


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POLITICS
IN ISLAM



POLITICS IN ISLAM

[Von Kremer's *Staatsidee des*
Islams enlarged and amplified]

by

S. KHUDA BAKHSH

53804

Incorporating researches of Wellhausen,
Goldziher and other English and Con-
tinental scholars



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FOREWORD

"The great object in trying to understand history, political, religious, literary or scientific, is to get behind men and to grasp ideas. Ideas have a radiation and development, an ancestry and posterity of their own, in which men play the part of godfathers and godmothers more than that of legitimate parents."

Lord Acton¹

Everywhere I notice a growing interest in Islâm and Islamic studies. Islamic studies now find a definite place in the education imparted by Calcutta University and the other Universities of India—all of which are in many respects giving a lead to the world's older seats of learning. The interest aroused will, I trust, increase as the years go by. Yet not merely love of learning, for its own sake, but recent political events have quickened, widened and deepened this interest. There is, therefore, a need for a brief but exhaustive survey of the social, political and economic conditions of the Muslims under the Caliphate. Nay, the Caliphate itself calls for notice and attention. It is a subject of absorbing interest just now. Its meaning, its significance, its historical importance, its religious bearing—these require careful study. To understand the present we must know the past; for the present is a text, and the past is largely its interpretation.

We want no political pamphlet, no controversial monograph; but a sober, well-considered, well-weighted

1. *Letters of Lord Acton*, pp. 5, 6.

historical work. I can think of no such work in English; but in German there is certainly one which, in spite of the years that have passed since its publication, is still well-worthy of study and respect. It is the *Staatsidee des Islāms* in Von Kremer's *Geschichte der herrschenden Ideen des Islāms*. It would be inaccurate to describe the pages lying before us as a mere translation of the *Staatsidee des Islāms*, for I have incorporated into it the researches of Wellhausen, Goldziher and other English and Continental scholars. It is Von Kremer enlarged, amplified.

Here, in these pages, we have an account of those political and social questions which arose in, agitated and wrecked the Muslim Empire. Here we have an account of the strength and weaknesses of Islām, a tribute to its inherent religious force and vitality, a hope and a prophecy. And here we have an illustration and commentary upon the words of John Henry Newman: "All things are double, one against another. Every power, every form of government, every influence, strong as it may be, has its natural remedy or match, by which it is prevented from doing all things at its will. In constitutional governments they appeal to the law; in absolute monarchies they rise; in military despotisms they assassinate. James the Second is opposed by forms of law; Louis of France by Jacqueries; Paul of Russia is strangled."¹

The political history of Islām is the history of shattered ideals. The system, founded by the Prophet

1. Newman, *Select Essays*, p. 50.

and maintained by Abû Bakr and 'Omar, was a system impossible of complete realization or of long endurance in a world of imperfect conditions. In these pages we see the slow and steady decline and eventual disappearance of that purely ideal system of love, brotherhood and equality, inaugurated by the genius of the Prophet and sustained by the unwavering loyalty of his two Successors.

Von Kremer is essentially a scholar of the highest mark and distinction. He weighs, sifts, criticizes evidence, and then delivers judgment. Hence the weight and value of his pronouncements. I am confident this little book will supply a need long felt by students and the public alike. It will encourage Islamic studies and foster sympathy with Muslims. Further, it will enlarge the outlook on questions Islamic. There is no greater need of the times than mutual understanding and mutual sympathy, larger outlook and broader toleration.

Has not Goethe said: "Delight, pleasure, sympathy—this alone calls forth reality, all else is empty and vain."

I have to offer my most grateful thanks to Mr. H. Bruce Hannah (a thinker, whose recent work has caused a great stir in the historical world), and Mr. A. H. Harley, of the Calcutta Madrassah, ... and to Dr. Brühl for explaining to me passages in regard to which I sometimes felt doubt or difficulty.

S KHUDA BUKHS

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I

The Patriarchal Epoch

(Muhammad not only found a new religion but established a new polity. By converting his countrymen to the faith in one God he destroyed the old constitution of his native town and in place of the old aristocratic tribal constitution, which meant conduct of public affairs by the ruling families, set up an out-and-out theocratic constitution, at the head of which he stood as the representative of God on earth. Even before his death almost the whole of Arabia—Arabia, which had never bent its neck to a prince or a ruler—lay, all of a sudden, at his feet, as a national unit, paying homage to the will of an absolute master. Out of a hundred struggling, warring tribes Muhammad created a nation. The idea of a common religion, with a common High Priest, welded the different tribes into one political organism which, with a marvellous rapidity, shaped its own peculiar form and system. Only a powerful idea could have attained this end. The tribe—the dominating factor of Arab heathenism—had to give way to the newly-born sense of religious unity. The great work had succeeded, and at the death of the Prophet, over by far the greatest part of Arabia reigned a peace and quiet such as the blood-thirsty, vengeance-seeking tribes had never known before. Religion hushed their disputes into silence and effected a reconciliation. And yet (as we shall learn in the sequel), though repressed by religion,

and turned, for a time, into other channels, the old tribal and clannish spirit never actually and completely perished among them. In fact the subsequent history of the Arabs is the history of the collision and conflict of this very spirit which entirely swayed the Arab mind.)

At the time of Muḥammad's ministry the population of Arabia was composed of two distinct elements - namely, the North Arabs, Ishmaïlites, also called after their mythical ancestor 'Adnân, 'Adnânites and South Arabs, Yoktanides. While the latter, the Yoktanides, had attained, even in the remotest antiquity, a high stage of culture, the North Arabian tribes, living in Ḥejâz, Najd and Central Arabia, and gradually moving more and more towards south and south-east, lived completely in the primitive conditions of patriarchal times. The descendants of one common ancestor, together with their families, slaves and clients, constituted a clan, a self-sufficing little community independent of the rest of the world. At the head of each such group stood the most senior in age of the first and foremost family among them. But he exercised no other power than that which his word could command or enforce. His judicial pronouncements were respected, and at the deliberations of the tribal elders he held the chair. In war and predatory expeditions he took the lead. To him also fell the fourth of the booty; a practice which Muḥammad, with a slight modification, incorporated into his law. (Muḥammad claimed the fifth for the State.) As regards the *headship* there was no settled rule of succession. In the choice, seniority in age and popular

esteem turned the scale. If a tribe became too large and unwieldy it was split up into several divisions; each carrying on under the common tribal name its own separate existence. The only tie that held them together—these smaller groups—was the tie of common descent. In case of common danger they united, and not infrequently they did so for a large campaign. Every such division, in process of time, split up into yet smaller groups and families, every one of which was a miniature of the tribe.

Though separate and isolated, the tribes nevertheless came frequently into contact with each other, through campaigns and predatory expeditions; through vengeance for bloodshed (blood-revenge), an institution of immemorial antiquity among them; and through the diversity and variety of tribal gods. Thus the tribes of Arabia offered a true picture of the first and the earliest human society.

While in the south great political communities came into existence under monarchical constitution, in the north there existed only independent tribes under the guidance of their ephemeral chiefs.

And yet even in very early times we catch a glimpse of permanent settlements. Thus Medina became the seat of a numerous Jewish colony; and Mekka itself, whose earliest history is wrapped in obscurity, became, possibly under the influence of foreigners, especially the Jewish immigrants, a meeting-place and a sanctuary for the nomad tribes residing in the neighbourhood. At Dumat-ul-Jundal the South Arabian colonists established a settlement

which soon, by its position, acquired great importance. In this way may have risen Hail in Yemâma. Khaibar was a Jewish colony. Tâif was an important seat of the tribe of Takif. The need for exchange of goods and caravan-traffic promoted the growth of towns. Thus arose the annual market of 'Okaz, the market-place of the tribes, known under the common name of Qais Ailan and Takif; Magannah in the neighbourhood of Mekka; Magâz in the land of the tribe of Hudail.¹ Hajar in Bahrain, and 'Omân in the district bearing the same name, were the chief centres of concourse in the east of the Arabian Peninsula. Among all the settlements in North Arabia Mekka and Medina held, undoubtedly, the most conspicuous place. Both of these towns lay on the great caravan-route which led from south Arabia to the north; on the one hand to Syria, across Hijr, the old rocky town of the Tamudites, to Tabûk and Ma'an; on the other to the north-west across Bada, an old Tamudite town, and Mijân to Ailah (the modern 'Akaba), whence the caravan started for Egypt and the shores of the Mediterranean.

An aristocracy of merchants, well cultivated and cultured by constant contact with Syria and Egypt, ruled Mekka—the tribe of Quraish predominating. The entire town lived upon caravan-trade and the income of the national sanctuary of the North Arabian tribes, the Ka'aba. This national sanctuary was under the care and supervision of the most respected Mekkan families. It secured for them great religious and

1 Sprenger, *Life of Muḥammad* (Allahabad), p. 5.

political influence among the Beduin tribes of the surrounding country. In Medina lived the Aus and Khazraj, and a good many industrious and diligent Jews who gradually extended their colony into the neighbourhood. Here, among the Aus and Khazraj, Muḥammad first found support and encouragement. Here he first won his easy victory over the rich but disunited and hence politically powerless Jews. We are not concerned at present with the history of the Prophet's successes. Suffice it to state that in the eighth year of the Hijra he victoriously entered Mekka at the head of an army of 10,000 men consisting mostly of the Beduin converts. Such a success Arabia had never seen. He crushed some of the opposing tribes, but the rest hastened to make their submission. To the most distant parts of the Peninsula, to Hadramaut and 'Omān, the Prophet sent his vicegerents, calling upon the people to accept Islām and pay the poor-tax. This consisted in the payment of a tenth of the produce of the land. In many cases it was only half of the tenth.¹ This poor-tax, which was mostly paid in camels and sheep, along with the legal fifth of the war-booty, enabled the Prophet to pay the army, to help the poor, and to win over, by rich presents, the affection and loyalty of the influential chiefs. Thus, in his last years, Muḥammad ruled over almost the whole of Arabia. There was, however, a difference in the political conditions of the different provinces. According to Sprenger we can divide these into two classes: direct provinces, and

1. Sprenger, D.L.M., III, 339, 347, 350.

protectorates. In the first the Prophet caused the poor-tax to be collected by officers appointed by him; distributing a portion of the tax so collected among the poor of the province. The greater part, of course, made its way to Medina. In the latter—namely, lands under suzerainty, such as Yamamah, 'Omân, Yaman—the old princes of the land retained, by treaty, the right of collecting the tenth themselves. Only a portion of Yamamah, devoted to the false prophet, Masailmah, maintained its independence, and declined to acknowledge the Prophet until his death. Thus, in a few years, Muḥammad settled the framework of the State machinery for the whole of Arabia. But at the root of the new political fabric lay the tie of common religion; the absolute cessation of hostilities among Muslims; in other words, the eternal Peace of God. This led gradually to the disappearance of blood-feud and the union of the tribes into one large body of Muslims.¹

Before Islām every tribe had its own idols, its own sanctuary; and stood severely apart from the others, whom it looked upon as strangers and enemies. Once and for all Islām overthrew these artificial barriers by giving one and the same religion to all, and by bringing all under one and the same divine law. From the very first Muḥammad recognized the importance of welding the tribes into one compact whole; and even if his success was not absolute, none can deny that in the face of that genuine Semitic tenacity with which the Arabs clung to their old traditions

¹ Sprenger, III, 357.

and practices he achieved marvellous results. He announced to his followers that Islām abrogated the obligation and duties of heathen days.¹ But quite as much as his preachings, if not more, his extraordinary successes, the eagerness for booty of the tribes who hastened to his banner from one expedition to another, the surest security offered by Islām against the operation of the principle of blood-revenge, still dominant among their heathen country-folks, contributed to the triumph of the Prophet and his cause.² Such was the position of affairs when an event, never seriously considered by Muslims, occurred. On the 8th of June, 632 A.D., the Prophet passed away, and Islām was bereft of its chief. Muḥammad left no son, nor made any arrangements regarding his successor, but the most distinguished companions of the Prophet agreed upon the necessity of electing one. The nearest relatives of the Prophet were his father-in-law, Abū Bakr, two years younger than the Prophet; 'Othmān, his son-in-law, five to ten years younger; 'Alī, his second son-in-law, about thirty years younger; 'Omar, the father-in-law of the Prophet, his trusted friend and counsellor, eighteen years younger.³ We have purposely referred to these differences in age, for they were decisive in

1. Ibn Khaldūn, *Prolég.*, 412. The Prophet said, "The tie of blood and the number of children will not avail you (on the Day of Judgment). He also declared that there was no right of inheritance between believers and unbelievers. *Bukhārī*, 2206 (3).

2. *Bukhārī*, 2212 (2). The Arabs made acceptance of Islām conditional on its success, and said: "Let him (Muḥammad) come out successful and we will regard him as a true Prophet." When Mekka was taken all the tribes hastened to accept Islām.

3. Muḥammad's third son-in-law, 'Abul-Asi, was a heathen, and accepted Islām later. Sprenger, I, 201.

the choice of the first Caliphs. In the leadership of the tribe there was never acknowledged among the Beduin tribes a fixed order of hereditary succession. It was regarded as something extraordinary if the leadership of a tribe continued in one and the same family for four generations.¹ Seniority in age and popular esteem were the only determining factors in the choice of the tribal chief. Hence the term *Shaikh*, i.e., the aged one, was the term always applied to the head of the tribe. These were the determining considerations in the election of Abû Bakr for he undoubtedly was the most senior in age and the most respected of the family of the Prophet.

'Omar succeeded Abû Bakr by virtue of an express arrangement made by the latter : an arrangement subsequently approved and confirmed by the community. 'Omar was the father-in-law of the Prophet ; and, among his nearest relatives, he was, indeed, the oldest and the most esteemed one. In the midst of his great organizing activity he fell by the dagger of an assassin. To the last he retained consciousness. He knew 'Othmân, and he knew 'Alî. He knew, too, that according to seniority it was their turn one after the other, but he considered them both equally unfit for the Caliphate. If the information handed down to us is correct he expressed himself about 'Alî as one who, though entitled by right to the Caliphate, was still too weak and unstable in character, and was liable to be easily led.² Of 'Othmân he observed that he

1. Ibn Khaldûn, *Prolég.*, I, 289. Freytag, *Einleitung in des Studium der arab. Sprache*, 337.

2. Mawardi (Enger's ed.), p. 45. Compare the masterly sketch of 'Alî's character. Sprenger, *D.L.M.*, I, 396.

would, to be sure, favour his tribesmen above the others. He reckoned Ṭalḥa, Zubair and Sa'ad equally unsuitable. On his death-bed (excluding his son) he appointed a Council of Regency consisting of six of the most esteemed and oldest of the companions of the Prophet. They were 'Alī, 'Oṭhmān, Ṭalḥa, Zubair, 'Abdur Raḥmān Ibn 'Auf, Sa'ad Ibn Abī Waqqās. They were the earliest converts to Islām, and by their age and wealth held a distinguished position in Muslim society. The old Arab idea of a tribal chief asserted itself over the personal vanity of the members of the regency, and, after a series of party intrigues, the choice fell upon 'Oṭhmān. The idea of seniority doubtlessly contributed much to this result, and especially to it must be assigned the submissive attitude of 'Alī, who, apart from it, could have put forward the strongest claim to the Caliphate. As against the considerably older 'Oṭhmān, 'Alī withdrew, in the hope that his turn would come next. But during the reign of 'Oṭhmān events happened which made this impossible, and 'Alī's effort, in spite of his good claim, called forth a fierce civil war which filled the Islāmic countries with blood and horror and exercised a decisive influence on the Islāmic civilization for evermore. For, out of the path into which the Muslim mind then drifted, there was no turning back possible. But before we enquire into the intellectual basis of this movement we must needs have a clear and correct idea of the ways and means adopted by Abū Bakr and 'Omar in the fulfilment of their mission, and the principles which dominated their system of government. We must especially consider the fundamental

ideas underlying their politics ; how, on the one hand, these ideas were translated into fact, and what impression, on the other, they made on the great masses of the Muslims.

II

The First Two Caliphs

When Abū Bakr became Caliph, he was chosen as the representative of the deceased Prophet, whom he had often, in his lifetime, represented as the leader of the public prayer.¹ This is the significance of the word "Calipha" which corresponds to the title "representative of God and Christ" which the XVIth council of Toledo gave to the kings of Spain.²

The most striking feature in the character of the Arabs is their nervous excitability; and the Arab character, accordingly, may be divided into two classes. In one the wild, unrestrained Beduin disposition shows itself. Its characteristics are greed, fondness for plunder, exceeding sensuality and an unrefined pride. In the more enlightened natures where these wild impulses were suppressed or controlled by a more highly-developed sense of morality, one finds a deep pervading melancholy, insensibly passing into religious fervour and ecstasy. This explains the character of people such as these: Naufal Ibn Waraqah, Omayyah Ibn Abi Salt, Zaid Ibn 'Amr, 'Othmān Ibn Huwairith, who, even prior to Muḥammad, meditated upon monotheism.³ And even the personality of the Pro-

1. *Mawattja* I, 311, 312. 2. Buckle, *History of Civilization*, Vol. IV, 30, Note 6.

3. Sprenger, *D.L.M.*, I, 75-92.

phet and his entire mental attitude were the outcome of this very disposition¹ which, to this day, is the distinctive peculiarity of the Arabs. We notice the two aspects of the Arab character in the companions of the Prophet; just as we notice in the Prophet himself the dominant psychological characteristics of his countrymen. The majority of the companions fall under the first heading: gold and property were all in all to them. The most distinguished companions of the Prophet, especially those who were nominated by 'Omar to the Council of Regency, acquired immense wealth. Zubair left behind property worth 50 million Dirhams.² 'Abdur Raḥmān Ibn 'Auf owned, when he died, 1,000 camels and so much in cash that every one of his four widows (according to another report, three), after the deduction of the share of the children, obtained 80 to 100 thousand Dirhams. Sa'ad Ibn Abī Waqqās had a beautiful palace in the neighbourhood of Medīna where he lived in comfort and peace. Ṭalḥa left behind on his death 2,200,000 Dirhams and 200,000 Dinārs in cash. His capital and landed properties were valued at 30 million Dirhams.³

But very different, indeed, was the character of Abū Bakr and 'Omar. Both were of a melancholy turn of mind, and, after the Prophet's death, tended and nursed Islām as before, with an unswerving love and loyalty. Of both might it be truly said that with-

1. Burton, *Pilgrimage to El-Medīnah and Mekkah*, II, 49, Note.

2. *Bukhārī*.

3. Sprenger, I, 382-386, 422. Cf. Mas'ūdi and Ibn Khaldūn, *Proleg.*, I, 416. The Dirham was worth 65-72 centimes, Sprenger, III, 135.

out them Islâm would have perished with the Prophet. Not after worldly gain did they aspire. Religion was their absorbing passion, and the glory of Islâm their one and only aim. Their life was exceedingly simple, and however much the anecdotes relating to them were coloured by imagination, they do prove beyond doubt that even in the first centuries of the Hijra their character was regarded in that light, and that the picture painted was not far removed from truth. There is no reason for assuming that their wealth and riches, if they had any, should remain unreported, while those of the other companions of the Prophet (mentioned above) should be made the subject of a detailed recital. We have, therefore, every reason to suppose that the account of the simple life of the first two Caliphs is historically sound and genuine.

Scarcely was Abû Bakr acknowledged Caliph in Medîna when almost all the Arabian tribes rose, shaking off the yoke of Islâm, to win back their earlier independence. Even in Medîna an insurrection threatened to break out, but the activity of some of the noble Mekkans succeeded in checking the movement in its inception. Taïf, the capital of the Hawazin tribes and the seat of the Takîfites, remained loyal to the Caliph. But from all other parts of Arabia the missionaries or the tax-gatherers of the Prophet were expelled, and those adherents of the new religion who refused to renounce their faith fell victims to popular fury. Some tribes wavered and hesitated, and declared their readiness to keep to Islâm, provided they had no poor-tax (Zakât) to pay. Medîna itself was threatened by the Beduin hordes, at the head of which

stood the powerful tribe of Ghāṭafān. In this highly perilous position Abū Bakr behaved in a manner which leaves us in no doubt of his character. He acted not as a circumspect statesman or a shrewd general would act, but his conduct was that of a devoted worshipper of the Prophet who, relying upon the supernatural power of Islām and the protection of God, despised all danger, and who, clinging with fanatical conviction to his principles, achieved extraordinary results.¹

Shortly before his death Muḥammad had arranged for an expedition to the north. In spite of the threatened insurrections on all sides; in spite of the objections of the most influential Muslims, Abū Bakr insisted upon sending this expedition, for, said he, a command issued by the Prophet must be unconditionally carried out. Abū Bakr succeeded in winning some advantage over the undisciplined hordes. Reinforcements arrived both from Mekka and from the loyal Ḥejāz Beduins who stood too much under the influence of Mekka and Medina to carry on an independent political existence.² Even the troops sent to the north returned with large booty and without meeting any serious resistance.

From this moment the game was won; and, as great men are never wanting in great times, so Abū Bakr found a man whom he appointed as the leader of the troops against the insurgent tribes in the interior of Arabia; a man who, undoubtedly, must be reckon-

1. *Bukhārī*, 882.

2. These were the tribes of Muzainah, Ghifār, Juhainah, etc. Caussin de Perceval, *Essai sur l'histoire des Arabes*, III, 352.

ed as the greatest Arab general of all times. This was Khâlid Ibn Walid. Before his conversion to Islâm he was the leader of the Quraishite Cavalry and took part in all the wars against the Prophet. He accepted Islâm and distinguished himself by his courage and military talents. He was at once brave and cruel, cautious and faithless, rapacious and voluptuous. He always remained a Muslim to outward seeming, but his deeds point to his fond devotion to the old inherited notions of Arab heathenism—to blood-revenge, to greed for booty, to the Arab method of warfare. Khâlid conquered the apostate tribes; but Arabia, which had never up to now known anything except tribal feuds, he overwhelmed with a deluge of blood. Entire tribes were wiped out of existence; others were sold as slaves, or were robbed of their possessions. Flourishing provinces were laid waste. Never had Arabia seen such devastation. Islâm was everywhere triumphant. To Medîna the caravans wended their way loaded with booty of war, or with money paid in as taxes, or money paid in as tributes. Great enough were the direct successes of Islâm, but greater still were the indirect ones. Apart from the extraordinary progress of the new religion which convinced the rude sons of the desert, more than anything else, of its truth, the religious war at home led to a complete transformation of the entire social conditions.

Great armies had never passed through the interior of Arabia, but often, under Khâlid's banner, 10,000 Muslims fought. Of many of the Beduin tribes the only worldly possessions consisted of camels,

horses, and sheep, and these fell as booty to the conquerors. Under these conditions the agricultural population suffered no loss, and it can easily be shown that entire tribes were reduced to utter penury and privation. In the days of heathenism these would have repaired their fortune by predatory expeditions against the neighbouring tribes, but this was no longer possible, for Islâm had spread the Peace of God among all its believers. To escape privation and misery no other alternative, then, was left to them than to emigrate to the north, where the rich and fertile frontiers of the Persian and Greek Empires offered an alluring prospect, or to enter the army of the Caliph and receive a regular pay from the State treasury.

The interior of Arabia, as the travels of Palgrave and Guarmani have shown, is anything but a desert. While the Nefud, like a broad stream of drift-sand, encircles Central Arabia, separating it from the Syrio-Mesopotamian desert; the desert of Dahana awaits the traveller towards the east in the direction of the Persian Gulf. But once these obstacles are overcome, there succeeds a fertile plateau in places thickly populated, which in antiquity was the seat of a far more numerous population than is the case at present. Here, in the heart of Arabia, there was always a thick population which, rolling over its frontier, poured into the neighbouring low-land like a devastating flood. Such a scene Europe witnessed last century in the conquering campaigns of the Wahâbis; a thousand years ago a similar rôle was played by the Carmathians, and precisely the same thing happened in

the beginning of Islām. Disturbed out of their wonted ways, and robbed of their belongings by the Islāmic wars under Abū Bakr, the tribes of Central Arabia were set in motion. The rich and fertile frontiers of the Persian empire, lying this side of the Euphrates, attracted these hungry hordes separated from their home only by a desert. The one man who clearly read the signs of the times and who knew how to turn them to his own uses was the great Khālid—as eager, perhaps more than they, for booty. Thus was the first inroad of the Arab hordes effected in the country along the Euphrates, and it proved absolutely irresistible. A similar movement was launched from Arabia against Syria under the supervision of the Caliph Abū Bakr. Arabia, where Islām, establishing a religious brotherhood, had put an end to strife and plunder, became too narrow for its population, and the Arabs therefore burst forth in all directions.

The expedition against Syria was organized at Medina. While the Yamāmah tribes supplied the largest portion of the troops advancing towards the Euphrates, Yaman furnished the largest contingent for the Syrian army.¹ Not merely warriors composed the expedition; entire tribes joined, with their women and children. It was, indeed, not a campaign but a *Völkerwanderung*.²

1. Abū Ismā'il Azdi (ed. Nassau Lees), p. 112. The tribes of Rābiyah, Tamim and Asad proceeded to 'Irāq. To Syria chiefly the South Arabian tribes advanced.

2. Abū Ismā'il Azdi, pp. 7, 20. The information of Azdi comes from the best source, as a comparison with Ibn 'Asākir clearly proves. The common source of both these authors is Saif Ibn 'Omar's work *Kitābul Futūḥ*.

The two empires with which the Arabs came into collision had long passed their bloom. They no longer possessed sufficient power of resistance. Both had forfeited the love, loyalty and support of their subjects. Ecclesiastical disputes and controversies had shaken and enfeebled the Byzantine Empire. And court intrigues, disputed successions and insurrections, on the other hand, were painfully frequent in the Sassanid Empire. Thus the mighty flood that surged forth from Arabia could not be stemmed either by the Persian Chosroes or the Byzantine Cæsars. Caravans laden with gold, silver, valuable utensils, troops of prisoners of war, droves of camels and horses, wended their way to Medina either as the private property of the soldiers or as the fifth of the booty legally falling to the State. While, on the one hand, this encouraged increasing emigration to the North, and emigration meant reinforcement of the Arab army in Syria and Babylonia; on the other it enabled the State treasury in Medina to carry out the system of State annuity—foreshadowed by Muḥammad—to the entire Muslim community. From the very beginning of his Caliphate, Abū Bakr divided the State revenue among Muslims, following, doubtlessly, the example of the Prophet. Every Muslim received his share. True, in the beginning it was very small, for the progress of the Muslim army was checked by troubles at home. In the first year, to every Muslim fell 10; in the second 20 Dirhams. Men, women, children, even slaves, received a like share.¹ No

1. Ibn Sa'ad in Sprenger, D.L.M., I, 409; see Sprenger, D.L.M., Einleit., III, cxxi.

difference was made between those who accepted Islām before or after the taking of Mekka. 'Omar, on the other hand, showed preference to those who accepted Islām prior to the taking of Mekka. He placed them first. Then followed those who accepted Islām after the taking of Mekka. Then came the general Muslim population. The latter obtained an annuity varying from 300 to 400 Dirhams. Sucklings, at first, were not given an annuity until weaned, when they got 100 Dirhams each. Later, 'Omar altered this arrangement, allowing to all children the same amount. According to another report, he is said to have allowed to every child two *jaribs* (a certain measure of corn) of wheat, two kists of oil, one kist of vinegar, per month, in addition to the annual grant of 100 Dirhams.¹

To introduce order and method in the distribution of the annuity, 'Omar had a list of recipients prepared and kept in one of his offices (Diwan). For distinguished persons special arrangements were made. Thus the widows of the Prophet received an annuity of 12,000 Dirhams, and so did others who were closely associated with the Prophet. He divided the rest of the Muslims, as already mentioned, into three classes, which, according to Sprenger, were²:

- (1) Veterans who had fought in the battle of Badr, annuity 5,000 Dirhams.
- (2) Fugitives (Muhājirīn) and Anṣār (helpers) who had accepted Islām before the battle of Badr but had not taken part in the battle, annuity 4,000. (Sons of fugitives and helpers received

1. *Sirāj-ul-Mulūk*, fol. 132, 133.

2. Sprenger, *D.L.M.*, III, cxxii.

2,000 Dirhams. The inhabitants of Mekka and some others received 800 each).

- (3) The rest of the Muslims received an annuity ranging from 600 to 400, or 300 to 200 Dirhams.¹

'Omar wanted the entire Muslim population to receive the State annuity; but this, as Sprenger justly remarks, never really happened. The inhabitants of the two holy cities and the warriors absorbed the whole State revenue.

