative in organizing a grand alliance, known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), consisting of the United States and Canada, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Italy, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and Portugal. Later Greece and Turkey joined, as did West Germany. Spain also granted bases to the United States but did not become a member of NATO. In spite of all efforts by the Soviet bloc to dis-

rupt NATO, and in spite of numerous differences on minor matters between the component powers, the organization still exists. It differs from all earlier alliances in European history in that an army under international command came into being, ready to defend Europe against any armed aggression by the Soviet bloc. No such aggression has been attempted since the organization of NATO, though of course it cannot be demonstrated that the Soviet Union ever had the intention of launching it. The Soviet Union in due course riposted by creating a similar alliance between her and her satellites, known as the Warsaw Pact.

In 1949 President Truman, who had just been re-elected, recommended in his inaugural address to Congress the provision of extensive financial and technical assistance to underdeveloped areas. Known as the Point Four program, this was a bold effort to assist the un-



United States technical aid. A technician teaches an Israeli how to drill a well in the Negev desert. (COURTESY FOREIGN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION)

committed nations of the world both to improve their economies and, when necessary, to resist Soviet aggression. Although more aid has been given under the new Mutual Security Administration for military purposes, especially in more recent years, the economic aid has undoubtedly been of considerable value—in spite of much waste and even failure in some areas to provide the aid that would be most effective.

THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953

The former Japanese colony of Korea had been divided after the war into two sectors, one under Russian and the other under Western influence, and all efforts to unite them had failed. In 1950 the Communist north invaded the pro-Western and anti-Communist south. Since, as it happened, the Soviet Union at the time was boycotting the United Nations Security Council, the other members were able to act quickly, first calling upon North Korea to cease hostilities, then authorizing armed assistance to South Korea. President Truman, who had taken the initiative in the United Nations, thereupon ordered United States forces into action. Soon afterward the Soviet Union returned to the Security Council and blocked further action. It was at this moment that Secretary of State Dean Acheson introduced his Uniting for Peace resolution into the General Assembly (discussed in Chapter 25), which was passed by 52 votes to 5. Under this resolution the Assembly could recommend, but not require, members to take part in action for the maintenance of peace and security. The General Assembly recommended continued action in Korea, and about one tenth of the forces provided for the war came from countries other than the United States.

The United States, in fact, was very ill prepared for a war of this kind, and suffered early reverses. After reinforcements had been sent, United Nations forces were able to take the offensive, but drove so far into the country that the Chinese Communists, some of whose most valuable territory (Manchuria) bordered on North Korea, became seriously alarmed and sent reinforcements to the North Koreans, under the guise of volunteers, in such numbers that the

Westerners again were compelled to retreat. The war dragged on for three years, to be followed by an inconclusive peace under United Nations supervision. But South Korea was saved; and though the territory was perhaps of minimal strategic importance to the United States, the Communist powers had again been prevented from successful armed aggression and "contained"—although the war has permanently embittered relations between the United States and the new China, and has perhaps compelled closer association between China and the Soviet Union than would otherwise have been the case.

The Korean War was extremely unpopular in the United States. Many people, unable to understand why the United States had not dropped the atomic bomb on Chinese cities, criticized their government for fighting the war with one hand behind its back; a war was a war, they insisted, and had to end in victory, as had other wars in United States history. These people were willing to use the military preponderance of the United States to police the world if necessary, and they criticized the government because it perceived that even the United States was not omnipotent and that the policy of containment meant just what its name implied. Military aggression had to be halted, but ideological penetration had to be handled by other means. American leaders came to recognize that they had to deal with the ideological offensives carried out by the Soviet Union and other Communist powers for the purpose of winning the minds of the uncommitted nations, especially those underdeveloped nations which need some aid from outside if they are to survive. If the United States had penetrated into China she would have had no support from the United Nations, under whose leadership the Korean War was fought, little if any even from her allies, and still less from the uncommitted nations. Dropping an atomic bomb on defenseless people, however Communist-dominated and however hostile to the United States, would only compound the damage already done by having used the bomb against Japan in far more excusable circumstances. All the nonwhite peoples of the world, in particular, were already inclined to believe that the United States would use such a weapon against them but not against her fel-

low whites. So the United States was content to accept a stalemate, and she moved into a new phase of the Cold War, a phase later characterized by the Russians as "competitive co-existence."

THE PHASE OF COMPETITIVE COEXISTENCE

In this warfare, which has occupied the years since the Korean War, the United States has been at a great disadvantage. She has continued trying to build military alliances with the nations that belong, if only by courtesy, to what she calls "the free world," that is, with the non-Communist world, and she has supplied military equipment, technicians, and technical assistance to all those nations which are willing to accept it. A military war is the only kind of war which many Americans understand, and they continue to plan more for armed hostilities than for defense in an ideological warfare. Nevertheless, the military phase, as most of them are well aware, has now reached a stalemate. Both of the two great powers have enough long-range weapons and bombs of colossal destructive potential to be able to inflict such damage on the other, if war breaks out, as to persuade both nations that at almost any cost such a war should be avoided. Although local wars may still be risked with conventional forces, there is no certainty that such a war could be kept under control, or that any power possessing atomic weapons would refrain from using them.

The rivalry between the United States and the USSR has therefore been transformed into a war of words between the two major powers, and constant efforts are made by the USSR and her ally, Communist China, to find weak spots in the "free world" where there may be an opportunity for interference. In such a war most of the weapons are in the hands of the more aggressive power. The United States and her allies of the West stand for "freedom," a commodity never known by any of the peoples of the underdeveloped countries, who are more interested in mundane matters like the disposition of large landowners, agrarian reform, and speedy industrialization. They admire and envy the standard of living of the United States but have very little belief that they can achieve

it by means developed over the centuries by the United States. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was able to offer her own example to the uncommitted nations. The Russians had converted a backward society into a powerful nation, second only to the United States, within the span of just over thirty years; and they were more than willing to demonstrate how it was accomplished, and aid in its achievement. They did not announce from the housetops the fact, known to Americans, that the miracle had been achieved only through compulsion and terror and at the expense of what the West called freedom. On the contrary, they called their own society free and democratic; and Americans could only draw attention in their own propaganda to the palpable falsehood of the claim.

Whether or not the uncommitted nations are attracted by the example of the Soviet Union, they are quite willing to receive anything the United States is willing to give on easy terms or for free, and in several instances have shown themselves willing to take advantage of the rivalry between the United States and USSR to obtain more favorable terms from each than would be obtained if the other did not exist. Thus the very real generosity of the United States, already alluded to, and her true desire to help other nations to stand on their own feet, appears almost in the light of the payment of blackmail, paid to save the uncommitted nations from moving into the enemy camp.

This struggle, unlike struggles in earlier centuries, has also been fought out in the center of the world's stage. Every blow and every counterblow is reported in the world's press, favorably or unfavorably, according as the particular country is friendly or hostile to one camp or the other. This publicity has meant the rise and fall of the prestige of one power or the other, often in accord with wholly ephemeral "leads" taken by one or the other. Thus when the Russians were the first to send an artificial satellite into orbit around the sun and followed this feat not long afterward with a missile that reached the moon, and when they were able to take photographs of the dark side of the moon, transmitting them to the earth, the prestige of Russian science increased and that of the United States sank precipitately. The United States was

therefore compelled, in the interest of prestige, to emulate these feats or undertake others that the Russians had not yet attempted.

In the 1950's it was thus clear that the initiative had been wrested from the United States, and each move was being compelled from her in answer to one from the other side. It was not unlike a gigantic chess game in which the Russians had the move, and the United States for the moment could do nothing but try to counter them, hoping that she would one day be free to start a counterattack of her own. Meanwhile the military stalemate continued into the 1960's, with both sides continuing to increase the funds and resources invested in what was euphemistically termed "defense." Neither side had given or shown any signs of giving way on any essential. Berlin remained the chief bone of contention and the chief target for direct Soviet initiatives against the West. But meanwhile the Soviet Union continued to play her game, using economic aid and occasional threats to win over the uncommitted countries, and taking advantage as far as she could of every Western error of commission and omission. Faced with this spectacle, it was tempting to forget that after all it was not a gigantic chess game for a golden chalice of victory, but a struggle that could end in destruction for the greater part, if not all, of mankind—a true *Gottterdammerung* in which the strong and the weak would be dragged together with their world into a thermonuclear holocaust, the tomb not only for all the promise and achievement of Western civilization, but perhaps for all those peoples who had, in however slight a measure, come within its orbit.

♦ USSR and her satellites

THE STALINIST ERA

From the end of the war until his death in 1953, Josef Stalin remained in full control of Soviet foreign policy. He appears to have had certain definite objectives which he wished to attain; but he did not dare to challenge the United States too openly. In 1945 his army was barely the equal of that of the United States, and his industrial equipment was vastly inferior. In addition, the United States had the atomic

bomb. As the United States demobilized and set about the task of converting her war economy to peacetime needs, the Russian army became relatively stronger, since it was not demobilized so quickly. But in view of the possession of the atomic bomb by the United States, it was necessary for Stalin to walk carefully. As a Communist he regarded the United States with distrust and recognized that she had no use for the Soviet system. He was sure that she would be found on the opposite side from the Soviet Union in any future war, even though at the present moment the United States could be relied upon to cooperate in the punishment of the Germans, and perhaps in preventing Germany from recovering so quickly that she would constitute a danger to European peace. But he believed that Germany as a capitalist country was a natural ally of the United States rather than of the Soviet Union. In his view the only way to ensure the security of the Soviet Union, which had twice warred with Germany in a generation, was to convert all the states between her and Germany, and as much of Germany herself as possible, into Communist states, which by definition would be "peace-loving." The creation of the satellite nations was therefore a protection for the Soviet Union from "war-mongering" capitalist nations out to destroy the USSR, and an extension of the Communist world. Both objectives were good in his eyes, as was any weakening of the capitalist nations. His doctrinaire view of the world precluded any notion of true cooperation between capitalist and Communist states; the relations between them would always, at best, be an armed truce.

Seen in this light the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was consistent and predictable; but the means adopted for the achievement of Soviet aims must be flexible and necessarily varied with the relative power positions of the Soviet Union and the capitalist world. What she had taken in the war had to be retained as long as the possession profited her; nothing would be given up unless it was either militarily untenable or more expensive to keep than it was worth. As we have seen, she was in the end compelled to give up nothing. She early cut her losses in Greece, but was able to take over Czechoslovakia fully in 1948. Finland had already proved difficult enough to defeat in 1940.

It was better to compel her to pay heavy reparations and keep the democratic Finnish government in line by instilling in it the salutary fear of intervention if she joined too closely with the West. The only great loss in this period was the declaration of independence by Communist Yugoslavia. Stalin's petulant reaction to the Yugoslav defection forced Yugoslavia to some degree into the Western orbit; his successors did their best to remedy the situation, but Yugoslavia continued to adopt an independent policy. From the Soviet point of view she was thus unreliable as an ally. Stalin's successors gave up hope of communizing Austria and settled in 1955 for the permanent neutralization of the country, rather than continuing the expensive and useless occupation of her territory. This settlement also removed the Western armies from Austrian soil, which was a distinct gain.

Meanwhile it was essential to strain every resource to manufacture atomic and thermonuclear weapons, in order to win a free hand and military equality with the United States. At home it was also necessary to reconstruct the industrial establishment of the Soviet Union,

which was done with considerable despatch, aided by very heavy sequestration of capital equipment from the defeated countries.

Stalin was unable to prevent the formation of NATO, and, as we have seen, his only answer to the alliance was a counteralliance and the arming of the satellite states. He could not, however, be sure of the loyalty of the states. As long as they kept their Communist governments subservient to Soviet policies and dominated by Moscow, they could be compelled to aid him; and their armies, such as they were, he kept fortified by Russian officers, and dependent upon Russian technical and material aid. This was the best he could do until the Soviet Union herself had the new atomic weapons and the means for delivering them.

NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV—RELAXATION OF STALINISM

When Stalin died in 1953 there was a struggle for the succession, and there is little doubt that none of his successors has as yet obtained authority and power comparable to his. The



The Hungarian revolution of 1956. Refugees crossing the canal between Hungary and Austria. (WORLD WIDE PHOTOS)


elimination of Beria, a faithful henchman of Stalin and the head of the secret police, brought the army more into politics than had been customary before, but the Communist party retained its ascendancy and was soon able to relegate the army leaders to the background once again. Nikita Khrushchev, holding the position from which Stalin exercised his own power, the Secretaryship of the Central Committee of the party, became clearly the most powerful man in Russia, but not the absolute ruler that Stalin had been.

Under the unsettled political conditions of the new regime there was some relaxation in many fields of the Stalinist tyranny, which indeed was criticized by Khrushchev in 1956 at the twentieth congress of the party. But it was not possible for the Soviet Union to permit any serious measure of freedom to the satellites, least of all to allow them to throw off their Communist governments. Already in 1953 the workers of East Germany had organized strikes, which were suppressed in short order. In 1956, however, both Poland and Hungary showed signs of restiveness. In Poland an anti-Stalin Communist was brought to power by an internal coup. This change of personality at the head of

the government was popular in the country as a demonstration of Polish nationalism and independence. After some hesitation Khrushchev accepted the new regime in preference to armed intervention. In Hungary, on the other hand, a similar coup resulted in a government that proposed to be totally independent of the Soviet Union and that even allied itself with the West. This Khrushchev could not tolerate. Soviet forces and native Communist police suppressed the new government and restored a subservient Communist regime. Later the regime executed the leader of the revolutionary government.

COMMUNIZATION OF SATELLITE COUNTRIES

Meanwhile the countries were gradually subjected—under constant Soviet advice and effective Soviet control, remote or local according to circumstances—to revolutions similar to that of the Soviet Union herself in the 1920's and 1930's. The results in the early years were the same as they had been in the Soviet Union, although not so devastating. But the economies of the countries were for many years extremely backward in comparison with those of the countries which used Western methods and were



aided by the United States. In recent years they appear to be undergoing a period of rapid growth, especially the more industrialized sectors. Consumer goods remain short as in the Soviet Union, but heavy industry has greatly expanded; and the satellite countries, especially Czechoslovakia, and to a lesser degree East Germany, are providing much of the industrial material and many of the technicians used in the foreign aid program of the Soviet Union.

FOREIGN AID PROGRAM

This program is of course politically oriented. It tries to gain the goodwill of the underdeveloped countries and accustom them to the presence of Soviet and satellite technicians. It is intended also to provide some competition for the United States and to increase the prestige of the Soviet Union and the Communist system. The program is flexible, and not infrequently, as in India, is carried out by technicians who make no attempt at all to interfere politically in the countries thus aided. The recipients, indeed, are often convinced that there are absolutely no political strings attached to the aid. The credits are granted, often, it is true, at a very low rate of interest, but always in exchange for some commodity which the recipient country has available for export. Elsewhere, the credits are granted with the obvious purpose of causing trouble to the Western capitalists who have hitherto dominated the country; and it is of course no accident that aid is readily forthcoming from the Soviet Union for countries where there are strong Communist or fellow-traveling parties. This aid program is exploited very fully by Soviet propaganda, with the result that the much more extensive United States aid is often forgotten by the recipient, which is inclined to treat the United States aid as its due. Clearly there would be great difficulties for the West if the Soviet Union and her satellites were able to provide aid in really substantial quantities and at prices determined by political rather than economic considerations.

SCIENTIFIC ADVANCES

There can be no doubt that the Soviet economy in recent years has forged ahead steadily,

and that the Soviet practice of allocating resources and planning for the future needs of the system has enabled her to make some spectacular advances in areas to which the government has given priority. The Soviet Union was able to manufacture atomic and thermonuclear bombs within a very few years after the war. But the most spectacular demonstration of Soviet scientific advance was the launching of her first artificial satellite into orbit. The success of this Sputnik, as it was called, excited much soul-searching in the United States and serious consideration of the fact that the Soviet Union was training far more scientists than the United States. The latter responded by trying to increase the incentives for students to choose science as their major field of study; but otherwise she did not interfere with the system of free choice on which she had hitherto relied and on which the whole democratic world has based its existence. Nor did she feel it necessary to make any major changes in her educational system, criticized though this has often been for its lack of effective teaching, especially at the high-school level.

Thus the two superpowers move on into the 1960's, the Soviet Union on the offensive and the United States responding to the challenge as best she can, still far ahead but with a rate of economic growth significantly lower than that of the Soviet Union and her satellites. Both sides are armed with the most modern military weapons and both are unable, now or in the foreseeable future, to deliver a knockout military blow on the other without suffering a similar fate themselves. For better or for worse, "competitive coexistence" appears to be the order of the day, and there is no end in sight.

❖ Second-rank European powers

BRITAIN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REORIENTATION

Although the two superpowers are clearly the focus of attraction for all the other nations of the world, which can take only strictly circumscribed initiatives, the old countries of Europe are by no means relegated exclusively to the sidelines. In Asia there are at least two

major powers which, by reason of their huge populations, could perhaps in time come to contest world leadership with the present leaders. But as yet both the countries of Europe and of the East, with the possible exception of the People's Republic of China, are unable to exercise direct leadership themselves—the two Far Eastern countries by reason of their immense domestic problems, and the European countries because of their present dependence on the might and goodwill of the United States, which they cannot afford to antagonize so deeply that she would withdraw her aid. Yet the United States, as these European powers know, needs them also, and can no longer withdraw into isolation. This gives them some leverage for negotiation in minor matters, even though they cannot afford to threaten, still less carry out any threats, unless they wish to change alliances and join the Soviet bloc. Up to the present time there is no prospect whatever of any such switching, even though the United States, at least in 1956, deeply humiliated both Britain and France by publicly siding with the Soviet Union against them.

After the war the process that had begun in the first World War was virtually completed. Britain was now on balance a debtor nation. Almost all her major overseas investments had been liquidated for the purpose of obtaining food and supplies for war effort. She was in debt also to many of her imperial dependencies who held "sterling balances," credits in London which would some day be repaid, but which were currently frozen until Britain should have the wherewithal to liquidate them. Her trade balance was as unfavorable as ever, and her industries were in even greater need of capital investment than in the inter-war years. Nevertheless the Labor government under Clement Attlee, which came to power by a huge majority after the surrender of Germany, was determined to keep its election promises to expand the system of social security and to provide health benefits "from the cradle to the grave," together with full employment. Somewhat irrelevant to the main purpose of providing this security was a promise also to nationalize the major interests in the country, especially in transportation and public utilities, in exchange for compensation

to the stockholders at fair market prices. Full employment was indeed assured from the beginning, and unemployment has never been a problem in postwar Britain. The social services were likewise provided by legislation, and some of the industries were nationalized.

But the extremely high cost of the new social services was met by taxation unprecedented even for Britain and by a regime of austerity based on rationing of almost everything in demand by the public. Quotas, protective duties, and stringent currency control served to restrict imports, while an energetic program for the expansion of exports likewise helped reduce the unfavorable balance of trade. Nevertheless, in spite of all efforts, currency crises were frequent, especially when the government, in response to American pressure, for a brief period made sterling freely convertible into foreign currencies. Large reconstruction loans from the United States and Canada helped to tide Britain over the first, most difficult, period; when this was spent, the Marshall Plan took up the slack. By the time the Conservatives replaced the Labor government in 1951 the worst was over. By degrees rationing was abolished, with no untoward effects on the economy; and although capital investment remained low in comparison with that in other industrial nations, the British export position in certain important fields was strong and its products competitive. The increase in exports to the British dependencies, which for the first time became importers of some economic significance, also helped to keep the unfavorable trade balance within manageable limits. In some months of recent years there has even been an actual favorable balance, a situation unknown in Britain for many years.


Nevertheless Britain had only a minor share of the increasing world prosperity of the 1950's. Western Germany and France forged much further ahead than Britain, and it remained extremely difficult for Britain to maintain her expensive commitments both to NATO and to her dependencies. She therefore left ever more of the tasks of maintaining the international position of the Western alliance to her now obviously senior partner across the Atlantic. It was not easy for her to adjust to her new position, especially when the Conservatives, the tra-

ditional imperial party, were in power. When nations obviously inferior to herself in military and industrial power tweaked the lion's tail, it was sometimes difficult to recognize that she could no longer take action alone, or even in company with France, without at least the tacit acquiescence of the United States, which alone could neutralize the inevitable threats of the Soviet Union.

This fact was demonstrated in a most humiliating manner at the end of 1956. The British and French, the largest stockholders in the Suez Canal, were no longer in a position to protect the Canal once the British, following a treaty with Egypt, had withdrawn their permanent forces. But Egyptian President Gamal Nasser, in pursuit of his own nationalist ends, determined to take full possession of the Canal and run it, if need be, without the benefit of foreign technicians, who monopolized the best jobs in the company and discriminated against the native Egyptians. Moreover Nasser proposed to keep as much as possible of the profits of the operation at home. Nasser had for some time prior to 1956 been acting in a manner which the West considered provocative. Not only had he been accepting aid, including arms, from the Soviet bloc, but he was also apparently determined to make life impossible for the Israelis, whose state he had refused to recognize. One of his reasons for nationalizing the Suez Canal was certainly the expectation that he could prevent Israeli products from passing through the Canal, which he could not do as long as foreigners controlled it. When at last he nationalized the Canal without any prior negotiation with the stockholders, efforts were made by the West to come to terms with him, perhaps on the basis of the internationalization of the strategic waterway, with far greater participation in its operation by the Egyptians. However, these efforts came to nothing, and relations, especially between the British and French and the Egyptians, deteriorated rapidly. The French, although interested in the Canal, were at least as interested in toppling the Nasser regime, which was giving aid and comfort to the Algerian rebels, with whom the French were at war.

At the end of 1956 the Israelis, tired of constant raids by the Egyptians across their

borders, struck at Egypt, routing the Egyptian defenses without difficulty. At this moment the British and French, acting in concert, attacked Egypt also. But the expedition was bungled. The British naval force sent from Malta was several days on the voyage and could not give the necessary support to the air force operating out of Cyprus. Meanwhile the United Nations met, and though the British and French were able to stop action by the Security Council through their vetoes, the General Assembly took up the matter. The United States, furious with her allies, who had not forewarned her of their intended action, joined with the Soviet Union in demanding the withdrawal of all three nations; and though the United States was perhaps instrumental in preventing the USSR from carrying out her threats to bomb Israel—threats that may or may not have been serious—it was at the cost of abandoning her NATO allies and embittering relations with a large percentage of the British people, who had been suddenly roused to extremes of old-fashioned patriotism by the thought that for once they were taking effective action without the by-your-leave of the Americans. The British prime minister, Sir Anthony Eden, who had been responsible for the debacle, soon afterward resigned, leaving the task of repairing the relations to his successor, Harold Macmillan, who achieved the task with suavity and dignity. Although Macmillan had personally been a supporter of the Suez expedition, he had taken no great initiative in its preparation. Aware of the feelings of so many of his compatriots, he was able to show some sympathy with them in Parliament while not espousing unequivocally their point of view. By saying as little as possible and meanwhile rebuilding relations with the United States, without actually disowning the expedition, he was nevertheless able to convey the impression to the latter that such a breach of the new international etiquette would never occur again. Meanwhile Macmillan attempted a number of initiatives leading toward the relaxation of the tensions with the USSR, and he remained imperturbable when they led to nothing. It was the most he could do to show to the United States that Britain had still a useful role to play in the alliance and that she was always ready in




future to play the part of the honest broker should occasion arise.

Thus the British demonstrated that they had learned their lesson and the feelings of a proud people, though hardly assuaged, were allowed quietly to subside. It was now clear to the world that if anyone save the Soviet Union or the United States provoked a breach of the peace in the future, they would have the entire world represented in the United Nations to reckon with, and that if for any reason the United States and the USSR lined up on the same side, not even a combination of the two next greatest powers could prevail against them.

The Commonwealth—Devolution of the British Empire The British however were still able to take initiative in a different direction. The role of Britain as head of a great Commonwealth entitled her to respect in the world, if not as the head of a power combination under her sole control or of an alternative grouping able to challenge either of the super-powers. After the war in the Far East was over, Britain quickly recovered the dependencies that had been lost to Japan. But her prestige in this part of the world had been grievously damaged; and it was no longer possible for her to rule by pure might. The British Labor Government, which was in principle anticolonial, took the lead in making clear the new relation of Britain to her colonies, that of a trustee toward a ward who will someday attain its majority. All the colonies were to be prepared for self-government and independence, as far as this was possible; after independence it was hoped they would remain as free nations in the Commonwealth. Meanwhile they were to be aided to stand on their own feet. The policy adopted has been outlined in Chapter 21 and needs no further elaboration here. Burma and Israel, the former mandated territory of Palestine, chose independence outside the Commonwealth, as did the Sudan later. All the other colonies remained—first India and Pakistan, then after a long interval Ghana, Malaya, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, while Singapore became a wholly self-governing state but with certain strategic safeguards resting in the hands of Britain. Difficulties arose only in Cyprus, a strategic island which took on added

importance after the loss of the Suez Canal, and in the countries which have substantial numbers of white settlers who do not wish to be ruled by the African majority. The question of Cyprus was finally settled by agreement between the Cypriotes of Greek and Turkish ancestry who inhabit it. Agreement was also eventually reached between the Cypriotes and the British under which the latter were to maintain a base of limited size in the island after independence. The future of the settler-dominated African colonies remains still undecided at the time of writing.

The Commonwealth, as it is now called (no longer the British Commonwealth), is a curious phenomenon whose significance it is difficult to estimate. There are close cultural bonds between the component countries, for the British educational and legal systems, in particular, have persisted with relatively few changes almost everywhere. There are numerous Commonwealth organizations for mutual aid and consultation, and no obligations have to be assumed by any member. The nations can and often do vote on opposite sides in the United Nations. There has always been absolute freedom to the component nations to pursue any domestic policies they see fit—although this freedom has in recent times been shown to have a limit, since the nonwhite members are beginning to feel they can no longer tolerate the racial policies of the Union of South Africa. The systems of government in the various Commonwealth countries differ, but all have parliamentary constitutions even if they may not currently be in full operation: some of the countries accept the Queen of the United Kingdom as head of their own states; others, which are republics, accept her only as the head of the Commonwealth. But in spite of all anomalies, this peculiarly British organization still flourishes and shows no signs of decay. It is an organization for mutual and totally voluntary cooperation that manifestly is a going concern. But it is doubtful if it can be considered as a significant factor in world politics, aside from the prestige it confers upon its founder and leader, and the common attitude toward world affairs almost invariably shared by the great British-peopled dominions and sometimes, through the continuous action of British and



Commonwealth influence, by the other peoples in the Commonwealth.

FRANCE, THE STRUGGLE FOR STABILITY AND GRANDEUR

When France was liberated in 1944 General de Gaulle, who enjoyed an incomparable prestige, became head of the provisional government, which lasted until a new constitution was written giving birth to the Fourth Republic. The elements which had been strong in the Resistance movement to the Germans, especially the Communist party, also reaped political advantage from their behavior during the occupation. Not only were the servants of the Pétain regime disgraced, but many of them, including Pierre Laval, paid for their collaboration with their lives. Many of the Resistance activists in the *Maquis* (the French underground), accustomed to living dangerously, could only with difficulty reconcile themselves to peace. They hunted out the collaborators and those suspected of collaboration mercilessly; and not for many years was the rift in French society even partially healed. The new governments were left-wing in orientation; for more than a year French Communists occupied high positions and formed part of the ruling majority. But the Socialists found it extremely difficult to work with them. The Communists insisted on using their positions to place fellow Communists in strategic jobs, and it was difficult to believe that they were not conspiring against the state. They constantly demanded key government positions, which experience elsewhere showed could not be safely entrusted to them. Finally when the Cold War began, the Communists were ousted from the coalition, which therefore moved slightly to the right (1947). Meanwhile de Gaulle, who had become president under the Fourth Republic, had retired from active politics in January 1946, complaining that the constitution had given too much power to the legislature and that this had robbed the government of all possibility of stable rule.

Governments were indeed unstable, coalitions forming and reforming with substantially the same ministers. Some were led by politicians right of center and some by politicians of the

left and left-center. But none commanded the confidence of the majority of the country. The Communist party retained the largest number of deputies, but was permanently excluded after 1947 from the government. It was difficult to form the government without the Communists, since their votes counted usually for a good quarter of the National Assembly; but it was too dangerous to let them into it. Most governments fell by a combination of extreme right and extreme left-wing votes, with a sprinkling of votes from one side of the center or the other.

Nevertheless, the policies of the various governments, as in the Third Republic, maintained some consistency. Although on some occasions ministers would enter into agreements with foreign powers, only to have them later repudiated by the legislature, in general only those policies on which France was most bitterly divided, as for instance, over the formation of an international European army with German participation (European Defense Community, EDC), met this fate; and it was certainly better for the alliance not to try to compel France to work policies on which her people were so seriously divided. France entered NATO, was instrumental in building the European Coal and Steel Community, adopted the Monnet Plan for the rebuilding and expansion of French industry, and finally led the way toward a European Common Market. All these achievements, which were of immense value to the country, were initiated or accepted by one or the other of the unstable governments and ratified by the divided Assembly. But the governments were unable to halt inflation and to stabilize the currency, nor could they cure the chronic shortage of dollars or improve the system of tax collection; least of all could they impose upon the French a program of austerity comparable to that of the British. Time and again the United States had to help France out of her financial difficulties. Yet in the 1950's the Monnet Plan began to show some startling results, and the French economy began to soar, with a rate of growth not far short of that of West Germany. It was an astonishing paradox of the mid-1950's that the French economy, in spite of some weaknesses, was continuing to break rec-

ords, while the governments floundered, totally unable to solve their problems, and succeeding one another with monotonous regularity.

The major reason for the political failure of so many governments and for the inability of all the governments ever to balance their budgets or bridge the dollar gap was failure of the French to adjust their expenses to their means. Widespread tax evasion certainly reduced government receipts; social benefits and industrial subsidies were far from cheap and increased the chronic budgetary deficits. But much more important was the huge expenditure on colonial wars and colonial development, very little of which brought in any substantial monetary return. Although the salaries paid to colonial administrators and soldiers were no doubt for the most part spent in France and did not contribute to the dollar deficit, they were of course included in budgetary expenditures; and since the French colonies were relatively poor and underdeveloped, local taxation could not cover more than a small percentage of colonial expenditures.

Because of the failure to balance so many budgets, the governments had to resort to borrowing, usually at high rates of interest. This was the main factor of the instability of the French franc and its progressive devaluation throughout the postwar years. Government investment and grants to French African territories were far higher than in either British or Belgian colonies, and less return could be expected from them; but the colonial wars were of course far more costly than any development grants. The French returned to Indo-China after the war, but they were never able to pacify the whole country. Ho Chi Minh, a native Communist, soon started a guerilla war against the French. When China became a Communist country he could rely on some aid from the Chinese and was able to step up operations against the French, who held on tenaciously, although the drain in men and material was tremendous. Morocco and Tunisia, the French territories across the Mediterranean, were also restive, and small rebellions had to be put down. By 1954 Tunisia was in open rebellion and French operations were increasingly costly. Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France, one of the few French

ministers who was willing to sustain the unpopularity of cutting the French losses in these territories, which probably the large majority of Frenchmen recognized to be the only sensible policy, finally put an end to both the Indo-Chinese and the Tunisian wars by conceding independence. Even so, it cost him his position and he has never been prime minister since. After long negotiations Morocco was also granted her independence.

The Algerian war In North Africa, unlike the situation in Indo-China, it was not only French investments and prestige that were at stake, but the privileged position of almost two million Frenchmen who had colonized the countries. Although many of the French colonists were far from rich, especially the small farmers, others were in high positions. They monopolized all administrative posts of importance, and on the whole they had done very little for the Muslim inhabitants of the poorer classes. The Tunisian war was barely over when Algeria, the largest of the countries, which had been French since the 1830's, rebelled also. This department of France had more than a million French colonists who were extremely influential in the French parliament and who knew how to appeal to French nationalism to gain their ends. The French have been fighting in Algeria ever since, and no solution acceptable to both sides has ever been worked out, in spite of the efforts of every French cabinet and of the administration of President de Gaulle.

As soon as any government suggested concessions which would alter the status of Algeria, that government fell; and in early 1958, it became clear that the French army in Algeria was rapidly becoming a political factor to be reckoned with, supported as it was by the "ultras" in Algeria itself. Believing that de Gaulle would not give way, the army leaders and some of the ultras demanded his return from retirement to head the government. Under the threat of a military coup, the last government of the Fourth Republic resigned, and President Coty appointed de Gaulle prime minister. De Gaulle obtained the right from parliament to rule by decree for a limited period while a new constitution was being tailored for him. This constitution gave

far greater powers to the executive than had been permitted under the Fourth Republic. The president, whose position had formerly resembled that of a British king, now received powers not unlike those of a president of the United States, or, indeed, those of the mid-nineteenth century French king, Louis Philippe. The constitution was accepted by a referendum, held in September 1958. Shortly afterward, to no one's surprise, de Gaulle was elected president. But he has up to the present time not been able to bring an end to the Algerian war, although he was able to restore discipline to the army. Even this last success in recent times has become questionable, and it is uncertain whether he could adopt a policy wholly at variance with that of the army leaders. A referendum held in January, 1961, on the question whether Algeria should be granted a form of self-government, was answered in the affirmative by the voters. But it remains uncertain at the time of writing whether de Gaulle can impose this constitution against the wishes of the ultras and of many army leaders, and whether it can be made to work. The Algerian rebels (the F.L.N.), who have formed a provisional government-in-exile, boycotted the referendum, and it will be difficult to form a stable Algerian government without their co-operation.

Black Africa The other French African colonies, in what the French call Black Africa, were granted in 1946 a new constitutional status known as the *Union Française*. Under this system some French African deputies sat in the French National Assembly and Senate (Council of State), where they were able to obtain political experience; but in the colonies themselves (French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, and Madagascar) the French continued to rule, although there were now some representative assemblies where the Africans could make themselves heard. In 1956 Gaston Defferre, the Socialist colonial minister in the Guy Mollet government, worked out with the help of leading Africans in the French Parliament a new enabling law, and piloted it through Parliament. Under this *loi-cadre*, the former federations of FWA and FEA were dissolved. Territorial assemblies were created, composed of Africans

elected under universal manhood suffrage, and responsible governments were set up with cabinets presided over by Frenchmen, but with African vice-presidents. When de Gaulle came to power, the French presidents of the cabinets retired, leaving the governments in the charge of their African vice-presidents, though some powers were still reserved to the French.

In the constitutional referendum of September 1958, the Africans voted on the question of whether they would accept the new constitution and form part of a new Community, a much closer association than the British Commonwealth, or opt for independence. Guinea alone chose independence and was at once cut off from all French aid. But the Community itself came into being, with an Executive Council made up of both French and Africans. The local governments in the territories yielded certain powers to the Community, but were otherwise independent. Dissatisfied with this less-than-complete independence, which, among other things, prevented the countries from belonging to the United Nations, two West African states united in the Federation of Mali. The new state then demanded full independence within a transformed Community, stripped of the powers hitherto reserved to it. The request in due course was granted and for a few months there were nine new formerly French republics in Africa, in addition to Madagascar (Malagasy Republic). Then, in the late summer of 1960 the Federation of Mali was dissolved when Senegal seceded from it, leaving the two component territories independent as separate states. Togoland and Cameroons, formerly under French administration as trust territories, were also granted independence in 1960.

Although ties between the African elite and the French have been close, and in almost every African government there are still Frenchmen as elected members responsible to African prime ministers or presidents, there can be little doubt that the deciding factor for the continued association was the generosity with which the French governments have poured out development funds, which naturally none of the new states wishes to forego. In the present state of the French economy such prestige expenditures, some of which may show an ultimate but not

immediate financial return, can be afforded by the French. What cannot be afforded is the constant drain of the Algerian war, which compromises the French position in the "free world." The war has for many years involved both the use of troops which are supposed to be maintained for NATO purposes and the indirect diversion of United States aid funds supplied for ends far different from the Algerian war.

De Gaulle as exponent of foreign policy of "realism and grandeur" Since de Gaulle became president of France and undertook the primary responsibility for French foreign policy, there can be little doubt that French influence in world affairs has constantly increased. De Gaulle has very definite ideas on France's role in the world, and his experience as head of the Free French movement in the war has caused him, if not his country, to be taken more seriously by the other members of the alliance than were any of his postwar predecessors. It is his view, frequently expressed in his memoirs, that France is still a great nation with a part to play in the changed postwar world consistent with her long leadership in Western civilization and her great experience, an experience necessarily lacking in the United States, which came to world leadership so recently.

De Gaulle regards Europe as still the heartland of the world and the birthplace of Western civilization, and France as the natural leader of Europe. He therefore regards it as part of his task to restore "style" to French diplomacy and a grandeur to French life which is missing in an increasingly vulgarized world. These views do not prevent him from being extremely realistic in his approach to foreign affairs and to the Western alliance. He regards the Soviet Union as a part of Western civilization, a part which should be restored to it, although she is at present a potential enemy because of her temporary involvement with Marxism and world revolution. The Soviet Union to him remains tsarist Russia with modern embellishments. It is necessary at present to contain her, and he has no quarrel with NATO as a military alliance designed for this purpose, although every effort should be made to come to terms with the Russians insofar as the latter are willing to cooperate. It is essential for Germany to be a part of the Alliance.

Germany, in spite of her aberrations under Hitler, is an old and civilized European nation like France; and de Gaulle has made every effort to cultivate good relations with Adenauer's Germany, as he has with Macmillan's Britain, working persistently toward a greater Europe which will someday be able to be a true third force. Such a force, even though not perhaps itself capable of containing the Soviet Union, will be able to occupy a middle point between the two super-powers, and make its collective voice listened to in world affairs, either in opposition to or as mediator between them. France, in de Gaulle's view, should be the leader in this Europe insofar as her "greatness" entitles her to leadership, but she should be *prima inter pares*, equal with the others in status and laying claim neither to any special privilege nor to any consideration beyond what she merits. Since he has full confidence in France, and has striven throughout his regime to make her worthy of confidence, he would be willing to yield some sovereignty to a new Europe of equals, as long as sovereignty in domestic affairs were retained by the individual nations. More will be said at the end of the European section of this chapter on the initiatives toward an integrated Europe that have already been successfully taken.

France under de Gaulle has without doubt succeeded in restoring much of French prestige, which was slowly eroded between 1918 and 1958. In spite of de Gaulle's failure to bring an end to the Algerian war on terms acceptable to both the French and the Algerian Muslims, it is still believed that if anyone can work this miracle it is de Gaulle. But he is no longer young, and if not as old as Chancellor Adenauer of Germany, he has passed his seventieth birthday. It remains to be seen whether any successor can either work the constitution of the Fifth Republic or continue his personal policy, which may well be not that of a France led by anyone but President de Gaulle.

GERMANY: RECONSTRUCTION AND RECOVERY

We have already seen how Germany was divided after the war into spheres of control by the Four Powers, and how East Germany became a Soviet satellite country. The other three

zones were at first administered by the United States, Britain, and France, quite separately. Each of the powers devoted itself to what it felt were the primary needs in its zone. Britain and the United States attempted what was called the "denazification" of the Germans under their control, and as soon as possible devolved some of their administrative duties on the Germans. But there was an enormous job of reconstruction to be done, refugees were pouring into the Western zones from the Communist zone to the east. The military governments, however, did succeed in restoring some kind of order, and were able at the end of their regime to stabilize the currency by creating a new Deutschmark. Most of their other well-intentioned efforts, for example the attempt to break down the old concentration of German industry which was believed to have contributed to the war, were abandoned before the end of the first phase of the occupation.

The second phase began when hope was abandoned for a speedy reunification with East Germany in the face of Soviet refusal to unify the entire country except on terms impossible for the West to accept. In 1948 the three zones were unified under the name of the Federal Republic of Germany. A number of organic laws were passed to take the place of the constitution which, it was still hoped, would some day be written for a reunited Germany. These laws are in fact very similar to the constitution of the Weimar Republic, although the chancellor has somewhat greater powers than before. Politicians who had survived from the Weimar era became the mentors of the new generation of Germany led by Konrad Adenauer, leader of the largest party of the state, the Christian Democratic Union. This was a party of the center, led by a Catholic but not drawing its support exclusively, or even mainly, from Catholics. Before the end of 1948 Adenauer formed the first government, which was a right-wing coalition. His official opposition was the Social Democratic party. In every election the CDU has increased its electoral strength until it now has an absolute majority in the Reichstag, a result both of the remarkably successful government provided by that party and the old chancellor and of the fading away of the smaller parties. Germany is now virtually a two-party

state. In 1955, when Germany became an official ally of the West, the armies of occupation were transformed into Allied forces, and the Federal Republic became a fully sovereign state.

The astonishing economic recovery of West Germany has been the result of the relatively low wages paid to German labor, which resulted from the plethora of labor available in the country, the successful drive of German businessmen to capture foreign markets, the new and modern industrial techniques, including new factories built to replace those destroyed in the war, and the policy of balancing the budget and maintaining financial stability adopted by the government. Very quickly a considerable surplus of exports over imports was achieved, and the resulting accumulation of capital was, for the most part, plowed back into industry, not into the raising of the wage structure, which has only in very recent times been significantly raised. Thus the Germans, like the British, engaged in a program that amounted to austerity; but the austerity was achieved by orthodox means and without the multiplication of physical and financial controls adopted by the British. This policy was successful because the Germans modernized their industry far more effectively than the British and were able to sell their exports in a competitive market on price and merit; and the low prices were possible because of the relatively low cost of government and the relative paucity of social services provided at public expense, as well as German freedom from the necessity to provide for her own defense.

It is a deeply ironic fact that the Germans, whose aggressiveness under Hitler had compelled other nations to defend themselves and to continue their military expenditures when the war was over, were able to profit commercially from the very circumstance that they were now disarmed and forbidden either to manufacture arms or to create a new army. Other nations had to continue the unprofitable and inflationary manufacture of armaments and thus could not use their industrial plants to concentrate on making goods for export; other nations had to continue to pay for the last war, whereas Germany's internal debt was wiped out by the postwar inflation and the subsequent creation of a new and stable currency; and other nations now had to pay for the maintenance of German

security. It is therefore not surprising that the prosperous Germans had no desire to forego their competitive advantage in the world markets by rearming, even in response to Allied promises of full sovereignty. Moreover the occupying powers had for years been preaching to the Germans the virtues of peacefulness and trying to persuade them to abandon their martial tradition. Now that Allied policy had changed and the Germans were asked to accept their fair share of the common defense against the Soviet Union, the vast majority objected, much preferring to leave conditions as they were. Chancellor Adenauer, however, understood the need for Germany to keep on good terms with the West, and recognized that he could not resist Western pressure to the point of outright refusal. The limited forces desired by the West were not too high a price, in his view, to be paid for full independence. In spite of the continued opposition by the Social Democrats to the rearmament program he was able to push the measure successfully through the German parliament; and very slowly the twelve divisions began to be recruited and armed, so as to cause the least possible disturbance in the German economy and to affront German public opinion as little as possible. From 1955 the Federal Republic of Germany has been fully independent.

Problem of reunification But the question of reunification with East Germany remained. It was not only the satellite state of East Germany that had been part of Hitler's Reich, but also the area of Germany now under Polish sovereignty east of the Oder-Neisse boundary. The West Germans were unwilling to concede the latter frontier to the Soviet bloc, nor would they recognize the so-called German Democratic Republic to the west of that boundary. Moreover the status of Berlin could not be accepted as permanent. The small university city of Bonn, even though much enlarged, could never be thought of by patriotic Germans as the capital of the German nation. The terms offered to the Soviet Union by the West were nothing less than free elections in the whole of Germany, which, they were convinced, would mean reunification. The Soviet Union was not prepared to take the risk, since her view of the result of such an election probably coincided with that of the

West. It could hardly be expected that she would abandon what she already controlled, and what she professes to believe is necessary for her security, in exchange for anything but an extremely substantial quid pro quo, which the West is in no position to offer. Acceptance by the West of the Oder-Neisse boundary in exchange for the union of West and East Germany would almost surely be insufficient, and even that has never been offered. A divided Germany has therefore gradually come to be accepted as a simple fact of life, even by West Germany. Since there is no basis for negotiation, no negotiation can be expected to succeed.

Berlin, far into East Germany, remains a permanent bone of contention between West and East. The division of Berlin into Eastern and Western zones has likewise come to be considered a fact of life. The West has refused to change its status in any way. It remains an outpost of the West deep in enemy territory, a focus of attraction for East German refugees. Its continued occupation by the West, and the independent attitude toward the Soviet Union adopted by successive German mayors of the city are deeply offensive to the Soviet Union and to her German satellites. The Russians could take physical possession of West Berlin tomorrow, but only at the cost of a possible world war, which hitherto they have been unwilling to risk. From time to time they threaten to make a separate peace with East Germany, bringing to an end the legal status for the occupation of West Berlin by the West, and presumably following this up by permitting the East Germans to take over the city. But so far they have taken no decisive action; if ever they feel strong enough to take the risk of the consequences, or if they can divide the Western nations on the issue, they may decide that the time has come. But it remains unlikely indeed that they will ever accept the terms offered by the West, namely the reunification of West and East Germany with free elections, unless they come to believe that such elections would turn out in their favor—an unlikely eventuality indeed.

❖ Third-rank powers—Italy

We have now considered the three major powers in Europe which we have classified as

second-rank world powers. Little needs to be said of the European powers ranking below these three. Only in union with one another and with the major European powers can the remainder exercise much influence in world affairs. Some belong to NATO, and all have played some part in movements toward European unity to be considered at the end of the European section of this chapter. It need only be remarked that Italy, the most populous of the third-rank powers, was able to solve her fundamental political problem for a brief period during the first few years after the war. At this time the Christian Democrats were able to obtain a working majority in the Italian Parliament and set in motion a number of important reforms. After the death of the Christian Democratic leader, Alcide de Gasperi, the party was not able to hold together, and all subsequent governments have been coalitions, most of them short-lived. Social reform has slowed down and the long-standing problems of southern Italy and Sicily are hardly much nearer to solution than before the war. But industrial Italy has made immense strides since the war; and the economy of the country as a whole is booming, with a rate of growth higher even than West Germany and with special strength visible in the export trade. Thus Italy's financial problems are now manageable; although she has still the strongest Communist party in Europe with considerable strength in Parliament, the parliamentary system is working with some effectiveness, and is likely to continue to do so as long as the economy of the most advanced section of the country retains its prosperity.

❖ **Movements toward greater European unity**

THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

Perhaps the most hopeful movement in the whole postwar world, a movement that goes far to offset the embittered rivalry between the super-powers of East and West, is the increasing economic integration of Europe. This integration has necessarily involved ever closer political cooperation, although as yet no European nation has yielded any significant part of its sovereignty and the political institutions of the

new Europe are still in the womb of the future. A Council of Europe with headquarters at Strassburg in Alsace was created in 1949, and it is still functioning. But this Council, made up of members nominated by the various national governments, and with an executive, known as the Council of Ministers, made up of the foreign ministers of the different nations, was not permitted to make any decisions binding on the separate nations. It did serve as a clearing-house for ideas and gave an opportunity for responsible ministers to meet together to discuss problems of general European interest. Some of its recommendations were accepted by the component governments, but the Council remained little more than a debating society, in spite of the hope of many of its founders that it would become a true parliament of Europe, the beginning of a political federation. The Council's influence, such as it was, has indeed declined in recent years, and there is little probability that federal institutions will evolve from it. We have already noted how the component nations of NATO have permitted an integrated high command for the armies of the alliance. The notion of a true international army, however, collapsed when the French parliament in 1954 refused to ratify the treaty under which the army would have come into existence. The different nations have retained in their own hands all major decisions regarding the activity of NATO on their own soil and the use made by NATO of their own national contingents.

INITIATIVES TOWARD ECONOMIC COOPERATION

But the story is very different in the economic field. The Marshall Plan, as we have seen, required agreement between the various nations as to the proportions of the United States aid each was to receive, and the administration of the funds was handled through new intra-European bodies, on which the United States was represented. Thus cooperation was fostered for definite and limited ends in these bodies. Perhaps more important was the movement toward disposing of some of the obstacles to international trade that had grown up in recent centuries and that were at their worst in the inter-war period. All economists were aware of

the dangers of economic nationalism, yet each nation believed it had to protect its own industry against its competitors through the use of tariffs, quotas, and other restrictions of imports. The first tentative efforts toward the relaxation of these restrictions were taken in the form of a limited customs union between Belgium, the Netherlands, and the Luxemburg, commonly known as Benelux. After a period of trial had proved encouraging, a full customs union was instituted. The union naturally increased trade between the three countries; but the limited scope of their trade, and the fact that the great foreign markets lay outside the union, prevented the success of Benelux, as far as it went, from acting at once as a beacon for the larger and industrially stronger states of Europe.

A much more spectacular operation was the Coal and Steel Community which integrated the production and marketing of the coal and steel of six European countries—the Benelux nations, France, Italy, and Germany. The Coal and Steel Community (CSC, also known as the Six), has its own form of government, including an executive, an assembly, and a court. The members of these bodies are chosen by the national governments of the countries involved, but representatives of manufacturers, workers, distributors, and others sit on the Community's various committees. Within the Community the separate manufacturers are left free, and the purpose of the whole was to expand production and consumption, find new uses for the products of the industry, and share a common market. The Community, which has been operating since 1952, has been outstandingly successful, in spite of many difficult problems that had to be solved by tactful compromises. It undoubtedly served as the pilot for the next great European economic initiative, the European Common Market (officially known as the European Economic Community, EEC), set up in 1957 and including, in addition to the six countries, the colonies of the component members.

A common effort was also made to develop atomic energy for peaceful uses, known as Euratom. Though Euratom is still only in its initial stages, the EEC is now functioning with great effectiveness, with a tariff only against outsiders, and free trade within. Its success has

naturally caused great disquiet to the countries outside the Six, who see so much of their former trade going to other nations in the Common Market rather than to themselves. Britain of course was the most seriously affected. In 1954 she negotiated a limited agreement with the CSC under which the British steel and coal industries meet with CSC leaders for regular discussions on trade conditions on a friendly basis; but she was unable to come to any satisfactory arrangements with the EEC. Britain was invited to become a full member on exactly the same terms as the Six, but she refused to abandon her system of Commonwealth preferences, and therefore could not adopt the common tariff of the Six. The latter could not agree to allow Britain to retain these preferences, which were quite at variance with the concept of the Common Market. Britain, therefore, with the wholehearted cooperation especially of the Swedes, who were as seriously threatened by the Common Market as herself, organized a group, popularly known as the Outer Seven (officially known as the European Free Trade Association); this was made up of Britain, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, Portugal, and Austria, with aims similar to those of the Six but with a far looser organization. This organization permitted the British to keep their system of Commonwealth preferences. However, the success of the Common Market, from which the Commonwealth countries were excluded unless their products paid the tariff, has worried the latter, who have considerable trade with the Six. It has occurred to these Commonwealth countries that perhaps the British connection may not be worth as much as it used to be. Thus it is likely that they may be willing to pay the price of entry and abandon their special arrangements with Britain. If the Six, the Outer Seven, and the Commonwealth nations were indeed to join in one huge customs union, a tremendous dent would thereby be made in the economic nationalism so characteristic of the last decades. Freedom of trade and economic cooperation would without doubt tend to lessen political antagonism between the nations and make war between them unlikely. Whether out of this increasing economic interdependence there would arise eventually the political third

force envisaged by President de Gaulle and, more cautiously, by Chancellor Adenauer, remains one of the crucial questions for the next decades.

❖ The major powers in Asia

CHINA IN REVOLUTION


The countries to be discussed in the rest of this chapter do not in themselves fall within the scope of this book. But the postwar world is now one in a sense it never was in past ages; and the fact that it is one is the consequence of the expansion of Western civilization into these areas, not only by means of what is commonly called imperialism, but through cultural diffusion, in the widest sense of that term. Every nation in the world has been changed by this process, and their partial Westernization is now beginning to have its own effects on the West itself. The balance of power in the West can no longer operate without reference to the huge population of the East. With one great exception all these non-European nations belong to the United Nations and make their voices heard in that body. This chapter must therefore include at least a brief survey of the role played in the world by the non-Western nations and a discussion of their main groupings and alignments.

The Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek had established itself fairly effectively in almost the whole of China in the 1920's, and was engaged in a substantial program of modernization with Western help when the Japanese invaded in 1931 and again on a larger scale in 1937. It was during the wars with Japan that the Communists first began to play an important role in the country, initially only in the northwest. The Communist strength grew constantly during these years, although at no time did it have much support from the Soviet Union. The Communists, led by Mao Tse-tung, never followed in the wake of the Soviet example. They could not hope to organize among the industrial proletariat, which was small or nonexistent. They preferred to organize the peasants. Well disciplined and dedicated, the Communist leaders presented a strong contrast to the regime of

Chiang Kai-shek, which became ever more corrupt and inefficient as the war progressed, while its social programs, such as they were, fell into disrepair. Chiang never attempted the fundamental reform of Chinese life and institutions that was clearly necessary, and he was apparently unable to control the groups of powerful self-seekers in his party, the Kuomintang. Moreover, his resistance to the Japanese invaders was seldom very effective, even during the period when China was an official ally and co-belligerent of the United States.

In the 1930's the Communists desired a common front with Chiang against the Japanese. On one occasion they even kidnapped him, releasing him only when he had agreed to co-operate with them in an all-out attack on the Japanese. But the alliance was an uneasy one. Chiang could not forget that the Communists were a threat to his regime, even while they fought the Japanese. When the Japanese finally surrendered and left the country, the Communists were already powerful and controlled several provinces. They had at their disposal an army of almost a million men, fortified with material abandoned by the retreating Japanese, as well as with material captured from the Nationalists. But Chiang Kai-shek, still head of the legal government of China, took over the areas evacuated by the Japanese, and it was to him that the Russians surrendered Manchuria. Stalin had not yet decided that he wished to support such a possibly dangerous rival as Mao Tse-tung, whose idea of the necessity of the Communist world revolution was at variance with his own. In short, Mao Tse-tung was a "deviationist," his ideas were ideologically "impure," and he had come to his present position of power entirely independently of the Soviet Union.

It was not until 1947 that Stalin changed his mind, at a time when it had become clear to him that Mao would in due course drive Chiang out of China. For a full-scale civil war had begun in 1946 between Mao and Chiang. Breaking out of the fully communized provinces, Mao began to win military victories. The United States tried to bolster Chiang and his regime for a period, but found she could accomplish little. Even if the United States had pro-



Chinese Communist infantry approaching the northwest gate of Peking for a parade in honor of their victory of a few days before, when the city was won from the defending Nationalists. (COURTESY DERK BODDE AND ABELARD-SCHUMAN, INC., NEW YORK)

vided all the war material Chiang asked for—and she provided a great deal—even if she had intervened actively with troops, it is doubtful if any progress would have been made, and the Communists almost certainly could not have been defeated. Chiang had lost the support of the majority of his countrymen, who, although they were in no sense pro-Communist, were unwilling to fight to defend his tottering regime. So it was that the Communists, now aided by Russian material, were able to drive him out of the country at the end of 1949. He and his aides took up residence in the island of Formosa (Taiwan), which was protected by the United States. There he remains to this day, ruling the small country and a few islands off the Chinese coast, which the Communists have up to this time been unable to wrest from him and his American allies. Taiwan is an important strategic outpost of the United States, which she does not wish to relinquish; and Chiang's government could not last for a day without United States support.

The Formosans are not Chinese, and to them his regime is hardly less alien than that of his predecessors, the Japanese.

Once the Communists had gained control of the mainland, they began to subject it to a totalitarian rule probably now unequaled in the world and to a process of forced communization reminiscent of the Soviet Union under the first Five-Year Plan. After the death of Stalin, Mao regarded himself as the ranking Communist in the world, superior to any of Stalin's successors in the Soviet Union. Although the latter has supported Mao and his regime with extensive aid and credits, and has entered a full-scale military alliance with the People's Republic of China, as it is now called, it is evident that there is some competition between the two regimes for the allegiance of the uncommitted world. The Chinese have exercised a powerful attraction for the underdeveloped countries. In recent times they have sent aid and technicians to the newly independent states of Africa, and even to Cuba, which aid has evidently not been

coordinated with that of the Soviet Union. It is clear why the Chinese example could be a potent one. Marxian theory, as developed by Lenin, looked to the industrial proletariat as the spearhead of revolution and paid little attention to the peasants. But the underdeveloped countries, having few urban centers, are overwhelmingly agricultural. If Mao was able to use Chinese peasants as the backbone of his movement, and could win the fanatical devotion of his peasantry before branching out into the cities, then it should be possible to imitate him elsewhere. China is now engaged in an immense program of industrialization by making the fullest use of the enormous manpower, initially unskilled, at his disposal; but this was the second phase of the Chinese Communist revolution. Would not the example offered by China perhaps be a better model for the underdeveloped countries to follow, rather than trying to build up industry with the help of the West, and subsequently using the industrial proletariat to make the revolution? Such a program would have the immense advantage that aid from the West could be more quickly dispensed with. Moreover, China is a long way from Africa; she presents no threat to the hard-won independence of the new African nations.

Western nations have had great difficulty in dealing with Communist China. The Communist Chinese are fanatically anti-Western, regarding the West, and particularly the United States, as enemies both of their revolution and of their nation. The United States prevents them from incorporating Taiwan and the offshore islands. She refuses to recognize the existence of the People's Republic of China, and has hitherto used all her influence to keep it out of the United Nations—on the grounds that it came to power by force (in this respect hardly unique among the nations of the world) and is manifestly not "peace-loving" (a requisite for entering, according to the United Nations Charter). The United States, indeed, still regards the government of Nationalist China in Taiwan as the only legitimate government of China, and Taiwan still retains her permanent seat in the Security Council, and the veto that accompanies it. Some of the other Western nations have recognized the Communist regime on the main-

land, but none has established cordial relations with it. It seems evident, indeed, that the new China, like the old China of the nineteenth and earlier centuries, regards herself as perfectly capable of dispensing with any friendly relations with the West, as long as she is associated with the Soviet Union and her satellites; and there are signs in recent times that she may well soon come to regard this latter association as scarcely less expendable.

The West, on the other hand, and especially the United States, has taken the association of China with the Soviet bloc to mean that they are one and indivisible, both Communist, and therefore beyond redemption. No consistent efforts have yet been made to divide the two, or to arrive at an accommodation with one of the two to the exclusion of the other. This is not to say that such a policy would have had any success—only that it has never been attempted. But it may well be that the two greatest Communist powers may before very long be quarreling among themselves, although neither is likely to fall into the arms of the West in the foreseeable future. Their national interests in many ways conflict, and in certain areas—especially that of the leadership of the uncommitted and underdeveloped world—it is not impossible that they could become competitors. It has been frequently surmised in recent times that the eastern partner of the Communist bloc has been calling the tune of Communist policy, rather than the western, and that the Soviet Union genuinely desires some accommodation with the West—an accommodation frowned upon by the Chinese leaders, who continue to insist that peaceful co-existence with capitalist powers is an impossibility. There must always be war between them, cold or hot, since that is the nature of the "war-mongering" capitalists, and the necessary result of the "contradictions" in the capitalist system.

Meanwhile the presence of a nation of some 600 million people who are engaged in industrializing themselves at top speed without paying the least attention to the human cost, cannot fail to be of increasing importance in the coming decades—even if Communist China does not provoke the United States into war in the Far East over the contested offshore islands.

If the manpower and resources of the Soviet bloc and the People's Democratic Republic of China were truly to be united in an armed offensive against the West, with all the most modern weapons at the disposal of both sides, there would be little hope for the survival of the West—and in such a holocaust it might well be that it would be in the vast spaces of rural China rather than in the highly industrialized West that the spark of civilization would know its reawakening. China and India, alone among the major nations of the world, could perhaps survive the thermonuclear Armageddon.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN

The Republic of India, separated from Pakistan, is considerably smaller and less populous than China, but she remains the second-largest nation in the world. India has chosen to remain free and democratic, using the institutions inherited from her former master to try to bring about a social and industrial revolution that she believes to be necessary. Although much progress has been made, it is unspectacular and relatively slow. The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union have all constructed steel plants for India, and in recent times West Germany has also played a significant part in Indian industrialization. But none of this has as yet made a significant dent in India's poverty.

In the global competition for men's minds, India necessarily appears as the champion of the West, of the Western capitalist system, and the Western system of free government. The Western powers, however, have not consistently regarded India from this point of view. Their aid has been sporadic, and the United States, in particular, has always been hesitant to gamble on India's future. The reason for this appears to be in part ideological. India is not truly a capitalist nation. Her prime minister is a Socialist, and the India National Congress is predominantly Socialist. There is a very large public sector in the Indian economy, since her government believes that when private enterprise cannot function effectively it is the task of government to fill the breach. In addition, from the United States point of view, India is infuriatingly independent. Unlike Pakistan, she

will not accept American military aid, nor will she enter into any alliance with the Western nations. She cannot be relied upon for a vote in the United Nations in support of the Western point of view, and her defense minister, Krishna Menon, has often taken a high moral tone in the United Nations, which, in the view of the United States, contrasts strangely with Indian refusal to submit her long-standing dispute with Pakistan over the rulership of Kashmir to arbitration or to a plebiscite of the inhabitants.

Prime Minister Nehru has attempted to adopt a policy of truly peaceful coexistence with China, insisting that since the two nations have never warred with one another in all history, they will not come to blows now. Even when the Chinese, after ferociously subjugating Tibet, occupied some territory in the Himalayas that had been under Indian sovereignty, Nehru did not adopt a consistently firm attitude. Thus the United States, although helping her on numerous occasions in relatively minor ways, especially by making available food in time of famine, has never given consistent and unqualified support to India or her government. So, though the Republic of India remains in the Commonwealth and shares in what aid can be made available from Britain and the other dominions, she has never in fact become the Asian showpiece of the West that the uncommitted world believes her to be; nor, for various reasons, has she truly exercised, save on a very few occasions, the moral influence in the United Nations to which she lays claim. Nor has she at any time pulled the weight in the world's counsels to which her population, if not her military strength, might be considered to entitle her. Perhaps when the Security Council enlarges its permanent membership, and India becomes a permanent member, this situation will change. Meanwhile she remains a huge nation, earnestly striving to mind her own business and be at enmity with no one, the most eminent and perhaps the one truly uncommitted nation in the world, but condemned to remain little more than a spectator in a world of warring and self-assertive powers hawking their ideological wares for the world's attention.

Pakistan, on the other hand, has committed herself, if with some reservations, to the Western

camp. She has accepted military aid from the United States and agreed to play her part in the containment of the Soviet bloc. But Pakistan for many years was bedeviled by a consistent failure to work her democratic institutions effectively, and she has too many domestic problems that require solution for her to be able to play any substantial part in world affairs, other than belonging to the Western alliance. A military dictator, Ayub Khan, is now in a quiet and unobtrusive manner attempting to improve relations with India and solve his own domestic problems. Some progress has been made; but Pakistan is not an important factor in world politics.

JAPAN, SMALL YET STRATEGIC

A third Far Eastern power can lay no claim to attention because of the size of her population, which, though immense for such a small territory, is still far from that of China or India. Japan has made a remarkable economic recovery from her defeat in World War II and has settled down under a conservative democratic form of government, which apparently commands the support of the majority of her people—in spite of a noisy opposition on the extreme left. Rapidly recovering her old position as the chief supplier of manufactured goods to the underdeveloped Asian countries, Japan has built a substantial export trade, even with the industrial nations of the West. Although she has a small army of her own, she is an important strategic outpost of the United States, which has a defense treaty with her and which still occupies a number of fortified islands formerly in the Japanese empire. As yet it is impossible for Japan to adopt an independent foreign policy of her own that is at variance with that of the United States. Her government has understood this situation with an admirable realism, and thus has turned its attention exclusively to domestic affairs. Japan, like the Western world whose economic and political systems she has adopted, is enjoying an unprecedented economic expansion, aided, like West Germany, by the fact that she has to spend relatively little on defense. But she will become important in the world power system again only if she becomes a

bone of contention between East and West. At present she is bound securely to the Western camp and is making the best of it.

♦ The Arab League and Israel

Before concluding this chapter some attention should be given to two other groupings of nations, both of which, with rare exceptions, combine in the United Nations, though none of them have much military potential. Some of these nations, however, possess important and strategic natural resources, which they are able to put at the disposal of greater powers than themselves or which, if they are so inclined, they can withhold. In the present stalemate between the two world blocs, these nations are in the position, therefore, to play East and West against each other for their own benefit and without fear of military intervention by either.

The Arab League is made up of a group of Muslim states—United Arab Republic, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. Until 1958, Egypt under President Nasser was the acknowledged leader of the League. Since the revolution in Iraq which brought President Kassem to power after the murder of the former king and his prime minister, the leadership has been disputed between Nasser and Kassem. The primary purpose of the League is to destroy the state of Israel, and this is one of the very few objectives on which they are all united. They still make it as difficult as possible for visitors to proceed from Israel to any of the Arab League countries, and there is no direct communication between them. Nasser uses his control of the Suez Canal to prevent Israeli ships and merchandise from passing through the Canal. A secondary purpose of the League is to furnish aid to the Algerians in the war with France, but the initiative in this purpose among the states of the Arab League has always rested with the North African States, the others taking only a lukewarm interest in the matter.

Nasser, who is engaged in serious efforts to improve the social and economic structure of his country, for several years tried to win assistance from some other nation to build a

great dam at Aswan to provide, among other benefits, more irrigable land for the peasants (fellahin). Obviously the most suitable nation was the United States, which indeed expressed interest and entered into negotiations. But even more than the dam, Nasser desired arms for the eventual show-down with Israel, and these the United States hesitated to sell him. Thereupon he turned to the Soviet bloc, and Czechoslovakia obliged him with a considerable shipment of military equipment, to be paid for out of future crops of Egyptian cotton. Soon afterward the United States decided finally against providing credit for the dam. Nasser blamed the entire West for this refusal and nationalized the Suez Canal, which, in turn, as we have seen, was followed by the British, French, and Israeli attack on Egypt. Nasser, confident of the support of the Soviet Union, but no doubt surprised by the United States' abandonment of her NATO allies on the issue, won a great victory at the United Nations, even while his armies were being defeated by the Israelis. Meanwhile Egypt, having sequestered more than a billion dollars worth of foreign property, blocked the Canal by sinking ships in the channel. With her actual control of the Canal and her possession of foreign property and funds as hostages, she was able to deal with the British and French as equals and to compel the acceptance of favorable terms for the release of their investments. The Russians, who had threatened to bomb the Israelis, were credited with the victory by the Egyptians, and in due course the Russians also promised to build the Aswan dam. All that Egypt possessed were her strategic position and the Canal; but she was able to turn these to her considerable advantage by fishing in the troubled waters, which in past centuries would have resulted in her swift defeat by military force. Nevertheless, Egypt remains non-Communist, and takes what she can from both sides. She also grants hospitality to an Algerian government-in-exile without fear of French reprisals.

Iraq's authoritarian ruler has been less successful since he is isolated from the rest of the Arab League and is deeply hostile to UAR. But he too has accepted considerable help from the Soviet bloc, and his country may yet be taken

over by native Communists with the help of the Soviet Union, if such a course appears desirable to the latter. At present Kassem treads an uneasy tightrope between the West and the East. Saudi Arabia, rich in oil, is more interested in her royalties from the United States than in pan-Arab ventures, and has, at present, no need to play any part in the Cold War. Nevertheless, whatever the divergent interests of these countries, they can be relied upon on certain issues to stand together, although the movement toward a greater Arab unity, which received its one and only success with the union of Egypt and Syria, appears little likely to make progress. Although, for want of a constructive aim, it can exert little moral pressure on the world, the League cannot be wholly neglected as long as the question of Israel is not finally solved, and as long as it can speak with one voice, and that not a quiet one, in the counsels of nations.

❖ Africa: the new nations

We have already discussed in Chapter 21 the new African states from the point of view of their heritage from the Western nations which colonized them. It is still too early, and their independence is too young, for any definite estimate to be made of their influence on world affairs. The ten nations that belong to the French Community have inaugurated a working agreement with France, and as yet they have shown few signs of wishing to play any major role in the affairs of the rest of the world. Guinea, however, which has accepted extensive aid from both the Soviet bloc and from Communist China, has only minimal relations with France. She has, however, entered into a union with Ghana. Although progress toward any real measure of unification has been slow, this entente is intended by the two component states to form the nucleus of a much larger union, comprising as many African states as can be persuaded to join. Ghana, as the first of the African states to win her independence in the postwar era, has determined to keep ahead of her competitors in the pan-African movement.

The African states can be relied upon to vote together on any issue that involves the end-

ing of colonialism in Africa; and they are extremely sensitive to all efforts by the colonial powers to maintain their former domination by indirect means. Thus, in the Congo crisis of 1960, Ghana and Guinea at once regarded the issue as one that affected them, although their states were thousands of miles from the Congo. Indeed, they were ready to intervene directly if the United Nations did not devise a solution that pleased them. When the French insisted on granting independence to the trust territory of the Cameroons, under a government approved by themselves and without a prior election to see if this government was acceptable also to the people, the African nations stood together in the United Nations. They tried to organize an anti-French vote on the issue, and Ghana and Guinea only accorded de facto recognition to the Cameroons afterward.

The Africans, therefore, though militarily virtually powerless and as yet without much knowledge of the affairs of nations, have nevertheless quickly grasped the fundamental cleavage between East and West and have recognized

that their new states never will be without supporters. They feel themselves entirely safe from military intervention as long as they can play one side against the other. The African influence in the United Nations is one of the surest signs that the world has changed profoundly in the last twenty years and that the Cold War, with all its ramifications, is now the framework within which all the nations of the world perforce have to operate.

♦ The United Nations

SUCCESSSES AND FAILURES

There remains little to say further about the United Nations. But before summarizing the Cold War as a whole, it is fitting to draw together here the various successes and failures of the United Nations up to the present time.

Israel Its first great test was the question of Israel, which was created by a vote in the



United Nations Emergency Force in Port Said, Egypt in 1956. This force was sent by the General Assembly to put into effect the cease-fire agreed to by the Israelis, British, and French. (UNITED NATIONS PHOTO)

General Assembly after the new state had been accepted by the permanent members of the Security Council. Such a result might well have been unattainable in later years when the Soviet Union was anxious to obtain the favor of the Arab world, which voted solidly against the partition of Palestine and the establishment of Israel. Immediately after partition the Arab states invaded the new country but were severely defeated by the Israelis, who kept by right of conquest, as they claimed, more territory than they had been allotted by the United Nations. The United Nations, however, was able to arrange a truce, which is all that either side has ever accepted in the years since. It fell to the United Nations to police the truce line by means of a corps of observers and to report when either party broke the truce. It did not, however, prove too easy for the observers to do so. The Arabs developed the tactic of making small raids across the boundary line, usually under cover of night, to which the Israelis responded by making an occasional larger-scale expedition in reprisal. The result was that the latter usually drew the attention of the observers, who duly reported them to the Security Council. Israel was thus condemned more frequently than the Arabs; but the condemnation did not have any noticeable effect, save perhaps to encourage the Arabs.

Ultimately, as we have seen, the Israelis took matters into their own hands and in 1956 expelled the Arabs from the territory beyond their frontiers in a major expedition, in which the British and French, with their own accounts to settle with the Egyptians, intervened. This time the United Nations was able to compel the restitution of the territory thus conquered. It cannot be said that the United Nations has shown great effectiveness in the extremely difficult situation presented by the refusal of the Arab countries to recognize Israel; but in extenuation it may well be urged that the problem is one of the most difficult ever faced by an international body and that without the machinery of the United Nations the whole Middle East might have become involved in a war upon a much larger scale than the indecisive raids and counter-raids that have been incessant since the establishment of Israel in 1947.

Korea We have already noted that the United Nations was able to intervene in Korea when North Korea invaded South Korea, and that the army that defended South Korea fought under the United Nations banner. If there had been no United Nations it is possible that the North Koreans would have quickly subdued the South. Although the United States played the leading part in the defense, and the other nations supplied but one tenth of the United States forces, President Truman regarded the war as a test of the security system of the United Nations much more than as the containment of a Communist aggression in an area vital to United States security. If the prestige of the United Nations had not been at stake, it remains questionable whether the United States would have intervened so directly in this outlying area, from which she withdrew after the war and on whose strategic value there were differing opinions in the United States government.

Hungary In 1956 the Hungarian government sponsored by the Soviet Union was replaced in a spontaneous people's uprising. The new government attempted to free itself from Soviet and native Communist domination. The Soviet Union intervened with armed might and crushed the rebellion, despite the fact that the new Hungarian government was represented in the United Nations. The General Assembly, acting under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, condemned the Soviet action, but could do nothing more. No armed intervention by the non-Soviet powers was contemplated. The Soviet Union insisted that it was an internal Hungarian question and thus outside the scope of United Nations action. Although the United Nations did not accept the Soviet contention, it could do nothing effective, confining itself to taking note of and reporting on the situation. No action was taken against the Soviet government.

The Congo When Belgium granted independence to the Congo in June, 1960, the colony faced grave difficulties, especially from the fact that a new and inexperienced government was in office, and little preparation had been made by the Belgians in earlier years to prepare the

Congolese leaders for their role in an independent state. When a mutiny broke out in the army, and troops raged through the country attacking Belgians and other Europeans, the Belgians sent in reinforcements from Europe to protect them. At this point the Congolese government appealed to the United Nations, which dispatched an international force that in time reached the total of 18,000 men. But this force did not have any clearcut policy to follow, the United Nations merely instructing its secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld to restore order, but not to interfere in the internal affairs of the country. Such a mandate was difficult to fulfill, for the country soon became plagued with domestic strife. Katanga, the richest of the provinces, seceded. The Congolese prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, expected the United Nations to back him against the secessionist; but it hesitated to do so, since the secession might be regarded as solely a domestic affair. No constitution had been agreed to before independence, and it was not yet certain that the state would be a unitary one.

In due course Lumumba was deposed by Joseph Kasavubu, the chief of state, and a military coup brought a new leader to the fore, who exercised control over some sections of the army, but could not establish his authority over the whole country, though he was able to imprison Lumumba. This situation exposed the deep divisions within the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly, each side in the Cold War unalterably suspicious of the other, while the African independent states, who had supplied many of the international troops, on the whole supported the deposed premier and the Soviet Union, which constituted itself his leading foreign supporter. In the circumstances it was found impossible to obtain the necessary two thirds majority in the General Assembly to adopt any clear cut long term policy, and Dag Hammarskjöld was simply left to do the best he could on his own, reporting back from time to time to the Security Council. His earlier policies, however, had succeeded in incurring the pronounced hostility of the Soviet Union, which has made demands for his removal.

At the time of writing no solution appears in sight, and it is evident that the intervention

by the United Nations in this unprecedented situation has been far from successful, and has cost the organization much of its former prestige. Whether this can be recovered depends on whether it can find a permanent solution to which the great powers could agree. Few wish to see the United Nations fail, especially not the African states, whose influence in world affairs has been so greatly increased by it. Yet the Congo crisis has demonstrated in an alarming manner the weaknesses of the organization, not only in the unhappy conditions of the Cold War, but in a world where a perhaps excessive deference is paid to national sovereignty, even in the case of a country which only a few weeks before the intervention of the United Nations had been a dependent colony ruled by a European power. The Congo was hardly ready for independence. It lacked trained African administrators, and its politicians had no experience of governing. Nevertheless, it was granted a seat in the United Nations, and it was presumed by all that its independence was effective, and that it would solve its own problems by itself, if only the United Nations could restore at least a modicum of law and order. It remains to be seen whether this hope can be realized, or whether the United Nations or a concert of powers will not be compelled to settle the affairs of the country by a more massive intervention than has hitherto been contemplated.

EXERCISE OF MORAL PRESSURE

Some nations in the United Nations have taken a lead in trying to bring the Algerian war to the attention of that body. France has always claimed that this likewise is a domestic matter, since Algeria is legally a part of France. The United Nations has contented itself in this instance with passing resolutions calling upon the French and Algerians to negotiate a solution. France herself has refused to be present at the discussions. Britain adopted a similar stand when the United Nations attempted to discuss a rebellion in Cyprus, a British colony. The problem of Cyprus, however, was settled ultimately by an agreement between the three most interested powers: Britain, Greece, and Turkey.

Up to the present time the United Nations

has been unable to take effective action against the Union of South Africa, either to bring about a change in her racial policies, which clearly are a domestic matter, or to compel her to convert Southwest Africa into a trust territory under United Nations supervision. This territory had been mandated to the British Crown after World War I, and afterward transferred to the Union of South Africa, which now treated it as an integral part of her territory.

In all these instances, however, it seems certain that the moral pressure exercised by the United Nations has been of some avail. France, recognizing that the opinion of the world has been against her, has bent every effort to persuade her allies not to desert her on the issue of Algeria. In return she has given assurances to them that she is trying to make an acceptable settlement. She has perhaps made greater efforts than she would have made if she had not wished to avoid public condemnation in the United Nations. The Union of South Africa has hesitated to annex Southwest Africa outright, continues to make gestures toward negotiating the issue, and has even permitted some investigation to be made into affairs of the territory by the United Nations. Even in the case of the Hungarian rebellion the Soviet Union hesitated several weeks before intervening directly with military assistance to its puppet government, in the hope that a solution could be found not unlike that accepted by her in Poland. It may be that the certain condemnation of her action by the United Nations was a force making for moderation, even though in the end she did intervene to prevent the total collapse of her satellite empire that surely would have followed a successful rebellion in Hungary.

❖ **Summary: toward a solution of Cold War**

We have now completed our picture of the power structure of the postwar world. In whatever direction we look we see the influence of the Cold War. Kaiser William II of Germany, in the early part of the century, used to insist that everything that happened in the world was his concern and the concern of Germany. If this

was true, it was because he felt himself personally concerned. Today everything that happens in the world really is a concern of the United States and the USSR as the champions of their respective ideologies and power-systems. If the French fight a colonial war in Indo-China and the Communists win, the West has suffered a setback. If France cannot bring her war in Algeria to an end with an agreed solution, the United States is embarrassed because one of her allies, on whom she must rely, is expending troops that ought to be at the disposal of the Western alliance. France also is engaged in an enterprise which the United States finds morally embarrassing as champion of the "free world," since patently France is not letting the Algerians choose their future freely. If the Belgians yield self-government prematurely to their Congo colony and the independent government is insufficiently experienced to manage the country afterwards, with resulting chaos, the country simply cannot be left to its own devices, for the USSR stands ready to interfere for her own benefit and to embarrass the United States and her allies.

In this chapter we have stressed the rivalries between the two great powers as a matter of hard fact, and some attempt has been made to contrast their behavior in the postwar period. It remains only to consider here an essential distinction between the attitudes of the two powers toward the rest of the world.

Although the United States' record of non-interference with other nations has been spotty, and although there are many instances of interference with the freedom of other nations to choose their own destiny for themselves, when these instances are examined one sees that there always have been strategic or financial interests involved. Financial interests not infrequently, by various means, influence the government of the United States, as they have influenced the governments of other capitalistic nations, and clearly the process has not yet come to an end—as is evidenced by the United States' attitude toward the Cuba of Fidel Castro, whose regime in no way initially threatened the strategic interests of its neighbor to the north. Nevertheless, it is not a settled policy of the United States to interfere in the affairs of foreign nations.

By contrast, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the Soviet Union has a messianic desire to spread the gospel of her own social revolution. Such a mission was proclaimed by the Bolshevik revolutionaries who founded the Soviet Union, and there has never been any serious evidence of its abandonment. The Western world has been inclined to regard this mission as merely a smokescreen for the efforts of the Soviet Union to control the revolutionary governments of foreign countries. Such a view holds that the social gospel preached by the Soviet Union is a fake and a sham, and that it is merely a weapon in the power struggle between East and West. There can be little doubt that it is such a weapon, but the view that it is *merely* a weapon is hardly tenable. The Soviet Union, after winning control of the satellite countries, did not set up old-fashioned dictatorships, nor did she support reactionary and traditional groups, as fascism did. She has insisted on the social revolution. No doubt she regards this as a means for establishing governments that are dependent on her, for the same reason that Pericles, the Athenian statesman, insisted that the islands in the Delian League should expel their oligarchies and install democratic forms of government. But even if it were true that this were her only reason for insisting on the revolution, it is irrelevant, as long as the nations who believe they need a social revolution know that the aid of the Soviet Union is available to support it. For the *fact* of her support of social revolution is well known to all interested parties. Speculation as to her reasons remains speculation.

The United States has too often been placed in the position of tolerating and doing business with at least some tyrannous regimes, as long as they did not bring about social revolutions that would have destroyed the private property bases of the economies of the countries concerned. This has made it easy for the Soviet Union to picture the United States as a reactionary supporter of the status quo; and Russia has been able to sow distrust of her rival's motives, especially among the underdeveloped nations. It is not, indeed, at all certain that the Soviet Union would cease to make progress among these nations even if she were totally

unable to make threats of armed intervention. The United States has laid herself open to Soviet propaganda by the manner in which she has pictured the East-West struggle and the Cold War. She has tended to look upon the Cold War as a struggle between two economic systems, one free and the other compelled, and between two political systems, one democratic and the other tyrannous; she has looked askance even at her own allies when they have turned toward ever more state intervention and "socialism." Only slowly has she come to recognize that for many reasons a considerable degree of socialism is necessary for the economic development of the undeveloped nations, and that strong governments are necessary to establish and maintain this socialism. Few of the undeveloped nations look upon the Soviet Union through our eyes; they are not even afraid of communism. They feel they must have industrial development as the only solution to their abject poverty, and the Soviet and Chinese experience seems to them an effective way of gaining this end—even though the human cost is high. Their governments are willing to make sacrifices for the better future that they believe is attainable. It is this urge for economic betterment that is the most certain reality in the twentieth century world; and if the price is to be high now and in the next generation, it remains a price many are willing to pay. In this context the conflict between freedom and tyranny is meaningless; freedom is a luxury the "have-nots" cannot afford if it is to mean simply a freedom to starve in a world in which they have glimpsed a future of possible plenty.

Thus again, ironically, we see Western civilization producing its Industrial Revolution from its own genius and carelessly diffusing its fruits to the rest of the world, thereby setting in motion forces which are no longer under its control. Leaders of the undeveloped nations long for the benefits of industrialism and are determined to have them. The East and the West offer their aid, each in its own way; the new nations welcome both brands, but the great majority wish to have the aid without strings attached. They do not wish to be compelled to become either communistic or capitalistic. They wish to adapt their own institutions as necessary.

and if a middle way presents itself as a suitable alternative, to adopt that. It is above all clear that the smaller nations wish to be neutral in the Cold War and that they are prepared to do everything they can to put an end to it. If the 1960 meeting of the United Nations General Assembly did nothing else, it made clear that all the uncommitted nations felt themselves threatened in two different ways. On the one hand, they did not want to become involved in the Cold War, with their countries a possible battleground. On the other hand, they felt that as long as the great powers wasted their resources on unproductive weapons of war there would be little surplus available for their own enormous economic needs. It was for this reason that Khrushchev's proposal for universal disarmament, put forward in 1959 and again in 1960, was regarded so wistfully. This seemed the proper objective to be aimed for; yet all but a few nations had grave doubts that any such proposal was practicable in the present state of the world.