Next to the diffusion and propagation of Islām, which was the propelling force of the whole movement, was the idea of the Arab body-politic, as a vast Muslim brotherhood participating and sharing in the State revenue. It was conceived, so to speak, as a guild for organized robbery and plunder against people of other faiths; the consideration being the division of the proceeds among the members of the guild, and, indeed, something else besides, namely the sure prospect of admission into paradise and enjoyment of eternal bliss. Some were induced by the former, some by the latter consideration: but, true enough, every one found what he wished for most. The balance of the first year shows the successful issue of these plunderings, and explains the rapid progress of Islām in such an incredibly short time: The Arab tribes soon discovered that it was far more profitable to present a united front against the common enemy, the foreigners, than to carry on an internecine feud in which they

1. Compare Caussin de Perceval, III, 504; Hammer, *Über die Länderverwaltung unter dem Chalifate* (1835), p. 137. Weil, *Gesch. d. Chal.*, I, 77, 78.

could not possibly hope to secure anything more valuable than camels, horses and sheep. They saw, on the other side of the desert, the rich and luxurious countries: Syria, Egypt and Babylon. They saw the treasures of the Byzantine Cæsars and the Persian Chosroes lying temptingly before them.

Next to the system of annuity ('Atā)—the development, if not the origin, of which is to be ascribed to 'Omar—he took an important step forward towards the establishment of a fixed system of administration, by introducing a methodical principle of taxation, and by assigning fixed salaries to government officers. 'Omar thus introduced the first element of order and method into the system of administration.¹ About this time arose the system of military stations which gradually led to the formation of the standing army. The tribes which conquered 'Irâq and Syria formed military camps (Amsar) which in Syria were christened as *Jund* and in 'Irâq as 'Askār. Here lived the soldiers divided into regiments, or, to be absolutely precise, into clans. They renounced their earlier

1. Ibn 'Asâkir in the *Tārīkh Dimishq*, fol. 88, says: 'Omar, when he came to Syria, organized military stations and established permanent military cantonments. Cf. *Prolég.* of Ibn Khaldūn, I, 273, where these Syrian cantonments are mentioned, namely Damascus, Kinnisrin, and Awasim. According to Abū Ismā'il Azdī, p. 219, there were only four military stations in the beginning: Emessa, Damascus, Urdun, Filistin. Later, a fifth one was added, namely Kinnisrin. The division of Syria into five military districts was probably in the mind of Ibn Wardi who in his book *Khariḍat-ul-'Ajd'ib*, drawn from older sources, says that Syria was divided into five districts: 1. Ghaza, Ramla, Filistin, Ascalon, Jarusalem; 2. Urdun, Tiberius, Ghur, Yarmūk, Baisān; 3. Ghutah, Damascus along with the sea-coast; 4. Emessa, Hamah, Kafṭab, Kinnestīn, Aleppo; and 5. Antioch, Awasim, Masysah, Tarsus; *Khariḍat-ul-'Ajd'ib* (Cairo ed.), p. 38.

occupation of agriculture and cattle-breeding, and exchanged it, only too willingly, for the military profession. They were religious soldiers. The State paid them a monthly salary, and the subject race supplied them with provisions. Thus arose in 'Irâq the military stations of Kûfa and Başra, and in Syria those of Kinnisrin, Damascus, Urdun, Filistin.

The view has gained ground that even the first Caliphs granted lands to soldiers when they settled down, and established a sort of military colonies. This, undoubtedly, was so later. Under the first two Caliphs the very opposite was the case. Neither the soldier nor the private citizen was allowed to acquire land in conquered countries. Strange as this statement may seem, it comes from an incontestable source. But the question naturally suggests itself—what did the Muslims do with the immense territories which fell to them in the conquered countries? An enquiry into this subject—hitherto neglected—is all the more necessary for a complete understanding of the social conditions under the Caliphate. The lands in the conquered countries may be divided into two classes: (a) those whose inhabitants concluded a capitulation with Muslims and peacefully submitted to them; (b) those whose inhabitants were conquered by force of arms. As regards lands won by capitulation, these remained in the possession of the earlier proprietors who paid the capitation tax (*Jaziya*) and the land-tax (*Khirāj*). They had, moreover, to supply provisions free to Muslim soldiers; to maintain every Muslim for three days, and to provide a fixed quantity of

linen for the use of the soldiery.¹ As against the fulfilment of these conditions, they remained in possession of their land. They were forbidden to alienate lands to Muslims. The land-tax, payable by them, was fixed once for all, no matter whether the actual produce of the land increased or decreased.

The second class of lands, namely those that were conquered by force of arms, passed into the possession of the exchequer, and was administered for the common benefit of the Muslims. But political and economic conditions induced 'Omar not to rigorously enforce this rule in all cases. He therefore allowed the old proprietors to remain, wherever necessary, in possession of their lands. Thus did 'Omar deal with Sawād, which he declared to be crown-lands. That dealing was made into a precedent, often quoted by Arab jurists. Being crown-lands they could not be disposed of, for the simple reason that they were inalienable. In the conquered countries, therefore, there was not an inch of land, as a matter of fact, owned by Muslims. The whole belonged to all, but to no one in particular. They allowed the old inhabitants and the subject population peacefully to cultivate the land, but these had to pay heavy taxes, and were overburdened with payments in kind.

The State revenue went into the common chest of the Muslims—the Bait-ul-māl, the State treasury—and out of it was paid the State expenses, costs of the wars, pay of officers and annuity to Muslims. In contrast to the Muslims the native population were a sort

1. *Ibn 'Asākir*, fol. 89.

of helots, whose chief function appears to have been to swell the treasury and maintain the Muslims. Their lands were expressly forbidden to be sold to the latter. In the event of any violation of this rule the land sold was returned to its owner, but the purchase-money was forfeited to the State. The reason for this rule, which both Abū Bakr and 'Omar so rigorously enforced, is obvious. The object was to hold together the Muslim troops, consisting as they did of different tribes, and to prevent them from drifting apart and degenerating into effeminate ways. Nothing could have more surely and swiftly contributed to these results than possession of landed properties. Hence the prohibition. Furthermore, this policy was best calculated to check the gradual emigration of Christian population. By declaring landed property inalienable the owners could not realize any money in case of sale, and had therefore no alternative left but to continue in possession of their lands.¹ This policy further saved agriculture from neglect and wreckage, and the need of agriculture was great for the maintenance of the troops. The original inhabitants devoted themselves to cultivation. Cases of extortion undoubtedly there were, for 'Omar issued a warning, and recommended kinder treatment of non-Muslims.²

1. To this very policy 'Omar adhered in other conquered countries, especially in Egypt. When 'Amr built a house in Fustat, 'Omar administered a reprimand to him. Weil, *Gesch. d. Chalif*, I, 117. Weil has not quite caught the point; cf. Weil, I, 76, Note. 'Omar did not allow Muslims to permanently settle in Egypt. Weil, I, 118. Ibn 'Asākir mentions a tradition which runs thus: 'Omar and the companions of the Prophet did not consider it permissible for a Muslim to purchase land from a Ra'ayyah, because it would interfere with his military duties.

2. Tradition of Ibn 'Adi in Ibn 'Asākir, fol. 69. As regards the Ra'ayyah 'Omar wrote to the governors recommending remission of taxes to those who were unable to pay.

The Muslim State of the first century was a purely military State, not unlike the old Sparta—only Islām recognized no aristocracy. The Muslims were a race of warriors to be maintained at the cost of the subject races.¹

From what has been said, it is apparent that the dominating idea of 'Omar's government was the promotion of the military-religious development of Islām at the expense of the subject races. For this reason precisely he issued strict rules prohibiting Christians and people of other faith from having in common with the ruling race; for this reason precisely he decided to clear Arabia of the infidel, and gave Arabs the choice between Islām and expulsion from their native land. The prosperous and hard-working inhabitants of Najran, who continued loyal to Christianity, had, in consequence of this measure, to migrate to the country along the Euphrates.² He likewise expelled the Jews from Khaibar.³ He governed the Muslim community with a firm and masterful hand. Under him was completed the conquest of Syria, 'Irāq and Persia up to the Oxus, and the frontiers of Hindustān were brought under Muslim sway. In the west, Egypt rendered him homage, and his troops penetrated along the coast of North Africa as far as Tripoli. Everywhere he governed the subject races upon one and the same principle; everywhere he sought to keep the Arabs

1. Sprenger, *D.L.M.*, III, 164.

2. *Ibid.*, 504.

3. Those who were expelled appear to have received compensation. According to Kodamah, cited in Sprenger, III, 277, they paid to the inhabitants of Fadak, who emigrated to Syria, half of the value of their immovable property.

apart from the native population, and to maintain them as a military caste, and everywhere he forbade them from making a settlement or acquiring landed property. He kept his rapacious governors under strict control, and he himself, as the administrator of the common treasury of the Muslims, displayed spotless purity and irreproachable integrity. He confiscated half the wealth of 'Amr Ibn 'Asi, the conqueror of Egypt, and Khâlid, the hero of Muta and the conqueror of 'Irâq and Syria, was similarly dealt with. He had to make over to the treasury a considerable portion of his wealth, acquired by plunder.¹

It is doubtful whether 'Omar could have long kept his system of government intact. Had all the Arabs been as unselfish as he, had all been fired by the same religious fervour as he, he might possibly have succeeded. But he did not reckon with one of the most powerful springs of human action—personal interest. True, the Arabs fought in honour of God and for Islâm, but they had not thereby surrendered their greed for gold. They wanted wealth and riches. 'Omar's communistic system of government, according to which all belonged to the State, did not quite suit them. Everyone sought to acquire and retain for himself. For this reason, indeed, as might have been anticipated, the exclusion of Muslims from landed properties in conquered countries could not long be maintained. It is equally clear that he failed to take into account another factor which thwarted his scheme. The people of other faiths in conquered countries

1. Weil, I, 127; Khuda Bukhsh, *Islamic Peoples*, pp. 57 et sq.

were, as we have seen, reduced to the position of helots. They lived under fearful oppression. It might have been expected that this would lead, sometime or other, to fierce collision and conflict. For the non-Muslims there were only two ways of escape from their rôle of slavery: conversion to Islâm, or rebellion against Islâmic rule. The road to conversion was made hard by the fact that the Christian who accepted Islâm (receiving, indeed, equal civil rights with Muslims), had to give up his landed property, which immediately passed into the hands of his former co-religionists, who continued to pay the *Khirâj* (land-tax) on it as before. The numerous insurrections against the Muslim rule, even in the first years, prove that they looked upon armed rising against foreign rule as not altogether hopeless, and that so long as the memory of their former independence had not completely faded out of mind, the subject races found their lot intolerable. Oppressed nations often avenge themselves, when insurrections and rebellions fail, by attempts on the lives of those whom they look upon as their oppressors. To such an act of despair did 'Omar fall a victim. Ferûz, a Persian, stabbed the Caliph when he, as was his practice, was about to lead the prayer at the mosque.

III

The Anti-Islamic Reaction or the Civil War

With the death of 'Omar ends the first and the most singular phase of the development of the Islamic State which we may describe as the Patriarchal phase. Two equally powerful motives, so long as they were operative, kept the balance even. One rested on the highest and noblest; the other on the lowest and vilest side of human nature. On the one hand were religious fervour and enthusiasm for the realization of a great idea; namely the union of the entire Arabs in complete equality before God, and the establishment of a religio-military community; and on the other, were the greed for plunder and lust of conquest, immeasurably heightened by unheard-of successes.

An Abdshamshite by family, 'Othmān belonged to the old and proud aristocracy of Mekka. But, though powerful his connexion and noble his descent, he never gave any proof of courage or wisdom. In fact he was and remained to the last weak, vain, fond of money and splendour, and, what was worse still, entirely in the hands of his Mekkan kinsmen—the majority of whom were never really Muslims at heart, but were secret followers of the traditions and the ideals of the old Arab heathenism.¹ During his weak and inefficient administration, the political institutions,

1. Goldziher, *Muh. Studien*, Vol. I, Chap. I. Cf. the excellent character-sketch of 'Othmān, Sprenger, I, 382.

laboriously built up by 'Omar, gradually fell to pieces. He could not restrain the rapacity of the governors, nor did he maintain intact that most important measure of the Caliph 'Omar, namely the exclusion of Muslims from acquiring or owning landed property in conquered countries. In fact it soon became a dead letter. Mu'āwiah, the governor of Syria and a cousin of 'Othmān, to whom 'Omar refused such permission, coaxed the Caliph into granting his request. It happened thus. Mu'āwiah wrote to 'Othmān that his pay was not sufficient to meet the expenses of the numerous military officers and Greek envoys that were frequently at his court. He therefore begged the Caliph to grant ownerless lands (Almazari Aṣṣafiyah) to him to enable him to meet the calls upon his purse. In Syria there were many such lands; for the Greek patricians to whom they belonged had either been slain in battle or had abandoned them. These ownerless lands were considered as crown-lands (Ṣafiyah) belonging to the entire Muslim community. They were leased out by the governor, and their rent was paid into the treasury.¹ For the grant of these lands Mu'āwiah asked the Caliph and the Caliph consented.² And precisely in the same manner did 'Othmān act in other provinces. Thus, in the Caliphate of 'Omar, Ṭalḥa had purchased the estate of Nashtasag in Kūfa. 'Omar had annulled the transaction, but 'Othmān

1. On the other meaning of the word *Kabalah*, cf. Kremer, *Aegypten* Vol. I, 261, Hammer, *Über die Ländverwaltungen unter dem Chalifate*, p. 193; and the excellent observations of Deffrémery in the *Journal Asiatique* (1866), Oct.-Nov., 418-25. The French word *Gabelle* is derived from it.

2. *Ibn 'Asākir*, fol. 97.

sanctioned it.¹ Thus the Caliph lightly and carelessly dealt with lands which Muslims had been taught by 'Omar to regard as their common property. 'Othmān, similarly, made a present of the estate of Fadak, State property, to Hākam Ibn 'Ali-l-'Aṣī, a kinsman, who only under compulsion had accepted Islām and who, for betraying the Prophet, had been banished to Ṭāif.² He likewise gave away the most important offices to his relatives, the Omayyads.³ But what was especially offensive to 'Ali was the grant of enormous annuities to his kinsmen.⁴

Thus all the favourites of the Caliph belonged to the Omayyad family. Between this family and the family to which the Prophet belonged, the Hashimite, there had been even in the days of Paganism, many disagreements and discords. When Muḥammad began his mission, the hostility was deepened and intensified, and between them the most violent collisions took place. When, however, after the conquest of Mekka, the Omayyads accepted Islām, their conversion was not genuine or sincere. They remained at heart true and loyal to the ideas of the old Arab heathenism. When, with the accession of 'Othmān, they came to power and influence, they never made a secret of this fact. Walid Ibn 'Uqbah appeared drunk at the mosque. Another governor distinguished himself by wholesale extortion and embezzlement.⁵ 'Othmān

1. Murasid *sub voce*: Naḡtasag on the authority of Wāqidi. Ṭalḥa, like Zubair, built a palace at Baṣra. From his landed property Ṭalḥa drew a daily income of 1,000 Dinārs. Mas'ūdi, IV, 253, 254.

2. Weil, I, 165, according to the *Kitābul Aghānī*.

3. *Ibid.*, 156, 157, 172.

4. Maqrizi, *Khiṭṭat*, II, 335.

5. Weil, I, 165, 171.

himself revived some of the heathen practices at the pilgrim ceremony at Mekka.¹ But what seems to have aroused and embittered the genuine Muslims most against him was the unseemly levity with which he carried out the official redaction of the Qur'ân, and the destruction of all copies differing from it.² Thus the Anşâr, the old companions of Muḥammad, who, in the lifetime of the Prophet, and still more so under Abû Bakr and 'Omar, had formed, so to speak, a hierarchichal aristocracy, found themselves suddenly supplanted by the Mekkan party who had joined Islâm as a last resort, and then only outwardly. Personal interest and religious zeal enkindled and fanned their wrath and bitterness more and more. The democrato-communistic principles which 'Omar had fashioned and championed were still full of life and force, and the people therefore were not inclined to accept or to submit to the autocratic assertion of power with which 'Othmân dealt with that which was regarded as Public Property. The gift to his cousin and to others set the people aflame.

Abû Dharr Ghifârî, one of the most pious Muslims of his time, urged upon the governor of Syria the view that the rich should be compelled to give a fraction of their wealth for the benefit of the poor.

1. Weil, 167, Vol. I. "Othmân loved finery and even in the pilgrim's dress he could not do without it, though all finery was severely forbidden. We find in *Mawatta* a reliable tradition which says: I saw 'Othmân in Arg (a village three posts from Medina) on a hot summer day; he had his face covered in a purple burnoose.

2. He entrusted the redaction of the Qur'ân to Zaid Ibn Thâbit and others devoted to him to the exclusion of the old companions of the Prophet such as Ibn Mas'ûd.

On this question a violent dispute arose between him and Mu'āwiah, with the result that Mu'āwiah sent him to the Caliph as a fomenter of discord and strife, and the Caliph banished him to the little village of Rabāḍah.¹

Enthusiasts like Abū Dharr were many in the days of early Islām. Thus the party of the discontented grew more and more. 'Alī, the most distinguished living member of the family, joined them, and with him went many of the war companions of the Prophet, such as Ṭalḥa, Zubair, 'Ammār Ibn Yāsir, and Abū Mūsa Aṣḥ'arī.²

Thus, while Islām was extending beyond the borders of Arabia, and was conquering fresh countries year by year, within its bosom sprang up the germs of eternal discord. Insurrection broke out almost simultaneously at the two opposite ends of the vast empire. In Kūfa and Baṣra people rose against the governors appointed by 'Oṯmān. In Egypt the same thing occurred. By timely concessions 'Oṯmān quietened the rebels; but the discontent, tended and nursed by the distinguished companions of the Prophet, notably by 'Alī, Ṭalḥa, Zubair (every one of whom was silently aiming at the Caliphate), increased in volume and intensity, and soon led to the catastrophe which

1. Weil, I, 170. In the *Tadhkirah* of Hamdūn the following is related about Abū Dharr: "When Mu'āwiah built his green palace at Damascus he asked Abū Dharr what he thought of it. He replied, "If thou hast built it with public money thou art a traitor, if with thy own thou art a squanderer." *Tadhkirah*, I, fol. 21.

2. For further information I must refer the reader to my translation of Weil's *Islamitische Völker* published by the Calcutta University under the title of *Islamic Peoples*.

resulted in the murder of the Caliph. From Egypt, where 'Ali had the largest following, came the chief impetus. Egypt formed the base of operation. From there the emissaries carried on their secret propaganda. In this 'Abdullah Ibn Sabâ, the Jew, distinguished himself most. He preached that every Prophet had a representative, and 'Ali was the legitimate representative of Muḥammad, and that 'Othmân had wrongly and unrighteously taken possession of the Caliphate.¹ Later, after the death of 'Ali, he went even still further, and making use of the Jewish idea of Messiah, asserted that 'Ali would some time in future return to the earth as Redeemer and fill it with justice. With this doctrine he, for the first time, introduced into Islâm the idea of the Mahdî, the future Messiah.²

A distinguished Amir, placing himself at the head of the movement and driving away the governor of the Caliph, soon set insurrection on foot in Egypt. A body of 600 Egyptians, pure volunteers, started for Medina. On the way they were joined by the mutineers of Kûfa and Baṣra. After a long negotiation with the Caliph (who was abandoned by his friends and shamefully betrayed by the Anṣâr and the hierarchichal coterie of Medina), the rebels stormed his house and killed the aged Caliph, who knew, if not how to live, at least, how to die with honour and dignity. With truth and justice the poet Ḥasan Ibn Thâbit thus sang of 'Othmân:

The Anṣâr left him in the lurch when death appeared on the scene, though the Anṣâr had the

1. Maqrizi, *Khittaṭ*, II, 334; Weil, I, 259, Note (1).

2. *Shahraṣṭāni*, I, 200; *Ibn Quṭaybah*, 300.

power (to help him if they would). Who would acquit Ṭalḥa and Zubair of complicity in this tragic affair? Muḥammad, the son of Abū Bakr, appeared to be the ringleader, and behind him stood 'Ammār Ibn Yasir.¹

The old Arab clannish and tribal instinct completely swayed the government of 'Othmān. As chief of the Omayyads he felt himself bound to lead his tribesmen to power and renown, and to make his family the ruling family in the land; and this, indeed, above everything else.

But this idea brought the Caliph not only into collision with the idea of equality and brotherhood of all Muslims, which, developing under 'Omar's fostering care, had found wide acceptance among the masses of the Muslims, but also into collision with the Muhājirīn and Anṣār, who felt deeply and sorely aggrieved and injured by it. The Muhājirīn and Anṣār had fought the battles of Islām; they had shared the joys and sorrows of the Prophet—in fact, with their blood had Islām been securely and surely established. Now they had to retire into the background, and to see the Mekkans come to the forefront—the very Mekkans who only under compulsion had acknowledged the Qur'ān, and upon many of whom had rested the curses of the Prophet. Thus the hierarchichal clique of Medina came into fierce conflict with the aristocratic party of Mekka. This Medinite clique possessed immense wealth, and had the confidence of the masses, who were deeply imbued with religious ardour. At

1. *Mas'ūdi*, IV, 284.

the head of this clique stood 'Ali. Hence the fall of 'Othmān as soon as the latter withdrew his support from him.¹

Thus was a long war begun between the ruling families, not only for religious leadership, but more so still for temporal power—for the Caliphate.

To judge accurately the reason for the stubbornness and tenacity with which this war was fought; for its long duration and the greatness of the sacrifice in men and money which it involved—we must try to form a correct idea of the great Arab families of the time.

1. Cf. the interesting letters that passed between 'Ali and Mu'āwiah in *Kāmil* (Wright's ed.), pp. 184, 186. They are perhaps genuine.

IV

The Family and Tribe in Arab Antiquity

We notice in the first years of Islām a similar development of the tribal system as we find among the Romans, of whom we read that the Gens Claudia reckoned a thousand heads and the Gens Fabia supplied eight hundred fighting men. Oyainah Ibn Hisn, the chief of the Fazarah tribe, commanded over 10,000 lancers¹ and the chief of a Himyarite tribe, Dhul-Kala, who was one of the first to join the Syrian campaign, owned one thousand slaves.²

The oldest forms of human association are the family and the tribe. In the earliest times every family existed for itself, and constituted a community closed to the outside world. But when the family grew, it was split up again into different branches. The older and the younger branches, owning one common tribal ancestor, felt bound by the common tie of descent. Such a union of several families made up a tribe which, as it grew, was again split up into various smaller units, sub-tribes or clans consisting of a larger or smaller number of individual families.³ The

1. *Mawajja*, IV, 89.

2. *Mas'udi*, IV, 178.

3. A tribe was, says Robertson Smith, but a large family, the tribal name was the name or nickname of the common ancestor. In process of time it broke up into two or more tribes, each embracing the descendants of one of the great ancestor's sons and taking its name from him. These tribes were again divided and subdivided on the same principle and so at length that extreme state of division was reached which we found in the peninsula at the

word "family" (*bait*, i.e., house, tent), in its widest sense, included a whole tribe; in its limited sense only the members of a family; that is to say, father, mother, sons, daughters, grandchildren and the nearest blood relations.

Every tribe, every sub-tribe, says Ibn *Khaldūn*, formed a self-sufficient community, since all its members were the descendants of the same ancestor.¹ But, at the same time, within it were individual groups more closely bound to each other than the larger group constituting the tribe. The narrower group meant the actual family circle—closest blood relations. Bound by the tie of common descent, they could always count upon the help and protection of the tribe, but the help and protection received from the tribe was never so effective as the help and protection received from direct blood relations.²

But wherein resided the power, the strength? The wealth of the Arab chief lay in the number of sons, slaves, freedmen, droves of camels and horses; but the strength and power of the tribe depended upon the number of men capable of bearing arms. Polygamy, which prevailed among the Arabs, did not

time of the Prophet. Between a nation, a tribe, sept or sub-tribe, and a family there is no difference, on this theory, except in size and distance from the common ancestor. As time rolls on, the sons of a household become heads of separate families, the families grow into septs, and finally the septs become great tribes or even nations embracing several tribes. Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage* (1907), p. 4.

1. The real meaning of *ahl* is tent. It was applied to those who lived under one common tent. In Hebrew the word has preserved its original meaning which it has lost in Arabic. The abbreviation of *ahl* is *al* which also means a family.

2. Ibn *Khaldūn*, *Proleg.*, I. 276.

always quickly multiply a family and thereby bring it to or maintain it in importance. They had therefore to resort to an institution whose origin dates back to remote antiquity, and which aimed at rapidly swelling the tribe or the ruling family with free men capable of bearing arms. This was the institution of clientship.¹ We do not know how this institution came into existence in the Arab heathenism, but from the rules of Muslim law relating to the clients—rules, like so many others, resting on the customs current in Heathen days—we can form a fairly accurate idea of this institution, so exceedingly important for the social and political conditions of the East. There were different ways in which a slave could be manumitted. By manumission he obtained freedom to this extent that he became master of his affairs and was allowed to acquire and bequeath property. Such a manumitted slave was called '*atiq*, a freedman. Apparently the Arabs always deemed it a generous and meritorious act to grant freedom to slaves. But with freedom the bond between the manumitted slave and his master was not absolutely dissolved. The master—despite the manumission—continued to be his protector and defender; and, indeed, his patron. As against protection and help, and especially the defence of his life and property, he was permanently bound to his *quondam* master and his family, and he

1. See Coulanges, *Ancient City* (translated by W. Small), p. 151. "Clientship is an institution of the domestic law, and existed in families before there were cities." The permanent and hereditary dependents of a tribe other than slaves may be roughly classified as (a) freedmen, (b) refugees outlawed from their own tribe, (c) groups like the Jews at Medina who were not strong enough to stand by themselves. Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage*, p. 51.

was thenceforward known as the client of N. N. or, of the tribe of N. N. As such he participated in all the rights and duties of the tribe. If the client died without heirs his patron succeeded to his property. The status of a patron was a hereditary one. It descended to the children of the patron.¹ Patronage was an inalienable right. It could not be got rid of, either by gift or by sale.² Between the patron and the client there subsisted an indissoluble tie, which has been described with justice by Muslim jurists as a strong and powerful kinship.³ Along with simple manumission there were other ways by which the slave became free. The most usual was self-redemption. The slave acquired his freedom by paying a fixed sum to his master within a fixed period.⁴ But as soon as he became free he entered into the relation of a client to his master. In the choice of his patron he had not the slightest freedom. He could become the client of no other than his old master. Another way in which a slave became free was, when he was promised freedom in the event of his master's death.⁵ Finally the heir often used to grant freedom to some of the slaves of the deceased for the salvation of his soul.⁶

There was, however, one kind of manumission by which the client became absolutely free, with power of choosing his patron at will. It was when a slave was set free as *saibah*. This appears to have been a

1. *Mawāṭṭa*, III, 263, 273. 2. *Ibid.*, p. 262. 3. *Ibn Adhārī*, I, 39, 40.

4. The jurists called this compact of self-redemption *mukatubah*.

5. *Tadbīr*; such a slave was called *mudabbār*: *Mawāṭṭa*, III, 277.

6. *Ibid.*, III, 255.

relic of heathenism, and early fell into disuse.¹

The old Arab tribe, in its original composition, consisted of all the families connected by common descent, the freedmen and the descendants of such freedmen, and finally the slaves. Besides these there were others—not connected by blood—who were admitted into the tribe. They were called *mulṣaq* or *laziq* (adscripti), also *ḥalif*. The rights of such strangers, received into the tribe, were perhaps not very different from those of the clients.

"The adoption of individual protégés to full tribesmanship must in later times have been very common, for *ḥilf* and *dai*, sworn ally and adopted son, are often taken as synonymous terms, (*Nawāwī*; see also Goldziher, *Muḥ. Stud.*, I, 134-137). When a whole group was taken into dependent alliance the terms of alliance would naturally be governed by circumstances, and complete fusion would not be so easy, especially if there were religious differences, such as separated the worshippers of Al-Lât and Manât in Medina, the 'Auṣ Manât and the Taim al-Lât, from their Jewish *ḥolafa*. Nevertheless the obligations that united protector and protected were not much less stringent, at least as regarded the duty of help against outsiders, than those which united

1. Mālik says that he questioned Ibn Shihāb as regards *saibah*. He replied: He as *saibah* may choose as his patron any one he pleases. But if he has no patron his inheritance belongs to the entire Muslim community (i.e., the state), and the community must pay the hush money for a murder committed by him. The learned commentator of *Mawaṭṭa* adds that Mālik disapproved of manumission known as *saibah* because the word recalled a heathen practice and because that mode of manumission was no longer current. *Mawaṭṭa*, III, 264.

full tribesmen. The Jews of Medina are said to be 'between the backs' of the protecting clans, that is, they could not be reached by a foe except over the bodies of their supporters. Protector and protected shared the risks and benefits of the blood-feud; the protector was bound to avenge his *ḥalīf's* blood, and he himself or any of his people was liable to be slain in the *ḥalīf's* quarrel, as the latter was in the quarrel of his protector (*Ibn Hishām*, p. 543). The only difference was that the blood-money for the death of a dependent was not so high as for a *ṣarīh*. Further, in Medina, at least, the sworn ally had a claim on the inheritance of the protector. According to the commentators on *Sūra* 4: 37, a man's *ḥolafa* took one-sixth of his estate. The covenant of alliance and protection was based upon an oath."¹

Such was the line along which the Arab tribal system had developed for ages. History but partially lifts the veil. Its beginning goes back to remotest antiquity, indeed, to prehistoric times.

About the time when the Prophet was born this social system had reached the highest stage of development of which it was capable. The tribe, which began in families, had grown into large communities, which, along with their entire suite of clients and slaves, numbered many thousands.

In consequence of the gradual increase of population, of lively commercial intercourse, of growing prosperity, the general² conditions of life had consider-

1. Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage*, pp. 54-56.

2. Freytag: *Einteitung*, pp. 24, 25; Caussin de Perceval, I, 330; Sprenger, *Life of Muḥammad*, p. 8. "Sharastāni informs us that the Banū" Qātham and Daws formed, as late as 571 A.D., so powerful a state."

ably changed, and the desire for association and co-operation began to grow, to deepen and to widen among the Arabs. Even before the Prophet instances are not wanting of tribes entering into offensive and defensive alliances. This desire, shall we say, this need for association, made Mekka the common sanctuary of the Beduin tribes of Ḥejāz. Similarly other tribes too had their sacred places. Thus several of the South Arabian tribes made a pilgrimage to their common sanctuary, Khalaṣah.¹

From what we have said it is apparent that the old tribal system, in the existing conditions of Arabian civilization, was becoming more and more unsuited and out of place, and the need for a greater union made itself keenly and insistently felt. It is a phenomenon which frequently occurs in the life of nations, that, as soon as a nation is ready for a great social, political and religious revolution, men and means, necessary for carrying it through, never fail. Then the entire scaffolding upon which the old structure rested, gives way and a new one rises out of its ruins. A superficial view might suggest that national progress and development are by fits and starts; but it is an error, a grievous error. National development extends over a long period of time. It proceeds slowly and silently—one event connects with another; one

1. Freytag: *Einleitung*, p. 365. "We should be under a great mistake, were we blindly to believe Mohammedan writers," says Sprenger, "who state that not only all the Arabs, but even the Persians performed pilgrimages to Mekka. Ibn Ishāq allows that there were several Tāghūts (temples) in Arabia which were as sacred as the Ka'aba. Shahrastāni, informs us that the Banū Qātham and Daws did not perform pilgrimages to the Ka'aba. They had a Tāghūt of their own": Sprenger, *Life of Muḥammad*, p. 8.

chain links with another until the time is ripe and the moment opportune for revolution. It is prepared by years, even ages, of intellectual ferment. Then suddenly it bursts forth, not as the result of chance or accident, but of deep-laid causes and well-calculated reasons.

Such was the position of the ancient world when the Sublime Teacher of Nazareth delivered His noble message unto mankind; a message which completely transformed the political and religious conditions of the world. Similar was the condition of Arabia when the Prophet Muḥammad appeared on the scene. The dormant idea of the homogeneity of all tribes and of one supreme God—common to all mankind—found shape and expression in him; an idea which united the scattered Arabian tribes, ever at war with each other, into one vast and all-embracing brotherhood. In antiquity common worship always forged the strongest tie of love and mutual protection. Thus, in the sphere of religio-politics, Muḥammad became the Cavour of Arabia. However momentary the success of the Prophet in reuniting the Arab tribes, through one common religion, into one compact whole, it was a great moral advance compared to the earlier Arab heathenism. It was, of course, too much to expect that the Prophet would, at one stroke, destroy the Arab tribal system root and branch. In fact he adopted most of the tribal institutions current among them; especially those relating to clientship and patronage. In fact, he most effectively encouraged the institution of clientship by declaring emancipation of slaves a pious and God-pleasing act; nay, even as

expiation of many kinds of sin.¹

The conquests of Abū Bakr and 'Omar brought in their train large crowds of captives to Arabia who were sold as slaves. The companions of the Prophet (of whom many, as already noticed, had amassed great wealth) and the rich Mekkans purchased thousands of such slaves. The majority of these, doubtless, were gradually emancipated and became clients. Thus the chiefs of the distinguished Mekkan and Medinite families were surrounded by a retinue of clients who numbered thousands.² But when the influence and importance of a family depends upon its numerical strength it is obvious that intelligent self-interest would at once lengthen out the chain and keep the feeling of kinship keenly alive. Of this the Arabic language offers the best and clearest proof, for it contains terms, to indicate different grades of kinship, which are not to be found in other languages; indeed, not even in other Semitic dialects. The Aryans, including Greeks and Romans, originally acknowledged only *agnatio*, relationship on the paternal side; not *cognatio*, that on the mother's side. The Arabs, on the contrary, held both of them in esteem and honour; but the former more than the latter.³ Thus there are special terms in Arabic for uncles and aunts on the paternal and on the maternal side; for relations by marriage on the husband's and on the wife's side, for

1. Ibn Adhārī, p. 17. Introduction.

2. Mūsa Ibn Nuṣair, the conqueror of Africa, himself a freedman, mentions the number of his clients to be several thousands. Ṭāriq Ibn Ziyād, the conqueror of Spain, was one of his clients. Ibn Adhārī, II, 17, 18, 19.

3. Freytag, *Einleitung*, 336, 337; *Ḥamaṣah* (Arab. Text), ed. Freytag, 359.

grandsons by sons, and those by daughters, and so on. Many later fell into disuse. They were not satisfied with kinship carried to its farthest point, but they even had recourse to fictitious ties. In this connexion the most remarkable is what the Arab jurists describe as *kinship by milk-kinship*. It appears to have been a heathen custom which soon disappeared in Islam. To admit a stranger into the family circle they made him suck a few drops of milk at the breast of the lady of the house, or one of her sisters, or one of her nearest¹ female relatives, and with the milk thus drawn, the stranger became a member of the family.² The result was so effective that a husband who had inadvertently drawn some drops of milk from the breast of his nursing wife, felt doubts about the validity of the marriage

1. *Ibn Adhārī*, I, 21. We find among the Arabs a feeling about milk-kinship so well established that Muḥammad's law of forbidden degrees gives it all the effects of blood-relationship as a bar to marriage, p. 176. The commingling of blood by which two men became brothers or two kins allies, and the fiction of adoption by which a new tribesman was feigned to be the veritable son of a member of the tribe, are both evidences of the highest value that the Arabs were incapable of conceiving any absolute social obligation or social unity which was not based on kinship... To us, who live under quite modern circumstances and have lost the tribal idea altogether, kinship is always a variable and measurable quantity. We have a strong sense of kindred duty towards parents or children, not quite so strong a one towards brothers, and a sense much less strong towards first cousins; while in the remoter degrees kinship has hardly any practical significance for us. Something of this sort, though not nearly so developed, is occasionally found in Arabia before Muḥammad, when beyond question family feeling was getting the upper hand of tribal feeling. (*The influence of the law of blood revenge in the disintegration of the Arab society*, pp. 62-63). See the observations of Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage*, pp. 63, 64, 65. Compare the observations of Ibn Khaldūn quoted above.

2. This practice still exists among the Berbers. *Ibn Adhārī*, I, 21. It is not altogether unknown in India. I have personally witnessed one instance of this practice.

on the ground of near kinship and consulted Abū Mûsa Ash'arī, the governor of Kûfa, on the subject. He told him that by reason of the kinship effected by milk it was not permissible for him to cohabit with his wife. 'Abdullāh Ibn Mas'ūd took a contrary view. This incident related by Mālik in his *Mawattā* shows how widely diffused and how powerfully effective was the idea of kinship by milk among the Arabs. Using this idea of kinship by milk 'Āyasha, the wife of the Prophet, admitted those into her presence whom she wanted to receive in her house. Thus she caused milk to be given to them by her sister, Umm Kulthūm, or by the daughters of her brother, 'Abdur Raḥmān, and received them without the veil.¹

Finally there was yet another way of establishing kinship; namely by adoption.² It was common in the

1. *Mawattā* III, 92, *Bukhārī*, 70, where a marriage, at the command of the Prophet, was declared illegal by reason of milk relationship. Even for the different grades of milk-relationship they had different names. The Prophet himself decided that a marriage was dissolved on the ground of milk-relationship. 'Āyasha relates, "Aḥḥab begged me to receive him. When I hesitated he sent word to me, 'How is it that you appear veiled in my presence, for, to be sure, am I not your uncle?'" When 'Āyasha took exception to this, he answered that the wife of his brother was 'Āyasha's nurse. Thereupon 'Āyasha questioned the Prophet and he said: "Aḥḥab is right, receive him." *Bukhārī*.

2. Freedmen were often adopted by their patrons. The commonest case was no doubt that of which the poet Antara furnishes an illustration. Antara was the son of a black slave girl, and, therefore, by the old law, was born a slave. But when he gave proof of prowess his father recognized him as his son and then he became a full tribesman. The right of adoption, however, was not limited to the legitimization of the offspring of a free tribesman by a slave girl. Muḥammad, for example, adopted his freedman, Zaid, a lad of pure Arab blood who had become a slave through the fortune of war. Here, then, a man is incorporated by adoption into a group of alien blood; but we learn that to preserve the doctrine of tribal homogeneity it was feigned that the adopted son was veritably, and to all effects, of the blood of his new father.

days of Arab heathenism, and Muḥammad had confirmed it by adopting Zaid Ibn Ḥārith. The adopted, by adoption, entered into all the rights and duties of a real son (*Mawṭṭa*, III, 91).

These observations suffice to show what a great Arab family of Mekka and Medina was like in the first years of Islām. It was a community by itself, an *imperium in imperio*, consisting of hundreds of near and distant relatives, of thousands of clients and slaves. All these stood under the direct influence and command of the then head of the family, ready, at all times, to gather round him for purposes offensive and defensive.

For when Muḥammad married Zainab who had been Zaid's wife, it was objected, that by the Prophet's own law, laid down in the Qur'ān, it was incest for a father to marry a woman who had been his son's wife, and a special revelation was required to explain that in Islām the Dai or adopted son was no longer, as he had been in old Arabia, to be regarded as a son proper. As there was no difference between an adopted and real son before Islām, emancipated slaves appear in the genealogical lists without any note of explanation, just as if they had been pure Arabs. Dhawāḥ, for example, who is entered as son of 'Omayya, and whom the Omayyads themselves always called the son of 'Omayya, in spite of M.'s new law, was really, as the genealogist Daghfal reminded the Caliph Mu'āwiah, the slave who used to lead 'Omayya by the hand in his blind old age. In like manner refugees were frequently admitted to the tribe of their protectors by adoption. The relation of protector and protected was constituted by a solemn engagement and oath. Robertson Smith, pp. 52, 53.

V

The Civil War

Under 'Omar the very same spirit of complete equality and brotherhood prevailed among the faithful as it did under Abû Bakr, who would not deviate by a hair's breadth from the orders of the Prophet, and who, in spite of all the objections of the Anşâr and Muhâjirîn, sent 'Oşâma Ibn Zaid, though a freedman, in command of a division of troops, because the Prophet had so arranged. Religious enthusiasm was still very active and keen under 'Omar, and it succeeded, for a time, in checking tribal jealousies and family rivalries. But with 'Othmân the Caliphate assumed a worldly tone and colour. The element of kingship supplanted the religious element in the Caliphate. 'Othmân outrageously favoured his tribesmen, the Omayyads, and the Mekkan aristocracy connected by marriage with him, and thus he revived the old tribal spirit—by no means quite extinct among the Arabs. The distinguished men, specially 'Alî, ʿṬalḥa, Zubair, 'Amr Ibn 'Aşî, Muḥammad, son of Abû Bakr, who stood at the head of the great association of 'Arab families, fashioned in the old Arabian sense, would not tolerate the supremacy of the Omayyads, who still, in many of their ways, fondly clung to the ideas of the Arab heathenism. They silently encouraged the rebellion which ended in the murder of the Caliph. 'Alî had his supporters mostly in Egypt, ʿṬalḥa and Zubair in Kûfa and Başra,¹ where, through relations

1. We know that ʿṬalḥa had a house in Başra. Wüstenfeld, *Register*, p. 439. Zubair had a house in Kûfa, two in Başra, eleven in Medina, one in old Cairo. His property was worth more than 50 million Dirhams. Wüstenfeld, *Register*, 475

and clients, they exercised great influence. In Syria, on the contrary, the Omayyads predominated. The Governor of the Province was Mu'āwiah, an Omayyad, who was confirmed in his post by 'Othmān, and was granted large landed properties. 'Omar was wont to banish to Syria all those with whom he was displeased. This information, proceeding as it does from a reliable source, leads us to the inference that Syria was the home of a large number of exiles who were not very well-disposed towards the Caliph.¹ Also some influential men, following the example of Mu'āwiah, and possibly encouraged and helped by him, had settled down there and had acquired landed property, in violation of the law laid down by 'Omar, that no Muslim was permitted to acquire landed property in conquered countries.² Nor must we forget that on the conquest of Syria the Arabs found there a large number of Arab tribes who were apparently Christians, but who readily accepted Islām, and who substantially contributed to the cause of Arab nationality and to the consolidation of the Muslim rule.³

1. *Ibn 'Asākir*, fol. 12. Tradition of Bhaghawi from 'Ali Ibn Al-jad, from Shubah, from Abi Sinām (i.e. Dirār Ibn Murrāh), from 'Abdullah Ibn 'Ali Hudail.

2. 'Amr Ibn 'As had a country estate at Sabo in Palestine. Wüstenfeld, *Register*, p. 72.

3. The Arab tribes of Lakham, Judām, Kuda'ah, Tayy, etc., had emigrated to Syria before the Prophet. They belonged to the sect of the *Ḥanifs*. Among them, in all probability, the names Muslim and Islām were used before the Prophet. We find these appellations even before the Arab conquest among the Arab tribes settled down in Syria. Thus the Syrian Arabs are called in Abū Ismā'il Al-Azdi: *Masā'il al-Sham* [ed. Lees, Calcutta (1854), p. 25].

Of this rich and fertile province the shrewd, ambitious, enterprising Mu'āwiah was in possession. It stands to reason that he would use for his own benefit the events that were happening in Medina. There, at Medina, homage was done to 'Alī, undoubtedly the best and the rightful claimant to the Caliphate. But Ṭalḥa and Zubair had only consented under threat and duress. They therefore left Medina at the earliest opportunity, hastened to Mekka, and there declared the election of 'Alī invalid and illegal.

Without delay, Mu'āwiah, in Syria, took up quite an independent attitude.¹ Directly after the murder of 'Othmān, and even before the elevation of 'Alī to the Caliphate, many Omayyads left Medina. Some set out for Mekka and some for Syria to Mu'āwiah, who, on the death of 'Othmān, stood at the head of the Association of the Omayyad families numbering many thousands, and at whose disposal lay the entire resources of a vast province.

Between these four men : 'Alī, Ṭalḥa, Zubair and Mu'āwiah, there now began the fight for the Caliphate. As the favourite and the son-in-law of the Prophet, 'Alī had the highest claim. Ṭalḥa relied upon his position as one of the oldest and the most esteemed companions of the Prophet; upon his kinship with Abū Bakr who, like himself, belonged to the family of the Taimites,² upon his immense wealth, and upon the influence he wielded over his tribesmen.³ Zubair

1. Dozy, *Spanish Islām*, pp. 27 et seq.

2. *Mas'ūdī*, IV, 223.

3. Sprenger, *D.L.M.*, I, 383 et seq.

put forward his relationship with the Prophet in support of his candidature. His mother Şafīyyah was an aunt of the Prophet (daughter of 'Abdul Muṭṭalib). He himself was the son-in-law of Abū Bakr, and was immensely wealthy.¹ Mu'āwiah, too, rested his claim on his relationship with the Prophet. His sister, Umm Ḥabībah, was married to the Prophet, and he himself was a kinsman of 'Oṭhmān.² He further relied upon his political power and upon his tribesmen, the Omayyads, incontestably the strongest in numerical strength among the great Arab families. And armed with all these, as he was, he awakened an idea, always most tremendously effective with the Arabs: namely vengeance for 'Oṭhmān. He set the idea afloat. Round it rallied Ṭalḥa and Zubair, and to them came 'Ayashah, the mother of the Faithful. Thus was quickly fulfilled the threat of the poet, Ḥasan Ibn Thābit, who, reproaching the Anṣār for the betrayal of 'Oṭhmān, said:

They murdered 'Oṭhmān on whose brow shone
the fear of God, who spent the night saying
prayers and singing hymns. Soon wilt thou hear
in thy own country the call: God is great!
Vengeance for 'Oṭhmān.

The superior military talent and courage of 'Ali soon succeeded in vanquishing Ṭalḥa and Zubair. In the "Battle of the Camel," where 20,000 fell, he rid himself of his rivals. Ṭalḥa was mortally wounded;

1. It is not quite clear whether he was related to Khadijah, the first wife of the Prophet.

2. Ibn Qutaibah, 175. Cf. Sprenger, D.L.M., I, 134; II, 52; III 78.

Zubair was assassinated; 'Ayasha besought and obtained pardon.¹ As against Mu'āwiah he was not so successful. This was a far-sighted politician and a shrewd diplomat. Ali was merely a general and a brave soldier. The Civil War, in spite of the "Battle of the Camel," continued with unabated fury until 'Ali fell victim to the dagger of a fanatic.² The bitterness with which the Arab tribes fought surpassed all bounds. At Šiffin 70,000 fell on the battle-field. Mas'ūdi relates the following characteristic story.

After the "Battle of the Camel" a man who was examining the corpses of the soldiers, fallen on the battle-field, found a severely wounded soldier reciting the following verses in low whispers:

Death has led us to the longed-for spring;
well-seated with drink we return home. We have
obeyed the Taimites because of the follies of our
ancestors but what are the Banū Taim but slaves
and servants?³

He went near the wounded man and spoke to him. But the latter begged him to stoop down and to repeat the Muslim Article of Faith. Scarcely had he stooped when the dying man, with great effort, raised himself and bit off his ear, saying: "If thy mother asks thee where has thou left thy ear; say unto her, with

1. Dozy (Eng. Tr.), p. 34. "Battle of the Camel" fought near Bagra A.D. 656, so called from 'Ayasha's camel, which was a rallying-point.

2. Dozy, p. 39.

3. Mas'ūdi. IV, 333. The tribe, to which Abū Bakr and his daughter belonged, was called Taim. The latter was the prime-mover of the events which led to the murderous "Battle of the Camel."

'Omair Ibn Aḥlab of the tribe of Dabbah, the dupe of a woman (i.e. 'Ayasha) who coveted the Caliphate." Very soon, indeed, the war assumed the character of a war of extermination.¹

The longer it lasted the more victims it claimed and the clearer it became to the tribes, ranged in hostile camps and under opposite banners, that there was no longer any religious question or any question of tribal supremacy involved, but merely inordinate ambition, absorbing passion for power, fond longing for sovereign authority—these were the motives of the contending claimants; these were the real causes of the bloody war. Thus the verses are handed down in which, after the Battle of Ṣiffin where she lost her son, a mother bewailed his death :

O ! My eyes shed streams of tears for the youths reckoned as the noblest of the Arabs. It would not matter a straw, if they did not lose their lives, what Amīr eventually won the victory.

Such were the ideas which paved the way for the conspiracy that sought to destroy three lives at one and the same time. Three fanatics swore that they would kill on the appointed day 'Alī at Kūfa; Mu'āwiah at Damascus; and 'Amr Ibn Asī at Old Cairo. They proceeded with their design, but only 'Alī was mortally wounded and died. Thus Mu'āwiah became the undisputed ruler of the Muslim world. Before we deal with the further consequences of this fateful

1. Mas'ūdī, IV, 340.

event we must closely examine those movements which the Civil War called into existence and which have ever since powerfully affected and influenced Muslim thought.

VI

Rise of the Politico-Religious Parties

It were completely to misunderstand human nature did we set down selfishness as the mainspring of action. It undoubtedly has a very important bearing and will always exercise a powerful influence on human conduct; but there are nobler sides of human nature, too, which, though rarely in evidence, yet, when they do come into play, achieve great and noble results. We have already seen that many of those who took active part in the foundation and building-up of the political fabric of Islâm, were decidedly dominated by greed of gold, ambition, love of war, tribal spirit and family rivalry; and similarly our enquiry has shown that at least the first campaigns of the Muslims were prompted more by zeal for plunder than ardour for Islâm. But it would be an absolute error to suppose that later, other motives, equally powerful and of a wholly different character, were not effectively at work. Ibn Khaldûn justly observes that in countries where wealth and prosperity prevail sense of piety and tendency to religious enthusiasm always and invariably weaken and vanish. Precisely for this reason we find in large towns religious feelings in a very attenuated form. Luxurious life, distractions, sumptuous fare, make men indifferent or insensible to the promptings of faith. Hence the general indifference. In country places, in the desert, on the other hand, the very opposite is the

case. There, humanity, by simple fare, by laborious living, by hunger and privation, awake to religious feelings, and turn to a contemplative life.¹ A deep truth underlies these words of the great Arab thinker and statesman, and the history of Islâm is an eloquent commentary upon them.

Early, indeed, a powerful religious feeling permeated and pervaded the masses, and the greater the outward successes of Islâm the more this feeling gained in depth and intensity. It is true that religious ideas made slow progress among the Beduins; but no less true is it that once these ideas arose, they powerfully laid hold of the Beduin mind. Superstitious—for superstition is dominant among the half-wild tribes, and renders them highly amenable to spiritual sensibilities—these tribes, once touched by spiritual emotion, became the most powerful instruments for the dissemination of religious ideas. The Patriarchal government of 'Omar; the continued and uninterrupted successes of the Arab arms; the conversion, in masses, of the subject races, especially in the Provinces of the Persian Empire, tended to the growth and extension of Islâm with the result that the new religion made in silence as great a conquest of the

1. Ibn Khaldūn, *Prolég.*, I, 180. All that Ibn Khaldūn has said about the influence of food and climate upon civilization has been worked out, from the modern point of view, by Buckle in his *History of Civilization*. What the Arab thinker has divined, the British publicist has proved. Between them, however, there is a gap of five hundred years. One wrote in the metropolis of the modern world on the Thames; the other in North Africa, in an old castle (Kalat Ibn Salamah) the ruins of which are still to be seen in the Province of Oran (Algeria) on the left bank of Mina.

mind and heart as did the army of the Caliph win visible triumphs on the battle-field.

With this steady growth of Islâm the degeneration of the ruling classes under 'Othmân, and the bloody civil war consequent upon his death, did not in the least interfere. The spiritual seed germinated and grew silently, developing and extending its roots and branches on all sides. And yet the violent convulsions of the long-drawn civil war led to greater and greater embitterment of mind, and facilitated the gradual formation of parties.

On the plain of Şiffin, on the western bank of the Euphrates, a succession of fierce fights ended in a three days' battle. A portion of the army of 'Alî rebelled and compelled him to accept the arbitration offered by Mu'âwiah. The troops were weary of massacre, and were no longer inclined to fight for the ambition of their chiefs. About 12,000 men left 'Alî's camp, dissociated themselves from him, and retired to Harûra, where they encamped.¹ They received the appellation of Khâriji. They were composed of different elements.² Religious fanatics formed the nucleus. As Shahrastâni excellently puts it, they were people of prayer and fast. The democracy set up by 'Omar, harmonizing with the Arab temperament, found in these heroic champions. Thoroughly sick of the rivalry

1. On the Kharijites: see the admirable monograph of Brûnnow, *Die Charidschâen*. Brill 1884; Z.D.M.G., Vol. XIII, p. 605; Browne, *Lit. Hist. of Persia*, I, 220 et seq.; Goldziher, M.S., I, 133; also Goldziher's *Mohammed and Islâm*, Chapter V; Von Kremer, *Kulturgeschichte des Orients*, Chapter VI (my translation of this work published under the title of *Orient under the Caliphs*, pp. 258 et seq.).

2. Weil, I, 332.

and jealousy of the aristocratic party of Mekka and the hierarchichal clique of Medina, they were anxious to go back to the ways of 'Omar. Their principles, then, were decidedly democratic. They declared both 'Ali and Mu'āwiah unjust autocrats. They held it a duty to renounce allegiance to a ruler who violated the laws of religion. They rejected the exclusive claim of the Quraishite relatives of the Prophet to the Caliphate as utterly unfounded and without substance, and put forward the view that the *Imām* (Head of the State) should be elected by the people, and the choice need not be restricted to an Arab. It might fall upon a non-Arab, even upon a slave. Some even questioned the necessity for a Head of the State at all, and maintained that an unjust or an irreligious ruler might be deposed or killed.¹ In a certain sense the Kharijites were the Puritans of Islām; fanatical in religion, democratic in politics. The majority of the Kharijites were Arab Nationalists. They belonged chiefly to 'Irāq, Baḥrain and Central Arabia.

Another politico-religious party, in clear contrast to these, came into being about this time. It was the party of the supporters of 'Ali (Shi'at 'Ali). They stood unconditionally by him, looked upon him as the legitimate successor of the Prophet, clung to him with enthusiastic devotion, and declared themselves ready to lay down their lives for him. When, at the battle of Ṣiffin, the award went against 'Ali, 60,000 men are said to have declared themselves ready to sacrifice

1. *Shahrestānī*, I, 129, 130; 138; *Mawāfiq*, p. 206; Ibn Khaldūn, *Proleg.*, I, 389; Abul Fārāj, *Hist. Dynast.*, p. 170.

their lives for him.¹ We have already spoken of the Jew, 'Abdullah Ibn Saba, who actively worked in Egypt on behalf of 'Ali, and who, even in his lifetime, gave currency to extravagant doctrines about him. For instance, he proclaimed him to be a Prophet; nay, an incarnation of Divinity.² At the beginning of the civil war he made his appearance in 'Irâq, where he worked in the interest of the Alides. But in his partisanship he went much further than 'Ali quite liked, and therefore 'Ali banished him to Medîna. It is, however, beyond doubt, that even in the lifetime of 'Ali a party was formed in 'Irâq, consisting mostly of new converts, the old native population, who, in spite of Islâm, which they professed, fastened upon 'Ali the ancient Asiatic ideas—their immemorial inheritance—relating to hereditary succession and divine right of Princes.

This party consisted of his Arab troops, his clients, his tribesmen, a considerable number of pietists, and the ever-growing circle of the new converts.

Tragic as was the death of 'Ali, the persecution of his adherents which the Omayyads ruthlessly indulged in and the hideous catastrophe in Kerbala awoke a deep feeling of vengeance, and fostered the growth of the sect of the Shiites.

In the Eastern lands of the Caliphate, especially among the Persians, the tenets of this party found ready and wide acceptance and impressed upon Islâm a peculiar stamp of its own. It soon developed a

2. Abul Fārāj, p. 190.

3. Weil, I, 209. See Prof. Friedländer's *Heterodoxies of Shiite iites in the Presentation of Ibn Hārm*, p. 65.

personal cult of 'Ali and his descendants. While the Shiite ideas, paving the way to Absolutism in religion and politics, rapidly spread in the West and attained a decisive preponderance; in the East, no less, the ideas of the Kharijites obtained an unmistakable ascendancy. Both these phenomena can be explained by the local conditions and the peculiar genius of the people concerned. The inhabitants of old Babylonia, an Aramaic race, in consequence of the nature of the country, which is a richly watered and fertile plain, have been from time immemorial engaged in agriculture, and have suffered the usual fate of agricultural nations; namely a despotic government. They were accustomed to look upon their princes, not as human beings, but as divinities; and the idea, therefore, of electing or deposing them would appear profoundly sacrilegious to them. From the remotest antiquity¹ they have been accustomed to monarchical despotism, which degrades its subjects to a will-less instrument of the all-powerful ruler. The character of the people there was, and had ever been, slavishly servile. In fact servility was congenital with them; and it was the one quality which found favour in the eyes of their mighty rulers. Accordingly, the Shiite doctrine of fixed hereditary succession and the worship of the descendants of 'Ali, in the nature of things, appealed to such a degenerate race.