Yet events are moving toward such a solution, slowly indeed, but surely. Both superpowers already have recognized that there can be no thermonuclear war without destroying the world, and that neither power can hope to land a knockout blow on the other without itself being almost as severely damaged in the process. If they do not use the ultimate weapons, but confine themselves to conventional arms, as is sometimes suggested, will the sense of security of the world be any greater? Neither side trusts the other without the strictest of controls. The controls may in time be agreed to. What then? There still will be a world of competing nations, each piling up its armaments. More men will be drafted into the armies of the world, and technology will be turned toward the perfecting of instruments of destruction that will not infringe on the nuclear ban. These weapons will not necessarily be much less expensive and may not free enough money and resources for the needs of the undeveloped nations.

It begins to become clear that the age-old system under which war has been the final instrument for decision in international relations is not only outmoded—as most men would agree in principle—but may be on the way out al-

together, if a substitute can be devised. War would then join domestic and chattel slavery as one of the aberrations which mankind has outgrown. If the power and influence of a nation were no longer to be construed in terms of military potential, it does not follow necessarily that the power and influence of the United States and the USSR would be diminished. They would still have their competing systems in operation; they would still be poles of attraction for other nations. Each nation still would have its own police forces, and we should not automatically see the end of reactionary and tyrannous regimes. But without the possibility of military interference from abroad, these regimes would become an affair for the individual peoples to deal with as best they could.

Political and economic dislocations would certainly follow the abandonment of international warfare. Tremendous adjustments would have to be made, especially in those countries where armaments occupy a significant percentage of the gross national product. But the world would not be changed totally. The nations would remain, still competitive, still nationalistic. World government would not necessarily be any nearer, even if it were desirable. But total disarmament, save for domestic police forces and an international control force with the sole task of policing universal disarmament, is not unthinkable; nor does it require an improbable change of heart on the part of all human beings in the world. It would usher in no millennium.

But disarmament would be a rational decision to put an end to the age-old institution of international war, when it has outlived its usefulness and the purpose for which it has been used in the past. Disarmament would free the world to tackle its other problems in a new manner. The decision seems to this writer to be one that must be taken if the world is to survive, and its cost may be not so excessive as to rule it out as forever impracticable. It is even questionable whether the two present leaders in the international struggle for power would be the chief losers under such a system. The solution, moreover, appears to be on the way. The pressure of world opinion may become strong enough to overcome the stubbornness of the most committed nations, and the institution al-

ready exists through which the pressure can be applied—the United Nations.

Disarmament is, indeed, the one hope for long-term survival. If it is not adopted, the chess game will end—and even the two kings themselves will not survive to glower at one another in solitary majesty on a stricken board.

Suggestions for further reading

PAPERBACK BOOKS

- Agar, Herbert. *The Price of Power: America Since 1945*. Chicago Studies in American Civilization. Considers the role of the United States as leader of the Western world.
- Aron, Raymond. *The Century of Total War*. Beacon. Thoughtful discussion by a French political analyst of the dilemmas of the twentieth century, especially the Cold War, in relation to European history.
- Aron, Raymond. *France: The New Republic*. Oceana. A short book; the text of the constitution of the Fifth Republic, with a brief commentary.
- Chamberlin, Waldo. *A Chronology of United Nations Affairs*. Oceana.
- Djilas, Milovan. *The New Class*. Praeger. Thoroughgoing criticism of the Yugoslav Communist State by a disillusioned former official who was imprisoned for writing it.
- Hand, Learned. *The Spirit of Liberty*. Vintage. A series of essays by a celebrated American jurist, stating the ideals that lie behind American life.
- Latourette, Kenneth Scott. *A History of Modern China*. Penguin. A relatively brief account by the leading Western historian of Chinese history.
- Millis, Walter. *Arms and Men*. NAL. Revealing study of the manner in which the character of war has changed, with special attention to the present balance of terror created by nuclear weapons.
- Roberts, Henry L. *Russia and America: Dangers and Prospects*. NAL.
- Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. *Islam in Modern History*. NAL.
- interesting comparison between world aims and ideologies of Soviet Russia and United States.
- Einaudi, M., et al. *Communism in Western Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951. Mainly on Italian and French communism.
- Feis, Herbert. *The China Tangle*. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1953. A lucid account of the fall of China to the Communists and the problems this presented to the United States.
- Harrison, Selig S. *India: The Most Dangerous Decades*. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960. Thoughtful and informative consideration of the prospects for India's success in her difficult enterprise of modernization under democratic government.
- Horne, Alastair. *Return to Power: A Report on the New Germany*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. Admiring account of Dr. Adenauer's Germany by a British journalist. Not the last word on the subject, but useful as far as it goes.
- Lasky, M. J., ed. *The Hungarian Revolution*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. A book of documents, with commentary.
- Moore, Ben T. *NATO and the Future of Europe*. New York: Harper & Brothers (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1958. An important study of NATO and the various efforts being made to build institutions in Europe which work toward closer economic cooperation.
- Murray, James N. *The United Nations Trusteeship System*. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1957. A fine study of this important organ of the United Nations—how it has worked, and the influence it has had on the development of colonies.
- Nasser, Gamal Abdul. *Egypt's Liberation: Philosophy of the Revolution*. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955. The program of the Egyptian president, as expounded early in his career.
- Nuseibeh, H. Z. *Ideas of Arab Nationalism*. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956. Informative study of the Arab League and the ideas that lie behind it.
- Rostow, W. W., et al. *The Prospects for Communist China*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1954. A major effort to discover the truth about and the potentialities of Communist China.
- Schwartz, Harry. *Russia's Soviet Economy*. 2d ed.

CASEBOUND BOOKS

Davenport, Russell W. *The Dignity of Man*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. Exceptionally

- Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954. Up-to-date factual account, comprehensive and as accurate as possible for a Westerner.
- Truman, Harry S. *Memoirs*. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955-1956. 2 vols. Pungent, full of trenchant judgments, and sometimes pugnacious. An extremely valuable picture of these crucial years in America, from the point of view of the chief participant and creator of policy—though naturally to be treated with some caution.
- Werth, Alexander. *France, 1940-1955*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1956. Already somewhat dated but full of information on the period covered, even though many of the judgments have not stood the test of time.
- White, Theodore H. *Fire in the Ashes: Europe in Mid-Century*. New York: William Sloane Associates, 1953. A summary by a competent and experienced journalist of the successes of the United States in postwar Europe. Somewhat melancholy reading in the 1960's.

Social and Cultural Changes in the Western World in the Twentieth Century

♦ **The new freedom and its consequences**

The twentieth century is an age of paradox. The achievements of this century and its predecessors in the modern period have made it possible for the majority of Western men to emancipate themselves from numerous restrictions that afflicted men in past centuries. The individualism that we noticed as early as the Renaissance, but which could be the possession of only a few in that age, has now become possible for the majority. Throughout his life, Western man makes thousands of choices not available to him earlier. He can choose his career and his spouse freely; he can educate himself or not according to his bent; he can choose from a myriad forms of entertainment; he can cultivate a hobby in his spare time; he can live wherever he feels inclined, either in the country of his birth or in a foreign land. All that is required of him in return is to behave in such a way as not to infringe too outrageously on the freedom of others, to obey such laws as his society imposes on him, and to make enough money for himself by his work (or to inherit it from an ancestor who earned more than enough for his needs) to enable him to satisfy what he conceives to be his requirements. Truly an enviable lot, one would think, in comparison with what was demanded of a medieval serf!

Yet it can scarcely be doubted that twentieth-century man has not discovered the secret of happiness, and that his new-found freedom has posed for him a new set of problems to which he has not yet found even the beginnings of a solution. These problems may be summed up under the general heading of insecurity, an insecurity which leads to fear of real or imagined dangers and to a sense of frustration because he can do so little by himself to overcome them. It should be noted at this point that most of what follows in this section refers to the average member of the middle class in Western society. Of course there are exceptions to any such generalizations as these, but the case of the typical bourgeois is considered because he is the representative of that class which gives its tone to society. It is certainly true that a member of a subject race or of a formerly submerged class will find excitement and stimulus in the vistas of freedom held in front of him, and some Western bourgeois may find a similar excitement in helping him to achieve his aims. The submerged members of society clearly have a tangible goal to pursue. The contention in this chapter is that emancipated Western men have not yet found a similar goal now that the tangible goals have been largely achieved.

In the capitalistic societies of the West, man has become dependent upon the possession of enough money to meet what he believes to be

his needs; and these needs are no longer simple. The food, clothing, and shelter, which we have spoken of in the first chapter of this book as the elementary needs of every human being, are not to be won as easily as in primitive societies; nor do they constitute the only requirements for human beings living in a developed society. From a fifth to a third of the population of most industrial nations still has difficulty in earning enough to satisfy these elementary needs. But even these men and women are not immune to the pressures of their society, and will often choose, for example, to be entertained, or to own a private means of transportation, rather than to live in an adequate house or provide themselves with an adequate diet. The large majority of the population determines its needs by reference to its social position, which is raised or lowered in accordance with its consumption of goods and services provided by the society. Thus there is a steady pressure to earn more money and so to consume more goods and services. Few individuals in an industrial society are immune to such pressure. They worry about their present and future income, they spend much of their energy and thought in trying to make more than they do, or at least to protect themselves from losing what they have already.

The higher they rise in the social scale, the more they are in danger, and the more they suffer from a sense of chronic insecurity. The low-income worker uses his labor union to bargain for a contract which will guarantee him his job and, if possible, a rising income for a limited period of time. As soon as the contract expires he is ready to lay down his tools for the purpose of putting pressure on his employer to grant him a new contract. Once it is signed he will once more breathe freely. His union also is expected to protect him against arbitrary dismissal and to ensure him a pension when he is too old to work. In addition he looks to the state to supplement his pension from taxes collected from himself and from others during his working life.

Such efforts to achieve economic security through the process of collective bargaining are not feasible for most higher-income workers, who are not hired and fired en masse according to conditions of employment, but who are employed upon an individual basis. Such men and

women are hired not only because of market conditions, nor indeed only because of their particular skills, but on the basis of a large number of imponderable factors—for example, whether they are personally acceptable to and liked by their employers, whether they happen to have the right social connections, whether they hear of the opening at the right time, whether there is someone else available who has better connections or simply better luck. Yet it is more serious for these people to be without work or income since they have grown accustomed to a higher standard of living and have undertaken certain commitments which presuppose a continued high income. Moreover they have achieved a social rank, which they could lose if they are long without a suitable position and income. It is not surprising that these men suffer from a sense of insecurity even more than the organized lower-income worker, or that they expend a disproportionate amount of their time and energy in trying to manipulate events in their favor. Against the dangers of unemployment the small sum of money provided by the state as social security is to them virtually negligible. Their only recourse is to save money if they can in the good years of high income and employment, so that they will have something to fall back upon in the case of emergency. Yet this too is difficult since there will be pressure upon them during the good years to maintain their social position. This means in fact that most of them can save little.

Thus low-income and high-income workers find that their freedom is not as meaningful as might appear. The quest for money is forced upon them by the social world in which they live. Most of them have undertaken responsibilities toward others as well as toward themselves which cannot be easily abandoned. It is hardly too strong to say that they have acquired a new kind of serfdom which is concealed, because they have an apparent freedom of choice denied to the medieval serf. But in return the serf had a security which the modern man lacks, however little the serf may have appreciated it.

Beset as he is by social and economic pressure, it is difficult for twentieth-century man to see how he is to extricate himself from his position. From time to time he recognizes his virtual enslavement. But what is he to do, beyond char-

acterizing his life as a "rat race"? Could he and his family, for whom he is responsible, really endure the loss of income and social position involved in quitting his job? Everything he consumes is provided for him by the labor and machines of others. A true independence is unthinkable, unless he has some source of income. He must therefore conform, at least to some degree, to the pressures of his society, and make for himself a minimal income on which he and his family can live. So why not accept the position, regard himself, indeed, as a serf, but rise superior to his serfdom in his own inner being—be gently tolerant toward himself and his society, but recognize at the same time that once his debt to society is paid, he is thereafter free? Once his living has been made and his seven-hour day accomplished, he has many hours left for himself, probably including a full two days of "weekend." But he is wearied by his five-day rat race. It is easier to sink into an intellectual sloth, to put aside, if he can, his worries, and either be entertained or undertake a mindless escape in the many ways provided for him by an industrial economy—drugging the mind with alcohol, speeding over the highways and waterways, talking idly with friends and acquaintances, pursuing a golf ball in an electrically propelled cart and occasionally exercising his muscles by hitting it. Then the persistent thought that he is a human being and that he is not developing all his human potentialities will not come up to plague him.

Why indeed should he develop them? And indeed what is so remarkable about a human being? His persistent intuition of himself as a being unique in creation is surely, he may think, belied by what "science" (read "some scientists") teaches him about himself. The Darwinian theory discussed in Chapter 20 is still not outmoded. Man is an accidental product of evolution, fitted to survive because of the usefulness of his mind. If there had been no chance mutation in the remote past, there would be no human being. His habitat, the earth, has nothing unique about it. It is a most insignificant spot in the universe. Matter is now known to be something inconceivably complex, made up apparently of charges of positive and negative electricity, which act at a distance—so that what we call solid and material is mostly space. The

human being himself, insofar as his organism is material, is of course made up of the same electrical charges and space; his atoms are just like those of the rest of the material world, and in combination with other atoms and molecules are subject to chemical changes. Mental activity is probably a chemical and electrical process of an extremely complex kind, but substantially no different from any other such process.

Insofar as he is an individual human being, he is the product of heredity and environment. He receives his biological and mental inheritance from his parents, who in turn received their own from their parents. This inheritance is transmitted by genes, extremely complex molecules, which may be combined in an almost infinitely large number of combinations, according to statistical laws of probability. Born with this inheritance he is at once influenced by his environment, and will be so influenced all his life. None of this was of the man's own making or by his own choice. Moreover, if he achieves anything in the world, he cannot transmit it to his children through the genes. He may through no fault of his own transmit faulty genes to them, and thus have a retarded or imbecile child; thereafter he is almost powerless to help his child to become more nearly normal, however excellent the environment he provides for it. He can merely provide certain environmental advantages for his children; but of all that he has won for himself there is nothing that he can, as the saying goes, "take with him."

When he dies, there may be or there may not be a future life. But the hypothesis that there is such a future life, as his religion asserts, has never been verified by science. It seems to him unlikely that any methods as yet conceived of by science could verify it. Thus he is compelled to fall back on faith. The picture provided for him of such a future life by his religion, even if it were credible, is not necessarily attractive to him. A paradise of earthly charms magnified a millionfold would in his eyes be likely to be boring; a position "at the right hand of God" is only barely conceivable, and perhaps might prove to be rather tiresome. Likewise the notion of hell as a place or condition of permanent suffering, though more conceivable, since it corresponds better with his earthly experience, too often appears like a tale told to the children to

frighten them into good behavior. Indeed, heaven itself may be thought of as a similar tale, invented for the purpose of persuading a man to be "good." What reason is there to take such tales seriously?

Thus man is penned within his earthly world; his life began with a birth before which there was nothing, and will end with a death after which there is nothing. Any incentive to develop himself must be provided on this earth and out of his own nature as it is revealed to him by his own intuition. If he is to be moral, if his acts are to be ethical, then his morality and ethics must either give him personal satisfaction or be approved (and rewarded) by his society. There is no objective reason why he should be moral, unless morality pays off in his social life, or unless doing good makes him "feel good." There is no objective reason why man should do anything save for the pleasure it affords him; there is no objective reason why he should develop his potentialities save insofar as it gives him satisfaction to develop them. Yet it remains incontestable that the simple pursuit of his various forms of enjoyment does not lead to happiness, but leaves him both sated and dissatisfied; and that he has acquired a horror of everything that gives him pain and discomfort.

We have already considered the fear of unemployment and ill-success, measured in material terms, and the loss of income which accompanies them. To these fears should be added a fear of ill health, a fear of old age, and a fear of death, which, according to all indications of history, is both far stronger and far more widespread than in earlier centuries. The third fear is natural enough in a skeptical age. Death marks the end of all the life he will ever know; and though there may not be much left to enjoy on earth, it is better than nothing. The other two fears are closely connected. The fear of old age arises in part from a fear of the ill health that accompanies it. But, probably even more important as a contributory factor, is the social position of the aged in Western society. The old are not respected by the young as a matter of course, as in some Oriental societies. They are well aware that they are too often a burden on their children, who have their own needs to care for and have little income to spare

for their support. They do not relish the prospect of living in a special home for the aged, with its many restrictions on their freedom, and the constant companionship of others who are plagued by the same ills as themselves. The elderly in Western society are also discriminated against by employers, who too often prefer to see young faces around them.

The fear of ill health afflicts modern men and women all their lives. This fear is catered to by advertisers interested in selling their nostrums for every ill to which man is heir and by the public press which is aware of the consuming interest of its readers in the topic. Ill health and suffering, in the opinion of modern Western man, must be put an end to at once by whatever means are available. A pill must be downed, an operation undertaken if advised by the doctor, a careful watch must be maintained to see that one of the major killers is not in the offing. Inoculations against every disease are increasingly sought by the biochemist, so that the disease can be headed off before its onset. More pills must be taken to strengthen resistance to diseases that might penetrate the defenses.

Thus modern man is hagridden by fear and worry, in spite of all the pleasures that his society through its ingenuity and industry provide him; and the historian of Western civilization is driven to see in all the symptoms of malaise that he has recorded the shadow side of individualism—the concentration of modern man upon himself, the anthropocentricity of the twentieth-century world. All that will be discussed later in this chapter has some bearing upon this phenomenon—the science and technology which have been used for the pleasure of man, for the provision of more and more varied goods, to save him from drudgery, to provide him with painless entertainment; the medicine that keeps him from suffering, the psychology that relieves him of his frustrations, the education that enables him to bring his talents to fruition, the literature that diverts him, the religion that offers him salvation. And we shall see also how the artists in twentieth-century society have, almost to a man, been dissatisfied with their society, in revolt against and often seriously alienated from it. For the artists do not require objective reasons to develop their potentialities.

They know that it is an inner need for them to express what is in them, a need that cannot be gainsaid; and it is the artist who, perhaps alone in our society, knows at the gate of death that what he has done on earth has been worth while.

It is now our task to discuss the means by which man has been emancipated in this age from the ills that beset him in former ages, as well as the concepts of man and his world that are provided for him by his intellectual leaders. Among these what is called science (formerly known less inclusively as "natural" science) takes pride of place.

❖ Twentieth-century science and technology

In previous chapters we have considered scientific advances primarily from the point of view of their effect upon man's view of himself and the world. Until the nineteenth century, science was of relatively little practical value; such technical advances as were made stemmed mostly from the efforts of practical men and owed little to the seekers after pure knowledge. Even the gigantic achievements of Galileo and Newton, much though they contributed to man's understanding of the world, did not succeed in doing much to improve his lot. Before the end of the eighteenth century things were beginning to change. We have seen how university scientists, engaged in demonstrating the principles of the steam engine, were able to contribute to the invention of an improved model. But such assistance was still rare at that time. In the nineteenth century, however, scientists and technologists worked together in harmony much more frequently. This was especially true in the field of chemistry. But it was not until the twentieth century that the scientists clearly outstripped the technologists and engineers; and it is from the work of the scientists that almost all the great technical advances of this century have stemmed. Clearly it would be impossible to enumerate even a small percentage of the great advances in science during this period, especially those made by the physicists. What will therefore be attempted is a brief discussion of the most outstanding developments, including those which have influenced man's thought about

himself and his world and those which have contributed most to the alteration of his mode of life.

The present knowledge of the physical world held by man is the result of the rigorous application of the scientific method developed in the seventeenth century. In essence this method consists of formulating hypotheses to explain previously observed phenomena, the prediction of some necessary consequences of the hypotheses, followed by the setting up of planned experiments for the purpose of testing the predictions. If an experiment is successful it is then concluded that the hypothesis has been verified; it is held to be true unless a further consequence of the hypothesis is later shown to be untrue, at which point the hypothesis has to be either modified to take account of the newly discovered fact or abandoned. The rigorous logician will of course note that a logical fallacy is involved (the affirming of the consequent—if A is, then B is; B is, therefore A is), but there is no need to trouble with the fallacious reasoning, if it is understood that A is only to be taken as a temporary truth, which can be overthrown if at some future date it is found that B is not.

The strength of this method lies in its practical usefulness. Each newly observed fact can be given its due weight, and takes its place in the general body of confirmed hypotheses which constitute scientific knowledge; and there is no need to consider too closely just what each particular item in the theory really is. Its *effects* merely have to be capable of being tested, and its relations expressed in mathematical form. A mathematical equation itself may be quite incapable of being pictured at all, still less of being tested directly. But from all equations consequences can be deduced by mathematical means; sooner or later such a consequence should be verifiable, giving the mathematician a faith that his equation represents a truth.

PHYSICS

The subsensible world The most spectacular scientific advances of the twentieth century have been in the realm of physics, many of the results of which have had practical applications. This has been especially true of the investiga-

tions of the subsensible world. We concluded our study of physics in Chapter 20 by a brief mention of the new theories on the constitution of matter. The old form of the atomic theory, according to which the atom was an indivisible but real component of matter, often pictured as a billiard ball of almost infinitesimal size, had to be abandoned in favor of the theory that the atom was made up of electrical charges. These charges, for reasons that will appear, still are called particles and thought to behave in a manner that can be ascertained by experiment. The first elementary particle to be discovered (at present the number of such known particles is 30) was the electron, but physicists quickly recognized that there were at least two kinds of particles, the proton and the electron, the former with a positive, the latter with a negative charge. The whole, the atom, was pictured as a proton nucleus, around which moved the electrons in circular orbits. The atoms were held together by the balance between the positive charge of the nucleus and the negative charge of the electrons. Later it was discovered that the electrons did not move only in circular orbits. Some orbits, indeed, were elliptical. It was shown that there were many orbits, and electrons could move from one orbit to another. But apparently they did not move across the intervening space between the orbits. They leapt from one to the other orbit. Atoms whose electrons moved from one orbit to another were therefore unstable; and it was also found possible by highly refined techniques to increase their instability, to make naturally stable atoms unstable. In the course of time many other particles were postulated to explain various observed phenomena, especially the spectrum lines of the different elements; it was also discovered that the nucleus possesses both protons and neutrons, neutral particles whose presence did not affect the stability of the atom. The nucleus of the atom remained positively charged in order to balance the negative electrons.

Meanwhile investigation was proceeding into the phenomenon of radiation, the emission of energy by luminous bodies, which varies according to the wave length of the particular kind of "light" which emits it. In modern science,

light is no longer just the visible light appearing in the rainbow, but all electromagnetic radiations. Visible light, indeed, is often thought of as made up of "free electrons," which, being unconnected with any atoms, are free to travel at the known speed of light, now reckoned to be about 186,300 miles per second. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Max Planck discovered that radiant energy is emitted and absorbed in definite amounts, which are always a multiple of the minimum amount, which appears to be irreducible. The minimum amount Planck called a "quantum" of energy. Energy is not emitted continuously but in measurable quantities at a time.

In Planck's original theory the atom in some way was able to emit these quanta of energy from itself. It was Einstein who was able to deduce from his theory of relativity the relation between energy and the atom, which latter, of course, unlike energy, has mass. He arrived at the famous equation, $E = mc^2$, where the energy equivalent is expressed as mass multiplied by the square of the velocity of light (or momentum, multiplied by the velocity of light). The equation suggested to Einstein and other scientists that it should be possible to release energy through the fission of the atom, a train of scientific investigation which led eventually to the development of the atomic bomb.

Meanwhile more difficulties were experienced in determining the actual nature of the electron. Simple experiments showed that it was clearly a particle, whereas more refined experiments showed also that it behaved like a wave—in just the same way as light itself. The nature of light had been a problem to scientists ever since the seventeenth century. Newton believing that it was corpuscular, and Huygens that it was a wave. It is thus necessary to hold that the electron is both a particle and a wave: wave groups manifest themselves as particles, and the frequencies, i.e., the number of crests of these waves which pass a given point in a second, manifest themselves as energies. The mathematics for these equivalencies are well established and accepted by physicists, who have, however, different views on the meaning of the equations.

At this point the attempt to picture the constitution of matter and its smallest constituents breaks down altogether. Nevertheless, it remains possible to use both the mathematics and the knowledge of the behavior of the electrons for practical purposes in numerous ways, as, for instance, in the branch of electrical engineering known as electronics. But neither the physicist nor the ordinary human being can feel that a comprehensive understanding has yet been obtained of the true nature of matter, which appears to become ever more and more mysterious.

A final point should be noted which has arisen out of these physical investigations, that has sometimes been given more philosophical weight than can possibly be its due. In 1927 Werner Heisenberg enunciated his principle of uncertainty (sometimes improperly called the principle of indeterminacy). Experiments showed that it would forever be impossible to determine the actual position and the velocity at any time of an electron, since the very effort would require the use of a radiation which would alter either the position or the velocity. Heisenberg, indeed, expressed mathematically the margin of error that would be entailed; but since there were two unknowns in his equation, no numerical equivalent would ever be obtained. A limit had thus been reached beyond which exact knowledge could not go. The future position of a particle could not be predicted from a knowledge of its present position and velocity; thus scientific causation, which consists, as has been noted, of prediction and verification, broke down when confronted with these phenomena of the subatomic world. But it is a far step from recognizing this breakdown to the conclusion made by some physicists that the principle of strict causality in *other realms* has to be abandoned. Even in the subatomic realm the laws of probability are still usable. It can be shown statistically that the probability of the movement of the electrons will be as predicted, even though the movement of an individual electron cannot be predicted. It has also been held by some physicists and others that the Principle of Uncertainty demonstrates the possibility of the human free will, as if the unpredictable behavior

of the electron was in some way connected with the unpredictability of human behavior. The only bearing that the principle could have on the question of human free will is that, since it is not possible to predict the behavior of an atom, it may be equally impossible to predict the behavior of the human will; and that because there *may* not be strict causality in the subsensible world, there may not be strict causality in the actions of the human will. An analogical argument with such meager consequences seems to this writer to have been hardly worth making. It is perhaps worth noting, however, that the supposed relation between the movements of the atom and the human will was also held in the ancient world. The Greek scientific philosopher Epicurus and the Roman poet Lucretius likewise postulated a random swerve (*clinamen*) of the atom in order to account for human free will.

Relativity and gravitation It is almost a relief to turn from the subsensible world to the macroscopic universe and consider the other great achievements of twentieth-century physics, the two theories of relativity put forward by Albert Einstein, the special theory announced in 1905 and the general theory announced in 1915. Like all good theories, they explain a number of difficulties and discrepancies that had been revealed by observation and experiment in the previous decades, and they threw light on numerous other matters not immediately connected with the material studied by Einstein. For some time past it had begun to appear to physicists that the Newtonian laws of motion and gravitation were not fully applicable either in the vast spaces of the universe or in the subsensible world, however accurate and useful they might be when applied to motion and gravitation on earth. The theories of relativity, indeed, do not overthrow the Newtonian system. But, being more generalized, they include the Newtonian laws—which thus become a special case of the laws propounded by Einstein. The Newtonian laws thus continue to be used in practice, since we are usually concerned with the macroscopic phenomena to which they apply. But when very high velocities are involved, as in the

macroscopic phenomena of light and the microscopic phenomena of the atomic world, then the more comprehensive laws of relativity must be used.

During the nineteenth century there was widespread belief among physicists that an "ether" existed which was a medium for the propagation of lightwaves and through which the earth and other bodies passed. When various phenomena connected with light and motion could not be explained under the Newtonian laws, qualities were ascribed to the ether that became ever more difficult to believe—not unlike the manner in which purely theoretical epicycles were invented for many centuries to explain difficulties that arose from astronomical observations. The ether thus became ever more and more complicated, as more attributes were ascribed to it, so that it became difficult to believe that it really existed. Finally experiments carried out in 1887 (Michelson-Morley) showed results that cast very grave doubts on the existence of an ether of any conceivable qualities at all. When the experiments in subsequent years were made with more refined techniques the results were the same. Albert Einstein, pondering on the Michelson-Morley experiments and other difficulties being experienced by the mathematicians, took as his hypothesis the notion that the velocity of light would always appear the same, whatever the position of the observer, and however fast he was moving—a notion that was plainly contrary to observation in the case of every other form of motion. Einstein took for granted that the ether did not exist. The result of his investigations was the special principle of relativity, which takes into account the motion of the observer (who is of course known to be always in motion, like everything else in the universe). All velocity, according to this principle, is meaningless except relative velocity.

It is unnecessary here to go into the ramifications of the theory. It need only be said that almost everything that had been thought about the universe as a whole had to be rethought, above all the concepts of time and space. In 1908, the mathematician Hermann Minkowski, drawing conclusions from the special theory, spoke of time as an actual "dimension," in addi-

tion to the three dimensions of space—length, breadth, and thickness. This meant that the universe must henceforth be considered as a four-dimensional space-time continuum; and though the time dimension may in practice be ignored in the study of macroscopic phenomena on the earth, if one wishes to approach the actual truth, the fourth dimension must also be considered.

The general theory of relativity considered the phenomenon of gravitation, which, it will be remembered, had been shown by Newton to be universal. But Newton had never even attempted to say what gravitation is. Although we commonly speak of the "force" of gravity, it still cannot be regarded as a force in any sense in which a force is usually pictured. It cannot be screened off, it cannot be harnessed, it acts instantaneously. But gravity remains a prime fact of the universe, and obviously some explanation should be given as to what it is, and why it acts (if it "acts") as it does. By making use of a non-Euclidean geometry invented in the nineteenth century by the mathematician Georg Friedrich Riemann, Einstein concluded that a gravitational field is simply a "curvature" of space. Space is distorted; and the distortion increases in proportion to the mass of the body which distorts it, and decreases with the distance from that body. A falling body simply moves to the next nearest point in "space-time." Thus gravity has no power of "attraction," but any particle of matter moves in the easiest direction at a constant velocity, unless it encounters a distorted region of space (formerly called a gravitational field). As soon as Einstein's general theory became known after World War I, an expedition was sent out to observe a solar eclipse, and to see if an important consequence of the theory could be verified by observation. It was known that the planet Mercury did not follow exactly the path predicted for it under the Newtonian laws. It is reported that Einstein stayed quietly at home in bed, confident that his predictions would be verified.

The expedition in due course reported that the movement was in accordance with the prediction of the relativity theory. Since 1919 more predictions have been verified, and no observa-

tions have been made that would cast any doubt on the theory. Thus for the present the theory, strange as it may appear to the untutored common man—who happily continues to speak in his common tongue of the “force” of gravity—is still provisionally true in accordance with the principles of the scientific method.

CHEMISTRY

The science of chemistry owes much to the new concepts of physics, especially to the developed theories dealing with the atomic structure of matter, and in some areas the work of the chemist can hardly be distinguished from that of the physicist. Insight into the process of chemical change, derived from the theories and techniques of physics, has provided the chemist with direction for his own research—which research, on the whole, is expected to have more immediate practical application than physics. It is seldom feasible for the chemist to engage in his research without the use of extensive apparatus and substantial numbers of co-workers. Much twentieth-century chemical research is therefore sponsored by the industrial establishments, which hope to make practical use of the work done and of the discoveries made. The great universities also provide comparable facilities; but even these are often supported directly or indirectly by industry, as well as by the state which has also an interest in the results.

It would be as tedious as it is unnecessary to record here all the areas in which chemistry has advanced in the twentieth century. But a few general remarks will suggest the direction in which chemistry has advanced. The raw materials provided by nature are now very seldom used in their pristine form. The manufacturer requires of his material that it be suitable for the particular purposes he has in mind. Steel should have certain qualities, which will differ according to his needs, for example, high tensile strength, ductility, malleability, and the like. The builder wishes his material to be weather-proof, fire-proof, strong but not brittle. The manufacturer of household utensils wishes his wares to be handsome in appearance, not easily

broken, uniform in texture and so on. The hosiery manufacturer needs a material which is smart in appearance, absorbent, capable of being dyed in a variety of shades—and not too strong, lest he should be put out of business by being unable to win repeat orders for his products. All manufacturers wish to be able to make some commercial use of everything in their raw materials. Nothing should be wasted if any use can be found for it. It is then up to the chemist to reconstruct the iron ore, wood, coal, and other materials in such a way that he can meet the specifications of industry, using the innumerable techniques now available to him, his knowledge of the molecular structure of the given raw materials, and a blueprint of the ideal material he proposes to make. Thus he can plan his chemical changes with extreme precision, and even make entirely new raw materials. If, for various reasons, he does not have at his disposal enough of a particular raw material, he is encouraged to make substitute, but similar, material from whatever is available to him—as Germany, a country not rich in raw materials, was compelled to produce numerous *ersatz* materials during both wars.

BIOLOGY

Biology in the twentieth century has become far more closely allied to chemistry than it was in the past. Indeed the science known as biochemistry today attracts far more research workers than classical macrobiology, perhaps because it can more readily use the rigorous methods of scientific research and rely less on trial and error. Research biochemists, like their brethren in chemistry and physics, are, for the same reason, interested in the extremely small (microbiology), and there is even a tendency to neglect the study of the ordinary visible living organisms in favor of the tiny units which compose the organic wholes. As is natural when so much research is concentrated on a problem, much has been discovered about the cell, which, at least until very recently, was considered to be the basic structural unit of all living matter, in much the same way as the atom was considered the basic unit of all matter. Some biologists,

however, now propose to abandon the notion that the cell is the basic unit, preferring to speak of "envelope-systems" and to regard the cell as a special case of a particular envelope-system. All cells are envelope-systems of a particular kind, but not all envelope-systems are cells.

However this may be, much study is given to the complex organic compounds called proteins, which form the essential element in protoplasm, the term used for the basic living material of which all organisms are constructed. The chemistry of the protein is now well understood, and its various components identified. The greatest aid has been given to this science by the electron microscope, invented in the 1930's and constantly perfected since. With this instrument an object can be magnified more than 60,000 times, a feat quite impossible for any apparatus which has to use ordinary visible light. The biochemist therefore has an advantage over the physicist in that he can actually see the elements with which he is dealing; he is not compelled to deal only with theoretically postulated entities. On the other hand, his work must largely be confined to observation and to the effort to understand the structure and operation of the given entity, which he cannot change. The molecular structure of the living organism must remain as it was constructed by nature. Beneath the visible cell with its protein there remains, however, the invisible molecule; and beneath the molecule are the atom and the elementary particles. The biochemist must therefore construct by theoretical means the relation that must obtain between the molecule and the cell or envelope-system, then calculate the manner in which the molecules must be placed in order to form the entity as it is observed under the electron microscope. Such calculations enable predictions to be made, which sometimes can be confirmed by observation under the microscope, thus fulfilling the criteria for knowledge of a scientific nature.

The origin of life. The great yearning of most biologists is to discover by their techniques the origin of life. It is rarely believed now that the human being will ever be able to create living material out of the nonliving in the labora-

tory, thus demonstrating how life must have been created "in the beginning." He can observe the conditions necessary for this initial "spontaneous generation" and infer that, when these conditions obtained at some remote period of geological time, then life did arise. He can calculate the probability of the presence of the necessary conditions. Such a probability, though very small, is not infinitely small. If enough time is posited, it may be assumed that this probability was translated into actuality, as it very likely has been on other planets in the universe where similar suitable conditions for the maintenance of life have obtained as on earth. No problem results from the fact that conditions suitable for spontaneous generation have arisen so rarely, nor is there any need to postulate constant spontaneous generation, as was assumed to be the case by scientists of earlier periods, including Aristotle. For the organism has the property of being able to reproduce itself. Once life arose, the process of evolution began to operate, and the myriad of varieties of forms have arisen through natural selection, as discussed earlier.

There is, however, a considerable question among biologists as to what in fact constitutes life. It is not as easy as might be imagined to distinguish the living from the nonliving. In particular there are two most important entities, one postulated and one observed, that are thought by some biologists to constitute a kind of "missing link" between the living and the nonliving. These are the gene and the virus. Both behave in some ways like nonliving substances, and in some ways like living substances. Although the gene is not, as yet, observable, and only its position on the chromosome is known, its assumed existence accounts for so many of the known phenomena of heredity that its actual existence and its supposed composition are rarely doubted. The virus, on the other hand, has been isolated in some cases, and its behavior within the organism is fairly well known. The virus, however, cannot be treated as if it were a bacterium. Drugs, as we shall see, do not affect it as they affect bacteria. It is believed by some researchers that cancer is caused by some as yet unknown virus, since there is

some evidence that it will respond to the same kind of treatment as virus diseases.

In the traditional realm of macrobiology, advances have continued to be made. In this realm it is of course impossible to make controlled experiments on the same scale in the laboratory as is possible in microbiology. Most of the advances have come from the modern habit of specialization in one particular area, as for example the functioning of the endocrine glands (endocrinology). Research workers who devote all their attention to their specialty are naturally likely to make more discoveries than the synthesizer of the past. Moreover, in the present century there is available not only a far more refined technology, but also animals on a prodigious scale for experiment. One of the most useful of all research tools was a by-product of atomic research during the war. This is the use of the radioactive isotope for the purpose of tracing a particular substance as it passes through the organism. By "observing" the movement of the substance by means of a Geiger counter many inferences can be made as to what part the substance plays within the organism. This obviates the necessity for physical contact with the substance by the researcher, which in earlier times would have involved the damaging of the organism being examined.

There are now a number of major specialties, in all of which much information has been gathered about the actual behavior of organisms. Such specialties are physiology, which deals with the structure and function of organisms; ecology, which studies the adaptation of the organism to its environment; embryology; genetics; and others. Within these major areas are more sub-specialties. Clearly it would be of little value to go into all these specialties here. More important for our purposes is the consideration of those branches of biology that have the greatest bearing on human life and affairs. Among these are nutrition, pharmacology, endocrinology, applied genetics—and, of course, medicine.

Nutrition If the biochemist were to attempt to improve human nutrition, it was first necessary to determine the means by which human beings, animals, and plants were in fact nour-

ished. Much still remains obscure in this field, and opinions have changed very frequently during the century. One of the most well-established theories, it seemed, was that certain "accessory food factors" were necessary to a truly balanced diet. For a time the search for vitamins, as these accessory factors were called, became something of a craze, and the consuming public was thoroughly sold on them. The production of vitamins became a multi-million-dollar industry. Today, though the initial craze has abated, many millions of people in the countries of Western civilization take their daily vitamins, with or without benefit of medical advice. Nevertheless, increasingly large numbers of biologists are beginning to doubt the value and efficacy of supplementary vitamins and to wonder whether they may not do more harm than good. Experimenters also discovered that certain key minerals appeared to be necessary for satisfactory nutrition. These too were then made available by the chemists. Knowledge of body chemistry also provided the information that the ductless glands, whose functioning has been very thoroughly studied (even though much remains unknown or imperfectly understood in this area), produce chemicals of vital importance for the functioning of the body. Each gland produces its own characteristic chemical substance, known as a hormone, which is carried in the bloodstream to other organs or tissues. When a human being suffers from a deficiency of any particular hormone, his bodily functioning, and sometimes his mental functioning, is impaired. Most of the hormones are also now available in synthetic form; before they were available, they were obtained from comparable animals, which were thus treated as chemical laboratories. The assumption, it should be noted, is that the substance manufactured by the animal is in all essential respects identical with that manufactured by the human being. Indeed, this principle is customarily observed in all experimentation with animals. It is assumed that there is no factor present in the human being and absent in the animal which would make experiments with animals inapplicable. Since very great successes have been achieved on the basis of this assumption, there is no reason to question its essential

validity, although the area of this validity may be less wide than is generally assumed. The influence of the human mind upon the human organism is a field which is as yet far from having been adequately explored.

Applied genetics Some attention was given in Chapter 20 to the genetic theories that spring from the work of the monk Gregor Mendel. The great advances in the twentieth century have been solidly based on the work of the nineteenth, and not much need be said about them here. The key has been the analysis of the mechanism of reproduction and the selective breeding based upon it. The work has been very productive in the plant world, where improved plants have been constantly developed by choosing mutations that appeared to be advantageous and crossing them with other strains which possessed characteristics considered desirable. When it has been found, for example, that a plant cannot be grown in a particular climate because it is adversely affected by cold, a similar plant from a cold climate will be crossed with it, and the offspring thereafter carefully cherished, until there is enough seed for commercial distribution. Certain corn (maize) plants produced only small ears, but were of good flavor. The answer was to develop a hybrid which would retain the flavor and increase the size of the ears. The work has been more effective with plants than with animals, in part because mutations cannot be induced by artificial means with the animals as they can be in some cases with the plants. But much progress has been made with certain domestic animals. Artificial insemination, however, has made great progress in recent years. One bull with desired characteristics may now be used to inseminate many thousands of cows which could never have paid a personal visit to him. The science of human heredity, known as eugenics, is still in its infancy. Experimentation is extremely difficult, since personal and social rather than eugenic factors continue to determine the choice of life partners in Western society. The progress of eugenics has also been hampered by the tremendous number of the postulated genes to be taken into account before any human beings with characteristics considered desirable, could be predicted—much less

produced. It seems doubtful indeed whether much serious progress can be made with eugenics, even in the more remote future, though it may become possible to ensure the perpetuation of some desired but unimportant physical features through the selection of a mate with the required combination of genes to satisfy the aesthetic sensibilities of the eugenicist.

MEDICINE AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY

Perhaps the most epoch-making work in medicine in this century has been in the provision of public health facilities for the control of the epidemics that afflicted men of the past ages and in the spreading of the knowledge of sanitation. This, in turn, depended upon the recognition of the bacterial origin of many diseases, the identification of their carriers, and the destruction of the latter at their source. This work is so generally accepted, and its knowledge has been disseminated so fully throughout the world by such agencies as the United Nations World Health Organization, that it has caused major demographic changes almost everywhere, and greatly increased the life expectancy of already more than a billion of the earth's inhabitants.

A great deal of the advance in medical science has come from the work of the pharmaceutical industry, itself fed by the discoveries of biochemistry. The curative value of certain herbs, plants, and minerals has, of course, always been known. In past ages such substances were either taken in their natural state or in extracts distilled from the plants. Modern biochemists have tried to discover the actual curative agent in such remedies. Once this has been isolated, either that agent alone is administered, or its chemical equivalent, which can be manufactured in the laboratory—the assumption here being that the synthesized chemical product is in all important respects the same as the original product of nature. Relatively few drugs are now manufactured from the original natural product, and huge numbers of drugs which have been compounded in the laboratory are constantly tried. The discovery of many of these owes little to theory; and often little, if anything, is known

for certain as to just how they work within the animal or human being. Every effort is made to determine if they have any toxic side-effects which cannot be predicted in advance. Only when this has been discovered by experiment is the drug released for human consumption, on the general principle that it has been demonstrated to do some good, and it has not been found to do any harm comparable with the good.

Not all the improvements in the treatment of disease in the twentieth century have stemmed from the trial and error method; and even when trial and error play a large part in the discovery of useful drugs certain basic discoveries of the biologists have been utilized. It is, for example, of the utmost importance to know whether a disease is of bacterial or viral origin. The virus has still not yielded to treatment by any drugs, and it is possible that it never will. The "wonder-drugs" of the twentieth century have hitherto proved useful in stemming the onset of bacteria, but are helpless against the virus diseases. An early specific for syphilis, known as salvarsan, was developed in the laboratory, as were sulfanilamide and its derivatives. The most effective cures up to the present have been found in the so-called antibiotic substances. Penicillin, discovered by Sir Alexander Fleming in 1929, streptomycin, aureomycin, and others have been derived from the organic world, where they are manufactured by micro-organisms which can be cultivated under laboratory conditions. Some can now be synthesized. It is still not fully known just how these substances work, though in the case of some it can be demonstrated that they deprive the bacteria of needed nourishment, and therefore inhibit their growth.

For virus diseases the only technique so far available is a highly refined version of the old technique of vaccination discussed briefly in Chapter 20. Smallpox is a viral disease. It therefore responds to the process of immunization, infecting the human being with the virus and giving him a light dose of the disease, thus enabling him to acquire a temporary or permanent immunity. Exactly how this immunity is conferred is still not fully known.

There remain, however, many ailments that

can still not be treated medically, and for which only surgery is applicable. Surgical techniques in the twentieth century have reached an almost incredible degree of refinement, while certain semisurgical techniques can also be used to halt the disease by mechanical means, as, for example, the use of radium in cancer therapy.

Although there can be no doubt that medicine and surgery have made vast progresses in the present century, and the life expectancy of men and women in the Western nations has increased, so that it stands almost at the psalmist's three score years and ten—and in some nations has surpassed it—it is also true that certain diseases that may be specifically attributed to the conditions of twentieth-century life are not decreasing. After all, if one is not permitted to die of contagious or infectious disease, one must die of something. Cancer and heart disease are the major killers, on which hundreds of millions of dollars of research money are spent, in the ever-present hope that something will be found to arrest their progress. These and similar "diseases" may well be the price to be paid for civilization, with its temptations to overindulgence, its nervous frustrations, and the high tension induced by the competitive life of Western civilization.

ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY

Little need be said here of the prodigious advances in engineering and technology, which are familiar to every reader. The internal combustion engine, the diesel engine, the airplane, are all based on nineteenth-century inventions; but they have been greatly improved and refined, especially by the use of better fuels developed by the chemists. Certain methods of propulsion long known suddenly became practicable as the fuel was developed for them. There has been a constant stream of inventions in the twentieth century, which has provided an incentive unknown in earlier centuries. The private manufacturer, anxious to keep ahead of his competitors, is on a constant lookout for new inventions which he can exploit to his commercial advantage. The inventor with a patent may hope to attain continuing royalties from the licensing of his patent—or at least he paid a

substantial sum to keep it off the market, and thus not endanger the sales of an existing product, which would be outmoded by the new invention. It need only be said here that every manufacturer of substance has to have some facilities for research at his disposal, as well as researchers whose sole task is to contribute to the improvement of his product, and that most of such improvements today are contributed by such specialized and salaried workers, rather than by the private hobbyist working in his garage. Indeed, in all fields of science today, as we have noted in the case of biology, it is the specialist who is in demand and who alone can hope to make new contributions. Few scientists today can have much knowledge of work done in fields other than their own specialty. Knowledge in each field is so vast that subspecialties are constantly being created, leaving the task of synthesis largely to dilettantes (for example, historians and philosophers).

PSYCHOLOGY—FREUD AND HIS SUCCESSORS

In an age which grants such prestige to its scientists as the twentieth century, and in which man is so heavily preoccupied with himself, it is natural that he should look to science for an explanation of his own being, rather than to the older insights of religion and philosophy. We have already given in Chapter 20 some features of the psychology of Freud which were based upon the findings of empirical science, especially the phenomena presented by the hysterical and the mentally disturbed. But Freud was far from content with merely providing a therapy. All his life he was constantly seeking to understand the total human condition, to build up a picture of man, both normal and abnormal, and to understand civilization as the product of men. Indeed, he grew to see the problems of society as simply those of man writ large; and though much modern psychology has deviated from Freud's teachings in detail, it is still true that his primal myth underlies almost all schools of psychology and has pervaded almost all fields of twentieth-century culture.

Freud postulated an initial struggle that all men have to undergo. It cannot be avoided because the conditions of man's very birth present

him with the field for this struggle. Freud found the archetype of this struggle in the Greek myth of Oedipus, who killed his father and married his mother. Each male child repeats in his unconscious the hate for his father and love for his mother which were symbolized in the myth. His father is a competitor for the love of his mother, while at the same time he is a stern judge and symbol of authority, against whom the child must assert himself if he is to become a true man in his turn. In his actual life he does not re-enact what is in his subconscious; but it remains always as a motivating force behind his relation to the world and his actions in it. Freud goes so far as to say that "the beginnings of religion, ethics, society, and art meet in the Oedipus complex," and that it is also the "nucleus of all neuroses." Religion has its father-figure in the just and stern God, to whom the loving kindness of the tender mother is also sometimes attributed, out of the wish that he should be so; ethics has its stern command to pursue righteousness at the expense of the instinctive desires; society imposes punishment on man for breaking its taboos; art, at its best, is the sublimation of the unconscious divisions within the personality and the expression of the individual creativity which has succeeded in asserting itself after the resolution of the internal struggle. At its worst, art is the representation of the unresolved neurotic conflict.

It is impossible to estimate the influence of this view of the life of man. Religious, social, and art criticism have been suffused with it. Shakespeare's *Hamlet* has been seen as a classical Oedipal struggle. Works of art have been analyzed to see what Oedipal elements have not been resolved in the artist. Freud's emphasis upon the sexual drive as the motivating force behind almost all human actions, and his emphasis upon the repressive nature of social institutions and conventions, helped foster a permissiveness which has pervaded all areas in the twentieth century.

Several of Freud's co-workers deviated from him in the early twentieth century, some of them on points which revealed a fundamental difference of philosophy, even though the point might appear to be minor. Freud wished in his psychoanalytical technique to awaken the awareness of

the human individuality, so that the individual could cope with his problems in a rational manner thereafter. Otto Rank, however, insisted that the patient could not hope to achieve full rationality, but should learn to cope with his life by strengthening his will, even though he retained his irrational illusions. Alfred Adler regarded the observed aggressiveness of the human being as a response to his real feeling of powerlessness as a child. Thus he made a "masculine response" which was thereafter his motivating force for action. Karl Jung came in time to deny the sexual nature of the life force, but allowed an inherited racial or collective unconscious as a motivating force, together with unconscious motives stemming from childhood repressions. His classification of human types into extroverts and introverts (with numerous intermediate stages) for many years was very influential and passed into the vocabulary of the common man.

More recent psychologists have inclined to look at man as the product in large part of his society rather than a being of primeval urges such as were pictured by Freud. Although these psychologists did not deny the urges, remaining in this sense Freudian, they have studied those elements in twentieth-century culture which have tended to make man frustrated and neurotic, as for example, the way in which the child in Western society is taught one type of ideal, and finds the reality of his adult life totally at variance with it. Moreover, in stressing the impossibility of the fulfillment of certain tasks and duties approved by society, they have drawn attention to the pulls and pressures which have helped to produce the corrosive sense of guilt that is recognized by all as one of the most prevalent personality traits in this century. With an understanding derived from clinical experience, some psychologists have written most penetratingly about the condition of man. But collectively, they have not succeeded in giving man any sense of direction as to what he should do or where to "go from here." Having, for the most part, a concept of happiness as the goal of men, which rests on social fulfillment, they must be content to suggest adaptation to the particular conditions of twentieth-century society. But the recognition of the unconscious elements in man is a clear advance from the

more simple view of the pre-nineteenth-century world, even if there still remains much doubt as to the "contents" of this unconscious and how they are to be interpreted for the understanding and therapy of man.

♦ Cultural consequences of twentieth-century science and society

The twentieth century is the first period in human history when the masses of society have had access to some part of the culture hitherto reserved for a small leisure and monied class. All classes of men in modern industrial society have become consumers of some cultural wares, and industrial techniques have been applied to the production of these wares. In such circumstances some producers have concentrated on catering to a mass market; others have continued to appeal to a cultural elite which is larger than in earlier days, since more men have had the opportunity to become informed and educated in appreciation. Thus in all fields there are now available cultural products of varying qualities, some designed for the masses and thus properly called "popular," and others which, it is hoped, will appeal to the more serious and educated classes.

Nevertheless, as will be discussed more fully later, the creators of culture in twentieth-century industrial society have now had to take more account of their public than has hitherto been customary. Commercial values have permeated all phases of culture. The writer who wishes to communicate must find some publisher to print and circulate his book, or he must persuade some magazine editor to pay him for his story. If he is ready to pay for the printing of his own book, he is still at the mercy of the distributors who offer it to the buying public. Others beside himself have to agree to print and distribute; these men are in business for profit, not for philanthropic service. If they do not believe the book will appeal to a buying public, they cannot afford to take a chance with it. Likewise the composer of music requires an orchestra to perform his work and an audience to listen to it. Managers and conductors of orchestras can-

not consult only their own wishes. Audiences have to pay for their tickets, and they will not pay to listen to unpopular programs. The painter may still paint for his own satisfaction; but unless he paints in his spare time, he can make a living only by selling his paintings. Thus it becomes essential for the artist to pay some attention to the buying public and its tastes. Of course in earlier ages a patron had to be pleased. But a patron, often enough, did not have any particular appreciation for the work in question. It was his task to act as a patron, and he earned prestige from the mere fact of his patronage. Today there are two distinct audiences: the elite and the masses. If the artist wishes to make any worth-while income from his art, he must usually appeal to the relatively low common denominator of mass taste.

The entertainment industry has experienced an unparalleled growth in recent decades; but this growth has been largely confined to those forms of entertainment that require least enlightenment and cooperation from their audience. Radio, television, and movies require of the members of the audience nothing but their mere presence. Though some of the programs provided may be of high artistic quality, capable of exciting an emotional and intellectual response from the viewers, it is seldom these programs which are the most profitable. Even if many more of them were available to the producer than there in fact are, he could not afford to produce and exhibit them. On the other hand, live drama requires an alive and active audience to lend inspiration to the actors. There has been no marked increase in such drama during this century. It is safer for the producer and backer to provide plays with mass appeal, and most theaters are occupied at any given time with plays designed for this purpose. Theater rentals and production costs are high, and the elite audience is still too small to be profitable—though numerous efforts have been made to provide other means of financing for plays likely to be unprofitable. Such efforts have usually been at the expense of the performer and for the benefit of the viewer. The performer, for love of his art, agrees to take less than his fair salary, whereas the audience obtains its tickets at a subsidized

price. Music has found a new audience, especially among those who first listen to serious music on the radio or phonograph; more musicians are certainly employed than at any other period of history. But modern composers find difficulty in educating their audiences to like their unfamiliar products, save in the realm of popular music. Much writing can be classed only as popular entertainment. The writers are aware of the taste of their readers and cater to it. If the readers rejoice in illusion, then these writers will become, for suitable royalties, purveyors of illusions; if they like sex and violence, sex and violence they shall have, for a consideration. An idle hour is whiled away by the reader, which he might have spent equally well before his television set. Moreover, the necessity for the artist to communicate rather than simply to please himself, has created in him the awareness of his audience which may be to the good of both if he does not simply cater to its known or supposed desires.

There are two important consequences of this commercialization of culture, which in itself is not necessarily a bad thing. First, the serious artist who feels that he must communicate what he possesses as his inner vision may find there is no one to share it with him. He cannot or will not write drivel or trash; but the publisher is always present at his elbow, to suggest that if he will make at least some concession to popular taste, for example, by inserting a sex scene which can be billed in the advertising, then he can perhaps put across his message in the rest of the book. If he finds a successful formula, the publisher will urge him to repeat it. Constantly the writer finds that there are temptations offered to him to prostitute his artistic integrity; and since the pain of nonconformity to the publisher's wishes is silence and noncommunication, the artist is driven to choose between two evils—of which he may choose the lesser one, which at least enables him to eat and to ply his vocation.

The second consequence is the professionalization and specialization of the artist and intellectual. There is a place for them in the cloistered havens of learning, on the sole condition that they can become articulate in the subject of their

specialty. The poet and the novelist can analyze their own work and the work of others, lay bare the mechanics of their procedures, and then tell others about them. It may even be that the university press which does not have to make a profit will publish his poems and works of non-fiction or will sponsor a small magazine in which he can publish his fiction and criticism. Most writers are not aware of the procedures they use, while they are using them; but they are willing to cast an objective glance upon them afterwards. The more successful, and perhaps less inspired, writers who do work according to a formula, may not need the university professorship with its secure salary. But if they accept it, they may well be able to learn to explain their artistic procedures lucidly. Likewise with the painter or musician. If they can instruct the young on the techniques of painting, and the harmonies of music, and how to appreciate it, then they can secure paid employment. The cost is an intellectualizing of all works of art, a preoccupation with technique at the expense of content. But the university does at least provide a market for their abilities; and they can console themselves with the thought that they may inspire their pupils to create for themselves and thus come nearer to their own personal happiness and fulfillment.

❖ Some twentieth-century trends in literature and art

We cannot hope to do more in the following paragraphs than draw attention to and illustrate certain cultural manifestations of the twentieth century which reflect the trends we have considered above. The work of sixty highly productive years cannot be encompassed in a few pages of discussion; nor could any list of names with a few details attached serve any useful purpose.

FICTION—REALISM, NATURALISM, SYMBOLISM, STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS

In fiction, especially in the United States, the trend toward naturalism already remarked in the later part of the nineteenth century has

been continued. But the choice of subject matter and the manner of its treatment have often suggested a profound distaste by the writer for the life that he describes with such fidelity. Pity and disgust are mingled, often in almost equal parts. There is little catharsis, and only rarely any glimpses of ultimate meaning and purpose in the lives depicted. Much of this literature has been well received by the public, which is able to find its own life pictured; most of the human beings and their environments are readily identified by the reader as belonging to his own experience.

Theodore Dreiser, discussed briefly in Chapter 20, was a leading exponent of this school. His *American Tragedy* appeared as late as 1925. James Farrell, with his *Studs Lonigan* trilogy (1932-1935), follows closely in Dreiser's footsteps, as do more recent writers such as John O'Hara. The German novelist Erich Maria Remarque wrote a realistic novel of World War I, *All Quiet on the Western Front*, from the German point of view. This, and other war novels of that period, did not match in their starkness the World War II naturalistic novels, especially those of such writers as Norman Mailer (*The Naked and the Dead*) and James Jones (*From Here to Eternity*). Jones, however, also attempted in his novel, with somewhat indifferent success, to consider his characters as part of a framework of destiny that transcended their individual lives. John Steinbeck's most famous novel, the *Grapes of Wrath*, was a realistic study of the Depression as it affected the lives of the displaced farmers of the Middle West.

Varying slightly from these straightforward slices of life are the novels which attempt to see the characters and situations as symbols of the condition of man. These novels are therefore not fully naturalistic. They may be considered as the intellectual descendants of the fairy story and the medieval morality play, combining some elements of these, usually in a modern naturalistic setting. The most famous of such novels is probably *The Magic Mountain* by the German writer Thomas Mann. Mann pictures a tuberculosis sanitarium, where the hero is incarcerated, without making it clear whether or not he really has the disease. The hero is subjected not only

to the external and internal experiences that might be expected from a man in his position, but also to highly stimulating and often profound conversations by representatives of certain outlooks on life, all of which have their influence on his conscious and unconscious being. In the same category are the novels of the American Nobel prize winner William Faulkner, who has chosen for his setting a village in the Deep South. The often macabre details of these stories draw attention to the inhumanity of man toward his fellow man, a theme which Faulkner developed even further in one of his later books, *A Fable*, where he attempts to draw analogies with the life and death of Christ. Another American prize winner, Ernest Hemingway, comes closer to naturalism, although he has a great fondness also for imagery. But in some of his work, which is always experimental in its technique, and has exercised marked influence on his younger contemporaries, he attempts to give his sometimes protean characters a weight of symbolism which they cannot always bear. In general, Hemingway lays very strong stress on the physical world, and on the masculine virtues of courage and sexual prowess, which he sees in their symbolic aspects. French serious novelists, especially in recent years, have been affected perhaps even more profoundly than their contemporaries elsewhere by the feeling of the utter corruption of society and the meaninglessness of human life. One such novelist, Jean-Paul Sartre, will be discussed again when we come to the modern philosophy of existentialism. Albert Camus is the best exponent of this point of view: in all his novels there is an overt symbolism, perhaps most notably in *La Peste* (The Plague), *L'Etranger* (The Stranger) expresses best Camus' sense of modern man's alienation from the world around him.

Totally symbolic is the work of Franz Kafka, without doubt one of the most significant of twentieth-century novelists. Unfortunately for the critics, there is still much doubt as to the meaning of the symbolism, and many points of view have been aired on the subject. Kafka's two masterpieces, *The Trial* and *The Castle*, present the individual as a being of self-consciousness but almost without identity, wandering in an internal darkness, acted upon, but not acting

of himself, ignorant of his destination and his aim, conscious of some unnamed guilt, at the mercy of his terrifyingly arbitrary accusers (*The Trial*), and forever cut off from happiness or fulfillment (*The Castle*). No resolution is offered in the novels; they are merely presented as the picture of man in the twentieth-century world, and it is for the reader to supply the meaning of the symbolism for himself out of his own experience.

As the conclusion for this brief section, two other major novelists will be considered, one of whom was a symbolist to the core, and the other of whom explored the significance of experience and memory. Although both James Joyce and Marcel Proust have been immensely influential, they are each *sui generis*; and no imitator, either of their subject matters or of their techniques, has come close to the originals. In his major novel *Ulysses*, Joyce chose to treat the lives of a few characters of his native Dublin as symbolic of all humanity and to place them within a framework provided by the Homeric poem of the *Odyssey*. The novel is written in the form of what has come to be called the stream of consciousness. All rules for the construction and form of a novel are abandoned, and the reader has to enter with both his mind and his emotions into the consciousness of the characters, their vague thought processes, their stronger feelings, and their interior monologues. Throughout the long book there are moments of rare insight, and long periods during which the reader is driven close to boredom by the banality of the thoughts and feelings ascribed to the author's characters, unless he is interested in tracing the numerous literary allusions—for which commentaries have been provided by later students. But, difficult though it is, *Ulysses* is undoubtedly an important landmark in the history of fiction. An altogether new effort has been made by the writer to free himself from all the canons of fiction laid down before his time and to allow his own unconscious to dictate the contents of his novel, thus compelling the reader to enter fully into the work with him, and not merely peruse it for its story, theme, and characterization. A later novel by the same author, *Finnegans Wake*, carried the technique of *Ulysses* even further and with considerably

more obscurity. This novel dealt with a night in the life of the characters, as *Ulysses* had dealt with a day. Thus this novel, both in form and content, is intended to convey the chaos of dreams.

It is unfortunate that Marcel Proust's masterpiece should have been translated as *The Remembrance of Things Past*, since this is exactly what the novel is not. On the contrary, it is a search for a past that has gone—not the result of such a search, which would be the remembrance. The title in French, *A la recherche du temps perdu*, literally "in search of lost time," expresses exactly what Proust was doing. This accounts for the strange time sequence of the eight volumes, which dip here and there into the past, with the reader's experience uncompleted until the final "Time Refound." The book exercises a strange charm. The subject matter is almost trivial, telling of the social and amatory experiences of a young man in French society of the early part of the century. But its significance lies in the exploration into the world of memory, the way in which an apparently trivial recurrence, the eating of a piece of crumb-cake, sets in motion a train of sensuous thought-feel-


ings which begin to take on a pattern, intricate as a piece of modern music, but bound together at last as a coherent whole, which is more meaningful than any of its parts. In the thought and feeling of the life of man between birth and death, Proust wishes to say, there is a musical harmony which makes of a human life a work of art; but it has to be not only lived but perceived as such, by the self-conscious human being. This is the task, indeed, of the self-consciousness of man—to heighten his awareness, to develop his sensibility, and thus, whatever the actual destiny of individual man, perceive that it has meaning and significance, irrespective of the framework within which it is lived out. But without the search there can be no finding, without these memories, meaninglessness.

DRAMA

The drama has not lived up to its promise of the nineteenth century, and it is a rare season anywhere which has brought forth a work of profundity or significance. Commercial considerations have been in part responsible for the



Massive mural entitled "Sugar Cane," by the Mexican artist Diego Rivera. (COURTESY PHILADELPHIA MUSEUM OF ART)



"The Persistence of Memory," surrealist painting by Salvador Dalí, 1931. (COLLECTION, THE MUSEUM OF MODERN ART, NEW YORK)

dearth, as indicated earlier; but they do not fully explain it. Perhaps the necessary limitations imposed by the stage have made it difficult for the dramatist to experiment freely with his medium, as other artists have been able to do in the twentieth century. Samuel Beckett's experimental plays, especially *Waiting for Godot*, have been able to carry their message to only a few, since to a majority the purpose and meaning of the playwright have been obscured by the stream-of-consciousness technique employed. Perhaps the most noteworthy dramatist of the century, as he has certainly been the leading American, was Eugene O'Neill, who in the grand tradition attempted to write tragedy within the framework of destiny, while in the modern manner making use of the insights of Freud and the psychologists. As he grew older O'Neill became ever more pessimistic, and his last major drama (*The Iceman Cometh*), which takes more than four hours to play, is, like all of his

work, concerned with the ordinary life of the twentieth-century man. In this play, while adopting the Rankian point of view that the human being must live with his illusions and cannot endure without them, O'Neill does not permit to his characters the strong will advocated by the psychologists as the means for man's salvation. So the tragedy, as with Euripides, relapses into pathos, and pity alone is left.

POETRY

Poetry in the twentieth century continued the symbolist trend of the nineteenth, but poets succeeded in emancipating themselves entirely from all restrictions of the past, both in subject matter and in technique. Few poets among the experimenters have found a wide audience, since much of their work has been extremely esoteric, requiring commentaries and elucidations from the initiated. Unfortunately, it has been in

poetry that intellectual analysis has reached its apogee and that so many critics, especially in the universities, have preoccupied themselves with the techniques, even the mechanics, of poetry—too often to the exclusion of the sensibility needed by the poet from his audience. It is doubtful if the poets themselves, in most cases, were so keenly aware of the mechanics of their art. The American poet Ezra Pound, whose work is regarded by many poets and critics as the most profound to be written in this century, is entirely incomprehensible to others. The numerous literary allusions require commentaries, and it is difficult for the layman to believe that some parts of the *Cantos* were not purposely designed to shock and confound his readers and to en-

tangle them in efforts to explain what may never have been explicable from the beginning. T. S. Eliot, an American poet who has lived much of his life in England, is experimental, but rarely obscure. Written in musical verse of a high order, *The Waste Land* (1922), his most noted poem, was an almost despairing criticism of his society as he perceived it in his middle thirties. A few years later Eliot announced his conversion to Anglo-Catholicism, and since that time his poetry has shown the influence of his religion, especially the religious play in verse, *Murder in the Cathedral*, in which he concerned himself with the twelfth-century murder of Archbishop Thomas Becket. Dylan Thomas, the Welsh poet, wrote beautiful lyrics in numerous diffi-



"Three Musicians," by Pablo Picasso, from the cubist period of the Spanish master. (COLLECTION, THE MUSEUM OF MODERN ART, NEW YORK. MRS. SIMON GUGGENHEIM FUND)



"The Moroccans," by Henry Matisse, 1916. (COLLECTION, THE MUSEUM OF MODERN ART, NEW YORK, GIFT OF MR. AND MRS. SAMUEL A. MARX)

cult meters, some of which he invented. Deeply concerned as he was with his own inner being, his particular use of symbols shows an awareness of the teachings of the psychoanalysts. But everything he wrote had a personal quality, as if he were continually striving to realize his own self through the medium of poetry, to express what welled up from his unconscious in his own personal idiom. Paul Valéry, a French poet in the symbolist tradition, in some respects crowns the symbolist school which began in the later part of the nineteenth century, as recorded in Chapter 20. Valéry's poems are always intensely thought-out as well as expressed in the most carefully constructed and often very musical verses; many remain deeply moving, and are far indeed from the youthful work of such rebels against their society as Rimbaud and Verlaine.

In a different class from all other poets of the twentieth century is Rainer Maria Rilke, a German poet who died in 1926 but whose influence and repute have grown immeasurably in the years since. Rilke was at all times a mystic

who sought inspiration from his inner being. Owing little to any of the philosophers of the unconscious, it is nevertheless clear that this was the world of experience that was closest to him—and is visible in particular, in his last work, *Sonnets to Orpheus* (1923). In other poems the mood is one of disgust with the world, and with the doubt and confusion that he found there, in contrast with the serenity of the inner world that he discovered when he sank into his own being. Two Irish poets, William Butler Yeats and the lyrical poet William Russell, who called himself A.E., were likewise mystics and deeply interested at all times in the hidden world beneath the threshold of consciousness. Both were also, incidentally, Irish nationalists. Yeats's work, although prolific, was uneven, but the best of it belongs among the greatest lyrics in the English tongue.

PAINTING

In painting the tendencies already noticed in the nineteenth century were carried further



From the abstract to the non-objective. Two paintings of Vasily Kandinsky, executed at an interval of thirty years: "Blue Mountain," 1903, and "Yellow Painting No. 653," 1938. (COURTESY THE SOLOMON R. GUGGENHEIM MUSEUM)

in the twentieth. Some artists, especially the great Mexicans Diego Rivera and José Orozco, have painted magnificent large-scale murals which are far from conventional, using their freedom from the old restrictions to emphasize social themes. Although the majority of painters have never ceased to paint in the old representational manner, the avant-garde has moved away altogether from representational art. The work of the avant-garde men has tended in two different directions. First, there are those who attempt to depict the unconscious life of man, his dreams, and especially his life between dreaming and waking. The greatest master of this surrealism was Salvador Dali, whose canvases often suggest nightmares but have an inner logic of their own. Moving in the same direction were the expressionist painters who attempted to depict their own emotions and, by the extensive use of distortion, to create an emotional response in the



beholder. Van Gogh may be regarded as the progenitor of this school; but none of his successors approached him in genius or authority. The distortions which seem natural to Van Gogh and an integral part of his vision sometimes seem overdeliberate in the later expressionists.

In the other direction is the much more influential school of abstract painting, which deliberately attempts to paint what is not to be found in nature. This painting is intellectual rather than emotional. Objects in the natural world are sometimes suggested in somewhat skeletal form rather than portrayed, and many of the canvases are beautifully composed. Abstract art is, however, a creation of the mind. The objects in abstract art are drawn from nature, but the artist strips them of their non-essential contingent elements. Abstract painting and sculpture have greatly influenced modern

design. Pablo Picasso, its most consistent exponent, whose work was originally cubist, has also designed many beautiful ceramics, and both he and Henri Matisse have performed a similar service for sculpture. At the extreme end of this spectrum is nonobjective painting, whose early master was Vasily Kandinsky. This painting abandons even the suggestion of the external world retained by the abstract artists. Some of the best examples are little more than geometrical colored figures, often arranged in very pleasing harmonies and presenting a gay and almost playful effect. With this painting, however, we have reached the end of the road away from the work of the classical masters of the Renaissance. The escape from the real world could not be more complete than with the avant-garde painters, whether the escape is into the seclusion of their unconscious, or their intellects, or both.

Aside from the work of such painter-sculp-

tors as Matisse and Picasso and other abstract sculptors, the most noted figure in twentieth-century sculpture is Jacob Epstein, almost all of whose works have created storms of controversy. Technically extremely skilled, and able, when he wished, to create the most finely wrought heads and busts of living men, Epstein preferred to create massive symbolic figures, often overwhelming in their effect, which emphasize the struggle and suffering of man.

ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN

To the architect and the designer, the modern world has been more kind than to other artists. It has provided them with engineering skill and numerous new materials, it has offered an expanding market for buildings and furnishings, and its pursuit of freedom has permitted the artists and designers to escape from the bondage of the past, which had laid a dead hand upon architecture. The American architect Louis Sullivan, born in 1856, was the great pioneer of modern functional architecture; and although he had to fight against the conservative forces of his age, before his death he had been permitted to design a few modern masterpieces, and through his writings and teachings had influenced a new generation which was to spread his ideas through the world. The principle enunciated by Sullivan that form must follow function, that every building must be designed to suit the purpose for which it was intended, was finally accepted. The patrons of architecture, as in the days of the Renaissance, found that it brought them prestige to have their buildings designed by modern architects, that students came to study them when they were built, and that there was a natural association in the public mind between an up-to-date and modern business and an up-to-date and modern building in which it was housed.

Freed from the conventions of the past, and especially anxious to be rid of the cobwebs of the Victorian age, which was pronounced unbearably stuffy by later ages, the architects and designers enjoyed a real freedom. They could study a site and make themselves acquainted with the purpose of the building, whether it was

"Bird in Space," by Constantin Brancusi, 1919. This bronze, 54 inches high, eloquently suggests bird movement. (COLLECTION, THE MUSEUM OF MODERN ART, NEW YORK)





"Mother and Child," sculpture in stone by Jacob Epstein. (COLLECTION, THE RIVERSIDE CHURCH, NEW YORK)

for domestic needs, public or commercial uses, or even a monument. They could then plan to use any of the hundreds of materials available to them. Structural steel was improved out of all recognition from what it had been in the past, and it could now take all the stresses and support the weight of huge buildings: reinforced concrete could supply the foundations, and these

could be let down into the rock and fused with it.

The mathematicians and engineers could calculate the weight which each material could stand. There was no need now for the medieval flying buttress or for other structural aids. The outer wall need be only strong enough to resist the weather, the inner walls only enough to separate the rooms. The outer walls could even be built of strong glass, making the whole light and airy in a manner impossible before. Thus the New York and Chicago "skyscrapers" became possible.

Buildings were required not only for the cold and temperate lands, but also for the tropical and semi-tropical lands, each presenting its own problems and each its own opportunities. There was no reason why even churches should be built as they had been in the past. A church might be no less suitable for worship even if it were built of steel and reinforced concrete and had an unexpected shape.

It would be out of place here to name more than a few of the architects of this century. The eccentric and articulate Frank Lloyd Wright was perhaps the most famous in his day. Wright was especially noted for the way in which he adapted his buildings, not only for their purpose, but in accordance with the potentialities of the site which was provided for him. In Europe the leader of the movement in the last decades has been Le Corbusier, a Swiss architect, who was responsible, among other architects, for the design of the United Nations building in New York. The German Walter Gropius exercised an incalculable influence on modern functional architecture through the school of design that he founded, known as the Bauhaus, in Weimar and Dessau, which sent out offshoots into other parts of the world, notably to Chicago. At the Bauhaus both arts and crafts were studied; and even though it met with much opposition in the Germany of the 1930's, the general principle of functionalism in all forms of design was so widely accepted that the movement continues to flourish, and new converts to functionalism are recorded with every year that passes.

Though the majority of the public may still



The George Sturges residence in Brentwood Heights, California, designed by Frank Lloyd Wright, 1939. Traditional materials—brick, with board and batten—are used in a cantilevered overhang that takes advantage of the site. (PHOTO BY WAYNE ANDREWS)

be traditional and conservative in its tastes, a significant and growing minority recognized the great advantages of functionalism; and very few industrialists today care to build in the same way as their ancestors, when so many improvements can be made in their factories, and even extra profits earned, by adapting the form to the purpose they are to fulfill.

MUSIC

Music in the twentieth century has tended, like the other arts, to escape from conventions and the discipline of form of earlier times. It would appear, however, that the most modern music has not yet acquired its full audience, even though the audience may be growing. This is not unusual in musical history. The beauty of

the music of Beethoven was not appreciated in his own time, and it was not until he had been many years dead that he came to be considered by many as the greatest composer who had ever lived. It is doubtful if this failure to appreciate the moderns—several of whom (for instance, Alban Berg and Arnold Schönberg), were often subjected to hostile demonstrations when their works were played—is simply a matter of fashion. It may be not that the ear has simply to grow accustomed to a new style of music, but that the entire organism must learn to respond to such music, and this is not done quickly. Although the atonality of Schönberg, in which each of the twelve tones has equal importance, and the entire concept of key is virtually abandoned, is of great interest, it does not fit as yet the sensibilities of many. Most modern music

is moving away from the style we consider classical, but it has not moved away so far as to reach atonality. Indeed, the composer Igor Stravinsky, who had begun his career as an avant-garde composer, turned in his later life to neoclassicism, and he has been in part responsible for the revived interest in Bach.

On the other hand, a new and different kind of music attained almost immediate popularity, although some of its more extreme forms are still appreciated only by the aficionado. Developed out of the earlier ragtime by Negro musicians of New Orleans, jazz, with all its offshoots—the blues, swing, and others—has captured popular taste. A music with a pronounced rhythm, it is designed to excite the emotions directly. Syncopation, the accentuation of a beat which would normally be weak, is one of the features of jazz, and the particular type of syncopation used is customarily at the choice of the musician. Jazz is dependent largely on the improvisation of the player, though in swing, which uses a larger orchestra, more discipline and form are imposed by the arranger. George Gershwin, in his *Rhapsody in Blue*, adapted the rhythms and syncopation of jazz for the use of the symphony, and many other modern musicians have employed some of its techniques,

together with other traditional folk music, for their compositions.

❖ Insights into the nature of man and the universe

PHILOSOPHY

Having now considered the main cultural achievements of the twentieth century, we return to man himself and his problems in the twentieth-century world. We have already seen what the specialized science of psychology has to say about him. Psychologists, however, are engaged in the task of trying to cure man of his mental ills. Although Freud had a definite world outlook, even he was not concerned with ultimate questions, such as man's place in the universe, nor did he attempt to formulate a system of ethics which would take into account the cosmological situation of man. This has traditionally been the task of philosophy.

The philosopher in the twentieth century has had many new facts to elucidate and enclose within his system. The new findings of physical and biological science were in need of interpretation; Freudian psychology had to be either



Savoye House of Le Corbusier, 1929-1930. (PHOTO BY LUCIEN HERVÉ.)

accepted or rejected; above all it seemed to be necessary to formulate a new system of ethics which, while perhaps not contrary to the older teachings of traditional religion, might be acceptable also to the agnostic and the atheist. The modern world was recognized to be much more complex than it could have appeared to Moses, Buddha, or Christ. Could it really be that the ethics of the Judeo-Christian tradition or of the Islamic or the Oriental tradition was indeed absolute, holding good for all men at all times and in all places; and if so which of them, since they were not identical? Was ethics relative to the particular culture? Might not the principle of relativity enunciated by Einstein be a principle that held good in the moral as in the physical universe?

The major philosophies of the twentieth century may be classified as scientific and positivistic, granting primacy to the human intellect, as or antirational, giving primacy to the sensibilities, exalting instinct and intuition above the intellect. All, of course, have to find a place for modern science in their philosophy; but the value they attach to science, and its meaning and relevance, will differ according to the predilection of the different philosophers. Among the scientific philosophies the leading school was that of logical positivism or logical empiricism, associated with the names of Bertrand Russell, Rudolf Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, and others. Rational through and through, but more concerned with the implications of science and the scientific method for social behavior than logical empiricism, was the instrumentalism of John Dewey. Attempting a synthesis of science and aesthetics was the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. On the antirational side, we have the existentialism of Jaspers, Sartre, and others, and the philosophy of Henri Bergson, which exalted the intuition as the highest faculty of man.

Logical empiricism. We have already drawn attention to the work of the logical positivists in the nineteenth century. It is only necessary to add here that the scientific philosophers in the twentieth century became preoccupied with the technical question of meaning, almost to the exclusion of every other consider-

ation. These philosophers held that the sole task of philosophy was logical analysis. A proposition, to have meaning, must be clear and verifiable, and the reasoning resulting from it must be logically impeccable. Propositions in mathematics or logic, expressed in symbolic form are "certain," in that the consequences automatically follow from the proposition. If the proposition relates to something which is in principle verifiable, then it should be verified. It will then have the probability of being true. If it is not in principle verifiable, then it is a meaningless proposition. All "metaphysical" assertions, assertions about God, the immortality of the soul, and similar propositions, are incapable of verification, even in principle. The onus is on the man who makes any proposition to suggest a means for verification, even if it cannot yet be verified. If he cannot do this, his proposition is meaningless.

Clearly this philosophy cannot make any major contribution to ethics. In principle, certain parts of empirical psychology, for example, the actual behavior of men in a social context, could be verified; but the ethical norms are invariably statements of the beliefs of the men who make them, and a command on their part for others to do the same. The logical empiricists arrive at this conclusion by a careful analysis of the way in which all such statements are uttered. It is impossible to find fault with these arguments. The intellect has analyzed away the whole moral heritage of man, leaving him stripped and bare, a mind functioning with the precision of a machine. The philosophy may be satisfying to a disembodied mind, but the possessor has to choose means other than his philosophy to deal with his problems as a human being and with the richness of his actual experience of life.

Instrumentalism. John Dewey's instrumentalism was likewise an attempt to come to terms with the scientific method. But he drew far different conclusions from it. Less theoretical than the logical empiricist, and deeply interested in social improvement, he was ready to admit that propositions are held to be true only insofar as they work in practice, and from this postulation he drew the conclusion that every hypothesis

must be tested for its effectiveness. This applies as much to social hypotheses, which must be tested in practice for their social utility, as to scientific hypotheses. If they do not work, then they must be abandoned. Dewey detested the very notion of absolutes. An ethical principle must be seen to be socially useful in the particular social context in which it is tested. He did not go so far as the utilitarians, in that he did not pretend to set up a calculus of pains and pleasures, but he was nevertheless at one with them in spirit, in that above everything he desired social reform directed by reason, which he regarded as the highest faculty in man and the only tool which enables man to control his environment. Logic is simply a tool for the proper formulation of propositions and for testing the results to see that they do indeed verify the proposition. When this has been done, it is not truth that is attained, but what Dewey calls "warranted assertibility." Typically, Dewey objected to communism, which he observed in Russia in the 1920's, because although it was the most interesting social experiment on the face of the globe, it was not genuinely experimental, since it rested on a fanatical belief in the Marxian theology. He approved of the New Deal, even though it meant the enlargement of state enterprise—not because he was a Socialist, which he was not, but because in the social context of the 1930's he found it beneficial to have some state enterprise. In all respects Dewey was an empiricist, believing that experience alone provided man with his material for thought, that all propositions were tested by experience, and that the usefulness of thought itself could be tested only after observing its consequences in action.

Dewey's philosophy is clearly the ideal philosophy for democracy. Though democracy in practice does not use reason in the way approved by Dewey, and though it is true that legislation is much more frequently a question of the balancing of pressures from various interests, it is also true that in a democracy no solution to a social problem is ruled out on the basis of a priori assumptions. Dewey did hold up their proper goal to the citizens of democratic countries, and drew attention to the correct implications of the democratic method. But though

Dewey spoke much of the reconstruction of society, when he came down to how it should be reconstructed, he fell back on the concept of growth as the ideal to be pursued—growth both for the individual and for the society. This growth boiled down to the achievement of ever greater perfection of the traditional virtues, a perfection that could never, *ex hypothesi*, be attained; but the pursuit of it would make for a more dynamic society.

Dewey's work bore fruit in many ways, especially in the criticism of existing institutions from the point of view of their social utility. In this Dewey did for twentieth-century America what Bentham and his followers had attempted for nineteenth-century Britain. Dewey is best known, of course, for his contributions to educational theory and practice. Although he did not originate "progressive" education, which goes back in time at least as far as the Czech Amos Comenius in the seventeenth century and Pestalozzi in the eighteenth, he was its most influential proponent in America. Dewey stressed the social purpose of education and the growth of the human being through his education. Thus certain traditional subjects were seen to be singularly useless, and others were vocationally valuable, and even useful to the individual for his own personal development; and though in fact much of Dewey's thought on the improvement and reconstruction of society became lost by the wayside, and conformity to the existing society was more likely to be stressed by his educational successors, this was no fault of the philosopher, whose idealistic vision and robust and wholesome common sense present something of an oasis in the sometimes arid wastes of philosophical thought in the twentieth century.