Quite different was the position of affairs in the West—by which we mean to convey what the Arabs understood by that term; namely the entire North African coast-land lying beyond Egypt. With the

L. Dozy, *Het Islamisme*, p. 144.

exception of a few Greek and Roman Colonists¹ settled in towns and fortified places, and a small remnant of the Vandal invasion, the population consisted of tribesmen whom the Arabs call Berbers, and who had a strong affinity with the Arab tribes in their tribal constitution, in their mode of living, in their entire mentality.² These Berber tribes, whose³ military skill and talents the Romans had learnt to know in their war with Jugurtha, had lived most simply, from time immemorial, under their native tribal chief. Cattle-breeding was their main occupation.

It can easily be imagined that among such people no despotic monarchy, in the old Asiatic sense, could find acceptance. A keen sense of freedom and independence has ever existed among tribes living in mountainous and inaccessible regions, or carrying on cattle-breeding and leading a wandering life. The agriculturist is rooted to the soil. The Beduin in his desert, the mountaineer in his fastnesses, laughs every pursuit to scorn. The Berbers do not seem to have possessed a national religion. Hence their readiness to accept foreign faiths. Thus we find Christianity in some, and Judaism in others, as the faith of the tribe.⁴ Among such people Islâm, which originally preached brotherhood and equality, and, in addition, assured a

1. It was specially reported of the inhabitants of Kastyliyyah and Bilde-duljerid, as also of the town of Tuzar, that they were the descendants of the Roman Colonists. Cf. A. de Kremer, *Description de l' Afrique*, 42.

2. Weil I, 544; Dozy, *Musulmans d' Espagne*, I, 228.

3. Sallust. Cf. the essay of Baron H. Aucapitaine (*Journal Asiatique* 1839, XV, 273): Sur les tribus de la Haute Kabylie.

4. Barth, *Reisen und Entdeckungen*, I, 53, 244.

good deal of booty, was sure to find a quick response.¹ When the politico-religious party arose in Islām the doctrines of the Kharijites spread as rapidly among them as did the Shiite doctrines among the Persians.²

1. The Berbers had a strong tendency to superstition. Even long after their conversion to Islām they worshipped the many Roman sepulchres in their country. They offered prayers and sacrifices there. Barth, I, 39; *Notices et extraits de la Bibliothèque du Roi*, Vol. XII, 458.

2. Later at the end of the third century A.H. the Shiite doctrine obtained a footing in Africa. The result of this was the rise of the dynasty of the 'Ubadites, who subdued and ruled Egypt for a long time.

VII

The Kharijites

The twelve thousand men who rebelled at Siffin dissociated themselves from 'Ali and took up their position at Harûra, in the neighbourhood of Kûfa. Some months passed in futile negotiations, and finally Ali found himself constrained to take up arms against them. Adopting as their war-cry the words *Lā hukma illā l'llah* (Arbiterment belongs to none save God), they advanced towards Madâin (Ctesiphon) with the intention of occupying it and establishing a "Council of Representatives" which should serve as "a model to the ungodly cities all around." Foiled in this endeavour by the foresight of the governor, they continued their march to Nahruwân,¹ near the Persian frontier. They also nominated a Caliph of their own—'Abdullah b. Wahb, of the tribe of Rasib—on 22nd March, 658 A.D., and proceeded to slay as unbeliever Muslims who did not share their views or recognize their Caliph and refused to curse 'Othmân and 'Ali.² When 'Ali's army advanced against them, most of the rebels dispersed, but a band of 15 to 18 hundred unflinching fanatics held their ground. They were hewn down, if we credit the Arab version, with the exception of a very few. But such movements never perish in streams of blood. The Kharijites silently

1. Between Wasit and Baghdâd. Both these towns, as is well known, were built later.

2. Browne, *Lit. Hist. of Persia*, p. 222.

worked for their cause, and won so large a following that within a short time of 'Ali's death they could muster strong in the province of Khuzistān. Ahwāz, the capital of this province, is three days' march from the Tigris. Preaching sedition, they traversed the entire country between Khuzistān and Moṣul. The Governor of the province needed one full year to effect even a temporary submission of the Kharijites.

After the town of Harūra these earliest Kharjites were called Harurites. The little that we know of their views and beliefs leads us to conclude that they were fierce fanatics in whom the fear of Hell worked most effectively. They even thought that mere belief in Eternal Punishment would not save, and looked upon every Muslim who had committed a heinous sin as a heathen, and maintained that true faith rested not in lip service, but in the absolute avoidance of every sin. They stand, as Maqrizi excellently puts it, in complete contrast to the religious views of the Murjiya.¹ Both

1. Khuda Bukhsh, *Islamic Civilization*, pp. 58 et seq. ; Goldziher, *M.S.*, I, 91 ; Von Kremer, *Herrsch. Ideen*, p. 26. "The Murjiya (so called from the root *arja'a*, 'he postponed,' because they postpone or defer judgment against sinful Muslims till the Day of Resurrection, and refuse to assert that any true believer, no matter what sins he may have committed, is certainly damned) were essentially that body of Muslims who, unlike the Shiites and Kharijites, acquiesced in the Omayyad rule. In doctrine they otherwise agreed in the main with the orthodox party, though, as Von Kremer thinks, they greatly softened and mitigated the terrible features, holding 'that no believing Muslim would remain eternally in hell,' and in general, setting faith above works. Their views were so evidently adapted to the environment of the Omayyad court, with which no sincere Shiite or Kharijite could have established any *modus vivendi*, though Christians and other non-Muslims stood in high favour there and held important offices, that it is hard to regard them otherwise than as time-servers of the Vicar of Bray type. With the fall of the Omayyads their *raison d'être* ended, and they ceased to exist as an independent party, though from their ranks arose the celebrated ḥuṣaynī Ḥanifa, the founder of one of the four orthodox schools of the Sunnis to endure to the present day." (Browne, I, 280).

in 'Irâq and in the Persian provinces adjoining 'Irâq, these religious fanatics multiplied so rapidly that the Caliphs of Damascus had to send their most energetic general there to maintain mere order and peace. Basra was entirely under the influence of the Kharijites. In other towns, too, they were in large numbers; in fact, everywhere they had friends and supporters. The 'Irâqians were not favourably inclined towards the Omayyads, and were in sympathy partly with the Alides and partly with the rival Caliph, 'Abdullah Ibn Zubair. More than once, indeed, that one common purpose, namely the overthrow of the Omayyad yoke, united the Kharijites and the Shiites, divided though they were in their belief by a sundering gulf. In Kûfa the entire population was for the Alides, and held by the Shiite belief. In Basra, on the other hand, the Kharijites predominated. The inhabitants of both these towns, almost simultaneously, expelled the Omayyad Governors.¹ In Mukhtâr the Shiites of Kûfa found a competent leader. This unwearied agitator made common cause now with one and then with another party, but always with an eye to business.

The Kharijites, on the other hand, developing along independent lines of their own, led by a chief elected by them, repeatedly lost and retook the town of Kûfa from the troops of the rival Caliph at Mekka, 'Abdullah Ibn Zubair. When finally driven away, they withdrew under their chief, Nafi Ibn Azraq (called Azraqites after him), to the province of

1. Weil, I, 353. Weil does not distinguish between the Shiites and the Kharijites and hence his account in many places is not quite clear.

Khuzistân, which like Fars and Kirmân they reduced to submission. Nafi fell in battle, but they elected another in his place. Commander of the Faithful was the title they gave to their elected chief. They possessed an army of 30,000 horsemen, and constantly put large hosts to flight. Their last chief, Katâri, one of the most chivalrous figures, holds a distinguished position in the history of this epoch.¹ Some fragments of his military poems have come down to us. The Kharijites rose in Bahrain as they had done in Khuzistân, and only after bitter fights were they vanquished.²

Not until 'Abdul Mâlik had conquered the rival Caliph of Mekka, subdued the whole of Irâq, (71 A.H., 690 A.D.), and brought the holy towns of Mekka and Medina under his control (73 A.H., 692 A.D.), was he able to use his whole strength against the Kharijites. In 75 A.H. (694 A.D.) Hajjâj was appointed Governor of 'Irâq. The rare energy and statesmanship of Hajjâj, reinforced by the tact and military talents of Muḥallab, succeeded in uprooting the Kharijites. Katâri, their last chief, was slain in battle. They proceeded with terrible severity against the Kharijites; thousands were sent to the gallows. Hajjâj is said to have condemned 120,000 of them to death. Such is the report of the 'Irâqians, who represent Hajjâj as a monster of iniquities. According to other reports he was as unselfish as he was an

1. *Hamaçah*, pp. 4, 44, 60, 331; Von Kremer, *Kultur geschichte*, II, 360-2; Brünnow, 26; Browne, *Lit. Hist. of Persia*, I, 221.

2. Weil, I, 413; Ibn Khallikân, *Vita*, No. 555. Abū Fudaik was the leader of the Kharijites of Bahrain.

excellent administrator, and hence the esteem and honour in which the Syrians held him.¹ Against the Shiites he adopted no less severe and repressive measures than he did against the Kharijites; for both these sects, though differing widely in their aims and objects, were in complete accord in one thing, their hatred of the existing government. But, as is always the case with persecution, fanaticism augments in proportion to the severity used.

A fresh revolt of the Kharijites was not long in coming. Şâleḥ Ibn Mişrah and Shabīb Ibn Yazīd headed the movement.² They gathered around them a small but heroic band who knew how to die for their cause. Their views were in agreement with the general views of the Kharijites. They described both 'Alī and 'Othmān as unjust Caliphs, and declared war against the tyranny of the Omayyads as a holy war in honour of God. They pointed to this life as fleeting and worthless, and relied upon the reward in heaven as sure and eternal. A deeper sense of justice, a humaner spirit, a more chivalrous tone and temper characterized this movement. A series of fights against considerably superior numbers of the troops of the Caliphs took place. Şâleḥ fell in one of these many conflicts, and Shabīb succeeded him as the Commander of the Faithful. Round him tradition has woven a chaplet of romance. With his brave band he was everywhere and nowhere. Now he made

1. Zamākhsharas Rabī-ul-Abrār in Ibn Qāsim, p. 33; Weil, I, 551; Ibn Khaldūn, Proleg., I, 312; Ibn 'Asākir, fol. 15; Khudā Bukhsh, Orient under the Caliphs, 201-204.

2. Weil, I, 434.

his appearance in the neighbourhood of Madāin ; now in Adherbaijān ; now in the territory of Moṣul. In all his campaigns his mother and his beautiful wife, Ghazālah, accompanied him. To please Ghazālah he once made a daring attack upon Kūfa (though Ḥajjāj with his troops was in occupation of the Government Palace) and actually took it, and this because Ghazālah had made a vow to perform a short prayer and to recite the two largest chapters of the Qur'ān in the mosque of Kūfa.¹ He even managed to attack Kūfa a second time, but fortune had deserted him. Larger and larger numbers of troops were sent against him. His mother and his wife fell in battle.² The Omayyad general overtook him at Ahwāz. Shabīb, to whom a small number of troops remained loyal, retreated. While riding over a bridge on the little Tigris (Dujail) his horse took fright, and fell with him into the water.³ The heavy steel coat-of-mail dragged him down in the river, but before he was drowned he is said to have called out to his loyal companions: "God, the All-Powerful, fulfils our destiny." (Weil, I, 434 note 5).

A series of such insurrections, now of the Shiites and then of the Kharijites, followed at varying inter-

1. Ibn Khallikān, (Eng. Tr.), I, 616.

2. We read with reference to Ghazālah that the sect of Shabibiyyah (the supporters of Shabīb) declared the Imāmat of a woman permissible.

3. The Dujail (little Tigris) is a large river in the province of Al-Ahwāz, having a number of towns and villages on its banks. It takes its rise near Isphahān, and its bed was dug by Ardāshīr Ibn Bābak. It must not be confounded with the Dujail of Baghdād, which branches off the Tigris opposite to Al-Kadisiya, on the west side of the river, between Tikrit and Baghdād, and waters an extensive country; Ibn Khall., I, 619.

vals. The Omayyads, in the meantime, were fast on the decline. Risings, on all sides, followed one another in swift succession, and family dissensions grew more and more bitter and paralysing. Scarcely had Merwân, the last of the Omayyads, seized the reins of government, when a Shiite insurrection broke out in Kûfa. Simultaneously a far greater danger threatened from the north. Ḍaḥḥâq Ibn Qais Shaibânî, a Kharijite chief, collected an army of 3,000 men in Mesopotamia, destroyed at one stroke the Shiite troops in Kûfa, took possession of the town, and soon became master of the whole of 'Irâq.¹ With an army of 12,000 men he advanced towards the Euphrates near Rakkah, with the obvious intention of attacking Syria. The Caliph personally took the field against him, and Ḍaḥḥâq fell in the battle and his troops suffered a complete defeat (128 A.H., 745-6 A.D.).² Though order was restored here, the Kharijites secured entire possession of Adherbâijân, from which they drove out the imperial troops. A Kharijite flying-corps even managed to obtain temporary possession of Medina.³

In Persia the Alides took up a strong position, and visibly grew in power and influence. While the rise of hostile parties, all over, threatened to wreck the Empire; a movement, which had for long been maturing, suddenly burst into light. The Alides and the Abbasids, for some time, had been conspiring against the Omayyads, both hoping to set up their own nominee to the Caliphate. A coalition seems at last to have been effected between the two main branches

1. Weil, I, 689 et seq. 2. Muir, Caliphate, pp. 147 et seq. 3. Weil, I, 693.

of the great Quraishite family; namely the Alides and the Abbasids. They combined against their common enemy, and overthrew Merwân II, the last of the Omayyads, a prince, surely worthy of a better fate.

Here we shall pause to cast a glance at the extension of the Kharijite ideas in Africa, and to estimate its influence on the political history of that country. Hunted down in the East, dispersed and scattered, many of the Kharijites found asylum in Africa. There they found shelter and protection among the different Berber tribes, and there they propagated their doctrines with unexampled success. The majority of the Kharijites who emigrated to Africa belonged to the two sects of the Sufrites and the Ibadites. On this subject our information is meagre and insufficient. It seems that their doctrines were not so rigid and unbending as those of the Harûrites, but their political principles were distinctly democratic. These two sects secured a large following among the Berbers.¹

1. *Ibn Adhârî*, I, 39, 40, 41. "The Berbers' faith was the stern and passionate religion preached to them by the Kharijites. Nowhere had these zealous and convinced teachers found their tenets so fervently embraced; the Calvinists of Islâm had at last found their Scotland. The Arabs had rejected their doctrines, not through any repugnance to their political principles—which, on the contrary, accorded well with the republican instincts of the race—but because they would neither take their religion seriously, nor accept the intolerant Puritanism by which these sectaries were distinguished. On the other hand the inmates of squalid African huts accepted their teachings with indescribable enthusiasm . . . It would be unprofitable to enquire what particular sect they gave a preference to—whether they were Harûrites, or Sufrites, or Ibadites—for the chroniclers are not agreed upon this matter. At any rate they understood enough of the Kharijites' doctrines to assimilate their revolutionary and democratic principles, to share the fanciful hopes of universal levelling which their teachers aroused, and to be convinced that their oppressors were reprobates whose destiny was hell-fire." Dozy, *Spanish Islâm*, pp. 130-131.

By reason of the oppression of the Arab governors who mercilessly sucked the land and drained the resources of the country to enrich themselves and the Court of Damascus, the Berber population was driven to rebellion, which broke out almost simultaneously with the most violent political upheaval in Iraq (122 A.H., 740 A.D.). A great number of the Berber tribes rejected Islām, expelled their Muslim chiefs, and elected in their places chiefs of their own tribe. The insurrection became so extensive that it seemed that it would end in the complete extirpation of the Arab invaders.¹ A Berber called Maisarah placed himself at the head of the rebels. His countrymen chose him as their Caliph and the Kharijites (the Sufrites) appointed him their chief. But soon his troops put him to death, and elected in his place Khālid Ibn Ḥamid, of the great Berber tribe of Zanatah, who had inflicted several crushing defeats on the Arabs.² In the battle of Wādī Sabū (where along with 20,000 Arabs there were 10,000 members of the Omayyad family) the Arab army was completely put to flight. The town of Kairwān was attacked by the Kharijites and thirty thousand Berbers, but the inhabitants repulsed the attack. After this unsuccessful attack one of the generals, Ṭarif, settled down among the Berbers in Tamesna, and founded the dynasty of the Barghawātah.³ After a great deal of bloodshed the government succeeded in suppressing the Berber revolt (155 A.H., 772 A.D.). But insurrections, great and small, uninterruptedly continued, proving

1. Dozy, *Musul. d'Espagne*, I, 241.

2. Ibn Adhārī (Dozy's edition), I. 40 et seq.

3. Ibn Adhārī, I, 44.

how deeply the people resented the foreign yoke. The doctrines of the Kharijites had taken deep root in different tribes. Such was the case with the powerful Zanátah tribe and the Hawwárah tribe. A colony of the Kharijites (Ibadiyyah) founded the town of Taihort, and the fight between the native tribes and the Arab settlers never really ceased at any time. The governors of the Caliph had a difficult position to keep, but that did not prevent them from striving after greater and greater independence from the Central Government at Baghdád. They gradually secured allies among the Berber tribes, and, by identifying themselves with their interests, they strengthened their position and consolidated their power.

It is not difficult to see that these repeated wars of the Berbers against the Arabs were really nothing more nor less than the assertion and manifestation of the Spirit of Nationality against a foreign rule. The Kharijite ideas found so swift a response among them sheerly because its democratic spirit completely harmonized with their own sense of liberty and freedom. These wars, therefore, like most of the insurrections in 'Irâq, were far more political than religious in their spirit and significance.

VIII

The Shiites

The change of dynasty which had taken place in the East and which had transferred the Caliphate from the family of the Omayyads to that of the Abbasids was a change completely disappointing to those who had done most for it; namely to the Alides and the Shiites. By the overthrow of the Omayyads they had cherished the hope of setting up a descendant of 'Alī on the throne—instead of that the descendants of 'Abbās, the uncle of the Prophet, obtained possession of the Caliphate. Against the new dynasty, therefore, rebellious movements were not wanting and the first Abbasids treated the Alides with as great harshness and severity as they did the Omayyads. The Shiites, as might be expected, with a small exception, who went over unconditionally to the Abbasids, clung to the Alides and shared their fate.

Fortune smiled upon them but for a while. In the fratricidal war between the two sons of Hārūn, Māmūn relied on the Persians, who were steeped through and through in Shiite ideas; while his brother relied on the Arabs. Māmūn won, and with him began not only a period of great religious toleration, but also open patronage of the Shiites. Under the influence of his Alide counsellors, especially his Wazīr Faḍl Ibn Sahl, he went the length of marrying one of his daughters to a great-grandson of 'Alī, and even declared him as his successor. He ordered coins to be

struck in his name, and changed the black flag of the Abbasids for the green of the Alides.¹ Against this act of the Caliph a popular anti-Shiite reaction set in. 'Irâq and other provinces were not only not inclined to tolerate the tutelage of the Persian courtiers of the Caliph, but felt apprehensive of falling under the sway of the Shiite religious ideas through the influence of the Alide Crown Prince—a prospect not very cheering to the Arabs. The Shiites had made themselves thoroughly disliked by their repeated fanatical excesses, and by their wild intolerance towards the rest of the Muslims.² Mâmûn was forced

1. Weil, II, 217.

2. "It is an erroneous view," says Goldziher in his *Mohammed and Islâm* (pp. 255-256), "which traces the origin and development of Shi'ism to the modifications of the ideas in Islâm, brought about by the conquest and spread among Iranic nations." This widespread view is based on a historical misunderstanding, which Wellhausen has overthrown conclusively in his essay on the *Religiös-politischen Oppositionen-parteien im alten Islâm*. The Shiite movement started on genuine Arab soil. It was not till the uprising of Mukhtar that it spread among the non-Semitic element of Islâm. The origins of the Imâm theory, involving the theocratic opposition against the worldly conception of the State; the doctrine of the Messiah into which the Imâm theory merges; and the belief in the Parousia in which it finds an expression, can be traced back to Judæo-Christian influences. Even the exaggerated deification of 'Ali was first proclaimed by 'Abdullah Ibn Saba before there could possibly have been a question of the influence of such ideas from Aryan circles, and Arabs joined this movement in great numbers. Even the most marked consequences of the anthropomorphic doctrine of incarnation (see Goldziher, p. 233) owe their origin in part to those who are of indisputable Arabic descent. Shiism as a sectarian doctrine was seized upon as eagerly by orthodox and theocratically-minded Arabs as by Iranians. To be sure, the Shiite form of opposition was decidedly welcome to the latter, and they readily identified themselves with this form of Muslim thought, on whose further development their old inherited ideas of a divine kingship exercised a direct influence. But the primary origins of these ideas within Islâm do not depend on such influence; Shiism is, in its roots, as genuinely Arabic.

to change his policy. He had his wazir murdered in the bath, and his son-in-law poisoned (203 A.H., 818-19 A.D.). The religious faith of the Shiites had developed early, and in quite an original way. The idolatrous worship of 'Alī and his descendants lies at the root of the entire system.¹ Even in the first century they made pilgrimage to the grave of Ḥusain, where they sobbed and sighed and wept. Later, this developed into an annual function (celebrated on the 10th of Moḥurrum), which has been most effective in keeping alive the Shiite fanaticism.

In the year 62 A.H. (681-82 A.D.) a Shiite army was passing by the sepulchre of Ḥusain in Kerbala.² As soon as it came within sight of the sepulchre the men dismounted, tore off their dresses, flung dust on their heads and raised a woeful cry. Stridently vocal was their commander in prayer: "Peace be on thee, son of the daughter of our Prophet! Martyr, son of a martyr! Truth-lover, son of a truth-lover! Imām, son of an Imām! How unjust and violent was thy death! what noble bodies were trodden under the horses' hoofs! what a head pierced by an enemy lance! we have blackened our faces, and with blackened faces we appear before thee to seek thy forgiveness! we are sinners. Thy blood is on our neck. We have vowed to avenge thee with our very lives, so that the Almighty may forgive us and the Prophet may not withdraw his intercession from us!" Ani-

1. Shiism was a fertile soil for fostering absurdities calculated to bring about the total disintegration of the God-idea in Islām. See Goldziher, *Moḥammed and Islām*, p. 234. Also pp. 232-233.

2. Weil, I, 359, according to Ṭabarī. See Wüstenfeld, *Der Tod des Ḥusain und die Rache*.

mated by such ideas the Shiites still visit the sepulchre of Husain, and, in the very same spirit as their forefathers, celebrate the anniversary of his death.¹

At first the oldest Shiites regarded Husain and Hasan as Imāms. After their death opinion was divided. Some maintained that the Imāmat continued in their descendants (the holders of this view are the Imāmiyya and the Zaidiyya); others held that the Imāmat after the death of Husain was transferred to 'Ali's son, Muḥammad Ibn-Al-Ḥanafiyya, whom, henceforward, they considered their rightful Imām. Muhammad Ibn-Al-Ḥanafiyya died in A.H. 81 (A.D. 700) at Ṭaif at the age of 65.² After his death extravagant stories about him were put in circulation by a freedman of 'Ali, called Kaisan. Some fanatics asserted that Ibn-Al-Ḥanafiyya was not dead but had disappeared, and that he was actually living in concealment; that he would return at a stated time, and fill the Earth with justice and righteousness.³ The

1. Goldziher, *Mohammed and Islam*, pp. 253 and 254.

2. *Ibn Qutaiba*, p. 111.

3. *Shahrastāni*, I, 168. The well-known poet Sa'id Ḥimyarī believed in this. He died in A.H. 171 or 179 (A.D. 795). Hammer-Purgstall, *Lit. Gesch. d. Araber*, III, 548; *Khariḍat-ul-'Aja'ib*, p. 153. "Even in the earliest days of the development of the Imām there was no agreement among the Shiite community as to the personalities of the Imām. One of the earliest manifestations of the Shiite idea, as we have seen (p. 224), appeared in connexion with an Imām who did not trace his descent from the Fāṭimid line of 'Ali. And even within the Fāṭimid descendants various groups of 'Ali adherents have set up quite distinct lines of Imāms—a divergence due to the numerous ramifications of the 'Ali family. After the death of Imām Abū Muḥammad Al-'Askari, the Shiites were already split up into about fourteen divisions, each claiming the privilege of direct descent from 'Ali. The series of Imāms most widely recognized at the present time among the Shiites is that set up by the sect of the so-called 'Twelvers' (or Imāmites). According to them 'Ali's rank as Imām was directly inherited by 'visible' Imāms up to the eleventh,

idea of a "hidden Imâm" who, at a certain point of time, would come out of his concealment to rule the world and to usher in a golden age, made its appearance very early, and has played an important rôle in later Islam. In fact it is not without influence even now (*Ibn Athîr*, VIII, 21 *et. seq.*). We might divide the Shiites into two main classes: those who acknowledge the transmission of the Imâmat to the descendants of 'Alî's wife, Fâtima, only (Imâmiyya, Ithn-'Ashariyya, Zaidiyya), the severe, uncompromising legitimists; and those who make the Imâmat hereditary in the line of Muḥammad Ibn-Al-Ḥanafiyya (Kaisaniyya, Hashimiyya, etc.). A portion of the latter went over to the Abbasids and acknowledged the Imâmat of the first Abbasid and his successors. By this, of course, they ceased to be Shiites.¹ Apart from the cleavage due to the question of succession, there is a yet wider fissure, traversing the whole of

whose son Muḥammad Abul Qāsim (born in Baghdād, 872) was removed from the Earth when scarcely eight years old, and since then lives hidden from the sight of men, in order to appear at the end of time as the Imâm Mahdi, the Saviour, to free the world from injustice, and to set up the kingdom of Peace and Justice. This is the so-called 'hidden Imâm' who has lived on ever since his disappearance, and whose reappearance is daily awaited by the faithful Shiite. This belief in a hidden Imâm is to be found in all branches of Shiism. Each one of the parties believe in the continued existence and ultimate appearance of that Imâm who in the special order of Imâm is regarded as the last...The 'Return' is, therefore, one of the decisive factors in the Imâm theory of all sub-divisions of the Shiites; they differ only in regard to the person and order of the hidden and returning Imâm...The next person to be regarded as a vanishing Imâm who would some day return, was 'Alî's son Muḥammad Ibn-Al-Ḥanafiyya, whose adherents were convinced of his continued existence and his reappearance. The idea of the 'Return' is not of itself an original doctrine. Probably this belief came over to Islām through Judæo-Christian influences." Goldziher, pp. 240-242.

1. *Shahvastāni*, I, 169, 170.

their religious system, according as the latter deviated more or less in the matter of dogmatic questions from general orthodox Islām. We must, therefore, follow the Arab authorities, and divide them into moderate and ultra-Shiites.

The (oft-mentioned) South Arabian Jew, 'Abdullah Ibn Saba, championed the view that the spirit of God had descended on 'Ali, and that he would, at some future time, return and fill the Earth with righteousness.¹ This idea steadily gained ground among the ultra-Shiites, especially among the Persians, who incorporated into Islām the old Indian idea of the divine incarnation in man. They looked upon the Imām as one directly appointed by God. He was sinless and infallible; a continuing manifestation of Godhead in human form, whose soul, when dead, passed into the body of his successor.² He was the very embodiment of religion and morality; and, therefore, to him was due blind, unquestioning obedience. They went, in the end, even to the extent of regarding the Imām as God in human shape.³ The Alides, exposed as they were to constant persecutions, set up the doctrine of the hidden Imām, and this for the obvious reason that it was not safe for the Imām publicly to appear and

1. The sect of Ibbaiyyah regarded 'Ali as God. Others associated Muḥammad with him in his divinity, and some thought that God was a mystical five, consisting of Muḥammad, 'Ali, Fāṭima, Ḥasan, and Ḥusain. *Shahrastānī*, I 202; *Mawākif*, 346.