The philosophy of A. N. Whitehead Whitehead was by profession a mathematician before he became a philosopher, and the influence of his mathematics is never absent from his picture of the world and of man. He aspired to be a synthesist, and his developed philosophy attempts to bring within a single system every phenomenon of the universe. Unlike the logical empiricists, he did not neglect man, for every human phenomenon is as much a fact of the universe as the atom, or molecule, or quantum of energy.

Wordsworth's philosophical poems *The Prelude* and *The Excursion* receive earnest attention from Whitehead, who asks himself why Wordsworth was so disgusted with the science of his day and what he found in nature that was not to be discovered in what scientists told him of the world. While not himself disgusted with science, Whitehead recognized that it did indeed dissect the world of nature into its parts, thus losing sight of the whole, as apprehended aesthetically by man. Whitehead therefore built up a philosophy of process, explained most fully in his masterwork, *Process and Reality*, to which the key is the crucial concept of the interrelatedness of all phenomena, and the experience of them by the human being—which experience is an integral part of the entire process.

The great diversity of the universe, of history, and of man is a subject for aesthetic appreciation, and the great ideal for man, according to Whitehead, is ultimately the pursuit of beauty. Indeed, beauty is the justification for the entire universe. Out of this philosophy can come no moral teaching of an absolute nature, since Whitehead sees in the clash, and even strife, of opposites a part of the all-encompassing beauty; and each has its value. Thus his philosophy remains a beautiful, original, but supremely difficult "adventure of the mind" (as he calls it himself in his book, *Adventures in Ideas*) and of the emotions—a journey which a man may take in his company and which will greatly enlarge his vision, and perhaps his understanding. But the philosophy has been of little influence in the twentieth century, and its influence is not likely to increase. It is too finished, too perfect, too aesthetically satisfying; and it does not truly come to grips with the problems that men in the twentieth century feel most deeply—what do we do, specifically, and where do we go from here.

Existentialism Existentialism grew out of the work of Nietzsche and especially of Kierkegaard. Although there are many existentialist philosophers who disagree with one another, even in fundamentals, it is generally held that there are at least two existentialist schools, which differ in their religious conclusions. One is represented by Karl Jaspers, a Protestant,

and Gabriel Marcel, a Catholic; and the other, which draws atheistic conclusions from its existentialism, is represented by Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre. The neo-Thomist Catholic philosophy, represented especially by Jacques Maritain, also claims to be a Christian existentialism. The justification for calling these men existentialists is that they accept as fundamental truth that all philosophical problems are concerned with existence, as distinct from essence. That is, they are concerned with the individual and particular rather than with the general—or, as Sartre puts it, that a being "exists before it can be defined by our conception of it." The only knowledge available to the human being is of the particular and individual concrete fact, whether it be the human being or a fact of nature, and all general ideas are derived by man from the knowledge of the particular.

All existentialist philosophy is concerned with man and his unique situation as a lone, self-conscious being. For Jaspers, the experience of himself leads to the experience of what he calls the Encompassing, the totality of Being, of which man recognizes himself with his reason to be a part. "The Encompassing is that which always makes its presence known, which does not appear itself, but from which everything comes to us." It is man's reason which strives to know the Encompassing, but it is his *Existenz*, which relates him to the Encompassing, and makes possible the success of the search. Reason without *Existenz* becomes merely intellectual thinking, and *Existenz* without reason means the sinking into the realm of the instinctual, and results in blind violence. Without reason man cannot transcend his own particular self. Clearly there is no reason why this philosophy should not be held in conjunction with a religion—especially since Jaspers in the loneliness of his own being cries out for "communication." His perception of the condition of man in modern society is so pointed a presentation of the sources of this need that it is worth quoting in full:

"The emptiness caused by dissatisfaction with mere achievement, and the helplessness that results when the channels of relation break down, have brought forth a loneliness of soul such as never existed before, a loneliness that hides itself, that seeks relief in vain in the erotic and

the irrational until it leads eventually to a deep comprehension of the importance of establishing communication between man and man."^{*}

Jean-Paul Sartre, on the other hand, finds that the human being is faced in his life always with nonbeing, nothingness, which he can face only with revulsion and disgust. He and Heidegger both consider the anguish and dread of Kierkegaard to be the necessary plight of the human being faced with nothingness. This revulsion faces the human being likewise when he examines himself. There is nothing genuine about either himself or his society—all introspection and all observation of the other human being, including the response to the other human being, is suffused with what Sartre calls *mauvaise foi*, or self-deception. Nevertheless, at the core of the human being is the one true reality, his freedom. Man, according to Sartre, is condemned to be free, but the only way for this to find expression in a free deed is for the will to be totally undetermined, either by the past or by the future, or by any conditions imposed by the social framework in which the action takes place—least of all by respect for the opinion of others, who have no right to an opinion about anyone else. Sartre is willing to admit that this makes all moral responsibility senseless. He is willing to admit its senselessness, yet he insists that man is utterly responsible for everything he does, not to God, but to his own true being and freedom. Man cannot know what God desires, for how can he know that it is God? A coward is responsible for his cowardice; he cannot blame it on his heredity and his environment. Thus he must at every moment of his life choose; and the choice must be free and undetermined. It is this choosing which is the sole task of man, and guarantees his authenticity as man. It is not without significance that Sartre, a leader in the French Resistance movement, was able to say that "we were never more free than during the German occupation." The choices, as he reminds us, were then all made

when face to face with death. In facing themselves and their own cowardices and self-deceptions men could make the free commitments that to the existentialist are alone the full expressions of themselves as men, and the guarantors of their existence.

Henri Bergson Henri Bergson had already published a few philosophical studies during the nineteenth century, but his influence has been felt more in the twentieth. His two greatest books appeared in 1907 (*Creative Evolution*) and in 1932 (*The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*). Interested in biology rather than in physics, Bergson took exception to the interpretation of the Darwinian theory of evolution that was current in his time. He did not dispute the facts uncovered by Darwin and his successors, but he contended that the materialistic interpretation given to the facts was untrue, and that the relation between man and animal was not such as had been assumed by the Darwinians. Man was not just an animal plus mind, but rather a being whose organism was specifically adapted to the possession of mind. Bergson therefore postulated the existence of an *élan vital*, or vital force, which was the creative agent of evolution. This force found expression first in the plant world, which did not need to move and feel but was undoubtedly alive, then in the animal world, where the force manifested itself as instinct. Gradually in the higher animals there developed the beginnings of intelligence, which lived in the animal in conjunction with instinct. Finally the human being evolved, who possessed both instinct and intelligence, and the germ of a higher faculty, intuition.

The intellect is "a more supple and complex adaptation of the consciousness of human beings to the conditions of existence that are made for them." It can "represent the relations of external things among themselves." The intellect, in Bergson's view, cannot understand the organic world which, being of like nature to man himself, is connected with him in a more intimate way than the world of the nonliving. But the intelligence, or intellect, functions effectively in the inorganic world, and is able to discover correct scientific principles and to predict and verify. The reason it is able to do this is that

^{*} Karl Jaspers, *On My Philosophy*, translated by Felix Kaufmann, in Walter Kaufmann, *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre* (New York: Meridian Books, 1956) p. 140. By permission of the publishers.

the creative force is not present in the inorganic world. It is the presence of the *élan vital* in all forms of life that prevents the acquisition of exact knowledge in the organic world—least of all the knowledge of man himself, whose power of creating lies within himself. We are, Bergson says, "creating ourselves continually."

By 1932, when his later book appeared, Bergson had given more thought to the faculty of intuition in man and had developed more fully his concept of the two poles of instinct plus intuition, and intellect. He saw that the great religions had been founded by human beings who had been in close touch through intuition with the mysteries of the universe, as had also the great moral leaders of mankind. These men had the faculty of intuition developed strongly within them, as had the great creative artists, whereas the ordinary run of mankind had only occasional flashes of intuition, not easily to be distinguished from the more ancient faculty of instinct. The great moral leaders of mankind appeared in comparison with their fellow men to constitute almost a "species" in themselves. Institutionalized religion and institutionalized morality were established for social purposes by the human intelligence, but the original religion on which they were based had been the work of the leaders who had been gifted with intuition. Intuition religion was therefore dynamic and creative, and institutionalized religion static. But the latter was, or should be, ready at any moment to take wings, as it were, when new insights are provided by the men of moral intuition who are in touch with the mysteries of the universe through their inner being. Mysticism belongs to dynamic religion. For this reason the churches had always adopted an ambivalent attitude toward mysticism, hesitating to deny the inspirations of the mystics, but unable or unwilling to modify their dogmas and rituals on the basis of mystical insights.

The philosophy of Bergson demands of man that he continually seek to transcend his own given nature; and it is thus the most dynamic of twentieth-century philosophies. Though of course utterly meaningless to the logical empiricist, since there is barely a scientific or verifiable prediction to be made from any part of it,

it nevertheless has the virtue of not feeling called upon to oppose even symbolic logic as a means of understanding the operations of the universe—insofar as they are mechanical and capable of prediction and verification. But the *élan vital*, the impetus toward creation, does have to be postulated; and being immaterial, its existence can never be verified, and its movement is not predictable. It is this element in Bergson that has drawn the scorn of the scientific philosophers; but it may be that its ability to account for the phenomena of both the inner and outer world of man without doing excessive violence to the intellectual, moral, and religious history of mankind will some day be regarded as a merit, and the stigma of antirationalism, which seems, at least to this author, to be undeserved, will be taken from it.

RELIGION

Catholicism The general materialistic and hedonistic attitude of the average Western man toward his life does not appear to have resulted in a reduction of church membership and attendance, which, after declining in the period prior to World War I, has increased noticeably in the subsequent decades, especially in the United States after World War II. It has been said that there are "no atheists in fox-holes," and whether that is true or not, unquestionably the insecurity and spiritual emptiness of man's ordinary life on earth have contributed to the acceptance of the solace offered by religion. Theology and serious religious thought, however, have continued for the most part to be dominated by tradition, and, in spite of the work of some able religious thinkers and philosophers, working within the traditional framework, few new insights have been offered in this century.

Catholic thought has been largely dominated by the neo-Thomist movement, approved by Pope Leo XIII in the late nineteenth century, as interpreted in the light of modern philosophy, especially by Jacques Maritain, Etienne Gilson, and other French thinkers. The thirteenth-century synthesis of Thomas Aquinas has lent itself exceptionally well to new interpretation in the light of modern insights into evolution, since the

philosophy of Aristotle, used by Thomas, was itself evolutionary. The traditional teachings of the soul allow for the importance of the subconscious and even for some of the findings of psychoanalysis, although Catholic thought interprets them differently from Freud. The Aristotelian logic of Thomas can still be used for some purposes, as previously, since within its limitations it is still valid in spite of the advance of symbolic logic and the scientific purposes to which it has been put.

The traditional Catholic dogma was added to by Pope Pius XII, but in other respects it has remained unchanged. It may be said that Catholicism has retained its rationality, but that it is held largely by faith; and the Catholic success in the work of conversion in the Western nations has rested upon its strict adherence to the traditional teachings, and upon its belief that these were divinely inspired. By maintaining its ritual and its principle of authority, it has ministered to the need for faith and reassurance felt by human beings in an age of doubt and questioning, when few can offer a firm and unqualified answer. Catholicism has also fostered both social and political movements, including labor unions. But after a period of trial the Church hierarchy put an end to an attempt of worker-priests in France to convert directly by mingling with the ordinary French workers, many of whom had left Christianity for communism. It was believed that too many of these priests identified themselves so wholeheartedly with the workers that their own faith was endangered, and the results were too meager to justify their separation from their proper work in the diocese. Since that time the work of conversion has continued, but by more traditional means.

Protestantism Protestant theology has shown some vitality in the twentieth century, especially in the work of the Calvinist theologians Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, and Reinhold Niebuhr, but the assumptions of liberal Protestantism, on the whole, have proved too optimistic for an age which has in its serious thought ceased to be optimistic. However, Calvinists have found the message of Christianity

to have continued relevance to the present political and social condition of man. While Barth has continued to insist on the need for the human being to cast himself on the mercy of God, as in the thought of Kierkegaard and in the Calvinist tradition, Niebuhr, who has devoted much of his attention to social questions, has insisted that the general optimistic liberal philosophy of the Western world, and its ideal of the perfectibility of man, are belied by the facts of life. On the contrary, original sin, and the fallen condition of man are taught by the Christian religion and are clearly evident in man's behavior. This means not that man cannot improve himself, but that his efforts will go awry if he is not inspired by the grace of God. Moreover he should recognize his infirmity fully and the fact that there are limitations to the good he may hope to do. Niebuhr has apparently taken a special delight in pointing to the ironies of recent history that have become evident as soon as the most consistently do-good nation has attempted to do good in international life—simply because the optimistic liberal philosophy consistently underrates the evil in the world and is therefore consistently surprised. Nevertheless the Christian, in Niebuhr's thought, should continue to try to better his neighbors' lot according to his lights; but he should at the same time both be aware of the limitations of what he can do and be alive to his need for grace. Like the Catholics, Protestants have paid much attention also to social work; but, in part due to lack of any central church which can direct and encourage them, Protestants have not tended to form a political party or labor unions, except as individuals—though they may find themselves at home in Christian Democratic parties and cooperate with Catholics in them, in preference to joining consistently secular groups.

The sects and undenominational groups discussed in Chapter 20 have continued to flourish in the twentieth century, especially those groups with apocalyptic messages which can be interpreted to fit the present dangerous times. New groups have continued to arise, especially in areas such as California in the United States. Many of them derive from Oriental philosophy, which itself has attracted a considerable interest

in Western countries, especially in the United States. Most of these groups have congregated around some leader with an inspired message, and it is questionable how long they will survive the deaths of these leaders.

❖ Summary and conclusion

We have now reached the end of this study of Western man and his heritage from the past. We are compelled to ask, What has this history taught us and how does Western man stand now? In this chapter we have considered twentieth-century man in his society and the problems facing him. We have considered the advances of science, the ever increasing understanding of the mechanisms of the world of nature, and what science and technology have achieved for man's comfort. We have further concerned ourselves with the paradox that almost none of the writers or philosophers of stature in this century have been optimistic about the condition of man, and that all are engaged in trying to find meaning in the life of man—meaning which continues to elude them. Such men, with a few exceptions, do not appear to believe that man is on an upward path and that he knows where he is going; to them material progress is meaningless. Man, in the view of many, has shown little or no signs of moral progress. The last war was the most extensive and one of the most bitterly fought in all history. Men and women were exterminated for the sole reason that they were Jews or gypsies. Others were tortured, hostages were taken and killed, unbearable moral pressures were put upon men, and humanity as a whole, victors and vanquished alike, with few exceptions, came out of this contest with little or no credit.

Yet in spite of these evidences of continued barbarism, the historian, looking back along the sweep of history, and considering his own age, must enter a plea for the past two centuries. For it seems evident from the history of mankind that an important change, which can only be characterized as a moral improvement, has taken place in humanity during the present century and was already visible in embryo in the nineteenth. The present epoch has witnessed

an awareness on the part of human beings that they are indeed "their brother's keepers" beyond that of any earlier age. It is true that in the Middle Ages the Christian religion taught the equality of all men in the sight of God, and did its best to instil into Christians the sense of responsibility toward one another. But this teaching was little reflected in medieval life and society; at most it succeeded in reinforcing the sense of reciprocal obligations between the separate classes which was the cement that held a caste-ridden society together. Today in Western civilization almost every one seeks to be loved and appreciated, and is willing to love and appreciate in turn according to the best of his abilities. The modern parent really cares whether his children have a good opinion of him. It is true that this often leads him to be over-indulgent, and to neglect his task of training, and if need be, disciplining them. But it is also true that he regards his child as having a personality, a moral being of his own. When the child grows up he is expected to leave his parents and set up his own household. He is not compelled to cater to his parents' whims; the heavy-handed parent today is regarded as cruel, when he is not a mere figure of fun. The businessman wants his customers to like him, to call him by his first name; he does not want to hurt anyone's feelings, and he expects them to have a care for his feelings.

On a wider scale, rich nations feel that they have an obligation to help others which are less fortunate. A famine, epidemic, or catastrophe of nature calls forth goodwill and material aid from all over the globe. Racial discrimination causes a twinge of conscience, even among the most stubborn racialists; it becomes ever more difficult to rationalize such discrimination. The very fact that the need to rationalize it is felt is symptomatic of the change of attitude. Slavery has been legally abolished for a century and a half, although it had existed in all past ages; almost everyone today feels that it was contrary to the dignity of man that he should have been the chattel of another. Few in the West even secretly admire such aberrations of recent mankind as the regime of Hitler or the cruelties of contemporary tyrannies. It is not the individual man alone who has changed his attitude, it is

Western society. It is socially respectable today for a man to detest tyranny and discrimination, and socially disreputable to approve them; the conscience of the individual man in such matters has become the conscience of society.

If it is true that there has been such an evolution in the moral thinking of mankind, what is responsible for it? A Darwinian survival of the fittest, adapting itself to the inescapable fact of the new interdependence of mankind? Or has individual man in attaining his full self-consciousness come to recognize the individuality in others that he perceives in himself, and, in recognizing it, respect it? And this, in spite of the fact that he expects neither reward in heaven nor punishment in hell for his successes and failures in "loving his neighbor as himself"? The historian cannot presume to answer this question; he can only pose it. But he would be remiss in his duty if he left unanswered the statement, so often to be met with in current discussions of the problems of mankind, that men have clearly made progress in science and technology, but none at all in morality.

It seems to this historian that man has acquired his freedom and his self-consciousness, but that he does not as yet know what to do with them. He has obtained access to all kinds of material goods, and he has the possibility of enjoying thousands of services which were unavailable to him in past ages. He can spend his life in pursuit of innumerable pleasures. But he is not happy; in part because of the worries attendant on his economic and social position, but also in very large part because of a lack of a sense of direction, a certain emptiness of soul. Sociologists inform us that the majority of men are inclined to estimate themselves by the criterion of the approval by others rather than by their own self-evaluations, that their very choice of actions is dependent upon their presumed effect on other men. The "inner-directed" men, we are told, are becoming rarer, and may perhaps even become extinct. Much of the material provided in this chapter may seem to support this view. But it remains true that, if the human being finds time to reflect in the midst of the twentieth-century world, he knows, from his own personal knowledge, that he is an individual separate from others, that he is born alone, lives

alone, and dies alone; that if he is stripped of all his worldly goods and his whole civilization is destroyed around him, there are inner resources on which he can draw for his survival. All those things told him by scientists and sociologists are mere spinings of thoughts, in comparison with this intuited reality. The history of the next thousand years may perhaps record that man found an answer to the question "where do we go from here?" And having found it, he discovered that the pursuit of his new goals made use of his full potentialities as man, and did not, as in the twentieth century, leave most of them unrecognized and unused—or squandered on goals unworthy of his talents and dignity.

Suggestions for further reading

NOTE ON LITERATURE OF THE PERIOD: In philosophy, see Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic* (Dover) for a leading introduction to logical positivism; Bergson's works (Anchor) and Franz Winkler's *Man, the Bridge Between Two Worlds* (Harper) for Bergsonism brought up to date; Dewey's *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (Beacon); Whitehead's *Adventures of Ideas* (NAL); and, for existentialism, Jaspers' *The Way to Wisdom* (Yale) and Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* (Philosophical Library), as well as Iris Murdoch's sympathetic *Sartre* (Yale) and Walter Kaufmann's not-too-sympathetic *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*, an anthology with commentary (Meridian). In science, see Barnett's popular *The Universe and Dr. Einstein* (NAL) and Cassirer's more demanding *Substance and Function and Einstein's Theory of Relativity* (Dover); Freud's works (Anchor and Modern Library) and Mullahy's *Oedipus, Myth and Complex: A Review of Psychoanalytical Theory* (Evergreen); and Fordham's *Introduction to Jung's Psychology* (Penguin). In the arts, some of the more interesting critical works are the French poet Apollinaire's *The Cubist Painters* (Wittenborn); Gertrude Stein's subjective *Picasso* (Beacon); Moholy-Nagy's *The New Vision* (Wittenborn); the pioneer functional architect Louis H. Sullivan's *The Autobiography of an Idea* (Dover); André Hodeir's controversial *Jazz: Its Evolution and Essence* (Evergreen); and Howard and Lyons' lucid *Modern Music* (NAL). A mere list of the works by and about the chief writers of the twentieth cen-

tury would fill a book, but a student might start with Germaine Brée's *Marcel Proust and His Deliverance from Time* (Evergreen) or Barrett H. Clark's *Eugene O'Neill: The Man and His Plays* (Dover).

PAPERBACK BOOKS

Brown, Harrison. *The Challenge of Man's Future*. Compass. A serious, well-reasoned forecast, which does not minimize the problems but is guardedly hopeful.

Davis, Elmer. *But We Were Born Free*. Perma-books. A portrait of the McCarthy era in the United States, written while the late senator was at the height of his power and influence. Profoundly suggestive of the weaknesses of American society in the early 1950's, while guardedly optimistic about the future.

Eddington, Arthur. *The Nature of the Physical World* (Ann Arbor) and *The Philosophy of Physical Science* (Ann Arbor). Popular and influential books, especially the first, though it is doubtful whether Eddington had the qualifications for philosophizing that have often been ascribed to him. See Stebbing.

Empson, William. *Seven Types of Ambiguity*. Meridian. The primer of modern intellectualist criticism, especially of poetry.

Frankel, Charles. *The Case of Modern Man*. Beacon. Reasoned and optimistic summary by a professor of philosophy.

Jeans, James. *The Growth of Physical Science*. Premier. A clear and relatively brief history of physical theories and mathematics, best on modern times, though with some interesting insights on earlier science. See Stebbing.

Reichenbach, Hans. *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy*. California. One of the best presentations of what scientific philosophers think and have thought about the world, by a logical empiricist. The defects of the system are very clearly visible to a reader when he applies himself to Reichenbach's consideration of ethics.

Riesman, David. *The Lonely Crowd* (abridged). Anchor. Influential book, introducing the concept of the "other-directed" personality, seen by Riesman as the creation of twentieth-century social pressures.

Riesman, David. *Individualism Reconsidered* (abridged). Anchor. Some stimulating essays on various aspects of twentieth-century social life.

Simpson, George G. *The Meaning of Evolution* (abridged). NAL. Evolutionary theory brought

up to date (1949), with commentary, by a biologist.

Stebbing, L. Susan. *Philosophy and the Physicists*. Dover. A trenchant criticism of the pretensions of the physicists when they attempt to apply their findings to the study of metaphysics. Especially hard on Eddington and Jeans, her book should be read in conjunction with theirs.

Weil, Simone. *Waiting for God* (Capricorn) and *The Need for Roots* (Beacon). Some of the most profound questioning of the position of the individual in modern life and his relation to God that has appeared during this century.

White, Morton, ed. *The Age of Analysis: Twentieth-Century Philosophers*. NAL. Introduction to twentieth-century rationalist philosophy, especially logical empiricism. Extracts from the philosophers, with commentary.

Whyte, William H., Jr. *The Organization Man*. Anchor. Acute social criticism, concerning the pressures to conform in business organizations.

Wilson, Edmund. *Axel's Castle*. Scribner's. A perceptive book on twentieth-century Western literature and its immediate antecedents, especially good on Proust. By the leading American literary critic.

CASEBOUND BOOKS

Allen, Frederick. *The Big Change*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952. Sequel to *Only Yesterday*, bringing the social picture of America to the date of writing.

Beauvoir, Simone de. *The Mandarins*. Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1956. Important novel about postwar French society, including political leaders and Existentialists and other intellectuals.

Ellis, Havelock. *From Rousseau to Proust*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1935. A perceptive account of the psychology of Proust and others by the non-Freudian English psychologist. Many important and stimulating insights, not only on Proust but on the Romantics who preceded him and on the cult of irrationality and feeling.

Levi, Albert William. *Philosophy and the Modern World*. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1959. Perhaps the best single volume on the influential thinkers of the twentieth century. By a professional philosopher, it is well written, well thought out, and well organized, and it treats each thinker sympathetically, attempting to bring out exactly what he thought, and not what the author would have preferred him to think.

INDEX

- Aachen, 43, 189
 Abbas, 172
 Abbasid caliphs, 172
 Abbasid dynasty, 170, 176, 228
 Abbasids, 42, 172, 176, 177, 228
 Abdera, 69
 Abdul Hamid II, 535, 702
 Abelard, Peter, 282
 Abraham, 44
 Absolutism, 374, 376, 407, 411, 414
 Catherine the Great, attitude to-
 ward, 407
 Charles I. and, 379, 431
 European, 374, 376
 French, 377, 378, 398, 407, 414,
 508
 growth of, under Roman Empire,
 101
 James I, king of England, and,
 378-379, 428
 Richelieu, pillar of, 410
 Russian, 398, 402, 407, 562, 726
 See also Monarchy, absolute
 Abu Bekr, 170
 Abydos, 29
 Académie des sciences, 471, 481
 Accademia dei Lincei, 471
 Achaeans, 52, 53
 Acheson, Dean, 820
 Achilles, 55, 70
 Accre, 230, 231
 Acropolis, 55
 Actium, battle of, 102
 Act of Settlement, 440
 Act of Supremacy, 428
 Act of Toleration, 440
 Act of Uniformity, 361, 363
 Acton, Lord, 110
 Acts of the Apostles, 135
 Adam, original sin of, 132
 Address to the Christian Nobility
 of the German Nation, 350
 Adenauer, Konrad, 834, 835, 836,
 839
 Adler, Alfred, 867
 Adler, Felix, 660
 See also American Ethical Cul-
 tural Society
 Aediles, 105
 Aegean civilization, 52
 bibliography, 87, 88
 Greek civilization influenced by,
 52
 map, 53
 Aegospotami, 66
 Aeneas, 114
 Aeneas Silvius (see Pius II, Pope)
 Aeneid, 114
 Aeolians, 53
 Aequitas, 116
 Aeschylus, 70, 71
 dramas of, 71
 Africa, 678, 682, 683, 684, 685-695
 Algeria, 680, 682, 832-833, 834
 Angola, 686
 Arab slaves in, 684
 Bantu tribes of, 679, 688
 Belgian attitude toward, 693
 bibliography, 695
 British attitude toward, 693
 British, in, 681, 682, 683, 685,
 686, 693
 Central Africa, 685-686
 China, aid from, to new states
 of, 840
 chronological chart of, 670-671
 colonialism, by foreign powers,
 in, 671
 Congo, 686, 803, 804, 810, 846-
 847
 East Africa, 679
 Egypt, in, 680, 681-682
 Eritrea, retained by Italians, in,
 682
 Ethiopia, defeat of Italians, by,
 682, 687, 745, 773, 777
 European imperialism in, 680
 French attitude toward, 693
 French Equatorial, 686
 French, in, 680
 Gambia, 685
 Ghana, 829, 844, 845
 Greek colonies in, 55
 Guinea, 844, 845
 Hottentots in, 680
 Islam, in, 679
 Kenya, 679, 686
 Libya, lost by Turkey, in, 682
 missionary interest in, 683
 Morocco, French conquest of,
 682-683
 Mozambique, 686
 Natal, 688
 nationalism and, 565
 Nigeria, 685, 829
 North Africa, 680, 683, 769-770
 Orange Free State, 688, 689
 Ottoman empire in, 680
 partition of, 679, 686
 Portuguese in, 680
 Rhodesia, 686
 Roman war in, 99
 Sierra Leone, 684, 685
 Somaliland, retained by Italians,
 in, 682
 Southwest Africa, 680
 German, 686
 Sudan, under British control in,
 680
 Tanganyika, 678, 686
 Transvaal, 688
 Tripolitania (see Libya)
 Tunis, French possession in, 682
 Tunisia, annexation of, 682
 Uganda, 686
 Union of South Africa, 680
 Boer war, and, 614, 688
 Self-government of, 689
 West Africa, 679
 African Fathers, 281
 Afrikaners, 689
 Agade, 37
 Agamemnon, 52, 55, 71
 Age of Discovery, 337-346
 bibliography, 371-373
 chronological chart, 306, 308
 Agincourt, battle of, 267
 Agricola, Rudolf, 325
 Agriculture (see under specific civi-
 lizations)
 Agrippa, 96
 Ahmed, Sultan, mosque of, 162
 Ahmose I, 29
 Ahriman, 41
 Ahura-Mazda, 41
 Aingra-Manu (see Ahriman)
 Aistulf, 185
 Akhenaton, 30, 31, 32
 Akkadians, Sumerians conquered
 by, 37
 Al-Farabi, elements of musical no-
 tation and musical times
 value, credited to, 174
 Al-Haitham, 174
 Al-Hazen, 174
 Al-Idrisi, 175
 Al-Khwarizmi, 173
 Al-Kindi, 174
 Alaric, Rome sacked by, 136, 148
 Albania, 779
 Mussolini's seizure of, 745

- Albert of Brandenburg, 394
 Albert the Great (see Albertus Magnus)
 Albertus Magnus, 276, 284, 285, 286, 289, 290, 480
 Albigensian Crusade, 176, 235
 Albigensians, 42, 235
 suppression by Innocent III, 235
 Alcibiades, 71, 73
 Aleuin, 189, 279
 Alemanni, 153
 Alexander III, Pope, 234
 Alexander VI, Pope, 318, 339
 Savonarola excommunicated by, 346
 Alexander the Great, 41, 42, 45
 Aristotle and, 76, 82
 Egypt conquered by, 32
 Greece conquered by, 81
 India conquered by, 81
 Persia conquered by, 81
 polis, favored by, 82
 successors of, 82
 Alexander I, of Russia, 513, 514, 528, 531, 533, 536, 562, 564
 Alexander II, of Russia, 537, 562
 Alexander III, of Russia, 562
 Alexandria, 85, 681
 Alexius Comnenus, 228
 Alfonso XII, of Spain, 625
 Alfonso XIII, of Spain, 780
 Alfred the Great, 247
 Algeria, 680, 682, 833
 Algerian War, 832-833, 834
 Algorism, 173
 Ali, 170
 Allah, 169, 170, 177
 Mahomet, prophet of, 168
 Alodial, 251
 Alsace-Lorraine, 189, 557, 607, 713, 766, 768
 Althusius, 378
 Amboise, France, 324
 Ambrose, 135
 Amenemhat I, 27
 Amenhotep IV (see Akhenaton)
 America, discovery of, 339
 emigration of Puritans to, 444
 English settlements in, 443, 444, 445
 French settlements in, 443, 444
 See also Central America; North America; South America; United States
 American Colonies, 442
 American Ethical Cultural Society, 660
 American War of Independence, 442, 494
 Amiens, 394
 treaty of, 512
 Amon-Re, 30
 Amorites, 35, 37
 Amsterdam, 342, 343
 Anabaptists, 349, 358
 bibliography, 218, 243, 303, 372
 Calvin's attitude toward, 315
 Anagni, 242
 Anarchists, 594
 Anatolia, 159
 Anatomy, advance of, 475
 Anaxagoras, 76
 Anaximenes, 69
 Ancient World
 chronological charts, 22-23, 28-29
 Andromache, 70
 Angevin princes, 247
 Angles, 150, 154
 Anglican Church, 429, 430, 431, 435, 610
 disestablishment of, in Ireland, 614
 See also Church of England
 Anglo-Saxons, 247
 Angola, 680
 Annam, 677
 Annates, 348
 Anne, queen of England, 440, 441
 Anselm, Saint, 156, 281, 282, 474
 Antigonos, 82
 Antinationalist tendencies in early modern times, 525
 Antoninus Pius, 112
 Antony, Mark, 102
 Antwerp, 342, 343, 389
 Aphrodite of Melos, 85, 86
 Apollo, 55, 56
 Aquinas, Saint Thomas, 72, 276, 278, 280, 284, 285, 302, 483, 484, 884
 Aquitaine, 261
 Arab League, 843-844
 Arabesques, 176
 Arabia, 167
 Arabian Nights, 176
 Arabs, 172
 Israel's defeat of, 845
 slavery in Africa, by, 684
 Aragon, 239, 271, 272
 Aramaeans, 43
 Archimedes, 85
 Architecture, Gothic, 293-296, 318
 Romanesque, 292-293
 See also under specific civilizations
 Arcopagitica, 452
 Argentina, 540
 Arianism, 136, 164
 Arians, 164
 Aristarchus, 85, 465
 Aristotelianism, 284, 325
 Aristotle, 68, 70, 278, 289
 Alexander the Great, and, 76
 biological classification of, 76, 77
 condemnation of, by Archbishop of Sens, 284
 Lyceum founded by, 75
 metaphysics of, 76, 288
 Muslim civilization, influenced by, 284
 Muslim regard for, 173
 Plato, contrasted with, 76
 Politics of, 76
 Arius, 136
 Arkwright, Richard, 572, 575
 Arnold, Matthew, 652, 653
 Art (see under specific civilizations and countries)
 Art of Hunting with Birds, 290
 Arthur, King, 298
 Arthurian legends, 298
 Articles of Faith and Ceremonies, 361
 Artigas, José, 540, 541
 Asia Minor, 43, 82, 91
 Asquith, Lord, 614
 Assignats, 507, 508
 Assize of Clarendon, 254
 Assize of Northampton, 254
 Assurbanipal, 40
 Assyrians, 34, 35, 36
 Babylonia conquered by, 39
 bibliography of, 50-51
 empire of, 39-40
 Hebrews conquered by, 40
 Astrolabe, 74
 Astronomy, development of, 480
 See also under names of civilizations
 Asturias, 271
 Avwan dam, 844
 Ataraxia, 84
 Athens, 56, 61, 62, 63, 66
 capture and sack of, 65
 Darius I, expedition against, 64
 Delos Confederation led by, 66
 Macedonia, conquest by, 64
 Marathon, campaign of, 65
 Persians, defeat of at Mycale, by, 65
 victory of Salamis, 65
 Athens School (see School of Athens)
 Atlantic Charter, 801
 Atomic bomb, 798, 799, 820, 822, 825
 Japan attacked by U.S.A., with, 798

- Aton, 31
 Attalus, 82
 Attica, 61
 See also Athens
 Attila, 135
 Italy invaded by, 148
 Attlee, Clement, 615, 800, 826
 Augsburg, 336, 349
 confession of, 350
 Religious Peace of, 350, 351, 382, 384
 Augustan Age, 125
 Augustine, Saint, bishop of Hippo, 136, 137, 188, 285
 Augustus Caesar, 101, 102, 119
 achievements of, 109-110
 agriculture, under, 109
 army, under, 102, 104
 boundaries of Roman Empire, re-set by, 107
 civil power, permanent, of, 105
 Egypt, status of, under, 107
 genius, cult of, in worship of, 106
 military power, permanent, of, 105
 reforms of, 107-108
 religious authority of, 105
 reorganization of government, under, 104-105
 reorganization of the provinces, under, 106
 Roman worship of the state, under, 106, 107
 social and economic policies, under, 108-109
 successors of, 110-112
 taxation changes, under, 108
 unemployment problem and, 109
 See also Octavian
 Aurelian, 144
 Aurelius, Marcus, 84, 106, 112, 121, 147
 Aureomycin, 865
 Ausgleich, 560
 Austerlitz, 513
 Australian ballot, 618
 Austria, 386, 397, 417, 419
 called the "fire brigade of Europe," 534, 545
 constitution, difficulties arising from, in, 627
 defeat by France, of, 509, 547
 defeat by Sardinia, of, 547
 German Reich, incorporation into, of, 754
 Hapsburg rulers of (*see* Hapsburgs)
 Hitler's conquest of, 753
 Seven Weeks War, 549
 See also World War I (701-710)
 Austria-Hungary, 386, 560
 Austrian Netherlands, 419
 Austro-Prussian War, 551, 555, 560
 Avars, 186
 Averroës, 173, 284
 Avicenna, 173, 287, 288
 Avignon, 237, 242, 315
 Avis, Order of, 271
 Aviz, House of, 386
 Axis, 745, 778
 Japan, pact with, 753
 See also Germany; Hitler; Italy; Mussolini
 Ayub Khan, 843
 Azores, 339
 Aztecs, 341
 Babylon, 34, 35, 39
 Babylonia, 39
 Assyrians, conquered by, 40
 Hammurabi Code, observance of, in, 38
 justice in, nature of, 38
 Persians, conquered by, 35
 "Babylonian Captivity of the Church," 242, 346
 Bach, 455, 879
 Bacon, Francis, 460, 461, 474-475
 Bacon, Roger, 77, 174, 288, 289, 320
 Bagdad, 43, 172, 177
 Baden, 550
 Baekeland, Leo, 583
 Baillif, 262, 263, 270
 Bakewell, Robert, 570
 Baldachin, 453
 Balkan States, 535, 537, 706, 794
 Baltic States, 714
 Balts, 563
 Balzac, 653
 Banalités, 208, 495
 Bank of England, 574
 Banking, growth of, 336
 Bantus, 679
 Boers' enslavement of, 688
 Baptism, 134, 220
 Barbarians (*see* under Roman Empire and specific main entries)
 Barnett, battle of, 260
 Baroque, 318, 450, 451, 458
 music, 455, 456, 457
 painting, 453-454
 rococo compared with, 457
 "Barrack Emperors," 142
 Barth, Karl, 885
 Basel, Council of, 316
 Basil, Saint, 137
 Basilica, 119
 Basques, 186, 271
 Bastille, 495, 499, 500, 542
 Batavian Republic, 508
 Battle of Britain, 793-794
 Battle of the Bulge, 798
 Baudelaire, 662
 Bavaria, 384, 386, 550
 Bayle, Pierre, 481
 Beatrix, 299, 300
 Becket, Saint Thomas, 255, 256
 Beckett, Samuel, 872
 Bede, Venerable, 279
 Bedouins, 167, 172
 Beethoven, 458, 636, 878
 Belgian Congo, 688, 846-847
 Belgians, 534
 Belgium, 526, 534
 Dutch invasion of, 532
 German invasion of, 535
 independence of the Congo, granted by, 846-847
 mutiny of Congolese army, against, 847
 See also World War I; World War II
 Belisarius, 151
 Benedict, Saint, 137
 Benedictine Rule, 137, 138, 223
 Beneficium, 196
 Benelux Nations, 838
 Bentham, Jeremy, 589
 Benoulf, 297
 Berbers, 170, 679
 Berengar, 281
 Berg, Alban, 878
 Bergson, Henri, 56, 880, 883, 884
 Berlin, 836
 See also Germany
 Berlin airlift, 817
 Bernadotte, Charles, 392
 Bernard de Fontenelle, 481
 Bernard, Saint, 234, 283
 Bernini, Giovanni, 453
 Bessarabia, 714
 Bethlehem, 128
 Biarritz, 555
 Bible, 43, 44, 47, 48, 658
 Calvinism and the, 354, 355
 Catholic version, 363
 Latin Vulgate version, 366
 translated into German by Luther, 310, 350
 See also New Testament; Old Testament
 Bill of exchange, 335
 endorsement of, 336
 Bill of Rights, 440
 Bishop, 134, 135, 136, 152

- Rimarek, 550, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 594, 606, 703
 Black Africa, 833
 Black Death, 266, 277, 344, 346
 Black, Joseph, 479
 Blackstone, 589
 Blane, Louis, 603, 604
 Blavetsky, Helena (see Theosophy)
Blitzkrieg, 790, 795
 Blood, circulation of, 477
 Blücher, 317
 Blum, Léon, 767
 Boccaccio, 176, 299
 Bofin, Jenn, 377, 378
 Boer War, 614, 688
 Boers, 679, 688, 689
 Boethius, 150, 279
 Bohemia, 382, 384, 552, 559, 562
 Counter Reformation in, 317
 Protestantism in, 352
 Thirty Years' War, 384
 Boleyn, Anne, 360, 427
 Bolívar, Simón, 538, 539, 540
 Bolivia created by, 540
 Ecuador, taken by, 540
 military campaign in Venezuela, 539
 Peru, taken by, 540
 president of Greater Colombia, 540
 Bolivia, 540
 Bologna, Concordat of, 346, 356, 362
 Bologna University, 117, 291
 Bolshevik Revolution, 564
 Bonaparte, Jerome, 513
 Bonaparte, Joseph, 514
 Bonaparte, Napoleon (see Napoleon)
 Boniface, Saint, 185
 Boniface VIII, Pope, 241, 242, 258, 264
 Bonn, 836
 Book of Common Prayer, 363, 434
 First, 361
 Second, 361
 Borodino, 516
 Bosnia, 706
 Bossuet, Bishop, 378
 Bosworth, battle of, 260
 Botany, advance of, 480
 Botticelli, Sandro, 322
 Bourbon family, 261, 528
 Bourse, 343
 Boxer Rebellion, 675
 Boyars, 399, 401, 402, 403, 405
 Boyle, Robert, 475, 478-479
 Bracchiolini, Poggio, 312
 Brahe, Tycho, 464, 466, 467
 Bramante, 318
 Brandenburg, 374
 chronological chart, 381
 peace of Westphalia and, 385
 rulers, list of, 381
 Brandenburg-Prussia
 chronological chart, 393
 consolidation of kingdom, 393
 Hohenzollern rulers, 325
 Brant, Sebastian, 325
 Brazil, 537, 541
 Brazza, 686
 Brethren of the Common Life, 325
 Bridgewater, duke of, 571, 577
 Brindley, James, 577
 Britain (see England)
 (British) Commonwealth of Nations, 765, 829
 British East India Company, 443-444, 672, 673
 British Guiana, 668
 British North America Act, 617
 British South Africa Company, 686
 Bronze Age, 18
 Bruckner, Anton, 665
 Bruening, Heinrich, 748
 Bruno, Giordano, 466, 469
 Brutus, Marcus, 110
 Buckingham, duke of, 431
 Budapest, 560
 Buddha, 880
 Budé, Guillaume, 326
 Buffon, 640
 Bulgaria, 239, 537, 794
 Bulgars, 159, 165
 Bulls, 221, 241, 242, 381
 Bundesrat, 557, 558
 Burgundians, 150, 153
 Burgundy, 267
 Buridan, Jean, 291
 Burke, Edmund, 508, 529
 Burma, 672, 677, 796, 829
 Burros, 111
 Byelo-Russia, 802
 Byron, 635
 Byzantine civilization, 158-167
 art of, 162, 163
 chronological chart of, 160-161
 Greek civilization, influence upon, 159, 161, 162
 influence of, 162, 165
 religion under, 161, 166
 Russia, influenced by, 159, 163, 165, 166
 Slavs, influenced by, 159, 164, 165
 Byzantine Empire, 148-167
 Islam, bulwark against, by, 166-167
 iconoclastic controversy in, 161
 papacy, relations with, 161
 Roman Empire, contrasted with, 158, 159
 Byzantium, 147
 Calbra, 339
 Caesar, Julius, 100, 101, 102, 117
 administration of, 101
 dictatorship of, 100, 101
 failings of, 101
 Gaul, conquest of, by, 100
 murder of, 101
 Pompey, rivalry with, 100
 reforms of, 101
 rise of, 100
 triumvirate after death of, 102
 Cairo, 681
 Calculus, 470, 471
 Calicut, 274
 Caligula, 111, 112, 113
 Caliphs, 170
 Calonne, Charles, 497
 Calvin, John, 50, 317, 352, 354
 background of, 353
 bibliography, 371-372
 doctrine of, 354, 355
 persecution of Anabaptists by, 355
 Calvinism, 353
 acceptance of, reasons for, 353
 democracy and, 355
 in England, 360, 363
 in France, 356, 357
 in Germany, 360
 in Holland, 359
 humanists' attitude toward, 353
 Lutheranism compared with, 353, 354, 355
 predestination, belief in, 354
 Puritanism compared with, 355, 356
 in Scotland, 357
 Calvinists, 352
 attitude toward Church of England, 363
 toward monarchism, 355
 James I and, 358, 364, 429
 Loyals compared with, 369
 Cambodia, 678
 Cameroons, 685, 769, 833
 Campo Formio, treaty of, 509
 Camus, Albert, 870
 Canaan, 39, 44
 Canada, exploration of, 341
 British in, 445, 617
 constitutional development in, 616
 Dominion of, 618
 French in, 443, 617

- Canisius, Saint Peter, 369
 Canning, 610
Canon, 173
 Canon law, 222
 Canossa, 227
Canterbury Tales, 299
 Canute, 247
 Cape of Good Hope, 274, 338, 445, 531, 680
 Capetian monarchy, 200, 261, 265
 Capetians, 26
 Capitalism, 333, 334, 571, 585, 592, 593
 accumulation of, for investment, 571, 669
 Capitalist world, 822
Capitularies, 187
 Capitulations, system of, 535
 Capo d'Istria, 536
 Caporetto, 709, 742
 Capuchins, 365
 Caracalla, 113
 Carafa, 365, 366
 See also Paul IV, Pope
 Carbonari, 544-545
 Carmona, 754
 Carnap, Rudolf, 880
 Carnot, Lazare, 505, 506
 Carol I, of Rumania, 536
 Carolingian Empire, 189, 190, 193
 Carolingian miniscule, 280
 Carolingian Renaissance, 279
 Cartesianism, 473-474, 482, 483, 484
 criticism of, 478, 479, 632
 Carthage, 94, 95, 97
 Cartwright, Edmund, 575
 Cassiodorus, 150
 Cassius, 110
 Castile, 271, 272
 Castleknagh, Lord, 528
 Castro, Fidel, 848
 Catafonia, 780
 Cathari, 42, 235
 See also Albigensians
 Catherine of Aragon, 360, 427
 Catherine de Medici (*see* Medici, Catherine de)
 Catherine II, the Great, 405, 407
 Catholic Church (*see* Church)
 Catholic League, 445, 474
 Catholic Reformation, 365, 370
 bibliography, 372-373
 Council of Trent, 316, 322, 366
 See also Trent, Council of
 movements toward reform, 365-366
 Catholicism, 351, 352, 356, 360, 362, 367, 370, 884-885
 See also Church
 Cavaliers, 435, 436
 Cavendish, Henry, 479
 Cavour, 546, 547
 Celts, 154
 Central Africa, 685-686
 Central America, 541
 Cervantes, Miguel de, 330
 Ceylon, 531
 Cézanne, Paul, 663
 Chaeronea, 80
 Chaldeans, 35, 36, 41, 49
 astrology and astronomy of, 40
 conquest of Hebrews, 49
 mathematics of, 40
 religion of, 40
 Chamber of Deputies, 528, 598, 602, 607, 767
 Chamberlain, Neville, 754, 763, 768, 769, 794
 Chamliord, Comte de, 606, 607
 Chancery, 254
Chanson de Roland, 297
Chansons de geste, 297
Characters, 452
 Charlemagne, 43, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 192
 achievements of, 186, 190
 administrative system of, 187
 Bavaria conquered by, 186
 defeat by Basques at Roncesvalles, of, 186
 empire of, 196
 breakup of, causes for, 195
 government of, 187
 Leo III, relations with, 188, 189
 Saxons conquered by, 186
 successors of, 189
 weaknesses in rule of, 189-190
 Charles V, Emperor, 166, 266, 350, 351
 Charles I, king of England, 431, 423-433, 434, 435, 436
 civil war and, 436
 execution of, 436, 437
 marriage to Infanta of Spain planned by father, 430
 Parliament and, 431, 432, 434, 435
 personal rule of, without Parliament, 432
 Petition of Right and, 432, 433
 reign of, 431-437
 conditions at beginning of, 431
 war with the Scots, 434
 Charles II, king of England, 379, 438
 bibliography, 447-448
 Declaration of Breda, 437
 Declaration of Indulgence, 438
 Parliament and, 438, 439
 reign of, 438, 439
 restoration of, 438
 Rye House Plot, 439
 subsidy from Louis XIV, 438
 Test Act, 438
 Charles VI, king of France, 266
 Charles VII, king of France, 267, 269, 270, 524
 Charles VIII, king of France, 324, 346
 Italy invaded by, 324, 326, 346
 Charles IX, king of France, 356
 Charles X, (Bourbon) king of France, 533, 601, 602, 680
 Charles Albert, king of Sardinia, 545
 Charles I, king of Spain, 273, 381
 See also Charles V, Emperor
 Charles II, king of Spain, 382, 390
 Charles IX, king of Sweden, 391
 Charles X, king of Sweden, 392
 Charles XII, king of Sweden, 392
 Charles Augustus (*see* Charles-magne)
 Charles of Anjou, 240
 Charles the Bald, 280
 Charles the Fat, 261
 Chartists, 527, 618
 Chartres, 408
 Chartres Cathedral, 294
 Chateaubriand, 490
 Chaucer, 299
 Cheka, 733, 734
 Chekhov, Anton, 655, 656
 Chiang Kai-shek, 779, 810, 840
 communist kidnapping of, 839
 United States bolstering of, 839
 Chile, 540
 China, 113
 art of, 678
 bibliography, 851
 British trade in, 674
 civil war in, 839
 Communism in, 820, 821, 832, 839
 Confucianism in, 678
 culture in, 678
 difficulties of trade with, 673
 Han dynasty of, 113
 Hong Kong ceded to British, by, 674
 Japanese attacks on, 796, 839
 Manchuria, 676
 Manchus, rule of, 673
 rebellion against, 674
 national government of, 810, 820, 841
 opium war, and, 674
 People's Republic of, 826, 841

- China (*Cont.*)
 revolution in, 839
 West, allies of, 798
- Chivalry (*see under* Feudal system)
- Chopin, Frederic, 636
- Christ, 48, 49, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 136, 880
 Church founded by, 368, 369
See also Jesus
- Christian II, king of Denmark, 352
- Christian III, king of Denmark, 393
- Christian IV, king of Denmark, 392
 Thirty Years' War and, 385, 393
- Christian Church (*see* Church)
- Christian Democratic Union, 835, 837
- Christian Science, 660
- Christianity, 48, 49, 127, 128
 appeal of, 132, 133
 Arianism in, 136
 asceticism in, 137
 background of, 125-126
 bibliography of, 139-140
 in Byzantine civilization, 161, 164, 165
 chronological chart of, 129
 doctrines of, 135-136
 early church of, 134
 Greek attitude toward, 125, 130
 Hebrew religion, influence upon, 48-50
 heresy in early, 136
 Islam contrasted with, 167, 168
 Jesus, tradition of, in, 127-129
 Jews, opposition to, 130, 131
 monasteries in, 137-138
 Paul's work for, 130, 131
 persecution of, 131
 Petrine succession in, 139
 rise of, 125-139
 Roman attitude toward, 131, 132, 133-134
 sacraments in, 132, 134
 Trinity in, 136
See also Church; Papacy; Reformation; and under specific main entries
- Christina, queen of Sweden, 392
- Chrysolaus, Manuel, 312
- Church, 219-286
 Anglican (*see* Church of England)
 Aristotle, conflict about, in, 284-285
 "Babylonian Captivity" of, 242, 315, 346
 bibliography of, 243-244, 303, 304
 canon law of, 222
 chronological chart of, 224, 249
- Cluniac reform in, 223, 225
- Council movement in, 314, 316, 346
- Crusades, 228-231
 effects on, 232
 in feudal system, 219-220
 Great Schism (*see* Great Schism)
- Greek Orthodox, 165
- heresies in, 222, 234, 235
See also under specific names
- Inquisition of (*see* Inquisition)
- mendicant orders in, 235
- monastic orders, failure of, in, 233-234
- Papal authority, in, 222-223
- Presbyterian, 357, 435, 436, 620
- reformation (*see* Reformation)
- in Renaissance, 314-318
- Roman Empire, influence upon, 132-134
- sacraments of (*see* Sacraments)
- salvation, theory of, 220-222
See also Papacy; Reformation; and under names of countries
- Church of England, 360-361, 426-427, 429
 James I and, 430-431
- Churchill, Winston, 763, 794, 800, 801, 802
- Cicero, 114, 115
- Cisalpine Republic, 508, 509
- Cistercian Order, 234
- City-states, 245
 Greeks (*see* Polis)
- Sumerian, 35, 36
- Civil Constitution of the Clergy, 501, 505
- Civilization (*see under* Societies and names of specific civilizations)
- Claudius, 107, 111
- Cleithenes, 63, 64
- Clemenceau, Georges, 712
- Clement IV, Pope, 240, 290
- Cleopatra, 100, 102
- Clericis laicos, 241
- Clive, Robert, 443-444
- Clotilda, 153
- Clough, Arthur Hugh, 653
- Clovis, 150, 184
 conquests of, 153, 154
 conversion of, 153
- Cluniac reform, 223, 225, 226, 227
- Cluny, 223, 234
- Cobbett's Register, 610
- Code Napoléon, 512, 544
- Code of Hammurabi (*see* Hammurabi Code)
- Colbert, Jean Baptiste, 343, 394, 414, 416-417, 443
- Colbertism (*see* Colbert)
- Cold War, 802, 807
 bibliography, 851-852
 chronological chart, 812-815
 contrasts between U.S.A. and USSR, 807-808
 summary of, 848-851
- Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 635
- Coligny, Admiral, 356
- College of Cardinals, 225, 315
- Collège de France, 326
- Collegia, 146
- Colosseum, 118, 119
- Colombia, 539, 540
- Coloni, 146
- Columba, Saint, 138
- Columban, Saint, 138
- Columbus, Christopher, 274, 339
- Comenius, Amos, 486
- Comitatus, 148, 197
- Commendation, 196
- Commentaries on the Sentences, 283
- Commerce (*see under* specific civilizations and countries)
- Committee of Public Safety, 505, 506, 507
- Commodus, 106, 112, 141
- Common law, 254
- "Common-law Courts," 424
- Communes, 213
- Communism, 593
 in China, 820, 821, 832, 839
 in France, 594, 601, 767, 831
 in Italy, 741, 743, 837
 in Russia, 732, 735, 736
 in Spain, 782
- Communist manifesto, 552
- Marxian theory, 734
- party, 734
 Orgburo, subcommittee of, 735
 Politburo (*Præsidium*), subcommittee of, 735
 rule, 564
- Compass, 177
- Comte, Auguste, 649
- Concert of Europe, 531, 533
- Conciliar Movement, 314, 316, 346
- Concordat of Bologna, 346
- Concordat of Worms, 228
- Concordat with Rome, 511
- Confederation of the Rhine, 550
- Confirmation, 220
- Confucianism, 678
- Congo, 803, 804, 810, 846-847
- Congolese government, 847
 independence granted to, by Belgium, 846-847

- Congolese government (*Cont.*)
 mutiny of, against Belgium, 847
 Congregation of the Index, 366, 367
 Congress of Berlin, 536-537, 682
 Congress of Paris, 721
 Congress of Vienna, 526, 528, 533,
 534, 544, 549, 560
 attitude toward France, 530
 bibliography, 565-566
 principles of compensation and
 legitimacy, 530
 representatives attending, 528
 results of, 530-531
 Talleyrand at, 528-529
 terms demanded by Prussia, at,
 530
 territorial settlements wrought
 by, 530-531
 breakdown of, 533-534
 Treaty of Utrecht, compared
 with, 530
 Conservatives, 615
 Constable, 636
 Constance, Council of, 316
 Constantine, 134, 136, 144, 146, 147
 Constantinople founded by, 158
 conversion to Christianity of, 134
 division of empire by, 159
 Constantine V, 185
 Constantinople, 109, 144, 147, 152,
 156, 159, 161, 162, 163, 164
 Algeria and, 680
 fall of, 159, 165
 founding of, 158
 Hippodrome in, 159
 renamed Istanbul, 714
 Constitution of 1791 (*French*), 501,
 502
 Constitutions of Clarendon, 256
 Constitution of the Year III, 507
 Constitution of the Year VIII, 511
 Consubstantiation, 349
 Continental Blockade, 514, 571
 Conventuals, 237
 Convocation, 363
 Copenhagen, treaty of, 392
 Copernican theory, 77, 464-465,
 467, 469, 474
 opponents of, 466
 rejected by Descartes, 473
 supporters of, 466
 Copernicus, Nicolas, 323, 464, 466
 Copper Age, 18
 Cordova, 271
 Cordova Caliphate, 172
 Corneille, Pierre, 451
 Corinth, 61, 66
Cordon Sanitaire, 738
 Corfu, 776
 Corsica, 421
 Cortes, 272, 273, 780, 781
 Cortes, Hernando, 339
Cortée, 495
 Cosmology, 69, 70, 114
 Coty, 832
 Council of Constance, 316
 Council of Elders, 507
 Council of Five Hundred, 507
 Council of Ministers, 734
 Council of Nationalities, 734
 Council of People's Commissars,
 732, 734
 Council of Pisa, 316
 Council of State, 425
 Council of Trent, 316, 322, 366
 Counter Reformation, 353, 360, 365
 bibliography, 371-373
 Counterpoint, 296
 Court of High Commission, 364,
 428
 Court of Star Chamber, 425, 433
 Covenant, 47
 Cracow, 560
 Cracow University, 396
 Craft guilds, 214
 Cranmer, Thomas, 360, 361, 427
 Crassus, 100, 101
 Creoles, 526, 537, 538, 539, 541
 Crete, 52, 54
 bibliography, 87-88
 Crimean War, 534, 536, 546, 562,
 606
 Critias, 73
Critique of Pure Reason, 483
 Cro-Magnon man, 14
 Croatia, 385, 714
 Croats, 166, 559, 562
 Cromlechs, 17
 Cromwell, Oliver, 378, 429
 civil war and, 436
 death of, 437
 New Model Army, 436
 Parliament and, 436, 437
 Cromwell, Thomas, 361, 427
 Crucifixion, 129, 131
 Crusades, 228, 229, 230, 231
 Fifth, 230
 First, 228, 229
 Fourth, 230
 papacy, effect on, 231
 Second, 230
 Third, 230
 Cuba, 840, 848
Cuius regio, eius religio, 351, 352,
 360
 Cuneiform writing, 34, 35, 40
Curia Regis, 252
Curiales, 146
Cursus honorum, 106
 Cybele, 125
 Cynicism, 84
 Cypriotes, 829
 Cyprus, 827, 829
 Cyrenaica, 794
 Cyril, Saint, 164
 Cyrillic, 165
 Cyrus the Great, 35, 41
 Czechoslovakia, 562, 564, 714, 720,
 763, 817
 Hitler's seizure of, 745, 753
 Partition by Big Four, of, 754
 Czechs, 559, 562

 Dacia, 107, 111, 144
 Daimler, Gottfried, 583
 Daladier, 768
 Dali, Salvador, 875
 Damascening, 176
 Damascus, 170, 172, 176
 Damiatta, 230
 Danegeld, 249
 Danes (*see* Northmen)
 Dante Alighieri, 295, 300, 301, 302,
 320
 Danton, Georges, 502, 505, 507
 Danube, 147, 148
 Danzig, 783
 Dar-es-salaam, 679
 Darby, Abraham, 576
 Dardanelles, 708
 Darius I, 41, 64
 Dark Ages, 154, 277
 See also Middle Ages
 Darnley, Lord, 357
 Darwin, Charles, 480, 641-642,
 643
 Descent of Man, 641
 Origin of Species, 641
 Darwinian Theory, 480, 641-642,
 643, 645, 883
 Daumier, Honoré, 657
 Dauphin, 267, 268
 David, 44, 48, 128
 Davy, Humphry, 573
 Dawes Plan, 747
De divisione naturae, 281
 De Gasperi, Alcide, 837
 De Gaulle, Charles, 598, 601, 792,
 793, 831, 832, 833, 834
 De Lesseps, Ferdinand, 681
De monarchia, 301
 De Rivera, Primo, 625, 780
 Deak, Francis, 560
 Debussy, Claude, 664-665
 Decameron, 299
 Decembrists, 562
 Declaration of Independence, 355,
 445
 Declaration of Indulgence, 355
 Declaration of Pillnitz, 502

- Declaration of the Rights of Man, 500, 508
- Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, The*, 489
- "Decline of the West," 449
- Defenestration of Prague, 384
- Deferre, Gaston, 833
- Deists, 483
- Delacroix, Ferdinand, 636
- Delorme, Philibert, 331, 333
- Delos Confederation, 66
- Delphic Oracle, and Socrates, 72
- Democracy, 5, 527
- in Belgium, 626
- connection with Industrial Revolution, 527
- in France, 527
- in Great Britain, establishment of political, 608-611, 615-616
- in Holland, 626
- in Italy, 625
- in Portugal, 625
- in Scandinavia, 626
- in Spain, 625
- in Switzerland, 626
- Social-Democratic sentiment in German Reichstag toward, 627
- See also under America; United States; and names of civilizations and countries
- Democritus of Abdera, 69, 84, 114
- Demosthenes, 80
- Denmark, 392
- bibliography, 447-448
- chronological chart, 392
- Lutheranism in, 393
- Norway, union with, 393
- Schleswig-Holstein and, 555
- Sweden, wars with, 391, 392
- Thirty Years' War and, 385, 393
- Descartes, René, 461, 464, 470, 472-473, 474, 633
- Discourse on Method*, 473, 483
- Deuteronomy, 49
- Deventer, 325
- Dewey, John, 648, 880, 881
- Dialogue on the Two Chief Systems of the World, A*, 469
- "Diana and the Deer," 333
- Diaspora, 126
- Dickens, Charles, 653
- Diderot, Denis, 481
- Diet of the German Confederation, 550, 555
- Diet of Worms, 350
- Digest*, 117, 291
- Diocletian, 134, 141, 144, 145, 146
- Diogenes, 84
- Directory (*French Revolution*), 507, 508, 509, 512, 542, 544, 599
- Disarmament Conference, 778
- Discourses on Livy*, 377
- "Disputa," 322
- Disraeli, 672, 681
- Divine Comedy*, 295
- Doctrine of Phlogiston Established and the Composition of Water Refuted*, 479
- Dolmens, 16
- Domesday Book, 251
- "Domestic system," 345
- Dominic, Saint, 235
- Dominican Republic, 543
- Dominicans, 235, 237, 281, 285, 347
- Domitian, 111, 113
- Donation of Constantine, 186, 312, 317
- Donation of Pepin, 186, 544, 549
- Don Quixote de la Mancha, 329, 330
- Doré, Paul Gustave, 329
- Dorians, 52, 53, 58, 61
- Dostoevski, Fyodor, 654
- Douai, France, 363
- Draco, 62
- Drake, Sir Francis, 329
- Dreiser, Theodore, 654, 869
- Duma, 400, 729, 730
- Dumouriez, 503, 505
- Dunbarton Oaks, 802
- Dunkirk, 759, 791
- Duns Scotus, 276, 285
- Dupleix, 443
- Dürer, Albrecht, 331, 332
- Durham Report, 617
- Dutch (see Holland; Netherlands)
- Dutch East India Company, 673
- Dutch War, 419
- Earl of Bothwell, 357
- East Africa, 679
- East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, 796
- East Germany, 824, 825, 834, 835
- Eastern Orthodox Church, 161, 164, 165
- Ecclesiastical History*, 137
- Ecclesiastical History of England*, 279
- Ecclesiastical*, 49
- Ecuador, 540
- Eddy, Mary Baker, 660
- Eden, Anthony, 827
- Edessa, 230
- Edict of Nantes, 356, 408, 410, 415
- revoked, 356
- Edictum*, 115
- Edison, Thomas, 567, 583
- Edward I, king of England, 241, 257
- Edward II, king of England, 258
- Edward III, king of England, 259
- Edward IV, king of England, 259
- Edward VI, king of England, 361, 362
- Edward VII, king of England, 442
- Edward the Confessor, 247
- Egypt, 24, 679, 680, 681, 682
- Alexander the Great, conquest of, 81
- Assyrians, conquest of, 32
- chronological charts of, 22, 23, 28-29
- Crete, commerce with, 52
- decline of, 33
- falls to the Romans, 32
- First Dynasty of, 24
- First Intermediate Period of, 27
- Hittites, wars against, 32
- Hyskos, conquest of, 29
- Israelites, as slaves in, 30
- Lower, 27
- Mehemet Ali Dynasty, rule of, in, 681
- Mesopotamia, civilization contrasted with, 24
- culture influenced by, 24
- Middle Kingdom in, 25, 29
- national state, compared with, 245
- Persians, defeat of, 24
- revolt of 1882 against khedive, by, 681
- rulers (*Pharaohs*) of, 24, 25, 26, 27
- self-government, granted by Britain, to, 682
- Sudan, conquest of, and, 682
- Suez Canal and, 681
- World War II, and, 794-795
- Italian invasion, of, 794
- Einhard, 189
- Einstein, Albert, 77, 470, 471, 645, 858, 859, 860, 880
- El Alamein, 795
- El Greco (*Kyriakos Theotokopoulos*), 454
- Elba, 516
- Eleanor of Aquitaine, 254
- Elgin marbles, 78
- Eliot, T. S., 873
- Elizabeth I, queen of England, 362
- Church and, 363
- excommunication of, 363
- Poor Law of, 433
- Puritanism and, 428
- reign of, 427, 428

- Elizabeth of York, 424
 Elizabethan Age, 328-329, 524
 Elizabethan Compromise, 328, 362, 363
 Empedocles, 591
Encyclopédie, 482 (see *Voltaire*)
 Engels, Friedrich, 552, 592, 593, 594
 England, 150, 200, 247-260, 422, 707-717, 825-831
 Act of Settlement, 440
 Act of Supremacy, 428
 Act of Toleration, 440
 Bank of, 574
 bibliography, 218, 275, 303, 373, 565-566, 806, 851-852
 Bill of Rights, 440
 cabinet government, beginnings of, 441
 Calvinism, 360, 363
 chronological charts, 306, 308-309, 423, 758-759
 Church of (see Church of England)
 civil war in, 436
 colonial rivalry with France, 443
 common law, development of, 254, 425
 Commonwealth and Protectorate, 437
 Council of State, 425
 courts and James I, in, 424, 425, 428
 Elizabethan Age, 328-329, 524
 France, wars with, 426, 432
 Glorious Revolution, 439
 House of Commons, 258, 429, 442, 610, 611, 614
 "Grand Remonstrance" resolution passed by, 435
 House of Lords, 258, 429, 441, 610, 611, 614, 615
 Hundred Years' War in, 258
 India and, 672
 invasions of, 247
 Irish question and, 613
 rebellion, suppressed by Cromwell, in, 437
 Justices of the peace, 425
 king's council in, 425, 441
 Lutheranism in, 361, 365
 Magna Carta and, 233, 256
 monarchy in, 260, 441
 constitutional, 441, 442
 Tudor, 422, 423-428
 nobility in, 265
 Parliament, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 430, 432, 440, 441, 444, 445, 491-495, 591, 608, 609, 623, 626, 627, 641
 Barebone's, 437
 Cavalier, 438
 Charles I and, 424, 431-434
 Charles II and, 438-439
 Cromwell and, 429
 James I and, 428, 429, 430, 431
 James II and, 439
 Long, 425, 434, 436
 Mad, 257
 Model, 257
 Reformation, 438
 Rump, 437
 Short, 434
 Stuarts and, 425, 429
 Triennial Act, 434
 William and Mary and, 440
 Peace of Utrecht and, 439
 Peasant Revolt in, 344
 Petition of Right, 432
 Political Reform Bills in, 611-613
 "Popish Plot," 438
 Presbyterians in, 435, 436, 437, 438
 Protestantism in, 427-430, 440
 Provisions of Oxford, 257
 Puritan Revolution in, 428-430
 Revolution of American Colonies, 444-445
 Rye House Plot, 439
 Scotland, campaign against, by, 434
 war with, 434-436
 Spanish Armada, danger to, 524
 Test Act, 436, 439, 440
 Tories in, 439
 Tudor monarchy in, 260, 422, 424, 426
 Wars of the Roses in, 422
 Whigs in, 438, 439
 Wolsey, Cardinal, power of, in, 427
 See also names of rulers
 World War I, and, 707-717
 bibliography, 784-785
 (British) Commonwealth of Nations, 765
 chronological chart, 758-759
 economic changes in, 760
 foreign policy of, 762-763
 government in, 760, 762
 government of British Dominions, modeled after, 765
 Great Depression in, 761
 labor unions in, 762
 unrest in, 762
 problems with India, 764
 with Ireland, 763, 764
 with Middle East, 764
 with Palestine, 764-765
 World War II and (see World War II)
 World War II, period after, and, 825
 Britain, reconstruction and re-orientation of, 825-826
 British Empire, devolution of, 827, 829
 Commonwealth, headed by, 829-831
 Labor government of, 826
 English Royal Society, 471
 Engrossing, 217
 Enlightenment, 420, 484, 488, 489-490, 492, 500, 589, 632
 Enlil, 36
 Ensi, 34
 Entente Cordiale, 685
 Ephraim, 44, 47
 Epictetus, 84
 Epicurism, 84, 650
 Epicurus, 84, 85, 114, 859
 Epstein, Jacob, 876
 Equity, 116
 Erasmus, Desiderius, 325, 330, 331, 463
 Eratosthenes, 85
 Erechtheum, 79
 Eric XIV, king of Sweden, 391
 Erigena, John Scotus, 139, 280
 Eritrea, 682
 Essenes, 126, 128
 Estonia, 563, 714
 Ethiopia, 682, 687
 invasion by Italy, of, 745, 753, 777
 Etruscans, 91, 119
 Etymologies, 279
 Eucharist, 132, 134, 220, 349, 353
 Euclid, 85
 Eugenius IV, Pope, 316
 Euripides, 71, 451
 Europe, absolutism in, 374, 376
 See also names of countries
 Council of, 837
 national states, development of, in Medieval times, 245-275
 in Modern times, 374-448
 nineteenth century expansion of, 668-695
 twentieth century aid to, by Marshall Plan, 816-817
 See also names of countries
 European Defense Community, 831
 European Free Trade Association, 838
 Eusebius, 137
 Eustachi, 323

- Evangelicalism (*see* Lutheranism)
 Evangelists, 127, 128
Everyman, 303
Exarch, 151
Exchequer, 253
 Exclusion Bill, 439
 Excommunication, 226, 227
Exercitatio de Motu Cordis et Sanguinis, 477
 Existentialism, 882
Exposition du Système du Monde, 480
 Extreme unction, 220
 Ezekiel, 32
- Fabian Society, 594-595
Fabliaux, 299
 Fabricius, 323
Faerie Queene, 329
 Falange, 783
 Fallopio, 323
 Faraday, Michael, 583, 645
 Farrell, James, 869
 Fascism, 741, 742-743, 782, 783
 See also Italy; Mussolini
 Fatima, 167
 Faulkner, William, 870
 Faust, 299, 449, 453, 459, 638
 Federation of Mali, 833
 Feirefiz, 298, 299
 Ferdinand I, Emperor, 382
 Bohemia under, 382
 Germany under, 382
 Peace of Augsburg and, 382
 See also Ferdinand, king of Bohemia; Ferdinand of Austria
 Ferdinand III, Emperor, 384
 Ferdinand, king of Bohemia, 382, 384
 See also Ferdinand I, Emperor
 Ferdinand of Castile, 272
 Ferdinand VII, of Spain, 539, 540
 Ferdinand and Isabella, consolidation of Iberian peninsula by, 273
 expulsion of Jews, by, 273
 Ferdinand, tsar of Bulgaria, 537
Festung Europa, 798
 Feudal system, 195-213
 bibliography, 217-218
 Church under, 196, 201-203, 206
 courts in, 198
 escheat in, 199
 king, position of, under, 200
 knighthood in, 197-200
 lord, duties of, 197
 manorial basis of, 204
 peasantry in, 204
 primogeniture under, 199
 serfs under, 205, 208
 vassal, duties of, in, 198
 women under, 199
 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 633, 634
 Fief, 195, 197
 Finland, 563, 720
 Protestantism in, 352
 Russia's attitude toward, 562, 564
 First Consul (*Napoleon*), 508, 509, 511
 First International, 594
 Fiscus, 106
 Five-Year Plan, 736, 840
 Flanders, 262
 art in, 331
 Renaissance in, 325
 science in, 323, 333
 Flaubert, Gustave, 653
 Fleming, Sir Alexander, 865
 Flemish language, 534
 Florentine Republic, 377
 Foch, Marshal, 710
 Fontainebleau, 327
 Food Agriculture Organization (*see* United Nations)
 Ford, Henry, 584
 Forestalling, 217
 Formosa, 840
Formulae, 115
 Four Power (*occupation*) zones, 801
 Four Vows, 369
 Fourier, Charles, 486, 590
 Fourteen Points, 710-712, 745
 Fourth Committee (*see* United Nations)
 France, 246-250, 254, 256, 259, 260-271, 407-422, 602
 absolutism in, 377, 414
 Algerian war, 832-833
 Angevin princes of, 247
 architecture of, 331, 333
 art, 324, 325
 bibliography, 518-519, 628-629
 Black Africa and, 833
 Calvinism in, 353
 Capetian monarchy of, 200, 261, 265
 Carolingian empire of, 189-190, 193
 under Charlemagne and successors, 261
 Charles V and, 266, 350
 charter, granted by Louis XVI, 528
 chronological charts, 409, 758-759
 coalitions against, 509, 512, 513
 Colbertism, 343, 394, 414, 416-417
 colonial rivalry with England, 443
 Concordat with Rome, 511
 Constitution of 1791, 501, 502
 culture of, 407, 420-421
 De Gaulle, 831
 England, contrasted with, 265, 407, 422
 possessions of, in, 250, 267
 wars with, 258, 259, 268, 512
 etiquette in, 412
 explorations by, 341
 First Republic, 503
 Fourth Republic, 831, 832, 833
 Franco-Prussian war, 506
 French-African territories, 832
 Gallican Church, 501
 Huguenots in, 350, 408, 410
 humanism in, 326, 327
 Hundred Years' War in, 258, 265, 266, 267
 Indo-China, return to, by, 832
 Jacobins, 497
 July Monarchy, 602
 Lafayette, 499
 language, 154
 Legislative Assembly in, 502
 Marie Antoinette, 490, 499
 Merovingian kingdom of, 153, 154, 185, 190
 military expansion, 506
 Mirabeau and, 499
 monarchy in, 247, 266, 411
 Napoleon and (*see* Napoleon)
 papacy in, 264, 315-316, 501
 Philip Augustus, reign of, in, 260-261, 262-263, 264
 religious issue in, 266, 414, 415-416
 Renaissance in, 326-328
 Republics of, 503, 601, 604, 831
 First, 503
 Fourth, 831-833
 Second, 604, 605
 Third, 601, 606-608
 revolution in (*see* French Revolution)
 science in, 333
 Second Empire in, 605-606
 Seven Years' War, 421, 422
 States-General in, 264, 266, 273, 493, 497, 498, 499
 taille (tax) in, 269
 Thirty Years' War and, 410-411
 Vichy government of, 791-792

- France (*Cont.*)
 War of Devolution, 419
 War of the League of Augsburg, 419
 war with Prussia, 506
 World War I (*see* World War I)
 World War II (*see* World War II)
- France, Anatole, 651
- Francesco I, of Mantua, 314
- Franche-Comté, 419
- Francis, Gaspar, 541
- Francis, Saint, 236
- Francis I, king of France, 324, 326
- Francis II, of Naples, 548
- Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, 706
- Francis, Lord Bacon of Verulam (*see* Bacon, Francis)
- Franciscan Rule, 237
- Franciscans, 235-237, 285, 347
- Franco, Francisco, 781, 782, 784, 793
- Franco-Prussian War, 506
- Frankfurt Assembly, 552, 554
- Frankish kingdom (*see* France)
- Franks, 150, 153, 185
- Frederic I, Barbarossa, 230
- Frederic II, Emperor, 230, 239-240, 289, 290, 291
See also under Holy Roman Empire
- Frederic of Hohenstaufen (*see* Frederic II, Emperor)
- Frederic the Wise, 347, 350
- Frederick (the "Winter King"), king of Bohemia, 384
- Frederick I, king of Prussia, 394
- Frederick II, the Great, king of Prussia, 386, 394, 505
- Frederick William (the "Great Elector"), 384, 394
- Frederick William IV, king of Prussia, 552, 554
- Frederick V, Elector Palatine (*see* Frederick, the "Winter King")
- French Equatorial Africa, 833
- French Indo-China, 677, 796, 832
- French Revolution, 308, 376, 407, 474, 494-508, 511, 518, 583, 663, 737
 accomplishments of, 509-510
 background of, 494-495, 497, 498-499, 500-501
 Bastille, fall of, 499-500
 bibliography, 518-519
 Consulate, 510
 chronological chart, 496-497
 Directory, 507, 508, 509, 512
- Girondins and, 502, 503, 504, 505, 507
 First Republic, formed by, 505
 influence of America on, 492, 493
 Jacobins and, 497, 502, 504, 505
 Legislative Assembly, 502
L'evée en masse, 505, 506
 Louis XIV and, 494, 497, 499, 502
 Marie Antoinette and, 499
 Napoleon and, 507-512
 National Assembly, 499, 500, 501, 503
 National Convention, 503, 504, 505, 507
 Reign of Terror in, 488, 505, 507
 Robespierre and, 488, 502, 505, 506, 507
 States-General and, 493, 497, 498
 become National Assembly, 499
- French West Africa, 833
- Freud, Sigmund, 646, 647, 866, 867, 880
- Freudians, 75, 867
- Free French Movement, 792
See also De Gaulle
- Friars, 346
- Friedland, 513
- Fronde, 411, 412, 415
- Fugger family, 336
- Führer, der* (*see* Hitler)
- Fulton, Robert, 574
- Furlong, 205
- Gabelle, 270
- Galen, 114, 475-476
- Galicia, 559, 560
- Galileo, 77, 278, 291, 461, 463, 466, 468, 472, 473, 857
 clerical opponents of, 469
 telescopes made by, 468, 469
- Gall, Saint, 138
- Gallican Church, 415, 501
 French, 182
- Galvez, José de, 537
- Gama, Vasco da, 274, 338
- Gambetta, Léon, 607
- Gambia, 685
- Gandhi, Mohandas, 673, 764
- Gargantua and Pantagruel*, 327
- Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 546-549
- Gascony, 261
- Gassendi, 478
- Gauguin, Paul, 663, 664
- Gaul, 100, 102, 113, 138, 148, 150
- Gauleiters*, 790
- Geiger Counter, 863
- Gellée, Claude (Lorrain), 453
- General Assembly (*see* United Nations)
- "General Will," 487, 501
See also Rousseau
- Généralités*, 413, 421
- Geneva, 353, 355
- Genoa, 545
See also Ligurian Republic
- Geology, development of, 480
- Geometry, analytical, 472
- George I, king of England, 442
- George III, king of England, 442, 526, 674
 American grievances against, 445
- George V, king of England, 615
- George, Henry, 489
- George, Lloyd, 580, 712
- Georges, comte de Buffon, 480
- Georgics*, 109
- Gerard of Cremona, 284
- Gerbert of Aurillac, 281
See also Sylvester II, Pope
- Germans, 146, 147, 148
- Germany, art and architecture in, 325, 331
 bibliography, 755-756
 Calvinism in, 360
 commerce in, 336
 Confederation of the Rhine, 550
 Denmark, war with, 550
 Diet of the Confederation of, 550, 555
 Empire, establishment of, in, 557
 and Holy Roman Empire, 549-550
 humanism in, 325-326
 Lutheranism in, 347-351
 North German Federation, 555
 Reformation in (*see* Reformation)
- Renaissance in, 325-326, 331, 332, 333, 336
- Thirty Years' War and, 549
 unification of, 549
- Versailles, treaty of, 713-715
See also World War I
- Zollverein and, 550, 551
- Germany in the twentieth century, bibliography, 755-756
 chronological charts, 724-725, 758-759
 Communist Party and, 746
 de-Nazification of, 835
 East Germany, separated from, 824, 825, 834
 Federal Republic of, 835-836
 inflation in, 746-747

Germany (*Cont.*)

- National Socialists in, 726, 738, 749
- Nationalist Party, 748
- Nazism in, 715-753
 - Hitler and, 715, 716, 719, 745, 746-754, 762, 763, 769, 778-784
 - Austria conquered by, 753
 - Czechoslovakia conquered by, 753
 - measures against Communists, by, 750
 - measures against Jews, by, 750
 - politics of, domestic, of, 750
 - politics of, foreign, of, 750
 - rise of, 747
 - reconstruction and recovery of, 746-747
 - treaties of non-aggression, between Britain and France, and, 753
 - Weimar constitution and, 746
 - Weimar Era in, 745-746
 - Social Democratic Party, and, 594, 745-746, 835
- See also World War I; World War II
- Gershwin, George, 879
- Ghana, 844, 845
- Gibbon, Edward, 121, 489
- Gilchrist-Thomas process, 567
- Gilgamesh, 36
- Gilgamesh, Epic of, 35, 36, 298
- Gilson, Etienne, 884
- Giotto, 237, 320
- Grondins, 502-505, 507
- Gladstone, 610, 611, 613
- Glorious Revolution (*see under* England)
- Godfrey of Bouillon, 229
- Goebbels, Paul, 750
- Goering, Hermann, 749, 750
- Goethe, 449, 453, 458, 459, 550, 631, 633, 634, 636-638
- Golden Bull, 381
- Goliardic poems, 297
- Gollas, Bishop, 297
- Gondisapur, academy of, 162
- "Good Emperors," 106, 111, 113, 489
- Gospels, 127, 128
- Gothic architecture, 292-294, 324, 450
- Gothic script, 280
- Goths, 150
- Goujon, Jean, 333
- Gracchan Revolution, 93, 98

- Gracchus, Gaius, 98
- Gracchus, Tiberius, 98
- Grace, 220
- Granada, 271
- Grand jury, 254
- "Grand Remonstrance," 435, 436
- Gratian, 222
- Gravitation, 470, 473
- Great Britain (*see* England)
- Great Depression, 581, 585, 595, 723
 - in Britain, 761
 - in France, 766
 - in Germany, 746
 - in Italy, 744
 - stock market crash and, 772
 - in U.S.A., 771
- Great Didactic, 486
- Great Schism, 242, 316, 317, 346
- Greece, 52-86
 - Alexander the Great, conquest of, 75, 81
 - architecture of, 79
 - art in, 77-78, 85
 - colonies of, 55
 - Hellenistic Age in, 80-86
 - independence from Turkey, 536
 - Persian Wars in, 64-65
 - Philip of Macedon, conquest of, 66
 - Rome, conquest of, 95-96
- See also Greek civilization: and specific main entries
- Greek civilization, 52-86
 - Aegean civilization, influence upon, 52
 - art of, 78-79
 - Athens, 56, 61, 63
 - bibliography of, 87-88
 - chronological chart of, 57
 - Homeric Age in, 53, 55
 - polis in, 55, 79, 80, 83
 - Roman civilization influenced by, 85, 86
 - sculpture of, 79-80, 85
 - Sparta, 58-60, 65
- Greek Orthodox Church, 165
- Gregorian chant, 296
- Gregorian Reform (*see* Cluniac reform)
- Gregory I, the Great, Pope, 139, 152, 154, 220, 287
- Gregory VII, Pope, 198, 200, 225, 226
- Gregory IX, Pope, 230, 237, 238, 281
- Gregory XI, Pope, 315
- Grey, Earl, 611
- Grimaldi man, 14