2. Ibn Khaldūn. *Proleg.*, I, 404; *Shahrastānī*, I, 170.

3. The Sect of Bazighiyya looked upon Ja'far Ibn Muḥammad, an Alide, as an incarnation of God. *Khiṭṭat*, II, 352. Others worshipped Ja'far Ṣādiq as God. At Kunash in Kūfa they erected a hut, where they met and worshipped.

declare himself as such.¹ Muḥammad Ibn-Al-Ḥanfiyya was worshiped as such by a sect. The Ithnā-ʿAshariyya held a similar belief. They maintained that their last Imām, Ḥasan ʿAskari, whom they also call Mahdī, had disappeared in a subterranean passage, and would return at the end of time, as Messiah, to rule the world. This doctrine of the "hidden Imām" led to further deviations. The idea that God manifested Himself in the family of ʿAlī was extended, enlarged, amplified. It came to be believed that other men, too, might be ordained by God as Imāms, and thus become His Representative on Earth, exercising supreme authority in matters spiritual and temporal. In the first century such ideas got abroad and laid hold of the popular mind—calling forth a great many popular risings. A long series of fanatics and impostors put themselves forward as the expected Imām (the Mahdī), and the instance of the Bāb clearly points to the conclusion that this tendency has not yet wholly died out from the East.²

Under the strong and stern government of the first Abbasids these politico-religious parties, in

1. Sunni Islām, says Goldziher, emphatically rejects the Shiʿite form of this belief. It ridicules the long-lived hidden Imām, p. 246. Even during his bodily absence the hidden Imām is the genuine "leader of the time" and not without the power to manifest his will to believers, p. 247. Goldziher, on p. 247, cites a remarkable proof of the active force of this belief in modern Persia. "The doctrine of the Imām, accordingly, maintains its active force. It has attained a dogmatic significance of fundamental importance, and is an active, essential element of the religious and political system."

2. Even under the Omayyads one Bonān Ibn Sīnān gave himself out as an incarnation of God, *Shahrastānī*, I, 172. He was killed. Muqanna played a similar role, and so did Abū Maṣṣūr Ijlī and Abul Khaṭṭāb, Ḥallāj and Shalmaghani died for this idea, and many other enthusiasts sacrificed their lives for it.

spite of repeated insurrections and fierce fights, could not make much headway. The hand of an all-powerful government kept them under control, and even if, perchance, an individual ruler felt favourably inclined towards the Shiites, he could not, with any safety to himself, abandon the path of orthodoxy—for the great mass of Muslim population in Syria, Egypt and Arabia were decidedly orthodox. In 'Irâq itself, where formerly the Kharijite and the Shiite ideas flourished, a change manifested itself when, after the fall of the Omayyads, the Abbasid Caliphs went into residence at Baghdâd. The orthodox party, henceforward, gained and managed to retain the upper hand here, and the masses, especially in the Capital, were distinctly and positively hostile to the Shiites, as the frequently recurring street riots only too clearly prove. Later, these riots between the Orthodox and the Shiites became an annual institution, so to speak, both at Baghdâd and in other large towns. Circumstanced as they were, the Shiites resorted to a method which oppressed political parties have adopted at all times and in all ages. They worked in the dark, formed secret societies, sent emissaries to outlying provinces. From the centre of the Caliphate they transferred their activity to its periphery. Thus they succeeded in founding small independent principalities and dynasties. Thus arose, in the extreme west of Africa (in the modern Morocco), the dynasty of the Idrisids. Under the Caliph Hâdi (169-70 A.H., 785-86 A. D.) an insurrection of the Alides took place in Mekka and Medina which was quelled with streams of blood. One of the Alides, a great-grandson of 'Ali,

called Idris, saved himself by flight. He settled down in the west in the neighbourhood of Walili,¹ where he was welcomed by the Berbers, and where he laid the foundation of the Idrisid dynasty.² He was poisoned at the instance of the Caliph Hārūn, but his dynasty continued through his son (187-312 A.H., 808-924 A.D.).³

A Shiite emissary, himself a descendant of 'Ali, succeeded in Ṭabaristān, in the north of Persia, in inducing the inhabitants to accept the Shiite faith and the Alide rule.⁴ Some time later an Alide, called Naṣīr Otrush, came to Dailam, and successfully proclaimed himself as Imām.⁵

During the great Alide insurrection under Māmūn (199 A.H., 814-15 A.D.), when Ibn Ṭabāṭabā, being proclaimed Imām, occupied Kūfa and Baṣra, and managed to hold out some time Yaman, the inhabitants of which were for the most part Shiites of the Zaidiyya sect, declared for him and accepted his governor.⁶

In Yaman, where the largest portion of the inhabitants were Zaidites, small Alide princes maintained themselves, assuming the title of Imām, which

1. Walili is the Berber name for the town of Tangier. Cf. Dory, *Ibn Adhari*, I, 73.

2. Muir, *Caliphate*, p. 470. Lane-Poole, *Moh. Dynasties*, p. 35.

3. *Ibn Adhari*, Dozy's Ed., I, 218.

4. Weil, II, 391; *Hamza Ispahanensis*, 232.

5. *Ibn Khaldūn*, *Proleg.*, I, 408; Weil, II, 613. He conquered Ṭabaristān in 302 A.H. *Ibn Athīr*, VIII, 60.

6. Weil; II, 205.

is still borne by the rulers of Şan'â.¹ Thus grew up within the Caliphate more or less independent Alide dynasties. Most of these were short-lived, and were without any influence on the course of Islamic history. Far greater, however, were the successes which the Shiites achieved in Africa. There, in the second half of the third century, Shiite emissaries had already secured power and influence among the great Berber tribe of Qatamah. A certain Abû 'Abdullah, belonging to Şan'â, succeeded in winning over and obtaining the leadership of this tribe, along with most of the allied tribes.² He preached to them the doctrine of an infallible hidden Imâm of the family of 'Alî who would shortly reveal himself and assume, as Mahdî, the reins of spiritual and temporal sovereignty. He cursed the first two Caliphs as usurpers, and accused the Companions of the Prophet of apostacy. Those who held beliefs similar to his own he called "Faithful"—all others he set down as infidels and outlaws.³ He soon felt himself strong enough to cross swords with the Aghlabides—the then ruling dynasty in Africa. The first military successes nerved the booty-loving Berber tribes to greater exertions. The last of the Aghlabides was soon compelled to abandon his residence, Rakkadah, and to fly with all his treasures to Egypt.⁴ In the meantime a scion of the family of 'Alî, with his son, was discovered in the

1. On the fate of the South Arabian Zaidites cf. Rutgers: *Historia Jemanæ sub Hasano Pascha* (Leyden, 1833), p. 124. Some Alide princes maintained and some still maintain a more or less independent rule up to the present time. Thus in the Central Arabian town of Hail an Alide family still rules. Ausland, 1865, N. 40, p. 941.

2. I. - *Athir*, VIII, 23. 3. *Ibn Adhharî*, I, 132. 4. *Ibid.*, I, 143.

prison at Sigilmasa. He was called 'Ubaidullah, and Abû 'Abdullah regarded him as the infallible, sinless Imâm. He liberated him (296 A.H., 908 A.D.) and proclaimed him the Mahdî, the Imâm, who had come out of concealment, and to whom blind, unhesitating obedience was due.

'Ubaidullah was not slow in claiming his privileges, and soon, as infallible sinless Mahdî, he demanded complete obedience to his will, and carried out the principles of the Shiite belief to all their extreme consequences. In outer seeming Islâm was retained, and 'Ubaidullah on every occasion strengthened himself by citing suitable verses from the Qur'ân : but, in the place of Islâm, a complete enslavement of the mind, and a deification of the person of the prince, were really introduced and established.

Mahdiyya, the new residence built by him (308 A.H., 920 A.D.), was regarded as a national sanctuary by the followers of 'Ubaidullah, and instead of turning, at prayers, to Mekka, they turned towards Mahdiyya, as they had formerly done towards Rabbâdah, when the Imâm was in residence there. One of the confidants of 'Ubaidullah used often to say to him : "Ascend to heaven ! how long wilt thou tarry on earth and move about among mankind ?"¹

Everywhere an anti-Islamic spirit manifested and asserted itself. They preached community of wives;² they publicly renounced the Fast of Ramaḍân ; they altered the usual form and number of prayers, and everywhere they fiercely persecuted the orthodox

1. *Ibn Adhārî*, I, 190.

2. *Ibid.*, 190, 191.

school. But in this general wreck of the old order there were symptoms which caused uneasiness to the infallible Imâm and movements which needed no little effort to check and to completely crush. In the neighbourhood of Tetuan lies a mountainous district—the Rif—which is inhabited by the Berber tribe of Ghomarah.¹ This tract of land, rich in fertile plains and smiling cornfields, was intersected all over by rivulets and mountain streams. This, for obvious reasons, was always the seat of a thick population. Its length may be computed at six days', its breadth three days' journey. The inhabitants, the Ghomarah tribe, were always noted for their freedom and independence. Shortly after 'Ubaidullah had settled down at Mahdiyya, an alleged Prophet called Ḥamim, son of the Merciful God, made his appearance among them.² A great many of his Berber fellow-citizens joined him, and he fought those that did not—like the Masmūdah tribe in the coast-land of Tangier.³ He set up for his followers a religious system different from but far more comfortable than Islām.⁴ Instead of five he enjoined two daily prayers morning and evening. On Wednesday he enjoined a half-day's, on Thursday a full day's fast. For failing to fast he imposed the penalty of five cows to the Prophet. In

1. The Ghomarah are one of the three chief tribes of the great Masmūdah family which resides on the western part of the Maghrib, the western chain of Atlas and the Rif.

2. *Description de l'Afrique, Texte Arab*, published by Von Kremer (Vienna 1851), pp. 79, 80; *Journal, Asiat.* 1859, XIII, 185.

3. *Ibn Adh-hari*, I, 198.

4. *Wüstenfeld, Gesch. d. Fat. Chalifen*, p. 66.

the month of Ramaḍān¹ only three days' fast were sanctioned. He declared the pilgrimage to Mekka, ablution and purification unnecessary. He even allowed pork, but absolutely forbade eggs. He announced a revelation in the Berber tongue, and called it his Qur'ān. The following is a verse from it: "Save me from my sins! O thou, that hast granted me sight to see the world. Save me from my sins, O thou that leddest Moses out of the sea." Ḥamim levied the tenth for his own use from his community.² He was finally killed by the Masmūdah tribe in the coast-land of Tangier.³ The rising of the numerous Berber tribes, which took place shortly after under Abū Yazīd, calls for serious attention. It was less religious than political in its bearing, and aimed at the overthrow of the Shiite government. The innate sense of liberty and freedom of the Berbers would not long endure the despotism of the Ubaidites. Shortly after the death of Imām 'Ubaidullah (322 A.H., 934 A.D.) and during the reign of his son Abul Qāsim, a man called Abū Yazīd Makhḷad, of the tribe of Zanāṭah, revolted. In the valleys of Mount Atlas he found his first supporters, but later many Berbers gathered round his standard. His teachings were distinctly democratic, and hence the Arab authors call him Kharijite ('Ibadi). With his troops he overran the whole of Africa and conquered Kairowān.

1. According to the author of *Tārīkh-ul-Jumān* (fol. 136) he fixed 10 days' fast in the month of Ramaḍān. According to the same author the Spanish Caliph Naṣir sent troops against this false prophet, who killed him in 310 A.H., 922 A.D.

2. Kremer, *Description de l'Afrique*, pp. 79, 80.

3. Dozy, *Ibn Adhārī*, I, 198.

All the orthodox, dissatisfied with the Shiite rule, cheerfully joined him. But Makhlad, like a true Berber, abandoned Kairowân with absolute unconcern for his Arab allies; with the result that the Shiite troops retook it and committed a fearful massacre of the orthodox population of the town.¹ These fights of the Berbers with the Ubaidites continued with varying results until Makhlad, by arraying himself in princely splendour, offended the democratic susceptibilities of the Berbers, suffered a great defeat, and though successful in escaping from the field of battle in the Katâmah hill-tracts, was at last, after desperate resistance, taken captive and cruelly executed (330 A.H., 947-48 A.D.).²

Unopposed, the rule of the Ubaidites now extended over Africa. Egypt was conquered by them, and Cairo founded by their general Mo'izz.³ Thereto they transferred the seat of government, and appointed governors to administer the Western Province. But soon these governors managed to make themselves independent and to restore the glory of orthodox Islâm.⁴ The Shiite faith reached its farthest point of development under the Caliph Hâkim, the sixth of the Fâtimids, who declared himself an incarnation of God. In the recesses of Lebanon, among a simple, unsophisticated people, his supporters found a con-

1. Dozy, *Ibn Adhari*, I, 226.

2. According to *Ibn Athir* he died of his wounds, VIII, 332.

3. Prof. Margoliouth's *Damascus, Cairo and Jerusalem*.

4. On the Ziyarides; cf. *Ibn Adhari*, I, 237, 305, 307. Party spirit broke out among the Berber tribes themselves. Thus the Sarhagah tribe remained loyal to the Ubaidites; while the Zanāṣah tribe sympathized with the Spanish Omayyads. Dozy, I, 262.

genial soil and a large following. The Druses worshipped and still worship him as God, who was naught but a wild, insensate tyrant. With the death of Hâkim and the fall of the Fâtimids, who were supplanted in Egypt by the Ayyûbids, the Shiite movement¹ ended in the west.

Henceforward the rule of orthodox Islâm continued undisputed, but the Berber insurrections did not cease. Under the cloak of religion the Almora-vids took up the cause of the Berber nation against the foreign rule of the Arabs. These, in turn, succumbed to the Almohads. However great the success of the Shiites may appear in the west, the importance and significance of the Shiites really belongs to the religious and political history of the eastern lands of the Caliphate.

We have already described the fearful insurrection of the Zenj, which broke out in Bahrain in the second half of the third century, precisely at the time when the Shiite missionaries were most active in Africa. Suppressed for a while, it broke out again in Baṣra, and continued for fourteen years, devastating 'Irâq and the adjoining provinces (up to 270 A.H., 803-4 A.D.).²

In this the Shiite ideas were used as a mere pretence, for the entire movement was pre-eminently a democratic movement, that is, of Kharijite colour and complexion. It was supported by the lowest strata

1. A great persecution and massacre of the Shiites took place in Africa in 407 A.H., 1016 A.D.

2. Muir, 541.

of society, especially the slaves. The wars of the Zenj ran a wild and bloody course.

A still more violent upheaval directly followed the rise of the Zenj; namely, the Karmathian outbreak (281 A.H., 894 A.D.).¹ They established their power in Baḥrāin, and, using Baḥrāin as the base of their operations, they overran 'Irāq, Mesopotamia, Arabia, Egypt, plundering, burning and murdering wherever they went. Even Baghdād, the residence of the Caliph, fell into their possession, though only for a short time. They captured Mekka, plundered the Holy City, and carried away the Black Stone from the Ka'aba, which, however, they restored twenty-two years after at the command of the fourth Fāṭimid Caliph.² It took almost a century to repress these fearful hordes, but their power was never completely broken up. They still continue in Baḥrāin, where their influence appears to be powerful up to the present day. The striking similarity in many respects of the Wahabite Movement with that of the Karmathians cannot be put down to a mere accident.

The developments which the Shiite doctrines showed among the Ubaidites and the Karmathians clearly prove how completely they had drifted away from the Islām of the Prophet.

One other sect of the Shiites which distinguished itself by its political activities in Eastern history appeared on the scene under the name of the Assassins. Its founder, Ḥasan Ibn Šabbāḥ, lived at Rayy in the

1. Wood's *History of the Assassins*, pp. 29 et seq.

2. Weil, II, 611, 612; Dozy, *Islamisme*, p. 186; Ibn Athīr, VIII, 365.

fifth century of the Hijra. His father was a zealous Shiite, and belonged to the sect of the "Twelvers," then largely diffused in Persia. He sent his son Hasan to Nishâpur, then the most famous orthodox university of Persia. There he made the acquaintance of the Shiite emissaries, who persuaded him to go to Cairo, where ruled the Fâtimid Caliph, the spiritual chief of the African Shiites.¹ In Cairo he was admitted into the secret order, where Islâm probably was regarded as no more than an outward formality. After a residence of almost twenty years Hasan left Cairo. The Egyptian Caliph provided him with money and recommendations, and commissioned him to launch on foot a propaganda on behalf of the Fâtimids. In the year 1090 he succeeded in taking the castle of Alamut in the district of Rudbar, north of Qazwin. Here he organized his religio-political order, at the head of which he presided, as its great master, after the death of Ibn 'Attâsh, who held the castle of Işfahân and was worshipped by his sect, as their king.² To all the provinces he sent his missionaries to enlist supporters or assassins (Fidâ'i); fanatics, whom he secured so completely under his influence that they only too cheerfully sacrificed their lives for him. With such instruments as these, the order grew into power and prominence. It obtained a firm footing not only in Persia but also

1. The ultra-Shiite sect of the Baṭinites, who later merged into that of the Ishmaelites, existed in Persia before Hasan, owned many castles, and were specially numerous in Işfahân, where a certain 'Abdul Mâlik Ibn 'Aṭṭâsh was honoured by them as their king. Hasan professed to be the follower of 'Abdul Mâlik. It is therefore an error to call Hasan founder of the Assassins. Cf. Ibn Athîr, X, 216, 299.

2. Ibn Athîr, X, 299.

later in Syria¹, and thus, in process of time, the Assassins became a tremendous political force.² A succession of great masters followed Ḥasan. For some time this order was in close and intimate touch with the Fātimid Caliphs of Egypt, in whose interest and on whose behalf it worked ; but later it completely shook itself free from Islām. Not until Halākū, the Mongolian conqueror, was its power broken : for he captured and destroyed the fort of Alamut.

Though shorn of political power, the Ishmaelites as a sect still exist both in Persia and Syria.³ The moderate Shiites would have nothing to do with this extreme sect. They stood by Islām, and differed from the Orthodox mainly on the question of succession, which they deemed to be exclusively in the descendants of 'Alī. The moderate sect of the "Twelvers" (Ithna-'Ashariyya, also Imāmiyya) found the largest diffusion among the Shiite sects ; especially in the Persian countries.⁴ There were Shiites also in 'Irāq, Syria and Egypt ; but they were constantly exposed to persecutions, from the side of the orthodox government as well as from the populace. Their own fanaticism, as also their obstinacy with which they celebrated, even when in the minority, the anniversary of the tragedy of Kerbala, contributed largely towards these ever-recurring persecutions. This was the

1. *Ibn Athīr*, IX, X, 161, 216.

2. In Lebanon, on the way from Hamah to Tripoli, there are ruins of the castles of Kadmus and Masjar which belonged to the Assassins. *Ibn Athīr*, X, 461 ; XI, 452.

3. Goldziher, *Mohammed and Islām*, pp. 265 et seq.

4. Browne, pp. 229, 239.

occasion, almost every year, of great fights at Baghdād culminating in murder and plunder.¹

Political considerations at first induced the Buwayhids, who ruled the Persian 'Irāq, to favour the Shiites. As the latter did not acknowledge the Caliphs as their legitimate rulers, they were well in harmony with the politics of the Buwayhids, who were only too anxious to make themselves independent of the Caliphs, and that as quickly as possible. They continued to favour the Shiites until they got the Caliph well in hand (334 A.H., 945-46 A.D.).² For this very reason Maḥmūd Ibn Subuktagīn, the opponent of the Buwayhids, persecuted them.³ Henceforward the fate of the Shiites depended, for the most part, on political conditions. The dynasties that gradually arose and obtained more and more independence in Persia, were oftener favourable than otherwise to the Shiites. In Baghdād, on the other hand, with the weakness of the Caliphs, orthodox fanaticism gained the ascendancy.⁴ When, after a violent street fight between the Shiites and the Sunnis, in the suburb of Karkh, inhabited by the Shiites, a son of the Caliph sided with the Sunnis and most mercilessly persecuted the Shiites, the latter

1. Compare Hammer, *Gesch. d. osman. Reichs*, I, 707, 708; *Gemäldesaal*, V, 21, 22, 29; *Ibn Athīr*, specially IX, 394, 406. Hammer is instructive on the disputes between the Shiites and the Sunnites. For the offensiveness of the Shiites, see Polak's *Persien*, Vol. I, pp. 320 *et seq.*

2. *Ibn Athīr*, VIII, 339, 372, 403, 407. The Buwayhids later took up a mediatory attitude between the Sunnites. *Ibn Athīr*, IX, 126, 184, 217. Finally they made enemies of the Shiites, who received the Seljūk, Toghrul Beg, the destroyer of the Buwayhid dynasty, with open arms. *Ibn Athīr*, IX, 420.

3. *Uyūn-ul-Tawārikh*, XII, fol. 85. Hammer, *Gemäldesaal*, IV, 82; *Ibn Athīr*, X, 440.

4. Hammer, *Gesch. d. Ilchane*, I, 125, 126.

applied to Halâkû (who had just smashed the Assassins) for protection. To this step of the Shiites is ascribed Halâkû's march upon Baghdâd, and its conquest by him (656 A.H., 1258 A.D. Weil, III, 471; Hammer, *Gesch. d. Ilchane*, I, 141). Under the Mongolian dynasty better days dawned upon the Shiites; for the Mongolians were ever tolerant in matters religious. The Alides rose into favour, and the Mongolian prince Khudâbanda, the twelfth ruler of this dynasty in Persia, not only accepted Islâm but is said to have professed the Shiite faith, though only for a time, for he soon again became a Sunnî. But two centuries later, when the dynasty of the Şafawis ascended the throne, the Shiite faith with Shâh Ismâ'il became the State religion of Persia (Ithna-'Ashariyya). This change was marked by a horrible persecution of the Sunnis all over the kingdom. The Ottoman Sultân Salim, who professed the Sunnî faith, returned the compliment by massacring the Shiite residents of the Ottoman Empire (1514 A.D.). About 40,000 Shiites are said to have been massacred. With this the deep rent, which from the very beginning divided the Muslims into two hostile camps, was fixed for all time. The Turks became the ruling nation in the west, the Persians in the east. The Turks represented the Sunnis; the Persians the Shiites. It must be apparent from the foregoing pages, how deeply and how widely they had diverged from the original ideals of Islâm. In the intellectual and spiritual life of humanity there is always an ebb and flow. It is never stagnant or stationary. New ideas come to life; new spiritual veins open up. even religions, which, by

virtue of their inherent force and inner stability, are said to remain unaffected amid the storms that at intervals sweep over the world, do, as a matter of fact, suffer from change and decay, and are liable to transformation, or even to complete subversion. As the centuries with their noiseless feet go by, we find either fresh transformations in religions, more consonant with the spirit of the age, or, where transformation is impossible, complete breakdown and overthrow of the original system in favour of a more robust, vigorous, life-giving and life-sustaining one. What is to be the eventual lot of Islâm no human foresight, at this stage and in the present condition of things, can divine · but signs of timely reform augur a future bright and hopeful!

IX

Khilāfat and Imāmlāt

With the accession of Mu'āwiah an exceedingly important epoch for the inner development of the Caliphate sets in. The Khilāfat, which, under the first two Caliphs, was purely patriarchal (the religious aspect being more obtrusively prominent), suffered under 'Oṭhmān a transformation which led to a great civil war. Mu'āwiah, indeed, triumphed over his rivals, and the Khilāfat gradually assumed a worldly character. During the weary struggle for sovereignty Mu'āwiah found unwavering support in the Syrians. Accordingly after his victory, in loyalty to them, he made Damascus the Capital of the Islamic Empire. With this change Medīna, which had hitherto been the metropolis of Islām, sank into an insignificant provincial town. The new Caliph set himself up as the spiritual and temporal chief of Islām. Like his predecessors, as the chief judge, he decided religious and secular disputes. Like them too he preached at the mosque, and presided over the divine service; but in all other respects he acted as a temporal sovereign. He concluded a humiliating peace—a thing unheard of in Islām—with the Byzantine Caesar, as against the payment of a tribute—and this, with a view to having a free hand at home to use the whole weight of his power against 'Alī. He is reported to

1. Mas'ūdī, IV, 350. Abul Fārāj, *Hist. Dynast.*, on p. 194 says: "He preached before prayer for fear that people might disperse before he had said what he intended to say."

have said, "I am the first king in Islām."¹ Mu'awiah disposed of the State revenue at will. He made a gift of the entire revenue of Egypt to 'Amr Ibn Asi.² He was the first to assail the rule introduced and rigorously adhered to by 'Omar; namely that no Muslim should acquire landed property in conquered countries. Not only did he personally appropriate large landed properties in Syria, but he made lavish presents of them to his friends and tribesmen. And this, of course, at the sacrifice of the State, or as the Arabs would say, from the common property of the Muslims.³

But nothing was more calculated to change social conditions than these dispositions of landed properties. With the first step the rest followed of itself.⁴ Mu'awiah disposed of the ownerless lands, with which 'Othmân had invested him, thus: he made them into an endowment in favour of the members of his family and of Muslims generally—the endowment coming into force on his death. But his adherents, who also had been invested with lands, kept these to themselves, making no such arrangement as Mu'awiah had done. When all ownerless lands were disposed of, they sought other resources and devised other means. The Caliph 'Abdul Mâlik allowed such lands as were in possession of subject races, but whose owners and possessors had died out, to be given away

1. *Mawattâ*, II, 106.

2. Maqrizi, *Khittat*, II, 337. Out of it he had to maintain the administration and pay the salary of the soldiers.

3. Ibn 'Asâkir, Fol. 97.

4. Hitti, *Origins of the Islamic State*, p. 431. (This is an English translation of *Beladîhûri*).

to Muslims. But the result of this policy was that these lands ceased to pay the land-tax—the Muslim landowners being liable for the tenth only. When these lands were exhausted the government went still further in granting concessions. Both ‘Abdul Mālik and Walid permitted Muslims to purchase lands from the subject races. The purchase-money went into the treasury in payment of the arrears of the land-tax. The land-tax, henceforward, disappeared, and in its place the tenth was substituted. Thus a great deal of land came into Muslim possession. The Caliph ‘Omar Ibn ‘Abdul-‘Aziz made a futile attempt to prevent lands passing out of the hands of the subject races and falling into the possession of Muslims.¹ He cancelled all sales concluded without sanction of the Government, and issued an edict declaring sales of all land, after the year 100 A.H., invalid. But the edict was fruitless. Thus, ever since the Caliphate of Mu‘āwiah, a fateful social transformation was at work within the bosom of the Caliphate. The Arab conquerors were gradually transformed into owners and cultivators of land. At first they constituted a warrior-caste, for whom the subject races worked and tilled and toiled. Now, partially at least, they were rooted in the land, and the floating Arab population, available for military service, declined in exactly the same proportion as the acquisition of land spread among them. This explains the policy of the various administrators who sought to check as much as possible the transfer of

1. *Khuda Bukhsh, Orient under the Caliphs*, pp. 208 *et seq.* (This is an English translation of Von Kremer's *Culturgeschichte des Orients*).

landed properties from the subject races to Muslim hands. Nor were financial reasons absent from this policy. While the subject races paid the land-tax, the revenue was far more considerable than the tenth levied upon landed property in Muslim possession.¹

Another important measure dates from the time of the Omayyads; namely grant of revenue of certain districts to entire Arab tribes. This was a continuation of the system of military stations begun under 'Omar. The Arab army was not divided into regiments, but according to tribes who received fixed pay from the treasury along with a share of the booty. As soon as the system of granting lands in fiefs made its way under the Omayyads, the tribes, distributed in various military cantonments, were invested with the land where they were stationed. The arrangement arrived at was that, instead of pay from the treasury, they would levy for themselves the land-tax from the lands cultivated by subject races, and also receive from them provisions for themselves and fodder for their beasts of burden. They, on the contrary, were always to hold themselves in readiness for military service at the command of the Caliph. This Syrian system was adopted in its entirety by the Omayyads in Spain, when, after the battle of Saba, they repaired to Spain, and founded later an Omayyad dynasty there. We possess reliable information here, and with the help of what we know regarding the military organization in Spain, we can offer a pretty accurate account of the Arab military

1. See Aghnides, *Mohammedan Theories of Finance*, pp. 374 et seq. For *Khirāj* or Land-tax, see Chap. VI of this book.

system in Syria. According to the Syrian model the Omayyad troops in Spain were divided into four legions (Jund), named after the military districts to which their forefathers belonged; Legion of Damascus (Jund Dimishq), Legion of Emessa (Jund Hims), Legion of Chalcis (Jund Kinnasrin), and Legion of Palestine (Jund Filistin). The first had their lands in the district of Elvira; the second in the district of Seville; the third in the district of Jaen, and the fourth in the district of Sidonia.¹ For a long time this arrangement remained in force in Spain. Sulṭān Maṣṣūr Ibn Abi Amir, for the first time, strove to effect a change in the system, but unsuccessfully.²

On this subject a Spanish savant has handed down³ to us some very instructive information: "I was informed," says he, "by several Spanish shaiḥs, some of whom actually belonged to the Jund, that Muṣṣlīms remained victorious so long as land was distributed among the legions; for the troops cultivated the land and took care of the peasants, in whose welfare they were as much interested as the slave-dealers were in the health of their slaves. Thus land, receiving proper care and attention, yielded a rich harvest. The legions had everything in abundance: both arms and beasts of burden. And so it continued until Maṣṣūr, who, towards the close of his reign, again

1. Ibn Aḡḡari (Dozy's ed.), II, 260. The Christian population had to supply to the troops a third of the harvest crop. Dozy, *Musulmans d'Espagne*, I, 268.

2. On Ibn Abi Amir: see Dozy, *Spanish Islām*, pp. 457 et seq. On Jund and Awāsim, see Hitti, *Origins of the Islamic State*, p. 202.

3. Tartūṣḡhi, *Širāʾ-ul-Mulūk*, fol. 122, Chapter 47. On Tartūṣḡhi, cf. *Journal Asiat.*, 1861, Vol. XVII, p. 147.

assigned to the troops, as had been the practice earlier, a fixed pay, and collected taxes from the peasants direct through his tax-collectors, who exhausted the tax-payers and embezzled the revenue. So great was the extortion that a portion of the population sought safety in emigration. Thus agriculture declined, and with agriculture the revenue too, and the legions lost their earlier strength and valour. The enemy grew more and more daring, and won back many of the lands of Islām. Thus things continued until the Al-Moravids conquered Spain and restored the old system of granting lands in fiefs." Out of the system of granting the income of certain districts to particular regiments, arose early in Syria proper military colonies. Such especially was the case in the districts on the northern frontier, which were constantly exposed to the attacks of the Greeks. They therefore posted at important points divisions of troops, whose duty it was to guard the frontier against hostile attacks or incursions of the enemy.¹ For this purpose they even took to establishing colonies of foreign peoples. Thus it is pretty certain that the last Omayyad Caliph settled Slav races on the northern frontier of Syria—a piece of information which is confirmed by the Byzantine chronicles.² According to Beladhuri

1. Thus according to Beladhuri in Kuris (Cyrrus) at Antioch; Kremer, *Beiträge zur Geographie des nördlichen Syriens*, p. 12. "Kuris was for Antioch the seat of a garrison that kept watch on the enemy. To it came every year a detachment from the Antioch army to act as garrison. Later, one of the four divisions into which the army of Antioch was divided was moved to it; and the periodical detachments were no more sent there." Hitti, p. 230. Thus Mu'awiah stationed a division of troops at Marzagh (*Beiträge*, p. 21) and another at Malatia.

2. *Beiträge*, p. 12. For further information see *Orient under the Caliphs*, pp. 304 et seq.

the Caliph Mu'taṣim transferred a colony of Zotts—an Indian race who had taken possession of the marshy lands of Baṣra—to Masisah in Asia Minor: and Hārūn even earlier planted colonists from Khōrasān at Anazarba, and established a military colony at Hādith, and also built the hill fort of Hārūniyya.¹ The second Abbasid Caliph established a military colony of 4,000 men at Mālatia, and built the fort of Klaudiyya (Claudia: Abul Fārāj, *Hist. Dyn.*, p. 217). Thus did several Caliphs provide for the defence and safety of the northern frontier of Syria; and these facts clearly indicate a great change of conditions. After their immense conquests the Arabs had reached the limit beyond which, for the time being, they could not go. They then began to think of the defence of their conquered countries. The tribes who had constituted the Muslim soldiery, and who had overflowed the whole of Syria, Egypt, 'Irāq and Persia, had gradually settled down in the luxurious landed estates of conquered provinces, or peopled large towns; and, spreading as they did far and wide over the vast empire, had considerably lost their martial valour and military aptitudes. By contact with the inhabitants of conquered countries they lost their original purity of race and the force of

1. Beladhūri (in Hitti's translation, p. 264) says, "In the year 180 Ar-Raḡhid ordered that the city of 'Ain-Zarbāh should be built and fortified. He summoned to it a regiment from Khurasān and others, to whom he gave houses as fiefs. In the year 183 he ordered Al-Hārūniyya to be built. It was accordingly built and manned with a garrison and with volunteers that emigrated to it. The city was named after him. Others say that Hārūn started its erection in the Caliphate of Al-Mahdi, but completed it in his own Caliphate." Regarding the Zotts, see Hitti, p. 250.

the old Arab tribal spirit.¹ The Arab manhood was, moreover, exhausted in the early Muslim wars, and well-nigh two centuries were needed before it could again furnish proof, as it did in the Karmathian movement, essentially an east Arabian movement, that the vitality of Arab national life was not completely extinct. During the first Muslim wars a mere summons to arms sufficed to bring together an army of requisite strength; but witness the altered conditions even at the time of Ḥajjāj, who could not get the inhabitants of Kūfa to do military service except under threat of death.² With the fall of the Omayyads these unfortunate conditions did not end, but rather steadily grew worse. The Abbasids mainly relied upon the people and troops of Khorasān, who had been won over for them by their great general Abū Muslim, and thus with the ascendancy of the Abbasids the Persian element got the upper hand of the Arab. This state of affairs comes clearly to light under Māmūn. Under his successors the troops of foreign mercenaries (mostly of Turkish origin), who henceforward surround the Caliphs, gain greater and greater influence. The military spirit of the Arabs (both in town and country) had almost disappeared, and the Beduins were no longer animated by those ideas which had characterized them in days of yore. Henceforward, like most oriental rulers, the Caliphs relied mainly upon foreign mercenaries. From their midst came the Pretorian Guards, who

1. Ibn Khaldūn, *Proleg.* I, 272, 273. See the monograph of Bouvat on *Les Barmécides*.

2. Weil, *Gesch. d. Chal.* I, 432; Kāmil, ed. Wright, 216.

reduced the Caliphs to a shadow. The religious enthusiasm of the first century, which welded the Arab tribes into one great family, soon waned and wore away, and the more the circle of foreign converts enlarged the more the Caliphate lost its Arab character. Foreigners, widely apart in ideas and traditions, found themselves united in the bosom of Islām. Among them naturally flourished the spirit of faction and rivalry, born of the feeling of differing nationalities. Thus the idea of nationality, once fully awakened to life, led to most fateful results. It proved stronger than the tie of religion, and made the first breach in the proud edifice of the Caliphate. In the east the Persians; in the west the Berbers strove to shake off the Arab yoke, and did in fact succeed in establishing fairly independent dynasties under the shadowy suzerainty¹ of the Abbasids.

1. "When the Persians restored to Māmūn the insignia of empire their influence with him was very great, and they became contemptuous of the Abbasid power. After Mu'taḡim's time the Turks obtained control over the Caliphs, tied their hands and enfeebled their power, in which operations the Persians had a considerable share. When, however, they found their influence at the court departed, they endeavoured to substitute for it independence in their principalities. The captains and governors who acquired independence continued to acknowledge the spiritual sovereignty of the Abbasids, and desired independence under their suzerainty. The Abbasid empire thus split into a number of independent principalities, increasing by some law of progression. The following is a list of the Persian dynasties according to the order in which they became independent, with the names of the founders :

Dynasty	Province	Duration	Founder
Tahirids	... <u>Khorasān</u>	... 205—259	... Tāhir Ibn al-Husain.
Saffarids	... <u>Fars</u>	... 254—290	... Ya'qūb Ibn al-Laith.
Samanids	... <u>Transoxania</u>	... 261—389	... Naṣr Ibn Aḥmed.
Sājids	... <u>Adherbaijān</u>	... 266—318	... Abul Sāj.
Ziyarids	... <u>Jurjān</u>	... 316—434	... Mardawij Ibn Ziyār.

We thus see how Persia became divided into a number of Persian principalities. The Alide faction revived, and realized to some extent the original

The strength of the Caliphate rested on the national sentiment of the Arabs; but when its original force was weakened and lost, and the Caliphs had to rely for protection upon foreign mercenaries, the glory of the Caliphate rapidly declined and departed.²

Relying upon and making use of the Beduins' greed for conquest and love of booty, the first Caliphs succeeded within a few years in founding their colossal Empire. But they did something more—with the aid of the new religion they brought these rude tribes under one supreme spiritual control. The great civil war, in which the tribes fought each other until they were sick of fighting any more, struck the first and the most decisive blow at this unity and cohesion of the Arabs. In the meantime, with the advancing civilization and growing political organization under the Caliphate, fresh conditions came into life, which were not very pleasing to Beduin mentality. Permanent military stations were established, and many tribes settled down in large towns, or conquered provinces, with the result that the settled Arab population became more and more estranged from Beduin life. The Government, further, relied upon the standing army and the townspeople, with the

object of their efforts in behalf of the family of 'Alī, viz., the restoration of the mighty power of Persia as it had existed before Islām. These principalities were, as appears from the table, of no long duration, and presently there arose the Buyid dynasty, the greatest Persian and Shiite dynasty which arose in the east under Abbasid suzerainty." Zydari, *Omayyads and Abbasids*, pp. 239-40. For the Buyid dynasty, Zydari, pp. 240-242; for Turkish Dynasties under the suzerainty of the Abbasids, *ib.*, p. 242.

1. Ibn Khaldūn, *Proleg.*, I, 423, 424.

result that the Beduins ceased to be the ruling element of the Empire. There was no longer any prospect of booty, for there were no more Persian and Roman provinces to conquer and to exploit. Such being the position of affairs, the old Arab independence of the Beduin tribes once more asserted itself, bursting all the trammels of convention. They gradually withdrew to the solitude of their desert, and reverted to their old, bad ways. Once again they went back to the life that they had led before the Prophet, the pastoral life alternating with the life of plunder, common to all nomads. We may thus divide the Arab nation into two parts; one which lived in towns, cultivated lands and served in the army of the Caliph; and the other which retired to the desert, and worried no more about the Caliph or Islâm. Often, indeed, did the latter burst into civilized countries, plundering and devastating, now fighting on the side of the Caliph, and now against him. Their oft-recurring predatory expeditions contributed more than anything else to the decline of civilization and the fall of the Caliphate.

Thus, from the tribes of the desert the Karmathians pre-eminently received help and support.¹ One of the most powerful insurrections against the Caliph Wâthiq was the insurrection of the Beduin tribes of Najd and Central Arabia (about 230 A.H., 844-45 A.D.). At the head of the rebels stood the two old Arab tribes of Sulaim and Fazârah. To these repaired many other North Arabian tribes.

1 Weil, II, 509, 527.

They plundered the villages round about Medina, even pressed forward into the town, and only after several years of warfare were they reduced to submission.¹ In the region to the north of the Euphrates² the Anazah tribe lived in complete independence. Then, as now, they made predatory raids into civilized lands. South of the Euphrates and along the richly-watered banks of the Tigris lived then, as now, the powerful Munṭafiq tribe, who plundered Baṣra under the Caliph Mustarshid.³

In the fifth century after the Prophet a far more fateful Beduin movement took place from Egypt in a westerly direction, laying Africa, hitherto one of the most prosperous countries, in ruins. In the eastern desert, bordering on the rich region watered by the Nile, which the isthmus of Suez connects with the Arab motherland, lived, since the earliest times, and especially since the Arab conquest of Egypt, a considerable multitude of Arab nomads. Attracted by the luxurious and charming regions of the Nile, their numbers steadily augmented. They lived chiefly by cattle-breeding and by caravan trade, but partly also by agriculture, and yet they never really renounced their Beduin ways, as may be observed to this day among the Beduin tribes settled in Egypt. The Egyptian Government never allowed any settlements

1. Cf. *Ibn Athīr*, VII, pp. 8, 12, 18; also Muir, p. 516.

2. Athwart the plain, from Aleppo to Babylon, runs the Euphrates, while the Far East is bounded by the Tigris, flowing under the mountain range that separates Irāq-Arab from Persia. Between the two rivers lies Mesopotamia, full of patriarchal memories. Muir, *Caliphate*, p. 50.

3. On the predatory expeditions of the Beduins, see *Ibn Athīr*, X, 121, 147, 288; XI, 182; XII, 52.

on the western side of the Nile. But under the Fāṭimid Caliph Mustanşir these Egypto-Arab Beduins crossed the river and advanced westward.¹ This movement, which soon assumed the character of a *Völkerwanderung*, is said to have been encouraged by the then Egyptian Government, as their African governors had got out of hand and refused obedience.² As has always been the case, the Beduin hordes poured like torrents into the rich and fertile coast-lands of North Africa. They destroyed the troops of the native princes sent to oppose their onward march—especially the troops of the ruler of Kairowân, Mo'iz Ibn Badis.³ Immense booty fell into the hands of the conquerors, who overran the entire country, plundering and pillaging. As Leo Africanus informs us, they conquered Tripoli and cruelly plundered it. Then they took Kabis, and finally Kairowân (449 A.H., 1057 A.D.), and drove away a portion of the inhabitants to the south.⁴ Thus the most beautiful and the most fertile districts of Africa passed into the hands of the Arab hordes, who henceforward exercised a decisive influence on the political conditions of this country, for they now sided with one and then with some other of the smaller dynasties there. With justice the great Arab historian observes: "But now, I mean at the end of the eighth century A.H., the condition of Africa, as we see it, is completely changed. The Berbers, who have inhabited the country from the most

1. According to *Ibn Aṭṭār* (IX, 387), in the year 442 A.H. (1050 A.D.).

2. Dozy, *Ibn Aḡḡarī*, I, 300.

3. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 302.

4. Barth: *Wanderung und Entdeckungen*, I, 245.

ancient times, are supplanted by the Arab Beduins, who flooded the land in the fifth century of the A.H. and subjugated the native population by their number and their strength, took away from them a large portion of their landed properties, and shared with them the enjoyment of those lands that they were allowed to hold. Moreover, in the middle of the eighth century (A.H.) a fearful pestilence desolated the eastern and the western lands, swept away a great part of the population, and destroyed culture and civilization." The devastations of the Beduins, which Ibn Khaldûn had before his eyes, filled him with grief: and in a genuine philosophic spirit, relying upon his experiences, he fashioned his theory that the nomad element, wherever it appears, works destructively, destroying governments and wrecking civilization. With the deep earnestness of a Tacitus he draws a picture of the universal decline and decay of the Islamic countries.

"Consider," says he, "all the countries which the Arab Beduins have conquered since the earliest times. Civilization and population have disappeared therefrom; even the very land seems to have changed its character. In Yaman, with the exception of some towns, all the great meeting-places of the people have become dreary and desolate. Previously the same thing happened in 'Irâq-'Arabi. All the beautiful buildings, with which the Persians had adorned it, disappeared. In our own time Syria has been ruined. Africa and the west are still suffering from the devastations of the Beduins. In the fifth century A.H. the nomad tribes of Hilâl and Sulaim made their

appearance in the country; and ever since, for three centuries, they have done their work of horror and devastation, and lo! you see nothing but waste and ruin. Before their appearance the entire country from Nigritia to the Mediterranean was richly populated: and proof of this you find in the remains of the old civilization, in the ruins of numerous towns, hamlets, monuments and buildings." In the eastern parts of the Islamic Empire we find a similar painful picture. Following a law of nature, frequently repeating itself in history, the northern peoples pressed south. The old wars of *Îrân* and *Tûrân* were due to the descent of the *Tâtâr* races of High Asia upon the Persian and Indian frontiers. The very same process is repeating itself in the slow but steady advance of the Russians from Central Asia to the south. Thus, between the middle of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth century A.H., a movement of the Turkish tribes took place. Towards the end of the ninth century A.D., the *Ghuzz* advanced to the west, and conquered the Turkish tribes of *Kipdschak* who inhabited the country between the *Volga* and the *Dnieper*.¹ About 960 A.D. a Turkish chief called *Tschanak*, or *Kara Khân*, with two thousand families, accepted Islâm, advanced towards the west, and settled down on the eastern bank of the *Caspian Sea*. Individual tribes even went further, and settled in *Adherbâijân*, *Armenia*, and *Asia Minor*, where they received the name of *Turkomâns*.² Other tribes of

1. *Ibn Athîr*, IX, 68, 209, 266 et seq., 365.

2. Hammer, *Gesch. d. osman. Reichs*, I, 37, 38; see also, *Gemäldeaal*, V, 2, 3. A further inroad of the Turkish tribes took place in the year 1153 A.D. (548 A.H.) when *Sultân Sanjar* was taken prisoner, and the *Ghuzz* for four years devastated *Khorasân*. Hammer, *Gemäldeaal*, V, 117, 118.

Ghuzz showed themselves in Khorasân. There they split up into different branches and made their way into Muslim lands as far as Isphahân, Maraghah, Moşul.¹ In consequence of a dispute with the Chinese authorities, almost contemporaneously with Kara Khân, another Turkish tribe, which later became famous under the name of the Seljûks, emigrated from Eastern Turkistân, and settled down in the region of Bukhâra. Within a hundred years they moved on to Khorasân and conquered it. Toghrul, a grandson of Seljûk, took possession of the towns of Nishâpûr and Merv, and scarcely had he secured a footing there when he advanced, making conquests in Persia, Asia Minor, and 'Irâq, overthrew the Buwayhids, the protectors of the Caliphs, and got himself appointed Amir-ul-Omarâ by them.² These emigrations of the Turkish tribes and their unceasing wars and marauding expeditions played havoc with the eastern lands of the Caliphate. To these were added continued incursions of the Greeks and Armenians into the Syrian and Mesopotamian frontier-districts, as well as predatory expeditions of the rude but warlike inhabitants of the Caucasus region—namely, the Georgians, Khazars and Kipdschaks.³ The countries under the Caliphs resounded with the horse-hoofs of these roaming bands, who spread in Persia, in Asia Minor, in northern Mesopotamia and in Syria, but who never-

1. Abul Fārâj, *Hist. Dynast.*, 337.

2. Hammer, *Gesch. d. osman. Reichs*, I, 39. On later inroads, cf. *Ibn Athîr*, XI, 53, 116, 138, 152, etc. Finlay, *History of Greece*, Vol. II, pp. 441 et seq., Vol. III, pp. 87 et seq.

3. Abul Fārâj, *Hist. Dynast.*, pp. 377, 431.

theless bowed in superstitious reverence before the Caliphs, surrounded as they were by the nimbus of religion.¹

But the Arabs, in whose midst grew and matured the institution of the Khilāfat, now retired more and more into the background, leaving the Caliphs no alternative but to come to terms with these bold adventurers. Along with this great historical process which was gradually undermining the Khilāfat, other reasons too contributed to its fall. Among these we must first of all mention want of a fixed rule of succession, and the uncertainty of public opinion regarding constitutional questions of vital importance. On the subject of succession, from the very beginning they adhered to the idea that none but a member of the ruling family could ascend the throne. But the old Arab idea of seniority constantly conflicted with the direct transmission from father to son, naturally most frequently striven for.² The former was the idea that dominated in the first century of the Caliphate; the latter came to a head later. Of this the following table offers ample proof:—

NAME OF THE CALIPH	SUCCESSOR	
	Son	Brother or other relative
1. Abū Bakr		'Omar
2. 'Omar		'Othmān
3. 'Othmān		'Ali

1. See Macdonald, *Muslim Theology*, chapter III.

2. Von Kremer has more thoroughly discussed this subject in his *Culturgeschichte*. See the Eng. transl., Khuda Bukhsh, *Orient under the Caliphs*, pp. 244 *et seq.*

NAME OF THE CALIPH	SUCCESSOR	
	Son	Brother or other relative
4. Mu'āwiah	Yazid	
5. Yazid	Mu'āwiah II	
6. Mu'āwiah II		Merwān
7. Merwān	'Abdul Malik	
8. 'Abdul Malik	Walid	
9. Walid		Sulaimān
10. Sulaimān		'Omar Ibn 'Abdul 'Aziz
11. 'Omar Ibn 'Abdul 'Aziz		Yazid II
12. Yazid II		Highām
13. Highām		Walid II
14. Walid II		Yazid III
15. Yazid III		Ibrāhīm
16. Ibrāhīm		Merwān II
17. Merwān II		Saffah
18. Saffah		Manṣūr
19. Manṣūr	Mahdi	
20. Mahdi	Hādī	
21. Hādī		Hārūn-ar-Rashid
22. Hārūn-ar-Rashid	Amin	
23. Amin		Māmūn
24. Māmūn		Mu'tasim
25. Mu'tasim	Wāthiq	
26. Wāthiq		Mutawakkil
27. Mutawakkil	Muntasir	
28. Muntasir		Musta'in
29. Musta'in		Mut'azz
30. Mut'azz		Muhtadi
31. Muhtadi		Mu'tamid
32. Mu'tamid		Mu'tadid
33. Mu'tadid	Muktafi	
34. Muktafi		Muqtadir

NAME OF THE CALIPH	SUCCESSOR	
	Son	Brother or other relative
35. Muqtadir		Qāhir
36. Qāhir		Radhī
37. Radhī		Muttaqī
38. Muttaqī		Mustakfi
39. Mustakfi		Muṭī'
40. Muṭī'		Ṭai
41. Ṭai		Qādir
42. Qādir	Qa'im	
43. Qa'im		Muqtadi
44. Muqtadi	Mustaḡhir	
45. Mustaḡhir	Mustarshid	
46. Mustarshid	Raḡhid	
47. Raḡhid		Mukrafi II
48. Muktafi II	Mustanjid	
49. Mustanjid	Musta'di	
50. Musta'di	Nāṣir	
51. Nāṣir	Zahir	
52. Zahir	Mustaṣṣir	
53. Mustaṣṣir	Musta'ṣim	

We see from this that in the first two columns of Caliphs—consisting of 18 rulers—only 4 bequeathed the throne to their sons. Among the Abbasids the position seems more favourable, although of the first twenty-four Caliphs only six had their sons as successors. No less was succession to the throne influenced by another idea which may be traced back to the beginning of Islām, and which seems to be deeply rooted in the old Arab idea of freedom. Hereditary descent was never, among the Arabs, a recognized

title for spiritual or temporal sovereignty. Free election and acknowledgment by the entire people were deemed indispensably necessary for succession to the throne.

Thus with legitimate right to succession by inheritance was coupled a democratic element; namely, election by the people. A long series of civil wars, popular insurrections, family disputes, and fearful conspiracies were the result of the fundamentally divergent elements regulating succession to the throne. To this may be referred an unbroken chain of wars which, throughout the Caliphate, make the pages of history crimson. In Turkey—the modern counterpart of the old Arab *Khilāfat*—some of these ideas are still operative. Thus, according to the idea of seniority, which in Turkey has become an express rule of succession, the legitimate successor is not the son but the brother of the ruling Sultān.¹ It was indeed reserved for our age to see the extinction of this old Asiatic idea. Sultān 'Abdul 'Aziz sanctioned direct succession in Egypt. He even thought of securing the succession in his own line as soon as that could be safely done.²

Election by the people goes back to the old Arab custom, according to which the chief of the tribe was elected by the free choice of the members of the tribe. Immediately after the death of the Prophet, election

1. Under the first Ottoman Sultāns direct succession obtained, In fact fratricide was even sanctioned by the law of the realm. Hammer, *Gesch. d. osman. Reichs*, I, 582.

2. Even the oldest Hungarian rule of succession was oriental. It preferred the brother to the son. Among the Berbers the dignity of the chief passed to the sister's son. Barth's *Reisen und Entdeckungen*, I, 374.

of a successor took place, and was accompanied, as always, by party disputes. This was the election of Abū Bakr. Medīna was then the centre and metropolis of Islām, and in Medīna lived the ruling families who determined the election. There was, of course, no such thing as representation of the people in the modern sense. Election consisted in tendering the oath of allegiance to the Caliph-elect. This, in Arabic, was called *Bai'ah*, and was reckoned of such vital importance that even those Caliphs who appointed their sons as successors in their lifetime never omitted to have homage done to them, for only by *Bai'ah* did the succession receive its legal force and validity. This ceremony, in the earliest times, was of a purely patriarchal character: the electors offered their hand, and thereby vowed loyalty and obedience to the Caliph. *Bai'ah* could also be rendered in writing. Thus a copy has come down to us of the letter in which 'Abdullah, the son of the Caliph 'Omar, did homage to the fifth Omayyad Caliph, 'Abdul Malik. It runs thus: "In the name of God, the Merciful and Compassionate, to the Servant of God, 'Abdul Malik—Prince of the Faithful. Peace be on thee! I praise Allah before thee, and I offer my submission and obedience to thee, according to the precept of God and His Prophet, in all that I do."¹

Later, the election and homage degenerated into a pure court ceremony—especially among the Sultāns.

1. *Mawāṭṭa* IV, 220. The address in the text, "Servant of God, son of 'Abdul Malik" is obviously wrong. The formula of homage, as it obtained among the later Caliphs, has been preserved by Ibn Hamdūn, in his *Tadhkirah*, and Ibn Hamdūn, as State Secretary at the Court of Baghdād, must have been quite familiar with it.

Already, Ibn Khaldūn observes, homage was becoming more and more what it was at the court of the old Persian Kings of Kings (Shāh-an-Shāh); namely, the courtiers kissed the ground before the new Sultān, and his hand and his foot.¹

Like the later Roman Emperors, whose election for the most part depended upon the Pretorian guards, the Caliphs had on these occasions to make lavish gifts of gold to their troops.² So long as Medina was the seat of the Caliphate and the residence of the influential families, the election of the Caliph passed off, if not without violent party strife, still without any serious convulsions, until the election of 'Alī, which evoked a bloody war. Things, however, shaped themselves differently when the Caliphate was removed to Damascus, then on to Kūfa, 'Anbar and Baghdād. The inhabitants of Mekka and Medina always claimed for themselves the right of choosing the Caliph according to their judgment, and disregarded the election effected at the residence of the Caliph hundreds of miles away from them. For this presumption the two holy towns paid heavily. Military measures of extreme severity soon compelled them to obedience, and proved to them that might was oftener more effective than right. But the unrest occasioned by the election of the Caliph, and its ruthless suppression, brought one lesson clearly home to the people; namely, that the inhabitants of the provinces were bound to

1. Ibn Khaldūn, *Proleg.*, I, 425.

2. Thus the Caliph Qā'im, at his election, made a gift of three million dinārs to his Turkish bodyguard. *Uyūn-ul-Tawārikh*, XIII, fol. 104.

accept the election effected at the residence of the Caliph, and to recognize it as legally binding.

A learned Muslim jurist, Mawardi, who wrote in the first half of the fifth century after the Prophet, makes the following observation: "The following qualifications are necessary for the electors: (a) spotless purity, (b) capacity for judging the qualifications for leadership of the State, (c) insight and judgment to decide which of the candidates is most suited to conduct the government and to assume the charge of affairs. In this the inhabitants of the capital had no pre-eminence over the rest of the people; but practice, not legal theory, settled that, since the inhabitants of the capital would be informed of the death of the Caliph sooner than the others, they could forthwith proceed with the election. Further, the persons likely to succeed mostly reside there."¹

It is apparent from this that the old Arab franchise, which was a universal franchise, soon disappeared, and the right to elect the sovereign fell into the hands of the soldiery and the inhabitants of the capital. That portion of the Arab people who would not acquiesce in this state of affairs, passed over to the Kharijite camp, where the old democratic ideas prevailed, and where even the necessity for and usefulness of a head of the State was called into question and denied,² or where the election of the sovereign was held to be wholly unfettered by any consideration of

1. Mawardi, ed. Enger, p. 4; Shahrastāni, I, 138; Abul Fārāj, p. 170; D'Ohsson, Eng. Tr., 150; Khuda Bukhsh, Orient under the Caliphs, p. 263. Al-Ash'ari holds unconditionally by elective franchise.

2. Mawākif, pp. 297, 301; Ibn Khaldūn, Prolég., I, 389; Shahrastāni, I, 138; Abul Fārāj, p. 170.

hereditary succession or family connexion; for they maintained that even a slave or a peasant, if just and pious, was eligible for sovereignty (Goldziher, *Muh. Studien*, Vol. I, pp. 138 *et seq.*; *Khuda Bukhsh*, *Islamic Civilization*, pp. 122 *et seq.*).