- Grocyn, William, 328
- Gropius, Walter, 877
- Grosseteste, Robert, 174, 289
- Grotius, Hugo, 379
- Gudea, 35
- Guienne, 261
- Gulds, 336, 510
- Guinea, 844, 845
- Guise, Duke of, 356
- Gustavus Adolphus, king of Sweden, 385, 391-392
- Gustavus Vasa, 352, 391
- Gustavus IV, king of Sweden, 392
- Guti, 37
- Hadith*, 168, 169
- Hadrian, 107, 111, 112, 113, 116
- Hagia Sophia, 162
- Haiti, 541, 543
- Hamarskjold, Dag, 847
- Hammurabi, 35, 37
- Hammurabi Code, 35
 - capital punishment under, 38
 - general characteristics of, 37
 - Hebrews influenced by, 35, 39
 - land tenure under, 38
 - significance of, 38
- Han dynasty, 113
- Handel, George Frederick, 456-457
- Hanging Gardens, 34
- Hannibal, 95, 97, 98, 104
- Hanover, 549-551, 555
- Hanseatic League, 337
- Hapsburgs, 240, 352, 374, 379, 381, 383, 386, 525, 543, 552
 - attitude toward French Revolution, 502
 - Spanish, 382, 387, 417, 419
 - Richelieu and, 384
- Hardy, Thomas, 654
- Hargreaves, James, 575
- Harun-al-Rashid, 43, 176
- Harvey, William, 323, 477-478
- Hastings, battle of, 250
- Hauptmann, Gerhard, 656
- Hawaii, Japanese attack on, 796
- Hawley-Smoot Act, 771
- Haydn, Josef, 457
- Hebrews, 24, 39, 40-50
 - art of, 43
 - bibliography of, 50-51
 - chronological charts, 22-23, 28-29
- Hammurabi Code, influence upon, 39
 - history of, 43
 - monotheism of, 45-46
 - Moses, leader of, 44
 - national state compared with, 245

- Hebrews (*Cont.*)
 religion of, 46-48
 influence, upon Christianity of, 43, 49
 upon Islam of, 43-49
 upon Protestant reformers of, 50
 religious influence of, 45
 Romans, conquest of, 45
 as slaves in Egypt, 44
 See also Jews
- Hector, 70
- Hegel, George Friedrich, 552, 591, 592, 633
- Heidegger, Martin, 882
- Heidelberg, University of, 325
- Heisenberg, Werner, 859
- Hellenic culture (*see* Greek civilization; Hellenistic Age)
- Hellenistic Age, 82-88
 architecture during, 85
 art in, 85
 bibliography of, 87-88
 Roman civilization, influenced by, 85
 science in, 85
 sculpture in, 85-86
 See also under specific main entries
- Héloïse, 282
- Helots, 58-60
- Helvetic Republic, 508
- Helvétius, 486, 490
- Hemingway, Ernest, 870
- Henry III, Emperor, 226, 233
- Henry IV, Emperor, 225, 226
- Henry V, Emperor, 228
- Henry VI, Emperor, 230, 232, 233
- Henry I, king of England, 252, 253
- Henry II, king of England, 222, 254, 260
- Henry III, king of England, 260
- Henry IV, king of England, 259, 260, 271
- Henry V, king of England, 259, 267
- Henry VI, king of England, 260
- Henry VII, king of England, 260, 423-424, 425, 426-427
- Henry VIII, king of England, 324, 360, 361, 426
 break with Catholicism, 360
 marriages, 360-361
 papal refusal to annul marriage to Catherine of Aragon, 360
- Henry IV, king of France, 356, 408-409
 accession of, 408
 administration of, 408-409
 Edict of Nantes, 356, 408
- Henry IV, of Germany, 200
- Henry, king of Portugal, 337, 386
- Henry, Prince, the Navigator, 337
- Henry the Fowler, 192
- Henry of Navarre (*see* Henry IV, king of France)
- Herculaneum, 459
- Herder, Johann Gottfried, 634
- Hersilia, José María de, 653
- Heresy, 117, 222, 234, 235, 238, 316
 See also under Church
- Hermes, 79
- Hero, 85
- Herod the Great, 96, 126, 128
- Herodotus, 26, 30
- Herulian (*see* Odoacer)
- Herzegovina, 706
- Hezekiah, 47
- Hidalgo, 538, 541
- Hildebrand, 226
 See also Gregory VII, Pope
- Hillel, 126
- Himmler, Heinrich, 749
- Hindenburg, 746, 748, 749
- Hindus, "Arabic" numerals invented by, 173
- Hippas, 63
- Hippocrates, 85
- Hippodrome: (in Constantinople), 159
- Hippolytus, 451
- Hiram, 44
- Hiroshima, 799
- Hispaniola, 393
- Historical and Critical Dictionary*, 481
- History of the Art of Antiquity*, 458
- Hitler, Adolf, 715-719, 744-754, 762-765, 769, 778-798
 Mein Kampf, written by, 747
 psychology of a "master race," advocated by, 786-787
 See also Germany: World War II
- Hitrites, 32, 43
- Ho Chi Minh, 810, 832
- Hoare, Sir Samuel, 778
- Hobbes, Thomas, 4, 378, 464, 484-485, 646
- Hohenlinden, 512
- Hohenstaufen dynasty, 233, 239-240
- Hohenzollern family, 525, 536, 551
 Carol I, of Rumania, of, 536
- Holbach, 483, 632
- Holbein, Hans, the Younger, 331
- Holland, 359, 508, 534
 Anabaptists in, 358
 Calvinism in, 359, 379, 382
- Dutch Reform Church of, 358
- Lutheran influence in, 359
- Peace of Utrecht and, 360
- peace of Westphalia and, 359
- revolt against Spain, 378
- ships of, 342
 See also Netherlands
- Holocene Age, 2
- Holy Alliance, 531, 533
- Holy Grail, 298
- Holy orders, 220
- Holy Roman Empire, 190, 374, 376, 385, 395
 bibliography, 243, 244
 Charles V, as emperor of, 382
 chronological chart, 381
 Germany and the, 393, 549
 as Hapsburg preserve, 379, 381
 See also under specific main entries
- Holy See, 152, 193, 219
- Holy Sepulcher, 228, 229
- Holy Spirit, 130, 135, 136, 161, 188, 350, 366, 367
- Holy Wisdom Church, 162, 163
- Homer, 53, 70, 114
- Homeric Age, 53
- Homo sapiens, 14
- Honorius, Pope, 135, 239
- Hoover, Herbert, 772
- Horns, 25
- Hottentots, 680
- House of Commons (*see* under England)
- House of Lords (*see* under England)
- House of Peers (French), 528
- House of Savoy, 545, 546
- Hugh Capet, 201, 261
- Hugo, Victor, 606, 631, 635, 636, 639, 661
- Huguenots, 356, 415, 416
- Humanism, 311-331
 English, 328-329
 Erasmus and, 330-331
 French, 326
 German, 325-326
 Italians, 312
 Spanish, 329
- Humanists, 311-331
 Church, attitude toward, 353
 English, 328-329
 Erasmus and, 330-331
 French, 326
 Italian, 312-324
 Luther and the, 330
 Spanish, 329
- Hume, David, 483
- Hundred*, 250

- Hundred Days, 517
 Hundred Years' War, 258, 265, 267, 336
 See also under specific countries
 Hungary, 166, 193, 239, 385, 564, 714
 Anti-Austrian movement in, 560
 Hitler's World War II negotiations with, 794
 recovered from Turks, 385
 Republic under Kossuth, 560
 Soviet Union's suppression of rebellion in, 846
 Turkish conquest of, 166
 See also Austria; World War I; World War II
 Huns, 147, 148
 Hus, John, 317
 Huskisson, 610
 Hutton, James, 480
 Huyghens, Christian, 470, 471, 645, 858
 Hyskos, 29

 Iberia (*see Portugal; Spain*)
 Ibn Khaldun, 176
 Ibsen, Henrik, 655
 Iconoclastic controversy, 161, 165
 Iconoclastic emperors, 161
 Idumaea, 126
 Il Duce (*see Mussolini*)
 Il Statuto, 545
Iliad, 53, 55, 70
 Illyria, 144
 Imam, 169
 Immortals, 41
 Impressionism, 663
In Praise of Folly, 330
 Incas, 341
 Incelibacy, 223
 Index of Forbidden Books, 366
 India, 672, 764, 829
 British in, 672
 reforms by, 764
 China, attitude toward, by, 842
 civil disobedience in, 764
 Hindus and Muslims, inability of, to cooperate in, 764
 National Congress of, 672, 764
 partition of, 764
 Republic of, 842
 Western world, attitude toward, by, 842
 Indo-China, 677, 796, 832
 Industrial Revolution, 3, 17, 109, 346, 523, 527, 567-588, 595
 agricultural chemistry, role in, 570
 bibliography of, 596-597
 European economy, growth of, and, 567
 finance capitalism and, 585
 inventions and inventors, during, 573-575
 labor unions, rise of, in, 586
 liberalism, connection with, 527
 metallurgy, growth of, during, 576
 population explosion, problems of, and, 568
 agriculture, in connection with, 568-570
 livestock, improvement of, to cope with, 570
 scientific knowledge, affecting, 573
 social and economic consequences of, 577, 586, 588
 technical improvement, during, 573
 textile industry, growth of, during, 575
 transportation, improvement of, during, 577
 Industrialization, 570-595
 incentives to, 571
 state encouragement of, 574
Inferno, 301
 Innocent III, Pope, 220, 230, 232, 233, 235
 Inquisition, 235, 237, 238, 269, 360, 366
 Institutes, 117
Institutes of the Christian Religion, 353
 Instrumentalism, 880
 Insurance, 335
 Intelligences, 280
 Intendants, 409
 Interdict, 233
 Ionian Islands, 531
 Ionians, 53, 61
 Iraq, 843, 844
 Ireland, England, attitude toward, by, 764
 Irish Nationalists, 614, 615
 "Irish Question" in England, 613
 Northern, status of, 764
 rebellion in, suppressed by Cromwell, 437
 Sinn Féin, independence party of, 764
 Southern, 764
 State of Eire, growing out of, 764
 See also Great Britain
 Iron Age, 18
 Iron Law of Wages, 489
 Isabella of Castile, 273
 Isalah, 131
 Isidore, Saint, 279
 Isis, 125
 Islam, 167
 Allah, as God of, 168
 expansion of, 169-170
 Hebrew religion, influence upon, 169
 Koran of, 168-169
 Mahomet, prophet of, 168
 Mecca, holy city of, 167
 relations to other religions of, 168
 Israel, 765, 829, 843-845
 Israelis, 827
 Istanbul, 714
 Italian Renaissance (*see Renaissance*)
 Italy, 93, 94, 95, 96, 150, 544, 740-745, 750, 751
 art in, 311, 313, 319, 320-323, 453
 chronological charts of, 724-725, 758-759
 Communism in, 741, 742
 Eleatic school of thought, in, 69
 Ethiopia, invasion of, by, 745, 753, 777
 Fascism, rise of, in, 741-743
 Fascist Party in, 743-744
 financial problems, modern, of, 837
 Garibaldi and, 546-548
 growth of nationalism in, 544
 House of Savoy, leadership in, 545, 547
 humanism in, 312-314, 316-318, 324
 Mazzini and, 545-547
 Mussolini and, 740-744
 Redshirts, under Garibaldi, and, 547
 Risorgimento and Mazzini, and, 544, 545
 Rome becomes capital of, 549
 Seven Weeks' War, 549
 Sicilian Expedition, 547
 totalitarianism in, 740
 Victor Emmanuel II, and, 546-548
 See also World War I; World War II
 Iturbide, Augustin de, 541
 Ivan I, 166
 Ivan III, the Great, 166, 399, 400
 Ivan IV, the Terrible, 231, 401-402

 Jacobins, 497, 502, 504, 505
 Jagiello dynasty, 395

- James I, king of England, 364, 378, 428, 429
 absolutism and, 378, 379
 Calvinists and, 409
 Church of England and, 429, 430
 financial difficulties of, 480
 Parliament and, 428, 430, 431
 plans to marry son (Charles) to Infanta of Spain, 430
 Puritanism and, 429, 430
 Thirty Years' War and, 382, 430
 James II, king of England, 438
 attempted restoration of Catholicism, 439
 Declaration of Indulgence, 439
 Exclusion Bill, 439
 flight of, 439
 Rye House Plot, 439
 Test Act and, 439
 James VI, king of Scotland (see James I, king of England)
 James, William, 646, 648, 649
 Jansen, Cornelius, 415
 Jansenists, 415
 Jaspers, Karl, 880, 882
 Java Man, 13
 Jefferson, Thomas, 474
 Jihad, 168
 Jena, 513
 Jeremiah, 46
 Jerome, Saint, 366
 Jerusalem, 44, 126, 128, 130, 229
 Jesuits, 352, 363, 364, 365, 369, 370, 438
 expelled by Charles III, 390
 expelled from Portugal, 387
 Jesus, 127, 128, 129, 130
 See also Christ
 Jewa, 126
 expelled from Spain, 273, 389
 Hitler's attitude toward, 787
 measures against, 750
 See also under specific civilizations and countries and Hebrews
 Jidda, 167
 Joan of Arc, 267-269, 524
 Joanna, queen of Spain, 273
 Job, 49
 John the Baptist, 128, 130
 John XXII, Pope, 315
 John I, king of England, 233, 260
 John I, king of Portugal, 271, 272
 John, of Sweden, 391
 Jonah, 46, 47
 Jones, James, 869
 Jordan, 843
 Joseph II, of Austria, 386
 Joseph of Bethlehem, 128
 Josephine (wife of Napoleon), 514, 515, 605
 Joshua, 44
 Josiah, 49
Journal des sarrants, 471
 Joyce, James, 870
 Judah, 45, 48
 Judas Iscariot, 128, 130
 Julian house, 111
 Julian the Apostate, 134
 Julius II, Pope, 317, 318
 patron of Michelangelo, 319
 July Monarchy, 602, 606
 Jung, Karl, 867
 Junkers military class, 394, 553, 554, 748
 Justices of the peace, 425
 Justinian, 150, 151, 159, 161
 Justinian *Corpus*, 117
 Jutes, 154
 Jutland, battle of, 708
 Juvenal, 109
 Kaaba, 167
 Kafka, Franz, 870
 Kaiser William II, 554, 558, 671, 682, 705, 848
 Kandinsky, Vassily, 876
 Kant, Immanuel, 480, 484, 632, 633, 643, 646
Critique of Pure Reason, 483, 632
 Kasavubu, Joseph, 847
 Kassim, 843
 Katanga, 811, 847
 Kay, John, 575
 Keats, John, 632
 Keitel, 791
 Kellogg-Briand Pact, 768
 Kenya, 679, 686
 Kepler, Johannes, 461, 465, 467-468, 470, 473
 Kerensky, Alexander, 731
 Khadija, 167
 Khartoum, 682
 Khrushchev, Nikita, 735, 823, 850
 Kierkegaard, Søren, 652, 882, 883, 885
 Kiev, 165, 398
 Kipling, Rudyard, 672
 Kitchener, 685
 Knights Templar, 337
 Knox, John, 355-357
 Koch, Robert, 648
 Koine, 83
 Koran, 168, 169, 170, 172, 173, 176
 Korea, 677
 Korean War, 506, 803, 820-821
 United Nations, intervention in, 846
 Kosciusko, Thaddeus, 396, 397
 Kossuth, Louis, 560
 Kronstadt, 405
 Krudener, Baroness, 531
 Kuomintang, 839
 Kuraish family, 167, 169
 La Bruyère, 452
 La Rochefoucauld, 452
 Labor Party (British), 527, 614
 Australia, in tradition of, 595
 New Zealand, in tradition of, 595
 Laconia, 61
 Lafayette, Marquis de, 499, 602
 Lagash, 35
 Lamarck, Jean Baptiste, 640
 Lamartine, Alphonse de, 604, 605, 636
 Lancaster, House of, 259
 Landtag, 554, 555
 Langland, William, 299
 Laocoön, 85
 Laos, 678
 Laplace, Pierre, 480, 643, 657
 Lassalle, Ferdinand, 594
 Last Judgment, 42, 320
 "Last Supper," 321, 353, 455
 Lateran Council, 230, 239
 Latin, 279, 297, 311
 Latin America, 526, 537, 538
 Argentina, independence of, 540
 Chile, conquest of, 540
 Christian culture in, 537
 Paraguay independence, 540
 Portuguese in Brazil, in, 537, 541
 Spanish colonies in, 537
 Spanish regime in, 537
 resentment of, 526
 Uruguay independence, 540
 Latin Kingdom of Constantinople, 239
 Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 231
 Latium, 547
 Latvia, 563, 714
 Laud, Archbishop, 433, 434
 Laval, Pierre, 769, 778, 792, 831
 Lavoisier, Antoine, 479, 480
 Law of Maximum, 505
 Law of Suspects, 505
 Le Corbusier, 877
 League of Nations, 711, 715, 738, 775
 Assembly of, 774
 constitution and purposes of, 774
 Council of, 774
 Germany becomes member of, 748
 withdraws from, 752
 major power aggression and, 771-778

- League of Nations (*Cont.*)
 successes of, 776-777
- Lebanon, 769, 843
- Lebensraum*, 780
- Leclerc, 543
- Leges*, 115
- Legion of Honor, 517
- Legislative Assembly (French), 502
- Leihniz, 470, 471
- Lelden, 371
- Leipzig, 349, 516
- Lenin, Nikolai, 729, 731, 732, 735
- Leningrad, 795
- Leo I, Pope, 135
- Leo X, Pope, 318, 326, 350
- Leo XIII, Pope, 658, 659, 884
- Leo III, the Isaurian, Emperor of Constantinople, 161, 188, 189
- Leob, 173
- Leonardo of Pisa, 173, 291
- Leonardo da Vinci, 313, 319, 322, 323, 324, 455, 477
- Leopardi, Giacomo, 636
- Leopold II, Emperor of Austria, 502
- Leopold II, of Belgium, 671, 686
- Leopold I, of Saxe-Coburg, 534
- Leopoldville, 690, 691
- Lepanto, 379
- Lepidus, 102, 105
- Letters of Obscure Men*, 326
- Lettres de cachet*, 495
- Levée en masse*, 505, 506
- Leviathan*, 378
- Lewes, battle of, 257
- Liaotung peninsula, 677
- Liberal Party, 527, 610, 613, 615
- Liberalism and democracy, 526
 bibliography, 628-629
 chronological chart, 600-601
 connection with Industrial Revolution, 527
 France and, 598-608
 Great Britain and, 608-611
 political democracy, establishment of, in, 608-611, 615-616
- Liberia, 684, 687
- Lihya, 682
- Liebig, Justus von, 570
- Ligurian Republic, 508
- Linnae, Carl von (Linnaeus), 480, 645
- Lisbon, 342, 387
- Lit de justice*, 412, 495, 498
- Lithuania, 563, 564, 714
 chronological chart, 305
- Litvinov, Maxim, 783
- Livonia, 391, 392
- Lobengula, 686
- Locarno Pact, 748, 768
- Locke, John, 198, 378, 474, 485-486, 488, 490
- Logical Empiricism, 880
- Loi-cadre*, 833
- Lollards, 316, 317
- Lombard League, 212, 240
- Lombard, Peter, 283
- Lombards, 151-152, 192
- Lomhardy, 546, 547
- Loménie de Brienne, 497
- Lorenzo the Magnificent, 313, 317, 321
- Lorraine, 192, 421
- Lothair, 189
- Louis VI (the Fat), king of France, 262
- Louis VII, king of France, 254
- Louis VIII, king of France, 262
- Louis IX, king of France, 231, 263
- Louis X, king of France, 265
- Louis XI, king of France, 270, 326, 356
- Louis XIII, king of France, 356
- Louis XIV, king of France, 412-413, 451, 525
 army subject to, 413
 bibliography, 447-448
 ceremony and, 412
 Edict of Nantes revoked by, 415-416
 Huguenots and, 415, 416
 Jansenists and, 415
 Jesuits and, 415
 papacy, relations with, 415
 Parlement and, 412
 postal system organized by, 413
 Protestantism and, 414-415
 reign of, 412-419
 religious policy of, 414
 wars of, 417, 419
- Louis XV, king of France, 420, 494
- Louis XVI, king of France, 422, 494, 497, 499, 502, 504, 529
 charter granted by, 528
 constitutional monarchy, stemming from, 528
 legislative bodies of, 528
 See also Chamber of Deputies; House of Peers
- Louis the Debonair, 189
- Louis XVIII, king of France, 508, 602
 restoration to throne, of, 516, 530
- Louis Napoleon, president of France, 546, 599, 605
 See also Napoleon III
- Louis Philippe, 602, 603, 606, 680
- Louis the Pious, 189
- Laurence Marques, 689
- Loyola, Saint Ignatius, 368
 bibliography, 371
- Lublin Union, 395
- Lucretius, 859
- Ludendorff, 747
- Ludwig the Child, 190
- Lugal, 34
- Luke, 127, 128
- Lumumba, Patrice, 847
- Lusitania*, sinking of, 709
- Luther, Martin, 221, 310, 317, 318, 326, 347, 348, 349, 350
 Anabaptists and, 349
 Bible translated into German by, 310, 350
 bibliography, 371-373
 Charles V and, 358
 death of, 351
 Erasmus and, 330-331, 352
 excommunicated, 350
 humanists and, 330-331, 352
 indulgences opposed by, 349
 Loyola compared with, 368
 ninety-five theses of, 346, 348
 papacy defied by, 348
 Peasants' Revolt opposed by, 351-352
 salvation, in opinion of, 349
 teachings of, 317
 compared with Calvin's, 355
- Lutheran revolt (see Luther, Martin; Lutheranism; Reformation, Lutheran)
- Lutheranism, 350-351
 Anabaptists and, 358
 Calvinism compared with, 353-355
 Charles V, Emperor, and, 365
 chronological charts, 306, 308-309
 in Denmark, 393
 in England, 361, 365
 in Holland, 359
 in Poland, 396
 Religious Peace of Augsburg, 350, 351
 in Sweden, 352, 391
- Luxembourg, duchy of, 534, 555
- Lyceum, 75
- Lycurgan system, 60
- Lycurgus, 58, 60
- Lydians, 43
- McAdam, John, 577
- Ma'at*, 27
- Maccabees, 45, 126

- Macedonia, 64, 96
 MacArthur, Douglas, 802
 MacDonald, Ramsay, 761, 762
 MacMahon, Count de, president, 607
 Macmillan, Harold, 827
 MacPherson, James, 634, 635
 Machault, 421
 Machiavelli, Niccolò, 247, 377
 Madagascar, 833
 Magi, 42
 Maginot line, 769, 790
Magistri militum, 146
 Magna Carta, 233, 256
 Magyars, 189, 192, 193, 559, 560
 Mahdi, 682
 Mahomet, 167, 177
 death of, 170
 early life of, 167, 168
 flight from Mecca to Yathrib, of, 169
 Hegira of, 170
 Maid of Orléans, 267
 See also Joan of Arc
 Major domus, 154, 185
 Malagasy Republic, 833
 Malaya, 829
 Malayan peninsula, 677, 716
 Mallarmé, Stephen, 662
 Malory, Sir Thomas, 298
 Malpighi, 477
 Malta, 531
 Malthus, Thomas, 489, 568, 641
 Manchuria, 676, 771, 773, 798, 799, 820
 Manchu Dynasty, 673, 677, 678
 Boxer Rebellion, 675
 Chinese Rebellion against, 674
 fall of, 675
 Japanese war against, 675
 Mandats, 508
 Manet, Edouard, 663
 Manfred, king of Sicily, 240
 Manichaeism, 42, 235
 Mann, Thomas, 869
 Manuel II, king of Portugal, 754
 Manzoni, Alessandro, 636
 Mao Tse-tung, 839, 840, 841
 Maquis, 831
 Marathon, battle of, 41, 65
 Marcel, Étienne, 266
 Marcel, Gabriel, 882
 Marchand, Major, 685
 Marduk, 34, 35, 40
 Marengo, battle of, 512
 Margraves, 187
 Marguerite of Navarre, 326, 327
 Maria Theresa, of Austria, 386
 Marie Antoinette, queen of France, 490, 499
 Marie Louise, Archduchess, 515
 Maritain, Jacques, 884
 Maritime Provinces, 616, 618
 Marins, 99, 104
 Marlowe, Christopher, 328
 Marshall Plan, 816-817, 826, 837
 Marston Moor, battle of, 436
 Martel, Charles, 185
 Martin V, Pope, 316
 Marx, Karl, 8, 592, 593, 594
 bibliography, 596
 communist manifesto of, 552
 "scientific" Socialism of, 590, 591
 Marxian Socialism, 728
 in Russia, 727, 729
 Marxian Theory, 841
 Mary Magdalene, 130
 Mary, mother of Jesus, 128
 Mary I, queen of England, 362, 427
 Mary, queen of Scots, 357, 364
 Massacio, 321
 Mass, 353
 Matahele, 686
 Matilda, 254
 Matisse, Henri, 876
 Matrimony, 220
 Matthew, 127, 128
 Maupéou, 422
 Mauritius, 668
 Maximian, 144, 145
 Maximilian I, Emperor, 349, 350
Maxims, 452
 Maxwell, James Clark, 645
 Mayflower, 430
 Mazirin, Jules, 410, 411
 Mazzini, Giuseppe, 545-547
 Mecca, 167
 Medes, 41
 Medici, 317
 Medici, Catherine de, 356
 Medici, Marie de, 410
 Medicine, advance of, 474, 475
 Medieval Age (*see* Middle Ages)
 Medina, 170
 Megaliths, 16
 Mehemet Ali, 681-682
 Melancthon, Philip, 351
 Memphis, 27
 Mendel, Gregor, 642, 864
 Mendelssohn, Felix, 636
 Mendès-France, Pierre, 832
 Mendicant orders (*see under* Church)
 Menelik, 682
 Menhirs, 17
 Menou, Krishna, 842
 Merchant guild, 214
 Mercia, 247
 Merovingian kingdom, 152-154, 185, 190
 Meroveus, 154
 Mesolithic Age, 115
 Mesopotamia, 23, 33-43
 bibliography of, 50-51
 chronological charts of, 22-23, 28-29
 conquest of, by Cyrus, 35
 "cradle of civilization" in, 24
 creation, conception of, 35
 Egypt, civilization of, contrasted with, 36
 Hebrews influenced by, 35
 influence of, summary, 42
 man, his role in religion of, 36, 37
 mathematics, 35
 pessimistic view of life in, 35
 religion of, 35-36
 contrasted with Hebrew monotheism, 36
 See also Assyria; Babylonians; Sumerians
 Messenian Wars, 58
 Messiah, 48, 126, 128, 129
 "Messiah" (oratorio), 457
 Mestizos, 538
 Metallurgy, beginnings of, 18
Metaphysics, 76, 288
 Methodism, 484
 See also Wesley, John
 Methodius, Saint, 164
 Metternich, Clemens von, 528, 534, 536, 545, 552
 Mexico, Spanish conquest of, 541
 Micah, 36, 46, 128
 Michael Scotus, 284
 Michelangelo, Buonarroti, 319, 321, 322
 Michelson-Morley experiments, 860
 Middle Ages, 181-217, 219-243, 245-275, 276-303
 agriculture in, 344-345
 architecture in, 292, 318
 Gothic, 292-295
 Romanesque, 292
 Aristotle, influence upon, 182, 284
 art in, 292, 320-323, 331
 astrology in, 287
 astronomy in, 288
 banks in, 336
 bibliography of, 217-218, 275, 303-304
 capitalism, growth of, during, 333
 Carolingian renaissance in, 279-281

Middle Ages (*Cont.*)

- chronological charts of, 180, 224, 248-249
- Church in, 189-190, 192-193, 216-217, 346-347
- commerce in, 343
 - fairs, 215-216
 - markets, 215
- craft guilds in, 215
- Crusades during, 209, 228-231
- Dark Ages in, 277
- discovery, voyages of, in, 337-341
- education in, 279, 291-292
- feudal system in, 193, 194, 195-204
- France in, 260-265
- Great Schism in, 242, 316
- heresies in, 234-235, 316
- industry in, 238, 336
- literature in, 296-297
 - drama, 302
 - heroic epic, 298-299
 - in Latin, 297
 - poetry, 297
- maternal system in, 204-205
- merchant guilds in, 214
- music in, 296, 297
- Muslim civilization, influence upon, 284
- mystery plays in, 302
- papacy in, 222-228, 317
 - See also* as main entry
- Papal States in, 219-222
- passion plays in, 302, 303
- peasantry in, 207-209
 - emancipation of, in, 212
- Plato, influence upon, 182
- science in, 286, 288, 289, 323
- sculpture in, 318
- theology in, 281
- towns in, 213
 - See also under* specific main entries
- Milan, 147
- Milan Obrenovitch, king of Serbia, 537
- Miller, William (*see* Seventh-day Adventists)
- Milosh, 536
- Milton, John, 452-453
- Minaret, 176
- Minkowski, Hermann, 860
- Minnesingers, 297
- Mirabeau, 499, 506
- Miranda, Francisco de, 537, 538, 539
- Missi dominici*, 187, 253
- Missionary work, 678
 - African slave trade and, 683-684

- Catholic orders engaged in, 669, 684
 - Protestants engaged in, 669, 684
- Mithra, 125
- Mithraism, 42, 126, 128
- Mithras the Redeemer, 42
- Mithridates VI, of Pontus, 100
- Model parliament, 257
- Mohacs, battle of, 379
- Mohammed (*see* Mahomet)
- Moiro, 70
- Moldavia, 536
- Molière, Jean Baptiste, 451
- Mollet, Guy, 833
- Molotov, Vyacheslav, 783, 791
- Mombasa, 679
- "Mona Lisa," 322
- Monarchy, 5
 - absolute, 105, 374
 - in France, 378, 398, 407
 - in Germany, 377
 - in Russia, 398
 - See also* Absolutism
 - constitutional (*see under* names of countries and rulers)
- Monck, General, 438
- Monet, Claude, 663
- Money, 43
- Mongols, empire of, 165
- Monnet Plan, 831
- Monotheism, 45, 46
- Montague-Chelmsford reforms, 764
- Montaigne, Michel de, 327, 328
- Monte Cassino, 137, 138
- Montesquieu, 486, 487, 604
- Montgomery, General, 795
- Moravia, 165
- Moravians, 164, 484
- More, Sir Thomas, 361, 590
- Morreau, 512
- Morelos, José, 538, 541
- Moriacos, 273, 389
- Mormons, 660
- Morocco, 679, 769, 832
 - conquest by French, 682
- Morte d'Arthur*, 298
- Moscow, 165, 398, 401, 402
 - Hitler's failure to take, 795
 - Napoleon's capture of, 516
 - retreat from, 516
- Moses, 44, 131, 880
- Motet, 296
- Mozambique, 680
- Mozart, 457-458
- Muerzin, 169, 176
- Munich Agreement, 763
 - crisis, 753
- Munich Conference, 745
- Muslim civilization, 159-167
 - "Arabic" numerals in, 173

- Arabs, contribution of, to, 174
- architecture in, 175
- art in, 174-176
- astronomy in, 174
- bibliography of, 177-178
- chronological chart of, 160-161
- disruption of Mediterranean trade, by, 193
- literature in, 176
- mathematics in, 173
- medicine in, 173
- philosophy in, 173
- religion in, 167-169
 - See also* Islam
- science in, 173-175
- Muslim Empire, 158-177
 - See also* Muslim civilization
- Mussolini, Benito, 549, 740, 741-744, 753, 754, 769, 778, 782
 - Catholic Populist Party, contempt of, by, 742
 - Hitler, initial opposition to, by, 744
 - Socialists, contempt of, by, 742
- Mustapha Kemal, 535
- Mutual Security Administration, 820
- M V D, 735
- Mycale, 65
- Mycenae, 52, 56
- Nagasaki, 799
- Nahum, 40
- Naples, 545, 548
- Napoleon, 506-508, 525, 526, 530, 539, 550
 - abdication of, 516, 528
 - achievements of, 517-518
 - Austria defeated by, 509, 547
 - bibliography, 518-519
 - character of, 517-518
 - chronological chart, 496-497
 - Cisalpine Republic formed by, 508
 - Code Napoléon, 512
 - Constitution of the Year VIII, as First Consul, 510-511
 - continental blockade, 514
 - Britain's retaliation of, 514
 - Convention and, 507
 - Directory and, 507-508, 509, 543
 - Egyptian Expedition, 509
 - Elba, escape from, by, 516
 - exile to, of, 516
 - Emperor of the French, 510
 - French Revolution and, 507-512
 - Hundred Days, 517
 - Italian campaign, 508
 - Josephine, marriage to, 514
 - annulment of, 515

- Napoleon (*Cont.*)
 Legion of Honor, instituted by, 517
 Marie Louise, marriage to, 515
 Moscow, retreat from, 516
 Russia, invaded by, 516
 St. Helena, exile to, of, 517
 Spain, interference in, by, 514
 Wars of, 512-517, 544
 Waterloo, defeat at, 517
See also Bonaparte, Jerome;
 Bonaparte, Joseph
 Napoleon III, Emperor of France, 546, 547, 599
 attack on Prussia by, 549, 556
 Austria, defeat of, by, 547
 Bismarck and, 555, 556
 Garibaldi defeated by, 549
 Seven Weeks' War, 549
See also Louis Napoleon
 Narses, 151
 Narva, battle of, 392, 405
 Naseby, 436
 Nasser, Gamal, 827, 843, 844
 Natal, 688
 National Assembly (French), 499, 500, 501, 503
 National Convention (French), 503, 504, 505, 507
 National Socialist Germany, 726, 738
 National state, 246-275
 characteristics of, 246
 chronological chart, 248
 Egypt, compared with, 245
 England as, 246
 France as, 247
 Germany, reasons for slow evolution into, 246
 Italy, reasons for slow evolution into, 246
 separatist tendencies in, 246
See also names of countries
 Nationalism, 523, 565
 ancient world and, 523-524
 effect of Napoleonic wars on, 525-526, 544
 Western Europe, beginnings in, of, 524
 Nationalization Act, 615
 NATO, 817, 823, 827, 831, 834, 837
 nations belonging to, 819
 Naturalism, 639-640
 counter-movements to, 657-661
 Catholicism, movement within, 659
 Oxford movement (tractarian), 658-659
 literature and the arts, revolt against, 661-663
 musical innovations and, 663-665
 religious revival and, 657-665
 Christian Science, 660
 Evangelical, 659-660
 Humanitarian, 660
 Millennialist sects, 661
 Mormons and, 660-661
 Theosophy and, 661
 Navarino, battle of, 536
 Navarre, 271, 272
 Nazi movement, 593
See also Germany; Hitler
 Neanderthal man, 13
 Near East civilizations, 24-50
See also specific main entries
 Necker, Jacques, 497, 498
 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 764, 842
 Nelson, Horatio, 509, 518
 neo-Thomist movement, 184
 Neoclassicism, 458-460
 Neolithic Age, 14
 Neolithic revolution, 4, 16-18, 567
 Neoplatonism, 173
 N E P system, 736
 Nepotism, 223
 Nero, 11, 112, 113, 131, 133
 Nerva, 111
 Netherlands, 341
 bibliography, 372
 Calvinism in, 359, 379, 382
 colonies in New World of, 445
 East Indies, 673, 793, 796
 English wars against, 437
 expansion in Africa by, 342
 in New World by, 442
 Far East empire, built by, 352
 French rule of, 390
 Hapsburg rule of, 382, 386
 Philip II and, 382, 387
 Spanish Netherlands, 386, 387, 390, 418, 419
 Spanish rule of, 386, 387, 390, 418, 419
 revolt against, 378
 United Provinces of, 360, 379
 World War II and, 791
See also Holland; Zealand
 Neutrality Acts, 771, 794
 New Deal, the, 772, 773
 New Grenada, 539, 540
 New South Wales, 618
 New Testament, 128, 135
 New Zealand, 618-619
 New World, European rivalry for possession of, 443
 Newcastle, duke of, 571
 Newcomen, Thomas, 572, 574
 Newton, Sir Isaac, 461, 464, 467, 468, 469, 470-471, 472, 473, 484, 858, 859, 860
 Nibelungenlied, 297
 Nicaea, Council of, 136
 Nice, 546, 547, 606, 779
 Nicholas V, Pope, 317
 Nicholas of Oresme, 291
 Nicholas I, tsar of Russia, 533, 534, 554, 560, 562
 Nicholas II, tsar of Russia, 562, 707, 709, 727, 729, 730
 Niebuhr, Reinhold, 885
 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 639, 651, 882
 Nigeria, 685, 829
 Nike of Samothrace, 85, 86
 Nilotic people, 679
 Nineveh, 40
 Nogaret, 242
 Norfolk System of agriculture, 569
 Norman Conquest, 250
 Normandy, 797
 Normans, 249
 North Africa, 680, 683, 769-770
 North German Federation, 555
 Northmen, 189, 193
 England invaded by, 194, 247
 Normandy settled by, 194
 Sicily conquered by, 194
 Northumberland, duke of, 362
 Northumbria, 247
 Norway, 392
 chronological chart, 392
 freed from Denmark, 393
 Lutheranism in, 393
 Protestantism in, 352
 union with Denmark, 393
 World War II and, 791
 Notre Dame of Paris, 294, 296
 Noumena, 483
 Nous, 74, 75
 Novels, 117
 Nyasaland, 679
 Nystadt, treaty of, 392, 405, 563
 Oates, Titus, 438, 439
 Oberammergau, passion play, 303
 Obolus, 196, 204
 Occam, William of, 276, 285
 Octavian, 102
See also Augustus Caesar
 Oder-Neisse boundary, 836
 Odo, 261
 Odoacer, 148
 Odysseus, 114, 298
 Odyssey, 53, 55, 70, 114, 298
 Oedipus, 75
 Oedipus complex, 866
 O'Hara, John, 869
 O'Higgins, Bernardo, 540
 Old Testament, 48, 50, 137, 139
 Oliva, peace of, 392
 Olmutz, humiliation of, 554, 555

- Omar Khayyám, 176
 Oondurman, 685
 Onmeyed dynasty, 170, 172
 O'Neill, Eugene, 872
 Open Door Policy, 675
 Oprichnina, 402
 Optimates, 98
 Orange, free state of South Africa, 688, 689
Oration on the Dignity of Man, 313
 Oratory of Divine Love, 365
 Order of the Harmonious Fist, 675
 Orders-in-Council, 514
 Organic laws, 511
 Orlando, 712
 Orléans, 268
 Orozco, José, 875
 Osiris, 25, 30
 Ossian, 635
 Ostia, 108
 Ostrogoths, 148, 150, 151, 159
 Otto I, 190, 192
 Otto, Niclaus, 583
 Ottoman Empire, 159, 165
 See also Turkey
 Owen, Robert, 590
 Oxenstierna, Count, 392
 Oxford University, 289
- Pacioli, 335
 Padua University, 77, 291, 323, 461, 475
 Paez, Antonio, 540
 Pakistan, 829, 842, 843
 Palacký, Frantisek, 559, 560
 Palatinate, 382
 Palenlithic Age, 14
 Palestine, 29, 44, 829
 mandated to Britain, 764
 national home of Jews, in, 765
 See also Hebrews; Israel; Judah
 Palmyra, 144
 Pantheon, 114
 Papacy, 219-243
 absolutism of, in Avignon period, 185
 Avignon period of, 135, 241, 351
 bibliography of, 211, 218, 243-244
 Byzantine Empire, relations with, 189
 Charlemagne, relations with, 186, 189, 191, 193
 chronological charts of, 180, 191, 224
 Climac reform of, 223-226
 Conciliar movement in, 316
 Councils of (*see under city where held*)
 Crusades, effect on, 227-231
 England, relations with, 240, 315
 France, relations with, 240, 315, 501
 Great Schism in, 242, 316
 Gregory VII, rule of, 226-227, 231
 Hohenstaufen emperors, conflict with, 231-232
 in feudal system, 219-226
 Luther's defiance of, 221, 233, 317, 320, 350
 Otto I, relations with, 190, 191, 193
 Renaissance, influence upon, 317
 return to Rome of, 317
 secular powers, conflicts with, 225
 See also Church; Popes; and under names of popes
 Papal legate, 226
 Papal States, 219, 222-223, 246, 544, 545
 Italian kingdom, threat to, 547
 revenues of, 219
 Papen, Franz von, 748, 749
 Paracelsus, 333
 Paradise, 169, 349
Paradise Lost, 452
Paradise Regained, 453
Paradiso, 301
 Paraguay, 541
 Paré, Ambroise, 333
 Paris, 481, 501, 503
 capture of, 516
 fall of, in World War II, of, 791
 treaty of, 528
 bibliography, 565-566
 Crimean war and, 534
 Paris University, 291, 463
Parlement de Paris, 263, 411-412, 422, 495
 Parliament, British, 608, 609
 factory conditions, investigation of, by, 579
 See also under England
 Parnell, Charles Stuart, 614
 Parthenon, 78, 79, 80, 114
 Parthia, 101
 Parthian Empire, 112
 Parthians, 42
Parts of Animals, 76
Partisal, 298, 299
 Pasha Ismail, 681
 Passion plays, 302, 303
 Pasteur, Louis, 648
 Patricians, 91, 97
Patrocinius, 196
 Paul, 130, 131, 132-135
 See also Saul of Tarsus
 Paul III, Pope, 351, 365
 Paul IV, Pope (Carafa), 365, 366
Pax Romana, 108, 109, 133
 Peasants' Revolt, 344, 351, 352
 in Russia, 407
 Peel, Sir Robert, 610, 613
 Peirce, Charles, 648, 649
 Peking man, 13
 Pelagius, 136, 137
 Peloponnesian War, 61, 64, 65, 66
 Penance, 204, 220
 Penicillin, 865
 Pentateuch, 49
 Pepi II, 27
 Pepin III, the Short, 185-186
 Pepin, Donation of (*see* Donation of Pepin)
 Pergamum, 82
 Pericles, 64, 66, 67, 68
Periæci, 58
 Permanent Court of Justice, 771
 Perry, Commodore Matthew, 676
 Persia, Alexander the Great, conquest of, 41
 Egypt conquered by, 32
 empire of, 41
 Greece, defeat of, 60, 65, 81
 Medes, conquest by, 41
 Mesopotamia, conquered by, 29
 Palestine conquered by, 29
 Zoroastrianism of, 41
 Persian Wars, 64, 65, 81
 Peru, 549
 Pétain, 769, 792, 831
 Peter, Saint, 129, 130, 133, 135, 136
 Peter the Great, 392, 402, 405
 reign of, 402-405
 wars of, 403
 Peter the Hermit, 228
 Peter de Maricourt, 291
 Peters, Karl, 686, 706
 Petit jury, 254
 Petition of Right, 432
 Petrarch, 312
 Petrine supremacy, 135, 136, 139, 152
 Petrograd, 730, 731, 732
 Phanariots, 536
 Pharaohs, 26, 37
 as king-gods, 32
 Hebrews under, 29-30
 pyramids of, 26-27
 Pharisees, 126, 128, 130, 131
 Pharsalia, battle of, 100
Phèdre, 451
 Phidias, 78
 Philip Augustus, king of France, 201, 230, 260
 Philip IV (the Fair), king of France, 241, 242, 264, 337

- Philip VI (of Valois), king of France, 265
- Philip II, of Macedon, 66, 80
- Philip II, king of Spain, 382, 386, 387
- bibliography of, 447, 448
- England, conquest of, planned by, 388
- financial difficulties of, 389
- French civil and religious war, interference in, by, 387
- marriage to Mary Tudor, 388
- Netherlands revolt and, 389
- Protestant Reformation and, 387
- Spanish Armada and, 388
- taxation under, 389
- wars of, 389, 390
- Philippi, battle of, 102
- Philippine Islands, 773, 796
- Philosophy, 639, 640
- bibliography, 666-667
- epicurism, 650
- modern, 640
- Stoicism, 650
- Kierkegaard, 652
- Nietzsche, 651
- Schopenhauer, 651
- Phoenicians, 43, 44, 55
- Physiocrats, 488, 489, 497
- Picasso, Pablo, 876
- Piedmont, 545, 547
- Pietà, 319
- Pilgrims, 430
- Pisa, Council of, 316
- Pisistratus, 63
- Pithecanthropus erectus, 13
- Pitt, William, the Elder, 444, 538, 609
- Pitt, William, the Younger, 609
- Pius II, Pope, 317
- Pius V, Pope, Elizabeth I (England) excommunicated by, 363
- Pius IX, Pope, 415, 549, 659
- Pius X, Pope, 659
- Planck, Max, 858
- Plantagenets, 249
- Plataea, 65
- Plato, 68, 70-76, 114
- Aristotle contrasted with, 76, 287, 288
- Dialogues* of, 74
- Republic* of, 74
- Socrates, as teacher of, 72, 73
- Plebeians, 89, 97, 98
- Pleistocene Age, 14
- Plurality of Worlds, 481
- Poetics, 45
- Poincaré, Raymond, 766
- Point Four Program, 819, 820
- Poitiers, battles of, 166, 185
- Poland, 352, 392-393, 394-395, 396-397
- bibliography, 447
- chronological chart, 395
- discovery of national identity, 524
- feudalism in, 393, 396
- governmental institutions in, 396
- Lutheranism in, 396
- monarchy in, 397
- partitions of, 395, 397, 739
- Protestantism in, 352
- Reformation in, 396
- uncertainty over Prussia, 394
- wars with Russia, 396
- wars with Sweden, 392, 396
- Poles in Galicia, 559
- revolt of, 560
- Polis, 55, 79, 80, 83
- Polish Corridor, 713, 779, 783
- Polish minorities, united in national state, 560
- See also* World War II
- Politburo (see Praesidium)
- Politics, 76
- Poltava, 392
- Polyphony, 296
- Pombal, Marquis of, 387
- Pomerania, 392
- Pompeii, 459
- Pompey, 100, 117, 126
- Pontifex Maximus, 105
- Pontius Pilate, 129
- "Poor Men of Lyons," 234
- See also* Waldensians
- Popes (see Church; Papacy; and names of popes)
- Portugal, 271, 386, 387, 541, 754
- chronological chart, 249
- decline of, 386
- dictator rule in, 754
- England, alliance with, 387
- explorations by, 274, 338, 339
- consequences of, 338
- freed from Spanish rule, 387
- incorporated into Spanish kingdom, 338, 386
- mercantilism in, 387
- slavery in, 338
- Portuguese in Africa, 680
- in Brazil, 541
- Portuguese Guinea, slave trade in, 685
- Portsmouth, Treaty of, 729
- Posterior Analytics, 289
- Postimpressionism, 663
- Potsdam Agreements, 799, 816
- Pound, Ezra, 873
- Poussin, Nicolas, 452, 453
- Praesidium, 735
- Practor pegrinus, 115
- Practor urbanus, 115
- Pragmatism, 649
- Prague, defenestration of, 384
- pan-Slavic congress held at, 560
- Praxiteles, 79
- Precarium, 196
- Predestination, 354
- Prehistory, 3-19
- bibliography of, 10, 19
- chronological chart of, 3
- evolution of man, 11-12
- Presbyterian Church, 357, 435-437
- Prester, John, 338
- Preston, battle of, 437
- Prévôt, 262
- Priestley, Joseph, 479
- Primogeniture, 199
- abolishment in France, of, 512
- Prince, 377
- Princeps, 108, 109
- Princeps Senatus, 105
- Principia Mathematica, 471, 481
- Proconsular imperium, 105
- Promissory notes, 336
- Protestant Reformation, 221, 242, 310, 351-370
- background of, 346
- bibliography, 371-373
- consequences of, 370
- in England, 360-364
- humanist movement and, 325, 326
- monarchs and the, 385
- Philip II (Spain) and, 387-388
- political issues and the, 385-386
- Spain and the, 387-388
- See also* Reformation
- Protestantism, 237, 352
- in Bohemia, 317, 352
- Catholic Reformation and, 367-369
- Edict of Nantes, 356
- in England, 363
- in France, 356
- See also* Huguenots
- Louis XIV and, 414-415
- in Poland, 352
- Zwinglian, 352
- See also* Anglicanism; Calvinism; Lutheranism
- Proust, Marcel, 870, 871
- Provence, 176
- Proverbs, 47
- Prussia, 374, 386, 395, 549, 550, 556
- army of, 394, 554
- defeat of Napoleon by, 517
- growth of national feeling in, 526

Prussia (*Cont.*)

Junkers military class in, 394, 553

loss of territory of partitioned Poland, 513

peace of Westphalia and, 393

Polish suzerainty over, 394

separation of West Prussia from, 513

serfdom abolished in, 518

Seven Weeks' War, 549

Zollverein and, 551

Ptolemies in Egypt, 32

Ptolemy, Claudius, 114, 173, 464, 467

Ptolemy I, Soter, 82

Publicani, 97

Punic Wars, 95, 97

Purgatorio, 301

Purgatory, 220, 349

Puritan Revolution (*see under* England)

Puritanism, 356

Calvinism compared with, 429

democracy and, 355

Elizabeth I and, 428

as in ideal, 356

James, king of England and Scotland, and, 429-430

Puritans, 355, 356, 429, 430, 431, 438

emigration to America, 444

satire on religious differences between sects of, 435

Puteoli, 108

Pym, John, 435

Pyrrhic Wars, 94

Pyrrhus, 95

Quadrant, 177

Quadrivium, 279

Quadruple Alliance, 533

Quebec, 617

Quebec Act, 445

Quesnel, François, 415

Quintuple Alliance, 533

Quisling, Vidkun, 791

Quod sic videtur, 283

Rabelais, François, 327

Racine, Jean, 451

Radicals, 527, 610, 611

Radioactive isotope, 863

Raleigh, Walter, 329

Ramadan, 169

Ramesses II, 32

Ranke, Otto, 867

Ranke, Otto von, 657

Rapallo, treaty of, 748

Raphael, Santi, 322, 454

Rasputin, 730

Rauschnig, Hermann, 750

Ravenna, 135, 147, 148, 151

Ray, John, 480

Realism, 639-640

in drama, 655-656

in fiction, 653

in fine arts, 656

pessimism and, 652

in poetry, 652

transition from romanticism to, 639

Redshirts (*see* Garibaldi)

Reformation, bibliography, 371-373

Calvinism, 353-356

Catholic, 365, 370

Council of Trent, 316, 322, 366

movements toward reform, 365

reforming popes, 365-366

See also Reformation, Counter chronological chart, 308-309

Counter, 317, 365

in Bohemia, 317

Maximilian of Bavaria and, 349, 350

See also Reformation, Catholic in England, 360-361, 363

Lutheran, 221, 317, 348-352

in Poland, 353, 396

Protestant, 221, 242, 310, 351-370

background of, 346

in England, 360-363

Philip II (Spain) and, 387

Religious Peace of Augsburg, 350, 351, 382, 384

in Scotland, 357

Swiss (Zwinglians), 352-353

Reformed Church (*see* Calvinism)

Reforming popes, 365-366

Reginald, Archbishop of Reims, 269

Reginald of Charters (*see* Reginald of Reims)

Regrating, 217

Reichstag, 557-559, 594, 746, 750

communist and Nazi deputies in, 748

destruction by fire, of, 749

Reign of Terror, 488, 505, 507, 599

Relief, 199

Religious Peace of Augsburg, 350, 351, 382, 384

Remarque, Erich Maria, 869

Rembrandt, 450, 454-455, 456

Renaissance, 310-337

art in, 313, 320-323, 325

beginnings of, 324

bibliography, 371-373

chronological charts, 306, 308-309

Church in, 314, 317, 318

defined, 310

education in, 314

English, 328-329

Flemish, 325, 331

French, 325, 331

German, 325

humanism in, 311, 312, 317, 323, 325

Italian, 311, 312, 314, 324

literature in, 326-327

medieval contrasts, 311

science in, 323-324, 333

sculpture in, 319, 333

Spanish, 329-330

urbanization and, 311

Renan, Ernest, 651

Renoir, Jean, 663

"Republic of Virtue," 488, 506, 507

See also Robespierre

Reuchlin, John, 325-326

Revolutionary Tribunal, 505

Reynard the Fox, 299

Rhine, 147

Rhineland, 713, 753, 768, 779, 780

Rhodes, Cecil, 686

Rhodesia, 686

Ribbentrop, 791

Ricardo, David, 489, 592

Richard I (the Lion-Hearted), king of England, 230

Richard II, king of England, 259

Richard III, king of England, 260

Richard, Duke of York, 259

Richelieu, Armand de, 356, 384, 392, 410, 411

Académie Française founded by, 471

Académie des sciences founded by, 471, 481

bibliography, 447

domestic policy of, 410

foreign policy of, 410

Huguenots suppressed by, 356

intendants and, 409-410

noble rebellions and, 410

Thirty Years' War and, 392

Riemann, Georg Friedrich, 860

Rimbaud, Arthur, 662, 874

Rilke, Rainer Maria, 874

Risorgimento, 544, 545

Rivers, Diego, 875

Robespierre, 502, 505-507

Reign of Terror and, 488

"Republic of Virtue," effort to establish, by, 488

Robles, Gil, 781

- Rococo, 457-458
 Chippendale furniture influenced by, 457
 music influenced by, 457
- Rodin, Auguste, 657
- Röntgen, 645
- Roman civilization, 89-121, 141-156
 Byzantine civilization influenced by, 158, 159, 161
 chronological charts, 90-91, 143
 Etruscans, influence upon, 91
 Greek civilization, influence upon, 95, 96, 107, 113-114
 Merovingian kingdom influenced by, 154
 Twelve Tables in, 92
- Roman culture, 113-121
 architecture, 117-119
 basilica, 119
 art, 117
 Greek culture contrasted with, 114, 119-120
 law, 114-117
 literature, 113
 philosophy, 114
 Epicurism, 84
 Stoicism, 84, 116
 sculpture, 119-121
- Roman Empire, 101-121, 141-156
 army, domination of, 104
 reform of, 108
 Augustus, as ruler of, 104-106
See also as main entry
 after Augustus, 106, 110-113
 barbarian invasions of, 147-148, 150, 153
 barbarians, relations with, 150
 "barrack emperors" in, 142, 144
 bibliography of, 121-122, 156
 Burgundians, invasion of, 150
 chronological chart of, 143
 Constantine's rule of, 146-147
See also as main entry
 Franks, invasion of, 153
 Germans, invasion of, 153
 Goths, invasion of, 148
 Huns, invasion of, 148
 invasion by barbarians of, 147, 148, 150, 153
 Justinian, restoration of, 150-151
 law under, 114-117
 provinces under, 107, 112-113
 reorganization of, 106-108
 Senate under, 99-102
 totalitarianism in, 146-147
 Vandals, invasion of, 148, 150
- Roman Forum, 93
- Roman law, 114-117
 bibliography of, 121-122
 citizenship rights under, 94, 115
 codification of, 115, 116-117
Corpus Juris Civilis, of, 117
edictum in, 115
 equity, under, 115
ius civile of, 115
ius gentium of, 115
ius naturale in, 116
juris prudentes under, 116
 Justinian Code of, 116-117
praetor peregrinus under, 115
praetor urbanus under, 115
 Theodosian Code of, 116
 Twelve Tables of, 92
- Roman Republic, 89, 91
 bibliography of, 121-122
 Carthage, Punic Wars with, 95-96
 chronological chart of, 90-91
 Gracchan Revolution during, 98-99
 Greece conquered by, 94-95
 Macedonia, defeated by, 96
 oligarchy in, 99
 provincial system of, 96-97
 Senate, under, 99-102
 Sulla's reforms of, 99
- Romance of the Rose*, 300
- Romanesque architecture, 292
- Romanov, Michael, 402
- Romanov dynasty, 402
 Nicholas I, 533-534
- Romans, Egypt falls to the, 42
 Hebrews conquered by, 45
 Punic Wars, 95, 97
 Pyrrhic Wars, 94-95
 Samnite Wars, 94
- Rome, 89, 141, 147, 148
 Alaric, sacking of, by, 148
 Attila, invasion of, by, 148
 Carthage, defeated by, 95-96
 Etruscans, domination over, 91
 expansion of, 108-109
 fall of, 141
 French invasion of, 326
 Gauls, invasion by, 150
 Goths, sacking of, 148
 government in early, 96
 Huns, invasion of, 148
 Macedonia conquered by, 96
 papacy, ruler of, 150, 152
 patricians in, 91, 92, 97
 plebeians in, 89, 91, 97
 Sicily conquered by, 95
 Vandals, sacking of, 148, 150
 Vatican and, 549
- Rommel, Erwin, 795
- Romulus, 91
- Roncesvalles, 186
- Roosevelt, Franklin D., 773, 794, 800, 801
- Roosevelt, Theodore, 728
- Rosetta Stone, 509
- "Rotten" Boroughs, 609, 612
- Roundheads, 435
- Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 481, 484, 488, 490, 497, 621, 632
General Will, concept of, 487
Social Contract, treatise of, 487
- Ruanda-Urundi, 805
- Rubāiyāt*, 176
- Rubens, Peter Paul, 454
- Rubicon, 100
- Rudolf of Hapsburg, 240
- Rudolph of Swabia, 226
- Ruhr, 768
- Rumania, 536, 709, 720
 Hitler's negotiations with, 794
- Runnymede, 256
- Russell, Bertrand, 650, 880
- Russell, William ("AE"), 874
- Russia, 165, 398-407
 absolutism in, 398, 402, 407, 562, 726
 bibliography, 565, 755-756
 Bolsheviks in, 594, 727, 731, 739
 Bolsheviks' Revolution in, 729-730, 732
 Byzantine civilization, influence on, 400, 401, 405
 Cadet party in, 727, 729
 Catherine the Great, reign of, in, 405, 407
 chronological charts of, 399, 724-725
 Communism in, 552, 564, 593, 732, 734, 735
 compared with capitalistic system, 737-738
 constitutional government, beginnings of, in, 729
 Cossacks in, 406
 expansion of, 406
 Finland acquired by, 563
 First Five-Year Plan in, 736, 840
 French influence on upper classes, in, 405
 Germany, non-aggression pact with, 738-739
 industry, development of, in, 404-405
 invasion by Napoleon, of, 516
 Ivan IV, reign of, in, 401-402
 Mensheviks in, 594, 729
Mir system in, 727
 Moscow, principality in, 398, 399-400
 Peter the Great, reign of, in, 402-405

Russia (Cont.)

- political parties, formation of, in, 727
- provisional government, formation of, in, 730
- Red army of, 733
- Revolution of 1905, 728-729
- rule over minorities by, 563
- Russo-Japanese war, 562
- Russo-Turkish war, 536, 537, 562
- social revolutionaries in, 727, 729
- Socialism (Marxian), in, 727
- Soviet government's separate peace with Germany, 733
- Stolypin regime in, 729
- Sweden, defeat by, 405
- Tsarist government in, 726, 727
- USSR (see under main head)
- Russo-Japanese war, 562, 729
- Russo-Turkish war, 536, 537, 562
- Ruthenia, 719
- Ruthenians, 559
- Rutherford, 644
- Rutilius, Rufus, 97
- Rye House Plot, 439
- Saar, 752
- Sacraments, 132, 134, 220
- Sadducees, 126, 131
- Sadowa, battle of, 555
- Sahara Desert, 679
- St. Catherine of Siena, 315
- St. Helena, 517, 605
- St. Mark's Church, 163
- St. Peter's Cathedral, 320, 347, 453
- St. Petersburg, 404, 405
 - re-named Petrograd, 730
- Saint-Simon, Claude Henri, 589-590
- Saladin, 230
- Salamis, 65
- Salazar, Oliveira, 754
- Salerno, 177
- Salisbury, 251
- Salvation, 220-222
- Salzburg, Cathedral of, 450
- Samnite Wars, 94
- Samothrace, 125
- Samuel, 44
- San Martin, José de, 540
- San Stefano, treaty of, 537, 562
- Sand, George (*Aurore Dupin*), 636
- Sangu, 34
- Sanhedrin, 126
- Santo Domingo, 542
- Sardinia, 95, 96, 545, 546, 547, 555
- Sarmatians, 146
- Sartre, Jean-Paul, 870, 880, 882, 883
- Sassanid Persians, 42
- Satrap, 41
- Saudi Arabia, 843
- Saul of Tarsus, 126, 130
- "Saving the phenomena," 461, 463, 464, 467, 479
- Savonarola, 346
- Savoy, 546, 547, 606, 779
- Saxe-Coburg, 534
- Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, 537
- Saxons, 150, 154, 186
- Saxony, 540, 555
- Scandinavians, 247
 - See also Denmark; Finland; Norway; Sweden
- Scarlatti, Domenico, 457
- Sceptical Chemist, *The*, 478
- Schacht, Hjalmar, 750, 751-752
- Schelling, Friedrich, 633
- Schiller, 633, 637
- Schlegel, Friedrich von, 633, 634
- Schleicher, General von, 748
- Schleswig-Holstein, 554, 555
- Schmalkaldic League, 351
- Schönberg, Arnold, 878
- School of Athens, 161
- "School of Athens," (painting), 322
- Schopenhauer, 639, 647, 651, 654
- Schumann, Robert, 636
- Science, ancient, 34-36
 - Greek, 69-70, 75-77
 - medieval, 286-294
 - modern, 640-648, 857-869
- Scotland, 355
 - Presbyterian Church in, 357
 - Reformation in, 357
 - war with England, 434-436
- Scott, Sir Walter, 631, 635
- Sculpture (see under specific civilization)
- Sebastian, king of Portugal, 386
- Second International, 594
- Security Council, 811, 820
 - See also under United Nations
- Sed contra*, 283
- Seddon, Richard, 619
- Sejanus, 110
- Selassie, Haile, 777
- Seleucid empire, 82, 83
- Seleucus, 82
- Selim I, 172
- Seljuk Turks, 166, 176, 228, 229
 - See also Turks
- Seneca, 111, 114
- Senegal, 685
- Seneschals, 263
- Sens, Archbishop of, 284
- Serbia, 239, 706, 720
 - See also under World War I
- Serbs, 165, 720
- Serfdom, Prussia's abolishment of, 518
- Serfs, Russia's emancipation of, 562
- Servetus, 355
- Seven Books on the Structure of the Human Body*, 333
- Seven Weeks' War, 549, 555
- Seven Years' War, 421, 422, 444, 573
- Seventh-day Adventists, 661
- Severus, Septimius, 141, 142
- Seymour, Jane (see Henry VIII, king of England)
- Shaftesbury, Lord, 590
- Shakespeare, William, 303, 327, 328, 329, 452, 524, 634
- Shamash, 37
- Shaw, George Bernard, 656
- Shelley, Percy Bysshe, 635
- Shool, 36
- Sheriff, 249
- Shiite sect, 170
- Ship of Fools*, 325
- Shire-reeve (see Sheriff)
- Shires, 249
- Siam (see Thailand)
- Siberia, 406, 737
- Sic et Non*, 282
- Sicilian Vespers, 240
- Sicily, 94, 95, 531, 837
 - Garibaldi's capture of, 547
 - Rome, conquest of, 95
 - Western Allies' capture of, 797
- Siegfried Line, 790
- Sierra Leone, 684, 829
- Sieyès, Abbé, 509, 511
- Sigismund, Emperor, 317
- Silesia, 386, 394
- Simon de Montfort, 257
- Simony, 222, 223, 226, 315
- Sinanthropus, 13
- Singapore, 796, 829
- Sinn Féin, 764
- Sistine Chapel, 318, 319, 320
- Six Articles*, 361
- Sixtus IV, Pope, 273, 317
- Skeptics, 125
- Slave trade, abolished by British, 684
 - Africa and, 683-686
 - Arab traffic in, 679
 - European attitude toward, 668
 - Zanzibar slave market, 679
- Slavery, in Egypt, 26, 30
 - in French West Indies, 542
 - in Portugal, 685
 - in Sparta, 84
- Slavic alphabet, 165
- Slavic peoples, 559
 - Croats, 559
 - Czechs, 559
 - Ruthenians, 559

- Slavic peoples (*Cont.*)
 Serbs, 562
 Slovaks, 559
 Slovenes, 559
See also under main entries and
 Hungary; Moravia; Poland;
 Prussia; Russia
- Slavs, conversion of, 164
- Slovaks, 559
- Slovenes, 166, 559
- Smith, Adam, 489
- Socialism, 590, 593, 594
- Socialists, 594
 British, 594
 Christian, 590
 Finnish, 595
 French, 594
 Italian, 594, 741
 Scandinavian, 595
 Uruguayan, 595
See also Russia
- Smith, Joseph: (*see* Mormons)
- Sobieski, Jan, 379, 396
- Social Contract*, 487, 488
- Societies, 3-8
- Society of Jesus, 368, 369
See also Jesuits
- Socrates, 70, 72, 73, 76, 83
- Solemn League and Covenant, 434
- Solomon, 44
- Solon, 62, 65
- Solutio*, 283
- Somaliland, 682
- Somme, battle of the, 757
- Song of Roland*, 297
- Sophists, 71-73, 77-78, 83
- Sophocles, 70
- Sophrosyne*, 56
- Sorbonne, 326
- Sorecery, 222
- Southwest Africa, 680
 Germans in, 686
- Soviet Union, 719, 723, 726, 730,
 731, 790, 794, 797, 800, 815,
 816, 821, 822, 849
 China and, 839
See also Russia; USSR
- Spain, 100, 150, 271-274
 bibliography, 275
 chronological chart, 249
 Church in, 273-274
 colonialism, 339, 442
 decline of, 312, 390, 391
 explorations by, 337, 341
 Goths, conquest of, 148, 155
 Greek colonies in, 55
 Hapsburg rule of, 387
 humanism in, 329
 industry in, 342
 Jews driven out of, 273, 389
 mercantilism, 343
 Mexico, conquest of, 339
 Moors driven out of, 389
 Netherlands ruled by, 387
 Peru, conquest of, 339
 Portugal united with, 337
 possessions of, 339
 Italian territories of, 389
 Latin America, loss of, 537-
 540
 Protestant Reformation and, 387-
 388
 Renaissance in, 329-330
 treasure ships, 389
 wars with France, 390
See also names of rulers
- Spanish Armada, 388, 524
- Spanish Civil War, 780-783
- Spanish Inquisition, 273, 341, 368,
 387
- Spanish Netherlands (*see* Nether-
 lands, Spanish rule of)
- Sparta, 56, 58, 59-61, 66, 84
 defeat at Thermopylae, 65
 victory at Plataea, 65
- Spartiates, 58
- Spencer, Herbert, 650
- Spengler, Oswald, 8, 449
- Spenser, Edmund, 329
- Spirit of the Laws* (*see* Montes-
 quieu)
- Spiritual Exercises*, 368
- Spiritualism, 661
- Spirituals, 237
- Sputnik, 825
- Stalin, 592, 734-736, 739, 740, 783,
 794, 800, 802, 822, 823
- Stalingrad, 795
- Stanley, H. M., 685-686
- States-General, 264, 266, 273, 493,
 497, 498
 becomes National Assembly, 499
- Statute of Livery and Maintenance,
 425
- Statute of Westminster, 765
- Stavisky riots, 767
- Steel, 576
 Bessemer process, 576
 Gilchrist-Thomas processes, 576
 Siemens-Martin method of mak-
 ing, 576
- Steinbeck, John, 869
- Stephen, first Christian martyr, 130
- Stephen II, Pope, 185, 186
- Stephen, king of England, 253, 254
- Stephen Dushan, 116
- Stephenson, George, 574
- Stockholm, treaty of, 392
- Stoicism, 84, 116, 650
- Stoics, 84, 111, 112, 116
- Stolypin, Peter, 729
- Stonehenge, 16
- Strafford, Earl of (Thomas Went-
 worth), 433, 434
- Strassburg, 325
- Strauss, Richard, 665
- Stravinsky, Igor, 879
- Streletsy*, 401
- Streptomycin, 865
- Stresemann, Gustav, 747, 748, 768
- Strindberg, August, 656
- Stuarts, 424, 425, 428, 429, 450
 bibliography, 447, 448
- Styria, 382
- Suhinfederation, 197, 251
- Sucre, Antonio de, 540
- Sudan, 679, 680
 conquest of, 682
- Sudanese, 679
- Sudeten-Germans, 714, 753
- Sudetenland, 754, 779
- Suez Canal, 680, 681, 795
 Nasser and, 827, 844
- Suffrage, universal manhood, 601,
 607, 621
 for women, 757
- Suleiman the Magnificent, 379
- Sulla, 99
- Sullivan, Louis, 876
- Sully, duke of, 408-410
- Sumerians, 34-37
- Summa Theologica*, 285
- Sun Yat-Sen, 675
- Sunni, 170
- Suzerain, 195
- Sven (*see* Sweyn)
- Sweden, 352
 chronological chart of, 391
 expansion of, 392
 Lutheranism in, 352, 391
 as national state, 391, 392
 peace of Westphalia and, 392
 Protestantism in, 352, 392
 Russia, wars with, 392, 405
 Thirty Years' War and, 392
 wars with Denmark, 391, 392
 wars with Poland, 391, 392
- Sweyn, 247
- Switzerland, 274, 508
 peace of Westphalia and, 274
See also Helvetic Republic
- Sylvester I, Pope, 186
- Sylvester II, Pope, 281
See also Gerbert of Autillae
- Syndicalists, 594, 741
- Syria, 170, 769
- Tacitus, 110, 120
- Taille, 208, 494
- Taine, Hippolyte, 657

- Taiping Rebellion, 674
 Taiwan, 840, 841
 Tallage, 208
 Talleyrand, 528-529, 530
 Tamerlane, 166
 Tanganyika, 679
 Tannenberg, 708
 Tarawa, 799
 Tarentum, 94, 95
 Tarquin the Proud, 91
Tartuffe, 451
 Tasmania, 618
 Taylor, Frederick Winslow, 584
Techné, 79
 Teheran Conference, 801
 Telford, Thomas, 577
Tempest, 329
 Templars, Order of, 264
 Tennessee Valley Authority, 773
Tennis Court Oath, 499
 See also National Assembly, French
 Tennyson, Alfred Lord, 650
 Test Act, 439, 440
 Tetzel, 349
 Teutonic Knights, 394
 Tewkesbury, battle of, 260
 Thackeray, William Makepeace, 653
 Thailand, 677, 796
 Cambodia, province of, 678
 Laos, province of, 678
 Thales, 68
 Theatines, 365
 Thebes (Egypt), 27
 Thebes (Greece), 60, 80
 Theodoric, 150, 543
 Theodosian Code, 116
 Theophrastus, 75
Theory of the Earth, 480
 Theosophy, 661
 Thermidorian reaction, 507
 Thermopylae, 65
 Thiers, Adolphe, 606, 607
 Third Reich, 752, 763
 Thirty-nine Articles, 363
 Thirty Tyrants, 73
 Thirty Years' War, 246, 336, 382, 384, 385, 410
 background of, 382
 bibliography, 448
 England and, 382
 France and, 410, 411
 peace of Westphalia, 410
 Richelieu and, 384, 385
 Sweden and, 385
 Thomas, Dylan, 873
 Thomson, J. J., 644, 645
Thousand and One Nights (*see* Arabian Nights)
 Three Emperors' League, 705
 Thucydides, 176
 Thutmose II, 29, 31
 Tiamat, 35
 Tiberius, 98, 110, 111, 120
 Tibet, 677
 Tillich, Paul, 885
 Timur Lenk (*Tamerlane*), 166
 Tindal, Matthew, 483
 Titian, 322
 Tito, 801
 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 487
 Togoland, 685, 769, 833
 Tojo, Hideki, 796
 Toledo, 176
 Tolstoy, Leo, 654
 Tonkin, 677
 Torah, 49
 Tordesillas, Treaty of, 339
 Tories, 439, 441, 609, 610, 612
 Totalitarianism, 144, 145, 146, 740
 Peter the Great and, 405
 USSR philosophy of, 809-810
 See also under Germany: Hitler;
 Nazism; Fascism; Italy;
 Mussolini; USSR
 Toulon, 507
 massacre of royalists in, 506
 Toulouse, count of, 235
 Tournai, 153
 Toussaint l'Ouverture, 541, 543
 Townshend, Viscount (Turnip), 569
 Toynbee, Arnold, 8, 275
 Egypt interpreted by, 33
 Trades' Union Congress, 761
 Trajan, 107, 111, 112, 113, 144
 Transvaal, 688
 Transylvania, 385
 Treaties (*see under* names of treaties)
Treatise on Civil Government, Second, 379
 Treaty of London, 714, 741
 Trebonian, 116
 Trent, Council of, 316, 322, 366
 Tribunes, 98, 105
Tribunicia potestas, 105
 Trial jury, 254
 Tridentine Catechism, 367
 Trier, 47
 Trinidad, 668
 Triple Alliance, 705
 Tripoli, 795
 Tripolitania (*see* Libya)
Trivium, 279
 Troppau, 533
 Trotsky, Leon, 592, 731, 732, 733
 Troubadours, 202, 297
 Troyes, Treaty of, 259
True Law of Free Monarchy, The, 378
 Truman, Harry, 799, 800, 816, 819, 820
 Trusteeship Council (*see* United Nations)
 Tsar, 399, 400, 401, 404
 Tudor Monarchy, 260, 261, 360, 422, 425
 relations with Parliament, 427, 428
 Tuileries, 501
 Tull, Jethro, 569
 Tunis, 682
 Tunisia, 682, 705, 832
 Turenne, Marshal, 412
 Turgot, 497
 Turin, 545
 Turkey, called "the sick man of Europe," 381, 535, 704
 Russia, war with, 536
 See also Ottoman Empire
 Turkish menace, 379, 381
 Turks, 385
 Balkan States under rule of, 536
 Bulgaria, rebellion against, 537
 independence from, 537
 Bulgars conquered by, 166
 Constantinople conquered by, 159, 165, 401
 Greek independence from, 536
 Hungary conquered by, 379
 Islam influenced by, 172
 Muslim Empire conquered by, 159
 Reform, efforts of, 535
 constitution under, 535
 Rumania, independence of, and, 536
 Russo-Turkish war, 536
 Serbia conquered by, 166
 freed from, 536
 Young Turks, revolution of, 535
 See also Seljuk Turks
 Tuscany, 544
 Twelve Tables, 92, 115
 Two Sicilies, 239, 531, 544, 548
 Uganda, 686
 Ukraine, 400, 733, 802
 famine in, 736
 Ulema, 169
 Ulm, 513
 Ulster, 764
 Ultras, 832, 833
Unam sanctam, 242
 Union Française and Black Africa, 833


- Union of South Africa, 680
 Boer War and, 688
 self-government of, 689
 Unitarian Church, 660
 United Arab Republic, 843
 United Nations Organization, 775,
 776, 802, 805, 820, 845, 846
 African questions before, 848
 bibliography of, 805-806, 851-852
 charter of, 803
 Congolese government appeal to,
 847
 General Assembly of, 802-804
 Hungarian government, repre-
 sented in, 846
 Israel-Arabs dispute, 845-846
 Korea, intervention in, by, 846
 moral pressure exercised by, 847
 Security Council of, 803, 804
 significance of the veto in, 803
 specialized agencies of, 804
 successes and failures of, 845-
 848
 Trusteeship Council of, 804-805
 United Provinces, 359, 360
 United States of America, Berlin
 airlift and, 817
 bibliography of, 851, 852
 chronological chart, 812-815
 Civil War in, 623-624
 colonial policy of, 773
 containment of USSR by, 816
 contrasts between USSR and,
 807-808
 democratic philosophy of, 808-
 809
 Federal system of, 619-622
 foreign policy of, 816
 free public education in, 622-623
 Hitler declares war on, 796
 immigration to, 625
 invasion of Europe (World War
 II) by, 798
 Japan attacks fleet in Hawaii, of,
 796
 defeated by, 798
 Lend Lease Act, passed by, 794
 Louisiana Purchase by, 623
 Marshall Plan of, 816-817
 Mussolini declares war on, 796
 NATO and, 817, 819
 Neutrality Acts abandoned by,
 794
 New Deal measures in, 772-773
 North Africa, expedition in, 797
 Oregon territory, 623
 rivalry between USSR and, 821-
 822
 social democracy in, 622
 See also World War I; World
 War II
 Uniting for peace resolution, 820
 "Universal man," 312
 Urban II, Pope, 228
 Urban VI, Pope, 316
 Urban VIII, Pope, 469
 Uruguay, 540, 541, 547
 Uruk, 36
 USSR, 564, 565, 723, 732, 734-736,
 795, 797, 799, 801, 802, 827,
 848
 attitude toward other nations,
 810-811
 contrast between USA and, 807-
 808
 rivalry between USA and, 821-
 822
 satellites and, 822-823
 communization of, 824-825
 scientific advances of, 821, 825
 suppression of Hungarian rebel-
 lion by, 846
 totalitarian philosophy of, 809,
 810
 USA policy of containment and,
 816
 See also Russia
 Utilitarianism, 488, 589
 Utopia, 328
 Utopianism, 590
 Utrecht, 360
 Peace of, 419
 Treaty of, compared with Con-
 gress of Vienna, 530
 Utrum, 283
 Valentinian, 135
 Valéry, Paul, 874
 Valdes, Juan de, 365
 Valla, Lorenzo, 186, 312, 317
 Valladolid, 541
 Valmy, battle of, 503-504, 505
 Valois family, 261, 265
 Van Eyck, John, 331
 Van Gogh, Vincent, 663-664, 875
 Vandals, 135, 148, 150, 159
 Vassal, 195
 Vassily III. of Russia, 401
 Vatican, 549
 Veblen, Thorstein, 572
 Vendée, 501, 510, 599
 Venetia, 509, 546, 547, 555
 Venezuela, 539, 540
 Venice, 163
 Vergil, 109, 114, 299, 300
 Verlaine, Paul, 662, 874
 Versailles, 413, 417, 453, 499, 501,
 779, 787
 assembly in, 607
 Prussian king proclaimed em-
 peror at, 557
 Treaty of, 713-715, 768
 Germany's acceptance of, 748
 scrapping of, 750, 752, 753
 Vesalius, Andreas, 323, 333, 476,
 477
 Vespasian, 111
 Vichy government, 791, 792, 795,
 797
 Victor Emmanuel II, of Italy, 546-
 548
 Mussolini's dismissal of, 797
 support of, 743
 Victoria, queen of England, 672
 Victorian Age, 581
 Vienna, 166, 379
 Congress of, 526, 528, 533, 534,
 544, 549, 560
 Vikings, 279
 England invaded by, 247
 monasteries destroyed by, 280
 See also Northmen
 Villeins, 205
 Vilna, 564
 Visigoths, 148, 150, 153
 Vision of Piers Plowman, 299
 Vita Nuova, 300
 Vittorino da Feltre, 314
 Vivès, Juan, 330
 Vladimir I, 165
 Volta, Alessandro, 583
 Voltaire, 422, 482, 483, 495, 631
 Voortrekkers, 688
Waffen, S.S., 787
 Wagner, Richard, 297, 299, 665
 Waldensians, 234
 See also "Poor Men of Lyons"
 Waldo, Peter, 234
 Wallachia, 536
 Wallenstein, Albrecht von, 385
 Wallon Amendment, 607
 Walther von der Vogelweide, 297
 War of Devolution, 419
 War of the League of Augsburg,
 419
 War of the Spanish Succession,
 390, 419
 Warsaw Pact, 819
 Wartburg, castle of, 350
 Warsaw, 516
 creation of new duchy of, 513
 University of, 564
 Wars of the Roses, 259, 260
 Warwick, earl of, 260
 Washington Naval Agreement, 778

- Waterloo, 517
 Watt, James, 567, 573
 Watteau, 457
 Wavell, Archibald, 795
 Weimar Republic, 608
 Weismann, August, 642
 Wellington, duke of, 514, 517, 612
 France invaded by, 516
 Napoleon defeated at Waterloo, by, 517
 Wesley, John, 484, 659
 conversion to Moravianism, 484
 evangelical movement in the Anglican Church, led by, 484
 issue with Darwinian Theory, 659
 Methodism, preached by, 484
 Wessex, 247
 West Africa, 679
 West Germany, 816
 West Indies, 339, 443, 445, 531, 542, 668
 West Prussia, 513
 separation from Prussia, 513
 Westphalia, kingdom of, created out of, 513
 Western New Guinea, 796
 Westminster Abbey, 294
 Westphalia, 274
 Peace of, 274, 359, 360, 385, 392
 separation from Prussia, to become kingdom of, 513
 Whigs, 439, 441, 527, 609, 610
 Whitby, Synod of, 139
 White Mountain, battle of the, 384
 Whitehead, Alfred North, 880, 881-882
 Whitney, Eli, 575
 Wilberforce, Samuel, 684
 William I, king of Germany, 554, 555
 William III, king of England, 439, 440, 441
 war with Louis XIV, 439
 See also William III, of Orange
 William I (the Silent), of Orange, 359, 360, 419
 Holland ruled by, 534
 William of Aquitaine, 223
 William the Conqueror, 199, 250, 251, 252
 William de Lorris, 300
 Wilson, Woodrow, 564, 627, 710, 714, 715, 770
 Wimpfeling, John, 325
 Winckelmann, Johann, 458
 "Winged Victory," 85, 86
Wisdom of Sirach, 49
 Wise Men of the East, 42
Witan, 247, 252
 Wittenberg, 349, 350
 Wolfram von Eschenbach, 298
 Wolsey, Cardinal, 360, 427
 Wordsworth, 882
 World Health Organization (see United Nations)
 World War I, 701-710, 711-721
 alignment of powers, 709
 Balkan States and, 702
 bibliography of, 721-722
 Britain and, 707, 708, 711, 716, 717
 chronological charts, 704-705, 724-725
 economic dislocation, following, 717-719
 European boundaries, after, 718
 before, 700
 France and, 712
 Francis Ferdinand, assassination of, leading to, 701, 706
 Germany and, 707, 708
 Russia invades Germany, in, 709
 submarine warfare in, 707, 709
 Treaty of Versailles, following, 713
 dismemberment of Germany at, 713
 treaties with other Central Powers, after, 714
 United States enters, 709, 710
 See also names of all other countries
 World War II, 786-805
 Anglo-American success, in, 795
 Balkans, conquest of, by, 794
 battle of Britain, 793-794
 Belgium and, 791
 bibliography, 805-806
 Bulgaria joins, 794
 causes of, 786-787, 790
 France, fall of, in, 791-793
 Hungary joins, 794
 Greece invaded, in, 794
 Netherlands and, 791
 Norway and, 791
 Poland and, 790-791
 Russia joins, 794
 United States and, 794-805
 United States and Japan, in, 795, 798-799
 See also names of all other countries
 Wright brothers, 583
 Wright, Frank Lloyd, 877
 Württemberg, 550
 Wyclif, John, 316, 317, 360
 Xerxes, 41, 65
 Yahweh, 44, 126, 131
 Yalta, 798, 799, 801
 Yathrib, 167, 169, 170
 Yeats, William Butler, 874
 York, House of, 259, 260
 Ypsilanti, Alexander, 536
 Yugoslavia, 562, 564, 714, 720
 Communists in Greece, aided by, 816
 Dalmatian coast of, 779
 refusal to join Hitler, by, 794
 Zacharias, Pope, 185
 Zanzibar, 679, 686
 Zarathustra (Zoroaster), 41, 42
Zemsky sobor, 401
 Zenobia, 144
 Zeus, 70
Ziggurat, 34
 Zola, Emile, 654
 Zollverein, 550, 551-552, 554, 555
 Zoology, 480
 Zoroastrianism, 41, 42, 126
 Zwingli, Ulrich, 352, 353
 Zwinglians, 353





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