The Shiites, the legitimists of Islām, stood in opposition to these views. Between the two, namely, the Shiites and the Kharijites, steered the great orthodox party of Islām. They represented the staunch monarchical idea of the East. Different parties—each in its own way—supported this position. Thus the Mut'azalites and the Zaidites (these are moderate Shiites) sought, on rational principles, to establish the necessity for monarchy. Mankind, they contended, needed a guide, a prince, to end injustice, to decide disputes. Without such a one there would be disorder, chaos, anarchy. Others proved from the Qur'ān the necessity for monarchy, and looked upon the monarch, from a religious point of view, as the custodian and defender of religion, as its high-priest.¹ On one point there was complete unanimity among the orthodox; namely, that the Caliph or Imām should belong to the family of Quraish, and to none else.²

The relation of the sovereign to the people was regarded in the light of a bilateral compact ('Aqd), which only subsisted so long as there was mutual

1. Mawardi, p. 4.

2. Qaḍi Abū Bakr Bakillāni differed from this view and held that a non-Quraishite could become Imām. On the orthodox view, Mawardi, p. 5; Ihya I, 147; D'Oshson, I, 153; Mawākif, p. 302; Ibn Khaldūn, *Proleg.*, I, 396. The Shiites acknowledge only the right of the Hashimite branch to the Imāmat, Mawākif.

observance of the terms, but not otherwise.¹ These were the duties of the sovereign :

- (a) To maintain religion in its original purity, to suppress heresies, etc.,
- (b) to lay down the law and to decide disputes,
- (c) to keep the peace,
- (d) to punish transgressions, offences and crimes,
- (e) to defend the frontiers,
- (f) to fight those who refused to accept Islâm,
- (g) to collect and administer war-booty and poor-tax,
- (h) to distribute rewards to soldiers, and to make other payments from the treasury sparingly and conscientiously,
- (i) to appoint efficient and trustworthy officers, and
- (j) to personally take part in the affairs of the State, and to work diligently and carefully.²

To the Prince of the Faithful who duly discharged these duties the people were bound to render ready obedience and ungrudging support. But if he neglected them, or from some other untoward circumstances, such as blindness, chronic disease, mutilation, etc., was unable to carry on his duties, his right and title to Imâmat ceased.³

Along with the elective sovereignty Muslim jurisprudence recognizes a mode of transmission of sovereignty in direct opposition to elective sovereignty ; namely, transmission by will. Of that nature was the appointment of 'Omar by the Caliph Abû Bakr, and such also was the procedure adopted by

1. *Mawardi*, p. 11. 2. *Ibid.*, pp. 43, 24. 3. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

'Omar when he left the choice of his successor to a Council of Regency.¹

Later, when the Caliphs were pressed on all sides by supercilious vassals who gradually became independent rulers and sought to ignore the Caliphs both in matters temporal and spiritual, Islamic jurisprudence learnt to recognize a new mode of acquiring sovereignty, which consisted in the acknowledgment of accomplished facts. *This was acquisition of sovereignty by force.* It was stated to be the last alternative on which a Government could be founded. Ibn Jama'ah, an Egyptian writer, makes the following observation, "Force is the last alternative on which a Government may be founded. When there is no legitimate Imâm present, or when none capable or competent to assume the leadership seek the Imâmat, and some one takes possession of the government by force, and even though there has been no election nor transmission of sovereignty to him (by any of the recognized methods), he is to be acknowledged as ruler and is entitled to obedience; and this, indeed, to keep Muslims together and to avoid growth of parties. It matters not if the ruler is ignorant or godless. But if one has seized the government by force, and another rises against him and conquers him, the conqueror is to be acknowledged as the rightful Imâm; and this for the reasons already given."²

A further result of this opportunist theory was that in complete opposition to the old Arab ideas which dominated in the beginning of the Caliphate,

1. Mawardi. p. 12.

2. Ibn Jama'ah, *Kitâb Tahrîr-ul-Ahkâm*; ms. fol. 7.

they declared it permissible for two Islamic sovereigns (Imâms) to rule simultaneously. The oldest Islâm knew only of one ruler of the Islamic Empire, the Caliph. But soon they saw several rival Caliphs claiming to rule simultaneously, and the nearer the Caliphate approached its fall the larger grew the number of the independent rulers. Thus they came to hold that the co-existence of two (or even several) Imâms was legally permissible if they did not rule in the same but in different and distant countries.¹ Another result of the gradual transformation of the political conditions was that the old Arab theory, according to which the Prince forfeited the throne by reason of irreligion and godlessness was insensibly shelved, and the very opposite view asserted itself, which found a staunch champion in Naṣafî, who expressly stated that neither vice nor unrighteousness would justify the deposition of the Imâm.² In full possession of their temporal power the earlier Caliphs rarely relied upon the spiritual aspect of their dignity, and liked to act like temporal potentates; but the later ones, the more they lost their political power, the more they sought to encircle themselves with the halo of an inviolable religious sanctity. And thus we see that at the time when the political authority of the Caliph hardly extended beyond the walls of Baghdād, those very princes who had torn from him his fairest provinces only felt secure in the possession of their

1. *Mawākif*, p. 306; Ibn Khaldūn, *Prolég.*, I, 381; Ibn Jama'ah finds fault with this view and adheres to the old principle that there can be only one legitimate Imâm at a time. He looks upon the Imâm in the sense of the "head of the religion."

2. D'Ohsson, I, 163, 164, § 37.

power when the Caliph invested them with those lands and granted them his sign-manual warrant and conferred upon them high-sounding titles such as: Bahâ'-ud-Dawlah; 'Adad-ud-Dawlah; Jalâl-ul-Mulk; Rukn-ud-Dîn, etc.¹ We can only explain this phenomenon by the increasing ignorance and growing superstition of the times. Under the Caliph Qâdir the Buwayhid princes ruled 'Irâq and Fars under the title of Amîr-ul-Omarâ'. And yet every one of them sought and obtained solemn investiture from the Caliph. It consisted in the Caliph summoning the officials to his palace, receiving the new Amîr in solemn audience in their midst, attiring him with seven robes of honour, black turban, and presenting him two arm-buckles and a gold chain. Then he made over to him two banners which he with his own hand fastened to the spear-staff, and finally got his courtiers to engirdle him with a sword.² The union of the spiritual and temporal power in the person of the ruler—though it prolonged the life of the Caliphate

1. The last title was the subject of a long diplomatic negotiation between the Caliph Qâdir and the King Abū Kalîgar. (Weil, III, 54). In this negotiation Mawardi acted as the ambassador of the Caliph. The King wished for nothing less than the title of "Sultân-ul-Mua'zzam Malik-ul-umam" but Mawardi peremptorily refused, on the ground that only the Caliph was the great Sultân and the ruler of nations. At last he consented to the title of Malik-ud-Dawlah and sent rich presents to the Caliph through Mawardi. Weil, III, 78, *Ibn Athîr*, IX, 313.

2. *Uyûn-ul-Tawârikh*, XIII, fol. I. The hanging of sword and attiring with fur is, to this day, the usual form of investiture of the vassal-princes in Constantinople. The diadem and the arm-buckles are the exclusive tokens of royal dignity. Abul Fâraj, p. 374. The decorations conferred by the Abbasid Caliphs consisted of black banners, robes of honour, a golden chain and a diadem. Cf. *Ibn Adhârî*, I, 169. *Ibn Athîr*, VIII, 315. Compare the investiture of Toghrul in Hammer, *Gesch. d. osman. Reichs*, I, 39; *Gemäldeaal*, V, 24, on investiture; see also Hammer, *Gesch. d. Ilchane*, I, 139.

—was not without disadvantage. In the earliest days of Islām they could not conceive of the separation of the spiritual from the temporal power. In fact the governors appointed in their provinces were not only at the head of the administration (military, financial and judicial), but were also the representatives of the Spiritual Chief of Islām in all matters religious and ecclesiastical. They preached every Friday at divine service in the mosque, presided at the prayers, and were not only governors but also the legates of the High-Priest of Religion. It is not difficult to see how wide and extensive their powers were, for they ruled over the conscience of their subjects. But, as Ibn Khaldūn truly observes, just as there is a constant tendency in an oriental monarchy towards absolutism, towards unlimited power, so undoubtedly the effort of the oriental governors was always in the direction of greater and greater independence of the central authority. This the Caliphs soon perceived and sought to check, by the introduction of posts and postmasters, who continually kept sending in reports and informing the Caliphs of all that was going on in the provinces; not omitting to mention the conduct of their governors.¹ But this was of little avail. The governors became more and more independent in their provinces. They even converted them into hereditary governorships—transmitting the dignity to their descendants—and soon became absolute independent princes who, in conformity with the spirit of the age, duly acknowledged the Caliph as the Spiritual Chief of Islām. From the theoretical views which the earliest Arab

1. Cf. Sprenger, *Die Post und Reiserouten des Orients*, pp 1 et seq.

jurist, the oft-mentioned Mawardî, has set forth, we see at once that the idea of a strong central government never obtained in the Caliphate. Like the Wizârat, governorship too was divided into limited and unlimited functions. According to Mawardî, the governor, with unlimited powers, was appointed directly by the Caliph, and in his province was all in all. He stood at the head of the army, he decided disputes, appointed judges, collected taxes and poor-tax, applied the revenue to government expenses, maintained religion intact, punished religious offences, and held the position of the Commander-in-Chief when at war.¹ This unlimited governorship at the time of Mawardî was nothing more nor less than kingship. It prevailed throughout the Empire. In 'Irâq, nay, even in Baghdâd itself, the Buwayhids ruled under the title of Amîrs, but really as independent princes.

The limited governorship fairly corresponded to the governorship as it existed in the best days of the Caliphate, when the Caliphs could keep the governors under control. The limited governor was entrusted with the command of the troops and the administration of the province, but he neither exercised judicial functions, nor had he anything to do with the taxes, nor indeed did he represent the Caliph in matters religious.

On the other hand, governorship by usurpation, referred to by Mawardî, gives us a correct picture of the then conditions of the Caliphate which was hastening to its fall. Discussing the views of the

1. Mawardî. pp. 47, 48, also 51-53.

Islamic jurists on sovereignty and their opportunist theory of acknowledging the rule of might, we have already seen that they accepted accomplished facts. Mawardi's theory of governorship by usurpation rests upon the very same principle, namely, acceptance of the inevitable. By governorship by usurpation he understands the governorship which a rebel acquires by force of arms, and in which he is confirmed by the Caliph. The conditions necessary for such confirmation are too significant to be passed over in silence. They are: (1) the usurper must acknowledge the sovereignty of the Caliph, and his authority as religious head; (2) in matters religious he must submit to the authority of the Caliph and promise obedience to him; (3) he must promise friendship and assistance to the Muslims; (4) he must permit the bestowal of religious ranks (through the Caliph), and recognize as lawful the resulting decisions and orders; (5) the legal dues must be adjusted according to law, so that the giver may fulfil his duty, and both the giver and the receiver may feel that they are just and fair; (6) the legal enactments must be observed and applied with firmness.¹

It is not possible to cite a clearer proof than this passage of the effort of the Caliphs to preserve the nimbus of religious sovereignty, and to maintain the spiritual dignity in its absolute entirety, as their last sheet-anchor, in the growing decay of their political power. They willingly acknowledged a bold adventurer, who took possession of a province, by transform-

1. *Mawardi*, pp. 55, 56.

ing him through their consecration from a rebel into a legitimate ruler. They recognized his new position, with unlimited powers, provided he acknowledged unconditionally the religious supremacy of the High-Priest of all Muslims enthroned at Baghdād. Very great was the respect and veneration in which the Caliphs were held as the Spiritual Chiefs of Islām. And this indeed conferred upon them a political power at the time when they possessed no army, and had even in their own capital to submit to the tutelage of the Seljūks. I will here mention a fact characteristic of what has been said. When the powerful Seljūkian Sultān, Malik Shah, received the investiture from the Caliph at Baghdād, he wanted at the conclusion of the ceremony to kiss the hand of the Caliph, but this the Caliph refused, and offered him his signet to kiss.¹

Thus, nominally, the Caliph still remained the spiritual and temporal head of the largest portion of the Islamic world. In fact, from Muktafi II (d. 555 A.H., 1160 A.D.) onward, they even managed to acquire great political independence, and to step into light once again as powerful temporal rulers. But the Moghuls made an end of their temporal power. They took Baghdād, and killed the Caliph, his two sons and many kinsmen (656 A.H., 1258 A.D.) The importance which the religious element conferred upon the Caliphs shows itself at best in the fact that, though their temporal power perished, their religious dignity continued unimpaired.

1. *Ibn Athir*, X, 104.

A son of the last Caliph but two continued the Caliphate in Egypt under the protection of the Ayyûbids, the rulers there. But a great change had taken place. In Cairo the Abbasid Caliphs ruled merely as the religious chiefs of orthodox Islâm. They exercised no temporal power of any kind, except that they conferred investiture, now reduced to a mere formality, upon the Sultâns, who, for reasons religious or political, sought it from the Caliphs.¹

Thus was completed the separation of the spiritual from the temporal power of the Caliph. The Caliph was the spiritual head--the Sultân, the temporal ruler of Islâm. Until the conquest of Egypt by the Ottoman Salim, this Spiritual Chief of Islâm resided at Cairo under the almost meaningless title of the Caliph, or the Commander of the Faithful, and, under the protection of the temporal sovereign, led a precarious existence. The last of these is said to have resigned his claim in favour of the Turkish conqueror. Upon this the Ottoman Sultâns rest their claim to the spiritual and temporal sovereignty of Islâm.²

Thus vanished one of the most powerful ideas, the old Asiatic conception of theocracy, which made everything subordinate to religion, and which looked upon the prince more as a High Priest than a temporal ruler.

1. Like Firûz Tughlaq, the third ruler of the dynasty of Tughlaq Shâh at Delhi. Hammer, *Gemäldeaal*, IV, p. 233. *Gesch. der Ilchane*, I, 214

2. D'Ohsen I, 154. Hammer in his *Gesch. d. osman. Reichs* does not speak of any direct transfer of the Caliphate, but only emphasizes the homage of the Sherifs of Mekka in consequence of which Salim, as servant of the two holy cities (a title which Ottoman Sultans still bear), is said to have become the Protector and the Suzerain of the Egyptian Sultans and Caliphs. Hammer, I, 791. See Snouck Hurgronje, *Mohammedanism*, Chapter III; and Marriott, *Eastern Question*, Chapter III.

X

The Sultānate

With the extinction of the Caliphate the Church of Islām lost its Spiritual Chief. The common tie which united all Muslims into one religious community, irrespective of race and language, was rent asunder. In the following pages we propose to deal with the further developments which took place in the bosom of Islām : showing how the old Arab ideas of Church and State were gradually transformed, nay, displaced by fresh ones, and how, even in the woeful tumults of the Moghul invasion and the devastating incursions of the Turkish hordes, signs of progress were not wanting which heralded a better and brighter future for the East.

All this demonstrates how little the human mind can be constrained in rigid forms, and how, under new and altered conditions, it will strive to bring itself into line with the culture and civilization of the times. It further demonstrates how the ideas of a vanished age live and linger, long after they have spent their force and served their purpose. They persist, indeed, amidst the assault of newer forces, until they are completely worn away.

Though ruled by independent governors, the individual provinces of the Caliphate were yet part and parcel of one empire ; and this, by reason of the spiritual authority of the Caliph, which was, so to speak, the uniting tie. But, with the altered condi-

tions, they became absolute independent States. Geographical position and the dawning sense of nationality determined their growth and defined their boundary.

Thus in his own dominion every Sultān was an unlimited ruler in matters both spiritual and temporal. Not only was he the head of the State, but also the high-priest of Religion.¹ Thus it was in Spain and Africa ; and thus in Arabia and India. In Persia, where the Moghul dynasty of the family of Chengiz Khān had founded a vast empire extending from the Indus to the Euphrates, and even for a time including Syria, the first rulers were heathens and Buddhists. They were doubtless partial to the Christians and Jews ; but, in matters religious, on the whole they adopted an attitude of indifference, nay, almost of contemptuous tolerance. And yet they kept the supreme spiritual power well in their hands, and personally appointed high ecclesiastical dignitaries.²

Only in Egypt did the Caliphate continue ; but more in name than in reality. Thus, in Islamic lands, with the different independent Sultānats, different independent Churches grew up. But, be it noted, the

1. Thus the Arab rulers of Spain appointed Christian bishops and summoned Councils. Dozy, *Musul. d'Espagne*, II, 47, 140.

2. Arghun was a Buddhist. The solemn reception of a relic of Buddha which was brought to him proves this. Hammer, *Gesch. d. Ilkhane* I, 376. Also Halākū was a Buddhist. *Journal Asiat.* 1860, vol. xvi, 306. The Ilkhane Keidschatu was quite indifferent to religion. Of him the Armenian historian Haithon speaks thus: *Nullam habebat legem vel fidem*. Hammer, I, 400. The Ilkhane, naturally, with the acceptance of Islām, became a fanatic in matters religious. Ghazan, who was converted from Buddhism to Islām, wavered for some time between Orthodox and Shīte Islām. Hammer, II, 119, 153, 160 173. He finally adopted the Šūfi-Shīte view. Hammer, II, 68, 133, 135.

temporal and spiritual power remained completely in the hands of one man—the Sultân. The vital principle of Islâm, the indissoluble union of the spiritual and temporal power, one of the oldest and the most powerful of Semitic ideas, wherein lay the greatest strength of the Caliphate, continued unaffected. But while of yore the temporal power had been lodged in the person of the Spiritual Chief, now, in the altered state of affairs—though the spiritual and temporal power remained in the hands of one and the same person—it was lodged no longer, as in days gone by, in the high-priest of Islâm, but in an avowedly temporal ruler—the Sultân. However outward this subordination of Religion to State—it marks an important stage in the history of Islamic civilization.

This explains the theories of the later jurists, theories completely foreign to the original spirit of Islâm, which regarded descent from the family of Quraish as no longer indispensable for the Imâmat, and which permitted every bold adventurer who made good his claim to be treated as the legitimate head of the State. They no longer held, as before, that there could only be one head of Islâm, but they conceded that several Imâms might rule different countries at one and the same time. Finally they treated the Imâmat no longer as a spiritual but as a temporal institution.¹

It would be an error to suppose that, with the gradual transformation of ideas relating to spiritual and temporal sovereignty, there was a corresponding

2. Ibn Khaldûn, *Prolég.*, I, 431. *Mawâkif*, 296.

change in the spirit and method of administration, or that the government itself became more tolerant or less susceptible to religious influences. In this respect, indeed, the Sultānate made no change at all. Such a change was only effected in the course of centuries, and was felt comparatively late.

The transition from the Caliphate to the Sultānate, attended as it was by violent convulsions, put back the hour-hand of progress.

The partition of the Caliphate into a number of almost independent dynasties (already an accomplished fact long before the Moghul invasion) had dealt a fatal blow at the moral and material conditions of the Muslim empire. Prosperity had declined, and with prosperity civilization had sensibly and seriously suffered.

In the East the Turkish adventurers, in the West the Berber chiefs, as the supercilious vassals of the Caliph, had divided amongst themselves the richest and fairest lands of the Caliphate. Everywhere the Arab element receded into the background, and not until the foreign conquerors were *arabicized* and thereby civilized, did they offer a helping hand to letters.

When, with the conquest of Baghdād by the Moghuls, and the disappearance of the last Abbasid Caliph, the small vassal princes were bereft of their feudal chief, their position became so insecure that they needed something else besides military force to render themselves safe. They therefore sought the help of that most influential class of the community—the theologians—who gave ungrudging support only

to those who followed their lead and governed according to their views.

In the opinion of the Muslims, Religion and Kingship are the two ideas which mutually complete themselves.¹ Just as men, says Ghazzālī, must needs have a prince to rule them, so the Prince must needs have a law (*qānūn*) to rule by. The theologian (*faqīh*) knows this law, and he knows how to apply it when men come into collision with each other in matters of right. He, therefore, is the instructor and the guide of the Prince. According to an Arab proverb: Religion and Kingship are twinborn.² Ibn Khaldūn himself emphasizes the distinctive feature of the Islamic State by saying that the spiritual and temporal powers in that State are one and indivisible; while among other people the king is only a temporal ruler.³ He only is a true prince who is at once the spiritual and temporal chief of his people.⁴ Even as early as Bukhārī the ‘ulemā were regarded as the heirs of the Prophet,⁵ and a tradition (which obviously is a forgery, but which goes back to an early age) tells us that the ink of the ‘ulemā, on the Day of Judgment, will be of much greater worth and value than the blood of the martyrs.⁶ The need for reading the Qur’ān, and reading it aright, and the need for learning the traditions of the Prophet, called forth in the first century a class of teachers who were held in high esteem; and this, indeed, for the simple and obvious reason that the instruction they imparted stood in intimate relation to religion. Thousands of students flocked

1. *Iḥyā’*, I, 21.

2. *Rabī-ul-Abrār*, p. 33.

3. *Proleg.*, I, 469.

4. I, 1, 319.

5. *Bukhārī*, 54.

6. *Rabī-ul-Abrār*, p. 15.

to the lectures of pious and renowned Shaikhs, and some of these savants, like the jurist Malik Ibn Anas, enjoyed almost a princely status.¹ In Islâm law and administration of law were inseparable from religion. Thus the administration of justice passed entirely into the hands of the 'ulemâ, who with it acquired immense influence and immense wealth. True, the Caliph 'Omar appointed judges who were paid by the State, but it must be remembered that along with their fixed pay they received fees (e.g. for delivering Fatwâs) which far exceeded their emolument.² In the increasing degeneration of the Muslim empire the office of the judge was later sold to the highest bidder.³

There was therefore no more brilliant career for a promising youth than the study of law and theology.⁴ Soon the number of theologians was legion. In the 9th century A.D., in the southern suburb of the town of Cordova alone, there were no less than 4,000 theologians and students of theology. The lectures of the pious Abû Darda (d. 32 A.H. ; 652-53 A.D.), the first Qâdî of Damascus, were attended by 1,600 students (Ibn 'Asâkir, fol. 4). Bukhârî's lectures

1. He lived at Medina which was the cradle of learning of the earliest Islâm. *Bukhârî*, 21-49.

2. The income of a judge of Aleppo amounted to 100,000 Dirhams. Haneberg: *Schul und Lehrwesen der Araber*, p 27. A qâdî of Seville possessed a third of the landed properties of this town. Dozy, *Musul. d'Espagne*, IV, 2, 9.

3. Von Kremer, *Aegypten*, II, 72.

4. Dozy, *Musul. d'Espagne*, III, 110, says of the studies at the mosque of Cordova. Thus the students who studied numbered thousands. The majority of them studied *fiqh*, i.e., theology and law, because this learning then led to most lucrative offices.

at Baghdād attracted an audience of 20,000 men. Even if this number be an exaggeration, it undoubtedly gives an idea of the number of the theologians and students of theology who in the golden period of Islām congregated in large towns such as Mekka, Damascus, Baghdād, Medina, Nishâpûr, Cordova, Seville, Kairowân, etc., etc. The great mosque of Azhar counts even now more than a thousand students. How imposing must have been their number during the period when the number of the inhabitants exceeded half a million !

One common purpose united the members of this great guild, and welded them into a vast brotherhood fired by one common party fervour. Their common course of study ; their faith in the sacredness of their calling, and the sanctity of their order ; the superstitious veneration accorded to them by the ignorant masses—all these inspired the theological guild, diffused as it was throughout the length and breadth of the Muslim empire, with the self-same thought of their dignity, and the self-same thought of their indispensability. Add to this the fact that the theologians soon acquired immense incomes and extensive landed properties.

Even in the early days of Islām the practice of dedicating landed properties to religious uses had come into existence, and had crystallized into an institution. The income of the properties so dedicated was employed according to the direction of the founder.¹ In the institution the strong religious

1. Bukhārî : The Prophet said to 'Omar : " Divide the income without selling the property endowed."

sense of the Arabs finds beautiful expression. Often, perhaps, fear of death and remorse of conscience, induced them, in the last hour of their existence, to give away a portion of their illgotten gains for religious uses; partly to atone for the past, partly to obtain admission into paradise. But often a much loftier motive called forth these endowments. Very many were such institutions in the first century of Islām, but information fails us.¹

The Spanish Caliph Hākam III (350-366 A.H., 961-979 A.D.) deserves mention as one of the noblest benefactors of humanity of all times. After he had completed the construction of the great mosque of Cordova (which later he considerably extended), he endowed it with a fourth of the landed property which he had inherited from his father, with a direction that its annual income should be divided among the poor of Spain.² One other institution of this Prince calls for notice here. In his time primary schools were good and numerous in Muslim Spain. In Andalusia nearly every one could read and write, while in Christian Europe persons in most exalted positions—unless they belonged to the clergy—remained illiterate. Hākam, however, believed that instruction was not yet as widely diffused as it ought to be, and in his tender solicitude for the poorer classes he founded in the capital twenty-seven Seminaries, in which children of poor parents were educated gratuitously, the

1. Already Mu'āwiah made an endowment in favour of his kinsmen and all poor Muslims.

2. *Aḥḥārī*, II, 250. Dozy's ed.

teachers being paid out of the Caliph's privy purse.¹

Under the Fāṭimid Caliph Mo'izz (359 A.H., 969-970 A.D.) the great mosque of Cairo, Al-Azhar, was built and endowed. The endowment was considerably enlarged by his grandson, Hākīm, the sixth Fāṭimid ruler of Egypt. He not only richly endowed the mosque of Al-Azhar with landed properties, but also three other mosques and the Academy of Learning founded by him. Out of the income of the endowed lands the mosques were maintained, and numerous theologians provided with stipends.² By reason of such endowments and legacies to pious uses the 'ulemā (into whose hands, as might have been expected, their administration passed) acquired immense landed properties and an immense income. Only a portion (as is the case to this day) was used for the purpose indicated by the founder ; the bulk passing into the pockets of the Inspectors, Administrators, etc. (Nāẓir, Mutawallī). And this notwithstanding the efforts of the Government. In this connexion the Diwān-ul-Awqāf should be mentioned. It is an office still to be found both in Turkey and Egypt, and it existed under the Moghul rule in Persia, where the famous astronomer Naṣīruddīn Ṭūsī (d. 675 A.H.; 1276-77 A.D.) held the post of the Inspector-General of Waqfs—an honourable and lucrative post.³

1. Dozy, *Spanish Islām*, p. 455. See also *Ibn Adhārī*, II, 256, about the University of Cordova. For further information, see Von Schack's *Poesie und Kunst der Araber in Spanien und Sicilien*, Vol. I, pp 50 et seq.; *Ibn Khal.*, Vol. I, 210-212.

2. Hammer, *Gemäldesaal*, III, 218.

3. Hammer, *Gesch. d. Ilchane*, II, 154, 171, 181. *Abul Fārāj*, 548.

The Turkish Sultāns entrusted the supervision of the pious endowments made by them to their great Wazirs, or Muftis, or to their *Kapu Aghasī*, or *Kizlar Aghasī*.¹ But private individuals preferred to entrust the administration to learned men (*Ulemā*), such as the Mufti, the two *Qādi 'Askar*, the *Qādi* of Constantinople or to the Mullas, *Qādis*, or other ecclesiastics of the town where the waqf property happened to be.²

A cursory glance at oriental history shows how tremendously grew the tendency to make pious bequests, and this tendency was further fostered and encouraged by the fashion which arose in the fifth century of the Hijrā; namely to build and endow madrassahs, i.e., colleges, learned academies.

Such institutions soon spread over the entire Muslim world. Princes and Amirs, rich merchants, noble ladies and well-to-do savants vied with each other in founding madrassahs and thereby perpetuating their own memory. By their endowment with landed properties a sure and certain income was secured for these institutions. Out of it the professors were paid, even the students were maintained,

1 *Kapu Aghasī* is the Head of the Palace Officials and *Kizlar Aghasī* is the Chief of the Eunuchs of the Seraglio.

2. In Egypt to this day waqf properties are mostly under the control of the influential 'Ulemā. The jurist *Kaghaf*, in his work on waqfs (*Kitāb-ul-Awqāf*, MS.; Vienna Library, p. 14), says: some old jurists maintained that it was best that the *Qādi* should appoint the Mutawalli, but in later times when men came to know how the *Qādis* longed for the waqf properties, they differed from this view, and asserted that it was best to let the official of the mosque appoint the Mutawalli by common consent.

and not infrequently a considerable amount was spent on books.¹

This tendency called into being a vast succession of endowments in favour of institutions for the study of the Qur'ân and Ḥadīth; for the establishment of cloisters (Ribat); place of shelter (Khānqah); hospitals; eating houses and fountains for public use.

The large incomes bequeathed for the maintenance of these institutions stood, as has been stated above, mostly under the administration of the Muslim priests, who were anything but scrupulous in the discharge of their duties. This suffices to prove how immense was the income which the 'Ulemâ, standing at the head of the mosques and the madrassahs, had at their disposal—apart from the income that they made from such splendid offices as those of the judge (Qâdī) and muftī. This makes it quite clear why all young people devoted themselves to the study of theology, to the exclusion of all other learning—a fact which called forth bitter regrets from Ghazzālī.²

In no other sphere of intellectual activity, indeed, could one reach so quickly the goal which the majority of men strive after—wealth and esteem. In the history of Islām, we have instances, only in the most recent times, of rulers laying their hands on the property of the Muslim clergy.³ The body of the 'Ulemâ, forming a graded and rigidly confined hierarchy,

1. Von Kremer, *Aegypten*, II, 272. Haneburg: *Schul und Lehrwesen der Araber*.

2. *Iḥyā*, I, 26.

3. The only instance in earlier Islām, when the property of the church was confiscated, is mentioned by Dozy. See Eng. Tr., p. 567

was thus the dominating class of society from the moment when, under the Caliph Mutawakkil, the orthodox party succeeded in destroying the influence of the Mut'azzalites and reconstructing Islâm on its old, dogmatic foundation. Contemporaneously with this event took place the development of that pietistic mode of thought which, right up to modern times, became more and more the directing power of intellectual life permeating the entire culture of the Muslim world.

By pietism we do not here mean the genuine and spontaneous expression of religious feelings and sentiments, but outward religious practices—intended merely for show—without any inward importance and significance, which, we may notice, at all times and in every religion discrediting and destroying the true spirit of religion. It was pietism in this sense that henceforward began to play an exceedingly large and truly damaging rôle in the intellectual and spiritual history of Islâm. Many things, to be sure, Islâm did contain which encouraged this form of mentality. The rules of divine service, the most precise directions regarding the movements of the body at such service, and the general formality of the religious system of Islâm—these could not but lead to far-reaching consequences.

The ascetic movement owed its origin to the union of religious enthusiasm with the fear of eternal punishment. But these very causes gave birth to asceticism on the one hand; to pietism on the other. Genuine religious men, always in a minority, fondly

took to asceticism, but the great majority of those who thirsted for honours and wealth and sought the sweetest fruits of life, strove by mere outward conformity to the current standard of religion and morality, to pass for the devout and the religious. In no religion, indeed, has hypocrisy assumed so colossal a shape as it has assumed in Islām. Judaism, by its formalism and outward ceremonials, would have been led similarly astray, but it was early chastened by repressions and persecutions. Victorious Islām, however, soon slackened in its precepts—hypocrisy and pietism robbing it of the only true foundation of every religion—purity of heart. Morbid sentiments (rapture and ecstasy which had already become widely diffused at the time of Ghazzālī) were the unfailing results. To pass for religious has always been in Islām the surest road to honour and dignity. It was essential, therefore, that one should act, or affect to act, and appear, what one was not.¹

When Şufism called forth a reaction against the rule of the degenerate hierarchy, religious hypocrisy took possession of this field.

A time came—it was in the 5th or the 6th century of the Hijra—when it became a fashion to profess Şufism. These pretenders imitated the Şūfis in their dress and in their demeanour. They gave up their silver and gold-embroidered dresses, and clothed themselves in patched garments and carried about their prayer-rugs with them. These people, Ghazzālī

1. *Iḥyā*, III, 356. A most interesting passage.

exclaims, pretended to be Şûfis.¹

These words of Ghazzâlî very clearly indicate how very general was the tendency in those days to swim with the religious sentiments of the day. But even in the preceding century the very same ideas predominated. An eye-witness, the Spanish savant Tartûshî, who travelled through 'Irâq in the second half of the fifth century A.H. (476 A.H.), and who for a long time resided in Baghdâd and Başra, eloquently describes the services which the great Nizâm-ul-Mulk rendered to religion. He devoted his fullest attention, we are told, to the votaries of religion. He built educational institutions (Dâr-ul-'Ilm) for theologians, Madrassahs for 'Ulemâ, founded cloisters (Ribat) for penitents and ascetics, for the pious and for faqîrs; assigned them salaries, and gave them food and raiment, provided students with ink and paper, and even allowed them stipends. His beneficence extended over the whole empire, from Jerusalem to the borders of Syria, to Diarbekr, 'Irâq, Khurâsân, and Samarqand which lies on the other side of the Oxus. In this whole empire—a hundred days' journey—there was no savant no student, no devotee, no ascetic in his tent, who did not enjoy Nizâm's benefaction. The amount annually spent by him on this account amounted to 600,000 Dinârs.²

To secure the support of the 'Ulemâ and the orthodox party, 'Adad-ud-Dawlah, a hundred years before, assigned to the clergy a fixed pay and rebuilt several mosques.³ Extremely powerful always

1. *Ihyâ*, III, 492.

2. *Serâj-ul-Mulûk*, fol. 127.

3. *Abul Fârâj*, p. 319.

was the influence of the 'Ulemâ, and *faqīhā* in the countries of Islām, and if they formed a party against the ruler, popular insurrection was absolutely inevitable. The dominant traits of this class were fanaticism and greed. Seeking their support the Sultân had to make terms with them, but it was by no means easy to do so, as they were always extravagant in their demands. True, this party could often secure peace at home, but against enemies abroad it was entirely helpless. In that case the military order was the only protection available. Indeed, soldiers were but too often necessary for the maintenance of peace at home. For in the disorganized condition of the Muslim States, in the constant appearance of pretenders to the throne, and religious enthusiasts and other agitators, an efficient army was indispensable. The Caliphate, by reason of the religious influence which it exercised, held together most of the Muslim dynasties under its spiritual sway, and gave to them the appearance of religious solidarity. With the fall of the Caliphate this was no longer possible. Now nothing existed but the rule of might—softened, no doubt, by the sense of common descent—most of the rulers then being of Turkish nationality.

In the Caliphate the foreign soldiery had already become a great power. The Abbasids obtained the throne with the aid of the Persian troops, mostly recruited from *Khorasân*. The practice soon grew up among the Abbasids of surrounding themselves with several thousands of strong body-guards, consisting mostly of purchased slaves, imported from the countries of Central Asia inhabited by the Turko-

māns. Relying upon the old Arab idea of the relation of *patron* and *client*, the Caliphs presented freedom to these slaves. Their number grew. They were given fiefs. They attained wealth and influence, and the Caliphs were lulled into the belief that they were surrounded by men, true and loyal to them. But the idea of the relation between *patron* and *client*, a purely Arab idea, was completely foreign to the Turkish slaves. As soon as prosperity had destroyed their original simplicity of life, they became rude and defiant. Every new Caliph, on his accession, had to secure their favour and support by lavish presents, by increase of salary, by grant of rich fiefs. Withal there always was the risk of losing life and throne.

In Spain the Mamlûks, and later the Berbers, played precisely the same rôle as did the Turks in the East.¹ The Almovahid Sultāns, who chose their troops chiefly from the Berber tribe of Zanātah and the Arab Beduins, shared later the very same fate. (Ibn Khaldûn, I, 346.)

The leaders of these foreign troops, who were everywhere given large landed properties, gradually became a kind of feudal nobility, a military aristocracy; and the more their power grew the less they obeyed the Sultān.² Already in the 3rd century A.H. there had arisen in Persia the dynasties of the Ṭāhirids, the Ṣaffarids, and the Samanides. And immediately before the first crusade almost the entire Caliphate

1. Under 'Abdur Raḥmān III the number of slaves, who were partly soldiers and partly courtiers, was between 6,000 to 12,000. Dozy. III, 60, 61. Even many negroes were in the body-guard of the Spanish Caliphs. Ibid., II, 68.

2. Wilken, *Gesch. d. Kreuzzüge*, I, 273.

was in the hands of vassal princelets of Turkish origin.

The Seljûks, and after them the Khwârizm Shâh, ruled the eastern lands.¹ Aleppo, Emessa, Damascus, Antioch, Samosata, Saruj, Harran, Moşul, Mardin, Tikrit, Sunjar, etc., were in possession of the Turkish amîrs. In Asia Minor, Seljûkian dynasty maintained itself until overthrown by the Moghul rulers of Persia. The Turkish princes, standing in the relation of vassals partly to the Sultân of 'Irâq and partly to the Fâtimid Caliph residing at Cairo, ruled Syria. But they were constantly at war with each other.²

Such was the position of affairs in the Caliphate when, at the end of the 11th century, the army of the crusaders marched through Asia Minor to Syria. The disunion of the Muslim princes made the conquest of Jerusalem easy. And thus, on the 15th of July, 1099 A.D., Jerusalem was conquered. While unbroken warfare was going on between Cross and Crescent for nearly two centuries, a tremendous danger had arisen in the East.

Chengîz Khân, the great Moghul prince, burst from Turkistân into the Muslim countries, destroying and flooding them with crimson streams (1218). His son Halâkû continued the conquests, and with the capture of Baghdâd and the execution of the Caliph extinguished the Caliphate. Islâm seemed lost:

1. Lane-Poole, *Moh. Dynasties*, pp. 176-178. "At one time the rule of the Khwârizm Shâh was almost with the Seljûk empire, but this period of widest extent scarcely lasted a dozen years." For the Il-khan of Persia, see Lane-Poole, p. 217.

2. Kremer, *Mittelsyrien und Damascus*, p. 42.

pressed on the one hand by the army of the crusaders, filled with religious fervour ; and on the other by the wild plundering, ever-advancing cavalry of the Moghuls. But Islām did not perish. In Syria it steadily supplanted the Franks : and in Persia, where a powerful Moghul dynasty had established a vast empire under the name of Īlkhān, the religion of the Prophet won a dazzling victory when Ghazan, the seventh ruler, accepted Islām and entered into friendly relations with the rest of the Muslim princes. Not by arms but by religious ideas did Islām vanquish the northern conquerors. There must, indeed, be some tremendous power in these Semitic religions which enables them not only to weather world-shattering storms but to emerge out of them firmer, stronger, more vigorous than ever. In the war with the Franks, extending over more than a century, Islām passed through a tempering process. The rift that had opened, closed in fire and blood. Islām shook off its lethargy and gathered fresh strength. The Arab nation, which had long ceased to champion the religious ideas that had arisen and grown into maturity in their midst, now retired into the background, handing over the torch to a nation ruder but more powerful, whose empire soon embraced the entire Orient, and whose political power the older Caliphate never attained or equalled.

Almost about the time of the conversion of Ghazan the Franks lost Acre, their last stronghold in the Holy Land (1291). Then followed the fall of Sidon and Beyrūt (1291).¹ Here, in Syria, Islām con-

1. *Wilken, Gesch. d. Kreuzzüge*, VII, 771.

quered by the sword; there, in Persia, by the Qur'an.

In Egypt and Syria ruled the first Mamlūk Sultāns. They were Turkish and Circassian slaves, and had their origin in the purchased body-guard of the Ayyūbid Sultān Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb.¹ The first of their line was a woman, Queen Shajar-al-Durz, widow of Ṣāliḥ; but a representative of the Ayyūbid family (Mūsa) was accorded the nominal dignity of joint sovereignty for a few years. Then followed a succession of slave-kings, divided into two dynasties, the Baḥrī (of the River) and the Burjī (of the Fort), who ruled Egypt and Syria down to the beginning of the 16th century.² In Persia the empire founded by Chengīz and Halākū soon fell to pieces, and was lost in small dynasties.³ Asia Minor was split up into a number of Turkish principalities. Ten States soon divided the Seljūk kingdom of Rūm amongst themselves. The Karasī dynasty occupied Mysia; the families of Sārū Khān and Aydın, Lydia; the Mantasha princes, Caria; those of Takka, Lycia and Pamphylia; Ḥamīd, Pisidia and Isauria; Karamān, Lycaonia; Karmiyān, Phrygia; Kizil Aḥmadlī, Paphlagonia; whilst the house of 'Oṭhmān held Phrygia Epictetus. All these dynasties were gradually absorbed by the rising power of the 'Oṭhmānlīs, once the least among them. Karasī was annexed in 737 (1336); Ḥamīd was purchased as a marriage dower in 783 (1382); and in 792 (1390) Bāyazīd (Bajazet I) annexed Karmiyān, Takka,

1. Stanley Lane-Poole, *Moh. Dyn.*, pp. 80-83.

2. Von Kremer, *Mittelsyrien und Damascus*, pp. 75-91.

3. Hammer, *Gesch. d. Ilchane*, II, 335; Lane-Poole, *Moh. Dynasties*, pp.

Sârû Khân, Aydin and Mantashâ, in a single campaign, and completed his conquest by adding Karamân and Kizil Aḥmadî in 794-95 (1392-93). Thus at the end of the 14th century, not a hundred years after the assumption of independence by 'Othmân I, the arms of his great-grandson had swept away the nine rival dynasties.¹

A Christian kingdom enjoyed a more or less precarious existence in Armenia until overthrown by the Egyptian Mamlûks. In Africa, where the Almovâhid dynasty had continued for a century and half, a similar process was repeated as in the East. Smaller dynasties arose out of the general ruin. These were the Banû Marin in Morocco; the Banû Zijân in the province known today as Algeria and the Banû Hafs in Tûnis. In Spain, with the fall of Granada, vanished the last trace of Muslim rule.

In India Quṭbuddîn Aibak founded the first Muslim dynasty which ruled exclusively in India; for up till then Muslim India had been an outlying province of the kingdom of Ghazna.²

With the exception of the African coast beyond Egypt, the entire Orient was in the hands of numerous dynasties of Turkish and Mongolian origin, who, according to their old traditional ways, were always at war with each other.

But a still more devastating inroad of the Central Asiatic hordes was yet to take place in the Eastern countries. About the time when the Turkish tribe which later under the name of 'Othmânîs rose to such

1. Lane-Poole, p. 184.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 295.

great distinction, was securing and consolidating its power in Asia Minor; nay, even extending it towards the south-east of Europe; countless hordes under Timūr burst into the north-eastern provinces and thence proceeded in two directions: to India, where they overthrew the Pathān dynasty of Delhi, and to 'Irāq and Asia Minor, where they came into collision with the 'Othmānlis, and in the bloody battle of Angora destroyed the Ottoman army and took the Sultān Bajazet prisoner (1402). But with the death of Timūr (1405) the vast empire founded by him in fire and blood went to pieces. A large number of Timūrid dynasties came into existence—the last of which survived right up to modern times.¹

But in the rise of Timūr there is one distinctive feature. His was not an anti-Islamic movement like the first inroad of the Moghuls. Timūr was simply a conqueror, but not in the anti-Islamic sense. True, he inflicted upon the Islamic countries the most hideous barbarities, but he showed respect for religion and its exponents, the 'ulemā. Humanity has nothing to thank him for. Civilization grievously suffered by his desolating wars, but Islām ran no risks. The Muslim theologians readily paid homage to their new sovereign, who in no way threatened their privileges or affected their position. Indeed Timūr inclined to the Shiite faith, then predominant in Persia.

This is not the place to discuss the history of the numerous dynasties that sprang up after every fresh

1. The present Khān of Bukhāra—over whose history Prof. Vambrey has thrown light—traces his descent from Timūr. The last rulers of Delhi were Timūrids.

political revolution. The Timûrids ruled Persia, 'Irâq, Adherbâijân and the eastern parts of Asia Minor¹ until the Şafawîs in Persia and the Ottomans elsewhere put an end to their power. Only in India did the Moghul dynasty founded by Bâbar continue, until overthrown by the English in modern times.

The development and gradual transformation of the dominant ideas of Islâm under the influence of the Sultânate stand in too intimate a connexion with the history of the civilization of the individual Islamic States and the manifold local causes and forces at work there.

How differently religious ideas shaped themselves in the extreme west, in Africa and Morocco, and, in the remote east, in India! We shall therefore confine ourselves here to the intellectual and spiritual forces which have exercised a decisive influence on the Ottoman power, and, with them, conclude the history of the dominant ideas of Islâm.

The Turkish Empire has undoubtedly, up till very recent times, been the most powerful expression of the later Islamic civilization. True, Persia, India, Turkistân and Africa have each developed along their own intellectual line: still, from the standpoint of world-history not one of them can challenge comparison or enter into competition with Turkish Islâm. They stand, indeed, very far behind Turkey. Since the fall of the world-dominion of Islâm each individual nation has pursued its own particular way. Şufism,

1. They soon lost 'Irâq and Adherbâijân to the Turkomân dynasty of Akkojunuln. Hammer, *Gesch. d. osman. Reichs*, I, 505.

degenerating in the west, ended in a rude cult of saint-worship, and spread extensively in Persia and India. Holding a middle course between the two extremes, the Ottoman Empire, embracing almost the whole of further Asia and a considerable portion of Europe and Africa, sought to revive afresh the glory of the old Caliphate. But the spirit moving and animating it was essentially different from that of the old Islâm.

Asia Minor, the home of the Ottoman power, was occupied in the last period of the Caliphate by Turkish nomadic hordes. They were the individual streams of the great flood of the Turkish race-migration which in the 4th and 5th centuries of the Hijra had poured out of upper Asia into the culture-lands.

Whilst the family of the Seljûks settled down in Adherbâijân and ‘Irâq and overthrew the Buwayhids and in their place stepped into the guardianship of the Caliphs, a Seljûk dynasty established itself in Asia Minor and named itself after its capital, Iconium—the Sultānate of Iconium.¹ At the very time when this dynasty had reached its highest splendour, namely, under its ninth ruler, ‘Alā-ud-din Kaikobād (d. 634 A.H., 1036-37 A.D.), the inroad of the Moghuls took place in Persia. It ended the powerful empire of the Khwārizm Shāh, which included the whole of Persia and the largest of ‘Irâq.

Shortly before this event that particular kind of poetry had come into existence in Persia which is indissolubly connected with Şufism, and which, under

1. They ruled from 480-700 A.H. (1087-88 to 1300-01 A.D.) See Freeman's *Ottoman Power in Europe*, Chapter IV.

the name of mystic poetry, has preserved and immortalized one of the most alluring and charming sides of Persian culture. Then lived the great Farid-ud-din 'Aṭṭār¹ (b. 613 A.H., 1216 A.D.; d. about 719 or 732 A.H.), and the inspired singer of poetical pantheism Jalāl-ud-din Rūmi (d. 661 A.H., 1262-63 A.D.), and the world-renowned and world-pleasing Sa'di (d. 691 A.H., 1292 A.D.).

These poets brought Ṣūfism into prominence in Persia and with Ṣūfism grew the various orders of dervishes.² From its peaceful meditation Persia was suddenly awakened by the tumult of onrushing, devastating Moghul armies. Contemporaries have left us an account of the horror and alarm which the terrible news of cruelties in Balkh and Bukhāra aroused among the people. Many managed to save themselves, but many more shared the fate of Farid-ud-din 'Aṭṭār,

1. See Browne, *Lit. Hist. of Persia*, Vol. II, pp. 508-509. Von Krenet is evidently quite wrong here.

2. By dervishes are meant, says Goldziher, those who follow the ṣūf manner of life. They cannot, however, all be classed under one head. We must distinguish between the earnest representatives of the love of God and ecstatic exaltation, who endeavour to perfect their souls by a life of self-denial and meditation, and the vagabond dervishes who in an independent dissolute beggar's life use ṣūfism to cloak their idleness and to delude the masses; or the cloister brothers who, shrinking from work, use the exterior forms of the ṣūfi life to obtain a care-free and independent existence. They too are full of the love of God, and pretend to be "walking on the way." But earnest ṣūfis would hardly care to be identified with them; Goldziher, *Moḥammed and Islām*, pp. 180 et seq. The ṣūfis are opposed to the usual theological book-learning. They have no sympathy with the 'Ulemā and the Hadith searchers. These, so they say, simply perplex our times; Goldziher, p. 185. It was to be expected that the theologians by profession were not favourably disposed towards the ṣūfis; Goldziher, p. 186. See also p. 187 for the relation between ṣūfism and official Islām, also Goldziher, *Muh. Stud.* II, pp. 394 et seq.

and fell by the Moghul sword. The fugitives spread all over the western lands of Islām. There were two courts especially where poets and savants were sure of a generous welcome: in Shirāz at the court of the Atabeks, and in Iconium at the court of the Seljūkian Sultān, 'Ala'-ud-dīn Kaikobād. At the court of the latter a large circle of poets and savants assembled, and in his capital Persian literature found a congenial soil. Here Jalāl-ud-dīn and his father received princely hospitality, and here rest the remains of the great Persian mystic, his father's and his beloved master's, Shams-ud-dīn Tabriz,—a spot that is the place of pilgrimage of his order of dervishes.¹ In the different towns of his kingdom, in Sivas, Iconium, Amasia, he built mosques, cloisters, madrassahs, caravansarais—so many seats of culture and exchange of ideas.² The influence that the dervish orders wielded on the populace is best shown by a dervish insurrection which took place under 'Alā'-ud-dīn's son and successor, at the head of which stood a dervish called Ilyās Bābā.³

Another dervish, Nūr Şûfi, managed to gather so large a following that he actually took possession of a fort in Cilicia; whereupon the Sultān of Iconium made terms with the dervish's son and granted the neighbouring country to him in fief. This dervish's

1. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa has very interesting observations on this subject, II, 282, 283.

2. Hammer, I, 53. See also his *Gesch. d. schonen Redekünste in Persien*, p. 139.

3. Hammer, I, 55, Abul 'Fārāj, 479, on the influence of the dervish under the Seljūks. Hammer, I, 49. Even later the influence of the dervish order was decisive on the question of succession to the throne. Hammer, I, 601.

son soon became the founder of a small dynasty, which gave much trouble to the Ottoman Sultāns.¹

In this respect nothing changed when the Persian princes of the family of Chengiz put an end to the kingdom of the Seljūks of Iconium and brought the country under Moghul rule. The influence of *Şufism* and of the dervishes, towards whom the Moghul princes were not unfavourably inclined, continued; nay, developed still more powerfully. That this was really so, is shown by the famous traveller Ibn Baṭūṭa, who, in the year 733 A.H. (1333 A.D.), travelled through Asia Minor. He found a network of religious brotherhood spread throughout the country. This brotherhood was composed of men of all classes of society, and its members called themselves *Akhī* (brothers). They established chapels and inns for dervishes all over the kingdom, where even strangers received a friendly and generous hospitality. The Arab traveller had a warm reception in more than twenty inns of this brotherhood. The description which he gives of these *Akhī* in their long *kafatān*, in their high, white felt hat, and of their religious practices accompanied by songs and dances, leaves no doubt that these *Akhī* were no other than the predecessors of the *Mewlīs* and *Naqshbandīs* of modern Turkey.

About forty years before Ibn Baṭūṭa's travels in Asia Minor—in the last decade of the thirteenth century A.D.—the chief of a Turkomān horde, the

1. Hammer, I, 143, 149, 167. Ibn Baṭūṭa gives us an account of the third ruler of this House. He describes his residence *Alāya* and his country. II, 258

intrepid ErtoghriI, was rewarded by the Seljûkian Sultân, 'Ala'-ud-dîn, with fiefs for his military service, and was presented with robes of honour. This Turkomân chief¹ was given the province known as Phrygia Epictetus (henceforward called Sultân-onî, the centre of the Ottoman power) on the borders of Byzantine Bithynia, with the town of Sugut (Thesabasion) as headquarters.² ErtoghriI's son, Ottoman, waged successful war and extended his power in the bordering Byzantine lands. But he owed his success just as much to his army as to the religious ideas of his contemporaries. He married—so runs the popular legend—the charming Malkhatûn, the daughter of a pious hermit, Shaikh Adab 'Alî, honoured throughout the country. When we recall to mind how, shortly before, the dervishes had stirred up a dangerous rebellion against Sultân 'Ala'-ud-dîn; how, by their support, the Karmiyân dynasty had come into existence; and what the great Arab traveller says about the extraordinary influence and power of the Akhî-order—no room is left for doubt that Ottoman owed his success not merely to his arms but also to the support of the religious order—a support which would readily be given to him, to the fullest extent, as the son-in-law of Shaikh Adab 'Alî.

True, that schism had not then come to light in Asia Minor, which later so often drove the orthodox party to the persecution of the şûfis and the dervishes. Islâm was still young there, and the Turkomâns, its champions, were a rude and simple people who had no

1. Lane-Poole, *Moh. Dyn.* 186.

2. *Ibid.*, 186.

idea of the gulf that divided orthodox Islâm from the ecstatic enthusiasm of the Persian şûfis. Their clergy, mostly of Turkomân nationality, were not very learned, and therefore not very contentious. They were of easy-going temperament, of the type of village and country priests, who were quite content with the charity of the princes and populace, and who felt no need or inclination to pursue or punish heretics. Everywhere in his rambles Ibn Baţûta found mosques, madrassahs, inns, chapels. He observes with pleasure the expressive manner in which children recited the Qur'ân. He notes with satisfaction the pious and religious tendencies of the various Sultâns who ruled the land; their regard for theologians who were given precedence at Court over the Amîrs. On the occasion of the festival of Qurbân-Bairam, lawyers, 'ulemâ, members of the then *Akhî*-order, all dined at one table at the Court.¹ We are further told that many a professor of a well-endowed academy lived in princely luxury, surrounded by numerous slaves and servants.² The Qur'ân readers were never absent from the Court.³ After this account we need not be surprised if we read in the oldest Ottoman histories that Ottoman built inns for dervishes and established mosques; while his successor Orkhan founded in Brûsa, the spot selected for the capital, chapels and cloisters for dervishes. Here, under the second ruler of the house of Ottoman, in continuation of the pious policy of Ottoman, rose similar institutions and establishments

1. Ibn Baţûta, II, 277.

2. *Ibid.*, 296, 297.

3. *Ibid.*, II, 304, 307, 341.

founded by the rich and influential officers of the Court.

When we consider these circumstances in their entirety, we are confirmed in the view set forth earlier in a general way, namely, that in the beginning the Sultānate rested mainly on two parties: the clergy and the army. To the interplay of these two powerful factors the Ottoman Empire owed its exceedingly rapid growth and its later glorious political development.

These, nevertheless, carried within them the germs of decay and dissolution; for, on the one hand, as soon as political conditions settled down, the split between the orthodox party and şufism came glaringly to light, and, on the other, the army, invested as it was with large fiefs, was soon demoralized, and the Sultān's body-guard, the *Janisaries*, began to exercise a fateful influence over the Ottoman Empire.

In fact the State more and more assumed a military character. The position of the 'ulemā continued to be one of respect and influence. They held judicial and educational offices. They commanded large incomes; but, in spite of this, they ceased to occupy the most powerful position, because secular interests prevailed.

Thus the old Arab hierarchical system was exchanged for an out-and-out military system, and under Muḥammad II, the conqueror of Constantinople, the State was pre-eminently a military State. Uninterrupted wars maintained this system intact till the beginning of the nineteenth century.

By the destruction of the *Janisaries*, which preceded the reorganization of the army according to European pattern, the military tendencies acquired yet greater strength. But the various other reforms of Sultân Maḥmūd furnished proof that in accordance with the tendencies of modern times, even the Ottoman government subordinated the hierarchy to the State. In Egypt a much more far-reaching change took place. Similar tendencies manifested themselves in Persia, where, after the death of Fateḥ 'Alī Shāh, and at the commencement of the reign of Muḥammad Mirzā (1250 A.H., 1834-5 A.D.), an attempt was made to set a limit to the encroachments of the 'ulemā in the administration of justice by establishing a Supreme Court of Justice (Diwān-i-'Adālat).¹

Thus, everywhere in the Orient, the edifice of the State, built on the foundation of the old Arab theocratic idea, crumbled down, and out of its ruins, under the influence of more modern ideals, arose younger creations, whose growth and development will be witnessed by future generations; for the periods of time within which great changes are wrought cannot be measured by a single lifetime.

But, from the short span of years within our own personal experience, we may draw one conclusion, namely, that humanity will steadily progress in the direction of spiritual perfection, according to the eternal laws which lie at the very root of life and are of its very essence.

1. Cf. Weil, *Gesch. der islam. Völker*, p. 482.

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